COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

PATRICK J. MANNIX, S/K/A 

 PATRICK J. MANNIX, SR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record Nos. 2797-98-3 and JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 2798-98-3 JANUARY 4, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 

 Nicholas E. Persin, Judge Designate 

 Randall B. Campbell for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Patrick J. Mannix was convicted in a jury trial of 

disorderly conduct, in violation of Code § 18.2-415(A), and 

obstruction of justice, in violation of Code § 18.2-460. On 

appeal, Mannix argues (1) the trial court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury that a person has a right to resist an 

unlawful ejection from a public meeting, (2) the trial court 

erred in limiting his cross-examination regarding the Washington 

County Board of Supervisors Chairman's knowledge of 

parliamentary procedures for limiting or terminating a citizen's 

comments during a public meeting, and (3) the evidence is 

insufficient to support his convictions. For the following 

reasons, we affirm the convictions. 
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I. BACKGROUND

 The Washington County Board of Supervisors conducted a 

public hearing to solicit comments from citizens regarding an 

annexation agreement with the City of Bristol. Patrick J. 

Mannix requested to speak during the "citizens' comments" 

portion of the meeting. Mannix took the podium and began 

questioning the county attorney regarding the legality of the 

notice and advertising for the meeting. After Mannix posed 

several argumentative questions, the board's chairman instructed 

Mannix to confine his remarks to the annexation agreement. 

Instead of complying with the purpose of the meeting, Mannix 

became argumentative and accusatory with the chairman. The 

chairman ruled Mannix "out of order" and directed him to take 

his seat. 

 After Mannix ignored the chairman's repeated orders to be 

seated, the chairman instructed two uniformed deputies from the 

Washington County Sheriff's Department to remove Mannix from the 

meeting. Mannix was informed that he was not under arrest, but 

that he was "out of order" and was being ejected from the 

meeting. Mannix refused to leave, stating repeatedly that if he 

was not under arrest, he would not leave. The deputies forcibly 

removed Mannix from the room. The deputies had difficulty 

restraining Mannix, who was struggling and resisting their 

attempt to remove him from the room. Mannix was arrested for 
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disorderly conduct and obstruction of justice. Both deputies 

testified that they sustained minor injuries. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jury Instruction

 Mannix argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury that if he was being unlawfully ejected from 

the public meeting, he was entitled to use reasonable force in 

resisting the unlawful ejection. Mannix's proffered instruction 

stated, "[i]f you find that the Defendant used reasonable force 

to resist his unlawful ejection from a public meeting, then you 

will find the defendant not guilty of the offense of Obstruction 

of Justice." The trial court refused the instruction, stating 

that the instruction improperly assumed and informed the jury 

that the ejection from the meeting was unlawful. Mannix neither 

objected to the court's explanation nor offered an amended 

instruction. 

 "A reviewing court's responsibility in reviewing jury 

instructions is 'to see that the law has been clearly stated and 

that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly 

raises.'" Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488, 370 

S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 

503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)). The trial court did not err by 

ruling that the proffered jury instruction was an incorrect 

statement of law because it presupposed that Mannix's ejection 
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from the meeting was unlawful. The trial court did not err in 

refusing to give an instruction that contained an erroneous 

statement of the law. See Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 

24, 28-29, 448 S.E.2d 328, 330-31 (1994). Furthermore, "[t]he 

court is not required to give an instruction sua sponte." Manetta 

v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123, 127-28 n.2, 340 S.E.2d 828, 830 n.2 

(1986). Although it may be reversible error for a trial court to 

fail to properly instruct the jury on the basic elements of the 

charged criminal offense, see Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. 

App. 988, 992, 421 S.E.2d 652, 654-55 (1992) (en banc), aff'd in 

part, 246 Va. 174, 431 S.E.2d 648 (1993), the trial court has no 

duty sua sponte to correct or re-write a party's erroneous 

instruction which does not address the elements of the offense, 

the burden of proof, or the presumption of innocence. See Whaley 

v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973). 

