### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 21, 200 4 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CH RIST OPH ER FR AN KLIN WAD DEL L

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Sum ner County No. 291-2003 Jane Wheatc raft, Judge

No. M2004- 00126-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Janu ary 27, 2005

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Christ op he r Fra nk lin Wad de ll, app e a ls th es e n t e n c i n g d e c isi on of the Sum ne r C ou nty Cr imi na l Co urt w hic h r e su lte d in the imp os iti on of a n e ff e c tiv e thi rt y -y e ar se nte nc e . U nd e r the te rm s of a ple a ag ree ment, Waddell pled g uiltyto two counts of ag g ravated assault , fo u r co u n ts of attempted ag g ravated robbe ry , and thre e counts of c oerc ion of a witness. On appe al, Waddell arg ues that the trial court erre d: (1) in it s application of e nhancing fac tors with respec t to his agg ravated assault convictions; (2 ) i n imposing conse cutive sente nces; a nd (3) in denying an alternative
se nte nc e . A ft e r r e vie w, we a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in wh i ch J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., joined and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J

. , c o n c u rr e d i n r e s u l to n l y.
M. Al le n Ehm lin g , Ga llatin , Te nn e sse e , Atto rn e y fo r the Ap pe lla nt, Christ op he r Frank lin Wad de ll. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael Moore , Solicitor Genera l; Eliz abeth T. Ry an, Senior Couns el ; an d Thomas Dean, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

P roce dural Hi story
Th e e ff e c tiv e thi rt y -y e ar se nte nc e a t iss ue in thi s c a se aro se fr om thr e e se pa rate ind ic tme nts

. On Aug ust 7, 2001, the Appellant wa s involved in an alterc ation with J eff rey Sparks in a Portland, Te nn e sse e pa

rking lot . D ur ing the inc ide nt, the Ap pe lla nt c on fr on te d Sp ark s a ndthe n s truc k h im in the head w ith a wooden stick. The injuries to the v i ct i m require d medical attention. On November 8, 2001, a S umner Count y g rand jury returne d an indictment in case number 903-2001 ag ainst the Appellant c harg ing him with ag g ravated assault by use of a deadly wea pon.T his cha rge st em m ed f ro m t he A p p ell an t ’ s f

i ring o f his w ea p o n w hil e i n fl ig h t f ro m t he i nd i cted ro b b eries, 1

c a u sin g the vic tim , M a tt B u rn s, to “fea r im m ine n t b o d ily inj u ry b y us e o f a d e a d ly we a p o n .”

-2- Case number

12-2 0 02 stems from the Appe llant’s involvement in severa l ag g ravated robberies at the L ake D ’Ville Apa rtments in Hender sonville, Tenne ssee. On S eptember 5, 2001, the Appellant, along with three c o-def endants, each armed and wea ring ski masks, entere d an apa rtment wh e re a pa rt y wa s in pr og re ss. Th e arm e d in trud e rs fo rc e d th os e pr e se nt t o li e on the fl oo r w hil e t h e y s t o l e j e w e l r y, m ar i

j u a n a , a n d m o n e y. A s t h e d e f e n d a n t s f l e d t h e s c e n e , t h e y w e r e c h a s e d b y a ne ig hb or on fo ot. Up on re a c hin g the g e ta way c ar, the Ap pe llant tu rned and fir e d a sh ot f ro m hi s wea pon. Following an in v es t i gat i on, the police a rre sted the Appe llant, Mark Sampson, Chad Holmes, and Da vid L ame. A Sumner Countyg rand jury

returne d an eig hteen- co u n t indictment ag a in s t th e A p p e ll a n t a n d th e c o
- d e f e n d a n ts o n Ja n u ar y 1 0 , 2 0 0 2 , w h ic h in c lu d e d char g es of ag g ravat ed robbery , kidnapping , ag g ravated assault, and unlawf ul discharg e of a

wea pon. When 1 int e rv ie we d, c o- de fe nd a nt D a vidL a me c on fe sse d to the c ri me a ndimp lic a ted the Ap pe lla nt, Sampson, and Holmes. Sampson and Holm es eventually also confe ssed t heir invol vement. Each
rec eived r educe d sentenc es for their coope ration.

