a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 2004 MILITARY 

TRANSFORMATION

Fielding of Army’s 

Stryker Vehicles Is 

Well Under Way, but 

Expectations for Their 

Transportability by 

C-130 Aircraft Need to 

Be Clarified

GAO-04-925
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-925.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-925, a report to 

congressional requesters 

August 2004

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 

Fielding of Army’s Stryker Vehicles Is 

Well Under Way, but Expectations for 

Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft 

Need to Be Clarified 

In its transformation to a more 

responsive and mobile force, the 

Army plans to form 6 Stryker 

Brigade Combat teams equipped 

with a new family of armored 

vehicles known as Strykers. The 

Stryker—which provides transport 

for troops, weapons, and command 

and control—was required by the 

Army to weigh no more than 38,000 

pounds and be transportable in 

theater by C-130 cargo aircraft 

arriving ready for immediate 

combat operations. The Army plans 

to equip its future force with a new 

generation of vehicles—Future 

Combat Systems—to also be 

transportable by C-130s. 

GAO was asked to assess (1) the 

current status of Stryker vehicle 

acquisition, including the most 

current Stryker vehicle program 

and operating cost estimates; 

(2) the status and results of Stryker 

vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of 

C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker 

vehicles within a theater of 

operations. This report also 

addresses the transportability of 

the Army’s Future Combat Systems 

on C-130 aircraft. 

GAO recommends that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

provide to Congress clarification of 

expected capabilities and 

limitations of C-130 transport for 

Stryker vehicles and Future 

Combat System vehicles; and 

options for alternative transport. 

DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendations. 

The acquisition of the Stryker vehicles is about two-thirds complete; with 

about 1,200 of 8 production vehicle configurations ordered and 800 delivered 

to units. In addition, limited quantities of two developmental vehicles—the 

Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Reconnaissance vehicle prototypes—have also been ordered for testing. 

Stryker program costs have increased about 22 percent from the November 

2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. 

Total program costs include acquisition costs—procurement, research, 

development, and test and evaluation—as well as military construction costs 

related to Strykers. The Army does not yet have reliable estimates of the 

Stryker’s operating costs because of limited peacetime use to develop data. 

As of June 2004, testing of the eight production Strykers was mostly 

complete, with the vehicles meeting Army operational requirements with 

limitations. However, development and testing schedules of the two 

developmental Strykers have been delayed, resulting in an over 1-year delay 

in meeting the vehicles’ production milestones and fielding dates. 

While the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of Strykers 

by C-130 aircraft in training exercises, in an operational environment, the 

Stryker’s average weight of 38,000 pounds—along with other factors such as 

added equipment weight and less than ideal flight conditions—significantly 

limits the C-130’s flight range and reduces the size force that could be 

deployed. These factors also limit the ability of Strykers to conduct combat 

operations immediately upon arrival as required. With the similar maximum 

weight envisioned for Future Combat System vehicles intended for the 

Army’s future force, the planned C-130 transport of those vehicles would 

present similar challenges. 

Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in Nearly Ideal Flight Conditions 

Range

Source: GAO analysis of Air Mobility Command data.

0 500 1,000 1,500

42,000

40,000

60 miles

 500 miles

600 miles

860 miles

1,000 miles

39,000

38,000

36,000

Cargo payload weight (lbs.)
Page i GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Acquisition of Stryker Production Vehicles Is about Two-thirds 

Complete, Though Overall Program Costs Have Increased, and 

Operational Cost Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable 11

Tested Production Vehicles Generally Met Requirements, but 

Testing and Acquisition Schedules for Developmental Vehicles 

Have Been Delayed 16

Army Demonstrated Required Stryker C-130 Transportability, but 

Contrary to Congressional Expectations, Operational Limits 

Significantly Challenge Routine C-130 Transport 20

Conclusions 28

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix Comments from the Department of Defense 32 

Related GAO Products 34 

Tables 

Table 1: Stryker Vehicle Descriptions 7

Table 2: Stryker Vehicle Acquisition Status As of April 2004 12

Table 3: Increases in Stryker Vehicle Program’s Costs 13

Table 4: Operating Cost Estimates per Vehicle 15

Table 5: Selected Performance Capabilities and Limitations from 

Stryker Evaluation Report 17

Table 6: Stryker Production Vehicle and Total Load Weights at the 

National Training Center in April 2003 22

Table 7: Analysis of C-130 Range from Selected Airfields in the 

Middle East and Afghanistan When Carrying Cargo 

Weighing 38,000 Pounds 25

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Figures 

Figure 1: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle Is One of Eight Production 

Configurations 8

Figure 2: The Mobile Gun System Is One of Two Developmental 

Configurations 9

Figure 3: The Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle 

Is One of Two Developmental Configurations 10

Figure 4: Stryker Vehicle Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National 

Training Center 21

Figure 5: Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft 

in Nearly Ideal Flight Conditions 23

Figure 6: Stryker Vehicle with Slat Armor in Iraq 24

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

RTD&E Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation 

SAR Selected Acquisition Report 

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

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Page 1 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

August 12, 2004 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman, Committee On Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

 Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The U.S. Army is transforming its force to one expected to be more 

strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and able to effectively operate 

in all types of military operations. The first step in the Army’s 

transformation was to form six Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams 

equipped with a new family of 10 armored vehicle configurations known 

as Strykers. Congressional appropriations for the Stryker vehicle program, 

in then-year dollars1

 totaled $4.5 billion from fiscal years 2000 through 

2004. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2005 included $1.3 

billion for the program, leaving $2.9 billion based on current estimates 

needed to complete funding of the $8.7 billion estimated total cost of the 

program.2

 These program costs include acquisition costs-—procurement, 

research, development, and test and evaluation—as well as related 

military construction costs. 

According to the Army’s operational requirements,3

 Stryker vehicles are to 

be transportable by C-130 aircraft within a theater of operation, arriving 

ready for combat operations. The capability of C-130 transport is a key 

performance requirement for the vehicles and is central to the Army’s 

rationale for creating Stryker brigades. The C-130 is a four-engine, high-

 1

 Then-year dollar amounts for a particular year reflect the cost prevailing during that year. 

2

 Appropriations included operations and support costs of $121 million through fiscal year 

2005 for contractor support and maintenance of the vehicles. After 2005 and through the 

life cycle of the vehicles, operations and support costs are to be included in the Army’s 

Operations and Maintenance budget account. 

3

 Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document For A Family of Stryker 

Vehicles, Prepared for Milestone III Decision (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2004). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

wing cargo aircraft that the U.S. Air Force primarily uses as a short-range 

transporter. The first Stryker brigade became operational in October 2003, 

at which time it was deployed to Iraq. Beginning in 2010, the Army plans to 

begin the transition to its future force—the Objective Force—and to equip 

this force with a new generation of vehicles known as Future Combat 

Systems,4 which are also, according to operational requirements,5 to be 

transportable in theater by C-130 air transport. 

