Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Commerce, Justice, State, and the 

Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

August 2004 FBI 

TRANSFORMATION 

Data Inconclusive on 

Effects of Shift to 

CounterterrorismRelated Priorities on 

Traditional Crime 

Enforcement 

GAO-04-1036 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1036.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand 

at (202) 512-8777 or esktrandl@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-1036, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 

State, and the Judiciary and Related 

Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives 

August 2004

FBI TRANSFORMATION

Data Inconclusive on Effects of Shift to 

Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on 

Traditional Crime Enforcement 

The data GAO examined are inconclusive about the effect of the shifts in the 

FBI’s priorities after September 11 on federal efforts to combat drug, whitecollar, and violent crime. As the figure below shows, indicators are mixed on 

the effect of the FBI shift on federal drug, white-collar, and violent crime 

enforcement. Further, GAO’s analyses should be cautiously viewed as shortterm indicators that are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. 

Inconclusive data on effects of shift to counterterrorism-related priorities 

Drug enforcement

White-collar crime enforcement Violent crime enforcement

 FBI and DEA new matters

down

10%

down

6%

(but may be

more complex)

 FBI and DEA agentsa

down

13%

(but DEA is filling

new positions)

 Referrals to U.S. Attorneys

 by all federal agencies

 Referrals to U.S. Attorneys

 by all federal agencies

Views of practitioners on effects are mixed

up

 29%

 Referrals to U.S. Attorneys

 by all federal agencies

down

2%

FBI's shift in 

priorities after 

September 11 

has had an 

indeterminate 

effect on federal 

drug, whitecollar, and 

violent crime 

enforcement

Source: GAO.

a

Includes only nonsupervisory field agent positions directly focused on investigations. 

Data GAO examined on federal drug enforcement efforts did not show a 

conclusive effect of the FBI’s shift in agent resources to priority areas. GAO 

found that combined FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field agent resources 

decreased by about 10 percent since September 11 but that DEA is expecting 

significant increases in positions over the next 2 fiscal years. The combined 

number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 

10 percent since 2001, from 22,736 matters in fiscal year 2001, which ended 

just after September 11, to 20,387 matters in fiscal year 2003. This decline 

may be attributed, at least in part, to an increased emphasis on cases 

targeting major drug organizations rather than to fewer investigative 

resources. In addition, referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all 

federal sources decreased about 2 percent. 

Similarly, data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to combat 

white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI’s shift in priorities. For 

example, while the number of white-collar crime referrals from federal 

agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent, from 12,792 in fiscal 

year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003, violent crime referrals from all federal 

sources have increased by about 29 percent, from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 

to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003. 

Views of law enforcement practitioners GAO interviewed were mixed on the 

effect of the FBI’s shift in resources on drug, white-collar, and violent crime 

enforcement efforts. Although these views are not representative of all 

practitioners, some did not think the FBI’s shift had a significant impact on 

these crime enforcement efforts in their communities, while others said that 

drug, white-collar and violent-crime investigations had suffered. 

As a result of the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 

committed to a transformation to 

increase its focus on national 

security. The FBI has shifted agent 

resources to its top priorities of 

counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, and cyber 

crime. Some of these agent 

resources were shifted away from 

drug, white-collar, and violent 

crime enforcement programs. The 

FBI’s drug program has sustained, 

by far, the largest reduction in FBI 

agent workforce—about 550 

positions, or more than 80 percent 

of the nonsupervisory field agents 

who were permanently 

reprogrammed. In addition, the FBI 

has had a continuing need to 

temporarily redirect agents from 

drug, white-collar, and violent 

crime enforcement to address 

counterterrorism-related workload 

demands. While GAO and other 

organizations have focused 

considerable attention on the 

progress of the FBI’s 

transformation, this report 

addresses questions about the 

extent to which the shift in 

resources has affected federal 

efforts to combat drug, whitecollar, and violent crime and 

whether other agencies, including 

the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) in the drug 

enforcement area, are filling gaps 

created by FBI resource shifts. 
Page i GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

No Conclusive Effect on Federal Drug Enforcement Resulting from 

FBI Agent Resource Shifts because Results Are Mixed and 

Available Data Have Limitations 9

Our Analysis Did Not Identify Conclusive Effect on Federal WhiteCollar and Violent Crime Enforcement Resulting from FBI 

Priority Shifts 18

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24 

Appendix II FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions 

and Work Years 27 

Appendix III Decreases in FBI’s Newly Opened Drug, White-Collar 

and Violent Crime Matters Since September 11, 2001 30 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33 

GAO Contacts 33

Acknowledgments 33

Table 

Table 1: Field Locations and Agencies We Visited 25

Figures 

Figure 1: Increase in Nonsupervisory FBI Field Agent Positions 

Allocated to Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and 

Cyber Crime Programs 6

Figure 2: FBI Field Agent Nonsupervisory Agent Positions 

Allocated and Agent Work Years Charged to the 

Counterterrorism Program Increased after September 11 7

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 3: The FBI’s Newly Opened Counterterrorism Matters 

Increased after September 11 8

Figure 4: DEA Special Agent Resources Are the Major Portion of 

the Combined FBI and DEA Domestic Drug Enforcement 

Program 10

Figure 5: Number of Newly Opened FBI and DEA Drug Matters 

Decreased About 10 Percent from Fiscal Year 2001 to 

Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2004 13

Figure 6: Referrals of Drug Matters to U.S. Attorneys by FBI and 

DEA and All Federal Agencies Slightly Decreased (Fiscal 

Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2003) 15

Figure 7: Referrals of White-Collar Crime Matters from All Federal 

Agencies Decreased About 6 Percent since September 11 19

Figure 8: Referrals of Violent Crime Matters from All Federal 

Agencies to U.S. Attorneys for Prosecution Increased 22 

Percent 20

Figure 9: FBI Drug Program Agent Positions and Work Years 27

Figure 10: FBI White-Collar Crime Program Agent Positions and 

Work Years 28

Figure 11: FBI Violent Crime Program Agent Positions and Work 

Years 29

Figure 12: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI Drug Matters 30

Figure 13: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI White-Collar Matters 31

Figure 14: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI Violent Crime Matters 32

Abbreviations

ATF Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

CPOT Consolidated Priority Organization Targeting 

CRS Congressional Research Service 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

EOUSA Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

August 31, 2004 

The Honorable Frank Wolf 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, 

 and the Judiciary and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the dual mission of 

protecting national security and combating traditional crimes such as 

drug, white-collar, and violent crime. As a result of the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI committed to transforming itself to 

strengthen its ability to combat terrorism. One of the goals of the FBI’s 

transformation efforts was to shift its investigative resources to increase 

its focus on its national security mission. 

As we have previously reported, the FBI’s recent focus on its top priorities 

of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime has required a 

continuous shift in resources away from drug, white-collar, and violent 

crime enforcement, despite additional appropriations to hire special 

agents in priority areas. Drug enforcement has sustained, by far, the 

largest reduction in FBI agent workforce. 

