United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2497

___________

George Deretich, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

City of St. Francis; St. Francis City *

Council Members from 1980 until *

the present; Steven Braastad; Robert *

Patterson; Raymond Steinke; Dale * Appeals from the United States

Frederikson; Carol Berg; Walt Hiller; * District Court for the

William Hawkins, individually and in * District of Minnesota.

his representative capacity of St. *

Francis City Attorney; Mateffy * [UNPUBLISHED]

Engineering & Associates, Inc., *

individually and in its representative *

capacity of St. Francis City Engineer; *

Sharon Fulkerson, individually and in *

her representative capacity of St. *

Francis City Clerk; Stephen M. Klein, *

individually and in his representative *

capacity of St. Francis City Planner; *

Marvin E. Gustafson; Burke and *

Hawkins; Barna, Guzy Merrill, Hynes, *

and Giancolo, Ltd.; Richard Merrill; *

Steffen, Munstenteiger, Bearse, Beens, *

Parta, and Peterson; Ronald Peterson; *

Lester Mateffy; First National Bank of *

Anoka; Steve Schmitt, individually and *

in his representative capacity of First *

National Bank of Anoka Commercial *
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Loan Officer; Gramont Corporation, *

a Minnesota corporation, *

*

Appellees, *

*

v. *

*

Deretich & Timmons, P.A., *

*

Third Party Defendant, *

*

--------------------- *

*

City of St. Francis; Steven Braastad; *

Robert Patterson; Raymond Steinke; *

Dale Frederikson; Carol Berg; Walt *

Hiller; Sharon Fulkerson; Stephen M. *

Klein; William Hawkins; Burke and *

Hawkins; Steffen, Munstenteiger, *

Bearse, Beens, Parta, and Peterson; *

Ronald Peterson; Marvin E. *

Gustafson; Gramont Corporation; First *

National Bank of Anoka; Steve *

Schmitt; Richard Merrill; Barna, Guzy *

Merrill, Hynes, and Giancolo; *

Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.; Risk *

Enterprise Mgt.; Minnesota Lawyers *

Mutual Insurance; Richard Merrill, as *

Trustee of the Estate of Marvin E. *

Gustafson, *

*

Appellees, *

*
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v. *

*

George Deretich; Mary Timmons *

Sarazin, also known as Mary E. *

Timmons, *

*

Appellants. *

___________ 

 

No. 97-3925 

___________ 

Mateffy Engineering & Associates, *

Inc., suing as Mateffy Engineering, *

Inc.; Estate of Leslie H. Mateffy, Jr., *

*

Appellees, *

*

v. *

*

George Deretich; Mary Sarazin *

Timmons, also known as Mary E. *

Timmons, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

 Submitted: May 7, 1998

 Filed: June 19, 1998

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Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________
The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of 1

Minnesota.

The Honorable Edward J. Devitt, late a United States District Judge for the

2

District of Minnesota.

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PER CURIAM.

In separate actions, Mateffy Engineering, Inc. and the Estate of Leslie H.

Mateffy, Jr. (Mateffy), and the City of St. Francis and related parties (St. Francis)

sought to renew a judgment entered in 1986 against George Deretich and Mary

Timmons Sarazin (collectively defendants). The district court renewed the judgment 1

in each action, and defendants now separately appeal those orders. As both appeals

necessitate resolution of the same issue of law, we address both in this opinion.

The judgment St. Francis and Mateffy sought to renew arose from a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action brought against them by defendants in 1983. The district court had

2

dismissed that action as frivolous and granted attorneys& fees and costs to Mateffy and

St. Francis. This court affirmed, and assessed appeal costs against defendants; the

district court amended its prior judgment of costs to include those assessed by this

court, entering the amended judgment on December 23, 1986.

Defendants did not satisfy the judgment. In September 1996, St. Francis

brought an action to renew and extend the judgment, and on December 9, 1996,

Mateffy brought a similar action. The district court concluded that it had ancillary

jurisdiction over the actions, rejected defendants& assertion that Mateffy&s action was

time-barred, and renewed the judgment as to each plaintiff for ten years.

Defendants argue in both appeals that the district court erred in concluding that

it had ancillary jurisdiction to renew the judgment. Specifically, they argue that

although this action involves a debt on a judgment entered in federal court, the action
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arises independently under state law (i.e., it is an independent contract action) and thus

cannot confer jurisdiction on the federal court. St. Francis and Mateffy both maintain

that the court did not err in determining that it had ancillary jurisdiction, because a

federal court retains jurisdiction to enforce its own judgments. 

We conclude that the district court properly exercised its ancillary jurisdiction

to renew the judgment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 85 F.3d 372,

375 (8th Cir. 1996) (district court&s finding of jurisdiction is reviewed de novo). A

federal court may assert ancillary jurisdiction “to enable a court to function

successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate

its decrees.” See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80

(1994). To this end, the Supreme Court has approved the use of ancillary jurisdiction

“over a broad range of supplementary proceedings . . . to assist in the protection and

enforcement of federal judgments--including attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and

the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.” See Peacock v. Thomas, 516

U.S. 349, 356 (1996). Such jurisdiction, however, may not extend “beyond attempts

to execute, or to guarantee eventual executability of, a federal judgment.” Id. at 357.

Because St. Francis&s and Mateffy&s actions to renew the district court judgment sought

simply to maintain its viability, not to extend its effect beyond the underlying judgment,

these actions fall within the range of actions brought to “guarantee eventual

executability” of a federal judgment. 

Defendants also argue that Mateffy&s action was time-barred. Under Minnesota

law, an action to renew a judgment must be commenced within ten years after the entry

of such judgment. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.04 (West 1988) (statute of limitations);

In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 724 n.20 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993). Defendants assert that

the district court should have applied Minnesota procedural law to this state-law

renewal action, that under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 3.01 an action is not

commenced until service, and that they were not served until January 1997. We review

de novo the district court&s determination that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3
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governed Mateffy&s action, and thus that the action was timely, and conclude the court

did not err. See Cortese v. United States , 782 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1986)

(determination regarding whether state or federal law governs action is question of law;

reviewing de novo). 

In diversity actions where the underlying cause of action is based on state law,

federal courts apply state procedural law; thus, state law dictates the appropriate statute

of limitations as well as the commencement of an action. See Walker v. Armco Steel

Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-53 (1980). In actions brought in federal court based on a

federal question, however, “[t]his requirement, naturally, does not apply.” See West

v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 & n.4 (1987) (holding that even though statute of

limitations was borrowed from another federal statute, Rule 3--and not commencement

rule found in statute from which limitations period was borrowed--applied to action);

cf. Henderson v. United States, 116 U.S. 1638, 1640-42, 1648 (1996) (in actions

arising under federal law, “commenced in compliance with the governing statute of

limitations, the manner and timing of serving process are generally nonjurisdictional

matters of #procedure& controlled by the Federal Rules”; concluding Fed. R. Civ. P. 4

superseded Suits in Admiralty Act provision mandating service in shorter period of

time). 

Although Mateffy&s renewal action is not itself a federal-question action, the very

basis for exercising ancillary jurisdiction over it is its close affinity to the underlying

federal-question action. We thus conclude that the same procedural law--federal--

applies to both actions. Under Rule 3, Mateffy&s action was commenced on December

9, 1996, within ten years of the December 23, 1986 judgment it sought to renew, and

was thus timely.

Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.