Kirby v. REHC 1, Inc., No. 112-7-17 Ancv (Toor, J., June 1, 2018).

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the 

accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]

Kirby vs. REHC 1, Inc. et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION

Count 1, Personal Injury - Other (112-7-17 Ancv)

Count 2, Personal Injury - Other (112-7-17 Ancv)

Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion 1)

Filer: REHC 1, Inc.

Attorney: James W. Coffrin

Filed Date: March 19, 2018

Supplement filed on 04/24/2018 by Attorney James W. Coffrin for Defendant REHC 1, Inc.

(Supplemental Memorandum to Motion to Dismiss/REHC1)

Opposition filed on 05/03/2018 by Attorney Kevin E. Brown for Plaintiff Vicki Kirby

Reply filed on 05/14/2018 by Attorney James W. Coffrin for Defendant REHC 1, Inc. 

Sur-reply filed May 31

 This is a personal injury suit alleging that Plaintiff Kirby, a Vermont resident, was 

injured while a guest at a Hampton Inn run by REHC 1, Inc. (REHC) in New York State. 

REHC moves to dismiss, arguing that Vermont lacks personal jurisdiction over it. Plaintiff 

responds that Vermont has jurisdiction because REHC or its franchisor, Hampton Inns, 

directed advertising to Vermont residents by (1) placing ads in Niagara Falls USA, a travel 

publication distributed in Vermont, and (2) participating in its franchisor’s on-line 

reservation system. 

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION

Addison Unit Docket No. 112-7-17 Ancv
2

Discussion

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to limit the power 

of a State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984). There must be minimum 

contacts such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being “haled into court” in 

Vermont. Fox v. Fox, 2014 VT 100, ¶ 29, 197 Vt. 466. “The concept of minimum contacts 

not only ‘protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or 

inconvenient forum,’ but also ‘acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not 

reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a 

federal system.’” State v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2016 VT 22, ¶ 12, 201 Vt. 342 (2016), quoting 

World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction and general 

jurisdiction. Atl. Richfield, 2016 VT 22, ¶14; Fox, 2014 VT 100, ¶ 27. Plaintiff need only 

establish one, not both. Specific jurisdiction is essentially “you had sufficient dealings in 

Vermont related to the subject matter of this case so that you can be haled into court 

related to this one matter.” General jurisdiction is essentially “you do business here to 

such an extent that you can be treated as being a resident of Vermont for litigation in 

general.” 

When a defendant raises the issue, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that 

the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See, Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. 

Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 40 (1990); 5B Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 

Civil 3d § 1351. To meet its burden, the plaintiff must make “a prima facie showing of 

jurisdiction, or, in other words, demonstrate facts which would support a finding of 
3

jurisdiction.” Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Electronics, Ltd., 2008 VT 96, ¶ 15, 184 Vt. 

303 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff is apparently arguing that specific jurisdiction applies here. “[A] court 

may exercise specific jurisdiction where a defendant has purposefully directed . . . 

activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise 

out of or relate to those activities.” Fox, 2014 VT 100, ¶ 27 (citation omitted). Specific 

jurisdiction focuses upon the relationships among the defendant, the forum, and the 

particular subject matter of the litigation. Id. ¶26; Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, __, 134 

S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). That is, “the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a 

substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121.

Here, the complaint contains no allegations that the alleged injuries in this case

arose out of anything REHC did in Vermont. Even if the advertising done by REHC’s 

franchisor, Hampton Inns, is properly attributable to REHC—an issue the court does not 

reach—the complaint contains no allegations that Plaintiff saw or acted upon any such 

advertisement. The same is true of the online reservation system, which Plaintiff does not 

allege she used. Nothing occurred in Vermont connecting Plaintiff and REHC. This 

distinguishes the cases cited by Plaintiff in her opposition, both of which involved 

advertisements that the Plaintiffs had seen and acted upon, leading directly to the 

transactions at issue in those cases. See Brown v. Cal Dykstra Equip. Co., 169 Vt. 636 

(1999); Dall v. Kaylor, 163 Vt. 274, 275 (1995). It also distinguishes a recent Vermont 

District Court case in which an out-of-state hotel was found to be subject to a tort suit 

here because it had negotiated a special discount to lure employees of Plaintiff’s company 

to the hotel, as well as “creating a personal relationship with [Plaintiff] to encourage him 

to return to the hotel.” Leonard v. Shield Hotel Mgmt., LLC, No. 5:17-CV-51, 2017 WL 
4

3085323, at *3 (D. Vt. July 19, 2017). Likewise, the Vermont cases cited in Plaintiff’s surreply involved an injury that occurred in Vermont, and the placement of products into the 

stream of commerce knowing, or reasonably foreseeing, that they would be sold in 

Vermont. Hedges v. Western Auto Supply Co., 161 Vt. 614 (1994)1; Atl. Richfield Co., 2016 

VT 22, ¶ 23.

In sum, there is absolutely no basis for specific jurisdiction over REHC tied to the 

transaction that is the subject of this suit.

It is unclear whether Plaintiff is also arguing that general jurisdiction applies here. 

General jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff shows “continuous and systematic general 

business contacts” between the defendant and the state. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 

U.S. at 416; Schwartz v. Frankenhoff, 169 Vt. 287, 293 n. 1 (1999). There is nothing to 

suggest that this doctrine applies here. 

“With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of 

business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 

U.S. 117, 137 (2014)(citation omitted). Mere continuous and systematic business contacts 

in the state are not enough; those contacts must be so significant that they are equivalent 

to the business being “at home” in the state. Id. at 127; Retail Pipeline, LLC v. JDA 

Software Grp., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00067, 2018 WL 1621508, at *10 (D. Vt. Mar. 30, 

2018)(no general jurisdiction where Delaware corporation was “not registered to do 

business in Vermont, does not own real property in the state, and does not have a Vermont 

address or telephone number.”).

 

1 The analysis in Hedges has also been called into question in light of more recent authority. See Hinrichs v. Gen. 

Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114, 1159 (Ala. 2016) (Noting that the Hedges holding is “now directly contrary 

to Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), and 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), which hold that a manufacturer is 

not automatically subject to jurisdiction in every state in which its products are sold.”).
5

The advertising to which Plaintiff points is far from sufficient to meet this test. Nor 

is the availability of an online reservation system. Otherwise, every business that can be 

found online could be sued in every state, and in every country in the world except those 

that block internet access to their citizens. This would be an “exorbitant exercise[] of allpurpose jurisdiction.” Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139. The entire idea of tying jurisdiction to 

a particular locale would be eliminated. While the future may bring such globalization of 

the legal system, we are not there yet. 

Order

The motion to dismiss REHC for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. 

Electronically signed on June 01, 2018 at 11:16 AM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 7(d).

___________________________

Helen M. Toor

Superior Court Judge