While GAO and other organizations, for example, the Congressional 

Research Service (CRS) and the National Academy of Public 

Administration, have focused considerable attention on the progress of the 

FBI’s transformation efforts,1

 we have also had questions about the extent 

to which the shift in resources has affected federal efforts to combat 

traditional crimes that were a significant portion of the FBI’s caseload 

 1

Testimonies and reports on FBI’s transformation efforts include GAO, FBI 

Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and 

Address Priorities, GAO-04-578T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004); GAO, FBI 

Organization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, 

GAO-03-759T (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003); and Congressional Research Service, FBI 

Intelligence Reform since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, 

(Washington, D.C., April 6, 2004), and Testimony of the Chairman of the National Academy 

of Public Administration on FBI Reorganization (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

before the terrorist attacks. Questions have been raised about the effect, if 

any, that the FBI’s shift in resources into priority areas may have had on 

the enforcement of drug, white-collar, and violent crimes and whether 

other federal agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are filling gaps created as a result of 

the FBI resource shift. 2

To assist with its oversight responsibilities, the House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary and Related 

Agencies has requested that we study the effects FBI’s shift to its new 

priorities has had on enforcement of selected traditional crimes. To assess 

overall impacts of the FBI’s shift in resources, this report examines the 

following issues: (1) How has FBI’s shift in agent resources since 

September 11 affected federal efforts to combat drug crime? (2) How has 

FBI’s shift in priorities affected federal efforts to combat white-collar and 

violent crime? 

To examine the effect of FBI’s post-September 11 shift in resources to 

national security priorities on federal efforts to combat domestic drug 

crime, we analyzed data related to (1) the combined nonsupervisory field 

agent resources devoted to drug enforcement by the FBI and DEA3

; (2) the 

number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters; (3) the number of 

drug matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 

for prosecution. We also conducted semistructured interviews to 

determine what impacts, if any, selected headquarters and field law 

enforcement officials4

 have observed. To examine the effect of the FBI’s 

post-September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat white-collar 

and violent crime, we analyzed data indicating the number of such matters 

referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution from the FBI and all 

other federal agencies. In addition, we included in our semistructured 

interview for law enforcement officials questions related to impacts 

observed, if any, on violent and white-collar crime caseloads and 

 2

DEA is the nation’s single-mission drug enforcement agency, which referred almost half of 

all of the federal drug matters referred to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution in fiscal year 2003. 

3

We focused the analysis on nonsupervisory field special agent positions because these 

positions are directly involved in investigations, while supervisors, managers, and 

headquarters agents often have noninvestigative responsibilities in addition to their 

investigative duties. 

4

We interviewed officials of FBI, DEA, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, local police departments, 

and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
Page 3 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

enforcement activities. The interviewees, although working in locations 

that experienced some of the sharpest reductions in FBI drug program 

resources, are not representative of all locations or even of all of those 

locations that experienced similar reductions in resources. The data we 

analyzed and interviews with law enforcement officials should be 

considered as short-term indicators with limitations in their ability to 

determine the effect of FBI priority shifts. 

Because the reliability of FBI, DEA, and Executive Office for U.S. 

Attorneys (EOUSA) information management systems data is significant to 

the findings of this review, we also interviewed officials of FBI, DEA, and 

EOUSA to determine what steps they take to assess the accuracy of data 

elements in these systems and what limitations, if any, they have identified 

with the data elements used for our review. We also did a limited 

assessment of the reliability of the data systems used for this report, and 

we determined that the required data elements are sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of this review. 

We performed our work from December 2003 to July 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our scope and 

methodology are discussed in greater detail in appendix I. 

The data we examined are inconclusive as to whether shifts in the FBI’s 

priorities after September 11 have had an effect on overall federal efforts 

to combat drug crime. Combined agent resources from the FBI and DEA 

devoted to drug crime matters have decreased by about 10 percent since 

September 11, with FBI agent resources decreasing and DEA agent 

resources increasing slightly. DEA officials expect to increase current 

resource levels, as they fill new positions authorized in previous budget 

cycles. DEA, however, is pacing the hiring of new agents in an effort to 

manage its growth so that as new special agents come on board, it has the 

necessary infrastructure (i.e., office space, cars, equipment, and training 

resources) to support them. The combined number of newly opened FBI 

and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10 percent since September 

11. A DEA official said, however, that this decrease might be due to an 

increased emphasis on complex, long-term cases that focus on dismantling 

or disrupting major drug organizations rather than from fewer federal drug 

enforcement resources. Referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from 

all federal sources decreased about 2 percent from 22,694 matters in fiscal 

year 2001 to 22,252 matters in fiscal year 2003. Law enforcement officials 

we interviewed expressed mixed perspectives about the impact of the 

FBI’s shift of resources on drug enforcement in their communities. The 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

data we analyzed and the information we obtained from interviews with 

law enforcement officials represent short-term indicators of potential 

effects of the FBI’s transformation on overall federal efforts to combat 

crime and are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. The data 

should be considered with caution in light of their limitations. For 

example, an interviewee noted that it may be too early to determine the 

full impact of the FBI shift out of drug work, since many of the cases now 

being referred to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution were opened by 

investigative agencies before the terrorist attacks occurred. 

Similarly, the data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to 

combat white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI’s shift in 

priorities. Since September 11, the number of white-collar crime referrals 

from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent, 

from 12,792 in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003. Violent crime 

referrals from all federal agencies have increased by about 29 percent, 

from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003. Federal and 

local law enforcement officials we interviewed had mixed views on the 

degree to which the FBI’s shift in resources affected efforts to combat 

white-collar and violent crime. For example, some officials said that the 

FBI was still directing resources where they are needed in critical violent 

and white-collar enforcement efforts, while a prosecutor in another 

location said that white-collar crime enforcement efforts were suffering as 

a result of the FBI’s shift of resources. 

The Department of Justice (Justice) provided technical comments on a 

draft of this report, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, national security, including 

counterterrorism, was a top-tier priority for the FBI. However, this top tier 

combined national security responsibilities with other issues, and the 

FBI’s focus and priorities were not entirely clear. According to a 

Congressional Research Service report, the events of September 11 made 

clear the need to develop a definitive list of priorities.5

 In June 2002, the 

FBI’s director announced 10 priorities. The top 3 priorities were to 

(1) protect the United States from terrorist attack (counterterrorism), 

(2) protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and 

 5

Congressional Research Service, The FBI: Past, Present, and Future (Washington, D.C.: 

October 2, 2003). 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

espionage (counterintelligence), and (3) protect the United States against 

cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes (cyber crime). Whitecollar crime ranked seventh in the priority list, and violent crime ranked 

eighth. Drug crimes that were not part of transnational or national 

criminal organizations were not specifically among the FBI’s top 

10 priorities. 

