CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIESHONOLULU, HAWAII   FEBRUARY 2000

#### *Paper for the Asia-Pacific Centerfor Security Studies*

#### *27September 2000***** REVIEWING THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM 
**AND ITS ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY***

 by

 Maria Consuelo C. Ortuoste**

  Introduction
            The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1993 as a loose,informal grouping of 23 states,[i]with the stated purpose of fostering constructive dialogue and consultation onpolitical and security issues of common interest and concern. The ARF also hopes to make significant contributions to confidencebuilding and preventive diplomacy in the region, with the goal of evolving intoa third stage officially tagged as “elaboration of approaches to conflict.”[ii] 

            At the outset, it should be made clear that the ARF is not a collectivedefense organization, nor is it based on collective security, “nor [is it] amanagerial control-oriented regime (stressing orderliness through obligation andcompliance to a specific set of established rules).”[iii] Instead, the ARF is a unique alternative security arrangement premised onmultilateralism.[iv] It is different from the bilateral alliance system in the region,providing a multilateral venue for the discussion of confidence building andpreventive diplomacy rather than deterrence or identification of a common enemy. It seeks to “develop a more predictable constructive pattern ofrelations for the Asia-Pacific” through political and security cooperation. 

            The uniqueness of the ARF derives from the novelty of a multilateralundertaking in security in the Asia-Pacific, and the lead role of a grouping ofsmall states – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – in aforum which brings together the major regional powers – US, Japan, China,Russia.  Moreover, the ARF is basedon consensus and incrementalism, proceeding only as fast as the slowest member. The ARF also has no formal institutions or secretariat.

            Because of these attributes, the ARF is susceptible to changes in theinternational environment and, more importantly, to the interests andmaneuverings of states.  It can evenbe stated that the ARF proposal was acceptable to many Asia-Pacific statesbecause this participation did not entail high political risks. With principles of consensus and incrementalism, states were assured thatthe ARF is not a supranational entity which could unduly threaten their nationalinterests.  One analyst even notedthat although the ARF was “formed on the basis of liberal ideals, [it] hasbecome a cover to conceal realist intentions.”[v] These observations are valid not only for major powers, but also forsmaller states which pin their hopes for regional security on a multilateralsecurity mechanism.  ASEAN also hadits own interest in being central in the ARF, the latter being only one of themany webs of relations that ASEAN has woven in order to ensure its security andprosperity.

            This paper examines the role of the ARF in the security of SoutheastAsia.  Specifically, it considersthe goals of ASEAN[vi]in the ARF and the latter’s contributions, if any, to achieving these goals. The paper also looks at how the evolving post-Cold War environment hascontinued to affect and challenge the Forum over the past seven years. Finally, the paper briefly touches on the future of the Forum.

 **I. Adopting the ASEAN Model for the Asia-Pacific: 1989-1996[vii]**
           **A.  A Convergence ofFactors**

            The establishment of the ARF was a result of the convergence of threesignificant factors.  First, thechanged environment in the Asia-Pacific at the end of the Cold War pointedtowards the need, and provided the opportunity, for the establishment of amechanism to handle regional security matters. Second, track-two fora and individual states made importantcontributions, such as the substance of the ideas behind the ARF, as well as theinitial push for a multilateral regional security process. Third, through interaction in various fora, there eventually developed aminimum common concern among the initial ARF participants on the need to developconstructive security relationships – minus the Cold War baggage – if onlyto sustain the robust national and regional economic growth during the 1980s andthe first half of the 1990s.  Accordingto one analyst:
Thedesire to sustain the benefits of economic growth and interdependence underliesthe rationale for both regional economic and regional security regimes.  The form and pace of economic regionalism will increasinglyaffect the nature of regional security developments.[viii]

        The resulting form and structure of the ARF derived both from track-two andcountry proposals.  Moreimportantly, it reflected the exigencies of accommodation of states diverse insize, political tradition, and interests.

       **Uncertainty and Optimism.**  Thefirst half of the 1990s up to 1996 may be characterized as uncertain but with anunderlying optimism among states about the supposed dawn of a new age ofregional cooperation.  Theuncertainty stemmed from several latent or “old” conflicts such as thesituation in the Korean Peninsula, unresolved territorial and maritime disputes,the issue of China’s territories, nuclear weapons, and domestic insurgencies. At the same time, there were other emerging regional concerns such as theextended maritime jurisdictions resulting from the UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS); the increased defense spending and weapons modernization andacquisition of more affluent Southeast Asian countries; the need to reconstructCambodia, to aid in the transition of Vietnam and Laos, and to constructivelyengage Myanmar; and other non-traditional security concerns such as migrationand environmental problems. 

        Perhaps the most important consideration in the region at the time was theshifts in power relations.  With theUS perceived as withdrawing its forces from the region, there was wide concernthat other regional states would rush in to fill a supposed power vacuum or tochallenge the primary role of the US in the region. In general these concerns were characterized by:

 �       the layering of new issues over old ones “where the orderingprocesses perversely imposed by the politics of Soviet-American relations nolonger afford[ed] ... any semblance of an ordered agenda”;[ix]

 �       the continued need to involve major powers in efforts to maintainpeace and stability in a region where there are both strong and weak states;[x] and

 �       the lack of an organizing principle in regional security beyondbalance-of-power politics, the relevance and adequacy of which was beginning tobe questioned by newer security issues.

           Despite these uncertainties, there was a sense of optimism in the region duemainly to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, eventually, the ideologicaldivide.  Thus, there seemed to be noneed to label other countries as “enemies” in the Cold War sense of theword. Robust economic growth in the region was also another factor for apositive regional outlook.  Manyanalysts noted that the increased economic interdependence in the area wouldprevent would-be rising powers from unduly upsetting the current situation asmore states would benefit from an economically vibrant Asia-Pacific. One scholar even stated that economics has gained a very significant roleas success in gaining world market share has become more important thanterritorial acquisition for the survival of nation-states.[xi]

During thisperiod, there was a sharp increase in the number of available channels forstate-to-state communication.   Thesechannels – both track-one and track-two – have usually paved the way forinitiatives later undertaken by governments. In the area of security alone, the proliferation of channels for dialoguehas been remarkable:  “In 1989there were only three or four channels for trans-Pacific discussion of politicaland security matters in a multilateral setting. By 1994 ... there [were] some 50 ongoing dialogue channels in theAsia-Pacific region ....”[xii] These developments provided an opportunity for increased multipolarity inthe region as well as the possibility that for “... the first time in acentury and a half the future of Asia will primarily be determined by Asians.”[xiii]

**Crafting theARF.**  The ARF can be consideredas having been created along the lines of what Acharya calls “Asianinstitutionalism”.  This form ofinstitutionalism does not focus on “formal legalistic structures ofco-operation” but instead looks at institution-building “as a long-termprocess of socialization and consensus-building.”[xiv] In the context of the ARF, this socialization and consensus-buildingbegan with the series of roundtables hosted by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategicand International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and other thinktanks,[xv]and also by Thailand and the Philippines in the early 1990s.[xvi] These fora helped bring about slow acceptance of multilateralism anddialogue in the Asia-Pacific, facilitated extensive networking amongAsia-Pacific countries, helped crystallize specific proposals for confidencebuilding, and helped “indigenize” ideas (such as confidence-buildingmeasures or CBMs) which may have been coined outside the region.[xvii]

            Apart from track-two, several countries are credited for the push towardsmultilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific.  Australia, and laterCanada, in the early 1990s raised the possibility of developing a multilateralframework for security cooperation in Asia along the model of the Council forSecurity Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  This proposal was quickly droppedwhen several objections were raised.  Japanese Foreign Minister TaroNakayama later raised the issue of security discussion within the ASEANpost-ministerial conference (PMC) in the 1991 meeting of ASEAN and dialoguepartners.  ASEAN, for its part, was quietly considering the proposal madeby the ASEAN-ISIS.  Eventually during their Singapore Summit in 1992, theASEAN ministers approved in principle the ASEAN-ISIS proposal for anAsia-Pacific Dialogue on security using the PMC process.

           What these proposals for multilateral security dialogue had in common wasthe appreciation for a slow and incremental process, a process embodied by theASEAN, in promoting regional understanding. There were, however, differences of opinion about the strength and extentof institutionalization for a new multilateral undertaking in the region. Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, wanted the ARF to movefaster; while other countries, including China and the US, were cautious aboutmultilateralism.  There were alsodifferences regarding “the scope, the desirable aims, and the consequences ofthe endeavour”.[xviii] For example, while there was general agreement about the three stages ofARF evolution, there were as yet no common definitions of preventive diplomacyor even of conflict resolution. 
Despite thesedifferences, the ASEAN ministers and its dialogue partners agreed in 1993 toestablish the ARF, which held its first meeting in 1994.**** B. Establishing Processes and Principles**            **The“ASEAN Way”.**  From 1994 to1996, the ARF members were trying to lay the foundations for multilateralsecurity cooperation.  With theForum established as an expanded PMC, it was inevitable that ASEAN would becomethe core of the Forum with the “ASEAN Way” implicitly adopted as guiding theARF.  This ASEAN Way can be seen asfunctioning on three levels – the web of relations it involves, its approachtowards interstate relations, and its “operating principles”. 

           First, the ASEAN Way involves a process of building a dense web of relationsamong member countries.  This isbased on the assumption that the more interaction, contacts and areas ofcooperation are established, the easier it becomes to deal with more difficultissues (such as territorial conflicts) in the long-term. Moreover, it is hoped that states would not risk endangering the benefitsof their relations by resorting to threats or use of force.[xix]                         The ASEAN Wayalso relies primarily on informality, only formalizing certain processes whenthey have been tried and tested.  It is gradual and incremental, emphasizing “low profileexchanges and negotiations”.  Itvalues unity (or at least the appearance of unity) among the grouping.  The principles associated with the ASEAN Way are restraint;the use of consultation and consensus in decision-making; and respect forsovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of its members.                        Why adopt theASEAN model and make ASEAN the core of the Forum? First, ASEAN was seen, at this point in time, to have quite successfullymanaged the diversity of its members.  Itwas felt that any insecurity which may arise from the greater diversity in theARF may be best addressed and “rationally managed through organizationalinformality, state sovereignty, and flexible consensus.”[xx] It was also noted that“the ASEAN model was particularly appropriate for the post-Cold War era inwhich regional tensions were no longer expressed in a tangible and imminentcommon threat that called for a countervailing military coalition.”[xxi] Furthermore, a regional arrangement rooted in respect for sovereignty andconsensus did not pose high political risks for any member. 
Second, ASEANemerged as the most acceptable partner for major powers in the Asia-Pacific. Notwithstanding the rapprochement after the Cold War, suspicions lingeredand tensions erupted intermittently among China, the US, Japan and Russia. A regional arrangement led by either one of these powers would surely beviewed with reservation by other major powers as well as by smaller states.[xxii]

 Finally,on a practical note, ASEAN maintained cordial relations with these major powersand had an extensive network of contacts with various Asia-Pacific countriesthrough its dialogue partnerships.  Establishingthe ARF required tapping into these linkages.

