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94–035PDF 2004

UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 2, 2004

Serial No. 108–119

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

LARA ALAMEH, Professional Staff Member 

LIBERTY DUNN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William B. Taylor, Coordinator for Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 5

Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................................................................. 11

James Kunder, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the 

Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development ................................... 16

Charlotte Ponticelli, Senior Coordinator, Office of International Women’s 

Issues, U.S. Department of State ....................................................................... 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable William B. Taylor: Prepared statement ....................................... 8

Mary Beth Long: Prepared statement ................................................................... 13

James Kunder: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 19

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UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. The purpose 

of today’s hearing on the United States policy in Afghanistan is to 

examine the Administration’s implementation of the Afghanistan 

Freedom Support Act of 2002, and to better understand our Government’s strategies to assist the people of Afghanistan as they 

prepare for elections this September. Today, we will hear from Administration officials on how this goal might be achieved. 

In December 2002, Congress sought to establish the framework 

to guide reconstruction efforts through the passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act. That act authorized over $3 billion in 

economic and military assistance through fiscal year 2006. The 

purpose of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act is to help ensure 

that Afghanistan becomes a viable and independent nation-state 

that is secure and free from terrorism. 

Thanks to the efforts of Coalition forces, United States civilians, 

humanitarian workers, and the Afghan people, Afghanistan is far 

less of a haven for international terrorists and is doing far better 

now than it was under the misrule of the Taliban. 

However, Afghanistan still faces serious challenges to its security 

and stability. Violent attacks continue against U.S. forces, international aid workers, and Afghan citizens. In fact, according to the 

GAO, security for Afghans has gotten worse over time. 

The continuing influence of local commanders, more commonly 

known as warlords, undermines the ability of the central government to implement the rule of law. Again, according to GAO experts, they function as ‘‘judge, jury, and executioner’’ within their 

territory, undermining the rule of law. Their continued influence is 

due in large part to the consequences of high levels of poppy production, which are putting Afghanistan on the road to becoming a 

narco-state. As a result, there has been very little progress to date 

in U.S. and Coalition efforts against drug trafficking. Despite these 

challenges there are remarkably positive developments evolving 

that deserve our attention. 

The government of President Karzai is working to implement the 

final stages of the Bonn agreement. In January of this year the 

Constitutional Loya Jirga approved a final constitution, and the 

2

people of Afghanistan are now paving the way for presidential and 

parliamentary elections this September. This past week, President 

Karzai signed a new electoral law outlining the framework for elections. 

For these to take place serious questions need to be addressed 

and answered. So far a little over 2.5 million voters have been registered out of 9 to 10 million eligible persons. First, will the voters 

registered by September be representative of the population? Second, will it be necessary for the U.S. to widen the military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom in order to ensure that elections will be free and fair? Last, what is being done to assure that 

unyielding warlords won’t hijack the elections to consolidate their 

own hold on power? 

Today, we will examine how the U.S. and the international community are coordinating their activities to give the Afghans the 

ability to freely determine their own political future and lead the 

way to stability. 

Last month, international donors met in Berlin to show their 

commitment to securing Afghanistan’s future. A total of $8.2 billion 

was pledged through 2006. The Afghan government says their reconstruction needs over the next 7 years will be $27 billion. I agree 

with a recent policy brief from Barnett R. Rubin of the Center on 

International Cooperation, which observed that,

‘‘While the price tag for a more stable Afghanistan may appear 

high, it is nothing compared to the potentially astronomical 

costs of failure.’’

It is the responsibility of this Congress to uphold our commitment to Afghanistan. Today’s release of the General Accounting Office’s investigative report into this reconstruction process in Afghanistan is one step in this direction. By detailing areas where 

there is a need for improvement in United States strategy, we can 

begin to bridge the gap between the reality of the challenges that 

Afghanistan faces and the ideal that it seeks to become. 

We have a distinguished panel representing the Administration 

today, and I warmly welcome you to the Committee. We look forward to hearing from you about our country’s commitment to Afghanistan and other important issues, but first I have the pleasure 

of yielding to my friend and colleague, the Ranking Democratic 

Member, Tom Lantos, for any opening remarks that he may wish 

to make. Mr. Lantos. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Committee will come to order. 

The purpose of today’s hearing on United States policy in Afghanistan is to examine the Administration’s implementation of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 

of 2002, and to better understand our government’s strategies to assist the Afghan 

people as they prepare for elections this September. Today we will hear from Administration officials on how this goal might be achieved. 

In December of 2002, Congress sought to establish the framework to guide reconstruction efforts through the passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act. That 

Act authorized over $3 billion dollars in economic and military assistance through 

Fiscal Year 2006. The purpose of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act is to help 

3

ensure that Afghanistan becomes a viable and independent nation-state that is secure and free from terrorism. 

Thanks to the efforts of Coalition forces, U.S civilians, humanitarian workers, and 

the Afghan people, Afghanistan is far less of a haven for international terrorists and 

is doing far better now than it was under the misrule of the Taliban. However, Afghanistan still faces serious challenges to its security and stability. Violent attacks 

continue against U.S. forces, international aid workers, and Afghan citizens. In fact, 

according to the GAO, security for Afghans has gotten worse over time. 

The continuing influence of local commanders, more commonly known as ‘‘warlords,’’ undermines the ability of the central government to implement the rule of 

law. Again, according to GAO experts, they function as ‘‘judge, jury, and executioner’’ within their territory, undermining the rule of law. Their continued influence is due in large part to the consequences of high levels of poppy production, 

which are putting Afghanistan on the road to becoming a narco-state. As a result, 

there has been very little progress to date in U.S. and Coalition efforts against drug 

trafficking. 

Despite these challenges, there are remarkably positive developments evolving 

that deserve our attention. 

The government of President Karzai is working to implement the final stages of 

the Bonn Agreement. In January of this year, the Constitutional Loya Jirga approved a final constitution, and the people of Afghanistan are now paving the way 

for presidential and parliamentary elections this September. This past week, President Karzai signed a new electoral law outlining the framework for elections. 

For these to take place, serious questions need to be addressed and answered. So 

far, a little over 2.5 million voters have been registered out of 9–10 million eligible 

persons. First, will the voters registered by September be representative of the population? Second, will it be necessary for the U.S. to widen the military objectives 

of Operation Enduring Freedom in order to ensure that elections will be free and 

fair? Last, what is being done to assure that unyielding warlords won’t hijack the 

elections to consolidate their own hold on power? 

Today we will examine how the United States and the international community 

are coordinating their activities to give the Afghans the ability to freely determine 

their own political future and lead the way to stability. 

Last month, international donors met in Berlin to show their commitment to securing Afghanistan’s future. A total of $8.2 billion dollars was pledged through 

2006. The Afghan Government says their reconstruction needs over the next seven 

years will cost $27 billion. I agree with a recent policy brief from Barnett R. Rubin 

of the Center on International Cooperation which observed that, ‘‘While the price 

tag for a more stable Afghanistan may appear high, it is nothing compared to the 

potentially astronomical costs of failure.’’

It is the responsibility of this Congress to uphold our commitment to Afghanistan. 

Today’s release of the General Accounting Office’s investigative report into the reconstruction process in Afghanistan is one step in this direction. By detailing areas 

where there is need for improvement in U.S. strategy, we can begin to bridge the 

gap between the reality of the challenges that Afghanistan faces and the ideal that 

it seeks to become. 

We have a distinguished panel representing the Administration today, and I 

warmly welcome you to the Committee. I look forward to hearing from you about 

our country’s commitment to Afghanistan and other important issues. 

I will now yield to my friend and colleague, Ranking Democratic Member Tom 

Lantos, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

commend you for holding this hearing. Some 21⁄2 years ago, the 

United States and coalition forces liberated the people of Afghanistan from the brutal and repressive rule of the Taliban and its alQaeda supporters, who were using Afghanistan for the base of their 

terrorist activities. 

While this victory has brought the people of Afghanistan a desperately needed respite from civil war, and oppressive rule, I fear 

that we may be on the verge of losing the long-term battle for a 

peaceful and safer future for Afghanistan. 

Perhaps most disturbing for the long term future of the country 

is the lack of security and international funding for reconstruction 

which have severely impeded the development of moderate political 

4

forces, successful voter registration efforts, and serious disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. 

Now, we have plenty of American soldiers sacrificing their lives 

for the freedom and security of Afghanistan, and it has not escaped 

the attention of any of us, and The Washington Post today provides 

a beautiful, and moving, and sad portrait of the scores and scores 

of American servicemen who gave their lives in this battle. 

What Afghanistan needs, however, are dramatically more European and NATO forces on the ground. Mr. Chairman, this is a 

broader topic than just Afghanistan, but I would like to spend a 

moment expanding on this. 

We liberated Europe twice in both the First and Second World 

Wars, and the Memorial Day weekend, and the June 6th commemoration of the landing on Normandy Beach, is a vivid reminder 

of this. We saved Europe from the Soviet Union during two generations. 

And Europe today is on a free ride. Much of Europe and many 

of our NATO allies are shirking their responsibility globally, and 

Afghanistan is an outstanding example of this. NATO and Europe 

are not doing enough to bring security to Afghanistan, and we 

must say this loudly, however unpleasant that sounds, and however difficult it makes our relationship with our NATO allies. 

They are not contributing enough troops or resources, and I am 

beginning to suspect that despite their encouraging and solemn 

words to our officials, they do not really have the will to really participate in bringing peace to Afghanistan, or even to participate in 

a significant way in the global war against terrorism. 

Last October, NATO expanded its mandate to go beyond Kabul, 

but it has not increased the size of its forces or provided sufficient 

equipment to deploy effectively outside of the capital. 

Nor has NATO sent its forces to the insecure areas of the country that most desperately need greater presence. It is highly unlikely as we meet this morning that NATO will field the five additional provincial reconstruction teams by this summer. 

And none of those teams will ultimately be in the most dangerous areas of the south and the east. We must increase the size 

of NATO forces in Afghanistan, and we must establish more teams 

in more dangerous areas. 

NATO must extend its mandate to provide security along major 

highways, and to end banditry, human rights abuses and drug operations. Spain should send the troops that it peremptorily pulled 

out of Iraq to Afghanistan. Turkey should send the troops that it 

intended to send to Iraq, over 10,000 of them, to Afghanistan. 

And we must do more to convince our allies to participate and 

to provide whatever logistical support may be necessary. Afghanistan cannot wait any longer. We must do more to ensure that the 

upcoming parliamentary elections are not hijacked by the warlords 

and the Islamics. 

The warlords in Afghanistan, some of whom would welcome the 

return of the radical oppressive policies carried out by the Taliban, 

are increasing their political power with each passing day given the 

dreadfully slow pace of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of their militias. There is also a surge in poppy cultivation in areas that they control. 

5

Their power intimidates moderate Afghans from participating in 

the political process. As a result, today the Islamics are the only 

groups in Afghanistan well positioned to dominate the outcome in 

parliamentary elections. 

The prospect that President Karzai may have just cut a deal 

with the warlords in advance of the elections is a further demonstration of the political box in which he finds himself. 

The civilized world, Mr. Chairman, must increase its funding to 

help Afghans develop moderate political movements, and educate 

Afghans on the political process, human rights, and elections. 

Mr. Chairman, the future of the Afghan people continues to hang 

in the balance. Increasing the number of NATO troops and ensuring the legitimacy of the electoral process may yet save Afghanistan from once again falling into chaos and ruin. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos, for your usual excellent 

statement, with which I find myself in total agreement. Without 

objection, any further opening statements will be made a part of 

the record, and we will proceed with our witnesses. 

Ambassador William Bill Taylor, Junior, is the Afghanistan Coordinator in the U.S. Department of State, where he is responsible 

for overseeing all aspects of United States policy toward Afghanistan. Ambassador Taylor served as the Executive Branch’s Coordinator of United States assistance to Europe and Eurasia. 

Ms. Mary Beth Long is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, reporting to the Assistant Secretary for 

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Ms. Long oversees 

and controls the Department’s counternarcotic efforts in the United 

States and throughout the world. Ms. Long worked in the Central 

Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations from 1986 to 1999 

and, more recently, she was a litigation attorney with Williams & 

Connelly. 

Mr. James Kunder is the Deputy Assistant Administrator in the 

Bureau for Asia and the Near East at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Mr. Kunder was previously Director for Relief and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. He has been nominated to 

be the next Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East. 

Ms. Ponticelli is the Senior Coordinator for the Office of International Women’s Issues at the Department of State. She will not 

have a statement, but is prepared to answer questions pertaining 

to women’s issues in Afghanistan. 

We are honored to have you appear before the Committee today, 

and Ambassador Taylor, we will start with you. If you encapsulate 

your statement to 5 minutes, give or take, and your full statement 

will be made a part of the record. Ambassador Taylor. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure 

and honor to be here. I listened carefully to both opening statements and the support from those two statements and your Committee for our work in Afghanistan is both appreciated in the past, 

and is sought again for the future. 

6

This Committee has been—and this Congress indeed—has been 

very supportive of our work in Afghanistan, and we will continue 

to need that. 

Mr. Chairman, the Afghans have a proverb which they use. It is 

actually an optimistic saying. They say there is a path to the top 

of the highest mountain. So there is a way to get to the top. 

The top of the highest mountain for Afghanistan is a stable, and 

democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan that can secure its own 

boundaries, and can serve its own people, can deliver services to its 

people in terms of health and educational. 

That is the top and they can get there. We need to support them 

as they move in that direction, as they move up that path. Afghanistan is right now, Mr. Chairman, in the midst of three major activities that you both have referred to. 

Any one of these three would be a challenge for any mature government around the world, and for this government to take on all 

three at the same time is a major effort. The three of course as you 

have described are reintegrating militias that have been disarmed 

and demobilized into the civilian economy. That is the first one. 

The second one is a major effort that we are starting on to eradicate poppy from Afghanistan. It is going to be a long term one, but 

we are starting. I am sure that we will talk about that later on 

today. 

The third one you have mentioned is a move toward elections for 

a first time in a generation. In order to have these elections in September, we are going to need—we, the international community, 

we, the U.N., we, the Afghan government—need to register somewhere in the 7, 8, 9 million eligible voters. 

The Taliban have vowed to disrupt that effort. The Taliban have 

vowed to disrupt both the registration effort, as well as the polling 

effort that will take place in September. 

All three of these efforts are being pushed by the government of 

Afghanistan, and supported by the international community, and 

indeed supported by financing which you have provided, and the 

international community has come forward with. 

Let me just say a little bit about the elections, because the elections reflect different aspects of what you asked us to address in 

this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and the first of course is security. 

The security for these elections will be a major challenge as I indicated, not just for the registration where we need to send small 

teams to register voters all over the country, into over 4,000 places 

where people have been lining up to register. 

There are now over 2.8 million people registered in Afghanistan, 

and over a third, or about a third of those 2.8 million have been 

women. Congressman Lantos mentioned the challenge of a legitimate election, and ensuring that people can vote, and that people 

that do vote reflect the full range of people in Afghanistan, and 

that is happening. 