In June 2003 and March 2004, we testified that a key element of the FBI’s 

reorganization and successful transformation is the realignment of 

resources to better ensure focus on the highest priorities.6

 Since 

September 11, the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of 

its field agents from traditional criminal investigative programs to work on 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. The FBI’s staff 

reprogrammings carried out since September 11 have permanently shifted 

674 field agent positions from the drug, white-collar, and violent crime 

program areas to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. 7

 About 550 of 

these positions (more than 80 percent of the permanently shifted 

positions) came from the FBI’s drug program, with substantially smaller 

reductions from the white-collar and violent crime programs. In addition, 

the FBI established the cyber program. As figure 1 shows, about 

25 percent of the FBI’s field agent positions were allocated to 

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs prior to 

the FBI’s change in priorities. As a result of the staff reprogrammings and 

funding for additional special agent positions received through various 

appropriations between 2002 and 2004, 8

 the FBI staffing levels allocated to 

the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber program areas have 

increased to about 36 percent and now represent the single largest 

concentration of FBI resources. Figure 1 also notes that the number of 

nonsupervisory FBI field agent positions has increased from 10,292 in 

fiscal year 2002 to 11,021 in fiscal year 2004, about 7 percent. 

 6

See GAO-04-578T and GAO 03-759T. 

7

The figure of 674 positions excludes 11 supervisory positions that were returned to the 

drug program. 

8

The FBI has the authority to reprogram funds (i.e., move funds between activities within a 

given account) without notifying the relevant appropriations subcommittees unless a 

specific purpose is prohibited or the amount of the reprogramming exceeds a dollar 

threshold ($500,000 or a 10 percent change in funding level, whichever is less). 
Page 6 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 1: Increase in Nonsupervisory FBI Field Agent Positions Allocated to Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and 

Cyber Crime Programs 

Additionally, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect 

special agent resources from other criminal investigative programs to 

address counterterrorism and other higher-priority needs. The FBI 

continues to redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime 

programs to address the counterterrorism-related workload demands. 

These moves are directly in line with the FBI’s priorities and in keeping 

with its policy that no counterterrorism leads will go unaddressed. Figure 

2 shows that the counterterrorism program continues to rely on resources 

that are temporarily redirected from other crime programs. Appendix 

II contains figures that show the reductions in FBI nonsupervisory field 

agent positions and work years charged to the drug program and, to a 

lesser extent, the white-collar and violent crime programs after 

September 11. 

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Total: 10,292 Total: 10,254

Organized criminal enterprises and drugs

Other field programs

White-collar crime

Counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime

Total: 11,021

24%

27% 24%

25%

18%

25% 24%

33%

18%

24% 23%

36%

2,426

2,814 2,498

2,554 1,858

2,597 2,426

3,373 1,938

2,637 2,487

3,959

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

Gain of 819 Gain of 586

Before shift to new priorities After shift to new priorities
Page 7 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 2: FBI Field Agent Nonsupervisory Agent Positions Allocated and Agent Work Years Charged to the Counterterrorism 

Program Increased after September 11 

As one might expect, the reallocation of resources to align with postSeptember 11 priorities resulted in a significant increase in newly opened 

FBI counterterrorism matters, while the number of newly opened FBI 

drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters declined between fiscal year 

2001 and the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. As shown in figure 3, the 

FBI’s newly opened counterterrorism matters increased by about 

183 percent, from 1,006 matters in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2001 to 

2,850 matters in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003. 

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

6,000

Field agents September 11

FBI activity 

in support of 

Iraqi war effort

FY 2001

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the counterterrorism program

Average number of field agent work years charged to investigating counterterrorism-related matters

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Source: GAO analysis of FBI Time Utilization Record Keeping (TURK) data.

1/26-2/22

2/23-3/22

3/23-4/19

4/20-5/3

5/4-5/31

6/1-6/28

6/29-7/26

7/27-8/23

8/24-9/20

12/29-1/25

10/19-11/15

11/16-12/13

9/21-10/18

1/11-2/7

12/14-1/10

2/8-3/6

3/7-4/3

4/4-5/1

5/2-5/29

11/3-11/30

12/1-12/28

10/6-11/2

8/11-9/7

9/8-10/5

1/27-2/23

2/24-3/23

3/24-4/20

4/21-5/18

5/19-6/15

6/16-7/13

7/14-8/10

12/2-12/29

12/30-1/26

10/7-11/3

11/4-12/1

8/12-9/8

9/9-10/6

5/20-6/16

6/17-7/14

7/15-8/11

8/12-8/25

5/20-5/5

1/28-2/24

2/25-3/24

3/25-4/21

4/22-5/19

12/3-12/30

10/8-11/4

11/5-12/2

0
Page 8 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 3: The FBI’s Newly Opened Counterterrorism Matters Increased after 

September 11 

In contrast, the number of newly opened FBI drug matters declined from 

1,447 in fiscal year 2001 to 587 in fiscal year 2003—a decrease of about 

60 percent. FBI newly opened white-collar and violent crime matters also 

remained below pre-September 11 levels, though the decreases have not 

been as dramatic as those in the drug crime program. The decreases from 

fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003 were about 32 percent in the number of 

newly opened white-collar crime matters and about 40 percent in newly 

opened violent crime matters. See appendix III for figures showing the 

pre- and post-September 11 changes in the FBI’s newly opened drug, 

white-collar, and violent crime matters. 

Also, as expected with the significant shift in resources to address national 

security priorities, the FBI’s referrals of counterterrorism matters to U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution have increased since September 11, 

while referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters have 

decreased. In fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, 2001, 

the FBI referred 236 counterterrorism matters to U.S. Attorneys for 

prosecution. In fiscal year 2003, the FBI referred 1,821 of these matters to 

U.S. Attorneys, an increase of about 671 percent. At the same time, FBI 

referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters decreased about 

39 percent, 23 percent, and 10 percent respectively. 

2nd

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

12,000

Number of newly opened counterterrorism matters

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 1st

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

1st 2nd 3rd

FY 2004

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

September 11

993 1,232 1,006

2,667

2,196 2,472

2,943 3,350 3,255

2,850

3,517

2,812 2,893

4,408

1,092

quarter quarter quarter quarter

FBI activity

in support of

Iraqi war effort
Page 9 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

We could not conclusively identify an effect on federal drug enforcement 

resulting from the FBI’s shift in resources after September 11, because 

results of our analyses were mixed and the data we used had limitations. 