In your initial request, you asked us to review the Stryker vehicle’s 

capabilities, performance, costs, and ability to meet operational and 

mission requirements. You later asked us to assess the transportability of 

Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft. We provided your offices our 

preliminary observations on these issues in October and November 2003 

and April 2004, and this report summarizes and updates the information 

provided in those meetings. Our objectives were to determine (1) the 

current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition, including the most current 

Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates; (2) the status and 

results of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to 

transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of operations. We also address 

transportability of the Army’s Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft. 

To conduct our review of Stryker vehicle acquisition status, costs, and 

testing results, we interviewed officials and analyzed documents from the 

Army’s Stryker Program Management Office and Test and Evaluation 

Command and reviewed Army and Department of Defense developmental, 

operational, and survivability test reports. In our assessment of the ability 

of C-130 airlift to transport Stryker vehicles, we reviewed a study of the C130 aircraft’s range and payload capabilities, and interviewed U.S. Army, 

Air Force, and Transportation Command officials. We determined that the 

data and documents we reviewed were sufficiently reliable to answer our 

objectives. We performed our review from July 2003 through June 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 

more detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented later 

 4

 According to the Army, the Objective Force is the force that achieves the objectives of the 

Army’s transformation. The Army further states that this future force will capitalize on 

advances in science and technology enabling the Army to equip its forces with Future 

Combat Systems to include manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and 

munitions. These vehicles and systems are expected to be a fraction of the weight of 

existing heavy fighting vehicles to improve transportability. 

5

 Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document for the Future Combat 

Systems (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2003). 
Page 3 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

in the report. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this 

report. 

Acquisition of the Stryker production vehicles6

 is about two-thirds 

complete, but overall program costs are higher than earlier estimates and 

vehicle operating cost estimates are not yet reliable. The Army has ordered 

more than 1,200—or 68 percent—of the 8 Stryker production vehicle 

configurations it plans to buy, along with limited quantities of the two 

developmental vehicle prototypes for testing. Of the production vehicles, 

800 have been delivered to Stryker brigades. Estimated total costs for the 

Stryker vehicle program increased about 22 percent, from the original 

November 2000 estimate, in then-year dollars, of $7.1 billion to the 

December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. The average acquisition cost per 

vehicle increased from $3.34 million to $4.13 million during the same time 

period. The largest increase in the Stryker program’s cost estimate 

resulted from the cost of military construction, such as the cost of 

upgrading vehicle maintenance facilities for Strykers. However with the 

deployment of the first Stryker Brigade to Iraq, the Army did not have 

reliable estimates of Stryker vehicle operating costs because it does not 

yet have sufficient operational experience with the vehicles in peacetime. 

As of June 2004, the testing of the eight Stryker production vehicles is 

mostly complete with the vehicles meeting operational requirements with 

certain limitations, but the testing and acquisition schedules of the two 

developmental Strykers—the Mobile Gun System and Nuclear, Biological, 

and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance vehicles—have been delayed. The 

Stryker vehicle system evaluations by the Army and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) determined that the production vehicles met 

operational requirements with some limitations and, overall, support the 

key operational capabilities and effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team. Delays in development and testing of the Mobile Gun 

System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicles will result in about a 1- to 2-

year delay in meeting originally planned production decision milestones 

and fielding dates. 

 6

 Eight of 10 Stryker vehicle configurations are considered production ready because these 

vehicles have already undergone system development and engineering. Two of the 10 

vehicle configurations are developmental because design, development, and testing are 

needed before they can go into production. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Although the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of 

Strykers by C-130s during training events, the C-130 has a limited 

capability to transport the Stryker vehicle in an operational environment 

except under favorable conditions. Because of the Strykers’ average 

38,000-pound weight, using C-130 aircraft to transport Strykers in an 

operational environment would limit flight range, the size force that could 

be deployed, and the ability to conduct operations immediately upon 

arrival—a key operational requirement for Stryker vehicles. Additional 

weight, such as from mission equipment or armor and less than ideal 

environmental conditions, poses significant challenges. For example, 

according to a study of C-130 transport of Army vehicles by the Military 

Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, an 

armored C-130H7

 aircraft taking off in ideal conditions such as moderate 

air temperature could transport 38,000 pounds for a maximum range of 

860 miles. Adding just 2,000 pounds onboard the aircraft for associated 

cargo such as mission equipment or ammunition reduces the C-130 

aircraft’s takeoff-to-landing range to only 500 miles. Furthermore, a C-130 

with a 38,000-pound Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to take off 

at all from locations in higher elevations, such as Afghanistan, during 

daytime in the summer. Because of these constraints, equipment and 

supplies for the Strykers might need to be moved on separate aircraft, 

increasing the numbers of aircraft or sorties8

 needed to deploy a Stryker 

force, deployment time, and the time it would take after arrival to begin 

operations. In addition, if fitted with additional armor for increased 

protection against weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, a Stryker 

vehicle would be unable to fit inside a C-130, and with added weight of the 

armor, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off. At the envisioned 

38,000-pound maximum weight of the Future Combat System vehicles, the 

planned C-130 transport of those vehicles for the Army’s Future Objective 

Force would present the same challenges. 

Given the challenges of C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles, the Army’s 

operational requirements and congressional expectations for such 

transport, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in 

consultation with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, clarify for 

 7

 The current C-130 inventory is mostly comprised of various configurations of the E and H 

models. C-130 armor protects the aircraft in hostile areas from weapons such as small arms 

and rocket-propelled grenades. The armor adds about 1,600 pounds to the weight of the 

aircraft. 

8

 In air operations, a sortie is defined as an operational flight by one aircraft. 
Page 5 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Congress (1) the expected deployment capabilities of Stryker brigades and 

Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft within a theater of operations and the 

types of operational missions using C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles 

that would be achievable; (2) potential operational capability limitations of 

Stryker brigades given the limits of C-130 transport; and (3) options for, 

and availability of, alternative modes of transportation for transporting 

Stryker brigades within an operational theater. We are also recommending 

that the department include similar clarification for C-130 transport of 

Future Combat System vehicles. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD’s comments are in 

the appendix and our evaluation of its comments is on page 29. 

The Stryker family of vehicles consists of 10 eight-wheeled armored 

vehicles mounted on a common chassis that provide transport for troops, 

weapons, and command and control. Stryker vehicles weigh on average 

about 19 tons—or 38,000 pounds, substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams 

tanks (68 tons) and the Bradley Fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary 

combat platforms of the Army’s heavier armored units. The C-130 cargo 

aircraft is capable of tactical, or in-theater, transport of one Stryker 

vehicle; the Army’s Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting vehicle exceed the 

C-130 aircraft’s size and weight limits. 

The Army’s original operational requirements for Stryker vehicles9

included (1) the capability of entering, being transportable in, and exiting a 

C-130 aircraft; (2) the vehicle’s combat capable deployment weight10 must 

not exceed 38,000 pounds to allow C-130 transport of 1,000 miles; and (3) 

the Stryker vehicles must be capable of immediate combat operations 

after unloading.11 The Army’s most current operational requirements for 

 9

 Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document For A Family of Interim 

Armored Vehicles, Prepared for Milestone II Decision (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2000).

10 According to Army contracting officials, combat capable deployment weight is the weight 

of Stryker vehicles along with any equipment for the vehicles, such as communications 

systems or weapons that allow the capability to conduct combat operations immediately 

after unloading from an aircraft. 

