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MARJORIE HORNUNG v. ROBERT HORNUNG

(SC 19361)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa, Robinson and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued November 3, 2015—officially released September 20, 2016

Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Wesley W.

Horton, and, on the brief, Richard L. Albrecht and Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellant-appellee

(defendant).

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom, on the brief, were

Jon T. Kukucka, Brandon B. Fontaine, Wayne Effron

and Johanna S. Katz, for the appellee-appellant

(plaintiff).
Opinion

ROBINSON, J. The defendant, Robert Hornung,

appeals1

from the judgment of the trial court setting

forth financial orders incident to the dissolution of his

marriage to the plaintiff, Marjorie Hornung. In those

orders, the trial court directed the defendant to pay to

the plaintiff, inter alia, lump sum alimony in the amount

of $7.5 million and attorney’s fees in the amount of

$140,000. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial

court: (1) improperly rendered a lump sum alimony

award that constitutes a property distribution in violation of the parties’ prenuptial agreement (agreement);

and (2) abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees

to the plaintiff in light of its other awards to her. We

disagree with the defendant’s claim that the lump sum

alimony award is actually an improper property distribution, but agree that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.

Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the

judgment of the trial court.2

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history. The plaintiff and the defendant were married

in Greenwich in 1997 and have four minor children.

The defendant earns $970,000 per year from employment and investments, and received $37 million from

the sale of a software program in 2000. The plaintiff, a

full-time homemaker and the primary caretaker of the

children, presently earns no income. She suffers from

a thyroid condition and is borderline diabetic.

Shortly before their marriage, the parties entered into

the agreement. The agreement provided for sole ownership of separate property acquired before the marriage,

which would not be subject to equitable distribution in

the event of dissolution.3 Marital assets were to be

divided in accordance with a formula based upon the

length of the marriage and the number of children. The

agreement stated that the issues of alimony and child

support would be addressed by the courts.4

In 2011, the plaintiff brought the present action seeking a legal separation, and later amended her complaint

to seek a dissolution of the marriage. After trial, the

trial court ordered the defendant to pay, inter alia,

$40,000 per month in periodic unallocated alimony and

child support, and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony.5

With respect to the lump sum alimony award, the court

noted that ‘‘under all the circumstances [the] award

. . . is appropriate to provide for continuing support of

the [plaintiff]’’ in light of the following: ‘‘[the plaintiff’s]

health issues; her lack of recent employment; her primary child care responsibilities for four children, which

limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time

basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire assets in

the future.’’6

In making the award, the court stated that

it considered the factors in the alimony statute, General
Statutes § 46b-82,7 as well as ‘‘other factors which may

be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In discussing alimony generally, the court noted that ‘‘both parties . . .

made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including

the real estate.’’ The court also ordered the defendant

to contribute $100,000 toward the plaintiff’s attorney’s

fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62,8

reasoning

that ‘‘to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning

capacity and the responsibility for the primary care of

four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of

whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her

portion of the financial award . . . would undermine

the purposes of [the] same’’ and that ‘‘it would be fair

and equitable for the [defendant] to pay [those fees].’’

The defendant then filed this appeal. See footnote 1 of

this opinion.

The plaintiff subsequently moved for an award of

appellate attorney’s fees. After a hearing, the trial court

ordered the defendant to contribute an additional

$40,000 toward the plaintiff’s appellate attorney’s fees.

The court stated that the plaintiff needed ‘‘reasonable

access to the court system [to] defend an appeal that

[the defendant] made’’ and that she ‘‘does not have

ample liquid assets’’ or ‘‘resources that are readily available’’ to pay the fees because several of the trial court’s

orders were stayed pending the defendant’s appeal.

Thereafter, the defendant filed an amended appeal challenging the trial court’s award of appellate attorney’s

fees. Additional facts and procedural history will be set

forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the lump

sum alimony award constitutes a functional property

distribution in violation of the agreement; and (2) the

trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay

the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. We address each claim

in turn.

I

The defendant first claims that the lump sum alimony

award is actually a property distribution in violation of

the agreement because: (1) in making the award, the

trial court considered two factors—the plaintiff’s

opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate—that appear in the property distribution statute, General Statutes § 46b-81,9 but

not the alimony statute, § 46b-82; and (2) the lump sum

award is more than necessary for the plaintiff’s continued support, thus indicating that it is functionally a

property distribution.10 In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly awarded lump sum

alimony, rather than a disguised property distribution,

because: (1) the trial court unambiguously characterized the lump sum award as alimony, and retained discretion to consider equitable factors beyond § 46b-82,
including those listed in § 46b-81, in making the award;

and (2) the award was appropriate in light of the standard of living of the marriage, the substantial assets

awarded to the defendant under the agreement, and

the equitable factors considered by the trial court. We

agree with the plaintiff.

The question of whether the trial court properly

applied the law when fashioning the lump sum alimony

award is a question of law subject to plenary review.

See Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153, 162, 989 A.2d 1060

(2010). Although financial orders in family matters are

generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion; Ross v.

Ross, 172 Conn. 269, 275, 374 A.2d 185 (1977); this court

applies a less deferential standard ‘‘when the decision

of the trial court is based not on an exercise of discretion but on a purported principle of law.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280

Conn. 632, 641, 910 A.2d 963 (2006). ‘‘Notwithstanding

the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court’s ruling . . . may be

reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial

court applies the wrong standard of law.’’ Borkowski

v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 740, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).

We conclude that the trial court properly awarded

lump sum alimony, and not a property distribution in

violation of the agreement, for two reasons: (1) the

trial court unambiguously characterized the lump sum

award as alimony and, as such, its incidental consideration of two factors in § 46b-81, the property distribution statute, does not demonstrate that the award is a

functional property distribution; and (2)the factthat the

combined alimony and child support awards apparently

exceed the plaintiff’s claimed expenses does not demonstrate that the award is actually a property distribution, in light of the standard of living of the marriage

and the equitable and statutory factors considered by

the trial court.11 See footnote 10 of this opinion. We

discuss each rationale in turn.

A

First, the trial court consistently described the lump

sum award as alimony in its decision, articulation, and

comments. From the beginning of its decision, the trial

court distinguished between the property distribution

allowed under the prenuptial agreement and its broad

authority to award alimony.12 Thereafter, the trial court

explained that, ‘‘under all the circumstances,’’ the purpose of the lump sum award was to provide ‘‘continuing

support’’ to the plaintiff—the quintessential purpose of

alimony. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski,

273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005). The purpose

of a property distribution, by contrast, is ‘‘to unscramble

existing marital property in order to give each spouse

his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 133; see also

Blake v. Blake, 211 Conn. 485, 497, 560 A.2d 396 (1989)
(‘‘[t]he difference between an assignment of a specific

portion of an estate and alimony is in their purposes’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). The trial court

made no reference or allusion to this equitable purpose

in making the lump sum alimony award, and instead

divided the property in accordance with the agreement.

The trial court also specifically cited § 46b-82, the alimony statute, and two judicial opinions in which lump

sum alimony was properly awarded when making the

lump sum alimony award.13 See Maguire v. Maguire,

222 Conn. 32, 47, 608 A.2d 79 (1992) (‘‘[a]ny ambiguity

as to the criteria upon which the courtrelied for alimony

was put to rest [when] the trial court indicated that it

had relied upon the criteria in § 46b-82 for its award

of alimony’’).

In light of this language,the trial court’s mere mention

of two factors in the property distribution statute,

namely, the plaintiff’s opportunity to acquire assets in

the future and her contribution to the marital estate, did

not render the lump sum award an improper property

distribution.14 See id., 46–47 (trial court did not improperly predicate alimony award on ‘‘impermissible statutory criterion [by] . . . refer[ring] to § 46b-81’’ in

decision); Blake v. Blake, supra, 211 Conn. 495–99 (trial

court’s characterization of lump sum payment as alimony in oral decision did not render it alimony, as

opposed to property distribution, when court otherwise

consistently characterized award as property distribution). In awarding lump sum alimony, the trial court

pointed to several considerations, including ‘‘the [plaintiff’s] health issues; her lack of recent employment; her

primary child care responsibilities for four children,

which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a

full-time basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire

assets in the future.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court also

noted that throughout the marriage, ‘‘both parties . . .

made significant contributions to the acquisition,

maintenance, and preservation of the family assets,

including the real estate.’’ (Emphasis added.)

We have repeatedly acknowledged that the statutory

factors for awarding alimony and distributing property

are ‘‘virtually identical.’’15 Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210

Conn. 170, 173–74, 553 A.2d 612 (1989); see also Greco

v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 360, 880 A.2d 872 (2005)

(‘‘essentially identical’’); Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, supra, 273 Conn. 137 (‘‘ ‘almost identical’ ’’).