 **   **        **Developments in the ARF.**  Followingthe ASEAN model, the ARF therefore was created not as a collective defenseorganization.  The predictability ofrelations the participants envision “is not to be provided through theoperation of the balance of power, but through the development of a securityarrangement that draws on concepts connective with cooperative security.”[xxiii] The first two ARF Chairman’s Statements noted that the ARF would be ahigh-level consultative forum to cultivate the habit of dialogue where divergingviews could be discussed and reconciled.  Inthis framework, “the process itself is an extremely important product, sinceincreased dialogue promotes increased understanding, which, in turn, may lead toa reduced risk of conflict.”[xxiv]

           Moreover, the ARF could build relations by facilitating “bilateral (orsubregional) dialogue among nations and their official or unofficialrepresentatives who, for a variety of reasons, may be unable or ill-prepared tomake arrangements directly with one another.”[xxv] The creation of a peaceful regional environment is seen as setting thestage for states to begin serious discussion of conflictual issues eithermultilaterally or bilaterally, not necessarily involving all the ARF members orbeing reflected on the formal ARF agenda.[xxvi]

            The ASEAN Way was formally adopted when the ARF ministers endorsed the ARFConcept Paper prepared by ASEAN in 1995.  ThisConcept Paper specified the three-stage evolution of the ARF: from confidencebuilding, to preventive diplomacy, to the elaboration of approaches to conflict. The ARF members also endorsed the principles of the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia; the notion of comprehensive security; thelinkages among subregions in the Asia-Pacific; and the principles ofinformality, incrementalism, consensus, inclusivity, respect for sovereignty,territorial integrity and equality, and non-interference in internal affairs.Criteria for future membership were also elaborated in 1996, and the role of theASEAN as the driving force of the ARF was also recognized.            Apartfrom these efforts, there were several meetings – both track-one and track-two– which generated several ideas and proposals for CBMs and preventivediplomacy.  Several intersessionalgroups – confidence-building, peacekeeping, and search and rescue – wereformed and convened on an irregular basis.             The onlyconcrete contributions to regional security of the ARF at this time were theseveral proposals for CBMs, as well as the slowly increasing reportage to the UNRegister for Conventional Arms.  Thefocus, from 1994 to 1996, was merely to continue the process of meeting anddiscussions with many of the ARF participants stating emphatically that the ARFis only a forum for discussion.
           Nevertheless, at that point in time, even just bringing together 18 countries– some of whom not so long ago viewed each other with considerable suspicion– was considered an achievement.  Oneanalyst stated that the convening of the ARF provided “the critical chance forthe region to drop diplomatic hypocrisy, step up communication and cooperation,both formal and informal, so that all parties are engaged in constructive andfrank dialogue and exchanges.”[xxvii] 

            **C.  The Agenda of ASEAN**

            The ARF provided an opportunity for ASEAN to advance its own objectives. Being a group of relatively small- and medium-sized states, ASEANbelieved “that its long-term security is tied with the overall securityoutlook of the Asia-Pacific region.”[xxviii] A stable wider regional environment would help ensure that the ASEANstates could concentrate on attaining their national objectives.[xxix] Specifically, four main goals can be gleaned from ASEAN’s actions. This section looks at whether or not ARF, during its early years,fulfilled these goals for ASEAN. *   *         *First,the lack of a “concert of great powers” provided smaller states a chance toshape a regional arrangement which would ensure that their interests were takenseriously by major powers.* ASEAN, ever since its establishment, representsan attempt by Southeast Asian states to maintain some sort of independence from,while at the same time constructively engaging, major powers if only to precludeintervention in their domestic affairs.  The ARF would complement the ZOPFAN (the Declaration on aZone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) and other similar declarations of theCold War period.  Specifically,tying major powers to multilateral processes while they are still defining theirroles was seen as beneficial to ASEAN, which then could be part of shaping theregional security environment in the post-Cold War era. Thus, even while some ASEAN countries had reservations about theestablishment of the ARF, they decided to play a central role in the Forum. Their close consultations resulted in the ARF Concept Paper wherein theyundertook to play a “pivotal role” in and be the “primary driving force”of the Forum.[xxx] 

           The acceptance of the ASEAN model as well as its role as the “primary drivingforce” of the ARF proved to be some sort of vindication for this groupingwhich had formerly been relegated to the sidelines. It offered some assurance to ASEAN that with a consensus mechanism inplace, it could prevent major powers from “hijacking” the Forum.

            ASEAN’s leadership in the ARF also reflected ASEAN’s newfound confidence. At that time, many ASEAN members were enjoying high growth rates andinternational economic prominence, there was relative calm in their domesticsocieties, and the organization gained acclaim for its positive role in theresolution of the Cambodian issue.  Apartfrom this confidence, one scholar suspects that the ASEAN members felt that toremain reticent on the issue of regional security would be counter-productivefor the organization:  there was aneed to replace its original raison d’�tre, i.e., Cambodia and Vietnam, andthere was a very real threat that this new regional initiative might be snatchedfrom ASEAN in the same manner as the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperationforum) initiative was seized by Australia.[xxxi]

 Thecontinued capacity of ASEAN to play a united driving force for ARF is, however,limited mainly because ASEAN attends the ARF as individual countries and not asan organization.  They did not necessarily have common positions on all CBMssuch as the creation of a regional arms register, which was supported byPhilippines but not by Malaysia; and the ASEAN countries did not even implementCBMs proposed in the ARF among themselves. This would, ultimately, be detrimental to ASEAN’s maintaining crediblecentrality in the ARF.

 *Second,the ASEAN states desired the discussion of Southeast Asian issues within alarger context.* With the ColdWar over, the major powers – US, China, Japan – were beginning to focus onthe resolution of Northeast Asian, rather than Southeast Asian, issues. According to an analyst, “The ARF represents an effort by ASEAN topromote through a multilateral structure its regional security agenda, thussetting the parameters for its group political relations with extra-SoutheastAsian states.”[xxxii]

 ASEAN hadbeen slightly successful in this regard.  TheARF had discussions on Cambodia, the ZOPFAN Declaration, the Southeast AsianNuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty, and the South China Sea issue. In fact, it was observed that China was forced to defend its actions inMischief Reef in 1995 before the ARF when pressured by the ARF participants.[xxxiii] ASEAN, however, cannot force the other ARF participants to focus solelyon Southeast Asian issues.  Thesituation in the Korean Peninsula has been consistently discussed, as well asoverall regional developments.  Itis incumbent upon ASEAN to demonstrate the importance of Southeast Asian issuesto the wider Asia-Pacific region.

 On arelated point, it is ironic that while the ARF ostensibly agreed to look atsecurity in a comprehensive manner (as ASEAN is wont to do), it continues tofocus on “traditional” security issues such as the situation in the KoreanPeninsula, and conventional and nuclear arms proliferation. 

 *Third,the ASEAN states used this opportunity to intensify external relations withtheir dialogue partners.*  Inthis regard, the ASEAN countries were quite successful. They developed partnerships with other ARF participants throughco-chairing of the intersessional groups at both the track-one and track-twolevels.  These interactionshighlighted the importance of “corridor diplomacy” and the possibility thatthis process could spill over into other areas such as specific bilateralinitiatives.  Broadening areas ofdiscussion and possible cooperation to security matters also provided ASEAN thechance to transcend the “donor-receiver” relationship with its dialoguepartners to one of more equal partnership.

 *Finally,ASEAN saw the ARF as a means to assure the positive engagement of major powersin the region. *ASEAN has alwaysseen itself as vulnerable to the unilateral actions of major powers, as well asto the fluctuations in their relationships. ASEAN has been trying to foster the positive engagement of major powersin the affairs of Southeast Asia on its own terms – first through the dialoguepartnerships (even though this was largely focused on development assistance)and later through the political-security discussions in the ARF on an equalfooting with the major powers.  Oneanalyst describes “power-balancing” in the ASEAN context as “... keepingwell-disposed but distant external powers interested enough in the region thatAsean's hand can be reinforced in dealing with local or regional hegemonicambitions - whether from a Soviet-backed Vietnam or now, from a steadily morepowerful China. ‘Balance of power’, in ASEAN-speak, thus means mediatingdestabilizing challenges in the context of competing Great Power interests.”[xxxiv] 

            Thus, “[h]ow ASEAN as a group succeeds in maintaining its resilience andsolidarity amidst these emerging and unpredictable power permutations will havea bearing on its own prosperity and on the stability of the region as awhole.”[xxxv]Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated that “the forum was attemptingto ‘manage strategic change in such a way that a new equilibrium among themajor powers in the Asia-Pacific region could evolve gradually and peacefullyover the next decade.’”[xxxvi]

            Part of managing this change was to obtain assurance of continued US presence without undulyalarming China, whose growing assertiveness was a cause for concern among someSoutheast Asian countries.  ASEANsaw “the need to engage China in a comprehensive fashion”: with itsparticipation in ARF and APEC, it was hoped that “China will become part of anEast Asian and Pacific security community in which the breadth of interests infunctional cooperation will reduce the possibility of a threat or use of forceby China.”[xxxvii] This would prevent the creation of  anotherenemy in the post-Cold War era.  Throughthe ARF, ASEAN could “promote a balance or distribution of power that wouldenable the Association to maintain its operational security doctrine withoutprovision for collective defence.”[xxxviii]

            More specifically, engaging in dialogues would be better than facing unilateralintervention.[xxxix] The Forum has no joint military power, and it has never sought to replaceexisting bilateral mechanisms and arrangements.[xl] The ARF thus embodies

 ...the combination of a residual neo-realist focus on ‘interest’, theneoliberal focus on institution-building, and notions of an ‘Asian’ securityculture [which] allows for a broad regional definition. … [The regionalsecurity discourse] is one primarily concerned with the security of states inthe region rather than the security of a regional community as such.[xli]
            How did the ARF fare in this regard?  Didthe ARF help manage strategic change?  Insome way, the discussions in the ARF may have allowed the major powers toovercome (albeit only slightly) suspicions about each other, providing anothervenue to improve their relations. Certainly, the ARF became one of the venuesfor more US-China and even China-Japan interaction.  By not threatening the interests of these major powers, andeven advancing Chinese and Russian intentions to keep the US in check, the ARFmanaged to keep the major powers engaged in the region. Nevertheless, questions will arise as to how significant a factor the ARFwas in managing the relations of these powers.

            In the Asia-Pacific no major interstate wars or arms races broke out during thisperiod.  Whether or not this can beattributed to the ARF is debatable.  Whatis clear is that the ARF did allow regional states a chance to voice theirconcerns about the regional security environment and, to some extent, this mayhave encouraged participants to exercise more restraint in their actions. Nevertheless, the discussions in the ARF did not prevent the occupationof Mischief Reef by China in 1995, nor the testing of nuclear weapons by Indiaand Pakistan in 1998.  The ARFmembers discussed many of these issues in some detail but there were noinitiatives to take serious action within the ARF framework. At this early stageof the ARF, doubts began to surface about the effectiveness of the Forum toaddress real security issues, and the utility of the ASEAN Way in the widerAsia-Pacific.

 **II. Crisis and Recovery? Consolidating the ARF, 1997-present
           The period for consolidation of the ARF process could not have occurredat a more inopportune time, with Asia torn by the Asian economic crisis, nucleartests, domestic upheavals and strategic transitions. The period since 1997 emphasized the uncertainties and security problemsin the region.  Unlike theatmosphere surrounding the establishment of the ARF, the outlook for theAsia-Pacific vacillated from pessimism during the height of the Asian economiccrisis, to cautious optimism with some signs of economic recovery in SoutheastAsia.  There is now a more sober,even critical approach towards multilateral structures such as the ARF, whichare perceived as not significantly altering the underlying basis ofinternational relations.

            **A. An Abundance of Security Problems
           The good news is that no major interstate wars erupted in the region, andthere are moves towards concrete conflict management such as the process ofdeveloping a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea.  On the Korean peninsula, the mood has changed from concernsraised in August 1998 due to the launching of the Taepodong missile by NorthKorea, to some enthusiasm with the South – North Korea Summit held in June2000.

            Nevertheless, many of the countries falling within the “geographicfootprint” of the ARF had to tackle issues of a more comprehensive nature thanwhat had been previously discussed by ARF ministers. Many of these problems were also largely internal in nature.

