Executive Order 13650 Listening Session, Los Angeles, CA

Date: January 9, 2014

Location: Mt. Saint Mary’s College, Doheny Campus, 10 Chester Place, Los Angeles, CA 90007-2598

Introduction and Opening Remarks

Jack Eisenhauer, Moderator, introduced the proceedings:

• Welcomed everyone to the listening session and introduced the panel

• Mentioned future listening sessions

• Written comments can be sent to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov. These comments will be included in 

the docket.

• Announcements:

o Please put phones on vibrate.

o Session is being recorded for note-taking purposes.

o Emergency exit information and restroom locations were provided for the facility.

• The purpose of this session is to provide stakeholders with an overview of and progress on 

Executive Order 13650: Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (EO), as well as to give 

the public an opportunity to provide comments, feedback, and suggestions.

Steven John, Director, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Southern California Field Office:

• Mr. Stanislaus is delayed at the airport. We expect to see him here shortly.

• Each of our agencies has important roles under the Executive Order. For example, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is primarily focused on security at facilities, and the 

Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is primarily 

focused on worker health and safety. EPA focuses on facility safety and the protection of 

human health and the environment in and around chemical facilities. 

• EPA is committed to improving the way that facilities, local governments, and the Federal 

Government relay and share information. We are also committed to improving access of 

information to communities, especially communities of color and those that are underserved.

• We are taking this Executive Order very seriously. Over the next 3 months, we will schedule 

several more listening sessions, including Webinars.

• I would like to highlight some of the accomplishments made under this Executive Order so far:

o A pilot project has been established in EPA Region II. The pilot is defining high-risk and 

inspection prioritization among the agencies and is determining which information will 

be shared among each another and with first responders. 

o EPA was also active in developing the recent Ammonium Nitrate Advisory. On August 

30, EPA, OSHA, and the Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives (ATF) issued a chemical advisory that provides information on the 

hazards of ammonium nitrate storage, handling, and management.

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o We are currently working on drafting a Request for Information (RFI) concerning 

modifications to the Risk Management Program (RMP). 

o EPA is drafting potential options for improving risk management and safety programs by 

collecting and sharing best practice information with industry and local communities.

• We are looking forward to the discussion here this evening.

Jay Vicory, Director, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) San 

Diego Field Office:

• Thank you for being here tonight.

• We come here with a common interest: to hear from you concerning how to improve chemical 

safety and security.

• The Process Safety Management (PSM) standard was published in 1992, partly in response to 

several catastrophic incidents that occurred at chemical facilities. We are all familiar with what 

happened in Bhopal, India, as well as at the 1989 Philips Petroleum incident in Pasadena, Texas. 

• Despite the benefits of the PSM standard, significant incidents still occur:

o In 2004, there was an explosion at Formosa Plastics.

o There was a fire in 2012 at the Richmond Chevron Refinery, which sent more than 

15,000 people to hospital with breathing disorders.

o There was the incident in West, Texas in 2013, which created this Executive order.

• Federal agencies on the working group are concerned and seek your comments.

Earl (Jack) Whitley, Transportation Specialist, Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration, Western Region:

• Thank you for coming this evening. The Assistant Director was unable to attend this evening, 

but I will advise him of what we hear this evening.

Amy Graydon, Chief, Policy & Rulemaking Branch, Department of Homeland Security (DHS):

• Thank you all for joining us here tonight.

• I would like to acknowledge that the ATF has also been participating in the working group. A 

representative is joining us on the phone to hear these comments.

• DHS brings a unique security-centric perspective to chemical security. We accomplish this task 

through voluntary and regulatory programs. Regulatory programs include the Coast Guard 

Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS). 

• Our work within the Office of Infrastructure Protection has showed us the value of engaging 

with our stakeholders. 

• We are looking forward to hearing a diverse set of perspectives.

Lisa Long, Director, Office of Engineering Safety, OSHA, Department of Labor (DOL), provided a review of 

progress to date on Section 6 of the Executive Order: 

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• OSHA is leading the Section 6 working group. We are tasked with policy and standards 

modernization, which encompasses three main tasks:

o In the first 90 days, we are developing a list of options. 

o In the second 90-day period, we are engaging with stakeholders for input. 

o In the third 90-day period, we will be writing a plan to implement the chosen options.

• We have a document that was made public last week, outlining the options we are considering.

