COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

JOHN A. FULCHER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0382-97-1 PER CURIAM 

 AUGUST 12, 1997 

LINDA S. FULCHER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 

John M. Folkes, Judge 

 (Dana L. Gay; Duty, Duty and Gay, on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 (Breckenridge Ingles; Martin, Ingles & 

Ingles, on brief), for appellee. 

 John A. Fulcher (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court awarding a divorce to Linda S. Fulcher (wife) on 

the ground of cruelty. Husband contends that the trial court 

erred because (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove 

cruelty; and (2) there was evidence of wife's fault through 

adultery and financial irresponsibility. Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 The evidence was heard by the commissioner in chancery, who 

found that wife proved her ground of divorce by clear and 

convincing evidence. The commissioner based his findings upon 

the testimony and his "ability to observe the parties and the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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witnesses and despite denials by [husband] . . . ." On appeal, 

 [t]he commissioner's report is deemed to be 

prima facie correct. The commissioner has 

the authority to resolve conflicts in the 

evidence and to make factual findings. When 

the commissioner's findings are based upon 

ore tenus evidence, "due regard [must be 

given] to the commissioner's ability . . . to 

see, hear and evaluate the witness at first 

hand." 

Brown v. Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 236, 397 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990) 

(citations omitted). "[T]he trial judge ordinarily must sustain 

the commissioner's report unless he or she concludes that it is 

not supported by the evidence." Id. We must affirm the trial 

court's decision unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support it. See McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2 Va. App. 463, 

466-67, 346 S.E.2d 535, 536 (1986). 

 I. 

 Wife testified regarding husband's behavior throughout the 

marriage, which was marked by several separations. Husband had 

affairs and drank excessively. He took little responsibility for 

the children when they were young. Husband discouraged wife's 

contacts with her friends. On several occasions, husband refused 

to provide wife with sufficient funds to purchase groceries, so 

wife borrowed money from a friend. Wife testified that husband 

was increasingly angry with her and their children, would scream 

at her, and "would stand there in front of me with his fist 

clenched just so mad and so angry." Following one incident when 

husband became angry and threw a beer bottle at her, wife moved 
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out of the house. 

 Numerous witnesses corroborated wife's testimony. Elizabeth 

Trudell corroborated wife's description of her emotional 

condition following the bottle-throwing incident. Wife was 

"shaking and crying and pacing back and forth." Trudell also 

corroborated wife's testimony that husband was unpleasant to her 

friends. Cindy Wiatt corroborated wife's testimony that husband 

would refuse to pay for groceries. Betty Lou Hudgins 

corroborated wife's testimony that husband was domineering and 

controlling towards wife. Husband admitted to one adulterous 

affair during the marriage, although he denied three other 

affairs. 

 It is true that "a complainant must prove and corroborate 

his or her grounds for divorce by independent evidence." Emrich 

v. Emrich, 9 Va. App. 288, 295-96, 387 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1989). 

However, "[e]very element or essential charge need not be 

corroborated, nor must the corroborating evidence, standing 

alone, prove the grounds for divorce, but corroboration must give 

sufficient strength to the complainant's testimony to be clearly 

worthy of belief." Id. at 296, 387 S.E.2d at 278. The record 

contains sufficient corroboration of wife's allegations of 

cruelty to support the commissioner's factual findings and the 

trial court's decision. 
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 II. 

 Husband contends that the trial court erred in awarding wife 

a divorce on the ground of cruelty when, through her financial 

irresponsibility and adultery, there was sufficient evidence of 

fault on wife's part. Although not so identified, this argument 

raises the defense of recrimination. "The doctrine of 

recrimination bars granting a divorce where the complainant's own 

actions constitute grounds for divorce." Venable v. Venable, 2 

Va. App. 178, 184, 342 S.E.2d 646, 650 (1986). Husband did not 

plead adultery as a ground for divorce, and hence may not rely on 

that ground by way of recrimination. Instead, husband alleged 

that wife was guilty of "mental cruelty" and was unable to manage 

finances, causing him "great embarrassment and mental anguish." 

Neither the commissioner nor the trial judge found that husband 

had proven this allegation. We find no error in the trial 

court's refusal to award husband a divorce on the unproven ground 

of mental cruelty. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.