          The South Pacific was gripped with a spate of internal crises; and SouthAsia continues to be bothered by the problems of India and Pakistan relations,as well as with the civil war in Sri Lanka. In Northeast Asia, while the situation in the Korean peninsula seems morepromising,  the period alsowitnessed continuing difficulties with the Taiwan issue.

            In Southeast Asia, after “all the hobgoblins have jumped out of the box atonce”,[xlii]there are some positive indicators.  Thecountries are poised to post collective growth of 3.4 per cent[xliii] and the short-term prospects are equally promising – short-term debtshave been repaid or defaulted upon, there has been a rebound in exchange ratesin some countries, interest rates have dropped, and asset prices have returnedto reasonable levels.[xliv] Despite these positive signs, Southeast Asia continues to grapple withthe effects of the crisis on individual members and on the ASEAN itself. It still has to contend with the pains of domestic political transitions,particularly in Indonesia, as well as with other issues such as East Timor,secessionism, unresolved internal conflicts, terrorism in the Philippines, andeven transnational environmental problems. ASEAN also had to deal with the South China Sea issue but in a moredisparate manner than it had done in 1995. Moreover, ASEAN members faced difficulties in strengthening theassociation because of the expansion of its membership.[xlv] 

            There were also wider questions about relations among major powers. US-China relations continued to fluctuate, reaching a low point when theChinese embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed, and during the recentelections in Taiwan.  China and Russia voiced their suspicions about the plannedTheater Missile Defense (TMD) system of the US and Japan; and relations betweenJapan and Russia are only slowly being normalized.   

            The significance of this situation lies in the linkages that have become moremanifest, the need for stronger regional mechanisms, and the continuities in theregional security environment.

            First, the economic crisis demonstrated the crucial link betweeneconomics, internal stability and regional security especially in SoutheastAsia.  One analyst states that theeconomic crisis has affected “domestic stability, interregional relations, andtrans-Pacific relations although in differing degrees. So far, the impact of the crisis has been greater on individual or humansecurity than on traditionally defined national security.”[xlvi] Not only did these events show the linkages among issue areas in regionalsecurity, but they also underscored the linkages among Southeast Asian statesand wider East Asia.

            Second,these linkages not only highlighted the need for a regional approach but alsoexposed the weaknesses of existing regional arrangements. A report noted that: “The crisis has paradoxically illustrated the needfor stronger regional institutional structures for cooperation whileunderscoring the incapacity of existing institutions to mount an adequateresponse to the crisis.”[xlvii] Both the APEC and the ARF were severely criticized for not being able torespond adequately to regional problems.  Becauseof this perceived inadequacy, preference for bilateral -- rather thanmultilateral -- approaches gained ground. 

            Third, the weakness of existing regional arrangements derives not onlyfrom perceived structural inadequacies, but also from the manifest tensionbetween national and regional interests.  Connectedwith this is the continued primary importance given to sovereignty even whenemerging security issues such as economic transactions, environmental impacts,population flows, and humanitarian problems point toward the increasinglypermeability of borders. While this is a major trend in international relations,the development of international law and practice have not kept in stride.[xlviii]

            Finally, recent events have pointed to the other continuities in internationalrelations.  One of these is thevulnerability of Southeast Asian countries to external shocks, and theirdependence on external actors with the unilateral capability to affect regionalsecurity and economics.  It has beenmentioned that: “Recovery in the region is critically dependent on policiesand developments in the major economic powers, over which ASEAN has nocontrol.”[xlix] 

            Moreover, the underlying bases of international relations – power, the primacyof national interests, the persistence of conflict, and the wide differencesamong states – remain intact.  Ithas been noted that the economic crisis has once again promoted shifts in thebalance of power in East Asia.  Whilethis may have derailed many defense modernization efforts – a positivedevelopment for advocates of conventional arms control – it has simultaneouslyplaced China in a more powerful position vis-�-vis its Southeast Asianneighbors.

             **B. Developments in the ARF
             TheARF has managed to sustain, and even increase, its points of contact over itsseven-year existence. It also increased its membership from 18 to 23 with India,Mongolia and North Korea as the most recent additions. While this fulfills the principle of inclusivity, there are concerns thatthe ARF has become quite unwieldy with a larger and more varied membership.  In their annual meeting in July 2000, the ARF ministers notedthey should now focus on “consolidating the process of dialogue andcooperation.”[l]      

           Nevertheless,as the only vehicle for multilateral discussion in the Asia-Pacific, the ARFpresented all regional actors the chance to voice their concerns and to discussissues in a more in-depth manner than in its first meetings. For example, despite the objections of China to discussing the SouthChina Sea issue in the ARF, this matter has been taken up and each subsequentARF meeting has seen more frankness on the part of the participants. Moreover, other issues like the economic crisis, globalization andtransnational crime, along with more “traditional” security issues, havefound their way into the security discourse of the Forum. There are also movesto develop norms for regional cooperation. Work is in progress at the track-two level, with the collaboration ofRussia and ASEAN-ISIS, on a draft Pacific Concord.[li] 
           In addition, despite the economic crisis, the ARF has acquired a momentumof its own – there were more meetings held in the intersessional year1998-1999 than in the previous years.   Other planned meetings include training courses and a seminar oncivil-military relations in peacekeeping operations; training in disastermanagement, and enhancing capabilities for early warning systems; andtransparency, approaches to confidence-building, and possible cooperation inanti-piracy.  While not verydramatic, there has also been some progress on confidence- building andpreventive diplomacy.
**ConfidenceBuilding.** In confidence-building, the ARF and the track-two CSCAP meetingshave contributed numerous proposals which have found their way into the ASEANconcept paper and, more recently, into the two baskets of additional CBMs to beconsidered by the members.[lii] The implementation of these CBMs has largely been voluntary on aunilateral, bilateral, or subregional basis. These CBMs are information-exchange measures rather than restraint-typemeasures.  Some examples are:

     �       exchanges or dialogues on security perceptions;

�       meetings of heads of national defense colleges;

�       voluntary submission of annual defense policy statements ordefense white papers; and

�       reporting to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.[liii]

            What is interesting to note is that the submissions of ARF participants to theUN Register has actually increased – from less than 10 to 18 reportingcountries – since the inception of the ARF. Moreover, countries which initially had reservations about issuingdefense policy statements or defense white papers have created their ownversions of such documents and have shared the same with ARF members. This is a first step in a wider regional acceptance of transparency.

** P**reventive****** Diplomacy.**  Proposals forARF preventive diplomacy have also slowly developed over the years primarilythrough track-two efforts.[liv] It is only in recent years, that there has been more in-depth discussionon the track-one level.  The ASEAN, specifically Singapore, developed a concept paperpresented to the ARF-SOM in 2000.  Theimportant points of these discussions are the following: 
�     Definition: preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising betweenstates; to prevent such disputes from escalating into armed confrontation, andto prevent such disputes from spreading geographically.[lv] 
�     Principles:  use ofdiplomatic rather than military or coercive means; respect for sovereignty andnon-interference; consultation and consensus; voluntary; requires trust andconfidence; based on international law; and timeliness. 
�     Four tabled proposals: (1) an enhanced role for the ARF chairman -good offices, liaison with other regional arrangements, a bridge betweentrack-one and track-two fora, and coordination in-between ARF meetings; (2) aregister of experts or experts group; (3) an Annual Security Outlook voluntarilyat the track-one level; and (4) voluntary background briefing on regionalsecurity issues. 
           There has been some progress with the four tabled proposals. The Foreign Minister of Thailand, as acting chair of the ARF, already hasestablished informal contacts with the United Nations (UN), the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS), and the OSCE.  The ARF Chair is also similarly enjoined to promoteinteraction between track-one and track-two. An *ARF Register of Experts and Eminent Persons* has already beenestablished, and available for use on a voluntary basis. It is hoped that these experts could provide non-binding professionaladvice and recommendations to the ARF members.   The register is still being expanded while the terms ofreference are being developed.  Finallythe first volume of the *Annual Security Outlook*has been releasedcontaining the voluntary submission of the security outlooks of thirteencountries.  The topics discussedrange from traditional to non-traditional security issues, as well as theforeign policy and security approaches of many of the countries.[lvi] 
           **Limitations.**  The ARFdid not play any significant part in any of the specific conflicts or securityissues that arose during this period.  Itwas difficult for the Forum to play any role in conflict management: the members themselves did not identify which security issues will bedealt with in a more active manner; the consensus nature of decision-makingmeant that parties to a dispute had an effective veto over any collective actionwhich could be potentially detrimental to their interests; and the ARF did notyet have any mechanisms for actions in specific conflicts. In fact, there were even differences on which aspects ofconfidence-building overlap with preventive diplomacy, and how fast theevolution of the ARF should occur. Thus, the ARF “… has yet to realize itsfull potential as a multilateral vehicle for building the trust and confidencewhich are the essential precursors to effective conflict management and conflictresolution.”[lvii] 
Some ofthe worst criticisms came in the wake of the East Timor crisis. Many analysts saw this as an opportunity for the ARF participants toclosely discuss the issue and to identify ways by which they could contribute toresolving the problem (even if such action is undertaken only by specificmembers of ARF).  But thisexpectation did not materialize:  intensive discussions occurred during the APEC meeting inAuckland (1999) rather than during the earlier meeting of the ARF. British foreign secretary Robin Cook noted that while there was somediscussion in the Forum about East Timor, ‘“[t]he ARF was not just ready forit.”’[lviii] 
           [This] inability also ended any notion that the ARF has political leadership inregional security dialogues, in relation either to Southeast Asia or to theAsia-Pacific region as a whole.  Inshort, the ARF’s capacity to function as the fulcrum for regional securitycoordination and dialogue has been crippled, and it is unlikely that the ARF ornascent regional institutions will regain any major role in securitydeliberations or outcomes in the near future. With no other meaningful autonomous security institutions on the horizon,the path is again clear for big powers to contend for hegemony in the region.[lix]
           While the comment above may be considered as too strong, it highlightsthe question about the usefulness of multilateral mechanisms in general.  In particular, bilateralism has been reinvigorated since1996.[lx]This is symptomatic of the low priority given to multilateral solutions at atime when multilateralism is still being developed and strengthened. The ARF continues to lack some organizational structure, and its activityis highly dependent on the chair of the Forum. One author has commented that:

            ... bilateralalliances will continue to contribute to regional stability and security. For example, the presence of bilateral security arrangements between theUS and its allies in the region, to a certain extent, provides a “temporarybreathing space needed to facilitate [the] evolution [of rising regional powers]into … more benign power[s]” and thereby tempers what could be theiraggressive intentions and actions.[lxi]
            Ultimately, the question is about the relevance of the existing approachadopted by the ARF in light of the many internal and transnational issuesplaguing the region.  Many ARFparticipants are increasingly dissatisfied with the pace of the ARF. Are the ASEAN Way and the “primary driving role” of ASEAN stillrelevant for the Asia-Pacific? 
**C.  RevisitingASEAN’s Agenda
             Atthis stage of the ARF evolution, ASEAN has had moderate success in achieving itsgoals within the Forum.  Even whileit has intensified its relations with non-ASEAN countries outside of the ARFframework, ASEAN has had trouble asserting its credibility to lead the ARFprocess.

 **   **        **ASEAN Centrality in the ARF. **Theeconomic crisis exacted a major toll on ASEAN not only in terms of setbacks innational development programs, but also in its efforts to lead in regionalsecurity mechanisms: “The economic crisis of 1997 and the political turmoilthat followed it, seriously damaged the image and credibility of ASEAN.”[lxii] The pillars of the association’s credibility – economic dynamism; apublic show of cohesion; an ability to solve ASEAN problems; and the engagementof regional actors[lxiii]– were shaken by the crisis.  Oneanalyst even goes so far to say that:

            The public has been largely disappointed withASEAN.  Its perception is that of ahelpless ASEAN, an ASEAN that cannot move decisively, an ASEAN that is trappedunder its organisational and bureaucratic weight, and an ASEAN that fails torespond to real, current problems and challenges.[lxiv] 
            It can even be argued that the “public was not even aware of the significanceof ASEAN in their lives, thereby raising the question ‘for whom is ASEAN –for policy elites or for the ASEAN peoples?’”