Case number

291-2003 ar ose fr om three se parate criminal a ct s which occ urre d while the Appellant wa s incarc erated on the char g es arising from his indictment in ca se number 12- 2002. Two of t h e c h ar g e s s t e m f

r o m l e t t e r s w r i t t e n o n Ju n e 4 , 2 0 0 2 , a n d F e b ru ar y 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 , a tte mpt ing to influence the testimony of potential witnesses in case number 12-2002. T he first wa s a threatening letter written to co-def

endant Da vid L ame a fter he ag ree d t o t es t ify ag ainst the Appellant. The second involved a

lett er wr i tten to J ason Cross soliciting his help in a planne d assault of c odefe ndant Mark Sampson. The last instance a rose f rom an a ssault and ver

bal threats by

the Appellant ag ainst Sampson in the laundry room of t he jail on Marc h 28, 2003. On April 10, 2003, a Sumner County

g rand jury

returne d an indictment ag ainst the Appellant c harg ing him with t hree counts of coe rcion of a

witness.

On Se pte mbe r 11, 20 03 , the Ap pe lla nt, un de r the te rm s of the ple a a g re e me nt, ple d g uil ty to ag g ravated assault in ca se number 903- 2001, four c ounts of attempted ag g ravated robbe ry and one
c ou nt o f a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult in c a se nu mbe r 1 2- 20 02 , a ndthr e e c ount s of coe rc ion of a wi tne ss i n case number 291-2003. T he plea ag ree ment provided that the A ppellant would re ceive a six -y ear sentenc e for ea ch o f t he four counts of attempted a g g ravated robbe ry , with all four counts to be
se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y . With r e sp e c t to the rem ain in g c ha rg e s, the a g re e me nt p ro vid e d th a t th e se se nte nc e s a nd the ma nn e r of se rv ic e of the se nte nc e s wo uld be de te rm ine d by th e tr ial cou rt

. Additionally , the trial court would d et er m ine whethe r the “ open plea ” sente nces w ould be serve d
concur rently or conse cutively

. A sentenc ing he aring was he ld Dece mber 3 a nd Dec ember 16, 2003. T he court hear d testimonyfrom various witnesses. The twenty -five- y ear -old Appellant acknowledg ed that he had owned se vera l weapons a nd had used and sold dr ug s for a pproxi mately

five y ear s. Testimony

was also prese nted re g arding the Appellant’s criminal past, including testimony that the Appellant wa s-3-

involved in drive-by

shootings in Florida

. One witness, Carey Gallag her, testified that she wa s the victim of an ag g ravated assault by the Appellant. Ms. Gallag her r elated that she and the A ppellant attended the same pa

rty in Portland, but the Appellant was a sked to leave

. S h o rt l y t h er eafter, a dr ive -b y sh oo tin g o ccur red. At

the he ari ng , th e Ap pe lla nt a dmi tte d th a t he ha d f ir e d th e sh ots

. Gallag her f

urther te s t i fi ed t h at s he saw the Appellant in the f ront y ard a fter the shooting, a nd, follo wi n g an alterc ation with the Appellant, he sla mmed her he ad into the windshield of a c ar, requiring medical attention.

I n addit i o n, the State introduce d letters written by the Appellant while he was in jail. The letters conta ined numerous threa ts, as well as seve ral re fer ence s to guns, violenc e, and smug g ling illega l drug s into the jail. Photogra phs wer e also admitted of g raf fiti authored by

the Appellant on the wall of his ce ll. The text of these me ssag es, which the Appellant a d m i tted writing , involved threa ts d ir e c te d a t th e c o
- d e f e n d a n ts in th e r o b b e r y c a s e
. A ta p e o f a p h o n e c o n v e r s a ti o n bythe Appellant shortly

befor e the se ntencing hearing w as admit ted, during which he thr eate ned a police detec tive. The Appellant also admitted that he wrote a letter to the jail a dminist rator wee ks befor e the sentenc ing he aring in which he state d that “[he] can’t be br oken.”