11 The Army’s Test and Evaluation Command defined “immediate” to mean between 15 and 

40 minutes upon off-loading from the aircraft, depending on the vehicle variant. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Stryker vehicles required the same vehicle weight and C-130 transport 

capabilities without reference to C-130 transport of 1,000 miles. The Army 

has similar operational requirements for its Future Combat Systems’ 

vehicles. The Army’s April 2003 Operational Requirements document for 

the Future Combat Systems requires the vehicles’ essential combat 

configuration to be no greater than 38,000 pounds and have a size suitable 

for C-130 aircraft transport. A memorandum of agreement between the Air 

Force and the Army issued in 2003,12 set procedures allowing C-130 

transport of 38,000-pound Stryker vehicles aboard Air Force aircraft, but 

required that the combined weight of the vehicles, other cargo, and 

passengers shall not exceed C-130 operational capabilities, which vary 

based on mission requirements, weather, airfield conditions, among other 

factors. 

Eight of the 10 vehicle configurations are being acquired production 

ready—meaning they require little engineering design and development 

work prior to production. Two of the 10 vehicle configurations, the Mobile 

Gun System and the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle, are developmental 

vehicle variants—meaning that a substantial amount of design, 

development, and testing is needed before they can go into production. 

Table 1 provides descriptions of the ten Stryker vehicles. Three of the 

vehicles are shown in figures 1 to 3. 

 12 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Air Force and United States Army 

for Air-Transport of the Stryker, signed by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. 

Army, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

4, 2003). 
Page 7 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Table 1: Stryker Vehicle Descriptions 

Vehicle configuration Description 

Production vehicles 

Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle 

Provides the brigade’s primary tank-killing system. It 

reinforces the brigade reconnaissance squadron and 

provides long-range direct fires. 

Commander’s vehicle 

Provides the brigade with the means to receive 

information and data, analyze, prepare and transmit 

data; and control the forces/ functions carrying out 

combat missions. 

Engineer Squad vehicle 

Provides maneuver/mobility support capabilities, 

which include obstacle clearing, in-stride breaching of 

surface mines, proofing of subsurface mines, and 

smoke generation for local protection. 

Fire Support vehicle 

Provides automated enhanced surveillance, target 

acquisition, target identification, target tracking, target 

designation, position location, and communications 

functionality. 

Infantry Carrier vehicle 

Provides protected transport and supporting fires for 

the infantry squad during dismounted assault. It 

carries an infantry squad with individual equipment. 

Medical Evaluation vehicle 

The battalion aid station for brigade units, providing 

treatment for serious injury and advanced trauma 

cases. 

Mortar Carrier 

Provides infantry units with screening obscurants, 

suppressive forces and on-call supporting fires. 

120mm and 81mm variants provide responsive, 

accurate and lethal indirect fire support to the 

dismounted infantry assault. 

Reconnaissance vehicle 

Provides force situational awareness, gathering and 

transmitting real time intelligence while moving 

throughout the battlefield in close, complex, and 

urban terrain. 

Developmental vehicles 

Mobile Gun System 

Supports dismounted infantry and engages the 

enemy in close combat to clear opposition and permit 

rapid movement, allowing the force to maintain the 

initiative, occupy and/ or secure key objectives, and 

defeat strong points. 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

(NBC) Reconnaissance vehicle 

Provides on-the-move and remote near-real-time 

nuclear, biological, and chemical detection and 

surveillance. 

Source: U.S. Army. 
Page 8 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Figure 1: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle Is One of Eight Production Configurations 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 9 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Figure 2: The Mobile Gun System Is One of Two Developmental Configurations 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 10 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Figure 3: The Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle Is One of Two 

Developmental Configurations 

The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry 

brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first two of six planned 

Stryker brigades. The first of these brigades, the 3rd Brigade, Second 

Infantry Division, became operational in October 2003, at which time the 

Brigade was deployed to Iraq. The second of the two Fort Lewis brigades 

became operational in May 2004, and plans are for it to deploy to Iraq in 

late 2004. The Army plans to form four more Stryker brigades from 2005 

through 2008. The planned locations of the next four brigades are Fort 

Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield 

Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 11 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Acquisition of the eight Stryker production vehicle configurations is about 

two-thirds complete with about 68 percent of the over 1,800-planned 

production vehicles ordered, and a low rate of production for the two 

developmental Strykers is scheduled for September 2004. Estimated 

program costs have increased because of, among other reasons, increases 

in the Army’s estimate for related military construction, such as for the 

cost of building new Stryker vehicle maintenance facilities. However, the 

Army does not yet have reliable estimates for the Stryker’s operating costs, 

such as for vehicle maintenance, because of limited peacetime operational 

experience with the vehicles. 

The Army is pursuing three acquisition schedules for the Stryker 

production and developmental vehicles. Since the November 2000 Stryker 

vehicle contract award,13 the Army has ordered 1,231 production 

vehicles—about 68 percent—of the 1,814 production vehicles the Army 

plans to buy for the six Stryker brigades. Of the 1,231 vehicles ordered, 800 

have been delivered to the brigades, including all of the production 

vehicles for the first two Stryker brigades. The Army is currently fielding 

Stryker production vehicles for the third of the six planned brigades. The 

third brigade is to be fielded in Alaska. 

Thus far, the Army has bought limited quantities of the developmental 

vehicle variants—8 Mobile Gun System and 4 NBC Reconnaissance 

vehicles—as prototypes and for use in testing at various test sites around 

the country. Of 238 Mobile Gun Systems the Army plans to buy overall, 

current plans are to buy 72 initially upon approval for low-rate initial 

production scheduled for September 2004. The Army plans low-rate initial 

production of 17 NBC Reconnaissance vehicles also in September 2004. 

The Mobile Gun System is not scheduled to reach a full production 

decision until September 2006 at the earliest, while the NBC 

Reconnaissance vehicle is not scheduled to reach its full production 

decision until 2007. Table 2 below shows the status of Stryker vehicle 

acquisition as of April 2004. 

 13 On November 16, 2000, the Army awarded a contract for Interim Armored vehicles, now 

called Stryker Vehicles, to General Motors General Dynamics Defense Group L.L.C; a joint 

venture of General Motors Defense-Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems. In 2003 

General Dynamics Land Systems bought General Motors Defense-Canada. 

Acquisition of Stryker 

Production Vehicles Is 

about Two-thirds 

Complete, Though 

Overall Program 

Costs Have Increased, 

and Operational Cost 

Estimates Are Not Yet 

Reliable 

About Two-thirds of 

Stryker Production Vehicle 

Acquisition Completed 
Page 12 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Table 2: Stryker Vehicle Acquisition Status As of April 2004 

Vehicle configuration/ 

variant 

Total planned 

quantities

Quantities

ordered Percent

Quantities 

delivered 

Percent of planned 

quantities

Production vehicles 

 Infantry carrier 699 445 64 328 47

 Reconnaissance 393 290 74 140 36

 Mortar carrier 224 127 57 85 38

 Medical evacuation 114 79 69 47 41

 Commander’s 112 80 71 41 37

 Fire-Support 108 80 74 39 36

 Antitank guided missile 88 88 100 88 100

 Engineer squad 76 42 55 32 42

Production vehicle total 1,814 1,231 68 800 44

Developmental vehicles 

 NBC Reconnaissance 44 4 9 4 9

 Mobile Gun System 238 8 3 8 3

Developmental vehicle total 282 12 4 12 4

Total 2,096 1,243 59 812 39

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Note: Percentages are rounded. 