The registration is moving forward on this, and it has a long way 

to go. I mentioned that we are at about 2.8 million, and we have 

somewhere around 7, 8, or 9 million that should be registered. That 

is a long way to go and the elections are in September. 

So that is a major challenge, and security for these elections will 

be an effort, a major effort. The first line of defense in securing 

7

these elections will be the police. The local police will provide joint 

security and will ensure the security of the people as they vote, as 

well as the ballot boxes that are going to be important as they 

move back to the national government to be counted. 

We are training, with the Germans in the lead, and Congressman Lantos rightly pointed out the need for the international community, and not just the Americans, to step forward on this kind 

of support. 

And the Germans are leading the effort on training the police. 

We are supporting them, but the Germans have moved forward on 

that police training, and we are helping with 10,000 police trained 

so far, and we hope that by the election time that we will have 

20,000 police trained. 

We will still need more. We will still need more equipment. 

There is a lot to be done on the police. The second line of defense 

for the election security will be the Afghan National Army. 

And, Mr. Chairman, you have asked in the past about this, and 

we have talked about this in the past. This is an emerging success 

is the way that I would put it. We hope to have 10,000 soldiers 

trained this summer. 

We hope to have the Central Corps. The Central Corps is basically set up. The battalions of the Central Corps has been deployed 

both in patrols around the country, but also in an attempt, a successful attempt, to put down disturbances in other parts of the 

country; in Herat, in Maimana, in Lazar. 

These deployments have generated a lot of support from the people of Afghanistan. They have noticed the professionalism of their 

army, and they are proud of it, and they are signing up to join 

them. 

The third line of support for security of the elections, and again 

Congressman Lantos has mentioned it, and that is NATO in charge 

of ISAF. They are in charge of security in Kabul, and they have 

moved out in the first phase, and which we fully agree, to be a 

broader expansion out into other parts of the country. 

They have moved out of the first phase to Kandu, and they do 

have one of their provincial reconstruction teams out of the capital, 

and we are hopeful that they will be able to provide additional security for the elections in September. 

And the NATO military command is working on the coordination 

of exactly that. The final stage in the defense and security for the 

elections will be the coalition forces, our coalition forces, and they 

do take security for the elections very seriously. 

The Constitutional Loya Jirga, which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, finished up successfully in January with the Constitution, coalition forces will keep the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, and other antiAfghanistan, anti-coalition forces, on the defensive by mounting a 

campaign during that time. And coalition forces will do the same 

kind of thing as we approach the elections in September. 

You both mentioned the importance of fundings. The international community has stepped up. You mentioned the Berlin conference. In addition to or as part of the $8.2 billion over 3 years 

that you mentioned, the international community has stepped up 

and come with about two-thirds of the necessary funding so far for 

the elections. 

8

The international community, with the Americans in the lead, 

has about fully funded the current effort to register these voters 

that I mentioned before. That is nearly funded. 

What we are now looking at, and what we have two-thirds of the 

money for, is for the actual conduct of the elections, and at Berlin, 

the donors stepped up with about $66 million worth of pledges for 

those elections as they are moving forward. 

Mr. Chairman, my colleague, Jim Kunder, will talk more about 

the reconstruction effort, but that is going well. Do we need to go 

faster, and are we in need of additional funds? Yes. 

Our request is in for this year, and I am sure that we will have 

another request for next year. We continue to work with our allies 

to provide additional funds both from individual donors, as well as 

the banks. 

That is going to be a long term effort as you have indicated, and 

the government of Afghanistan did calculate their needs over a 7 

year period and it is large. We need to stay there. We need to 

maintain our commitment as you have both indicated. 

Mr. Chairman, I mentioned that the Afghans have an optimistic 

saying that there is a path to the top of the mountain. The way 

that we translate that is where there is a will, there is a way. 

Our will needs to be firm. Our will needs to be long term. Our 

will needs to be there so that not only the Afghan people know that 

we are going to be there for the long term, but also those enemies 

of the Afghan people. 

They need to know that they can’t wait us out. They need to 

know that we are going to maintain our commitment. I don’t have 

to remind this Committee, Mr. Chairman, that 15 years ago we 

didn’t stay the course. We abandoned Afghanistan 15 years ago. 

And the Afghan people and the American people paid the price. 

Mr. Chairman, we need to stay the course. I am sure that your 

Committee will continue to provide that leadership, and I appreciate being able to be here today. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Taylor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, COORDINATOR FOR

AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss with the Committee 

today our current policy in Afghanistan and our vision for the birth of a new democracy in the world community. 

Mr. Chairman, the Afghans have a proverb that captures our efforts: ‘‘There is 

a path to the top of the highest mountain.’’ For Afghanistan, the ‘‘top of the highest 

mountain’’ is a prosperous, sustainable, constitutional democracy in the Islamic 

world. 

For the past two and a half years, the United States has helped Afghanistan proceed along this path, but the crucial driver will always be the Afghan people, who 

must have the desire and the determination to make progress. And they do. Mobilization and participation at the grassroots level has brought Afghanistan a long way 

since the Taliban regime, and will soon allow the country to experience a historic 

moment: democratic elections scheduled for this September. 

DDR, COUNTER NARCOTICS AND ELECTIONS

Mr. Chairman, right now the Government of Afghanistan and the international 

community are doing three big things at the same time. First, we are moving into 

the main phase of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating major parts of the militia forces around the country. President Karzai has set an ambitious goal of demobilizing 40% of the militias and cantoning 100% of the heavy weapons this summer. 

9

His government and the international community are fully engaged in this historic 

and difficult effort. 

Second, the Afghan government with the help of the international community is 

executing a three-pronged counternarcotics strategy, which includes an eradication 

campaign in several provinces, alternative development efforts, and the training and 

fielding of drug interdiction units. This year’s harvest could be even larger than last 

year. Eradication and interdiction efforts need to go forward, despite the logistical 

and security challenges. 

Finally, we are preparing for the first elections in Afghanistan in a generation. 

Registering voters, providing election information to those voters, and planning to 

secure thousands of voting places are enormous challenges. 

Any one of these three tasks would test more mature governments anywhere in 

the world. Attempting all three at once is a monumental undertaking. We must support President Karzai’s government politically, financially and with Coalition forces. 

This morning I will focus on Afghanistan’s upcoming election because it pulls together prospects and obstacles that illustrate all three components of our support 

to the Afghan government and people—governance, security, and reconstruction. 

BERLIN: FUNDS FOR ELECTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION

The international community gathered in Berlin this past April to reaffirm its 

commitment to create a stable and secure political and economic future, and to support the Afghan people’s own integral and active role in the reconstruction process. 

Upon the conclusion of the conference, the sixty-five delegations signed a declaration 

articulating a clear vision and framework for Afghan ownership of the reconstruction process. In addition to pledging over $8 billion for reconstruction projects over 

the next three years, donor countries also committed to provide an additional $66 

million for funding the upcoming elections. Of the $66 million, the United States 

pledged $25 million, clearly showing our desire to see an election that will fulfill 

goals established by the Bonn Agreements. 

The international community has essentially fully funded the UN’s current voter 

registration plans. As of today, about 2.8 million voters have been registered across 

Afghanistan, out of an estimated eligible seven to nine million. Nearly a third of 

the people registered so far are women. The U.N. is deploying voter-registering 

teams to over 4,500 places in small villages and in difficult terrain. It is imperative 

to have a balanced cross-section of registered voters to ensure a legitimate election. 

Even though the number of registered voters has been increasing, the country’s tenuous security environment, which is my next point, could threaten its viability. 

THE NEED FOR SECURITY

The elections present an immediate security challenge and highlight the ongoing 

security task before us. The Taliban and other anti-Karzai elements have explicitly 

vowed to disrupt the elections—just as they vowed to disrupt the Constitutional 

Loya Jirga last winter. Afghan and international forces thwarted them then. The 

challenge is even bigger now. 

The first line of protection is the police. We are working with the Afghan Minister 

of the Interior, Ali Jalali, in ensuring that well-equipped and well-trained Afghan 

police forces will be securing polling places and ballot-transport convoys across the 

country. 

While elections will be one of the major tasks for the police in September, a welldeveloped force is also crucial for other day-to-day operations and larger law-enforcement needs in Afghanistan’s future. Along with lead-nation Germany, the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the United States have made progress toward building and providing long-term institutional capacity and equipment and infrastructure 

support. We have completed construction of a Central Police Training Center in 

Kabul, as well as Regional Police Training Centers in seven locations across the 

country. Since the inception of our training program last year, we have trained approximately 10,000 police officers, and are committed to reaching our goal of training 20,000 by the end of this month. 

The second line of security for the upcoming elections is the Afghan National 

Army. Along with the British and the French, we have trained 10,000 ANA troops 

so that they will be ready to address security needs during the election process, such 

as disruption or attacks on voting places. However, our ultimate goal is to help build 

an ANA that can assume, along with the police, responsibility for the maintenance 

of security within Afghanistan and the means to secure its own borders and citizens. 

As of late last month, U.S. and coalition forces have conducted individual basic 

training for nineteen battalions and have completed initial fielding of the Central 

Corps. Two more battalions are expected to graduate over the course of the next two 

10

months. While U.S. Foreign Military Financing funds, Defense Department expenditures under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, and international donations are 

being used to equip and sustain the Central Corps, crucial in our efforts are supporting battalions that are continuing unit training and rebuilding military infrastructure. We are also ensuring the permanence of the Afghan National Army by 

diversifying recruitment procedures, seeing that each battalion has a mix of ethnic 

groups in Afghanistan. 

The third component of Afghanistan’s defense line is the International Security 

Assistance Force, or ISAF, now led by NATO. ISAF troops represent a multilateral 

effort in stabilizing the security environment in Afghanistan. ISAF has grown to 

6,500 soldiers. NATO has also set a goal to establish five provincial reconstruction 

teams this summer in northern and western Afghanistan. 

Finally, as they did during the Constitutional Loya Jirga, Coalition forces will 

keep Taliban, Al Qaeda and other anti-government forces off balance and on the defensive. 

RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The upcoming election represents a short-term goal within a larger strategy to 

help Afghanistan establish the institutions of a democracy. 

Once the government is elected, the country will need adequate infrastructure and 

a well-organized civil society to function and grow. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs) have begun to forge such relationships within Afghanistan’s society, and are 

expanding to help manage reconstruction efforts for the future. PRTs expand the 

reach of the central government into the provinces, enhance security, and facilitate 

reconstruction projects. Each team has a security section, including military and security observers; a representative of the Afghan Ministry of Interior; a civilian section, including State and USAID officers; and a headquarters element, including 

force protection and support elements. These teams, which range from sixty to 250 

personnel, patrol, survey and assess the security environment daily and often diffuse potential problems by informing government officials of potential violence or arranging for parties to meet to discuss problems. Quick impact projects have been 

completed in various sectors, including agriculture, bridge and road projects, hospitals, schools and water wells. PRTs continue to enjoy the confidence of the Afghan 

government and the support of the Afghan people. The Coalition and NATO have 

thirteen PRTs today, expect to have sixteen by the election, and hope NATO will 

come through with its promised five more, so that PRTs will be working in twentyone of the thirty-four provinces by the end of the year. 

The United States is also heavily involved in rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure, particularly national roads, electric power, irrigation and communications. Reconstruction remains an essential element of U.S. strategy to meet the long-term security needs of the country. My friend and colleague Jim Kunder will further describe our reconstruction efforts. 

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

As you can see, the upcoming election is the crossroads of our short- and longterm strategies in Afghanistan. Our short-term tasks to provide elections safety, 

build needed infrastructure, and support democratization, represent long-term endeavors of democracy and governance, security, and reconstruction. When millions 

of Afghans go to the polls this September, it will represent a milestone in our strategy in Afghanistan. It will take us closer to the top of the mountain. 

However, serious difficulties remain. The country still needs stronger links between provincial regions and the national government, and most importantly, a stable security environment. Fighting the ever-increasing illicit drug trade, overcoming 

the influence of local commanders and fighting a Taliban insurgency still require 

much work. The path is very steep. 

A LONG-TERM PARTNERSHIP

Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned, the Afghans say, optimistically, ‘‘there is a path 

to the top of the highest mountain.’’ The American version of the proverb is—‘‘where 

there is a will, there is a way.’’ As the Afghan proverb applies to Afghan cooperation 

with our efforts, the American version squarely applies to our commitment and our 

will. U.S. government agencies, civilian and military, are demonstrating their commitment in helping Afghanistan become an example of democracy in the Islamic 

world. The September elections will not mark the end of our efforts; rather, its success will be another milestone in our long-term commitment to Afghanistan. 

This long-term relationship will be strengthened on June 15, when President 

Bush welcomes President Karzai to the White House and Sea Island. Presidents 

11

Bush and Karzai will discuss a wide range of issues, including the war on terrorism, 

and bringing peace, security, and prosperity to the Afghan people. President Karzai 

will also visit Chicago, Los Angeles, and Davis, California, meeting with various actors in the commercial, private, and agricultural sectors. This visit will demonstrate 

the ‘‘will’’ of both nations, working together for a safer and more prosperous future. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, President Dwight Eisenhower visited Afghanistan on December 9, 

1959. After passing through the country, President Eisenhower wrote in his memoir, 

‘‘[f]ew, if any, women were present.’’ Much has changed now. Life for women under 

the current government represents an improvement over the past, as they are receiving literacy training, vocational education, health-care programs, and increased 

opportunities in public and civic life. After decades of war, instability, and insecurity, Afghans are now beginning to enjoy a more dynamic and open civic life. While 

much has changed since President Eisenhower’s assessment, his comment upon departing the country does stand true: he considered the Afghans ‘‘the most determined lot he had ever encountered.’’

Mr. Chairman, we abandoned Afghanistan fifteen years ago. That was a tragic 

mistake for Afghans and for Americans. The Afghan people are worried we will 

abandon them again. The enemies of democracy are hoping we will. We must not.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador. Ms. Long. 

STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LONG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Ms. LONG. Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my distinct pleasure to 

be here today to discuss with you the problem of illegal narcotics 

trafficking in Afghanistan and the Department’s efforts toward 

that problem. 

The Department appreciates the support that Congress has provided as it demonstrates your awareness of this problem, and it is 

indeed critical to our efforts to address the problem of illegal narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. 

As this Committee already knows, we expect the poppy product 

in Afghanistan this year will be substantially increased over last 

year’s crop. At this point, we are unable to estimate the precise size 

of that increase. 

However, available information suggests that the poppy crop this 

year will be large. This not only the bad news. We believe that the 

increased cultivation and the resulting expansion in narcotics trafficking helps local Afghan commanders who resist efforts to expand 

the authority of the centralized Afghan government throughout the 

country. 

And we are certain that the narcotics industry benefits the extremists and terrorist groups, including the Taliban, the Hizb 

Islami or Gulbuddin, or commonly known as the HIG, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, sometimes referred to as the IMU, 

to undermine the stability of a central representative government 

in Afghanistan, and that many of these groups sometimes work 

with al-Qaeda. 