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial co urt imposed maxi mum six -y ear sentenc es for
eac h of the two ag g ravated assault convictions. The court also imposed the m axim um sentence of four y ear s for e ach of t h e four counts of coe rcion of a witness and sente nced the Appellant, as ag ree d, to concur

re n t s ix- y e ar se ntence s for the attempted ag g ravated robbe ry convictions. The c ourt then determin ed that all the sentence s, with the exception of the attempted a g g ravated robbe ry s e n t e n c e s , w e r e t o b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y, r e s u l t i n g i n a n e f f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e o f t h i r t y- ye ar s
. F i n a l l y, the trial court determined tha t the Appellant wa s not an appro p ri ate c andidate f or any type of alternative sentenc ing a nd that the sentenc es should be ser ved in conf inement.

Ana lys is On appe al, the Appe llant raises three issues for our review : (1) whe ther the tria l court er red in i ts a pp lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s w ith re sp e c t to his two s e nte nc e s f or a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult ; (2) whe ther the tria l court err ed in imposing consec utive sentenc es; and (3) whether the trial court err ed in deny i n g an alternative sentenc e. When an a ccuse d challeng es the leng th, rang e, or the
manner of ser vice of

a sente nce, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the se ntence with a pre sumption t hat the determinations made by the trial court a re c orre ct. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) (2 00 3) ; State v. A s hby , 8 23 S.W. 2d16 6, 16 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T his pr e su mpt ion is “conditioned upon t

he af firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. When conducting
a de novo revie w of a

sentenc e, this court must consider: (a ) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se nten ci n g h ea ri ng ; (b) the pr e-se ntence report; (c) the principles of sente ncing and arg uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature an d char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) a ny

statutory mitigating or enhance ment fac tors; (f) any statement that the Appe llant
ma d e o n h i s o w n b e h a l f ; a n d ( g ) t h e p o t e n t i a l o r l a c k o f p o t e n t i a l f

o r r e h ab i l i t a t i o n o r

tr e a tme nt. T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 , - 1 0 3 , - 2 1 0 (2 00 3) ; A s h by , 823 S.W .2d at 168. On appe al, theP urs uant t o a 20 0 2 am end m ent t o T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed sect i o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 , t he exi st i ng enhancem ent 2 fac to rs w e re re n u m b e re d a s fac to rs tw o (2 ) t h ro u g h tw e n ty-t h re e (2 3 ). W h ile b o th t h e trial c o u rt a n d t h e A p p e llan t’s b rie f utili z e the p re -am e n d m e n t nu m e ra tio n , t h e S ta te c o rr e c tly u til iz e s the c u rr e n t sc h e m e
. -4- Appellant bea

rs the burde n of showing that the sentenc e is improper. Te n n. Code Ann. § 40-35- 40 1( d) , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . F urthe rm or e , w e e mph a size that f a c ts rel evant

to se nte nc ing mus t be e sta

bli sh e d b y

a pr e po ndera nc e of

the e vid e nc e a ndno t be y on d a re a so na ble doubt. Sta te v . W

inf ie ld , 2 3 S

. W

. 3 d 2 7 9 , 2 8 3 (T en n
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . P oo le , 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997) ). 1. Appli cation of E nhan cem ent F actor s On appe al, t he Appellant challeng es t he application of certain enhanc ement fa ctors applied to his co n v i ct i o ns for a g g ravated assault. The Appellant does not c ontest his three four -y ear sentenc es for coer cion of a witness. Moreove r, as previously noted, the Appe llant’s sentenc es for attempted ag g ravated robbe ry wer e imposed under

the terms of the plea a g ree ment

. Ag g ra va te d ass a ult is a cla ss C fe lon y wh ic h ca rrie s a sen te nc ing rang e of thr e e to s ix y e ars
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(3) (2 0 0 3). The pr esumptive sentenc e to be imposed by the trial court for a cla ss C felon y i s t h e minimum sentenc e within the applica ble ra ng e unless ther e ar e enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors prese nt. Tenn. Code A n n . § 40-35-210( c). When ther e ar e enhanc ement fa ctors and no mitig ating fac tors, the court may sentenc e above the minimum i n the
ra ng e
. Te nn . C o d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 ( d )

