1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-41232 Summary Calendar

RAUL HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus
JOSE ELOY PULIDO; HIDALGO COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. M-99-CV-66

-------------------- August 2, 2001 Before DUHÉ, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

Raul Hernandez appeals the granting of summary judgment
dismissing his claims under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Texas defamation and wrongful
discharge law against Jose Eloy Pulido, County Judge of Hidalgo
County, and Hidalgo County. We affirm.

Hernandez’s First Amendment claim is premised on his argument

that he was fired from his position as Hidalgo County
Superintendent o f Buildings and Grounds impermissibly for not
supporting politically the newly-elected county judge, Pulido.2

However, the summary judgment evidence showed that Hernandez’s job

was a policy-making one, and, therefore, discharge on the basis of
political affiliation was constitutionally permissible. S ee Stegmaier v. Trammell , 597 F.2d 1027, 1035 (5th Cir. 1979). Even

if Hernandez’s discharge for political affiliation reasons was not constitutionally permissible, both Hidalgo County and Pulido were

immune from suit on this claim. S ee Monell v. Department of Social

Servs. of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Sorenson v. Ferrie , 134 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1998).

Pulido and Hidalgo County also are immune from Hernandez’s

suit for defamation. Defamation is an intentional tort, for which

the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

.
& R EM
. C ODE § 101.057(2) (Vernon 2001); City of Hempstead v. Kmiec , 902 S.W.2d 11 8, 122 (Tex. App. 1995). To the extent that Pulido
was sued in his individual capacity, he also is immune. T EX
. C IV
.
P RAC

. & R EM
. C ODE § 101.106 (Vernon 2001); Dallas Coun ty Mental

Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley , 968 S.W.2d 339, 343-44
(Tex. 1998).
Hernandez’s wrongful discharge claim under Texas state law

also appropriately was dismissed on summary judgment. Hidalgo

County, not Pulido, was Hernandez’s employer, and Hidalgo County is
sovereignly immune from suit for wrongfully terminating an at-will
employee, even one allegedly terminated for refusing to engage in
illegal acts. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v.

Hohman , 6 S.W.3d 767, 777 (Tex. App. 2000).3

Hernandez’s claim that Pulido and Hidalgo County violated the

Texas Whistleblower Act also properly was dismissed on summary judgment. That act provides relief only against the government
entity, not Pulido. T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 554.0035. Hernandez’s claim
against Hidalgo County fails because Hernandez did not demonstrate
that he made a whistleblowing report as required by the act. See

T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 554.002 (Vernon 2001). The summary judgment of the
district court dismissing all of Hernandez’s claims is AFFIRMED.