At this time, we can’t precisely estimate how much these groups 

rely on the narcotics trade for financial or logistical support, but we 

suspect that they receive substantial benefits from the trades. 

In addition, we are beginning to see signs of direct involvement 

by some members of these groups in narcotics trafficking. This is 

a new development that concerns us. We are also concerned that 

12

some of the key traffickers may be able to apply their increased 

profits to strengthening the military capabilities of the forces that 

they control. 

This development may undermine our efforts to promote long 

term stability in Afghanistan. These developments underscore the 

fact that narcotics trafficking not only hinders our efforts to defeat 

extremists and terrorist forces in Afghanistan, but also our efforts 

to support the stability and legitimacy of the Afghanistan central 

government, and to protect the security of the United States. 

The drug trade tempts Afghan government officials to pander to 

crime rather than to protect the Afghan citizens. It creates a hidden economy that is separate from the informal and formal taxation system, and it distorts the investment decision making of the 

Afghan people. 

In addition, it undermines the functioning representative and 

centralized Afghan national government, and it provides cover 

under which unaccountable groups, including the groups that I just 

mentioned, including al-Qaeda and its allies, operate. 

These are developments that the United States clearly cannot 

allow. I believe all can agree that the narcotics problem in Afghanistan is serious and that action is required. The difficult issue is to 

determine the right response, and the timing of that response. 

The Department of Defense is engaged in building the Afghan 

Government’s capacity to attack the narcotics problem. The Defense Department also supports coalition members and other 

United States Government agencies, like the DEA, in their efforts 

to attack the Afghan narcotics problem. 

In general, the Department’s counterdrug Afghan program focuses in three ways; enhancing border security, intelligence capability and sharing, and support to interdiction efforts. 

For example, the Department will be building infrastructure and 

providing equipment to the Afghan police in the south and southeast border regions, as well as the Afghan interdiction forces, including a new DEA-sponsored interdiction force. 

In addition, the Department has provided a communication system for the border police and establishing an intelligence fusion 

center that will assist the combined forces in Afghanistan to address narcotics trafficking problems. 

The Department is also providing hopefully through its fusion 

center an intelligence database that will be a capability for the Afghan Ministry of Interior. These efforts are now coming on-line. 

We have provided funds to the affected commands, and the Army 

Corps of Engineers elements in Afghanistan are preparing to conduct site surveys for the infrastructure of these projects, and contracts with the border police, communications systems, and the intelligence fusion center should be awarded in July. 

We realize that our initial efforts to build the Afghan government’s capacity to deal with the illegal narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan may not bear significant results in the next few months. 

We are, however, convinced that this approach is the right one. 

The counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan will take time, and it 

must be sustained over many years, perhaps as long as a decade. 

By way of comparison, it took Pakistan a long time to eliminate 

most of its poppy production and narcotics processing. I am preVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:39 Aug 10, 2004 Jkt 094035 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\060204\94035.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

pared to discuss in closed session additional details and developments in our thinking about the appropriate military role in the 

overall United States Government programs, and the approach to 

counternarcotics in Afghanistan. 

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Representative 

Lantos, and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to be 

here today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Long follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LONG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

COUNTERNARCOTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the problem of illegal 

narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, and our approach to defeat this problem. We 

appreciate the support the Defense Department has received from Congress in this 

area. That support was very forward-leaning and has been critical in our government’s response to this problem. 

THE PROBLEM—AND THE RIGHT RESPONSE

We believe that this year’s estimate for poppy cultivation in Afghanistan will 

show a substantial increase over last year’s. At this point, we are not in a position 

to estimate the precise size of the increase, but data available now suggest the increase will be large. 

That is not the only bad news. We believe that the increased cultivation, and the 

resulting expanded trafficking in narcotics, helps local commanders who want to resist our efforts to expand the authority of the Afghan government throughout the 

country. In addition, we are certain that the narcotics industry benefits various extremist and terrorist groups such as the Taliban, the Hizb Islami (Gulbuddin faction) (or ‘‘HIG’’), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (or ‘‘IMU’’) that undermine stability in Afghanistan. We cannot precisely estimate how much these groups 

rely on the narcotics trade for financial resources or logistical support, but we suspect that at least some in these groups receive substantial benefits from the trade. 

Some or all of these groups may provide support to al Qa’ida. 

Moreover, we are beginning to see greater signs of direct involvement by some 

members of these groups in actual trafficking. This is a new development that obviously concerns us. 

We are also concerned that some of the key traffickers will be able to funnel their 

increased profits into stronger military capabilities directly under their control. This 

also is a situation that should be of great concern. 

Narcotics trafficking not only poses challenges to our efforts to defeat extremist 

and terrorist forces; it also is a threat to the stability and legitimacy of the Afghan 

government, and to the security of the United States. The drugs trade tempts Afghan government officials to obey hidden masters rather than the people of Afghanistan. It creates a hidden economy and a separate informal taxation system that distorts investment incentives, undermines the authority of the Afghan Government, 

and provides cover for unaccountable groups, including al Qa’ida and its allies, to 

wield power and to secure protected sanctuaries. This is a situation that the United 

States clearly cannot allow. 

I believe all can agree that this problem is serious and that action is required. 

The difficult issue is to determine the right response, and the timing of that response. The Defense Department is engaged in building the Afghan Government’s 

capacity to attack this problem. The Defense Department is also supporting other 

government agencies, like the Drug Enforcement Administration, in their efforts to 

attack this problem. 

We recognize that our approach—building the Afghan Government’s own 

counterdrug capacity—will not produce many results in the next four months. However, we are convinced that this approach is the right one. The counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan must be sustained over several years, perhaps for as much as 

a decade. As a point of comparison, that is how long it took Afghanistan’s neighboring Pakistan to eliminate most of its poppy production and narcotics processing. 

I am prepared to discuss in more specifics, in a closed session, recent developments regarding our thinking about the appropriate military role in the overall U.S. 

Government counternarcotics approach in Afghanistan. 

14

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE—BUILDING CAPACITY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS

AND COUNTERTERRORISM

The Defense Department’s approach to this problem has undergone significant 

discussion and refinement, within USCENTCOM and in Kabul, between CFC–A and 

the Embassy. The approach is now decided, however. The Ambassador has endorsed 

a plan, and we are beginning to assist in the implementation of that plan. 

This plan has three principal thrusts. The first two thrusts—improving border security and the sharing of intelligence with law enforcement—are specifically assigned to the Defense Department by the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan. The third thrust—interdiction—a task that the Defense Department believes it should support. 

The Defense Department’s counterdrug approach in Afghanistan is designed to 

achieve counternarcotics objectives, but it is also a counterterrorism tool designed 

to provide payoffs in the war against al Qa’ida and other terrorist groups. The following chart illustrates the Department’s approach in using counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan in ways that provide benefits to its counterterrorism and national stability objectives. 

In general, the Department views its programs in Afghanistan to fall within three 

general categories: 1.Border Security; 2. Intelligence Sharing and Support; and 3. 

Support to Interdiction Efforts.

Counternarcotics Objectives Counternarcotics Programs Counterterrorism Payoffs 

• Improve border security • Provide infrastructure and equipment for National and Highway 

Police 

• Improve border crossing points 

• Provide communications for Border 

Police 

• Improve controls over border 

• Build Afghan law enforcement 

• Interdict smuggling routes used by 

terrorists and traffickers

• Improve intelligence sharing with 

law enforcement 

• Create intelligence fusion centers 

in CFC–A and in Afghan Ministry of 

Interior 

• Bolster Coalition intelligence capability against traffickers that support movement of terrorists 

• Build Afghan law enforcement

• Support direct interdiction • Improve mobility of Afghan interdiction force 

• Provide infrastructure and equipment for Counter Narcotics Police 

• Destroy drug labs/facilities that 

generate funding for terrorists 

1. Border Security 

The Department intends to bolster border security, not just along the actual border, but in border regions, especially in areas bordering Pakistan. 

Specifically, two Border Police Brigades will receive infrastructure and equipment 

support, enabling better security along the border in Paktika, Kandahar, and Zabol 

provinces. The Corps of Engineers elements in CFC–A will oversee the construction 

of brigade, battalion, and company headquarters facilities. Since Border Police operate almost like light infantry that patrol sectors where heavily armed militants 

sometimes move, they need additional equipment beyond the requirements of normal policemen. CFC–A will also oversee the issuance of specialized equipment, beyond the equipment that police receive when they complete U.S.-sponsored or German-sponsored police training. The specialized equipment list is still being finalized, 

but it will include some additional protective gear and equipment for bad weather. 

In addition, the Department will fund a communications system for the Border 

Police that will link them with the existing National Police communications backbone—procured through Department of State funds—and that will extend from the 

command to the tactical level. The plan is to provide these communications systems 

to Border Police units as they are deployed and as they replace the existing Border 

Guard forces that have traditionally operated on Afghanistan’s borders. 

Away from the borders, the Defense Department will improve, or in many cases, 

construct, police facilities and other infrastructure for National Police headquarters 

in provinces stretching south, along the Pakistan border, from Nangahar to Nimruz. 

CFC–A will coordinate with various international efforts that are ongoing, and with 

the State Department. The Defense Department also will supplement existing 

equipment provided to the National Police in these provinces. 

15

The National Highway Police also will receive Defense Department assistance in 

this general region. The Department will fund construction and the refurbishment 

of Highway Police facilities for the battalion that operates on the ring road between 

Kabul and Gardez. Again, the Department also will assist in providing needed 

equipment. For the Highway Police, that equipment will include refurbishing a helicopter belonging to the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is intended for use in responding to problems along the ring road south of Kabul. 

Finally, the Department is funding two projects in Uzbekistan: construction of a 

set of moorings for small maritime patrol vessels on the Amu Darya River, across 

which substantial amounts of narcotics are shipped; and infrastructure for an Uzbek 

Special Investigative Unit established by the DEA. 

2. Intelligence Sharing 

To improve the flow of information between intelligence and law enforcement organizations, the Defense Department will establish counter-narcoterrorism intelligence fusion centers (IFCs) within CFC–A and the Ministry of Interior. The IFC 

within CFC–A will augment, with counternarcotics and counter-narcoterrorism expertise, the military intelligence support provided to the Commanding General. It 

also will integrate its analysis with the military and with counterinsurgency intelligence efforts within CFC–A. 

The IFC in the Ministry of Interior will have several functions. It will consist of 

a database, provided and operated initially by a contractor. This data base will be 

the first step in reconstructing Afghanistan’s criminal justice records, which were 

destroyed by the last two decades of war. It will also enable Afghan police to focus 

their investigative efforts on narcotics traffickers. Defense Department and DEA 

personnel working in the CFC–A IFC and in Embassy Kabul will help the Ministry 

of Interior to begin to populate this data base. 

The Afghan IFC also will be a focal point for the MoI’s own counternarcotics intelligence analysis. The Defense Department believes and expects that some information developed by the Afghans utilizing this fusion center will then be made available to CFC–A and to U.S. law enforcement agencies. 

3. Interdiction 

The Defense Department will provide up to two refurbished helicopters for use by 

the existing interdiction force within the Ministry of Interior, and will also provide 

a base of operations and equipment for a new interdiction unit established by the 

DEA. The existing interdiction force is conducting effective operations, but needs 

greater mobility to extend its reach and to increase its force protection capability. 

The DEA-run interdiction unit will have a stronger law enforcement focus than the 

existing unit, which is relatively well armed and capable of conducting light infantry 

combat operations. As the Afghan Government re-establishes the rule of law in the 

country, expanding interdiction operations that result in criminal prosecutions will 

be an important goal. The DEA-run unit will have that kind of focus. 

FUNDING DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROJECTS

Funding requirements for each of these projects are currently only initial estimates, as described in the table below:

16

Program Area Millions $

National Police Facilities and Equipment 13.00

Counter Narcotics Police Facilities and Equipment 3.00

Border Police Brigades (2) 27.90

Border Police Communications System 9.00

National Highway Police Battalion Facilities and Equipment 5.90

Intel Fusion Center 4.00

Helicopters for Afghan Interdiction Force 6.50

Uzbekistan Maritime Infrastructure and Special Investigative Unit 

Facilities 3.75

Total 73.00

STATUS OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROJECTS

The Department of Defense’s implementation of Afghan counterdrug programs is 

now in its initial stages. The Department has transferred the funding for so that 

contracts can be approved. We anticipate contract approval in the coming weeks. 

We expect that facility construction will begin this summer and that equipment 

for the police will be arriving in Afghanistan in September. The helicopters for the 

interdiction force and various police units (e.g. the 2 helos for interdiction force, the 

2 helos for the Border Police, and the 1 destined for the Highway Police) probably 

will arrive early next year. The Statements of Work (SOWs) for the intelligence fusion centers and the communications system for the Border Police have been drafted 

and are being reviewed by CFC–A. We expect both SOWs will be approved within 

the next weeks, and contracts will be awarded no later than early July. Equipment 

for these projects will probably begin arriving in Afghanistan in early September. 

At this time, CFC–A is developing a plan to receive and distribute this equipment, 

and to support its fielding and proper safeguarding by the Afghan authorities. CFC–

A also is working with State Department officers and German representatives in 

Kabul to ensure that police facilities and equipment provided by different agencies 

and countries are compatible. 

The Department recognizes that the pace of our work building a program to 

counter narcotics-related activities in Afghanistan needs to be as brisk as possible 

so that Afghan authorities can build their capacity, as quickly as possible, to begin 

to counter the narcotics threat growing in their country. We appreciate the congressional support we have received to date toward this important goal. 

I would like to thank you, Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, and the Members of the Committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. I look 

forward to answering your questions.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ms. Long. Mr. Kunder. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES KUNDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, read the paper 

today and saw that sad article on the first page about the Army 

PFC who was killed in Afghanistan and talking about a forgotten 

war. 

And I do very much appreciate the interest of the Committee in 

making sure that this isn’t a forgotten reconstruction effort. I do 

keep a copy of the Afghan Freedom Support Act in my office, and 

we look at it frequently, and it has been a help and guide to us. 

17

I think that the Committee showed some real wisdom in anticipating what some of the issues were going to be, and so we very 

much appreciate your continued interest in this topic, which certainly is not a forgotten war or forgotten issue to us. 

I also want to take the opportunity to report to the Committee 

on what I think the status of the reconstruction effort has been in 

Afghanistan, and from where I sit at least I would report that the 

overall reconstruction process has been a success thus far. 

This process started in the winter of 2001–2002 with the fall of 

the Taliban. I think it is critical to remember that Afghanistan was 

one of the poorest places on the face of the earth before the Russian 

invasion. 

Stop and think about the massive investment that was required 

to rebuild our country after the Civil War, a 4-year war, and then 

think about the level that Afghanistan found itself in 2001 and 

2002, after 23 years of conflict, in which virtually the entire infrastructure of the country and virtually every institution in the country—the army, the police, the government, the customs service—

was destroyed. 

