This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-1959 

A15-1963 

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: W. J. C., III, and G. A. C., Parents. 

Filed July 5, 2016 

Affirmed 

Reilly, Judge 

Carver County District Court 

File No. 10-JV-15-183 

Carol J. Mayer, Mayer Law Office, LLC, Arlington, Minnesota (for appellant G.A.C.) 

Marla M. Zack, Anne Heimkes Tuttle, Tuttle Family Law & Mediation, P.A., Shakopee, 

Minnesota (for appellant W.J.C.) 

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jennifer L. Christensen, Assistant County Attorney, 

Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Dianne Schafer, State of Minnesota Guardian Ad Litem Program, Chaska, Minnesota 

(guardian ad litem) 

 Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and 

Reilly, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

REILLY, Judge 

Appellant-mother G.A.C. and appellant-father W.J.C. challenge the district court’s 

order terminating the parental rights of both parents to their child, Z.K.C. Because a 
2 

statutory ground for termination exists and termination is in the child’s best interest, we 

affirm. 

FACTS 

Following trial, the district court made extensive and detailed findings of fact which 

are summarized here. G.A.C. and W.J.C. are the biological parents of Z.K.C., born in 

November 2009. G.A.C.’s custodial rights to her eldest two children were involuntarily 

transferred to relatives in January 2004 due to drug abuse, neglect, and domestic violence. 

In September 2009, Carver County Community Social Services (CCCSS) learned that 

G.A.C. was pregnant with Z.K.C. Because of the prior involuntary transfer of custody, 

CCCSS assigned the case to a child welfare and protection case manager (the case 

manager) for a child welfare assessment. The case manager visited appellants and noticed 

a strong smell of marijuana inside the home. The case manager was concerned about how 

small G.A.C. was, given the stage of her pregnancy. W.J.C. called the case manager the 

following day “screaming at [her], yelling at [her], and threatening to sue [her]” if she 

spoke to them or visited their home again. 

 Z.K.C. was born prematurely in November 2009 as a special-needs child, and the 

doctor was concerned about Z.K.C.’s health and development. G.A.C. and W.J.C. did not 

believe that Z.K.C. was a special-needs child. CCCSS filed a child-in-need-of-protectionor-services (CHIPS) petition due to concerns about appellants’ history of substance abuse, 

their history of domestic violence and fighting, and their inability to care for a child with 

special needs. The case manager referred appellants to Connected Families to assist with 
3 

setting up a safety network and safety planning, and gave financial resources to assist 

appellants in providing a safe home environment for Z.K.C. 

CCCSS social workers experienced difficulty meeting with appellants during this 

period. Appellants continued to abuse substances and engage in violent behavior. CCCSS 

created a safety plan for Z.K.C. which included a condition that appellants could not have 

drugs or alcohol in the home. W.J.C. did not participate in the majority of the meetings 

related to Z.K.C.’s safety plan, and appellants regularly cancelled appointments with the 

social workers. CCCSS closed the CHIPS petition without an adjudication in June 2010, 

despite ongoing concerns about appellants’ ability to parent Z.K.C. or follow the safety 

plan. 

In March 2010, CCCSS referred Z.K.C. to the First Step program to address 

Z.K.C.’s doctor’s concerns about Z.K.C.’s developmental issues. An early childhood 

intervention teacher had difficulty scheduling home visits with appellants. The teacher 

visited the home in fall 2010 and noted her concerns about Z.K.C.’s developmental and 

cognitive delays. Shortly thereafter, G.A.C. moved out of the family’s home but did not 

inform CCCSS about her new address. G.A.C. stated that she was moving because she 

was fearful of W.J.C., and testified to two domestic violence incidents where W.J.C. 

became physically abusive and hit G.A.C. Z.K.C. was asleep in his bedroom during these 

incidents. Appellants admitted to abusing alcohol and drugs during this period. Appellants 

continued to have domestic problems in January and February 2011, and W.J.C. petitioned 

for an order for protection on behalf of himself and Z.K.C. against G.A.C. and her thenboyfriend. 
4 

CCCSS again had contact with the family in March 2011, and identified appellants’ 

case as one involving chronic neglect. A chronic-neglect case is a case that includes a child 

under the age of five in the family, with at least two previous reports of maltreatment, 

where one of the reports is substantiated or there is a determination that services are needed. 