            ASEAN’s public show of cohesion has also been criticized as only being“skin-deep.”[lxv]The association could not act decisively to address the economic crisis and thehaze problem. Bilateral problems would rear their ugly heads every now and then. The ASEAN Troika was initially rebuffed by Hun Sen during the problem inCambodia in July 1997.[lxvi]And the ASEAN countries were not able to present a united front towards China inthe 1998 Mischief Reef issue. There is some basis to Luhulima’s criticism thatthe ASEAN leaders “often contradicted each other” and that there were fears“that relations with [Southeast Asian] neighbours might be sacrificed in theprocess of finding solutions to domestic instabilities.”[lxvii]The lack of a collective response reflects in no small measure the lack ofleadership in ASEAN with Indonesia still in the midst of domestic crises, andthere seems to be no single country which can fill in Indonesia’s shoes.[lxviii] 

            Moreover, ASEAN solidarity may have been unwittingly undermined by theill-planned expansion of the organization’s membership. The difficulty of socializing newer members into the ASEAN process iswell-documented in the cases of Cambodia and Myanmar.[lxix] The diversity of views makes consensus difficult; dealing with externalpartners was complicated by issues such as sanctions imposed on Myanmar;decision-making and institutionalization was slow; and there was a lack of moresubstantial assistance to ASEAN’s newer members directly caused by theeconomic crisis.[lxx]

            Another problem with which ASEAN countries had to contend is the persistence ofunresolved domestic issues.  Thereis still a need to strengthen political institutions and instill propergovernance; strengthen national unity, or at least to satisfactorily managesocial diversity; make economic growth sustainable; address the largesocioeconomic inequalities in society; provide for the development of civilsociety;[lxxi]and adapt domestic institutions and procedures to a dynamic internationalenvironment.

            With such challenges, ASEAN’s credibility and capability to lead the ARF, andthe applicability of the ASEAN Way for the Asia-Pacific are seriously open toquestion.   How can ASEAN leadwhen its attention is focused on domestic housekeeping? Why should the “ASEAN model” be extended to the rest of theAsia-Pacific when it could not help solve the problems in Southeast Asia?

            ASEAN was acutely aware of these criticisms. Singapore Foreign Minister Jayakumar observed, ‘“Perceptions candefine political reality. … If we continue to be perceived as ineffective, wecan be marginalized as our dialogue partners and international investors relateus to the sidelines.”’[lxxii] Thus, ASEAN attempted to mount a credible response in order to meetfuture challenges, as well as to counter criticisms of its irrelevance orimpending demise.  In transformingASEAN, the group developed visions (ASEAN Vision-2020 and Hanoi Plan of Action),undertook incremental steps in implementing previous agreements (environmentalcooperation, protocol for nuclear-weapons states to the SEANWFZ treaty), set inplace new initiatives (e.g., surveillance process), and reasserted itsleadership in the ARF.  In itsministerial meeting in July 2000, the ASEAN ministers adopted the *ComprehensiveDevelopment Agenda* as the organization’s thrust in the coming years. They also set up the ASEAN Troika as an ad hoc body at the ministeriallevel to enable the organization to “address more effectively and cooperatemore closely on issues affecting regional peace and stability.”[lxxiii] The Troika, however, is not a decision-making body, is expected not tointerfere in internal affairs, and will be activated only after a consensus hasbeen reached by ASEAN ministers.  Ithas yet to be seen whether this measure will help ASEAN respond in a more timelymanner to arising problems. Despite early criticisms of the Troika,[lxxiv]this should be seen as an attempt by ASEAN to demonstrate its capability tosolve its own problems, and this may help in maintaining its centrality in theARF.

            Apart from organizational changes, ASEAN has also attempted to be morepro-active in the Forum, but many of these efforts fell short of formalinstitutionalization or even of re-interpreting norms such as non-interferenceas other ARF participants had hoped.

            In both the 1999 and 2000 sessions of ASEAN, the Foreign Ministers went on aretreat to evaluate and honestly discuss the future of ASEAN, ARF and dialoguerelations.  Realizing that ASEANneeded to take concrete measures to retain the driver’s seat in the ARF, theinternal review of the ARF process included organizational matters – once ataboo subject in the ASEAN.  It wasthen decided that the ASEAN Secretariat should provide technical and secretarialsupport required by the ARF Chair, monitor ARF activities, and serve as arepository for all ARF documents (the last echoing the ASEAN Concept Paper onthe ARF).  Despite these decisions,there is still no special unit in the ASEAN Secretariat specifically devoted tohandle ARF matters.  Such a unitwould be seen as a positive step towards greater commitment to the purposes ofthe Forum.

           Another attempt is by developing a concept paper on preventive diplomacy(Singapore), and on the security implications of globalization (Thailand). Although these are positive gestures, they fall short of more concretemeasures.  For instance, ASEANmembers cannot even agree on which CBMs proposed in the ARF they would try toimplement together (to be some sort of example for the rest of the ARFparticipants).  Moreover, only twoASEAN countries submitted their country papers for the Annual Security Outlook. The joint submission of ASEAN could have sent a stronger signal of itscommitment in the ARF.

            A significant effort is the initiation of a process of “informal summitry”among the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea during the 1999 ASEAN InformalSummit in Manila. Foreign ministry officials in Manila noted that ASEAN couldact as an independent intermediary among the Northeast Asian countries. This could be interpreted as one means by which ASEAN could exert more,albeit soft, influence in Northeast Asia thereby countering criticisms ofASEAN’s leadership in ARF based on the former’s minimal linkages orfamiliarity with Northeast Asian security issues.

            Despite its limitations, ASEAN is still an acceptable steward for the Forum,performing what Sukma calls an ‘administrative role’ quite well.[lxxv] Formally, it is still ASEAN which chairs the ARF ministerial meeting, andco-chairs the intersessional groups.  Increasingly,however, ASEAN is beginning to compromise on this stewardship, if not willinglythen out of necessity.  For example,participation in the ARF is no longer strictly tied to establishing dialoguepartner relations with ASEAN.  Mongoliaand North Korea had no formal ties with ASEAN as dialogue or consultativepartners when they were admitted into the Forum. In effect, ASEAN has “delinked participation in the ARF from formalrelations with ASEAN as a prerequisite for the participation in the ARF.”[lxxvi] 

 **   **        **Discussion of Southeast Asian issues.** ASEAN has also shown some flexibility in the discussions in ARF.  It does not insist that Southeast Asian issues be the sole agenda –that would be counter-productive in the first place. There is now more discussion on the comprehensive aspects of security. In the meeting of the ARF in July 2000, the ministers discussed thesecurity implications of globalization – an important subject for developingcountries.  The Chairman’sStatement stated “In addressing regional security issues, the ARF should givedue consideration to economic, social and human components of security, and theneed to promote regional cooperation.”[lxxvii] They also discussed transnational crime for which the ARF formed anexperts group.  The issues discussedwere piracy, illegal migration (trafficking in human persons), illegaltrafficking in small arms, drug production and trafficking, money laundering,corruption, and computer crime.  Thisis significant as these are very important issues for Southeast Asia, and alsobecause the ARF may actually be able to address these issues since they havebeen undertaking several activities relating to these issues. With a broader discussion, the ARF, however, should manage discussionsand possible cooperative ventures given its already “crowded agenda.”
TheSouth China Sea was also discussed during this period. In the ARF ministerial meeting in July 2000, China announced itswillingness to finalize a regional code of conduct on the South China Sea beforethe end of 2000.  It should be notedthat it took a long time before these issues were discussed in the ARF and inthe intersessional group on CBMs China refused to include the matter on theformal agenda.  The substantiveaspects of drafting an actual code of conduct, however, are undertaken in theASEAN-China consultations rather than under a subgroup of the ARF.  
TheTAC and the protocol to the SEANWFZ treaty have also been constant topics. Nevertheless, the ASEAN has been unable to use the ARF to rally supportfrom the nuclear-weapons states for the treaty’s protocol. The association will now be consulting bilaterally with the US, France,UK, and Russia regarding the protocol.  
 Butdiscussions of Southeast Asian issues in the ARF have not necessarily been apositive development for ASEAN states.  Thesediscussions have actually invited criticism of its individual members likeMyanmar, and of the ASEAN’s belated action in East Timor. In some way, such frankness has actually created irritants in relationsbetween ASEAN and some of its external partners. 
 **IntensifyingExternal Relations.**  Acting as apreliminary contact point, the ARF has helped ASEAN expand its externalrelations.  Some ASEAN countries arealready working towards re-establishing formal relations with North Korea. Moreover, possibly as a result of a greater comfort level withmultilateralism and in appreciation of the importance of other security issuesin the region, Japan has offered to begin cooperation on anti-piracy effortswith Southeast Asian countries.[lxxviii] More importantly from the perspective of Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s tieswith the US are moving forward.  Theannual US-Thailand Cobra Gold exercise has been widened to include 30Singaporean service personnel, and observers from the Philippines, Australia,Malaysia and Indonesia.[lxxix]

 One ofthe most important recent developments has been the growing linkage betweenNortheast and Southeast Asia.  Forboth China and Japan, the dialogue experience in the ARF and in the PMC may havehelped lay the groundwork for wider East Asian cooperation.  The dialogue possibly helped the two subregions become“more aware of each other’s [sic] strategic preoccupations and to becomemore conversant with the dynamics and realities of their very different securityenvironments.”[lxxx] 
Themajor impetus for East Asia, however, was the economic crisis. According toSouth Korean foreign minister Hong Soon Young, the ‘“economic hardship madeus [East Asians] keenly aware we share a common fate.”’ Amitav Acharya adds that this move “is partly a reaction to the Crisis,which led to some disillusionment with APEC, and partly a signal to the U.S. andAustralia that their recent policies don’t meet ASEAN’s interests andexpectations.”[lxxxi]
 There wasa perceived “inaction” or belated action of the West, specifically the US,to the Southeast Asian economic crisis. The US seemed to lack appreciation forthe role of Southeast Asia in regional security. The speedy assistance given to South Korea was interpreted as a strategicchoice – clearly, Southeast Asia ranked very low in the priority of the USgovernment.  It has even been notedthat US policy-makers continue to rely on Cold War thinking: “South Korea received quick and significant economic assistance becauseit faced a communist North armed with nuclear weapons. Indonesia did not, because, with the Cold War over, the country is nolonger important to the US as a bastion against communism.”[lxxxii]

Asa result, Northeast and Southeast Asia are finally taking more concrete steps todeepen their linkages.  Theselinkages began with the contacts made in APEC, the ARF and ASEAN. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meetings, which was capped by a Summit inKuala Lumpur, is the first of its kind for the organization. The most recent summit in Manila in 1999 promises a closer relationsbetween the two subregions.  The *JointStatement on East Asia Cooperation*  identifieseight areas of cooperation:  economic,monetary and financial, social and human resources development, scientific andtechnical development, culture and information, development cooperation,political-security, and transnational issues.  Other initiatives are Korea’s East Asia Vision Group, and the Miyazawaand Obuchi funds from Japan.  In thePMC meetings in 2000 in Bangkok, the APT discussed the monitoring andimplementation of cooperation in the eight areas. Moreover, China, Japan and Korea  proposedmore specific cooperative ventures on agriculture technology, environmentalprotection, human resources development, and a cyber-university and a studentexchange program.[lxxxiii]

 **ThePositive Engagement of Major Powers.**  Theinitial lack of cohesion in ASEAN resulting from the economic crisis has led todifficulties for the association in dealing with major powers. One author has mentioned that the ASEAN has actually over-estimated itsinfluence on major actors, and is now in a Catch-22 situation: “…its abilityto influence other actors is contingent on its political unity, yet that unityis contingent on its effectiveness as an international actor.”[lxxxiv] 

            An example is the relationship between ASEAN and China. While the US missed animportant opportunity to make a positive mark on Southeast Asia, thisopportunity was not lost on China.  Theeconomic and political support China extended to ASEAN during the financialcrisis placed Beijing in a leadership position in East Asia. “In terms of the balance of power, the political winner is China, whichhas positioned itself as a champion of ASEAN economic nationalism.”[lxxxv] China is capitalizing on this – reminding ASEAN leaders of its supportduring the crisis.[lxxxvi] It has also taken a more assertive stance in the South China Sea: itstrengthened its presence in the area and pushed for the ‘bilateralization’of the issue.  As an example,Chinese and Malaysian leaders, in their discussion on maritime disputes agreed‘“that the South China Sea issue can only be resolved by relevant countriesinvolved, opposing any involvement and interference by any outside force.”’[lxxxvii] This has, in effect, ruled out an ARF role in the South China Sea. China has also initiated a series of long-term bilateral agreements withBrunei, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.[lxxxviii]It was only much later that ASEAN was able to agree on a draft regional code ofconduct which it is currently negotiating with China.  This draft, however, is problematic because the ASEAN statesthemselves cannot agree on the geographic scope of the code of conduct.

