Department of Energy

Richland Operations Office 

P.O. Box 550 

Richland, Washington 99352

02-RCA-0421 JUL 1 6 2002

Dear Reader:

The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, is pleased to present the “History 

of the Plutonium Production Facilities at the Hanford Site Historic District, 1943-1990.” This 

book documents the significant structures and processes that took place at the Hanford Site 

during the Manhattan Project (1943-1946) and Cold War Era (1947-1990).

We recognize and appreciate the contribution of the authors who were selected for their historical 

and technical expertise and made up the Historic Buildings Project Team. National experts were 

also used in the review of the book. The public also had an opportunity to review the book from 

February 1-April 30, 2000.

In addition to the hard copy, the book will also be published on the Internet at 

http://www.hanford.gov/docs/rl-97-1047/index.htm. The Internet version will contain the 

biographies of the contributors to the book (Appendix A). Due to pending security issues, 

Appendix B, which contains information on specific buildings either through the Historic 

American Engineering Records and Historic Property Inventory Forms, is not currently 

available. Once the issues are resolved, Appendix B will be placed on the Internet.

The book is also on the Internet at most public libraries and at the U.S. Department of Energy’s 

Public Reading Room located at the Consolidated Information Center, Washington State . 

University, Tri-Cities Campus, 2770 University Drive, Room 101L, Richland, Washington. A 

hard copy of the history without the appendices is also available at the Public Reading Room and 

local Tri-Cities libraries.

The book fulfills a regulatory agreement between the U.S. Departmenf of Energy, the 

Washington State Historic Preservation Office, and the Advisory Council on Historic 

Preservation to make the Hanford story available to the general public.

Sincerely,

Keith A. Klein 

RCA:ALR Manager

Enclosure
The

Ha n f o r d sh e

H is t o r ic d ist r ic t

M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t 1943 - 1946
LEGAL NOTICE

This Notice shall not be separated fro m the attached document.

LEG AL D IS C L A IM E R _______________________________________________

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency o f the United States 

Government. Neither the United Slates Government nor any agency thereof, not any of their 

employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors or their employees, makes any warranty, 

express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, 

or any third party's use or the results o f such use of any information, apparatus, product, or 

process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference 

herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, 

manufacturer, or otherwise, docs not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, 

recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its 

contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not 

necessarily stale or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

This document was prepared by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the 

U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office 

Hanford Cultural and Historical Resources Program 

formerly under the direction o f Dee Lloyd, currently under the direction of Annabelle L. Rodriguez.

Contract DE-AC06-76RL0I830

Approved for public release: further dissemination unlimited.

This report is electronically available on the Internet at 

http://www.hanford.gov/ does/rl-97- 1047/index.htm.

For a hard copy, call Public Requests Services at 509-376-1418. 

Printed in the United States of America

Collage l- r : B Reactor. 1940s C onstruction Workers at Lunch, N Reactor

Release A p p ro va l Date

This document was printed on 30% post-consumer recycled, acid free, and ground-wood free paper.
DOE/RL-97-1047

H is to ry o f t h e P lu to n iu m P ro d u c tio n

F a c ilitie s a t t h e H a n fo rd S ite

H is to ric D is tric t, 1943-1990

M a n h a t t a n Pr o j e c t 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 6

Tprrrr

June 2002

J

H a n fo rd C u ltu ra l and H is to ric Resources Program

U.S. D epartm ent o f Energy
Au t h o r s

THOMAS E. MARCEAU - Bechtel Hanford, Inc.

Supervisor, Environmental Restoration Contractor Cultural Resources Program, 1994-Present 

Chair, Hanford Site Historic Buildings Task Group, 1994-1997 

Author Chapter 1 - Historic Overview

Chapter 4 - Recommendations for Future Uses of Structures

DAVID W. HARVEY - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Research Scientist/Historian, Hanford Cultural and Historic Resources Program, 1993-Present 

Key Contributor, Hanford Site Historic Buildings M itigation Project, 1994-Present 

Author Section 1 - Construction History

Section 2 - Fuel Manufacturing

Section 9 - M ilitary Operations

Appendix B - Metal Fuels Fabrication Building 

Co-Author Section 8 - Site Security

Section 11 - Transportation, Communication, and General Site Support

Appendix B - Development Laboratory Complex 

Appendix B - Plutonium Concentration Facility 

Appendix B - Waste Incinerator Facility

DARBY C. STARR - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Manager, Hanford Site Historic Buildings Mitigation Project, 1999-Present 

Director, Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory, 1998-Present 

Author Section 3 - Reactor Operations

Section 12 - History of Workers

Co-Author Section 7 - Research and Development

SANDRA D. CANNO N - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Communications Manager, Hanford Site Historic Buildings Mitigation Project, 1996-Present 

Author Chapter 3 - Guide to Resources

CHARLES A. CONW AY - Radio-Chemical Process Consultant

Consultant to the Hanford Site Historic Buildings M itigation Project, 1999 

Co-Author Section 4 - Chemical Separations

DENNIS H. DEFORD - Hanford Search

President and Senior Researcher, Hanford Search

Retired Senior Scientist CH2M HILL Hanford, Inc. and Westinghouse Hanford Company 

Retired Senior Management Analyst, U.S. Department of Energy 

Author Section 6 - Waste Management

BRIAN ). FREER - CH2M HILL Hanford, Inc.

Researcher, Historical Buildings Mitigation Project, 1998-1999 

Author Section 10 - Worker Health and Safety

Co-Author Section 4 - Chemical Separations

MICHELE S. GERBER - Fluor Hanford, Inc.

Historian, Hanford Site

Author Section 5 - Plutonium Finishing

Co-Author Appendix B - Development Laboratory Complex

Appendix B - Plutonium Concentration Facility

Appendix B - Waste Incinerator Facility

JOY K. KEATING - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Researcher, Hanford Site Historic Buildings Mitigation Project, 1998-2000 

Co-Author Section 8 - Site Security

Section 11 - Transportation, Communication, and General Site Support

CHRISTINE F. N O O N AN - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Researcher, Hanford Site Historic Buildings Mitigation Project, 1999-2000 

Co-Author Section 7 - Research and Development

GENE WEISSKOPF - B Reactor Museum Association

Project Coordinator and Lead Author for the B Reactor Museum Association 

Author Appendix B - B Reactor

Appendix B - T Plant
Co n t e n t s

Page

Chapter 1: H istoric O verview .............................................................................1,1

Chapter 2: Plutonium Production Facilities.................................................. 2.1

Section 1: Construction H is to ry ................... 2-1.1

Section 2: Fuel M anufacturing.................................................2-2.1

Section 3: Reactor O perations.................................................2-3.1

Section 4: Chemical Separations............................................2-4.1

Section 5: Plutonium F inishing................................................2-5.1

Section 6: Waste Management................................................ 2-6.1

Section 7: Research and Developm ent............................... . 2-7.1

Section 8: Site S ecurity.......................................... 2-8.1

Section 9: M ilitary O perations............................... 2-9.1

Section 10: W orker Health and Safety.................................. 2-10.1

Section 11: Transportation, Communication,

Site Support . 2-11.1

Section 12: History of Workers at the Hanford S ite ............2-12.1

Chapter 3: Guide to Resources......................................................................... 3.1

Chapter 4: Recommendations fo r Future U ses....................................... . 4.1

Key D a tes ..................................................................................................................D.1

List o f Figures ...................................................................................................... F.1

List o f Tables ......................................................................................................... T.1

References C ited .......................................................................................................R.1

Bibliography fo r Further In fo rm a tio n ............................................................... B.l

Appendices - Published O nly on the Internet Internet URL

Appendix A ............. http://www.hanford.gov/docs/rl-97-1047/biographies/index.htm

Biographies of the Historic Buildings Task Group Members

Appendix B ...................... http://www.hanford.gov/docs/rl-97-1047/appendix b.htm

Historic American Engineering Records and 

Historic Property Inventory Forms
Ac k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

Numerous people shared their knowledge of facilities and processes at the 

Hanford Site w ith us during the course of w riting this book. Numerous 

others reviewed and made recommendations on early drafts. We specifically 

requested experts in fields applicable to this history of facilities to review an 

early draft, but many other reviewers read the book and made recommendations out of shear interest in helping us achieve as accurate a portrayal of the 

fac ilities as possible. To all who have helped improve this book, we offer our 

sincere "thanks!

C'on r R iB U T O R S

Paul Beardsley, retired Hanford Patrol - Site Security

Bruc e Cameron, Hanford Patrol Training Instructor - Site Security

Roy Gephart, Waste Management Technical Expert - Waste Management

Shirley Gydesen, Classification Officer - Site Security

Don Sorenson, Plutonium Finishing Technologist-Plutonium Finishing

|im Spracklen, Safeguards and Security Director - Site Security

Judy Tokarz-Hames, Emergency Preparedness - Emergency Preparedness subsection in Site Security

A! Walker, Security Operations Program Manager - Site Security 

Everett Weakley, Senior Principal Engineer - Fuel Manufacturing

111 h n i c a i P e e r R e v i e w e r s

Marie Bouttee, Medical Anthropologist, University of Nevada at Las Vegas - 

Health and Safety

Rodney Carlisle, Professor of History, Rutgers University - Fuel Manufacturing, Reactor Operations, Plutonium Finishing

( alhryn Carson, Assistant Professor of History of Science University of 

Caliiornia at Berkeley - Reactor Operations
Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, Senior Research Fellow in Cold War Science - 

M ilitary Operations, Overview of Book

Hugh Gusterson, Associate Professor of Anthropology & Science,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Research and Development

Louise Kaplan, Assistant Professor of Nursing, Pacific Lutheran University - 

Health and Safety

Ronald Kathren, Professor Emeritus in Biokinetics and Radiological Health, 

Washington State University - Waste Management and Health and Safety

Kevin Kennedy, Lecturer of Environmental Sciences, University of California at 

B erkeley-C hem ical Separations

Scott Kirsch, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, University of North 

Carolina - Site Security

Russell O lw ell, Lecturer of Natural Sciences, University of Michigan - Site 

Security and History of Workers

Joshua Silverman, Doctoral Candidate in History, Carnegie M ellon 

University - Waste Management

John K, Smith, Associate Professor of History, Lehigh University - Chemical 

Separations

Andrea Szasz, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of California at yT 

Santa Cruz - Waste Management and History of Workers

Bryan Taylor, Associate Professor of Communications, University of Colorado 

at Boulder - Construction History, O verview of Book

Harry Thayer, Author of Management o f the Hanford Engineer Works in Work

War II: H ow the Corps, Du Pont and the Metallurgical Laboratory Fast Tracked

the original Plutonium W orks- Transportation, Communications, and Site 

Support
P u b l ic a t io n Te a m

C ommunications Manager - Sandra D. Cannon 

Edilor - Rosalind E. Schrempf

Reference and Bibliography E ditor-Janet K. Tarantino

Book Designer-Joan K. Slavens

'lext Designers - Elaine C. Schneider, Cindi L. Gregg

Indexer - Kristin L. Manke

Webmaster - Debora A. Schulz, Jodi C. Melland
P r e f a c e

The U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office and the : 

Washington State Historic Preservation O ffice designated the Manhattan 

Project and Cold W ar facilities of the Hanford Site a historic district eligible 

for listing in the National Register o f Historic Places in 1996. The purpose of 

this book is to preserve in words, diagrams, and photographs the structures at 

the Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project and Cold War Era because the: 

majority of them have been or w ill be demolished. Because of the national 

and international significance of the Hanford Site, we hope certain properties 

w ill be left in place to illustrate the scope and scale of the various missions 

that developed the atomic energy program and supported national security. 

Those facilities that must be demolished because of safety concerns and lack 

of a future use w ill at least live on in this book.

This book is the result of a regulatory agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy, the Washington State Historic Preservation Office, and the 

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. They agreed that a historic 

narrative (this book) would be written to record

• Information about the roles played by different property types and/or 

processes at the Hanford Site /

• Numbers of buildings/structures w ithin the different property types and 

their locations

• Changes in technology, design, and use of the different property types 

overtim e :

• Photographs, plans, and cross sections of representative samples that 

document the form or manifestation of different property types

The U.S. Department of Energy's present mission at the Hanford Site is 

cleanup: restore the Columbia River Corridor, transition the Central Plateau 

to long-term waste storage and treatment operations, and prepare for the 

future. None of the accomplishments fulfilling the U.S. Department of 

Energy's present mission are described in this book. The time period covered in this book is 1943-1990—the years spanning the Manhattan Project 

and Cold War era. The book is the result of research into the facilities and; 

processes that took place w ithin those facilities at the Hanford Site during 

that time period. This book is not a definitive history nor an investigation or 

interpretation of issues nor a prognosis on the clean up of the Hanford Site Or. 

activities beyond 1990. That we leave to future researchers, who we hope 

w ill use the resources in this book as a springboard for their work.
and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation is that the book w ill be 

published as a hard copy. This has limited the amount of space we can 

devote to each topic. Even w ith that lim itation, the book is voluminous and 

w ill have a very lim ited distribution of the hard copy edition. We are 

publishing the book on the Internet to make it accessible to more readers. 

The appendices w ill only be published on the Internet, not in the hard copy.
Ch a p t e r

His t o r ic

Ov e r v ie w

T E . JVlARCJEAU 

Bechtel Ha n io r d , Lnc.
Co n t e n t s

Purpose and O bjectives...............................................................................1.1

Scope................................................................................................................ 1.3

Setting the Stage............................................................................................ 1.5

Manhattan Project: Creation of the Hanford S ite ................................1.10

Initial C onstruction.........................................................................................1.15

"It's Atom ic Bombs": Hanford Site Operations 1943-1945 .............. 1.25

End of the Manhattan Project: 1 9 4 6 ....................................................... 1.40

Cold War: Expansion of the Hanford Site ........................................1.42

Soviet "G ia n t" Awakes: 1947-1949......................................................... 1.45

Korean War: 1949-1952 .......................................................................... 1.48

Korean War: 1952-1955 ............................................................................. 1.52

Peak Production: 1956-1965 .................................................................... 1.56

Cold W ar Ends: Diversification at the Hanford S ite............................ 1.65

Reagan B uildup..............................................................................................1.73

Transition to C leanup.................................................................................. 1.75

Areas fo r Further Research......................................................................... 1.77

O verview o f the Managers and Contractors

at the Hanford S ite ....................................................................................... 1.78

Graphic: Uncle Sam by R.S. Sloan, Rockwell Hanford

Operations.
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Ch a p te r 1 - His to r ic Ov e r v ie w

For nearly 50 years (1943-1990), the history of the Manhattan Project and the Hanford Site's role in it and the subsequent 

Cold War have been largely invisible. For national security reasons, the government labeled these facilities "classified" 

and deliberately kept the public in the dark about what was going on behind the fences. W ith the end of the Cold War, 

this history no longer needs to be kept secret. In recognition of the global significance o f events that occurred on an 

isolated stretch of the Columbia River in south-central Washington State, the Richland Operations Office of the 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducted a 4-year project to document the plutonium production facilities at the 

Hanford Site (Figure 1.1). Through this project, the roles these facilities played in World War II and the Cold War Era, 

together with the perspective of the workers who staffed them, are captured in this book supplemented with historic 

photographs and oral histories - many of which appear in print for the first time.

P u r p o s e a n d Ob j e c t iv e s

The dual purpose o f this book is to formally identify the Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Historic 

District and to preserve in words, diagrams, and photographs its significant structures because the majority of these 

structures have been or w ill be demolished. The designation of the Manhattan Project and Cold War Era facilities at the 

Hanford Site as a Historic District came about through an agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy and the 

Washington State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO).

The National Historic Preservation Act 

(NHPA) was passed in 1966. Among the 

reasons for its passage, Congress noted that 

"historic properties significant to the 

Nation's heritage are being lost or 

substantially altered, often inadvertently, 

with increasing frequency" (16 USC 

470(b)(3)). From its inception, NHPA has 

emphasized the identification and 

protection of discrete sites, buildings, 

structures, and objects tied to a specific 

geographic location.

The principal tool for identification, 

evaluation, and protection of significant 

properties is the National Register of 

Historic Places - the "nation's inventory of 

historic places and the national repository 

of documentation on the variety of historic 

property types, significance, abundance, 

condition, ownership, needs, and other 

information" (NPS 1990, p. 1). Section 106 

of NHPA prescribes for each undertaking 

that Federal agencies "take into account the 

effect of the undertaking on any district, 

site, building, structure, or object that is 

included in or eligible for inclusion in the 

National Register" (16.USC 47Of).

[ KITTITAS

Priest Rapids COUNT

— ' 7 Dam

Y A K IM A -^ ------

COUNTY % %

_____________• y--"w! ,

i ffi+ S B M ii , spokaae

GRANT \ & csz t.x r ? n \

COUNTY ^ - t I

u._ i C "C5

Bridge Coyote Sapids

Haaloixl Site

v n \

I 111 N \

1 \ 3»f> Arra v V p v y rs

-

X

FR A N K LIN X . X 

C O U N T Y x

'" .X

3000 Area

^rZ^RjchJand , 1100 Area ./<

Pasco

x7*X KenflewickX"

Figure 1.1. Hanford Site (Gray Area) Located in Washington State

along the Columbia River

1 .1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Section 110 of NHPA requires that agencies "initiate measures to assure [sic] that where...an historic property is to be 

substantially altered or demolished, timely steps are taken to make or have made appropriate records...for future use and 

| reference" (16 USC 470h-2(b)). W ith the change in mission from plutonium production to environmental restoration and

the demolition of surplus properties, DOE resolved to satisfy its responsibilities under NHPA by initiating an innovative 

j management strategy for those properties related to the Manhattan Project and Cold War.

I In 1996, DOE, SHPO, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation signed a Programmatic Agreement that

j modified compliance with Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA with respect to historic buildings on the Hanford Site

(DOE 1996a). In deliberations leading to the Programmatic Agreement, DOE and SHPO first determined that the 

Hanford Site was a designed industrial landscape whose buildings, grouped by function within designated geographic 

complexes, were united historically and thematically by the production of plutonium for national defense. Given this 

finding, DOE and SHPO agreed that the Hanford Site met the requirements for an Historic District, as defined by the 

National Park Service, because it possessed a "significant concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings, 

structures, or objects united historically...by plan or physical development" (NPS 1990, p. 5). By identifying the Hanford 

| Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Historic District in the Programmatic Agreement, DOE and SHPO were able to

replace the documenting and mitigating of each building at the Hanford Site with a systematic treatment of the Hanford 

| Site itself.

j Key to this strategy was to develop property types and identify the buildings that best represented each type. DOE

• selected the primary functions of Fuel Manufacturing, Reactor Operations, Chemical Separations, and Plutonium

Finishing as w ell as the support functions of Waste Management, Research and Development, Site Security, M ilitary 

Operations, Health and Safety, and Infrastructure as categories in which the buildings would be classified. Using this 

classification matrix, DOE assigned 1100 buildings to specific property types and evaluated each building for its 

'j eligibility for listing in the National Register of Historic Places as a contributing or non-contributing property w ithin the

■ Historic District. O f the.527 buildings determined to be contributing properties, DOE and SHPO ultimately selected

j 190 (initially 187) properties for individual documentation using Historic American Engineering Records (HAER),

expanded Historic Property Inventory Forms (ExHPlF), or standard Historic Property Inventory Forms (HPIF). These key 

properties col lectively represented the events and activities that took place on the Hanford Site from 1943-1990. The 

Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Historic District Treatment Plan (Marceau 1998) shows the original 

classification matrix of 1 1 0 0 buildings and the properties recommended for individual documentation.

' DOE's current mission of environmental restoration, which includes the demolition o f surplus properties, w ill adversely

I affect the historic properties that comprise the Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Historic District.

However, SHPO agreed that recording the key events that occurred at the Hanford Site from 1943-1990 in this book and 

documenting each of the 190 representative properties would address the effects of decommissioning and environmental 

| restoration. This book, History o f the Plutonium Production Facilities o f the Hanford Site Historic District, 1943-1990,

satisfies Stipulation VI of the Programmatic Agreement (DOE 1996a) under which DOE agreed to write a "synthetic, 

j integrated Hanford Site historic narrative" that would include:

• Contextual information about the different property types and processes associated with them - see Chapter 2 of 

! this book and Appendix B on the Internet

• Numbers and locations of buildings w ithin property types - see Table A.5 in the Hanford Site Manhattan Project

| and Cold War Historic District Treatment Plan at http://www.hanford.gov/doe/culres/historic/index.htm

1 (Marceau 1998) and Appendix B on the Internet

j * Descriptions o f changes in technology, design, and use of property types over time - see Appendix B on the

j Internet

• Photographs, plans, and cross sections of representative examples of the different property types - see 

Appendix B on the Internet

The narrative was further defined in the Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Historic District Treatment

Plan (Marceau 1998), which was written in compliance with Stipulation IV of the Programmatic Agreement. In scope,

1 .2
Ch a p t e r l - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

the historic narrative would be a "report which w ill chronicle the history of the Hanford Site, its technology, and the 

people w ho worked here" (DOE 1998a, p. 1). Selection of the word "chronicle" was deliberate since, according to 

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, it defined the end state of the report as an "historical account of events arranged in 

order of time without analysis or interpretation" (emphasis added). From the outset, this book was designed to reflect the 

emphasis of the National Register program and the Secretary of the Interior's Standards and Guidelines for Historical 

Documentation.

In keeping with this guidance .ih Dm unwuhilimi i- ,i tlet.ulvtl tvim ti in the lotm m ,i K'pmf

(see sidebar box), the authors of this rf„,,„nfews .md

book used existing information to the u ,:,lr dn, nnwnl.dwn u.c, .rr,h i.if

fullest extent possible to recount the iiu /it.;./. ur,d hntnn Irihniqtu•. rf/iriri/ifs/rim-. /../». rr.i\» i/i tnnl.unrd

events that occurred at the Hanford Site ,... ... ■/<■(.,Ur,I m ,/ nr

from 1943 through 1990 to highlight the id c n tiu v d i.i/i.i-. »r to iin r~ tiq .d e p .trtk n i.n q m ^ ltn tn .dnm t

significance of the buildings and t lt r e*i.ihh~hrd *iq n im .w t.r vt .1 p to p c in n rp io p c rtie * . Z>»t tim rn l.d io n

structures in which those events ... ZrutZ. ;M r > r.„ A,,,TM ZmZ-,- .,bnui the ~ p r,„h

occurred. The purpose of this book is /„ /..u .t „r,rf,.,.u rn /,,,.;,» r/„.f. Zr.i|.

not an academically oriented history of h i.i,,,,,.,/ um c,./„.„lrl ,,r,,ra ll.e r I/,.,,,

the Hanford Site. The authors of this d u p lU jh ' tin- rZ.ir/Zriii. rW /i.in rrxi. ir^ r.n i /i." 41. 1R 447 u,. p. 44 " 4*.

book did not use a uniform or classic 

historic spprocich nor did thsy int0 rpi*0 t

or explain the events that took place at the Hanford Site over the past 50 years. Rather, they sought to present these 

events like a reporter who informs the audience and allows for independent conclusions.

The authors of this book were selected because of their backgrounds in the particular topics to be researched. The 

authors' biographies are in Appendix A on the Internet (http://www.hanford.gov/docs/rl-97-1047/biographies/index.htm). 

The variety of topics covered required authors from various disciplines w ith the result that each author took a slightly 

different approach to the method of research and manner of recording it. The sections in Chapter 2, therefore, are not 

always parallel in the type or depth of focus. W hile the reader may question the extent of the research underlying each 

section, how critically the authors examined their sources, the explicit or im plicit filters they applied in selecting 

pertinent passages, and how completely they synthesized their data, the authors neither present, nor intend that this book 

be taken as, a definitive history of the Hanford Site or an investigation or interpretation of specific issues, such as the 

long-term effects of operations on groundwater. That undertaking we leave to others, who we hope w ill use the 

resources in this book as a springboard for their work.

This book provides a brief chronicle of the facilities at the Hanford Site organized by the processes that define their 

reason for existence, mainly Fuel Manufacturing, Reactor Operations, Chemical Separations, Plutonium Finishing, and 

related activities. It complies with the requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act to document the facets of 

the properties that qualify them for listing in the National Register and their role in the Manhattan Project and subsequent 

Cold War. It also corresponds with the intent of the National Register program to recognize physical properties and 

document their appearance and importance.

Sc o p e

This book covers the time period 1943-1990 - the years spanning the Manhattan Project and the Cold War. Chapter 1 is 

a historic overview summarizing some of the events that accounted for and influenced the creation and operation of the 

Hanford Site as w ell as some of the activities undertaken on the Hanford Site in response to these events.

Chapter 2 consists o f twelve sections w ith details, descriptions, and illustrations of the primary production operations 

(manufacturing the fuel, irradiating it in the reactors, chemically separating it to isolate plutonium, and finishing the 

plutonium into the form needed for a bomb), support activities (construction, waste management, research and

1 .3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

development, security, military operations, worker health and safety, and infrastructure), and most importantly a 

perspective from the workers who made it all happen.

Chapter 3 is a guide to resources and information for future researchers. Ideas generated or omissions noted within this 

text may be investigated more fu lly by the interested reader using these resources.

Chapter 4 looks to the future and provides recommendations for future uses for some of the facilities still standing on the 

Hanford Site. It envisions opportunities for economic development and heritage tourism as a way to extend vestiges of 

the past into the 2 1 * century.

Appendix A contains the biographies of those who contributed directly or indirectly to the book. Appendix B contains the 

Historic American Engineering Records and Historic Property Inventory Forms for the focal properties designated in the 

Programmatic Agreement for individual documentation.

The following topics are not discussed because they are either treated more extensively or appropriately in other 

documents or they fall outside the scope of this book:

Waste Products/Cleanup: Each step in the plutonium production cycle had an associated waste stream. This 

book discusses only that wastes were produced during the fuel manufacturing, irradiation, separation, and 

concentration processes and were introduced into the environment in pits, drains, cribs, trenches, basins, and 

tanks. With the exception of personal and environmental health, no other topic in this book w ill likely generate 

as much concern among readers - particularly those w ithin proximity of the Hanford Site. However, this book 

w ill not explore or debate the consequences or effects of the waste products generated and stored on the 

Hanford Site nor the cleanup of the Hanford Site which began after the Cold War Era.

Health Effects: This book discusses the programs established to monitor worker health and safety and the 

environment. The long-term effectiveness of these programs and the effects of working with or living near 

radiation and chemicals are briefly discussed. These topics are covered more appropriately and explicitly in 

other sources including the results reported from the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR)

Project (HEDR 1994a), the Screening Assessment and Requirements for a Comprehensive Assessment, Columbia 

River Comprehensive Impact Assessment (DOE 1998a), as well as risk assessments contained in Environmental 

Impact Statements, CERCLA documents, and Safety Assessment Reports.

The Decision to Use the Bomb: The decision to use atomic weapons was not made lightly. The question was 

debated vigorously on moral, political, technical, and military grounds. President Truman's reasoning, the views 

of individual members of the Interim Committee, and the split w ithin the Scientific Panel culminating in a 

petition Leo Szilard drafted and 155 o f the scientists developing the bomb signed arguing that it not be used are 

all well documented. Readers interested in this topic are directed to sources such as The Making of the Atomic 

Bomb (Rhodes 1986) or "Hiroshima: World Culture as the Event War" (Lanouette 1999).

The agreement with SHPO and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation requires publishing this book as a hard 

copy, which limits the amount of space we can devote to each topic. Each of the chapters and sections in Chapter 2 has 

been restricted to roughly fifty pages including figures. Because of cost constraints inherent in publication, the 

appendices have been published only on the Internet at http://www.hanford.gov/docs/rl-97-1047/index.htm. If funding 

permits, a compact disk containing the complete book may be available in the future.

This book gives the historical measurements, which are usually rounded off. For exact measurements, the reader should 

refer to the original documents.

The References Cited Section lists the resources used in researching this book. The Bibliography lists additional 

resources not used directly but which may be of interest to the reader in pursuing additional research.
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Se t t in g Th e St a g e

STRAY NEUTRON

The Hanford Site was established for one reason - to produce plutonium for use in weapons. With a production record 

of 54.5 metric tons (quantity published to date, which is 60 percent of the total amount of weapons-grade plutonium 

produced by the United States), the Hanford Site fulfilled its Manhattan Project and Cold War mission (DOE 1996b, 

Figures 6 and 7, Table 2). At its inception, the Hanford Site was largely an experiment, the production-scale culmination 

of two key events - the demonstration of a controlled, sustainable nuclear chain reaction capable of transforming 

uranium into plutonium, and the discovery of a process to separate plutonium from uranium following irradiation.

The theme that the Hanford Site was an experiment runs throughout the Manhattan Project and the Cold War Era. 

Creating plutonium was a new science. Producing plutonium on an industrial scale was a major challenge. The time 

pressures of war added to the uncertainties that accompanied each decision. Yet critical decisions had to be made 

within very short time frames despite the uncertainties. Such a situation helps explain the mistakes, the risk taken, the 

resourcefulness of the workers, and the achievements that made the Hanford Site a Historic District today.

Throughout the book we read of decisions that had to be made without full knowledge of the consequences and the 

workers who met these challenges. In describing the need to proceed with the Manhattan Project and construct the 

Hanford Site, Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves as commander of the Manhattan Project relates "We would go ahead 

with their design and construction as fast as possible, even though we would have to base our work on the most meager 

laboratory data...we could not afford to wait" (Groves 1983, p. 72). We read of how one of the production line crew 

solved the problem of aluminum crumpling within 24 hours when manufacturing the fuel elements. We also learn of the 

problems of isolating the plutonium once it had been created: "The lack of actual irradiated 

uranium for experimentation, ignorance of the chemical properties of plutonium, and 

engineering inexperience with high radiation levels, complicated the development effort 

[to extract and purify the plutonium] tremendously" (DOE 1997e, p. 171). Describing 

the challenge of chemically separating out plutonium, one of Du Font's 

chemical engineers, Raymond Genereaux, illustrates the theme of the 

Hanford Site as an experiment: "We realized immediately we had to 

design flexibility into it if we were going to move ahead and get any 

designing done before we knew for sure what we were doing, before we knew 

what the process would be" (Genereaux, quoted in Sanger 1989, p. 40).

Creating plutonium was a challenge because it is an artificially made element. It 

exists only rarely in nature. Plutonium is a product of uranium fissioning and is 

created by the absorption o f neutrons within the nuclei of uranium atoms that 

have been subjected to neutron bombardment (see Figure 1.2).

Plutonium is not a daughter product of uranium. It does not form 

directly from uranium. Rather, the transmutation is a two-stage 

process in which an intermediary element is formed. Under 

neutron bombardment within a nuclear reactor, uranium-238 (one 

of the two main isotopes of uranium, element 92) first changes to 

uranium-239, a highly unstable isotope marked by the addition of an 

extra neutron. W ithin 20 minutes, on average, uranium-239 

spontaneously transforms to neptunium-239 (element 93). With a halflife of only 2.3 days, neptunium is also highly unstable, and when 

undergoing radioactive decay, spontaneously changes to plutonium239 (element 94), a radioactive element with a half-life of 

approximately 24,000 years (Rhodes 1995).

NEUTRONS FISSION FRAGMENT

MAYBE LOST

SLOW NEUTRONS

FISSION FRAGMENT

FISSION FRAGMENT

SLOW NEUTRONS TO CAUSE MORE FISSIONS 

AND SO ON.

Figure 1.2. Creation o f Plutonium— a Product o f

Uranium Fissioning
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Plutonium is highly fissile. This means its nuclei can be readily split, releasing large amounts of energy either under 

controlled conditions as a nuclear fuel or under uncontrolled conditions as a nuclear explosion. Physicists have devoted 

years to intense research to arrive at this understanding. In fact, theoretical physicists predicted the transmutation of 

uranium to plutonium several years before they actually observed it. The discovery of plutonium and its chemistry was 

intimately tied to the investigation o f the fissile properties of uranium.

N u c l e a r Fi s s i o n

? The nuclear arms race began w ith the race

"T/iv f/fVm v/i oi iM o n t.inw ju'-t ,t- (.rrm.im »./- qinhnq ihvlf la § to develop the atomic bomb. The

abandon i'x/i.i/mVi/i In intimidation and ii-sorf to armed j United States was a late entrant whose

tonqui,->l'>...\\orhl H.ir II I'tnptrd at ,i moment nhvn the pronmv at f participation came largely at the prodding

alontit t'Mi'iyt had ptm ircw d train Iwiny pr»-srVi/i* ta htunn probable. f of emigrant scientists including Leo

// u.i- not tlt\ir iv/icZ/uv tim wwifp touid bv ivlva^od o\plo>.i\vl\ | Szilard, Edward Teller, and Eugene Wigner

/?mi i‘i i'/.' - suhlvMc 1‘mw. p. i I who "regarded it as their responsibility to

I ..________ .. .... ..I alert Americans to the possibility that

German scientists might win the race to 

build an atomic bomb and to warn that Hitler would be more than w illing to resort to such a weapon" (Gosling 1999, 

p. vii). Great Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union also participated in this race; however, "only the Americans... 

protected by oceans on both sides, managed to take the discovery of fission from the laboratory to the battlefield and 

gain a short-lived atomic monopoly" (Gosling 1999, p.vii).

The history of high-energy physics and nuclear fission is extensive. Its retelling is w ell beyond the scope of this book. 

However, a recounting of key events is instrumental in establishing a framework for the existence of the Hanford Site and 

the establishment of the Historic District. Many dates and events could be chosen as the starting point, but this much 

abbreviated discussion begins in 1932 when James Chadwick demonstrated the existence of the neutron, or non-charged 

particle, w ithin the nucleus of an atom. Later that year, J. D. Cockroft and E. T. S. Walton successfully split lithium atoms 

in a particle accelerator (Gosling 1999, Sublette 1997). in 1933, Szilard first envisioned the dual potential of the atom 

when he surmised that the collision of neutrons within a chain reaction would release energy and speculated on the use 

of this energy in making bombs. Szilard formalized these thoughts in a patent application on July 4, 1934 that described 

how explosions could be induced through chain reactions and introduced the concept of critical mass. It would be 

2 years, however, before the British Admiralty accepted Szilard's offer of his patents (Sublette 1997).

in contrast to prevailing studies that required a high energy source to accelerate positive-charged proton beams and 

alpha particles, Enrico Fermi experimentally bombarded 63 elements with neutrons, reasoning that little resistance would 

be encountered by uncharged particles entering the nucleus. One of the experimental elements was uranium 

(Gosling 1999). Over the next several years, the international scientific community focused on neutron bombardment as 

a more promising technology for splitting atoms and uranium as a key element.

Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, working in 

Inlulv w r lapan imadvd ( bina and in \o w m hrr ioinvtK.rtm.im Berlin, discovered that uranium nuclei split into

and Ital\ in llw 1 x1- Alhamv. radioactive barium and fragments of uranium.

' Hahn published the experimental results in 

Naturwissenschatien on December 21, 1938 

(Sublette 1997). On January 13, 1939,

Otto Frisch substantiated these results and, together with Lise Meitner, an Austrian emigre living in Sweden at the time, 

calculated the unprecedented amount of energy released. Although she did not receive the credit she deserved, Meitner 

is recognized as the first to theorize the fission process (Meitner and Frisch 1939, Simes 1996). Based on their 

calculations, Frisch applied the term "fission," from biological cell division, to name this process (Sublette 1997,

Gosling 1999).

1 .6
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Niels Bohr announced the results of the Hahn-Strassmann uranium experiments and the Meitner-Frisch calculations to 

the American scientific community on January 26, 1939. In March of that year, a Columbia University team consisting of 

Fermi, Szilard, Walter H. Zinn, and Herbert Anderson discovered that "at least two secondary neutrons emerge from 

each neutron-induced fission" of uranium (Rhodes 1986, p. 294). On August 31, Bohr and John A. Wheeler, working at 

Princeton University, published their theory that the isotope uranium-235, present in trace quantities within 

uranium-238, was more fissile than uranium-238 and should become the focus of uranium research. In this publication, 

they also postulated that a then unnamed, unobserved transuranic element (referred to simply as 94239 or, more 

descriptively, as "high octane") produced during fissioning of uranium-238 would be highly fissionable (Sublette 1997). 

With these findings, the theoretical foundation for atomic energy was substantially set.

g g a . In response to this aggressive act by Germany,

< >n sqticmbui I, w Pi, r.mii.mx miii.ih'ri World W.ii II h\ U.S. uranium research objectives began to alter

Pohnd S !§ on October 11,1939 when Alexander Sachs

B flji delivered a letter to President Franklin D.

Roosevelt drafted by Szilard and signed by 

Albert Einstein. Szilard was among the most vocal of those advocating a program to develop bombs based on recent 

findings in nuclear physics and chemistry. The letter warned the President of the potential for and consequences of 

atomic weapons and prevailed upon him to take immediate action to counter the work being done in Germany at the 

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. Ten days later the Presidential Advisory Committee on Uranium met for the first time 

in Washington D.C. President Roosevelt had acted quickly, but the Committee, under the direction of Lyman Briggs, 

initially would take a cautious approach by continuing to focus primarily on uranium research and not applications 

(Sublette 1997).

If German scientists were moving ahead as 

quickly in developing an atomic bomb as the 

German army was in subjugating Western 

Europe, the United States needed to accelerate 

its uranium program. The National Defense 

Research Committee replaced the Presidential Advisory Committee on Uranium in June 1940 and afforded the American 

scientific community a presence within the executive branch. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Foundation, was 

appointed head of the new committee. By eliminating the former committee's military members, Bush concentrated 

power with the scientists. He also introduced security and secrecy into nuclear research by "barr[ing] foreign-born 

scientists from committee membership and blocking] the further publication of articles on uranium research"

(Gosling 1999, p. 7). These themes of secrecy and exclusion would become hallmarks of the nuclear weapons program. 

Using $40,000 awarded by the National Defense Research Committee, in November 1940 Fermi and Szilard began 

constructing a sub-critical, graphite-moderated, uranium oxide "pile" (the original name for reactors) at Columbia 

University to further investigate chain reactions (Sublette 1997).

On June 28,1941, the nuclear scientific community assumed an even stronger presence within the government when 

President Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and Development by executive order. Vannevar Bush 

was named its director and now reported directly to the President. President Roosevelt created the Office of Scientific 

Research and Development within a week of Germany invading the Soviet Union and less than a month following a 

presentation Tokutaro Haiwara made at the University of Kyoto in which he speculated about the potential for a fusion 

explosion using a fission ignition - the basis for thermonuclear weapons (Sublette 1997, Gosling 1999).

The British counterpart to the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the M AUD Committee, issued its final 

report on July 15,1941, in which they described the technical details of atomic bombs together with proposals and cost 

estimates for their development (Sublette 1997). "Americans had been in touch with the M AUD Committee since fall

On \pril •• V>40, (icrm.im inhaled Ih'iuturl. ,tnd \o n i.n ,intl on

\Ui\ 10 nn.idod Holl.unl, Rvluiuni. .uni I hint r.

1 .7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

1940, but it was the July 1941 M AUD report that helped the American bomb effort turn the corner. Here were specific 

plans for producing a bomb, produced by a distinguished group of scientists with high credibility in the United States." 

(Gosling 1999, p. 9).

Meeting with President Roosevelt and Vice President Henry A. Wallace on October 9, Bush relayed the findings in the 

M AUD report and received instructions from the President to quicken the pace of research to determine the feasibility of 

a bomb but not to proceed to production without explicit authorization (Gosling 1999). On November 6 , the National 

Academy of Sciences, under Arthur Compton, issued a report that verified the conclusions of the M AUD report, although 

less optimistically. Compton estimated that "a critical mass of between two and 100 kilograms of uranium-235 would 

produce a powerful fission bomb and that for $50-100 m illion isotope separation in sufficient quantities could be 

accomplished" (Gosling 1999, p. 10). Bush delivered the report to President Roosevelt on November 27. Building on 

this report and acting on the President's instructions, Bush organized an accelerated research project on December 6 that 

would investigate gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation, centrifuge separation, chain reactions, heavy water 

production, and plutonium production. At the same time, he began laying the foundation for engineering studies and the 

construction o f pilot plants (Gosling 1999, Sublette 1997).

America's entry into the war ended the bureaucratic 

O/i nvti'm hi t r. I'm . /.i/m/i jU 'tikcd f’v.ul H.iilun, struggling that had characterized fission study by focusing

investigations on the production of atomic weapons

(Sublette 1999). The National Defense Research 

Committee yielded all "broad policy decisions relating to uranium" to the Top Policy Group consisting of Vice President 

Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Vannevar Bush, and James Conant 

(Gosling 1999, p. 10). America's full commitment to the development of fission weapons came on December 18, 1941, 

when Arthur Compton called the first meeting of the newly created S-1 Committee (Section One, Uranium, of the Office 

of Scientific Research and Development). The Committee awarded $400,000 to Ernest O. Lawrence to continue his 

work on electromagnetic separation of uranium-235 at the University of California, Berkley (Gosling 1999). "W ith the 

United States now at war and with the fear that the American bomb effort was behind Nazi Germany's, a sense of 

urgency permeated the federal government's science enterprise...By spring 1942...the situation had changed from one of 

too little money and no deadlines to one of a clear goal, plenty of money, but too little time" (Gosling 1999, p. 10).

The accelerated research program Bush established at the end of 1941 and President Roosevelt approved on January 19, 

1942 meant several lines of research were being investigated concurrently so an atomic bomb could be delivered to the 

President by 1944. For the development of the Hanford Site, the most pertinent research was that devoted to plutonium 

production through a sustained chain reaction using uranium as a fuel, in January 1942, Compton moved "pile 

research" (reactor research) from Columbia University to the University of Chicago where he established the 

Metallurgical Laboratory. Over the next several months, Fermi's experiments there brought theory ever closer to reality.

In April, his efforts shifted from "demonstrating feasibility to securing graphite and uranium of adequate purity and in 

sufficient quantity to build the [Chicago Pile 1 or CP-1] reactor" (Sublette 1997). By mid-August, Fermi had evinced that 

a chain reaction was a certainty. On December 2, 1942, at 3:49 p.m., Fermi and Samuel K. Allison achieved the world's 

first controlled, self-sustained nuclear chain reaction in an experimental reactor of natural uranium and graphite 

constructed under the squash courts at Stagg Field (Gosling 1999, Sublette 1997). The stage had been set for reactor 

operations at the Hanford Site.

I s o t o p e Se p a r a t io n

Concurrent with the search for technologies to produce the isotopes uranium-235 and plutonium-239 was the search for 

a method to separate these isotopes once they were produced. Vastly different techniques would be required.

Early in 1939, Niels Bohr surmised that uranium-235 and uranium-238 possessed differing fission characteristics and 

concluded that the observed slow fission in uranium was attributable to uranium-235. Together with John A. Wheeler, 

Bohr published this theory on August 31. By March 1940, John R. Dunning of Columbia University experimentally

1 .8
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

confirmed their finding in collaboration with Alfred O. Nier of the University of Minnesota (Gosling 1999). However, to 

determine whether uranium-235 would support an explosive nuclear chain reaction, concentrated samples of this 

isotope, sufficient in size to form a critical mass, would need to be obtained. Separation of this isotope from uranium 

could not be accomplished through chemical means because isotopes of the same element, such as uranium-235 and 

uranium-238, are chemically indistinguishable. Physical separation, based solely on their differing atomic weights, 

would have to be used. Electromagnetic separation, centrifuge separation, and gaseous diffusion were candidate . 

techniques.