I would report to the Committee that the reconstruction success 

that has taken place in the last 21⁄2 years has been nothing short 

of phenomenal. Rather than cover it in a brief opening statement, 

I have appended to my statement, Mr. Chairman, reports in each 

of the sectors in which USAID is working; economic reconstruction, 

education, health infrastructure, economic governance, and so 

forth. 

And in each of these areas, I have tried to provide indicators to 

show the level of success that has been accomplished today. And 

I make that statement with a full recognition of the ongoing security problems, and as Ambassador Taylor said, how steep the hill 

is in front of us. 

But my report to the Committee today would be that the reconstruction effort has been a success thus far. I would also try to respond to the Committee’s request in my statement for information 

on lessons learned by USAID in Afghanistan, and I listed seven 

such lessons learned for post-conflict reconstruction environments. 

And I would just touch on three in this brief opening statement. 

First, we have had to pay close attention to making sure that the 

reconstruction effort is essentially an Afghan-supported and Afghan-owned process. 

We like to talk about our foreign assistance, but the Afghans 

have made tremendous strides on their own. This government has 

made heroic efforts to hold the country together and advance the 

reconstruction agenda. A lot of Afghans have been killed along 

projects like the Kabul-to Kandahar Highway Project that was just 

completed. 

And the Afghans have taken full ownership of this reconstruction 

effort, and I think that is an important lesson for us to remember. 

A second lesson that I would point out is to remember the gender 

implications of what we are doing. 

There has been an awful lot of writing, of course, and reporting, 

on the horrible conditions in which Afghan women found themselves under the Taliban, but we have tried to make sure that in 

all of our projects, and not just the projects specifically designed for 

18

women, in all of our economic reconstruction and infrastructure reconstruction, and health and education programs, to recognize 

what impact we are having on Afghan women, and how we can be 

of assistance to ensuring gender equality in Afghanistan. 

The third point that I would make, or the third lesson learned, 

is that again going back to the Afghan Freedom Support Act, it was 

a useful initiative on the part of the Committee to tell us as a government to appoint an overall interagency coordinator. 

And we have worked well with Ambassador Taylor and his predecessor, and that effort has helped us make sure that the entire 

U.S. Government is working together on complex areas like counternarcotics. 

And finally you asked us to take a look at the status of provincial 

reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. From the USAID perspective, 

we have worked well with our military colleagues in the field, and 

we have a good relationship on these PRTs. 

The military personnel help us identify what some of the projects 

are while they are out doing their patrolling, and we then take 

those project ideas, and we make sure that they are consistent with 

the Afghan government’s plan. 

So a soldier or a patrol might be approached by a group of villagers, and they might say we need a school in this village. They 

bring that idea to the USAID and State Department personnel at 

the provincial reconstruction team. 

We then run that up the flag pole at the Afghan Ministry of Education, and make sure that school and that village is on their priority list, and make sure that it makes sense to them. 

So we have worked out a pretty good synthesis with our military 

colleagues, and I think those PRTs in our estimation are doing 

good work in the countryside. I would just like to touch in closing 

on this issue of counternarcotics, which I know is of great interest 

to the Committee. 

We have attempted in our economic reconstruction effort to focus 

on the overall economic growth that is going to be necessary to provide a viable economy that is going to be the only long term alternative to poppy growing in Afghanistan. 

We need the interdiction, and we need the law enforcement, but 

in the long term what is going to convince those Afghan farmers 

is other alternatives. And I just want to leave the Committee with 

a couple of facts that I think are critical to understanding this 

problem. 

Wheat is the primary agricultural commodity in Afghanistan. We 

have had enormous increases, over 100 percent, of production increases in wheat by the hardworking Afghan farmers since the fall 

of the Taliban. 

But today what the farmer can realize from planting a hectare 

of wheat is about 1⁄30 of what a farmer can gain by planing a hectare of poppy. So those are the kinds of economic factors you are 

looking at. 

To us it is astonishing that the percentage of Afghan farmers 

who actually are growing poppy is well under 10 percent. In a desperately poor country, where the nutritional standards are where 

they are, and where 1 in 4 Afghan children even today dies before 

19

the age of five, the economics of this are desperate and rough for 

the average Afghan farmer. 

So our goal is to get the credit programs in place, and get the 

alternative crops, like olives, and peanuts, and cotton, and almonds, working in the countryside, and get the market centers and 

distribution centers running so that those farmers are not faced 

with quite as grim an economic choice as they are faced with today. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Committee for 

its ongoing interest in this topic. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES KUNDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development. 

I would like to start by thanking you and the Committee for your strong support 

to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. By passing the Afghan Freedom Support Act, 

and thereby providing sound guidance on the structure of the reconstruction process, and by ongoing interest in and support for the overall reconstruction effort, the 

Committee has contributed significantly to the reconstruction effort. 

Second, I would like to give an overall assessment of the reconstruction effort. In 

short, Mr. Chairman, the reconstruction process has been, thus far, a success. I say 

this with a full recognition of the serious security issues that still persist, and with 

a full recognition of the serious reconstruction challenges that remain ahead. But, 

when I recall the condition of the country in January of 2002, just after the fall of 

the Taliban, when 23 years of warfare had driven the country to almost total collapse of its physical and institutional infrastructure, then consider the state of the 

nation today, the amount of progress has been very significant. 

Rather than take the time of the Committee now to recount those many advances, 

I have appended to my testimony a fact sheet USAID has prepared illustrating the 

reconstruction situation in the following sectors in which U.S. taxpayer assistance 

has helped the Afghan people: (1) restoring infrastructure; (2) rehabilitating agriculture, the lifeblood of the Afghan economy; (3) improving health; (4) enhancing 

education; (5) empowering women; (6) growing the economy; and (7) promoting democracy and restoring the media. A review of the progress in these seven areas suggests just how far Afghanistan has come in 30 months, after 23 years of war. 

Of special importance now, on the eve of elections in Afghanistan, is the development of the political process—an inclusive political process—in Afghanistan. The introduction of legitimate political processes in Afghanistan contributes to the development of democracy and stability in the country. The United States has been a 

major donor for all the major political process benchmarks mandated by the Bonn 

Accord. USAID has supported and played an integral role in all the preliminary 

steps required for Afghanistan’s national elections this fall. These steps included the 

Emergency Loya Jirga; the Constitutional process, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, 

and the resulting constitution; and finally the national election registration process 

and voter education. 

SUPPORT FOR THE EMERGENCY LOYA JIRGA

USAID provided $6 million in logistical and technical support for the election of 

delegates and their assembly at the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, which ended 

with the announcement of 14 ministerial appointments and the swearing in of President Karzai and his colleagues. 

SUPPORT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

U. S. Government support for the constitutional process totaled approximately 

$13 million. USAID’s partners included the United Nations Development Programme, The Asia Foundation, Internews, the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, Management Systems International, the International Organization for Migration, and several Afghan organizations. USAID assistance provided technical advisers and funding for Afghanistan’s Constitutional Commission and printing the draft 

constitution for distribution to the Afghan people as part of a nation-wide public 

consultative process. 

20

USAID support included identification and election of representatives to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) in December. USAID, working with the UN, helped to 

meet the CLJ’s logistical, transport, media and security requirements. USAID-funded advisors helped to develop the CLJ’s rules of order and procedure. Currently, 

USAID is supporting the establishment of a CLJ archive and the physical rehabilitation of the convention site. 

Finally, USAID supported public information and debate regarding the draft constitution and the CLJ. USAID funded training for journalists and ensured that regional journalists could travel to Kabul to cover the proceedings. USAID’s partners 

produced a provincial radio talk show and a mobile cinema project that explained 

the constitutional process in Dari and Pashto, Afghanistan’s two most widely spoken 

languages. USAID also funded a consortium of NGOs that trained community leaders to provide information and civic education on the constitution in their communities. 

SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS

The United States is the largest contributor to the national elections—$78 million 

in 2004. USAID direct support for the national elections includes funding for the 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), The Asia Foundation (TAF), 

the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute 

(IRI). USAID provides technical assistance, training, logistical and organizational 

support to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the 

new Afghan electoral body that oversees the legal framework, voter registration, 

voter education and election administration. 

USAID support is essential to the election and long-term democratic development 

in Afghanistan, to build a politically active citizenry by helping citizens and political 

elites develop a shared system of democratic norms through civic education, election 

oversight, focus group research, polling and training to political parties and civic activists. 

After the elections, the government will no longer be considered transitional but 

democratically elected. Although the elections will be over, the democratic process 

within the country will have just begun, and USAID plans to provide support to 

help establish the necessary foundation to make the new Afghan parliament a viable, functioning democratic institution. 

Lessons learned since the establishment of USAID activities in post-Taliban Afghanistan and what improvements can be made to providing assistance to the people 

and Government of Afghanistan: 

Beyond the democratic governance issues, and in response to the Chairman’s 

questions, I would like to address more broadly USAID’s key lessons from Afghanistan. 

First, the process of developing democracy in any war-torn country must view security as priority one-every other development objective is, to a greater or lesser degree, negatively affected by poor security. We have developed a number of innovative techniques—working with our military colleagues, working with our civilian 

partners, and working with the Afghans themselves—to facilitate work in high-risk 

environments, and these techniques are paying dividends in the reconstruction program. 

Second, there must be local ownership of the reconstruction process, and thus 

unique country-specific approaches and institutions must be incorporated. In Afghanistan, the use of the Loya Jirga as a mechanism for determining the transitional government’s responsibilities and leadership, as well as for ratifying the Constitution is a good example. 

Third, the process must incorporate the capabilities of international organizations, 

including the United Nations. These international organizations can play an important leadership role, especially in countries like Afghanistan with little electoral experience and with a population that is largely illiterate. 

Fourth, the process of developing democracy in a war-torn country is a long-term 

endeavor and is not over when the last ballot is cast. It takes time to change traditional norms and approaches, and to design and build new norms and institutions. 

It will be many years before democracy takes full-hold in Afghanistan. The USG will 

need to commit long-term resources to assist the Afghans to ensure that it does take 

hold. 

Fifth, an interagency coordinator, an idea advanced in the Afghan Freedom Support Act, was a useful idea. This approach provides the government one point-person to focus the efforts of several agencies. This concept should be used in other situations as well. We have worked well with Ambassador Taylor and his predecessor, 

while maintaining the initiative to take on unforeseen developmental challenges. 

21

Sixth, flexibility in funding is critical to operating in wartime environments like 

Afghanistan. The combination of International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account 

funds, and reasonable waiver authority is essential to operating in a place like Afghanistan. 

Seventh, we need to continue to pay careful attention to gender issues in conflictive environments like Afghanistan. It is widely recognized that Afghanistan’s 

women have paid a high price in suffering and lost opportunity during the decades 

of war and Taliban oppression. Not only must we develop women’s opportunity programs in such environments, but the gender aspects of all of our reconstruction efforts must be considered. 

Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and their ability to respond to the needs of Afghans involved in rebuilding their communities: 

Afghanistan is transitioning to a functioning democracy and an economically progressive country. Stability is the biggest obstacle to development. Taliban insurgents, warlords, drug-financed groups, corruption and lawlessness in various parts 

of the country threaten investment and reconstruction efforts. They also hamper the 

ability of the government and donors to implement social, economic and political development priorities throughout the country. 

PRTs are joint civil-military units deployed throughout Afghanistan. They are an 

interim mechanism to strengthen the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government in outlying regions through improved security and the facilitation 

of reconstruction and development efforts. As such, they are a useful way for USAID 

to gather information from the provinces to make informed program decisions, and 

they are a mechanism for improving program monitoring. However, information 

gathering and program monitoring are partially dependent on the availability of 

support from the military—vehicles, security guards, etc.—for the civilian USG employees ‘‘embedded’’ within the PRT structure. Otherwise USAID officers are confined to the PRT compound. 

PRTs are also a useful mechanism for identifying small, quick impact projects in 

the surrounding area to demonstrate goodwill and tangible benefits. $52 million in 

U.S. Government resources has been programmed this year to support such small 

scale community reconstruction activities managed by the PRTs. 

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this information to the Committee, and 

will be pleased to answer questions. 

USAID ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

June 2004

Since late 2001, the United States Agency for International Development has responded swiftly and continuously to help rebuild Afghanistan, providing over $2 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance from 9/11 through the end of the 

current fiscal year. The first stage of assistance was humanitarian, averting famine 

in the winter of 2001 and 2002 through food aid, and restarting the economy 

through cash-for-work and food-for-work programs which also began the rebuilding 

of the country’s infrastructure. As the humanitarian programs continued throughout 

2002, USAID started programs to bring a sense of normalcy to the long-suffering 

Afghan people, rebuilding government offices, printing textbooks for the March 2002 

school year opening, and converting the devalued currency to a new Afghani currency, among many examples. During this period, USAID worked with the respective Afghan government ministries and coordinated with other donors to design 

longer-term development and reconstruction programs to help Afghanistan start on 

a path toward stability, prosperity, and self-sufficiency. 

Those longer-term development and reconstruction programs are now well underway. Below are the accomplishments and upcoming goals for those programs, organized by sector: 

INFRASTRUCTURE AND AFGHANISTAN’S RING ROAD

Years of unrest in Afghanistan, followed by Taliban rule, has left public infrastructure in ruin. All sectors of the economy struggle when poor roads prevent the 

transport of goods, or a shortage of clean water affects a community’s health. 

USAID is working to bring back the basics to Afghanistan. The beginning of the 

reconstruction of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Highway (Ring Road) revitalized entire 

villages. The reopened Salang Tunnel, high in the mountains, has cut more than 

two and a half days off common trips. These projects are key to the redevelopment 

of Afghanistan. 

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The Ring Road—The journey from Kabul to Kandahar was an arduous trip that 

required two days to travel; much of the road (surface) and several bridges suffered 

considerable deterioration, damage and lack of investment over the years, particularly during two-and-a half decades of civil war and hostilities. President Karzai 

stated that reconstruction of the country’s principal road system is key to Afghanistan’s economic recovery, as more than 35% of Afghanistan’s population lives within 

50 kilometers (31 miles) of the highway. 

Today, the first step toward reconstruction of Afghanistan’s national road system 

is complete. Phase I of the highway linking Kabul to Kandahar is open to traffic. 

As a result, people from Kabul to Kandahar enjoy better access to markets, 

healthcare, schools and jobs. At the national level, the highway has already begun 

to contribute to Afghanistan’s improved economic growth, security and national 

unity. 

The entire length of the Kabul-Kandahar highway is 482 kilometers (300 miles). 

USAID reconstructed 389 kilometers (242 miles) of the highway; the government of 

Japan funded the reconstruction of 50 kilometers (31 miles) of highway, and the remaining 43 kilometers (27 miles) did not require resurfacing. 

Sector Objective: Reconstruct Afghanistan’s major and rural roads, and improve 

economic growth, security, and political integration along the corridor linking Afghanistan’s two largest cities—Kabul and Kandahar.