            On the other hand, ASEAN has attained what it originally wanted – to retain USpresence in the area.  The expandedCobra Gold exercise dovetailed with the release of the US Defense ofDepartment’s *Joint Vision 2020*which places a greater emphasis on theAsia Pacific and on the role of peacekeeping operations.[lxxxix] More recently, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Forces Adm.Dennis Blair has enunciated the concept of “security communities” in the US approach toward its partners in the Asia-Pacific.

            These initiatives have the potential to strengthen concrete multilateralcooperation, to promote regionalism, and to facilitate the achievement of theobjectives stated in the ARF.  Nevertheless,it should be asked whether or not, in the long term, such initiatives could havea negative impact on the ARF.  Specifically,are these initiatives promoting more of a US-led form of multilateralism whichexcludes other Asia-Pacific countries?  Ifso it may have negative consequences for the ARF approach of inclusivity, andmight even raise suspicions from other Asia-Pacific countries as to the realmotives of the US.

             TheARF has become another venue for major powers to interact and to be engaged indiscussions on non-traditional security issues. This is an important contribution in itself. This interaction, however, does not necessarily result in a positiveimpact on relations of major powers which are guided by their interests and areonly peripherally influenced by a security mechanism such as the ARF. It is in their own interests not to destabilize the Asia-Pacific. Thus, it is ‘the interests and actions of the great powers, which havedefined the parameters of ASEAN’s security policies” including that in theARF.  “The decisions that thegreat powers make, for their own reasons, will determine the shape of theregional environment.”[xc]

**III.  CONCLUSION
            The ASEAN Regional Forum has made some minimum contributions to therealization of ASEAN’s goals in the Asia-Pacific. Over the years, the ARF has allowed for the discussion of Southeast Asianissues in a wider context and has gradually helped ASEAN intensify its relationswith external partners.  ASEAN alsohas a guaranteed role in the ARF although the credibility of ASEAN centralityand the ASEAN way to guide the ARF have been questioned in view of themultifarious problems the association has faced since 1997. In both periods studied, from 1989 to 1996 and from 1997 to the presenttime, there is no clear indication that the ARF has significantly contributed tomanaging the relations of China, Japan, and the US. The actions and relations of regional powers are driven by their owninterests and priorities which do not necessarily coincide with those of ASEANor of the ARF.

            The ARF has contributed moderately to a more stable regional environmentfor Southeast Asia.  As it continuesto move from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy, many of the premiseson which the ARF is based needs to be reviewed. The participants of the Forum also need to examine the challenges posedby a fluid regional security environment, the implications of wider membership,and the widening discourse on security.  A.  The Goals of ASEAN
 Despitebeing an imperfect security mechanism, the ARF is still relevant for ASEANbecause of the linkages it facilitates, and the resources which can be tappedespecially from ARF participants such as Australia, Canada, the US, the EU andJapan.  The ARF also affordsSoutheast Asian states nominal equality in the decisions which would shape thesecurity architecture in the Asia-Pacific. 

 **ASEANCentrality.**  The ARF has become“the primary diplomatic instrument through which an enlarged ASEAN has beenable to extend its influence into the wider region and enhance its previouslylimited strategic leverage.”[xci] In founding the ARF, ASEAN was an acceptable primary driver – thenon-threatening nature of the association was acceptable to major powers, andits “diplomatic ability to act as a unitary entity towards the outsideworld”[xcii](during the early 1990s) gave the ASEAN some credibility to lead the newmultilateral process.  Itscentrality is based more on an administrative role – managing the developmentof the dialogue process within the limits of a consensual and non-interferenceapproach – which has helped the ARF make moderate steps forward during itsfirst five years.

            Despite questions about ASEAN’s capability to lead a regional securitymechanism and about the appropriateness of the ASEAN Way, ASEAN remains anacceptable “leader” of the ARF.[xciii] It may even be premature to consider “other forms of alternateleadership” in the ARF with the current sharing of the chairmanship ofintersessional working groups still being an effective mechanism foraccommodating the initiatives of non-ASEAN members.[xciv] There are still residual suspicions among the major powers about eachother’s motivations, and many ARF participants still prefer to take anincremental approach in its evolution. 

            ASEAN, however, should not fall into complacency. A stronger ASEAN role in regional security is contingent on itsdeveloping and maintaining a united voice in the Forum especially in the wake ofthe Asian economic crisis.  Moreoften than not, the participation of ASEAN states in the ARF is marked bydifferences in their individual security outlooks and preferred modes ofoperation.  One author commentsthat: “ASEAN’s ability to manage regional security in Southeast Asia hasbeen ... limited by [the] divergent security perceptions and interests withinASEAN ....”[xcv] To retain the driver’s seat, the ASEAN needs not only to voice itsconcerns or push its agenda, but also to set the example of concretely puttingregional interests ahead of national interests, of implementing some of theproposed CBMs even within the ASEAN framework. ASEAN may also need to consider some gradual modifications to the ASEANWay if the ARF is to become more representative of the values and approaches ofother Asia-Pacific states.* 
           **Discussion of Southeast Asian Issues.** ASEAN has managed to place many of its issues on the agenda of the ARF. Discussion, however, is a far cry from effectively addressing problems;and ironically, these “frank and honest” discussions have also become asource of irritation in relations between ASEAN and its external partners. Moreover, the ARF is currently not equipped to deal with many SoutheastAsian issues which are still considered internal in nature. 
ASEAN, however,should not expect that its concerns will take centerstage in the ARF. Many ARF participants, in particular the US, Japan, and South and Korea,“...are more inclined to regard the ARF as a useful first step towards a morerepresentative regional security structure which gives greater weight toNortheast Asia’s security problems.”[xcvi]  
           **Intensifying ASEAN’s External Relations.** The ARF has become a venue for intensifying relations between ASEAN andits partners, especially as there is an increase in the comfort level inengaging in multilateral fora.  TheARF has also widened the networks among participants involving government andmilitary officials, and non-government sectors. This has facilitated bilateral or multilateral activities with a morepartners either within or outside of the ARF framework. 
           **Positive Engagement of Major Powers.** The ARF has successfully involved regional powers – the US, Japan,China, Russia and India.[xcvii]  Therehas been a higher level of comfort with the ARF format, especially for China. It was observed, “Over time and with enhanced exposure the Chinesedelegation spoke more frequently, often without notes in advancing the Chineseposition.  Both publicly andprivately in corridors, what would and would not wash in Beijing was madeclear.”[xcviii] China is also becoming more accustomed to multilateral processes: it has demonstrated willingness to involve itself in the CBM process byco-sponsoring the ISG-CBM with the Philippines, and hosting working seminars,the most recent of which was an *ARFProfessional Training Program on China’s Security Policy* held in Beijingin October 1999.  
           Moreover, the ARF still manages to fulfill some of the interests of thesetwo powers.  It assures China thatregional security will not be dominated by the US, and the US is given thechance to “engage China comprehensively”.  
           Beyond the involvement of major powers in a dialogue process, there hasbeen minimal success in improving major power relations through the ARF. To some extent, the ARF has also expanded the avenues for China-USinteraction and this has paid off with more bilateral exchanges such as annualDefense Consultative Talks, military exchanges, and possible joint efforts inseveral areas.[xcix] 
Having saidthis, the ARF has not really constrained the actions of major powers. It has also not yet evolved to such an extent to become some sort ofmediating influence on regional powers.  Theirrelations are characterized by their own peculiar security dynamics andhistorical baggage that a grouping such as the ARF is not equipped to deal with. In other words, “...the interests and actions of the great powers ...have defined the parameters of ASEAN’s security policies”[c] and not the other way around. B.  Prospects for the ASEANRegional Forum 
          The ARF also plays an important function for Southeast Asia in terms ofproviding for a relatively more stable regional environment where ASEANoperates.  Currently, the ARF has amixed record in achieving its own objectives. 
**Trust?**The ARF is widening the networks among participants, thus enabling them toundertake bilateral or multilateral activities with a multiplicity of partners. “The current dialogue mechanism centered around PMC, ARF and CSCAP isimproving and widening channels of information gathering and sharing and policyconsultation and coordination.”[ci]To a certain extent, these can help lessen uncertainty arising from certainactivities like joint military exercises. 
Nevertheless,some caveats are necessary. While CBMs “are [indeed] useful in generating adegree of trust among countries which have a history of mutual suspicion”,[cii]they should not be seen as an end in themselves but rather as part of a longprocess.  It has been observed that‘“CBMs are prominently concerned with perception and usually do not dealwith the root causes of security problems.”’ Moreover, if the goals are too unrealistic, the “lack of progress canresult in disappointment and halt the process.”[ciii] For CBMs to bear fruit, the ARF members should be ready to go through thelong haul and ASEAN should provide strategic direction in this regard. 
           Thus, if these CBMs in the ARF are seen within the wider context of eventsunfolding in Southeast Asia, one could be led to ask whether or not these CBMsare actually gaining ground, or are just being used as some sort of means toappease weaker states when they are threatened by the actions of larger powers. For example, while China talks the “CBM talk” its refurbishment ofstructures in the Mischief Reef is viewed with suspicion by other claimants,particularly the Philippines.  Inconflicts such as these, it is doubtful whether transparency and CBMs are makinga dent in terms of conflict management.  Thepower differential will still be a major factor in the ultimate resolution ofthis conflict. 
           Nevertheless, these CBMs have opened up avenues for the parties to explorevarious means by which they can manage disputes. For example, China has expressed its willingness to enter into a regionalcode of conduct.  It is possiblethat through the habit of dialogue in the ARF, China and other states are slowlyseeing the merits of a multilateral approach. 
           In addition, there has yet been no reconciliation of diverging views and the ARFis not yet a “consultative” forum.[civ] Notably, the only formal document of the ARF reflecting effort atagreement is a statement issued by the ARF Chair or co-chairs of the ISGs. The ARF participants have yet to give another strong signal of theircommitment to the process such as a joint declaration of principles or measuresthat they will implement jointly. 
**APredictable Pattern of Relations?**  Creatinga predictable pattern of relations should be seen as part of an ongoing processwhich has yet to bear fruit.  It isnot enough that principles for cooperation are enunciated in the Forum. To be relevant, these also need commitment from all ARF members. At this point in time, the habit of dialogue in the ARF has not yet ledto altered state behavior in terms of either greater surrender of sovereignrights or increased reliance on multilateral and cooperative securitymechanisms.  Both large and smallstates continue to be wary of institutions which have the potential tocircumscribe their sovereignty.  Oneauthor has mentioned that: 
…the commitment of regional states to the principle of sovereign statehood,though deployed for different purposes by different states, remains intactdespite the rapid increase in regional security dialogue. There appears to be little prospect of states ‘surrendering’sovereign powers as part of the burgeoning multilateralism in the region.  And, above all else, the search for security at a regionallevel has not challenged the notion that defence of the sovereign state involvesan ‘ongoing process of defining state boundaries, excluding that which differsfrom its domains, and punishing those who would challenge it’.[cv] 
Significantly,the ARF has neither prevented actions by any single state to ensure its nationalsecurity even if such actions tend to destabilize the whole region, nor has theARF constrained great power posturing or actions. Interaction in the Forum has, however, led to greater awareness of themerits of cooperative security and confidence building. Even preventive diplomacy measures are gaining some ground. For instance, China’s *NewSecurity Concept* embodies appreciation for a cooperative security approachwithin a multilateral setting.[cvi] Even the US has paid more lip service to the ARF in recent years withcomprehensive security finding its way in the *1998US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. 