Each of these techniques had champions, and each had problems to overcome in moving from an experimental to a 

production stage. Entirely new technologies would have to be designed and built with many of their components 

individually manufactured to exacting tolerances not found in standard industrial applications. Therefore, on May 23,

1942, given the uncertainties of success for any one of these separation methods to concentrate uranuim-235, or at this 

point the likelihood of sustaining a nuclear reaction that would transform uranium into plutonium, Conant urged the 

S-l Committee to proceed w ith all options simultaneously “ regardless of cost.'’ He argued convincingly that ''redundant 

development" would reduce the time required to produce enriched uranium or plutonium (Sublette 1997). The decision 

to push all options forward as fast as possible "reflected the inability of the committee to distinguish a front-runner and its 

consequent unwillingness to abandon any method. With funds readily available and the outcome of the war 

conceivably in the balance, the S-1 leadership recommended that [gaseous diffusion, centrifuge and electromagnetic 

separation, and plutonium production] proceed to the pilot plant stage and to full production planning" (Gosling 1999,

p. 1 1 ).

To ensure timely success, the United States "simultaneously pursued plutonium and highly enriched uranium as fissile 

materials for atomic weapons" (DOE 1997e, p. 136). Implementation of this strategy with respect to uranium enrichment 

led to the establishment of the Clinton Engineer Works, renamed the Oak Ridge Reservation after the war. Research that 

resulted first in the discovery of plutonium and then to a chemical means by which it could be separated from uranium 

led to the establishment of the Hanford Engineer Works, later renamed the Hanford Site.

In their August 1939 publication, Bohr and Wheeler had theorized that a uranium fission byproduct - assigned the 

nondescript elemental placeholder 94239 - would be highly fissionable. Following this lead, Edwin M cM illlan and 

Philip Abelson announced on May 27, 1940 that they had discovered a new element - element 93239 (neptunium) - 

produced by neutron bombardment of uranium-238 within the cyclotron at the University of California, Berkeley. 

Demonstration of this short-lived transuranic element was significant because neptunium, if the Bohr-Wheeler theory of 

transmutation were correct, would become 94239 following an additional beta-decay. Glenn T. Seaborg and Arthur Wahl, 

also of the University of California, Berkeley, brought closure to the theory when they successfully demonstrated the 

existence of element 94239 on February 26, 1941 (Sublette 1997). In 1942, they named this element plutonium, after the 

protocol of naming new elements after the outer planets, that is, uranium (Uranus), neptunium (Neptune), and plutonium 

(Pluto) (Rhodes 1986).

Having demonstrated that plutonium-239 could be created as a fission product from uranium-238, Seaborg, together 

with Emil No Segrd, began to investigate the chemical properties of plutonium. On May 18, 1941, fewer than 3 months 

after its discovery, they concluded that plutonium-239 was 1.7 times as fissionable as uranium-235, thereby "proving it 

to be an even better prospective nuclear explosive" (Sublette 1997). Seaborg subsequently moved to the Metallurgical 

Laboratory in Chicago at Compton's request where he began work on developing a "large-scale, remote-controlled" 

chemical separation and purification process to extract and concentrate plutonium (Rhodes 1986, p. 381). On 

August 20, 1942, Seaborg successfully concluded a sequence of chemical oxidation and reduction cycles using 

"ultramicrochemical equipment" that produced a microgram (a millionth of a gram) of plutonium (Rhodes 1986, p. 414). 

W hile Sublette (1997) correctly notes that Seaborg had identified a methodology that could be used on an industrial 

scale, actual scale-up of the equipment "had to keep abreast of, and in some cases ahead of, the development of the 

[separations] process itself" (Groves 1983, p. 85).

1 .9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Ma n h a t t a n P r o j e c t : Cr e a t io n o f t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

.w ith //i«i ,iuieenicnt o l e \e t\o n e w ho he ld tins dvgtee 01

[or th e fu o je tt. I h .id d v tid r il .ilm o ^l ,i/ f/ir- i m 

//('“ hhihiu f /i.t / 11 ia it m ild h.w «• Z»» .ih.indon < nm pletele .1II no rm .il

o id e rl\ p rm tt/u n s in thv dew lufrrnent 01 the /m if/w f/n /i fd.ints.

H e w o u h l !>i> ahe.id iv///f t/ii'ii .11)1/ < o m lrin lio n .}■* /.M .1-

/mw'fo/i*. vv c/i //i«u»/p ifv w o u ld h.we to />,w- o u r uorA 0/1 //nzm>-f /ifv.iiiiN /«?/ir)i.i/(u\ (/.1/.1 \i>Z/»/r»i> //Ac f/1/1 A iif/ r i c r Act1/) 

atlem /itedheT oie. hot w ith tim e .1- f/ic c o n lto llin i* /./< /or. itc < uu/W 

/;u f .u io rr/ Zu it.i/Z fo /ic -u /c uz",i/iif/i//i!>." - C irrnc* I •)<»«, p. ~ >

Fermi had demonstrated that a controlled, selfsustained nuclear reaction capable o f producing 

plutonium-239 was no longer theoretical. Seaborg 

had provided a means whereby plutonium could 

be chemically separated from irradiated uranium. 

The prerequisites necessary to enable operations at 

the Hanford Site had been met. Nevertheless, the 

gap between laboratory demonstrations and fullscale production was formidable. Lieutenant 

General Leslie R. Groves, who would command 

the Manhattan Project, both encouraged and

demanded risk taking in bridging that gap.

Be g in n in g s o f t h e Ma n h a t t a n P r o j e c t

By mid-1942, government-supported research was concentrated at Columbia University in New York, the University of 

California in Berkeley, and the University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory (DOE 1997e). Although directed towards 

the development of atomic weapons, the S-1 program was still largely an academic endeavor in which scientists held the 

leadership role. This changed within a matter of months.

' llw need m r -v t u / / f i 'rs /C f//i/.u int> Z/ic S-Z /m i!»r./m w ith in

one 01 Z/ic ,v n w d in n c«. and the < o n d riK tio n e \p e rtb c o f f/ic 

< u/po 0 1 1 ngnw vi o n u d e it .1 logit .1/ < lio n <• Zu b u ild the p i odut tio

jIic/7»/C o...W /z/i Z/i/’o rc<i/!»«i»f>.iz/u» Zu p /,u c , f/ic n.W u/c u l f/ic 

\m e rii.m .ilom U bom b e ffo rt ih.uvgod from one dom inated In

/C 'V tirt// it/c /if/s fo Zu u /ic h i k /i/c /i 'ic/c/if/Vfo p l.w vd a s i/p /ic rf/iii* 

zu/v in the to n -trm tion onft rp ri-e ru n In the I n ite d S/.i/vo Vmm 

f <H/io » l fly /H v c /s .' - (iiis lin g I ‘ MW, pp . 11 -1*2

organization experienced in producing weapons" (Sublette 1999, p.

As early as October 9, 1941, the military presence, 

which had largely been excluded with the 

establishment of the National Defense Research 

Committee in June 1940, began to reemerge when 

President Roosevelt authorized Bush to "explore 

construction needs with the Army" (Gosling 1999, 

p. 9). The S-1 Committee decision on May 23,

1942 to move from laboratory research to full 

production prompted a central role for the military 

since the prevailing thought was that weapons 

production should be "brought under an 

2). Bush selected the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

In June 1942, President Roosevelt approved $85 m illion to support atomic weapons development, which was a 

phenomenal increase from the $6,000 supplied for "uranium research" just 2 years earlier (Sublette 1997). The Corps 

assumed responsibility for process development, procurement, design, and site selection. They received $54 m illion in 

funding. The remaining $31 m illion was reserved for research and pilot plant studies under the direction of the 

S-1 Committee in the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Gosling 1999). However, this split between the 

Corps and Office of Scientific Research and Development proved counterproductive, and on June 18, 1942, Brigadier 

General Wilhelm D. Styer ordered Colonel James C. Marshall to organize an Army Corps of Engineer District devoted 

exclusively to managing and coordinating atomic weapons development. Initially named the Laboratory for the 

Development of Substitute Metals, by August 13, 1942, the organization was renamed the Manhattan Engineer District.

Such an industrial scale project under wartime conditions and pressure to produce demanded effective, proven 

leadership. Just a month after its formation, the Army tapped Lieutenant General (then Colonel) Leslie R. Groves to head 

the Manhattan Engineer District and its namesake, the "Manhattan Project." Groves was appointed on September 17,

1942 and "seized immediate and decisive control. In just two days he resolved issues that had dragged on for months 

under Compton" (Sublette 1999):

1 .1 0
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

• Purchasing and shipping 1,250 tons of high quality Belgian Congo uranium to Staten Island

• Purchasing 52,000 acres on the Clinch River in Tennessee

• Raising emergency procurement priority to AAA, the highest allowed by the War Production Board 

(Gosling 1999, Sublette 1997).

Groves' decisiveness was rewarded on September 23, 1942 with his promotion to Brigadier General. He firm ly believed 

that the exigencies of war required that the focus shift from laboratory research to full-scale development and production 

in the shortest time possible. He impressed this view on the scientific community. "Groves' pushy, even overbearing, 

demeanor won him few friends among the scientists on the Manhattan Project (in particular a special enmity developed 

between Groves and Szilard). Many detested him at the time, considering him a boor and a buffoon. It was only after 

the war that many scientists began to appreciate how critical his organizational and managerial genius was to the MED" 

(Sublette 1999, p. 3).

On October 15, 1942, Groves asked j. Robert Oppenheimer to head a laboratory in which research on the physics and 

design of atomic weapons would be centralized. The S-1 Executive Committee had discussed the need for this 

laboratory on September 13. On November 16, 1942, Groves and Oppenheimer selected a site on the Los Alamos mesa 

in New Mexico for the laboratory. The location was code-named "Site Y." in December 1942, Groves initiated 

development planning for the Clinton Engineer Works, code-named "Site X." This location on the Clinch River in 

Tennessee was to contain an experimental reactor, a chemical separations plant, and an electromagnetic separation 

facility (Sublette 1999).

Construction of the Clinton Engineer Works was predicated on the need to accelerate an already compressed schedule. 

Meeting with the M ilitary Policy Committee on November 12, 1942, Groves and Conant argued that centrifuge 

separation should be abandoned and that gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation, and plutonium production 

should bypass the pilot plant stage and proceed directly to full-scale operations. The S-1 Executive Committee seconded 

these decisions on November 14 (Gosling 1999). On December 28, 1942, following a final review of the decisions 

reached by the M ilitary Policy Committee and S-1 Executive Committee, President Roosevelt approved $500 m illion for 

the Manhattan Project (Gosling 1999, Sublette 1997). "No schedule could guarantee that the United States would 

overtake Germany in the race for the bomb, but by the beginning of 1943 the Manhattan Project had the complete 

support of President Roosevelt and the military leadership, the services of some of the nation's most distinguished 

scientists, and a sense of urgency driven by fear" (Gosling 1999, p. 17).

Se l e c t io n o f t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

Even before Fermi had achieved a sustained nuclear reaction, competition had begun to design a prototype large-scale 

production reactor. In June 1942, Thomas V. Moore and his team developed a plan for a helium-cooled pilot reactor to 

be built at the Argonne Forest Preserve outside Chicago. Because of the spherical segmentation of its outer shell, the 

design came to be known as the "Mae West." Eugene Wigner and Gale Young proposed a vertical water-cooled design, 

while Leo Szilard championed a reactor cooled by bismuth, a liquid metal. On October 5, with design frozen for 

months by indecision, Groves gave Compton and the Metallurgical Laboratory scientists 1 week to reach a decision with 

the admonishment that "even wrong decisions are better than no decisions" (Gosling 1999, p. 27). Compton decided to 

build a water-cooled reactor at Argonne, and an air-cooled semiworks at the Clinton Engineer Works. The shift from 

helium to air reflected an analysis by E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company in Wilmington, Delaware of the options 

proposed by the Metallurgical Laboratory (Gosling 1999). Du Pont soon assumed an influential role in the design, 

engineering, and construction of plutonium production and separation facilities.

The Manhattan Project was on a very fast-track. One example among many serves to illustrate this point. In 

December 1942, the M. M. Sundt Company began constructing the Los Alamos Laboratory "without plans or blueprints 

in order to finish as quickly as possible" (Sublette 1997, p. 10). Speed, w hile paramount, did not completely displace the 

concern for safety, however. The Manhattan Project was investing in unproven technology, much of it being developed

1 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

for the first time. Safety consideration as much as the requirement of secrecy ultimately led Groves to locate facilities in 

isolated areas.

For example, Compton's decision to relocate Fermi's second experimental reactor (CP-2) from the University of Chicago 

to the Argonne Forest Preserve was based primarily on safety considerations, that is, the potential effect on an urban 

population should something go wrong with the reactor. This was also the concern underlying Groves' decision to 

relocate the X-10 pilot plutonium reactor and separation plant from Chicago to Tennessee. This latter decision, however, 

had an unanticipated consequence. A pilot facility at the Clinton Engineer Works negated the construction of a full-scale 

production complex there due to siting requirements. There was not enough room for both facilities, and Knoxville was 

too close (Gosling 1999). Additionally, Groves was concerned that if an accident did occur in an untested, large reactor, 

the uranium enrichment facilities planned for the Clinton Engineer Works could be destroyed as well. This, together with 

the loss of life, would compromise the security and viability of the project (Groves 1983). Another location would have 

to be found for the industrial-scale plutonium production and chemical separations facilities.

On December 14, 1942, Metallurgical Laboratory scientists, Du Pont engineers, and Corps staff established the siting 

criteria. W hile he did not attend the meeting, Groves recalls his instructions to the participants and the outcome of the 

meeting:

" / arranged for a meeting at the Du Pont offices in Wilmington to ensure that the Du Pont organization, the

scientific people at Chicago, and the MED would all have the same understanding o f the then-accepted atomic

theories, the known scientific and technical facts, the scientific probabilities, and the construction and operating

problems. After reaching a common understanding, they were to arrive at the criteria for the plutonium plant

site, with special attention to the limitations imposed by safety." - Groves 1983, p. 70

Once they agreed on the criteria, Colonel Franklin T. Matthias, one of Groves' top assistants, and Du Pont engineers 

Gilbert Church and A. E. S. Hall began the scouting work on December 16. Concentrating on six locations in California, 

Oregon, and Washington, they selected an area around the small farming and ranching communities of W hite Bluffs, 

Hanford, and Richland on an isolated stretch of the Columbia River in Washington as the closest match to the siting 

criteria. Groves viewed the proposed site on January 16, 1943 and authorized the establishment of what they called the 

"Hanford Engineer Works" (today the Hanford Site) on 670 square miles of land. The location was assigned the code 

name "Site W " (Gosling 1999). It was the last site selected for the Manhattan Project.

Co m m u n i t y Sa c r if ic e

The Columbia River was the focal point of the Hanford Site. Clear, cold water from this source would dissipate the heat 

generated from nuclear fission within the reactors. Turbines driven by the river's current at Bonneville and Grand Coulee 

dams would supply electrical power. And, in the eyes of Matthias and Groves at least, the area the river flowed through 

was sparsely settled, essentially an empty region particularly well suited for a secret government project. To those 

directly affected by its placement w ithin their communities, it held a different meaning. The land on which the Hanford 

Site would be built was home to Native Americans with long ancestral ties to the land, and Euro-Americans who had 

settled in the area beginning in the 1860s. In constructing the Hanford Site, the Army forcefully removed over 

1500 people who sacrificed their lands, homes, and communities to a war effort the government cloaked from their view.

N ative A m ericans

Concentrated on the Columbia River, near inland water sources and areas of high topographic relief, the archaeological 

record of Native American occupation of the Hanford Site stretches back thousands of years. Typical archaeological sites 

include p it house villages, open campsites, fishing sites, hunting/kill sites, game drive complexes, quarries, and spirit 

quest sites. Physical features such as rock cairns, rock alignments, or artifacts mark these sites. Other sites relating to 

subsistence and ceremonial activities, which are not marked by physical remains, are also present but generally 

unrecognized by non-Native Americans. In 1943, the Wanapum were still resident in the Priest Rapids Valley - the area 

soon to become the Hanford Site. They called the Columbia River Ci Wana (big river), and from it took their name (the

1 .1 2
Ch a p t e r l - H is to ric O v e rv ie w

river people). They used many of the same gg

locations as their ancestors and engaged in a 

largely traditional lifestyle of fishing, hunting, and 

gathering, although white settlement had restricted 

their access to some areas. Their tie to the land 

was deeply rooted, but the Manhattan Project 

needed a secure area.

St i e/ in ih f'ii /iM iirv h.u l //if H .i/m /iu/iii i.nlcd //if you m m cn l

1/1.1/ //M -uhduvd m u I llw n ix n n iv d them I ’m k H \.ih fix*I me!

w ith the (u liin c i ■ M.i/f/i/.i-:' .1/11/he.nrf /«■» -/rin lh .il the

um em inent needed the land .m il lh .il the p ro file « m ild io .in i .it

n il/ no fontiei. M« tinrieMfnot/ f>ui 11.lam ents n t the < uinnel -

l.ilk. re .ih /in ii on/i lh .it it n ic .in l .m olhei m in e ,m d lh .il .ill b ill

When the Wanapum had to abandon their camps 

at W hite Bluffs and other locations on the 

Hanford Site, they concentrated their activities at

the l.n t old \ill.iu e -lie 11a* /<>*>/. . I he U>t \\,in.ipuni'>. Ih e ir he.irt^

\\.n e t inn. ifutellx '•u tienileied theii .int c ^ li.il fi-hinn tin m iu l .m il

lilte d in in n n n .d l- .it W hite M utf*. het .nee the ym rm/m'/W >.dd

111% ItllMI H |i #11 I Ml Mi III lillH |\ I I * /l« | | l a I

Priest Rapids. They continually sought to retain § j

entry to the Hanford Site to fish for salmon at their

traditional camps since salmon was a primary staple and central to their religion. Shortly after construction began and 

the security fences had been established, Matthias made inquiries about "restricting the Indian fishing rights in the project 

area." He was told that "it would be difficult to obtain an out and out restriction, but that it might be possible to deal

i

die kin d u .I* needed. " - Ki'l.mrlvr I *)■><», p 2 “"

locally" (Matthias 1945). On September 15, 1943, Matthias entered the following in his diary:

"...when the Indians arrive in this area in the faii, they spend two or three weeks,, usually in October, fishing in

who w ill, at their request, during the fishing season haul the Indians and the fish from White Bluffs to their camp

at Priest Rapids once a day. This would perm it the Indians to do their fishing under supervision, it would avoid

the necessity o f their living and sleeping in the area, and would assure them o f as much fish as they now get. A

cash settlement to be paid annually for their privilege to fish and be in that part o f the river was rejected by the

Chief. His only interest was that he get fish." - Matthias 1945, pp. 176-177

This arrangement was superseded by an arrangement made on April 2, 1944 whereby "it was agreed that these Indians 

would be passed through the reservation on presentation of a pass by one of three people, the Chief and his two 

assistants, who would be permitted to escort other Indians of the Tribe. Indians without these three people w ill not be 

admitted" (Matthias 1945, p. 57). Issuance of these passes was eventually revoked for "security reasons"

(Relander 1956).

When the Wanapum were relocated for the Manhattan Project, their possessions were left behind. Frances Riddell 

described the consequences of relocation at one site adjacent to the Columbia River:

"This village was suddenly abandoned at the beginning o f World War II when the Federal government took over

the area in order to establish a military reservation. As the Indians were not present at the time> one informant

told meall o f their houses and belongings remained just as the inhabitants had ieft them, the Indians were not

allowed to return for their belongings. However, the houses were soon broken into by irresponsible whites and

the belongings o f the Indians taken or strewn about the area." - Riddell 1948, p. 1

Concern about their material possessions was far overshadowed by their concern for their ancestors as Matthias notes of 

Chief Johnny Buck's request to "treat Indian Graves which we find with reverence and dispose of the bodies in some 

reasonable way" (Matthias 1945, p. 57). It would be nearly 15 years before the Wanapum regained access to the 

Hanford Site to mark their cemeteries. In the fall of 1997, indicative o f post-production changes, DOE approved a 

long-standing request, and Wanapum Elders began to bring Tribal members, especially children and young-adults, to see 

and learn about their sacred sites and traditional cultural places first-hand on an annual basis.

payment o f their fishing privileges. It was finally agreed that we provide the Indians with a truck and a driver

the river opposite and north o f White Bluffs. These fish are cut up and dried and provide the principal item o f

food for the tribe during the winter. A number of proposals were offered to the Indians in which they indicated

very little interest, among them was (1) a cash settlement equivalent to the value o f the fish, (2) a proposal that

we deliver to them the amount o f fish they would normally catch in a year, (3) that they would be permitted to

fish in the White Bluffs area this fall, but that they w ould not come back next fall, including a provision for a

1 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Euro-Americans

The transformation of the Priest Rapids Valley from an agrarian to an industrial landscape began with the Manhattan 

Project and continued throughout the Cold War. When Matthias came to view the site in December 1942, the area was 

still recovering from the effects of the Depression (Sharpe 1999). The principal towns were W hite Bluffs, Hanford, and 

Richland. Smaller communities like Vernita, Allard, Wahluke, and Ringold were primarily ferrying stations facilitating 

crossings of the Columbia River. Active and abandoned farmsteads lay between these centers, from his vantage point, 

Matthias missed more than.a hundred years of history and the roots these settlers had set down in the desert sand.

The Second War Powers Act authorized the Secretary of War to "acquire lands by purchase, as needed for military or 

other war purposes" (Sharpe 1999, p. T). On February 8 , 1943, Henry Stimson began land acquisition proceedings 

under directive RE-D 2161 (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.6). Ultimately, 670 square miles of land were withdrawn from 

settlement (Figure 1.3). On March 6 , residents received an official notification, known as a "declaration of taking," that 

informed them the Army was taking their land for a top-secret project. The government provided from 90 days to as little 

as 48 hours for residents to relocate, forcing many to leave most of their possessions behind (Chatters 1989, Sharpe 

1999). "There was no time to harvest crops or say proper goodbyes before being separated from lifelong friends" 

(Anonymous 1996). W alt Grisham, a W hite Bluffs resident, was serving in the U.S Army Air Corps stationed in 

Wormingford, England when he received a letter telling him his home and farm had been condemned and his family 

moved because of an important project. "I wondered w hy the postmark was from Hanford, and not W hite Bluffs. I 

learned that the families were asked not to mention much to their sons serving in the war" (Sorenson 1999).

For some, the enforced relocation came at a very high price: "It was a pretty hard thing. Some of them ended up at 

Medical Lake (the location of a state mental hospital), you know, they couldn't quite face it. M y mother never really 

adjusted to it. The fact that the government could come in and take your home away" (Ashton 1999).

The Army used many of the abandoned homes for 

offices and living quarters and brought in prison labor 

to harvest the crops. Under condemnation, the 

government offered only the value for the home as 

assessed by non-local appraisers and not the value of 

improvements, equipment, or the crops in the field 

(Heriford 1995). Many landowners rejected the Army's 

offer and filed petitions in court to secure a better 

appraisal. "Matthias adopted a strategy of settling out 

of court to save time, time being a more important 

commodity than money to the Manhattan Project"

(Gosling 1999, p. 32).

When they were done with construction of the 

Manhattan Project at the Hanford Site, the Army razed 

the homes and cut down the orchards. W hile the 

people were proud of what they had contributed to the 

war effort when "the secret" was revealed in 1945, their 

resentment over how they were treated remains strong 

even today. "Gone are those peaceful autumns; gone, 

in fact, is W hite Bluffs itself. It cannot even be called a 

ghost town, because the buildings too are gone, except 

for the remains of a few foundations which stand like 

teeth whose fillings have dropped out...W hite Bluffs, 

was a victim of the age of the atom; it is a ghost which Fjgure 7 .5 . initial M ap Designating the Area o f the Hanford

marks man's "progress" (Harris 1972, p. 1). Site, 1943

Public Proclamation No. 18 -July 14,1943

jjo

The Prssclamatioa tyax issued by the BeadquaSere ofthe t 

Theatres trilkhr &ebsny sowSdssy fe e tissdesi$sa£ed a 

The exefcsiosi stea was w iiiifc J>&!irasy Areas Nos. 1 ma'.

' Keadquaficts was i«atedat sbePtosidmaf ffenTesctism

1 .1 4

]
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Findlay and Hevly (1995, p. 11) offer a less personal but more encompassing summary of the displacement of the local 

population: "The Army separated almost all people from their homes and lands on the site; only a handful of people, 

who got work on the project, stayed behind in their homes, and they now paid, rent to Du Pont for the privilege. Even 

the dead were evicted. The government exhumed 177 burials from the W hite Bluffs cemetery and reinterred them in the 

nearby town of Prosser."

For the record, the Hanford townsite cemetery was also relocated to Prosser. The Army's actions at W hite Bluffs and 

Hanford were similar to those undertaken at Kingston and Clinton, Tennessee. There the Army acquired clear title for 

immediate use of approximately 56,000 acres between October 1942 and March 1943 through condemnation. Nearly 

1000 families were forced to relocate, some within 2 weeks of receiving their eviction notice. Compensation came only 

after the property had been vacated, and relocation expenses were not compensated. There too, structures not retained 

for "war-related uses" were demolished (Souza et al. 1996, p. 3-35).

In it ia l Co n s t r u c t io n

Site Name: Hanford Engineer Works - December 1943 to December 1946

Site Manager: Col. Franklin T. Matthias - February 1943 to August 1945

Responsible Agency: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - December 1942 to December 1946

Site Contractor: E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co, Inc. - December 1942 to August 1946

Groves succinctly recounts the rules common to all Manhattan Project construction sites: "All design was governed by 

three rules: 1 ) safety first against both known and unknown hazards; 2 ) certainty of operation - every possible chance of 

failure was guarded against; and 3) the utmost saving of time in achieving full production" (Groves 1983, p. 83).

The initial construction phase for the Hanford Engineer Works (originally named the Gable Project by the War 

Department and later named the Hanford Site) extended from March 1943 to February 1945 (Gerber 1992b). During 

that time, the Corps transformed an open agrarian landscape into a closed military-industrial complex described by one 

former resident as "a vast impersonal government site...with guards stationed at strategic points" (Harris 1972, pp. 1 -2).

Chosen as much for its isolation as its resources of water, sand, and gravel, the Corps now had to construct not only the 

complex itself, but the infrastructure necessary to support it. That.they did this under adverse conditions (particularly, 

wind, weather, and a short labor supply) during wartime and under tight security was a major engineering 

accomplishment "Once the land was procured, construction proceeded at a nearly unbelievable pace, in just the 

30 months between groundbreaking in March 1943, and the end of the war in August 1945, the MED built 554 buildings 

not dedicated to living requirements" (Gerber 1992b, p. 6 ).

These buildings ranged from reactors, separation plants, and laboratories to craft shops, warehouses, and electrical 

substations. Many of these buildings, such as the reactors and chemical separations plants, were first-of-a-kind since 

nothing of their type or scale had ever existed before (see Sections 3 and 4 in Chapter 2 for expanded discussions). For 

comparison, Fermi's first "pile" (the Chicago Pile 1 Reactor or CP-1), designed only to demonstrate a sustained chain 

reaction, was an ellipse that measured 25 feet wide by 20 feet high and used 56 tons of uranium fuel, 400 tons of 

graphite, had no cooling system, and operated at a maximum power level of 200 watts-thermal. The X-10 Reactor at the 

Clinton Engineer Works, designed as an experimental reactor to provide research quantities of plutonium, was a 24-toot 

cube, used milled uranium-metal fuel elements encased in aluminum, was air-cooled, and operated at a maximum 

power level of 4 million watts-thermal. The Hanford Site Manhattan Project reactors (B, D, and F), designed as 

plutonium production plants, were rectangular, measured 36 feet long by 28 feet wide by 36 feet high, used 200 tons of 

uranium-metal fuel, used 1200 tons of graphite, were water-cooled, and operated at an initial power level of 250 million 

watts-thermal.

1 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

W hile the m illion-fold scale-up in reactors was remarkable, the Hanford Site chemical separations plants (221-B, 221-T, 

and 221-U) truly amplified the extant model developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory: "Plutonium production at 

Hanford depended as much on chemical separation as it did on chain-reacting piles [reactors]. The chemistry was 

Glenn Seaborg's, spectacularly scaled up a billionfold directly from his team's earlier ultramicrochemical work"

(Rhodes 1986, p. 603).

Just as the selection of the Hanford Site had been preconditioned by siting criteria, so too was the design of the complex 

itself. The Corps and Du Pont used both the available space and the natural landforms to isolate and contain the primary 

production areas (see Figure 1.4). The reactors, six of which were planned, had to be adjacent to the Columbia River 

because of their cooling requirements. Starting inland from the western boundary and farthest from the communities of 

Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco, the reactors would be sited at intervals of at least 1 mile along the river. The reactor 

complexes were given sequential alphabetic identifications A through F. To increase separation between reactors and 

their isolation within the Hanford Site, the Corps selected B, D, and F as the initial locations for construction. By using 

alternating locations, the separation between reactors averaged nearly 6 miles. The reactor complexes were assigned the 

Area identification codes 100-B, 100-D, and 100-F. Each area (B, D, etc.) contained one reactor and support facilities.

The chemical separations plants, four of which were planned, would be built some 10 miles south of the reactors within 

the interior of the Hanford Site. Two of these plants would be built in the 200 East Area, while the other two would be

built some 4 miles away in the 200 West Area. The

-ivv-f

/A re a

•-X.

Figure 1.4. Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project Around

1945 When the Site Was Called the Hanford Engineer Works

basalt landforms of Gable Butte and Gable Mountain 

lay between the reactors and the separation plants, 

providing additional safety should something happen 

at either the irradiation or separation plants. Finally, 

the fuel manufacturing facilities (300 Area), considered 

the least threatening of the primary operations, would 

be located on the river approximately 2 0 miles 

southeast of the separation plants and 1 0 miles north of 

the administrative area (700 Area) and residential/ 

commercial center (1100 Area) planned for Richland 

(Gerber 1994a, Gosling 1999, Rhodes 1986).

The uncertainties surrounding the emerging 

technologies and the consequences associated with 

their failure marked the Hanford Site as one of the 

greatest scientific experiments of modern time or one 

of the riskiest. The Corps therefore designed each 

process area as an independent unit complete with 

operations facilities, operations support facilities, and 

administrative, security, health, communication, utility, 

and waste support facilities. This structural 

redundancy was a hedge against failure in any one unit 

since the overriding objective was the uninterrupted 

production of plutonium. To knit these units together, 

the Corps established a transportation, utilities, and 

communications infrastructure.

The single railroad line to the Hanford Site and the 

existing road system constituted the backbone of the 

transportation system that would move workers and

1 .1 6

j
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

materials. However, these facilities needed to be upgraded. New construction added "158 miles of railroad and 

386 miles of roadway" (Chatters 1989, p. D.85).

; Electrical power for the 100 and 200 Areas would be obtained from the Grand Coulee-to-Bonneville grid, while the

| remainder of the Hanford Site would receive power from the Midway-to-Walla Walla tie-line. To route this power, the

Corps constructed 52 miles of transmission lines. These electrical lines, together with the "distribution substations, fence 

and road lighting, fire alarm systems,, and telephones and telephone cables," were a non-geographic area but nonetheless 

assigned a numeric area identification, the 500 Area, to meet the military need for order and organization (Gerber et al. 

1997, p. 5.22).

Similarly, the 800 Area referred to the steam power plants and all "overhead pipe line facilities, specifically all pipe 

supports, steam lines, air lines, and process lines," while the 900 Area identified all "underground pipe line facilities, 

specifically the export water lines and valve houses, raw water and fire protection lines, sanitary sewers, process sewers, 

f wells, and pumps" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.23).

One of the most visible and ubiquitous items constructed was fencing. Hundreds of miles of fences were placed around 

the Hanford Site and its facilities. Fences were erected around key facilities within fenced complexes, and even the 

I administrative center within the residential community was enclosed by fences. See Chapter 2, Sections 1 and 11, for

additional discussion on construction and infrastructure.

Re c r u it in g a W o r k f o r c e a n d Se c u r in g M a t e r ia l s

Recruiters made direct inquiries to Du Pont staff engineers, scientists, and consultants and enticed many to relocate with 

? offers of better pay or more challenging work, although the specific nature of that work could not be explicitly stated

(Dejong 1995). Du Pont, working with the War Manpower Commission and the U.S. Employment Service, conducted 

aggressive advertisement campaigns in 47 of the 48 existing states as well as Alaska and Canada. Tennessee was 

excluded because of recruitment for the Clinton Engineer Works. The advertisements touted "attractive" wages and ■ 

extended, steady hours for skilled and unskilled workers. Unskilled workers could make twice the daily rate offered to 

laborers elsewhere, while skilled labor was offered a daily rate of $15 - 50 percent more than the prevailing rate of $10. 

Even with these incentives, maintaining a full labor force remained more an objective than an accomplishment 

| throughout initial construction: "The work proceeded slowly, dogged by recruiting problems. The nation at war had

; moved beyond full employment to severe labor shortages and men and women w illing to camp out on godforsaken

■j scrubland far from any major city were hard to find" (Rhodes 1986, p. 499).

i ‘i

Recruiters had to work hard since "they found themselves competing against other employers, including the armed 

services, which enjoyed a head start in mobilizing for war" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 15). To counter the effects of the 

draft and voluntary military enlistment, Du Pont reached out to people who were not at the top of the Selective Service's 

list: "Slightly more than half of all employees were 38 years or older, and therefore above the maximum drafting age, 

and three-quarters of those between 18 and 26 years old had 4-F ratings" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 17). Women 

made up nearly 13 percent of the workforce, and African Americans made up an additional 16 percent. Both of these 

groups were segregated within the Hanford construction camp. W hile initially reluctant to hire Hispanic Americans, 

Matthias eventually conceded to the War Manpower Commission but housed those who were hired "near Pasco, off the 

Hanford Site and away from the other workers" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 18).

Extraordinary measures were taken as necessary to ensure that construction continued at an accelerated schedule: "Later 

in 1944, when the project required trained pipe-fitters for completing the three piles [reactors], the Manhattan Engineer 

District (MED) furloughed enlisted men from active duty, enrolled them in reserve units, and employed them as civilian 

workers at Hanford, with a promise to reinduct them into the Army if their work proved unsatisfactory. Matthias and 

I Du Pont protected other highly skilled personnel, which the project could not afford to lose, by reaching agreements

with local draft boards" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 16).

1 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

As with all aspects of the Manhattan Project, the need for secrecy hampered Du Font's ability to hire and maintain 

workers. Since they could not be told specifically what the purpose of their work was, many employees left because 

they felt they were "not making a contribution to the war effort." Even those who stayed developed "a transient 

mentality" because they did not know if the Hanford Site would exist after the war. Union relations were difficult 

because of the secrecy issue although appeals to patriotism and skilled labor shortages "forced organized labor to 

become accommodating" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 21). See Chapter 2, Section 12 for additional discussion of this 

topic.

The issue of secrecy extended to the acquisition of supplies. So as not to tip off the War Production Board, the Hanford 

Site was constrained by procurement and transportation ratings of less than the optimum AAA. Gerber (1992b, p. 11) 

notes, for example, materials such as "lower grades of steel, and even of earthenware" sometimes were substituted where 

"a high grade of Colombian (Austenitic) stainless steel" should have been used. Other materials like "heavy-gauge 

railroad track, cement, copper, lumber, iron, electrical wire, graphite and aluminum were always in short supply...[but] 

the Hanford project could acquire an overriding priority when necessary."

Ha n f o r d Co n s t r u c t io n Ca m p

Colonel Matthias was charged with delivering plutonium to Los Alamos as soon as possible, and Lieutenant General 

Groves made several visits to the Hanford Site to remind him of the urgency. Yet for most of 1943, Matthias had to 

postpone construction of the production facilities and concentrate the workforce on constructing the facilities needed to 

house and support the workers, most of whom lived in tents through the first 6 months of construction (Findlay and 

Hevly 1995). Du Pont selected the now evacuated Hanford townsite to serve as the genesis o f the construction camp 

because of its proximity to the 100 and 200 Areas and the utilities already existing there. Already numbering 12,500 in 

August 1943, the construction force increased nearly four-fold to 45,000 at its peak in June 1944 (Thayer 1996). By that 

time, the "self-contained tow n" had "131 barracks for 24,892 men and another 64 barracks for 4,357 women;

880 hutments [Quonset huts] for men; and 3,639 trailer lots" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 25). In addition to housing, 

the camp also included 65 construction shops, a 24-building administrative area, eight mess halls, saloons, stores, a 

recreation hall and auditorium, a theater, a bowling alley, and a softball diamond among other amenities. Services 

included eight schools, a day nursery, five fire stations, and a large infirmary and clinic (Gerber 1999, p. 5).

Rhodes (1986, p. 499) reports that meat rationing, common during the war, did not occur at the Hanford construction 

camp. In fact, the ready availability of meat was used in recruiting the workforce, which was amply fed as evidenced by 

the information obtained from a posting found on a barrack wall by Artie McDaniels. A copy of the posting is on file at 

the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory in Richland, Washington 

(see sidebar box).

Various authors have described the Hanford construction camp as a "sea of tents and barracks, where workers had little 

to do and nowhere to go" (Gosling 1999, p. 32), where "boredom and loneliness" prevailed (Chatters 1989, p. D.85), 

and even the saloons were built "with windows hinged for easy tear-gas lobbing" (Rhodes 1986, p. 499). Findlay and 

Hevly (1995, p. 26) seek to put this "notoriety" in perspective by observing that the camp was not dissimilar from "the 

kind of rough-and-tumble community - like mining, lumber, and other construction camps - that emerged in the 

American West whenever a hard-working, well-paid, heavily male population was concentrated temporarily in one 

spot."

Just to be sure, however, the Corps did lock up their women, who lived in segregated barracks behind barbed wire under 

the watchful protection of "housemothers" and guards. The effectiveness of this enforced separation may be suspect, 

though, given events at Los Alamos where one women's dormitory came under review for closure until "a determined 

group o f bachelors argued even more persuasively against closing the dorm. It seems that the girls had been doing a 

flourishing business of requiting the basic needs of our young men, and at a price" even with roving m ilitary police 

(Robert Wilson, quoted in Rhodes 1986, pp. 566-567).

1.18
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

A more typical image of life at the camp is pn 

Hanford Site from Texas in 1944: "Primer anc 

pass to, going in and out. I worked the late sh 

other. Primer would visit me in the sitting roo

Chapter 2, Section 12 of this book adds substa 

throughout the operational life of the Hanford 

faced.

clvided by Susanna Brown, who together with her husband, moved to the 

lived in different barracks with fences and a guard you had to show a 

ift and my husband worked on another so we didn't see much of each 

m - all of the women's barracks had one" (Sorenson 1996, p. 5).

ntially to these images of life not only at the Hanford Camp but also 

Site. It gives voice to the people who worked here and the issues they

\\t>i Id War II ViMinu, l-ouml tin a Rair.ttL Wall

• 1,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 meal ticket cards on file

• S3,500,000 worth of meal tickets sold in 8 months through payroll deduction (do* 

not include meal tickets sold for cash)

• Menus prepared 60 days in advance

• Eight mess halls, 2700 workers in each hall at each setting, usually three settings per meal

• 3000 pounds of sausage used for one breakfast

• 2500 pounds of pot roast for one meal

• 18,000 pork chops for one meal for one mess hall

• 11,000 pounds of Swiss steak for one meal for all mess halls

• 250.000 pounds of meal used for all mess halls for 1 week

• 15 tons o f potatoes for one mess hall each day

• 5000 heads of lettuce for each meal for one mess hall

• 1 2 0 0 pounds of onions for one meal for one mess hall

• 900 full pies for one meal for one mess hall

• 600 gallons of ice cream a day

• 250 good cows needed to supply the m ilk for one breakfast

• 1 0 0 0 pounds of coffee tor one day for one mess half

• 700 cases of Coca-Cola a clay

• 2 2 0 0 loaves of bread used each day for sandwiches, not counting bread on tables

• Three sandwich machines, each making 360 sandwiches an hour

» 272,000 pounds o f processed meat, ready for oven or grill used in 1 week

• 4,000,000 lunch boxes sold from July 1943 to October 1944

• >0 , 0 0 0 doughnuts for one clay'

• An automatic doughnut machine making 18,000 doughnuts per hour

• 6500 eggs used for Sunday breakfast (only time fried eggs could be served be

were served over a longer period of time)

• 12,000 turkeys for Thanksgiving (22 tons of turkey, 1 2 tons of ham)

Other information supplied on this sheet indicates:

• Number of employees quartered in barracks: 40,000

• Number of employees quartered in trailer camp: 8,000

• 1 0 , 0 0 0 newspapers sold each day by recreation halls

• 16,000 packages of.cigarettes sold each day

• 12,000 gallons of beer consumed each week ( I 3 carloads)

• 2 0 0 0 kevs for barrac ks lost each month by employees

• 1.785.000 sheets washed. If these were tied together they would reach from Hanford to

• Hantord is the largest voting precinct in the United States

• Hanford has the largest general-deltvery post office in the world

1 .1 9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

From the beginning the workweek was long, and, as deadlines neared, it only got longer. It was initially a 6 -day, 8 -hoUr 

shift, then the Corps added an extra hour to each day in September 1943 and finally added floodlights to allow "aroundthe-clock construction" at the 100-B and 100-D Areas (Gerber 1992b, p. 8 ). Despite the cold and heat and the winds 

that blew the freshly released desert sands into and over everyone and everything, the workforce housed at the Hanford 

construction camp succeeded in building the world's first industrial-scale plutonium production and extraction complex 

in just under 2 years - a truly remarkable feat considering that today the paperwork alone required to permit construction 

of a single reactor would take significantly more time. By late February 1945 as the Corps and Du Pont were gearing up 

for operations, the camp was abandoned. Facilities that could be used elsewhere were moved out. Trailers, for example, 

were relocated to North Richland in 1946 to house General Electric and Atomic Energy Commission employees and their 

families, while the larger buildings such as the mess hall, recreation hall, and barracks were either dismantled or 

relocated to meet a growing postwar need for housing and temporary office space (Chatters 1989, p. D.85). W ithin a 

year after the war ended, whatever remained of the camp was removed and the area leveled, leaving only the roadway 

grid and a few isolated foundations low enough to have escaped complete destruction by the bulldozer's blade.

Ric h l a n d Vil l a g e

Though construction began on both the Hanford construction camp and the Richland Village (1100 Area) in 1943, the 

areas provide a study in contrasts. "Du Pont built the Hanford camp to house the workers during construction of the first 

three production reactors, two chemical separations canyons, and assorted other facilities. It erected the Richland 

Village to house the employees who would administer and operate the plant" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 12). The 

authors go on to list a number of juxtapositions beginning with their designations: Hanford was a camp, Richland was a 

village. Hanford was meant to last only as long as construction required, Richland would be a permanent settlement. 

Hanford was hastily built, Richland was planned and revised with changing conditions. Hanford was working class, 

Richland was middle class. Indeed, Matthias fully intended that Richland Village house supervisors, engineers, 

operators, and essential office staff and that craftsmen and laborers would be assimilated within the communities of 

Kennewick and Pasco.

To build the administrative and residential center, the Corps condemned the original Richland townsite and farms 

adjacent to it. Since the Hanford construction camp held a higher priority in terms of completion, residents of Richland 

were given until November 15 to evacuate their homes. As with the communities of W hite Bluffs and Hanford, the 

Corps identified 150 houses it could use together with some commercial properties and the irrigation system, then

destroyed the rest creating an open, dusty 

landscape where the town once stood. W hile 

“ M h rn to m p lv lrd . lurl/iH r U ith l.m d n 'p rc -v n lv d ,i < o m p ro m n r agreeing in principle that the Village would

h v tw rv n ih v \n in n » o f D u Pont .u id (n o w *. V .i r<‘-u/f o f t iv serve the managers and operators, the Corps and

tit'mv.i/'s ivruri- to t‘t n n u m i/v thv tow n w ound up w ith in .u ic ip u tv ' Du Pont disagreed on how well and at what

n u m bct* in -ir/cw.i/Av */«>iv> muI 'h o p p in g .irc.i-, no in /i 1 cost. Groves ordered that Richland Village be

tv n tc i. muI/ u,ids too n .irrim to i n in th uuto tr.iffh ...W .u tim c built "as cheaply as possible" and pressed the

Rit h l.m tl ,tbt> h.tri it- >h.nc o i tom por.m h o in iii» - 2 > d o tn u to riv■. In same requirement on Los Alamos and the 

l » - -o th,d it i o tifd h o u -r ho th «u m tru i lio n muI »/«■;.iliu m Clinton Engineer Works. However, Du Pont, in

w lw n H unt' tu n p h .no- o f Ih m io rd r/i-i c lo p n w n t _ effect looking out for its future staff who would

mi'/7.ip/W * -rimlhiv and Hrvlx p. $?{ ' be the operators and managers of the Hanford

 ^ .................. ■ Site, insisted that quality and comfort be

included within the design. For example, while 

Groves proposed "barracks and dormitories," Du Pont held firm for houses and submitted designs commensurate with 

the employee's status - the alphabet houses that still distinguish the former Richland Village within contemporary 

Richland. Unlike Los Alamos and the Clinton Engineer Works, Richland Village was not enclosed within a fence, 

although it was tightly guarded and monitored by the Army. The only fenced area w ithin the Village included the 

Administrative or 700 Area (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 34-39).