CCCSS found that Z.K.C.’s circumstances fit the criteria for chronic neglect. CCCSS 

updated the family plan and performed an assessment interview. Appellants continued to 

abuse methamphetamine, and there were reports of domestic violence in the home in May 

and June 2011. W.J.C. and G.A.C. denied the reports and refused CCCSS entry into the 

home. CCCSS considered the risk-level to Z.K.C. “high,” and noted that Z.K.C. looked 

“unkept,” tiny, and was failing to thrive. CCCSS had 16 visits scheduled with Z.K.C. 

between March and September 2011, but appellants cancelled 6 of the 16 visits. 

In September 2011, W.J.C. was arrested for domestic assault against G.A.C. for 

punching her in the face. Z.K.C. was asleep in the home. W.J.C. claimed that G.A.C. was 

using methamphetamine in front of Z.K.C. on the date of the assault, and found spoons and 

needles associated with drug use on the dryer. CCCSS received additional reports in 

October 2011 that G.A.C. was using methamphetamine at home in front of Z.K.C. and, 

during one incident, was unconscious on the floor for 12 hours. A neighbor heard Z.K.C. 

crying and broke into the home to find G.A.C. covered in her own vomit on the floor and 

Z.K.C. crying in his crib. A hair follicle test performed on Z.K.C. came back positive for 

cocaine and THC. While in the hospital, G.A.C. told CCCSS she was afraid W.J.C. was 

going to kill her. CCCSS removed Z.K.C. from his parents’ care on October 12, 2011, and 

filed a second CHIPS petition alleging chronic neglect, due to his parents’ behavior and 
5 

condition, the environment in which Z.K.C. was residing, as well as the severe and 

consistent use of methamphetamine by the parents. Z.K.C. was placed in foster care where 

he made progress, “looked healthier,” and appeared “well kept.” The district court 

adjudicated Z.K.C. as a child in need of protection or services in December 2011. 

Z.K.C. was reunified with his parents in fall 2012 on a trial home visit. CCCSS 

continued to have concerns about Z.K.C.’s safety and stability because G.A.C. had a 

positive urinalysis, and CCCSS received reports that appellants were not complying with 

the terms of their court-ordered treatment. CCCSS set up a safety network and created a 

safety plan to ensure Z.K.C.’s safety so that he could be returned to appellants’ care. 

G.A.C. testified that at that time, she had all the services and tools necessary to provide for 

Z.K.C.’s care. In January 2013, the district court closed the child protection file over the 

county’s objection. At that point, Z.K.C. had been in the county’s custody for 13 months. 

In February 2015, CCCSS received a report that Z.K.C. had arrived at school with 

a mark on his cheek. Z.K.C. said that G.A.C. pinched and scratched him when she was 

angry. Z.K.C. also had a new mark on his forehead that was not there the day before. As 

of that date, Z.K.C. has missed 15 days of school, 7 of which were unexcused absences. 

The school reported that it had difficulty reaching appellants when Z.K.C. was absent. Due 

to the then-current reports of alleged physical abuse, the family’s extensive child protection 

history, and reports that appellants were using methamphetamine again, law enforcement 

placed Z.K.C. on a 72-hour health and welfare hold. CCCSS filed a CHIPS petition on 

behalf of Z.K.C. and outlined its investigation. The petition alleged that Z.K.C. was in 

need of protection or services because (1) he was the victim of physical abuse, (2) he was 
6 

without proper parental care, and (3) his behavior, condition, or environment was injurious 

or dangerous to himself or others. 

