a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging Threats, 

and International Relations, Committee 

on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

May 2006 HOMELAND 

DEFENSE

National Guard 

Bureau Needs to 

Clarify Civil Support 

Teams’ Mission and 

Address Management 

Challenges

GAO-06-498
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2006

HOMELAND DEFENSE

National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify 

Civil Support Teams’ Mission and 

Address Management Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-06-498, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

To prepare for potential attacks in 

the United States involving

weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), Congress approved the 

development of National Guard 

Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked 

to identify chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

explosive weapons; assess 

consequences; advise civil 

authorities on response measures;

and assist with requests for

additional support. Thus far, 36 of 

the 55 approved teams have been 

fully certified to conduct their 

mission. The National Guard 

Bureau (NGB) is in the process of

establishing, certifying, and 

planning for the long-term 

sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was 

asked to address the extent to

which (1) the CSTs are ready to 

conduct their mission and 

(2) effective administrative

mechanisms are in place for the 

CSTs. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure the sustainment of CSTs, 

the Secretary of Defense should 

work with NGB and the Secretaries 

of the Army and of the Air Force to

clarify the types of non-WMD 

response efforts that belong in the 

CST mission; develop guidance to 

address CST management

challenges; and develop guidance

and work with state adjutants 

general to clarify administrative

oversight and support structures 

for CSTs. The Department of 

Defense (DOD) generally agreed 

with our recommendations. 

The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and 

have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic 

mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types 

of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD 

terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and 

local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. 

CSTs were created to focus on assisting civil authorities in domestic WMD 

events. Based on its review of the CSTs’ training, equipment, and staffing 

criteria; analysis of CST readiness data; site visits to 14 CSTs; and 

discussions with state, local, and federal responders, GAO found the 

certified teams visited to be ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the 

states have a clear structure for operational command and control of the 

CSTs. Though current NGB guidance and the CSTs’ message to state and 

local officials emphasize the CST mission as being focused on WMD events, 

some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing 

emergency assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. 

While NGB views such missions as useful preparations for WMD events, 

guidance has not been clarified to reflect the type of non-WMD missions that 

would be appropriate. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, 

local, and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts. Also, DOD 

is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with 

Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident.

DOD and NGB are informally considering limited overseas missions for the 

teams, though they have no plans to request a further expansion of the CSTs’ 

mission to encompass overseas operations. According to NGB and the CST 

commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable experience

and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more demanding 

missions, such as supporting the warfighter, could be detrimental to the 

readiness and availability of the CSTs.

Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the 

CST program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and 

management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer 

teams and the long-term sustainment of the program. NGB has made 

progress in establishing an administrative management structure for the 

CSTs, including issuing a broad CST management regulation and initiating a 

standardization and evaluation program. However, the CSTs face challenges

in personnel, coordination plans, equipment acquisition and planning, 

training objectives, readiness reporting and facilities. Further, insufficient 

NGB guidance on state National Guard roles and responsibilities for 

overseeing and supporting their CSTs has resulted in varied support at the 

state National Guard level. NGB is aware of the challenges and has efforts 

under way to address them. While these challenges have not yet undermined 

CST readiness, if NGB efforts are unsuccessful, the progress of newer teams 

could be impeded and the long-term sustainment of the CST program put at 

greater risk.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-498.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Davi M. 

D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 

dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

CSTs Are Prepared to Conduct Their Mission, but the Role of 

Non-WMD Missions Causes Confusion 14

CST Program Faces Management Challenges That Could Increase 

Risk to Long-term Sustainment 22

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II: CST Program Management Efforts 41

Appendix III: Data Collection Instrument 44

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 79

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 82

Tables Table 1: Examples of Civil Support Team Section Tasks 6

Table 2: CST Response Management Plan Sectors 11

Table 3: Summary of CST Nontraining Deployments, 2001-05 12

Figures Figure 1: The Unified Command Suite 8

Figure 2: The Analytical Laboratory System 9
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

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Abbreviations

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosive

CERFP CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package

CST Civil Support Team

DOD Department of Defense

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 

education, personnel, and facilities

NGB National Guard Bureau

WMD weapons of mass destruction
Page 1 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

May 31, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Emerging Threats, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman:

To help prepare the United States for potential terrorist attacks involving 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 1 Congress in 1998 approved the 

development of federally funded, state2 controlled, National Guard WMD 

Civil Support Teams (CSTs). The CSTs’ principal mission is to assist civil 

authorities in the United States in responding to incidents involving WMD 

or catastrophic terrorism, including the use of chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons and agents. The 

CSTs are to identify these agents and substances, assess current or 

projected consequences, advise civil authorities on response measures, and 

assist with requests for additional support. Like traditional National Guard 

units, the CSTs are under the control of the governors of their respective 

states and territories, unless they are activated for federal service, at which 

time they would fall under the control of the Department of Defense 

(DOD). However, unlike traditional National Guard units, these highly 

specialized teams are each composed of 22 members who are on full-time 

duty. The teams include both Army and Air National Guard personnel who 

are divided into six sections, including command, operations, 

administration/logistics, medical science, communications, and survey. The 

teams possess highly technical mobile laboratory and communications 

equipment to accomplish their mission.

1

 For the purposes of this report, “weapons of mass destruction” means any weapon or 

device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 

significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of (1) toxic or 

poisonous chemicals or their precursors, (2) a disease organism, or (3) radiation or 

radioactivity. 50 U.S.C. § 2302 (1).

2

 For purposes of this report, “state” includes the 50 United States; the territories of Guam, 

Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands; and the District of Columbia.
Page 2 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Congress initially approved the establishment of 10 CSTs.3 Since 1998, 

Congress has incrementally increased the number of authorized teams to 

the currently approved 55: one in each state; a second team in California; 

and one each in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 

and Guam. DOD established the stationing plan for the CSTs in five phases. 

The National Guard Bureau (NGB), the managing organization for the 

CSTs, executed the establishment, certification, and sustainment program 

for the teams. Phase one comprised 10 teams; phase two 17 teams; phase 

three 5 teams; phase four 12 teams; and phase five 11 teams. Each team 

must be certified by the Secretary of Defense as capable of conducting its 

mission. To accomplish this, each team must complete a battery of 

individual and team training, receive all its authorized equipment, achieve 

full staffing, pass an external evaluation by Army experts, and apply (via its 

state adjutant general) to the Secretary of Defense for certification. Thirtysix teams have been certified as of May 2006; the remaining 19 will be 

certified by the end of fiscal year 2007. The approximate cost for 

establishing all 55 teams is $424 million, and it costs approximately 

$3.4 million annually to sustain each team.

The challenges DOD faces in managing its reserve forces and allocating its 

resources across services and programs are some of the many issues that 

we highlighted for Congress as the nation entered the 21st century. For 

example, we issued a report in November 2004 that recommended the 

establishment of readiness standards and measures for the National 

Guard’s homeland security missions.4

 In 2001, the DOD Inspector General 

highlighted a number of structural and management problems with the CST 

program, including the standards for certification and readiness of the 

teams as well as other problems that may impede the CSTs from 

conducting their mission. 

We examined the operational readiness of the Army National Guard’s WMD 

CSTs. Our objectives were to address (1) the extent to which the CSTs are 

ready to conduct their mission and (2) the extent to which there are 

effective administrative mechanisms in place for the CSTs. 

3

 The teams were originally called Rapid Assessment Initial Detection Teams. 

4

 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future 

Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
Page 3 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

To address these objectives, we reviewed the readiness criteria and 

categories for the two systems used to track CST readiness.5

 We also 

incorporated these criteria into our questions as we designed and 

distributed a broad data collection instrument to all 55 CSTs to collect 

information regarding the status and availability of CST equipment, training 

and certification, mission, coordination, and personnel. We received 

complete responses from 52 CSTs. Further, we supplemented this 

information with visits to 14 CSTs, and we conducted interviews with state 

National Guard personnel as well as with local, State, and federal officials 

who currently or will potentially work with CSTs. In preparing the data 

collection instrument, we tested the reasonableness of our questions in 

discussions with the commanders of two CSTs not included in our 14 site 

visits. During several of our site visits, we observed exercises, an external 

evaluation, and other training events. We also compared the information 

collected during our visits, including interviews; after-action reports; and 

existing command, control, and coordination mechanisms, with policies 

and the expectations of officials with whom the CSTs must work in the 

states. We selected the site-visit sample to comprise a wide distribution of 

states and territories based on such criteria as geographic distribution, age 

of team, certification status, state size, and population. Additionally we 

collected cost data related to the establishment and sustainment of the 

CSTs from NGB, state National Guard personnel, and the CSTs themselves. 

We did not independently verify cost data, but we interviewed NGB 

officials who manage the data about data quality control procedures. We 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. Further details on our scope and methodology appear in appendix I. 

We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief The certified CSTs have thus far been ready to conduct their mission in 

terms of having the training, equipment, and staff required of them, and the 

teams have a functioning command and control structure. However, 

confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD 

missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission 

could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency 

management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. Congress 

authorized the creation of the CSTs for the primary purpose of assisting 

5

 One system is DOD’s Status of Resources and Training System and the other is NGB’s CSTspecific Operational Reporting System.
Page 4 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

civil authorities in responding to domestic incidents involving WMD. Based 

on our review of the CSTs’ training, equipment, and staffing criteria; data 

we collected for the CSTs in all three areas; our site visits to 14 CSTs; and 

our discussions with state, local, and federal responders who have worked 

with those teams, we found the certified teams we visited to thus far be 

ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the states have a clear structure 

for operational control of the CSTs, including procedures for who can 

authorize CST deployment, to whom they should report at an incident 

scene, and when command authority shifts because of a federalized effort. 

State and local officials we interviewed reported that the command and 

control of the teams is well understood and exercised. Though the CSTs’ 

mission is focused on WMD events, and the CSTs emphasize this focus 

when coordinating with state and local emergency management officials, 

some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing 

emergency assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. 

Beyond the benefits they provide to civil authorities, the CSTs use such 

missions to prepare for responding to a WMD event. However, the lack of 

clarity and guidance on what types of non-WMD operations the CSTs 

should use to prepare for a WMD response, as well as the desire of civil 

authorities to call upon the teams for other emergencies, is causing 

confusion among state, local, and National Guard officials about the 

appropriate use of the CSTs. This potentially slows coordination between 

local and state responders and the CSTs and coordinated NGB-level 

responses involving multiple CSTs. Also, DOD is proposing a limited role 

for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian 

officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. DOD and NGB are 

also informally considering limited overseas missions for the teams, though 

they have no plans to request a further expansion of the CSTs’ mission to 

encompass overseas operations. According to NGB and the CST 

commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable experience 

and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more demanding 

missions, such as supporting the warfighter, could be detrimental to the 

CSTs.

Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the 

CST program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and 

management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer 

teams and the long term sustainment of the program. As the managing 

authority for the CST program, NGB has made progress in establishing an 

administrative management structure for the CSTs, including issuing a 

broad CST management regulation and initiating a standardization and 

evaluation program. However, NGB also faces challenges to the CSTs in 
Page 5 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

such areas as staffing, coordination plans, equipment maintenance and 

acquisition, training and exercise oversight, readiness reporting, and 

facilities. Further, NGB guidance explaining state National Guard roles and 

responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs is insufficient to 

fully inform the states about the unique nature and requirements of the 

CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into the state National Guard 

command structure. The result has been varied and generally problematic 

oversight and support of CSTs at the state level in such areas as staffing and 

equipment augmentation and designing and building the facilities to house 

the teams. According to CST members and NGB officials we interviewed, 

these challenges have yet to harm readiness, and NGB officials recognize 

the importance of these challenges and have individual initiatives to 

address many of them. If NGB’s efforts are not successful, the challenges 

could, in the long run, impede the progress of newer teams and 

compromise the long-term sustainment of the CST program. 

This report makes recommendations to help DOD and NGB address 

management challenges and further its efforts to sustain the CST program. 

We are recommending that DOD work with NGB and the Army and Air 

Force to clarify the domestic CST mission, develop guidance to address 

management challenges, and create a clear and effective administrative 

support structure at the state level. In comments on a draft of this report, 

DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and described steps it is 

taking or will take to implement them.

Background In response to an increase in the threat of potential terrorist attacks in the 

United States involving WMDs, Congress directed the federal government 

to enhance its capability to deter, prevent, respond, and recover from 

terrorist attacks using such weapons.6

 Among the resulting efforts, 

Congress in fiscal year 1999 approved the development of National Guard 

WMD CSTs.7

 The CSTs are designed to support civil authorities in the event 

of a domestic WMD event by identifying WMD agents and substances, 

assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response 

measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. In 

describing WMD agents, DOD commonly uses the term chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Like 

6

 Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1411 (1996).

7

 Pub. L. No. 105-261, § 510 (1998).
Page 6 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

traditional National Guard units, the CSTs are under the day-to-day control 

of the governors of their respective states and territories. The CSTs can 

also be activated for federal service by the President, at which time they 

would fall under DOD command. Unlike traditional National Guard units, 

which generally consist of part-time soldiers who conduct regular drills, 

the CSTs are composed of full-time Army and Air National Guard members. 

Each 22-person team is divided into six sections: command, operations, 

communications, administration and logistics, medical/analytical, and 

survey. The members of the CSTs are trained in their various disciplines 

and operate sophisticated equipment that helps them accomplish their 

mission. Table 1 shows examples of some of the tasks associated with each 

CST section.