            **Prospects for the ARF.**  Thediscussion of the development of the ARF shows that the Forum is helping lay thefoundations for a more peaceful regional environment. The ARF tackles issues wider than the interests of ASEAN. There are also some indications that slowly there is more flexibility inhow ASEAN interprets its leadership role in the ARF.  The ARF ten years from now, if it manages to survive, mayactually begin to be more representative of an Asia-Pacific wide approach.

            Thus, the ARF should be seen as a long-term investment – a device which couldfacilitate learning among regional states, a means through which a regionalcommunity or identity could be defined.  Ithas been commented that “The ARF experiment is essentially one ofidentity-building.  By concentratingon process, dialogue should lead to socialization which, in turn, will lead tothe dissipation of conflicts of interests.”[cvii]

           The importance of the Forum would also lie in its potential for becoming agenuine alternative (if complementary) framework for security in the region.  In the long-run, “…perhaps by avoiding the language andmethods of balance of power approaches, or identifying threats and forgingcorresponding alliances, it may have avoided the realists’ security dilemma ofperpetual insecurity.”[cviii] 

            Making the transition to such a regional security mechanism is fraughtwith difficulties, not the least of which is the continued lower priority givento developing a multilateral security mechanism as compared to bilateralalliances and partnerships.  Inaddition, because the ARF is not yet a significant or an independent actor inthe region, it is not in a position to effectively manage the conflicts in theregion.  The ARF is actually the subject of state action and of eventsin the regional system rather than being an active contributor to regionalsecurity at the moment. *            Events in more recent times have exhibited the growing linkages inaspects of security and the closer intertwining of regional destinies. In this case, they have actually highlighted the need for regionalapproaches, such as the ARF, in order to manage emerging security issues. Infact, “the recent heightening of security concerns appears to have pushed ARFofficials to say the forum is prepared to ‘manage’ conflicts not justthrough the traditional means of ‘confidence-building measures’ but also byutilizing preventive diplomacy.”[cix] Instead of being a challenge, this is actually an opportunity for the ARFand its members to firmly resolve to push the multilateral process forward. 

            In addition, current security issues highlight the increasing permeability ofborders at the same time that there is a zealous guarding of sovereignty.  This is particularly the case for Southeast Asia where“[t]he economic crisis has created an environment in which disputes couldescalate more quickly, and the combination of crisis and strategic tensions willneed to be carefully managed if conflict is [to be] avoided.”[cx]Moreover, one of the major features of conflicts in Southeast Asia are theirlargely internal origin.  Clearly,the ARF will be constrained to take action in this regard as it is was notoriginally established to address such internal conflicts.

            The same holds true in terms of managing conflicts among the greatpowers.  While the ARF may have thepotential to become a mechanism for regulating such conflicts, it still has along way to go.  Moreover, the mostthat the ARF can do is to provide an atmosphere conducive to constructivedialogue and handling of these issues.

           More important than these changes in the regional security environment isthe continuity of the bases of international relations that circumscribe the ARF.  Despite some encouraging signs regarding the acceptability ofmultilateralism, there is still a lack of a common security concept and agendain practice in the region.[cxi] While this common security concept remains on paper, there will continueto be tensions in pushing a neoliberal agenda in a neorealist setting. 

            In the near-term, the ARF will have to address the following challenges.

        v    The implications of a larger membership on the consolidation ofthe ARF process.  It may be prudentfor the ARF to put on hold other applications for membership in the next fiveyears. 
 v    The problem of “consensus censorship”.[cxii]A wider membership which operates on the principle of consensus andnon-interference may lead to a dilemma in which the more important securityissues are not discussed as the concerned parties will veto their inclusion inthe ARF agenda.  If such becomes thecase, how relevant will the ARF be in addressing emerging security issues? 
 v    Managing a wider range of issues for discussion. Non-military or non-traditional security and transnational issues are asmuch a challenge as traditional security issues. The ARF would have to achieve some balance in these discussions in orderto identify in what areas the Forum could decisively act and undertakecooperative actions.

 v    There is a need to sustain interest and to make progress in theARF.  This is easiersaid   than doneas ASEAN needs to master a delicate balancing act in terms of managing the paceof the ARF.    

 v    The purposes must be made clear.  CBMsand even preventive diplomacy only address the symptoms, not the root causes, ofconflict.   Eventually the ARFmembers should reach a point when they would be willing and able to address theroots of conflicts in the region within or outside of the ARF framework.  This is important as there may be certain conflicts which lieoutside of the purview of the ARF, or their solution would require that only thespecific parties be involved.  Nevertheless,the ARF can hopefully act as some sort of “pressure” to resolve theseconflicts as regional interests may be at stake. In this case, other sub regional initiatives may also be important.

 
v    There are still many issues which need to be addressed ifpreventive diplomacy is to become a reality through the ARF: the scope of preventive diplomacy specifically if it should also dealwith transnational issues; balancing respect for sovereignty vis-�-vis the“interference” which may be perceived in the practice of preventivediplomacy; the actors involved; the use or non-use of force; and the“overlap” between CBMs and preventive diplomacy measures. What could eventually result is a preventive diplomacy tool which wouldbe used mainly for inter-state conflicts and possibly even transnational issues.  One think tank cautioned, however, that this focus “mayinvolve only normal diplomatic tools to the exclusion of crisis-time preventivediplomacy measures such as good offices and mediation. This could undermine the development of preventive diplomacy.”[cxiii]

 
v    ASEAN needs to lead the way, and it needs to capitalize on itscontinuing acceptability to “lead” the ARF.  It has already taken the initiative in convening the summitof Northeast Asian leaders, and this undertaking needs to be observed further. The effectiveness of ASEAN in promoting regional security rests on itsability to function as a cohesive and independent entity without necessarilyyielding to external influence.  Somespecific steps which could be taken are: implementing some of the CBM proposalson an ASEAN-wide level; and formalizing the ARF secretariat within the ASEANSecretariat.  At the same time,ASEAN also needs to fully realize that it is only one subregion in the ARF andthis entails some flexibility about its chairmanship in the ARF.

 
v    Some specific proposals that the ARF may want to consider are: (a)continued discussion of norms of regional behavior which may be adopted in aPacific Concord; (b) the establishment of a regional risk reduction center; (c)the creation of an ARF secretariat with an independent research capacity; (d)further dialogue, especially in the track-two context, on case studies ofsuccessful and unsuccessful intra- and extra- regional conflict resolution; and(e) the inclusion of law enforcement officials in the ARF process even at theintersessional level.[cxiv]

 
            The ASEAN RegionalForum has a great potential to become an overarching framework for regionalsecurity in the Asia-Pacific, with bilateral and subregional arrangements as itsnecessary components.  It also hasthe potential to help Asia-Pacific countries develop a mechanism trulyrepresentative of the region’s values and interests.  Yet realizing this potential will require re-interpretingcurrent norms as well as instilling a sense of security transcending narrownational interests – a path that the current ARF participants may not yet beable, or willing, to take.
  
*    Revised version of a paper presented in the International Workshop on *New    Dimensions of Conflict and Challenges for Conflict Management in Southeast    Asia* co-sponsored by the Research and Education for Peace Unit (REP)    School of Social Sciences of the Universiti Sains Malaysia, and the    Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University, Sweden.     Funded by the Swedish Agency for the Internationalization of Higher    Education (STINT).  Penang, 5-9    December 1999.

 
**    Head, Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the    Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs.     She is a graduate of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies    Class 99-1. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable research    assistance provided by Ms. Maria Carmencita C. Casta�os.     The views expressed herein do not represent those of the Institute or    of the Department.

**ENDNOTES
[i]    The ARF started in 1994 with 18 participants.     The ARF now has 23 participants:     the 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,    Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam); the 10    dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India,    Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, South Korea, and the US); ASEAN    observer, Papua New Guinea; and Mongolia (1998) and North Korea (2000).
[ii]    The ASEAN Concept Paper for the ARF states that Stage 3 of the ARF evolution    is “development of conflict-resolution mechanisms.”  Upon formal adoption in the second meeting of the ARF, stage    three was watered down to “elaboration of approaches to conflict.”     See “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,” 1995; and “The    Chairman’s Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum,” Brunei    Darussalam, 01 August 1995.   These    are available on the ASEAN webpage at http://www.asean.or.id/. 
[iii]    Robin Ramcharan, “ASEAN Regional Forum: A Pitfall in Pacific Asia’s    Security?” *World Affairs* 3, no. 3 (July-September 1999): 74-75.

 [iv]    Multilateralism is described as a generic institutional form in    international relations based on “principles which specify appropriate    conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic    interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any    specific occurrence.”  See    John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in    John Gerard Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an    Institutional Forum* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 10-11.    
 [v]    Daniel A. Lucero, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Pessimistic View,” *Army    Journal* (3rd quarter 1999): 9.    
 [vi]    It is a valid argument that ASEAN does not always function as one cohesive    entity in the ARF as formal representation in the ARF is not “ASEAN” as    an organization but by the individual Southeast Asian countries.     Nevertheless, this paper will look at the ASEAN as a collective unit    in the Forum.    

 [vii]    For a full discussion of how the ARF was established, see M.C. Ortuoste,    “The Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” paper presented at the *Multilateral    Institutions in Asia*Seminar, Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies,    Honolulu, Hawaii, 14 July 2000.    
 [viii]    Brian L. Job, “Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in William    T. Tow, Russell Trood and Toshiya Hoshino, eds., *Bilateralism in a    Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the    Asia-Pacific*(Tokyo and Queensland: The Japan Institute for    International Affairs and The Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia    Relations, 1997), 160-161.    
 [ix]    David B. Dewitt, “Concepts of Security for the Asia-Pacific Region in the    Post-Cold War Era: Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” *7th    Annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 1993.     See also David B. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative    Security, *Pacific Review*7, no. 1 (1994): 1-15.    
 [x]    One of the major issues at the time of the establishment of the ARF was the    uncertainty of continued US military presence because it was scaling down    its military forces, and also because of the closure of US military bases in    the Philippines.  China was    another concern for Southeast Asia not only because its economic growth    could translate to military power, but also because it had long-standing    territorial and maritime disputes with almost all countries in Southeast    Asia.  Japan’s future role was also in question at this time.
[xi] Susan Strange, “The    Erosion of the State,” *Current    History* (November 1997): 369.