1 .2 0
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

G. Albin Pehrson, the Spokane architectural engineer Du Pont engaged to design Richland Village, developed a 

"neighborhood-oriented plan" that would provide an "island of refuge" from the military atmosphere surrounding the 

Hanford Site. By 1945, the Village contained 4329 houses and a population of 16,000. The houses, eight conventional 

styles (A, B, D, E, F, G, H, and L) and three pre-fabricated styles (A-1, B-1, and C -l), were classified based on the number 

of bedrooms and total cost (Gerber et al. 1997, pp. 5.24-5.25). For the few who moved from the construction camp to 

the Village, the difference was described by Neil MacGregor: "We felt unspeakably elegant in rooms with plastered 

walls, painted woodwork and splinterless floors" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 34).

Richland Village also contained 24 commercial or retail stores including food and drug stores, barber and beauty shops, 

a hardware and variety store, and an icehouse. Community buildings included three schools, a church, a hospital, a 

movie theater, and a combined police and fire station. Recreational activities were enhanced by the incorporation of 

open spaces and green belts within the residential areas and a park along the Columbia River (Gerber et al., 1997, 

p. 5.25). Interestingly, in an ironic way, Du Pont and the Army found themselves on opposing sides with respect to the 

operation of the Village:

"In building R ichlandthe Arm y had wanted to skimp on expenses while Du Pont had wished to spend more; in

operating the village> those roles were reversed. W.O. Simon, Du Pont's manager at HEW, called the Army

"liberal" in its treatment o f residents and pointed out a number o f instances where the Arm y had demonstrated

too much initiative in providing services to townspeople. Du Pont's more “conservative" approach, according to

Simon, “ would avoid any activity or endeavor not necessary to its immediate needs and would follow rather

than anticipate public o p in io n - Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 43

Anytime the Army is called "liberal," a significant difference of opinion must exist. Engaging as this thread may be, the 

interested reader is directed to continue with the Findlay and Hevly manuscript for a better understanding of the cultural 

history of the Hanford Site and the Tri-Cities.

C o n s t r u c t in g t h e Op e r a t io n s Fa c il it ie s

Construction of the operating facilities was a shared responsibility among the Corps, the Metallurgical Laboratory, and 

Du Pont. The Corps was responsible for funding, scheduling, and decision making. The Metallurgical Laboratory 

scientists were responsible for the theoretical construct. Du Pont was responsible for design and engineering. As with 

many multiparty undertakings, the degree to which the parties disparage one another varies inversely with the level of 

success being achieved. In this case, the scientists were quick and consistent in criticizing Du Pont's "caution, expertise, 

and management skills," though in hindsight many credit Du Pont's "industrial experience, its engineering orientation, 

and its cautious policies" with bringing order to chaos and ultimately ensuring "the timely success of Hanford" (Findlay 

and Hevly 1995, pp. 13-14). Groves singles out Du Pont manager Crawford H. Greenewalt for praise in handling a 

difficult situation:

"[Greenewalt] served as the bridge between the hard-driving, thoroughly competent, industrial-minded,

scientific engineers and executives at Wilmington and the highly intelligent and theoretically inclined scientists

at Chicago. This means that he had to shuttle back and forth between Chicago and Wilmington and later

Hanford, easing tensions and calming tempers and, at the same time, seeing to it that needed scientific decisions

were prom ptly reached at Chicago." - Groves 1983, p. 79

Gosling (1999, p. 30) maintains that a sense of lessened importance, occasioned by the construction of the Hanford Site 

and the Clinton Engineer Works, fueled some of the scientists' criticism as "M et Lab research became increasingly 

unimportant in the race for the bomb and the scientists found themselves serving primarily as consultants for Du Pont." 

Time, or more specifically the lack of it, was also a factor: "The scientists' complaint about Du Pont, and 

General Groves' constant pressure on Matthias, stemmed primarily from the extreme urgency of the project from start to 

finish...Such urgency pushed construction and operations at Hanford at a pace that would have been inconceivable 

outside of wartime" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 14).

1 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Uncertainty coupled w ith accelerated schedules contributed even more to the frustration of all parties. Construction 

would be ongoing while the basic research underlying nuclear reaction and chemical separations was still being 

developed. However, as Groves later noted, "it is essential to keep in mind the truly pioneering nature of the plutonium 

development...gigantic steps [were taken]...moving rapidly...from the idea stage to an operating plant" (Groves quoted 

in Gerber 1992b, p. 71).

Design and construction proceeded simultaneously and more often than not out of step since the exigencies of war 

allowed little or no time for testing or validating designs. For example, groundbreaking for the cooling system for the first 

Hanford Site production reactor, 105-B, began on August 27, 1943, barely 8 months after Fermi had started CR-1, a 

short-term experimental reactor operated with no cooling system, and 3 months before initial operation of the air-cooled 

X-10 Reactor. Cooling a reactor with water was unprecedented, yet the success o f full-scale plutonium production and 

the Hanford Site's contribution to the Manhattan Project in large part rested on this entirely new and untested 

technology: "Because of the tremendous energy associated with fission, a great amount of heat is developed. To 

produce one ounce of plutonium, the reactor must develop a thousand kilowatts of heat power for a period of a month. 

Where many pounds are involved, a major engineering problem is the removal of this heat" (Compton 1956, p. 161).

On October 4, 1943, Du Pont engineers released the design drawings for the B Reactor allowing construction to begin 

6 days later with general site preparation (Sublette 1997). "Starting with the foundations for the pile [reactor] and the 

deepwater basins behind it where the irradiated slugs [fuel elements] would be collected after discharge, the work crews 

were w ell above ground by the end of the year" (Rhodes 1986, pp. 499-500). See the Historic American Engineering 

Record (HAER) for the B Reactor in Appendix B of this book on the Internet for a detailed discussion of the reactor's 

construction and operations.

More than half a continent away, Du Pont was also constructing the X-10 complex at the Clinton Engineer Works to test 

the principles of reactor operation and plutonium separation. Groundbreaking on this pilot reactor and its associated 

chemical separations plant containing six hot cells had begun during February 1943. W ithin 9 months of initiating 

construction, the X-10 Graphite Reactor went critical (condition in which a material undergoes nuclear fission at a 

self-sustaining rate) on November 4, 1943 and began "producing the first substantial (gram) amounts of plutonium to 

assist research into its properties" (Sublette 1997). With the world's supply of plutonium at this time standing at 

2.5 milligrams, all produced in cyclotrons, the 1.54 milligrams extracted within the separation ceils at the Clinton 

Engineer Works by the end of the year nearly doubled the amount available for research. A secret courier carried the 

plutonium to the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago using a container resembling a penlight (Souza et al. 1996, 

p. 3-39). Although this air-cooled experimental reactor was not a true prototype, experience gained in its construction 

assisted Du Pont's efforts w ith the Hanford Site reactors. The Hanford Site benefited from the X-10 reactor in other ways 

as well. Before June 1944, Du Pont sent future Hanford Site reactor operators to the Clinton Engineer Works for 

on-the-job training.

As noted earlier, security and secrecy were hallmarks of the Manhattan Project. This extended even to the blueprints 

used in constructing critical buildings. As described in the B Reactor HAER in Appendix B on the Internet, Rudy Dejong, 

a construction foreman at the B Reactor, recalls that the "foremen, engineers, and superintendents were the only ones 

who ever saw a drawing! We had to go into a vault inside the reactor building, look at the drawings, figure and get your 

dimensions, make notes, then go out to your crew and tell them what to do and what your dimensions were!" Du Pont 

also, for security reasons, designated the reactor buildings "classified" and further restricted worker access to those 

possessing the proper badge. A separate division engineer supervised construction of the reactor buildings. This helped 

maintain "compartmentalization," which was the heart of security and secrecy. Compartmentalization, as Groves 

established it, meant "each man should know everything he needed to know to do his job and nothing else"

(Groves 1983, p. 140).

Fewer than one percent of the workers were told the true nature of the project. One who was briefed,

Kenneth McCreight, a supervisor in charge of over 1800 electricians, remembers some very long workdays extending 

18-20 hours and switching assignments or terminating workers when necessary if too many questions were asked. He

1 .2 2
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

"hand picked" workers for the reactors and "the ones who were less skilled or couldn't get along with others" were 

assigned "less sensitive work such as building offices and septic systems" (Gerber 1994b, p. 16).

In addition to the three 100 Area reactor complexes along the Columbia River, Du Pont also constructed three chemical 

separations complexes within the interior of the Hanford Site. The 200 West Area contained the 221 -T and 221 -U 

Plants, while the 221 -B Plant was located in the 200 East Area. The second separations plant (221 -C) planned for the 

200 East Area was cancelled when Groves determined it was unnecessary based on experience and information gained 

from operations at the Clinton Semiworks (Gerber et al. 1997). indeed, only the 221-B and 221-T Plants were operated 

during W orld War II although Du Pont had constructed all three by early 1945. Gosling (1999, p. 33) observes that 

"labor shortages and the lack of blueprints" so constrained construction activities in the 200 Areas that Du Pont 

redirected workers to the 100-B Area "w ith the result that the 1943 construction progress on chemical separations was 

limited to digging two huge holes in the ground."

The Hanford Site chemical separations plants (locally called "canyons" because of their architectural design featuring a 

very long, high-walled, windowless operations area) dwarfed the pilot plant built at the Clinton Engineer Works. The 

Clinton Semiworks contained six hot cells, while the process plants on the Hanford Site contained forty. Measuring more 

than 800 feet long, 65 feet wide, and w ith a surface height of 80 feet (an additional 20 feet lay below grade), the workers 

also nicknamed the buildings "Queen Marys" after the British ocean liner. Stark, nearly featureless concrete structures on 

the outside, "the interior had an eerie quality as operators behind thick concrete shielding manipulated remote control 

equipment by looking through television monitors and periscopes from an upper gallery" (Gosling 1999, p. 34). To 

protect process workers from intense

radiation, Du Pont engineer Raymond P. ,, ,, .. , ,. ., ' & 7 “(hue the (Juecn uvte rtnil.imin.itiHl with r.idni.n h \it\ no

Genereaux designed each process cell to be ,, , , , , ,, , ,, „ ° r rvfhur ( re u - 1 n tila e iilr t them. I ijiiip m o n l n p e u tn r* Ihul lit he .ib/e to

encased w ithin concrete walls 7 feet thick and ..... , . x . ., . , . numt.un them h\ ivmntv t nnttol. the opcuitoi* trmiuHl .it Ihi I'onl in

enclosed each cell with a 6 -foot-thick cover . , , , „ Del.iw.ne. ,w < >.»/. Rnh*e .mil on nunLup+ .it Il.iiKortf, hut the enumeer

weighing 35 tons. A traveling overhead crane . ,, ,■ . , ... , & & ° in « mi ne .mlfmrilabK- f/iMmn.ihuriv Am/ round it: he

was used to lift the covers when necessary . . . . , , . . . . • # . u • # 1 u ‘(nun'(t his ii/Kv.i/urs. u/ii' Iwnart'd oi m hum .trinvtl .it H.miora in

(C.prhpr pt al 19971 (hUihet I ‘f44. to inst.ill Ihv firtnes* equipment into the fii+t

To receive the high level radioactive liquid -i'/m,.i/i/in huilrlinu In innate t mitral, tirelriulinii the <.nnon h.i

wastes (radioisotopes and chemicals) resulting .1/ r/>o hut h Uh

from the chemical separations process, tnniitivnte .i‘ pr.n tii e impnnetl their lemnte-in.inipiihtion -hill'-. -

Du Pont constructed 64 single-shell KhmJcs i riisi., p. (.(»4

underground storage tanks in four complexes

(241-B, 241-C, 241-T, 241-U), known as

"tank farms." Each complex consisted of sixteen tanks - twelve 500,000-gallon tanks and four 54,500-gallon tanks 

(Gerber 1992b). Each of the 500,000-gallon tanks measured 75 feet in diameter and was constructed of "reinforced 

concrete with a one-fourth inch welded [carbon-] steel plate lining" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.83). The four smaller tanks 

were 20 feet in diameter. Gerber (1992c, p. 46) reports that by the end of the Manhattan Project "half of these tanks 

were 100 percent full and the other half were 40 percent fu ll." This is understandable given the fact that nearly

10,000 gallons of high level radioactive waste was generated per day at both 221-T and 221-B Plants (Anderson 1990).

Stretching the workforce even further, Du Pont was also busy constructing the fuel manufacturing and testing facilities 

within the 300 Area. W hile irradiation and chemical separations were more visible steps in producing weapons-grade 

plutonium (based on the sheer number of facilities devoted to each of these operations), both were sequential steps that 

relied on precisely milled and processed uranium metal fuel elements, commonly known as "slugs." The 313 Metal 

Fabrication Building and 314 Press Building were key facilities that supplied the fuel elements for irradiation in the 

reactors.

1 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Both the 313 and 314 Buildings were operational well before the reactors were completed because w ithout fuel the 

reactors could not be charged. Completed in the fall 1943, about the same tim e that reactor construction began, the 

313 Building was reconfigured with eight additions within a 10-month period, each addition responding to "process 

improvements and changes in the very new, untried, and unique uranium fuel fabrication activities being carried out iri 

the facility" (Gerber 1993b, p. 1). In January 1945, workers at the 314 Building began to extrude (press) uranium billets 

(uranium metal cylinders approximately 2 0 inches long and weighing 2 0 0 pounds) into rods that machinists shaped into 

fuel elements in the 313 Building (DOE 1997e, p. 151). Prior to this onsite capability, the Hanford Site received 

pre-extruded uranium metal rods directly from outside sources beginning October 1943 (see Chapter 2, Section 2 for 

additional discussion and illustrations).

The 305 Test Pile (reactor), of necessity, was also constructed and operational before the production reactors in the 

100 Areas. Beginning in March 1944, this 16-foot graphite cube, air-cooled, natural uranium-powered reactor, the first 

to operate on the Hanford Site, "compared the performance of material samples under irradiation with samples of known 

quality and graded each lot" (Gerber 1993b, p. 11). For example, to maximize the movement of neutrons, only very 

pure graphite could be used in constructing the production reactors. To ensure that suitable graphite was delivered to the 

100 Areas, the 305 Test Pile was pushed to 16 hours a day almost as soon as it became operational. By May, it was 

testing graphite bars 24 hours a day. This schedule was maintained until August when operations were scaled back to a 

single 8 -hour shift. In addition to graphite bars, the 305 Test Pile irradiated and tested uranium billets (called "eggs"), 

fuel elements, aluminum canning materials, aluminum welding rods, and aluminum process tubes. This reactor also 

provided a radiation source for developing and calibrating radiation detection and measurement instruments 

(Gerberl 993b, pp. 11-13).

Like the 305 Test Pile, the 321 Separations Laboratory and the 3706 Radiochemistry Laboratory provided onsite research 

and trouble-shooting capabilities for the chemical separations process still under development as the 200 Area canyon 

buildings were being designed and constructed. Completed in December 1944, the 321 Building was a pilot-scale plant 

used "to replicate, study, and develop solutions to probjems developed in the early bismuth phosphate chemical 

separations process used in Hanford's T Plant and B Plant" as well as "equipment corrosion studies and methods of 

decontamination" (Gerber 1993b, p. 15). The 3706 Building was the first radiochemistry laboratory at the Hanford Site. 

Completed early in 1945, researchers used the 57 laboratories "to perform small-scale experiments w ith both low- and 

high-activity radioactive materials in support of all HEW production activities" (Gerber 1993b, p. 19). The Historic 

Property Inventory Forms (HPIF) for the 305, 321, and 3706 buildings give more detailed discussions of activities, 

accomplishments, and architecture (see Appendix B on the Internet).

Construction of the Hanford Site was a massive undertaking. Simultaneously, Du Pont built three reactor complexes, two 

chemical separations complexes, a fuel manufacturing and research and development center, a construction camp, and 

an employee village. The B Reactor HAER in Appendix B on the Internet summarizes the comments made by a number

of the people directly involved in constructing

-I/K - h ...a llu l ...I. ,«■ « ,.,» ,« / tin ■ If..n n .n l w ,,f j j th e Hanford Site <see sidebar box).

I'rnm if t w f In full. Am Ih-n.,I § J Each production comp|ex was self-contained,

imfti.fii.if c,unpin, in a -<•>-» tun v.ir-, c lu b cum in;:a nucb.tr 1 comp|ete with administrative, operational,

tc-chn,Ih.,l lc.nl cciclc iu .t Idie,r„;l. I , nncb, hea|th security maintenance, supply, and

,„a . mi,fi,.». ,hr p n . i . „ c tc c lc llu c .n m n c -rc ;I n c u n n i, g i utj|ity support facilities. This designed

He. U tt,n c :-,;l,b e A,/h. Cecnnticbb j | g redundancy ensured that plutonium production

<.... Itn rin : ,!„■ cnc rrdclcb pu d , „ i u . n lim r pncclu, ticm anrf . wou|d no, be interrupted _ an imperative for the

urcic-nc, h, Ihc-eicut I.d.c-ecnbucnd.cn p m p c H n n e - Manhattan Project. A sense o f the scale of

II Itva. i.n 11 \f It construction, momentarily discounting its

engineering complexity, is imparted through a 

summary listing of numbers alone. W ithin the 100 Areas, 94 permanent buildings and 69 service facilities were 

constructed. Additionally, "over 100 small support service TC [temporary construction] structures were built in each

:i 1 .2 4
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

100 Area including warming sheds, privies, check booths, miscellaneous sheds and guard/badge houses" (Gerber et al. 

1997, p. 5.16). This number does not include the 50 or more temporary construction structures used for the Division 

Engineers Office, Government Field Office, Safety Office, M achine-Millwright and Sheetmetal Shop, and structures for 

other administrative and craft support. The 200 Areas contained 108 permanent buildings and 62 service facilities and 

an additional 100 temporary construction buildings and structures. The 300 Area contained 34 permanent buildings and 

25 service facilities. O nly seven temporary construction buildings are accounted for in the 300 Area, which is 

considerably fewer than the other Areas, "because more o f the 300 Area work was done by subcontractors who provided 

their own facilities" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.20). These numbers are further augmented by the 9 permanent buildings 

and 14 service facilities in the 200 North Area, the "machine shops, pipe and electrical shops and carpentry shops" 

constructed for site-wide support at W hite Bluffs (Gerber 1999, p. 4), the Hot M ix Plant, and the Riveriand Classification 

Railroad Yard among other operational and support facilities outside the designated Areas (Gerber et al. 1997).

“It ’s At o m ic B o m b s ” : Ha n f o r d Sit e Op e r a t io n s

1 9 4 3 -1 9 4 5

On July 4, 1944, Oppenheimer informed the Los Alamos staff that the "neutron emission of reactor-produced plutonium 

was too high for the gun assembly to work" (Sublette 1999). The gun assembly required that two subcritical masses of 

the proper size and shape be forced together at high speed to obtain a supercritical mass that would initiate a chain 

reaction and subsequent explosion. Predetonation of either or both of the subcritical masses because of "spontaneously 

emitted neutrons" would render the bomb useless (Gosling 1999, p. 38). Given the rate o f emission determined by 

Emilio Segre, the planned plutonium gun had to be abandoned.

At this point in 1944, with construction of B Reactor nearly complete, the irony in Oppenheimer's announcement is 

sadly apparent: "The only workable bomb design at hand, the gun-type weapon, required U-235 which had no proven 

practical production methods available...Plutonium production had not yet begun, but the production technique 

appeared to have a high probability of success. However plausible approaches to building a plutonium bomb did not 

yet exist" (Sublette 1999).

Fortunately, Seth H. Neddermeyer of the ordnance staff at Los Alamos had been investigating an alternative, though 

highly theoretical, method for explosion with uranium of a purity less than optimal. These emergent studies were now 

directed to plutonium. Implosion would use high explosives to direct symmetrical shockwaves inward towards a 

subcritical mass of imbedded plutonium. The force of the explosion would compress the plutonium into a supercritical 

mass and initiate the chain reaction leading to explosion. Implosion research became a top priority. "W ith just 

1 2 months to go before expected weapon delivery a new fundamental technology...had to be invented, made reliable, 

and an enormous array of engineering problems had to be solved" (Sublette 1999). Oppenheimer assigned the task to 

Neddermeyer and George B. Kistiakowski.

The unplanned change to implosion also had an impact on the Hanford Site. Even before they were operational, 

production rates would be accelerated to counter the uncertainty of how much plutonium would be required. Given 

Grove's directive to deliver as much plutonium as possible as quickly as possible, initial activation of the B Reactor did 

not bode well. First-person accounts of the Hanford Site operators' startup of B Reactor can be found in Sections 3.1 -3.3 

of the B Reactor HAER in Appendix B on the Internet.

Ten months after the X-10 reactor had gone critical, Enrico Fermi was present to witness the startup of the Hanford Site's 

B Reactor. On September 13,1944, Fermi loaded the first fuel element into the reactor: "the Pope," says Rhodes (1986, 

p. 557), "conferring his blessing as he had on the piles [reactors] at Chicago and Oak Ridge." It took 2 weeks to hand 

load 1595 process tubes, slightly more than the 1500 calculated by Eugene Wigner in his initial design.

1 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Wheeler suspected that xenon-135, a daughter product of the 

reaction-induced isotope iodine-135, was the neutron-absorbing 

poison that was causing the reactor to fail. Once this short-lived 

isotope had decayed, the reaction would revive and continue 

building until the xenon level increased to the point where it 

again began to absorb the neutrons necessary to sustain the 

chain reaction.

To determine if this were the case, Crawford Greenewalt, also 

present for the startup, called Samuel Allison at the Argonne 

laboratory to test Wheeler's theory using the CP-3 reactor: 

"Disbelieving, [Walter] Zinn started the 300-kilowatt reactor up 

again and ran it at full power for twelve hours. It was primarily a 

research instrument and it had never been run for so long at full 

power before. He found the xenon effect...Groves received the 

news acidly. He had ordered Compton to run CP-3 at full power 

full tim e to look for just such trouble" (Rhodes 1986, p. 559).

Extra reactivity would have to be added to overcome this effect 

before production could begin. Fortunately, and providing a 

concrete example of Du Pont's conservative engineering 

approach overriding the theoretical calculations of the Metallurgical Laboratory scientists, Wheeler had anticipated this 

chance of failure: "Wheeler had fretted about fission-product poisoning... [and] had advised the chemical company to 

increase the count o f uranium channels for a margin of safety...That necessitated drilling out the shield blocks, which 

delayed construction and added millions to the cost. Du Pont had accepted the delay and drilled the extra channels. 

They were in place now when they were needed, although not yet connected to the water supply" (Rhodes 1986, 

p. 560}.

It would take 2 months to cohnect the remaining 409 channels, thereby achieving the reactor's full design configuration 

of 2004 process tubes. In the interim, however, having benefited from Du Pont's earlier engineering decision, the 

D Reactor went critical on December 17, 1944, "with sufficient reactivity to overcome fission product poisoning effects" 

(Sublette 1999). By December 28, 1944, all work required at B Reactor was completed. With these two reactors 

operating in tandem, large-scale plutonium production was under way. When the F Reactor went on-line on 

February 25, 1945, theoretical production capacity from the combined reactors rose to 21 kilograms per month 

(Sublette 1997).

Nevertheless, initial production efforts at the Hanford Site remained tied to B Reactor. The B Reactor was not idle during 

the 2 months it took to supply cooling water to all 2004 process tubes. Between September 30 and December 28, the 

reactor operated intermittently at steadily increasing power levels while fuel was added and discharged and additional 

process tubes were connected to the cooling system. As described in the B Reactor HAER (see Appendix B on the 

Internet), a test run of irradiated fuel elements was discharged from a single process tube on November 6 , 1944, "much 

earlier than would be normal for fuel processing [usually 1 0 0 days], but even m ildly hot fuel was badly needed to test 

the various fuel-handling and chemical separations facilities in the 100 and 200 Areas."

x The first scheduled discharge of 42 tubes took place between November 24 and 28. These fuel elements were

transported by rail to the 200-North Area Lag Storage Buildings (212-N, 212-P, and 212-R) where they were allowed to 

cool. W ithin 30 days they were shipped to the T Plant where the world's first production-scale chemical separations 

processing began on December 26, 1944. Processing was complete on February 2, 1945. Colonel Matthias himself 

drove the first plutonium shipment from the Hanford Site to Portland, Oregon, then boarded a train for Los Angeles, 

where he delivered the product to an "agent from Los Alamos" on February 3,1945 (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 50).

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1 .2 6
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

The B Plant came on-line on April 13, 1945. With this increased separations capacity, workers prepared a plutonium 

shipment for rail transportation every 5 days. To speed delivery, heavily guarded truck caravans replaced rail 

transportation beginning in May. To further accelerate delivery, Du Pont abandoned ground transportation and sent 

planes directly to Los Alamos beginning in late july. In the face of intense pressure from Oppenheimer in Los Alamos 

and Groves in Washington, D.C., Matthias continuously pressed Du Pont to produce more plutonium. In response,

Du Pont not only "ran the reactors above their rated power level" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 50), but also reduced the 

radiological cooling period for irradiated fuel elements to potentially unsafe levels to meet immediate demands: 

"Throughout the spring and early summer of 1945, metal cooling times fell, as HEW rushed to produce plutonium for the 

Trinity and Nagasaki bombs. Exactly how short the metal decay periods became is unclear, but it is known that they fell 

below 30 days and to perhaps as low as a few weeks" (Gerber 1994a, p. 1).

Even with accelerated production, Groves never let up and "continued to push for heightened production until the day 

Japan surrendered" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 51).

P r o d u c t io n Cy c l e

Much as Niels Bohr had surmised in March 1939, the production of nuclear weapons in the United States became "a 

complex series of integrated manufacturing activities executed at multiple sites across the country" (DOE 1997e, p. 117). 

The Hanford Site was one of only three Manhattan Project complexes built to develop the atomic bomb. Its mission, to 

produce plutonium, complimented that of the Oak Ridge Reservation, where enriched uranium was produced. Together, 

these two "production" sites supplied the scientists at Los Alamos with the nuclear materials necessary to test and 

fabricate the atomic fuels that powered the Fat Man and Little Boy bombs, respectively. After W orld War II, however, the 

Hanford Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and Los Alamos became part of an expanding nuclear weapons complex that 

ultimately spanned the United States with facilities in 28 states (Figure 1.5). Most facilities were highly specialized, 

contributing key services or materials in the national production line. Examples include uranium mining in Wyoming, 

uranium refinement in Ohio, weapons assembly in Texas, and weapons testing in Nevada. No one facility could do it 

all, and none existed in isolation. This was the height of compartmentalization. Throughout its operational history, the 

Hanford Site remained a principal component of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

When writing the history of nuclear weapons production, DOE (1997e, p. 117) grouped production activities into eight 

major processes:

• Mining, milling, and refining of uranium

• Isotope separation of uranium, lithium, boron, and heavy water

• Fuel and target fabrication for production reactors

• Reactor operations to irradiate fuel and targets to produce nuclear materials

• Chemical separations of plutonium, uranium, and tritium

• Component fabrication of both nuclear and nonnuclear components

• Weapon operations, including assembly, maintenance, modification, and development of nuclear weapons

• Research, development, and testing

The Hanford Site played a part in five o f these activities - fuel and target fabrication, reactor operations, chemical 

separations, component fabrication, and research and development. Component fabrication did not begin at the 

Hanford Site until 1949 with construction of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (234-5Z Building) where plutonium nitrate 

paste was further refined into plutonium metal (called "buttons") and machined into weapons parts (called "pits").

Figure 1. 6 is a stylized presentation of the Hanford Site production cycle as it existed throughout the Manhattan Project. 

The cycle began with the arrival of uranium billets from offsite sources. These billets were pressed, machined, canned, 

tested, and stored in the 300 Area. From there, the unirradiated fuel elements ("fresh metal") were transported to the 

100 Areas where they were irradiated within the reactors. Irradiated fuel "cooled" (a term for the decay of short-term 

radioisotopes) in the 200 North Area before being transported to the 200 East or 200 West Areas for separation within the 

chemical separations plants. Following separation and concentration, the plutonium, in the form of plutonium nitrate

1 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

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the Manhattan Project during World War II and evolved and operated until the lale 1980s. It typically employed more thaol00,000 contractor personnel at any ooe&ne. From the 

Manhattan Project to the present, the United States has spent approximately $300 billion on nuclear weapons research, production, and testing (in 1995 dollars).

Figure 1.5. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex

paste, was returned to the 200 North Area for storage before being shipped to Los Alamos. Detailed accounts of these 

operations are presented in Chapter 2, Sections 2 through 4.

Fuel M anufacturing

The first essential step in the plutonium production process was to manufacture uranium fuel. From the time pre-pressed 

uranium metal rods began to arrive at the Hanford Site in October 1943, workers systematically increased the 

manufacturing operations on site. M illwrights began to machine extruded uranium rods in December 1943. Canning 

operations began in March 1944. By September 1944, workers began straightening and "outgassing" (a term for 

removing hydrogen and other gases) fuel rods on site. Uranium metal billets first arrived in November 1944. Machinists 

began to extrude fuel rods from these billets in January 1945 (Gerber et al.1997, DOE 1997e).

The following steps in the fuel manufacturing process are a composite, assuming uranium billets were the initial raw 

material, and all activities were conducted on site. When shipments of fresh metal in the form of billets first arrived at 

the Hanford Site, workers stored the billets in one o f the nine 303 Buildings (303-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, J, and K) within the 

300 Area. Inspectors selected samples for testing in the 305 Test Pile (reactor). Lots matching purity requirements were 

sent to the 314 Building to be heated w ithin a furnace in an inert (argon) atmosphere then forced through a press to form 

rods from 12-14 feet in length. These rods were straightened and outgassed to ensure distortion did not occur w ithin the

1 .2 8
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Receipt of 

Uranium Billets

Inspection and 

Testing o f Fuel 

Components

Fresh Water to 

Reactor

Irradiation of 

Fuel Elements 

within Reactor

Storage of 

Fuel Elements

Process Water 

to Rention Basin 

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x ' T i

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and Testing o f Fuel 

Elements

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Plutonium

Monitoring Isolation

To Canyons for 

Chemical 

Separations

Exhaust and Fuel Element Dissolving 

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Plutonium 

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Figure 1.6. Plutonium Production Cycle as It Existed throughout the Manhattan Project at the Hanford Site

reactor. The rods were then sent to the 313 Building where they were machined (cut and turned) under very exacting 

tolerances to the required length and diameter. The cores (machined sections of rods) were "degreased" (dirt and oils 

removed in solvents) and "pickled" (solvent residue removed with an acid solution). The cleaned cores were then 

"canned" - a two-step process that involved preparing the core and inserting it within a sealed aluminum container. 

Short-lived electrical canning of cores began in March 1944.

The primary piece of equipment, an electric heater press nicknamed the "w hiz bang," never performed well, and the 

entire process was replaced by the triple-dip'method in August 1944. The fuel elements (canned cores) were subjected 

to three tests to ensure quality. Two of these, the Frost Test and Etch Test, were performed in the 313 Building. Each was 

designed to detect bonding or canning failures. The final test, steam autoclaving, was designed to detect leaks that 

would cause the fuel element to burst within the reactor. This test was conducted in the 314 Building. Every step had 

accompanying inspection points, and pieces not meeting rigorous standards were sent back for recycling. Chapter 2, 

Section 2 describes the fuel manufacturing process in detail.

Reactor O perations

Reactor operations included loading the fuel, operating the reactor, removing the fuel, and maintaining the reactor. It 

took 1 metric ton of uranium metal to produce 250 grams o f plutonium. The movement of two key elements (water and 

fuel) is at the core of this second step in the production cycle.

The B, D, and F Reactors were designed as single-pass, water-cooled reactors. A continuous flow of water would pass 

through the reactors, absorbing and removing the heat generated by the nuclear chain reaction. In part, the Hanford Site 

was selected because the Columbia River afforded a near limitless supply of cold water. On the clean side of the reactor, 

the 108, 181,182,183,185, 189, and 190 Buildings supplied and treated the water essential to operating the reactors. 

The 107 structures received heated process water flowing out of the reactors before its return to the Columbia River.

Water was withdrawn from the Columbia River through the 181 River Pump Houses located directly on the river.

Electric pumps provided the power that pulled water from below the normal low-water level through the 181 Buildings 

and into the 182 Reservoir and Pump Houses. The 182 Buildings stored 25 million gallons of primary and secondary

1 .2 9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

(backup) water. Primary water was pumped to the 183 Filter/Treatment Plants, and secondary water was held in reserve 

for emergency situations. W ithin the 183 Buildings, raw water was purified with chemicals (mixed and supplied via the 

108 Chemical Pump Houses), filtered to remove particulate matter, and stored for use in multiple "clearwelis" - each 

\ with a holding capacity o f 5 m illion gallons.

Throughout World War II, filtered water was then subjected to supplemental treatments that were later discontinued as 

unnecessary. In the supplemental treatments, dissolved gases, "particularly carbon dioxide and oxygen," were removed 

within the 185 Deaeration Plants to improve the "heat transfer capacity of the coolant" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.78). An 

additional step was taken at the 100-D and 100-F Areas. Here, water was next pumped to the 189 Refrigeration 

Buildings where it was chilled "allowing the reactors to operate at higher power levels and still not heat the process 

water to the point where it would flash to steam" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.33). Prepared water was then pumped to the 

Filtered Water Storage Tanks within the 190 Process Pump Houses. Pumps housed in the 190 Buildings then injected 

water into the reactor cores at a rate of almost 30,000 gallons per minute. Following its single pass through the reactor 

core, process water was then discharged to the 107 Retention Basins where it cooled from 2-4 hours while short-lived 

radionuclides picked up in the core decayed. From the retention basins, the water re-entered the Columbia River via 

outfall structures and underground pipelines emerging at mid-channel (see Chapter 2, Section 3 for an extended 

discussion of water movement and Section 6 for reactor discharges).

Given the importance of water in cooling the reactor, and the consequences inherent in failing to maintain the reactor 

operating temperature within prescribed limits, Du Pont designed three independent systems to ensure uninterrupted 

water flow within the reactor. The primary pumping system operated on electricity. Nearly 75 percent of the electrical 

demand w ithin the 100 Areas went to pumping and processing water. The secondary system relied on steam-driven 

turbines housed within the 184 Powerhouses. The tertiary system employed gravity feed from two 300,000-gallon 

elevated water tanks, the 187 structures. The sole purpose of the backup systems was to provide cooling water to the 

reactor w hile it was being shut down under emergency conditions, such as an electrical outage.

The second key element in reactor operations was the uranium fuel. Processed fuel elements were transported from the 

300 Area to the 100 Areas where they were stored in the 103 Fresh Metal Buildings (103-B, 103-D, 103-F) before being 

loaded into the reactors. In reality, except for the initial fuel loading of a process tube, loading (charging) and unloading 

(discharging) were simultaneous processes. On a conceptual level, raw fuel loaded into the front face of the reactor 

would push processed fuel out the rear face, a simple concept that was difficult to execute. See the B Reactor HAER in 

Appendix B on the Internet for an extended discussion o f the loading and unloading process.

Because of its configuration, irradiation o f fuel elements within the reactor did not take place at a uniform rate. Fuel 

elements near the center of the reactor had a higher neutron flux than those around the edges. Physicists calculated the 

point at which irradiation had produced the optimum amount of plutonium-239 based on the position o f the fuel 

elements within the reactor. Under-irradiation decreased the plutonium yield per unit of uranium, while over- irradiation 

increased the amount of undesirable isotopes such as plutonium-240 and plutonium-241. Tracking the progress of the 

fuel elements within each of the 2004 process tubes, these scientists called for an outage when approximately 25 percent 

of the tubes were ready for discharge.

Once discharged, the fuel elements were cooled in the fuel storage basin. Workers then prepared the fuel elements for 

rail shipment to the 200 North Area. Using a monorail, workers brought the buckets containing irradiated fuel elements 

to the adjacent transfer bay where they remotely placed the buckets within specifically designed lead casks and sealed 

the casks for shipment. Using an overhead crane, they pulled the filled casks from the deep-water basin and placed 

them within water-filled tanks on a flatbed rail car. Throughout the war years, fuel elements remained within the fuel 

storage basin for a very short period, usually days, before they were packaged for shipment to the 212 Lag Storage 

Buildings. Further radiological cooling occurred within a deep, water-filled basin in these buildings (Gerber et al. 1997, 

p. 5.81; see also the B Reactor HAER in Appendix B on the Internet).
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Staff operated the reactor from the Control Room. Startup began when the reactor operator began the gradual and 

sequenced withdrawal of the nine horizontal control rods. The operator used seven of these control rods to advance, 

retard, or maintain the neutron flux throughout the reactor as required. The remaining two rods were used to fine-tune 

the reaction.

Under normal operating conditions, the reactor was shut down by fully inserting the horizontal control rods. When 

required, the reactor could be shut down quickly by inserting 29 vertical safety rods normally suspended above the 

reactor. Under emergency conditions, the "electromagnetic clutch holding each rod in the out position would be 

de-energized (de-magnetized), and the rods would free-fall by gravity into channels penetrating the reactor"

(Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.31). A second fail-safe system consisted of a liquid boron solution contained in tanks on top of 

the reactor that could be fed into the reactor through the vertical safety rod openings. As with other safety 

configurations, electrical systems were backed by hydraulic systems, which were backed by gravity. Chapter 2, Section 3 

and the B Reactor HAER in Appendix B on the Internet describe in detail the reactor operations.

Chem ical Separations

Although Du Pont constructed three fully independent chemical separations facilities on the Hanford Site, only the T and 

B complexes were used throughout World War II. This decision derived from the integrated nature of the Manhattan 

Project: "Originally eight separation plants were considered necessary, then six, then four. Finally, with the benefit of 

the operating experience and information obtained from the Clinton semi-works, we decided to build only three, o f 

which two would operate and one [221 -U] would serve as a reserve" (Groves 1983, p. 85).

Dissolving irradiated fuel elements, and isolating and concentrating the plutonium they contained was the third step in 

the production cycle. Leaving as they had arrived on rail cask cars, irradiated fuel elements were transported from the 

Lag Storage Buildings directly to Cell 3 of the process plants— a unique section of the building "designed to provide a 

23-foot cell with adequate shielding to house the railroad tunnel into the building" (Gerber 1994a, p. 7). The chemical 

separations process began when the bridge crane operator removed the irradiated fuel elements from the casks and 

placed them into a dissolver tank. The tank was full or "charged" when a load of 1.5 metric tons of fuel elements had 

been transferred. Through remote manipulation, operators then chemically dissolved the aluminum cans encasing the 

irradiated fuel and transformed the solid fuel to a liquid solution. Operators, stationed at control panels in the shielded 

operating gallery, remotely processed this solution through a series of chemical and physical procedures from one cell to 

the next down the canyon until the 1.5 metric ton batch of irradiated fuel was reduced to 330 gallons of plutoniumbearing solution. The bismuth phosphate process separated plutonium from uranium and other irradiation-induced 

isotopes "by varying the valent state of the plutonium-239 and then repeatedly dissolving and centrifuging plutoniumbearing solutions" (Gerber 1994a, p. 4). Liquid waste from all process cycles was jetted to the single-shell, high level 

waste tanks constructed in the 200 Areas.

At this point, processing moved from the 221 Plants to the 224 Bulk Reduction Buildings (224-T, 224-B) where additional 

dissolving and centrifuging continued to concentrate the plutonium in solution, first using bismuth phosphate as a carrier 

then lanthanum fluoride. In the final step, the "solid plutonium lanthanum oxide was...dissolved w ith nitric acid, 

making plutonium nitrate" (Gerber 1994a, p. 11). The 330-gallon batch of plutonium-bearing solution piped into the 

224 Building exited as 8 gallons of concentrated plutonium nitrate. Carefully placed within specially designed cans, 

teamsters transported the plutonium nitrate to the 231 -Z Isolation Building in the 200-West Area. The designation "Z " 

was applied because the final step in the production cycle (purification) occurred in this building: "...a final product 

precipitation using sulfates and peroxide took place. The precipitate cake was dissolved with nitric acid, placed in small 

(10-inch-high) shipping cans, and boiled right in the cans using hot air. It was reduced to a wet nitrate paste (the HEW 

product)" (Gerber 1994a, p. 11).

These shipping cans, each holding approximately 1 kilogram of plutonium, were then transported to the 213 Structure in 

the 200-North Area. Excavated into the southeast face of Gable Mountain, this facility contained two magazine rooms 

(213-J, 213-K Vaults) "lined with concrete shelving interspersed with concrete brick partitions" (Gerber et al. 1997,

1 .3 1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

p. 5.82). Plutonium was stored in these vaults until it was shipped to Los Alamos. Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter 2 

describe the chemical separations and plutonium finishing processes in detail.

Adm inistrative, Facility, and O perations Support

Adhering to the siting requirements Groves established, the production cycle was segmented into discrete steps assigned 

to specific geographic areas of the Hanford Site, and, with the singular exceptions of fuel manufacturing and plutonium 

purification, duplicated at independent facilities within those areas. In reality then, the Hanford Site industrial complex 

consisted of seven production centers, each of which required administrative, facility, and operations support. For 

additional information on the construction, appearance, function, or history of many of these support facilities, see the 

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Forms (ExHPIF) or standard HPIF in Appendix B on the Internet.

W ithin the 100 Areas (100-B, 100-D, 100-F), a diverse workforce provided security, first aid, training, and maintenance 

services within specific ancillary buildings. For example, before and after each shift, all workers had to pass through the 

1701 Guard House. Guards stationed at the entrances verified the identification of each employee and visitor before 

allowing access to any of the 100 Areas. Those who worked in the exclusion area containing the reactor complex then 

had to pass an additional identification check in the 1702 Badge House before proceeding to their assigned work area. A 

Patrol Headquarters (1720 Building), First Aid Station (1719 Building), and Fire Station (1709 Building) also were 

established within each 100 Area. Du Pont stressed fire awareness and the need for quick fire suppression as early as 

June 1943 because of the remoteness of the facilities, the vegetation surrounding them, and the number of wooden 

buildings contained within each Area (Gerber 2000, p. 3).

Working within the 1717 Combined Shop or 1722 Area Shop, craftsmen fabricated or repaired the equipment and 

materials needed to maintain ongoing operations. For instance, the 1717 Building contained "a machine shop, a 

carpenter shop, a pipe shop, and a sheet metal shop, an electric shop, a forge shop, a tool room, and six offices"

(Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.54). Vehicles were repaired and serviced within the 1716 Automotive Repair Shop. Craft 

supplies could be obtained from the 1713 Warehouse or 1715 Storage Building. Workers needing to change into 

coveralls and other personal protection equipment before working with radioactive materials would go to the 

1707 Change House, where they might also shower or have lunch. Administrative staff oversaw operations, processed 

paper, maintained payrolls, ordered materials, and performed numerous other tasks within the 1704 Supervisor's Office.