• [Ms. Long provided a brief overview of the options document, “Executive Order 13650, Section 

A: Solicitation of Public Input on Options for Policy, Regulation, Standards, and Modernization,”

located at: https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/Section_6ai_Options_List.html. ]

• We are interested in your feedback concerning the options that are presented. They are only 

options at this time. 

The moderator provided the ground rules for the listening session. The goal is to give everyone an 

opportunity to speak and to be respectful of everyone’s time:

• This is a listening session. The purpose is to hear your comments. The point is not to come to 

consensus. Please respect the options of others.

• We are very interested in specific suggestions, as these would be the most helpful.

• Please feel free to provide written comments to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov.

• Individuals providing comments will be limited to 5 minutes.

• Following any remarks, members of the panel may ask questions for additional clarification and 

understanding.

• After all registered speakers have had an opportunity to present, we will open the floor to 

anyone who would like to speak. Those additional speakers will also be limited to 5 minutes.

Martha Arguello, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility, provided the following 

comments:

• We firmly believe that we should be preventing these disasters and that we should be moving to 

safer alternatives. 

• Voluntary programs have failed. We have seen that failure in New Jersey and other States.

• Many people do not know that they are living next to hazardous facilities.

• We think that there should be regulations looking at oil extraction facilities that are currently 

exempt. For example, we are standing on a site with an oil well on its border. Trucks are 

moving in and out of that site. Regulations have not addressed the hazards associated with 

that.

Jose Bravo, Executive Director, Just Transition Alliance, provided the following comments:

• Regarding comments on CFATS: DHS says that several thousand facilities are no longer in the 

CFATS program because they no longer have sufficient quantities of chemicals. DHS refuses to 

make information about these sites public. We would like to know. We can use the Freedom of 

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Information Act with EPA to obtain this type of information, but DHS has an obligation to the 

communities as well.

• You may exempt thousands of companies from CFATS, but I want you to hear about 

communities with hundreds of chemical plants and exposures and that may and do experience 

facility-related accidents. When you exempt companies, it does not benefit the communities.

• The Government needs to empower communities and be responsive to them as well.

• Voluntary processes have not worked in the past. EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is 

voluntary, and communities do not know about what is being done in these facilities because 

their information sharing is voluntary.

• I doubt that any member of the panel lives in one of the communities that I am speaking about 

today. These communities are marginalized by their presence near such facilities. These 

communities have gone for years without being heard.

• There was recently another accident in Mossville, Louisiana and a large train explosion in the 

Dakotas. These incidents are not rare or isolated; they are happening in low-income 

communities and communities of color at a disproportionate rate.

Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, and EO Tri-chair, joined 

the panel and introduced himself.

Jessie Marquez, Founder and Executive Director, Coalition for a Safe Environment, provided the 

following comments:

• I will share with you something that no one else in this room has ever had to experience. I am a 

victim of a horrific chemical explosion. When I was 16 years old, we lived fence-line and across 

the street from an oil refinery. One day, it caught fire and blew up. 

• I can tell you that during incidents such as this, people are burned and killed in those first few 

minutes. In this specific incident, over 300 residents were burned. 

• Five children, along with my mother, father, and grandmother, all lived in this area. All of us 

were burned with either first-, second-, or third-degree burns. Three tanks blew up that day 

around dinner time. The impact of that explosion knocked us to the floor.

• We were running to the car when a second explosion occurred. We ran back into the house as 

cars were crashing in the intersection, hearing the sounds of people screaming. We decided to 

run to a family member’s house a few blocks away; then there was a third explosion. 

• My mother was 7 months pregnant. We were forced to jump over a wall to escape.

• A woman asked me to save her baby. Both the mother and child were badly burned. She threw 

the baby to me.

• I did not find out what caused the explosion until about 10 years ago. A vehicle that was not 

grounded caused the fire, which killed two workers nearby. I had seen one of the bodies that 

was thrown through the air by the explosion.

• Prevention and planning are the keys to facility safety. I have specific examples of other things 

that have happened and have recommendations to give you. I will go on until my time is up,

and I will submit written comments as well.

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• Regarding power failures, chemical facilities, just like oil refineries, do not have back-up power 

systems. Even when they do, they may not work, or they may not be able to handle the 

capacity to maintain a safe environment. Why do agencies permit them to operate without 

adequate power back-up systems?

Austin Price, Field Director, California Public Interest Research Group (CALPIRG), provided the following 

comments:

• Please accept this as formal comments submitted on behalf of 25 organizations in California and 

32 in Texas.