Table 1: Examples of Civil Support Team Section Tasks

Section

Number of 

personnel Examples of tasks

Command 2 • Provides command and control of the team

• Interfaces with external agencies and organizations 

• Provides advice to the first responder community

• Facilitates introduction of follow-on DOD forces into 

a consolidated response team

• Ensures that sample collection and handling 

procedures are conducted safely and are accurately 

documented and the chain of custody is maintained

Operations 4 • Conducts hazard modeling

• Provides information for vulnerability analysis

• Coordinates and directs CBRNE surveys

• Coordinates and monitors unit training

• Prepares site safety and incident action plans

Medical/ 

analytical

4 • Establishes and maintains medical surveillance and 

monitoring programs for the unit

• Conducts lab analysis of incident-related samples

• Conducts medical reach-back coordination with 

medical labs

• Secures and prepares samples for transport and 

subsequent transfer

• Provides emergency medical stability for CST 

members
Page 7 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Source: DOD.

The CSTs employ military-provided equipment that is common to active 

duty military units, such as chemical defense equipment and uniforms. 

They also use a large variety of specialized commercial equipment, such as 

the protective ensembles worn in the hazard zone and much of the teams’ 

laboratory equipment. The CSTs employ several vehicles for transporting 

and supporting the six sections of the team. Among these are two specially 

constructed vehicles: the Unified Command Suite, which contains a wide 

range of radio, data, and video communications equipment, and the 

Analytical Laboratory System, which contains such equipment as a gas 

chromatograph/mass spectrometer for organic material analysis and a 

gamma spectrometer for radiological material analysis as well as other 

laboratory support equipment. Figures 1 and 2 show the Unified Command 

Suite and the Analytical Laboratory System, respectively. 

Communications 2 • Provides voice and data communications through a 

variety of networks designed to support CST 

operations

• Maintains communications within the team, with 

higher headquarters, with other responding 

agencies, and with subject matter experts

• Establishes secure communications links, as 

required

Survey 8 • Conducts missions in appropriate protective 

equipment

• Enters a suspected hot zone to conduct search for 

CBRNE hazards

• Collects and preserves incident-related samples for 

delivery to analytical equipment

• Identifies, marks and reports contaminated areas

Administration 

and logistics

2 • Sustains the ability of the CST to conduct operations

• Maintains logistics status reports

• Procures and stores unit equipment according to 

command guidance

(Continued From Previous Page)

Section

Number of 

personnel Examples of tasks
Page 8 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Figure 1: The Unified Command Suite

Source: DOD.
Page 9 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Figure 2: The Analytical Laboratory System

The equipment in the Analytical Laboratory System helps the CSTs conduct 

a “presumptive identification” of a CBRNE sample. If requested by the 

incident commander, the CST then transfers a sample to a Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention-approved laboratory for confirmation and 

official identification. 

NGB is responsible for managing the CST program and is the principal 

channel of communication between DOD and the adjutant general 

commanding the National Guard unit in each state. NGB also coordinates 

with other DOD commands and organizations to support various aspects of 

the CST program. For example, the joint service Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program conducts the acquisition process for much of the CST 

equipment, and the Army’s Maneuver Support Center assists in developing 

CST doctrine and conducting key CST-specific training. 

Source: GAO.
Page 10 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

The Secretary of Defense must certify each CST as ready to execute its 

WMD mission.8

 This certification involves a series of staffing, equipping, 

and training steps that take from 18 to 24 months. To achieve certification, 

each CST must complete the following steps:

1. Have the required personnel and equipment resources and be trained to 

undertake the full mission for which it is organized or designed. For 

example, at least 85 percent of assigned personnel must have 

completed all of their CST-specific individual training.

2. Undergo an external evaluation by Army experts according to the CST’s 

approved mission training plan.

3. Notify its adjutant general that it has completed the above steps, 

whereupon the adjutant general submits a request for certification to 

NGB, which then reviews and forwards the request to the Army Staff 

and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.9

The Secretary of Defense makes the final determination of approval for 

CST certification. Although certification is a onetime event, a CST that 

loses a significant number of key personnel associated with command and 

control or with medical and assessment capabilities that substantially 

degrades the team’s ability to conduct its mission must undergo a 

revalidation process. In addition, each CST undergoes an external 

evaluation every 18 months, during which Army experts assess each team’s 

ability to meet specific mission standards associated with all related WMD 

threats.

Both civil and military responders, including the CSTs, conduct WMD 

response operations in a three-tiered approach based on the National 

Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. The 

National Response Plan represents a comprehensive all-hazards approach 

intended to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic 

incidents. Fire and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical 

personnel constitute the first tier. If the extent of the event exceeds the 

ability of the first tier to manage the consequences of the situation, the 

8

 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c)(5).

9

 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management, 

NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503, ch. 14 (Jan. 12, 2006).
Page 11 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

state-level civil and military forces may be activated and deployed as the 

second tier. If the governor determines that the forces and resources 

available in the state require additional support, then the governor may 

request assistance from the President of the United States, constituting the 

third tier. The CSTs are generally included in the second tier of the 

response. 

In addition to preparing to respond to WMD and catastrophic terrorist 

events in their respective states, the CSTs also adhere to NGB’s Response 

Management Plan. Under this plan, NGB monitors the readiness status of 

each certified CST to ensure that at a given time, a designated number of 

CSTs are always ready to respond to a national need or the need of a state 

without an available CST. To facilitate planning for such responses, the plan 

divides the nation into six response sectors, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: CST Response Management Plan Sectors

Source: National Guard Bureau.

Under the Response Management Plan, the CSTs are scheduled on either 

“bronze,” “silver,” or “gold” status on a rotating basis. At any given time one 

certified team per response region is in gold status and must be ready to 

deploy a full CST (personnel and equipment) within 3 hours from its home 

station to an incident site within its region, should the need arise. At the 

same time, another certified team per response region is placed in silver 

status. While this team is in a slightly lower state of readiness it must be 

prepared to assume gold status in the event the gold team is deployed. The 

remaining certified teams are in bronze status and are focused more on 

Response sector States or territories

1 Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode 

Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine

2 West Virginia, Virginia, District of Columbia, Maryland, 

Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin

3 Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, 

Kentucky, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands

4 Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, 

Minnesota, Iowa, and Mississippi

5 New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, 

Hawaii, and Guam

6 South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, 

Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Nebraska
Page 12 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

training, block leave, equipment preparation, and state-directed missions. 

Bronze teams must, however, be prepared to respond to incidents within 

their region within 72 hours and to assume silver or gold status within 48 

and 96 hours, respectively.

Because the CSTs are state-controlled units, the respective governors are 

the final deployment authority for CST missions and, unless the CSTs are 

federalized, they remain under the command authority of the governors 

and state adjutants general. The CSTs generally conduct three types of 

mission: response, stand-by, and assist. Response missions are 

deployments in support of requests from local, state, or federal agencies, 

such as a CST deployment to help civil authorities identify a potentially 

toxic chemical left by a suspected terrorist. Stand-by missions involve 

providing CST expertise at special events, such as the national political 

conventions. Assist missions include a range of CST involvement, including 

technical assistance, reconnaissance, or assistance with CBRNE 

vulnerability assessments. For example, CST commanders and team 

members may provide technical assistance by phone to a local incident 

commander at a hazardous materials scene. Table 3 summarizes 

deployments of the CSTs for missions other than training exercises.

Table 3: Summary of CST Nontraining Deployments, 2001-05

Source: GAO.

As shown in table 3, CSTs deployed on response missions far less often 

than on stand-by and assist missions. The table does not show total activity 

by the CSTs, since the majority of their time is devoted to training in order 

to maintain individual and team readiness. It also may not reflect all CST 

deployments to assist in states affected by hurricanes in 2005. 

Each CST costs approximately $7.7 million to establish, or approximately 

$424 million to establish all 55 CSTs. This cost estimate includes initial 

equipment, vehicles, personnel, and training support. Sustaining each CST 

in these categories costs approximately $3.4 million a year, or $189 million 

Mission type Number Percentage of missions

Response 405 8

Stand-by 580 11

Assist 4,109 81

Total 5,094 100
Page 13 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

a year to sustain all 55 teams. DOD funds the establishment and 

sustainment of the CST program and NGB manages most of this funding. 

These estimates do not include utilities for CST facilities, which are paid by 

the states via a general calculation of all state facilities requirements and 

funded through NGB. The estimates also do not include federally funded 

costs for construction of CST facilities, since these costs vary widely 

depending on how and where the states decide to station their teams. 

There are also additional federal costs associated with the CST program 

that are not associated with the specific teams themselves. For example, 

approximately $65 million for fiscal year 2006 is associated with the 

following categories:

• funding for CST airlift;

• various CST-unique training courses;

• equipment replenishment and modifications;

• maintenance of secure Internet access for CSTs;

• government-owned vehicles;

• communications links;

• Unified Command Suite maintenance and support;

• civilian personnel involved in CST oversight functions; and

• U.S. Army personnel whose mission is to evaluate, train, and develop 

doctrine for CSTs.

NGB is also in the process of creating additional units meant to follow CSTs 

in response to WMD events and to be part of larger National Guard 

response forces. The mission of the 17 currently authorized National Guard 

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) is to support local, 

state, and federal agencies managing the consequences of a CBRNE event 

by providing capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, 

emergency medical services, and casualty search and rescue. Each CERFP 

comprises approximately 186 personnel taken from existing Army and Air 

National Guard medical, engineer, chemical, and other units. Unlike CST 

members, CERFP personnel do not serve in their units on a full-time basis 

but rather must be mobilized for duty. Like CSTs, however, CERFPs are 
Page 14 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

intended to be part of the state response to a WMD incident and can also be 

federalized and placed under DOD authority. 

CSTs Are Prepared to 

Conduct Their Mission, 

but the Role of NonWMD Missions Causes 

Confusion

Based on the CSTs’ readiness measures for staffing, training, and 

equipment; the data we obtained from the CSTs on each of these measures; 

the process NGB has in place to maintain and monitor CST readiness; and 

the discussions we had with CSTs and state, local, and federal officials in 

the 14 states and territories we visited, we found that the certified CSTs 

have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed to conduct their mission. 

Further, NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational 

command and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will 

operationally respond to a WMD event. However, confusion about the types 

of non-WMD missions the CSTs conduct to help them prepare for WMD 

missions could impede coordination between state, local, and federal 

officials about the appropriate use of the CSTs.

Certified CSTs Are Ready to 

Perform Their Mission

The certified CSTs have thus far had the staff, equipment, and training they 

need to conduct the mission that Congress intended for them. Staffing, 

equipment, and training data we collected from 52 of the 55 CSTs in late 

2005 confirmed this state of readiness, as did the discussions we had with 

CST personnel in the 14 states and territories we visited and state National 

Guard command staff, CST program managers at NGB, and state and local 

emergency responders. Additionally, NGB has a clear plan to maintain, 

monitor, and periodically evaluate the teams’ overall readiness. For 

example, for the certified CSTs we visited, in addition to fulfilling initial 

certification criteria that established strict standards for staffing, 

equipment, and training readiness, these teams have passed the external 

evaluations they are required to undergo every 18 months and have 

continued to prepare and execute training and exercise plans to maintain 

their readiness. 

Based on our review of the mission and training standards for the CST 

program and our interviews and observations of CST personnel during our 

site visits, we found CST members to be motivated soldiers who have 

mastered complex technical tasks and can perform them under duress. The 

teams we visited reported that they maintain high morale in spite of the 

training pressures, the need for around-the-clock availability, and the added 

burden of training to perform the duties of other positions on the team so 

that the CST will have added depth and flexibility. Their fitness regimen is 
Page 15 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

designed to keep them in superior physical condition, allowing them to 

perform in physically challenging response environments for an extended 

time. For example, teams are trained to conduct their work in fully 

contained protective suits and masks while carrying their own oxygen 

supply tanks on their backs. This is physically challenging even in 

moderate climate conditions.

CST personnel are prepared for their mission through a regimen of 

individual training that varies from 376 to 1,148 hours in the first 2 years, 

depending upon the duty position. The teams complete an initial external 

evaluation in order to obtain DOD certification, and they undergo a similar 

evaluation every 18 months thereafter. The teams are required to conduct 

12 collective training events each year to help them develop and maintain 

the skills necessary to complete the WMD response tasks outlined in the 

CST’s Mission Training Plan. NGB further monitors the 55 CSTs through 

two readiness reporting databases that inform NGB as to how well teams 

are meeting basic readiness criteria and provide detailed information on 

their personnel, equipment, and training status. One of these systems is a 

primary mechanism for NGB’s administration of the Response Management 

Plan. 

DOD assesses the teams’ proficiency in their critical tasks through external 

evaluations administered by U.S. Army subject matter experts. We 

observed an external evaluation for a phase one CST that required the team 

to locate and identify small amounts of chemical, biological, and 

radiological substances hidden inside a large warehouse, and it was able to 

do this successfully. Following the event, the Army experts and the CST 

members held an after-action review during which they discussed and 

assessed the team’s performance in critical mission areas, highlighting 

processes and procedures that worked well and those that required 

improvement. Army experts administer external evaluations to each CST 

every 18 months to assure both DOD and NGB of the team’s continued 

readiness. 

In response to our data collection instrument, 94 percent of CST 

commanders characterized external evaluations as an accurate indicator of 

their readiness. Some CST commanders who responded to our data 

collection instrument said the evaluations were good measures of the basic 

readiness of the teams to conduct their mission but did not adequately 

assess teams for their ability to interact with and support a civilian incident 

commander while at a site in company with multiple other local, state, and 

possibly federal authorities. CST members told us that a multiple-agency 
Page 16 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

incident response site will be the normal circumstance for an actual CST 

WMD mission. In addition to the external evaluations, the CSTs conduct a 

number of exercises every year that involve other civil responders with 

which they would work in the event of an actual WMD response. CST 

members and state, local, and federal officials we met with reported that 

these exercises are invaluable for helping all stakeholders understand each 

other’s capabilities and how best to work together. 