W ithin the 200 Areas (200 East and 200 West), staff provided the same administrative, security, health, maintenance, and 

utility functions in facilities whose only distinction from those in the 100 Areas was often the number displayed above 

the entryway. As illustration, the 182 Pump Houses in the 100 Areas were labeled 282 in the 200 Areas, the 184 Power 

Houses and 1802 Overhead Steam Lines were identified as 284 and 2802, in the 200 Areas, and the 1707 Change 

Houses in the 100 Areas became 2707 in the 200 Areas. Like the 100 Areas, the 200 Areas also contained their own 

"coal-fired central power station to provide steam for heating and process equipment needs, a water supply, sanitary 

system, [and] road and railroad grid" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.18).

The 200 Areas also contained support facilities specific to their function as chemical separations areas. The chemicals 

necessary to accomplish separations were delivered and stored in the 211 Tank Farms. Fresh chemicals could be 

supplied directly to the 221 Plant process cells from any of the 20 above-ground storage tanks or to the 271 Chemical 

Preparation and Service Buildings where they were mixed before being piped to the 221 Plants or 224 Buildings. 

Scientists in the 222 Sample Preparation Laboratories tested process solution samples withdrawn throughout the 

separation process. "Since the entire separation process was conducted remotely, the only way to verify that the process 

was working within specifications was to draw and test samples" (Gerber et al: 1997, p. 5.38). Finally, in this sequencing 

from start to finish, the 292 Exhaust Gas Laboratories supplied information on the level of chemical and radioactive 

contaminants exiting the process exhaust stack.

The 300 Area also contained a complete set of administrative, health, safety, and maintenance support facilities.

However, operations support facilities within the 300 Area were directed not only toward fuel manufacturing (the area's

1 .3 2

}
C h a p te r 1 - H is to ric O v e rv ie w ^ S i 

— ■ ^

primary mission) but also toward chemical separations process improvement and essential materials testing (Gerber et al. 

1997). An example is the role of the 305 Test Pile (reactor) in materials testing for the Hanford Site production reactors.

Another primary investigative focus within the 300 Area was research and development of the chemical separations 

process. As another example of the synergetic integration of the Manhattan Project, research conducted at the 

Clinton Semi works resulted in changes in the design and mission of the 321 Separations Laboratory at the Hanford Site. 

O riginally designed only for "cold" pilot-scale research using unirradiated sources, a "hot lab" was added just before 

completion of the 321 Building because scientists at the Clinton Semi works had demonstrated the importance of 

understanding and controlling factors affecting chemical separations under actual operating conditions.

To meet accelerating production demands, research staff in the Hanford Site 3706 Radiochemistry Laboratory examined 

each operation phase to make the bismuth phosphate process faster and more efficient, thereby extracting the greatest 

amount o f plutonium in the least amount of time. Research conducted in the 3706 Building was tested experimentally in 

the 321 Building "canyon," then applied within the 221 separations plants. Rhodes (1986, p. 604) recounts 

Glenn Seaborg's proud notation that "yields in the first plant runs...ranged between 60 and 70 per cent... [and] reached 

90 per cent early in February 1945." W hile this research was under way, other scientists in the 3706 Building focused on 

"metallurgical examination of irradiated fuel elements from the reactors, fuel development for the 313 Building, 

examination of graphite from the experimental levels of the 100 Area piles [reactors], special sample analyses from the 

spectroscopy and radiocounting activities, and multifaceted analyses for environmental and personal survey programs" 

(Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.39). See Chapter 2, Section 7 for extensive coverage of research and development activities at 

the Hanford Site.

Dis c h a r g e a n d Wa s t e : Th e Re s id u a l o f P r o d u c t io n

Leona Marshall, the only woman physicist on Fermi's staff, had occasion to visit the Hanford Site. Some years later, she 

offered this first-hand remembrance: "When the Queen Marys began to function, dissolving the irradiated slugs [fuel 

elements] in concentrated nitric acid, great plumes of brown fumes blossomed above the concrete canyons, climbed 

thousands of feet into the air, and drifted sideways as they cooled, blown by the winds aloft" (Marshall quoted in 

Rhodes 1986, p. 604).

As disquieting as this mental image may be, we are reminded that hindsight is a stern judge. W hile the discharge and 

disposal methods used throughout W orld War II, indeed through 1970, were primitive by today's standards, "the nuclear 

weapons industry typically used waste-disposal methods that were considered acceptable at the time" (DOE 1995e, 

p. 23). At the time, the "imperatives o f the nuclear arms race...demanded that weapons production and testing, rather 

than waste management and the control of environmental contamination, be given the first priority" (DOE 1995e, p. 5). 

Along these same lines, Findlay and Hevly (1995, p. 50), referring specifically to the Hanford Site, provide a summary 

less encumbered by government perspective: "Wartime exigencies dictated haste at the expense of safety and 

environmental concerns. Du Pont and the Army "took risks to get results" because they were in a hurry. They also cut 

corners with the expectation that such emergency conditions would last only a short while and that more effective 

safeguards would be introduced once the war ended."

Groves' recollection in the early 1960s confirms Findlay and Hevly's later analysis: "We had always thought that it 

would be possible to eliminate much of the radioactive problem in the future. We also hoped to recover the uranium 

remaining in the existing solutions and to reduce the bulk of the radioactive waste materials, thus making them easier to 

handle" (Groves 1983, p. 91). An abiding concern with the long-term effects of radioactive waste on future generations 

was also apparent at the time. In an interview given in 1948, Dr. Lyle Borst, then director of the Brookhaven National 

Laboratory Pile Project and the former supervisor of research at the X-10 Graphite Reactor, observed:

"For the first time man is creating something that cannot be destroyed - radioactive materials...If their radiation

gets into biological organisms, including human beings, it w ill destroy them... [present disposal methods, that is, 

thick concrete tanks, sunk deep into the ground, are adequate]. But since we're thinking in terms o f geological

1 .3 3
Ck a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

ages, how are we going to guarantee that some damn-fool archeologist w on't go sticking his nose into the stuff

ten thousand years from now?" - Lang 1948, p. 203

Plutonium production generated large volumes of radioactive and chemical waste. Hanford workers had to contend 

with these wastes in three forms: solid, liquid, and gas. The overview in this chapter discusses only methods developed 

and used during the Manhattan Project for handling and managing radioactive or toxic wastes. Chapter 2, Section 6 and 

the pertinent ExHPIFs and HPIFs offer more detail on how waste has been managed throughout the Manhattan Project 

and the Cold War Era.

Solid W aste

Burial of radioactively contaminated solid waste within shallow excavations was the preferred method of disposal ever 

since this type of waste began to accumulate at the Hanford Site. Low-level solid waste contained small amounts of 

radioactivity dispersed in large amounts of materials. Examples included protective clothing, tools, equipment, 

machinery, debris, sludge and other items contaminated with radionuclides. W ithin the 100 Areas, low-level solid waste 

burial grounds consisted of simple pit or trench excavations with no lining materials. Generally, one large burial ground 

was established at each reactor complex to facilitate burial of materials generated within that complex. Smaller pits or 

trenches were excavated as needed or to accommodate specific items. Low-level solid waste in the 200 Areas, namely 

protective clothing, obsolete or failed equipment, and other types of materials similar to those generated in the 100 Areas 

were disposed of in unlined burial grounds near the process facilities. M ixing of wastes (such as hazardous and 

radioactive, combustible, and non combustible) within the same burial ground was a defining characteristic of early 

waste disposal methods within both areas.

In addition to low-level solid waste such as protective clothing and process equipment, generated in common with the 

other areas, workers in the 300 Area also had to dispose of wastes resulting from the manufacture of fuel elements and 

research and development activities. Uranium scraps, primarily lathe turnings, billet ends, and container residue, were 

stored in 5-gallon cans in and around the 303 Buildings. Metal oxide from fuel elements that had failed the autoclave 

test was stored in 30-gallon drums as was uranium sludge (Gerber 1992c, p. 6). Two solid waste burial grounds were 

' constructed within the 300 Area during the Manhattan Project. The first (Burial Ground 618-8) was used from 1943- 

1944, the second (Burial Ground 618-1) from 1945 to 1951 (Gerber 1993b, p. 59).

Liquid W aste

Within the 100 Areas, low-level liquid waste, primarily reactor process water, was discharged to retention basins and 

ultimately to the Columbia River. Fuel storage basin overflows, maintenance and decontamination activities, and other 

activities also generated low-level radioactive liquid wastes. Many of these wastes were often discharged to open pits or 

cribs (an underground chamber constructed of loosely spaced timbers) adjacent to the reactor buildings. Contaminated 

water from individual process tubes in which a fuel cladding failure had occurred was generally discharged to a more 

distant crib where it percolated into the soil. No high-level liquid wastes were generated in the 100 Areas.

It is important to note for the 200 Area that high-level radioactive liquid wastes, generated at a rate of 10,000 gallons per 

ton of irradiated fuel processed, were always sent directly to underground storage tanks during W orld War II. Such was 

not the case, however, with low-level liquid waste. Herbert M. Parker, chief health physicist for the Hanford Site during 

the Manhattan Project, characterized the earliest low-level liquid waste disposal methods within the 200 Areas as 

temporary and expedient, devised "to avoid absurd costs on tank storage, [or] evaporation equipment" (Gerber 1992b, 

p. 45). His reference was to direct discharge of low-level wastes within natural depressions. This practice was 

abandoned early in 1945 because these resulting swamps produced higher than acceptable radiation levels. Throughout 

the remainder of the war, indeed until their general abandonment in mid-1947, most low-level liquid wastes were 

discharged to reverse wells (perforated casings extending to near groundwater depth). Some process wastes, however, 

were handled differently. For example, piped first to a settling tank where suspended particulates dropped but, process 

waste from the 224 Building was then mixed w ith discharged process cooling water from the 221 Plant before being

1 .3 4
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

piped to one of two 500,000-gallon retention basins. These basins "overflowed into open earthen drainage ditches that 

ran far out into the desert" (Gerber 1994a, p. 23).

Low-level liquid wastes from the 300 Area laboratories and fabrication facilities were collected in a centralized process 

sewer system (3904 Structure) and discharged to a process pond adjacent to the Columbia River. The process sewer 

system was distinct from and not connected to the sanitary"sewer system (3903 Structure). All high-level liquid wastes 

from the 3706 Building were sent to the process sewer system, while high-level liquid waste from the 321 Building was 

discharged to four underground tanks, a reverse well, or the process sewer (Gerber 1992c).

G aseous W aste

In designing the Hanford Site reactors, Du Pont realized, as had Fermi, that reactivity would increase if air were removed 

from the area within which the reaction occurred. This efficiency would occur because nitrogen gas, the largest 

component of air, attracts neutrons and therefore acts as a poison. Another inducement to remove air from the reactor 

arose from the fact that argon gas, a very minor component of air, quickly became radioactive under neutron 

bombardment. Escaping from the reaction area, this gas would be hazardous.

To address these issues, the design engineers made the reactor air-tight and installed a "circulating helium atmosphere" 

that "displaced neutron-absorbing air from the reactor core, and removed gases generated by the reactor" (DOE 1997e, 

p. 164). The 115 Gas Purification Building, adjacent to the reactor building, contained all the equipment necessary to 

purify and circulate the helium, which was stored in high-pressure storage tanks in the 110 Process Gas Storage Building. 

An integrated ventilation and exhaust system was installed throughout the reactor building that channeled air from areas 

of no contamination to areas of high contamination where they were collected and released. Engineers designed this 

negative pressure gradient for every building where radiation would be present throughout the Hanford Site. For the 

100 Area reactors, two supply fans "washed, filtered, and tempered" outside air coming into the building, while two 

exhaust fans discharged circulated air through an underground concrete duct to the base of the 116 Exhaust Stack. 

Released without filtration, low-level process gases passed to the atmosphere from the top of the stack at 200 feet 

(Wahlen 1989, p. 28).

From the beginning, the Metallurgical Laboratory scientists knew that chemical separation would generate highly toxic 

fumes in the metal dissolving phase. Early operations w ithin the Clinton Semi works demonstrated that gases generated 

throughout the separations process contained radioactive fission products. To address these off-gases at the Hanford.Site, 

Du Pont engineered a ventilation and exhaust system in the canyon buildings with the 291 Exhaust Building and Stack as 

the point of release. Measuring 200 feet high, the stack "functioned to exhaust process gases...and to provide additional 

'diluting air' deemed essential to the safe dispersion of process gases to the atmosphere" (Gerber 1994a, p. 16). To assist 

with their unfiltered dispersion into the atmosphere, Du Pont engineers increased the normal flow of air and gases from 

40,000-60,000 cubic feet per minute using three large fans within the stack.

In the 321 Building, nitrous oxide and fission gases from research to improve the chemical separations process were 

released directly to the atmosphere through an exhaust stack on the building's roof. Laboratory exhausts generated 

w ithin the 3706 Building simply discharged through ventilation dormers on the roof (Gerber 1992c).

; Wo r k e r a n d En v ir o n m e n t a l M o n it o r in g

in reviewing the formative stages o f personal and environmental monitoring programs, Gerber (1992b, p. 11) observed 

that "the new sciences of health physics and environmental monitoring developed rapidly at the [Hanford] Site, 

pioneering advances in instrumentation procedures/working conditions, and methods of analytical chemistry to process 

substances never before sampled." After developing a pilot health physics program at the Clinton Engineer Works X-10 

complex, Herbert Parker, a radiological physicist, left Tennessee to return to Washington State. Together with Carl C. 

Gamertsfelder (an x-ray diffraction scientist), W illiam D. Norwood (a physician), and a team of fifteen others, Parker 

established the Health Instruments Section for the Hanford Site in July 1944,

1 .3 5
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

The Health Instruments Section "was charged with defining and measuring radiological hazards, establishing procedures 

to make jobs in plutonium production safe for workers, and developing and calibrating instruments." These tasks were 

made very challenging "because strict MED security regulations precluded revealing to most employees even the 

existence of radioactivity" (Gerber 1992b, p. 12). W hile operating in an information vacuum, workers found that the 

regulations drafted by the Health Instruments Section were meticulously enforced. For example, each employee wore a 

film badge and two "pencils" (a small, tubular radiation monitor) throughout their shift. They were required to have the 

pencils read daily, while the film badges were submitted for reading weekly. Those who worked in proximity to radiation 

sources wore additional personal monitors and provided samples for urinalysis regularly. All this as protection against a 

danger about which they could not even be informed. Indeed, discussion of radiation monitoring was so sensitive that 

even the term could not be used. It was referred to by its code named "health physics."

Groves' selection of the Hanford Site was itself an acknowledgement of the dangers inherent in working with radiation. 

Even amidst the intense pressures of construction, Groves understood the need to determine where and how 

contamination might spread, and what effects it might have: "An accident might release radioactivity into the air; that 

called for thorough meteorological work. The river water needed study; so did the river's valuable salmon, to see how 

they would take to mild doses of transient radioactivity from pile [reactor] discharge flow " (Rhodes 1986, p. 497).

Beginning in June 1943, a meteorological team began to document "dominant wind patterns, velocities, and variances" 

at the Hanford Site. Once a baseline had been established, general meteorological studies gave way to "wind dispersion 

tests with oil fog (S02 [sulfur dioxide]), beginning in the partially completed T Plant Stack (291-T) as early as April 1944." 

By Fall 1944, the C Plant Stack and then the Meteorological Tower (622 Structure), a 400-foot-high metal lattice work 

erected outside of the 200 West Area, were used in sequence to determine off-gas trajectories because pre:operation 

activities precluded the use of the 291 -T Stack. "So extensive was the weather study and forecasting effort that by the 

end of 1944, over 36,000 individual readings on wind dilution patterns had been recorded in the 200 West Area"

(Gerber 1994a, p. 29). Du Pont would use the information gained in these studies to determine the optimum conditions 

for atmospheric dispersal of process wastes, particularly the off-gases produced in chemical separations.

Twenty-nine A ir Monitoring Stations (614 Buildings) were constructed to track the waste stream and evaluate the 

dispersion model. These small, wooden structures housed continuous air samplers that technicians periodically 

analyzed for the presence of plutonium nitrate dust as well as iodine-131 and other fission isotopes. Twelve of these 

sampling stations were placed in the 200 Areas, fifteen were distributed across the Hanford Site (including Richland 

Village), and two were located off site. Acting on the data obtained from these stations, Du Pont determined by June 

1945 that initial dissolving operations should be limited to the night shift since dispersal characteristics were generally 

more favorable. Also concurrent w ith the commencement of chemical separations activities, the Health Instruments 

Section began regional investigations of the deposition of airborne fission materials, particularly iodine-131, and their 

accumulation and effect w ithin both animals and vegetation (Gerber 1994a, Gerber et al. 1997).

Before operations started, in fact beginning with design changes to the reactor intake pipes, the Corps considered the 

effects o f plutonium production on the Columbia River and its aquatic resources, particularly salmon. For example, the 

Corps, on Groves' suggestion, established the Applied Fisheries Laboratory at the University of Washington in 1943 under 

the direction of Lauren Donaldson (Gerber 1992b). Studies on the effects of radiation on fish were initially conducted.on 

the Seattle campus to maintain what would now be called "plausible deniability" between the research being conducted 

there and the production of plutonium at the Hanford Site. Exposing fish to x-rays, the radiation source available for 

research, provided useful but limited data. If questions regarding the effects of reactor effluent on fish were to be 

answered, then direct exposure to reactor effluent, and the isotopes it contained, had to occur.

Consequently in June 1945, Richard Foster began to conduct onsite research w ithin the 100-F Area. Effluent water of 

differing strengths and temperatures was discharged to troughs and ponds holding salmon and trout to determine 

tolerances, diseases, and reproductive viability. Initial results indicated that "[y]oung fish, possibly due to higher 

metabolic rates, accumulated proportionately more radioactivity in their tissues than did adults. Accumulation of
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

radioactivity occurred more slowly in cooler water, and activity levels differed among various fish tissues"

(Gerber 1992b, p. 36). Disclosure of either the conduct of these first-of-a-kind studies or their results was not allowed 

until after World War II. Dr. Ronald Katherine, a leading expert in radiological health physics, maintains that these two 

studies mark the beginning of the longest continuously operating environmental monitoring program in the United States. 

Chapter 2, Section 7 discusses the atmospheric, radiobiological, and radioecological research conducted at the 

Hanford Site.

Se c r e c y a n d Se c u r it y

Secrecy enveloped atomic research from the onset of the War in Europe until the flash at Hiroshima made clear to the 

world that one nation had realized the vision patented by Leo Szilard in 1934. Security measures, many of which 

violated individual civil liberties, were constants throughout the Manhattan Project. As Findlay and Hevly (1995, p. 39) 

observed, the Richland Village may have escaped the fence that enclosed both Los Alamos and the Clinton Engineer 

Works, but the "Army would still police Richland and watch its residents carefully - wartime censors examined each 

departing letter; security personnel listened in on phone calls; [and] hotel porters acted as 'counter-espionage agents'."

In fact, undercover agents were everywhere, assuming roles that provided them with access to the operating facilities, 

laboratories, and craft shops. Many recruited informants to extend their reach.

Security concerns associated with atomic weapons development, however, were not confined to the Hanford Site and 

continued after the end of World War II. Discussing line work at the Rocky Flats Plant, an Atomic Energy Commission 

installation devoted to the manufacture of plutonium pits and other weapon components established in 1951,

Jack Weaver recalled: "Nobody talked about what we were doing in those days. We didn't even talk about it amongst 

ourselves, let alone with our families and friends offsite. On the floor even, we referred to "Y" or "Z " or "U " and not to 

beryllium or plutonium or enriched uranium" (DOE 1995e, p. 17).

These remarks mirror those described elsewhere by retired Hanford Site employees and demonstrate that Groves' 

philosophy of "compartmentalization" permeated the national atomic weapons program. As Groves recounted: "We 

made certain that each member of the project thoroughly understood his part in the total effort - that, and nothing more"

(Groves 1983, p. xv).

The Hanford Site Patrol, established under the Plant Protection Program developed by Du Pont and approved by 

Colonel Matthias in March 1943, provided front-line security for the Hanford Site. The Hanford Site Patrol partnered 

with and sought assistance from the Corps and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, both of whom established a local 

presence in conducting background checks, safeguarding information, and preventing theft of materials among other 

tasks. No new employee was hired without a background investigation commensurate with the position they would fill. 

Having accepted a position, each employee signed a "Declaration of Secrecy," enforceable under the National Espionage 

Act or the Federal Sabotage Act with imprisonment or heavy fines if breached. The Corps established classified areas 

and materials, and the Hanford Site Patrol provided security orientation and education so employees did not transgress 

boundaries with respect to either facilities or documents to which they did not have authorized access. Employees 

seeking information not essential to their specific tasks or speculating in rumors detrimental to the workforce were 

promptly disciplined with reprimand or termination. Some found these measures oppressive or excessive and, as a final 

irony, were required to resign a Declaration of Secrecy before they could terminate their employment In fact, all 

employees renewed this pledge of allegiance before terminating employment under any circumstances.

The Hanford Site Patrol conducted foot, vehicle, and boat patrol of the Hanford Site perimeter as well as the entry points 

to all operational areas from 1943 until August 1944. At that time, the Corps assumed responsibility for perimeter patrol 

and also established an A ir Patrol to enforce the restricted air space established over the Hanford Site. The Hanford Site 

Patrol then concentrated on patrolling the operational areas and the facilities within and between them. Ensuring the 

security of classified information remained one of their primary tasks. The Hanford Site Patrol made daily inspections to 

verify that filing cabinets containing classified data remained locked. An unlocked cabinet was investigated to determine 

that its contents were intact. Armed Hanford Site Patrol staff also accompanied every shipment of uranium metal, fuel

1 .3 7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

elements, irradiated fuel, and concentrated plutonium nitrate throughout the production cycle. Chapter 2, Section 8 

describes in detail the secrecy and security measures in place at the Hanford Site.

Al a m o g o r d o B o m b i n g Ra n g e , Hi r o s h i m a , a n d N a g a s a k i

By late 1944, the Hanford Site was fully operational, dependably delivering plutonium to Los Alamos for research, 

testing, and assembly. Though still tightly under wrap, the contribution the Hanford Site workforce made to the 

Manhattan Project would soon become apparent, pending resolution of one critical problem (see sidebar box).

"fic /rf tcsi- p c iu m n c il w ith m .w iu m - J p m t< t 1 \p t “. in Lite

t V44 iM tcd (tu iib l- the ,irtilici \ m etho d tu he em phn ed

in the u i.u m im bom h II u .ii < /<•,» that the u r.w iu m -J I » n n m

O ak Ridi;e w ou ld he u-'Od in ,1 run /<•,» d o \u e tn meet

the ti/y iM / ! I ,t4 ~ ' ile.u lfin r h.ul u h en (ic n c r.il

Vf.ir-Ju// and the Joint ( h id '' ot 'ta ll th e pliih>nitim produt. ed

at '•in h vn/iciI'.!' and e tto il a t ll.m m td w ould n ot tit into

w artim e plannhe* t r n l e .? h ic a k th io w ’li in im plo-ion

tv ih n o h m or ( u rre d .' - (iti'ilint* I p. 42

the line: "Batter my heart, three person'd G od..." "Beyond 

Rhodes 1986, pp. 571 -572).

Gosling (1999, p. 48) writes that "At precisely 5:30 a.m., on Monday, July 16, 1945 the atomic age began" at an isolated 

location within the Alamogordo Bombing Range (which later became the W hite Sands Missile Range) also known by the 

Spanish name Jornada del Muerto - the Journey of Death. With an explosive force of approximately 18.6 kilotons of 

power, the Trinity "device" turned darkness into light and the cool, damp desert air into searing heat. Isidor Rabi 

recounts the moment of detonation:

"Suddenly,, there was an enormous flash o f light, the brightest light I have ever seen or that I think anyone has

ever seen. It blasted; it pounced; it bored its way right through you. It was a vision which was seen with more

than the eye. It was seen to last forever. You would wish it would stop; altogether it lasted about two seconds.

Finally it was over, diminishing, and we looked toward the place where the bomb had been; there was an

epormous ball o f fire which grew and grew and rolled as it grew; it went up into the air, in yellow flashes and

ihto scarlet and green. It looked menacing. It seemed to come toward one." - Rabi, quoted in Rhodes 1986, 

p. 672

No longer was there any doubt that the implosion bomb, fueled by plutonium irradiated at the Hanford Site's B Reactor 

and separated at T Plant, would work.

President Roosevelt did not live to see the atomic age. He died o f a cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 1945 in 

Warm Springs, Georgia. Harry S. Truman assumed the Presidency that evening and with it the need to determine 

national policy in the waning days of World War II. Before he was fully advised of the Manhattan Project, a bombing 

raid on Tokyo on April 13 destroyed the building containing Japan's gaseous thermal diffusion experiment. "It burned to

the ground and took the Japanese atomic bomb project with it" (Rhodes 1986, p. 612). About the same time, American 

forces had confiscated the Belgian uranium ore stored in Strassfurt, Germany, crippling the German atomic weapons 

program and thereby eliminating any potential atomic threat from the Axis powers.

Despite Germany's surrender, japan continued to resist the unconditional surrender demanded by the Allied Forces. The 

success of the Trinity test and word that both the enriched uranium and plutonium bombs would be ready for use by 

early August enabled President Truman to avoid extending an offer o f surrender to Japan that allowed the Imperial

1 .3 8

I

 The hard-fought breakthrough came in April 1945 

when,the combined efforts of inveterate chemists and 

metallurgists at Los Alamos led to precise techniques 

for producing plutonium metal. This occurred just 

3 months ahead of the July 4 test firing Oppenheimer 

had scheduled for the plutonium bomb he christened 

"Trinity" (Gosling 1999). When Groves asked many 

years later why he had chosen that name, 

Oppenheimer responded that the reason was not 

clear even to him, but noted that certain thoughts 

had been in his mind. In particular, he mentioned a 

devotional poem by John Donne, which opened with 

lis," he said, "I have no clue" (Oppenheimer, quoted in

1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

I

Emperor to continue to rule. Nuclear weapons might force 

rtn xi.ii J 0 4 - t . e r n u m s u rre n d e re d u rn n m i i i w i W M B a surrender and negate the need to invade Japan, which,

based on bitter experience gained from military encounters 

on the Pacific islands, would have resulted in significant 

loss of lives on both sides. W ithout an invasion, Russian entry into the Pacific theater would not be necessary, which 

was equally important given Russia's "designs on Eastern Europe and Germany." Russia could not "expect to share in the 

postwar administration of Japan" (Gosling 1999, pp. 50-51).

On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Declaration was issued via radio to Japan. In it, the President of the United States, the 

President of Nationalist China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain called on the Japanese government to "proclaim 

now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces...The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction" 

(Rhodes 1986, p. 692). Rejection came quickly on July 29.

At 2:45 a.m. on the morning of August 6, 1945, the Enola Cay, code named Dimples Eight Two, began its take-off run 

down the Tinian airfield with "Little Boy," the enriched uranium gun-style bomb, securely shackled within the bomb bay. 

Little Boy was the brother of "Fat Man"—the other bomb planned for Japan. Confident that the gun design would work 

w ith an enriched uranium core, Oppenheimer never tested a prototype of this bomb as he had done with the Trinity 

plutonium device. This mission was both test and application: "Little Boy exploded at 8:16:02 Hiroshima time,

43 seconds after it left the Enola Gay, 1,900 feet above the courtyard of Shima Hospital, 550 feet southeast of 

Thomas Ferebee's aiming point, Aioi Bridge," 1

(Rhodes 1986, p. 711) with a yield equivalent to

15,000 tons of TNT (DOE 2000a). " I H ilt‘ llo \ k ille d 70. tHHi people 'iiu ludini> about t\\e n l\ Am erican

aii men heim i held a- / 'O l V 1.111d in ju re d .m other ~0.000. I!\ the end \

o f Iu 4 ». the H iroshim a death lo ll ro*e to 141).t>00 .is radiation

sitk n e ** death* m ounted. I i\ e w a r* later the to ta l reached 100,000

The b im ih t.u /'i‘d to ta l d e\a*latrnn fo r m e *ijiia ie m ile*, w ith alm o*t

alt <if the imi/t/inii- in f/ic t if\ vM ii't dt'sN m cdor f/.im .invd.' -

Cnsiiru' MMl'l. p. '1

Radio stations all over the United States 

broadcast the news of Hiroshima within hours 

of its bombing. Reading from a press release 

issued by President Truman, announcers 

informed the public for the first time of the 

existence of the atomic bomb and of 

President Truman's resolve to drop additional

atomic bombs if Japan did not offer its unconditional surrender. Rhodes (1986, p. 736) opines that the civilian Japanese 

population viewed the atomic bomb "like a golden opportunity to surrender without shame, but the admirals and 

generals still despised unconditional surrender and refused to concur." Foreign Minister Togo again reached out to 

Russia to mediate an agreement. Instead, Ambassador Naotake Sato was informed on August 8 that Russia would 

declare war on Japan at midnight, August 9 (Rhodes 1986).

'I.it K m exploded tccl .i/io w the slope* 01' the t i i \ with .1io n e tn

J 1,1)00 ton* or 7 \ /. I at Man killed 40.000 people and iniuied (>0.000 more. 

H irer *quate mile* ot the n t\ i t r /e de*tro\ed le** than ihro*him a he«au*e

r»t the *teep hill* suiroundinn V iy.iw A / fii fantiai t l t>4n. ~0,000 people

had died in \ati.i*aki I he total e\enlnall\ ie.it heil 140.000. with .1 death

rale *im ilai tn that o illiro *h im a .' - tiu-.linn IW ) . pp. ~»S>"4

The Fat Man bomb (named in honor of 

Winston Churchill and fueled by Hanford 

Site plutonium) was originally scheduled 

to be dropped August 11,1945, but the 

drop date was advanced by 2 days to take 

advantage of forecasted good weather. At 

3:47 a.m. on August 9, Bock's Car lifted

off from Tinian under the command of ,..................................... .................................................

Major Charles W. Sweeny rather than the

B-29's namesake Frederick Bock. Kokura Arsenal on Kyushu Island was the primary target. The Mitsubishi plant at 

Nagasaki, where the torpedoes used at Pearl Harbor originated, was the secondary target. Bad weather conditions 

caused Sweeny to abort the drop over Kokura, despite making three passes over the target area. Running low on fuel 

because the reserve tank was not operational, Sweeny turned toward Nagasaki where he could make one pass before 

heading for an emergency landing at Okinawa. A "twenty-second visual run" through an otherwise clouded sky

1 .3 9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

provided the only opportunity to locate the aiming point. The bombardier only had time to fix on a stadium several 

miles upriver (Rhodes 1986).

Even after the Nagasaki bombing, "civilian and military leaders continued to struggle in deadlocked debate"

(Rhodes 1986, p. 743). Taking the initiative, Emperor Hirohito "forced the issue" and delivered an offer of conditional 

surrender to Washington through Switzerland on August 10. The condition was that he remain as sovereign. Taking 

advice from Stimson, Byrnes, and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, President Truman authorized Byrnes to draft a 

response that stated that the Emperor's rule would be "subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." The 

reply was both broadcast on August 11 and routed for return through Switzerland.

News of Japan's surrender was celebrated across the United States, but no more so than in the "atomic city" of Richland, 

whose "victory celebrations were covered in newspapers and on radio programs throughout the nation, and the little city 

basked in admiration and praise." Groves came to the Hanford Site in October and presented each employee, for their 

part in the war effort, the Army-Navy "E" Award, "the highest civilian production commendation," and an "A-bomb" pin 

authorized by the War Department (Gerber 1992b, p. 17).

En d Of Th e M a n h a t t a n Pr o jec t: 1946

The Manhattan Project did not end with the announcement of the Hiroshima bomb. A well-controlled breach in the wall 

of secrecy allowed the government to indulge public curiosity without revealing sensitive information. Atom ic Energy for

M ilitary Purposes, authored by physicist Henry DeWolf Smyth and issued on August 12, 1946 made information on 

atomic bomb development available to the general public: "It appalled the British, enlightened the Soviets on which 

approaches to isotope separation not to pursue and - Groves' intention in releasing it - defined what might be public and 

what secret about the atomic bomb program, thereby forestalling information leaks" (Rhodes 1986, p. 750).

W hile the future of atomic weapons and atomic research would be debated somewhat more openly now, public 

disclosure did not stop the secret production and stockpiling,of atomic weapons that continued, albeit at a reduced pace. 

In September 1945 under a plan approved by Stimson and Marshall, Groves either closed or idled operations at the 

Clinton Engineer Works. At the Hanford Site, Groves first reduced the operating power at all three reactors, then shut 

down B Reactor altogether in December 1946. During this slowdown only T Plant was used for chemical separations. 

Finally, Groves re-assigned weapon assembly responsibility from Los Alamos to the Sandia Base in Albuquerque 

(Gerber 1992b, Gosling 1999). Manhattan Project operations ratcheted down while the formulation of a national atomic 

policy moved to the forefront.

As early as spring 1944, Niels Bohr attempted to impress on both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill the 

need to freely exchange information on nuclear weapons development both to secure international agreement on control 

and avoid international proliferation - an arms race. Rhodes (1986, p. 528) summarizes the political implications of 

Bohr's message to these world leaders: "Tell the Soviet Union soon, before the first bombs were nearly built, that a bomb 

project was under way, and the confidence might lead to negotiations on postwar arms control. Let the Soviet Union 

discover the information on its own, build the bombs and drop them, oppose the Soviets at the end of the war with an 

Anglo-American nuclear monopoly, and the likeliest outcome was a nuclear arms race."

Bohr did not succeed w ith either man. Churchill chastised him, and w hile President Roosevelt was more cordial and 

agreeable, he agreed in the end w ith Churchill that secrecy would be maintained. Focusing on the immediate situation, 

both lost sight of Bohr's deeper message, that relationships among nations would be changed fundamentally after the 

bomb since no one could w in a war between nations armed w ith atomic weapons.

Like Bohr, many of the scientists who developed the atomic bomb expressed misgivings about its use. Leo Szilard, the

man who pushed hardest for the production of nuclear weapons in 1939, became one of the most ardent voices in 

seeking to control their use and spread. He made four attempts to influence policy during the spring and summer of
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

1945. In March, Szilard drafted a memorandum for President Roosevelt and requested a letter of introduction from 

Einstein to secure a meeting with the President. Roosevelt died before their meeting could be arranged. Undeterred, 

Szilard sought to meet with President Truman in May. President Truman instead directed him to James Byrnes in 

South Carolina. In response to Szilard's concern that "the greatest immediate danger which faces us is the probability 

that our 'demonstration' of the bomb w ill precipitate a race in the production of these devices between the United States 

and Russia," Byrnes responded first that the use of the bomb would satisfy Congress that the two billion dollars spent 

secretly in its development was justified, and that a demonstration of the power of the bomb might incline Russia to 

withdraw its troops from eastern Europe after the war (Szilard, quoted in Rhodes 1986, p. 637).

Discouraged but still undeterred, Szilard worked with James Franck, Glenn Seaborg, and other members of the 

Metallurgical Laboratory's Committee on the Social and Political Implications of the Atomic Bomb to assert their 

positions to the Interim Committee's Scientific Panel that only international control of atomic power would prevent an 

arms race and that the bomb should be demonstrated on an uninhabited area before being used against Japan. Theirs 

was the minority view, as the Scientific Panel met with the Interim Committee on May 31 and opted for maintaining 

nuclear monopoly and conducting an unannounced strike on Japan (Gosling 1999).

Finally, in July, Szilard drafted and circulated a petition to President Truman in which he urged him not to use the bomb: 

"The last few years show a marked tendency toward increasing ruthlessness. At present our Air Force, striking at the 

Japanese cities, are using the same methods of warfare which were condemned by American public opinion only a few 

years ago when applied by the Germans to the cities of England. Our use of atomic bombs in this war would carry the 

world a long way further on this path of ruthlessness" (Szilard 1945).

Lanouette (1999, p. 6) notes that 155 scientists from the Metallurgical Laboratory and the Clinton Engineer Works signed 

drafts of this petition that Oppenheimer banned at Los Alamos. Groves wentfurther than Oppenheimer. Looking to 

dismiss the petition, he polled the scientists, but "when 72 percent of those responding favored a demonstration of the 

bomb, the Army bureaucracy suppressed both the petition and the poll."

Two events in late September 1945 framed the debate for international control of atomic weapons. Shortly after japan's 

surrender, having seen and keenly felt the destructive power unleashed by the atomic bomb, Oppenheimer brought a 

letter drafted by the Interim Committee's Scientific Panel to Washington to deliver to Stimson. In the letter, the Panel 

outlined their concerns that further research would introduce far more powerful bombs, that no military counter 

measures existed then or would be found later to defend against atomic bombs, and that safety lay not in developing or 

stockpiling weapons but in "making future wars impossible" (Rhodes 1986, pp. 751-752). Clearly, the Panel's opinion 

had changed, moved both by the aftermath of the bombing and the earlier admonishments of Bohr and Szilard. 

Oppenheimer did not see Stimson, who was away when Oppenheimer arrived in Washington. Instead, Oppenheimer 

met with Vannevar Bush and Stimson's aide George L. Harrison. Neither was very receptive. When the letter reached 

Byrnes through Harrison, Byrnes instructed Oppenheimer to continue the work initiated under the Manhattan Project 

"full steam ahead" because of the deteriorating international situation (Rhodes 1986, p. 752).

The second event, the Conference bn Atomic Energy Control, was a 2-day meeting organized by Szilard and University 

of Chicago chancellor Robert M. Hutchins. Following the revelation of the atomic bomb, Szilard felt the time was right 

to "get thoughtful and influential people to think about what the bomb might mean to the world, and how the world and 

America could adjust to its existence" (Szilard, quoted in Rhodes 1986, p. 750). Jacob Viner expounded on the concept 

of "psychological warfare" between equally armed nations wherein fear of the retaliatory effects of the bomb would deter 

its use. If the "war o f nerves" maintained fear at a level appropriate for deterrence, the net effect would be peace.

Szilard noted that deterrence might bring a "durable peace," but only "world government" could ensure a "permanent 

peace" (Rhodes 1986, p. 753).

Unfortunately for those proposing full disclosure and international control, initial congressional legislation, the MayJohnson bill, drew heavily from the draft legislation prepared by the Interim Committee prior to Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

bombings. Acting on President Truman's charge to formulate a nuclear weapons policy, the Interim Committee had

1 .4 1
Ch a p t e r l - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

developed draft legislation in July that proposed a "peacetime organization with responsibilities very similar to those of 

the Manhattan Project." The government would continue to control nuclear research and development through a board 

of commissioners weighted in favor of the military. Security would be maintained through fines and imprisonment. 

President Truman initially pushed for passage of the May-Johnson bill on October 3, 1945. Opponents of the bill 

complained that its provision for continued m ilitary control "tolerable during war...was unacceptable during peacetime 

when free scientific interchange should be resumed." Debate on the bill stalled "through a parliamentary maneuver" 

(Gosling 1999, p. 57).

On December 20,1945, Brien McMahon, chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, introduced an 

alternative to the May-Johnson bill, which had steadily lost ground, first from scientific opposition, then from 

President Truman's withdrawal of support. The bill was debated for 5 months. Groves objected to the bill and cited its 

"weak security provisions, the low m ilitary presence, and...[the] provision that atomic weapons be held in civilian rather 

than military custody." Ultimately, civilian control prevailed. President Truman signed the bill, known as the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1946, on August 1 and thereby gave control of atomic research and development to the newly created 

United States Atomic Energy Commission effective January 1, 1947 (Gosling 1999, p. 57).

Two of Groves' last acts as commander of the Manhattan Project demonstrated his acknowledgement of increased 

civilian interaction and control. In June 1946, nine plutonium bombs constituted the entire U.S. nuclear weapons 

arsenal (Rhodes 1986). During July of that year, two were detonated under Operation Crossroads. W ith a "large, invited 

audience of journalists, scientists, military officers, congressmen, and foreign observers" in attendance, Shot Able and 

Shot Baker, each with an explosive yield of 21,000 tons of TNT, were detonated on Bikini Atoll on July 1 and 15 

respectively. These public tests were the last conducted by the Manhattan Project (Gosling 1999, p. 55).

Late in 1946 in response to Oppenheimer's request for increased research and development funding, Groves established 

three national laboratories - Argonne, Brookhaven, and Oak Ridge (Gerber 1992b). The Argonne and Oak Ridge 

national laboratories grew out of their military background, and even their civilian focus remained tied to applied atomic 

research, that is, process improvement. The Brookhaven National Laboratory, on the other hand, was a "civilian 

institution from its conception, and its program was...oriented to basic research," that is, the discovery or understanding 

of previously unknown structures or characteristics principally in the fields of physics, engineering, biology, and 

medicine (Crease 1999, p. 1).

The Manhattan Project lasted 4 years from 1942-1946 and estimates on total expenditures range from $1.8 to

$2.2 billion. Today, this would be equivalent to over $20 billion (Bracchini 1997). It succeeded in what it had set out to

do - develop an atomic bomb for m ilitary use. Whether it had made the world more secure was another question.

Co l d Wa r : Ex p a n s i o n o f t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

Site Name: Hanford Works - January 1947 to December 1974

Site Manager: Lt. Col. Fredrick J. Clarke - August 1945 to August 1947

Carlton Shugg - August 1947 to September 1948 

Responsible Agency: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Atomic Energy Commission - January 1947 to December 1974 

Site Contractor: General Electric Company - September 1946 to January 1964

Rhodes (1986, p. 756) points out that the problem following the war "was not lack of support but lack of authority." 

Congressional authorization was required before funds could be released. The release of funds was tied to the 

development of policy objectives and legislation. W ith the creation of the Atom ic Energy Commission, initial legislation ; 

and congressional authorization were essentially resolved for the moment. Following the Atomic Energy Commission's 

introduction into the open political arena, however, the development of a national policy would continually shift with 

world events and presidential elections.
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

In an interesting analysis of the United j '

States and Russia at the end of the ' V f «■« \ p i<n od u> bo .1 h lc ^ m a in di-gui-o M ihouoji if d ii i.iio d iv m o tv w/r*

war, Rhodes (1995, p. 180) compares lo t.ilin n *. ic tfin rrd sublet fu:;o in nh l.u n iivi hihoi .111 d *u p p lio ,m d - o m u l.i- ,1

their relative youth as nations, their 1 niiit.iii/ irrif.m t lo iho .it .ideintt -i ie n li-t- m i the firo jv t t, if h .id one

shared origin through revolution, and m r iM /ir /m iiii; V i n ’i 1 m .ulc itp tr ^ ih lv tn m .ik r d n i-io n s w ith little

their populations and resources lo tio td to nornud po.u etim o p a h lii j I «on ^id o i.itio n '-.' - (i<>slmi» i«hmi, p. |<i

However, despite their similarities, he 

concludes that there remains "an

intractable difference between them. They were opposite experiments in the large organization of people and natural 

wealth, the one through liberty and competition, the other through terror and centralized control, an open society and a 

closed - a crystal of quartz and a crystal of onyx, Robert Oppenheimer once contrasted them - and each was convinced 

that the other side's intentions were malevolent."

The beginning of the Cold War was neither as abrupt nor as visible as that of World War II. Instead, it grew in the course 

of boasts and retaliatory statements beginning in 1946 with the Soviet Union's "there can be no permanent peaceful 

coexistence," Prime Minister Churchill's "an iron curtain has descended across the continent," and the Clifford-Elsey 

report that Soviet foreign policy was "a direct threat to American security." As a signal of U.S. resolve, the Truman 

Doctrine, delivered on March 12, 1947, assured the world that the United States would "support free peoples who are 

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Rhodes 1995, p. 295). In large measure, 

the Truman Doctrine was the military counterpunch to the Marshall Plan, first articulated by Secretary of State 

George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. His economic recovery plan proposed that the United States "do whatever it is 

able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability 

and no assured peace" (Marshall, quoted in Rhodes 1995, p. 297).

