a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats, and 

Capabilities, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

July 2004 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

The Global 

Information Grid and 

Challenges Facing Its 

Implementation

GAO-04-858
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-858.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robert E. Levin 

at (202) 512-4841 or levinr@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-858, a report to 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

July 2004

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

The Global Information Grid and 

Challenges Facing Its Implementation 

The GIG is a huge and complex undertaking that is intended to integrate 

virtually all of DOD’s information systems, services, and applications into 

one seamless, reliable, and secure network. DOD’s overall concept is to 

enable data access for a variety of systems and users in the network no 

matter which military service owns a weapon system or where a user might 

be located around the world. DOD is looking to the GIG to form the basis of 

a network-centric or “netcentric” way of fighting wars and to create a 

decisive advantage over adversaries. DOD has taken the following twopronged approach to building the GIG: 

(1) Invest in key acquisitions to build a core networking capability, including 

new communication satellites, next-generation interoperable radios, a 

new ground-based communication network with significantly expanded 

bandwidth, and services and applications to manage and protect the 

network and help users locate, post, and share information. 

(2) Integrate other existing and planned weapon systems, information 

technology systems, and logistics, personnel, and other business-related 

systems into the GIG. To integrate other systems, DOD officials who 

created the concept for the GIG have developed an initial blueprint or 

architecture for the GIG and policies to formalize the GIG, and they are 

attempting to influence key acquisition and budgeting decisions to align 

investments and systems with the GIG. 

The most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality. While 

DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG on paper 

and in policy and is beginning to make a heavy investment in the GIG as well 

as systems that will be heavily dependent on the GIG, it is not fully known 

how DOD will meet these objectives. For example, it is not known which 

investments should take priority over others and how these decisions will be 

enforced. Moreover, it is not known how DOD will assess the overall 

progress of the GIG and determine whether the network as a whole is 

providing a worthwhile return on investment, particularly in terms of 

enhancing and even transforming military operations. According to DOD 

officials, the enhancements DOD is making to its planning and budgeting 

processes are meant to begin addressing these questions. Until DOD 

implements an investment and oversight strategy for the GIG as a whole, it is 

at risk of making investments that do not fit DOD’s vision for the future. 

Highlights of Key Challenges Facing DOD’s Implementation of the GIG 

• Deciding what capabilities are affordable, what capabilities are unaffordable or not in line with 

DOD’s vision for the GIG, and enforcing these decisions 

• Assuring management attention and oversight are provided to assess the overall progress 

and return on investment 

• Developing a trustworthy network so data owners will share data with a broader audience 

• Advancing technologies on schedule 

• Developing the means to protect the network and its data 

Source: GAO analysis. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

is in the midst of transforming 

military capabilities. The 

transformation relies in part on the 

Global Information Grid (GIG), 

which is focused on building a new 

Internet-like network capability 

that DOD envisions will enable 

weapons and other systems and 

people to share information 

quickly, allowing warfighters to 

identify threats more effectively 

and to respond with greater 

precision and lethality. DOD plans 

to spend at least $21 billion through 

2010 to build a core GIG capability. 

GAO was asked (1) to describe the 

GIG, including the concept, key 

acquisitions, and implementation 

and (2) to identify significant 

challenges facing DOD in 

implementing the GIG. 

GAO is not making 

recommendations in this report as 

this effort is focused on providing 

an initial overview of the GIG and 

challenges. Our future work will 

continue to assess how DOD is 

addressing challenges and the 

progress of key acquisitions. DODprovided technical comments on 

this report are incorporated where 

appropriate. 
Page i GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Letter 1

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 2

Results in Brief 3

Description of the GIG 4

Acquisitions 8

Implementation 14

DOD Challenges in Implementing the GIG 18

Management and Investment Challenges 19

Operational Challenges 24

Technical Challenges 25

Conclusions 29

Agency Comments 30

Appendix I Policies, Standards, and Guidance to Implement the 

Global Information Grid 31 

Tables 

Table 1: How DOD Envisions GIG Will Help Transform Military 

Operations 6

Table 2: DOD Acquisitions Related to the GIG 8

Table 3: Overview of Six Major Acquisitions Related to the Core 

GIG Network and Information Capability 10

Table 4: Key Challenges 19

Table 5: Selected Global Information Grid Policies, Standards and 

Guidance (2000 to 2004) 31

Figure 

Figure 1: A General Depiction of DOD’s Characterization of the 

GIG 7

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GIG Global Information Grid 

GIG-BE Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion 

IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

NCES Network Centric Enterprise Services 

TSAT Transformational Satellite 

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

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Page 1 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

July 28, 2004 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Martin T. Meehan 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

 Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

To achieve long-term dominance over evolving, sophisticated threats, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking to make transformational 

improvements to military capabilities. The transformation involves 

achieving information and decision superiority over adversaries, striking 

with precision, deploying and sustaining military power rapidly, and 

dominating the “battlespace” on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. DOD 

has said that a successful transformation hinges largely on disparate 

weapon systems sharing information seamlessly, regardless of which 

military service owns the system and preempting the need to retrofit 

weapon systems to solve compatibility issues with other systems in the 

field. Beyond the need to build new weapon systems according to a 

predetermined architecture, DOD says the transformation encompasses 

new doctrine and institutional changes for DOD and its partners. 

One of DOD’s key initiatives to respond to this transformation is the 

Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG represents a collection of 

programs and initiatives aimed at building a secure network and set of 

information capabilities modeled after the Internet. The GIG is expected to 

facilitate DOD’s transformation by allowing warfighters, policy makers, 

and support personnel to engage in rapid decision making. By having the 

ability to access and exchange information quickly, reliably, and securely 

through linked systems and military components, DOD believes that 

commanders would identify threats more effectively, make informed 

decisions, and respond with greater precision and lethality. 

DOD began investing in the GIG in the late 1990s and plans to begin 

fielding a core capability by about 2010. It plans to spend at least $21 

billion to develop the GIG through fiscal year 2010. Full implementation of 

the GIG would occur in the 2020 time frame. Given the GIG’s overall 

investment and importance to DOD, as well as a lack of clarity about what 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

the GIG entails, you requested that we review DOD’s strategy for 

developing and deploying the GIG. As agreed with your office, our work 

initially focused on (1) describing the GIG, including the overall concept, 

key acquisitions, and implementation strategies and (2) identifying 

challenges facing DOD’s implementation of the GIG. Subsequent efforts 

will further explore the challenges we have identified and the progress of 

key acquisitions. 

To gain a better understanding of the overall concept, key acquisitions, 

and implementation strategy, we reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies, 

guidance, and other documents pertaining to the GIG. We also reviewed 

briefings prepared for high-ranking DOD officials and other organizations 

within the department to obtain more up-to-date information on the status 

of GIG activities and costs of key components. Funding and cost 

information was obtained from budget exhibits and other accounting 

reports compiled by the DOD. We did not conduct a comprehensive 

review of the financial reports or records. Also, we did not evaluate the 

content and quality of the GIG architecture and standards. In addition, we 

interviewed key officials responsible for the GIG in the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks Information and Integration 

(DOD’s Chief Information Officer); the Defense Information Systems 

Agency; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Office of 

Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Office of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. We held interviews with officials representing the Offices 

of the Chief Information Officer for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and U.S. 

Marine Corps. 

To identify the challenges associated with GIG implementation, we 

examined studies, reports, and guides on the GIG; DOD’s effort to 

transition toward more network-based military operations; and DOD’s 

efforts to enhance its capability to acquire joint systems that were 

completed by DOD, the Defense Science Board, and other research 

entities, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We 

examined reports and guides completed by the Congressional Research 

Service, Congressional Budget Office, and GAO on managing technology 

projects, architectures, and information technology investments. We held 

interviews with previously identified DOD officials to discuss key 

challenges associated with the development and implementation of the 

GIG. 

Objectives, Scope, 

and Methodology 
Page 3 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

We performed our work from November 2003 to June 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The GIG is a huge and complex undertaking that is intended to integrate 

virtually all of DOD’s information systems, services, applications, and data 

into one seamless, reliable, and secure network. A primary difference 

between the GIG initiative and previous efforts is that it focuses on 

promoting interoperability by building an Internet-like network for DODrelated operations based on common standards and protocols rather than 

on trying to establish interoperability after individual systems and 

platforms have been fielded. DOD envisions that this type of network 

would not just ensure systems can easily and quickly exchange data, but 

also would change how military operations are planned and executed 

since much more information would be dynamically available to users. 