The Stryker vehicle program’s total costs increased, in then-year dollars, 

from the original November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 

2003 estimate of $8.7 billion—or about 22 percent.14 The increases 

occurred primarily due to revised estimates for the associated cost of 

military construction, such as that needed to upgrade maintenance and 

training facilities for a Stryker brigade, but were also due to lesser 

increases in procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) costs for the vehicles—which together grew by about 8 percent 

from the original November 2000 estimate. 

In then-year dollars, the estimated cost of military construction accounted 

for the largest increase in the Stryker program’s cost estimate. In 

 14 This information was included in DOD’s Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) submitted to 

the Congress for the period ending December 31, 2003. The SAR summarizes the latest 

estimates of cost, schedule, and technical status of major defense acquisition programs. 

Stryker Vehicle Program’s 

Costs Have Increased from 

Earlier Estimates 
Page 13 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

December 2003, the Army increased its estimate for military construction 

by about $1.01 billion over the original November 2000 estimate, from $322 

million to $1.3 billion. (See table 3.) As in all major Department of Defense 

acquisition programs, military construction costs are included in the 

program’s total costs. According to the Army, the military construction 

cost estimate increased because the December 2003 estimate reflects (1) 

the identification of all five sites scheduled to receive Stryker brigades and 

(2) the total cost of upgrading or building maintenance and training 

facilities at these installations to accommodate a Stryker brigade. When 

the original estimate was made, only one site had been identified to 

receive a Stryker brigade and that estimate identified just the cost of 

maintenance facility upgrades. 

Table 3: Increases in Stryker Vehicle Program’s Costs 

Then-year dollars in millions 

Cost element 

November 2000 

(original estimate) December 2003 Increase/decrease

Military construction $322.2 $1,333.3 $1,011.1

Procurement $6,290.0 $6,679.8 $389.8

Research, development, test, & evaluation $508.0 $645.6 $137.6

Total cost $7,120.2 $8,658.7 $1,538.5

Total number of vehiclesa 2131 2096 (35.0)

Average acquisition cost per vehicleb $3.34 $4.13 $0.79

Source: U.S. Army. 

Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative. 

a

Planned vehicle quantities are subject to change because of modifications to the Stryker Brigade’s 

design. 

b

Total acquisition cost/number of vehicles. 

The Stryker vehicle’s procurement costs increased by about $390 million. 

The largest factor in the increase of procurement costs was the higher 

than originally estimated costs of procuring add-on reactive armor,15

including the additional costs to equip six Stryker brigades with add-on 

armor, instead of four brigades as originally planned. Also, the cost of 

 15 Stryker vehicles are built from ballistic steel and covered with ceramic armor that can 

withstand 14.5mm ammunition. For added protection against rocket-propelled grenades, 

the vehicles are designed to carry removable add-on reactive armor. The add-on armor is 

currently in development and will not be available until 2005. Strykers currently deployed 

to Iraq are fitted with slat armor to protect against rocket-propelled grenades. 
Page 14 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

RDT&E increased about $138 million, from $508 million to $645.6 million. 

Most of the RDT&E cost increase is attributable to revised estimates for 

the cost of test and evaluation, development, and system engineering for 

the developmental vehicles. The average acquisition cost per vehicle 

increased by about $0.79 million, from $3.34 million to $4.13 million. The 

program costs and average acquisition cost per vehicle estimates reflect a 

reduction in the number of Strykers planned from 2,131 to 2,096. (See 

table 3 above.) 

The Army does not have reliable estimates of Stryker vehicle operating 

costs because, with the first Stryker brigade’s deployment to Iraq, it lacks 

sufficient peacetime operational experience with the vehicles. The Army 

considers 3 years of actual peacetime operational cost data to be sufficient 

for reliable estimates.16 Since none of the production vehicles have 3 years 

of peacetime operating experience, reliable operating cost estimates will 

not be available until 2005 at the earliest. With the Mobile Gun System and 

NBC Reconnaissance vehicles still in development, it will be several years 

before these vehicles are fully fielded and sufficient data are available for 

reliable estimates of their operating costs. 

According to the Army, current Stryker vehicle operating cost estimates, 

shown in table 4 below, are engineering estimates based in part on 

operating costs for another vehicle in the Army’s inventory—the M-113 

armored personnel carrier.17 The estimates assume peacetime operations. 

 16 The Army uses peacetime operational cost data, rather than data collected during 

operations such as in Iraq, because peacetime data is more representative of actual longterm operating costs. 

17 The Army used operating costs of the M113 for its Stryker vehicle operating cost 

estimates because the M113 is a medium-weight armored personnel carrier that has been in 

the Army’s inventory for a number of years. Therefore, the Army had historical peacetime 

operating costs for the vehicle. 

Limited Peacetime 

Operational Experience 

Makes Operating Cost 

Estimates Unreliable 
Page 15 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Table 4: Operating Cost Estimates per Vehicle 

Fiscal year 2004 constant dollars 

Vehicle configuration Cost per-mile estimate

Medical Evaluation vehicle $12.27

Reconnaissance vehicle $16.48

Infantry Carrier vehicle $17.19

Fire Support vehicle $18.78

Commander’s vehicle $21.33

Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle $22.05

Engineer Squad vehicle $25.66

Mortar Carrier $28.96

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle $35.62

Mobile Gun System $69.76

Source: U.S. Army Stryker Program Office. 

Note: Estimates are based, in part, on costs of Army’s M-113 armored personnel carrier. 

Vehicle operating costs include the cost for maintenance, repair, and the 

cost of consumable and repairable parts. The Army calculates vehicle cost 

per mile by tracking vehicle mileage and the actual costs of consumable or 

replaceable parts used.18 However, the short time frame from fielding the 

first Stryker brigade’s production vehicles—May 2002 through January 

2003—and the brigades’ deployment to Iraq in October 2003, limited the 

amount of time and miles the vehicles were in peacetime service. 

Similarly, fielding of Stryker vehicles for the second brigade was 

completed in January 2004. While the Army collected operational cost and 

mileage data for both brigades, there were insufficient actual operating 

costs and miles on the vehicles to make reliable estimates. Consequently, 

until the Army can collect more actual peacetime operating cost data for 

the production vehicles, it will not be able to determine actual vehicle 

operating costs and make reliable operating cost estimates for these 

vehicles. Similarly, reliable operating cost estimates for the Mobile Gun 

System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicle will not be available until after 

2006 when they are scheduled to begin full production and fielding. 