With international positions hardening, the Atomic Energy Commission visited each of the Manhattan Project sites early 

in 1947. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, remembered their January inspection "as one of 

the saddest days of my life" when he determined there was only "one [bomb] that had a good chance of being operable" 

(Lilienthal, quoted in Rhodes 1995, p. 283). "Meeting early in the year after a w hirlwind tour of the production sites and 

laboratories, the A EC's General Advisory Committee assigned its highest priority to weapons research and production.

By February, improvement and expansion of the plutonium production units at Hanford topped the list of A EC goals" 

(Gerber 1992b, p. 18).

In August 1947, the General Electric Company, having assumed management of the Hanford Site from Du Pont on 

September 1,1946, announced that two new reactors would be built and research leading to the development of a new 

chemical separations process would begin. The news was well received in Richland, whose continued prosperity relied 

on government support for the Hanford Site.

To enhance plutonium production at a time when the existing reactors were aging, General Electric commissioned 

construction of the DR and H Reactor complexes to meet Atomic Energy Commission objectives. Completed in 

March 1949, the DR (D Replacement) Reactor was meant to take the place of the D Reactor, whose graphite core was 

observed to be expanding and distorting. In fact, expansion was occurring in all three reactors. The distortion was 

caused by graphite's reaction to intense neutron bombardment. Called "Wigner's disease," after the physicist 

Eugene Wigner who had predicted the effect in 1942, energy acquired under bombardment realigned the carbon atoms 

within the graphite's crystal lattice. This rearrangement caused the graphite to expand (Rhodes 1995). Operators 

monitoring the expansion at B Reactor noted that temperature, in addition to the intensity of the neutron flux, was 

causing disproportional expansion. As described in the B Reactor HAER in Appendix B on the Internet, "Temperature 

was so crucial to expansion that the cooler edges of the pile [reactor] were actually expanding quite a bit more than the 

graphite in the highly irradiated but thermally hot center portion." As a consequence of expansion, the process tubes 

were bowing, making charging and discharging more difficult, the alignments of the control rod and safety rod channels

1 .4 3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

were altering, and the neoprene seals along the shielding walls were being stressed. Unchecked distortion would render 

the reactors inoperable or, more ominously, uncontrollable.

Reactor expansion is the reason Groves shut down the B Reactor and reduced the operating power of the D and 

F Reactors in March 1946. Until the problem was resolved or new reactors were built, B Reactor would be held in 

reserve. Groves closed B Reactor to ensure that production of plutonium and polonium-210 could continue if D and F 

had to be taken offline. His primary concern was maintaining a source of polonium-210, which was used as the initiator 

or trigger in plutonium bombs. To produce polonium-210, "lead-bismuth alloy targets (called 'B Metal') [were] 

welded...into unbonded aluminum cans," and irradiated in the production reactors. The first targets were fabricated in 

1944 in the 313 Building, and production of polonium would continue until the early 1950s (DOE 1997e, p. 158). 

Polonium-210 is a short-lived isotope. With a half-life of only 138 days, "if the Hanford piles [reactors] broke down and 

polonium production ceased, the atomic bombs in the nations small stockpile would become unreliable within a year" 

(Rhodes 1995, p. 277). However, while construction of the DR Reactor was underway) scientists at the Hanford Site's 

Pile Technology Division found the solution to graphite swelling. By adding carbon dioxide to the helium atmosphere 

surrounding the reactor, the temperature of the graphite could be raised from 100° C to 250° C. This thermal increase 

during neutron bombardment within the reactor, termed nuclear annealing, negated the effects of crystal realignment. 

General Electric restarted B Reactor in July 1948 and elevated the operating power of all three Manhattan Project 

reactors, which increased product yield. Given this increased productivity, the Atomic Energy Commission held the 

DR Reactor in standby. The DR Reactor would not be started up until October 1950.

Advancing on the existing design, General Electric engineered the H Reactor to operate at 400 megawatts-thermal - a 

60 percent increase in power relative to the B, D, F, and DR reactors. Starting up October 1949, the H Reactor complex 

was the first post-Manhattan Project site constructed in the 100 Area. It also marked a deviation from the siting plan 

worked out by Groves and Du Pont in that it was located not downriver from the 100-F Area, as might be expected given 

the alphabetic sequence established in 1943, but rather up river between the 100-D and 100-F areas. In addition, the 

DR Reactor was located within one-half mile of the D Reactor so their later simultaneous operation also violated the 

1943 siting requirement of a separation of not less than one m ile between production reactors. These initial siting 

requirements would be further abrogated by future expansions.

Construction of two new reactors essentially improved existing capabilities; however, completion of the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant (234-5Z Building or Z Plant) in 1949 provided an entirely new capability. As described in the ExHPIF for 

the 234-5Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet: "Although the nitrate compound that left Hanford had been 

evaporated into a very thick, dry paste for safety reasons, the managing federal agencies (Manhattan Engineer District and 

later the Atomic Energy Commission) nonetheless viewed the shipment of non-solid forms of Pu [plutonium] as 

potentially hazardous, and thus looked for a way to create metallic Pu at the Hanford Site."

The expansion ordered in 1947 provided that opportunity. Using plutonium nitrate from the 231-Z Building as feed) 

operators at the Plutonium Finishing Plant chemically converted plutonium nitrate, the W orld War IE end-product, into 

hockey puck-shaped plutonium metal "buttons," which resemble hockey pucks. Machinists then fabricated these 

buttons into "pits" for use in nuclear weapons. Operations began on July 5, 1949, using the Rubber Glove Line, an 

assembly of 28 interconnected glove boxes. The Rubber Glove Line performed less than satisfactorily. Airborne 

contamination releases and corrosion failures caused slowdowns and periodic shutdowns at a time when the Atomic 

Energy Commission was calling for increasing production (see Chapter 2, Section 5 for an extended discussion).

The 234-5Z Building contained its own analytical laboratory where chemists analyzed samples drawn from stages 

throughout the finishing process to ensure that safety and isotopic standards were maintained. Another section housed 

the developmental laboratory where researchers sought ways to refine measurement accuracy, extract more plutonium 

(thereby reducing wastes), and solve production problems (see Chapter 2, Section 5). Support facilities constructed in 

association with 234-5Z included the 216-Z-1 and 216-Z-2 Waste Cribs, the 241 -Z Waste Storage Building, the 272-Z 

Shop and Warehouse, the 291 -Z Stack, the 2701 -Z Badge House, the 2704-Z Office Building, the 2705-Z Temporary 

Technical Office Building, the 2719-Z First Aid Station, and the 2901 -Z Elevated Water Storage Tank.

1 .4 4
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Scientists and politicians alike considered uranium a very limited resource in the late 1940s, so much so that the 

United States and Great Britain each tried to control the world supply (Rhodes 1995). Dissatisfied with the fact that 

uranium was flushed away as waste in the initial stages of the bismuth phosphate process, the Atomic Energy 

Commission issued "direct and urgent orders" to develop a better separations process early in 1947 (Gerber 1992c, 

p. 84). Consequently, General Electric decontaminated several laboratories within the 3706 Building and assigned their 

scientists the task of perfecting an alternative process. The scientists labeled the process they invented reductionoxidation or simply REDOX. In contrast to the bismuth phosphate batch process, REDOX was a continuous, solvent 

extraction process that was more efficient (in terms of total plutonium extracted per ton of irradiated fuel elements) and 

more economic (since uranium could be separated out and recovered) (Gerber 1992c, Gerber 1993b). However, 

construction of the REDOX Plant (202-S Building), the process canyon named after the pioneering chemical separations 

process, would not begin until late 1949. Chapter 2, Section 4 describes the REDOX process in detail.

To handle the additional waste stream from increased production within the 200 Area, General Electric built the 241 -BX, 

241-BY, and 241-TX Tank farms, constructing an additional 42 single-shell tanks (Gerber 1992b). In 1948,

General Electric built the 300 North Cribs (321 Cribs). Because monitoring of the main Process Pond determined that 

radioactivity levels had risen "precipitously, clim bing by three to thirty orders of magnitude in water and mud samples 

taken from 1945 through 1948" (Gerber 1993b, p. 55), the 300 North Cribs were seperated from the 300 Area by nearly 

5 miles. A second, larger process pond (the North Process Pond) was constructed that same year after a break in the dike 

of the main Process Pond (now called the South Process Pond) released 14.5 m illion gallons of waste water to the 

Columbia River in 90 minutes (Gerber 1993b)."

The workers who constructed these new facilities during the postwar expansion resided within the 3000 Area, a newly 

created construction camp located 5 miles north of the Richland Village. Single men lived in barracks acquired from the 

former Pasco Naval Air Station, while married men lived in small trailers. Some 12,000 construction workers and

13,000 dependents called the 3000 Area camp home in 1948. Population within the Richland Village increased to 

nearly 23,000 during this expansion period, fueled by "the highest birth rate in the nation!" (Gerber 1992b, p. 22).

The operations workforce alone at the newly renamed Hanford Works expanded from 4479 to 8628 in the 2 years 

between 1946-1948 (Findlay and Hevly 1995). In their attempt to make Richland "attractive enough to recruit and retain 

plant employees," the Atomic Energy Commission instructed General Electric that "consistent with security and other 

requirements, residents...shall enjoy those facilities, services, and activities which are properly a part of American life." 

Still, to some Richland Village retained its feeling as a police state since the "company, not the citizens, ran the town, 

and ran it on behalf of the AEC." To act on some of their concerns, General Electric established the Richland Community 

Council in 1948. The Council "provided a forum for residents to raise questions or propose changes, but it served only 

as an advisory body, with no legislative power and only a minimal budget provided by GE" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, 

pp. 80-88). Self-government would not come for another decade.

So v ie t “Gi a n t ” Aw a k e s : 1 9 4 7 -1 9 4 9

"In the winter and spring of 1948," Rhodes (1995, p. 317) writes, "the Soviet Union and the Western allies gave up any 

remaining pretense of continuing their wartime collaboration." New alliances, or forced allegiances, would be formed in 

the post-war era. Among the first was the alliance between Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 

established by the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1948. The occupation of Czechoslovakia by Russian troops on 

February 25, 1948 was among the first of the Soviet-enforced allegiances (Rhodes 1995).

On June 24, 1948, the Soviets closed all rail traffic leading to Berlin from West Germany, effectively isolating the city. 

Rhodes (1995, p. 319), citing Soviet sources, proposes that the "possibility that the West might rearm Germany [by 

including West Germany in a military alliance with the United States, Britain, Canada, and Western Austria] may well 

have precipitated the Soviet decision to move against Berlin." The State Department had initiated secret discussions on 

March 22 on establishing a western military alliance with Britain and Canada to defend Western Europe. By mid-June,

1 .4 5
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

with the secret long exposed, the Senate opened the way for "public negotiations towards a North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization" (Rhodes 1995, p. 322).

President Truman responded to the gauntlet the Soviets had thrown down by approving an airlift operation to supply the 

American, British, and French sectors of Berlin on June 28. The airlift lasted until the Soviets opened all rail lines in 

May 1949,11 months after the crisis began. In one of the first misinformation campaigns of the Cold War, "the 

government made a point of revealing" that the sixty B-29s the U.S. A ir Force flew to East Anglia in support of the airlift 

in July 1948 "were atomic-capable and hinted that they carried atomic bombs" (Rhodes 1995, p. 326). The allusion was 

untrue, but the bluff indicated the deterrent effect afforded atomic weapons and foreshadowed the National Security 

Council's adoption of deterrence as official national policy in November 1948.

Just prior to the Berlin blockade, weapon developers from Los Alamos traveled to Eniwetok atoll to test a new series of 

bombs, the Mark IV. Norris Bradbury, Oppenheimer's successor at Los Alamos, had directed his staff to develop "small 

atomic weapons" (Mitchell 1999, p. 21). These small tactical weapons "offered a technological solution that would 

bring nuclear weapons back to the battlefield, in a sense controlling the awesome destructive capabilities within some 

acceptable level. The destruction of concentrations of enemy troops, planes, tanks, and ships was morally more 

acceptable than that of whole cities and their inhabitants" (Mitchell 1999, p. 22).

The Mark IV bombs had new cores, which increased the yield substantially. The Sandstone tests of the Mark IV bombs 

consisted of three explosions: the first of which yielded 37 kilotons, the second 49 kiiotons-the largest yield of any 

atomic weapon yet. The third bomb, tested on May 14, 1948, exploded with a yield of 18 kilotons (DOE 2000a).

Not only were these new cores highly effective, but they were also highly efficient. Using this design, the existing 

stockpile of nuclear weapons could be upgraded and expanded, and new weapons with higher yields could be added 

more quickly: "Fabrication of standard nuclear cores stopped immediately so that all fissionable material would 

henceforth go into new models. The day of tailor-made weapons was fading fast; with Mark 4 would come mass 

production of components and assembly-line techniques" (Hewlett and Duncan, quoted in Mitchell 1999, p. 22).

At the Conference on Atomic Energy Control held at the University of Chicago in September 1945, Jacob Viner had 

characterized the United States and the Soviet Union as two giants whose mutual opposition would deter or ignite world 

conflict (Rhodes 1986, p. 753). Having faced down the Soviets in Berlin and with the West's nuclear capability 

increasing through expanded production facilities and redesigned weapons, Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed 

the administration's general feeling that in July 1949 the "position of the West... [has] grown greatly in strength, and the 

position of the Soviet Union...has changed from the offensive to the defensive" (Acheson, quoted in Gerber 1992b, 

p. 23). This feeling was short-lived.

On the isolated, high, short-grass steppes of northeastern Kazakhstan, the Soviets had established a site to detonate their 

first nuclear device, RDS-1. The test, which the Soviets code-named "First Lightning," was set off at 7:00 a.m. on 

August 29, 1949. The RDS-1 was a near replica of the Trinity device, whose plans had been acquired through espionage 

(Rhodes 1995, pp. 167-174). As with Trinity, the test was delayed by light early-morning showers but was successful, 

exploding with a yield of 20 kilotons. Unlike Trinity, however, the Soviets had constructed single- and multi-story 

houses, built bridges and tunnels, positioned military hardware, and placed animals both in open pens and within 

buildings to observe and measure the effects of the explosion and its attendant radiation throughout the test site. Little 

survived the blast (Rhodes 1995, pp. 364-368). The test marked the culmination of Soviet covert construction operations 

that had been going on for nearly 4 years.

The Soviets began construction o f the F-1 (Physics-1) test reactor in July 1946 based on a design two Soviet scientists,

Igor Kurchakov and Igor S. Panasyuk, had proposed in July 1943. However, based on declassified information, physicist 

Arnold Kramish concluded in 1955 that F-1 "was practically a carbon copy of the American 305 reactor built at 

Hanford," whose design was being developed at the Metallurgical Laboratory in June 1943 (Kramish, quoted in Rhodes

1 .4 6

\
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

1995, p. 266). Their function was also identical -testing the purity of graphite and uranium before emplacement within 

production reactors. It started operation on Christmas day 1946.

Although Stalin did not publicize the success o f the "First Lightning" test, western scientists literally pulled the 

information out of thin air. When a U.S. A ir Force "sniffer plane" was on a routine air-monitoring flight over the 

Kamchatka Peninsula on September 3,1949, it detected radioactivity "300 percent greater than the level...established as 

an alert: measurements quickly confirmed that the radioactivity was fission derived" (Rhodes 1995, p. 371). By 

September 14, experts associated with Los Alamos, the U.S. Navy, and the British monitoring program confirmed these 

findings. The scientist at Tracer!ab concluded that the blast, given the name "Joe 1" by Kramish, had taken place at 

6:00 a.m. on August 29 - they were off by one hour (Rhodes 1995). Following a period of denial, skepticism, and 

guarded acceptance, President Truman made the news public on September 23. The Soviet giant had awakened.

President Truman had made it known on July 14, 1949 before the detonation of RDS-1, that nuclear superiority was 

paramount to U.S. national security (Mitchell 1999, p. 20). Now that the Soviets had the atomic bomb, his words held a 

special meaning for Edward Teller, who judged that the time had come to conclude his long-standing push for 

development of thermonuclear weapons - the "Super." Rhodes (1986, p. 754) explains: "The end sought was a bomb 

burning about a cubic meter of liquid deuterium. For such a bomb the energy release w ill be about ten m illion tons 

[10 megatons] of TNT." Such a bomb would be 1,000 times more powerful than the one exploded over Hiroshima.

As early as 1943, Teller had lobbied for the development of a hydrogen bomb. Indeed he was "so preoccupied with the 

idea of the Super during the war-time Manhattan Project that when Oppenheimer assigned Teller work on calculations 

for Fat Man, the work had to be reassigned" (Mitchell 1999, p. 25). Ernest Rutherford, Marcus Oliphant, and 

Paul Harteck had discovered the "hydrogen fusion reaction" in 1934 while conducting experiments with the particle 

accelerator at Cambridge University. When concentrated heavy water (hydrogen-2 or deuterium) was bombarded with 

deuterium-accelerated nuclei, "the deuterium nuclei had fused together...Neutrons, heat and intense gamma radiation 

came out of the reaction as...the new nucleus [of helium] adjusted its energy level and stabilized." The reaction 

required "heating the nuclei until their thermal motion overcame their electrical repulsion" and thereby acquired the 

name "thermonuclear fusion" (Rhodes 1995, p. 247).

From April 18-20,1946, the Los Alamos scientist had held a "Super Conference" to review work conducted to date, to 

debate the feasibility of a hydrogen bomb, and to investigate its design. Teller, summarizing a report he authored with 

six colleagues, concluded that the Super could be made and that a large-scale development program should be initiated 

towards that end. Others in attendance were not convinced. The ignition might take place, they argued, but whether or 

not it would continue to burn was highly problematical. Noting, however, the importance o f tritium as a booster for 

either fission or fusion bombs, Teller recommended its production. This proposal did not generate resistance. The report 

issued following the Super Conference concluded that development would be costly "using up a fair portion of the 

national nuciear-weapons budget for some years to come." With the war concluded and with no apparent need for a 

weapon of this destructive magnitude, research on the Super was restricted to the Theoretical Division and then to only 

half-time over the next few years (Rhodes 1995, pp. 252-255).

W ith President Truman's announcement of the Soviet Union's nuclear capability on September 23, 1949 as a catalyst, the 

Atomic Energy Commission's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy proposed a number of ways to expand the production of 

atomic weapons including dramatically accelerating work on the hydrogen bomb arid building a new generation of 

reactors so that tritium production would not come at the expense of plutonium production. However, convening the 

Atomic Energy Commission on October 5, David Lilienthal did not place thermonuclear weapons on the agenda. 

Incredulous that the hydrogen bomb had been left out o f the discussion, Strauss contacted Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, 

who was to meet with President Truman the following morning. President Truman was briefed on the Super for the first 

time on October 6 , 1949 (Rhodes 1995, pp. 380-381).

1 .4 7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

On January 31, 1950, President Truman approved development of the Super. National security policy was based on 

deterrence, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson succinctly summarized the implications of that policy with respect to 

Russia: "We want a military establishment sufficient to deter that aggressor and sufficient to kick the hell out of her if she 

doesn't stay deterred" (Johnson, quoted in Rhodes 1995, p. 405). W ithin a few months, two events occurred which 

made President Truman's decision to add thermonuclear weapons to the U.S. arsenal look prescient. In May, the 

Communist forces of Mao Tse-Tung expelled Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist followers from China. Stalin and 

Tse-Tung had entered into a mutual assistance agreement on February 14. On June 25, the Communists forces of North 

Korea invaded the southern Korean peninsula. These events played to the nation's worst fears of unchecked communist 

expansion.

Ko r e a n Wa r : 1 9 4 9 -1 9 5 2

Site Name: Hanford Works - January 1947 to December 1974

Site Manager: Fred C. Schlemmer - September 1948 to May 1950

David F. Shaw - June 1950 to June 1955 

Responsible Agency: Atomic Energy Commission - January 1947 to December 1974

Site Contractor: General Electric Company - September 1946 to January 1964

"Using the Korean War as a club," the Senate persuaded President Truman to increase Atomic Energy Commission 

funding from $260 m illion to $1.4 billion between July and October 1950. A National Security Council Special 

Committee report, issued on October 2, cited the need not only for "more weapons o f existing designs, but for new 

designs in large numbers," and focused attention on their delivery systems as well. By mid-1951 /th e Joint Committee on 

Atomic Energy was already pressing for an additional enhancement of 50 to 150 percent in atomic weapons production 

(Mitchell 1999, p. 31).

Gerber (1992b, p. 25) has characterized the period from late 1949 to 1952 as "the greatest era of expansion in U.S. 

atomic/nuclear history." During this interval, the Atomic Energy Commission consolidated uranium metal production at 

the Fernald Feed Materials Production Plant in O hio; constructed a second plutonium production site, the Savannah 

River Plant, in South Carolina; and constructed a second uranium enrichment site, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 

in Kentucky. Two new laboratories, the Reactor Testing Station in Idaho and the Sandia Laboratory, were opened. The 

Pantex Plant in Texas was established as a weapons assembly site. Finally, the Atomic Energy Commission established 

the Nevada Test Site and expanded the Pacific Proving Ground at Bikini and Eniwetok atolls (Gerber 1992b). At the 

same time these new sites were being constructed, the Atomic Energy Commission added a number of facilities to the 

existing Manhattan Project sites.

Workers broke ground for the C Reactor complex, the sixth production reactor at the Hanford Site, on June 6 , 1951. It 

started up 17 months later on November 18, 1952. Like its predecessors, the C Reactor was a single-pass, water-cooled, 

graphite-moderated reactor. Unlike its predecessors, however, the design team engineered it to operate at 

650 megawatts-thermal, which was a 60 percent increase over the design rating of the H Reactor completed only a year 

earlier and a 160 percent increase over the original design specifications for the Manhattan Project reactors (Gerber et ai. 

1997, p. 5.17). To accelerate construction, General Electric located the C Reactor w ithin the 100-B Area and less than a 

mile from the B Reactor to "take economic advantage of existing utilities, services, and facilities" (Gerber 1993a, p. 106).

Nonetheless, as production capabilities rose at the Hanford Site, the Atomic Energy Commission production requirements 

expanded even more. To meet ever-spiraling demands, Hanford Site-physicists looked for ways to increase power levels 

first within the Manhattan Project reactors and then all reactors. In April 1949, physicists began incremental testing at 

D Reactor that would push the operating level from 250 to 330 megawatts-thermal. The D Reactor was chosen because 

with the DR Reactor nearly complete, the D Reactor was considered expendable should something go wrong. Exceeding 

expectations, D Reactor was operating at 400 megawatts-thermal by January 1950 (Gerber 1993a).

1 .4 8
C h a p te r 1 - His t o r ic O v e rv ie w

Sensing that operating levels could be 

pushed further, the Atomic Energy 

Commission recommended that the 

Hanford Site scientists "test whether B, D, 

and F Reactors could operate at 

600 megawatts-thermal, without causing 

Undue system failures or increases in the 

plutonium-240 content of the product"

Design reviews necessary to identify what 

equipment changes w ould be required to 

reach this level began shortly thereafter 

(Gerber 1993a, p. 4). However, the 

increased operating level was already 

causing problems as fuel element 

ruptures, feared since World War II,

became a reality." The first fuel failure occurred in the F Reactor in 1948. Subsequent failures "increased slowly during 

1949 to 1950, but expanded dramatically in 1951" (Gerber 1993a, p. 26). Chapter 2, Section 3 discusses in detail the 

failure of fuel elements that resulted from increasing the power levels.

In constructing the C Reactor and extending the power levels of the existing reactors, General Electric increased 

plutonium production capabilities at the Hanford Site and supported the Atomic Energy Commission's immediate need to 

. meet escalating military requirements. Augmentation in plutonium production also allowed General Electric to support 

development of the Super from February 1949 to March 1952 by releasing some of the process tubes in the existing 

reactors for tritium production. Production of tritium gas, conducted under the code name "P-10," began with the 

jacketing of lithium-aluminum alloy target elements in unbonded aluminum-silicon cans in the 313 Building. Initially 

manufactured offsite, machinists began to fabricate these target elements on the Hanford Site in the mid-1950s. The 

lithium targets, "surrounded by highly enriched uranium 'driver' elements," were irradiated primarily in "H Reactor but 

sometimes in B Reactor" (Gerber 1993a, p. 44). The irradiated targets were stored in the 104-B-2 Tritium Laboratory to 

await processing. To process the tritium, General Electric converted the four-story 108-B Chemical Pump House into 

offices, laboratories, and operations support rooms and installed five process lines contained within exhaust hoods on the 

third floor. A 300-foot ventilation stack was added to the 108-B Pump House to exhaust process gases. Tritium gas was 

extracted from the irradiated target elements, bottled in shipping casks, and then stored in the 104-B-1 Tritium Vault. The 

17Q3-B Technology Service Building was also constructed to provide additional offices as well as storage space for 

process equipment (Gerber 1993a, pp. 44-46).

With plutonium production levels rising and after nearly 5 years of developmental testing at the Hanford Site, the REDOX 

Plant (202-S Building), the "only continuous solvent extraction plant in the world," began processing irradiated fuel 

elements in January 1952 (Gerber 1992b, p. 25). Chemists in the 222-S Control Laboratory provided process sampling 

and operations support not only for plutonium separation work conducted in the REDOX Plant but also for uranium 

recovery work in the 221 -U and 224-U plants and waste reduction operations in the 242-B and 242-1 Waste Evaporator 

buildings as well. With REDOX operational, General Electric shut down B Plant (Gerber 1994a).

Responding to the need to conserve, recover, and recycle uranium (a strategic material believed to be scarce at this time), 

General Electric modified the 224-U Bulk Reduction Building in 1951 to serve as the primary facility for the Uranium 

Metal Recovery program. Now known as the Uranium Trioxide Facility or simply U 0 3, it began full-scale operations in 

1952 to convert liquid uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) to uranium trioxide powder (U 0 3) through a calcination process 

(Bailey and Gerber 1997, p. 13). The uranium fraction (UNH), isolated during REDOX separations, was piped to the 

Uranium Trioxide Facility for processing. A second uranium feed for the 224-U Bulk Reduction Building came from an 

unanticipated source. In 1952, General Electric changed the mission of the U Plant from training operators for B and 

T Plants to extracting the uranium contained within the bismuth phosphate process waste stored in the single-shell tank

" h i intre.i+e p lu to n iu m p ro d u i lio n i .i/Jiiuh H a n fa n l h e w n <ul(lini; low -

e n rii h i'd tita n iu m tuel -Itiiis v /rm i'/;/-; la it* ic.u lo t - ,i% r.irh ,t«. I lt >0 ,

In rit h ed o m n iu m fuel ,il-n .dlow ed Ila n io id i>miin eei* la <ii an ottl the

iv .it lo t Iv m p v r .if u iv an d p a n e l di-trih uU im . ted u i inu p io h le m - (,w \e d

h \ tin e w n ihvtm .d i '\p ,iti-im i ,m d r.id i.ilh tn-m d iu vd «. w ellina oi I he

u i.ip h ilr to te . \ c i itm n .thsorhinti 'p a i-tn i' -/hs*- ,i/-o n u d e on -ilr , ,iAu

h elped to even out the re.n to r*>. p m \e r di^lt Haitian. Most (»r Ihe-'C

em u hed uranium s/u««. it v ie n u n u i.u .tu te d udn i; the -.t/m* tvi /mih/mn a -

the ihilu r.tl titanium '.fun-. Ih m e v e i. -am ir o f the fuel elem ent* u vie

m ad e ot h i'J il\-v n rit lied ui.in ium .d lo w d w ith alum inum , w id th

iv tjiin e d -pet i.d f.d u n a tio n tei h n iijiir- to prevent ,n t ident.il

< rilit .dities. “ - I X >1 I ,>. (>4

1 .4 9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

farms. General Electric retrofitted the process cells in the U Plant with new equipment to accommodate the tri-butyl 

phosphate process, developed by Hanford Site chemists, to effect separation (Gerber et al. 1997). The Atomic Energy 

Commission supplied the uranium trioxide powder to the defense program for use in armor plating, projectile tips, and 

nuclear submarine fuel among other items.

A program to extract a formerly discarded material - uranium within high-level liquid waste - not only met a strategic 

need but also indicated the ongoing efforts to manage waste generated at the Hanford Site. The 242-B and 242-T Waste 

Evaporator Buildings represented another program aimed at waste reduction. General Electric constructed these facilities 

in 1951 to increase the storage capacity of the high-level liquid waste storage tanks by decreasing the amount of liquid 

contained in the waste. Operators first pumped liquid waste from the single-shell storage tank to a feed tank w ithin the 

242 Building. From the feed tank, the liquid waste passed to one of two preheaters before entering the evaporator tank. 

Continued heating in the evaporator tank concentrated the waste by boiling off liquid, leaving behind a slurry. This 

slurry was pumped back into the storage tanks where it solidified as it cooled. The net result was a reduction in waste 

volume. Low-level liquid condensate was disposed of in cribs or trenches while liquid vapor was scrubbed, filtered, and 

vented through an exhaust stack (see the 242-T HPIF in Appendix B on the Internet for additional information). Despite 

these efforts, General Electric constructed an additional eighteen single-shell, high-level liquid waste storage tanks (241-S 

and 241 -TY Tank Farms) because of the increased productivity requirements the Atomic Energy Commission mandated.

At the same time that liquid wastes were being recycled and reduced, Hanford Site scientists were investigating ways to 

control or lim it airborne releases of radionuclides from the process canyon stacks. Increasing production goals and 

expanding production capabilities placed additional burdens on the existing chemical separations facilities. Before the 

REDOX Plant opened, B Plant and T Plant were supporting five reactors operating at increased output levels. Not 

surprisingly, the emission of process gases had risen with each production quota. By late 1947, scientists had 

documented contaminated vegetation over a wide area of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington that was linked to emissions 

from the 291 -B and 291 -T Stacks.

After nearly 2 years of operations, General Electric installed water scrubbers between the exhaust fans and the stack 

openings and within the exhaust ducts for each process cell to filter the air before it was released. General Electric also 

replaced the fans, fan casings, and ductwork within the stacks because of radiologically contaminated particulates or 

"specs" being emitted with the exhaust gases (Gerber 1994a, p. 33). Further modifications were made to the exhaust 

flow in 1948 when General Electric added large underground sand filters to treat process gases before their release 

through the stacks. Measuring 110 feet long by 48 feet wide, these filters were designed to strip radiologically charged 

"droplets" or "acid mists" (formed from condensed process gases) as w ell as particulates out of the waste stream. 

However, "these filters were only marginally successful because the sand beds plugged and the resistance (pressure drop) 

within the unit increased rapidly" (Gerber 1994a, p. 34). Fiberglass filters installed within the dissolver off-gas lines 

offered little additional improvement. Finally late in 1950, Hanford Site scientists discovered that fiberglass embedded 

with silver-nitrate ("silver reactor" filters) was 99.9 percent effective in capturing iodine-131 when placed in the ducts 

between the dissolver cells and the main exhaust lines. However, this success rate was achieved only when the silver 

reactor filters were replaced or regenerated frequently and irradiated fuel cooling periods were extended to 80-100 days 

before dissolving (see Gerber 1994a, pp. 33-37 for additional discussion).

Operating conditions in the Soviet Union during this time provide perspective for waste management practices in the 

United States. In commenting on working conditions within the Soviet Union's chemical separations plant at 

Chelyabinsk-40, Rhodes observes:

"It was impossible to work at the plutonium separation plant without dangerous radiation exposure. Sixty-six

percent o f B installation workers received subclinical but excessive doses in the first year o f operation o f up to

100 rem; an unlucky 7 percent received above 100 rem where clinical signs such as vomiting and blood

changes begin to appear. (For comparison, the average lifetime dose o f workers in the US and British nuclear1 .5 0
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

weapons industry has been estimated at from 3 to 11 rem.).... B installation, by design, discharged its intensely

radioactive fission waste directly into the Techa River. By 1951, radioactivity from Chelyabinsk-40 had been

measured in river water discharging into the Arctic Ocean more than a thousand miles north." - Rhodes 1995, 

pp. 350-351

These statements highlight a philosophical difference underlying the two nuclear weapons development programs. The 

Soviets viewed the general workforce as largely expendable and gave little weight to environmental damage in their 

design considerations. From its inception, the U.S. program implemented measures to monitor worker health and safety 

while seeking ways to first understand and then lim it environmental degradation. This is not to imply that the U.S. 

program always succeeded in these objectives or that the consequences of ill-informed decisions are not still w ith us. It 

does demonstrate, however, that the United States was aware of at least some of the potential dangers, investigated their 

effects, and, when not rushed to action, sought to act accordingly. The Hanford Site offers a case in point.

Applied research, as well as production capabilities and process improvement, benefited from increased funding during 

the first years of the Korean War. The Hanford Site Biology Program had outgrown the facility assigned to it in 1946 - a 

single Quonset hut in the 100-F Area. Responding to a 1948 budget request from Hanford Site administrators, the 

Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine determined that "it was unwise to set up an 

additional national laboratory at Hanford as it was primarily a production center and research in biology and medicine 

there should be directly applicable to local problems. Nevertheless, the Committee believed it highly desirable that 

adequate facilities should be provided for aquatic biology and for a farm for animals because of specific concern to 

operations at Hanford" (see the 108-F Building ExHRIF in Appendix B on the Internet). In 1949, the Hanford Site Biology 

Program acquired the remodeled 108-F Chemical Pump House for office and laboratory space and constructed an 

animal farm and agricultural plots nearby. New radioecology and aquatic biology laboratories were added in 1951, with 

additional expansions in 1953 and 1956 devoted to biological research. Scientists concentrated on three major research 

areas: biological effects of reactor effluent on native fish within the Columbia River, biological effects of radioisotopes 

(such as cesium-137, iodrne-131, and strontium-90) on living tissue within large and small animals, and botanical effects 

on plants grown in soils containing radionuclides.

The Atomic Energy Commission was not the only agency expanding its presence at the Hanford Site. In response to 

increased tensions due to the escalating Cold War as expressed by the active conflict in Korea, the U.S. Department of 

Defense initiated additional measures to address the security of U.S. nuclear facilities. On March 28, 1951, the Army 

established Camp Hanford in North Richland and assigned troops from Ft. Lewis the task of providing air defense for the 

Hanford Site. The Army built sixteen anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) batteries, encircling the primary production complex, 

along what came to be called Army Loop Road (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.47). Each AAA site was equipped with 90 mm 

and 120 mm guns placed in four revetments constructed from sandbags. Each site also contained barracks for the 

enlisted men and officers and support facilities such as radar facilities, a mess hall, a motor pool, and craft shops.

Camp Hanford, situated in the 3000 Area just south of the North Richland Construction Camp, "consisted of cantonment/ 

barracks areas, an administrative area, commercial district, a trailer park, 'Bremerton' housing (residential units from the 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington), medical facilities, recreation centers, and an industrial area" 

(Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.26). The Camp Hanford industrial area, located at the southern terminus of the Camp, 

contained an electronic and signal maintenance shop (1154 Building), brigade motor pool (1226 Building), ordnance 

maintenance and crafts fabrication shop (1240 Building), and shipping and receiving warehouses (1250 and 

1252 Buildings) among other facilities that provided support for the defense installations (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.48). 

Chapter 2, Section 9 describes Camp Hanford and its 10-year mission.

1 .5 1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Ko r e a n Wa r : 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 5

With the Korean War continuing. President Truman approved further expansion on January 16, 1952. At $4.9 billion, 

this authorization was 250 percent higher than the 1950 appropriation and indicated the exponential growth o f the 

Atomic Energy Commission under its new Chairman, Gordon Dean. The "atomic weapons program was now so large 

that in the fall of 1952 the hitherto insatiable [Atomic Energy Commission] M ilitary Liaison Committee reported that it 

found no reason for further expansion" (Weils, quoted in Mitchell 1999, p. 33). All installations and improvements 

carried under this authorization were due for completion by January 1957.

On September 24 and October 18,1951, the Soviets had detonated their second ("Joe 2") and third ("Joe 3") atomic 

bombs, which were smaller, lighter, and more powerful than their first (Rhodes 1995). That same fall, with 

Stanislaw Ulam having found a way to make the Super work and fearful the Soviets might be making equal advances, the 

Atomic Energy Commission pressed forward w ith a dedicated thermonuclear weapon program. The Panda Committee, 

headed not by Teller but by Marshall Holloway, had 1 year to deliver a workable bomb. Teller left Los Alamos in 

September 1951 in protest. Primarily in response to Teller's unending efforts to establish a second weapons laboratory 

after leaving Los Alamos, the Atomic Energy Commission opened the Livermore Laboratory in California in July 1952. 

Although no longer a member of the design team, Teller now had a place to conduct thermonuclear diagnostic research 

(Rhodes 1995).

" O t u r the explosion broke through Ihe rosin::. it expended in set ondto a blinding n h iie rite b o ll m ore thon three m ile* across ■ the

I liro*h im o tu v h o ll h .itl me,inured little m in e thon one-tenth o fo m ile/

ond rose m e r the hot i/o n lik e o (I.uk surr the i rim s ot the lo*k fo rt e.

th ir l\ m ile* an ,iv, left ,t mi e ll o f hoot .is it *om eone h,u i opened a hot

o w n . he.it th.it p o r*i*te ii lorn* enough to •■eeni m e n ,H in t:. \ t it*

fu ith e *1 extent the M ike <lo u d b illo w e d out ,ih o \e «i th iil\-m ile stem

to form a hu^e tonopx m ore th.m one hundred m ile* it iile th.it

loornt'd m or the / / niw e to k ' o lo ll. ftodm ot t ii <• m od fe ll out. follow ed

h \ heox t r.tin...T he tire h .il! h id \o p o ri/e d the en tire jllu g e lo h ; isl.m d

le.ntnn be hind .1 ( iir u lo r < t.ile r fu n hundred le et deep ,uid m ore thori

,i m ile a< mss id le d w ith *c.n\<itei... The explo^um \o p o n /e d ,m d fitte d

in to the o il snine eiuht\ m illio n tons o f solid m olei i.il th .it u otdd fo il

out oround the n o ild . - Rhodes Ipp.

The nuclear community grew on October 3,

1952 when the British exploded their first 

atomic bomb ("Hurricane") with a yield of 

25 kilotons (Rhodes 1995). Just under a month 

later, the balance of power shifted dramatically 

when the United States detonated the world's 

first thermonuclear bomb. At 7:15 a.m. on 

November 1, 1952, "M ike" ("The Sausage") 

exploded w ith a yield of 10.4 megatons, the 

equivalent of 20 billion pounds of TNT - twice 

as much as "all the explosives used during the 

Second W orld War" (Rhodes 1995, p. 494).

The transitions of 1952 were not limited to 

nuclear armaments. Nikita Khrushchev 

assumed nominal control of the Soviet Union 

on June 26, 1952 following Stalin's death that 

March. After losing the New Hampshire 

primary in the spring of 1952, President Truman withdrew from the presidential race. His successor as the democratic 

candidate, Adlai Stevenson, lost to Dwight D. Eisenhower that November. Close on the heels of these political 

transitions, the Soviets detonated their first thermonuclear bomb ("Joe 4") at the Semipalatinsk test site on August 12,

1953. The explosive yield of 400 kilotons, fewer than the Atomic Energy Commission's Ivy series fission bomb, indicated 

that the Soviets had not discovered or through espionage knew of the Telier-Ulam invention of staging and fission 

compression (Rhodes 1995). However, because the Soviet device was thermonuclear, it was sufficient to alter again the 

perception of the balance of power and reinvigorate the arms race.

1 .5 2
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

On January 12, 1954, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, announced the administration's 

national policy of "massive retaliation," which anticipated the use of "nuclear weapons, tactical as well as strategic, 

whenever their use would be desirable from a military standpoint" (Mitchell 1999, p. 36). For the first time, the use of 

nuclear weapons was placed on a par with that of conventional arms and as an acceptable response to conventional 

aggression. In part, this policy was foreshadowed in a memorandum from President Eisenhower to Dulles in September 

1953. Assessing Soviet aggressiveness, President Eisenhower advised that "our own preparation could no longer be 

geared to a policy that attempts only to avert disaster during the early 'surprise' stages of a war, and so gain time for full 

mobilization. Rather, we would have to be constantly ready, on an instantaneous basis, to inflict greater loss upon the 

enemy than he could reasonably hope to inflict on us" (Eisenhower, quoted in Rhodes 1995, p. 528). .

Interestingly, President Eisenhower had told Lewis Strauss, upon appointing him Chairman of the Atomic Energy 

Commission in May 1953, that his first assignment was to demilitarize atomic energy so the world would no longer have 

to live w ith the fear of a nuclear war (Rhodes 1995). President Eisenhower would translate this message into action 

under his "Atoms for Peace" initiative. However, his defense policy of retaliation had the opposite consequence. It 

opened the floodgate of nuclear weapons development and deployment. The Atomic Energy Commission budget rose 

again from $4.9 billion in 1952 to $9 billion in 1955, an amount "exceeding the capital investment of General Motors, 

Bethlehem and US Steel, Alcoa, Du Pont and Goodyear combined" (Rhodes 1995, p. 561): "More production capacity 

meant more weapons, which diversified from strategic bombs into tactical and strategic warheads attached to everything 

from depth charges to atomic cannons to anti-aircraft missiles to ballistic missiles of every range from battlefield to 

intercontinental" (Rhodes 1995, p. 561).

By 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had identified from 5,000-6,000 nuclear targets, nearly 100 times the 6 6 cities that had 

been marked in 1945. Initially, the number of targets was a function of the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile. 

But with improved bomb designs extracting greater yields from a lower quantity of fissile material and greatly expanded 

production capabilities, the number of targets became the driving force and production responded accordingly 

(Rhodes 1995).

As part of "Project X", General Electric began building the KW and KE reactors - the largest single-pass, water-cooled, 

graphite-moderated reactors constructed at the Hanford Site - in November 1952 and January 1953, respectively. W hile 

the Atomic Energy Commission and General Electric knew by the early 1950s that heavy-water or beryllium would serve 

as a better moderator, they returned time and again to the graphite-moderated, single-pass, water-cooled reactor design 

because the nation needed plutonium and the proven design guaranteed results. With the KE and KW Reactors,

General Electric carried the design to a second-generation status by dramatically increasing the scale. At 

1850 megawatts-thermal, their design was for a power operating level three times that of the C Reactor and nearly nine 

times higher than the original Manhattan Project reactors. Each core contained 3220 process tubes and more 

experimental ports than any of the other reactors (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.17). The KW Reactor started up in December 

1954 and the KE Reactor in February 1955.

Further abrogating the siting requirements Lieutenant General Groves established in 1943, General Electric sited the KW 

and KE reactors within the same area (100-K Area), less than a mile apart, and approximately halfway between the "two 

other twin reactor sites, B/C and D/DR." Their decision to co-locate the KW and KE reactors downplayed "the possibility 

of a simultaneous accident," focusing instead on their "rapid, economical construction" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, 

pp. 168-169).

At the same time, General Electric continued to increase the power levels of the existing reactors to meet rising 

production demands. For example, by 1956 "a thorough set of modifications and retrofittings designed to increase 

coolant flow to the pile [reactor]" had raised the operating level at B Reactor to 800 megawatts-thermal (Gerber 1993a, 

p. 21). These changes involved all facets of the water treatment, delivery, and circulation system so that 71,000 gallons

1 .5 3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

per minute could be pushed through the reactor (Gerber 1993a). Before the reactors were shut down, their operating 

levels would be pushed far higher, some to nearly ten times their design rating.

With augmented irradiation capability came the need for increased separations capability. Workers completed 

construction of the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant (202-A Building) in April 1955. This was the last 

chemical separations canyon built at the Hanford Site. Like the KE and KW "jum bo" reactors, PUREX would become 

the "workhorse" separations plant both because of its design capacity and the increased efficiency of its extraction 

process. PUREX used a continuous solvent extraction process similar to the REDOX process. However, rather than 

relying on gravity to maintain the countercurrent flow of solutions within the extraction columns, the PUREX Plant used 

piston-driven pumps to circulate solutions within pulsed extraction columns. Extraction solvents of the two processes 

also differed. The PUREX process used tri-butyl phosphate rather than hexone. The PUREX process also separated a 

greater number of products including both weapons-grade and fuel-grade plutonium, depleted and slightly enriched 

uranium, neptunium, and thorium (see Chapter 2, Section 4 for more information on PUREX). The PUREX Plant went on 

line in January 1956. Because of the combined efficiency of REDOX and PUREX, T Plant, which by 1953 was reduced 

to processing only 12 percent o f the fuel being irradiated in the 100 Areas, ceased processing altogether on March 20,

1956 and received a new mission (Gerber 1994a).