. M o r e o v e r , t h e w e i g h tt o b e a s s i g n e d t o t h e ap p r o p r i a te enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors falls within the sound discretion of the trial court so long as that court c omplies with the purposes and principl es o f t h e 1 989 Sentencing Act and its finding s are supported by

the re cord. State v. Boggs , 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. a. Aggravat ed Assault- Case Num ber 903-2001

I mposing a

sen tence of six y ear s, the trial court applied four e nhance ment fac tors: (2) that the Ap pe lla nt h a d a

pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be ha vio r i n a dd iti on to tho se nece ssary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (9) that the Appel l ant had a previous history of unwillingness to comply

with the conditions of a sentenc e involving re lease in the community ; (11) that the Appellant ha d no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to huma n life wa s high; and (14) that the fe lony

was c ommitt ed while on any of the following forms of r elea se status if such rele ase i s from a prior felony conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114 (2) , (9), ( 11), (14) (2 0 0 3 ). T h e A p p el l an tch al l en ges t h e a p p l i ca t i o n o f f ac t o rs (1 1 ) & (1 4 )

. H e d o es n o tch al l en ge 2 the application of factors (2) or (9) , and we ag ree that they are amply

established by

the re cord a nd the Appellant’ s admissions at the sentencing hearing.

With re g ardto f

a c tor (1 1) , the tr ia l cou rt app lie d this fa c tor “ be c a us e thi s a g g ra vate d a ssa ult involved a we apon th at co uld have done even mor e serious damag e to Mr. Sparks than it did.” Rely ing upon State v. Bingham , 9 10 S.W. 2d44 8, 45 2 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ), the Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s-5-

that this factor w as er

roneously applied because it is applicable only “if the f acts de monstrate that the defe ndant cre ated a high risk to the life of a person oth e r th an the na me d v ic tim .” He arg ues that the only risk to human life, as f

ound by the t rial court, was to the name d victim, and, thus, the fac tor is not applicable.

The State re lies upon State v. Jone s , 883 S.W .2d 597 (Tenn. 1994), for the pr oposition t hat fac tor (11) is not an e lement of a g g ravated assault and w as prope rly applied. Howe ver, Jones holds that fac tor (11) is not an e lement of a g g ravated assault, whe n the assault is predicat ed upon the infliction of serious bodily injury beca use the State may prove serious bodily injury without proving a hig h risk to life. Id . a t 602. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e ind ic tme nt c ha rg e s th e Ap pe lla nt w ith
a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult by us e of a de a dly we apo n. Th is cou rt

ha s p re vio us ly

he ld that f

a c tor (1 1) is “esse ntially ” an e lement of that off ense. State v. Nixon , 922 S.W .2d 894, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95 ) ( ob se rv ing that “ the re is n e c e ssa ri ly a hig h ri sk to h uman li fe a ndthe g re a t po te nti a l f or bo dil y inj ury wh e ne ve r a

de a dly we apo n is use d” ); s e e als o Sta te v . H ill , 8 85 S.W. 2d35 7, 36 3 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1 9 9 4 ) (t he off

ense of ag g ravated assault inher ently comprises hig h risk to human life). Al tho ug h th is c ou rt

ha s f ou nd that fa c tor (1 1) ma y sti ll b e app lie d if pe rs on s o the r tha n th e vic tim
are place d in dang er by

the ac tions of the defe ndant, those ar e not the fa cts in this case. Se e Sta te v. Zonge , 973 S.W .2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Thus, this factor w as improper ly applied.