Emergency responders and state officials who work with CSTs in the states 

and territories we visited gave generally positive reviews of the teams. 

Reflecting mostly on their experience with the CSTs in exercises and other 

coordinating venues, state and local officials we interviewed reported a 

high degree of confidence in the readiness of the CSTs to conduct their 

mission. They also reported that the CSTs’ ability to provide on-scene initial 

identification of CBRNE substances, along with their communications 

capability, exceed that of most civilian response teams and are vital assets 

for WMD response in their states. 

Mechanisms Are in Place for 

CSTs to Operationally 

Respond to Missions 

NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational command 

and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will operationally 

respond to a WMD event. The basis of CST operational deployment 

guidance is the National Response Plan and the National Incident 

Management System.10 States and territories we visited were in the process 

of updating their emergency response plans, and these plans identify the 

state National Guard’s role, and sometimes specifically the CST role, in the 

response. State officials acknowledged that their plans were being revised 

to conform to the National Response Plan. Officials in states and territories 

we visited expressed a need to become better organized to address 

homeland security and WMD threats. 

10 In Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, dated February 28, 2003, the President 

directed the development of a new National Response Plan to align federal coordination 

structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified all-discipline, and all-hazards approach 

to domestic incident management. It covers coordination among federal, state, local, and 

tribal organizations by increasing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of incident 

management. Under the National Response Plan, state, local, and other organizations are, 

among other things, to utilize established incident reporting protocols and modify their 

existing incident management and emergency operations plans to align with National 

Response Plan coordinating structures, processes, and protocols.
Page 17 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

CSTs have successfully tested their command and control structures by 

deploying to response, stand-by, and assist missions under the authority of 

their respective state governors and adjutants general. To practice 

operational command and control, the CSTs also participate in various 

training exercises with federal, state, local, and nongovernmental agencies 

and organizations. Evaluation data on these missions and exercises are 

limited and often informal. However, the information available indicates 

that CSTs met NGB, state, and local expectations about coordination 

command and control, and comments by state and local officials we 

interviewed were overwhelmingly positive. 

In addition to operations within their states, CSTs have sometimes 

deployed outside their state based on requests for assistance. In these 

cases, the CSTs come under the command and control of the governors and 

adjutants general of the states in which they are operating. The CSTs have 

also been deployed to other states based on NGB requests that they 

respond to an event or disaster. For example, NGB managed the 

deployment of the CSTs to states affected by hurricanes in 2005 using the 

Response Management Plan to maintain enough teams in a high state of 

readiness in each response region. According to after-action reports on 

these events and comments from officials we interviewed during our site 

visits, the CSTs were integrated into the operational command and control 

of state military commands in the Gulf states, reported to incident 

commanders when responding to specific events, and performed their 

duties according to the response plan.

DOD also has guidance in place for operational command and control of 

the CSTs in the event the teams are federalized. In such an event, the CSTs 

would come under the command of DOD’s U.S. Northern Command. To 

date, no CSTs have been federalized. 

Role of Non-WMD Missions 

Causes Confusion

While the CSTs principally focus on responding to WMD and catastrophic 

terrorist attacks,11 some CSTs are preparing for this mission by responding 

to non-WMD events, causing confusion among civilian as well as National 

Guard officials about when the CSTs should and should not be employed. 

This confusion results from a lack of clear guidance interpreting the 

11 In 2002 Congress added to the CST’s mission “preparation for or response to a terrorist 

attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result, in 

catastrophic loss of life or property.” Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 514 (2002). 
Page 18 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

legislation that establishes the CST mission to “prepare for or to respond 

to” WMD or terrorist attacks12 and from DOD’s use of the term chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) in its 

characterization of the CSTs’ official mission. In a 2004 memo, the NGB’s 

Deputy Director for Domestic Operations advised all state National Guard 

headquarters that approve missions for their respective CSTs to ensure that 

their teams responded only to intentional uses of WMD, to terrorist attacks, 

or to threatened terrorist attacks. He cautioned that the military’s formal 

definition of CBRNE included unintentional events, such as accidental 

hazardous materials spills, that were outside the scope of the CSTs’ 

mission. As part of their coordination efforts with state and local 

emergency management officials, CST members highlight the WMD and 

catastrophic terrorism mission limitation of the CSTs. While CST 

commanders and team personnel accepted this formal limitation on their 

mission, they also reported that it is sometimes necessary for mission 

readiness purposes to respond to events that have no connection to WMD 

or terrorism. For example, 61 percent of CST commanders who responded 

to our data collection instrument consider it to be part of their respective 

CST’s mission to respond to CBRNE incidents that are known to be the 

result of accidents or acts of nature—that is, to incidents that are not 

attacks. Additionally, 92 percent of commanders who responded thought 

that this type of response should be part of their mission, and many of 

those with whom we met endorsed responding to non-CBRNE events as 

well. 

CST commanders value non-WMD and nonterrorism responses for a 

variety of reasons, and NGB officials agreed. Deployments to actual 

incidents, regardless of the cause, can function as a valuable means of 

exercising the CSTs’ core capabilities, such as communication and 

coordination with state, local, and federal responders and authorities, and 

help CSTs prepare for responses to incidents that are WMD related. 

Moreover, CST commanders and other officials explained that it is often 

difficult to determine the cause of a destructive event until the CST arrives 

on scene—only then can the possibility of terrorism be conclusively 

dismissed. 

The Hurricane Katrina response provides a recent example of CST 

deployments that were not directly related to WMD or terrorism but 

provided CSTs with real-life opportunities to exercise their capabilities to 

12 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c).
Page 19 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

respond to WMD events. Following an NGB request, 18 teams sent 

personnel and vehicles to assist in the response effort. This assistance, 

often in the form of satellite communications capabilities, enabled local 

authorities to coordinate with each other as well as with state and federal 

officials. For example, one southeastern CST sent personnel to establish a 

communications outpost just outside the Louisiana Superdome. According 

to NGB officials, there were lengthy discussions about whether these types 

of responses were appropriate CST missions. They ultimately concluded 

that response to large-scale disasters like Katrina were within the CSTs’ 

mandate to prepare for or respond to WMD or terrorism events. 

The use of CSTs for missions that do not involve catastrophic terrorist acts 

or WMD, as well as deployment criteria that can differ across 54 state and 

territorial governments, can lead to confusion at the local level and the 

potential for unmet expectations. Local responders we met in the 14 states 

and territories we visited reported that they value the CSTs’ expertise and 

capabilities and think that they can be put to wider use within their 

communities, although they recognized the need to protect the CSTs from 

overuse. But there remains no guidance that would assist CSTs or state and 

local officials in understanding what types of non-WMD missions are 

appropriate for the CSTs to conduct in preparing for their WMD terrorism 

mission. As a result, the parameters of allowable CST missions vary across 

states and among state civilian authorities, state National Guard 

headquarters staff, CST commanders, and others involved in approving 

CST missions. For example, some states did not acknowledge NGB’s 

requests for use of their CSTs for hurricane response operations, and at 

least one state refused to allow its team to participate. Following the 

destruction of the space shuttle Columbia in February 2003, multiple CSTs 

were involved in collecting debris across five states; but some state 

authorities and CST commanders declined to assist because they did not 

consider it to be a legitimate deployment. Further, in their responses to our 

data collection instrument, 59 percent of CST commanders recognized a 

need for their CSTs to provide operational support to local hazardous 

materials teams prior to those teams’ deployment to an incident scene, 

while 41 percent did not. Seventy-eight percent of commanders who 

responded identified a need to support hazardous materials teams during 

the response itself, while 22 percent did not. 

NGB officials acknowledged that while the conduct of non-WMD specific 

operations by the CSTs is a valuable way for the teams to satisfy their 

mission to prepare for or respond to WMD or catastrophic terrorist attacks, 

some confusion results among the CSTs and state and local officials. They 
Page 20 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

also acknowledge that NGB needs to work with DOD to clarify the types of 

missions that are appropriate for CSTs to perform as part of the 

preparation to respond to a WMD or catastrophic terrorist attack. A 

February 2006 report by the White House on lessons learned from the 

Hurricane Katrina operations recommended that the option of expanding 

the role of CSTs to an all-hazards approach should be explored.13 Further, 

DOD has requested that Congress expand the CSTs’ mission to include 

man-made and natural disasters. If the types of such non-WMD missions in 

which the CSTs participate are not made clear, this could exacerbate 

confusion at the state and local levels about the mission of the CSTs.

DOD Plans to Expand Role 

of CSTs Outside the United 

States

The CSTs are currently limited to conducting operations within the borders 

of the United States and its territories. However, DOD has requested that 

Congress allow CSTs to operate in conjunction with officials in Mexico and 

Canada in order to help accomplish their mission in states bordering these 

countries. CST members and NGB and DOD officials also told us that there 

have been informal discussions within DOD regarding a range of potential 

overseas operations for CSTs, including training, cooperative programs 

with foreign countries, prestaged support missions, as well as possibly 

direct support to the warfighter. However, DOD officials could not identify 

for us whether there is a validated requirement for CSTs to operate 

overseas, and they told us they have no plans to request a further 

expansion of the CST’s mission to encompass overseas operations.

Legislation governing the CST program specifically prohibits the CSTs from 

conducting operations outside the borders of the United States or its 

territories.14 This law emphasizes this restriction by requiring that any 

request by the Secretary of Defense for a legal change be submitted with a 

justification for the request and a written plan to sustain the CSTs’ 

capabilities. Regulations detailing the composition, management, training, 

and doctrine of the CSTs explicitly define the CST mission as supporting 

13 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned (Washington, 

D.C.: February 2006). The report also acknowledges that increased costs and other 

resources would be necessary to support an expanded CST mission.

14 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c)(3).
Page 21 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site, whether the CSTs are 

operating in a state or federal status.15

DOD has requested that Congress allow CSTs to coordinate and operate 

with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD 

incident. The CSTs in border states are currently not permitted to conduct 

exercises and coordination that involve cross-border movement, which 

may limit their effectiveness in planning for WMD events in their regions. 

Therefore, the legislative change DOD proposed could improve the 

effectiveness of state WMD emergency planning. DOD officials said that 

the CSTs would be federalized in order to conduct operations across the 

border.

Some CST members we spoke with during our site visits said they would 

like to engage in training outside the United States in order to exploit 

unique or superior training opportunities. For example, several CSTs 

expressed a desire to train at facilities such as the Defense Research and 

Development Center in Alberta, Canada, in order to undergo live-agent 

training, which several CST members told us would significantly enhance 

their training and exercise efforts. They also pointed out that the U.S. 

Marine Corps’ Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force has 

trained at the Canadian facility and greatly benefited as a result. CST 

members with whom we spoke said that permitting the CSTs to train at 

superior or unique facilities in other countries could increase their 

knowledge, skills, and experience, better preparing them to execute their 

mission. 

DOD and NGB are also informally considering such limited overseas 

missions as assisting foreign nations in developing CBRNE response teams 

similar to the CSTs and prepositioning CSTs at international events, such as 

the Olympics, to help provide critical monitoring and response support. 

CST commanders with whom we spoke told us that limited overseas roles 

for CSTs, such as foreign assistance and prestaged support missions, may 

provide them valuable experience and therefore have a positive effect on 

CSTs’ readiness to perform their stated mission. 

During the course of our work, we heard from NGB and DOD officials and 

some CST commanders that NGB and DOD have also informally 

15 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management, 

ch. 1-1.
Page 22 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

considered even more demanding overseas missions for the CSTs, 

including assisting warfighting forces in such places as Iraq and 

Afghanistan. DOD officials could not identify for us whether a validated 

requirement exists for any of these more expansive overseas missions, and 

they told us that they have no plans to request that Congress expand the 

CSTs’ mission to encompass them. Should such overseas missions be 

contemplated in the future, however, our review of CST capabilities, along 

with our discussions with CST members, indicates that support to the 

warfighter in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is not practicable because of 

inappropriateness of the CSTs’ commercial-grade equipment for use in 

austere conditions. Further, such operations would likely have a negative 

effect on CST readiness and availability, drawing much more heavily on 

existing CST equipment and personnel and reducing states’ access to CSTs, 

a critical component of the domestic WMD response infrastructure. 

CST Program Faces 

Management 

Challenges That Could 

Increase Risk to Longterm Sustainment 

NGB has made progress in establishing an institutional management 

approach to sustain the CST program once all 55 teams are certified. 

However, NGB faces several challenges to the program in such areas as 

staffing, coordination planning, equipment maintenance and acquisition, 

training and exercise oversight, readiness reporting, facilities, and varying 

state oversight and support of their CSTs. Although these challenges have 

not yet affected the overall readiness of the CSTs, if the current efforts to 

address them are unsuccessful, they could impede the progress of the 

newer teams and increase the risk to the long-term sustainment of the 

program.

NGB Is Pursuing 

Institutional Management 

Efforts 

NGB recognizes that the CST program—with 19 teams not yet certified—is 

still in the development process. In seeking to fully establish and sustain 

the CST program, NGB has made progress in developing institutional 

mechanisms that should facilitate standardization and continuous 

improvement within individual CSTs and across the program as a whole. 

For example, NGB’s CST standardization program is an attempt to 

establish a baseline level of interoperability among all CSTs in critical 

areas, such as training, logistics, personnel administration, and budgeting. 

One of the CST program managers responsible for developing the 

standardization program explained that it was initiated to ensure total 

program oversight and accountability for the CSTs and to assist the states 

in their CST oversight responsibility. Under the standardization program, 

NGB will evaluate each CST every 18 months. This evaluation will be 
Page 23 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

coordinated with state-level command inspections that the Army requires. 