The REDOX complex also expanded during this period. One of the more significant additions was the Plutonium 

Concentration Facility (233-S Building) constructed in 1955 "as part of the REDOX Canyon and Service Facility's Phase II 

capacity increase" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.39). Using an ion-exchange process, operators produced a final solution 

with a higher plutonium concentration level than had been achieved before. This solution was transported to the 234-5Z 

Plutonium Finishing Plant for final processing (see the 233-S HAER in Appendix B on the Internet for detailed discussion).

In 1952, operators de-emphasized use of the Rubber Glove Line in the 234-5Z Plutonium Finishing Plant and on 

March 18 began operations on the world's first large-scale Remote Mechanical Line, known as the RMA Line. The 

switch from manual to mechanical operations immediately increased production rates by 200 percent. General Electric 

retired the Rubber Glove Line in May 1953. To accommodate spiraling Atomic Energy Commission production 

demands, General Electric installed two machining glove boxes on the RMA Line so that two separate weapon pits could 

be produced simultaneously. By September of that year, Hanford Site plutonium was also being sent directly to the 

Rocky Flats Plant northwest of Denver for final fabrication. Hanford Site operators met or exceeded all Atomic Energy 

Commission production quotas for finished pits and non-machined buttons throughout 1954 and 1955 (see Chapter 2, 

Section 5 for additional details).

Like the uranium recovery process initiated at the U 0 3 Facility in 1952, Hanford Site chemists pioneered a process "to 

recover plutonium from PFP waste streams" in the 234-5Z Building (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.40). Beginning in 1951, 

researchers in the 1706 and 321 Buildings, and later the 325 Building, contributed to the development of the RECUPLEX 

(RECovery of Uranium and PLutonium by Extraction) process. RECUPLEX, a dissolver/solvent extraction process 

conducted in three glove boxes, coaxed plutonium from solid and liquid waste streams derived from the plutonium 

finishing operations. From July 1955 to May 1962, RECUPLEX operators provided highly concentrated plutonium-nitrate 

solutions to the RMA Line for conversion to plutonium metal, thereby adding hundreds of kilograms of plutonium to the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal (see Chapter 2, Section 5).

In 1955, General Electric also added the 224-UA Building, containing "six continuous-action calciners," to the U 0 3 

Facility (224-U Building) to "improve powder- and waste-handling" capabilities for the Uranium Metal Recovery 

program (Bailey and Gerber 1997, p. 13). Liquid uranium nitrate, obtained initially from REDOX and subsequently from 

PUREX as well, was now concentrated in the 224-U Building and converted to uranium oxide powder in the 224-UA 

Building (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.35).

Given increased production efficiency and demands, workers constructed twenty-one additional single-shell, high-level 

liquid waste storage tanks (241-SX and 241-A Tank Farms) in the 200 Area between 1953 and 1955.

1 .5 4
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

General Electric opened five new research and development laboratories and a second test reactor facility within the 

300 Area at the Hanford Site between 1952 and 1955. In Findlay and Hevly's opinion (1995, p. 146), research at the 

Hanford Site fulfilled two overriding objectives, the "steady development of graphite-moderated reactors" and the 

discovery of "measures to avoid production losses." "Hanford's first eight reactors were graphite and water-moderated, 

water-cooled uranium piles [reactors]; they were recognized by the end of World War II as dead ends in terms of the 

development of nuclear reactor technology. But they remained throughout the Cold War as cost-effective, reliable 

sources of plutonium, and ironically the U.S. strategy of a high-technology defense mandated that Hanford stick to a 

relatively low-technology method of producing plutonium" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 141).

The largest of the research and development laboratories was the 325 Radiochemistry Building, dedicated to chemical 

separations process improvement. As completed in 1953, this facility contained eight hot cells, "each 6 feet by 6 feet by 

5.5 feet (deep) surrounded by 2.5-foot-thick concrete walls with stainless steel liners [designed] to safely house and 

handle multicurie-level chemical development work with high-activity substances" (Gerber 1993b, p. 21). With its 

completion, much of the research formerly conducted in the 3706 Building transferred to the 325 Building. Scientists in 

the 325 Building worked to improve the PUREX, REDOX, and U 0 3 processes; to lower the activity levels o f chemical 

separations waste; and to develop the RECU FLEX process (Gerber 1992b, 1993b).

The 326 Pile (reactor) Technology Building, completed in 1953, had two primary missions, one relating to reactor 

physics, the other to metallurgy. "Experimentation with higher power levels, new lattice configurations, and cooling 

methods and trials with varied materials and designs in process tubes and fuel elements were proceeding quickly and 

simultaneously" (Gerber 1993a, p. 27). Continuing the research initially conducted in the 189-D Building, scientists in 

the 326 Building pushed the leading edge in Approach-to-Critical studies in developing lattice configurations that not 

only increased productivity but also improved safety. Lattice configuration, "the spacing of fuel tubes and moderators 

within the pile [reactor]/' was of critical importance because their arrangement was the primary determiner of reactivity 

and, therefore, power (see the 305-B ExHPIF in Appendix B on the Internet). In addition to lattice configuration, 

scientists also examined reactor components and fuel elements to effect improvements using "[s]olid-state nondestructive 

examination (NDE) methods." Another area of metallurgical research included analyses to improve fuel element 

jacketing and thereby reduce fuel failures (Gerber 1993a, p. 27).

To accelerate reactor design studies and relieve the burden then being placed on the 305 Test Pile (reactor),

General Electric completed the subsurface component of the 305-B Experimental Test Reactor Building in 1954. Two 

small reactors were housed in this below-grade structure. Both were dedicated to improving lattice configuration. The 

Physical Constants Test Reactor (PCTR) began operations in October 1955. Physicists used the graphite-moderated PCTR 

to test experimental lattice designs and measure their efficiency. The second test reactor, the Thermal Test Reactor (TTR), 

a 5-foot graphite cube, was acquired in 1954 from the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory but was not placed in service 

until 1957-1958 (Gerber 1992c, p. 72). Physicists used the TTR "as a neutron source for an external thermal column, as 

a low power irradiation facility, or for danger co-efficient measurements" in conducting a variety of exponential reactor 

physics experiments (see the 305-B

ExHPIF In Appendix B on the Internet).

W hile scientists worked primarily with "h r.id i.ile d nM/rr/.iK im hiding n ip U u e ii » i l.dled fue l to d - ! element--!

unirradiated materials in the 326 Building, , onttunini; fdntnnium jn d ire d i i i w r i / i p io d m K n e ie c \,in iin e d n h ilv

scientists in the 327 Radiometallurgy f / i r i u r n 1 ■ 'y i r r i r1il.e.. when the\ hod e\pcrirn<.vd ie /> little i / n . n oi

Building (operational in 1953) worked -to h d i/o lio n lim e /W m h //i r r\.im in .itn in o f on iu o d io tv d fu r1 m d

with hot materials to understand and to lle d fur d rillin g .i pinh ole from w hit h »,!■.«o lle tle d o fi—nm

resolve the problems such as fuel element -om ple. \ e \ t fin elem ent m,i<* ^owed ripen m id ,i m elollur.iu o l -.i/iip/e

distortion, uranium growth, and process Hil* around ond ptd i-h e d rur onoh Irrodioted p m t e-.-. itih r- ond olhe i

tube corrosion that accompanied umi to r t omponent-- likent-.e were « ul. am und, .m d p o lid ird In p n n h n e

increased power levels. w otkohlc sim p le* -(.vrher | ‘mj sj.;i

I

w -r -r

\

1 .5 5
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Scientists conducted destructive and non-destructive analyses in the 327 Building's eight hot cells and two basins. The 

327 Building replaced the 111-B "Test Building" where Hanford Site scientists had first initiated studies "to determine the 

'nature and causes of dimensional instability' in fuel elements and the effects of irradiation stresses on pile [reactor]

materials" (Gerber 1992c, p. 154).

Concurrent with these studies on materials and process improvement, General Electric built the 329 Biophysics 

Laboratory in 1953 "to support the pioneering...environmental monitoring and bioassay programs that were developed 

at the Hanford Site during the 1940s and 1950s" (Gerber 1993a, p. 24). Scientists working in this facility developed new 

radiation counting procedures as well as the instrumentation necessary to conduct the analyses. They examined air, 

water, soil, vegetation, and terrestrial and marine w ildlife samples from areas within and adjacent to the Hanford Site to 

as far away as the Pacific Proving Grounds. Hanford Site scientists also played "a major role in monitoring and counting 

fallout from atmospheric nuclear bomb tests conducted by the United States and the USSR" (Gerber 1993a, p. 24).

To support these laboratories, General Electric built the 328 Mechanical Development Building to fabricate and service 

the "specialized and intricate apparatus and equipment" that the biologists, chemists, metallurgists, and physicists 

working in the 325, 326, 327, and 329 buildings used. The only repairs not conducted in the 328 Building were those 

involving contaminated equipment that had to remain within the "hot" laboratories. The 328 Building, opened in 1952, 

replaced the Manhattan Project 3717 Instrument Shop and the two 3722 Area Shops (Gerber 1993a, p. 47).

Liquid radioactive wastes from these laboratories were 

piped to sampling tanks in the new 340 Retention and 

Neutralization Building through a complex of "singlewalled stainless steel pipes" known as the Radioactive 

Liquid Waste System. Technicians sampled the waste 

within these tanks and diverted wastes with no 

detectable radioactivity to one of two newly 

constructed Liquid Waste Trenches (307 Structures). 

Waste registering higher than allowable release limits 

was pumped into holding tanks to await tanker truck 

transport to 200 Area cribs (Gerber 1993a, p. 57). 

High-level radiochemical and radiometallurgical solid 

wastes, primarily from the 325 and 326 buildings, were 

disposed of first to the 618-2 Burial Ground in 1953 

and then to the 618-10 Burial Ground, located more 

then 4 miles northwest of the 300 Area, from 1954- 

1964.

Following the expansions of 1949-1955, the Hanford Site produced more than twice as much weapons-grade plutonium 

per year as the Savannah River Site through 1967 (Figures 6 and 7 in'DOE 1996b). It is likely, though unsubstantiated 

pending release of production amounts from non-U.S. facilities, that the Hanford Site produced more weapons-grade 

plutonium than any other complex in the world.

Pe a k P r o d u c t io n : 1 9 5 6 -1 9 6 5

The Killian report, named after James Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whom 

President Eisenhower appointed to head the Technical Capabilities Panel in 1954, reached Eisenhower early in 1955.

The report recommended "crash programs on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles (IRBM) based in Europe and on submarines, new military communications systems, intelligence systems, 

dispersal of Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers with some portion on continuous airborne alert, and new antiballistic 

missiles to destroy (as yet undeveloped) Soviet missiles" (Mitchell 1999, p. 37). In short, the report reflected the growing

rh v <» I !»-10 LSuri.il <ii om ul . ~i un>i>led o f Ite m he* a m l

im \ - ot b iiri.il t .iA s o /i- know n ,i«. "p ipe fie ld •>." I he < a /w ;/is 

it e rr n u d e o f > lo /» often-bottom ed 't ’i-u.dlon d ium * welded

together <i m l bu rie d upright. I to m I he m id -1 tm lil

.ib o u l I %(». > n//i/ r.ulio.u li ie w ,i*tc* » etc < n lle i le d n o m

operation* h u ild in ii•> in < ,ird b n ,ird t o n l.u n e ri M id then

•>toied in le.uJp.m * know n a - "m ini. c.it(h e r< ' .m d

h.inspoi ted to !OU \ n r lh io lH - lfij in -hielded “ lo.ul

iuiiaeis. ’ The «a tdbthird w. M r t ont.uner* then u r / r 

dropped from the iiunk < aft her', dow n the t .it-so/i-, ,m d the

ho le* v m v fille d w ith s ,in d ,u itl d irt u n til r.id i.ilio n le i el*

dei lin e d to a *.ne oi “ tolerant e ' re.idinu, It r.id b tio n le i el*

i o u h l not be re tlu i ed to toler.nu e r.im*e». < on i rete ua« 

p o u re d dow n the hole u n til *u i h / r ir / s u et e at hiexed. ' 

(le rh o i I'M) J.i, p.

1 .5 6
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

paranoia of a Soviet surprise attack and the measures necessary to survive and counter it. This fear was amplified in 

1956 when Khrushchev warned the West on November 17, "We w ill bury you."

In the spring of 1957, President Eisenhower asked H. Rowan Gaither to lead a panel of the Science Advisory Committee 

of the Office of Defense Mobilization in evaluating civil defense needs. Gaither's deputy, Robert C. Sprague, was 

successful in expanding the scope to include investigation of a "ready and effective second-strike capability" as well.

That fall the Soviets placed the first man-made object into outer space with the launch of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957 

(Mitchell 1999). "Sputnik, meaning "fellow traveler" in Russian,...was technologically crude and uninteresting to those 

involved in the U.S. space program, and had no m ilitary value, but the nation was horrified, in a state of near panic" 

(Mitchell 1999, p. 38).

The Soviets now appeared capable o f delivering nuclear warheads in minutes from space rather than in the hours 

required to deliver bombs by conventional aircraft. The United States had not demonstrated this ability. The Gaither 

report, issued to President Eisenhower on November 7, 19S7 and largely authored by Sprague and Paul Nitze, played up 

the "spectacular progress" made by the Soviets with respect to nuclear weapons and asserted that the Soviets had 

"probably surpassed" the United States in missile technology. The report recommended that an additional $44.2 billion 

be added to the defense budget over 5 years to address this "missile gap." In briefing Eisenhower, Sprague did not 

believe the President understood the gravity of the Soviet threat. However, Mitchell argues that "Eisenhower had the 

military background to know that wars tend to be initiated during periods of tense international crises, rather than 

boIt-from-the-blue scenarios, especially one of such magnitude as to involve nuclear weapons." Displeased with 

President Eisenhower's equivocal response to the report, "some members of the Gaither committee leaked the highly 

classified report to the press, creating the sensationalism and public outcry that they thought would bring action" 

(Mitchell 1999, p. 40).

By May 1958, the Soviets had also launched Sputnik II and Sputnik ill, and "near-hysterical descriptions of Soviet nuclear 

capabilities and threats" figured prominently in the national and highly partisan debate leading to the I960 presidential 

election (Mitchell 1999, p. 41). Based on high-resolution aerial photographs taken by U-2 spy planes and knowledge 

that the U.S. military missile program would be operational by 1960, President Eisenhower knew that the claims of 

Soviet superiority and the charges being leveled against his administration of providing a "second-best defense" were 

unfounded. However, his inability to release this top-secret information may have contributed to Nixon's defeat. 

"Ironically," Mitchell (1999, p. 43) points out, "this two-year period (1958-1959) of near-hysterical demand for nuclear 

weapons...was in fact the two-year period of greatest U.S. stockpile growth in the entire history of the arms race."

Having won the election, John F. Kennedy learned the true nature of the U.S. nuclear weapons force as well as 

intelligence estimates of the vastly over-extolled Soviet stockpile. However, his campaign had raised public expectations 

and created a momentum for increased armament O f more immediate concern, he discovered that the Navy and the 

A ir Force were engaged in a power struggle to shape and control the nuclear weapons program.

With the launch of the U.S.S. George Washington, the world's first submarine both nuclear-powered and armed with 

sea-launched ballistic missiles in May 1960, Admiral Arleigh Burke recommended that the administration adopt a 

deterrence-based strategy using "submerged nuclear-powered submarines with free roam of two-thirds of the earth's 

surface." The A ir Force, on the other hand, put forward a war-fighting strategy, developed by RAND analyst 

W illiam Kaufmann, that relied upon "more accurate land-based missiles and aircraft-delivered bombs" (Mitchell 1999, 

pp. 45-47). Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy, had commissioned a study earlier from 

his staff to investigate strategic alternatives. This report was delivered shortly after both the Navy and A ir Force had 

briefed McNamara on the strengths of their plans and the weaknesses of the other's. Acting on the recommendations 

made by his staff, McNamara established "...a new nuclear war plan that would emphasize destroying enemy military 

forces, avoiding their cities and protecting a ready reserve force aimed at their cities but withholding this force as a 

bargaining lever with which to coerce the enemy to end the war and come to terms favorable to the United States" 

(Mitchell 1999, p. 49).

1 .5 7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

In adopting this policy, the Kennedy administration largely aligned itself w ith the A ir Force's position that the 

United States could not only fight a nuclear war but win it. McNamara referred to this policy as "flexible response." To 

succeed in these policy objectives, the United States would have to continue investing heavily in the nuclear stockpile. 

"Swept up in a political current of their own making, both Kennedy and McNamara approved additional spending on 

nuclear weapons and delivery systems for what McNamara would later admit was an already over-built stockpile" 

(Mitchell 1999, p. 51).

Two pivotal events in the early 1960s set the temperature of the Cold War for the next two decades: the erection of the 

Berlin Wall and the facedown over nuclear missiles in Cuba. In "practicing diplomacy by nuclear threat" (Rhodes 1995, 

p. 569) throughout the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union gained experience in intimidating each other 

across the globe. The two superpowers rattled missiles and bombers in closing out the Korean War in 1953, at the 

Suez Canal in 1956, and over Lebanon and the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. The world had become divided 

ideologically, and nowhere would this be demonstrated more clearly than in Berlin. Three years after demanding that 

the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization leave West Berlin and to stem the "hemorrhage of East Germans 

defecting to the West" (Rhodes 1995, p. 570), Khrushchev erected the most visible and psychological symbol of the 

Cold War in 1961 - the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the destruction of the Berlin Wall on November 11, 1989 generally marks 

the end of the Cold War.

The hottest point of the Cold War occurred during the week of October 22-28, 1962. On October 14, a.U-2 flight 

photographed Soviet/Cuban construction of medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites in western Cuba. Khrushchev 

meant to counter the U.S. placement of fifteen Jupiter MRBM missiles in Turkey by deploying Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. In 

his own words, Khrushchev maintained, "We had no desire to start a war. On the contrary, our principal aim was only to 

deter America from starting a war" (Khrushchev, quoted in Rhodes 1995, p. 570). But the war he sought to avoid came 

closer to occurring that week than at any other point in time.

W hile Kennedy and Khrushchev "began an exchange of belligerent messages" (Rhodes 1995, p. 572), the U.S. military, 

by presidential order, moved from Defense Condition (DefCon) 5 to DefCon 3 with President Kennedy's nationally 

televised announcement of the crisis and his intention to blockade Cuba on October 22. Following that address, the 

nation was "gripped by dread of a nuclear holocaust. Schoolchildren were practicing duck-and-cover drills"

(Thomas 2000, p. 55). By October 24, the military stood at DefCon 2, a state of full alert, and war seemed imminent.

The crisis peaked that day as the U.S. Navy stopped two Soviet freighters at the quarantine line. Upon receiving the 

news that the blockade had held, Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued one of the most oft-quoted phrases of the 

Cold War, "We are eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked" (Thomas 2000, p. 56). The crisis 

concluded on Sunday, October 28, with Khrushchev's announcement to the Soviet Presidium that "In order to save the 

world, we must retreat" (Thomas 2000, p. 59). "The Soviet Union never went to full nuclear alert in all. the years of the 

Cold War. After the Cuban missile crisis, the United States never did again. Nor did the two nations ever again directly 

confront each other" (Rhodes 1995, p. 576).

_______________ :............. — j Lee Harvey Oswald

" V i tirit\ ilviM'int'- uim n .iwimi/is,’ .i itd/s/ uL u id b lc t .w ,ih lr lo .ib+orb f/ic lo l.il w o iyhl o f assassinated

, . . . ■ j . . President Kennedy on »m frwr .d f.it A on o u r i o u n ln - on out ii'i.ih .d o n rn rto * on tun m m n i.u u t.in a to n ita l ;

■ i . • i . ... , , , i . i n N o ve m b er 22, 1 9 6 3 . .ip/AM.i/i/-. on o u r tn d u '.ln .il t . ifi.it it\. on om tih t't. ,in tl on out fio p u l.ilio n <)n il *fill ho i

tjpnhlv o f flu- .iiicrcwi/ to thv point th.it /li- -m ir/i would hv siinp/v no tmnivi I : *~''n on Johnson assume

i/.i/i/c in lhi‘ luonliflh’t cnlmv firms. Ih.il i-n h .if flotvnoim1 oi nut h.ir .i^un'^ion j * e presi ency t at ay

/niM/ix II mr.i/is f/ic i vrl.iint\ n i *uit id( to I hr not nurrh to hi* mi/iMrv ton cs. retaining McNamara as is

I,,,/.,,/,/....... M c K ,,n ,r,,lunt,,li,........................4 ! Secretary of Defense. This

\ continuity was meaningful

................................... :..............................................- ~ ............... because M

an opportunity to rethink the war-fighting strategy while reflecting on the events in Berlin and Cuba. McNamara's belief 

in an ability to inflict significant damage on Soviet nuclear forces sufficient to avert massive U.S. civilian casualties

1 .5 8
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

through retaliatory strikes began to wane with the Soviet deployment of submarine-launched missiles and the confirmed 

existence of their land-based silos in 1962. His resolve diminished further with receipt of mathematician Glenn Kent's 

systems analysis review of "flexible response" in January 1964. Kent concluded that "offense w ill always w in over 

defense" in a nuclear war and w ill do so "at a lower cost." He demonstrated, conclusively to McNamara at least, that 

"fighting and winning a nuclear war is virtually impossible"(Mitchell 1999, p. 53). Given these realizations, McNamara 

effected a shift in U.S. policy to a deterrence-based strategy referred to as "assured destruction."

Mitchell (1999, p. 55) argues that this change in 

philosophy, together with the diversion of defense 

funds to the emerging war in Vietnam,

President Johnson's overall frugality, and his focus 

on domestic policy led to the "first ever levelingoff and eventual decline in the U.S. nuclear 

weapon stockpile." In McNamara's view, the 

United States had far surpassed the number of 

weapons necessary to ensure the destruction of the 

Soviet Union. In his State of the Union Address, 

delivered on January 8,1964, President Johnson 

announced a number of cutbacks for the Atomic 

Energy Commission - the closure of three 

Hanford Site plutonium production reactors was 

among them (Mitchell 1999).

Ri s e An d Fa ll o f De f e n s e P r o d u c t io n

Hanford Works - January 1947 to December 1974 

James E. Travis - June 1955 to June 1965 

Atomic Energy Commission - January 1947 to December 1974 

General Electric Company - September 1946 to January 1964

Essentially, the military used both the "massive retaliation" and "flexible response" strategies "to justify larger and larger 

procurement budgets, and consequently more and more nuclear weapons" (Mitchell 1999, p. 50). With "assured 

destruction," McNamara eliminated "damage limitation and counterforce as a military rationale for more weapons" since 

a "still greater nuclear superiority could not be theoretically justified" (Mitchell 1999, pp. 53, 55). Figure 1.7 shows the 

effects of these policy decisions. Atomic Energy Commission production of Weapons-grade plutonium on the Hanford 

Site rose dramatically from 1956 to 1960, reached a sustained peak between 1960 and 1965, then dropped off from 

1966 through 1969 even more precipitously than it had risen.

In 1961, the year before the standoff over missiles in Cuba, the Hanford Site workforce produced the most weaponsgrade plutonium of any year—almost 4500 kilograms (Figure 6 in DOE 1996b). In the Hanford Site's peak production 

years of 1956-1965, the workforce produced 37,146 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium— almost 70 percent of the 

total amount produced between 1945-1989.

General Electric continuously raised the operating levels of the production reactors between 1956 and 1964 to meet the 

ever increasing military demands for plutonium. By the time the Atomic Energy Commission ordered closure of the 

original Manhattan Project reactors, they had attained operating levels nearly ten times their initial design rating at 

2210 megawatts-thermal (B Reactor), 2165 megawatts-thermal (D Reactor), and 2140 megawatts-thermal (F Reactor).

The early post-war reactors were operating at 2140 megawatts-thermal (H Reactor) and 2015 megawatts-thermal 

(DR Reactor), while the Korean War reactors had attained operating levels of 2500 megawatts-thermal (C Reactor) and 

4400 megawatts-thermal (KW and KE reactors) (DOE 1996b). A ll of these operating levels were several orders of 

magnitude above their design ratings. The numbers for the "jum bo" reactors might have gone higher still but the Atomic

Site Name:

Site Manager: 

Responsible Agency: 

Site Contractor:

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1 .5 9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

FY 194?

I 2000 j represents

1500

§00

cumulative, 

productions 

since 1845

Q Fuel Grade ^12.3)

■W eapon Grade(54-5]

50 53.

Total=67,4 m

Energy Commission imposed "an 

administrative power lim it of 

4000 megawatts-thermal at the KE and KWReactors" (DOE T996b, Section 9.1.1). 

General Electric achieved these operating 

levels by investing heavily in cooling, 

electrical, and mechanical improvements to 

the older reactors and their support facilities 

as w ell as modifications in fuel element 

design and process tube fabrication 

(Gerber 1993a, pp. 62-63).

Figure 1,7, Total Annual Production o f Plutonium at the Hanford Site

Gerber (1993a, p. 62) attributes most of the 

power increase to a new fuel element design 

introduced in 1957. In fabricating internally 

and externally cooled fuel elements (known as l&E fuel), technicians in the 313 Building machined a horizontal hole 

through the uranium metal to allow water to circulate around and within the fuel element simultaneously as it passed 

through the reactor. The internally and externally cooled fuel "had a vastly augmented cooling capacity" and "provided 

less hydraulic resistance to the coolant flow." In a related improvement, General Electric began to usezjrcaloy-2 to 

replace the original aluminum process tubes. The higher tensile strength and higher melting point of zirconium made the 

new process tubes both thinner, thereby increasing heat exchange and water volume, and safer in the event of water loss 

(Gerber 1993a). Adding to these engineering changes, General Electric also effected an environmental change:

"Another innovation that allowed higher operating power levels in the late 1950s and early 1960s, specifically in

the hotter summer and autumn months, was artificial cooling o f the Hanford Reach o f the Columbia River by a

controlled spill o f cold water from the bottom levels o f Lake Roosevelt, the reservoir behind the Grand Coulee

Dam. The cooling program began during the summer o f 1959, and continued through the summer o f 1965. It

cooled the Columbia's water in the vicinity o f Hanford reactors by an average o f 1° C, and by a maximum o f

2.3° C during September 1960. The lower inlet water temperature made possible higher power levels in reactor

operations, while still not exceeding the maximum bulk outlet temperatures that were allowed." - Gerber 1993a,

p. 62

Pushing the Hanford Site reactors did not come without consequences, however, as the higher operating levels brought 

more frequent and more serious fuel ruptures, accelerated process tube corrosion and failures, and increased leaks in the 

effluent pipes among other problems. Hanford Site scientists investigated ways to reduce or eliminate these problems in 

the 185/189-D Complex and the 300 Area research laboratories. For example as early as January 1952, scientists had 

initiated "heat transfer and fuel corrosion studies" in the newly converted 185/189-D Building, "a thermal hydraulics and 

coolant systems development studies facility" (Gerber et al. 1997). According to the 190-D Complex HAER in Appendix 

B on the Internet, using mock-ups of pipes and tubes loaded with dummy fuel elements, scientists within the 185/189 

"Flow Lab" developed "coolant flow information that allowed repeated power level increases in the Hanford reactors."

Exhaust gases also increased in volume as reactor operating levels rose. To address this rise in emissions,

General Electric constructed large, primarily below-grade filters in the early 1960s to treat process gases before their 

release through the reactor stacks. The 117 Air Filter Buildings, consisting of two filter cells divided by an operating 

gallery, were tied into the existing exhaust ductwork using concrete inlet and outlet tunnels. Engineers designed "an 

exhaust filtration system that would entrap a small percentage of the pile [reactor] noble gases (kryton-85, argon 39, 41, 

and 42, and xenon-133), 70 to 95% of the halogens (iodine-131 and bromine-82), and most of the remainder of the 

particulates and aerosols in reactor gases (including cesium-137, tellurium-129, selenium-79, ruthenium-103/106, and 

others)" Gerber 1993a, p. 67). Technicians monitored the exhaust gases using instrumentation placed in the 119 Air 

Sample Buildings. Prior to this time, reactor gases had not been filtered before being dispersed into the atmosphere.

1 .6 0
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

The Atomic Energy Commission placed equal pressure on the Savannah River Site to produce beyond its engineered 

capacity during this period. With an original design rating of less than 500 megawatts-thermal, "the thermal power level 

of the reactors was increased to approximately 2500 m w" between 1955 and 1965 (DOE 1996b, Section 9.1.2). Indeed, 

the Atomic Energy Commission demanded increased productivity throughout its nuclear weapons complex during this 

interval.

Hanford Site chemical separations operators met the challenge of increased plutonium production from the site's eight 

enhanced reactors with only two operating canyons (REDOX and PUREX), although the real ability to meet accelerated 

demand rested primarily with PUREX. Engineers had designed PUREX to operate at a processing capacity of 8.33 metric 

tons of uranium per day. W ithin its first year of operations, PUREX staff had pushed operations to 16 metric tons of 

uranium per day, twice the design rating. By 1958, PUREX accounted for 79 percent of the Hanford Site production 

total. In the fall of 1960, in just under 5 years of operations, PUREX "reached the point of having processed 22,000 tons 

of irradiated fuel, thus surpassing the combined total of B and T plants and the REDOX facility for all their years of 

operations. For short periods of time, PUREX demonstrated the capacity to operate at 3.6 times its design capacity" 

(Gerber 1996, p. 4-14). This production rate notwithstanding, General Electric re-engineered the process equipment first 

between 1959 and 1961 and then again in 1965 to bring operations to 33 metric tons of uranium per day (Gerber 1996).

Responding to the need to increase efficiency to further production, General Electric modified the RMA Line in the 

234-5Z Building in 1955 so that the "precipitation and purification activities" formerly conducted in the 231-Z Building 

would now be the first steps undertaken at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (Gerber 1996, p. 5-3). This action concentrated 

plutonium finishing within one building, thereby increasing efficiency, and eliminated the need for twice handling and 

transporting plutonium between the chemical separations and metal production phases, thereby increasing safety.

Typical of the Hanford Site, the 231-Z Building did not stand idle following this loss of function. General Electric 

partially restructured the building's interior and established the Plutonium Fabrication Laboratory. Scientists working in 

this facility conducted "specialized plutonium metallurgy work...associated with research for the development of more 

sophisticated nuclear weaponry. Research was also conducted in the facility that was associated with plutonium fuels 

development for the commercial nuclear industry" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.37).

General Electric further accelerated production by installing the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line in the Plutonium . 

Finishing Plant in 1960. The RMC Line, "a completely self-contained, remotely operated series of glove boxes," 

produced both plutonium metal and machined weapons parts. Operating the RMA and RMC Lines in tandem, 

technicians provided the Atomic Energy Commission with weapons components of "precise, specified dimensions and 

configuration" (Gerber 1996, pp. 5-2 to 5-4) until December 1965 when the AEC shut down machining operations at the 

Hanford Site and transferred this task to the Rocky Flats Plant.

General Electric sought to contain or control the wastes generated by plutonium finishing operations. The RECUPLEX 

process was one of the measures they applied. However, a criticality incident in April 1962 resulted in the permanent 

shutdown of the facility. Prior to this closure, engineers had been designing a "safer and a more flexible version of the 

RECUPLEX." Completed in December 1963 and operational by May 1964, operators in the Plutonium Reclamation 

- Facility (236-Z Building) used a continuous solvent extraction process to recover and purify plutonium from 

plutonium-bearing scrap materials generated at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The resultant plutonium nitrate was then 

returned to the PFP for processing (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.40). Using industrial solid waste rather than process waste as 

feed material, operators in the 232-Z Incinerator Building burned and/or leached plutonium-bearing waste materials 

generated across the Hanford Site to recover usable plutonium, which they returned to PFP beginning in January 1962. 

General Electric also constructed the 242-Z Waste Treatment Facility to recover plutonium from the liquid waste 

generated in the Plutonium Finishing Plant and contained in the 241 -Z Tanks. Recovery operations began in 1963 

(Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.41).

Given the production rates attained by the PUREX Plant, General Electric built four additional single-shell, high-level 

liquid waste storage tanks (241 -AX Tank Farm) in the 200 East Area. These tanks, the last single-shell tanks constructed at

1 .6 1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

the Hanford Site, were available to receive PUREX process wastes from 1963-1964 (Gerber 1992b). The total number of 

single-shell tanks containing high-level liquid waste now stood at 149 (see Gephart 1999 for current information on 

liquid waste tanks at the Hanford Site).

Following 2 years of chemical cleaning that had begun with an initial nitric acid wash on April 1, 1956, General Electric 

placed T Plant into service as the Hanford Site's central decontamination facility in 1958. Although decontamination 

operations began that year, cleanup continued through 1969 as workers removed most of the chemical separations 

processing equipment and buried it within solid waste burial grounds near T Plant. In 1959, General Electric added the 

2706-T Decontamination Annex to handle "equipment too large to be moved into T Plant or pieces having lower 

contamination levels than those decontaminated in T Canyon itself" (Gerber 1994a, p. 39). In addition to cleaning 

Hanford Site equipment and returning it to service, an activity that netted between $100,000 and $200,000 in monthly 

savings, decontamination workers also processed offsite materials including "high-exposure, irradiated fuel from the 

Shippingport (Pennsylvania) power reactor" in the late 1970s and the "zeolite beds...loaded with cesium-137 from the 

Three M ile Island (Pennsylvania) power reactor" in 1983 (Gerber 1994a, p. 42). Limited Operations status was imposed 

in January 1987 and remained in effect until both the 221 -T Plant and 2706-T Decontamination Annex were inactivated 

in January 1990 awaiting major upgrades.

It Was during the period o f peak plutonium production 

(the 1960s) that General Electric built the ninth and 

final graphite-moderated, water-cooled production 

reactor at the Hanford Site, the N Reactor. Figure 1.8 . 

shows the additional reactor areas, roads, and Priest 

Rapids Dam added since the time of the Manhattan 

Project. The Atomic Energy Commission advanced 

the N Reactor (originally referred to as the New 

Production Reactor and then just N Reactor) as a 

model to demonstrate the "technological and 

economic feasibility o f constructing a dual-purpose 

reactor capable of producing special nuclear materials 

for weapons and also using the steam for electricity" 

(Stapp and Marceau 1996, p. 18). Senator Henry 

Jackson of Washington, a member of the Joint 

Committee on Atomic Energy, was the driving force 

behind the Atomic Energy Commission's position. In 

fact, by arguing in 1956 that there could never be 

enough atomic bombs, Findlay and Hevly (1995, 

p. 171) suggest that Jackson used the Senate "to force 

a reluctant A EC to build a dual-purpose reactor at 

Hanford." Arguments for and against construction 

were long and embittered, and in 1958 Congress 

approved only those funds sufficient to construct a 

weapons-production reactor, albeit a safer one 

incorporating new design technology.

Engineers designed another significant difference into 

the cooling system for the N Reactor. Abandoning the 

single-pass design for the first time, General Electric 

Figure 1.8. Hanford Site during the Cold War Era Around 7 965 incorporated a recirculation configuration. This 

When the Site Was Called Hanford Works design change accounted for a number of benefits.

First and foremost, "innovation of the light-water

1 .6 2
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

recirculation design configuration

greatly reduced the direct release of " ' d iiw rv m c mm? //?<• H .m tord />//<•'s (ui/icr rt «Jc f»r it.is

radionuclides to the environment" N K’rM " " ' •’ c n c m n v n t h , ./ Mr -m/nvmr

since the primary cooling water was m dv<iiiJi. V1 fm i.»*lr.ini Im/ilflr-. m mid. dci (■/»/>■. in .im

not directly discharged to the |im ’ n l O ir p u tt i>-. l u h t //ft- ni-u/nm i/»x inr n -.w - Io “ .irilh n m .ill- ,md

Columbia River Because cn/i.mtv- //»<• pow/WKfi of .1 svrmm ??i/c /v.?r .if < Went. S Kv.it lot \ r/f"./yn

recirculation required that the water »» o tp a i.iic ti .1 /»v!;.?/m'v-i<m7/ 1 nv«n /«■/?/ //»,?/. in //if1 c .m1 «/ .1 -/earn h u lth lr 01

be pressurized higher operating m id in ih r p ro cw. fn/ie. /end*. /« f/ir iv.n /nr i/um/i “ - ^l.ipp .nul M.ikv.iu

levels were attainable w ith less film P- -*

deposited in the process tubes due to 

higher flow rates. Since less water

was necessary under pressurized conditions, a smaller water intake system would suffice. Finally, the "recirculation 

design also enabled the generation of steam to produce electricity" (Stapp and Marceau 1996, p. 23). "By putting the 

water in the pipes under a pressure of 3206 pounds per square inch, the water could be prevented from turning to steam 

and superheated water could be run through a heat exchanger to provide steam for a generating plant..." (Findlay and 

Hevly 1995, p. 170).

To meet the startup deadline, the reactor operators started up N Reactor on December 31, 1963 and immediately shut it 

down. Actual startup of operations was in March 1964, and it was several years before it operated in its dual capacity of 

producing both plutonium and steam for electricity.

The N Reactor, "having benefited from nearly two decades of experience with Hanford's eight older reactors," was fueled 

by a new type of fuel element fabricated through a new process developed in the 306 Fuel Element Pilot Plant. 

Constructed in 1956, General Electric used the 306 Building to "pilot process improvements in single-pass reactor fuel 

fabrication methods" (Gerber 1993b, pp. 7-8). Anticipating the operation of the N Reactor, General Electric expanded 

the facility in 1960 and assigned its staff the task of developing a fuel element that could withstand increased heat and 

pressure. Rising to the challenge, Hanford Site metallurgists pioneered a "coextrusion fabrication process" wherein "all 

the fuel-element components, including the uranium core and all the cladding materials, were cleaned, assembled, and 

then extruded together. This method provided a better, more uniform bond than the earlier process of jacketing each fuel 

element separately" (Gerber 1993b, p. 7). Besides the process improvement, N Reactor fuel elements were also 

composed of two pieces, an inner and outer element, designed as a "tube-in-tube configuration (with a hole running 

down the entire length of the element)," which "allowed cooling water to circulate optimally around the elements" 

(Gerber 1993b, pp. 7-8). Machinists began making the fuel elements in the 333 Fuels Manufacturing Building, originally 

known as the New Fuel Cladding Facility, in 1960 (see Chapter 2, Section 2 for a detailed discussion of the process and 

facilities).

Because the Hanford Site was the leading producer of weapons-grade plutonium for the Atomic Energy Commission, its 

air defense remained critical. In 1955, the U.S. Army placed four Nike Ajax missile complexes on the Hanford Site. 

These guided missiles replaced the AAA gun batteries since the missiles provided "an air defense system with the 

capacity of engaging high speed aerial targets at greater ranges than conventional antiaircraft artillery." Three systems 

were emplaced on the North Slope, the area north of the Columbia River and south of Saddle Mountain. The fourth 

system was placed at the base of and atop Rattlesnake Mountain. By the late 1950s, a more advanced Nike missile, the 

Hercules, replaced the Ajax series. This replacement was short-lived, however, as "the development of the 

intercontinental ballistic missiles had rendered Nike missiles obsolete, and the Nike sites were abandoned when 

Camp Hanford was deactivated in 1960 and closed in 1961" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.47).

Budgetary considerations and an abundance of formerly scarce nuclear materials resulted in a shift from redundant sites 

to single-mission sites and a shutdown of some sites and materials production facilities in the mid-1960s (DOE 1997e, 

p. 18). For example, the Atomic Energy Commission eliminated the production of plutonium weapons parts on the 

Hanford Site in 1965 leaving the Rocky Flats Plant as the sole source of plutonium components (DOE 1997e, p. 26).

1 .6 3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

More significant than the loss of a function, the Hanford Site began to loose its primary mission when the Atomic Energy 

Commission began shutting down the production reactors. Following President Johnson's announcement of cutbacks, 

the Atomic Energy Commission ordered the closure of the DR Reactor, effective December 1964, and closure of H and 

F reactors effective April and June 1965, respectively. The Atomic Energy Commission would issue additional closure 

orders in 1967, 1968, and 1969.

Em e r g e n c e o f N o n -D e f e n s e Ap p l i c a t io n s : At o m s f o r P e a c e

In December 1953, President Eisenhower announced his "Atoms for Peace" initiative designed to share "technology and 

nuclear material w ith other nations, including nuclear materials for research and power reactor programs." Before this 

could happen/however, Congress had to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. They did so in 1954. th e amendment 

allowed "civilian peaceful use, though not ownership, of special nuclear materials" and further allowed "U.S. assistance 

to foreign countries developing peaceful nuclear programs" (DOE 1996b, Section 3.1). W ith this amendment,

President Eisenhower acted on his own directive to Lewis Strauss, delivered on Strauss' appointment as chairman of the 

Atomic Energy Commission, to develop alternatives other than m ilitary applications for atomic energy. In 1957, the 

International Atomic Energy Agency was formed "to promote peaceful nuclear energy and control nuclear material"

(DOE 1996b, Section 3.4). "The mid-to-late 1950s was a very expansive time in United States nuclear history. The 

belief was widespread that atomic energy would be the fuel of the future adopted to virtually all civilian and industrial 

power needs" (Gerber 1993b, p. 33).

In 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission had established the National Reactor Testing Station (now known as the Idaho 

National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory) northwest of Idaho Falls, Idaho. This facility offered an isolated 

location to design, build, and test prototype nuclear reactors. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission 

charged the facility staff w ith developing nuclear power for peacetime use and finding methods to effectively deal with 

radioactive waste (DOE 1997e). The Atomic Energy Commission had not selected the Hanford Site for the initial 

Materials Testing Reactor in 1952 because the reactor "was designed to be used by researchers for research; a secondary 

group and a secondary function at Hanford, as its role was defined by the AEC." The Atomic Energy Commission built 

the Materials Testing Reactor in Idaho because they viewed the Hanford Site as a "professional workplace dominated by 

engineers rather than scientists, and, among the scientists, by the most industrially-oriented disciplines" (Findlay and 

Hevly 1995, pp. 150-151). By 1960, the Hanford Site scientific community was not content to let this assessment persist.

Knowing both the importance of and the opportunities afforded in developing, testing, and fabricating alternate fuels for 

commercial applications, General Electric completed construction of both the 308 Plutonium Fabrication Pilot Plant 

(PFPP) and the 309 Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) in the 300 Area in 1960. "Anxious to participate in this new 

atomic frontier," Hanford Site scientists then "embark[ed] on a large research effort...directed at demonstrating the 

effectiveness of various plutonium oxide and mixed (plutonium, uranium, and other metallic) oxide fuel blends"

(Gerber 1993b, pp. 33, 36). Scientists working on the Plutonium Fuels Utilization Program developed and fabricated 

plutonium-based fuel elements in the PFPP, first in metallic form and then as "ceramic fuel blends ('cermets')," from 1960 

through 1965 (Gerber 1993b, p. 36). They tested these "developmental fuels" in the PRTR, "a heavy water moderated,

1 0 0 megawatt experimental reactor" used not only to test alternative fuels but also "process tubes, and the physical 

parameters of plutonium fuels" (Gerber 1992b, p. 40). Design engineers had located the PRTR partially below grade 

w ithin the 309 Building containment vessel. In addition to three large, below-grade cells containing reactor process, 

experimental, and instrumentation equipment, the 309 Building also contained a subsurface Hot Fuel Examination 

Facility, an irradiated fuel storage pit, and a fresh fuel storage pit (Gerber 1993b, p. 33). Scientists had pre-tested many of 

the PRTR components using mock-ups in the 185/189-D Thermal Hydraulics Laboratory. Between 1968 and 1972, 

physicists used the High Temperature Lattice Test Reactor, a 10-foot cubed, liquid nitrogen gas-cooled, graphitemoderated reactor housed in the 318 Building, "to test powdered, pelletized and other experimental fuels at high 

temperatures" (Gerber 1992b, p. 40). 1

In 1960, General Electric also completed construction of the 325-A High-Level Radiochemistry Annex to further 

"innovative, non-defense" research programs. This addition to the 325 Building provided three large hot cells within

1 .6 4
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

which scientists conducted "pioneering" isotope separation work for the National Aeronautical and Space Administration 

and medical researchers. Using high-level liquid waste as source material, chemists "fractionized specific isotopes 

[strontium-90, cesium-130, curium-244, americium-241, and promethium-147 being most in demand]...by ion 

exchange, carrier precipitation, solvent extraction, and various combinations of these and other methods"

(Gerber 1993b, p. 23). Chemists in the 325 Building complex also investigated methods to encapsulate strontium 

fluoride and cesium chloride and to vitrify high-level wastes in support of waste treatment and waste management 

objectives (Gerber 1993b).