While the number of FBI nonsupervisory field agents assigned to the drug 

program decreased by more than 40 percent after September 11, the 

decrease in the number of combined FBI and DEA field agents assigned to 

drug work was about 10 percent because the number of DEA field agent 

positions increased slightly. Further, DEA, the lead agency for federal drug 

enforcement, is continuing to increase its resources as positions 

appropriated by Congress in prior fiscal years are filled. The combined 

number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 

10 percent since September 11. However, the combined number of 

referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal sources 

decreased about 2 percent. Finally, law enforcement officials from the 

FBI, DEA, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and local police departments that we 

interviewed had mixed views on whether the FBI’s shift of resources had 

an impact on drug enforcement in their communities. The data we 

analyzed and interviews with law enforcement officials should be 

considered short-term indicators with some limitations in their ability to 

depict the complete impact of FBI priority changes. 

As figure 4 shows, the combined number of FBI and DEA nonsupervisory 

field agent positions has decreased about 10 percent since the terrorist 

attacks, from about 4,500 nonsupervisory field agents at the end of fiscal 

year 2001 to about 4,000 field agent positions in the second quarter of 

fiscal year 2004.9

 The decrease has not been more pronounced because 

DEA, as the nation’s single-mission drug enforcement agency, has devoted 

more resources to domestic drug enforcement than has the FBI in both 

pre- and post-September 11 periods. As the number of FBI nonsupervisory 

field special agents assigned to drug program investigations has decreased 

from about 1,400 in fiscal year 2001 to about 800 in fiscal year 2004, the 

number of DEA nonsupervisory field agents has increased slightly. These 

DEA positions increased from a little less than 3,100 positions in fiscal 

year 2001 to a little more than 3,200 positions in the second quarter of 

 9

These agent positions do not represent the total FBI and DEA special agent positions 

because in an effort to focus on positions directly involved in investigations, we did not 

include headquarters and supervisory field agents in our analysis. 

No Conclusive Effect 

on Federal Drug 

Enforcement 

Resulting from FBI 

Agent Resource Shifts 

because Results Are 

Mixed and Available 

Data Have Limitations 

Combined FBI and DEA 

Drug Program Agent 

Resources Have 

Decreased, but More DEA 

Positions Are Planned 
Page 10 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

fiscal year 200410. DEA devoted about twice as many agent resources as 

the FBI did to domestic drug enforcement before the terrorist attacks, and 

the DEA share of the combined FBI and DEA domestic drug enforcement 

agent resources has continued to increase since then. 

Figure 4: DEA Special Agent Resources Are the Major Portion of the Combined FBI 

and DEA Domestic Drug Enforcement Program 

a

This includes the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004 

A Department of Justice official noted that Justice has pursued the goal of 

increasing agent strength, and the DEA domestic drug operations chief 

said that he expects the number of DEA domestic drug agents to increase 

significantly over the next 2 fiscal years, when positions already 

appropriated by Congress are filled. According to the chief, DEA expects 

to fill 216 new special agent positions appropriated in fiscal year 2003 by 

the end of fiscal year 2004. The agency plans to fill 365 additional positions 

 10Because DEA’s resource management system does not distinguish between supervisory 

and nonsupervisory agents, in consultation with DEA, we subtracted 15 percent of DEA’s 

total domestic drug enforcement agent positions as an estimate of the number of field 

supervisory and managerial positions 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

FY 2004a FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

Agent positions

Source: GAO analysis of DEA and FBI data. 

DEA

FBI

September 11

4,497

1,423 1,379

863 826

3,074 3,075

3,090 3,213

4,454

3,953 4,039
Page 11 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

appropriated in fiscal year 2004 during fiscal year 2005. Thus, in fiscal year 

2005, the combined number of FBI and DEA drug enforcement agent 

resources should exceed the pre-September 11 workforce strength, and in 

fiscal year 2006, the total should continue to increase. In fiscal year 

2005, DEA is requesting 111 additional agent positions for domestic 

enforcement. The chief said that he has worked with FBI and Department 

of Justice officials to determine where to deploy new special agent 

positions allocated since September 11 and that DEA has put additional 

resources in high-threat areas where the FBI had shifted resources out of 

drug enforcement. The chief said that DEA is pacing the hiring of new 

agents in an effort to manage its growth so that as new special agents 

come on board, DEA has the necessary infrastructure, including office 

space, cars, equipment, and training resources, to support them. 

In contrast, the chief of the FBI’s drug section said that FBI officials do not 

foresee a significant increase in the number of agents assigned to drug 

investigations. However, he was not aware of any plans to withdraw 

additional agent resources from the drug program. He also said he was 

hopeful that in future years, as the FBI gained experience and resources 

for its national security-related priorities, fewer temporary diversions of 

special agents from drug work to higher priorities would be necessary. In 

addition, a Justice Department official noted that in fiscal year 2004, FBI 

received additional agent positions funded under the Organized Crime 

Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program, and that additional 

OCDETF field positions were requested for the FBI in the 2005 budget.11 

Since FBI officials do not foresee a significant increase in the number of 

special agents deployed to its drug program, if the trends continue, DEA 

would have an even larger portion of the combined FBI and DEA domestic 

drug program agent resources in the future than it currently has. 

Although the number of the FBI’s newly opened drug matters decreased 

about 60 percent after September 11, the combined decrease in the 

number of FBI and DEA newly opened matters is much smaller—about 

10 percent—because DEA has a much larger drug caseload than the FBI. 

As shown in Figure 5, the FBI and DEA together opened 22,736 domestic 

drug matters in fiscal year 2001, compared with a combined total of 

 11OCDETF is a federal drug enforcement program focusing on disrupting and dismantling 

major drug trafficking organizations. It is made up of 11 federal agencies, as well as state 

and local law enforcement agencies. These special agent positions are not FBI directfunded positions. 

Number of FBI and DEA 

Newly Opened Drug 

Matters Decreased About 

10 Percent after September 

11 
Page 12 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

20,387 domestic drug matters in fiscal year 2003. Assuming that the FBI 

and DEA open new matters at about the same pace in the last two quarters 

of fiscal year 2004 as they did during the first two quarters, fiscal year 

2004 levels of newly opened drug crime matters will be similar to those in 

fiscal year 2003. 

The DEA Chief of Domestic Drug Operations said that he thought the 

decrease in the number of newly opened matters was due in part to an 

increased Department of Justice emphasis on cases targeting major drug 

organizations in its Consolidated Priority Organization Targeting (CPOT) 

initiative rather than reduced federal resources for drug enforcement. He 

said that the policy has resulted in DEA opening fewer cases but that those 

cases have potential to dismantle or disrupt the operations of major drug 

cartels. In commenting on a draft of this report, a Department of Justice 

official more broadly stated that the decrease in newly opened drug 

matters was due to the Justice strategy, which directs resources on 

complex, nationwide investigation of entire drug trafficking networks. 

The networks involve major international sources of supply, including 

those on the Consolidated Priority Organization Target list. 
Page 13 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 5: Number of Newly Opened FBI and DEA Drug Matters Decreased About 10 

Percent from Fiscal Year 2001 to Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2004 

a

This includes the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004. 

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Drug matters

Source: GAO analysis of DEA and FBI data. 