Accomplishments:

• The first layer of pavement for the Kabul-Kandahar Highway was completed 

on December 15, 2003

Current Activities and Goals:

• Constructing/repairing 36 bridges along the Kabul-Kandahar Highway

• Reconstruct/construct 1,000 kilometers of rural roads; contracting underway

• Begin construction of the Kandahar-Herat Highway in summer 2004

• Providing emergency diesel fuel to Kabul

• Providing emergency generating plants for Kandahar, Lashkar-Gah, and 

Qalat 

AGRICULTURE AND RURAL ECONOMY

Agriculture is a way of life for 70 percent of Afghanistan’s people. However, instability, coupled with the region’s four-year drought, devastated the country’s food production capacity and impoverished farmers. 

USAID is helping farmers re-establish production and become more profitable and 

efficient, by rehabilitating irrigation systems and providing tools, agricultural equipment, fertilizer, and seeds. Revitalizing agriculture is key to the growth of the Afghan economy. 

Sector Objective: Enhance the food security and incomes of Afghanistan’s rural 

population by increasing agricultural productivity and facilitate effective linkages 

between producers, processors and markets.

Accomplishments:

• Provided 5,000 metric tons of seed and 9,000 metric tons of fertilizer to 

100,000 farmers in 13 provinces

• 7,000 kilometers of rural roads have been repaired

• Nearly 8,000 irrigation/water works projects have been completed

Current Activities and Goals:

• Revitalizing (Afghanistan’s) Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP):

— Irrigation projects affecting 301,000 hectares initiated since fall 2003; of 

these, projects affecting 150,000 ha now complete

— Training Afghan women and farmers in poultry production and in using 

new technologies in 250 villages

— Microfinance program underway; as of April 2004, loans disbursed to 

675 borrowers and 1,050 loan officers trained

— Vaccination/treatment of 350,000 head of livestock in spring/summer 

2004

— Constructing 140 market and collection centers by June 2004

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HEALTH

One of every four Afghan children dies before the age of five, and adults face an 

average life expectancy of only 46 years. The health status of the Afghan people is 

among the worst in the world. 

USAID is working to improve the basic health and nutrition of Afghans, particularly women, children, and displaced persons. It is bringing basic services and 

health education to under-served communities, focusing on maternal and child 

health, hygiene, water and sanitation, immunization and control of infectious diseases. These programs, women are the primary recipients of services, as well as providers of healthcare. 

Sector Objective: To increase access to health care across the country and rebuild 

Afghanistan’s health care infrastructure.

Accomplishments:

• Rehabilitated 140 health facilities (clinics, birth centers, feeding centers, and 

hospitals)

• Provided funding to UNICEF to treat 700,000 cases of malaria

• Vaccinated 4.26 million children against measles and polio, preventing some 

20,000 deaths

• Surveyed all health facilities and services—survey results provide key information for expanding basic health services and locating new clinics

• Funded NGOs to provide basic health services to more than 3.8 million people 

in 21 provinces starting in July 2002 through October 2003; program continues with basic health services now being provided to over 4.7 million people.

• Provide one-quarter of Kabul’s water supply, focusing on the poorest districts

• Rehabilitated the water systems of Kandahar and Kunduz, which provide 

water to 700,000 people

• Increased access to safe water through sale, distribution, and advertising of 

benefits of Clorin, the water purification product (over 5,000 bottles sold by 

October 2003)

Current Activities and Goals:

• 72 new clinics currently under construction—first completed April 2004

• REACH—Rural Expansion of Afghanistan’s Community-based Health Care: 

REACH is a three-year program to improve the health of women of reproductive age and of children under the age of five by providing the Ministry of 

Health’s basic package of health services to an estimated 11,000,000 people 

EDUCATION

In 2000, only about 32 percent of school-age children were enrolled. An overwhelming 97 percent of the country’s girls did not attend school, and eighty percent 

of existing schools were either severely damaged or destroyed at the end of Taliban 

rule. 

USAID is working to bring Afghan children and teachers back to school with textbooks, school supplies, and training materials in hand. Pent-up demand for education is so great that more than two times the projected number of children showed 

up for school in March 2002. To meet this demand, 1,000 schools are being rebuilt 

or rehabilitated over the next three years. 

Sector Objective: To provide primary education to Afghanistan’s children through 

school reconstruction, teacher training, accelerating learning programs and textbook 

production.

Accomplishments:

• Built/Rehabilitated over 200 primary and secondary schools and teacher 

training institutes

• Supported the 2002/2003 Back-to-School campaign by printing 25 million 

textbooks

• Trained over 7,000 teachers

• Produced and distributed 30,000 teacher instructional material kits

• Provided a curriculum development workshop for the Ministry of Education, 

NGOs involved in the education sector, and critical donors

24

• Established an accelerated learning program to address the problems of retention of over-aged students and lack of access for out-of-school youth—

130,000 students enrolled to date

Current Activities and Goals

• Providing food salary supplement to 55,000 teachers, valued at 26% of monthly income 

EMPOWERING WOMEN

Despite 23 years of war, Afghan urban women enjoyed a long history of freedom 

before the Taliban assumed power. Women were government ministers and members of the country’s highest legislative body. Under the Taliban, Afghan women 

were shunned from public life, often prohibited from working outside the home, and 

punished for showing their faces. Education was forbidden. 

USAID is giving Afghan women the education, skills, and tools they need to obtain jobs, support their families, and integrate into the political and public life of 

this new stage in Afghanistan’s history. The situation for women has improved 

markedly, but much work remains. 

Sector Objective: A focus on Afghan girls and women has been integrated into our 

sector programs (education, health, agriculture, democracy and governance).

Accomplishments:

• Rehabilitated the Ministry of Women Affair’s building and established 

MoWA’s first Women’s Resource Center in Kabul

• Kindergartens constructed in 9 ministries—providing safe care for working 

women in Kabul

Current Activities and Goals

• Building 17 multi-service Provincial Women’s Centers (5 complete or currently under construction)

• Accelerated health-focused literacy program underway in 13 rural provinces 

to enable 5,500 women to train to become community healthcare workers and 

community midwives 

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

For years, Afghanistan had a dysfunctional economy based on illicit drug trade 

and the business of war. A concerted effort must be made to re-establish a legitimate economy based on agriculture. 

USAID is strengthening Afghanistan’s economy by creating jobs in a variety of 

sectors, enabling Afghans to support their families and help rebuild their country. 

The private sector economy must begin to grow and offer people opportunities, or 

reconstruction will not succeed. 

Sector Objective: Provide support to the TISA to formulate and implement economic governance measures that will lead to the sustained financing of public services and enhanced levels of private investment.

Current Activities and Goals:

• Strengthening Afghanistan’s economy by creating jobs in a variety of agricultural, processing and micro-enterprise sectors, enabling Afghans to support 

their families and help rebuild their country.

• Working with the Ministry of Finance in developing a national budget, implementing streamlined customs reforms in Kabul and 4 other provinces, and in 

tax administration and the issuance of Tax Identification Numbers (TINs). 

TINs are now required in order for imports to enter the country

• Working with Afghanistan’s Central Bank to establish national and international money transfer services; create and implement commercial banking 

regulation and licensing (three commercial banks established in Afghanistan 

to date); implement monetary policy (currency has maintained its value since 

introduction); and continue work with relevant ministries in trade reform and 

public utilities 

DEMOCRACY AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA

Years of corruption, brutality, and tyranny imposed upon Afghanistan by the 

Taliban reduced the country to political, economic, and social ruin. 

USAID is funding programs that enhance the nascent government’s credibility 

and provide it with the tools and technical assistance to govern effectively. InstituVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:39 Aug 10, 2004 Jkt 094035 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\060204\94035.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
25

tional strengthening will contribute to improved civil-military relations and the 

emergence of a robust civil society. 

USAID is also working with the Afghan people and international organizations to 

rebuild communications and journalistic capacity. The goal is to inform and unite 

Afghanistan’s people to help produce a peaceful, stable, and viable political transition and administration. 

Sector Objective: USAID is funding programs that enhance the nascent government’s credibility and provide it with the tools and technical assistance to govern 

effectively.

Accomplishments:

• Provided critical financial and logistical assistance for the emergency Loya 

Jirga.

• Supported the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) through international advisors, registration of electors of delegates, printing/distribution of draft constitution, CLJ logistical support (CLJ site, civic education campaign, etc.)

• Rehabilitated four provincial courthouses, work beginning on an additional 

seven courthouses.

Current Activities and Goals

• Working with the United Nations to support voter registration for the June 

2004 presidential elections

• Ongoing financial support to Judicial Reform and Human Rights Commissions.

• More than 325 local journalists trained and 31 radio stations supported with 

equipment and training

Chairman HYDE. Well, thank you, Mr. Kunder, and now we will 

turn to the question period. I am going to ask the first question, 

because I am interested in the answer very much. 

During the Soviet area occupation of Afghanistan, we heard from 

some ex-KGB officers who were stationed there, that the Afghans 

used heroin as a tool of war to destroy the Russian army. So much 

so—and this is a startling statistic, and I assume its true—that at 

least half their army left addicted to heroin. In the end they were 

providing arms and intelligence to the Afghan resistance in order 

to support their heroin habits. Is that situation persisting, and 

what are we doing to avoid the same threat to our troops? That is 

directed at anybody who wants to answer. 

Ms. LONG. Chairman, I will answer that question. Our office is 

aware of the real problem that the Soviet army suffered when they 

left Afghanistan with abuse and indeed addiction for its troops. 

And in fact we are aware of press reporting indicating that there 

may be similar problems in our forces. We have checked into these 

things, and our followup has indicated that these are not a problem 

with the military forces. 

And indeed indications are with the testing being done that there 

is no difference between the testing of our personnel either in or 

returning from Afghanistan than the testing results from our general population. 

However, this is something that we are highly focused on, and 

in fact we have gone out to the area commands and asked them 

to keep monitoring. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. I am informed that Ms. 

Ponticelli would like to make a few comments, and therefore forgive me for passing you by, and we will come right back to you 

now. Ms. Ponticelli. 

26

STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE PONTICELLI, SENIOR COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S ISSUES, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. PONTICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not 

having a written statement, but it is such an honor to be before 

you today, and to have a chance just to mention very, very briefly 

a few of the things that we are working on at the U.S. Department 

of State in our office, which is the Office of the Senior Coordinator 

for International Women’s Issues. 

If the women of Afghanistan were emblematic of the brutal repression and denial of fundamental human rights during the 

Taliban regime, we believe that they certainly have become emblematic of the vision, the determination, and the courage of the 

Afghan people as they forge that path to the top of this very high 

mountain. 

Our office is involved in the preparation of the annual report to 

Congress, which you all will be getting soon, and this is pursuant 

to the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001, and every 

year for the past 3 years, we have been submitting a report—this 

will be the third one—on United States Government efforts to assist Afghan women, and children, and refugees. 

So this is very timely to be here today. It is also timely because 

another major initiative that our office works on very hard is the 

United States-Afghan Women’s Council. This was established by 

President Bush and President Karzai in January 2002. 

It is headed by my boss, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, along with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sorabi, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Afghanistan, Abdullah. 

We just had our fourth meeting of the council in Kabul at the 

end of February, it was amazing what our delegation was able to 

observe, particularly not only looking at where Afghan women were 

2 years ago, but including just a year ago when the council had last 

visited Kabul. 

For example, we saw women in literacy centers who were learning to hold a pencil for the first time, getting basic literacy classes. 

We met women who had been very active in the Constitutional 

Loya Jirga, and actually took an active part in the drafting of Afghanistan’s very progressive constitution. 

We met with midwife trainees, classes which will go far to teaching other midwives in the provinces to try to tackle the tragically 

high maternal mortality rate in Afghanistan, which is the second 

highest in the world. 

We also met some Afghan women who were training and being 

trained by our troops in the PRT in Bagram to take part in the security forces. So this is an exciting time for Afghan women. 

In just a few minutes, I will leave to join the Secretary of Agriculture, who is hosting a delegation of 12 Afghan women, representing six provinces in Afghanistan, who are here under the 

Cochran Fellowships, which is a women in agriculture training program. 

A few weeks ago I met with a young Afghan journalist, Maria 

Azizi, who participated in the filming of the documentary, entitled, 

Afghanistan Unveiled. 

27

Just a month or so ago I met with a group of Afghan women 

teachers who were here at a program at the University of Nebraska, and in just a week or 2, we are going to have a small contingent of Afghan women judges, who are coming to our training 

program under the auspices of the International Association of 

Women Judges. 

So I wanted to mention these as emblematic of our efforts. I 

want to particularly refer to Congressman Lantos’ very eloquent referral to the portrait of our troops who have been lost. 

And I feel obliged as I sit here today to convey the voice of many 

women in Afghanistan who have said to me, please, please, convey 

when you go back how grateful we are to the American people, and 

how we in Afghanistan, the mothers of Afghanistan, pray for the 

mothers of America, and express our gratitude for the great sacrifice that they have made on our belief. 

So thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you all might have. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. We understand that you must leave 

at 11:30. Is that correct? 

Ms. PONTICELLI. At least by a quarter-of-12, so that I can be over 

at USDA for the Afghan delegation. 

Chairman HYDE. You are going to press the envelope a little 

there. 

Ms. PONTICELLI. I will. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank all four of our witnesses, and I want to thank through them 

all of the remarkable people of our own government who are doing 

such an outstanding job in Afghanistan in a civilian capacity, and 

of course to all of our military in Afghanistan who are fighting terrorism with such extraordinary courage. 

I want to return to the question of burden sharing in 2004, because unless and until we tackle that issue, and I realize that is 

above your pay grade, as it is a job for the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, and those of us in Congress to push 

for it. 

But I want to underline some profound inequities in dealing with 

the enormous problems of Afghanistan. Now, Afghanistan and Iraq 

are different in the sense that NATO has accepted the responsibility for Afghanistan. 

So the psychological, the political, the ideological, threshold has 

now been achieved there. They are technically responsible for security, and I want to just mention a couple of statistics as to the appalling inequality in accepting responsibility. 

As of last month the Country of Norway, with a population of 

under 5 million, had 241 troops in Afghanistan. Spain, with a population of 40 million, had 118 troops in Afghanistan. And Turkey, 

with a population of 65 million, had 151 troops in Afghanistan. 

Now, Norway, Spain, and Turkey, are all members of NATO. 

Spain and Turkey have large military forces. Yet, their willingness 

to assume the responsibility that they have accepted by being 

members of NATO is not reflected in troop strength. 

With respect to Spain, as I mentioned in my opening observations, they removed their 1,500 troops from Iraq. There is no earthVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:39 Aug 10, 2004 Jkt 094035 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\060204\94035.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

ly reason why they should not be redeployed in Afghanistan. They 

are sorely needed. 

Turkey was ready to put 10,000 to 12,000 troops into Iraq, which 

for political reasons never materialized. They now have 151 troops 

in Afghanistan. This is inexcusable. Let me move on to the financial contribution area. 

Since 1951, Norway has pledged a quarter-billion dollars to the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan. This year, Norway’s contribution is 

$43 million. Austria’s contribution this year is $2 million. 