We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for considering the two factors that appear in the property

distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when

awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are

‘‘essentially equitable in . . . nature’’; Robinson v. Robinson, 187 Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234 (1982); and the

resulting financial orders are ‘‘entirely interwoven.’’16

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco,

supra, 354; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232,

541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (‘‘[i]n determining the assignment
of marital property under § 46b-81 or alimony under

§ 46b-82, a trial court must weigh . . . the opportunity

of each for future acquisition of capital assets and

income’’ [emphasis added]); Koizim v. Koizim, 181

Conn. 492, 493, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980) (alimony

award not abuse of discretion in part because of wife’s

‘‘very significant’’ contributions, ‘‘both financial and

otherwise,’’ to marriage; ‘‘even if we . . . look solely

at the other statutory criteria, especially . . . the contributions that each spouse made to the marriage . . .

the court’s [alimony] orders are neither mind boggling,

outrageously excessive nor unreasonable’’ [emphasis

added]); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn. App. 622,

634, 638, 561 A.2d 443 (1989) (after ‘‘properly assessing

the parties’ relative earning capacities, asset holdings,

and ability to acquire assets, in accordance with . . .

§ 46b-82,’’ trial court did not abuse discretion in not

awarding alimony to wife because of her ‘‘capacity to

acquire assets in the future’’ [emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted]). In any event, the trial court

had discretion to consider these equitable factors when

awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property

distribution statute did not render them off-limits to

the trial court’s analysis.17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski,

supra, 228 Conn. 743–44 (courts may consider ‘‘any

other factors which may be appropriate for a just and

equitable resolution of the marital dispute’’ when

awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted]);

Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn. App. 488, 500, 830

A.2d 394 (2003) (‘‘[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain

an exhaustive list of factors, the court properly may

consider other equitable factors when determining an

alimony award’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]);

accord Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 283–84, 752 A.2d

1023 (1999) (court could equitably consider husband’s

travel expenses in seeing children as factor when

awarding alimony even though factor is ‘‘listed explicitly’’ in child support regulations).18

Although the defendant points to the fact that the

trial court considered two factors that appear in the

property distribution statute but not the alimony statute, he does not mention that the trial court also considered one factor that appears in the alimony statute, but

not the property distribution statute. In awarding lump

sum alimony, the trial court emphasized the plaintiff’s

‘‘primary child care responsibilities for four children,

which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a fulltime basis . . . .’’ The alimony statute lists as a factor,

‘‘the desirability and feasibility of [the] parent’s securing

employment’’ in the case of parents to whom the custody of minor children is awarded. General Statutes

§ 46b-82 (a). The property distribution statute contains

no such factor.19 See General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).

The trial court’s articulation also supports the characterization of the award as alimony and not a property

distribution. The plaintiff sought an articulation as to
whether the trial court ‘‘considered, applied, or

intended to apply’’ a factor in § 46b-81 when it awarded

lump sum alimony. The trial court responded: ‘‘In making an equitable division of marital property or an award

of alimony, whether periodic or lump sum, the court

must, as it did, consider the statutory criteria set forth

in . . . §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 respectively.’’ (Emphasis

altered.) The word ‘‘respectively’’ indicates the court’s

understanding that each statute applies to each type of

financial order. This language therefore confirms the

trial court’s application of § 46b-82, not § 46b-81, when

awarding lump sum alimony. The trial court also

acknowledged its equitable power to consider ‘‘any

appropriate additional factors, statutory or otherwise’’

in its articulation, noting that those powers gave ‘‘the

court the authority to consider all the circumstances

that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute.’’(Emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.)

The trial court further differentiated between the

lump sum alimony award and its property distribution

orders at a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to terminate

an appellate stay on several of its orders. The court

stated, ‘‘I crafted this order . . . [a]nd I specifically

separated what I consider property settlement from .

. . lump sum alimony.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court

explained that it awarded both periodic and lump sum

alimony in consideration of how the defendant’s income

‘‘comes in’’ and ‘‘flow[s]’’ from his various income

streams. The court noted that ‘‘there’s a method to the

. . . madness in terms of how the decree is crafted.’’

Thus, the court evidently did not intend to effectuate

a functional property distribution by awarding lump

sum alimony, but intended to account for the fact that

the defendantreceived some components of his income

only a few times per year.

B

Second, we disagree with the defendant’s contention

that, because the combined alimony and child support

payments exceed the plaintiff’s claimed expenses, the

lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution, in light of the standard of living of the marriage

and the equitable factors considered by the trial court.20

See footnote 10 of this opinion. The plaintiff attested

to having $65,444 per month in expenses at the time of

trial.21 The $40,000 per month periodic alimony and

child support payments would not cover this amount.

The lump sum alimony payments, however, when combined with these payments, equate to $102,500 per

month in total alimony and child support. Although

this figure exceeds the plaintiff’s claimed expenses, we

cannot conclude that this fact alone means that the

lump sum award constitutes a functional property distribution. See Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 181 Conn.

493–94 (upholding total alimony award of $9000 per
month, when wife claimed approximately $7083 per

month in expenses and marital expenses were $7500

per month).

First, it is not clear from the record to what extent

the trial court considered the plaintiff’s expenses, as

stated in her financial affidavit, to represent the standard of living of the marriage.22 See, e.g., Mavilla v.

Mavilla, Docket No. 2011-095, 2011 WL 4975100, *5 (Vt.

August 31, 2011) (wife’s financial affidavit showed that

her ‘‘standard of living was far below that established

during the marriage and that which husband currently

enjoyed’’); see also Stamper v. Stamper, Docket No.

A10-109, 2010 WL 3119503, *4 (Minn. App. August 10,

2010) (wife’s claimed expenses ‘‘reflect[ed] a significantly reduced standard of living compared to the standard enjoyed during the marriage’’); cf. Thomas v.

Thomas, Docket No. A13-0905, 2014 WL 802035, *3

(Minn. App. March 3, 2014) (wife’s claimed expenses

‘‘accurately reflect[ed] the parties’ standard of living

during the marriage’’). Although the primary purpose

of alimony is to provide for continuing support of a

disadvantaged spouse,the spouse is entitled to maintain

the standard of living of the marriage after the dissolution, as closely as possible. See, e.g., Brody v. Brody,

315 Conn. 300, 313, 105 A.3d 887 (2015)(‘‘[t]he generally

accepted purpose of . . . alimony is to enable a spouse

who is disadvantaged through divorce to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with the standard of living

during marriage’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

When the disadvantaged spouse’s efforts ‘‘increased the

other’s earning capacity at the expense of [his or] her

own,’’ he or she is entitled to ‘‘sufficient alimony to

ensure the continued enjoyment of [that] standard of

living . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dan

v. Dan, 315 Conn. 1, 11, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). Moreover,

the parties’ children are entitled to continue ‘‘the lifestyle to which [they were] accustomed and the standard

of living [they] enjoyed before the divorce . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo,

296 Conn. 80, 108, 995 A.2d 1 (2010).

The parties apparently maintained a high standard

of living during the marriage. The defendant valued the

marital home at $6.75 million23 and the parties’ vacation

home at $1.2 million. Although the defendant’s income

fluctuated during the marriage, he earned more than

$1 million per year in several years of the marriage.24

The trial court acknowledged that his employment has

‘‘proven to be very lucrative.’’ In 2006, for example,

he earned $1,687,677, which equates to approximately

$140,640 per month. The following year, he earned

$1,253,766, or approximately $104,480 per month. He

also received an additional $37 million from the sale of

a software program three years into the marriage. At the

time of trial, the defendant’s bank account contained

$84,238. Because the plaintiff’s efforts as a homemaker

and the primary caretaker of the children increased the
defendant’s earning capacity at the expense of her own,

she is entitled to maintain this standard of living after

the divorce, to the extent possible. See, e.g., Dan v.

Dan, supra, 315 Conn. 11; Brody v. Brody, 136 Conn.

App. 773, 790, 51 A.3d 1121 (2012) (‘‘the parties had

enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during their marriage

. . . for the benefit of the [wife] and the parties’ children, any award of alimony should reflect this quality

of life’’), rev’d in part on other grounds, 315 Conn. 300,

105 A.3d 887 (2015).

In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial

court must also consider the factors in § 46b-82 when

awarding alimony. See Golden v. Mandel, 110 Conn.

App. 376, 385, 955 A.2d 115 (2008) (‘‘[t]he standard of

living . . . was only one factor that the court considered in making its financial award’’). Such factors

include: ‘‘the length of the marriage, the causes for the

. . . dissolution of the marriage . . . [and] the age,

health, station, occupation, amount and sources of

income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,

employability, estate and needs of each of the parties

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-82 (a). The trial court

must also consider any property distributions made

pursuant to § 46b-81 and, ‘‘in the case of a parent to

whom the custody of minor children has been awarded,

the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing

employment.’’ General Statutes § 46b-82 (a).