DOD’s plans for realizing the GIG involve building a new core network and 

information capability and successfully integrating the majority of its 

weapon systems, command, control, and communications systems, and 

business systems with the new network. The effort to build the GIG will 

require DOD to make a substantial investment in a new set of core 

enterprise programs and initiatives in order to develop and deploy new 

satellites capable of quickly transmitting and routing larger volumes of 

data, increased bandwidth capacity on the ground, new types of 

communications systems to be embedded on weapon systems, and new 

computer applications and services to enable information to be 

transferred globally. To integrate systems into the GIG, DOD has 

developed an initial blueprint or architecture for the GIG, developed new 

policies, guidance, and standards to guide implementation, undertaken 

proactive efforts to “market” the GIG and its potential benefits among 

various elements of DOD, and is attempting to influence key acquisition 

and budgeting decisions to align with the GIG. Depending on the extent 

DOD decides to rely on the GIG to facilitate military operations, the 

initiative could affect the way weapon systems and information 

technology systems are selected and built as well as how DOD military and 

civilian personnel collect, analyze, and share data. 

The most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality. 

While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG 

on paper and in policy and is beginning to make a substantial investment 

in the GIG as well as in systems that will be heavily dependent on the GIG, 

it is not fully known how DOD will meet these objectives. For example, it 

is not known which investments should take priority over others and how 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

these decisions will be enforced. Moreover, it is not known how DOD will 

assess the overall progress of the GIG and determine whether the network 

as a whole is providing a worthwhile return on investment, particularly in 

terms of enhancing and even transforming military operations. Until DOD 

implements an investment and oversight strategy for the GIG as a whole, it 

is at risk of making investments that do not fit its vision for the future. In 

addition, DOD faces risks inherent with the nature and scope of the effort 

it is undertaking, for example, risks related to protecting data within the 

thousands of systems that will be integrated into the network. 

Furthermore, the technical challenges to develop new networking and 

network management capabilities to support mobile, integrated 

communications are considerable. DOD recognizes these challenges, and 

many of the actions it is taking to implement the GIG are meant to address 

them. However, it is too early to assess how successful DOD will be in 

addressing the challenges and overcoming long-standing organizational 

impediments. 

For the past two decades, DOD has been seeking solutions to improve 

interoperability and information sharing across its business and 

warfighting operations. Too often weapon and information technology 

systems have been acquired by the military services and defense agencies 

without regard for their ability to work in a joint operational environment.1

As a result, extra layers of redundancy and common systems have been 

put in place to support military operations, but without the ability to easily 

and quickly exchange data. 

DOD defines the GIG as a “globally interconnected, end-to-end set of 

information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for 

collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information.” 

The GIG is meant to improve interoperability among DOD’s many 

information systems and weapon systems. More important, the GIG is to 

facilitate DOD’s effort to transform to a more network-based, or 

“netcentric,” way of fighting wars and achieving information superiority 

over adversaries, much the same way as the Internet has transformed 

industry and society on a global scale. Netcentric operations and warfare, 

according to DOD, are the combination of tactics, techniques, and 

procedures that a networked force can employ to create a decisive 

 1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time-Critical Targets, 

GAO-02-204R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2001). 

Description of the 

GIG 
Page 5 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

warfighting advantage. The GIG’s role is to create an environment in which 

users can access data on demand at any location without having to rely on 

(and wait for) organizations in charge of data collection to process and 

disseminate the information. Data could emanate from a variety of 

sources, including weapon systems belonging to other military services, 

space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, and 

DOD logistics, financial, and other systems that carry out business 

operations. Ultimately, DOD expects that most of these systems will 

become part of the GIG.2

With greater data access and a more robust communications 

infrastructure, DOD expects the GIG to enable more timely execution of 

military operations, collaborative mission planning and execution, 

common views of the battlespace, and more timely assessments of the 

condition of equipment and the levels of supplies. For example, according 

to DOD officials, greater information sharing could dramatically increase 

capabilities to rapidly identify and strike time-critical targets, such as 

mobile surface-to-air missile sites. In the past, such targets have proved to 

be elusive because the enemy is able to move them to safety in a shorter 

time frame than it takes U.S. military forces to detect, assess, and attack 

the targets. By having greater command of a battle situation, DOD expects 

that lethality and survivability of equipment and personnel would be 

increased. Armor protection could be scaled down in favor of more agility. 

In addition, the GIG would reduce the substantial resources and logistics 

needed to bring command, control, and communications systems to the 

war-fighting environment. Table 1 illustrates how DOD envisions the GIG 

will help transform military operations. 

 2

 DOD defines the GIG to include “all owned and leased communications and computing 

systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, and other 

associated services necessary to achieve information superiority.” 
Page 6 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Table 1: How DOD Envisions GIG Will Help Transform Military Operations 

Current Future 

Customized, platform-centric information technology 

Circuit-based transmission of data 

Bandwidth limitations 

Limited operational picture 

Fixed and remote command and control 

Broadcast (push) information to users 

Collect, process, exploit, disseminate 

Individual 

Stovepipe decision making 

Multiple data calls, data duplication 

Private data 

Perimeter, one-time security 

Single points of failure 

Separate infrastructures 

Interoperability by standard applications 

Network-centric, commercial off-the-shelf software, Web-based 

Internet protocol-based transmission of data 

Bandwidth on demand 

Situational awareness 

Mobile, deployable, in-transit command and control 

Post information on network and facilitate “smart” pull by users 

Collect, post, process, use 

Collaborative 

Communities of interest 

Handle information only once 

Shared data 

Persistent, continuous information assurance 

Diverse routing 

Enterprise services 

Interoperability designed from start (“born joint”) 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (presentation). 

The GIG is to be much like the Internet, but with less dependence on 

ground-based and fixed systems and equipment to transmit and route data 

and more dependence on space-based and mobile, ad hoc systems to carry 

out these functions. Figure 1 shows the various layers of the GIG’s overall 

concept. At the core are communications satellites, next-generation 

radios, and an installations-based network with significantly expanded 

bandwidth. These will provide the basic infrastructure through which data 

will be routed and shared. In addition, the GIG would employ a variety of 

information technology services and applications to manage the flow of 

information and ensure the network is reliable and secure. Various 

information technology tools would be available to help users determine 

what information is available, where to find it, and how best to use it. DOD 

envisions that communities of interest would be developed, linking users 

with common interests who would collaborate on analyzing and sharing 

information. Ultimately, most of DOD’s sensors, weapon systems, business 

systems, and systems belonging to decision makers, military units, and 

allies would be tied into the GIG network—serving as both users and 

providers of data. 
Page 7 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Figure 1: A General Depiction of DOD’s Characterization of the GIG 

Transformational

Satellite

Transformational

Satellite

Transformational

Satellite

Existing ground communication networks

and GIG-Bandwidth Expansion

JTRS in the air JTRS at sea JTRS

on the ground

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).

Applications

to be hosted on systems that use commercial technologies and open protocols and

standards

Applications

Future

Combat Systems, tactical aircraft, missile systems Space-Based Radar, Global Hawk, ground radars

Military forces

JTRS

on the ground

Advertise data availability; aggregate data; help users “push” and “pull” data

Network Centric Enterprise Services

Servers, databases, and mail engines

Data transfer

Information routed through

Transformational Satellites,

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 

and the ground-based GIG-Bandwidth

Expansion effort, as well as other

information transport systems

Sources and users

Personnel, financial, other business systems

Analysts, commanders, policy

makers
Page 8 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

DOD has taken a two-pronged approach to build the GIG: (1) invest in a 

set of core enterprise programs and initiatives to build a core network and 

information capability and (2) bring other existing and planned weapon 

systems, command, control, and communications systems, information 

technology systems, and logistics, personnel, and other business-related 

systems into the GIG network. The core network acquisitions are to be 

developed incrementally over time, with the aim of fielding the first 

increment of the GIG by 2010. The GIG is primarily being developed under 

the leadership and direction of DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Networks and Information Integration in coordination with 

other components in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. 