Program personnel have completed a series of test visits to uncertified 

CSTs, and NGB expects to begin formal evaluative visits in May 2006. 

NGB has also issued a CST regulation that details the processes and 

procedures for CST management.16 One of the CST program managers 

described the regulation as a desk reference guide for state officials as well 

as for the CSTs themselves. It clarifies CST operations in many areas, 

including mission requests and validation, command and control, 

personnel and administration, reporting requirements, funding, and 

certification. 

Other general management efforts NGB has led or helped coordinate 

include the following:

• The recent consolidation of Army-directed training and external 

evaluation responsibilities for the CSTs. This should facilitate progress 

and consistency across the program in terms of collective training and 

external evaluations. 

• Establishment of working groups at both the CST and program 

management levels to facilitate improvements in doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities for 

the CST program.

• Development and oversight of doctrine and other guidance to assist the 

establishment of the 55 CSTs.17 In creating this doctrine and guidance, 

NGB and the Army organization responsible for writing the doctrine 

have sought to incorporate lessons learned by the teams from the first 

few phases of the program as they established themselves in their 

respective states and territories. 

Further information on DOD management efforts related to the CSTs can 

be found in appendix II.

16 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management.

17 Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team and 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Installation Support Team Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures, Field Manual 3-11.22 (January 2004).
Page 24 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

CSTs Struggle to Fully Staff 

Teams

NGB faces several challenges to the CST program that could impede the 

progress of the newer teams as well as hinder the long-term sustainment of 

the CST program. One challenge is that CSTs struggle to maintain their 

official allotment of 22 fully trained, mission-capable personnel because of 

turnover, team structure, and retention challenges. 

NGB officials reported that CST positions exhibit an annual turnover rate 

of 25 to 35 percent. This is due to team members departing after their tours 

are complete, dismissal of team members for a variety of reasons, and 

reassignments within teams to replace departed personnel. After vacant 

positions are filled, new CST members are away from their teams for the 

first year, satisfying training requirements. Once they return they must be 

integrated into the team’s collective exercises and other existing 

operations. As a result, CSTs sometimes conduct their missions with less 

than full unit strength, and 75 percent of CST commanders responding to 

our data collection instrument reported that the ability of CSTs to perform 

their mission is adversely affected by the lack of available personnel 

because of training, leave, and other manpower issues. However, the 

commanders also said that their teams remain ready to conduct their 

mission, reporting, for example, that a CST can perform its mission with 

less than 22 people as long as other members of the team can substitute for 

a gap. 

The CST structure also creates a staffing challenge because few of the 

advanced military occupational specialties on the team are represented by 

more than one person. For example, the nuclear medical science officer, 

who is responsible for operating the CST’s mobile laboratory and is critical 

to the CST’s ability to identify CBRNE substances, is the only member of 

the team with that special skill. Likewise, there is a single physician’s 

assistant and a single modeler assigned to each team. If these or other 

highly technical positions remain vacant for an extended period, the team 

must rely upon cross-trained personnel within the team or borrow key 

personnel from other teams. Seventy-nine percent of CST commanders 

responding to our data collection instrument reported that this lack of 

depth among key personnel adversely affects the team’s ability to perform 

its mission. Additionally, 88 percent of commanders who responded report 

that there are too few duty positions in the team’s eight-member survey 

section. CST commanders reported to us that the survey teams should have 

more people and that responding with too few personnel restricts a CST’s 

ability to make multiple entries into an incident scene in search of 

suspected CBRNE substances, degrades its ability to remain on scene for 

long periods without relief, and increases the time required for resolution 
Page 25 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

of an incident. CSTs reported that their teams have still been able to 

conduct their missions and that cross-training other team members to add 

depth to various team sections may actually increase their overall 

capabilities.

CST staffing challenges are further exacerbated by recruiting and retention 

difficulties. When key personnel such as the nuclear medical science 

officer or physician’s assistant depart, the resulting open spots are 

especially hard to fill because qualified applicants are difficult to attract 

from the civilian world and are not widely represented within the military. 

CST commanders and NGB officials explained that the lack of promotion 

opportunity within the teams was another major factor affecting a soldier’s 

decision to become or remain a CST member, and that career progression 

is particularly limited for the team’s Air Guard contingent. They also listed 

other factors that frustrate a team’s ability to recruit and retain CST 

members, including the team’s substantial training requirements and its 

full-time alert status for possible deployment. 

NGB has pursued a number of efforts aimed at addressing these staffing 

challenges. For example, during live responses, NGB augments the lead 

CST with additional individuals and sometimes with entire teams. NGB has 

also been working to fund and conduct a limited operational experiment to 

validate the CSTs’ personnel and equipment list. Recommendations for 

adjustments to the number of authorized personnel may result from this 

experiment. 

In a further attempt to address staffing challenges, NGB is currently 

compiling the latest turnover data and other relevant personnel 

information to send to the service secretaries to encourage them to 

authorize $150 per month incentive pay for CST personnel in accordance 

with Title 37 United States Code, Section 305(b). 

Although these efforts may ease some of the staffing challenges discussed 

above, it is too early to know whether they will fully address them.

CSTs Lack Guidance on 

Conducting Coordination in 

Their States

Another challenge is that NGB provides little guidance to the CSTs on how 

they should coordinate with state and local emergency responders and 

officials, potentially lengthening the amount of time it takes new teams to 

become incorporated into their home state emergency response 

infrastructure. CST coordination and outreach efforts vary in nature and 

scope from state to state, and they include practices such as briefing state 

and local officials and responders on the mission and capabilities of the 
Page 26 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

CST, developing protocols for working with emergency responders and 

state officials, participating in training with other responders, conducting 

exercises with other responders, and offering technical advice to other 

responders. 

Established CSTs, state and local officials, and state and local responders 

have identified CST coordination and outreach efforts as being critical to 

the success of CST operations. Such efforts increase the CSTs’ visibility at 

the local level, improve responders’ understanding of the CST mission (for 

example, when they can be legitimately deployed), solidify working 

relationships and open communication between the CSTs and state and 

local responders, and increase the CSTs’ familiarity with the vulnerabilities 

and strategic targets in all areas of their states. 

Some CSTs reported a learning curve with respect to conducting successful 

coordination and outreach. For example, a few CSTs initially did not have 

good relationships with other emergency responders until outreach efforts 

clarified the role of the CST as working to support local and state 

emergency responders. One CST we visited coordinated closely with its 

state and local partners to prepare a clear set of written protocols and 

coordination mechanisms that it found to be highly successful. Some state 

officials reported that their CSTs have not yet developed written 

coordination protocols for state and local emergency responders, even 

though responders expressed confusion regarding CST capabilities and 

mission. NGB has not issued any guidance or requirements regarding the 

development, implementation, or assessment of CST coordination plans 

and outreach efforts. NGB has not included such outreach efforts in CST 

regulations as a mission-essential task, there is no formal system in place 

for sharing coordination best practices across teams, and there are no 

requirements to develop written protocols with local and state officials and 

responders. 

NGB officials told us that they recognize the importance of coordination 

and outreach to ensure the success of CSTs in their home states. However, 

they have not yet considered formal guidance for the teams on the subject.

CSTs Face Equipment, Training, 

Readiness Reporting, and 

Facilities Challenges

CSTs experience other challenges that NGB recognizes as important, and it 

has efforts under way to address them. Many of these efforts are new or 

ongoing, and it is therefore not clear how effective they will be in 

addressing the specific challenges. While these challenges have not yet 

affected the CSTs’ overall readiness, if the current efforts to address them 
Page 27 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

are unsuccessful, the challenges could threaten the long-term success and 

sustainability of the program. 

One of challenges the CSTs face is maintaining and replacing military and 

commercial equipment at the pace required to sustain CST readiness. CST 

members told us that they experience varying or poor maintenance support 

for their military equipment, which is the responsibility of the National 

Guard in each state. They, as well as state National Guard and NGB 

officials, told us that the varying degree of state National Guard support 

stems mostly from the state National Guards’ lack of understanding of the 

unique nature of the CST as a unit as opposed to a more traditional 

National Guard military unit. CST members reported that maintenance 

support for their commercial equipment, which is done through the NGBmanaged Consequence Management Support Center in Lexington, 

Kentucky, tends to be better. They also expressed concern that the pace of 

equipment replacement and development is too slow to ensure that the 

CSTs have the most relevant equipment available to accomplish their 

mission and that their existing equipment is updated to prevent its being 

worn out. NGB officials report that NGB and DOD have heard these 

concerns from the CSTs and are taking the following steps to address these 

equipment-related challenges:

• NGB is working with the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense and the Army Maneuver Support Center to plan 

for future generations of CST equipment. 

• NGB Logistics is assessing the cost of each piece of CST equipment and 

developing new items where appropriate. 

• NGB Resource Management is requesting an increase in funds in future 

years to maintain the CST equipment sets.

These efforts may help address some equipment challenges, such as 

adequate equipment update and re capitalization plans, but it is not yet 

clear whether they will be successful in the near or long term. NGB’s 

standardization program may help the state National Guard organizations 

provide better maintenance support for the CSTs’ military equipment, but it 

will take time and cooperation between NGB, the CSTs, and their 

respective state National Guard commands to accomplish this.

Another challenge the CSTs face is a lack of oversight and evaluation of 

exercises required of CSTs each year. Unlike the external evaluations the 
Page 28 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

CSTs undergo before certification and every 18 months thereafter, the 12 or 

more exercises the CSTs plan for and conduct each year do not follow the 

same specific set of objectives and criteria and are not evaluated to 

determine the extent to which those objectives were met. NGB officials 

told us that they recognize the need for more oversight of these exercises at 

the NGB and state levels. NGB and DOD have the following efforts under 

way to help address the lack of exercise oversight and evaluation:

• NGB and the Army Maneuver Support Center revised the CST 

Commanders Pre-Command Course to include instruction on training 

management.

• NGB is incorporating into its ongoing standardization initiative training 

management components to ensure teams are adhering to Army training 

regulation. 

• NGB is bringing a member of the standardization initiative to NGB to 

assist in training oversight. 

• DOD is consolidating Army-directed external evaluations and related 

training responsibilities under U.S. Army North to facilitate progress 

and consistency across the CST program.

These efforts should help NGB and the states better oversee and evaluate 

the effectiveness of the CST program. However, since many of the 

initiatives are new, particularly the standardization program, it is not clear 

how effective they will be.

The CSTs use two separate systems to report their readiness measures. 

CST members we interviewed said that one system, the standard Army 

readiness system (DOD’s Status of Resources and Training System), is ill 

suited to the unique nature of the CSTs. They also said that while the other 

system—maintained by NGB—is better suited to the CSTs as a unit, the 

system requires constant effort by team members to update and involves 

using secure Internet connections the teams do not always have readily 

available at their home stations. Many of the CST members we interviewed 

said that because the two systems overlapped, they should be merged or 

one should be eliminated. NGB officials explained that the system they 

maintain is critical for administering the Response Management Plan and is 

not meant to supplant the standard Army system. They also said that DOD 

is transitioning to the new Defense Readiness Reporting System. NGB 

expects the CSTs to replace the two existing systems with the new one in 
Page 29 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

October 2006. This should solve the problem of having two separate 

readiness reporting systems. However, until the new system is in place and 

NGB and CST members can evaluate the extent to which it suits the unique 

nature of the CSTs and helps NGB administer the Response Management 

Plan, it remains unclear how fully the new system will address this 

challenge. 

Finally, some CSTs have reported that their facilities are inadequate in 

terms of vehicle, storage, and training space. NGB recognizes that some 

CST facilities are not adequate and has issued revised planning templates 

for CST facilities to the states. However, as we discuss further below, the 

varying degree to which states understand how to use these templates and 

fully meet the needs of their CSTs indicates that the challenge remains to 

be fully addressed.

NGB Lacks Guidance to Help 

State National Guard Commands 

Oversee and Support CSTs 

NGB has made progress in issuing guidance that explains state National 

Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs, 

but this has been insufficient to fully inform the states about the unique 

nature and requirements of the CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into 

the state National Guard command structure. The result has been varied 

oversight of the CSTs at the state level in important administrative areas 

and varied support to their CSTs in areas such as staffing and equipment 

augmentation and designing and building the facilities to house the teams. 

According to NGB officials and the certified teams we visited, DOD 

established the first CSTs without the benefit of a great deal of direction 

and guidance that would help create a unique unit from scratch and 

incorporate that unit into a state National Guard structure that is 

unaccustomed to such units. Subsequently, NGB issued its CST 

management regulation, which listed responsibilities for state National 

Guard headquarters to exercise fiscal and administrative management and 

oversight of the CSTs in their states or territories.18 This guidance includes 

state National Guard responsibility for such CST oversight as issuing 

training guidance, approving mid- and long-range training plans and 

objectives, property accountability, and conducting readiness and 

compliance inspections. While this guidance represents progress in 

clarifying the roles of NGB and the states in overseeing and supporting the 

CSTs, it is not as detailed as NGB’s guidance on operational command and 

control and mission-related topics in explaining roles and responsibilities.

18 National Guard Bureau, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management.
Page 30 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Although the CST program has been under way for over 7 years, CST 

members and state National Guard officials with whom we met said the 

guidance on how the states should integrate the CSTs into their National 

Guard structures and how CST oversight and support should be conducted 

is still lacking. NGB officials told us that they recognized that the states 

have varied widely in how they have integrated the CSTs into their state 

National Guard structures. They also said they are planning to issue further 

guidance to clarify how states should integrate their CSTs into the new 

state Joint Force Headquarters organizations but that they are waiting for 

these organizations to be fully in place.