In April 2015, pursuant to an Alford-type plea, the parents admitted the allegations 

of the CHIPS petition. At the same hearing, CCCSS filed a termination of parental rights 

petition pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. (1)(b)(2), (4), (5), and (8) (2014). The 

district court found that “[i]t is in the best interest and safety of [Z.K.C.] for this matter to 

proceed to permanency. [Z.K.C.] has and continues to experience chronic neglect in 

[appellants’] care which has had a significant impact on his life.” The order concluded that 

Z.K.C. “is a child in need of protection or services as it relates to the CHIPS Petition” and 

ordered Z.K.C. to remain in the care of CCCSS. A guardian ad litem (GAL) report from 

May 2015 noted that Z.K.C. was “functioning fairly well since his placement with no new 

concerning behaviors” and indicated that there have been “[n]o safety concerns since 

[Z.K.C.’s] placement in foster care and supervised visitation with his parents.” At that 

time, according to county records five-year-old Z.K.C. had spent a cumulative 475 days 

out of his parents’ care, or approximately one-third of his life. 

Following trial, the district court concluded that clear and convincing evidence 

existed to terminate appellants’ parental rights. The district court determined that four 

statutory grounds justified termination: (1) appellants substantially, continuously, or 

repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon them by the parent 

and child relationship; (2) appellants were palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and 

child relationship; (3) following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts 

failed to correct the conditions leading to the placement; and (4) the child was neglected 
7 

and in foster care and appellants’ circumstances, condition, or conduct precluded 

reunification. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). After making detailed 

and thorough findings of fact, the district court concluded that clear and convincing 

evidence supported each of these grounds and that “[i]t is in the best interest of the child 

that [appellants’] parental rights be terminated.” Each parent filed a separate appeal, and 

this court consolidated those appeals. 

D E C I S I O N 

Whether to terminate parental rights is discretionary with the district court. In re 

Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014). While a reviewing 

court conducts a close inquiry into the evidence, it also gives “considerable deference” to 

the district court’s termination decision. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 

381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The reviewing court will affirm the termination of parental rights 

if “at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing 

evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 

678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2014). The “best 

interests of the child” are the “paramount consideration” in a termination of parental rights 

proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2014). A decision that termination is in the 

child’s best interests is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of 

J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901-02 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). 

Presumption of Palpable Unfitness 

Generally, a natural parent is presumed to be a “fit and suitable person to be 

entrusted with the care of his or her child,” and the petitioner must prove by clear and 
8 

convincing evidence that a parent is palpably unfit. In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 

643, 647 (Minn. 1995). But “[i]t is presumed that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party 

to the parent and child relationship upon a showing that . . . the parent’s custodial rights to 

another child have been involuntarily transferred to a relative.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, 

subd. 1(b)(4). When the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness is established by a 

prior involuntary transfer of custody, the burden shifts to the parent to rebut the 

presumption by “affirmatively and actively demonstrat[ing] her or his ability to 

successfully parent a child.” In re Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 

App. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

G.A.C.’s parental rights to her eldest two children were involuntarily transferred 

and she therefore bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of palpable unfitness. 

G.A.C. argues that she actively engaged in supervised visits, parenting sessions, and courtordered psychological evaluations. But G.A.C.’s participation in programming is 

insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption that she is palpably unfit to parent. A parent 

“must do more than engage in services and must demonstrate that his or her parenting 

abilities have improved.” In re Welfare of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn. App. 2011) 

review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012) (quotations omitted). Further, the “parent must 

affirmatively and actively demonstrate her or his ability to successfully parent a child.” Id. 