Th e Sta te c on c e de s th a t f a cto r (14 ) was inco rr e c tly app lie d. We a g re e . In o rd e r t o a pp ly fac tor (14), the felony

at issue must have be en “committed while on any of t he following forms of
re le a se status if

su c h r e le a se is fr om a pr ior fe lon y c on vic tio n: (A ) B a il, if the de fe nd a nt i s u lti ma te ly convicted of

such prior f

elony ; . .
. [or] (C) Probation; .

. .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 14). The trial court a

pplied this factor, stating that the “a gg ravated assault wa s committed while he wa s on bond . . . for the a ssault, a nd he was also on probation for c ontributing to the de linquency of a minor, criminal impersona tion, and resisting arr est.”

Review of the rec ord reve als that the Appellant was not on bond for a ny felony char g es whe n he c o mm it te d th e in s ta n t o f f e n s e
. T h e a s s a u lt

c h ar g e r e f

e rr e d to b y

th e c o u r t w a s a

misde meanor assault. Moreove r, all the c onvictions for which the Appellant re c e iv e d p r o b ati o nw e r e misdemea nor offe nses. Thus, the re cord establishes that the Appellant wa s not on bond or probation for a prior felony offe nse whe n he committed this ag g ravated assault. Reg ardle ss of the er

ror in a p ply ing the se two fa ctors, we find that the six -y ear sentenc e imposed for this ag g ravated assault conviction i s justified. Ba sed upon the re cord be fore us, fac tors (2 ) a nd(9 ) a

re e nti tle d t o great wei gh t. T he Ap pe llant h a s p ri or c on vic tio ns fo r r e sis tin g arr e st, criminal impersona tion, contribut i n g to the delinquency of a minor, a ssault, sale of marijuana, driving on a suspende d license, a nd t h ef t u nder $500. The pre- sentenc e re port indicates, a nd the Appellant conce d es, t hat a number of these of

fense s were committed while the Appellant wa s on probation. We conc lude that application of the two enha nceme nt fac tors supports the sentenc e.-6-

b. Aggravate d Assaul t- Case number12-2002

Ba sed upon the Appe llant’s act of “re cklessly

caus[ing] Matt Burns to reasona bly fea r imminent bodil y

injury by use of a [firearm],” the t ri al court found six enhancing fac tors and imposed a sentenc e of s i x y ear s. I n addition to factors ( 2), pre vious criminal history , and (9) , previous unwillingne ss to comply with conditions of release , the trial court applied fa ctors (4) that the offe nse involved more tha n one victim; (10) that the defe ndant possessed or employ ed a f irea rm during the commission of the offe nse; (11) that the de fenda nt had no hesitation about committing
a crime when th e ri s k t o h u m an li fe w as hig h; and (17) that the crime w as committed under circ umstances unde r which the potential for bodily injury to the victim was g reat. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 ( 2), (4), (9), (10), (11), (17). The Appellant cha lleng es the a pplication of fa ctors (4) , (10), ( 11), and ( 17). The State c oncede s that these four fac tors wer e e rr oneously applied to the sentenc e. We ag ree
. Clearly fac tor (10), possession of a firea rm, was misapplied a s use of a firea rm is an eleme nt of the off ense a s alleg ed in the indictment count. The Ap p el l an t re l i es upon State v. Anthony Humphrey , No. W2002-00195-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, May 16, 2003), to arg ue that fac tors (4) a nd (11) a re ina pplicable.