 18 Operating costs do not include petroleum, oil, and lubricant costs. 
Page 16 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

According to Army and OSD test reports19, the tested Stryker production 

vehicles met operational requirements with certain limitations and, 

overall, support the key operational capabilities and force effectiveness of 

the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The separate developmental testing 

schedules of the Mobile Gun System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicles 

have been delayed, resulting in delays in meeting planned production 

milestone dates. Delay in the Mobile Gun System’s development was due 

in part to shortfalls in meeting performance requirements of the vehicle’s 

ammunition autoloader system. The NBC Reconnaissance vehicle’s 

development schedule was delayed pending OSD approval of an updated 

technology readiness assessment20 for the vehicle and its nuclear, 

biological, and chemical sensor systems. 

Following the Army’s completion of live-fire tests and evaluation for seven 

production vehicles in February 2004 and its ongoing test evaluation of the 

eighth, the Army stated that the Stryker production vehicles met 

operational requirements, with limitations; and OSD approved full 

production.21

The Army’s System Evaluation Report for the Stryker production decision 

concluded that overall, the Stryker family of vehicles is effective, suitable, 

and survivable, and supports the key operational capabilities and force 

effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The report concluded 

that the Stryker production vehicle configurations met operational 

requirements with limitations. For example, in the area of lethality, the 

report noted that four Stryker vehicle configurations have a remote 

weapons station that provides effective protective and supporting fires for 

 19 Army Test and Evaluation Command, U.S. Army Evaluation Center, System Evaluation 

Report for the Stryker Family of Vehicles, for Milestone III Decision, (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 2004) and OSD Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Operational 

Test & Evaluation and Live Fire Test & Evaluation Report on the Stryker Family of 

Vehicles, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2004). 

20 A technology readiness assessment provides information to DOD acquisition officials on 

the maturity of technologies used in or proposed for a system at the time of acquisition 

milestones such as low-rate initial production. 

21 In its March 2004 Stryker Acquisition Decision Memorandum, OSD delegated to the Army 

Acquisition Executive a decision on Mortar Carrier production pending successful 

assessment of live-fire test results of the Mortar Carrier (B) mounted vehicle variant. The 

Mortar Carrier vehicle has two configurations: the Mortar Carrier (A), which carries 

mortars for dismounted use, and the Mortar Carrier (B), which has an integrated mounted 

mortar system. 

Tested Production 

Vehicles Generally 

Met Requirements, 

but Testing and 

Acquisition Schedules 

for Developmental 

Vehicles Have Been 

Delayed 

Following Testing, Army 

and OSD Indicate Stryker 

Production Vehicles Met 

Operational Requirements, 

with Limitations 
Page 17 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

dismounted maneuver. However, limitations of the remote weapons 

station’s capability to provide accurate and continuous fires at night and 

while moving reduce its effectiveness and lethality. Similarly, while the 

Stryker vehicles contribute to force protection and meet survivability 

requirements, there are inherent and expected survivability limitations as 

in any armored vehicle system. Table 5 lists some of the operational 

requirements of the vehicles and excerpts of selected performance 

capabilities and limitations from the Army’s Stryker system evaluation 

report. 

Table 5: Selected Performance Capabilities and Limitations from Stryker Evaluation Report 

Operational requirement Overall assessment Examples of limitations 

Lethality The Stryker family of 

vehicles provides significant 

firepower capabilities giving 

the Striker Combat Brigade 

Team commander the ability 

to shape the battle. Four 

variants have a remote 

weapons station that 

provides effective protective 

and supporting fires for 

dismounted maneuver. 

While the remote weapons station provides effective protective and 

support fires, its capability to provide accurate and continuous fires is 

limited at night and while moving. 

Logistics supportability Stryker vehicles are 

logistically supportable and 

require significantly less 

petroleum supplies than an 

equivalent heavy brigade. 

An augmentation of personnel is needed to sustain a brigade’s Stryker 

vehicle maintenance workload. 

Mobility Stryker has good on and offroad mobility. Its off-road 

mobility is comparable to 

other Army wheeled vehicles 

but less than tracked 

vehicles. 

Fully loaded in temperatures above 100 degrees Fahrenheit, power train 

cooling is insufficient, limiting the Stryker’s ability to operate for extended 

periods in soft soil or sand or to climb prolonged grades. 

Reliability and maintainability Except Engineer Squad 

vehicles, Stryker family of 

vehicles meets operational 

reliability requirements. 

All vehicle configurations experienced a significant number of 

unscheduled maintenance actions. 

Survivability Stryker vehicles contribute to 

force protection and meet 

survivability requirements. 

There are inherent and expected survivability limitations. Specific 

ballistic survivability results are classified. 

Source: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command. 

The OSD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, found that six Stryker 

production vehicles are operationally effective for employment in smallscale contingency operations and operationally suitable with certain 
Page 18 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

limitations.22 OSD found that the Engineer Squad vehicle is not 

operationally suitable because of poor reliability. However, in its March 

2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD determined that the operational 

capabilities provided by the Engineer Squad vehicle supported its 

continued production in light of planned fixes, operational work-arounds, 

and planned follow-on testing. It also determined that corrective actions 

are needed to address survivability and ballistic vulnerability limitations of 

the vehicles, such as ensuring basic armor performance and reducing 

exposure of Stryker personnel. 

Although developmental testing is ongoing, the development and testing 

schedule of the Mobile Gun System has been delayed, resulting in more 

than a 1-year delay in meeting planned production decision milestone 

dates, with initial limited production to start in September 2004. The delay 

in the Mobile Gun System’s development was due in part to shortfalls in 

meeting performance requirements of the vehicle’s ammunition autoloader 

system. At the time of our review, the Mobile Gun System was undergoing 

additional testing to find a fix for the autoloader, in preparation for a lowrate production decision. The Mobile Gun System is scheduled for 

production qualification testing through July 2004, production verification 

testing starting in October 2005, and live-fire test and evaluation starting in 

November 2005 through September 2006. The Army’s earlier Mobile Gun 

System acquisition schedule was to complete developmental testing and 

have a low-rate initial production decision in 2003 and begin full 

production in 2005. Current Army plans are to buy limited quantities of 

Mobile Gun System vehicles upon OSD approval of low-rate initial 

production planned for September 2004. A full-rate production decision 

for the Mobile Gun System is currently scheduled for late in 2006. 

The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for 

rapidly loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its threeperson crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to 

provide rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The 

Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create 

openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass to 

accomplish their missions. According to the Army’s Stryker Program 

 22 The Mortar Carrier vehicle was not evaluated by the OSD Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DOT&E), because its live-fire tests were not completed at the time DOT&E 

conducted its evaluation. 

Mobile Gun System 

Development and Testing 

Schedule Ongoing but 

Delayed 
Page 19 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent 

of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing 

because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the 

Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader’s 

manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed 

if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because 

manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and 

requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker 

acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the 

Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including 

the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria. 

Although its developmental testing is also ongoing, the development 

schedule of the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle has also been delayed, and 

its production is now scheduled to occur about two years later than 

planned. The delay was primarily due to additional time needed to develop 

and test the vehicle’s nuclear, biological, and chemical sensor systems. As 

a result, low-rate initial production, previously scheduled for December 

2003, will not occur until September 2004. A full-rate production decision, 

which had previously been scheduled for June 2005, will not occur until 

July 2007. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the 

Army to provide within 90 days an updated technology readiness 

assessment for the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and its nuclear, 

biological, and chemical sensor systems. At that time, OSD will make a 

determination as to whether the vehicle is ready for production. 