(quotation omitted). The testimony does not elaborate on any skills that G.A.C. learned to 

enable her to provide consistent and ongoing daily care for Z.K.C.; superficial compliance 

with court-ordered services is insufficient to rebut the presumption. See In re Welfare of 

Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 543-44 (Minn. App. 2009) (finding appellant-mother 
9 

did not rebut presumption of palpable unfitness where her apparent willingness to 

cooperate with services and present herself in a better light was superficial). The district 

court found that “[e]ven in light of the extraordinary services that have been provided to 

[appellants], they have been unable to embrace change and sustain change to ensure 

[Z.K.C.’s] needs are being met.” 

G.A.C. further argues that she has demonstrated sobriety, has ensured Z.K.C.’s 

physical health, and has a stable home in a good neighborhood. However, the trial 

testimony reveals that appellants have a history of alcohol- and chemical-abuse, often 

associated with instances of domestic violence in the home. The district court detailed 

G.A.C.’s past and present chemical use and found that she “failed to embrace and utilize 

services to address [her] chronic chemical use and addictions.” As the district court 

recognized, “[t]his is no environment for a child, and is illustrative of the neglect that 

[Z.K.C.] has suffered.” At trial, a case worker with Families in Transition Services testified 

that she conducted approximately 43 home visits with Z.K.C. The witness testified that 

the visits generally went “well,” but stated that G.A.C. appeared to be under the influence 

of chemicals during 2 visits, appellants were late to 19 visits, and appellants were ill or 

unengaged during 10 visits. A parenting attachment expert testified that the “home 

environment was extremely problematic,” and that Z.K.C. was “fending for himself” and 

had not formed a secure attachment with his parents. The district court found this testimony 

credible. 

 “Whether a parent’s evidence satisfies the burden of production must be determined 

on a case-by-case basis.” J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 446. Here, G.A.C. failed to present evidence 
10 

at trial that she has the skills to successfully parent Z.K.C. On this record, the district court 

did not err by determining that G.A.C. failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. 

Independent Statutory Ground for Termination: Neglect of Parental Duties 

A statutory basis to involuntarily terminate parental rights exists if one or more of 

nine conditions exist. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). One such condition is when: 

[T]he parent has substantially, continuously, or 

repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties 

imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship, 

including . . . providing the child with the necessary food, 

clothing, shelter, education and other care and control 

necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health 

and development. . . . 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). 

The district court found that Z.K.C. was “the victim of chronic neglect” in 

appellants’ care, and clear and convincing evidence in the record supports this 

determination. As of trial, Z.K.C. had spent a cumulative 475 days out of his parents’ care, 

or approximately one-third of his life. CCCSS social workers testified as to Z.K.C.’s 

condition prior to being placed outside of the home. CCCSS received 20 reports of 

Z.K.C.’s maltreatment, making him the “second most reported on child in all of Carver 

County.” Z.K.C. experienced chaos, stress, exposure to illegal chemicals, and exposure to 

domestic violence in the home. Child protection workers testified that they performed 

home visits and were concerned about Z.K.C.’s developmental and cognitive delays. One 

witness described Z.K.C. as looking tiny and “failing to thrive.” Z.K.C. did not meet his 

developmental milestones and was developmentally behind his peers, requiring speech 

therapy, occupational therapy, and physical therapy. Z.K.C. was not potty-trained at the 
11 

age of five, even though G.A.C. acknowledged that this impacted his ability to start 

kindergarten on time. Tellingly, Z.K.C. made significant improvements once he was 

removed from appellants’ home and placed in foster care. 

CCCSS witnesses also testified about their experience with appellants. Appellants 

failed to consistently obtain the services necessary to meet Z.K.C.’s needs. The CCCSS 

professionals expressed concern about appellants’ ability to care for a child with special 

needs, particularly since appellants did not agree that Z.K.C. was a special-needs child. An 

attachment expert testified that “both parents said [Z.K.C.] has never been affected by 

abuse, neglect, or trauma when there was lots of collateral evidence to suggest that simply 

wasn’t the case.” The witness could not determine whether such a statement was “just 

blatant dishonesty or a total lack of insight and acknowledgment about how they’ve 

affected their son[,]” but testified that it had a long-term impact upon Z.K.C.’s health and 

well-being. 