• We represent stakeholders, including first responders, environmental organizations, community 

members near high-risk facilities, plant workers, business owners, and consensus standards 

organizations.

• We urge you to use the full extent of your legal authority to eliminate these chemical hazards by 

ensuring that we use safer chemical processes when feasible.

• We stand together in solidarity with community members, workers, and organizations in 

California, whose lives and heath are at risk from preventable chemical disasters.

• Every day, many Americans live within the shadow of 12,000 chemical plants.

• Public input is critical, and we applaud the panel members for scheduling these listening 

sessions.

• Communities and workers who are exposed to preventable chemical disasters every day are 

tired of the delay. The incident in West, Texas occurred over 8 months ago. The latest releases 

at the Chevron facility occurred 6 months ago. Other chemical incidents occur virtually every 

week. 

• Our study identified at least 25,000 incidents at American Chemistry Council- (ACC) affiliated 

facilities.

• The EPA proposed new requirements in 2002 that could prevent many chemical disasters by 

transitioning to safer chemical processes that are effective and affordable.

• Since 2001, hundreds of facilities have switched to safer chemicals and processes. However, 

voluntary efforts are not enough. More than 100 million people still remain at risk in the U.S.

• It is time for the President and the EPA to use their authority under the Clean Air Act and 

through other authorities to require the use of safer alternatives. We encourage you, to the 

fullest extent of your legal authority, to adopt enforceable prevention-based requirements that 

eliminate these chemical hazards by ensuring the use of safer chemicals wherever feasible. 

• Speaking for myself, Los Angeles is a hotbed of these kinds of facilities. There are over 16 

facilities in Los Angeles County alone that put at least 100,000 people at risk. There is a facility in 

Santa Fe Springs that puts nearly 5 million people at risk.

• We are familiar with incidents at Richmond, California and West, Texas. A similar incident in a 

city like Los Angeles would be catastrophic.

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• Ms. Durkovich had asked me earlier [in Sacramento, California] what I meant in prior listening 

session comments regarding shifting the paradigm from risk management to risk prevention, so 

I brought her a letter explaining my point.

• 90 days after 9/11, the Blue Plains Treatment Plan in Washington, D.C. halted the use of 

chlorine, thereby decreasing the risk for 1.7 million people at a cost of only $0.50 per water user 

per year.

• The program in New Jersey still has nearly 90 facilities that have not complied, illustrating that 

voluntary programs will not address the issue.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: You mentioned some statistics about the New Jersey 

program. Do you have those?

o Mr. Price responded: That information is available in additional written comments that 

we will submit.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: You mentioned 16 high-risk RMP facilities in Los 

Angeles County. Do you have a list of those facilities?

o Mr. Price responded: Yes, I do. There are 15 or 16 facilities that are just at 100,000 

threshold, and there are a few more that fall below the 100,000 threshold.

Ronald Thomas, Technical Manager, Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), provided the following 

comments:

• I have been in the explosives business for 40 years. I have handled ammonium nitrate (AN)

facilities in different States and countries.

• In October 2014, IME submitted recommendations for the working group to consider. We are 

awaiting feedback, but I would like to focus here on those relating to AN:

o There is no other safer substitute for AN. 

o The EO was in response to the event in West, Texas. That facility was not compliant 

with a number of regulations and industry best practices.

o IME has been a forerunner of safe practices. 

o We support the updating and strengthening of OSHA regulation of 29 CFR 1910.109(i), 

including eliminating the option of storing AN in combustible structures and advising 

first responders to not fight fires where AN is involved.

o If the facility in West, Texas had been compliant, we do not believe that we would be 

here today.

o We applaud OSHA’s actions to issue “Notices of Violation” to the Texas Fertilizer 

Company. However, this standard, which was issued in 1971, needs to be updated.

o The current National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 400 code, currently under 

revision, needs to be revised to include these two recommendations (above) as well.

• Given that there has never been an accidental explosion of AN at a facility compliant with OSHA

standards, we believe that OSHA’s rules today are sufficient but do need to be improved. 

• RMP lacks OSHA’s perspective, good housekeeping, and material management standards. More 

regulation is not the answer to preventing tragedies. We need to ensure that outlying facilities 

are brought into compliance.

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• The West, Texas incident shows that agencies are failing to ensure regulatory compliance. 

Rather than changing regulations, it would be better to focus on compliance for all.