The Defense Information Systems Agency, military services, combatant 

commands, and other defense agencies also play roles in implementing the 

GIG. In addition, DOD’s Strategic Command has responsibilities for 

eventually operating the GIG. Table 2 shows the key acquisitions for the 

GIG’s core network and examples of additional acquisitions that must be 

integrated with the GIG. 

Table 2: DOD Acquisitions Related to the GIG 

Key acquisitions to build GIG’s core 

network and information capability 

Examples of acquisitions that must be 

integrated with the GIG 

Communications satellites 

Interoperable radio systems 

Expanded bandwidth on the ground 

Information technology applications to 

support the network 

Weapon systems 

Sensors 

Command, control, and communications 

systems 

Logistics, personnel, and other businessrelated systems 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis). 

According to DOD, the key acquisitions underway to build the GIG 

network capability include 1) Transformational Satellite3

 (TSAT), a new 

constellation of communications satellites to transmit and route larger 

volumes of data; 2) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), a new family of 

interoperable radio systems; 3) Global Information Grid-Bandwidth 

Expansion (GIG-BE), which includes state of the art optical network 

technologies and upgraded routers and switches to increase bandwidth for 

greater voice, data, and video transmissions as well as improvements in 

 3

 TSAT is one of six initiatives under development as part of the Transformational 

Communications System Initiative. 

Acquisitions 

Core GIG Network Acquisitions 
Page 9 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

network services at about 90 DOD installations; 4) Network Centric 

Enterprise Services (NCES), a common set of services and applications to 

manage the network and help users locate and share information; 5) 

Cryptography Transformation Initiative,4

 tools to protect sensitive 

information transmitted across the network and protect the network from 

attack; and 6) Horizontal Fusion, which is a portfolio of initiatives focused 

on developing and demonstrating data applications and tools for 

information sharing and netcentric operations. 

Table 3 reviews each of the key acquisitions for the GIG’s core capability, 

including the purpose, the financial investment between fiscal years 2004 

and 2009, the military service or defense agency responsible for managing 

the acquisition, and the current status. Some of these acquisitions will 

require funding, including sustainment costs, beyond 2009 but amounts are 

not yet known. 

 4

 The Cryptography Transformation Initiative is part of DOD’s broader Information 

Assurance program, which includes many security initiatives critical to the GIG. The 

cryptography initiative is funded from different program elements within DOD’s 

Information Assurance program. 
Page 10 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Table 3: Overview of Six Major Acquisitions Related to the Core GIG Network and Information Capability 

Program or initiative Purpose 

Investment 

(fiscal years 2004 

to 2009) Manager Status 

TSAT To develop satellites to serve 

as the cornerstone of a new 

DOD communications 

infrastructure and provide 

high bandwidth connectivity to 

the warfighter. Some of the 

technologies that TSAT plans 

to use are laser cross-links, 

space-based data processing 

and Internet routing systems, 

and highly agile 

multibeam/phased array 

antennas. 

$8.5 billion Air Force. Product development 

began in early fiscal year 

2004; first satellite 

scheduled to launch in 

2011. 

JTRS To develop family of softwaredefined radios to interoperate 

with different types of existing 

radios and significantly 

increase voice, data, and 

video communications 

capabilities. 

$5.8 billion Joint service program 

responsible for the 

software communications 

architecture and 

waveforms; military 

service-led programs 

responsible for developing 

radios. 

Army is leading the 

development of a cluster 

of radios for ground 

vehicles and helicopters. 

This cluster began in 

2002; the first radios are 

to be fielded in fiscal year 

2007. 

GIG-BE To provide additional 

bandwidth and information 

access at key military 

installations within the United 

States and overseas via a 

combination of acquiring 

bandwidth from commercial 

providers as well as extending 

fiber optic networks to bases 

and installations that are 

located away from 

commercial networks. 

$373 million Defense Information 

Systems Agency. 

Procurement phase 

began in 2003. Initially, 

10 sites to be completed 

this year and the 

remaining sites in 2005. 
Page 11 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Program or initiative Purpose 

Investment 

(fiscal years 2004 

to 2009) Manager Status 

NCES To enable network users to 

identify, access, send, store, 

and protect information. Also 

to enable DOD to monitor and 

manage network performance 

and problems. Is expected to 

require development of new 

capabilities and tools for 

tagging data so it is useful, 

providing users with capability 

to identify relevant information 

based on content and 

allowing users to freely 

exchange and collaborate on 

information. 

$371 million Defense Information 

Systems Agency. 

In concept phase; 

product development to 

begin in fiscal year 2004; 

initial set of core services 

to be provided beginning 

in fiscal year 2005. 

Crypto Transformation 

Initiative 

To enable DOD to protect the 

network and sensitive 

information. To provide 

information assurance and 

encryption support, including 

cryptography equipment (e.g., 

Internet protocol encryptors), 

firewalls, intrusion detection 

systems, etc. 

$4.8 billion National Security Agency, 

Defense Information 

Systems Agency, and the 

military services. 

The National Security 

Agency is developing 

information assurance 

component of GIG 

architecture; other 

ongoing efforts to 

develop enhanced 

encryption capabilities. 

Horizontal Fusion A portfolio of initiatives, drawn 

from existing programs, 

intended to demonstrate 

netcentric capabilities and 

address operational and 

technical challenges. Initiative 

underway, for example, to 

Web-enable current data 

sources, tools, and 

applications. 

$1.3 billion Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration. 

Ongoing program. Initial 

set of initiatives funded in 

fiscal year 2003. Annual 

demonstrations known as 

“Quantum Leap” 

conducted on initiatives. 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis). 

In developing the GIG’s core capability, DOD intends to build upon and 

enhance ongoing terrestrial and space-based networks and systems, such 

as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite communication 

system and the Defense Information Systems Network. The new programs 

underway are intended to improve communications and networking 

capabilities significantly. For example, according to DOD officials, current 

telecommunication lines are not robust enough to handle the volume of 

information needed to facilitate optimal, strategic decision making. The 

GIG-BE is designed to remove current bandwidth constraints. The GIG-BE 

is to use advanced fiber-optic backbone and switching technology to 

upgrade telecommunications lines and provide initially up to 10 gigabytes 
Page 12 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

per second of bandwidth at selected defense installations around the 

world. Also, unlike DOD’s legacy radio systems that cannot interoperate 

with one another, JTRS is software-based, meaning that the radios are 

essentially computers that can be programmed to imitate other types of 

radios and thus be readily configured to operate in different networks and 

waveforms5 based on common standards. JTRS is expected to act as a 

gateway for users with different hardware radios—a capability that speeds 

the transition to universal interoperability for DOD military operations. 

Also, unlike current communication satellites, TSAT is to be equipped with 

laser-optical payloads for high-capacity links to other air and space 

platforms. By using laser-optics, TSAT is intended to operate above the 

radiofrequency spectrum and provide relief to current military bandwidth 

constraints. NCES is to make use of commercial products and tools to 

manage messaging, storage, search, and other capabilities across 

platforms, but also require new and possibly customized services to 

ensure the sharing of information based on mission demands and 

priorities. Tools to allow users to “smartly” pull and fuse information will 

require investing in new data content and management techniques. 

Enhanced security (information assurance)6

 capabilities will need to be 

developed, including encryption mechanisms and devices, intrusion 

detection systems, and secure network management. 

Most ongoing and planned weapon systems; command, control and 

communications systems; and business systems will need to be integrated 

with the GIG network, because they will be the primary providers and 

receivers of data needed to support future military operations. 

• DOD plans to integrate most weapon systems into the GIG. In fact, 

some “transformational” weapon systems now under development 

require a more advanced communications infrastructure to perform as 

 5

 A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the frequency, modulation type, 

message format, and/or transmission system. In general usage, the term waveform refers to 

a known set of characteristics, for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, UHF), modulation 

techniques (FM, AM), message standards, and transmission systems. In JTRS, the term 

waveform is used to describe the entire set of radio functions that occur from the user 

input to the radiofrequency output and vice versa. 