[xii] Paul Evans, “Existing    Regional Dialogues in Asia Pacific,” paper prepared for the Second United    Nations Disarmament Conference *Transparency in Armament, Regional Dialogue and Disarmament*,    organized by the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia    Pacific, Hiroshima, Japan, 14-17 May 1994.     See also Paul Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security    Issues: Inventory and Analysis,” in Paul Evans, ed., *Studying Asia    Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training, and Dialogue Activities*    (Toronto: University of Toronto – York University Joint Centre for Asia    Pacific Studies, 1994), 297-318.    

 [xiii] Paul Evans, “The    Origins, Context and Prospects of CSCAP,” *The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region*    (1994), p. 20.    
 [xiv] Amitav Acharya,    “Realism, Institutionalism and the Asian Economic Crisis,” *Contemporary    Southeast Asia* 21, no. 1 (April 1999): 1-29. 
[xv]    These roundtables include:  ASEAN-ISIS    seminar on *Superpower Military Presence and the Security of Southeast    Asia* (1990); the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (1991); the series of    conferences on security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific held in Honolulu    (October 1991), Bali (April 1992), and Seoul (November 1992).     The last was organized by the ASEAN-ISIS, Japan Institute of    International Affairs (JIIA), Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA),     Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies (JCAPS), and Pacific Forum/CSIS.     These are the core institutes of the Council for Security Cooperation    in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) which is the track-two counterpart of the ARF.

 [xvi]    In 1991, the Philippine and Thai ministries of foreign affairs held a series    of seminars to discuss regional security.     The Manila seminar had the theme “ASEAN and the Asia Pacific    Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s” (June 5-7, 1991);    while the Bangkok seminar had the theme “Prospects for Regional Security    Cooperation in Southeast Asia in the 1990s” (November 4-7, 1991).   In both seminars there was very broad  and frank discussion on security issues in the region,    elaborating on ways for ASEAN to improve cooperation within its ranks and    also how to make it more relevant to the wider Asia-Pacific region.     The Bangkok seminar noted the need for the    “expansion of a multilateral dialogue on political-security developments    in the Asia-Pacific region.”  
[xvii]    Evans, “Existing Regional Dialogues.”    

[xviii]    J�rn Dosch, “PMC, ARF and CSCAP: Foundations for a Security Architecture    in the Asia-Pacific?” *Working Paper Number 307* (Canberra: Strategic    and Defence Studies Centre, Australia National University, June 1997), 4. 
[xix]    Narine questions the applicability or appropriateness of this approach under    a different set of circumstances.  See    Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the “ASEAN Way”,’ *Asian    Survey*37, no. 10 (October 1997): 961-978. 
[xx] Donald K. Emmerson,    “Building Frameworks for Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific: Seven    Questions in Search of Answers,” *10th Asia-Pacific    Roundtable*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 5-8, 1996, 3. 
[xxi] Michael Leifer, “The    ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security,” *Adelphi    Paper 302* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996),    26.  
[xxii] It is interesting to    note that even Australia and Canada were also looked upon with some doubt by    Asian countries in leading the process.  For a full discussion of leadership in the ARF, please see    M.C. Ortuoste, “Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: The ASEAN    Regional Forum Experiment,” *FSI    Foreign Affairs Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (January-March 1999): 62-64.

 [xxiii]Rosemary    Foot, “The Present and Future of the ARF: China’s Role and Attitude,”    in *The Future of the ARF*, edited by Khoo How San (Singapore:     Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 1999), 117. See also Paul    Evans, “The Prospects for Multilateral Security Cooperation in the    Asia-Pacific Region,” in Desmond Ball, ed., *The    Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region*(London: Frank    Cass, 1996).
 [xxiv] Ralph Cossa, “US Views    Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperation,” *IGCC    Policy Paper 51* (California: University of California San Diego –    Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, June 1999), available from http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/igcc2/PolicyPapers/PP51.html;    Internet.  Proquest database.    
 [xxv]*Ibid.*
 [xxvi] This is similar to the    ASEAN approach wherein the members were given the latitude to pursue    bilateral security talks, or resolve existing disputes in a bilateral manner    outside of the ASEAN framework, while taking advantage of the principles for    interstate relations laid down in the ASEAN Charter and Declarations. 
[xxvii] Al Dizon, “ASEAN    Regional Forum: Another Day Dawning,” *BusinessWorld*(Manila),    01 August 1994, 6. 
[xxviii]    Comment by ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino, Jr. in “Interview:    ASEAN and the Growth of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” *World    Affairs*3, no. 3 (July-September 1999): 20. 
[xxix]    See also the specific provisions in:  the    TAC; the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN);    ASEAN Concord; and the Bangkok Declaration.

 [xxx]    ASEAN was also projected to be the “repository of all ARF documents and    information.” 
 [xxxi] Leifer argues that    “The changed pattern of international and regional alignments had reduced    ASEAN’s political significance.”  Leifer,    “The ASEAN Regional Forum,” p. 18.    

[xxxii] Donald E. Weatherbee,    “ASEAN and the Political Challenges of Expansion,” from Manuel F.    Montes, Kevin F.F. Quigley, and Donald E. Weatherbee, *Growing Pains:    ASEAN’s Economic and Political Challenges* (The Asia Society, December    1997); available from http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/asean_challenges.html;    Internet.

 [xxxiii]    Patrick M. Cronin and Emily T. Metzgar, “ASEAN and Regional Security,” *Strategic    Forum*, no. 85 (October 1996); available from http://www.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum85.html;    Internet.** 
[xxxiv]James Clad, “Fin    de siecle, fin de l’ Asean?” *Asia Times On Line*[journal    on-line], 08 March 2000; accessed 23    May 2000; available from http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/BC08Ae01.html;    Internet.     Reposted    on the website with permission from Pacific Forum CSIS's PacNet Newsletter 9    of March 3, 2000.
 [xxxv] Hussin Mutalib, “At    Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millennium,” *Contemporary    Southeast Asia* 19, no. 1 (June 1997): 83.    
 [xxxvi] Michael Richardson,    “A Step Ahead on Asian Security,” *International Herald Tribune*, 26 July 1994, p. 2.    
 [xxxvii] Weatherbee, “ASEAN    and the Political Challenges of Expansion.”    
[xxxviii]  Leifer, “The ASEAN    Regional Forum,”p.19. 
[xxxix] “In founding the ARF,    ASEAN hoped to enhance regional security by ameliorating tensions and    cultivating a practice of consultation rather than intervention.” Kevin    F.F. Quigley, “ASEAN: How It Works and Why It Matters,” from Montes,    Quigley, and Weatherbee, *Growing Pains* (The Asia Society, December    1997); available from http://asiasociety.org/publications/asean_how.html;    Internet.

 
[xl] If the ARF purported to    replace bilateral alliances, the US may not have joined the Forum in the    first place.

 
[xli]Terry Narramore, “Coming    to Terms with Asia in Discourses of Asia-Pacific Regional Security,” *Australian    Journal of Political Science*, vol. 33, no. 2 (July 1988).  Requested from the website of the Asia Pacific Media Network,    a daily publication of the University of California in Los Angeles;    available from  http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/Deadline/AsianRegionalSecurity/articles/Narramore.htm;    Internet.

[xlii]    Clad, “Fin de siecle.”    

[xliii]*Ibid*.

[xliv]    Jeffrey Sachs, “Missing Pieces,” *Far Eastern Economic Review    Interactive Edition*, 25 February 1999 available from http://203.105.48.72.9902_25/p10cover.html;    Internet; accessed 30 June 1999. 

[xlv]‘For    the world's most successful developing-country association, all the    hobgoblins have jumped out of the box at once, including: profound threats    to Indonesia's national unity; difficult elite transitions; overall poor    Asean group dynamics between the old ''core group'' and the new members; an    emerging contrast between ''speak-your-mind'' democratic and more    authoritarian regimes; residual economic problems; enormous manufacturing    and energy industry over-capacity; miserable local governance, insistent    localism, and demands for new ways to slice the patronage pie; China's broad    and comprehensive emergence, including unanswered South China Sea    provocations; the near-disappearance of sustained Japanese political and    strategic leadership in Southeast Asia; the recurrence of high-profile Asean    diplomatic failures and lingering intra-Asean disputes; and, most of all in    the catalogue of multilateral failure, the disappointing performance of the    ARF.’  Clad, “Fin de    siecle.”

[xlvi] Charles E. Morrison,    ed., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook    1999* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999), 9-10.

[xlvii] Scott Snyder and    Richard H. Solomon, “Beyond the Asian Financial Crisis: Political and    Security Implications: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Leadership,” *A    Special Report of the U.S. Institute of Peace* (March 1998).

[xlviii] Simon SC Tay and Obood    Talib, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Preparing for Preventive Diplomacy,” *Contemporary    Southeast Asia*, vol. 19, no. 3 (December 1997): 258.

 
[xlix] Dalgit Singh, “ASEAN    Achievements are Endangered by Continuing Crisis.”     *International Herald Tribune*,    24 July 1998.

[l] Chairman’s Statement of    the Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, Thailand, 27 July 2000; available    from http://www.asean.or.id/politics/pol_arf7.htm;    Internet.

[li]    The Pacific Concord has been a subject of discussion since 1995.     In fact, ASEAN-ISIS proposed the development of norms and principles    for regional political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific as early    as November 1994 during its discussion with the ASEAN-SOM in Bandar Seri    Begawan, Brunei.

[lii]The proposals in the ASEAN    Concept Paper for the 2nd ARF focused on the areas of CBMs,    preventive diplomacy, non-proliferation and arms control, peacekeeping, and    maritime security cooperation. Annex A would be track-one activities --    mainly on information sharing and developing principles for cooperation --    to be implemented in the near term.  Annex B, on the other hand, contained proposals to be    implemented in the medium- and long-term and whose development may be    initially undertaken by track-two fora.     There has hardly been any implementation of Annex B proposals.

                  Endorsed in the ARF meeting of 1998, the two baskets of CBMs are    mainly elaborations on the Annexes of the ASEAN Concept Paper.     Basket 1 is intended for near-term implementation, while proposals in    Basket 2 are envisioned to be undertaken in the medium- and long-term.     These proposals aim to establish more intensive visits and exchanges,    as well the possibility of creating a multilateral communication network,    and other cooperative activities. 

[liii]    For a full report, see ARF Home page, and “Distillation of Agreed CBMs    from ARF 1-4.”  See the ARF    homepage maintained by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and    Trade; available from  http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arfhome.html;    Internet.

[liv]    This is well-documented in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, eds., *The    Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia    Pacific* (Canberra and Singapore:  Australian    National University and IDSS, 1999).

[lv]    The CSCAP draft’s definition of preventive diplomacy further elaborates    that preventive diplomacy should also limit the intensity of these disputes.     Proceedings of the meeting of the International Working Group on    Confidence and Security Building Measures, 01 March 1999.

[lvi]    Only two ASEAN countries – Singapore and Thailand – submitted their    security outlooks.  The other    countries who submitted are:  Australia,    Canada, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Russia,    and the United States.  Available    from http://www.asean.or.id/amm/aso/;    Internet; accessed 17 August 2000.

[lvii]    Dupont, “The Future of the ARF:  An    Australian Perspective,” *The Future of the ARF*, 33.

[lviii]    Alejandro Reyes, “Intelligence: Welcome to the World – ASEAN Day Five:    Pyongyang makes a splash,”  *Asiaweek.com.intelligence*    [magazine on-line],**28 July 2000; available from http://www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/intelligence/2000/07/28.2/;     Internet; accessed 07 August 2000. 
[lix]    Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes, “East Timor and Asian Security,” *Northeast    Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report*[on-line papers], 23    February 2000; available from ftp://ftp.nautilus.org/napsnet/special_reports/Huntley-Hayes    on East Timor.txt; Internet; accessed 05 September 2000.     The article is also included in the special issue on “East Timor,    Indonesia and the World System” *Bulletin of Concern Asian Scholars*    31, nos. 1 and 2; available from http://csf.colorado.edu/bcas/index.html;    Internet.