NBC Reconnaissance 

Vehicle Development 

Schedule Delayed 
Page 20 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Although the Army demonstrated during training events that Stryker 

vehicles can be transported short distances on C-130 aircraft and unloaded 

for immediate combat, the average 38,000 pound weight of Stryker 

vehicles, other cargo weight concerns, and less than ideal environmental 

conditions present significant challenges in using C-130s for routine 

Stryker transport. Similar operational limits would exist for C-130 

transport of the Army’s Future Combat Systems because they are also 

being designed to weigh about 38,000 pounds. 

In addition, much of the mission equipment, ammunition, fuel, personnel, 

and armor a Stryker brigade would need to conduct a combat operation 

might need to be moved on separate aircraft, increasing the numbers of 

aircraft or sorties needed to deploy a Stryker force, adding to deployment 

time and the time it would take after arrival to begin operations. Yet, the 

Army’s weight requirement and C-130 transport requirements for the 

vehicles, and information the Army provided to Congress in budget 

documents and testimony, created expectations that Stryker vehicles 

could be routinely transported by C-130 aircraft within an operational 

theater. 

In a December 2003 report on the first Stryker Brigade’s design 

evaluation,23 we reported that the Stryker Brigade demonstrated the ability 

to conduct tactical deployments by C-130 aircraft. At the National Training 

Center in April 2003, we observed the brigade conduct a tactical 

movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its personnel, 

supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via seven C-130 aircraft flying 35 sorties 

from Southern California Logistics Airfield to a desert airfield on Fort 

Irwin about 70 miles away.24 Figure 4 shows a Stryker vehicle being 

offloaded from a C-130 at the National Training Center. 

 23 GAO, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for 

First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades, GAO04-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2003).

24 In a later event in May 2003 during the Stryker Brigade operational evaluation, we also 

observed a Stryker infantry company—consisting of 21 Stryker vehicles and 5 other trucks 

and trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of food, water, ammunition, and fuel to support the 

company—travel from the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, to a 

nearby airfield using seven C-130s flying 25 sorties over a distance of about 100 miles. Upon 

landing at the airfield, the company moved to a tactical assembly area and onward to 

conduct a combat operation. 

Army Demonstrated 

Required Stryker C130 Transportability, 

but Contrary to 

Congressional 

Expectations, 

Operational Limits 

Significantly 

Challenge Routine C130 Transport 

Stryker’s C-130 ShortDistance Deployability 

Was Demonstrated in 

Operational Evaluations 
Page 21 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Figure 4: Stryker Vehicle Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training Center 

A team from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Director for 

Operational Test and Evaluation and the Army’s Test and Evaluation 

Command also observed the Stryker vehicle’s deployment and recorded 

the weight of the vehicles and the total load weight onboard the aircraft. 

The average weight for the eight production vehicle configurations was 

just less than 38,000 pounds, while the total load weight—including a 3-

days’ supply of fuel, food, water, and ammunition—averaged more than 

39,100 pounds. Table 6 shows the weight of eight-production vehicles and 

their total load weight recorded at the time of the April 2003 National 

Training Center deployment. We noted in our December 2003 report,25

however, that while the tactical deployment of Stryker vehicles by C-130 

aircraft was demonstrated, the Army had yet to demonstrate under various 

environmental conditions, such as high temperature and airfield altitude, 

just how far Stryker vehicles can be tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft. 

 25 GAO-04-188. 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 22 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Table 6: Stryker Production Vehicle and Total Load Weights at the National Training 

Center in April 2003 

Vehicle configurationa

 Vehicle weightbTotal load weightc

Commander’s 36,660 38,130

Reconnaissance 37,090 38,350

Fire-Support 37,220 37,850

Infantry Carrier 37,630 39,940

Medical Evacuation 37,930 38,570

Engineer Squad 38,450 39,500

Mortar Carrier 38,940 39,990

Antitank Guided Missile 39,980 40,820

Average weight 37,988 39,144

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

The NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and the Mobile Gun System were in developmental testing and 

did not participate in this exercise. 

b

Vehicle weight is the weight of each vehicle during a Stryker C-130 deployment that was conducted 

as part of the Stryker Brigade Operational Evaluation at the National Training Center in April 2003. 

The vehicle weights are not final and may change slightly as the make-up of their associated 

equipment packages is finalized. 

c

Total load weight is the weight of each vehicle during the April 2003 deployment with a 3-days’ 

supply of fuel, food, water, ammunition, and crew. The Anti-Tank Guided Missile’s total load weight 

included a four-man crew. 

The weight of Stryker vehicles presents significant challenges for C-130 

aircraft transport because, as a general rule U.S. Air Force air mobility 

planning factors specify an allowable C-130 cargo weight of about 34,000 

pounds for routine flight. With most Stryker vehicles weighing close to 

38,000 pounds on board, the distance—or range—that a C-130 aircraft 

could fly is significantly reduced when taking-off in high air temperatures 

or from airfields located in higher elevations. In standard, or nearly ideal, 

flight conditions—such as day-time, low head-wind, moderate air 

temperature, and low elevation—an armored C-130H with a cargo payload 

of 38,000 pounds can generally expect to fly 860 miles from takeoff to 

landing. Furthermore, according to a Military Traffic Management 

Command’s Transportation Engineering Agency study of C-130 aircraft 

Weight Presents 

Significant Challenges for 

C-130 Transport of Stryker 

Vehicles, Making 

Requirements and 

Expectations Difficult to 

Meet 
Page 23 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

transportability of Army vehicles,26 a C-130’s range is significantly reduced 

with only minimal additional weight, and ideal conditions rarely exist in 

combat scenarios. The C-130 aircraft’s range may be further reduced if 

operational conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route 

deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed under these 

conditions. Even in ideal flight conditions, adding just 2,000 pounds 

onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission equipment, 

personnel, or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft’s takeoff-to-landing 

range to 500 miles. In addition, the more than 41,000-pound weight of the 

Mobile Gun System would limit the C-130 aircraft’s range to a maximum 

distance of less than 500 miles. Figure 5 shows the affects of cargo weight 

on an armored C-130H aircraft’s flight range in nearly ideal flight 

conditions. 

Figure 5: Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in Nearly Ideal 

Flight Conditions 

 26 Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, C130E/H/J/J-30 Transportability of Army Vehicles (Sept. 11, 2002). The Military Traffic 

Management Command is a component command of the U.S. Transportation Command, 

which manages the Department of Defense’s transportation system. The Military Traffic 

Management Command was renamed Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in 

January 2004. 

Range

Source: GAO analysis of Air Mobility Command data.

0 500 1,000 1,500

42,000

40,000

60 miles

 500 miles

600 miles

860 miles

1,000 miles

39,000

38,000

36,000

Cargo payload weight (lbs.)
Page 24 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

The addition of armor to the Strykers would pose additional challenges. 