6

 “Information assurance is defined by DOD as measures that protect and defend 

information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 

authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration 

of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 

“Department of Defense Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance, October 24, 2002 

(Certified current as of Nov. 21, 2003), Section E2.1.17. 

Other Acquisitions That Must 

Be Integrated with the GIG 

Core Network 
Page 13 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

intended and to support voice, data, videoconferencing, and imagery 

transmissions. Without an integrated network that ties together 

different systems and enables information to flow freely across the 

battlefield, the high-paced warfare that DOD envisioned is likely to be 

constrained, according to DOD. For example, the Army is developing 

the Future Combat Systems, a new generation of manned and 

unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions that are to be 

lighter and more mobile yet lethal and survivable. Rather than rely on 

heavy armor to withstand an enemy attack, the Future Combat Systems 

will depend on superior information to see and kill the enemy before 

being detected. According to DOD, the ability to make this leap 

depends on (1) a network to collect, process, and deliver vast amounts 

of information, such as imagery and data, and (2) the performance of 

the individual systems themselves. Not only must systems within the 

Future Combat Systems interoperate effectively, they also must 

interoperate with the GIG. The GIG must perform at a level that 

enables the Future Combat Systems to quickly collect, process, and 

deliver data. DOD is also developing a new constellation of satellites—

known as Space-Based Radar—to provide a near continuous, allweather global capability of collecting intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance7

 information. Space-Based Radar is expected to be a 

critical data provider to transformational systems, such as those within 

the Future Combat Systems. Like the Future Combat Systems, the 

satellites will require a more robust communications infrastructure to 

send massive amounts of imagery data in a timely fashion. According to 

DOD, if TSAT, a key GIG component, is not ready in time or cannot 

provide the capability originally planned, DOD may need to build 

additional capability into Space-Based Radar satellites and ground 

stations to reduce the dependency on the communications 

infrastructure to transmit data.8

• DOD intends to integrate virtually all command, control, and 

communications, systems into the GIG. At the same time, DOD intends 

to develop and modify these systems to provide military commanders 

 7

 Intelligence is defined by DOD as the product resulting from the collection, processing, 

integration, analysis, and evaluation of information. Surveillance is the systematic 

observation of places, persons, or things through visual and other means. Reconnaissance 

is a mission undertaken to obtain information about activities and resources of an enemy 

or potential enemy or to secure data characteristics of a particular area. 

8

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar Effort Needs 

Additional Knowledge Before Starting Development, GAO-04-759 (Washington, D.C.: July 

23, 2004). 
Page 14 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

and forces with near-real time descriptions of the location and 

disposition of U.S. military forces and adversaries operating on the 

ground and in the air and to provide the ability to communicate across 

all elements involved in military operations. Each of the military 

services has major architectural initiatives underway (the Air Force’s 

C2 Constellation and ConstellationNet, the Army’s LandWarNet, and 

the Navy’s ForceNet) to transform their command, control, and 

communications systems and information infrastructures into the GIG. 

For example, the Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

(WIN-T) program (part of LandWarNet) is intended to be the 

integrating communications network that links Future Combat Systems 

units with higher Army echelons and with the GIG. In addition, DOD 

considers numerous other systems to be important in achieving the 

GIG, including the Mobile User Objective System (satellite 

communications), Global Command and Control System/Joint 

Command and Control, Deployed Joint Command and Control, and 

Teleports (information transport system). DOD has further identified 

the need to eventually link the GIG to coalition, allied, and non-DOD 

users and systems. 

• DOD also intends to integrate its business systems into the GIG. These 

include acquisition and procurement systems, financial management 

systems, personnel and health systems, logistics systems, and strategic 

planning and budgeting systems. Many of these play an important role 

in supporting military operations. For example, logistics systems are 

used to plan, control, and carry out the efficient and effective 

movement and maintenance of forces. 

The GIG’s success is dependent on DOD’s ability to successfully integrate 

the majority of its weapon systems, command, control, and 

communications systems, and business systems with the new core 

network. To make this happen, DOD has developed a blueprint or 

architecture for the GIG; developed new policies, guidance, and standards 

to guide implementation decisions; undertaken proactive efforts to 

“market” the GIG and its potential benefits; and is attempting to influence 

key budgeting and acquisition decision-making processes to align with the 

GIG concept. 

To help guide decision-making, DOD has developed an initial architecture 

for the GIG, which, according to DOD, presents the current information 

technology environment and desired (target) technology environment; 

describes how the commands, services, and defense agencies will operate 

in a netcentric environment, based on selected strategic, operational, and 

Implementation 

Architecture and Policies 
Page 15 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

tactical scenarios; and identifies the actions and information requirements 

for conducting operations in a netcentric environment, how systems will 

need to function to access information, and emerging standards for the 

development and acquisition of systems. DOD also has developed a 

reference model so program managers of various architectures and 

systems can ensure GIG compliance.9 According to DOD, the reference 

model’s key purpose is to provide users with an understanding of the GIG 

through common definitions and terms of reference, standards, and 

templates for developing more detailed architectures. Future versions of 

the GIG architecture are to include more complete views of DOD’s 

operational environment and existing enterprise requirements. 

Furthermore, DOD is modifying its Joint Technical Architecture,10 which 

sets standard technologies and protocols to better ensure interoperability 

and to complement the GIG architecture. 

DOD is also in the process of issuing new policies, standards, and 

guidance to formalize the architecture. Specifically, DOD has created 

policy that requires all departmental architectures to be GIG compliant. 

DOD also has developed specific policies, standards, and guidance to 

implement the GIG and help ensure that the military services acquire 

systems that integrate with the GIG. Several policies establish the GIG as a 

cornerstone for enabling DOD to achieve information superiority, formally 

define the objectives and key elements of the GIG, and assign roles and 

responsibilities for the GIG on an enterprise basis. Others assign 

responsibility and define waiver procedures for specific aspects of the 

GIG, such as ground-based telecommunications networks and NCES. For 

example, DOD formalized a waiver process to assess network and 

telecommunications systems (such as local area networks) that are not 

GIG-compliant. In addition, DOD has set standards to address data 

connectivity. To provide a common format for the transmission of 

information across the GIG, DOD recently mandated that GIG systems 

 9

 Referred to as the Netcentric Operations Warfare Reference Model, Version 1.0, 

December 2003. 

10 For several years, DOD has emphasized the use of a framework that defines three types 

of architectures: operational, technical, and system. A technical architecture is a set of 

rules to guide the design of systems and consists primarily of a common set of standards 

and protocols for sending and receiving information (e.g., Internet protocol), 

understanding information (e.g., format standards), and processing the information. The 

Joint Technical Architecture specifies the minimum set of standards and guidance for the 

acquisition of all DOD systems that produce, use, or exchange information. 
Page 16 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

must be Internet Protocol Version 611 capable, as well as Internet Protocol 

Version 4 (the Internet currently is based on version 4.),12 or obtain a 

waiver. Furthermore, DOD developed a netcentric data strategy, 

standardizing the way data will be described and used in systems that 

make up the GIG. Appendix I provides more details on these policies, 

standards, and guidance. 

DOD officials who developed the GIG concept also expect to influence 

decisions by participating in DOD’s key decision-making processes. Over 

the past couple years, DOD has revised its three primary decision-making 

processes for determining and delivering military capabilities—

requirements setting, acquisition, and budgeting—to focus acquisitions 

and investment decisions on meeting joint mission needs, particularly with 

regard to interoperability. In revising these processes, DOD has 

emphasized compliance with the GIG architecture. DOD officials have 

taken further action intended to strengthen these decisions by developing 

tools and criteria for actively participating in the decision-making 

process—by assisting military services in preparing for major acquisition 

reviews (as part of integrated product teams) and/or by providing input to 

decision-making boards. The revisions DOD has made to its requirements 

setting, acquisition, and budgeting process are all fairly recent. Therefore, 

it is too early to assess whether they will be successful in achieving their 

goals. 