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s expenses do not represent

the only factor that the trial court must consider when

awarding alimony. On the contrary, § 46b-82 lists thirteen other factors that the court must consider when

awarding alimony, in addition to the ‘‘needs’’ of the

recipient spouse. The court must not only examine the

spouse’s financial situation at the time of trial, but look

ahead to his or her ability to generate income in the

future. See General Statutes § 46b-82 (instructing court

to consider spouse’s ‘‘age, health, station, occupation

. . . earning capacity, vocational skills, education,

[and] employability’’). Several of the factors relate in

no way to the spouse’s expenses, such as the length of

the marriage and the cause of the breakdown of the

marriage. The trial court must also look to the payor

spouse’s financial situation, in addition to that of the

recipient spouse. Specifically, the trial court must consider the payor’s age, health, station, occupation,

amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, and employability. These factors have nothing to do with the recipient spouse’s

claimed expenses. Thus, it cannot be said that the trial

court was constrained by the plaintiff’s claimed

expenses in awarding alimony. The trial court instead

had ‘‘wide discretion’’ to ensure that the plaintiff and

the parties’ children continued to enjoy the standard

of living of the marriage for years to come. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Brody v. Brody, supra, 315

Conn. 313.
The trial court’s resolution of these factors in the

present case further militates against characterizing the

lump sum alimony award as a property distribution.25

The parties were married for seventeen years and have

four minor children. The children, now ages eleven,

fourteen, fifteen, and seventeen, three of whom have

learning issues, primarily reside with the plaintiff. The

defendant was fifty years old at the time of trial and in

‘‘general good health.’’ Although he described a ‘‘painful

bout of neuropathy’’ at one point during the marriage,

the trial court found that he ‘‘is not prevented from

working full-time.’’ The defendant has a business degree

from Syracuse University, and his primary employment

is with his family’s window company and its subsidiaries. At the time of trial, the defendant earned nearly $1

million per year from his employment and investments.

By contrast, the plaintiff was forty-five years old at the

time of trial, suffers from a thyroid condition, and is

borderline diabetic. She has a college degree from

Emerson College, but did not work for the ‘‘greater

portion’’ of the parties’ seventeen year marriage. When

she did work, she earned approximately $30,000 per

year, with a maximum of $65,000 to $70,000 per year.

She earned no income at the time of trial and claimed

$65,444 per month in expenses. Significantly, the trial

court also found that the defendant caused the breakdown ofthe marriage,26 characterizing him as a ‘‘controlling, emotional bully’’ and describing his ‘‘bizarre’’ and

‘‘demeaning’’ behavior.27

Moreover, the agreement left the defendant with significant assets as compared to the plaintiff. See General

Statutes § 46b-82 (trial court ‘‘shall consider the . . .

estate . . . of each of the parties’’); Golden v. Mandel,

supra, 110 Conn. App. 386 (‘‘[i]t is well established that

the parties’ estate is defined as the aggregate of the

property and liabilities of each’’ [emphasis added]);

see also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 192, 429

A.2d 470 (1980) (‘‘the ‘estate’ of the parties . . . comprehends the aggregate of the property and liabilities

of each’’). The trial court ordered the defendant to pay

to the plaintiff: $2,082,000, the amount owed her under

the prenuptial agreement; $40,000 per month in periodic

unallocated alimony and child support for fifteen years;

and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in biannual installments of $375,000. The defendant, however,

kept the marital home and the parties’ vacation home,

in addition to all of his commercial real estate, business

ownerships, securities, bonds, bank accounts, and

retirement accounts. He received, in total, more than

$25 million in assets.28 By comparison, the plaintiff kept

the home she purchased during this dissolution litigation, as well as her bank accounts, retirement accounts,

and personal property, which totaled approximately

$4.5 million.29

The trial court also did not specify how much of the
periodic alimony and child support award should go

toward the children’s maintenance, as opposed to the

plaintiff’s support. The trial court, at least, found it

appropriate to deviate from the presumptive minimum

child support amount under the guidelines based on the

defendant’s income. Moreover, the parties’ four minor

children are entitled to maintain the standard of living

of the marriage, to the extent possible. See Maturo

v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 108; see also id., 168–69

(Vertefeuille, J., dissenting in part) (noting ‘‘new wave’’

of cases recognizing ‘‘the significance of the standard of

living of children of affluent parents’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]). The $40,000 per month award, which

would not cover the plaintiff’s $65,444 in expenses, was

also limited to fifteen years.

In light of these principles, we disagree with the

defendant’s contention that, because the combined alimony and child support payments exceed the plaintiff’s

claimed expenses, the lump sum alimony award is functionally a property distribution. The agreement’s waiver

of equitable distribution of property does not change

this result. Although the agreement limited the court’s

discretion to distribute property, it did not limit the

trial court’s discretion to award alimony in any way.

The agreement simply stated that ‘‘a court of competent

jurisdiction shall address the issues of alimony and/or

child support . . . in the event [of] . . . divorce

. . . .’’ Indeed, the Appellate Court recently rejected a

nearly identical argument in Brody v. Brody, supra,

136 Conn. App. 790, in which the trial court properly

awarded lump sum alimony despite the existence of

a prenuptial agreement in which the parties waived

equitable distribution. The husband argued, as here,

that ‘‘the [trial] court improperly used the award of

alimony to effectuate an improper distribution of property in violation of the parties’ prenuptial agreement.’’

Id., 788. The Appellate Court disagreed, noting that the

trial court had ‘‘broad discretion’’ to award alimony

because the prenuptial agreement ‘‘by its clear terms,

[was] concerned with equitable distributions of property . . . not alimony awards.’’ Id., 791. Accordingly,

we conclude that the lump sum alimony award does

not constitute a functional property distribution in contravention of the parties’ agreement.30

II

We now turn to the defendant’s claim that the trial

court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay

$100,000 of the plaintiff’s trial attorney’s fees and

$40,000 of her appellate attorney’s fees, in light of its

other awards to her.31 Specifically, the defendant claims

that the plaintiff received ample liquid funds from the

trial court’s judgment with which to pay her attorney’s

fees, and thatthe trial court’s conclusion that not awarding her attorney’s fees would undermine its other

awards to her was unreasonable. In response, the plain-
tiff contends that the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in awarding her attorney’s fees, and reasonably concluded that not doing so would have undermined its other awards. Additionally, with respect to

the appellate attorney’s fees award, the plaintiff asserts

that she did not have sufficient liquid assets to defend

the appeal because several of the trial court’s financial

orders were stayed pending appeal. We agree with the

defendant, and conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees.

Section 46b-62 (a) authorizes the trial court to award

attorney’s fees in a dissolution action when appropriate

in light of the ‘‘respective financial abilities’’ of the parties and the equitable factors listed in § 46b-82. Turgeon

v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 280, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983);

see also footnotes 7 and 8 of this opinion. ‘‘[W]e [have]

stated three broad principles by which these statutory

criteria are to be applied. First, such awards should not

be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated

an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they

should be permitted to do so. Third, where, because

of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid

funds, an allowance of [attorney’s] fees is not justified.’’

Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 280.

‘‘A determination of what constitutes ample liquid

funds . . . requires . . . an examination of the total

assets of the parties at the time the award is made.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Anderson v. Anderson, 191 Conn. 46, 59, 463 A.2d 578

(1983). We have recognized, however, that ‘‘[t]he availability of sufficient cash to pay one’s attorney’s fees is

not an absolute litmus test . . . . [A] trial court’s discretion should be guided so that its decision regarding

attorney’s fees does not undermine its purpose in making any other financial award.’’ Devino v. Devino, 190

Conn. 36, 38–39, 458 A.2d 692 (1983); see also, e.g.,

Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 398, 886 A.2d 391

(2005) (not awarding $100,000 in attorney’s fees to wife

would have ‘‘necessarily eviscerate[d]’’ any benefit she

would have received from $100,000 lump sum alimony

award), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S. Ct. 2296, 164

L. Ed. 2d 815 (2006).

‘‘Whether to allow [attorney’s] fees, and if so in what

amount, calls for the exercise of judicial discretion’’

by the trial court. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Anderson v. Anderson, supra, 191 Conn. 58. ‘‘An abuse

of discretion in granting [attorney’s] fees will be found

only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial

court could not reasonably have concluded as it did.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v.

Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 386, 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

In the present case, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $100,000 of the plaintiff’s trial attorney’s

fees and $40,000 of her appellate attorney’s fees. The
trial court reasoned, with respect to the trial attorney’s

fees award, that ‘‘to require the [plaintiff], who has

minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the

primary care of four minor children age nine through

fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these

fees from her portion of the financial award . . . would

undermine the purposes of [the] same’’ and that ‘‘it

would be fair and equitable for the [defendant] to pay

[those fees].’’ After the defendant filed an appeal, the

trial court awarded the plaintiff an additional $40,000

in appellate attorney’s fees, stating that the plaintiff

needed ‘‘reasonable access to the court system [to]

defend an appeal that [the defendant] made.’’ The trial

court noted that several of its financial awards to the

plaintiff, including the $2,082,000 payment under the

agreement, the $375,000 biannual lump sum alimony

payments, and the $100,000 trial attorney’s fees award,

were automatically stayed pending the defendant’s

appeal. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a). The $40,000 per

month periodic alimony and child support payments

were not stayed, however, and the plaintiff continued

to receive those payments. See Practice Book § 61-11

(c) (‘‘no automatic stay shall apply . . . to orders of

periodic alimony, [or child] support’’). The trial court

also noted that the plaintiff had only $3700 in her bank

accounts at that time and, thus, she was ‘‘land rich but

cash poor.’’32 The trial court therefore concluded that

the plaintiff did ‘‘not have ample liquid assets’’ or

‘‘resources that are readily available’’ to pay the fees.

Four months later, the plaintiff successfully moved to

terminate the stay on the $2,082,000 payment and the

lump sum alimony award. Specifically, the plaintiff was

scheduled to receive the $2,082,000 payment and the

first $375,000 installment of the lump sum alimony

award by December 19, 2014.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion

in making the attorney’s fees awards because the plaintiff received ample liquid funds as a result of the trial

court’s judgment, and the trial court’s determination

that not awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff would

undermine its other awards was unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 181 Conn. 501. We further

disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that the appellate stay on the trial court’s financial orders justifies

the appellate attorney’s fees award because the trial

court could have terminated the stay sua sponte, and

because the plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to

terminate the stay on several of those orders.

First, the trial attorney’s fees award represents a very

small portion of the liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff

in the trial court’s judgment. Pursuant to the judgment,

the plaintiff would receive: $2,082,000,the amount owed

to her under the agreement, within sixty days of the

judgment; $40,000 per month in periodic alimony and

child support, starting twelve days from the judgment;

and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in bian-
nual installments of $375,000, starting two and one-half

months from the judgment. Thus, the plaintiff would

receive liquid assets totaling $2,577,000 within three

months of the judgment.33 The trial attorney’s fees

award represents only 4 percent of this amount.34 We

have previously held attorney’s fees awards amounting

to a low portion of the payee’s liquid assets to constitute

an abuse of discretion, since the payee could easily have

paid the fees out of those assets, despite the existence

of equitable factors supporting the award. See, e.g.,

Maguire v. Maguire, supra, 222 Conn. 34–35, 44

($50,000 attorney’s fees award, which amounted to 10

percent of wife’s $500,000 in liquid assets, was abuse

of discretion, even though parties were married forforty

years and had children, husband caused breakdown of

marriage, and wife had limited earning capacity);35

Blake v. Blake, supra, 211 Conn. 488–89 (concluding

that wife could not ‘‘reasonably’’ claim that failure to

award $14,948 in attorney’s fees and expenses, which

amounted to 2 percent of wife’s $630,000 in liquid assets,

‘‘would undermine or skew the substantial financial

awards granted to her’’ and noting that awarding attorney’s fees would be ‘‘gilding the lily’’ where husband

had $5,503,000 in total assets and wife had $1,535,000

in total assets); see also Blake v. Blake, supra, 207 Conn.

218–19 (parties were married for twelve years and had

three children).36 By contrast, this court and our Appellate Court have deemed attorney’s fees awards that

represent a more substantial part of the payee’s liquid

assets proper, because not doing so could result in the

immediate depletion of those assets, especially when

equitable factors support the award. See, e.g., Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 375–77, 710 A.2d 717

(1998) (wife amassed $3250 in attorney’s fees and had

liquid assets of only $1686); Eslami v. Eslami, 218

Conn. 801, 818–21, 591 A.2d 411 (1991) (trial court did

not abuse its discretion in awarding wife total of $48,230

in attorney’s fees and expert witness fees, amounting

to 15 percent of wife’s total assets, which were comprised of $95,000 in deposits and securities and $300,000

lump sum alimony award, less $70,650 in claimed liabilities, in case where parties were married for thirty years,

husband caused breakdown of marriage, there was

‘‘great disparity’’ in parties’ income and assets, and wife

was in ‘‘poor health’’ and had ‘‘substantial continuing

medical expenses’’); Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2

Conn. App. 416, 417, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984) ($7500

attorney’s fees award, which amounted to 50 percent

of wife’s $15,000 in liquid assets, was not abuse of

discretion; parties were married for thirty years and

husband caused breakdown of marriage).37

Viewed another way, the trial attorney’s fees award

in the present case represents less than 2 percent of

the lump sum alimony award alone, not including the

$2,082,000 payment under the agreement or the $40,000

per month periodic alimony and child support pay-
ments. Similarto the comparison with the payee’s liquid

assets, attorney’s fees awards that represent a small

portion of the payee’s lump sum alimony award have

been held improper, because the payee could easily pay

his or her own attorney’s fees out of that award, even

in the wake of strong equitable factors. See, e.g., Turgeon v. Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 270, 279–81 ($10,000

in attorney’s fees and $1500 in expert witness fees

awards, amounting to 8 percent of $140,000 in total lump

sum alimony awards to wife, was abuse of discretion,

though parties were married for twenty-three years and

husband received $309,000 in assets, compared to wife’s

$100,000; property and alimony awards to wife were

‘‘generous’’ and ‘‘liquid assets being made available [to

her were] ample’’); Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 181 Conn.

493–501 ($55,000 in attorney’s fees award, amounting

to 9 percent of $600,000 lump sum alimony award and

4 percent of $1,410,000 in total assets, not including

periodic alimony award, was abuse of discretion where

parties were married for twenty-seven years, husband

earned $208,000 per year, wife earned $1000 per year,

husband was unfaithful, and wife made ‘‘significant’’

contributions to marriage, ‘‘both financial and otherwise’’).38 Conversely, attorney’s fees awards reflecting

a more significant portion of the payee’s lump sum

alimony award, thereby potentially undermining that

award, have been held proper, especially when equitable factors support the award. See, e.g., Holley v. Holley,

194 Conn. 25, 26–27 and n.1, 478 A.2d 1000 (1984) (attorney’s fees award of $7500, amounting to 50 percent of

$15,000 lump sum alimony award, not including periodic alimony and child support award, not abuse of

discretion where parties were married for approximately fifteen years, had one minor child, husband

earned $100,000 per year, wife earned $23,000 per year,

and husband had $280,000 in separate assets); Costa

v. Costa, 11 Conn. App. 74, 75–77, 526 A.2d 4 (1987)

(attorney’s fees award of $6000, amounting to 30 percent of $20,000 lump sum alimony award, not including

periodic alimony award, not abuse of discretion where

husband had $280,000 in assets, wife had $170,000 in

assets, husband earned $58,400 per year, and wife

‘‘needed treatment for deep depression and had no

immediate prospect of being able to work’’); see also

Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 235–37, 449 A.2d

151 (1982)($10,000 attorney’s fees award to wife proper

when trial court ‘‘could reasonably have concluded that

[her] financial resources . . . were necessary to meet

her future needs’’ and alimony awarded to her ‘‘was

not substantial in amount nor was it for a long period

of time’’).39

In the present case, given the vast liquid assets

awarded to the plaintiff, and the modest nature of the

attorney’s fees when compared with those assets, the

equitable factors in § 46b-82, as incorporated into § 46b62, do not justify the award. See Koizim v. Koizim,
supra, 181 Conn. 500–501 (equitable factors justified

lump sum and periodic alimony awards, but not attorney’s fees award). As grounds for the trial attorney’s

fees award, the trial court cited the plaintiff’s ‘‘minimal

earning capacity’’ and responsibility for caring for the

parties’ four minor children. The trial court further

stated that it would be ‘‘fair and equitable’’ forthe defendant to pay the fees. The trial court cited similar concerns with regard to the appellate attorney’s fees award.