Because of the lack of clear guidance from NGB on how state National 

Guard organizations should oversee and support their CSTs, the level and 

quality of oversight and support for CSTs varies by state. Some states and 

territories we visited did not have formal plans in place at their National 

Guard headquarters or at the CST level for evaluating the effective use of 

resources, and very few of those states conducted periodic internal reviews 

of the CSTs. The states set up budget and accounting records to ensure 

funds for the CSTs were available when and where needed, but they 

conducted no regular program reviews for the CSTs. 

Many of the states and territories we visited did not have specific 

objectives for collective training, and they did not measure 

accomplishments against previously determined specific mission 

objectives. Therefore, those states could not identify deficiencies or make 

command management decisions based on such analyses. As a result, NGB 

and the states were not in a position to know if they were making the most 

effective use of CST resources. 

Again, because NGB has no clear guidance to the states, state National 

Guard support of the CSTs also varies widely in terms of staffing, 

equipment, and facilities. One state we visited provides additional 

administrative support to its CST through the use of three or four regular 

part-time National Guard members. This arrangement also allows those 

part-time members access to some CST training and, in the event those 

individuals apply for vacant permanent CST positions, can cut down on 

hiring and training delays. Another state hired an additional full-time duty 

member to support the team’s logistics. Some states provided limited 

amounts of additional equipment to support their CSTs, such as laptop 

computers. Other states do not augment their CSTs. Among the reasons 

some state National Guard officials reported for why their state’s National 

Guard headquarters did not augment their CSTs were a lack of money and 
Page 31 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

lack of interest by the headquarters in the CSTs because they are small 

units. NGB officials acknowledged that they need to help the states 

understand that the CSTs are unique units and should therefore be 

considered high priority. 

During our site visits, we found inconsistencies in how states interpret and 

apply procurement guidance to CST equipment requests. As a result, some 

states approved equipment for a CST while other states did not. For 

example, NGB guidance permits the purchase of nonstandard uniforms 

with state funds only and if necessary for CSTs to accomplish their mission 

by blending in with other police and first responder personnel. However, 

some states we visited refused to purchase uniforms for their teams, even 

though the teams indicated a need. Other states did support the purchase 

of the nonstandard uniforms. While NGB, state National Guard, and CST 

officials stated that they believed it was important to have the flexibility to 

make purchases that best support the CSTs’ mission, some CST 

commanders however thought this subjectivity sometimes negatively 

affected the CSTs’ ability to obtain material support. 

States have also had difficulties designing and renovating or building 

facilities that meet the needs of the CSTs. State National Guard officials 

said the unique nature of the CST mission made it more difficult for states 

to understand the support requirements and expectations placed upon 

their CSTs. For example, in addition to the need for climate controlled 

spaces for sensitive equipment, most CST members we interviewed said 

that there is a need for enclosed bays for all vehicle storage because it 

facilitates ready-to-roll deployment, improves vehicle security, and 

provides an all-weather maintenance and training area. However, 78 

percent of the CST commanders who responded to our data collection 

instrument reported that their facilities are not large enough to hold all 

vehicles and other CST equipment. Approximately half reported that their 

facilities are not large enough for all personnel to have an adequate 

workspace. National Guard officials in the states and territories we visited 

also identified inadequacies with their facilities. They said they followed 

Army procurement and budgeting guidance, which sometimes affected 

whether identified changes could be made to the design or construction. 

Sometimes the state National Guard did not recognize the unique mission 

of the CST as compared to building an armory, and sometimes the design 

was set before the CST commander or other members had a chance to 

review the plans. Because of varying interpretations, some states have 

constructed new or remodeled facilities that are in need of further 

remodeling. Other CSTs we visited were satisfied with their facilities, 
Page 32 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

despite believing that such things as vehicle bay space were not completely 

adequate. These CST members reported that their state National Guard 

headquarters worked well with the CST to design the most effective facility 

they could to meet the unique needs of the team.

In addition to the CST management regulation, NGB instituted the CST 

standardization program partially in response to its concerns that states 

were not adequately monitoring the CSTs’ implementation of key Army 

management controls in training, logistics, budgeting, and other areas. 

According to preliminary standardization program reviews, state National 

Guard headquarters have done few periodic reviews and inspections. NGB 

officials told us they intend to use these reviews to increase state 

participation in oversight of the CSTs and will also spell out in greater 

detail for the states the type of interaction NGB believes is necessary and 

required by regulation. If pursued consistently, the standardization 

program should help NGB better coordinate with the states on how to 

oversee and support the CSTs, though a significant NGB-state National 

Guard cooperative effort will be needed to facilitate success. 

Conclusions In managing the CST program, DOD and NGB have made significant 

progress toward establishing 55 highly specialized teams in every state and 

U.S. territory. The focus has thus far been on reaching the goal of certifying 

all 55 teams. As the CST program seeks to institutionalize its key processes 

and sustain itself in the long term, we see four areas that could increase the 

risk to that effort.

First, confusion about what types of non-WMD deployments the CSTs can 

and should use to help them accomplish their mission of preparing for or 

responding to WMD events could make it more difficult to effectively 

coordinate efforts at the state and local levels and possibly inhibit regional 

and national coordination between the states and the federal government. 

Expanding the CSTs’ mission to encompass natural and man-made 

disasters may not sufficiently clarify what types of such missions are 

appropriate for the CSTs to conduct, possibly exacerbating confusion 

among state and local officials about the mission of the CSTs.

Second, some limited overseas missions, such as coordinating with 

officials from Canada and Mexico or training at live agent facilities, may be 

beneficial to CST training and operational effectiveness. Though DOD 

indicates that it is not planning to request that Congress expand the CSTs’ 

role to encompass more demanding overseas missions, to the extent 
Page 33 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

missions such as regular CST support to overseas combatant commands 

are considered in the future, they would likely have a detrimental impact 

on the readiness and availability of the teams to perform their original 

mission to support domestic WMD response.

Third, despite the progress NGB has made in fully establishing the CST 

program and formalizing institutional sustainment plans for the teams, 

many areas of the program face significant challenges that require specific 

guidance and action from NGB. NGB understands these challenges, 

particularly in the areas of team staffing, coordination guidance, equipment 

maintenance and acquisition, training and exercise oversight, readiness 

reporting, and facility adequacy. While individual team readiness has not 

yet suffered, if current and planned NGB efforts to address these 

challenges are not successful, the challenges could eventually cause harm 

to overall CST readiness. 

Fourth, despite NGB’s progress in establishing such unique and specialized 

units as the CSTs, there remains a need for additional guidance on the 

administrative oversight structure for the CSTs at the state level. Small 

differences between the way each state manages its CST may be expected, 

given the fact of 54 different military commands. While NGB’s plans for 

additional guidance on the oversight and support of the CSTs and its 

standardization program should help states better integrate the CSTs, 

further guidance and coordination efforts between NGB, the CSTs, and the 

state National Guard commands is warranted. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To help address management challenges and further efforts to sustain the 

CST program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert 

with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the 

Army and of the Air Force, take the following three actions: 

• Clarify the types of non-WMD responses that are appropriate for CSTs 

as part of their mission to prepare for domestic WMD and catastrophic 

terrorist attacks. 

• Fully incorporate into ongoing management efforts to sustain the CST 

program a plan with goals, objectives, and evaluation mechanisms to 

address challenges such as team staffing issues, coordination guidance, 

equipment maintenance and acquisition, training and exercise oversight, 

readiness reporting, and facilities requirements. 
Page 34 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

• Develop clear guidance for the states on how CSTs should be integrated 

into state National Guard commands in order to facilitate an effective 

administrative oversight and support structure for the CSTs in each 

state that reflects familiarization with the role, mission, and 

requirements of these specialized units, and work with state adjutants 

general and federal financial officers at the state level to find 

appropriate ways to exchange ideas and best practices for ensuring 

effective NGB-state National Guard partnership in overseeing the CST 

program. One such method could be to create or modify an existing 

working group or team to allow state National Guard membership.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the intent 

of our recommendations. DOD discussed steps it is currently taking as well 

as actions it plans to take to address these recommendations. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report 

where appropriate.

In response to our recommendation that DOD clarify the types of nonWMD responses that are appropriate for CSTs, DOD reported that it has 

requested that Congress authorize the CSTs to respond to catastrophic 

events of intentional or unintentional origin and that if this is enacted, DOD 

will direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to develop implementing 

instructions. DOD reiterated its view that the CSTs have been participating 

in non-WMD responses as training. Expanding the CSTs’ mission to include 

both WMD and non-WMD events should help clarify the role of the latter in 

the CSTs’ overall mission. We continue to believe that as NGB develops 

implementing instructions, it should provide clear guidance on the types of 

non-WMD responses that are appropriate for the CSTs. This should help 

alleviate confusion about the CSTs’ mission and prevent their being 

overemployed to the detriment of their WMD-related training and mission 

requirements.

In its comments on our recommendation regarding incorporation into 

ongoing CST management efforts of a plan to address critical challenges to 

the CST program, DOD highlighted some of the CST management efforts 

we discussed in our report, such as the CST Working Group and the CST 

standardization program. DOD further stated that additional management 

efforts should be deferred until the effectiveness of the standardization 

program can be assessed. We agree that the program offers the potential of 

a good evaluation tool for NGB, the CSTs, and the states’ National Guard 

headquarters and that further information on many of the challenges we 
Page 35 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

highlight in our report may be gleaned from the results of the 

standardization program. To the extent the program further highlights 

these and other challenges for which no immediate corrective measures 

are in place, we would expect the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to 

take the appropriate management action.

In response to our recommendation that NGB develop clear guidance for 

the states on how CSTs should be integrated into state National Guard 

commands to facilitate effective administrative oversight and support, 

DOD indicated that in addition to guidance on state oversight of the CSTs in 

the recently published CST management regulation, the CST 

standardization program and NGB-conducted formal training for state 

National Guard leadership provide additional measures to review and 

reinforce state National Guard administrative oversight of their CSTs. DOD 

further recognized the value of currently available venues for coordination 

between NGB, the CSTs, and the states’ National Guard commands. As we 

state in our report, we believe that if pursued consistently, the 

standardization program should help NGB better coordinate with the states 

on how to oversee and support the CSTs. This should help NGB and the 

states provide an effective long-term partnership to sustain the CST 

program. To the extent necessary based on the result of standardization 

program evaluations, we would expect NGB to expand its efforts to assist 

state National Guard commands to provide effective oversight and support 

of their CSTs. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. We 

will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
Page 36 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

the last page of this report. Key staff members who contributed to this 

report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Davi M. D’Agostino

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 37 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To assess the extent to which the Civil Support Teams (CST) are prepared 

to conduct their mission, we gathered information on the categories and 

process of the two CST readiness measurement mechanisms; reviewed 

readiness-related documents for the 14 teams we visited; included similar 

readiness information in a data collection instrument sent to all 55 CSTs; 

and discussed CST readiness with local, state, and federal officials who 

have worked with CSTs. We observed the external evaluation of 1 CST by 

U.S. Army officials and attended the after action review following the 

evaluation. We also observed an exercise that included one CST and a 

number of local and state responders. During our site visits, we discussed 

operational command and control mechanisms with CST members and 

their National Guard headquarters officials. We compared the published 

mission of the CSTs to the types of missions the CSTs are performing and 

discussed the extent to which their mission is well understood with CST 

members and local, state, and federal officials. Further, we discussed the 

potential effect of overseas missions on CST readiness with CST members 

and civilian emergency management officials in the states and territories 

we visited. 

To assess the extent to which effective administrative mechanisms are in 

place for the CSTs, we compared National Guard Bureau (NGB) 

regulations and guidance on management of the CSTs with the practices in 

place at the 14 CSTs we visited. We also discussed operational and 

administrative issues with CST members in those states and their National 

Guard headquarters officials. We collected similar information in the data 

collection instrument sent to all 55 CSTs. During our site visits, we 

discussed with CST members those challenges they believed could inhibit 

CST readiness in future. We categorized these challenges, discussed them 

with NGB officials, and compared the challenges to information on NGB 

efforts related to those areas. We also collected cost data related to the 

establishment and sustainment of the CSTs from NGB, state National 

Guard personnel, and the CSTs themselves. We did not independently 

verify cost data, but we interviewed NGB officials who manage the data 

about data quality control procedures. We determined the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the 

Department of Defense (DOD), including the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, NGB, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, First Army, Fifth Army, and United States Northern Command. 

During each state site visit we met with members of the CST and officials 

from the state National Guard headquarters, state emergency management 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

and homeland security officials, representatives from local community 

emergency response agencies (such as fire and police departments), and 

representatives of federal agencies and organizations (such as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation and Department of Energy).

Our site visits to 14 of the 55 CSTs were conducted from August through 

December 2005. We selected the 14 teams in order to obtain a reasonable 

sample of CSTs based on a number of criteria, including geographic 

distribution, age of team, certification status, state size, state population, 

state government emergency management and homeland security 

organization, and DOD-related command structure. We visited the 

following locations:

• Alabama

• Alaska

• Colorado

• Iowa

• Massachusetts

• Montana

• New Mexico 

• New York

• North Carolina

• Puerto Rico

• Rhode Island

• Tennessee

• Texas

• Washington

To supplement the interviews we conducted during the site visits, we 

collected supporting documents from the CSTs and individuals we 

interviewed and made physical observations of CST facilities in every state 

we visited. 