B. Evidentiary Issue

 Mannix next argues that the trial court erred in refusing 

to permit defense counsel to question the board chairman 

regarding his familiarity with parliamentary procedures under 

Robert's Rules of Order to limit or terminate debate on an 

issue. He argues that the question was relevant because it 

related to the "legality" of the chairman's conduct, his ruling 

that Mannix was out of order, and whether Mannix had the right 
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to resist ejection. Mannix also argues that the evidence was 

probative of his "state of mind." 

 "'The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.'" Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 552, 555, 466 S.E.2d 116, 117 (1996) 

(quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 118, 442 S.E.2d 

407, 409 (1994)). "Evidence which tends to cast any light upon 

the subject of the inquiry is relevant." Cash v. Commonwealth, 

5 Va. App. 506, 510, 364 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1988). "Relevant 

evidence which has the tendency to add force and effect to a 

party's defense is admissible, unless excluded by a specific rule 

or policy consideration." Evans v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 118, 

122, 415 S.E.2d 851, 853-54 (1992). 

 Assuming the chairman failed to adhere to an acceptable or 

an applicable set of rules of procedure, Mannix was not entitled 

to be disorderly and to disrupt the meeting from proceeding in 

an orderly fashion. Thus, the chairman's knowledge of the rules 

of parliamentary procedure was not relevant to whether Mannix 

was lawfully ejected from the meeting. Regardless of the board 

chairman's adherence to acceptable parliamentary procedures, 

when Mannix insisted on speaking to issues other than those for 

which the public hearing was called, and in interrogating the 

county attorney, the board chairman had the right to rule him 
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out of order, direct that he be seated, and have him forcibly 

ejected when he resisted and refused to desist. See City of 

Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment 

Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976) (recognizing that 

a governing body may confine a public meeting to a specified 

subject matter); see also Scroggins v. City of Topeka, Kansas, 

2 F.Supp.2d 1362, 1372-73 (D.C. Kan. 1998) (collecting cases). 

Accordingly, Mannix's forcible ejection from the meeting under 

the circumstances was not illegal, and the chairman's knowledge 

of parliamentary procedure could not affect that holding. 

C. Sufficiency

 On review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party, and grant to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Commonwealth v. 

Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 521, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998). We review 

the evidence that tends to support and uphold the conviction, 

and we will affirm the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or 

lacks evidentiary support. See id. at 520, 499 S.E.2d at 265. 

 Intent may be shown by the circumstances, including a 

person's conduct and statements. See Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 

Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977); Hancock v. Commonwealth, 

12 Va. App. 774, 782, 407 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1991). "[T]he 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from proven facts are within the 
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province of the trier of fact." Fleming v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. 

App. 349, 353, 412 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1991). A fact finder may 

generally infer, moreover, that a person intends his deliberate 

acts. See id. 

1. Disorderly Conduct

 Mannix argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction for disorderly conduct. He argues, citing Ford 

v. City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 474 S.E.2d 848 (1996), 

that neither his verbal exchanges with the county attorney and 

the board chairman, no matter how inappropriate, nor his refusal 

to leave the podium and be seated rise to the level of 

disorderly conduct. Furthermore, he argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the specific intent 

required under the statute to support the conviction. 

 Section 18.2-415 provides that:1 

[a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct 

if, with the intent to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or 

recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 

 1

 Section 18.2-415(B) provides that a person who 

"[w]illfully . . . disrupts a meeting of the governing body of 

any political subdivision of this Commonwealth or a division or 

agency thereof . . ." shall be guilty of disorderly conduct if 

the disruption "(i) prevents or interferes with the orderly 

conduct of the meeting . . . ." Although Mannix's conduct 

appears to fit squarely within this provision, the jury was not 

instructed on this subsection. Therefore, the applicability of 

that provision is not before us. 
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 A. In any . . . public building, . . . 

or public place engages in conduct having a 

direct tendency to cause acts of violence by 

the person or persons at whom, individually, 

such conduct is directed[.] 