For example, DOD revised its requirements-setting process to shift the 

focus to a more capabilities-based approach for determining joint warfighting needs rather than a threat-based approach focused on individual 

systems and platforms. Under the threat-based approach, the services 

were primarily responsible for defining requirements, selecting 

alternatives, and developing systems, which frequently resulted in the 

fielding of stovepiped systems and duplicating capabilities. DOD’s 

rationale for shifting to capabilities-based requirements is a recognition 

 11 Internet protocol specifies the format of packets, also called “datagrams,” and the 

addressing scheme for communication transmissions and virtual connections made over 

the Internet. Internet Protocol Version 6 (also referred to as IPv6) is the latest version of 

this protocol. 

12 IPv6 includes a transition mechanism that is designed to allow users to adopt and deploy 

IPv6 in a highly diffuse fashion and to provide direct interoperability between IPv4 and 

IPv6 hosts. The transition to a new version of the Internet Protocol is intended to be 

incremental and allow users to upgrade their hosts to IPv6, and network operators to 

deploy IPv6 in routers, with very little coordination between the two. 

Influencing Acquisition and 

Budgeting Decisions 
Page 17 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

that there is greater uncertainty in future military conflicts without a 

clearly defined adversary and it will need to respond across a broader 

range of military operations. The new Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System, established in October 2003, is organized around 

key functional concepts and areas—command and control, force 

application, battlespace awareness, focused logistics, and force 

protection--aimed at improving joint warfighting capabilities. In addition, a 

sixth area has been established—netcentric operations—to enable 

planning across functional areas and support integration of netcentric 

capabilities. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks 

and Information Integration and Joint Staff officials believe the joint 

concept will provide a more coherent framework for identifying 

capabilities gaps, comparing alternatives, aligning requirements to the 

GIG, and reduce the potential for stovepiped, duplicative capabilities. 

DOD officials also indicated that the department has begun revising its 

planning and budgeting process in an effort to instill more collaboration 

among different components of the department in investment decisions. 

For example, DOD is asking the military services to plan budgets around 

guidance that takes a joint perspective. Data collection and management 

processes are intended to be merged into a portfolio management 

approach that enables program reviews and budget reviews to occur in a 

more integrated manner rather than sequentially. To complement this 

process, DOD is planning to develop an investment portfolio management 

structure to better manage its information technology resources where 

decisions about what information technology investments to make, 

modify, or terminate, are based on the GIG architecture and other 

objectives, such as mission area goals. Other recent policies have focused 

on establishing more effective investment processes for information 

technology systems that need to integrate with the GIG. 

DOD has developed several mechanisms to complement the decision 

making that occurs within the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System, planning and budgeting, and acquisition processes. 

For example, in November 2003, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Networks and Information Integration, in consultation with 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition Technology and Logistics, and U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
Page 18 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

established a new Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter13 and review 

process to focus greater attention on systems interoperability for joint 

operations as well as the information-sharing requirements of the GIG. The 

Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter is built around compliance with 

the GIG architecture, and the reference model will be used to assess 

system information needs, information assurance, and the technical 

exchange of information. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Networks and Information Integration has also developed a netcentric 

checklist to guide the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System and acquisition reviews. The checklist is based on the GIG 

architecture and will be used to assess whether key standards and 

protocols are being considered and built into particular capabilities and 

systems being acquired. In addition, the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Network and Information Integration has established a 

systems engineering and evaluation capability to support the reviews. A 

team of systems engineers will provide end-to-end technical support to the 

office and funding has been requested to create a facility to test key GIGrelated systems and components. DOD will be conducting specific 

netcentric reviews of major acquisition programs to assess whether they 

are transitioning to integrate with the future network. About 129 

information technology, weapon systems, and business systems have been 

selected to participate in the initial round of assessments. These reviews 

are scheduled to be completed later this year. 

The most critical challenge ahead for DOD is making the GIG a reality. 

While DOD has taken steps to define its vision and objectives for the GIG 

on paper and in policy, it is not fully known how DOD will meet these 

objectives, particularly with respect to setting investment priorities, 

providing management attention and oversight, transforming operations, 

and advancing technologies. At the same time, DOD is beginning to make a 

heavy investment in the GIG as well as systems that will be heavily 

dependent on the GIG, such as the Army’s Future Combat Systems, and 

DOD is asking its components and the military services to accept its vision 

and plan toward it. In addition, DOD faces risks inherent with the nature 

and scope of the effort it is undertaking, for example, risks related to 

protecting data within the thousands of systems that will be integrated 

 13 A key performance parameter represent those critical performance parameters so 

significant that a failure to meet a minimum value of performance can call into question a 

system’s ability to perform missions. 

DOD Challenges in 

Implementing the GIG 
Page 19 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

into the network. DOD recognizes these challenges, and many of the 

actions it is taking to implement the GIG are meant to address them. 

However, it is too early to assess how successful DOD will be in 

addressing the challenges and overcoming long-standing organizational 

impediments. 

Table 4 below highlights some of the key challenges facing DOD. 

Table 4: Key Challenges 

Management and 

investment 

• Deciding what capabilities are affordable; what 

capabilities are unaffordable or not in line with DOD’s 

vision for the GIG, and enforcing these decisions among 

thousands of systems and across the military services. 

Assuring DOD has the right representation in acquisition 

decisions. 

• Assuring management attention and oversight is 

provided to assess the overall progress of the GIG and 

determine whether it is providing a worthwhile return on 

investment, particularly in terms of enhancing and even 

transforming military operations. 

Operational • Deciding when, how, and how much information should 

be posted on the network and used. 

• Establishing rules to ensure the GIG can work as 

intended without reducing benefits of flexible and 

dynamic information sharing. 

• Convincing data owners of the value of sharing data 

with a broader audience and trusting the network 

enough to post data. 

Technical • Developing new technologies and advancing them on 

schedule. 

• Assuring common agreement on technical as well as 

information assurance standards and requirements. 

• Developing the means to protect the network and its 

data. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

While DOD has taken steps to establish a vision and objectives for the 

GIG, it is still not fully known how DOD will manage, oversee, and invest 

in this effort. Addressing these questions is a daunting task. DOD must find 

ways to make and enforce trade-off decisions for literally thousands of 

information technology systems, weapon systems, command and control 

Management and 

Investment 

Challenges 
Page 20 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

systems, intelligence systems, and other systems.14 These decisions will 

need to span a wide range of organizations, including the military services 

and their respective major commands and functional activities, numerous 

large defense agencies and field activities, and various combatant and joint 

operational commands that are responsible for military operations for 

specific geographic regions or theaters of operations. Having accurate and 

reliable visibility over spending on systems that must integrate with the 

GIG will be necessary as well as having effective mechanisms for 

identifying and deciding which systems should be pursued and which 

should not. In 2003, we reported (as part of a survey of federal agencies 

enterprise architecture programs) that DOD had made progress in 

developing the GIG architecture, however, the department had not 

completed some essential architecture products that describe the desired 

(target) technology environment and provide a sequencing plan for 

transitioning to it.15 More specifically, at this point, DOD is largely leaving 

it up to its components and services to decide how best to migrate their 

systems to the GIG. There is no well-defined strategy that 

• identifies what capabilities DOD will invest in and what it will not 

invest in; 

• identifies how investments will align with the goals and objectives of 

the GIG architecture; 

• determines what is affordable, particularly in light of near-term and 

long-term needs; 

• sets out criteria for determining what legacy systems should remain or 

be phased out; and 

• specifies by whom and how decisions will be enforced. 

In addition, it is unknown how senior leaders within DOD will be able to 

focus on the progress of the GIG as a whole, that is, whether it is being 

developed and fielded within cost and schedule, whether risks are being 

adequately mitigated, and whether the GIG is providing a worthwhile 

return on investment, particularly in terms of enhancing military 

operations. Until DOD implements an investment and oversight strategy 

 14 DOD’s information technology budget (covering national security and business systems) 

for fiscal year 2004 totaled about $28 billion. Of this, about $10.5 billion was for 

modernizing systems and the remaining $17.5 billion for operating and maintaining existing 

systems. 

15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Leadership Remains Key to

Agencies Making Progress on Enterprise Architecture Efforts, GAO-04-40 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 17, 2003). 
Page 21 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

for the GIG as a whole, it is at risk of making investments that do not fit its 

vision for the future. 