This incredibly wealthy country, which since the State Treaty of 

1955, has enjoyed the protection of NATO, while not being a member of NATO, has seen fit to contribute $2 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which I think is a disgrace. 

My suggestion to you is, because this is about your pay grade, 

that you take back to your respective chiefs the message that Congress is sick and tired of the lack of burden sharing in Afghanistan. 

At a time when the American people and the American taxpayer, 

and most of all our troops, are bearing such an enormous burden 

in Iraq, now that NATO has accepted full responsibility for security 

in Afghanistan, those with troop contributions and the financial 

contributions of both NATO members and other wealthy and developed countries not members of NATO, is appallingly insufficient. 

It is embarrassingly insufficient, and I think it will undermine 

all of our efforts unless we put at the top of our to do list burden 

sharing in Afghanistan. The big political, strategic, and psychological breakthrough is behind us. Iraq is our burden, but in Afghanistan, we have NATO. I hope in Iraq, we will have NATO 

soon. 

But Iraq, which absorbs enormous resources from this country, 

has been basically our responsibility. Afghanistan is a collective responsibility, except we still carry the bulk of the load. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First 

and foremost, I think that we all owe a great big congratulations 

to the Bush Administration for what it has accomplished already 

in Afghanistan. 

And having followed Afghanistan for many years in very intricate details about what was going on, I was aware of things that 

were happening, and I am aware of the tremendous challenges that 

have already been overcome by commitment, by both politically and 

economically, and militarily, by this Administration. 

And I think that when all is said and done, and especially the 

political bringing together the various anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and getting them to work together, has been a tremendous accomplishment. 

And one that I did not think that you would accomplish that 

much, because I knew how difficult it was. Second of all, I just note 

that several years ago Afghanistan was the turf of a radical Islamic 

sect, and was a terrorist base camp for operations against the 

United States. 

And we now have driven the Taliban out of Afghanistan, and we 

have eliminated that international terrorist base camp, a base of 

29

operations that al-Qaeda had. We did so with a minimal loss of life, 

both in terms of Afghan loss of life and American loss of life. 

Compared to what price could have been paid in death and destruction, our people did a tremendous job and continue to do a tremendous job there. So let us not forget that. Let us then put that 

in perspective when we talk about the challenges ahead. 

And let me get to the flip side of the challenges ahead, which let 

me note that I don’t believe that until we have faced the heroin 

problem, and I do not believe that problem—I think that problem 

has been put on the back burner. 

Every time we have asked the Administration about it, they said, 

well, the British are going to handle it. Well, it is time. The time 

has come for the United States Government, and for the government of Afghanistan, to face up to the challenge of heroin production, opium growth of opium poppies, in Afghanistan. 

And I don’t believe that Congress will be as tolerant of the Administration next year if we come back and do not have from the 

Administration facts and figures that back up a major accomplishment in this area. 

I mean, I don’t know if we can eliminate the whole problem, because that would be impossible. But there have been some major 

successes. Congress is not going to put out billions of dollars in aid 

to help build a country which is itself the major source of heroin 

for the world. 

So let us put the Afghan people, and put our government on notice, our people over there, that this is the year to come to grips 

with that challenge. And I understand, and we have given people 

a lot of leeway, that we were fighting a war, and that we did not 

expect everything to be done at once. 

But we expect that challenge to be met, and we expect to have 

major progress in that area in the next year. I never expect to hear 

the words that the British are in charge of that again. 

Let me note that unless we eliminate the heroin production, Mr. 

Chairman, and unless we make some major progress in this area, 

that money that is produced by that heroin production and the 

opium growth there in Afghanistan, will continue to supply the revenue needed by terrorists to attack our friends, and to undermine 

stability and democracy in that entire region, all the way from 

Chetzi, and all the way down through Central Asisa. 

Those billions of dollars coming from that, from the opium production in Afghanistan, are providing terrorists with that kind of 

revenue. So let us just put it right on the table, that we expect that 

to be taken of. 

Let me note women. You mentioned that women had a great success there. We also need to note that when we are trying to analyze 

what has happened. I was touched deeply by the progress made by 

women in Afghanistan. 

For example, we have made women the owners of several of the 

bakeries that provide bread for the people of Afghanistan, and that 

widows and orphans are now being able to provide for themselves. 

And we should make sure that we never backtrack on a demand 

for equal rights of women, and I am very proud that during the negotiations for the constitution that we have made sure that we 

have maintained that demand, and we have maintained a demand 

30

that there be freedom of religion, and I know that it is tough to 

get that point across politically. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I have just a statement, but if they have any 

comments, I would be happy to let the panel comment on my comments. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Long, do you have any comment on the 

narcotics aspect of his comments? 

Ms. LONG. The only thing I would mention is that some successes 

have been made, and I have had the opportunity to speak to General Barno, and also had the opportunity to speak with our colleagues from the U.K., and they are keenly aware that in the next 

year that we have to do better, and I expect that we will, sir. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Blumenauer. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been listening to the comments from my friend from California, and I must 

confess that I have a slightly different take based on what I have 

heard from independent observers, from people in my community 

who have done work on the ground, news accounts, that this hasn’t 

been a terrific success. 

We did topple the Taliban regime, but the last 2 years, at least 

from what this Member has heard, have not been that encouraging; 

with the rise of narcoterrorists, warlords, and an inability to extend 

the security footprint so that we can do a better job on the ground 

with assistance. 

I have appreciated the work that has been done with limited resources, and I personally think, Mr. Chairman, that this is something that our Committee could play a very significant role in, 

while giving deference to Mr. Lantos’ concern about burden sharing. 

It would be nice if some of our allies were doing more on the 

ground with resources and with troops, but I have been struck by 

the disparity between what we are doing in Iraq and what we are 

not doing in Afghanistan. 

I think the record indicates that Afghanistan is more seriously 

damaged, it is a larger country, it is more populous, and it is a 

greater challenge. 

Our resources are somewhere in the neighborhood of about 20 

times as much for the country that is less damaged, that is smaller 

in population, and which has not been the haunting problem that 

Afghanistan has been historically. 

I really appreciate your willingness to zero in on this subject for 

our Committee, and I would hope that our Committee would spend 

more time testing whether my version of reality, or Mr. 

Rohrabacher’s version of reality on how great a success Afghanistan has been is correct. 

I think we will hear people, and there may be some here today, 

certainly in the NGO community, that take exception to that. We 

could help pin down what the situation is, but more important than 

that reality, I think we have to acknowledge that we have got challenges. 

As Ambassador Taylor was talking about, we have got a long 

way to go in discerning what is the appropriate role of our resources between Afghanistan and Iraq. Should we be putting 20 

31

times as much in terms of assistance, resources, and in terms of 

the security footprint, in Iraq than in Afghanistan. 

I would think that any objective view would be that we are not 

doing enough in terms of security, that we are not doing enough 

in terms of putting money behind the excellent programs that we 

have with USAID, with the NGO community, and in providing the 

support for this government that we have helped install. 

I would hope that this would be the first of several conversations, 

Mr. Chairman, that we could have as a Committee. I hope that we 

could hear more evidence about what is happening, and what is 

working, and that we could help the House as we move in the 

months ahead to make again a substantial investment in this region. 

I hope that we would help the House be able to strike the right 

balance between Iraq and Afghanistan. The question is not whether we are going to spend money, we are, but whether we can spend 

it more appropriately for the country that is so seriously damaged, 

that has a greater population. 

We walked away in the past, and helped by our inaction create 

a problem that we ultimately had to go back and solve militarily. 

I don’t know that I have so much a question, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, am interested in pursuing it, and I hope that this is something that you can have our staff and our Members work with you 

on so that we have a better picture when the House is making this 

important resource question that will be facing us in the weeks 

ahead. 

Chairman HYDE. Well, I thank my friend for his helpful comment. I would rephrase the statement that you made about we are 

not doing enough to not enough is being done. I think we are doing 

plenty when you add up the obligations, global obligations that we 

have. 

And that makes the point that Mr. Lantos made all the more salient; that our burden would be more easily borne, and it would 

never not be onerous, but more easily borne with the cooperation 

of what is laughingly known as the United Nations. 

In any event, we are going to have another hearing on this in 

2 months or 3 months, I guess, and we have one scheduled. Now, 

next, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to second your 

observation. There was even talk at one point of NATO assuming 

full responsibility for the entire country of Afghanistan. However, 

all we have seen is continued foot-dragging on the part of our 

NATO partners, and the United Nations. I think we are all concerned about this. 

I want to talk about something Ambassador Peter Tomsen stated 

at this Committee about a year ago. Former Ambassador Peter 

Tomsen indicated great concern about the role that the Pakistani 

ISI was playing in Afghanistan. 

We also heard criticisms that the CIA is over-reliant on Pakistani intelligence. That was a year ago. I have talked to him since 

then and he still has the same concerns. Ambassador Taylor, do 

you have concerns about that? Is the picture different than it was 

a year ago, in terms of where we are getting our information, and 

in terms of our reliance on ISI? 

32

Ambassador TAYLOR. Congressman Royce, this is probably not 

the best forum to go into that in any fair amount. We would be 

happy to have another conversation on that with you. 

Mr. ROYCE. All right. Very good. We will do that. This winter, 

the head of United States forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Barno, announced that he was going to shift tactics along the 

border region and set up a ‘‘classic counterinsurgency strategy.’’

Part of that was to get small units into the villages, where they 

would forge these ties with tribal elders and be able to glean better 

information about the location and the activities of the enemy. 

It is now June. That was February when he said that. What has 

been the result of that approach so far, and what specific or general information did they get out of that strategy? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Congressman, General Barno has taken the 

steps that he described to you several months ago. I visited one example of that about 4 weeks ago in Ghazni. General Barno has deployed his infantry battalions alongside of these provincial reconstruction teams that several of us have mentioned here today. 

In Ghazni, there is an infantry battalion commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, and a PRT, a provincial reconstruction team, commanded by another Lieutenant Colonel, who work very closely together on exactly what General Barno suggested he would do. 

That is, that he would have his squads, his platoons, his companies, out in the villages where they get to know the village elders, 

and where they get to know the terrain, and where they get to 

know who normally is in these villages and who is not. 

And the answer to your question about what the result has been, 

the result has been an increase in information coming in through 

both the infantry battalions, and that has resulted in a much larger number, a dramatically increased number of caches, weapons 

caches, being identified and destroyed. 

It has also just in Ghazni, and just in using that as an example, 

the combination of provincial reconstruction teams and the infantry 

battalion, with its much larger capabilities, has been to improve 

the security in that part of a very difficult province. 

You will probably recall that in December that Ghazni was 

where the U.N. worker was killed by the Taliban. They pulled up 

beside her car. Since the PRT and the battalion have co-located in 

Ghazni in January, which is when Colonel Barno said he was getting started on this, there have been no such incidents. 

Now, that is something that could change tomorrow. But the past 

4 or 5 months have been a dramatic improvement over the previous time. So I believe that Barno’s counter-insurgency strategy is 

having a good effect. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me finalize with one last question. As Congressman Lantos said, NATO was to have established five PRTs across 

the north and west of the country by the time of the NATO summit, which is at the end of this month. 

They have been unable to supply what seems to be base equipment: A few helicopters, communications equipment, and a medical 

support team. At this point, we would be lucky if those got in place 

in time. 

33

At the same time, we hear from the EU this criticism about 

PRTs. As I recall, there was a Commissioner at the EU that said 

that PRTs are blurring the line between military and aid activities. 

This seems off the mark. Aid agencies from Europe have repeatedly asked for more security assistance in the countryside. When 

the PRTs come forward to do that, and are deployed to help the Afghan people, they are then criticized by the EU. 

Ambassador Taylor, is one of the reasons why the Europeans at 

this point are dragging their feet, or at least why NATO is not putting the PRTs in place, because of this criticism from the EU? 

I would like to give you a chance to answer the criticism that the 

EU Commissioner made about the use of PRTs. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Congressman, I saw that comment by the 

Commissioner. I was surprised by it, and disagreed with it. The 

PRTs have provided security the way that I have just described for 

the Afghan government and local governments to operate and exert 

their influence, and provide services. They have also helped nongovernmental organizations to provide the reconstruction work that 

we have been describing. So we also disagreed with that. You are 

right. NATO has committed to five PRTs by the end of this month, 

by the NATO summit. 

There is a lot of work going on, both within NATO, and pushing 

on NATO to make good on that promise. I have not given up on 

that yet. I fully expect that they will come up with that, and we 

expect them to come up with those five in that part of the country. 

They do have time to do that. I don’t believe therefore that the 

explanation for why they are going slowly is the same sentiment 

that——

Mr. ROYCE. It wasn’t a criticism. I just wondered if that was the 

excuse. I really encourage you—all of us—to redouble our efforts, 

and not just with NATO. Turkey, in particular, bears a certain responsibility to keep its commitments in this regard. 

So far the country that is keeping its commitments to Afghanistan is the United States. None of our allies have, to the extent 

that we would like to see. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like Ambassador Taylor, or anyone on the panel, to respond to a broad policy 

critique from the International Crisis Group. 

They recognize the success of what we are doing in Afghanistan, 

but they also note the serious resurgence of radical Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, and sort of go through that process. Initially 

our swift defeat of the Taliban created a political and military vacuum that gave other Islamic conservatives an opportunity to regain 

influence. 

At the Emergency Loya Jirga, the Tajiks used their control of the 

security apparatus to coerce delegates to consolidate to their own 

standing, and to exclude their main ethnic rivals, the Pashtuns, 

from government. 

Since the Pashtuns homelands are the south and east and are 

also the major staging grounds of the coalition military operations, 

the Taliban was thereby given an opportunity to further their 

cause by exploiting the resulting in Pashtun alienation. 

34

Almost 2 years later, attacks by the Taliban and their allies 

against Kabul’s representatives, against coalition forces, and 

against international and local non-governmental organizations, 

have made the south and east a no-man’s land, deprived of the 

fruits of political or economic reconstruction. 

At the Loya Jirga in December 2003, Karzai decided to use the 

ethnic card to counter his perceived rivals within and outside the 

government, but the allies that he chose were among the most undesirable of the Pashtun Islamic radicals, and included Pashtun 

Mujahedin, from Psyhef, Ilihad e-Islamic, as well as those associated with the forces, the radical Islamic forces controlled by Younis 

Khalis and Haq Qadir. 

The end result was a constitution that creates a strongly centralized form of government and a powerful President, at the cost of 

alienating powerful ethnic minorities, including the Tajiks, the 

Uzbeks, and the Hazaras, who are represented by their warlords 

and continue to reject the central government’s writ. 

He then points out that the constitution advances the interests 

of Islamic radicals, and while the civil and political rights are guaranteed, Islamic law is supreme. The constitution allows Islam to be 

invoked to limit political organizations by requiring that the charter of a political party be consistent with Islamic principles. 

Since the Afghan Supreme Court is packed with hard line Islamic clerics, the conversion of Islamic conservative groups, such as 

Bahranroden, Rabinas, Jiads, and political parties will be acceptable, but curves will be placed by the Judiciary and the Administration on democratic liberal forces. 