We have stated, however, that attorney’s fees ‘‘are not

to be awarded merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay’’ and that ‘‘[w]here, because of

other orders, both parties are financially able to pay

their own counsel fees they should be permitted to do

so.’’ Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 500–501. Although these

factors strongly support the validity of the lump sum

alimony award, they are outweighed in the attorney’s

fees context by the fact that the fees represent but a

small fraction of the substantial liquid assets awarded

to the plaintiff.40 Cf. Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos,

supra, 297 Conn. 383–87 ($64,000 attorney’s fees award

was proper when ‘‘the overwhelming majority of the

assets awarded to the [wife] were not liquid assets,’’

given that ‘‘[$2.6 million] of the approximately [$3.2

million] in assets awarded to the [wife] consisted of

the family home in which the [wife] and the parties’

three minor children resided’’ and ‘‘also included her

interest in a trust . . . certain retirement accounts,

vested stock and vested stock options’’).41

Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the $40,000 appellate

attorney’s fees award was, at least, proper, because the

$2,082,000 payment under the agreement and the lump

sum alimony payments were stayed pending the defendant’s appeal. Thus, she claims that she did not have

ample liquid funds with which to defend the appeal.

We are unpersuaded that the stay on these orders justifies the appellate attorney’s fees award. The plaintiff

always had the option of seeking to terminate the stay.

See Practice Book § 61-11 (c). As stated previously, the

plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to terminate the

stay several months after the trial court’s award of

appellate attorney’s fees. Furthermore, the trial court

had the discretion to terminate the stay sua sponte at

any time. See Practice Book § 61-11 (d). Additionally,

although the plaintiff’s amended financial affidavit

showed only $3700 in her bank accounts, she was still

receiving $40,000 per month in periodic alimony and

child support, and attested to having personal property

worth $305,810, a home worth $2.1 million, and other

assets worth $79,794.42 See Anderson v. Anderson,

supra, 191 Conn. 60 (attorney’s fees award was abuse

of discretion when home would be sold at later date,

because sale of home would ‘‘yield liquid assets for

both parties’’). These factors, when considered in light

of the substantial liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff,

offset the significance of the temporary stay on the
orders.43

We, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused

its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees

under these circumstances, thus requiring reversal of

the trial court’s judgment with respect to those

awards.44 Furthermore, because we conclude that the

attorney’s fees awards are severable from the trial

court’s other financial orders, it is not necessary to

remand the case for reconsideration of all financial

matters. See Smith v. Smith, supra, 249 Conn. 277. ‘‘This

court and the Appellate Court have often described

financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings

as entirely interwoven and as a carefully crafted mosaic,

each element of which may be dependent on the other.

. . . Every improper order, however, does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s

financial orders. A financial order is severable when it

is not in any way interdependent with other orders and

is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to

other factors.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. Here, the attorney’s fees awards

are severable from the trial court’s other financial

orders and a new hearing on all financial matters is

not required.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the

attorney’s fees awards to the plaintiff, and the case is

remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motions

for trial and appellate attorney’s fees; the judgment is

affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER and

VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the

appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-2. Although the plaintiff has also filed an appeal from the judgment

of the trial court, we need not address the issues raised therein. See footnote

2 of this opinion.

2 The plaintiff also filed a ‘‘contingent’’ cross appeal; see Fortin v. Hartford

Underwriters Ins. Co., 139 Conn. App. 826, 832 n.2, 59 A.3d 247, cert. granted,

308 Conn. 905, 61 A.3d 1098 (2013) (appeal withdrawn November 26, 2014);

challenging the enforceability of the agreement in the event that the defendant prevails in challenging the lump sum alimony award or in the event

the case is remanded for a new hearing on all financial matters. She contends,

however, that a new hearing on all financial matters is not required if we

reverse the trial court’s judgment only with respect to the attorney’s fees

award. See Montoya v. Montoya, 280 Conn. 605, 617, 909 A.2d 947 (2006)

(‘‘Every improper order . . . does not necessarily merit a reconsideration

of all of the trial court’s financial orders. A financial order is severable when

it is not in any way interdependent with other orders . . . .’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 47, 608 A.2d 79

(1992) (reversing trial court’s judgment with respect to attorney’s fees award

only and not ordering new hearing on all financial matters). Because we

uphold the validity of the lump sum alimony award and do not order a new

hearing on all financial matters based on our reversal of the attorney’s fees

award, we need not address the plaintiff’s ‘‘contingent’’ cross appeal.

3 The agreement provides: ‘‘It is the intention of the parties that the disposition of property in this [a]greement be deemed a disposition of property

which would fully satisfy any claims which each party may have against each

other under the laws of any jurisdiction including their rights to equitable

distribution and that the parties hereby specifically waive any equitable distribution.’’

4

In 2008, the parties entered into a modification of the agreement. The
modification clarified that the marital home remained the defendant’s separate property and that, in the event of divorce, the defendant would pay

the plaintiff an additional $3.5 million, representing her interest in the home.

All other provisions of the original agreement remained intact.

5 The trial court’s other orders included a $2,082,000 payment to the plaintiff, which represented the outstanding balance owed to her under the

agreement, and the defendant’s contribution to the children’s extracurricular

fees, medical and dental expenses, and college education. The defendant

does not challenge these orders in this appeal.

6

In response to the plaintiff’s challenge to the enforceability of the

agreement, the trial court held that the agreement was valid and enforceable.

See footnote 2 of this opinion.

7 General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In determining

whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the

award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and

shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment,

dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station,

occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational

skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and

the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81,

and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has

been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing

employment.’’

8 General Statutes § 46b-62 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any proceeding

seeking relief under the provisions of this chapter . . . the court may order

either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in

accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth

in section 46b-82. . . .’’

We note that, although § 46b-62 has been amended since the events underlying the present appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2014, No. 14-3, § 5; those

amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest

of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

9 General Statutes § 46b-81 (c) provides: ‘‘In fixing the nature and value

of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the

evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage,

the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation,

the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning

capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and

needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each forfuture acquisition

of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution

of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in

value of their respective estates.’’

10 We note that the defendant does not argue that the size of the lump

sum alimony award itself constitutes an abuse of discretion; only that the

excessiveness of the award makes it a property distribution. All of the

defendant’s statements with respect to the amount of the award are connected to his argument that the amount of the award indicates that it is a

property distribution. He argues that ‘‘[b]ecause the lump sum [award] far

exceeds what the record shows is necessary for the plaintiff’s support . . .

the lump sum ‘alimony’ award is, in fact, a property [distribution] . . . .’’

Specifically, the defendant contends that, because ‘‘the total amount of

support far exceeds the plaintiff’s claimed expenses . . . the only reasonable view of the lump sum award is that it is functionally a property [distribution].’’ Put a different way, the defendant asserts that, because the lump

sum alimony award is ‘‘far more than the record shows is necessary for the

plaintiff’s support,’’ the ‘‘only reasonable conclusion is that the trial court

ordered a property distribution . . . .’’

Because we are not asked to determine whether the lump sum award,

properly characterized as alimony, is so excessive that it constitutes an

abuse of discretion standing alone, we make no judgment to that effect. As

such, all references in this opinion to the claimed excess in the amount of

the award are for the sole purpose of determining whether the amount of

the award renders it a property distribution, and not whether the award

itself constitutes an abuse of discretion. Although we rely on cases in which

the alimony award, itself, constituted an abuse of discretion for guidance,

we limit our analysis to the question presented by the defendant.

11 The defendant also argues that the lump sum alimony award has features

of a property distribution because it is nonmodifiable, nontaxable, nondeductible, and survives the death of either party or the remarriage of the

plaintiff. It is well settled, however, that alimony awards may—in lump sum
form—be nonmodifiable, nontaxable, nondeductible, and survive the death

or remarriage of the parties. See, e.g., Tremaine v. Tremaine, 235 Conn.

45, 59, 663 A.2d 387 (1995) (‘‘lump sum alimony is generally neither taxable

to the payee nor deductible by the payor’’); Scoville v. Scoville, 179 Conn.

277, 279–80, 426 A.2d 271 (1979) (‘‘Lump sum alimony, unlike periodic

alimony . . . cannot be modified even should there be a substantial change

in circumstances. . . . This is true even if the lump sum alimony is . . .

payable in installments.’’ [Citations omitted.]); Pulvermacher v. Pulvermacher, 166 Conn. 380, 385, 349 A.2d 836 (1974) (‘‘[l]ump sum alimony,

even where divided into [installments], is payable in full regardless of future

events such as the death of the husband or the remarriage of the wife’’);

cf. Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370, 384, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (traditional

alimony ‘‘typically’’ taxable and deductible); Lynch v. Lynch, 153 Conn. App.

208, 224, 100 A.3d 968 (2014) (periodic alimony ‘‘accrue[s]’’ at later date),

cert. denied, 315 Conn. 923, 108 A.3d 1124, cert. denied, U.S. , 136

S. Ct. 68, 193 L. Ed. 2d 66 (2015). Thus, those features of the award do not

necessarily render it a property distribution.