I n Humphrey , th is c ou rt

re je c te d a pp lic a tio n o f the se fa c tor s to a de fe nd a nt w ho fi red a t a g roup of pe ople in an apa

rtment complex who were flee ing f rom the def

endant’ s attempted robbe ry of them, a c ase f

actua lly simil ar to the instant ca se.
On app e a l, a

pa ne l of thi s c ou rt re je c te d a pp lic a tio n o f f

a c tor s ( 4) a nd(1 1) re a so nin g that:
. . . [T] h e v i ct i m s we re p art of a g roup of six Mex icans whe n the crimes wer e committed. Howeve r, it is not clear f rom the re cord the extent to which others we re jeopar dized by

the shots fired by

the def endant, at l ea s t some of which w ere in the
a ir [.] . . . A c c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e re c or d do es no t su pp ort app ly ing thi s fac t o r t o any

of the c onvictions. W e believe that this same rationale applies to the application of e nhance ment fac tor [4] , that the offe nse involved m o re t han one victim.

A c c o r d i n g l y, w e f

i n d t h a t f a c t o r s ( 4 ) a n d ( 1 1 ) w e r e i n ap p r o p r i a t e l y ap p l i e d

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, the Appellant is corr ect that f actor (17) wa s err oneously

applied. Se e Sta te v . I

mf e ld , 70 S.W .3d 698, 70 6 (T e nn . 200 2) (h old ing that the re is nothin g in the statut ory la ng ua g e of fa c tor (1 7) to i nd ic a te that it a pplies to pote ntial vic tims or that it applies simplybeca use the off

ense w as committed in the pr e se nc e of

oth e r i nd ivi du a ls a nd that it is the re fo re no t app lic able wh e n th e of fe ns e inv olv e d b od ily injury to a spec ific, name d victim). Thus, just as in the previous agg ravated assault, the t rial court should have applied onl y two enhanc ement fa ctors, (2) and (9) . Ag ain, we note that these fa ctors ar e g iven g reat weig ht due to the Ap pe lla nt’ s p a tte rn of

c ri min a l c on vic tio ns a nda n e sta bli sh e d hist ory of c omm itt ing c ri me s w hil e-7-

on probation. Acc ording ly , despite t he mi sapplication of f our enha nceme nt fac tors, we f ind that the six -y ear sentenc e is justified by

the sentenc ing r ecor d.

c. Blakely v. Washington Although not r aised a s an is sue, we are constraine d to note at this juncture the r ece nt United States Supreme Court dec ision in Blakely v. W ash i n gton , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), clarify ing a nd extending its decision in Apprendi v. N ew Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. C t. 2348 (2000). The Blakely court he ld that any fac t that incre ases a sentenc e bey ond the “r eleva nt statutory max i m u m ,” def

ined as the ma x imum sentence that a judg e may impose without making a ny additional finding s of fa ct, must be submitted and proved to the jury bey ond a re asonable doubt or admitted by

the def endant. Bl ake ly , 5 42 U. S. at __

__ , 1 24 S. Ct . at 2 53 6-3 7. Th us , a dh e re nc e to Bl ake ly re qu ir e s th a t a ny

e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s, oth e r than prior c ri min a l his tory wh ic h w a s e xpre ssl y excluded, can only

be applied if

found by a jury or admitted by

the def endant. Id

. A re view of the two sentenc es for ag g ravated assault under the constraints of Bl ake ly leads us to the conclusion t hat neither fac tor (2) nor

fac tor (9) is implicated. Application of fac tor (2), p re v i o u s crimi nal history , is ex pressly permitted under Bl ake ly . Additionally , in this case, the Appellant admitted at the se ntencing hearing that while on probation he had committed additional crimes. The specific cr imes committed were ref ere nced at the hearing. T he pre -sentenc e re port confirms that the A ppellant , d uring three separ ate pr obationary periods, committed additional offe nses. The pr e-se ntence report was ente red w ith o u t objection. Thus, we c onclude that the Appellant’s une quivocal testimony at the sente ncing hearing on this issue, i n addition to the unobjec te d

- to e v idence contained in the pr e-se ntence report, constitutes an admission that enhancing fac tor (9) is esta

blished. Acc ording ly , Blakely revie w is not trigg ere d.