 Mannix's reliance on Ford is misplaced. In Ford, police 

officers were patrolling an area known for drug activity and 

prostitution. The officers approached the defendant, who was 

pushing a bicycle in a small park. When one of the officers asked 

the defendant to approach him, the defendant became "loud, angry, 

and uncooperative." The defendant used offensive language and 

threw his arms into the air. The defendant was arrested for 

disorderly conduct. On appeal, we reversed the defendant's 

conviction for disorderly conduct, finding that the officer had no 

reason to believe the defendant's conduct, no matter how offensive 

or rude, would provoke a violent response from the person or 

persons at whom the conduct was directed. See 23 Va. App. at 144, 

474 S.E.2d at 851. Further, we found in Ford no evidence to 

support a reasonable belief that the defendant's conduct would 

cause a reasonable officer to respond with physical force. See

id. Rather, the officers, who had no reason to suspect him of 

criminal activity, could simply have walked away from the 

defendant when he was unwilling to talk with them and continued 

their investigative patrol. 

 Here, however, the evidence viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth proves that Mannix disregarded the 
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board chairman's instructions to refrain from questioning the 

county attorney and to confine his comments to the annexation 

agreement. After being warned numerous times, Mannix persisted 

in the inappropriate questioning. The board chairman declared 

Mannix out of order and instructed him repeatedly to take his 

seat. The board chairman could not disregard Mannix's conduct. 

The fact finder could infer from Mannix's refusal to leave the 

podium when instructed to do so by the presiding officer that he 

intended to cause a public inconvenience or annoyance at the 

hearing. The meeting had been disrupted. The chairman was 

unable to solicit comments from other citizens while Mannix 

remained at the podium. In order to proceed with business, the 

board chairman deemed it necessary to have Mannix forcibly 

removed from the meeting. The fact finder could infer from 

these circumstances that Mannix was aware his conduct would 

cause the presiding officer to respond with physical force. The 

board chairman declared Mannix out of order, directed the 

deputies to come forward, and advised Mannix that if he did not 

take his seat he would be forcibly removed from the premises. 

Unlike the police officer in Ford, the board chairman could not 

disregard Mannix's conduct and continue the meeting with Mannix 

remaining at the podium. He had to be removed. Under these 

circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to support Mannix's 

conviction for disorderly conduct. 
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2. Obstruction of Justice

 Mannix, relying on Brown v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 111, 

497 S.E.2d 527 (1998), argues that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his conviction for obstruction of justice because he 

was legally permitted to use reasonable force to resist the 

unlawful ejection. By analogy, Mannix argues that if one is 

permitted to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest, 

one is also permitted to use reasonable force to resist an 

unlawful ejection from a public meeting. 

 Assuming, without deciding, that a similar principle to 

that articulated in Brown applies to an unlawful ejection from a 

public meeting, Mannix failed to show that he was unlawfully 

ejected from the meeting. Nothing in the record indicates that 

the board chairman acted outside of his authority in limiting 

and subsequently terminating Mannix's comments. Although 

citizens may be given the privilege to speak during a public 

meeting, the right to do so is not unlimited. Rather, the 

chairman of a public meeting has a legitimate interest in 

conducting the meeting in an orderly and effective manner. 

Furthermore, the board chairman's knowledge or lack of knowledge 

of parliamentary procedure was not relevant to whether Mannix's 

ejection was lawful. Regardless of the chairman's knowledge of 

parliamentary procedure, the board chairman had the right to 

have Mannix forcibly removed from the public hearing when he 
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refused to address the call of the meeting and refused to be 

seated after his time elapsed. Accordingly, the evidence is 

sufficient to support the conviction for obstruction of justice. 

 In summary, we find that the trial court did not err in 

refusing to give Mannix's proffered jury instruction and in 

limiting his examination of the board chairman and that the 

evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. We, 

therefore, affirm. 

Affirmed.