According to DOD officials, the enhancements DOD is making to its 

planning and budgeting processes are meant to begin addressing these 

questions. However, these changes may be difficult to implement for a 

number of reasons. First, to some degree because of the broad scope and 

crosscutting nature of the GIG concept, no office or single program is in 

charge of the GIG, making it more difficult to make and enforce trade-off 

decisions. Moreover, while key acquisition, budgeting, and requirements 

setting processes have been modified, they still largely operate under the 

same organizational structure, where it has been difficult to link 

acquisition and investment decisions to joint concepts like the GIG. 

Additionally, previous efforts that have been undertaken in past years to 

foster interoperability among DOD systems have had limited success, 

principally because management tools and leadership attention were not 

strong enough to provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance by 

the military services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of 

requirements that would benefit the department, as the following 

examples illustrate: 

• In our 2001 report16 on DOD’s efforts to improve its ability to attack 

time-critical targets, we noted that DOD had undertaken numerous 

efforts to achieve system interoperability, including the development of 

guidance, oversight controls, directives and policies, and technology 

demonstrations. However, success was limited because DOD had not 

yet overcome resistance from the military services, it lacked an 

architecture to guide interoperability efforts and some current 

oversight and control mechanisms, such as the interoperability 

certification process, were not working or were not being enforced. 

• In 2003, we reported17 that two joint acquisition programs lacked 

mechanisms to overcome parochialism and stovepipes at the military 

service level. The JTRS program lacked a strong management structure 

 16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time-Critical Targets, 

GAO-02-204R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2001). 

17U.S. General Accounting Office, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical 

Radio System Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003) and Force 

Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).
Page 22 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

to resolve operational requirements and funding issues among the 

services and DOD’s approach to planning Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

lacked an effective strategic plan to ensure the military services and 

other defense agencies focus their development efforts on systems that 

complement each other. 

• In 2004, we reported18 that DOD was making limited progress with its 

business modernization initiative—a departmentwide effort focused on 

transforming DOD business operations, including standardizing and 

optimizing business systems across DOD and reducing duplication. 

After 3 years of effort, we reported that we have not seen any 

significant change in the content of DOD’s business systems 

modernization architecture (which is to be integrated into the GIG 

architecture) or in DOD’s approach to investing billions of dollars in 

existing and new business systems. Further, DOD had not yet 

implemented an effective management structure and processes to 

provide adequate control and accountability over its $5 billion annual 

investment in business systems modernization. In particular, we 

reported that DOD had not yet clearly defined the roles and 

responsibilities for its new business investment domains, established 

common investment criteria, and conducted a comprehensive review 

of its existing business systems to ensure that they are consistent with 

the business modernization architecture. DOD acknowledged that it 

still had much more to do, including developing the business systems 

modernization architecture to a necessary level of detail, defining 

specific performance metrics, and clarifying the roles and 

responsibilities associated with managing the domains of portfolios of 

business systems and ensuring that these systems comply with the 

architecture. 

Several recent studies sponsored by DOD recognize that developing an 

investment strategy and adopting better management tools is critical for 

the success of the GIG. For example, a 1999 Defense Science Board study19

assessed DOD’s strategies and processes for attaining information 

 18 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Limited 

Progress in Development of Business Enterprise Architecture and Oversight of

Information Technology Investments, GAO-04-731R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004) and 

Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and Implement a 

Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management Transformation, GAO04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004).

19 Defense Science Board Task Force, Tactical Battlefield Communications (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 1999). 
Page 23 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

superiority and advocated that (1) an executive office be established to 

lead and implement the GIG and that (2) the office develop an 

implementation plan, including technical milestones and measurable 

interim goals, and identify resources to permit the transition to and 

completion of the GIG. A 2004 report by the U.S. Joint Forces Command,20

documenting the processes and planned activities underway to achieve 

transformational improvements in joint military capabilities, 

recommended, among other things, that the GIG should include a timephased plan for how future capabilities will link to current investments. In 

addition, the report recommends that such a plan should show how 

network development efforts underway by each of the military services 

will contribute to and be compatible with the GIG. 

Other studies have pointed to the need to strengthen current management 

processes to ensure warfighters themselves have more input into 

investment decisions. For example, a 2003 study21 chartered by the 

Secretary of Defense to examine how DOD develops, resources and 

provides joint capabilities, recommended moderate to more radical 

actions to streamline existing processes and/or establish alternative 

organizations to better integrate defense capabilities in support of joint 

military objectives. Organizational alternatives for strengthening the 

acquisition process ranged from the establishment of joint program 

executives for each of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System’s functional capabilities areas that would provide input and 

oversee resources on joint programs, to capability acquisition executives 

for each of the capability areas who would have direct oversight and 

decision authority over all programs. A 2004 study by the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies22 identified defense reforms needed to 

meet the challenges of a new strategic era and made a number of 

recommendations, including several to improve the acquisition of joint 

capabilities and establish a more effective resource allocation process. For 

example, the study recommended that the Joint Staff (J-6—Command, 

Control, Communications, and Computers) be expanded into a 

 20 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

21, 2004). 

21 Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Final Report

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2003). 

22 C.A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic 

Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Mar. 2004). 
Page 24 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

departmentwide, joint task force with budgetary and acquisition authority 

for joint command and control capabilities. In addition, to improve tradeoff decisions across mission areas, the study advocates building capacities 

in the combatant commands for a stronger role in the resource allocation 

process. 

There are also many unknowns concerning how DOD will meet its 

requirements and vision in terms of people, processes, and, ultimately, 

operations. First, DOD has yet to determine how much information should 

be posted on the network; when it should be posted; and how and where it 

should be used. Once these factors are determined, DOD must develop 

rules of operation to ensure the network can work as intended without 

precluding the benefits that can be derived from more flexible and 

dynamic information sharing. Currently, various offices within DOD are 

working through questions on whether unlimited amounts of data should 

be made available through the GIG, including unprocessed intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance data, without the benefit of some 

assimilation and analysis. These are important questions that need to be 

addressed in the near future because they could affect the direction of 

investments in netcentric systems and non-network systems as well as 

changes that need to be made in how the intelligence community operates. 

Even after these questions are settled, significant operational challenges 

remain. Joint commanders and the military services may need to find ways 

to adapt to an environment where data can be more readily obtained and 

shared by lower levels in the chains of command. New operational 

concepts are being developed to guide how military operations are to be 

conducted in this enhanced technology environment. They will need to be 

followed by associated doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Developing joint operational concepts is one of the key tenets under the 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; however, it is 

unclear how the concepts will be developed and translated by these 

boards into more detailed tactics, techniques and procedures. We recently 

reported that DOD had been proceeding with the JTRS program for 

several years without clear definition of how JTRS capabilities should be 

used in an operational environment and that the program’s concept of 

operations did not reflect the joint vision of JTRS but instead the servicecentric radio-replacement perspective. If DOD is to achieve its long-term 

goals for netcentric warfare, it is imperative that it develop concepts and 

processes for how individual systems, such as JTRS, can be used to 

leverage DOD’s new network infrastructure and maximize interoperability 

and collaboration in military operations. 

Operational 

Challenges 
Page 25 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Moreover, DOD must successfully persuade data owners to accept the 

value of sharing data with a broader audience and to trust the network 

enough to post data. We spoke with several officials in charge of GIG 

programs who acknowledged that facilitating these cultural changes—

particularly with the intelligence community—will be difficult. 

In addition, DOD also faces a formidable task in persuading the military 

services and other users of the network to rely on information technology 

applications and services being developed by the Defense Information 

Systems Agency. This agency has been tasked with developing and 

providing key voice, video, and data connectivity through core enterprise 

services for the GIG, such as data query (search or discovery) capabilities 

and information assurance. However, the military services and defense 

agencies have historically been reluctant to rely on the Defense 

Information Systems Agency for these services. We have reported in the 

past that the military services have regularly bypassed Defense 

Information Systems Agency, preferring instead to procure their own 

telecommunications networks and commercial satellites bandwidth 

services because they were dissatisfied with the level of service provided 

by the agency as well as the cost and length of time it took to procure 

these services centrally.23

Building a reliable, secure network that will operate on the move, virtually 

anywhere and provide the necessary information and services to enable 

netcentric military operations presents considerable technical challenges. 