 Appellants offer alternative interpretations of the testimony and argue that Z.K.C. 

was well-nourished, had stable housing, attended preschool, received regular medical 

attention, and was properly clothed. The factual record does not support appellants’ 

contentions. Moreover, we give considerable deference to the district court’s factual 

determination because the district court is in a “superior position to assess the credibility 

of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). The district 

court heard testimony from CCCSS social workers that Z.K.C. was neglected, exposed to 

chemical-use and domestic violence, and was failing to develop. The district court found 

this testimony credible, and clear and convincing evidence supports the findings. See 
12 

S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (instructing appellate courts to conduct a close inquiry into the 

evidence, but to give “considerable deference” to the district court’s termination decision). 

On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that appellants 

neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon them by the parent and child 

relationship. 

Reasonable Efforts Toward Reunification 

Appellants argue that the county did not make reasonable efforts to reunify Z.K.C. 

with his parents. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (requiring county to make reasonable efforts 

to reunify parent and child). The county claims it was relieved of its obligation because 

G.A.C.’s rights to her eldest two children were involuntarily transferred. See id., § 260.012 

(a)(4) (providing that reasonable efforts “are always required except upon a determination 

by the court that . . . the parent’s custodial rights to another child have involuntarily 

transferred to a relative”). Appellants argue that the district court erred by failing to make 

specific findings that reunification efforts would be “futile.” See id., subd. (h) (allowing 

district court to find that further efforts at reunification would be “futile”). Here the district 

court did not make a finding that reunification efforts would be futile, but did make a 

finding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify. Because those findings have 

substantial support in the record, we do not reach appellants’ argument. 

“Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of 

form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 

N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007) (quotation 

omitted). We review a district court’s reasonable-efforts findings for clear error, J.R.B., 
13 

805 N.W.2d at 901. In this case, the district court made findings at each hearing that 

CCCSS made reasonable efforts to prevent Z.K.C.’s out-of-home placement. In its April 

2015 order, the court noted that the county provided ongoing case management services, 

partnership and ongoing collaboration with Z.K.C.’s school, child protection assessments, 

interviews and observations of Z.K.C., conversations with the parents, safety and support 

network meetings, safety planning, case planning, chemical testing, contacts with law 

enforcement, review of reports, kinship referrals, coordination and collaboration with 

treatment providers, and financial assistance to ensure Z.K.C.’s basic needs and access to 

resources and services were being met. The district court reiterated that CCCSS made 

reasonable efforts to prevent out-of-home placement and repeated these findings in its May 

2015, June 2015, and July 2015 orders. 

The testimony and other evidence presented at trial supports the district court’s 

findings. CCCSS provided appellants with a number of services, including: parenting 

classes, supervised and unsupervised visitation, case consultation with agency staff and 

safety consultants, chemical dependency treatment, domestic violence counseling, 

marriage and individual therapy, coordination with pain clinics and medical providers, 

psychological evaluations and behavioral assessments, foster care, trial home visits, 

financial assistance, assistance with moving expenses, utility payments, daycare, 

budgeting, transportation, and medical assistance. CCCSS social workers began working 

with the family in September 2009, prior to Z.K.C.’s birth, and continued working with 

them until the time of trial. The record supports the district court’s finding that the county 
14 

satisfied its statutory obligation to undertake reasonable efforts to reunify Z.K.C. with his 

parents. 