The Atomic Energy Commission authorized the 324 Chemical Materials Engineering Laboratory (constructed between 

1964 and 1966 and originally named the Fuel Recycle Pilot Plant) to provide "chemical reprocessing and metallurgical 

examination" services for fuel elements irradiated in the PRTR. A second mission was to "house the Waste Solidification 

Engineering Project, one of the first high-level waste vitrification demonstration programs in the world" (Gerber 1993b, 

pp. 48-49). Therefore, design engineers provided both hot cells and laboratories for radiochemical and 

radiometallurgical research as well as numerous "cold" laboratories, a maintenance and fabrication shop, storage vaults, 

and waste vaults throughout the multi-level building. The support mission for PRTR ended quickly, however, when PRTR 

shut down in 1969 following the Atomic Energy Commission's decision to terminate mixed oxide fuels research 

(Gerber 1993b, p. 36). Several "contamination events" associated with PRTR operations likely contributed to this 

decision to shut down the test reactor (see Gerber 1993b, pp. 35-36 for discussion). On the other hand, vitrification 

research, using "[ejxtremely high-level waste, sometimes 'spiked' with extra strontium-90," or, post-1975, "spent 

commercial reactor fuel," continued until 1980 (Gerber 1993b, p. 51).

Hanford Site scientists began to prepare "plutonium oxides in specified, tailored blends for commercial nuclear 

experiments and development" within the Plutonium Finishing Plant in September 1964. The European Atomic Energy 

Community (EURATOM) was the customer. Between 1966 and 1968, non-defense work climbed to nearly 30 percent of 

the workload at the Plutonium Finishing Plant as "large-scale interaction w ith the commercial nuclear industry, nuclear 

research customers and foreign nuclear customers became a reality." After 1968, the RMA Line, closed since 1966, 

became known as the "oxide line" because of its use in non-defense work (Gerber 1996, pp. 5-4 to 5-5).

Co l d Wa r En d s : Div e r s if ic a t io n At Th e Ha n f o r d Sit e

The end of the Cold War was not nearly as simple or as linear as the following discussion may suggest. The geopolitics 

were very complex. The period from 1960-1990 witnessed the rise of the Chinese as a nuclear power 

(October 16,1964) and thermonuclear power (june 17, 1967), the emergence of oil as a defining force in world 

commerce, numerous proxy wars within the "Third W orld," the introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and a host 

of other domestic and international events that shaped and contorted the times. The interested reader is directed to The

Cold War, A History by Martin Walker (1995) and the sources the author draws on for a detailed accounting.

The Cold War may have ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, but glimpses of its demise can be seen in 

retrospect over a 30-year period in efforts to control the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Having walked to the 

brink of nuclear war and measured its consequences, representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the 

Soviet Union met during July 1963 to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. When onsite inspections became an 

insurmountable obstacle, negotiators turned to a limited test ban that would outlaw nuclear tests in the atmosphere, 

under water, and in outer space. President Kennedy signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty on July 25, 1963. He addressed 

the American public the following night and expressed his desire to effect a thaw in the Cold War.

"In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times

over; the world o f communism and the world o f free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle o f

conflicting ideology and interest Each increase in tension has produced an increase o f arms; each increase o f

arms has produced an increase o f tension... Yesterday a shaft o f light cut into the darkness... For the first time an

agreement has been reached on bringing the forces o f nuclear destruction under international control - a goal

1 .6 5
Ch a p t e r l - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations...If we

are to open new doorways to peace> if we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold

and farsighted in our control o f weapons as we have been in their invention, then let us now show the world on

this side o f the w all and the other that a strong America also stands for peace. There is no cause for

complacency." - Kennedy 1963

The U.S. Senate ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty by an 

80 to 14 vote on September 24, 1963. The Treaty went into

<>„ luh I l ‘»,SI -,w, .«;„«/ //»■ v „ -V,,,. I effect on October 11. President Kennedy had come a long

V,,,,,In.,/,. IT . /■/„■/. //,.■ way from hi? campaign rhetoric.

I n iiu d ,v u l %>ovit,t I nion hruan tfr.ili'ti/i A im *

lim ita tio n l.ilh *. Under President Johnson, McNamara had found a way to

reverse defense spending on nuclear weapons. In fact, he 

approved research and development for only one new 

weapon system, the M ultiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) as a way to "approve military requests for 

additional weapons without the cost of new delivery systems or missile bases" (Mitchell 1999, p. 55). President Johnson, 

notes M itchell (1999), was politically able to propose reductions because of the significant increase in weapons procured 

during the short Kennedy administration. Ironically, deployment of MIRV under the following Nixon administration, 

together with a shift in national policy, led to an increase in the nuclear stockpile between 1971 and 1974.

On January 10, 1974, James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense under Richard M. Nixon, formally set aside assured 

destruction when he announced "that the old policy...was no longer adequate for deterrence." The United States 

needed "a set of selective options against different sets of targets," prim arily m ilitary rather than civilian. Called "flexible 

targeting," this policy emphasized "controlled escalation" (Mitchell 1999, p. 60). Prior to this policy shift, the military 

had equipped Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles with MIRV warheads in 1970 and 1971, respectively. Following this 

announcement, the military again pushed for new weapons, in particular the B-1 bomber and the MX missile. Mitchell 

(1999, p. 61) points out that the Nixon administration buildup, while increasing the number of weapons in the short 

term, actually reshaped the nuclear stockpile in the years following 1974. "The number of weapons retired from the 

stockpile, mostly tactical weapons, far outpaced the number of new weapons entering the stockpile, mostly strategic 

weapons," He argues that "the reduction in fissile material production, initiated by President Johnson in the mid-1960s, 

was beginning to have an impact on the number of new weapons deployed."

Even as he built up the U.S. nuclear

VI.,, /-/-„■, 1 6 ,1 ,,/h'rf ..... .the s u ile t I /„■,,,, > u n . ; ' arsenal' however, President Nixon signaled

I: a desire to reduce the economic effects

caused by the arms race. In his first 

inaugural address, delivered in January 1969, President Nixon told the world, "After a period of confrontation, we are 

entering a period of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication are 

open...W ith those who are w illing to Join us, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of 

peace" (Nixon, quoted in Walker 1995, p. 216). President Nixon was speaking of detente. Walker (1995, pp. 216-219) 

suggests that the "public perception of detente as a method of easing tensions was...an almost deliberate fraud [since] 

detente was the continuation of the Cold War in other places, and by more subtle means." However, President Nixon 

used detente as an opportunity to pursue arms control, which had the duel objective of reducing the defense budget and 

easing the debt created by the Vietnam War. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which President Nixon signed in 

1972, addressed his inaugural message and represented the first attempt at mutual restraint between the United States 

and the Soviet Union. This treaty, which limited the "development and deployment of missiles designed to nullify each 

other's deterrent by shooting them down in flight," was a stabilizing measure that Walker (1995, p. 204) characterizes as 

the "first formal recognition that each superpower had an interest in protecting the strategic arsenal of the other." In the 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that followed, the United States and Soviet Union sought to codify the number of 

nuclear weapons each could possess.

1 .6 6
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

More direct than his predecessors, President Jimmy Carter, addressing the nation and the world in his inaugural speech in 

January 1977, stated bluntly: "We w ill move this year a step forward toward our ultimate goal - the elimination o f all 

nuclear weapons from this earth" (Carter, quoted 

in Mitchell 1999, p. 62). Unfortunately for 

President Carter, the Soviet buildup initiated years 

before by Leonid Brezhnev "bore fruit with the 

introduction of four new. models of strategic 

missiles in 1974...[and] the deployment of the 

SS-20 missiles [in Eastern Europe] in 1977"

(Walker 1995, p. 244). W hile President Carter 

acted on his "moral conviction to rid the world of 

nuclear weapons" in signing SALT II on June 18,

1979 (Mitchell 1999, p. 62), the Soviets appeared 

to be gaining superiority (see sidebar box).

 ij Dissatisfied from the start with his administration, the

On ftvirm ln r J - f f - ' f V n /r f Imop* im.irf.-r/ Wy/mnMa/i j Committee on Present Danger, a conservative group of 

.7/h/ lender H.nisulUh \min. I cold warriors, portrayed President Carter as ineffective

| and blamed him for turning the United States into a 

"weak and fading super-power" (Mitchell 1999, p. 64). 

On December 4, 1979, on the advice of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski, President Carter approved 

deployment of 200 MX missiles, a MIRV missile containing ten independently-targeted nuclear warheads. "The MX 

decision, and Carter's approval of the new Trident II SLBM [submarine launched ballistic missile], Pershing II IRBM 

[intermediate-range ballistic missile], and cruise missile...were measures by an administration perceived as weak, to 

demonstrate U.S. resolve, not only to the Soviets, but also to the American people" (Mitchell 1999, p. 63). In a classic 

case of bad timing, followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 and 

held the diplomats and staff hostage for over a year thereby negating President Carter's decision in the eyes of the 

American public and much of the world. When the rescue attempt failed on April 24, 1980, the people handed the 

presidency to Ronald Reagan, who, like President Kennedy, had campaigned hard on a platform to restore "strong and 

decisive leadership and a strengthened nation" (Mitchell 1999, p. 65).

Ronald Reagan "inherited a clear mandate for change, 

backed by a new American nationalism, and did not back 

away from the task at hand" (Mitchell 1999, p. 67). He 

increased spending on defense by 50 percent in his first 

5 years in office. Twenty percent of that increase went to 

nuclear weapons, the remainder to conventional weapons.

Ironically, the "dramatic rearmament of the Reagan years was largely envisioned by the Carter Administration" (Walker 

1995, p. 250). However, President Reagan seized the initiative. "Reagan's rearmament was an investment in national 

security. It was also the test of Reagan's private conviction that the United States could afford an arms race, while the 

Soviet Union could not. The Soviet Union would either have to renounce the arms race, or bankrupt itself into collapse 

in the vain effort to keep up" (Walker 1995, p. 267).

To compound the buildup, President Reagan proposed a new Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as "Star 

Wars," on March 23,1983. President Reagan's call for a massive research project to develop a land- and space-based 

anti-missile system alarmed the Soviets, whose newly empowered Secretary General Yuri Andropov had proposed a 

series of initiatives for arms reductions, including "a 25 per cent cut in the strategic arsenals of both the USA and the 

Soviet Union, combined with a nuclear freeze on any new deployments" (Walker 1995, p. 272). It frightened the

O n Septemhei JJ, I'HUK I v lIi lla /ts a n n ’.in i/e d llw

Sid id u n ti union in Rol.wd.

" I s. m/cn-ifs a/ipr.irvr/ 1u he i nm/ny under tlu e .d throughout the J

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I he 1*10 .I1. tie* fine I ih ei.itm n O r> ,in iA d io n i. the ,nl\,un.e of I he !

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fin- nun i lia/ii'iyi*1* 1» l/u‘ p i n- \im u u an f c,i:imc,« in < i-nf/ai

\m e iii ,i I he k re m lin '* ( ulxin .din's Ihid e -t.ihli-he d m ilil.m

to n tn d in A/iyiWa. O n the m.ips o f the w o rld w hU h \m e ih .u i

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1 .6 7
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Western Europeans, who believed they would become the target of choice for Soviet missiles if the United States were 

hidden behind a defensive shield and appeared to most observers to violate the mandates of the ABM Treaty of 1972.

The SDl was a double-edged sword. It is credited by many as the final straw that broke the back of the Soviet economic 

resolve to continue the arms race. As Mitchell (1999, p. 67) points out: "W ithin four years the U.S. was spending 

approximately $ 6 billion annually on research and development for a Star Wars system. SDl would prove to be an up in 

the economic ante of the arms race that Gorbachev was unwilling or unable to match." It also delayed agreements on 

arms reductions by several years because of President Reagan's reluctance to give up the system. The Soviet Union, 

believing that the Reagan buildup and SDl were a repudiation of the Andropov "peace offensive" offered in 1982, 

became "convinced by its own propaganda that Reagan's America was capable of a pre-emptive nuclear attack"

(Walker 1995, p. 277). Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), initiated in Geneva on June 29, 1982, made little 

progress by 1983. The Soviet Union then suspended the talks in December 1984.

Mikhail Gorbachev, a member of the new generation that Andropov believed "could help haul the country from 

Brezhnev's stagnant legacy," became Secretary General in March 1985 (Walker 1995, p. 272). Gorbachev's domestic 

agenda had three defining characteristics: "Sweeping economic reform with the profit motive, moves towards political 

democratization, and a much greater freedom for the Soviet press and media" (Walker 1995, p. 284). The essence of his 

reform movement was captured in two words, perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). The Solidarity 

movement in Poland, human rights activists in Czechoslovakia, and the democratic movements within Russia itself, 

fueled by the ever widening "peace movement" with its call for "N o Nukes," emerged from the darkness into the lig h t. 

under Gorbachev. "Gorbachev's "Novoye Myshlenniye" or New Thinking in international affairs was first spelt out at 

the Geneva summit with President Reagan in October 1985, when they agreed in principle to work towards a Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty [START] to cut their nuclear arsenals in half. It was amplified in January of 1986, with 

Gorbachev's detailed scenario for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000" (Walker 1995, p. 290).

Meeting again in Reykjavik in October 1986, President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev acted on the exchange 

of ideas they had had on disarmament since their meeting in Geneva. They "agreed in principle" to eliminate mediumrange nuclear missiles from Europe, eliminate all ABMs within 10 years, and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. 

However, the "proposal to abolish nuclear weapons tumbled at the last fence, at Gorbachev's insistence that Reagan 

abandon his cherished SDl, or at least confine the research to the laboratory" (Walker 1995, p. 295). What

President Reagan could not do, Congress did. With SDl scaled back, President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev

signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987.

In December 1988, Gorbachev addressed the United Nations and 

set in motion the breakup of the Soviet Union. "Force or the 

threat of force," he said, "neither can nor should be instruments of 

foreign policy...Freedom of choice is a universal principle. It 

knows no exceptions" (Gorbachev, quoted in Walker 1995, 

p. 309). Taking him at his word, the people of Eastern Europe 

began to reclaim their countries, first Hungary, then Lithuania, 

Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, all w ithin the first 6 months of 1989. East Germany left the Soviet fold in October 1989, 

destroying the Berlin Wall on November 10 to remove all doubt. Czechoslovakia followed on November 30 (Walker 

1995, pp. 309-313). President George H. Bush and Secretary General M ikhail Gorbachev signed START in July 1991. 

Following a failed coup by communist hard-liners in Moscow in August, eight of the fifteen Soviet Republics declared 

complete independence. In an address to the nation on September 27, 1991, President Bush announced that he would 

destroy the nuclear artillery shells and warheads that had armed the tactical weapons based in Europe; withdraw all the 

tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, submarines, and land-based naval aircraft; order the stand down of all „ 

strategic bombers and all the ICBMs scheduled for deactivation; and cancel those strategic weapons systems then in 

development (Mitchell 1999). With these actions, the United States and the Soviet Union ended the Cold War.

O n lu n t' t-4. I*HW. ( huH"-v \in lr n tl\ ended

the studcM ’,'d rm tH r.iin iih moment in T icn.inm rn

1 .6 8
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Ec o n o m ic Div e r s if ic a t io n : Ke y t o Su r v iv a l f o r t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

Site Name: Hanford Works

Hanford Reservation - January 1975 to September 1977 

Hanford Site - October 1977 to 1990

Site Manager: Donald G. Williams - June 1965 to November 1971

Thomas A. Nemzek - November 1971 to September 1973

Responsible Agency: Atomic Energy Commission

Energy Research and Development Administration - January 1975 to September 1977 

Department of Energy - October 1977 to 1990

Site Contractor: Douglas United Nuclear - November 1965 to August 1967

Reactor Operations, Fuel Manufacture

United Nuclear Industries - September 1967 to April 1973 

Reactor Operations, Fuel Manufacture 

UNC Nuclear Industries, Inc. - April 1973 to June 1987 

Reactor Operations, Fuel Manufacture

Isochem, Inc. - January 1966 to September 1967 

Chemical Processing, Waste Management

Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company - September 1967 to June 1977 

Chemical Processing, Waste Management, Management and Integration

Rockwell Hanford Operations - July 1977 to June 1987

Chemical Processing, Waste Management, Management and Integration

Westinghouse - July 1970 to June 1987

Hanford Engineering and Development Laboratory, Fast Flux Test Facility

Battel le - January 1965 to 1990 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

ITT Federal Support Services, Inc. - March 1966 to August 1971 

Site Administrative Services and Infrastructure

Findlay and Hevly (1995, pp. 72, 78) repeatedly make the point that the Hanford Site was, above all else, a production 

center whose overriding mission was the "manufacture of as much fissionable material for bombs, as quickly and costefficiently as possible." Even as commercial applications began to expand, the Atomic Energy Commission "mandated 

that Hanford favor certain operations over research, and plutonium production over power production." However, this 

myopia began to change as defense production fell off rapidly after 1965.

In the mid-1960s, with three reactors already shut down, the Atomic Energy Commission, in concert with community 

leaders, looked for ways to maintain the viability of the industrial complex. If the Hanford Site were to survive, it clearly 

had to move beyond defense-related plutonium production. In a strong statement o f the restructuring that would be 

necessary to achieve this objective, the Atomic Energy Commission and General Electric jointly announced the 

withdrawal of General Electric as the Hanford Site contractor on January 21, 1964. General Electric was not let go

1 .6 9
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

because of poor management. Rather, the Atomic Energy Commission acted upon the prevailing perception that a single, 

large contractor countered effective regional economic development by removing the incentive for other businesses to 

come (Findlay and Hevly 1995). "In an effort to encourage the use of the site's resources and work force in new ways, 

the Commission increased its commitment to research activities and power production at Hanford, spread responsibility 

for managing Hanford's activities among several contractors, and required those contractors to invest in the local 

economy" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, pp. 217-218).

Finding ways to boost the local economy was imperative as the proportion of weapons-related federal support fell from 

nearly 100 percent in 1964 to only 25 percent in 1975.

P o w e r Ge n e r a t io n

Congress did not approve the power plant that would produce and distribute electricity when it authorized construction

of N Reactor in 1958. It voted down a proposal to use the built-in capability for conversion again in 1961. However,

when the Washington Public Power Supply System (Supply System) agreed to pay all the expenses for the electrical 

generation and transmission facility, Congress passed the legislation necessary for a non-federal agency to construct and 

1 operate the facility on the Hanford Site on September 26, 1962.

Advocates for the facility, known as the Hanford Generating Plant, had waged a long political struggle against strong 

opposition from private utilities and the coal industry. Taking the long view, "business advocates saw dual-purpose 

; reactors...as the point of entry for private enterprise into the nuclear arena" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 170). Local

advocates saw the Hanford Generating Plant as a way to "link Hanford's production mission to the long-delayed hopes 

for commercial nuclear power' (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 204).

President Kennedy had taken an interest in the Hanford Generating Plant, indeed his administration had placed the 

conditions on the authorizing legislation, particularly private funding, that won Congressional approval. Suitably, then, 

in a ceremony open to the public for the first time on the Hanford Site, Kennedy both dedicated N Reactor and initiated 

construction of the Hanford Generating Plant on September 26, 1963. Noting that it was "exactly one year ago today, 

after a long and bitter legislative battle, that I was able to sign the Hanford steam plant legislation," Kennedy went on to 

say that to "have permitted this resource to be wasted would have been in conflict with all the principles of resource 

conservation and utilization to which we are committed" (Kennedy, quoted in Stapp and Marceau 1996, pp. 18-19).

i The Hanford Generating Plant first produced electricity on April 8 , 1966. With the addition of the generating facility,

j N Reactor became the nation's first and only dual-purpose reactor. To produce electricity, operators pumped N Reactor

primary cooling water to the 109-N Heat Exchange Building. Circulated through ten parallel heat exchangers, the heat 

from the process water caused water contained in a secondary system to boil and produce steam. This steam was 

transferred through overhead pipes to the 185-N Export Powerhouse Turbine Building where it drove two large turbines 

generating approximately 860 megawatts of electricity that was passed through the 155-N Export Power Switchyard to 

the Bonneville Power Administration power grid (UNI n.d., DOE 1997a).

| In 1957, the Shippingport Reactor in Pennsylvania became the nation's first commercial nuclear-powered electrical

generating facility. It was the first of many planned and constructed across the nation in the late 1950s and 1960s.

Acting on the success of the Hanford Generating Plant, and in partial fulfillm ent of a bold local plan to establish a

"nuclear power park" at the Hanford Site as a model for resolving the nation's "energy crisis" of the late 1970s, the 

Supply System proposed constructing three "electricity-generating reactors" - the first of up to twenty. Construction of 

the reactors began in 1980. However, the project was a huge financial drain and the Supply System terminated 

construction on two of the reactors in 1982. In 1983, Supply System "defaulted on its bonds, the largest default on 

municipal bonds in financial history." O nly one of the Supply System reactors was completed and began producing 

i electricity in 1984 "seven years later than initially planned" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 296). In 1990, this reactor was

| the only active nuclear reactor at the Hanford Site.

j 1 . 7 0

j - . ;

I ----------------------------- ------------------------------------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Se r v ic e t o t h e N u c l e a r a n d Sc ie n t if ic Co m m u n i t i e s

As the Hanford Site production reactors shut down, fuel manufacturing and chemical separations activities decreased so 

that research and development programs now constituted the major mission. The research and development facilities 

included numerous laboratories and large test facilities in support of peaceful uses of plutonium, reactor fuels 

development, liquid metal technology, fast flux support, gas-cooled reactor programs, and life sciences programs.

Construction and operation of the Plutonium Recycle Critical Facility (PRCF) in 1963 indicated the efforts undertaken by 

the Atomic Energy Commission to promote local economic development and uncouple the Hanford Site from its historic 

reliance on national defense. Completed as a second addition to the 309 Building, General Electric designed PRCF to 

support PRTR operations. However, scientists soon began using PRCF to test experimental lattice systems in support of 

light-water-cooled reactor design. "A commercial license was obtained from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

along w ith special permits from the Atomic Energy Commission. These permits allowed the PRCF to operate as a private 

business venture, housing experiments for both government projects and for private nuclear fuel vendors until 1976" 

when the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA), Atom ic Energy Commission's successor, closed the facility 

(Gerber 1993b, p. 35).

Originally a condition of their selection in 1965 as the Hanford Site contractor for chemical separations, Isochem, Inc. 

reneged on its promise to build a $9 m illion plant to recover and encapsulate radioisotopes from the Hanford Site highlevel liquid waste stream. Commercial" applications for the radioisotopes included food preservation, sterilization of 

medical supplies, and chemical manufacturing. However, unlike earlier successful isotope separations work conducted 

in the 325 High-Level Radiochemistry addition, Isochem determined no commercial market was available for the 

isotopes. Dissatisfied with isochem's performance, the Atomic Energy Commission turned the chemical separations 

operation over to the Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company (ARHCO) in 1967 (Findlay and Hevly 1995). Initially, 

ARHCO did not pursue commercially based applications. Instead it modified the idle B Plant and provided its second 

mission, the recovery of cesium-137 and strontium-90 from high-level liquid waste. In 1974, ARHCO added the 225-B 

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) to the B Plant complex. Here technicians solidified, encapsulated, and 

stored the recovered cesium and strontium. Operators completed cesium and strontium recovery in 1983 and 1985, 

respectively. These encapsulated isotopes were sent to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory for use in their isotope 

program.

In 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission decided to pursue breeder reactors instead of reactors fueled by mixed oxides. 

In an unanticipated decision, the Atomic Energy Commission selected the Hanford Site rather than the Argonne National 

Laboratory or the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory as the location for the prototype Fast Fuel 

Test Reactor "even though production-oriented Hanford had no design team in place for such a new reactor" (Findlay 

and Hevly 1995, p. 243). Many of the facilities originally constructed for mixed oxide research were converted quickly 

for use in the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program. For example, Westinghouse built a replica of a Fast Flux Test 

Facility (FFTF) operating cell within the 309 Building and used this facility to "train and requalify operators and to check 

operating procedures." The High Bay, added to the 308 Building in 1971, contained laboratories "for the initial storage, 

handling, testing, assembly, and instrumentation of FFTF fuel." In the late 1970s, specialists used the newly installed 

Training Research Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor to test FFTF fuel elements and jacket integrity 

(Gerber 1993b, p. 36). Metallurgists also conducted non-destructive examinations of FFTF fuel elements in the Shielded 

Materials Facility within the 324 Chemical Engineering Laboratory between 1968 and 1980.

To consolidate FFTF research and development, Westinghouse established the Hanford Engineering Development 

Laboratory. In addition to modifying existing facilities, Westinghouse constructed a number of new buildings within the 

300 Area between 1968 and 1972 including the 335 Fast Reactor Thermal Engineering Facility, the 336 Core Segment 

Development Facility, and the 337 High-Temperature Sodium Facility. The 338 Building, originally constructed in the 

100-F Area, was moved into the 300 Area in 1971 and served as the Components Mock-Up and Maintenance Facility to 

support FFTF. "In them, sodium loops tested various properties of sodium as a coolant, measured the behavior of

1 .7 1
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

mechanical components in a sodium environment, and fabricated, assembled and decontaminated equipment"

(Gerber 1992b, p. 41).

Construction of the FFTF (405 Building) began in 1970 and extended until 1978. Liquid sodium cooling allows neutrons 

to achieve higher energy levels than those possible or desirable in a water-cooled reactor. The flow of neutrons, or flux, 

is therefore faster. This characteristic of sodium-cooled reactors is reflected in the name of the facility. Engineers 

designed FFTF to operate at 400 megawatts-thermal. It went critical in February 1980. "FFTF was designed and 

constructed for the irradiation testing of fuels, core components and target assemblies for liquid metal fast breeder 

reactors. Reactor activities were later expanded to include long-term testing and evaluation of reactor components and 

systems, fusion power materials testing, passive [safety] testing and production [of] medical isotopes, and space power 

system research" (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.22).

As a final example of services the Hanford Site provided to the nuclear community, the Atomic Energy Commission 

designated the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (236-Z Building) as the Central Scrap Management Organization in 1972. 

The Plutonium Reclamation Facility would now recover and recycle plutonium from scrap materials shipped from 

defense and commercial facilities throughout the nation. "N ew defense grade oxides and metals could be made after 

Pu [plutonium] was reclaimed from these scraps, and commercial fuels...could be recycled and blended" (Gerber et al. 

1997, p. 5-20).

In service to the biological, ecological, and medical communities, in 1970 Battelle constructed the Life Sciences 

Laboratory (331 Building) as a replacement for the 108-F Building. Between 1972 and 1984, Battelle added several 

ancillary support facilities including living areas for the test animals, an animal birthing facility, an animal waste 

treatment facility, a greenhouse, experimental areas, and warehouses. Continuing pioneering research on the effects of 

radiation on animals and plants, scientists in the 331 complex conducted studies "devoted to dosimetry, isotope 

preparation, plant physiology, terrestrial ecology, aquatic biology, and biochemistry." They also conducted research in 

"inhalation toxicology...virology, histology, hematology...histochemistry, pathology, and microbial physiology"

(Gerber 1993b, p. 44). One accomplishment, among many, was the development of new techniques for heart surgery.

La n d Re l e a s e s

The shutdown of reactors, Findlay and Hevly (1995, p. 244), assert "presented chances to diversify Hanford's economy in 

an environmentally sensitive way, an increasingly important consideration in light of the growing environmental 

movement." The Atomic Energy Commission had released lands before in response to economic pressures. In 1947, the 

Atomic Energy Commission, through its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, established a 280,000-acre safety 

zone around the three production reactors as a protective measure in the event of an accident within one or more of 

these facilities (see Figure 1.9). This safety zone, extending beyond the boundaries delineating the Hanford Site in 1943, 

was divided into a Control Zone and a Secondary Zone. The Control Zone, which the Atomic Energy Commission 

owned outright as part of the original land acquisition, consisted of the land nearest the reactors and adjacent to the 

Columbia River. W hile the Atomic Energy Commission did not own the Secondary Zone, which extended to the crest of 

the Saddle Mountains, they had successfully prevented any development on or use of these 192,000 acres. Herein lay 

the conflict.

The lands within the Secondary Zone had been slated for settlement and irrigation under the Columbia Basin Project 

initiated in 1933. In 1952, the Bureau of Reclamation pointedly told the Atomic Energy Commission that continued 

withdrawal of the Secondary Zone was "costly to the taxpayer and project and to the Pacific Northwest...[and a] loss to 

the nation" (Van Arsdol 1980, Attachment 1, p.2). Given mounting pressure from the local community, the Atomic 

Energy Commission announced on January 8 , 1953 that it was releasing some 87,000 acres on the extreme east and west 

ends of the Secondary Zone. "We feel justified in making this determination on the basis of the knowledge and 

experience gained during eight years of safe and successful operation of the Hanford Works, during which the safety 

systems of the plant have steadily improved" (Atomic Energy Commission Commissioners quoted in Van Arsdol 1980, 

Attachment 2, p. 4).

1 .7 2
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

This concession was insufficient since the Atomic Energy .

Commission also announced that while they would 

"permit the temporary construction of canals and 

roadways through the remaining restricted areas" they 

would continue to "oppose occupation or regular work 

there" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p.122). With the hint of 

an impending lawsuit from the Columbia Basin 

Commission and following hearings held by Senator 

Jackson in October 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission 

released an additional 105,500 acres from the Secondary 

Zone on December 30, 1958, thereby reducing direct 

government control to the 560 square miles currently 

managed as the Hanford Site.

Pressure to release additional lands for economic 

development continued, but the Atomic Energy 

Commission found a new ally in the environmental 

movement. In response to two proposals centering on 

Rattlesnake Mountain and its adjacent slopes, the Atomic 

Energy Commission opted for biological and natural 

resource research rather than grazing and irrigation. On 

March 29, 1967, Senator Warren Magnuson announced 

the creation of the Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (now 

known as the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology 

Reserve) encompassing the southwestern edge of the |

Hanford Site. The Atomic Energy Commission set aside j

these 76,800 acres to "expand knowledge about man's

relationship with nature, and thereby help protect the Figure 1.9. Control Zone and Secondary Zones at the

environment"(Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 245). In Hanford Site

discussing this decision further, Findlay and Hevly (1995,

p. 247) assert that "proposals oriented more towards preservation gained precedence over economic development, 

largely because preservation dovetailed with a continuing emphasis on security at Hanford."

Continuing this trend, the Atomic Energy Commission established two additional natural resource areas. In 1971, the 

U.S. Fish and W ildlife Service assumed management o f the Saddle Mountain National W ildlife Refuge on 32,000 acres 

of land within the western portion of the former Control Zone. That same year, the Washington State Department of Fish 

and W ildlife obtained management of 55,680 acres of the northern and eastern Control Zone designated as the Wahluke 

W ildlife Recreation Area. Figure 1.10 shows the additions since the Cold War Era of the Wahluke W ildlife Recreation 

Area, Saddle Mountain National W ildlife Refuge, Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, the 400 Area where the Fast Flux Test 

Facility is located, and the Washington Public Power Supply System.

Re a g a n Bu i l d u p

Site Manager: Alex C. Fremling - September 1973 to June 1984

Responsible Agency: Department of Energy

Site Contractor: Westinghouse Hanford Company - June 1987 to 1990

The Atomic Energy Commission shut down D Reactor in June 1967. W ith four reactors now inactive, the Atomic Energy 

Commission closed REDOX in December 1967. Then, beginning with B Reactor in February 1968, the Atomic Energy

Secondary

Zone

Secondary

Zcvne

1 .7 3
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Commission ordered the closure of all remaining Hanford 

Site reactors in relatively quick succession: C Reactor in 

April 1969, KW Reactor in February 1970, and KE Reactor 

in January 1971. Only N Reactor expanded its operations 

to include steam production for the Hanford Generating 

Plant in 1966 and, for a short period between 1968 and 

1970, tritium production. However, the Atomic Energy 

Commission order, issued for closure of the KE Reactor on 

January 26, 1971, also required the shutdown of the 

N Reactor.

Designed and operating now as a dual-purpose reactor, the 

prospect of loosing a facility that had barely begun fulfilling 

its commercial energy mission to the Pacific Northwest 

mobilized opposition against the Atomic Energy 

Commission decision to shutdown N Reactor. The 

Bonneville Power Administration, Supply System, Atomic 

Energy Commission, and the Federal Budget Office 

negotiated for 4 months, finally reaching an agreement in 

April 1971 that allowed N Reactor to remain in operation 

primarily to produce steam to turn the turbines for the 

Hanford Generating Plant. However, as a consequence of 

operations, N Reactor would also provide an additional 

service to the commercial reactor program. It would 

"pre-produce fuel-grade plutonium for the breeder reactor 

program" (Stapp and Marceau 1996, p. 24).

Figure 1.10. Hanford Site Around 1985 Showing As the names indicate' weapons-grade plutonium was

Additions Since the Cold War Era produced for weapon use, and fuel-grade plutonium was

used as fuel for nuclear power reactors. In contrast to 

weapons-grade plutonium in which the level of the isotope plutonium-240 is kept below 7.4 percent, fuel-grade 

plutonium carries a plutonium-240 content of 7.4 percent or more. The N Reactor produced 8.2 metric tons of fuelgrade plutonium (12 percent plutonium-240) between 1973 and 1982. Unfortunately, this fuel-grade plutonium "was 

(and continues to be) stored in the fuel basins at the 100-K Reactors and was never used by the breeder reactor program 

as initially intentioned" (Stapp and Marceau 1996, p. 24). Because N Reactor would not be producing weapons-grade 

plutonium and RUREX was not equipped at the tim e to process commercial fuel, the Atomic Energy Commission placed 

RUREX on standby in June 1972.

To support the buildup of nuclear weapons initiated by President Carter and actuated by President Reagan, operators at 

N Reactor began producing weapons-grade plutonium in 1982. W hile DOE made the decision in 1980, it took nearly 

2 years to upgrade the N Reactor before production could begin. "One fundamental problem was the distortion of the 

graphite stack, where built-in slip joints could not accommodate all of the local distortion, some block cleavage, and 

actual separation of blocks had occurred within the central core" (Gerber 1996, p. 2-10). Other issues involved system 

and facility maintenance on the aging structure as well as the implementation of new safety regulations issued by the 

U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Westinghouse produced weapons-grade plutonium in N Reactor until 1987 when 

a number of unrelated events led to its closure.

By the mid-1980s, the international peace movement and its demand for disarmament made major inroads even within 

the Soviet Union. With the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty nearly signed, and disagreements about strategic arms 

reduction narrowing, the need for additional plutonium had greatly diminished. O f more immediate concern was the

SaddSe M o untain N ational — f

Y fiU iliie Retuge rfi'..V

Wahluke WHdlire 

Recreation Area

Wjk > ^ :

lOO-K XL/

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1 .7 4
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

explosion and fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26,1986. It raised concerns about the safety of 

N Reactor because o f perceived design similarities. "After lengthy study of the plant's flaws and projected costs [for 

improvement], DOE decided in 1987 and [again in] 1988 not to restart it" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 302). DOE 

ordered the reactor defueled in 1989. It never operated again.

In 1983, following an 11 -year "temporary" shutdown, Westinghouse reactivated PUREX to process N Reactor weaponsgrade fuel. During the period from 1972-1983, Westinghouse initiated numerous design changes, including a major 

conversion project that resulted in the production of plutonium oxide (metal) rather than plutonium nitrate (liquid) as the 

process end state. This allowed final processing to begin immediately upon receipt of the uranium metal at the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant. Other changes addressed "environmental concerns that led to providing upgraded filtration 

systems, seismic safeguards, backup power sources and many other projects" (Gerber 1996, p. 4-15). Additionally, 

under the Fuels Segregation Program from 1983-1984, PUREX operators also "extracted approximately 425 kilograms of 

weapon-grade plutonium... [from] some of the fuel assemblies discharged during the N-Reactor fuel grade campaigns" 

(DOE 1996b, Section 9.1.1). DOE placed PUREX on standby status in October 1990 after having effectively ended 

operations in December 1988.

Westinghouse operated the Plutonium Reclamation Facility and the RMC Line within the Plutonium Finishing Plant on an 

as-needed basis to support PUREX during the final defense run. The Plutonium Reclamation Facility reopened between 

1984 and December 1987. The Plutonium Finishing Plant operated from 1985 to June 1989 (Gerber 1996, p. 5-5). 

Processed plutonium metal was stored within the Primary Plutonium Storage Facility (2736-Z Building). The design and 

configuration of the building's underground storage vaults, constructed between 1972 and 1973, remain classified.

To accept the high-level liquid wastes associated with chemical processing, various contractors built 28 new high-level 

liquid waste storage tanks between 1968 and 1986. Knowing that a number of the single-shell tanks had developed 

leaks, engineers developed a new design, the "tank-within-a-tank," referred to simply as a double-shell tank. Each tank 

had a capacity of 1 m illion gallons (Gerber et al. 1997, p. 5.83). It was also during this period that the Hanford Site 

contractors re-evaluated their waste management practices. Among the conclusions reached, they determined in 1970 

that solid waste should be labeled and segregated by type before burial, that waste materials should be tracked, and that 

new burial grounds should be constructed in the 200 Area to receive all future solid wastes. In addressing high-level 

liquid wastes, contractors added two new Evaporators in 1974 (242-S) and 1976 (242-A) to augment the waste 

minimization program

Tr a n s it io n To Cl e a n u p

Site Manager: Michael j. Lawrence (june 1984 to July 1990)

John D. Wagoner (July 1990)

Responsible Agency: U.S. Department of Energy

Site Contractor: Westinghouse Hanford Company

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the environmental movement grew beyond any expectations held at its birth in the 

1960s. "The nation's attitude toward energy in general changed, and its confidence in nuclear power in particular 

declined" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 275). Popular films such as The China Syndrome moved public opinion with its 

depiction of the "meltdown" of a reactor core. Public reaction to this fictionalized account appeared subdued by 

contrast when, just a few weeks after the movie's release, the nation witnessed the real thing in 1979 in Pennsylvania at 

Three M ile Island. The explosion, fire, and subsequent global release of radionuclides from the Chernobyl accident in 

1986 galvanized the anti-nuclear movement. "Around the state and around'the nation, the growing doubts about 

nuclear energy and nuclear wastes found political support, and thereby affected Hanford's future. These changes in 

attitude came at a time when Hanford was particularly vulnerable in government" having lost their powerful 

Congressional delegates through death or political defeat (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 298).

1 .7 5
O fAPiER 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

I Along with this lack of confidence in nuclear power,

| the public also began to change their attitude toward

I secrecy and security. W hile the need for secrecy and

| security arose from an external threat (the race with

| Germany to develop the atomic bomb and then the

| race with the Soviet Union to be the world power),

| the practices related to secrecy and security

r (classification of information, shredding of

i documents, surveillance of workers, etc.) also had the 

I effect of preventing American citizens from gaining

j access to information about potential environmental

| degradation and health risks emanating from the

> Hanford Site.

The concept of a nuclear park died with the Supply System bond default. Defense production ended with the closures of 

N Reactor, PUREX, and the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Hanford Site administrators, with DOE's encouragement and 

assistance, sought one more time to find a national mission to store and manage the nation's nuclear waste. They saw 

their opportunity in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Under this legislation, Congress would select an eastern and 

a western repository among ten candidate sites. DOE spent $300 m illion examining the basalt formations of the 

Hanford Site, focusing primarily on Gable Mountain. This attention to the Hanford Site came at the expense of most of 

the alternative sites because of DOE's "perception that Washingtonians - or at least the state's elected officials - were 

more receptive to the idea of a repository than the people of other states" (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 298).

However in 1987, DOE cancelled all activity on the Basalt Waste Isolation Project on the Hanford Site and turned to 

Yucca Mountain in Nevada, "...the existence of an immense amount of waste at Hanford, and the record of its 

management and mismanagement over the years, provoked increasing public criticism. The waste itself, in other words, 

became a national crisis, so that Hanford was cast in the public mind as a problem rather than a solution to a problem" 

(Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 274).

Cleaning up the Hanford Site became the mission. In May 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the Washington State Department of Ecology signed the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, better 

known as the Tri-Party Agreement, which committed DOE to cleaning up the Hanford Site within 30 years. The 

signatories divided the Hanford Site into 78 Operable Units, each containing a number of "past practice" waste sites, 

each of which was to be investigated and remediated separately under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) program or the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 

program.

With that, the Hanford Site's Manhattan Project and Cold War mission to produce weapons-grade plutonium finally 

ended. W ith each passing year, the once active industrial complex faded further into obscurity. Facilities for which there 

were no safety or security concerns, or those that were not needed to house personnel or materials for cleanup, or those 

w ith no future use were demolished or simply left unattended while they deteriorated. The 100 Area facilities were 

particularly hard-hit.

Beginning in 1972, Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) concentrated on the clean structures (those not 

contaminated with radioactivity) within the reactor complexes, such as those for water treatment. Demolitions increased 

or waned over the years, consistent with funding allocated to the task. During the late 1980s, D&D activity reached a 

peak as workers took down the majority of buildings within the reactor complexes, in many cases leaving little more than 

the reactor itself. As demolition and cleanup moved to the forefront, the history associated with a specific building 

became less important than the history of the wastes it produced. Given the health risk associated w ith much of that 

waste, it is critical that DOE understand where and how waste was generated and how to effect remediation.

1 .7 6

‘ Ih v iiro d u t tiim o l inn.h-.ii ium /hui- had tu n to n lin u o io lv ,

h vd n n n t': tln rim ’ W orld ll.ii II w ith flu- -1.ulu(t o f Ihv fir*t

i vat lo t to p io d u i r plu to n iu m lo t Ihv lo ft—i\r v 1 \lanha1tan

F io jc i /. liu t y o u im : to n tv m *. about ifv1\ arid

v in n o n n w n l.il pro b le m - h.id ta u -v tl \ariou-* o l llw

» l i on i o n ifilv \ lo iw d iu l dow n in tlw WHO*.

Iln">c dw tdnw n-t. .if lii* t v \p v t Iv d to In- tvm i>otar\. hvtanitfw rm an vnt w hvn llw sm /vf ( nion d i-*,o lw d in 1*0 ) 1. llw

in n h a i arm*, ta t v o r tlw ( o ld lia r la m v to a h a lt toi Ihv

lir*,l lim v *im f tlw in w n tin n o i ih v aU nnii /jimm/i. *'. POT.
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

On the other hand, under the Historic Preservation Program, it is also important that DOE shed light on the history of the 

facilities themselves, long-hidden behind national security and fences. At first glance, little distinguishes the mundane 

buildings distributed across the Hanford Site. Outwardly, they appear to comprise just another large industrial complex 

composed of production and support facilities. It is only after one looks behind the structural facades that their 

importance emerges.