• The Ammonium Nitrate Security Program’s (ANSP’s) ill-conceived chain of custody approach will 

have a catastrophic impact to our industry. We ask DHS to submit a Supplemental Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking to include exemptions for transportation activities covered under the 

authority of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), for ATF-regulated businesses, and 

for the registration requirement for persons transferring ownership or receiving AN. It does not

make sense to overlay a redundant vetting scheme upon people already vetted by ATF and 

determined to be trustworthy to handle explosives. 

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: Regarding the outlier issue you mentioned, what 

would be your thoughts for how to best deal with outliers?

o Mr. Thomas responded: This issue has always been a challenge. We need to get rid of 

some of the outdated and dangerous practices regarding the storage and handling of 

AN. Once AN is burning, it will melt, and that is what brings the greatest danger.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: How should PSM and RMP be better aligned with 

respect to AN?

o Mr. Thomas responded: That is a great question but a challenge. Let me think about 

that.

Winston Johnson, Member, East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice, provided the following 

comments:

• I am here today because I was concerned about the gap from exempting the oil and gas drilling 

industry. 

• In my community of Long Beach, we have oil and fracking operations. I can see a refinery from 

my street.

• I am not only concerned about potential explosions but also about higher cancer rates for years 

to come following an incident.

• If we are going to regulate chemical facilities, then we need to regulate all chemical facilities.

• One may ask, “What is the economic impact of resuming public safety management 

enforcement?” I am not an economist, but I can only imagine what the impact would be on the 

healthcare system if we were to have an incident similar to what happened in Richmond, 

California or Wilmington, California.

• I have seen some less severe incidents in which the transportation of oil and gas products have 

caused issues for entire neighborhoods. It makes a news cycle for a day, but the impact lasts 

well beyond its media coverage.

• If we are serious about prevention, we need to also look at fracking. In southern California, we 

are more likely to encounter an earthquake than a terrorist attack. We need to look at 

alternative energy sources to move away from these practices.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: Regarding the exemptions you were referring to 

earlier, were you referring to the mention of exemption on page 16 of the document?

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o Mr. Johnson responded: Yes, on page 16 of the document, items A & B. The passage is 

as follows:

Identifying Facilities Covered under Existing Process Safety and Security Regulations

OSHA does not require PSM-covered facilities to register with OSHA. However, EPA requires RMPcovered facilities to register with EPA a risk management plan that indicates whether the facility is 

also covered under PSM. This presents an opportunity for EPA and OSHA to collaborate by using EPA’s 

existing RMP reporting system to identify PSM-covered facilities, even when not covered under RMP. 

In addition, NPPD is evaluating how to more effectively identify outlier entities not in compliance.

Options:

a. Should facilities covered under PSM but not RMP be required to register under the RMP 

reporting system? Under the existing RMP reporting system, only RMP-covered companies 

report to EPA whether they are covered under OSHA’s PSM standard (EPA and OSHA).

b. How can DHS most effectively identify entities that have not submitted required CFATS’ TopScreens? DHS believes that it has received CFATS Top-Screens from the majority of facilities that 

should have submitted them, but like any regulatory program that relies in part on selfreporting, 100% compliance is difficult to achieve. The expansive and dynamic nature of the 

business communities that use CFATS COI further increases the difficulty of doing so under 

CFATS. Nevertheless, DHS is committed to pursuing all reasonable measures to identify potential 

high-risk chemical facilities that are not among those that have already complied with initial 

CFATS requirements, and we will continue to work to get those facilities into compliance. 

(DHS/NPPD).

Mark Lopez, East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice, provided the following comments:

• I live with my family in the shadow of several chemical facilities and in the heart of the 

transportation corridor.

• Transportation safety is a high concern for me.

• About 10 years ago, we had a train derailment in my community. At the time, I did not 

appreciate how serious this incident could have been. Residents fled the community and did 

not return. 

• More recently, there was a double tanker that fell off the freeway and poured oil into the 

community, which then ignited. 

• I think about safer routes, prevention, and alternative energy sources. I learned of the EO a few 

days ago, and I am still researching information.

• I cannot emphasize how urgent this issue is. I think about my daughter, who is about to turn 2,

and about my daughter who will be born in a few weeks. I think about them having to deal with 

these same experiences in their own lives.

Maria Ramos, Member, Communities for a Better Environment, provided the following comments:

(Ms. Ramos had another participant translate her comments)

• I am a resident of Wilmington, California. In my community, I live close to the refineries, and I 

am exposed to accidents at these facilities. I am here today to ask you to take steps to prevent 

these accidents.

