Interim Decision #1827 

MA21221 OF LAIJ 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-15984947 

Decided by Board Jaruaary 6, 1968 

(1) An order to show cause is not defective for failure to specify the country 

of deportation and the subdivision of section 243(a) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act under which designated. 

(2) Where respondent did not designate a country of deportation and wee thereafter ordered deported to Formosa, the country of his citizenship, and alternatively to Hong Kong, there was no abuse of discretion by the special inquiry 

officer in designating Hong Kong as the alternate country of deportation since 

the record shows that respondent resided in Kong Kong from 1957-1067; that 

be left Hong Kong to join the'veaser which brought him to the United States 

as a crewman; and that he is in possession of a seaman's identity book and 

a seaman's discharge book issued to him by the government of Hong Kong. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (2) (8 U.S.C. 12513—Nonimmigrant 

(crewman)—remained longer. 

ON Emma or RESPONDENT: 

Jules E. Coven, Esquire 

Lebenkoff & Coven 

1 Bast 428 StroPt 

New York New York 10017 

ON Smuts or REMICK : 

Irving A. Appleman 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

The special inquiry officer, in a decision dated July 6, 1967, granted 

the respondent the privilege of voluntary departure, but provided for 

his deportation from the United States to the Republic of China on 

Formosa, alternatively to Hong Kong, on the charge contained in 

the order to show cause, in the event of his failure to so depart. The 

appeal from that decision, which brings the case before this Board 

for consideration, will be cligpliizsed. 

The record relates to a male alien, approiimately 24 years of age, 

who was born on the mainland of China. He last entered the United 

States on or about February 11, 1967. He was then admitted as a nontipigrant crewman for the period of time his vessel was to remain.in 

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Interim Decision #1827 

United States ports, but in no event to exceed 29 days. He has 

remained in the United States since the expiration of the temporary 

period of his admission without authority. 

The foregoing establishes the respondent's deportability on the 

above-stated charge. This has also been conceded. The point, therefore, 

needs no further discussion. 

The special inquiry officer has granted the respondent the privilege 

of voluntary departure. Suffice it to say, in this connection, that the 

record before us supports said official's action in this respect. 

It is immaterial that the order to show cause on which these proceedings are predicated did not specify the country to which the Government would request respondent's deportation. There is no requirement 

that the order state the section of the statutory provision under which 

the Government would proceed in this connection. Our reasons for 

rejecting this argument follow. 

A proceeding before the special inquiry officer under an order asserting that the alien is to show cause why he should not be deported under 

'certain sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act is merely investigative. It does not amount to an order of deportation. It does no 

more than obtain direct jnrisqiction over the person of the alien, and 

se% in motion an inquiry which may follow broad lines (see Haymes v. 

Landon,115 F. Supp. 506). 

If deportability is not established, then the question of place of 

deportation becomes moot. Practically speaking, then, the procedure 

desired by counsel would constitute "putting the cart before the horse." 

A warrant of deportation, which issues only after deportability has 

been established and discretionary relief questions disposed of, is not 

required to set forth the country to which an alien is to be deported 

(see Mee Hoek Chan v. Burney, 206 F. Supp. 894; and .1749 v. Kennedy, 292 F. 2d 140.A fortiori, there is no such requirement insofar as 

an order to show cause, which merely institutes the proceedings, is 

concerned. 

We also reject the respondent's other argument, to wit: that the 

speCial *quiff officer improperly designated Hong Kong as the alternate place of the respondent's deportation. The reason is that the procedure followed by the special inquiry officer complies strictly with the 

controlling statute, which is section 243 (a), Immigration and Nationality Act; 8 U.S.C. 1253 (see Hom Bin v. Evenly, 209 F. Supp. 3). 

Step #1 of the statute provides that an alien shall be deported to a 

country designated by him if that country is willing to accept him. 

Here, however, the alien failed to make such a designation. Therefore, 

step #2of the statute had to be taken. 

Such step contemplateSthe deportation of an alien to the country of 

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Interim Dedision #1827 

which he is a subject national or citizen, if such country is willing to 

accept him Here, the special inquiry officer has correctly concluded 

that the respondent is a citizen of the Republic of China on Formosa 

(see Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 320 F. 2d 86) . Also, the special inquiry 

officer has conditioned this portion of his order upon the Republic of 

China on Formosa advising that it will accept'the respondent. If it 

does not, then his deportation shall be effected as provided by step #3 

of the statute. 

That step allows for the alien's deportation to any one of seven 

categories of countries within. the discretion of the Attorney General. 

In this connection, the statute itself specifically points out that there 

is no necessity for giving any priority or preference because of the 

order of the countries referred to therein. One of those countries is 

the one where the alien resided prior to entering the country from 

which he entered the United States. 

In connection with the foregoing, the record demonstrates that the 

respondent resided in Hong Kong from 1957 until 1967. He left Hong 

Kong to join the crew of the vessel which eventually brought him to 

the United States. He is in possession of a seaman's identity book issued 

to him by the government of Hong Kong, and he is also in possession 

of a seaman's discharge book issued to him by the government of 

Hong Kong. 

Under these circumstances, the special inquiry officer was proceeding 

within the scope of the statute when he designated Hong Bong as the 

first alternate country of deportation for the respondent (he Peo 

Timm v. Kennedy, 293 F.2d 543), and we find no basis for a possible 

claim of abuse of discretion on 'his part in doing so. Moreover, the 

respondent could have resolved the difficulties which he now stresses 

by designating a country to which he.preferred to be deported, but 

this he refused to do. 

In conclusion, no claim of fear of possible persecution has been 

raised in connection with the respondent's deportation to Formosa 

or Hong Kong, either before the special inquiry officer or this Board. 

No further comment in this respect is required. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed. 

575