Despite the county’s efforts, appellants frequently cancelled appointments, failed to 

take advantage of the services offered to them, and refused to recognize that there was a 

problem. Evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that “ZKC had 

consistency as long as CCCSS was involved in providing services, but when the County 

was no longer involved, [appellants] were inconsistent with appointments and follow 

through.” CCCSS social workers testified to their concerns that Z.K.C. was not getting the 

services he needed from his parents, who did not work on the assigned tasks from Z.K.C.’s 

occupational and physical therapists between visits or provide him with a safe home 

environment. The district court found that, “[a]s early as the initial CHIPs petition filed on 

behalf of [Z.K.C.], there [were] concerns and worries that [appellants] were not going to 

obtain the services necessary to meet [his] special needs, and [he] would fail to meet his 

milestones. Those same concerns continue five (5) years later.” The district court’s finding 

that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify Z.K.C. with his parents is supported by 

clear and convincing evidence in the record. 

Case Plan 

Appellants argue that the termination of their parental rights is defective because 

they were never given a written case plan. A written out-of-home placement plan must be 

filed with the district court within 30 days after a child is placed in foster care. Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.212, subd. 1(a) (2014). The plan must describe the specific actions the parents can 

take to eliminate or correct the problems which led to the child’s placement in foster care. 
15 

Id., subd. 1(c). A written case plan is required in every case. In re Matter of Welfare of 

Copus, 356 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (Minn. App. 1984). However, the county’s failure to file 

a case plan is not reversible error in the limited circumstance where the parents’ own lack 

of cooperation prevented the county from constructing and providing a written case plan 

and the evidence shows the parents were informed of the expectations. In re Welfare of 

R.M.M. III, 316 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn. 1982). 

Here, the case worker provided case-planning services to appellants and drafted a 

preliminary case plan. The case worker scheduled an appointment to meet with appellants 

and their previous CCCSS case worker to have a “hand-over” meeting with the family. 

G.A.C. cancelled the meeting, and the case worker had difficulty rescheduling with 

appellants. Overall, the case worker testified that it was “very challenging” to meet with 

appellants to update the case plan, and it was difficult to “provide the full scope of case 

management services when there’s little engagement from the families.” As a result, the 

written case plan was not finalized or filed with the district court. 

However, this record demonstrates that district court orders adequately informed 

appellants of the county’s expectations, and that a finalized case plan would not have 

provided additional guidance. See In re Welfare of J.J.L.B., 394 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Minn. 

App. 1986) (affirming termination where lack of timely filed case plan was partly due to 

parent’s lack of cooperation and prior court orders adequately informed the parent of what 

needed to be done before children could return home), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 

1986). In its April 2015 order, the district court stated that “[t]he parties agree and the 

Court finds the case plan that is outlined in the Order of this matter is appropriate and is in 
16 

the best interest of the child.” The district court ordered that: appellants shall cooperate in 

the development of a case plan, W.J.C. shall complete a treatment program and a domestic 

abuse assessment, G.A.C. shall have an updated psychological assessment, parents shall 

participate in parenting classes and coaching sessions, parents shall abstain from moodaltering chemicals including alcohol and submit to random chemical testing, and parents 

shall participate in safety planning and the development of a safety and support network 

for Z.K.C. The district court repeated these detailed case plan elements, sometimes with 

some updated conditions, in its May 2015, June 2015, and July 2015 orders. 

We are aware that statutory authority provides that “[a]n out-of-home placement 

plan shall be prepared.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(a). Under the canons of statutory 

construction, the word “shall” creates a mandatory duty. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 

16 (2014) (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”). Section 260C.212, subdivision (a), however, does not 

preclude termination of parental rights if a county fails to provide a written case plan. 

Therefore, we will not assume that a failure to provide a case plan is automatically fatal to 

a termination. See generally, Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 

536, 541 (Minn. 2007) (noting that statutes can use “shall” “in two different contexts[,]” 

distinguishing “shall” when a statute uses the word in its mandatory sense from a statute 

that uses the word in its directory sense, and stating that the court could not “imply from 

the word ‘shall’ that there would be specific but unexpressed consequences for 

noncompliance with a statute”). Indeed, caselaw informs us that in rare cases, the failure 

to finalize a case plan does not warrant reversal where it would be ineffectual. See Copus, 

356 N.W.2d at 367 (noting that such situations will “rarely be present”). 
17 

Here, appellants were informed of the conditions they were required to satisfy in 

order to effect a reunification with their son. The district court clearly articulated the case 

plan elements with appellants each month between April and July 2015 in its written orders. 