DEA

FBI

September 11

22,736

20,954 20,387

9,882

9,570

1,447

21,289 20,004

19,800

950 587 312
Page 14 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

While the FBI’s referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution 

have decreased about 40 percent, from 2,994 matters to 1,840 matters 

between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003, DEA referrals increased over 

the same period by about 7 percent, from 9,907 matters in fiscal year 

2001 to 10,596 matters in fiscal year 2003. Almost half of the total number 

of drug matters that were referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices came from 

federal agencies other than the FBI and DEA in fiscal year 2003.12 The 

number of referrals from all federal agencies and departments other than 

the FBI and DEA was almost unchanged over the period, with 9,793 

referrals in fiscal year 2001 and 9,816 referrals in fiscal year 2003. 

As figure 6 shows, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices received 22,694 drug offense 

referrals in fiscal year 2001 and 22,252 drug offense referrals in fiscal year 

2003, a decrease of about 2 percent from all federal agencies. The FBI and 

DEA referred 12,901 drug matters to U.S. Attorneys in fiscal year 2001 and 

12,436 drug matters in fiscal year 2003, a decrease of about 4 percent. 

 12Other federal agencies and departments that EOUSA reported as referring large numbers 

of drug matters for prosecution in fiscal year 2003 were the Customs Service (4,949 

matters) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (629 matters). In March 2003, 

after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Customs Service was 

merged and reconstituted into the Bureaus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 

Customs and Border Protection. At the same, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Firearms was transferred from the Department of Treasury to the Department of Justice 

and became the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The EOUSA 

data management system was not changed to reflect these realignments and 

reorganizations, but an official said that efforts are under way to do so. 

Referrals of Drug Crime 

Matters to U.S. Attorneys 

from All Investigative 

Agencies Did Not Change 

Significantly after 

September 11 
Page 15 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 6: Referrals of Drug Matters to U.S. Attorneys by FBI and DEA and All 

Federal Agencies Slightly Decreased (Fiscal Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2003) 

Law enforcement practitioners we interviewed had mixed views about the 

impact of the FBI’s shift in resources on drug enforcement efforts. While 

many interviewees representing each of the locations and criminal justice 

organizations we visited generally described the FBI as a valuable law 

enforcement partner, some of them said that they did not think the FBI’s 

shift in resources had a significant impact on drug enforcement efforts in 

their communities. Other interviewees said that drug investigations have 

suffered as a result of the FBI’s shift in resources to new priority areas. 

For example, officials from 9 of the 14 law enforcement agencies we 

visited said that the FBI did not bring any specialized drug program 

expertise that in most cases could not be supplied by other agencies.13

However, 7 of the 14 interviewees said that there was a significant impact 

on overall drug enforcement efforts in the locations we visited as a result 

 13The 14 interviewees cited do not include the FBI officials we interviewed, all of whom 

said that the FBI brought certain specialized expertise to drug enforcement and that the 

shift in FBI resources out of the drug program had a negative impact on drug enforcement 

efforts. 

Law Enforcement 

Practitioners We 

Interviewed Valued the 

FBI’s Role but Had Mixed 

Views on the Effect of the 

FBI’s Shift in Resources on 

Drug Enforcement Efforts 

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

Number of referrals

Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data. 

 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

FBI and DEA combined

All federal agencies

September 11

22,694

12,901 12,731 12,436

FBI

DEA

FBI

DEA

FBI

DEA

22,763 22,252
Page 16 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

of the FBI’s shift in resources to new priorities. It is important to keep in 

mind that the interviewees, although working in locations that 

experienced some of the sharpest reductions in the FBI drug program 

resources, are not representative of all locations or even of all of those 

locations that experienced similar reductions in resources. 

The following are examples of some of the comments we received from 

law enforcement practitioners who did not think that the shift in the FBI’s 

resources had an impact on drug crime enforcement efforts in their 

communities. 

The DEA are the drug experts here. The FBI does not contribute any special expertise 

or specialized resources that are not available from the DEA. —First Assistant U.S. 

Attorney 

The FBI did not bring lots of agents or special skills and equipment to drug enforcement 

task forces. It brought information sources from legates around the world. Partnerships 

can be rebuilt and remain effective without the same level of FBI participation. —

International Association of Chiefs of Police representative 

In the past it was the FBI that “had it all”—good investigators, money, technical 

equipment—to a greater extent than anybody else. Now DEA and local police 

departments are catching up.” —DEA field division special agent in charge 

The FBI doesn’t bring anything different or special to drug investigations but their 

intelligence and informant system is excellent. Their biggest strength is that they can 

throw manpower and equipment in a crisis for the short term because they have more 

people than the DEA and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) combined. —U.S. 

Attorney 

The FBI shift in focus has had only a minimal impact and resulted in no noticeable 

difference in the number of drug-related cases being investigated and prosecuted. DEA 

has always done more partnering with local police than the FBI, so the diversion of local 

police resources from the narcotics bureaus and divisions to counterterrorism has been 

more of a problem for DEA than has the FBI’s shift. –-DEA field supervisory agent 

We have always done the most work in this area. The FBI often looks to our police 

department for drug expertise. We are the organization that does the most drug crime 

enforcement in this area. —city police department supervisor 

On the other hand, some law enforcement officials said that drug 

investigations have suffered as a result of the FBI shift in resources to new 

priority areas. The following are several of the other comments from law 

enforcement practitioners we interviewed who thought that the FBI’s shift 

in resources had affected efforts to combat crime. 

The FBI’s shift out of drug enforcement is having an impact in this city. We are 

receiving fewer drug referrals from the FBI since September 11, 2001, and, 

consequently, we are receiving fewer drug referrals overall. The FBI is the best agency 

at understanding the relationship between drugs and violence. —U.S. Attorney’s Office 

Criminal Division Chief 
Page 17 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Referrals have dropped off since the shift in priorities because there are fewer agents 

working in the FBI criminal divisions. The FBI is not working the long-term drug cases 

like they did in the past because the bureau cannot afford to keep cases open for a 

year or two. —First Assistant U.S. Attorney 

The FBI’s shift out of drug work has layered more responsibilities on state and local 

police. The organizations are responding by juggling resources, requiring officers to 

work more hours, and attempting to work smarter by improving information systems, 

using technology, and communicating more effectively with one another. State and 

local police agencies are more efficient now than they have ever been. As a result, FBI 

involvement is perhaps not as critical as it may have been in the past. —International 

Association of Chiefs of Police representative. 

The FBI’s shift into counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crimes has affected 

the number of drug cases investigated and prosecuted at the federal level. —DEA field 

supervisory agent 

The FBI makes a number of important contributions to drug investigations that we miss 

when resources are cut. First, FBI has an extensive intelligence database. The FBI 

also brings people, money, and equipment at a higher level than any other federal 

agency. —Local police supervisor 

Our analyses provide perspectives in the short term (less than 3 years) and 

are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. With respect to the 

short-term perspective, a U.S. Attorneys’ Office Criminal Division chief 

noted that cases can take many years to develop, and the full impact of the 

FBI’s shift in priorities may not be apparent for several years. He said that 

cases are being referred to his office for prosecution now that began long 

before the September 11 attacks. 