Th us , h a vin g de te rm ine d th a t Bl ake ly is not im plicated in this case , upon de novo revie w, we conclude that the record amply supports both enhanc ing fac tors. Moreove r, based upon the finding of these two e nhance ment fac tors, and no mitigating f actor s, we c onclude the trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentenc e of six y ear s for e ach ag g ravated assault conviction is j ustified. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d).

II. Co nse c ut iveSe nt e nc ing Next, the Appellant challeng es the imposition of consec utive sentenc es. The c ourt order ed that eac h of the Appe llant’s two six -y ear sentenc es for

ag g ravat ed assault and three four -y ear sentenc es for

coer cion of a witness be ser ved conse cutively to eac h other and consec utively to the six- y e ar s e nte nc e s f

or a tte mpt e d a g g ra va t e d

r o b b e r y , r e s ult ing in an e ff

e c tiv e se nte nc e of

thi rt y y e ars
. Ap pe llate re vie w of the imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s is de novo with a pre sumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d). The presumpti o n o f cor

rec tness imposes upon the appea ling pa rty the burde n of showing that the
se nte nc e imp os e d is impr op e r. Te nn . Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.-8-

Consecutive sente nces a

re w arr anted if the trial court f inds, by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e, that any one of the seven e numera ted criteria of T ennesse e Code Annotated section 40-35-115( b) (2003) exis t.
The trial c ourt imposed consec utive sentenc es based upon its finding that the Appellant wa s a “da ng erous of

fende r” a nd “bec ause of

his ex tensive criminal hist ory .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 11 5( b) (2 ) a nd(4 ). An a c c us e d q ua lif ie s as a “ da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r” wh e n h is “ be ha vio r i nd ic a te s li ttl e or no re g ardfo r h uma n li fe a nd[he ha s] no he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to human life is high.” Id . a t ( b) (4 ). Th is l a ng ua g e is e ssent ial ly a c od if ic a tio n o f o ur

su pr e me court’s holding in Gr

ay v . S tat e , 538 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976)

. See State v . W ilkerson , 905 S.W .2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995) . The c ourt in Gray more spec ifically held that “[a] defenda nt may be c la ssi fi e d a s a

da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r i f the c ri me s f

or wh ic h h e is c on vic te d in dic a te that he ha s li ttl e or no reg ard for hum an li fe, and no hesitation about commi tting a c rime in which the risk to human life i s high.” 538 S.W .2d at 393 (e mphasis added) . I n W ilkerson, 90 5 S.W. 2da t 93 3, ou r s up re me court re aff

irmed these principles and imposed additional g uidelines for f inding a defe ndant to be a “dang erous of

fende r.” The co u rt opined that proof that a def

endant wa s a “da ng erous of fende r,” standing alone, wa s not enoug h to sustain the im p o s i t i o n o f consecutive sente nces. Id . at 938. Consequently , under W

ilkerson , befor e the sentenc ing court may discretionarily

impose consec utive sentenc es for

one cla ssified as a “ dang erous of fende r, ” t h e co urt must also find that the resulting
se nte nc e is re a so na

bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty

of the c ri me s a ndne c e ssa

ry to p ro te c t th e pu bli c a g a ins t further criminal conduc t. Id.

The re cord supports a fi nding of these re quirements. F irst, the Appellant’s a ct of a rming him se lf wi th a we apo n a nd inv a din g a

re sid e nc e , w ith nu me ro us pe op le pr e se nt, wi th the int e nt t o commit robbery , indicates no hesitation “about c ommitt ing a crime in whic h the risk to human life is h ig h. ” Th e Ap pe lla nt, e ve n a ft e r i nc arc e ratio n, c on tin ue d to c oe rc e a ndthr e a te n th os e in a uth or ity
a ndtho se wh o mi g ht d are te sti fy a g a ins t him. He ha s c omm itt e d b ru ta l a ssa ult s u po n in div idu a ls wi tho ut re a so n. He is e na mor e d wi th we apo ns a nd a dmi ts ow nin g a ndpo sse ssi ng se ve ra l w e apo ns , including a n assault wea

pon. By his ow n admission, he has bee n involved in drive-by shootings and drug activity