And Afghan’s conservative mujas and judges, who believe in the 

enforcement of a conservative Islamic code, not that different from 

the Taliban, continue to dominate the supreme court, even as the 

country’s political transition takes place under the guidance of the 

international community. 

Now you get to the elections that are coming up, and you have 

talked about lines of defense, but we know how small our forces 

really are there, and how difficult this training process is, and how 

many of the training programs have gone on. 

And under the electoral law that Karzai signed, there is a requirement for a census by a certain deadline, and the elections can 

only go forward after those deadlines are met. The census has not 

been initiated, let alone been completed in the Afghanistan provinces. 

How can the elections for parliament go ahead when no census 

has been completed? What happens to the legitimacy of these elections if certain deadlines are not met, and are we really in a situation where in the scenario that you outlined is going to be able to 

pull this off in a way that creates legitimacy, long term legitimacy 

in Afghan institutions? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Berman, let me address several of 

those items, and let me know if I missed any of the important ones 

that you have outlined. Just starting at the top, you asked about 

the ICG’s analysis. 

First of all, about the Taliban resurgents. We would agree that 

in part of the country, that is, the south and southeast as several 

people have indicated, there is more evidence of Taliban in disVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:39 Aug 10, 2004 Jkt 094035 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\060204\94035.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
35

tricts, pushing on district headquarters, district capitals, moving in 

and shooting up the place, and being there for a day, and then 

withdrawing as soon as government forces arrive to reestablish 

order. That has been happening in certain districts of certain 

southern provinces, southern and eastern provinces, over the past 

several months. 

That is a problem, and it is not a problem around the country. 

It is a very localized problem, but it is a serious problem. The U.N. 

has a map that identifies the specific locations of the problems. 

And they have blue areas where they have no difficulty going, 

and they have yellow where people have to be cautious, and then 

they have a red area. So the pattern is very clear. 

Right along the Pakistan border is red, and that is where the districts in those southern provinces and eastern provinces are where 

we have the greatest difficulty with Taliban resurgents. That part 

is certainly true. 

I would not agree, however, that this was the result of any of the 

actions taken or not taken at the emergency Loya Jirga that you 

mentioned in June 2002, where the international community 

worked with the government of Afghanistan as it was then to come 

up with a government, with a cabinet. 

It was a coalition cabinet. You are absolutely right. And it did 

draw on all of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It did draw from 

the Tajiks, and it did draw from the Pashtuns, and the Pashtuns 

have a good number of ministers in that government still. 

It did draw on the Uzbeks, and it did draw on Hazaras. We have 

talked about several of the ministries already today that are headed up by these various groups. It was a coalition essentially. 

The way to think of this government is a coalition that had to 

be pulled together in order to get over the instability, the 

factionlessness, the forces that were there right after the Taliban 

were eliminated and pushed out of the country. 

So I don’t believe that the resurgents or the Taliban now in some 

of these districts in the south and southeast is a result of that, nor 

do I believe that it is as a result of the Constitutional Loya Jirga. 

The constitution as you have recognized, and as the ICG recognizes, does guarantee rights. It does as we have already talked 

about have an unprecedented role for women. It is in the Islamic 

world, and it is recognized as a good example of a constitution that 

provides for these rights. 

You mentioned that it calls for a powerful national government. 

It is true, it does. Several Members of this Committee have actually thought about whether it was a good idea or a bad idea to have 

a powerful national government, or as some people have suggested, 

to have a decentralized government, a Federal Government as we 

know it. 

And that was considered, and for some of the reasons that you 

described, the ICG describes, that is, the powerful local commanders, or governors, or police chiefs, who had their own source 

of income as we have talked about, and their own source of power, 

of military power as we have talked about, the militias. 

And whether it was a good idea to devolve power in a Federal 

way to those local commanders, and President Karzai, and indeed 

36

more broader than that, the entire Constitutional Loya Jirga, decided no. 

They decided that for now that in Afghanistan it is better to pull 

people together, to try to unite the country, rather than to devolve 

the power in that direction. So that again I believe that was the 

right decision for Afghanistan. They made it and so it doesn’t matter what we think. That was their decision. But objectively and 

looking at it from the outside, it probably makes sense from our 

standpoint to have that. 

You mentioned the Supreme Court. After the elections, as we 

have talked about, there are presidential elections, parliamentary 

elections, at least lower House of Parliament elections, in September. The upper House will require other local elections in order 

to establish that upper House of the Parliament. 

But after September, we will have a President elected by all the 

people in Afghanistan, and the beginnings of a Parliament. There 

will be appointments to a range of organizations, including the Supreme Court. So a newly elected President and a newly elected parliament will be able to examine the makeup of the Supreme Court 

at that time so as to interpret the constitution. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Berman’s time has long since expired. Mr. 

Paul. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just on the elections and 

the census. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I was going to come back to the elections. 

I can do it very quickly, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. I guess if the other Members don’t mind waiting. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Very quickly on the elections. I think this 

is an important point. Mr. Berman is correct that the census, the 

full census has not taken place. What the Afghans call and the 

U.N. calls a pre-census has taken place in over half, or well over 

half of the provinces. 

They anticipate being able to finish most, and with a couple of 

exceptions in a couple of provinces where again as I mentioned, in 

the south and southeast, may have difficulty. Even there they have 

sampling that they will be able to use to allocate the number of 

seats by province in the parliamentary elections. 

So it won’t be perfect. This election won’t be perfect, and the precensus won’t be perfect. It will require additional work in anticipation of the following election. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Paul. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to say 

thank you for the memorandum from the staff. I thought that the 

memorandum was very helpful, and did not go out of the way to 

try to paint a rosy picture that really does not exist. 

So there is every reason to believe that there is a lot of work to 

be done in Afghanistan. I also would like to try to categorize how 

I see what is happening over there. A lot of times if there is a controversial program that people say, well, whether it is half-full or 

half-empty, which way are we going. 

I think to be generous I think we could probably say that our 

program there is about 5 percent full, and about 95 percent empty, 

37

and we have committed about $31⁄2 billion. So it gives me room for 

a little bit of concern. 

I would like to ask one rhetorical question that has always bothered me when we get involved in a situation like this, is where in 

the world does the Congress and the Administration get the moral 

authority to impose our will on other people, on other countries, 

and in this case in Afghanistan. 

I have heard all of the goals that we all seek. I have no problems 

with that. It is just our methods. I find it sort of entertaining about 

this struggle for women’s rights over there. 

So we help them write a constitution, and the President is going 

to appoint a third of the senators, and then the President is instructed that he must appoint one-half women. It just does not 

seem to jive with our general understanding of what democracy is 

all about, but that is probably a minor point. 

But I do appreciate the comments by Ms. Long about the drugs, 

and how terrible it is, and how the situation has been turned 

where there were no drugs, and there are a lot of drugs now, and 

it is actually helping the al-Qaeda, and she does not hide from this, 

because it has been one of our complaints and concerns. 

My big concern is that whether it is Afghanistan, Columbia, or 

here in the United States, we have pursuing a war on drugs for 

30 years, and we have never changed the policy. We always just 

want more money, and more guns, and we are going to root them 

out, and we are going to solve this problem. 

So I can’t get any hope that that is going to be accomplished, because there is no evidence whatsoever in the last 30 years that 

more money and a tougher war on drugs ever helps people reduce 

their demand for drugs. 

We know that the Taliban is reorganizing, but I am amazed at 

how the authority to go in and get the al-Qaeda has morphed into 

a quagmire and moved ahead of rebuilding Afghanistan. 

I mean, we voted for the authority to go after Osama bin Laden 

in October. By May of the next year, here we are with the Afghan 

Freedom Support Act, which is your responsibility to carry out, and 

now there is nation building, and we don’t even talk about Osama 

bin Laden. That is somebody else’s problem. 

Osama bin Laden, the odds are great that he is in Pakistan, and 

Pakistan isn’t a democracy. It is a military dictatorship, and we 

just promised them $800 million, and we step a foot over their 

property line and then they are after us. 

I mean, the whole thing makes no sense whatsoever, and it is so 

discouraging. You know, I thought that Mr. Lantos’ point was pretty good. He was outraged by the fact that our allies don’t help us, 

and he has a right to be outraged. 

But what he does not understand is that they are not going to 

help us. It is pie in the sky dreaming if we think they will, and 

he says that if we don’t get it that our efforts will be undermined. 

We ought to be prepared for that, because that is likely to happen. 

My question comes from an article written this week by Robert 

Novak. I am sure that you have seen it, and that has to do with 

Afghanistan. Now, Robert Novak is not a left-wing Democrat. He 

is a very conservative Republican, and he supports the Administration, who would like to see this go better. 

38

So he talks, and his inside information is from the military, and 

this is what he says, and if this is true, we need to know it; and 

if it is true, we ought to be changing our policy in Afghanistan. 

The situation in Afghanistan, as laid out to me, and this was by 

military people, looks nothing like a country alleged to be progressing toward representative democracy under American 

tutorlege. 

Hamid Karzai is the United States sponsored Afghan President, 

and is regarded by the U.S. troops as hopelessly corrupt, and kept 

in power by U.S. forces of arms. Now, is that true or not, and if 

it is true, and if you don’t know, what are we going go do about 

it? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. It is not true, Congressman. 

Mr. PAUL. So Robert Novak has written something absolutely incorrect? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. It is not true that the United States military believes that the President of Afghanistan is hopelessly corrupt. 

Mr. PAUL. And there is no chance that he is involved with corruption? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. There is no chance that he is involved in 

the kind of corruption that that suggests. Now, it is certainly true 

that Afghanistan is a difficult place, and Afghanistan’s families, 

the families of individuals go all over. 

I certainly can’t speak for any member of an extended family. I 

had many conversations with people in Afghanistan, with ministers 

of Afghanistan, and I can remember one, whose name I won’t use. 

I was sitting beside him, and we were at some meeting, and I told 

him that I had met his cousin a couple of days before. 

And he said, ‘‘Oh, which one,’’ and I told him the name, and he 

said, ‘‘Oh, that is my good relative.’’ He has other relatives. So I 

am not speaking to that, but I will tell you that President Karzai 

is widely respected, not just by the Afghan people, but also by the 

Americans, by the American military, by the international community. 

We are lucky that we have a President Karzai in Afghanistan. 

We would like to have, and we hope we see emerging a President 

Karzai like person in Iraq. But, no, I would say very strongly that 

we are very lucky to have him, and he is someone who can lead 

his country forward. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. KUNDER. Mr. Chairman, could I respond just briefly to one 

point that Mr. Paul made, sir? On your point that Mr. Lantos 

raised earlier about whether our allies should be giving more. It is 

a fair point, and I am glad that he said, the gentleman, that it was 

well below our pay grade, which I appreciate. 

But I think of the time that you made the comment about they’re 

not doing anything. I do want to point out that a number of our 

allies—I mean, the Japanese, the Germans, the British—those are 

three that hit me—certainly on the reconstruction side have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in that country, and are 

working very closely with us on the ground. 

And so I just wanted to make sure that we make a distinction 

between a fair issue, which was how much each country should 

39

contribute, but it is certainly not a question that they are not doing 

anything. A lot of folks out there are doing a lot of good besides 

ourselves. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me say that 

I want to very, very, very strongly associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Paul. I thought that they were very much on the 

money, and we have really been diverted, not just as a Committee, 

but as a nation, on these issues of absolutely critical importance 

that we have to be addressing, namely the war on terror, which 

you are right, has morphed into quicksand, and then quagmire, in 

each of the two countries that you just referenced. 

I have a question for—and I am not sure who on the panel, but 

that given the restriction on the number of forces in Afghanistan 

that they had to concentrate on counter-terrorism operations and 

not counter-narcotics. 

It was my belief, and correct me if I am wrong, that the narcotics 

trade and terrorism in Afghanistan are inseparably linked, and is 

General Barno right that there are not enough troops in Afghanistan to deal with the narcotics-terrorism link? 

Ms. LONG. Thank you for the question. I believe that I would not 

want to mischaracterize what General Barno was trying to convey, 

but I believe what he was trying to state was that the priority right 

now for our military forces in Afghanistan is the missions that they 

have against the insurgents, and those include terrorists, and those 

include religious insurgents, and those include counternarco terrorists, who are involved in destablizing the central government, and 

who are involved in an attack mission against not only our troops 

and coalition forces, but against the Afghan people. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. One would logically think that in order to reduce 

the effectiveness of those terrible things that you reduce the source 

of funding. And he says that he does not have the troop strength 

to do that. Is that accurate? 

Ms. LONG. I am not sure, and I haven’t seen exactly what General Barno said, but I believe that what he was trying to convey 

was that as a matter of priority—but first let me say that our intelligence concerning the linkage between traditional counternarcotics 

or narcotics efforts and the insurgents in Afghanistan is nascent. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is what? 

Ms. LONG. Nascent. We are just beginning to develop our understanding of exactly what kind of support traditional terrorists and 

insurgents in Afghanistan——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Where did we think they were getting their financing to feed their warlords and their terrorists, and everybody 

else? 

Ms. LONG. That is something that we can discuss in detail in a 

closed session, but what I can say is that——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Was it other than narcotics? 

Ms. LONG. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is narcotics a large part of it? 

Ms. LONG. Quite frankly, sir, I don’t believe we could say at this 

point that we know in fact that narcotics is a large part of certain 

terrorist organizations that operate in Afghanistan. 

40

Now, certainly narcotics derive support, and is a large part of the 

instability that we are going to have to address long term in Afghanistan. But I believe what General Barno was trying to convey 

was that given the priority of missions and getting that country 

stable in the near term so that September elections can operate in 

an environment where people are enthusiastic and willing to participate, that it is his first priority to stabilize, and conduct, and 

dedicate his people and resources toward security missions that 

contribute toward that capability. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But you are not sure of the strength of that link 

is certainly intriguing, given that there is currently no distinctive—

no disincentive, excuse, no disincentive to farming poppy in Afghanistan, and no lucrative alternatives, opium provides farmers 

10 times the income of wheat or other crops, how do you propose 

to convince Afghans to move away from poppy and participate in 

alternative development efforts? And what are the state of those efforts today? 

Ms. LONG. I am going to defer the eradication questions to my 

colleagues. However, I wouldn’t agree entirely with the comment 

that there is no disincentive. As a matter of fact, there are substantial disincentives to poppy growth at this time. Ambassador Taylor, 

would you like to pick that up? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Congressman, if it were true, as it has been 

in the past, where there is no risk to growing poppy, and great reward as you have indicated, and as Ms. Long has indicated, and 

as Jim Kunder has indicated, that it is 30 times more lucrative to 

grow poppy than wheat, and if that were true, that is, that the rewards were very high and no risk, then we would continue to fail. 