We also determined that it was too early to assess possible changes in 

drug price, purity, use, and availability, as well as any drug-related crime 

trends that have occurred since September 11. Key statistical studies that 

track the price and purity of illegal drugs and reports on hospital 

emergency department drug episodes and drug abuse violations were not 

current enough to provide more than a year of trend data after September 

11. Data over several more years are needed to determine whether 

changes in drug use and availability have occurred, and even when data 

are available, it will be very difficult to determine whether changes are 

specifically attributable to the FBI’s shift in priorities or to other factors 

(such as improved drug prevention programs or new methods of drug 

importation). 

There are also other limitations to the data we analyzed. It is important to 

note that while we looked at numbers of agent resources, matters opened, 

and matters referred for prosecution, we could not fully assess the less 

tangible factors of the quality of agent resources and investigations and 

the complexity of investigations. Neither could we determine what drug 

Current Data Should Be 

Viewed as Short-Term 

Indicators with Limitations 
Page 18 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

investigations the FBI might have pursued had it had additional drug 

program agent resources. 

We did ask interviewees their opinions on whether the quality of drug 

agent resources and the quality and complexity of drug investigations had 

changed since September 11. Some FBI officials said that experienced 

agents were lost to the drug program when they were assigned to work in 

higher-priority areas and that these agents were unlikely to return to drug 

investigations. A top DEA official said that drug investigations are more 

complex now than they were prior to September 11. He said that the 

reason for the increased complexity is unrelated to counterterrorism 

efforts; instead it is the result of a Department of Justice strategy to target 

major drug organizations. 

We did not conclusively identify an effect on federal white-collar and 

violent crime enforcement resulting from the FBI’s shift in priorities after 

September 11. Our analysis was limited to only the number of these 

matters referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution from the FBI 

and all other federal agencies and impacts observed by law enforcement 

officials we interviewed. Overall, all federal agencies referred about 

6 percent fewer white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys—-down from 

12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003. 

However, violent crime referrals increased about 29 percent during this 

period—from 14,546 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal 

year 2003. Headquarters and field law enforcement officials we 

interviewed had mixed views on whether the FBI’s shift of resources had 

an effect on white-collar and violent crime enforcement in their 

communities. Caveats to the results we reported on impacts of the FBI’s 

shift in priorities on drug enforcement apply to white-collar and violent 

crime enforcement, as well. The data we analyzed and interviews with law 

enforcement officials should be considered as short-term indicators with 

limitations in their ability to determine the impact of the FBI priority 

shifts. 

All federal agencies referred about 6 percent fewer white-collar crime 

matters to U.S. Attorneys, down from 12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 

12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, violent crime referrals 

increased about 29 percent during this period, from 14,546 matters in fiscal 

year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal year 2003. Figures 7 and 8 show 

changes in the number of referrals of white-collar and violent crime 

Our Analysis Did Not 

Identify Conclusive 

Effect on Federal 

White-Collar and 

Violent Crime 

Enforcement 

Resulting from FBI 

Priority Shifts 

White-Collar Crime 

Matters Referred to U.S. 

Attorneys Decreased, 

while Violent Crime 

Referrals Increased after 

September 11 
Page 19 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal enforcement agencies since 

September 11, 2001. 

Figure 7: Referrals of White-Collar Crime Matters from All Federal Agencies 

Decreased About 6 Percent since September 11 

0

1,500

3,000

4,500

6,000

7,500

9,000

10,500

12,000

13,500

15,000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

Number of white-collar crime referrals

Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data. 

All other federal agencies

FBI

September 11

12,792

5,851

6,941

11,725

5,874

5,851

12,057

6,726

5,331
Page 20 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 8: Referrals of Violent Crime Matters from All Federal Agencies to U.S. 

Attorneys for Prosecution Increased 22 Percent 

Of all the federal agencies and departments, the FBI refers the greatest 

number of white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys. FBI referrals 

decreased about 23 percent, from 6,941 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 

5,331 matters in fiscal year 2003. At the same time, referrals by all other 

agencies increased by about 15 percent, from 5,851 matters in fiscal year 

2001 to 6,726 in fiscal year 2003. Other lead agencies and departments for 

referring white-collar crime cases included the Department of Health and 

Human Services and the Social Security Administration, with health care 

and federal program fraud and other white collar crime referrals; the U.S. 

Postal Service, with referrals of tax and bank fraud, and other white-collar 

crime matters; the U.S. Secret Service; and the Internal Revenue Service, 

with securities and other fraud referrals. 

FBI violent crime referrals decreased about 10 percent from 5,003 matters 

in fiscal year 2001 to 4,491 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, over the 

same period ATF’s violent crime referrals increased from 6,919 to 

10,789. Several other agencies and departments, including all of the 

military services and the Departments of the Interior and Housing and 

Urban Development, also referred violent crime matters to U.S. Attorneys 

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

22,000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

Number of violent crime referrals

Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data. 

All other federal agencies

FBI

September 11

14,546

9,543

5,003

11,752

4,492

14,232

4,491

16,244

18,723
Page 21 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

for prosecution. The Chief of the FBI’s Violent Crime Section noted that 

violent crime referrals by all federal agencies have increased because 

efforts are under way nationwide to prosecute gang violence. The 

Department of Justice is targeting cities nationwide where high murder 

and violence rates persist despite an overall reduction in violent crime 

rates to the lowest level in 30 years. 

Law enforcement officials we interviewed had mixed views on whether 

the FBI’s shift of resources had a negative impact on white-collar and 

violent crime enforcement in their communities. For example, police and 

federal prosecutors in two locations noted that the FBI had continued to 

provide necessary resources for critical white-collar and violent crime 

concerns, while prosecutors in another location expressed concern that 

white-collar crime enforcement was suffering because of the reduced FBI 

involvement. 

The following are comments we received from the local police supervisors 

and officials of several U.S. Attorneys’ Offices who did not think that the 

FBI’s shift in resources had an impact on white-collar and violent crime 

enforcement efforts in their communities. 