12 The trial court stated: ‘‘[T]he parties had agreed that in the event of

divorce, the [defendant] would pay the [plaintiff] pursuant to the original

prenuptial agreement, in accordance with a formula . . . the agreement

does not prohibit the award of alimony . . . .’’

13 The trial court cited Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, supra, 273

Conn. 137–38, in which the trial court properly treated a spouse’s lottery

payments as alimony, rather than as a property distribution, and Pacchiana

v. McAree, 94 Conn. App. 61, 68–71, 891 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 278 Conn.

922, 901 A.2d 1221 (2006), in which the trial court properly awarded lump

sum alimony.

14 The trial court listed § 46b-81 as one of the statutes it considered in

fashioning its orders, but apparently only in reference to the enforceability

of the agreement. The court noted that it was ‘‘mandated to take into consideration a dozen specific factors as set forth in . . . § 46b-81’’ when contemplating the enforceability of the agreement. Thus, the trial court’s citation

to § 46b-81 in another part of its decision does not indicate that it considered

§ 46b-81 in awarding lump sum alimony.

15 Both §§ 46b-81 (c) and 46b-82 (a) list the following factors to be considered when distributing property or awarding alimony: the length of the

marriage; the cause of the breakdown of the marriage; and the age, health,

station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, and needs of each of the

parties. Three additional factors appear exclusively in § 46b-81 (c): ‘‘the

opportunity of each [party] for future acquisition of capital assets and

income’’; ‘‘the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates’’; and the ‘‘liabilities

. . . of each of the parties . . . .’’ Section 46b-82 (a) lists two additional,

but different, factors: ‘‘the award, if any . . . [made] pursuant to section

46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children

has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.’’

16 A spouse’s ability to acquire future assets also appears related to the

concept of the spouse’s ‘‘station, occupation, amount and sources of income,

earning capacity, vocational skills, education, [and] employability . . . .’’

General Statutes § 46b-82 (a). Moreover, a spouse’s contribution to the

marital estate may be implicit in the court’s consideration of the parties’

‘‘estate . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-82 (a); see Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn.

265, 284, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999) (noting that husband’s travel expenses in

seeing children ‘‘falls squarely within the general criterion of the ‘needs of

each of the parties’ ’’ under § 46b-82). The fact that § 46b-82 (a) mandates

consideration of any property awards made pursuant to § 46b-81 when

awarding alimony further supports the interrelatedness of the statutes.

17 The defendant argues that the agreement restricted the trial court’s

discretion to consider the equitable factors that appear in the property

distribution statute. The agreement’s language pertaining to alimony, however, does not restrict the trial court’s discretion in any way: ‘‘The parties

agree that a court of competent jurisdiction shall address the issues of

alimony and/or child support . . . in the event [of] . . . divorce . . . .’’

See also Brody v. Brody, 136 Conn. App. 773, 791, 51 A.3d 1121 (2012)

(trial court had ‘‘broad discretion’’ to award alimony because prenuptial

agreement ‘‘by its clear terms, [was] concerned with equitable distributions

of property . . . not alimony awards’’), rev’d in part on other grounds, 315

Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015). Moreover, it would be imprudent to require

the trial court to consider a different set of factors when awarding alimony
in a case in which the parties waived equitable distribution in a prenuptial

agreement than under other circumstances.

18 See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-5c (b)(3)(A) (listing ‘‘significant visitation expenses’’ as factor in awarding child support).

19 The factthatthis court has not prohibited the trial courtfrom considering

the needs of the parties’ children when dividing marital property further

undermines the defendant’s argument. See, e.g., Blake v. Blake, supra, 207

Conn. 232 (‘‘[w]hich spouse has primary physical custody of minor children

is also a consideration in determining the division of marital assets’’

[emphasis added]); see also Robinson v. Robinson, supra, 187 Conn. 72

(court may consider equitable factors not listed in § 46b-81 when distributing property).

20 Justice Zarella argues in his dissent that, when a prenuptial agreement

distributes all of the property in a dissolution action, an alimony award

functions as a property distribution that violates that agreement when it: (1)

exceeds the recipient spouse’s expenses, plus, if appropriate, a reasonable

amount based on the trial court’s resolution of the equitable factors; and

(2) exceeds the payor spouse’s income, thus apparently requiring the spouse

to dip into his or her assets. Even if we agree with this formulation of a

functional property distribution, we disagree that it applies to this case for

two reasons.

First, the defendant does not claim that he must invade his assets to make

the alimony and child support payments and, accordingly, he does not argue

that his need to do so indicates that the lump sum award is a functional

property distribution. He simply argues that, because the alimony and child

support awards apparently exceed the plaintiff’s claimed expenses, the

award is actually a property distribution.As acknowledged by Justice Zarella,

‘‘this fact alone does not make the lump sum alimony award a functional

property distribution.’’ We respectfully disagree, however, with Justice Zarella’s subsequent assertion and consideration of the defendant’s purported

need to dip into his assets—the second factor in his two part test—in

concluding that the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution. The defendant did not raise or brief this claim and, as such, the

plaintiff did not have an opportunity to address whether the defendant had

to invade his assets to pay the awards or the effect that it would have on

this court’s determination of whether the lump sum award is a functional

property distribution.

We respectfully disagree with Justice Zarella’s contention that the defendant’s argument that he must invade his assets is ‘‘necessarily subsumed’’

within his claim that the award is a functional property distribution. The

defendant’s argument may reasonably be understood as being that, because

the award exceeds the plaintiff’s claimed expenses, the award is actually a

property distribution, regardless of how he pays the award—out of his

income or assets. Cf. Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 319 Conn.

623, 635 n.7, 126 A.3d 558 (2015) (respondent’s ‘‘argument’’ that ‘‘there was

a strategic reason not to call an expert’’ was ‘‘subsumed’’ within its ‘‘claim’’

that ‘‘habeas court incorrectly determined that . . . petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present expert testimony’’).

Moreover, even if the parties discussed this issue at oral argument, it is well

settled that a claim cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument.

State v. Lenarz, 301 Conn. 417, 483 n.22, 22 A.3d 536 (2011). We find Justice

Zarella’s distinction between claims and arguments unpersuasive in this

context, considering the plaintiff’s inability to brief and fully respond to the

invasion of assets issue. See Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 635 (petitioner could not claim to have been ‘‘ambushed’’ by respondent’s argument that there was strategic reason not to call expert, in support

of claim that habeas court improperly determined that petitioner’s trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not calling expert). We therefore

address the issue as squarely presented by the defendant. See also footnote

10 of this opinion.

Second, even if the defendant had briefed this claim, we cannot presume

that he must invade his assets to pay the alimony and child support awards

based upon this record. The posture of this case presents us with a significant

anomaly. Although the trial court made findings as to the defendant’s income

at the time of trial, our review of the record indicates that the court did

not make any determination as to whether its finding of the defendant’s

income was also a finding of his earning capacity. See General Statutes

§ 46b-82 (a) (in awarding alimony trial court ‘‘shall consider the . . . earning

capacity . . . of each of the parties’’); Auerbach v. Auerbach, 113 Conn.

App. 318, 334–35, 966 A.2d 292 (court may base financial awards on earning

capacity rather than actual earned income), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 902,
971 A.2d 40 (2009). Without establishing this factual predicate, we cannot

agree with Justice Zarella’s conclusion that the defendant would have to

dip into assets that were the subject of the prenuptial agreement, because

we cannot presume that the defendant would need to invade those assets

to satisfy the awards. See In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334

(2012) (‘‘[w]e read an ambiguous trial court record so as to support, rather

than contradict, its judgment’’). For illustrative purposes, we note that the

defendant earned significantly more income—enough to pay the alimony

and child support awards without utilizing any assets—in several years

leading up to the dissolution of the marriage. For example, in 2006, he

earned $1,687,677 in yearly income, which equates to $140,639 per month—

more than enough to pay the alimony and child support awards and maintain

a considerably high standard of living. The following year, he earned

$1,253,766 in yearly income, which equates to $104,480 per month, which

is still enough to cover the alimony and child support payments. To the

extent that the defendant’s earning capacity is, in Justice Zarella’s words,

‘‘theoretical,’’ it is only so because the trial court did not make such a finding.

In the absence of such a finding, we read the record to support, rather than

undermine, the trial court’s judgment. DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 320 Conn.

178, 197, 128 A.3d 901 (2016). Thus, even if we agreed with Justice Zarella’s

formulation of a functional property distribution, these unusual facts prevent

us from agreeing with his application of the formulation to this unique case.

21 Although Justice Zarella states that the trial court was ‘‘entitled to rely

on the truth and accuracy of [the parties’] affidavits,’’ he calculates the

plaintiff’s expenses to be $45,000 per month. Using this figure, in conjunction

with the defendant’s expenses and the plaintiff’s pendente lite alimony and

child support award, he concludes that the parties need ‘‘approximately

$45,000 per month’’ to maintain the marital standard of living. As Justice

Zarella acknowledges, however, ‘‘[t]he trial court made no finding regarding

the marital standard of living or the monthly marital expenses.’’