 [lx] This would include the    bilateral exchanges among the US, China, Japan and Russia; the US review of    its bilateral relations in the region; continued bilateralism even among    ASEAN countries; and China’s renewal of bilateral ties with Southeast    Asian countries in time for the twenty-first century.
[lxi] “Bilateral Alliances    and Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: An Update,” paper presented    at the 4th Workshop on the Bilateral System of Alliances in the    Changing Environment of the Asia-Pacific, June 10-12, 1996, Tokyo, Japan, p.    5.  Cited in Raymund Jose G.    Quilop, “Bilateralism, Regional Security and the Philippine-US    Alliance,” *OSS Working Papers*    (October 1999), 20. 
[lxii]    Obaid Ul Haq, “ASEAN: Search for Regional Security in Southeast Asia,” *World    Affairs*3, no. 3 (July-September 1999): 37. 
[lxiii] See M.C. Ortuoste,    “Institutional Re-Building in a Time of Crisis,” draft paper presented    at the Biennial Conference of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies: *Asia-Pacific    Security in a Time of Economic Recovery*, Working Group 6: “The Future    of the Asia-Pacific Community,” August 30 - September 2, 1999, Honolulu,    Hawaii. 
[lxiv] Paul Dibb, David D.    Hale, and Peter Prince, “Asia’s Insecurity*,*”*Survival*, vol. 41,    no. 3  (Autumn 1999).     The same point is made by Hadi Soesastro, “Asia during the    Crisis,” in H.W. Arndt and Hal Hill, *Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin,    1999). 
[lxv]    Alejandro Reyes, “Southeast Asia Adrift.” *Asiaweek.com.magazine*,    26 no. 34 (01 September 2000).  Available    from http://www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0901/asean.sea.html.;    Internet; accessed 28 August 2000.* 
[lxvi]    See Carlyle A. Thayer, “Reinventing ASEAN: From Constructive Engagement to    Flexible Intervention,” *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* 3, no. 2    (Summer 1999): 67-70. 
[lxvii]    CPF Luhulima, “ASEAN’s Relevance: Has It Become Questionable?” *Pacific    Link Indonesia*, Jakarta, 09 November 1999; available from http://www.pacific.net/id/pakar/luhulima/tulisam_03.html;    Internet; accessed 27 June 2000. 
[lxviii]    Thailand and the Philippines are seen to be limited by their respective    domestic political instabilities and therefore “cannot leverage their    democratic credentials into influence.”     Singapore and Brunei have the economic clout but are still relatively    small countries, while on Malaysia it was mentioned that PM Mahathir    “can’t give progressive directions.” Reyes, “Southeast Asia    Adrift.” 
[lxix] See Herman Joseph Kraft,    “ASEAN and Intra-ASEAN Relations: Weathering the Storm,” soon to be    published manuscript. 
[lxx]    See Kao Kim Hourn, “Regionalism Compared – The Perils and Benefits of    Expansion: A View of a New Member,” paper presented at Plenary Session 5    of the 14th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 05 June 2000, Kuala Lumpur. 
[lxxi] Discussed in detail in    M.C. Ortuoste, “The Prospect of a Concert of ASEAN Nations and Leadership    in the Asia Pacific*,*”*ISIS Paper 1* (Bangkok: ISIS Thailand, 1999). 
[lxxii]    Quoted in Reyes, “Southeast Asia Adrift.” 
[lxxiii]    The terms of reference are available from http://www.asean.or.id/amm/as_troika.htm;    Internet. 
[lxxiv]    It was opined that the Troika is “another paper tiger”, an attempt to    prevent the organization’s irrelevance “in the greater strategic scheme    of things.”  See Shawn W.    Crispin,“ASEAN:    Ties That Bind.” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 August 2000;     available from http://www.feer.com/_0008_10/p22region.html;    Internet; accessed 08 August 2000. 
[lxxv] Rizal Sukma, ‘ASEAN    and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Should “The Driver” be Replaced?’ paper    prepared for the ASEAN-ISIS Conference on *ASEAN 2020 Vision: Crisis and    Change*, Singapore, 21-22 July 1999. 
[lxxvi] Dr. Termsak    Chalermpalanupap, Special Assistant to the ASEAN Secretary-General, “The    ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): Current Status,” briefing for the *International    Consultation in South Asia and the Asia Pacific Region*, organized by the    Oxford Research Group, Port Dickson, Malaysia, November 15-18, 1999. 
[lxxvii]    Chairman’s Statement of the Seventh Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum,    Bangkok, Thailand, 27 July 2000; available from http://www.asean.or.id/politics/pol_arf7.htm;    Internet; accessed 01 August 2000. 
[lxxviii]    “Japanese Defence Agency chief pledges medical assistance to ASEAN    Forum,” BBC Monitoring Asia and Pacific – Political.     London 02 May 2000; Proquest, 09 July 2000. 
[lxxix]    Samantha F. Ravich, “Lingering Concerns Amidst Some Promising    Developments,” *Comparative Connections* [an e-journal on East Asian    bilateral relations], Pacific Forum-CSIS, 2nd quarter 2000;    available from http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/002/Qus_asean.html;    Internet. 
[lxxx]    Dupont, “The Future of the ARF:  An    Australian Perspective,” in *The Future of the ARF*, 34-35.** 
[lxxxi]    Quoted in Roger Mitton, “A Swift Reversal of Fortune,” *Asiaweek.com*    25, no. 49 [magazine on-line] (10 December 1999); available from http://japan/cnn/com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/99/1210/nat.asean.main.html;    Internet; accessed 08 August 2000. 
[lxxxii] Dibb, et.al.,    “Asia’s Insecurity.” 
[lxxxiii]    China proposed the development of a working group on agriculture technology    and environmental protection.  Japan    proposed trilateral cooperation on Japan East Partnership Initiative on    human resources development (together with Singapore, South Korea and    Thailand).  South Korea    suggested the creation of a cyber-university and the development of a    student exchange program.

                   This effort is being criticized as “a dying ASEAN’s new    lifeline” (Reyes, “Southeast Asia Adrift”); that the viability of the    APT is in question given Japan’s “directionless diplomacy” and its    sensitivity to Washington’s opinions; and there are concerns about    China’s “unilateralist ambitions.” (Clad, “Fin de siecle”) 
[lxxxiv] Shaun Narine, “ASEAN    and the Management of Regional Security,” *Pacific Affairs*71, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 196-214. 
[lxxxv]  Weatherbee, “ASEAN    and the Political Challenges of Expansion.” 
[lxxxvi] One example was    Jiang’s visit to Thailand in 1999. 
[lxxxvii]Carlyle A. Thayer,    “Beijing Plans for a Long-Term Partnership and Benefits from Anti-Western    Sentiment,” *Comparative Connections*[an    e-journal on East Asian bilateral relations], Pacific Forum-CSIS, 3rd    quarter 1999; available from http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/992Qchina_asean.html;    Internet. 
[lxxxviii] Discussed in detail    in Thayer, “Beijing Plans for a Long-Term Partnership.”     15-Point Sino-Thai plan of action for the 21st century (05    February 1999); 12-point Sino-Malaysian framework of future bilateral    cooperation (03 June 1999); PRC-VN mechanism for bilateral relationship    (February-March 1999). The Philippines is also set to “renew” its    25-years of bilateral relations with China in May 2000. 
[lxxxix]    Samantha F. Ravich, “Lingering Concerns Amidst Some Promising    Developments,” *Comparative Connections* [an e-journal on East Asian    bilateral relations], Pacific Forum-CSIS, 2nd quarter 2000;    available from http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/002/Qus_asean.html;    Internet 
[xc]    Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security,” 195 and    209. 
[xci] Dupont, “The Future of    the ARF:  An Australian    Perspective,” *The Future of the ARF*, 34. 
[xcii] Sukma, ‘Should “the    driver” be replaced?’ 
[xciii]    ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino states that the “... ASEAN    serves as the fulcrum in the balance between and among the powers and    provides a venue and reference point for the dialogues of the great powers    among themselves as well as within ASEAN.     Thus, ASEAN manages and moderates, to some extent, the behavior of    the great powers, whose presence and influence ASEAN could not keep out of    the region anyway, even if it wanted to.”     In his paper “ASEAN and Regional Security” for the 30th    Anniversary of ASEAN at a seminar sponsored by the ASEAN Washington    Committee, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1997. 
[xciv] This is a point raised    in the *Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar* sponsored by the    Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 17 July 2000. 
[xcv] Narine, “ASEAN and the    Management of Regional Security.”

[xcvi] Dupont, “The Future of    the ARF:  An Australian    Perspective,” *The Future of the ARF*, 37. 
[xcvii]  Ramcharan, “A Pitfall    in Pacific Asia’s Security?” 75. 
[xcviii]    Gary J. Smith, “Multilateralism and Regional Security in Asia:     The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC’s Geopolitical Value,” *Harvard    University Paper No. 97-2* (February 1997); available from http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/srchfrm.html;    Internet. 
[xcix]    See *The United States Security    Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998* (Washington: Department    of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, November 1998). 
[c] Narine, “ASEAN and the    Management of Regional Security.”

[ci]    Dorsch, “The United States and the New Security Architecture of the    Asia-Pacific,” 
[cii]    Sheldon W. Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative    Efforts and the ASEAN Regional Forum,” *Pacific    Review* 11, no. 2 (June 1998): 206-207. 
[ciii]    These comments are from Marie-France Dejardins, “Rethinking    Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to Agreement and the Risks of    Overselling the Process,” *Adelphi    Paper 307* (Oxford:  IISS,    Oxford University Press, December 1996), quoted in Michael Pillsbury, “The    Future of the ARF:  An American    Perspective,” in Khoo How San, ed., *The    Future of ARF*, 145. 
[civ]    It is not clear from the ARF Chairman’s Statements what these “diverging    views” are.  It is assumed in    this paper that this would refer to differences arising from latent disputes    among the members, as well as differences in the participants’ security    outlooks, approaches towards multilateralism and cooperation, and the    actions that they would allow the ARF to take. 
[cv]    The last statement is by B.S. Klein, *Strategic    Studies and World Order*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),    p. 7.  The whole paragraph is    from Narramore, “Coming to Terms with Asia.” 
[cvi]    For greater detail, see Foot, “ China’s Role and Attitude,” pp.    123-126. 
[cvii] Amitav Acharya,    “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the    ‘Asia-Pacific Way’,” *Pacific Review*10, no. 3 (1997): 78. 
[cviii] Ramcharan, A Pitfall in    Pacific Asia’s Security?,” 78. 
[cix]    Isagani de Castro, “Southeast Asia: Long on Security Headaches, Short on    Solutions,” *Asia Times on line*    [magazine on-line] 28 July 1999; available from http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/AG28Ae01.html;    Internet. 
[cx]    Dibb, et.al., “Asia’s Insecurity.” 
[cxi]    Common security “seeks to reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of    military conflict by gaining adherence to norms or rules to govern    resolution of disputes.”  See    Andrew Mack, “Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War,” *Working    Paper 1993/8* (Australia National University, Department of International    Relations); David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative    Security,” *The Pacific Review*7, no. 1 (1994): 5; Stephanie Lawson,    ed., *The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond*(St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1995). 
[cxii] Barry Wain, “North    Korea’s Coming-Out party,” *Asia Wall Street Journal*, 28-30 July 2000, 8. 
[cxiii]    This was expressed by CSCAP Singapore as cited in Ball and Acharya, eds., *The    Next Stage*, p. 313. 
[cxiv]    These are only some of the proposals identified by the participants in the *Multilateral    Institutions in Asia Seminar* sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Center for    Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 17 July 2000. *************************