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• Many people in my community suffer from asthma, respiratory illnesses, and cancer. 

• We want to be protected from dangerous companies that use and store chemicals, many of 

which are explosive and flammable.

• We also have many schools near these facilities.

• I lived through an explosion at one of these refineries several years ago.

• We want these regulations to be mandatory.

• These refineries do not have any respect for the communities nearby. For example, one facility

had a release that ruined our Christmas.

• The smells from this facility cause nausea, dizziness, headaches, and stomach problems.

• It seems that no one respects our health. All of these accidents impact our health and quality of 

life. These are problems, especially for the youth of our communities.

• It is not justice when our communities are forced to breathe these toxic chemicals and our 

children’s lives are put a risk.

• It is a very painful experience to open your window and realize that you cannot tolerate the gas 

smell.

• We ask those of you who have the authority to protect the residents of Wilmington. I am sure

that in other communities, such as Palos Verdes, you would stop these problems.

• Mr. Vicory asked a clarifying question: The release you were referring to, when was that?

o Ms. Ramos responded: On December 31, when we left for the city, we could smell it. 

Then we saw on the news that there was a spill. 

o A member of the audience clarified that 13 workers from the Conoco Phillips facility

were taken to the hospital. This just happened a few weeks ago.

Alicia Rivera, Communities for a Better Environment, provided the following comments:

• It is sad for me to see a low-income community like Wilmington deal with so many incidents.

• One local oil extraction company had an excess in storage, and it was spilling into the area 

where people work. You could see them running around trying to cover it up. 

• I was celebrating with my family over the holidays, and I did not get the call for evacuation until 

about 1:00 am. 

• An inspector came, but at that point the levels had reverted back to normal.

• There are so many facilities that manufacture chemicals in support of the refineries; many of 

these are very close to schools and homes (less than 1 mile).

• Refineries are not going to participate in voluntary programs.

• We need monitors and enforcement in a timely fashion. By the time an inspector comes, the 

level of toxics has lowered to normal limits.

• The explosion at the Chevron facility was caused by too much corrosion in a pipe. For a year the 

facility refused to address this issue until there was an accident. That is just one example of how 

voluntary measures do not work.

Sonny Roque, East Yard Center for Environmental Justice, provided the following comments:

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• I live in a community just a few blocks away from a rail line where there have been accidents. I 

also worked at a refinery for 7 years. At that time, we had spills all the time, and nothing was 

done about it.

• There was an explosion at that refinery. A person I knew all of my life was very badly burned. 

The plant, which produced mineral spirits and linseed oil, eventually closed.

• I would support any policy for safer technologies.

• In my community at nighttime, we can smell bad things.

• The rail line in our community is contaminated.

• I am in support of the new safety policy.

The moderator moved to open session and welcomed anyone who would like to speak to come forward.

Jesse Marquez, Founder and Executive Director, Coalition for a Safe Environment, provided the 

following comments:

• Thank you for taking the time to be here today. It is very important that the public has an 

opportunity to speak and present. 

• Chemical facilities do not use the best available control technologies. I don’t believe refineries 

when they say that better technologies don’t exist. It took years before we saw that vapor 

recovery systems were cost effective. They are not mandatory. Why? 

• The Clean Air Act provides you with full authority for regulation. The Government is negotiating 

with industry as to what is acceptable to them. That is not acceptable to the public. 

• You should take an inventory of all the best technologies that are available for each type of 

chemical that is out there.

• Oil refineries frequently have equipment malfunctions and failures. We see flaring every month 

from nearly every refinery. Flaring is prevention. The refinery says flaring is to protect the 

public, but that’s not true. There are vapor recovery systems that can prevent the need for 

flaring. Why are the vapor recovery systems not mandatory?

• Why are there inadequate investigations and fines? The fines that are levied are meaningless to 

such large companies with large profits.

• Emissions reporting is a joke. I looked at emissions from all refineries in the area from 2000 to 

2010. I can show you, based upon data collected elsewhere, that these reports are not 

accurate. 

• The flaring we are talking about is underestimated by the facilities. Why? Because they only 

report when it involves a major incident.

Ronald Thomas, Technical Manager, Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), provided the following 

comments:

• I was going over Section B of the Policy Options document, and I believe that you asked some 

good questions about the PSM standard. They are well covered there. 