The FBI shift in resources did not have an impact on most traditional crime enforcement 

areas in our location. Violent crime, firearm, and child pornography case referrals are all 

up since September 11. In the securities and commodities fraud area, the shifts have 

not kept the FBI from doing the investigative work that needs to be done. Also, we are 

making more use of the U.S. Attorney’s Office investigators and Postal Service 

investigators. Similarly, for government contract fraud, federal inspector generals’ 

offices have taken larger post-September 11 roles. State investigators and the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency investigators are referring more environmental crime 

cases. —U.S. Attorney’s Office division chiefs 

The FBI continues to provide resources for traditional crime programs when they are 

really needed. The FBI field office in our city was able to make violent crime a priority to 

help the local police with its violent crime problem in the public schools and housing 

projects. —city police department supervisor 

The FBI can still throw manpower and equipment into a crisis for the short term 

because they have more people than DEA and ATF combined. –-U.S. Attorney 

The FBI had not been a major partner in white-collar and violent crime investigations 

prior to 9/11. Our department’s strongest federal partnerships are with ATF for violent 

crime and Secret Service on identity theft. —city police department supervisor 

The following are two of the other comments from U.S. Attorneys’ Office 

and FBI managers and supervisors who thought that the FBI’s shift in 

resources had affected efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime. 

Law Enforcement 

Practitioners We 

Interviewed Had Mixed 

Views on Whether the 

FBI’s Shift of Resources 

Had an Impact on WhiteCollar and Violent Crime 

Enforcement 
Page 22 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

The FBI has raised investigation thresholds for white-collar crime. It appears that 

criminals know this and are engaged in counterfeit check fraud at levels just below the 

threshold. The white-collar crime expertise of the FBI is gone. The good white-collar 

crime agents are now working on cyber crimes. The FBI has also given up most of their 

child pornography cases to the Postal Service and Customs. —U.S. Attorney 

The FBI is the primary source of white-collar and public corruption case referrals in this 

district. FBI resources for these areas have declined, and no other agencies appear to 

be taking up the slack. —U.S. Attorney’s Office Criminal Division Chief 

Caveats to the results we reported on impacts of the FBI’s shift in 

priorities on drug enforcement apply to indicators of possible impacts on 

white-collar and violent crime enforcement as well. The data we analyzed 

and interviews with law enforcement officials should be considered as 

short-term indicators with limitations in their ability to determine the full 

impact of the FBI priority shifts. The data provide perspectives in the short 

term of less than 3 years, and they do not consider important factors such 

as whether changes have occurred in the quality or complexity of whitecollar and violent crime matters being referred from federal law 

enforcement agencies to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution. Also, our analysis 

does not consider the number and quality of cases that could have been 

referred for prosecution by the FBI had additional white-collar and violent 

crime program resources been available. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Department of Justice and 

interested congressional committees We will also make copies available to 

others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Major contributors to this report 

are listed in appendix IV. 

Current Data Should Be 

Viewed as Short-Term 

Indicators with Limitations 
Page 23 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me on (202) 512-8777 or by email at ekstrandl@gao.gov, or Charles Michael 

Johnson, Assistant Director on (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in Appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Laurie Ekstrand 

Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 24 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

To examine the effect of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) postSeptember 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat domestic drug 

crime, we analyzed (1) the impact of resource shifts on the combined FBI 

and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nonsupervisory field special 

agent resources devoted to drug enforcement; (2) changes in the number 

of newly opened FBI and DEA drug crime matters; (3) changes in the 

number of drug crime matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution; and (4) impacts, if any, observed by 

headquarters and field law enforcement officials we interviewed. 

Specifically, to determine changes in the combined level of FBI and DEA 

nonsupervisory field special agent resources devoted to domestic drug 

enforcement, we analyzed FBI time utilization data and DEA data on 

funded staff levels for fiscal year 2001, which ended September 30, 2001, 

through the second quarter of fiscal year 2004, ending on March 31, 2004. 

We also analyzed FBI and DEA budget and resource allocation 

information. We focused our analysis primarily on nonsupervisory field 

special agent positions because these positions are directly involved in 

investigations, while supervisors, managers, and headquarters agents often 

have noninvestigative responsibilities in addition to their investigative 

duties. To determine the number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug 

matters, we analyzed case management system data for the period from 

fiscal year 2001 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. We also 

reviewed the Department of Justice’s Domestic Drug Enforcement 

Strategy and discussed resource allocation issues and concerns with FBI 

and DEA officials. We did not attempt to analyze data on drug 

enforcement resource allocations and drug matters opened for federal 

agencies and departments other than the FBI and DEA that are involved in 

investigating drug-related crimes. To determine the number of drug 

referrals from the FBI, DEA, and other federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys, 

we analyzed Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) case 

management data on the number of referrals received by referring agency 

and type of referral for fiscal year 2001 through 2003. We did not have 

access to criminal case files and thus did not provide any assessment of 

changes in the quality or complexity of traditional criminal investigations 

in pre- and post-September 11 periods. 

To provide perspectives of law enforcement officials on impacts, if any, 

they observed on traditional FBI criminal enforcement areas as a result of 

the FBI’s shift of resources to new priorities, we interviewed selected 

federal headquarters and field officials, police department supervisors, 

and representatives of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. At 

FBI headquarters we interviewed the chief of the drug section, and at DEA 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 25 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

headquarters we interviewed the chief of the domestic drug program. The 

field locations we visited, as shown in table 1, had among the greatest 

shifts of FBI resources from traditional criminal programs into new 

priorities. Using a semistructured interview and a data collection 

instrument, at each location we asked FBI and DEA field office managers 

and U.S. Attorney’s Office supervisory prosecutors and local police 

department supervisors responsible for drug enforcement about any 

impacts they had observed on their caseloads, workloads, and crime in 

their communities as a result of the FBI shift in priorities.1

 The results of 

these interviews cannot be generalized to any broader community of law 

enforcement agencies or officials or to other geographic locations. 

Table 1: Field Locations and Agencies We Visited 

Location Law Enforcement Agencies Visited 

Dallas, TX FBI, Dallas Field Office 

DEA, Dallas Division 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas 

Dallas Police Department 

Los Angeles, CA FBI, Los Angeles Field Office 

DEA, Los Angeles Division 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California 

Los Angeles Police Department 

Miami, FL FBI, Miami Field Office 

DEA, Miami Division 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida 

Miami (Dade County) Police Department 

New York City, NY FBI, New York Field Office 

DEA, New York Division 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 

Washington, D.C. FBI, Washington, D.C., Field Office 

DEA, Washington, D.C., Division 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia 

Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department 

Source: GAO. 

 1

We obtained local police department perspectives from four of the five locations we 

visited because the New York City Police Department declined to participate in an 

interview. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 26 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

To examine the effect of the FBI’s post-September 11 priority shifts on 

federal efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime, we considered 

(1) the number of matters referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for 

prosecution from the FBI and all other federal agencies and (2) the effects, 

if any, observed by law enforcement officials we interviewed. To 

determine how the numbers of white-collar and violent crime matters 

referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution from the FBI and all 

other federal agencies have changed, we analyzed case-management 

system data from EOUSA. To provide perspectives from selected law 

enforcement officials on any changes in federal white-collar and violent 

crime enforcement activities as a result of the FBI’s shift in priorities, we 

included in our structured interview questions about effects federal and 

local law enforcement officials we visited might have observed on whitecollar and violent crime caseloads, workloads, and law enforcement 

activities in their communities. We did not attempt to collect information 

on the number of newly opened white-collar and violent crime matters 

from all federal sources because there is no agency comparable to DEA, 

with single-mission dedication to white-collar crime or violent crime 

investigations. Many different federal agencies and offices, including 

criminal investigative agencies and inspectors general, investigate these 

matters, but our time frames did not allow us to obtain resource allocation 

data from them. 