With removable armor added to Strykers, the vehicles will not fit inside a 

C-130. To provide interim protection against rocket-propelled grenades, 

the Stryker vehicles of the brigade that deployed to Iraq in October 2003, 

were fitted with Slat armor weighing about 5,000 pounds for each vehicle 

(see fig. 6). By 2005, the Army expects to complete the development of 

add-on reactive armor—weighing about 9,000 pounds per vehicle—for 

protection against rocket-propelled grenades. With either type of armor 

installed, a Stryker vehicle will not fit inside a C-130 aircraft cargo bay. 

Regardless, with the added weight of the armor even in ideal flight 

conditions, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off. 

Figure 6: Stryker Vehicle with Slat Armor in Iraq 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 25 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Furthermore, according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s 

Stryker System Evaluation, in less than favorable flight conditions, the Air 

Force considers routine transport of the 38,000-pound cargo weight of a 

Stryker vehicle on C-130 aircraft risky, and such flight may not be 

permitted under the Air Force’s flight operations risk management 

requirements if other transport means are available. In two theaters where 

U.S. forces are currently operating—the Middle East and Afghanistan, high 

temperatures and elevation can reduce C-130 aircraft range if carrying a 

38,000-pound Stryker vehicle. Table 7 shows the reduced C-130 aircraft 

transport range due to daytime average summer temperatures of more 

than 100 degrees Fahrenheit in Iraq and high temperatures and elevations 

in Afghanistan. From two locations in Afghanistan (Bagram at 4,895 feet 

elevation and Kabul at 5,871 feet elevation) during daytime in the summer, 

a C-130 with a Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to take off at all. 

In winter from these same locations, its flight range would be reduced to 

610 miles departing from Bagram and to 310 miles departing from Kabul. 

These same weight concerns would also apply to the Army’s Future 

Combat Systems vehicles, which according to the Army’s operational 

requirements should be no larger than 38,000 pounds and be transportable 

by a C-130. 

Table 7: Analysis of C-130 Range from Selected Airfields in the Middle East and 

Afghanistan When Carrying Cargo Weighing 38,000 Pounds 

Flight ranges in nautical miles 

Airfield 

Flight range 

(summer) 

Flight range 

(winter) 

Day Night Day Night

Kuwait City, Kuwait 710 860 710 860

Tallil Air Base, Iraq 760 860 860 860

Baghdad, Int’l, Iraq 760 860 760 860

Balad Air Base, Iraq 760 860 760 860

Mosul Air Base, Iraq 660 860 860 860

Doha, Qatar 760 760 860 860

Bagram, Afghanistana 0 510 610 860

Kabul, Afghanistana 0 110 310 610

Kandahar, Afghanistan 360 760 760 860

Source: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Army Evaluation Center. 

a

Elevation, temperature, and terrain prevent takeoff with cargo weighing 38,000 pounds. 
Page 26 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Additionally, the Mobile Gun System, expected to weigh over 41,000 

pounds, is probably too heavy to transport a significant distance via C-130 

aircraft. Furthermore, the C-130 aircraft cannot transport many of a 

Stryker brigade’s vehicles at all. Stryker vehicles make up a little more 

than 300 of the over 1,000 vehicles of a Stryker brigade, and many of the 

brigade’s support vehicles, such as fuel trucks, are too large or heavy for 

C-130 transport. 

Because a C-130’s range is limited by weight and a Stryker’s weight 

exceeds limits for routine C-130 loading, a tactical movement of significant 

distance of a Stryker brigade via C-130 aircraft in less than ideal conditions 

could necessitate moving much of the mission equipment, ammunition, 

fuel, personnel, and armor on separate aircraft. Such use of separate 

aircraft for moving Stryker vehicles and associated equipment, personnel, 

and supplies increases the force closure,27 or deployment, time and might 

limit the deployed forces’ ability to be capable of immediate combat 

operations upon arrival—one of the Army’s key operational requirements 

for the Stryker vehicles—because aircraft would arrive at different times 

and potentially different locations. In combination, a 38,000-pound Stryker 

vehicle, and the associated equipment, personnel, or armor that would 

have to be transported on separate aircraft are likely to increase the 

number of aircraft or sorties that would be needed to deploy a Stryker 

force. For example, if a decision were made to use a Stryker’s add-on 

armor for a tactical mission, at about 9,000 pounds for each vehicle’s 

armor, it would take at least one additional C-130 aircraft sortie to 

transport the armor for about four vehicles. Or, because of potential limits 

of the availability of C-130 lift assets, the size of a Stryker force and 

number of Stryker vehicles that could be tactically deployed would have to 

be reduced. 

At the National Training Center in April 2003, we observed, upon landing, 

an infantry company unload the vehicles from the C-130 aircraft, 

reconfigure them for combat missions, and move onward to a staging area. 

All Stryker variants except one reconfigured into combat capable modes 

within their designated time standard. Once reconfigured, units of the 

Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate 

combat operations. However, this was a short-range movement with only 

 27 Force closure is the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the 

first element arrives at a designated location, and ends when the last element arrives. 

C-130 Airlift for Stryker 

Brigades Could Increase 

Force Deployment Time 

and Time Needed to Start 

Operations upon Arrival—

a Key Operational 

Requirement and 

Expectation 
Page 27 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

seven aircraft and did not require fitting armor on the vehicles. In an 

operational mission, depending on the size of the Stryker force deployed, 

using separate C-130 aircraft for transporting vehicles and associated 

people and equipment could significantly increase force deployment time 

because of the increased numbers of aircraft sorties needed. Upon arrival, 

it would also increase the time needed to reconfigure and begin operations 

because the vehicles, equipment, and personnel on different aircraft might 

arrive at different times or at different airfield locations. In addition, if a 

decision were made to use add-on armor for a mission, the armor would 

need to be installed after arrival, adding an average of about 10 hours per 

vehicle in reconfiguration time to install the armor. 

The capability of transporting Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft, despite 

its challenges and limitations, is a major objective of the Army’s 

transformation to a lighter more responsive force. As such, the Army’s 

weight and C-130 transport requirements for the vehicles, as well as 

information the Army provided to Congress, created expectations that 

Stryker vehicles could be routinely transported within an operational 

theater by C-130 aircraft. For example, in several congressional hearings 

since 2001, senior Army leadership testified that Stryker vehicles would be 

capable of transport by C-130 aircraft.28 In addition, annual budget 

justifications, which the Army submits to Congress for Stryker vehicle 

acquisition, highlight the C-130 transport capability of Stryker-vehicleequipped Brigade Combat Teams. 