. Irre spective of the numerous pr obated se ntence s rec eived, the A ppellant’s criminal
c on du c t c on tin ue d u na

ba te d a nd , in fa c t, e sc a la te d in natur e a ndfr e qu e nc y . T he Ap pe lla nt h ims e lf pr ofes se s th a t he c a nn ot b e “ br ok e n. ” F ro m th e se fa c ts, it i s o bv iou s th a t a n e xten de d s e nte nc e is
nece ssary to protect the public f

rom furthe r criminal acts by the Appellant a nd that the sentenc es ar e rea sonably

rela ted to the severity of the crimes. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the trial court did not
err in imposi ng an ag g reg ate se ntence of thirty y ear s.
III . A lt e r nat ive Se nt e nc ing

L ast, t h e A p p e ll a n t a

r g u e s th a t th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d b y o r d e r in g a

s e n te n c e o f

to ta l confine ment. A def

endant c onvicted of a cl as s C, D, or E fe lony and sente nced a s a mitiga ted or standard of

fende r is presumed to be a fa vorable candidate “f or alternative sente ncing options in t he absenc e of e vidence to the contra ry .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(6) . Guidance reg arding what-9-

constitutes “evidenc e to the contr ary ” to re but the presumption can be fou n d i n Tenne ssee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (1 ), wh ic h s e ts f orth the fo llo wi ng c on sid e ratio ns : (A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty by restra ining a

defe ndant who has
a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essary to avoid depre ciating the s eriousness of the offe nse or c on fi ne me nt is p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strict ive than conf inement havefre quently

or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1)

. Although the presumption of alternative sente ncing was a v ai l ab le to the Appellant, a nd considere d by

the trial court, the court de nied any form of a lternative se ntenci n g fi n d i n g: (1) a leng thy history of criminal conduct; (2) confine ment was nece ssary to a void de prec i at i n g the
se ri ou sn e ss o f the of

fe ns e s; a nd (3 ) that me a su re s le ss re str ic tiv e than c on fi ne me nt ha d f re qu e ntl y or re cently

been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the Appellant. The trial court f urther obse rved:

The fa ct of the ma tter is that in the 18 y ear s that I have be en on the be nch I have n o t come across a

defe ndant that I

find puts society

at more risk than Mr. Waddell. . . . [ H] av i n g s ee n these letter s, having looked at the pictur es and the draw ings, ha v in g h e ar d th e ta p e w h e r e it

is o b v io u s th a t h e is th r e a te n in g O f f ic er H ar d i n , I b e l i e v e t h a ti n c ar c e r a t i o n i s n e c e s s ar y i n t h i s c a s e
. . . H e h a s a l o n g h i s t o r y, by his own admission of criminal conduc t. . . . He ha s been on probation, and he has continued to commit crimes. He lef t the State of F lorida, appa

rently , beca

use he w as in so much hot water with the leg al sy stem down there . The fa ct of the ma tter is, this man, his life has been drug s and g uns and shooting of

those g uns, drive-by

shootings, drug dealing

. One pa rticular se ction of one of

the letters that I looked at starte d, “You know wh a t a n A K c a n d o. I t st a y s d ow n lo w, lik e me
. . . . I a lso g ot me a

ne w f ri e nd . H is
na me is M AC -1 0. Yo u n e e d to me e t him. He ha s a fe w 36 frie nd s. Whe n I re le a se t h e i r p o w e r , i tw i l l b e a

f

— i n g w ar
. D o y o u w a n tt o b e i n t h e w ar ?

The re cord supports the trial court’s f indings that sente nces of total confineme nt are war rante d.-10- CO NC LU SION

B a s e d u p o nth e f o r e g o in g , we a ffirm the se ntencing decisions of the Sumner County Criminal Court and the trial c ourt’s imposition of an eff ective thirty -y ear

sentenc e.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE