1342 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

Related Information 

(l) For more information about this AD, 

contact Berhane Alazar, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; telephone (425) 917–6577; fax (425) 

917–6590. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(m) You must use Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 727–53–0232, dated 

September 23, 2009, to do the actions 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at an NARA facility, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

December 17, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–188 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–28435 Directorate 

Identifier 2007–CE–054–AD; Amendment 

39–16556; AD 2011–01–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; GROB– 

WERKE GMBH & CO KG Models G102 

ASTIR CS, G102 CLUB ASTIR III, G102 

CLUB ASTIR IIIb, and G102 

STANDARD ASTIR III Gliders 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

As a result of the replacement action of the 

G 103 TWIN ASTIR spar spigot assemblies, 

the Gliding Federation of Australia issued a 

directive to inspect the similar main spigots 

of single-seater sailplanes. 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

February 14, 2011. 

On February 14, 2011, the Director of 

the Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in this AD. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Grob Aircraft; 

Lettenbachstr. 9; TussenhausenMattsies; Head of Customer Service & 

Support, Germany; telephone: +49 (0) 

8268 998 139; fax: +49 (0) 8268 998 200; 

E-mail: productsupport@grobaircraft.com; Web site: http://www.grobaircraft.com. You may review copies of 

the referenced service information at the 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 

Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 816–329– 

4148. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT ONE

OF THE FOLLOWING:

• Jim Rutherford, Aerospace 

Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane 

Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, 

Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: 

(816) 329–4165; fax: (816) 329–4090. 

• Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 

Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, 

Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329– 

4130; fax: (816) 329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

History of AD Actions 

When the State of Design issues MCAI 

against a product that is certificated for 

operation in the United States, the FAA 

evaluates this information and either 

issues a corresponding U.S. AD or 

completes a no action required (NAR) 

form. In 1988, the FAA’s Brussels, 

Belgium office evaluated MCAIs. When 

the Brussels office determined an AD 

was necessary, the corresponding 

Directorate issued an AD for the 

product. NAR forms were completed by 

the Brussels office. When a NAR form 

was completed, the Directorates did not 

always receive a copy since they were 

not required to take action. 

The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA), 

which is the airworthiness authority for 

Germany, issued AD 88–176 Grob, dated 

August 15, 1988, to apply to the GROB– 

WERKE GMBH & CO KG G103 twin-seat 

gliders. That AD required inspection 

and replacement of the spar spigot 

assembly to prevent fatigue failure of 

the spigot. The FAA issued AD 90–02– 

09 (55 FR 269, January 4, 1990), 

effective February 5, 1990, to mandate 

replacement of the spigot assembly for 

the G103 twin-seat versions of the 

glider. 

The LBA issued 91–5/2 Grob, dated 

February 1, 1991, to apply to the GROB– 

WERKE GMBH & CO KG G102 singleseat gliders. The MCAI states: 

As a result of the replacement action of the 

G 103 TWIN ASTIR spar spigot assemblies, 

the Gliding Federation of Australia issued a 

directive to inspect the similar main spigots 

of single-seater sailplanes. 

The MCAI requires you to inspect the 

wing main spigot assembly before the 

next flight and replace it on the G102 

single-seat gliders. You may obtain 

further information by examining the 

MCAI in the AD docket. 

The FAA inadvertently did not issue 

an AD on the single-seat versions at the 

time the LBA issued AD 91–5/2 Grob. 

The FAA finds no AD or NAR 

information to correspond with German 

AD 91–5/2 Grob from that time period. 

In 1997/1998, the responsibility to 

evaluate MCAIs transferred from 

Brussels to the Directorates. The 

Directorates assimilated all of the 

Brussels information into the 

Directorate information, identifying if 

ADs were issued, if NAR forms were 

completed, or if neither action was 

taken. During this time, the Small 

Airplane Directorate issued a total of 

310 AD actions in fiscal year (FY) 1998. 

This was an increase of 79 percent over 

the 173 total actions issued in FY–97, 

and a 121 percent increase over the 140 

total actions issued in FY–96. This 

workload increase contributed to the 

FAA not identifying the German AD 91– 

5/2 Grob as an item without a U.S. AD 

or NAR correspondence associated with 

it. 


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In early 2005, through discussions 

with Grob representatives, we 

determined that we needed to address 

the unsafe condition for the G102 

single-seat versions of the glider in the 

United States. 

After further review of the data, we 

determined AD action is necessary to 

correct an unsafe condition on the G102 

versions of the glider for the following 

reasons: 

• Cracks have been found on the wing 

spigot assemblies installed on the G102 

single-seat gliders. Several of these 

cracks were internal to the spigot and 

were not visually detectable until the 

component failed. 

• Cracks in the wing spigot assembly 

pin-to-plate interface could cause the 

spar spigot to fail with little or no 

warning. 

• The manufacturer has maintained 

their position that the original wing 

spigot assembly design is inadequate to 

sustain the structure for the operational 

service life of the aircraft. 

Consequently, we issued a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 

14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that 

would apply to the specified products. 

The NPRM was published in the 

Federal Register on July 30, 2007 (72 FR 

41466). That NPRM proposed to correct 

an unsafe condition for the specified 

products. 

The public responded to this 

published notice, and the FAA 

appreciates the numerous comments 

submitted for consideration in 

addressing this important airworthiness 

issue. Our comment disposition took a 

considerable amount of time researching 

and organizing data to adequately 

address those comments. Through the 

comment disposition process, we found 

that the material required for the repair 

was not available in the United States 

and an undue cost burden would have 

been placed on operators to get the 

repair material from Germany. We 

coordinated the use of an alternate 

resin/hardener for the repair that is 

available in the United States. 

History of the Unsafe Condition 

The original design of the spar spigot 

utilizes a steel pin with a welded steel 

plate adjacently attached. The welded 

interface between the pin and the plate 

is the critical area subjected to structural 

fatigue. This mode of failure has 

resulted in a redesign (design 

enhancement) of the spar spigot 

assembly that uses no welds and has 

additional filleting to increase part 

strength, durability, and enhances 

reliability. Therefore, based on the 

potential severity of failure, the FAA 

determined that the originally designed 

spar spigots should be replaced. 

When Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt 

(Grob) issued Service Bulletin TM 306– 

29; TM 320–5, issue date: October 11, 

1990, there were no reports of crack 

occurrences in Germany. However, Grob 

implemented this measure to ensure the 

safety of their gliders. 

The Gliding Federation of Australia’s 

Airworthiness Directive number 370, 

Issue 2, dated January 10, 1991, stated 

a large percentage of their single-seat 

G102 series gliders, at that time, were 

found to contain cracks. The exact 

figure for the number of occurrences is 

not known. The results of one repair 

shop in Australia revealed that of 12 

spigot assemblies replaced on the 

single-seat models, 7 were found to have 

cracks. Several of these cracks were 

internal to the spigot. Internal cracks 

located in this area would not be 

visually detectable until the component 

failed. 

The LBA issued AD 91–5/2 Grob to 

mandate the action from Grob’s service 

bulletin; this action was later adopted in 

Europe, New Zealand, Canada, and 

Brazil. 

After evaluating the crack findings 

from the Gliding Federation of 

Australia, the position of Grob’s 

technical advisors, and the actions of 

the German airworthiness authority, we 

determined it necessary to issue this AD 

action. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received. 

Comment Issue No. 1: Proposed AD 

Lacks Supporting Evidence 

Cindy Brickner, John H. Campbell, 

David Forrest, Hartley L. Falbaum, 

Philippe C. Marchal, Bruce Stobbe, and 

the Soaring Society of America (SSA) 

cite lack of rationale to mandate the 

unconditional replacement of the wing 

main spigot assembly. The spar spigot 

assembly is serviceable, and there is no 

evidence or history of problems for the 

G102 series gliders. We infer the 

commenters want us to withdraw the 

NPRM. 

We disagree with the comment. 

Because a failure has not occurred is no 

justification that imminent failure to 

this critical structure could not happen. 

The Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service 

Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 320–5, issue 

date: October 11, 1990, states that 

inspection and replacement of the spar 

spigot assembly was due to an increased 

occurrence of cracks found on Grob’s 

single-seat Astir series that operated in 

Australia. The Gliding Federation of 

Australia has identified at least nine 

occurrences of cracks found during the 

inspection of the single-seat gliders. 

Consequently, the occurrences of 

cracked pins resulted in Australia 

issuing AD 370, Issue 2, dated January 

10, 1991. 

Although a critical failure of the spar 

spigot assembly has not been 

documented in the United States, Grob 

maintains that the original design of the 

wing spar spigot assembly is inadequate 

to meet the airframe life limits and can 

not be repaired as a long-term corrective 

action. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 2: Request 

Repetitive Inspections Instead of a 

Calendar-Based Replacement 

Cindy Brickner, Robert DeFabio, 

David M. Forrest, Philippe C. Marchal, 

Bruce Stobbe, and the SSA, request 

allowing frequent or annual inspections 

in lieu of the required wing main spigot 

replacement citing that inspections 

would provide adequate warning before 

spigot failure. 

We disagree with the comment. Based 

on information from the manufacturer, 

the original design of the wing main 

spigot assembly uses materials and/or a 

configuration deemed inadequate to 

sustain the structure for the operation 

and service life of the aircraft. 

The critical failure mode of the wing 

spar spigot assembly is at the weld of 

the steel pin-to-plate interface. Cracks in 

these welds could cause the spar spigot 

to fail with little or no warning. If this 

joint fails, then failure of the wing spar 

could occur. Considering this situation, 

using an inspection to determine 

airworthiness is not a comprehensive 

method for ensuring the safety of the 

airframe. 

The spar spigot assembly is based on 

a safe-life design philosophy. A safe-life 

design structure must be able to sustain 

a certain number of events such as 

flights, landings, and/or flight hours 

with a low probability that the strength 

will degrade below its design ultimate 

value due to fatigue cracking. In this 

type of structural design, there is no 

redundant or backup structural element 

to retain the structure’s residual strength 

after the failure or partial failure of the 

principle structural element: the pin-toplate interface. 

From the FAA’s perspective, in a safelife designed structure, the development 

of a detectable crack is considered 

fatigue failure. Since a safe-life 

evaluation usually does not include 

demonstration of crack growth rates or 

residual strength capability, we assume 

that the development of a detectable 


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crack may result in a catastrophic 

failure of the structure. The replacement 

spar spigot assembly has been 

redesigned to be more robust due to the 

manufacturing process used along with 

additional filleting which enhances 

fatigue resistance. 

The new design also removes the 

critical failure mode and the 

requirements for weld inspections. 

Therefore, at Grob’s discretion, a design 

enhancement, not a work-around 

solution, was implemented in order to 

increase the safety of this structural 

interface. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 3: The German 

MCAI Is Less Severe Than the Proposed 

AD 

Hartley L. Falbaum and Bruce Stobbe 

interpret that the German AD allows 

cracks to be blended out and the parts 

to remain in service. Consequently, 

there is adequate warning prior to 

failure. They request an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) to the 

requirements of the proposed AD. 

We disagree with the comment and 

the interpretation. The MCAI clearly 

states the requirements to inspect and 

replace the wing main spigot assembly. 

The Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service 

Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 320–5, issue 

date: October 11, 1990, authorizes crack 

removal by blending based on specific, 

detailed criteria. Regardless, if the 

criterion is or is not met, the wing main 

spigot assembly must be replaced 

within a given time. Finally, cracks in 

the welds of the pin-to-plate interface 

could cause the spar spigot to fail with 

little or no warning. 

We are not changing this final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 4: Limited Number 

of Repair Facilities 

Cindy Brickner, John H. Campbell, 

Robert DeFabio, David Forrest, Hartley 

L. Falbaum, Bruce Stobbe, and the SSA 

express concerns that an adequate repair 

facility may not be available to do the 

repair. 

We partially agree with this comment. 

The closing of Grob’s repair facility in 

Bluffton, Ohio, leaves few repair 

facilities with direct experience in doing 

this work. However, 14 CFR part 65 

provides that an appropriately rated 

mechanic with an inspection 

authorization or an appropriately rated 

mechanic under the oversight of a 

mechanic with an inspection 

authorization is approved for this level 

of repair. We are aware of the cost and 

travel impacts of this AD on the gliding 

community. However, this does not 

diminish the need to do the repair, and 

a glider that has not had the 

replacement of the wing main spigot 

assembly has a corresponding reduction 

in its value. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 5: Risk With the 

Proposed Repair 

Robert DeFabio, Hartley L. Falbaum, 

Philippe C. Marchal, and Bruce Stobbe 

express concerns that fewer repair 

stations with less experienced personnel 

to do the repair will create a greater risk 

than the one the glider is currently 

exposed to. 

We disagree with the comment. We 

issued AD 90–02–09, effective February 

5, 1990, for the twin-seat version of the 

glider, which mandated replacement of 

the spigot assembly. Approximately 120 

of the repairs have been made for this 

AD, all without incident or failure 

attributed to this rework. Further, the 

mandatory repair implemented 

worldwide has had no known failure. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 6: Parts, Tools, and 

Repair Skills Needed May Not Be 

Available 

Cindy Brickner and David Forrest 

express concern that since the closing of 

Grob’s repair facility in Ohio, the parts, 

tools, and repair skills needed may not 

be available to do the proposed AD. 

We disagree with the comment. Parts 

are available for the replacement of the 

wing main spigot assembly from 

Fiberglas-technik, Rudolph Linder 

GmbH & Co. KG; Steige 3, 88487 

Walpertshofen; telephone: +49 7353 

2243; fax: +49 7353 3096; e-mail: 

H.Lindner@t-online.de; Internet: http:// 

www.LTB-Lindner.com. There is also a 

limited supply of parts from Composite 

Aircraft Repair, P.O. Box 2010, 

Moriarty, New Mexico 87035; telephone 

(505) 269-8234; e-mail: 

Robertmudd1u@aol.com. An 

appropriately rated mechanic with an 

inspection authorization or an 

appropriately rated mechanic under the 

oversight of a mechanic with an 

inspection authorization is approved to 

do this repair. Also, approximately 120 

of the repairs have been made for a 

similar AD, all without incident or 

failure attributed to this rework. 

Further, the mandatory repair 

implemented worldwide has had no 

known failure. 

After the NPRM was issued, we found 

that the material required for the repair 

was not available in the United States 

and an undue cost burden would have 

been placed on operators to get the 

repair material from Germany. This final 

rule AD action adds Grob Aircraft 

Repair Instructions No. RI–GROB–001, 

dated May 14, 2009, that lists an 

alternate resin/hardener available in the 

United States. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 7: Extend All 

Compliance Times To Allow Time To 

Get Parts and Schedule Spar Spigot 

Assembly Replacement 

The SSA requests FAA extend all 

compliance times to allow time to 

procure parts and schedule replacement 

of the wing main spigot assembly with 

a qualified repair facility. 

The FAA agrees with the SSA’s 

proposal to extend the compliance time 

for the initial inspection from 10 to 25 

hours time-in-service after the effective 

date of the AD and, if no cracks are 

found, increase the replacement time for 

the wing main spigot assembly from 12 

to 15 months after the effective date of 

the AD. 

Comment Issue No. 8: The Design 

Defect Found on the Twin-Seat Glider 

Is Not Applicable to the Single-Seat 

Glider 

John H. Campbell writes that the 

perceived defect is centered on the 

twin-seat version of the glider. This 

perceived defect should not include the 

single-seat version of this glider. He also 

writes that the twin-seat glider is 

certificated under the aerobatic 

category; the single-seat glider is 

certificated under the utility category. 

We infer that, based on the design and 

operation of the affected single-seat 

glider, the commenter wants the 

proposed AD withdrawn. 

We disagree with this comment. The 

fact that the single-seat glider is lighter 

and certificated in the utility category is 

not relevant. The original design of the 

wing spar spigot assembly of the singleseat and twin-seat gliders is insufficient 

to meet the airframe life limits. The type 

design of the G102 series gliders is 

similar to the type design of the G103 

series gliders. As a result, the German 

airworthiness authority issued its ADs. 

We concur with Grob and the German 

airworthiness authority that this is a 

required AD action. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 9: Withdraw the 

Proposed AD 

John Campbell writes that this issue 

was addressed more than 20 years ago 

and that many Grob sailplanes now 

have thousands of flight hours. The 

MCAI statement from the manufacturer 


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in the NPRM is based on a decision 

made in Australia. Campbell asks why 

the FAA is addressing this now and 

what prompted action on this issue. He 

notes that the gliders made in the 1980s 

are bargain investments. The cost to 

repair is a large part of the total value 

of the glider. Although no specific 

change is requested, based on the 

comment, we infer that the commenter 

wants the NPRM withdrawn. 

For unknown reasons, the FAA did 

not issue an AD on the single-seat 

versions of these gliders at the time the 

German airworthiness authority issued 

its AD. Further, a review of our records 

finds no explanation for the delay in 

addressing this issue. Nevertheless, a 

safety issue exists that must be 

addressed. 

The Gliding Federation of Australia 

noted that in Australia, the single-seat 

G102 series gliders, which have a 

similar type design to the twin-seat 

versions, had reports of cracking in the 

welds of the pins. Consequently, the 

occurrences of cracked pins in several 

gliders resulted in Australia issuing AD 

370, Issue: 2, dated January 10, 1991. 

We recognize that doing this AD to 

maintain the glider’s airworthiness is a 

financial burden. However, a glider that 

has not had the replacement of the wing 

main spigot assembly has a 

corresponding reduction in its value. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action as a result of this comment. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data, 

including the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We determined that these changes will 

not increase the economic burden on 

any operator or increase the scope of the 

AD. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. 

Any such differences are highlighted in 

a Note within the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

79 products of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it will take about 25 workhours per product to comply with the 

basic requirements of this AD. The 

average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. 

Required parts will cost about $840 per 

product. 

Based on these figures, we estimate 

the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators 

to be $234,235 or $2,965 per product. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains the NPRM, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Office 

(telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2011–01–03 GROB–WERKE GMBH & CO 

KG: Amendment 39–16556; Docket No. 

FAA–2007–28435; Directorate Identifier 

2007–CE–054–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective February 14, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to the GROB–WERKE 

GMBH & CO KG gliders Model G102 ASTIR 

CS, serial numbers (SNs) 1001 through 1536; 

Model G102 CLUB ASTIR III, SNs 5501 

(suffix C) through 5652 (suffix C); Model 

G102 CLUB ASTIR IIIb, SNs 5501 (suffix Cb) 

through 5652 (suffix Cb); and Model G102 

STANDARD ASTIR III, SNs 5501 (suffix S) 

through 5652 (suffix S), that are: 

(1) Equipped with any wing spar spigot 

assembly that has not been replaced 

following Grob Luft-und Raumfahrt Service 

Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 320–5, issue date: 

October 11, 1990; and 

(2) Are certificated in any category. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association of America 

(ATA) Code 57: Wings. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

As a result of the replacement action of the 

G 103 TWIN ASTIR spar spigot assemblies, 

the Gliding Federation of Australia issued a 

directive to inspect the similar main spigots 

of single-seater sailplanes. 


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The MCAI requires you to inspect the wing 

main spigot assembly before the next flight 

and replace it. 

Actions and Compliance 

(f) Unless already done, do the following 

actions: 

(1) Within the next 25 hours time-inservice (TIS) after February 14, 2011 (the 

effective date of this AD), inspect both wing 

spar spigot assemblies for cracks using a dyepenetrant or magnetic-particle method 

following Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service 

Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 320–5, issue date: 

October 11, 1990. The use of the 

magnification method is prohibited. 

Note 1: If dye-penetrant method is used, 

great care should be exercised when cleaning 

and/or etching the surfaces and interpreting 

surface faults. 