To further address our objectives, we designed a broad data collection 

instrument for all 55 CSTs that would collect information regarding CST 

personnel, equipment, training, certification, costs, coordination, and 

mission scope. Within these major topic areas, we developed and tested 

relevant questions based upon previous GAO work, current research, and 

interviews at both the NGB and CST level. After two formal pretests with 

the command staff of 2 separate CSTs, we deployed the data collection 

instrument simultaneously to the National Guard’s state supervisory 

auditors for all 55 teams and asked that they be forwarded to the CST 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

commanders in each of their respective states or territories. The data 

collection instrument was administered via e-mail using an ActiveXenabled Microsoft Word attachment. 

Although every team received an identical version of the data collection 

instrument, we advised the team commanders that because of differing 

experiences, locations, certification statuses, and lengths of service, we 

recognized that not all teams would be able to respond to every question. 

Each section of the instrument contained questions that could be answered 

by both certified and uncertified teams, as well as questions that were 

applicable to certified teams only. The data collection instrument was 

addressed to the 55 unit commanders, and while these individuals were 

explicitly responsible for the overall content of the completed data 

collection instruments, we permitted them to delegate specific questions or 

sections to other appropriate members within the CST. To ensure a full and 

candid response, we noted that individual responses would be attributed 

neither to individual CSTs nor to their individual members. Further, we 

requested that the teams transmit their responses over a secure e-mail 

channel to safeguard any sensitive information. 

We distributed the data collection instrument via e-mail on September 26, 

2005, and it was deployed through December 27, 2005. Out of the 55 

deployed, we received 52 completed data collection instrument responses 

during our 3-month response window.1

 To analyze the results of the 

completed responses, we noted responses for all questions and highlighted 

those we deemed significant, such as responses where there was 

overwhelming agreement among CST commanders. These responses and 

others were compared with preliminary results from our site visits and 

used to verify that the GAO site visit teams had not overlooked significant 

widespread CST issues.

Percentage results from the data collection instrument are discussed in the 

letter. In some cases, there are fewer than 52 respondents for a given 

question. Because some respondents did not answer all questions, the 

percentages we report are calculated using the base of respondents who 

answered the question. In no cases did fewer than 48 of the 52 respondents 

answer a question whose percentage results appear in the report.

1 The three CSTs that did not submit responses included one phase 2 team and two 

phase 5 teams.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. 

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any data collection effort 

may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For 

example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the 

sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how the data 

are entered into a database or are analyzed, can introduce unwanted 

variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the 

data collection instrument, the data collection, and the data analysis to 

minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, GAO staff with subject 

matter expertise designed the data collection instrument in collaboration 

with social science survey specialists. Then, the draft questionnaire was 

pre-tested with the command staff of two CSTs to ensure (1) the questions 

were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to comprehend; (2) terminology was 

used correctly; (3) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on the 

respondents; (4) the information was feasible to obtain; and (5) the survey 

was comprehensive and unbiased. Finally, when the data were analyzed, a 

second, independent analyst checked all computer programs.

The entire data collection instrument appears in appendix III.

We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 41 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Appendix II

CST Program Management Efforts ApendxiI

NGB has focused much of its management on establishing and certifying all 

55 of the authorized CSTs. But NGB also recognizes that a significant 

amount of effort is required to ensure that the CST program is sustained for 

the long term, while it also provides for the continued improvement of the 

process for establishing the teams and modifying doctrine, training, 

equipment, and operational considerations as necessary. Some of the 

institutional efforts NGB has coordinated or led include a CST 

standardization program, coordinating Army-directed CST training and 

evaluations, and establishing working groups to evaluate and recommend 

improvements to the CST program.

Standardization and 

Evaluation Program

The standardization program is scheduled to evaluate each CST every 18 

months and is intended to be coordinated with state-level command 

inspections that the Army requires. The process begins with a 

precoordination meeting 6 months prior to the scheduled standardization 

visit that explains the purpose, evaluation method, and desired outcome for 

the upcoming visit. Ninety days prior to the scheduled visit, a second 

coordination meeting is held to resolve any remaining administrative 

details and to allow the standardization team personnel responsible for 

conducting the evaluation to become familiar with the CST’s location. 

During the visit itself, these personnel conduct compliance-oriented 

evaluations using a series of checklists that monitor various subtasks 

within the evaluated areas. For example, the training checklist assesses 55 

items, including whether the CST has an approved Mission Essential Task 

List, whether the team publishes quarterly training guidance, and whether 

the team conducts after-action reports for all training. Each checklist item 

is evaluated as “go,” “no-go,” or “not applicable.” Items that are initially 

characterized as needing improvement (no-go) may be upgraded to 

satisfactory (go) as a result of on-the-spot corrections. At the evaluation’s 

conclusion, standardization team personnel will present the results of their 

evaluation to the state adjutant general. They must issue a formal report to 

the adjutant general within 6duty days after the end of their visit. Among 

the standardization program’s objectives is integrating with state and 

intermediate command inspections that could reduce the total amount of 

time committed to the inspection process, as well as imposing CST-specific 

management controls to assist in the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse 

of Army resources. Program personnel have completed a series of test 

visits to CSTs, and they expect to begin formal evaluation visits in May 

2006.
Appendix II

CST Program Management Efforts

Page 42 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Army Training and 

Evaluation Support

As of October 1, 2005, Fifth Army assumed sole responsibility for all CST 

external evaluations and related training, with the exception of CSTs in 

Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam, which remain under U.S. Army Pacific. Under 

Fifth Army, the organization and protocols of all CST training and 

evaluation teams should be standardized. Army, NGB, and CST officials 

report that training, education, and experience requirements of 

trainer/evaluators will also be standardized. They indicate that this 

standardization should increase the consistency of external evaluations 

and related collective training across all teams. Consolidation of Army 

training, readiness, and oversight responsibilities could also promote better 

information sharing and guidance development both across the Fifth Army 

training and evaluation teams and the program as a whole. Responsibility 

for all CST external evaluations and related training was previously divided 

geographically between the First Army and Fifth Army under the U.S. Army 

Forces Command, with the exception of Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam. 

Although both First and Fifth Armies were required to train and evaluate 

teams to the standards set forth in the CSTs’ Mission Training Plan, Army 

field manuals and other regulations, each Army organized its CST training 

and evaluation teams differently and followed different protocols for 

executing training and external evaluations. 

CST Working Groups In April 2005 NGB formally established the Civil Support Team Working 

Group to (1) increase the operational effectives of CSTs by providing 

operationally relevant advice on gaps, shortfalls, and improvements to CST 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF); (2) assist in implementing any 

resulting plans, and (3) promote standardization and interoperability 

among CSTs. The working group process had already been working 

informally since the establishment of the first 10 CSTs. In addition to NGB, 

working group membership includes the CST commanders and 

representatives from the Army Maneuver Support Center1

 and the joint 

service Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The working group is 

organized to include several technical working groups and subgroups that 

focus on specific aspects (e.g., equipment, personnel, and training) or 

components (e.g., operations, survey, medical and science assessment, 

communications, computer and information systems, and 

logistics/sustainment) of the CST program. In June 2004 the Army 

1

 Part of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.
Appendix II

CST Program Management Efforts

Page 43 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Maneuver Support Center and NGB initiated the Integrated Concept Team 

to determine the tasks, schedules, milestones, and products required to 

develop operational concepts and provide DOTMLPF solutions to support 

the CST program. In addition to directing the efforts of the other CST 

working groups with regard to DOTMLPF responsibilities, the Integrated 

Concept Team is also tasked with more broadly addressing CST issues 

within the larger scope of DOD force management and operational 

capabilities plans. 
Page 44 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Appendix III

Data Collection Instrument ApendxiI

US GAO 

Page 1 of 35 

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT for the WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Introduction 

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan agency that assists Congress in evaluating federal programs. We have been 

asked to report to Congress on the following aspects of the Civil Support Team (CST) 

program: readiness and capability to respond to WMD incidents; coordination with other 

local, regional, state, and federal emergency responders; and costs associated with 

establishment of teams and continuing operations for both certified and uncertified 

teams.

In order to obtain similar information across all CSTs, we are sending this data collection 

instrument (DCI) to all 55 unit commanders. The questions in the DCI are grouped into 

six sections: 

1) Threats and responders 

2) Coordination and communication 

3) Mission readiness and certification 

4) Equipment, transport, and medical 

5) Training

6) Personnel

Each section contains questions that can be answered by both certified and uncertified 

teams, as well as questions that may be applicable to certified teams only. While it is 

necessary for methodological reasons for every team to receive the same version of the 

DCI, it is understood that due to differing experiences, locations, certification 

statuses, and lengths of service, not all teams will be able to respond to every question.

The DCI is addressed to the 55 unit commanders, and while these individuals are 

responsible for the overall content of the completed DCIs, the unit commander may 

delegate specific questions or sections to other appropriate members within the CST. 

There is a blank field at the end of each of the six sections that asks for a name, phone 

number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the responses to that 

section. This field should be used to identify any team member other than the 

commander who should be contacted about that section’s responses; if the unit 

commander is the contact point for that section, the field may be left blank. 

Although there is a possibility that sources both within and outside the CST may be 

contacted to validate responses, it is important to note that responses will be attributed 

neither to individual CSTs nor to their individual members. Data from the DCI will be 

presented in larger groupings for summary purposes only and will not identify the 

responses from any one CST. 
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Page 2 of 35 

 Section 1: THREATS & RESPONDERS

Note: For the purposes of this document, the term ‘REGIONAL’ is intended to mean a geographic or 

political area that is larger than a locality but smaller than a state. It may be entirely within one state, 

or it may be a metropolitan area that crosses state boundaries, but it does not refer to groupings of 

several states. 

1. For each of the potential threats in your state that are listed across the top of the table below, please 

identify the potential responders in the left-hand column that you would expect to encounter at the 

corresponding incident scene. (Please check all that apply.) 

POTENTIAL THREATS 

Chemical, 

biological, 

nuclear, or 

radiological

incidents 

T

Accidents 

or natural 

disasters

T

Other

types of 

incidents 

T

LOCAL & REGIONAL RESPONSE 

Local/Regional police depts. 

Local/Regional fire depts. 

Local/Regional HAZMAT teams 

Local/Regional bomb squads 

Local/Regional EMTs 

Local/Regional utilities 

Other local/regional response

(please identify) 

 

Other local/regional response

(please identify) 

 

STATE RESPONSE 

NG WMD-CSTs 

from other states 

NG CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 

Packages (CERFP) 

State HAZMAT Teams 

State bomb squads 

State Police 

State Bureau of Investigation 

State Fire Marshal 

State Office of Emergency Services/ 

Emergency Management or similar 
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Page 3 of 35 

POTENTIAL THREATS 

Chemical, 

biological, 

nuclear, or 

radiological

incidents 

T

Accidents 

or natural 

disasters

T

Other

types of 

incidents 

T

State Office of Homeland Security 

or similar 

State Office of 

Environmental Management 

or similar 

State Health Dept 

Other state response 

(please identify) 

 

Other state response 

(please identify) 

 

FEDERAL RESPONSE 

Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

(JTF-CS) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

Hazardous Materials Response Team 

(HMRT) 

Other FBI agent(s) or team(s) 

U.S. Coast Guard’s National Strike 

Force (NSF) teams 

U.S. Secret Service 

U.S. Marshals 

Federal Incident Response Support 

Team (FIRST) 

Nuclear Incident Response Team 

(NIRT)

Dept of Energy’s radiation

assessment teams 

FEMA’s Advance Emergency Response 

Team (ERT-A) 

FEMA’s National Emergency Response 

Team (ERT-N) 

Other FEMA response assets 

Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 

response teams 

National Disaster Medical System 

EPA – Radiological Emergency 

Response Team (RERT) 

EPA – National Response Team 
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Page 4 of 35 

POTENTIAL THREATS 

Chemical, 

biological, 

nuclear, or 

radiological

incidents 

T

Accidents 

or natural 

disasters

T

Other

types of 

incidents 

T

Other federal response 

(please identify) 

 

Other federal response 

(please identify) 

 

2. Does the team consider itself to be a CBRNE responder, a WMD responder, both, or neither? 

 CBRNE responder 

 WMD responder 

 Both 

 Neither 

Follow-up to #2: Is there a practical difference between being a CBRNE responder and being a WMD 

responder?

3. Other than those possessed by CSTs, what response capabilities exist for CBRNE incidents at the 

local/regional, state, and federal levels? Who possesses these capabilities at each level? 

LOCAL/REGIONAL 

Is this capability present 

at the local level? 

T

If YES, who possesses this capability? 

T

CBRNE detection YES 

 NO 

CBRNE identification YES 

 NO 

CBRNE consequence 

assessment

 YES 

 NO 

STATE 

Is this capability present 

at the state level? 

T

If YES, who possesses this capability? 

T

CBRNE detection YES 

 NO 

CBRNE identification YES 

 NO 
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CBRNE consequence 

assessment

 YES 

 NO 

FEDERAL 

Is this capability present 

at the federal level? 

T

If YES, who possesses this capability? 

T

CBRNE detection YES 

 NO 

CBRNE identification YES 

 NO 

CBRNE consequence 

assessment

 YES 

 NO 

4. Approximately how many times has the CST been formally deployed for the following types of 

missions other than training exercises?

FISCAL 

YEAR 

Number of 

 RESPONSE 

MISSIONS 

(deployed in 

response to a 

validated support 

request)

T

Number of 

STAND-BY 

MISSIONS 

(pre-positioned,

deployed for a 

special event, VIP, 

etc.) 

T

Number of 

ASSIST 

MISSIONS 

(contingency ops, 

capabilities briefs, 

technical 

assistance, mission 

recon, state/local 

exercises, etc.) 