During our review, Army officials acknowledged the significant challenges 

and limitations of meeting expectations for transporting Stryker vehicles—

and beyond 2010, the Future Combat Systems—on C-130 aircraft in terms 

of limited flight range, the size force that could be deployed, and the 

challenges of arriving ready for combat. The officials, however, believe 

that the capability to transport Stryker vehicles or the Future Combat 

Systems’ vehicles on C-130 aircraft, even over short distances, offers the 

theater combatant commanders an additional option among other modes 

of intratheater transportation—such as C-17 aircraft, sealift, or driving 

over land—for transporting Stryker brigades and vehicles in tactical 

missions. In addition, the officials believe that the ability to transport 

 28 See, for example, Army Modernization and Transformation In Review of the Defense 

Authorization Request for fiscal year 2003: Hearings on S. 2225 Before the Airland 

Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 107th Cong. 15 (2002) (statement 

of General John M. Keane, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army). 
Page 28 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

elements of a Stryker brigade as small as a platoon29 with four Stryker 

vehicles— as a part of an operational mission of forces moving by other 

means, greatly enhances the combatant commander’s war-fighting 

capabilities. 

In less than 4 years from the November 2000 Stryker vehicle contract 

award, the Army is well under way in fielding the eight production vehicle 

configurations, and Stryker vehicles are already in use in military 

operations in Iraq. However, program costs have increased, largely 

because of the cost of military construction related to Stryker vehicle 

needs, and delays in developing and testing the two remaining variants will 

delay their fielding and use. 

Furthermore, although the Army has successfully demonstrated that 

Stryker vehicles can be transported on C-130 aircraft during training 

events, routine use of the C-130 for airlifting Stryker vehicles, for other 

than short-range missions with limited numbers of vehicles, would be 

difficult in theaters where U.S. forces are currently operating. Therefore, 

the intended capability of Stryker brigades to be transportable by C-130 

aircraft would be markedly reduced. The Army’s operational requirements 

and information the Army provided to Congress created expectations that 

a Stryker vehicle weight of 38,000 pounds—and a similar weight for Future 

Combat System vehicles—would allow routine C-130 transport in tactical 

operations. Consequently, congressional decision makers do not have an 

accurate sense or realistic expectations of the operational capabilities of 

Stryker vehicles and Future Combat Systems. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, take the 

following two actions: 

1. Provide to Congress information that 

• clarifies the expected C-130 tactical intratheater deployment 

capabilities of Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles and describes 

probable operational missions and scenarios using C-130 transport 

 29 A Stryker brigade platoon could consist of about 16 to 44 people, depending on its 

organizational mission. 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 29 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

of Stryker vehicles that are achievable, including the size of a 

combat capable C-130 deployable Stryker force; 

• describes operational capability limitations of Stryker brigades 

given the limits of C-130 transport; and 

• identifies options for, and the feasibility of, alternative modes of 

transportation—such as C-17 aircraft— for transporting Stryker 

brigades within an operational theater. 

2. Provide the Congress similar clarification concerning the operational 

requirements and expected C-130 tactical airlift capabilities of Future 

Combat System vehicles, considering the limits of C-130 aircraft 

transportability. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

partially concurred with our recommendations. The department also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where 

appropriate. 

DOD concurred that operational requirements for airlift capability for 

brigade transport need clarification and stated that the ongoing Mobility 

Capabilities Study, scheduled for completion in the spring of 2005, will 

include an assessment of the intratheater transport of Army Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams and address the recommendations of this report. 

In responding to our recommendation to provide information to Congress 

concerning C-130 transport of Stryker-equipped brigades, the department 

partially concurred and stated that the Army has studied C-130 

transportability in depth. While we agree that the Army has studied C-130 

transportability of Stryker vehicles—including the limitations that we 

point out in this report—their comments provide no assurance that this 

information will be provided to Congress, and we believe Congress needs 

this type of information to have an accurate sense of the operational 

capabilities of Stryker brigades. The department also partially concurred 

with our recommendation to provide to Congress similar clarification 

concerning the operational requirements and expected C-130 tactical 

airlift capabilities of Future Combat System vehicles, considering the 

limits of C-130 aircraft transportability. The department noted in its 

response that the Army is currently considering many factors, including C130 tactical airlift capability limits, as it reviews Future Combat Systems 

Unit of Action capability requirements. The department also stated that 

the Mobility Capabilities Study would include intratheater transport of 

Army units of action—the Army’s Future Combat Systems-equipped future 

force. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 30 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Given the ongoing congressional interest in the implications of the Army’s 

requirements for C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles and Future Combat 

System ground vehicles, we agree that the information the Congress would 

need, if addressed in the Mobility Capabilities Study and provided to 

Congress, would meet the intent of our recommendations. With the 

Mobility Capabilities Study not scheduled for completion until the spring 

of 2005, we will assess at that time the adequacy of the study’s assessment 

of intratheater transport of Army Stryker- and Future Combat Systemequipped units. The Senate Armed Services Committee has directed GAO 

to monitor DOD’s processes used to conduct the Mobility Capabilities 

Study, and to report on the adequacy and completeness of the study to the 

congressional defense committees no later than 30 days after the 

completion of the study.30 

The appendix contains the full text of the department’s comments. 

To determine the current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition and the 

latest Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates, we analyzed 

documents on Stryker vehicle acquisition plans, contract performance 

requirements, and costs and interviewed officials from the Army Program 

Executive Office/Stryker Program Management Office, Warren, Michigan. 

To determine Stryker program costs, we reviewed the DOD approved 

December 2003 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and interviewed 

Stryker Program Management Office officials. For our analysis of Stryker 

vehicle-operating costs, we reviewed the Army’s mileage cost estimates 

and the Army’s methodology for calculating costs per mile. We did not 

verify source information the Army used in its calculations. 

To determine the status and results of Stryker vehicle tests, we reviewed 

the results of Stryker vehicle developmental and survivability testing from 

the Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia, and the 

Army Developmental Test Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland. We also reviewed the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, 

Army Evaluation Center’s Stryker System Evaluation Report and OSD 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation’s Operational Test and 

Evaluation and Live Fire Test and Evaluation Report for the Stryker family 

of vehicles. 

 30 S. Rep No. 108-260 at 126 (2004). 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 31 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

To determine the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles 

within a theater of operations, we reviewed a Military Traffic Management 

Command’s, Transportation Engineering Agency study of the C-130 

aircraft’s range and payload capabilities and interviewed U.S. Army, Air 

Force and Transportation Command officials. We notified U.S. Central 

Command of our objective to review plans for C-130 aircraft transport of 

Stryker vehicles within the command’s area of operations, but Central 

Command officials determined that this was an Army issue, rather than a 

combatant command’s issue. 

Our review was conducted from July 2003 through June 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and 

subcommittees that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for 

DOD. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available 

at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8365, or Assistant Director, George Poindexter, at (202) 

512-7213. Major contributors to this report were Kevin Handley, Frank 

Smith, and M. Jane Hunt. 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix: Comments from the Department of 

Defense 

Page 32 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Appendix: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix: Comments from the Department of 

Defense 

Page 33 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 
Related GAO Products 

Page 34 GAO-04-925 Army Stryker Vehicles 

Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, 

Risks, and Alternatives. GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004. 

Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative 

Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues 

Remain for Future Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December 

12, 2003. 

Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program. GAO-03-

1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003. 

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for 

Army Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 

Infantry Carrier vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily 

Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003. 

Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should 

Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army’s 

Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 

2003. 

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation 

of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2002. 

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for 

Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. 

Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2001. 

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems 

Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001. 

Related GAO Products 

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