This evidence contradicts appellants’ arguments that they did not know what was expected 

of them, and renders harmless any failure to provide a written case plan. See In re Welfare 

of S.R.A., 527 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Minn. App. 1995) (refusing to reverse a termination of 

parental rights for technical defects when outweighed by child’s best interest), review 

denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1995). Moreover, the district court found that “CCCSS provided 

significant [c]ase planning, but it was difficult to provide the full scope of planning when 

there was little engagement from the family.” The CCCSS case worker discussed the case 

plan with appellants and they “could not identify any services that they believed would be 

beneficial to them.” As the district court noted, neither the county nor the court can “force 

parents to engage in services that they are not willing to engage in.” We therefore 

determine that this is the rare case where the lack of a finalized case plan does not require 

reversal. 

Best Interests of the Child 

An appellate court will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights if “at 

least one statutory ground alleged in the petition is supported by clear and convincing 

evidence and termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” In re Children 

of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). The child’s 

best interests are the paramount consideration in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat. 

§§ 260C.001, subd. 2(a), .301, subd. 7 (2014). A best-interests’ analysis requires 
18 

consideration of the child and parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship 

and of any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3); 

see also J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (“Competing interests [of the child] include such things 

as a stable environment, health considerations[,] and the child’s preferences.” (quotation 

omitted)). 

The district court’s best-interest finding is well-supported. Z.K.C. was five years 

old at the time of trial and spent a cumulative 475 days out of his parents’ care. The district 

court found that while appellants love Z.K.C., “they do not have the ability to place 

[Z.K.C.’s] needs ahead of their own. If [Z.K.C.] were returned to [appellants’] care, [he] 

would continue to fall behind, continue to be absent from school, and continue to be 

exposed to the chemical use and domestic violence that exists in the . . . home.” These 

findings are supported by the record given appellants’ well-documented history of 

chemical abuse, domestic violence, and chronic neglect of their child. See R.M.M., 316 

N.W.2d at 542 (affirming termination where parent’s inability to care for child “threatens 

the mental and physical health” of the child); see also In re Welfare of A.J.C., 556 N.W.2d 

616, 622 (Minn. App. 1996) (affirming termination of parental rights where “in spite of 

[mother’s] love for her children, [she] has failed to comply with her parental duties, 

basically due to her personal problems of alcoholism, drug addiction, low self-esteem, and 

her tendency to involve herself in abusive relationships”). 

Termination will allow Z.K.C. to be adopted into a family that can meet his needs 

for a safe, stable, and permanent home. The district court did not abuse its discretion by 

determining that termination of appellants’ parental rights is in Z.K.C.’s best interests. 
19 

Because a statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence 

and termination is in Z.K.C.’s best interests, we affirm the termination of appellants’ 

parental rights to Z.K.C.1

 

Affirmed. 

 

1

 W.J.C. argues that his due-process rights were violated due to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Specifically W.J.C. argues that his trial counsel did not object throughout the 

proceedings to the district court’s findings that the county made reasonable efforts. W.J.C. 

did not raise this argument below and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. 

See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (noting appellate courts will not 

consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court). Moreover, an appellate 

court “will generally not review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on 

[litigation] strategy.” Andersen v. State, 803 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). Further, for an 

appellate court to grant a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, W.J.C. would 

need to prove that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have differed. Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 

398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s 

performance was reasonable, Anderson, 803 N.W.2d at 10, and on this record, W.J.C. has 

failed to meet his burden that if his counsel had objected, the outcome would have been 

different.