While DOD intends to utilize existing commercial communications and 

networking technologies, which have advanced significantly in recent 

years, the GIG requires DOD to advance a number of key technologies, 

develop a series of complex systems and software, field them without 

delay so schedules for other dependent systems are not disrupted, and 

develop the means to effectively manage and protect the network and its 

data. 

 23 U.S. General Accounting Office, Satellite Communications: Strategic Approach for 

DOD’s Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth, GAO-04-206 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 10, 2003); Defense Networks: Management Information Shortfalls Hinder Defense 

Efforts to Meet DISN Goals, GAO/AIMD-98-202 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1998); and 

Defense IRM: Investments at Risk for DOD Computer Centers, GAO/AIMD-97-39

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 1997). 

Technical Challenges 
Page 26 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

At this time, however, DOD is pushing ahead on several programs with 

immature technologies and with aggressive development and fielding 

schedules. As a result, DOD is at risk of not delivering required capabilities 

within budgeted resources. This, in turn, may affect schedules and funding 

for other systems depending on the GIG. For example, two key GIGrelated programs—JTRS and TSAT—are facing schedule and performance 

risks, which are largely rooted in attempts to move these programs into 

product development without sufficient knowledge that their technologies 

can work as intended. In March 2004, we reported that none of the 20 

critical hardware and software technologies for the Army’s initial JTRS 

radio development for ground vehicles and helicopters were sufficiently 

mature according to best practice standards.24 When product development 

began in June 2002, the Army determined that while many of the 

technologies within the program had been used in other radio 

applications, they could not be assessed as mature because they had not 

been integrated into a complex radio, such as JTRS. Mature backup 

technologies exist for some critical technologies, but program officials 

have cautioned that substituting them could complicate integration or 

result in degraded performance. Moreover, the program recently 

experienced a 4-month schedule slip that officials attribute to short-term 

technology deviations affecting size, weight, and power requirements for 

the radio sets. Further, the program entered product development with an 

ambitious schedule that program officials recognized as high risk. In 

particular, the program has a compressed test and evaluation phase that 

leaves little room for error and rework. 

We also recently reported that the TSAT program entered into product 

development with only one of its six critical technologies sufficiently 

mature. The remaining five technologies are not expected to reach 

maturity until 2006. Backup technologies exist for three of the five 

immature technologies, but they would degrade system performance. The 

other technology—single access laser communications—has no backup 

and program officials indicated any delay in maturing this technology 

 24 GAO has conducted a body of work on best practices and found that programs managed 

within a knowledge-based approach—where levels of product knowledge are 

demonstrated at critical points during development—are better positioned to deliver 

superior performance within cost and schedule estimates. For example, a match between 

program requirements and resources (mature technology, time, and funding) at the start of 

product development is particularly important. A high level of technology, time, and 

funding) at the start of product development is particularly important. A high level of 

technology maturity means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 

requirements have been demonstrated in their intended environment. 
Page 27 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

would cause the first satellite launch date to slip significantly. DOD 

believes it has adequate measures to mitigate these risks, however, 

concern over TSAT technology readiness led the Air Force to schedule an 

interim review for November 2004, which will determine whether the 

program’s technology development has progressed sufficiently or whether 

alternative action should be taken. 

Similar risks extend to the systems that must be integrated with the GIG 

and on which DOD is dependent for achieving its vision for netcentric 

warfare. For example, our review of the Future Combat Systems 

determined that the program is at significant risk, in part because more 

than 75 percent of its critical technologies were immature at the start of 

development and many will not be sufficiently mature until the production 

decision.25 First prototypes for the systems that make up the Future 

Combat Systems will not be delivered until just before the production 

decision, and full demonstration of the Future Combat Systems’ ability to 

work and meet its goals will not occur until after production has begun. If 

the lessons learned from best practices and the experiences of past 

programs have any bearing, the Future Combat Systems program is likely 

to encounter “late-cycle churn,” a phrase used by private industry to 

describe the discovery of significant problems late in development and the 

resulting search for fixes when costs are high and time is short. 

Networking, network management, and secure network management 

challenges are considerable.26 Currently, mobile networking is limited, 

mainly to narrowband, fixed infrastructures, and relatively stable user 

groups. The GIG network will require new wideband waveforms that can 

handle the expected high data rates, throughput of information, and ability 

to transmit integrated voice, data, and video simultaneously. In addition, 

dynamic networking capabilities that can automatically adjust to changing 

circumstances, such as intrusions or node failures, are needed; however, 

 25 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat 

Systems’ Features, Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2004).

26 GAO has defined five categories of cybersecurity controls: (1) access control; (2) system 

integrity; (3) cryptography; (4) audit and monitoring; and (5) configuration management 

and assurance, that can help as safeguards and countermeasures to protect agencies’ 

information technology networks such as the GIG network. Agencies such as DOD can use 

network management to control and monitor networks to obtain status data from 

components, make configuration changes, and alert network managers to problems. See 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Technologies to Secure Federal 

Systems, GAO-04-467 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).
Page 28 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

the scalability of network management technologies for a network like the 

GIG with such a large number of nodes is unproven. To facilitate timely 

and prioritized access to information from a wide variety of sources, the 

network will require enhanced quality of service mechanisms and 

algorithms to manage bandwidth allocation and handle the flow of 

information and security. Furthermore, advances will be needed in several 

other technological areas, such as antennas, power sources, and the 

miniaturization of components to facilitate mobile communications. For 

example, current antennas do not support all of the portions of the radio 

frequency spectrum where the GIG network will operate and are limited to 

specific communications waveforms. Advanced multiband antennas will 

be needed to support mobile and simultaneous communications across 

different portions of the spectrum. 

Integrating other elements of the network will also be challenging. The 

increased bandwidth capability provided by the GIG-BE program may not 

be fully realized if the military services and defense agencies do not use 

compatible technologies and protocols in upgrading their networks. Even 

if the technologies and protocols are compatible, bandwidth may be 

limited if these networks are not properly designed and integrated to 

manage voice, data, and imagery transmissions. Network management 

policies may pose challenges if common agreement cannot be reached 

across the military services and defense agencies on standards and 

information assurance requirements. For example, DOD and the 

intelligence community have not yet reached agreement on how they will 

exchange information and verify security credentials on the GIG network. 

Information assurance itself may be one of the most critical challenges 

facing DOD. While building a network based on Internet protocols is 

expected by DOD to provide a more viable path to achieve interoperability 

and enable more dynamic and flexible information sharing, it also exposes 

DOD to the same vulnerabilities that face all users of the Internet, and it 

increases the opportunity for potential attackers with limited knowledge 

and technical skills to cause a great deal of damage. Establishing network 

and system security safeguards—such as firewalls, identifying the sender 

and recipient of information, protecting information from unauthorized 

access, and safeguarding data to prevent accidental and deliberate 

alterations—will be essential but difficult given the size the network and 

the thousands of systems and users that will be linked to it. 
Page 29 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Moreover, if the network is to be used to provide warfighters on the move 

with access to intelligence and other sensitive information on demand, 

information will need to be encrypted to safeguard data from misuse.27

However, the technologies needed to secure communications, such as 

software programmable encryption devices are still in their infancy. 

Further, the complexity and magnitude of enabling hundreds of systems 

and applications to operate in a secure, Web-based environment will 

require careful planning and coordination. Comprehensive plans will be 

needed to ensure that sensitive data and communications are safeguarded 

across diverse platforms. This will require DOD to identify sensitive data 

as well as applications, databases, storage subsystems, and media used to 

process and store the data. Once systems have been examined, data 

access models must be applied to determine proper security levels for 

information and how integration can occur across platforms without 

disrupting network and near-real time operations. No one security solution 

likely will address GIG requirements. 

Lastly, the enterprise information services planned for the GIG pose timing 

challenges. For example, in the near-term, DOD has established a goal to 

complete the transition to Internet Protocol Version 6 by fiscal year 2008. 

According DOD officials, the commercial industry may not be able to 

provide the necessary products for Internet Protocol Version 6 by the 

targeted milestone. Also, the transition will not be completed until a Joint 

Staff developed set of performance and technical criteria can be met. In 

addition, because of the enormous amount of data that will become 

available, new data fusion methods will need to be developed to help users 

rapidly identify, access, and make sense of available information. 