(2) Replace the wing main spigot assembly 

following Grob Luft- und Raumfahrt Service 

Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 320–5, issue date: 

October 11, 1990; and Grob Aircraft Repair 

Instructions No. RI–GROB–001, dated May 

14, 2009, using whichever of the following 

compliance times that apply: 

(i) If cracks are found during the inspection 

required in paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before 

further flight; or 

(ii) If no cracks are found during the 

inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this 

AD, within the next 15 months after February 

14, 2011 (the effective date of this AD). 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: 

(1) The MCAI compliance time required 

the wing main spigot assembly to be 

inspected before the next flight and 

replacement of the wing spar spigot assembly 

no later than December 31, 1992. This AD 

requires inspection within the next 25 hours 

TIS after February 14, 2011 (the effective date 

of this AD), and replacement prior to further 

flight after the inspection where cracks are 

found or 15 months after February 14, 2011 

(the effective date of this AD), if no cracks 

are found. 

(2) In lieu of authorizing a 10x magnifier 

for inspection as specified in the MCAI, this 

AD requires you use either a dye-penetrant 

or magnetic-particle inspection method. 

(3) After the notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM) was issued, we found that the 

material required for the repair was not 

available in the United States and an undue 

cost burden would have been placed on 

operators to get the repair material from 

Germany. This AD adds Grob Aircraft Repair 

Instructions No. RI–GROB–001, dated May 

14, 2009. This repair instruction lists an 

alternate resin/hardener that is available in 

the United States. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(g) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Staff, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any 

approved AMOC on any airplane to which 

the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight 

Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking 

a PI, your local FSDO. Send information to 

ATTN of one of the following individuals: 

(i) Jim Rutherford, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, 

Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4165; fax: (816) 329– 

4090; or 

(ii) Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, 

Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4130; fax: (816) 329– 

4090. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, a Federal 

agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a 

person is not required to respond to, nor 

shall a person be subject to a penalty for 

failure to comply with a collection of 

information subject to the requirements of 

the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that 

collection of information displays a current 

valid OMB Control Number. The OMB 

Control Number for this information 

collection is 2120–0056. Public reporting for 

this collection of information is estimated to 

be approximately 5 minutes per response, 

including the time for reviewing instructions, 

completing and reviewing the collection of 

information. All responses to this collection 

of information are mandatory. Comments 

concerning the accuracy of this burden and 

suggestions for reducing the burden should 

be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence 

Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: 

Information Collection Clearance Officer, 

AES–200. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to MCAI Federal Republic of 

Germany Luftfahrt-Bundesamt AD 91–5/2 

Grob, dated February 1, 1991; Grob Luft- und 

Raumfahrt Service Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 

320–5, issue date: October 11, 1990; and Grob 

Aircraft Repair Instructions No. RI–GROB– 

001, dated May 14, 2009, for related 

information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Grob Luft-und Raumfahrt 

Service Bulletin TM 306–29; TM 320–5, issue 

date: October 11, 1990; and Grob Aircraft 

Repair Instructions No. RI–GROB–001, dated 

May 14, 2009, to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Grob Aircraft; Lettenbachstr. 

9; Tussenhausen-Mattsies; Head of Customer 

Service & Support, Germany; telephone: +49 

(0) 8268 998 139; fax: +49 (0) 8268 998 200; 

E-mail: productsupport@grob-aircraft.com; 

Web site: http://www.grob-aircraft.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information incorporated by reference for 

this AD at the FAA, Central Region, Office of 

the Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas 

City, Missouri 64106. For information on the 

availability of this material at the Central 

Region, call (816) 329–3768. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information incorporated by reference 

for this AD at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 21, 2010. 

Earl Lawrence, 

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32753 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1279; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–258–AD; Amendment 

39–16568; AD 2010–02–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A300, A300–600, A310, A318, A319, 

A320, A321, A330–300, A340–200, 

A340–300, A340–500, A340–600, and 

A380–800 Series Airplanes; and Model 

A330–201, A330–202, A330–203, A330– 

223, A330–243 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: This document publishes in 

the Federal Register an amendment 

adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 

2010–02–05 that was sent previously by 

individual notices to the known U.S. 

owners and operators of affected 

airplanes identified above. This AD 

requires modifying the flight deck door. 

This AD was prompted by a report 

indicating that certain equipment of the 

flight deck door is defective. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent failure of this 

equipment, which could jeopardize 

flight safety. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

January 18, 2011 to all persons except 

those persons to whom it was made 

immediately effective by AD 2010–02– 

05, which contained the requirements of 

this amendment. 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with RULES_PART 1