The data should be viewed as short-term indicators with limitations. The 

full impact of the FBI’s shift in priorities may not be apparent for several 

years. While we looked at numbers of agent resources, matters opened, 

and matters referred for prosecution, we could not fully assess the less 

tangible factors of the quality of agent resources and investigations and 

the complexity of investigations. Neither could we determine what 

investigations the FBI might have pursued had it had additional agent 

resources. 

Because the reliability of FBI, DEA, and EOUSA information management 

systems data is significant to the findings of this review, we interviewed 

FBI, DEA, and U.S. Attorney personnel to determine what steps they take 

to assess the accuracy of data elements and what limitations, if any, they 

have identified with the data elements used for our review. As a result of 

our assessment, we determined that the required data elements are 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. 

We performed our work from December 2003 to July 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field 

Special Agent Positions and Work Years 

Page 27 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work Years 

Charged to the Drug, White-Collar, and Violent Crime Programs (fiscal 

year 2001 to second quarter, fiscal year 2004). 

Figure 9: FBI Drug Program Agent Positions and Work Years 

Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field 

Special Agent Positions and Work Years 

0

150

300

450

600

750

900

1,050

1,200

1,350

1,500

Field agents

9/11

1st quarter

2nd quarter

3rd quarter

4th quarter

1st quarter

2nd quarter

3rd quarter

4th quarter

1st quarter

2nd quarter

10/01/00-12/31/00

1/01/01-3/31/01

4/01/01-6/30/01

7/1/01-9/30/01

10/01/01-12/31/01

1/01/02-3/31/02

4/01/02-6/30/02

7/01/02-9/30/02

10/01/02-12/31/02

1/01/03-3/31/03

3rd quarter

4/01/03-6/30/03

4th quarter

7/01/03-9/30/03

1st quarter

10/01/03-12/31/03

2nd quarter

1/1/04-3/31/04

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the drug program

Average number of field agent work years charged to investigating drug matters

Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data.
Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field 

Special Agent Positions and Work Years 

Page 28 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 10: FBI White-Collar Crime Program Agent Positions and Work Years 

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Field agents

September 11

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the white-collar crime program

Average number of field agent work years charged to investigating white-collar crime-related matters

Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data.

0

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

1/26-2/22

2/23-3/22

3/23-4/19

4/20-5/3

5/4-5/31

6/1-6/28

6/29-7/26

7/27-8/23

8/24-9/20

12/29-1/25

10/19-11/15

11/16-12/13

9/21-10/18

1/11-2/7

12/14-1/10

2/8-3/6

3/7-4/3

4/4-5/1

5/2-5/29

11/3-11/30

12/1-12/28

10/6-11/2

8/11-9/7

9/8-10/5

1/27-2/23

2/24-3/23

3/24-4/20

4/21-5/18

5/19-6/15

6/16-7/13

7/14-8/10

12/2-12/29

12/30-1/26

10/7-11/3

11/4-12/1

8/12-9/8

9/9-10/6

5/20-6/16

6/17-7/14

7/15-8/11

8/12-8/25

5/20-5/5

1/28-2/24

2/25-3/24

3/25-4/21

4/22-5/19

12/3-12/30

10/8-11/4

11/5-12/2
Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field 

Special Agent Positions and Work Years 

Page 29 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 11: FBI Violent Crime Program Agent Positions and Work Years 

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Field agents

September 11

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the violent crime program

Average number of field agent work years charged to investigating violent crime-related matters

Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data.

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

1/26-2/22

2/23-3/22

3/23-4/19

4/20-5/3

5/4-5/31

6/1-6/28

6/29-7/26

7/27-8/23

8/24-9/20

12/29-1/25

10/19-11/15

11/16-12/13

9/21-10/18

1/11-2/7

12/14-1/10

2/8-3/6

3/7-4/3

4/4-5/1

5/2-5/29

11/3-11/30

12/1-12/28

10/6-11/2

8/11-9/7

9/8-10/5

1/27-2/23

2/24-3/23

3/24-4/20

4/21-5/18

5/19-6/15

6/16-7/13

7/14-8/10

12/2-12/29

12/30-1/26

10/7-11/3

11/4-12/1

8/12-9/8

9/9-10/6

5/20-6/16

6/17-7/14

7/15-8/11

8/12-8/25

5/20-5/5

1/28-2/24

2/25-3/24

3/25-4/21

4/22-5/19

12/3-12/30

10/8-11/4

11/5-12/2
Appendix III: Decreases in FBI’s Newly 

Opened Drug, White-Collar and Violent Crime 

Matters Since September 11, 2001 

Page 30 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 12: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI Drug Matters 

a

This includes the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004. Assuming that the FBI opens new matters at 

about the same pace in the last two quarters of fiscal year 2004 that it did during the first two 

quarters, fiscal year 2004 levels of newly opened drug crime matters will be similar to those in fiscal 

year 2003. 

Appendix III: Decreases in FBI’s Newly 

Opened Drug, White-Collar and Violent Crime 

Matters Since September 11, 2001 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Number of newly opened drug matters

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

Non-Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)

OCDETF

1,447

426

289 208 107

205

379

661

1021 950

587

312a

9/11
Appendix III: Decreases in FBI’s Newly 

Opened Drug, White-Collar and Violent Crime 

Matters Since September 11, 2001 

Page 31 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 13: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI White-Collar Matters 

2nd

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Number of newly opened white-collar crime matters

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 1st

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

 September 11

4,901

6,150

4,143

3,819

4,338

3,420 3,417 3,609

3,110

3,934

2,878

3,447

3,186

4,410

4,842

quarter quarter quarter quarter
Appendix III: Decreases in FBI’s Newly 

Opened Drug, White-Collar and Violent Crime 

Matters Since September 11, 2001 

Page 32 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Figure 14: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI Violent Crime Matters 

2nd

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Number of newly opened violent crime major offender matters

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 1st

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

September 11

8,032

9,034

5,811

5,509

6,522

6,130 5,906

4,641 4,563 4,441

4,810 4,682 4,885

4,505

7,724

quarter quarter quarter quarter
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 33 GAO-04-1036 FBI Transformation 

Laurie Ekstrand, (202) 512-8777 

Charles Michael Johnson, (202) 512-7331 

David Alexander, Leo Barbour, William Bates, Geoffrey Hamilton, 

Benjamin Jordan, Deborah Knorr, Jessica Lundberg, Andrew O’Connell, 

and Kathryn Young made significant contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

(440257) 
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