So exactly what Secretary Long has indicated is true, and that 

is that we have begun, but only begun, an eradication program, 

and an interdiction program, to go along with an alternative livelihood program that can show to farmers, and can show to other——

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I can just ask you on that point. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Sure. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the General says that he is not doing that because he does not have the troops to do that, who do you have 

there that is doing that? Is the Embassy doing that? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. No. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Volunteers, the Red Cross? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. No, it is the Afghans, sir. It is the government of Afghanistan, and the Minister of the Interior who is responsible for the police, with support from both us, and with support from the British. 

The British are funding an interdiction force, and an eradication 

force, and we are also doing that. Right now, Mr. Ackerman, we 

have Afghans in the field who are turning over and plowing under 

fields of poppy. 

Is it enough? Is it large enough to have an effect on this year’s 

crop? Probably not. Is it large enough, however, to send a signal 

to that farmer, and other farmers around the country, that next 

year these eradicators, these Afghans that are going to come and 

eradicate their poppy fields, are going to be back. 

And therefore there is a risk, and therefore it can be risky for 

them to invest their time, and their money, and their season of ferVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:39 Aug 10, 2004 Jkt 094035 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\060204\94035.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
41

tilizer, and their land in growing poppy when they know that it 

might be eradicated next year, and they know that it might be 

interdicted on the way to the labs. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And you are confident that is——

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Flake. Your time has elapsed, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I was hoping that I would be able to get an answer to the question. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I am sorry, sir, but what was the last question? 

Chairman HYDE. I am sorry. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are the efforts on the Afghans effective? Their 

efforts, are they effective? You said it has no measurable result. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. It is having a small effect this year. Our 

hope is that that signals, and that it sends——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is hope a plan? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. We have a plan and we are hopeful of that 

plan, yes, sir. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Flake. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the testimony. Mr. Kunder, I am concerned about long term development 

and being able to see the Afghans stand on their own economically. 

I am wondering if you are familiar with the writings of Peruvian 

economist Hernando DeSoto? 

Mr. KUNDER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FLAKE. To what extent are we trying to ensure that the Afghans have structures in place where they can access capital, and 

where they can leverage their assets? What specifically are we 

doing along those lines working with the new government to make 

sure that there is property registration assistance? 

Because as we all know, we don’t have enough money in our 

budget or in our treasury over the long term to help that country, 

or give that country the capital that it needs. They have to access 

it on their own. So what specifically are we doing? 

Mr. KUNDER. Yes, sir. We see that very much the way that you 

do, and we are not going to finance through United States taxpayer 

dollars a significant growth of the Afghan economy. We can do 

some things in the short term to facilitate economic growth in the 

long term. 

It is going to have to be private investment, and it is going to 

have to be foreign investment, and it is going to have to be domestic Afghan investment. The situation that we encountered when we 

arrived in January 2002 was an almost complete breakdown of the 

financial and monetary systems. 

The Central Bank was not functioning and there was no commercial banking system except for the informal cash transfer on the 

economy. There was no investment code, and there was no good 

property record keeping system. There was not a judicial system in 

place. 

We have tried to take a look at each one of those components. 

The problem is as I think the Chairman said earlier, when everything is broke, you have to try to do everything simultaneously. 

So we have got the Central Bank up and running, and we have 

got a new currency in place, and we are starting to get the customs 

42

and duties collection, and support the Afghan government to get 

that under control. 

We have gotten an investment law passed now, and we have 

commercial banks starting to operate in the country. We are starting to facilitate some small and microenterprise lending on our 

own. 

The Afghan Freedom Support Act called for an investment fund, 

and we are now beginning to take a look. We didn’t think that the 

building blocks were in place to do a full-fledged enterprise fund 

at that point. 

But we are now taking a look at whether we shouldn’t support 

at least an initial venture capital fund in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FLAKE. If I may, that isn’t getting to the root here. What 

DeSoto talks about is people being able to leverage their own property, their own assets, their businesses. 

What are we doing specifically to make sure that at whatever 

level of government—municipal, central government, wherever in 

between—that they have those systems in place to register property? 

Do people have access to a deed when they have a farm, for example? What are we doing specifically there? I know that you are 

talking about microenterprise, but that is us lending or encouraging other lenders to lend to them. We want them to be able to 

mortgage their own capital, and free up capital that way. What are 

we doing specifically there? 

Mr. KUNDER. We have assisted the Afghan government in doing 

the property registration. By the way, it is a complex land tenure 

in the country. There is some private ownership, and there is some 

community ownership, and so forth. So it is a complex system, even 

by Hernando DeSoto’s standards. 

We have by the way consulted with Mr. DeSoto specifically on 

the situation in Afghanistan. The first thing we have tried to do 

is help with the property records system, and try to get that system 

computerized so that we can at least get the basic record keeping. 

And we have started working on that path as well. 

Mr. FLAKE. And how is that going? 

Mr. KUNDER. It is going well, but I am going to have to tell you 

that it was in an absolute shambles. It was an antiquated, noncomputerized system of paper records that we found, and so we 

have begun that process, and we have a long way to go. 

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Taylor, do you want to comment on that at all? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I would agree with Mr. Kunder. The only 

other thing I would say is that there are some plots of land that 

have three deeds on them. One is from the King, one from the 

Taliban time, and one from the interim, the sort of civil war time. 

So it is very difficult to establish property rights which Hernando 

DeSoto and the titling work that Jim Kunder just described. It essentially takes courts, and a judge has to decide which of these 

three claimants on a piece of land gets to go forward. 

Mr. FLAKE. I just hope that is a priority of ours. I know that it 

takes a long time. I know that it is a difficult process there, with 

different types of arrangements for ownership of property, but I 

hope that we are making every effort, because long term that is 

how we get out from under our own commitment there. 

43

Ambassador TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Welcome, Ambassador. The reports that are coming in via the media, I think the bottom line is that it looks like 

a real mess, and that does not in any way mean to denigrate your 

valiant efforts. 

But my own sense is that you are outgunned and you are overwhelmed, and you need more resources. I listened earlier to the 

Ranking Member when he talked about burden sharing and of 

course I agree with him on that. It would be welcome to see additional security forces, as well as substantial non-military resources 

devoted to Afghanistan. 

I don’t know if that is feasible or not. As I reflect back on my 

own position, in terms of the resolution authorizing intervention in 

Iraq, I remember being concerned ‘‘are we going to forget about Afghanistan?’’

And it appears that the international community has, and one 

only has to look at the attendance here today from the media. I 

would say that it is lacking, and yet it all began there. 

That is when we had world opinion on our side. That is when we 

had a nearly unanimous vote from the House. My own sense is that 

we could probably use 100,000 troops, or 138,000 troops in Afghanistan rather than Iraq. But that unfortunately is not the case. 

Very rarely do I ever read or quote rather Robert Novak. But he 

did a recent piece and I would like for you to respond, Ambassador. 

Let me just read you some excerpts and tell me your opinion. 

He is referring to American soldiers, and:

‘‘They are undermanned and feel neglected, and lack confidence in their Generals, and disgusted by the Afghan political 

leadership. . . . Mostly the overlooked war continues with no 

end in sight. 

‘‘Narcotics trafficking is at an all-time high. If U.S. forces 

were to leave the Taliban or something like it would regain 

power. The U.S. is lost in Afghanistan, bound to this wild 

country, and unable to leave. 

‘‘Hamad Karzai, the U.S.-sponsored Afghan president, is regarded by the U.S. troops as hopelessly corrupt and kept in 

power by the force of the U.S. arms.’’

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Delahunt, if I may intervene briefly. We 

have five votes pending on the Floor, and so I am going to dismiss 

this panel and close the hearing. If you wish to proceed, Ambassador Taylor will answer you, I am sure. You go ahead. I am going 

to go over and vote. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. While you are leaving, Mr. Chairman, I will be 

happy to listen to Ambassador Taylor’s comments. 

Chairman HYDE. You can act as Chairman Pro Tem. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I defer to my colleague, Mr. Paul, because I know 

that he will stay here with me. You will leave me, Mr. Chairman, 

and I know that. You didn’t like me quoting Mr. Novak, Mr. Chairman, and I know that. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Novak has been skeptical of the war in 

Iraq and brings those ideas to his very interesting columns. Anyway, the Committee stands adjourned, except for Mr. Delahunt. 

44

Mr. DELAHUNT [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Congressman, your colleague, Congressman 

Paul, also asked and quoted, but let me——

Mr. DELAHUNT. We share the same brilliance. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I agree on the brilliant part. However, I 

would say first of all that it is not a real mess as far as the media 

is concerned. Sometimes you get a good story, and sometimes you 

get a bad story. 

CBS recently did a good story, and they addressed exactly that. 

They said when good news comes, and I think their quote was ‘‘no 

news is good news,’’ and they said the opposite is true in Afghanistan; that good news is no news. 

But they went through a very good piece, which I can send to 

you, and you will see some of the media that is——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I just ask you a series of quick questions? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because we have some time here, and I might as 

well take advantage. I understand that President Karzai, and in 

this column, he is being described as corrupt. I don’t accept that. 

But I understand that he has entered into discussions with moderate elements of the Taliban. Can you describe to me what a moderate Taliban is? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I think a moderate Taliban is a contradiction in terms. But I think there are such things as ex-Taliban, and 

low level Taliban who had no responsibility for the policies and actions taken by the Taliban government. 

So therefore I can understand if President Karzai wants to get 

into a discussion with low level Taliban, ex-Taliban, former 

Taliban, who want to distance themselves, and who will put the 

past behind them and rejoin the Afghan society, rejoin the move toward a constitution that if they swear allegiance to, and if they acknowledge the constitution as the law of the land, and if they are 

willing to move forward under this new Afghanistan, and put the 

old one behind them, I could understand President Karzai wanting 

to have conversations with them to bring them into the Afghan society. 

There also have been discussions on the other side recently, with 

President Karzai having discussions with Jihads who fought 

against the Taliban. And here again this is politics in Afghanistan, 

and this is a political season, just like it is here. 

They are moving toward presidential and parliamentary elections, the first time in a generation in September. President Karzai 

is dealing with those issues in a way that tries to bring the country 

together. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. In other words, you are satisfied with the bona 

fides, if you will, and the efforts of President Karzai? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I am very satisfied, and in response to Mr. 

Paul’s question, I disagree fully with the characterization that he 

described, and that you quoted from that column. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, what concerns me is the snail’s pace of this 

armament of the militias. What concerns me is the delay, in terms 

of the election, and what concerns me is the failure to meet 

progress, in terms of the registration of voters. 

45

I think the bottom line, and so that I understand the restrictions 

that you are all under as members of the Administration, we are 

not committing the level of resources to Afghanistan that are necessary to salvage, and accelerate if you will, over a period of years, 

and I understand that——

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Delahunt, would you consider in our last moments before the vote allowing me to ask a question, and Mr. 

Wexler, you can ask a question. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You can respond to me in writing, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Or if you have time afterwards, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. I guess my question, and I guess my concern, is that 

if you relate the 14,000 estimated troops that we have in and 

around Afghanistan, as opposed to 2,000 troops contributed by 

NATO and other countries, number one, are we carrying the equivalent load in the reconstruction organization effort? 

Are we carrying 88 percent of the financial load? What percentage would you guess, Ambassador Taylor? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I would guess half, sir. We can take a look 

at the Berlin conference that several people have mentioned here 

today. In Berlin, the international community came up with about 

$4 billion just for this year. 

Our contribution, the U.S. Government, thanks to the Congress 

for which we are greatly appreciative, the United States was able 

to pledge about $2 billion, a little over $2 billion. 

Mr. SMITH. Is the ambition trying to make Afghanistan something it has almost never been, in terms of an economically viable 

country? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. The ambition is to make Afghanistan economically viable, and politically viable, and able to secure——

Mr. SMITH. Have they ever been economically viable other 

than——

Mr. KUNDER. I said earlier that it was one of the poorest countries in the world before the Soviets invaded, but certainly by some 

measures Afghanistan was self-sustaining in food before the Soviet 

invasion. 

There were certainly some standards that they can get to that 

are very important economically. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service and attached to the 

memo to the Committee from Mr. Hyde, points out in reference to 

the Afghanistan National Army, which I think we would all agree 

is the key to long term stability, points out that American officials 

leading the training say they lack enough resources to build the 

ANA at a more rapid pace. 

Would you agree with that, that we lack the resources? As I understand it, it is about a 9,500 strong Army at this point, of which 

about 30 percent of that is still in basic training. The goal is 10 

times that? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. The goal is 70,000. We are approaching 

10,000 as you indicate. Those 10,000, nearly 10,000, have all graduated from the training center. There are more trainees in the 

training center now, and so that will continue to grow. 

46

And I would say—and if I could answer your question about resources. We have identified, the military has identified, the U.S. 

Government has identified the requirements for fiscal year 2004, 

the current fiscal year, and we admit those. 

I would be willing to bet that the military, who are concerned 

about resources, are not concerned about current resources. In fiscal year 2004 we do have a big request in to the Congress for fiscal 

year 2005, but you have not acted on that yet, and have not had 

an opportunity to act on that yet. 

We are here to hope that you will act favorably on that request 

so that we can continue the good progress that we are making the 

Afghanistan National Army. 

Mr. WEXLER. So under this analysis when will we reach 70,000 

strong? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Congressman Wexler, I don’t know the 

exact date, but I would imagine that it wouldn’t be before 2008. 

Mr. WEXLER. So you would take a different view of at least the 

comment in the Congressional Research Service that cites American officers saying that they lack resources in order to complete 

the task? What would be inferred would be a more brisk pace? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I would say that we have the resources 

that we have identified that we need today. We have a request in 

to the Congress for additional resources next year, and we will 

come back the following year for additional resources. So do we 

have them in-hand? No, we do not have them in-hand. 

Mr. SMITH. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. WEXLER. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH. My understanding is that you have not asked for an 

authorization of funds? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I am sorry, sir, what is the question? 

Mr. SMITH. For authorizing funds for Afghanistan, that request 

has not been made by the Administration; is that correct? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. In our budget, in the President’s budget 

that is before you now, we have a fully funded—we would ask you 

to fully fund the training of the Afghan National Army. Now if you 

are asking about the——

Mr. SMITH. I am asking about the authorization bill that apparently you have refused to give your recommendation of what should 

be authorized for Afghanistan. But I don’t want to take your time 

to——

Mr. WEXLER. No, please. No, thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Is that correct or not correct? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. I don’t know. I know that what we have requested in the President’s budget, Mr. Chairman, but I don’t know 

about the authorization bill. 

Mr. SMITH. My staff is pointing out that, no, you haven’t. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Fine. 

Mr. WEXLER. If I could just speak very quickly. We have to run 

and vote. Are you satisfied with the amount of money available to 

American officers on the ground today, in terms of training for the 

Afghan Army? 

Ms. LONG. Last year for the Afghan Army? I honestly could not 

answer that question. I would have to get back out you on that. As 

you know, as far as counternarcotics is concerned, we received a 

47

$73 million supplement, and we have programmed that out, and it 

is going to be disbursed. 

Mr. WEXLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the Committee has not been adjourned previously, thank you very much for your testimony, and the Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Committee meeting was adjourned.]

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