T

Other

T

TOTALS

T

2005 

2004 

2003 

2002 

2001 

TOTALS 
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Page 6 of 35 

5. Please list the last 10 deployments (RESPONSE, STAND-BY, ASSIST, and/or Other) deployments 

– excluding training exercises -- for your CST in the past two fiscal years (FY 2004-2005) and then 

provide the information requested in each column. 

Mission

Number 

or other 

identifier

T

Date

(must be in 

yyyy-mm-dd 

format, e.g. 

2005-07-25

or 

2004-12-15)

T

Response

Management 

Plan readiness 

status at the 

time of the 

incident 

(Gold/Silver/ 

Bronze)

T

CST unit 

readiness

status at the 

time of the 

incident 

(Green/

Amber/Red/ 

Black)

T

How long 

did it take 

to deploy 

the CST’s 

ADVON (or 

the whole 

team, if no 

ADVON)? 

T

How long 

did it take 

the ADVON 

(or the 

whole team, 

if no 

ADVON) to 

arrive at the 

incident 

once?

T

Contact 

information 

for Incident 

Commander 

T

 

6. Do any of the following potential issues adversely affect the ability of CSTs to perform their mission? 

(Please check all that apply.) 

 CSTs are not considered a “first responder” like police, fire, etc. 

 CSTs limited to specific role and capabilities: Identify, Assess, Advise, Assist. 

 CSTs have mobility constraints. 

 Other federal, state, regional, and/or local organizations have capabilities that are similar to

the CST’s capabilities. 

 Other federal, state, regional, and/or local organizations have unrealistic expectations for the CST. 

 Geographic location of CST facilities within the state makes wide-area response difficult. 

 There are not enough personnel available (because of training, leave, etc.) within the CST. 
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 CST is thin with respect to certain key personnel (e.g., only one Nuclear Medical Science Officer). 

 Other / Please identify: 

7. What changes, if any, would you suggest to make the CSTs better able to respond to incidents? 

8. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this 

space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the 

earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.). 

9. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the 

responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.) 

 Section 2: COORDINATION & COMMUNICATION

1. How familiar is the unit’s leadership with each of the following emergency planning documents? 

(Please check only one box per row.) 

EMERGENCY PLANS 

Very 

familiar 

T

Working 

knowledge

T

Not very 

familiar, 

but do know 

that it exists 

T

Never seen 

before, 

or it may 

not exist 

T

National Response Plan (NRP) 

National Incident Management 

System (NIMS) 

State Emergency Response Plan(s) 

State Terrorism Response Plan(s) 

Local Emergency Response Plans 

in the most populated areas of your 

state

Local Terrorism Response Plans 

in the most populated areas of your 

state
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2. To what extent is your CST integrated into your state’s primary emergency response plan? 

(Please select the best response.) 

 Fully integrated – CST’s roles/responsibilities are specifically outlined and CST participates in 

emergency response training exercises. 

 Partially integrated – CST is not directly mentioned, but National Guard’s responsibilities are 

outlined.

 Not integrated – Emergency response plan has been updated since CST establishment, but neither 

CST nor National Guard is mentioned. 

 Not applicable – State’s emergency response plan has not been updated since CST establishment. 

 State has no emergency response plan. 

3. To what extent is your CST integrated into your state’s primary terrorism response plan? 

(Please select the best response.) 

 Fully integrated – CST’s roles/responsibilities are specifically outlined and CST participates in 

terrorism response training exercises. 

 Partially integrated – CST is not directly mentioned, but National Guard’s responsibilities are 

outlined.

 Not integrated – Terrorism emergency response plan has been updated since CST establishment, 

but neither CST nor National Guard is mentioned. 

 Not applicable – State’s terrorism response plan has not been updated since CST establishment. 

 State has no terrorism response plan. 

4. Are you aware of your CST’s inclusion in any local emergency response plans or local terrorism 

response plans within your state? 

 YES 

 NO 

5. Which of the following mutual aid agreements or compacts, if any, are in place in your state? (Please 

check all that apply.) 

Local/Regional compacts: 

 Local government (city/county) mutual aid agreements 

State-to-State compacts: 

 Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

 State-to-state memoranda of agreement 

 Other state-to-state compacts / Please identify: 
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6. Does your CST regularly participate in any local consortiums or task forces? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #6: If YES, please identify the name of the consortium/task force (up to five), contact 

information for someone within the organization, and your frequency of contact. 

Frequency of participation 

(please check only 

Task force or one per row) 

consortium 

T

Contact name 

T

Contact phone 

number and/or 

email address 

T

Weekly 

T

Monthly

T

Annually

T

 

7. What types of interaction exist between your CST and the following agencies that could be involved in 

a CBRNE incident response? (Please check all that apply.) 

We

participate

on the same 

task forces 

T

We attend 

the same 

briefings, or 

brief each 

other

T

We

participate

in the same 

conference 

calls

T

We

participate

in the 

same

exercises

T

We

coordinate

at the same 

incident 

scenes

T

No

coordination/ 

Not

applicable

T

LOCAL & REGIONAL RESPONSE 

Local/Regional 

police depts. 

Local/Regional 

fire depts. 

Local/Regional 

HAZMAT teams 

Local/Regional 

bomb squads 

Local/Regional 

EMTs

Local/Regional 

utilities 

Other local/regional 

response (please 

identify) 

 
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We

participate

on the same 

task forces 

T

We attend 

the same 

briefings, or 

brief each 

other

T

We

participate

in the same 

conference 

calls

T

We

participate

in the 

same

exercises

T

We

coordinate

at the same 

incident 

scenes

T

No

coordination/ 

Not

applicable

T

Other local/regional 

response (please 

identify) 

 

STATE RESPONSE 

NG WMD-CSTs 

from other states 

NG CBRNE 

Enhanced Response 

Force Packages 

(CERFPs)

State HAZMAT 

teams

State bomb squads 

State Police 

State Bureau of 

Investigation

State Fire Marshal 

State Office of 

Emergency Services/ 

Emergency 

Management or 

similar 

State Office of 

Homeland Security 

similar 

State Office of 

Environmental

Management or 

similar 

State Health Dept 

Other state response 

(please identify) 

 

Other state response 

(please identify) 

 

FEDERAL RESPONSE

Joint Task ForceCivil Support 

(JTF-CS) 
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We

participate

on the same 

task forces 

T

We attend 

the same 

briefings, or 

brief each 

other

T

We

participate

in the same 

conference 

calls

T

We

participate

in the 

same

exercises

T

We

coordinate

at the same 

incident 

scenes

T

No

coordination/ 

Not

applicable

T

Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) 

Hazardous Materials 

Response Team 

(HMRT) 

Other FBI agent(s) 

or team(s) 

U.S. Coast Guard’s 

National Strike 

Force (NSF) teams 

U.S. Secret Service 

U.S. Marshals 

Federal Incident 

Response Support 

Team (FIRST) 

Nuclear Incident 

Response Team 

(NIRT)

Dept of Energy’s 

radiation

assessment teams 

FEMA’s Advance 

Emergency 

Response Team 

(ERT-A) 

FEMA’s National 

Emergency 

Response Team 

(ERT-N) 

Other FEMA 

response assets 

Centers for Disease 

Control (CDC) 

response teams 

National Disaster 

Medical System 

EPA – Radiological

Emergency 

Response Team 

(RERT) 

EPA – National 

Response Team 

Other federal 

response

(please identify) 

 
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We

participate

on the same 

task forces 

T

We attend 

the same 

briefings, or 

brief each 

other

T

We

participate

in the same 

conference 

calls

T

We

participate

in the 

same

exercises

T

We

coordinate

at the same 

incident 

scenes

T

No

coordination/ 

Not

applicable

T

Other federal 

response

(please identify) 

 

8. Are there teams, agencies, or governments that have been problematic in coordinating with your CST? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #8: If YES, please identify up to five of those entities as well as the nature and frequency 

of the coordination problems that you have faced in the past or are currently facing. (Reminder: survey 

answers will not be attributed to individual CSTs or to their personnel.) 

Frequency of Problem 

Entity 

T

Problem encountered 

T

Regularly

T

Sometimes 

T

Once

T

 

 

 

 

 

9. In general, how would you rate your local, regional, and state authorities’ understanding of your CST’s 

overall capabilities and duties? 
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Follow-up to #9: If you reported a lack of understanding, how have you attempted to address this? 

10. In general, how would you rate the capabilities of the local HAZMAT teams in the metropolitan areas

of your state? (Please check only one.) 

 Robust Presence - Fully capable, staffed, and equipped 

 Significant Presence – Generally capable, staffed, and equipped 

 Presence – Staffed and equipped but with some weaknesses 

 Weak Presence – Scattered capabilities and staff, out-of-date equipment, and/or other serious 

deficiencies 

Not applicable – There are no local HAZMAT teams in our state 

11. Outside of the metropolitan areas, how would you rate the capabilities of the local HAZMAT teams 

across your state, in general? (Please check only one.) 

 Robust Presence - Fully capable, staffed, and equipped 

 Significant Presence – Generally capable, staffed, and equipped 

LEVEL of UNDERSTANDING of CST CAPABILITIES 

LOCAL, REGIONAL, or 

STATE AUTHORITY 

A good 

understanding 

T

A moderate 

understanding 

T

A poor 

understanding 

T

They do not 

know that 

we exist 

T

Not sure/ 

Don’t know 

T

Local/Regional fire depts. 

Local/Regional 

HAZMAT teams 

Local/Regional police depts. 

Local/Regional EMTs 

State Office of Emergency 

Services/Emergency 

Management or similar 

State Office of Homeland 

Security or similar 

State Police 

Other (please identify) 

 

Other (please identify) 

 
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 Presence – Staffed and equipped but with some weaknesses 

 Weak Presence – Scattered capabilities and staff, out-of-date equipment, and/or other serious 

deficiencies 

Not applicable – There are no local HAZMAT teams in our state 

12. Do you see a need for your CST to provide support to the local HAZMAT teams across your state? 

(Please check only one.) 

 YES, but mostly outside the metropolitan areas 

 YES, but mostly inside the metropolitan areas 

 YES, both inside and outside the metropolitan areas equally 

 NO 

 Cannot generalize; it varies too greatly by local team 

Not applicable – There are no local HAZMAT teams in our state 

Follow-up to #12: If you do see a need for your CST to provide support to local HAZMAT teams, in 

which of the following areas do these teams need your support?

(Please check all that apply.) 

 Operational support prior to deployment 

 Operational support during a response 

 Training and exercises 

 Maintenance 

 Equipment advice 

Not applicable – I do not see a need to support local HAZMAT teams in my state, or these 

teams do not exist in my state 

13. If there are state-supported teams with HAZMAT capability (other than the CST) in your state, how 

would you rate their capabilities, in general? (Please check all that apply.) 

 Robust Presence - Fully capable, staffed, and equipped 

 Significant Presence – Generally capable, staffed, and equipped 

 Presence – Staffed and equipped but with some weaknesses 

 Weak Presence – Scattered capabilities and staff, out-of-date equipment, and/or other serious 

deficiencies 

Not applicable – There are no other state-supported teams with HAZMAT capability in my state 
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14. Do you see a need for your CST to provide support to the other state-supported HAZMAT teams in 

your state? 

 YES 

 NO 

 Cannot generalize; it varies too greatly by local team 

Not applicable – There are no other state-supported teams with HAZMAT capability in my state 

Follow-up to #14: If you do see a need for your CST to provide support to other state-supported

HAZMAT teams, in which of the following areas do these teams need your support? 

(Please check all that apply.) 

 Operational support prior to deployment 

Operational support during a response 

 Training and exercises 

 Maintenance 

 Equipment advice 

Not applicable – I do not see a need to support other state-supported teams with HAZMAT 

 capability in my state, or these teams do not exist in my state 

15. Do you feel that your CST has HAZMAT capabilities that overlap with other state, regional, or local 

emergency responders in your state? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #15: If YES, to what extent to do they overlap? 

 Complete overlap 

 Large amount of overlap 

 Some overlap 

 Slight amount of overlap 

16. What capabilities does the CST possess that are not shared by other state, regional, or local emergency 

responders in your state? 
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17. Once a CST has been deployed to a CBRNE incident scene, what additional capabilities would a 

CERFP bring to that incident scene that would not already be provided by the CST? 

18. Which states, if any, have formal mutual aid agreements with your state with regard to sharing CST 

resources or responding to incidents in other states? 

Follow-up to #18: What is your assessment of these formal arrangements’ effectiveness? 

19. Which states, if any, have informal mutual aid agreements with your state with regard to sharing CST 

resources or responding to incidents in other states? (Informal agreements include TAG-to-TAG and 

CST-to-CST.)

Follow-up to #19: What is your assessment of these informal arrangements’ effectiveness? 

20. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this 

space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the 

earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.). 

21. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the 

responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.) 
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 Section 3: MISSION READINESS & CERTIFICATION

1. What is the CST’s mission, and which documents or guidance do you use to define it? 

2. Considering the National Guard Bureau’s expectations of your CST, how does this differ from your 

CST’s mission, if at all? 

3. Considering your state’s expectations of your CST, how does this differ from your CST’s mission, 

if at all? 

4. What documents or guidance do you use to define the mission and readiness of the CST? 

5. Do you consider it a part of your CST’s mission to respond to CBRNE incidents that are known to be 

the result of accidents or acts of nature (i.e., that are NOT attacks)? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #5: Whether it is part your CST’s mission or not, do you think that this type of response 

should be part of your mission? 

 YES 

 NO 

Please explain your answers to #5. 
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6. Which of the following is an accurate indicator of readiness (or unreadiness) to perform the CST’s 

mission?