• It is good to see an effort to share industry best practices.

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• Regarding some of the ATF standards, ATF is looking at making AN more difficult to obtain and 

use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There are other substances, such as black powder 

and smokeless powder, that are easy to obtain and use for those same purposes.

• Some binary products (e.g., exploding targets) available to the general public could cause tragic 

consequences. It does not make sense to impose regulatory requirements upon industry when 

these other alternative products are so readily available to the general public. There are people 

who are making these items on their own in their homes, which is obviously a very dangerous 

practice.

• PSM needs updating, but we rely upon it very heavily and have used it successfully in the 

explosives industry.

Angelica Romero, People Not Pozos, provided the following comments:

• I would like to speak about the list of regulated substances. I do not consider myself an expert; 

however, I am hoping that others who are experts will do the right thing to protect us. 

• The oil industries in our communities are making us sick. All facilities exempt from the Clean Air 

Act need to be regulated.

• The thresholds for the regulated chemicals need to be changed. The current thresholds are not 

sufficient. We are seeing reports of nose bleeds, asthma, and other ailments near facilities that 

are reported to be meeting the requirements.

• I do not believe that any dangerous facility should be located near a densely populated 

community. 

Jesse Marquez, Coalition for a Safe Environment, provided the following comments:

• Let’s talk about homeland security and how safe we are in Wilmington. 

o We have problems with buffer zones between facilities stores and roads/neighborhood. 

The security doesn’t address the risk.

o Instead of having an 8’ chain link fence, let’s think about 20’ block walls.

• With regards to ports, someone could use a small remote control boat with explosives.

o Nearby, a boater was stopped and searched. It was found that he had dynamite on the 

vessel. He was using it for fishing, but this event demonstrates how easy it would be to 

bring dynamite into a port. Where is the register of boat owners with explosives? 

o In the Port of Los Angeles, a truck driver drove into the facility when he was not

permitted. It was a longshoreman dock worker who stopped the man and held him for 

police.

o At a refinery, we need better protections to prevent vehicle intrusion, going beyond just 

a simple gate.

• In addition to oil refineries, there are independent fuel distributors. A local distributor had 

200,000 lbs. but had reported no significant vapors. This distributor offered us a tour, during 

which I asked if they had any significant spills. They revealed that they had floating roof tanks, 

which an earthquake impacted.

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Jose Bravo, Just Transition Alliance, provided the following comments:

• I want to tell you about other communities where DHS has moved in and criminalized youth. 

DHS has put local youth hanging out near rail cars on watch lists. You need to be very careful 

about how to implement this process. I am afraid of the person who looks like Tim McVeigh, 

but we are seeing the potential for the Government to profile us.

• The West, Texas incident was 18 years to the day from the Oklahoma City bombing, in which AN 

was the primary explosive ingredient, the same agent involved in West.

• If I put a 50 gallon drum of cyanide in a well, I would be labeled a terrorist. However, if a 

company does that same thing or worse, they are perhaps fined, if they are even caught. Let us 

think not only about policing people, but about policing industry as well.

• We need to encourage industry to engineer danger out of processes and to use safer chemicals.

Alicia Rivera, Communities for a Better Environment, provided the following comments:

• You are listening to us because of a tragedy. Why did it have to come to that?

• Where was the compliance and oversight in West, Texas?

• We need appropriate regulations and enforcement before a tragedy happens.

• At the Richmond, California accident, the facility had been warned repeatedly by the regulators, 

but the regulation was not enforced.

Martha Arguello, Physicians for Social Responsibility, provided the following comments:

• Doctors have an oath to do no harm. Unfortunately, our environmental policies are not based 

upon the same ideal.

• We need jobs and economic development, but we expect the Government to watch the store to 

keep us safe.

• What do we want to be doing in 30 years? Do we want an economy dependent upon the 

everyday stress of chemicals accidents?

• We are depending on the Government to infuse green chemistry into the industry. You have to 

transform our communities and economy to show us that we are not considered disposable 

anymore.

Jesse Marquez, Coalition for a Safe Environment, provided the following comments:

• Hazardous safety risk assessments are a joke. When I read one, I always read what is supposed 

to be a worst-case scenario. They always seem to have a scenario involving just one tank. They 

never address the cascading worst-case scenario (because one tank will involve others as well).

• In San Pedro, we have a natural gas facility tank there, along with trains. There is also a refinery 

next door. An incident at one will impact the others.