22 The parties did not move for an articulation as to whether the trial

court considered the plaintiff’s financial affidavit to accurately portray the

standard of living of the marriage. Cf. Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 185,

627 A.2d 414 (1993) (trial court explicitly stated that ‘‘parties did not during

their marriage years enjoy a high standard of living as claimed by the [wife]’’).

23 The plaintiff, however, estimated the fair market value of the marital

home to be $10 million.

24 The record reflects that the defendant earned $1,249,989 in 2004,

$902,025 in 2005, $1,687,677 in 2006, $1,253,766 in 2007, and $575,262 in 2008.

25 We look to the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable

factors in § 46b-82 to help us determine whetherthe lump sum alimony award

is a functional property distribution. In concluding that these considerations

support the characterization of the award as alimony and not a property

distribution, we do not suggest that award is ‘‘not excessive or improper

at all,’’ as Justice Zarella contends in his dissent. As stated previously, we

make no judgment as to the excessiveness or propriety of the alimony award

as alimony. See footnote 10 of this opinion. Although we utilize the same

considerations, we do so in an effort to discern whether the lump sum

alimony award is actually alimony or a disguised property distribution.

26 The plaintiff admitted to a one year long affair late in the marriage, but

the trial court determined that it did not lead to the breakdown of the

marriage. The trial court stated that ‘‘ample evidence exists that, while both

parties have contributed to said breakdown, the [defendant] must bear the

greater share.’’

27 Specifically, the trial court stated: ‘‘As to the breakdown of the marriage,

the [plaintiff] testified at length about the [defendant’s] frequent use of

inappropriate language and his bizarre behavior, toward her and others,

that was both demeaning and . . . crude. In addition, he frequently mimicked her tendency to stutter when placed in stressful situations. She admitted to a [one year] long affair late in the marriage. That relationship, now

long since ended, was not the cause of the breakdown. Evidence supports

a finding that the cause for the breakdown is primarily attributable to the

[defendant]. It is abundantly clear that right from the beginning, with the

execution of the . . . agreement, that [the defendant] was not looking for

a true marital partner, and has shut the [plaintiff] out both fiscally and

emotionally. He is a controlling, emotional bully, who has failed to appreciate

[the plaintiff’s] true worth as a wife, let alone her contributions. He offers

her the minimum, which he believes that he can, in order to preserve the

greater bulk of his assets for himself. The [defendant], she said, engaged

in frequent, long-winded arguments about his plans, and badgered her to
go along with his ideas, such as the . . . agreement. She told the court that

she had a hard time being heard, that [the defendant] ignored her important

requests, and that she did not feel that she was a real partner.’’

28 This figure accounts for the defendant’s $2,082,000 payment to the

plaintiff.

29 This figure includes the $2,082,000 payment owed to the plaintiff under

the agreement.

30 We acknowledge Justice Zarella’s concerns with the ‘‘practical consequences’’ of this opinion. To the extent that trial courts, however, may be

tempted to circumvent a lopsided property distribution contained in an

otherwise enforceable prenuptial agreement by awarding large amounts of

alimony, ‘‘[j]udicial restraint counsels us to commend the issue to the attention of the legislature for further review . . . .’’ Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 302 Conn. 464, 473 n.6, 28 A.3d

958 (2011). The trial court in the present case properly applied the statutory

factors in § 46b-82, and properly adhered to the Connecticut Premarital

Agreement Act (act) by enforcing the agreement and distributing the parties’

property in accordance with that agreement. See General Statutes § 46b36a et seq. Specifically, with respect to the agreement, the trial court cited

the act and concluded that ‘‘[u]nder all the facts and circumstances, the

[agreement] was fair and equitable at that time, and therefore a valid

agreement.’’

We further note that when a trial court awards a spouse alimony exceeding

his or her claimed expenses in the wake of a prenuptial agreement distributing all of the parties’ property, the award may still be challenged as excessive

alimony, rather than a functional property distribution. Today’s result does

not change this fact. As noted previously, the defendant did not ask us to

proclaim the lump sum award as excessive even if we determine that the

award is not a functional property distribution. See footnote 10 of this

opinion.

31 The defendant also claims that the agreement prohibits an award of

attorney’s fees. The plaintiff argues that this claim is unpreserved because

the defendant did not raise this claim at trial, he raised it for the first time

in his objection to the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion for appellate attorney’s

fees. See, e.g., Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘[an appellate] court shall not be bound

to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose

subsequent to the trial’’); Cunniffe v. Cunniffe, 150 Conn. App. 419, 441,

91 A.3d 497 (appellant must ‘‘bring to the attention of the court the precise

matter on which its decision is being asked’’ [emphasis omitted]), cert.

denied, 314 Conn. 935, 102 A.3d 1112 (2014). Because we conclude that the

attorney’s fees award constitutes an abuse of discretion even if authorized

under the agreement, we need not address the defendant’s claim that the

agreement bars an award of attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we need not consider the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant failed to preserve this

claim for review. See FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 313

Conn. 669, 677 n.11, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014).

32 In connection with the plaintiff’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees,

the trial court also addressed, for the first time, the defendant’s argument

that the agreement barred an award of attorney’s fees. See footnote 31 of

this opinion. The trial court found that the defendant had waived or was

equitably estopped from asserting this claim by previously agreeing to pay

some of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. See Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274

Conn. 33, 60, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) (‘‘[e]quitable estoppel is a doctrine that

operates in many contexts to bar a party from asserting a right that it

otherwise would have but for its own conduct’’); Lanna v. Greene, 175

Conn. 453, 458, 399 A.2d 837 (1978) (party may waive provisions in contract

included solely for his or her benefit); see also Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman

Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 58, 970 A.2d 656 (waiver may be

implied by conduct), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 991, 130 S. Ct. 500, 175 L. Ed.

2d 348 (2009). During litigation, the parties entered into a stipulation that

the trial court made an order of the court, in which the defendant agreed

to pay $250,000 of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The trial court noted in its

oral decision on the plaintiff’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees that, even

if the agreement barred an award of attorney’s fees, the defendant ‘‘basically

undercut the terms of the agreement’’ by agreeing to pay some of the

plaintiff’s attorney’s fees pendente lite. The defendant argues that the trial

court’s finding that he waived or was equitably estopped from claiming that

the agreement bars an award of attorney’s fees was clearly erroneous,

because the parties agreed in the stipulation that ‘‘[t]he [plaintiff] shall not

be precluded from seeking additional [attorney’s] fees, pendente lite, and
the [defendant] shall not be precluded from opposing the [plaintiff’s] request

for additional [attorney’s] fees.’’ See Banks Building Co., LLC v. Malanga

Family Real Estate Holding, LLC, 102 Conn. App. 231, 239, 926 A.2d 1

(2007) (‘‘waiver [is a question] of fact . . . we will not disturb the trial

court’s [finding] unless [it is] clearly erroneous’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]); see also Fischer v. Zollino, 303 Conn. 661, 667–68, 35 A.3d 270

(2012) (reviewing trial court’s finding of equitable estoppel for clear error).

Because we hold that even if the agreement authorized an award of attorney’s

fees, such an award constituted an abuse of discretion under the circumstances, we need not address the defendant’s claim that the agreement bars

an award of attorney’s fees. See footnote 31 of this opinion. We therefore

need not address the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that

he had waived or was equitably estopped from asserting this claim.

33 The trial court’s judgment, dated March 20, 2014, ordered the defendant

to pay to the plaintiff: $40,000 per month commencing April 1, 2014; $375,000

every six months commencing June 1, 2014; and $2,082,000 within sixty

days of the judgment.

34 The combined trial and appellate attorney’s fees awards represent less

than 6 percent of this amount.

35 We respectfully disagree with Justice Eveleigh’s argument in his dissent,

that Maguire is ‘‘easily distinguishable’’ from the present case. Justice Eveleigh argues that, contrary to Maguire, the following equitable factors justify

the attorney’s fees awards in the present case: the parties’ seventeen year

marriage; the defendant’s mistreatment of the plaintiff, which caused the

breakdown of the marriage; and the plaintiff’s limited earning capacity. All

of these factors, however, weighed heavily in Maguire—some even more

so than in the present case—but this court nonetheless determined in Maguire that the attorney’s fees award constituted an abuse of discretion. Maguire

v. Maguire, supra, 222 Conn. 43–45. In Maguire, the parties were married

for forty years, rather than seventeen, and the husband mistreated the wife.