Unit Status Report (USR) YES NO 

Operational Reporting System (ORS) YES NO 

EXEVALs YES NO 

Initial Certification YES NO 

Re-Validation YES NO 

Lanes training YES NO 

Other / Please identify: 

 YES NO 

Additional comments for #6, if any: 

7. Were there (or have there been) any significant obstacles for your CST in achieving initial 

certification? 

Requirements for 

initial certification 

Was this an 

obstacle?

T

If YES, please describe the problem 

T

Not

applicable

T

Acquiring necessary 

equipment 

 YES 

 NO 

 

Acquiring necessary 

personnel

 YES 

 NO 

 

 

Completing individual 

training 

 YES 

 NO 

 

Completing collective 

training 

 YES 

 NO 

 

 

Passing EXEVAL YES 

 NO 

 

 

Achieving C1 rating in all 

areas 

 YES 

 NO 

 

Guaranteeing 90-day 

retention of personnel 

following certification 

 YES 

 NO 

 

 

Receiving final 

certification 

 YES 

 NO 

 
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8. Please identify the readiness level for each CST component at each specified time: 

READINESS LEVEL 

CST 

READINESS 

COMPONENT 

At certification 

T

6 months after 

certification

T

12 months after 

certification

T

Currently

T

Equipment on hand 

(S-level) 

 

Equipment readiness 

(R-level) 

Personnel

(P-level) 

Training 

(T-level) 

Overall 

(C-level) 

9. After the EXEVAL that supported your CST’s certification, what extra training (if any) was 

recommended by the Adjutant General and implemented by the CST commander before the 

certification package was sent to the Department of the Army? 

10. Please identify which readiness component is the most challenging to sustain with regard to each of 

the following CST capabilities. (Please check only one capability per row.) 

Readiness components 

CST 

CAPABILITY 

Equipment 

T

Personnel 

T

Training

T

Identify CBRNE 

agents/substances 

Assess current 

and projected 

consequences

Advise on 

response

measures 

Assist with 

requests for 

additional 

support
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11. Does the state government (i.e., non-military) have any additional readiness and/or capability 

requirements for the CST beyond what is required by the National Guard?

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #11: If YES, what are these additional requirements, and what guidance is provided by 

the state for achieving these requirements? 

12. Does the state government (i.e., non-military) provide any of the following additional resources for the 

CST beyond what is provided by the National Guard?

Type of Resource Specific resource 

T

Funding 

Guidance 

Equipment 

Personnel 

Training 

Facilities 

13. Please describe the process by which a request for CST deployment is approved or denied: How many 

decisionmakers must approve the request, and what positions (or titles) do these decisionmakers 

hold?

14. Who receives the following mission information from your CST? (Please check all that apply.) 

Type of 

information 

Reported

to state 

TAG?

T

Reported

to other 

state

officials? 

T

Reported

to NGB? 

T

Reported

to 1st

Army? 

T

Reported

to 5th

Army? 

T

This

information 

is not

reported

T

after-action 

reports (from 

exercises) 
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Type of 

information 

Reported

to state 

TAG?

T

Reported

to other 

state

officials? 

T

Reported

to NGB? 

T

Reported

to 1st

Army? 

T

Reported

to 5th

Army? 

T

This

information 

is not

reported

T

after-action 

reports (from 

actual 

incidents) 

response times 

on-scene 

injuries 

problems 

encountered

lessons learned 

assessments of 

collaboration 

Other (please 

identify) 

 

Other (please 

identify) 

 

15. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this 

space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the 

earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.). 

16. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the 

responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.) 
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 Section 4: EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORT, & MEDICAL

1. Which documents or guidance do you use to develop your equipment list? 

2. Has your team experienced any problems in acquiring CST equipment? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #2: If YES, please describe these problems and discuss their impact. 

3. Please provide the following financial information for the requested years. 

FISCAL 

YEAR 

2060

(NGPA) 

T

2065

(OMNG) 

T

If your state has a 

CERFP, did it 

receive any of 

this funding? 

(YES, NO, or N/A)

T

2005 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

2004 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

2003 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

2002 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

2001 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

2000 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

1999 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 
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4. Please provide a list of the top 5 equipment items (or equipment capabilities) that are NOT currently 

provided to your CST (by either the state or the National Guard Bureau) that you would like to see 

provided, if any. (Please list in order of importance, with ‘1’ being the most important item or 

capability.) 

EQUIPMENT ITEM or 

EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY 

Intended Use? 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

5. In your opinion, what are the primary advantages and disadvantages of having non-military (i.e., 

commercial off-the-shelf) equipment? 

Advantages...

Disadvantages... 

6. Is the facility that houses the CST large enough to hold all vehicles and other CST equipment? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #6: What improvements to your facility could you suggest, if any? 
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7. Have there been any recurrent equipment issues during deployments and exercises? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #7: If YES, please describe the most frequent equipment issues. 

8. Please respond to the following questions about your CST’s formulary: 

Yes

T

No

T

Has the state augmented the 

standardized CST formulary? 

Has the State Surgeon approved the CST 

formulary? 

Has the NGB Surgeon approved the CST 

formulary? 

Does the CST carry any medications 

that are not listed on the CST formulary?

9. Does your CST have a Delegation of Services Agreement (DSA) from the State Surgeon? 

 YES 

 NO

Follow-up to #9: If YES, what was the date of this DSA? 

(Date must be in yyyy-mm-dd format, e.g. 2005-07-25 or 2004-12-15) 

Follow-up to #9: What problems, if any, did you encounter in securing the DSA? 
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10. Please use the following matrix to describe your transport strategy. Under what conditions does your 

CST rely on land transport? On air transport? On water transport? 

Type of transport 

Time or distance to 

travel to incident 

T

Weather en route 

to incident 

T

Geography of incident 

setting (urban, rural, 

coastal, inland, etc) 

T

LAND 

AIR 

WATER 

Additional comments about transport strategy, if any: 

11. For each of the following types of transport, please identify what the CST has access to and whether or 

not this access is a dedicated asset (i.e., owned by the CST). If it is borrowed from other agencies, 

please indicate the process by which the CST would gain access to a specific means of transport: 

Type of transport 

(Land/Air/Water) 

Specific

means of 

travel (e.g., 

cargo plane or 

helicopter?)

T

Owned by the CST, 

or borrowed from 

other forces? 

T

If borrowed, how would the CST 

gain access to it? 

T

LAND Owned 

 Borrowed 

 

AIR Owned 

 Borrowed 

 

WATER Owned 

 Borrowed 

 

12. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this 

space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the 

earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.). 
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13. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the 

responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.) 

 Section 5: TRAINING

1. Which documents or guidance do you use to develop your training plan? 

2. Please provide the requested information about training and certification for the following duty 

positions: 

DUTY 

POSITION 

Is this 

person

MOS/AFSC 

qualified?

(YES, NO, 

or N/A) 

T

For training 

year 2005, 

what

approximate 

percentage 

of CSTspecific

individual

training was 

completed?

T

For training 

year 2005, 

what

approximate 

percentage 

of collective 

training was 

completed?

T

Number of other 

CST members crosstrained for 

this position 

(e.g. fully trained, 

currently certified, 

experienced, etc.) 

T

CMDR YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

DCMDR YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

AOPSO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

SR OPS NCO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

OPS NCO-M YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

AOPS NCO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 
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DUTY 

POSITION 

Is this 

person

MOS/AFSC 

qualified?

(YES, NO, 

or N/A) 

T

For training 

year 2005, 

what

approximate 

percentage 

of CSTspecific

individual

training was 

completed?

T

For training 

year 2005, 

what

approximate 

percentage 

of collective 

training was 

completed?

T

Number of other 

CST members crosstrained for 

this position 

(e.g. fully trained, 

currently certified, 

experienced, etc.) 

T

LOG NCO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

ADMIN NCO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

COM TC YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

INF SYS OPR YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

PA YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

MED OPSO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NMSO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

MED NCO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

SURV TL YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NBC REC NCO YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NBC TC YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 
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DUTY 

POSITION 

Is this 

person

MOS/AFSC 

qualified?

(YES, NO, 

or N/A) 

T

For training 

year 2005, 

what

approximate 

percentage 

of CSTspecific

individual

training was 

completed?

T

For training 

year 2005, 

what

approximate 

percentage 

of collective 

training was 

completed?

T

Number of other 

CST members crosstrained for 

this position 

(e.g. fully trained, 

currently certified, 

experienced, etc.) 

T

NBC TC YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

Other position / 

Please identify: 

 

 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

Other position / 

Please identify: 

 

 YES 

 NO 

 N/A 

 

3. In addition to the EXEVALs and annual lanes training, what other tests, certifications, or proofs of 

competence do CST members complete, if any? 

4. Should anything more be done to ensure technical and duty-specific expertise among CST members? 

 YES 

 NO 
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Follow-up to #4: If YES, what more should be done? 

5. Do members of the CST receive any training regarding chain-of-evidence and other evidence collection 

protocols? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #5: If YES, who provides this training? 

6. What supplementary training, if any, does the state require that is in addition to what is already 

required by the National Guard Bureau? 

7. At the present time, what are the training strengths of your CST? 

8. At the present time, what are the training weaknesses of your CST? If weaknesses exist, how could 

training be improved to address them? 

9. What is the impact of personnel turnover on training? 
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10. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this 

space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the 

earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.). 

11. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the 

responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.) 

 Section 6: PERSONNEL 

1. For each of the following sections of the CST, is the number of duty positions adequate to perform all 

of the CST’s missions? If not, what would be the ideal number? 

CST section 

and strength Too many

T

About 

right

T

Too few 

T

Not sure 

T

If not already 

right, the 

ideal number of 

personnel

would be... 

T

Command (2) 

Operations (4) 

Administration/Logistics (2) 

Medical/Analytical (4) 

Communications (2) 

Survey (8) 

Follow-up to #1: Which additional specialties, if any, would you add if your authorized strength were 

increased? 
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2. Is the facility that houses the CST large enough for all personnel to have an adequate workspace? 

 YES 

 NO 

3. Please provide the requested information about turnover for the following duty positions: 

DUTY 

POSTION 

Is someone 

currently 

assigned to 

this

position?

T

Approximate 

number of 

times this 

position has 

been filled 

since

certification

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Will this 

position

likely be 

vacant in 

the next 6 

months? 

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Will this 

position

likely be 

vacant in 

the next 7-

12 months? 

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Will this 

position

likely be 

vacant in 

the next 

13-18

months? 

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Average 

fill time 

for this 

position

(i.e. how 

many 

days, 

weeks,

months) 

T

CMDR YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

DCMDR YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

AOPSO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

SR OPS NCO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

OPS NCO-M YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

AOPS NCO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

LOG NCO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

ADMIN NCO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

COM TC YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

INF SYS OPR YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

PA YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

MED OPSO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NMSO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 
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DUTY 

POSTION 

Is someone 

currently 

assigned to 

this

position?

T

Approximate 

number of 

times this 

position has 

been filled 

since

certification

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Will this 

position

likely be 

vacant in 

the next 6 

months? 

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Will this 

position

likely be 

vacant in 

the next 7-

12 months? 

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Will this 

position

likely be 

vacant in 

the next 

13-18

months? 

(including 

promotions 

within the 

team)

T

Average 

fill time 

for this 

position

(i.e. how 

many 

days, 

weeks,

months) 

T

MED NCO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

SURV TL YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC REC NCO YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC TC YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC TC YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

NBC TM YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

Other position / 

Please identify: 

 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

Other position / 

Please identify: 

 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 NO 

 

4. Do you ever perform CST missions (training or live response) with fewer personnel than you need? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #4: If YES, what is the impact of responding with fewer personnel than you need? 
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5. What has been your CST’s annual turnover totals for personnel? 

FISCAL 

YEAR 

Total Turnover 

(number of positions, including 

promotions within the team) 

T

Are these figures 

actual or 

estimated? 

T

2005 ACTUAL 

 ESTIMATED 

2004 ACTUAL 

 ESTIMATED 

2003 ACTUAL 

 ESTIMATED 

2002 ACTUAL 

 ESTIMATED 

2001 ACTUAL 

 ESTIMATED 

6. What are the primary factors that affect these personnel trends? 

7. What have been the effects of your turnover rate on team operations? 

8. Have any CST members left to become members of state, regional, or local fire departments, HAZMAT 

teams, or other emergency response agencies? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #8: If YES, approximately how many? 
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9. Has any of your team’s turnover been due to dismissal of team members? 

 YES 

 NO 

Follow-up to #9: If YES, why were these members dismissed? 

10. What, if anything, could be done to reduce the amount of turnover within CSTs? 

11. What problems, if any, do you experience in recruiting for the CST? 

12. Other than training, what additional requirements, if any, does the state have for CST personnel 

beyond what is already required by the National Guard Bureau?

13. What are the primary strengths of your CST’s personnel? 

14. What are the primary weaknesses of your CST’s personnel, and how could these weaknesses be 

addressed?
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15. If you have further comments in response to any of the questions in this section, you may use this 

space to provide them. Please identify your comments by preceding them with the number of the 

earlier question to which they refer (e.g., 1, 3, 7, etc.). 

16. Please provide a name, phone number, and email address for follow-up questions regarding the 

responses to this section. (Field may be left blank if the unit commander is the contact point.) 
Page 79 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 80 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 81 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense
Page 82 GAO-06-498 Homeland Defense

Appendix V

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiV

GAO Contact Davi M. D’Agostino (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Ann Borseth, Assistant Director; Bari L. 

Bendell; Jaclyn A. Bowland; David A. Brown; Carole F. Coffey; Lee Cooper; 

Joseph W. Kirschbaum; David A. Mayfield; Walter K. Vance; and Tamika S. 

Weerasingha made key contributions to this report.

(350687)
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