• Risk assessments do not appear to be revised when facilities increase the size of their storage 

tanks.

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• I have asked for copies of risk assessments. I have not been given copies or provided an 

opportunity to see them. 

• When there is a comment period under Title V, EPA is commenting at the same time as the 

public. When I submit a 40-page public comment on a Title V permit, the Government will not 

see those comments. 

• Health risk assessments are not valuable. They contain statements such as how many people 

“might” die of cancer. They do not address how many people have chronic obstructive 

pulmonary disease, asthma, or symptoms of leukemia. They do not discuss how long people 

have been sick. 

o We need something called a “Health Impact Assessment.” It includes a public health 

baseline. 

o My research shows that lung cancer near the Port of Los Angeles has been going up 6% 

every year for the past 10 years. However, facilities there are reporting that public 

health is actually improving.

• Prevention is key. Any piece of equipment can be a problem. At the BP refinery in Carson, there 

was smoke coming out of the ground. A conveyor line underground had caught on fire. There 

was no alarm or extinguishing system. The fire department responded and could not extinguish 

the fire initially. They eventually came up with a plan to flood the tunnel. This was not 

previously identified as a potential risk.

• Section 6 of your document asked specific questions. My answer to each of your yes/no 

questions is a resounding yes, they should be done. I’ll provide written comments on this as 

well.

Mathy Stanislaus, provided closing remarks:

• Thank you for taking the time to be here today and to share this valuable feedback with us. It is 

extremely helpful to hear about your personal experiences. This is one of the reasons that we 

have pushed to have evening meetings: to hear the voices of community members who live 

near these facilities.

• There will be a community Webinar in the coming weeks. We are working with representatives 

from around the country who have identified the need for independent technical experts on the 

behalf of local communities. More details on this will follow.

• The document that was issued on Friday relates to policy and regulatory options that were 

identified during the listening sessions, as well as some that have been under consideration for a 

longer period. We ask that stakeholders submit comments regarding this document as soon as 

possible and not wait until the end of the 90-day comment period.

• Tonight was not a single event. We intend to continue our engagement with you and other 

stakeholders, and we invite you to reach out to us through our email address and Website.

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 13

January 9, 2014

Los Angeles, CA (Evening Session)
INSERT PARTICIPANT ANALYSIS 

Participant Analysis 

Stakeholder Group

1/9/2014 

Los Angeles, 

CA

Chemical Producer 2

Ag Supply 0

Chemical Storage 0

State/Local Regulator 1

First Responder 0

Media 2

Owner/Operator 0

Industry Association 1

Labor Organization 0

Federal Representative 4

Environment/Community 21

Consensus Organization 0

Other: 1

Citizen 0

Education 0

Security 1

Vendor 0

State/Local 0

Tribal 0

Health/Research 0

TOTAL

(Attended In-Person) 33

Conference Call 10

Attended (InPerson & Conf Call) 43

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 14

January 9, 2014

Los Angeles, CA (Evening Session)
Executive Order 13650

Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

January 9, 2014 Listening Session 

Hosted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

and the Department of Labor (DoL)

Location: Mount St. Mary’s College, Doheny Campus, 10 Chester Place, Los Angeles, CA 90007-2598

Agenda 

5:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. Registration

6:00 p.m. – 6:20 p.m. Welcome, Introductions, and Overview

Jack Eisenhauer, Facilitator

Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

Jay Vicory, Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health 

 Administration (OSHA)

Amy Graydon, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Joe Riehl, SAC/Wesley Beck, Department of Justice/ Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

 Representative, Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

Earl (Jack) Whitley, Department of Transportation (DOT)

Overview Section 6 a

Lisa Long, Director, Office of Engineering Safety, OSHA

6:20 p.m. – 6:30 p.m. Listening Session Format

Jack Eisenhauer, Facilitator

6:30 p.m. – 7:50 p.m. Comments from Listening Session Participants

7:50 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. Closing Remarks 

 

 Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

8:00 p.m. Adjournment 

Persons may also submit written comments to NPPD/ISCD/Mailstop 0610, Department of Homeland 

Security, 245 Murray Lane, SW, Arlington, VA 20598-0610. Comments will also be accepted by email 

at: EO.Chemical@hq.dhs.gov or through the Federal eRulemaking Portal 

at http://www.regulations.gov. For more information on EO 13650, please 

visit https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/index.html

and https://www.dhs.gov/topic/chemical-security.