Id., 35 (‘‘[the wife’s] participation as the linchpin of the family, as the wife,

lover, mother, homemaker . . . means, and has meant, nothing to the [husband]’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also id., 34–35 (‘‘ ‘In all the

years of their marriage . . . the [husband] never placed any property in his

wife’s name . . . . He has provided for their children who are totally selfsufficient. He has provided for the future for his secretary and for himself,

but not for his wife. He dismissed her fears and concerns for her future

with the comment ‘‘the [s]tate will take care of you.’’ ’ ’’). The wife in Maguire

had a limited earning capacity, and was sixty years old, compared to the

plaintiff’s forty-five years. See id., 35 (‘‘[t]his woman is . . . past her peak

as an active real estate saleswoman, and the real estate business is in

shambles’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The wife in Maguire also

received more than $3 million in assets, not including her $500,000 in liquid

assets, just as the plaintiff received more than $4 million in assets, not

including the liquid assets she would receive from her other awards. Id., 41

n.8, 44. Despite these factors, this court concluded in Maguire that ‘‘nothing

in the record’’ would support a finding that the attorney’s fees award was

necessary to avoid undermining the wife’s other awards. Id., 44–45.

36 Justice Eveleigh asserts in his dissent that Blake is distinguishable based

on the trial court’s attempt to punish the husband with the attorney’s fees

award. We disagree. In Blake, the court did not reverse the award of attorney’s fees based solely on the trial court’s attempt to ‘‘punish’’ the husband.

See Blake v. Blake, supra, 211 Conn. 487–89. Rather, the court went on to

determine whether the award constituted an abuse of discretion under, inter

alia, § 46b-62, Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 181 Conn. 492, and Fitzgerald v.

Fitzgerald, 190 Conn. 26, 29–30, 459 A.2d 498 (1983), none of which concern

punishment of a litigant through an attorney’s fees award. Blake v. Blake,

supra, 211 Conn. 487–89; see also id., 489 (‘‘In the light of the plaintiff’s

net assets of over [$1.5 million] and her liquid assets of $630,000, it cannot

reasonably be claimed that the failure to award $14,947.63 for attorney’s

fees and expenses would undermine or skew the substantial financial awards

granted to her in the dissolution judgment. To award counsel fees under

these circumstances is gilding the lily. The court abused its discretion in

making such an order.’’ [Emphasis added.]). Accordingly, we disagree with

Justice Eveleigh’s argument that Blake is ‘‘distinguishable from the facts of

the present case.’’

37 But see Emanuelson v. Emanuelson, 26 Conn. App. 527, 533–34, 602

A.2d 609 (1992)(attorney’s fees award amounting to 3 percent of wife’s liquid

assets not abuse of discretion in light of parties’ thirty-five year marriage, fact

that husband caused breakdown of marriage, and ‘‘great disparity’’ between
parties’ earning capacities).

38 Although this court and the Appellate Court did not actually calculate

the percentage of the alimony award that the attorney’s fees award represented in these cases, they did compare the size of the attorney’s fees award

to the alimony award. In fact, they could not avoid such comparisons in

orderto determine whetherthe spouses had ‘‘ample liquid funds’’ with which

to pay the attorney’s fees, or whether an award of attorney’s fees was

necessary to avoid undermining their alimony awards. Anderson v. Anderson, supra, 191 Conn. 59. Calculating the percentages in these cases only

helps compare them to the present case for illustrative purposes, notwithstanding Justice Eveleigh’s criticism of these calculations in his dissent.

39 But see Devino v. Devino, supra, 190 Conn. 38–39 (attorney’s fees award

amounting to 7 percent of lump sum alimony award was not abuse of

discretion, when wife had only $2000 in assets and income of $200 per

week); Pacchiana v. McAree, 94 Conn. App. 61, 71–72, 891 A.2d 86 (attorney’s

fees award amounting to 4 percent of lump sum alimony award not abuse

of discretion due to wife’s ‘‘relatively low level of earnings,’’ husband’s

‘‘periodic receipt of substantial distributions from his investment activities,’’

and court’s decision not to award periodic alimony to wife), cert. denied,

278 Conn. 922, 901 A.2d 1221 (2006).

40 We disagree with Justice Eveleigh’s characterization in his dissent of

our analysis as a ‘‘purely mathematical calculation . . . .’’ We simply use

percentages to place our prior case law into perspective, in light of the

massive financial awards rendered in this case. We do not contend that

attorney’s fees awards amounting to 4 or 6 percent of a spouse’s assets

constitute a per se abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Damon v. Damon, 23 Conn.

App. 111, 113–14, 579 A.2d 124 (1990) (‘‘[a]lthough the assets awarded to

the [husband] equaled more than 85 percent of the total marital assets, that

is not a per se abuse of discretion’’). Rather, these percentages elucidate

the financial circumstances of the parties and help us determine whether

the equitable factors justify the award of attorney’s fees. In this vein, we do

not ‘‘ignore’’ the equitable factors or attempt to ‘‘boil down these [equitable]

considerations to a mathematical equation’’ as Justice Eveleigh suggests.

We instead evaluate the equitable factors in the context of these percentages.

Furthermore, we see no reason why such calculations should be barred

in the attorney’s fees context when both this court and the Appellate Court

have used similar calculations to evaluate divisions of property under § 46b81 and alimony awards under § 46b-82, in conjunction with the equitable

factors listed in those statutes, which are the same as those applicable under

§ 46b-62. See footnote 15 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Greco v. Greco, supra,

275 Conn. 356, 360 (concluding that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances’’ presented,

award providing ‘‘98.5 percent of the marital estate’’ to wife and ‘‘less than

2 percent’’ to husband was improper); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 664, 462

A.2d 1031 (1983)(upholding awards when trial court properly ‘‘considered all

the statutory factors, including the fact that the marital home represented

almost 90 percent of all family assets’’ [emphasis added]); Turgeon v.

Turgeon, supra, 190 Conn. 279 (husband properly awarded ‘‘approximately

76 percent’’ of total marital assets); Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 181 Conn.

496–97 (upholding property and alimony awards when assets distributed to

plaintiff represented ‘‘52 percent of the total assets as calculated by the

plaintiff and 46 percent of the total assets as calculated by the defendant,’’

and noting that ‘‘[c]alculated another way, the value of assets’’ would represent ‘‘39 percent of family wealth’’); Pellow v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122,

129, 964 A.2d 1252 (2009) (alimony and child support awards consuming

‘‘more than 90 percent’’ of husband’s income excessive); Valentine v. Valentine, 149 Conn. App. 799, 807, 90 A.3d 300 (2014) (alimony and child support

payments that ‘‘constituted more than 80 percent’’ of husband’s income was

abuse of discretion).

Ultimately, not including these percentages in our opinion, and simply

listing the panoply of financial awards in our prior cases, along with the

equitable factors, would be unhelpful to the bench, bar, and members of

the public who rely on our opinions for meaningful guidance.

41 In Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, supra, 297 Conn. 389, this court made

the following observation: ‘‘[T]he trial court determined that the [husband]

had used the parties’ marital assets to pay his attorney’s fees . . . . By

requiring the [husband] to pay an additional $50,000 of the [wife’s] trial

attorney’s fees and a portion of her appellate attorney’s fees, it is reasonable

to presume that the trial court was attempting to equalize the amount of

marital assets that were used to pay each of the parties’ attorney’s fees.’’

42 The plaintiff, however, claimed monthly expenses of $44,332 and liabili-
ties of $68,142, not including the attorney’s fees.

43 But see Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, supra, 2 Conn. App. 424 ($7500

attorney’s fees award not abuse of discretion, when wife had $15,000 in

liquid assets, and $2500 per month periodic alimony payments and first

$23,000 installment of $116,000 lump sum alimony award were stayed pending husband’s appeal).

44 Like Justice Eveleigh, ‘‘[w]e are fully cognizant of the reluctance of

appellate courts in Connecticut to disturb the discretionary findings of the

trial court in dissolution cases. . . . Delay and uncertainty create hardship

for all concerned, more frequently for the recipient of the disputed award.

. . . Reluctance to reverse the trial court’s exercise of discretion, however,

should not mean that the door is entirely closed to successful appeals in

dissolution cases. Limited appellate review in dissolution cases must not

be a mere shibboleth on the basis of which the appellate court makes such

review a nullity. . . . This practice does not establish the proposition that

such an award should never be disturbed, but rather that it should be

disturbed only under the clearest circumstances.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, supra, 2 Conn.

App. 421. In the present case, when the attorney’s fees awards represent

such a miniscule amount of the spouse’s liquid assets and total financial

awards, the ‘‘clearest circumstances’’ are present. Id. We must be mindful

not to ‘‘abdicat[e] . . . our responsibility for appellate review’’ in these

matters. Koizim v. Koizim, supra, 181 Conn. 498.