DOD is depending on the GIG to enable a fundamental transformation in 

the way military operations are conducted. While DOD’s vision of the GIG 

is compelling, the breadth and depth of the GIG and DOD’s objectives for 

netcentric warfare, present enormous challenges and risks—many of 

which have not been successfully overcome in smaller-scale efforts and 

many of which require significant changes in DOD’s culture. Moreover, 

even though DOD has begun to make heavy investments to implement the 

new network and to ask the military services to accept its vision for the 

GIG, important questions as to how DOD will make the GIG a reality and 

 27 Cryptographic transformation involves altering data into a form that conceals that data’s 

original meaning to prevent it from being known or used. 

Conclusions 
Page 30 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

how it will oversee progress as a whole and ensure the GIG is providing an 

adequate return on DOD’s investment are only just beginning to be 

addressed, leaving DOD at risk of making investments that may not fit in 

with its vision for the future. Moreover, many new weapon systems and 

sensors, which are costing DOD tens of billions of dollars, are critically 

dependent on the future network to successfully achieve their own 

capabilities. Any disruptions in the schedule for key systems that support 

the network, therefore, can have significant ramifications. As such, it is 

important that DOD ensure it has sufficient knowledge about these 

systems (e.g., requirements, technologies, security) as it makes additional 

commitments to them and that it has effective risk mitigation plans to 

ensure that they can deliver promised capability on time. Our future work, 

therefore, will assess DOD’s progress in addressing these challenges in 

more depth as well as its progress in managing key acquisitions related to 

the GIG. 

DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report that we 

incorporated where appropriate. 

We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Director of the Defense 

Information Systems Agency, and interested congressional committees. 

We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3519, Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4859, or John Oppenheim 

at (202) 512-3111. Other individuals making key contributions to this 

report are Lily Chin, Arturo Holguin, and Yvonne Vigil. 

Robert E. Levin 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Agency Comments 
Appendix I: Policies, Standards, and Guidance 

to Implement the Global Information Grid 

Page 31 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Table 5: Selected Global Information Grid Policies, Standards, and Guidance (2000 to 2004) 

Policy/guidance Key Objectives 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Memorandum, August 24, 2000 

(No. 4-8460) 

Subject: DOD CIO Guidance and Policy on 

GIG Networks 

This policy establishes the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) as DOD’s 

networking capability for the transfer of information in support of military operation in the 

context of the Global Information Grid (GIG). It further specifies that DISN shall be the 

means for wide-area and metropolitan-area networking unless granted a waiver through 

the DISN/GIG waiver board. 

Department of Defense Directive 

8000.1, February 27, 2002 

Subject: Management of DOD Information 

Resources and Information Technology 

This directive establishes policies for DOD information resources management, including 

information technology, and delineates, authorities, duties, and responsibilities for DOD 

information resources management activities. It also provides direction on establishing 

Chief Information Officers at various levels. 

Department of Defense Instruction 

4630.8, May 2, 2002 

Subject: Procedures for Interoperability 

and Supportability of Information 

Technology and National Security 

Systems 

This instruction implements an approach that considers both materiel (acquisition or 

procurement) and nonmateriel (doctrine, organizational, training, leadership, and 

personnel) aspects to ensure life-cycle interoperability and supportability of information 

technology and national security systems throughout DOD. It also implements an 

outcome-based, mission area focused process whereby information technology and 

national security systems interoperability and supportability requirements for new, 

modified, and fielded systems are documented, coordinated, implemented, verified, and 

approved to achieve an integrated, and secure information technology and national 

security systems infrastructure supporting global operations across the peace-conflict 

spectrum. 

Department of Defense Directive 8100.1, 

September 19, 2002 

Subject: GIG Overarching Policy 

The directive states that the GIG shall support all DOD missions with information 

technology, for national security systems, joint operations, joint task force, and/or 

combined-task for commands in a manner that offers the most effective, efficient, and 

assured information handling capabilities available, consistent with national military 

strategy, operational requirements, and best-value enterprise-level business practices. 

Department of Defense Directive 8500.1, 

October 24, 2002 

Subject: Information Assurance 

The policy assigns responsibilities to achieve DOD information assurance through a 

defense-in-depth approach that integrates the capabilities of personnel, operations, and 

technology, and supports the evolution to network- centric warfare. 

Department of Defense Instruction 

8500.2, February 6, 2003 

Subject: Information Assurance 

Implementation 

The instructions implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures 

for applying integrated, layered protection of the DOD information systems and networks 

referenced in DOD Directive 8500.1. 

Department of Defense 

Memorandum, July 7, 2003 

Subject: End-to-End Information 

Assurance for the Global Information Grid 

The policy establishes a goal to converge voice, video, and data traffic over DOD’s internetwork and the National Security Agency (NSA) as lead in developing the information 

assurance component of the GIG architecture. 

Department of Defense Memorandum, 

September 29, 2003 

Subject: Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) 

Interim Transition Guidance 

The policy establishes a goal of transitioning all DOD networking to the next generation of 

Internet Protocol, IPv6, by fiscal year 2008. As part of this transition, the strategy will be 

to minimize costs by ensuring products and systems procured, acquired, or in 

development after October 1, 2003, are capable of operating in IPv6 networks. 

Appendix I: Policies, Standards, and 

Guidance to Implement the Global 

Information Grid 
Appendix I: Policies, Standards, and Guidance 

to Implement the Global Information Grid 

Page 32 GAO-04-858 Global Information Grid 

Policy/guidance Key Objectives 

Department of Defense, Office of the Chief 

Information Officer Memorandum, October 

24, 2003 

Subject: DOD Net-Centric Data Strategy 

The policy establishes a DOD-wide goal to institutionalize the practice of identifying all 

data assets on the GIG by fiscal year 2008. Information will be provided on each data 

asset to standardize the way data are described and used for all IT and national security 

systems. This practice will enable DOD to create tools to query data assets across 

platforms. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Memorandum, November 10, 2003 

Subject: GIG Enterprise Services 

Implementation 

The policy establishes a program to begin the development of core enterprise services 

within the GIG as part of the fiscal year 2006 program review process. Core enterprise 

services—such as messaging, collaboration, services management, security, discovery, 

and mediation—are to be developed to provide access and the delivery of data and 

services across the department. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 

CJCSI 6212.01C, November 20, 2003 

Subject: Interoperability and Supportability 

of Information Technology and National 

Security Systems 

This instruction establishes polices and procedures for developing, evaluating and 

providing interoperability and supportability certification in support of the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System for acquisition category, nonacquisition category 

and fielded capabilities. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 

CJCSI 3170.01D, March 12, 2004 

Subject: Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development Systems 

This instruction establishes the policies and procedures of the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System. Procedures established in this instruction support 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in 

identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Memorandum, March 22, 2004 

Subject: Information Technology Portfolio 

Management 

This policy assigns responsibilities for managing information technology investments as 

portfolios. It also establishes that decisions on what information technology investments 

to make, modify or terminate shall be based on architectures, risk tolerance levels, 

potential returns, outcome goals, and performance. 

Department of Defense Directive 

8100.2, April 14, 2004 

Subject: Use of Commercial Wireless 

Devices, Services, and Technologies in 

the Department of Defense Global 

Information Grid 

This policy assigns responsibilities for the use of commercial wireless devices, services, 

and technologies in the DOD Global Information Grid. It also directs the development and 

use of a knowledge management process to promote the sharing of wireless technology 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and vulnerability mitigation strategies throughout DOD and 

promotes joint interoperability using open standards throughout DOD for commercial 

wireless services, devices, and technological implementations. 

Department of Defense Directive 

4630.5, May 5, 2004 

Subject: Interoperability and Supportability 

of Information Technology and National 

Security Systems 

The directive updates DOD responsibilities for interoperability and supportability of 

information technology, including national security systems, and implements DOD Chief 

Information Officer’s responsibilities. It also defines a capability-focused, effects-based 

approach to advance information technology and national security systems 

interoperability and supportability across DOD and establishes the Net-Ready Key 

Performance Parameter to assess net-ready attributes required for both the technical 

exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange. 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis). 

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