The world-changing events associated with these buildings have local, state, national, and international significance that 

cannot be dismissed or denied. The Hanford Site mission both shaped and was shaped by world events in the last half of 

the 20th century. The buildings and structures remaining on the Hanford Site are the cumulative legacy and physical 

manifestation of that mission. This book introduces the reader to the science, technology, craftsmanship, and politics 

that infuse these facilities w ith meaning. The reader is encouraged to explore the events, processes, accomplishments, 

and failures that embody the story of the facilities and their role at the Hanford Site.

Ar e a s Fo r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

The theme that the Hanford Site was an experiment runs throughout the Manhattan Project and the Cold War Era. 

Creating plutonium was a new science. Producing plutonium on an industrial scale was a major challenge.. The time 

pressures of war and need for secrecy added to the uncertainties that accompanied each decision. Yet critical decisions 

had to be made within very short time frames despite the uncertainties. Because this book is a history of facilities and 

not intended to be the definitive history of producing plutonium at the Hanford Site, numerous facets of this theme of the 

Hanford Site as an experiment could not be explored. Hopefully future researchers w ill use this book as a springboard 

for their own studies to investigate such topics as the following:

• How was the geological history of the Hanford area affected by the load it had to bear when the Hanford Site 

was built?

• The yearly budgets for the Hanford Site have never been released to the public. When they are, future 

researchers would be able to evaluate the effect of the budgets over the years on the operations at the 

Hanford Site.

• How did the different corporate cultures of the various contractors, Du Pont and General Electric in particular, 

affect operations at the Hanford Site?

• Because the production of plutonium on an industrial scale was new and on a wartime schedule, workers had to 

be extraordinarily creative in making processes with which no one had experience work. A study of their 

creativity and the results would contribute greatly to understanding how the Hanford Site was able to produce 

plutonium against numerous odds.

• Developing an electronic, annotated bibliography of all references pertaining to the Hanford Site would facilitate 

future researchers' ability to find the particular information they seek.

1.77
Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Ov e r v i e w o f t h e Ma n a g e r s a n d Co n t r a c t o r s

a t t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

Date Contractor Responsibility

Site Manager: CoLFranklin T Matthias, 1 '943-1945 ^- l_LCot ^ J . Clarke, 1945-1*947^^ ° " ° °

Site Name: Hanford Engineer Works

1943-1946 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company Prime Contractor responsible for

all activities

ijjResptmsihle Xgem ): \ mi 11 ■ ■. Commission nHHHHHHHHHI

Site Manager: Carlton Shugg, 1947-1948 - Fred C. Schlemmer, 1948-1950 - David F. 

1965 - Donald G. Williams, 1965-1971 - Thomas A. Nemzek, 1971 -1973 - Alex G. 

Site Name: Hanford Works

1947-1974 General Electric Company

Giffels & Vallet, Inc.

Charles T. Main 

J. A. Jones

Vitro Engineering, Co.

Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc.

Isochem

Atlantic Richfield Hanford

ITT Federal Support Services, Inc.

U.S. Testing Company

Battelle. Memorial Institute 

Westinghouse Hanford Company 

Hanford Environmental Health Foundation

Shaw, 1950-1954 James E. Travis, 1955- 

Fremling, 1973 -1984

Prime Contractor responsible for 

all activities except as indicated 

Engineering 

Engineering 

Construction Work 

Architect-Engineer Services 

Reactor Operations 

Chemical Processing Operations 

Prime Contractor responsible for 

all activities except as indicated 

Support Services 

Bioassays, film badges, 

environmental samples 

National Laboratory 

Fast Flux Test Facility 

Health Services

Responsible Agency: Energy Research and Developmoni Administration 

Site Manager: Alex G. Fremling 1973-1984 

Site Name: Hanford Reservation

1975-1977 (see contractor list above)

Responsible Xgentv: ' ^ I > -p r : ■ ■ . ii : ■ r«

Site Manager: Michael j. Lawrence, 1984-1990, John D. Wagoner, 1990 

Site Name: Hanford Site

1977-1990 Rockwell Hanford Operations

Westinghouse Hanford Company

ICF Kaiser Hanford Company

Hanford Environmental Health Foundation

Battelle Memorial Institute

Prime Contractor responsible for 

all activities except as indicated above 

Prime Contractor responsible for 

all activities except as indicated below 

Architecture and Engineering 

Health Services 

National Laboratory

1 .7 8
Ch a p t e r 2

Pl u t o n iu m

P r o d u

Fa c il it ie s
Co n t e n t s

Section 1: Construction H isto ry .................................................2-1.1

Section 2: Fuel M anufacturing.................................................. 2-2.1

Section 3: Reactor O perations.................................................. 2-3.1

Section 4: Chemical Separations............................................... 2-4.1

Section 5: Plutonium Finishing.................................................. 2-5.1

Section 6: Waste M anagem ent.................................................. 2-6.1

Section 7: Research and Developm ent.....................................2-7.1

Section 8: Site S e cu rity ................................................................2-8.1

Section 9: M ilitary O perations...................................................2-9.1

Section 10: W orker Health and Safety.....................................2-10.1

Section 11: Transportation, Communication,

Site S upport...............................................................2-11.1

Section 12: History o f Workers at the Hanford Site 2-12.1

Photo: B Reactor under Construction, Decem ber 9, 1943

(Neg. P520; Box D 28790)
Se c t io n

Co n

His t o r y

D.W. H a rv e y

P a c i f i c N o r t h w e s t N a t i o n a l L a b o r a t o r y
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s tr u c t io n His t o r y

Sec tio n 1 - Co n str u c tio n His to r y

From the outset, numerous factors influenced the physical characteristics of the Hanford Site's facilities, but functional 

considerations were the primary determinants of the design features and layout. Once built to meet a specific function, 

industrial and laboratory facilities at the Hanford Site were subjected to numerous internal and external construction 

modifications to accommodate technological advances, changing mission and scientific objectives, and expansion of 

plutonium production as well as non-defense facilities. These changes had a significant effect on the layout of the site 

and influenced the selection of construction styles, building materials, and industrial architectural designs.

The initial layout and construction also reflected the federal government's desire for cost-effective, wartime mobilization. 

As with other W orld War II military installations, speed of design and construction was of the utmost necessity.

Stabilizing construction design was difficult because no previous experience or precedent was available from which to 

draw upon. Because of the wartime emergency situation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers only permitted slight design 

variations were permitted at the Hanford Site.

Before designing and constructing facilities, however, the Corps had the responsibility to select where the Hanford Site 

should be built. In late 1942 when the Corps contracted with E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company for the 

construction and management of the world's first plutonium production facility, they originally considered locating the 

site at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee. The Oak Ridge Reservation, however, did not meet the federal 

government's siting criteria. The reservation did not have sufficient land for six reactors to be separated from each other 

by at least 1 mile and three chemical separations plants to be separated from each other and from the reactors by at least 

4 miles. Also, an isolated area was not to be artificially created by the evacuation of large numbers of people from the 

selected site, which would have occurred if the Oak Ridge Reservation had been chosen. Most importantly, the Corps 

and Du Pont were concerned that premature criticality of plutonium would cause an explosion, devastating the 

Oak Ridge Reservation and sending a lethal contamination cloud over nearby Knoxville and strategic war industries in 

the Tennessee Valley Authority region (Groves 1983).

Wartime economic considerations also influenced siting criteria. Arable land was not to be taken. Local supplies of 

gravel for the vast amount of concrete required and regional suppliers of coal and oil were preferred to reduce 

transportation costs and conserve precious wartime fuel. Because of the wartime scarcity of metal, the site was to be 

close to the power source so it would not be necessary to build long transmission lines (USAGE 1947, Vol. 3).

Wartime urgencies necessitated the construction o f a plutonium production facility in a short time span.

"...in order to keep to the tight schedule mandated by the U.S. Arm y for the Manhattan Project's effort to build

an atomic bomb. The project required an immense amount o f expertise, labor, and building materials, at a time 

when each o f these commodities was in short supply. It demanded tremendous secrecy, despite its immense

size, and it entailed the construction o f a

permanent set o f facilities, including a whole

new town, even though it was not clear that

these facilities would be needed after the war."

- Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 1

The need for the Manhattan Project to proceed 

with haste despite the reliance on untested 

technologies was expressed years later by 

Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves, commander 

of the Manhattan Project, when he wrote "Nothing 

like this had ever been attempted before, but..w e 

could not afford to wait...."- (Groves 1983, p. 72).

Co n ti nts ||

Site Design and Layout.............................................2-1.3

Building Periods... ...................................... 2-1.8

Industrial Vernacular Architecture..........................2-1.14

Landscape Modifications ..................................*

Primary Contractors/Subcontractors.......................2-1.23

Areas for Further Research ...................................... 2-1.25

Divider Page Photo: Construction Camp, June 22, 7 944

i-Meg. P3437, Box 028791)

2 -1 .1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iu t ie s

Because of the hazards inherent in the production and separation of plutonium and the handling and disposal of large 

quantities of radioactive materials and waste, the design and layout of the world's first plutonium production facility had 

to satisfy the Corps's safety, location, and natural resource requirements. The site had to have (USAGE 1947, Vol. 3):

• Area of at least 12 miles by 16 miles

• Remote setting w ith no population greater than 1,000 w ithin 20 miles

• Abundant water supply of at least 25,000 gallons per minute to cool the reactors

• Dependable hydroelectric power source to supply at least 100,000 kilowatts of electricity

• Convenient access to railroad and highway facilities

• Relatively flat landscape

• Available fuel and concrete aggregate

The siting criteria narrowed the choice of a location to a few isolated places in the far West. From the beginning, the 

Pacific Northwest was at the top of the list. The Bonneville Power Administration's excess quantities of electrical power 

were available year-round without the need to install additional generating equipment. The discovery that a high-voltage 

power line from Grand Coulee Dam (1941) to the Bonneville Dam (1937) ran through the future Hanford Site made the 

area even more attractive (HAI 1987).

After a tour o f the mid-Columbia region, the Corps concluded that the Hanford area met all siting conditions better than 

the other West Coast areas being considered. The site had the quantity of land required, was remote from major 

populated areas, had enough clean water from the nearby Columbia River, ample electrical power from Grand Coulee 

Dam and associated transmission facilities, a functional railroad, a flat landscape, and coarse glacial-fluvial sediment that 

provided sand and gravel aggregate for constructing large concrete structures. Additionally, the site was far enough 

inland from the coast to satisfy War Department officials (Groves 1983). Finally, soil investigations indicated that the 

land surface was capable of sustaining the considerable stress from the construction of processing buildings. "Although 

not an original siting requirement, Hanford's arid environment and soil features allowed large amounts of liquid waste to 

be released to the ground without immediately descending to groundwater" (Gray and Becker 1993, p. 462).

The planners siting the Manhattan Project decided early on to 

locate production facilities in remote areas, partly for secrecy and 

military security and partly out of concern for public safety in the 

event of a catastrophic reactor accident. In choosing isolated 

areas like Hanford, the Manhattan Project officers dispensed with 

the usual practice of locating a large industrial facility near 

adequate housing, services, construction labor, and a skilled work 

force. Instead, the Manhattan Project had to build and administer 

whole new communities and draw masses of people from other 

places to work at the sites (HAI 1987).

Hanford was one of the largest procurements of land handled 

during the war with a total of 428,850 acres. W ithin a year after 

the federal government acquired it, they transformed the site from ^ '•

a sparsely populated, arid shrub-steppe landscape into a major

military and manufacturing complex that included the Figure 2 - 7 . 7 . Hanford Site Construction Camp

establishment o f a construction camp at the former Hanford Located at the Former Hanford Townsite Around

townsite (see Figure 2-1.1) and a new community in Richland, 1944

which consisted of over 4300 new residential units to house some 

6000 operations workers and 11,000 fam ily members (USAGE 1947, Vol. 3).

2- 1.2
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

Sit e De s ig n a n d La y o u t

For safety and security reasons, the planners of the Hanford Site separated the production areas by relatively large 

distances. Due to the nature of the production processes, they designed the site areas as independent units constructed 

in widely separated districts because "the possibility of explosions of catastrophic proportions and the possibility of 

releasing to the atmosphere of intensely radioactive gases would dictate the selection of a site of sufficient area to permit 

the several manufacturing areas to be separated by distances of several miles...that included six primary manufacturing 

areas separated by distances of not less than one mile, and four secondary manufacturing areas separated from each 

other by not less than four miles...." (USAGE 1947, Vol. 3, p. 2.1). This decision was made so an accident in any one 

area would not affect the operation of the remaining units.

Early considerations in the design of the Hanford Site took into account the supplying of adequate electrical power, 

communication, rail, and highway facilities to all construction, operating, and housing areas. Because of the magnitude 

of the project and the demand on these facilities, the Corps found it necessary not only to expand the existing facilities 

but to design additional and reliable power and communication lines, roadways, and railroads (USAGE 1947, Vol. 3). 

Totals included "158 miles of railway, 386 miles of new highway, 52 miles of 230 Kv transmission lines, a water 

distribution system ranking in magnitude w ith the large metropolitan areas...." (Matthias n.d., p. 3).

For security, safety, and functional reasons, the Corps designed and constructed all the process areas as semi-autonomous 

units. Each area contained support buildings and structures that provided administrative, security, health and safety, 

communications, utility and maintenance, waste treatment and environmental monitoring services.

3 0 0 Ar e a

The 300 Area was where the uranium fuel was manufactured before it was sent for irradiation in the reactors in the 

100 Areas. As such, the 300 Area housed the first step in the plutonium production process. The Hanford Site fabricated 

nuclear fuel in the form of pipe-like cylinders (referred to as "fuel elements" or "slugs") from metallic uranium from 

offsite production facilities. Metallic uranium was extruded into the proper shape and encapsulated in aluminum or 

zirconium cladding. Railroad cars then transported the fuel cylinders to the reactors in the 100 Areas for irradiation. For 

more information on the fuel cladding and canning processes, see Section 2, Fuel Manufacturing.

Because the 300 Area's fuel fabrication activities were the least likely of the production processes to experience a serious 

accident, the Corps and Du Pont considered it safe enough to 

locate them near a populated area. The 300 Area is approximately 

7.5 miles north of the center of Richland and occupies 

approximately 1.5 square miles in the southeastern portion o f the 

Hanford Site along the west bank of the Columbia River.

The layout of the 300 Area was a grid pattern (see Figure 2-1.2).

Originally the facilities were concentrated in the central zone and 

northwest corner of the 300 Area. Besides the uranium fuel 

fabrication facilities, the 300 Area was the location of most of the 

Hanford Site's research and development activities, chemical 

process laboratories, and test reactors. Over 30 buildings and 

structures were constructed there during the wartime period.

The 300 Area was also the location of several test reactors during 

the Manhattan Project and Cold War periods. In the 305 Building, 

a small reactor tested samples of the graphite, uranium, and other

materials used in essential Hanford Site operations. The Physical Figiire 2-1.2. Grid Pattern o f 300 Area Looking

Constants Test Reactor and Thermal Test Reactor were located in West, 1979

2 - 1 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

the 305-B Building and used for lattice configuration experiments. Other 300 Area test reactors included the Plutonium 

Recycle Test Reactor in the Plutonium Fuels Utilization Program in the 309 Building and the High Temperature Lattice 

Test Reactor in the 318 Building.

Most of the early buildings and structures were situated in the 300 Area by function and proximity to fuel fabrication/ 

uranium production and laboratory facilities. Buildings such as the 313 Fuel Manufacturing Support Facility, 314 Press 

Building, 305 Test Pile, 305 B Engineering Development Lab Annex, and 3706 Radiochemistry Lab were sited in 

proximity to one another. The 303 Fresh Metal Storage buildings (303-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, j, K) were situated in a 

relatively east-west linear line perpendicular to the 313 Building due to their functional association with the missions of 

the facility. But as the size of the 300 Area expanded and its mission diversified, research, laboratory and fuel fabrication 

facilities were mixed among storage buildings, shops, administrative buildings, health, security and safety facilities, and 

environmental monitoring structures.

The current layout of the 300 Area consists o f three distinct sections. The northern section has experienced minimal 

building development, consisting mainly of waste sites such as trenches, ponds, and burial grounds. The central section 

has a congested network of infrastructure systems, Manhattan Project and early/middle Cold War era facilities. The 

southern section has had minimal infrastructure and building/structural development. The southern section, lacking a 

grid design, is a sprawling landscape of parking lots, mobile offices/trailers and several buildings/structures that date from 

the late Cold War era to the post-1990 period.

1 0 0 Ar e a s

Fabricated fuel cylinders were shipped by rail from the 300 Area to the reactors in the 100 Areas for irradiation, the 

second step in the plutonium production process. The nine plutonium production reactors (typically referred to as piles) 

and their ancillary/support facilities were designed and constructed along the south shore of the Columbia River. The 

reactor areas had to be situated close to the river because large quantities of water were required to dissipate the heat 

generated during reactor operations. For specific information on the design and construction of Hanford Site reactors, 

see Section 3, Reactor Operations..

Because of the dangers inherent in the irradiation o f uranium fuel elements, the planners situated the reactors as far.as 

possible from Richland. The 100 Areas are approximately 30 miles from Richland in the northern portion of the Hanford 

Site along the south bank of the Columbia River.

W ithin the 100 Areas, each of the reactors (B, C, D, DR, F, H, KE, KW, and N) was located in an area 1 square mile in 

size and separated 1 -3 miles from one another, a distance assumed adequate enough to prevent operational difficulties in 

one area from affecting another. The Hanford Site planners thought that this siting requirement would minimize the 

effects of an explosion or act of sabotage at one reactor from adversely affecting other 100 Areas facilities.

W hile each of the production facilities in the 100 Areas was designed as a self-contained, functional unit, completely 

independent of the others, each production reactor was functionally dependent on the two other major processing areas, 

the 200 and 300 areas.

Each 100 Area was designed to be virtually identical except fo ri 00N (see Area Expansions sub-section). In addition to 

the reactor buildings, each 100 Area had in common a retention basin, pump houses, chemical and gas storage facilities, 

water purification facilities, reservoirs, filter plants, power houses, water treatment plants, water tanks, electrical 

substations, waste processing facilities, change houses, warehouses, maintenance shops, oil and gas storage facilities, 

patrol headquarters and badge houses, first aid stations, fire stations, and water chemistry laboratories.

During the Manhattan Project era, Du Pont and the Corps used temporary construction structures in the 100-B, D, and 

F areas. Temporary construction facilities included construction offices and shops, storage buildings and yards, electric 

power distribution facilities, water pumping and transmission facilities, and ground transportation facilities.

2 - 1 .4

1
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

Because there had been no experience in the construction and operation of a facility similar to the Hanford Site, it was 

only natural that the initial design would change. The need for some of the changes was not apparent until the startup of 

B Reactor. Many of the design changes in the 100 Areas were made as construction expedients rather than because of 

changes in the process. The greater portion of these changes, mainly piping revisions, occurred in the 100-B Area since 

it was the first of the three 100 Areas completed (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3).

2 0 0 Ar e a s

The 200 Areas with its chemical separations (processing) plants functioned as the third step in the nuclear process at the , 

Hanford Site. The 200 Areas contained all the facilities used to separate, isolate, store, and ship the plutonium. To 

separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission by-products formed in the irradiation process, the chemical 

separations plants dissolved irradiated fuel cylinders and then chemically manipulated the resulting plutonium-bearing 

solution. In addition to the chemical separations facilities in the 200 Areas, tanks were constructed to store the resulting 

high level radioactive waste. For a description of these tanks, see the Facilities Descriptions sub-section in Section 6, 

Waste Management.

Because separating out plutonium was the most hazardous of the plutonium production processes, the 200 Areas were 

situated 20 miles from Richland. The 200 Areas are located on a plateau in the center of the Hanford Site, roughly 

5 miles south of the Columbia River. The planners selected the sites because they "lay in the intervening valley between 

the Rattlesnake Hills, Gable Mountain, and Gable Butte with the latter two providing a natural barricade between the 

100 and 200 Process Areas" (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3, p. 812).

Another determinant that influenced the siting of the 200 Areas in the central plateau area had to do with its distance 

above the water table. The water table is approximately 240 feet below the surface of the central plateau, whereas the 

water table is 50-75 feet below the 100 Areas. W hile the Corps built the processing facilities in the 200 Areas atop the 

same permeable gravel as the production reactors, the sediment underlying the 200 Areas was finer, less permeable to 

liquids, and with less chance of contamination of the groundwater (conversation with R.W. Carpenter, Waste Site Facility 

researcher, CH2M HILL Hanford, Inc., November 1996).

W ithin the 200 Areas, the hazardous nature of the separations activities made it undesirable to concentrate the process 

buildings together so the Corps designated 200 East, West, and North areas. "Certain storage buildings were segregated 

(in 200 N) and the productive capacity divided (between 200 East and West). The distances required between areas 

made a large tract necessary" (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3, p. 812).

The 200 East and 200 West areas were very similar. The most significant buildings were the separations plants, T Plant 

and B Plant The 200 West Area operated initially when T Plant (221 -T) dissolved the first irradiated fuel rods received 

from B Reactor In 1944. In the 200 East Area, B Plant (221 -B) began processing irradiated fuel in April 1945 

(Gerber 1993c). The planners placed these separations plants approximately 2 miles apart

Each of the 200 East and West areas contained temporary structures needed for construction such as administrative 

facilities, warehouses, craft and maintenance shops. Other temporary construction buildings included change houses, 

warming sheds, privies, and guard houses. In some cases, temporary construction structures were converted to 

permanent buildings near the end of the wartime period (Gerber 1993c).

The 200 North Area was completely different in design and function from 200 East and 200 West because it was a 

storage area for the irradiated fuel rods after their removal from the reactors while awaiting chemical dissolution, for the 

finished product before it was shipped to Los Alamos, and for the empty product storage cans that were returned from 

Los Alamos awaiting refill. The 200 North Area was the first of the 200 Areas to operate when it began storing irradiated 

fuel rods from the B Reactor in November 1944 (Gerber 1993c).

2 - 1 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The 200 Areas were relatively self-sufficient during the Manhattan Project period. Each area contained a coal-fired 

central power station to provide steam for heating and for the process equipment. They also had their own water supply, 

sanitary system, railroads, and administrative and utility buildings.

4 0 0 Ar e a

The 400 Area came into existence when Westinghouse Hanford Company built the Fast Flux Test Facility complex in the 

1970s for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The Fast Flux Test Facility complex contains the largest test reactor on 

the Hanford Site. Westinghouse designed this special nuclear reactor to test fuels and materials for advanced nuclear 

power plants as well as for the irradiation testing of fuels, core components, and target assemblies for liquid metal fast 

breeder reactors.

The Fast Flux Test Facility complex includes the reactor, containment structure, and various utilities and ancillary 

facilities. The complex array of buildings, equipment, and roads are arranged in a grid around the Reactor Containment 

(405 Building). Being sodium-cooled, the reactor did not need to be located near the river for coolant purposes as did 

the production reactors. Similar to the 100, 200 and 300 areas, the 400 Area contains support facilities that provided 

administrative, security, health and safety, utility and maintenance, communications, waste treatment and environmental 

monitoring services.

5 0 0 , 8 0 0 , and 9 0 0 A reas

These three areas are not geographical areas but consist of electrical, pipeline, power and sewage outlets and facilities, 

and fences and fire lines found throughout the site.

6 0 0 Ar e a

The 600 Area comprised facilities that served more than one specific area. "Included in the construction of the HEW 

[Hanford Engineer Works now Hanford Site] are a number of facilities which serve more than one specific area and in 

cases, such as roads and railroads, serve the entire Project. For this reason they have been designated as 600 Area 

buildings and facilities, and are not confined to a single location..." (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 4, p. 1085). The 600 Area 

designation soon came to refer to all areas of the Hanford Site that were excluded specifically from some other area. 

Facilities included health, safety, and environmental monjtoring properties such as radar and utility/communication 

towers and structures, site security, m ilitary defense, and fire suppression facilities.

The initial step in organizing the 600 Area for construction activities began in 1943. The planners selected the former . 

Hanford townsite as the location for the project construction camp because of its proximity to the 100 and 200 areas, 

existing infrastructure (for example, roads, buildings, wells, electrical utilities), and the terminus of the Priest Rapids 

Railway, a branch line of the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad. Practically overnight the camp turned into a 

city, reaching a population of about 45,000 during its peak occupancy in mid-1944, complete with barracks, trailer lots, 

mess halls, recreation, administrative, and other service facilities.

Du Font's W ilmington Design Division prepared the layout for the site's intra-area roads and railroads (Du Pont 1945a, 

Vol. 4). Because of the widespread location of construction areas and the volume and types of materials involved, 

railroads were an important method of transportation. Existing tracks were upgraded to accommodate the anticipated 

heavy use during the Manhattan Project.

"The isolation o f the HEW site [present Hanford Site] and the distances separating the various manufacturing

areas made the establishment o f a complete transportation network a necessity. An extensive system o f roads

and railroads was designed and constructed to expedite transfer o f the enormous quantities of construction

equipment and materials to the various areas as w ell as to provide adequate transportation facilities in case o f an

emergency in one or more o f the areas during plant operations.... Design o f the plant road system was based

upon the great peak construction requirements and upon traffic needs during the operating period in the event

that mass evacuation o f the operating personnel might be necessary." - USAGE 1947, Vol. 3, p. 7.4

2 - 1 .6
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

Kitchen

Room

Garbage P it/ ' 

{Glass & Batteries) (

o

Barracks I

J U L L

Radar Pad

□

 Concrete Pad 

August 1954

'.Oil Can 

J Waste

Artillery

Placements

""Fuse Storage

□

 Concrete Pad 

August 1954

< P -

NOT TO SCALE

Other major 600 Area facilities included the Army's Camp Hanford anti-aircraft artillery sites. Sixteen of them were built 

in the early 1950s. The most intact anti-aircraft artillery sites are situated along Army Loop Road (see Figure 2-1.3) 

and on 200 East H ill. Extant resources include the remains 

of doughnut-shaped artillery placements (defense walls) 

and other sandbagged/cobblestone structures.

The internal layout of the anti-aircraft artillery sites reflected 

a standard military arrangement of facilities separated by 

function. Four semi-circular artillery revetments were 

arranged in a square separate from the rest of the 

installation. The more permanent, concrete structures 

were situatedin a rectangular grid that included barracks, 

latrines, mess halls, recreation halls, motor pools, 

administrative, and radar facilities. Each anti-aircraft 

artillery site typically had a small arms range, a water storage 

cistern, and sanitary/sewage waste facilities. The site facilities 

were connected by roadways, sidewalks, and parking lots.

7 0 0 Ar e a

The 700 Area was the original location of the central 

administrative functions for the Hanford Site. The 

700 Administration Area was contained within the 

commercial district of downtown Richland. Besides the 

administrative center of the site, the 700 Area was also

comprised of repair and maintenance shops, central supply houses, plant laundries, central supply houses, and central 

heating plant. Planners placed the administration and shopping district near the center of town so the surrounding lands 

could be developed exclusively for residential purposes. The 700 Area was bounded by Swift Boulevard on the north, 

Knight Street on the south, jadwin Avenue on the east, and Stevens Drive on the west. The area was roughly rectangular 

in shape with the long portion running east-west.

Although situated within the center of Richland and not containing any buildings of a strictly classified nature, the entire 

700 Area was fenced off from the surrounding land, and, within the area, the Administration Building, the Permanent 

Record Storage facilities and the Employment Building were separated by a fence from the other sections. The 700 Area 

ceased to be a separate fenced entity after the sale of the property in 1957-1958 to private owners. During that time, the 

area was incorporated as the City of Richland. Today, only four DOE buildings are extant, all constructed during the 

Cold War period.

1 1 0 0 Ar e a

The 1100 Area is located in North Richland west of Stevens Drive, north of Snyder Avenue, east of the DOE railroad 

tracks. The 1100 Area had the site support services, such as general stores, shipping, receiving, transportation, 

maintenance, and general warehouse facilities. The area expanded considerably during the early 1950s in response to 

the need for a central shipping, receiving, and transportation center due to the accelerated Cold War era growth of the 

Hanford Site. The industrial and warehouse facilities were strategically situated adjacent to the Hanford Site's main 

north-south highway and the site railroad.

TYPICAL ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY BATTERY SITE 

US Army Corps of engineers 

December 1994 Oronance & explosive Waste Records Search 

7813«02t«4)05 Hantord. Washington

Figure 2-1.3. Typical Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery Site

2 - 1 . 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

B u il d in g P e r io d s

Ma n h a tt a n Project

Du Pont under the direction of the Corps began construction at the Hanford Site in March 1943 and essentially 

completed it by April 1945. Design and construction of the site included seven process areas (100-B, 100-D, 100-F, 

200 East, 200 West, 200 North, and 300), five service areas (500—outside electrical facilities such as substations and 

transmission lines, 600— general facilities and services, 700— administration, 800— overhead pipe lines, and 900— 

underground pipe lines), and the 1100 residential and commercial area (Du Pont 1945f).

"//>«* isol.dion o l Ih r '-iiv from ,im r \i- tin a t enters o fp o p u l.ilio n

prosi'nted s c rim /- p io h lrin -. m ith iv a p rt I to m .im ph.tse> o f

( fi/is f/i/c lion, //it's i* problem * wore r r l.ilr d p iim .u ih lo the

p ro t urenw nt. Ir.m *p tirt,itiu n . /lo u -m y . fc rd in 'i. h r.ilth m orale, .1 nd

reten tion o f* i m .ixin nin i fn /.i/ 1 iin n Io n v o fa h o n l

4 ~ ,0 il(l per+on* mh u h num ber i» j« r c .it/iu i/ in futw . I “ 44... I h r indent

nvtvl for ih r p i,m l in o p ri.itio n .tl I h r e.uliest po**ihh- (Lite

p rv tlu d e d the p ii* * ih iliti o f i/c /.n m u the st,n1 n l < m isfru t lio n w ork. In

nuitn in ‘ l.m t f-s. iiM s fr m tom u o ik u .i- in p n m r«■— during p u in k /s when

hjsU lose,it ( h lu n i n o l he rn tu ll\ d r\e lo p e d . ( nnseqtionllv, Ih r harden

o f t m i- f n ii lio n pl.m nim :. ■'ihcdnlinii ,m d p ro ttite m e n l » ./- r\lre m o h

' - IX>V\ n./l,, pp. 4-1

The construction of the Hanford Site 

presented a number of unprecedented 

problems that stemmed both from the 

project's wartime emergency mission and its 

immense magnitude. For example, 

distances were considerable between 

several of the process plants to be 

constructed. Wartime scheduling needs 

allowed no time to test the designs. The 

secret nature of the project caused 

coordination difficulties and inflexible 

military security requirements. The most 

difficult element, however, was the isolated 

location of the site.

Cold Wa r Er a Ex p a n s io n

Hanford Site's Cold War Mission

International events associated w ith the intensification of the Cold War during the late 1940s to early 1950s increased 

allocations to national defense and expansion of America's nuclear weapons program. This translated into a dramatic 

expansion of facilities at all Atomic Energy Commission sites, including a substantial increase in plutonium production 

and construction/modification of plutonium production structures at the Hanford Site. Such expansion at the Hanford 

Site required an enormous amount of resources, resulting in the largest federal peacetime construction project to that 

date.

In the immediate postwar period, the effort to expand the Hanford Site's production capabilities looked and felt 

somewhat like the wartime years. Congress decided to expand the nation's plutonium stockpile in response to Soviet 

actions in eastern Europe. That placed much of the burden of production directly upon the Hanford Site, which was the 

sole supplier of fissionable plutonium for atomic bombs until the completion of the first reactors at the Savannah River 

Site in 1953 (Findlay and Hevly 1995).

The Hanford Site's postwar mission underwent two major periods of expansion: first w ith America's commitment to 

nuclear weapons as a central part of its postwar defense doctrine and then with the intensification of the Cold War 

between 1949-1953, especially with the outbreak of the Korean War. Between 1947 and 1955, the Atomic Energy 

Commission added five new reactors at the Hanford Site while concurrently boosting the output of the three Manhattan 

Project reactors. Incremental improvements in the basic components of the World War II reactors and a construction 

program to build reactors that incorporated these changes accounted for the doubling in plutonium output in 1952-1953. 

New plutonium extraction centers were built to process this output.

2 - 1 .8

j
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s tr u c t io n His t o r y

Building Expansion at the Hanford Site

Gerber (1992b) characterized the major postwar expansion of the Hanford Site's production facilities between 1947- 

1963 as follows:

First Postwar Expansion (1947-1949) resulted in major expansion of the Hanford Site facilities. Two new 

reactors, DR and H, and ancillary buildings were constructed.

Korean War Expansion (1950-1952) was the aftermath of the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic bomb 

and a major Communist thrust into South Korea. C Reactor and support facilities were built.

Eisenhower Expansion (1953-1955) was the result of President Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy and the 

first Soviet hydrogen bomb detonated in 1953. Two jumbo reactors, KE and KW, were built. The ballistic missile 

development program was initiated.

Major Defense Production (1956-1964) was the period of the most intense defense production period at the 

Hanford Site. N Reactor and other major facilities were constructed.

Early postwar expansion at the Hanford Site saw the construction of numerous buildings and structures that included the 

Reduction-Oxidation Chemical Processing (REDOX) Plant, the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant, the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant), "the C Plant (a radiochemical pilot plant), seven complex laboratories in the 

300 Area, and 81 additional underground, high-level waste storage tanks" (Gerber 1993d, p. 7). The chronic shortage of 

tank space led to the decision to build two evaporators, 242-B and 242-T, to concentrate and reduce the volume of high 

level wastes. Z Plant made possible the conversion o f plutonium-nitrate paste to plutonium metal known as buttons. 

"Work also went forward on the development of the REDOX process, the only continuous solvent extraction plant in the

world to save scarce uranium that was wasted in the first precipitation cycle of the old bismuth-phosphate processing. In

1949, Hanford Works [now the Hanford Site] 

initiated completion of C Plant in the 200 East 

Area as a pilot plant for the REDOX process" I

(Gerber 1991, p. 5).

The mid-1950s through 1963 when N Reactor 

was completed marked the most intense defense I

production period at the Hanford Site.

Additionally, major new capabilities were added 

a tZ Plant that centered on the reclaiming of 

plutonium from process scraps.

Non-Defense Programs and Mission *

Change

Expansion of the Hanford Site facilities during the 1950s also included programs dedicated to the peaceful uses of the 

atom. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program and the "passage of the new Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

designed to allow for more private, commercial atomic applications, brought innovative, non-defense programs to the 

Hanford Atomic Products Operation (HAPO).-.HAPO built the 308 Plutonium Fuels Pilot Plant and the 309 Plutonium 

Recycle Test Reactor" (Gerber 1992b, p. 40) to test developmental fuels for use in commercial reactors.

By the mid-1960s, decreased national demand for special nuclear materials precipitated a down-sizing of the Hanford 

Site's plutonium production mission. By 1971, all but one reactor were shut down. Plutonium production for national 

defense use came to a halt between 1972 and 1983 when the site's only fuel processing facility was shut down. Fuel 

production at the Hanford Site stopped when the N Reactor shut down in 1987 while numerous improvements were 

made. By 1988, improved relations w ith the Soviet Union, symbolized by Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks, 

seemingly reduced the need for special nuclear materials, and N Reactor was put in standby mode, never to operate 

again. The closure of N Reactor brought to an end nearly 45 years of plutonium production at the Hanford Site.

"7/fc most o uidM uhnu « rw m i Uit\ u .i* \ R t\u tin. an unique

p i.?nt tluit < um iii/u'd p lutonium pruihu'tion u jrJi the ntv.im

licnerolion ol t u nim cit i.il elm Irit p ow er.... Prndut in i• m <jr

i> > billion kilon.it1» in J4 w .ir - \ Rvth lo r i t j * the l,ir^c>l elm 1m

p o w e r p io d m er in the n.ilion in iti e .u l\ h m O th c i now

i.u ilih e - < im -tru i Im l dining the pc.ik p ro d \n lion xe.ir-.-./ni luded

ihc smoll, experim ent.!! Plutonium Ret u /c le d Kc.ii 1oi ,m d

Plutonium I ueb Pilnl Pi,m l ,i nd I he I.id fo u r sinnle’ d io ll

lii'ih -lcxel w .id e dur.o iv lo o k *.' -<ii*il> rr I V'JJl). pp. 51-52

2 - 1 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Ar e a Ex p a n s io n s

The expansion of buildings and structures in each of the areas was in direct response to the needs of the Manhattan 

Project and Postwar era.

100 Areas

The General Electric Company completed the DR and H reactors for the Atomic Energy Commission during the first 

post-World War II expansion (1947-1949) period at the Hanford Site. DR Reactor was completed in March 1949 as a 

replacement for the D Reactor. "D Reactor was thought to be nearing the end of its effective operational life in the late 

1940s due to growth and distortion of its graphite core [see "Graphite Expansion" in the Reactor Operations Section]. It 

was subsequently determined that the graphite distortion in 105-D could be controlled; both reactors would operate 

simultaneously" (Carpenter 1993, p. 2-3).

Construction of the H Reactor began in March 1948 and was completed in October 1949. "The reactor initially 

operated at 400 M W of power. Its operating limits were gradually increased over the years, until 2140 M W was 

authorized in 1965. Soon thereafter the reactor was shut down and deactivated in April 1965" (DeFord and Einan 1.995,

p.2-4).

"The 105-C Reactor was the Hanford Site's sixth production reactor. Its construction began in June 1951 and was 

completed in November 1952. The reactor initially operated at 650 megawatts, but its power level was increased over 

time to 2360 megawatts. It operated until April 1969 and has remained in deactivated status since then"

(Carpenter 1994a, pp. 2-3).

The 100-KE/KW areas contain the KE and KW reactor buildings and their support facilities, including water treatment 

structures, administrative buildings, laboratories, and maintenance shops. Construction of the 100-K Area reactors began 

in September 1953 as part of Project X, a large Cold War expansion effort at the Hanford Site (Carpenter 1994b). The 

construction of the 1850 megawatt reactors was completed in 1954. They were the largest reactors built as of that date. 

The 100-K Area reactors had more output than the other single-pass reactors because of higher thermal power levels. 

Their operating limits were gradually increased to a lim it of 4400 megawatts by 1961. Operations continued until 1970, 

when the KW Reactor was deactivated and 1971, when the KE Reactor was deactivated. The reactors have remained in 

deactivated status since that date. The fuel storage basins and small portions of both reactor buildings, however, remain 

active for the storage of irradiated fuels from N Reactor.

N Reactor, completed in 1963, was the last of the graphite-moderated reactors. "W hile basically the same as the 

previous eight reactors, the N Reactor design differed in several ways to afford greater safety and to enable cogeneration 

of electricity" (Stapp and Marceau 1996, p. 3). The fabrication process at N Reactor also differed from the other eight 

reactors. The fuel rods for N Reactor were manufactured in the 333 Fuels Manufacturing Building using the co-extrusion 

process. (For details on the co-extrusion process, see the Fuel Manufacturing Section.) Testing of tubes made by this 

process "concluded that the characteristics of zirconium alloy enhanced reactor operations and provided longer life than 

the aluminum that had been used previously" (Stapp and Marceau 1996, p. 20).

200 Areas

O f the approximately 350 buildings and structures (excluding mobile offices/trailers, subsurface trenches, wells, cribs, 

towers and storage tanks) remaining today in the 200 East and West areas, 45-50 were b u ilt during the Manhattan 

Project. The rest were constructed during the post-World War II period, reflecting the considerable expansion of the 

Hanford Site during the Cold War. Likewise, many Manhattan Project era facilities were redesigned over the years to 

accommodate continually changing missions and technologies at the Hanford Site. Three of the most important 

buildings constructed were:

2 - 1 .1 0
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

The Reduction-Oxidation Plant (REDOX - S Plant), completed in the 200 West Area in 1952, was the first full-scale 

solvent extraction plant built in the United States for the recovery of plutonium and uranium. The plant employed an 

advanced organic solvent extraction process that replaced the bismuth phosphate process employed at B and T plants.

The Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX - A Plant), completed in the 200 East Area in 1955, extracted 

plutonium and uranium from nuclear fuel. The plutonium was sent in a liquid form to the Plutonium Finishing Plant in 

the 200 West Area, while the uranium was sent in liquid form to the Uranium Trioxide Plant. The Uranium Trioxide 

Plant converted the liquid to a solid uranium oxide powder that was shipped to other DOE sites where it was enriched 

and converted to forms useful in weapons.

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant - 234-5 Building), completed in the 200 West Area in 1949, played an important 

defense role during the Cold War. The Plutonium Finishing Plant, made possible the conversion of plutonium nitrate 

(a wet paste) to plutonium metal, known as buttons, through the oxalate, oxide, and reduction steps (Gerber 1992b).

300 Area

Indicative of the intensive post-World War II construction at the Hanford Site was the growth of the 300 Area. The 

postwar expansion of the United States nuclear weapons complex led to a dramatic increase in the construction of 

research and development laboratories, maintenance and craft shops, and administrative facilities in the 300 Area with 

approximately 160 buildings and structures (excluding mobile offices/trailers and subsurface tanks/cribs) still extant.

"The large defense production expansions that increased the number of reactors, separations facilities and waste tanks at 

the Hanford Site in the early 1950s also led to growth in the 300 Area. In 1952-1953, five large buildings, along with 

ancillary service structures, opened in the southern sector of that area.... Soon after these buildings were completed, 

continuing defense production expansions brought major additions to them" (Gerber 1992b, pp. 39-40).

The construction of research and development facilities accelerated during the early 1950s. The following decade saw 

the establishment of additional laboratories and expansion of research and development activities to handle the increase 

in defense and energy research. In the 1970s, additional support and laboratory facilities were constructed in the 

southern 300 Area for energy research, waste management activities, and biological and environmental sciences 

research. The additional facilities were needed for scientists to explore the potential danger to human health and the 

surrounding environment through environmental monitoring and bioassay programs.

Although the number of facilities in the 300 Area increased considerably during the post-World War ll era, its original 

functions as a process improvement and fuel fabrication area remained relatively unchanged through the duration o f the 

Cold War era. During this period, many buildings and structures in the 300 Area had to be retrofitted to accommodate 

new technologies and changing missions. For example, the 3706 Building, the original radiochemistry laboratory for the 

Hanford Site, underwent extensive modifications and additions before its completion in 1945. During the 1950s-1960s, 

the 3706 Building experienced major modifications when many of its laboratories were converted to offices.

The fuel fabrication process in the 300 Area went through numerous changes during and after World War II, especially in 

the 313 and 314 buildings. Fuel elements were initially fabricated and jacketed in these facilities. The 313 Building 

even experienced eight additions during its first year (1943-1944) due to process improvements and changes in uranium 

fuel fabrication activities. A decade later, the 313 Building was extensively remodeled and expanded to accommodate a 

new fuel canning technology. By 1971, all fuel element preparation activities for the single-pass reactors ceased in the 

313 and 314 buildings with the closure of the reactors.

During the early 1950s, General Electric constructed many buildings and facilities for the Atomic Energy Commission in 

the 300 Area under the Hanford Laboratories Operation Program for research and development activities. The most 

prominent developmental laboratories and shops included the 324 Chemical Materials Engineering Laboratory,

325 Radiochemistry Building, 326 Pile Technology Building, 327 Radiometallurgy Building, and the 329 Biophysics 

Laboratory. The 328 Mechanical Development Building was built as a central shop to support the above laboratories.

2 -1 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - P i u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Facility expansion continued in the 300 Area w ith the co-extrusion process, a new fuel fabrication method developed in 

the 1960s to accommodate N Reactor fuel needs. "The unique new process for jacketing or cladding uranium fuel 

elements for Hanford's N Reactor was initially developed in the 306 Fuel Element Pilot Plant" (Gerber 1993b, p. 7). The 

pilot plant was completed in 1956 initially to assist 3 13 Building operations and to pilot process improvements in 

single-pass reactor fuel fabrication methods. The facility was expanded in 1960 to develop the co-extrusion fabrication 

process for N Reactor fuel elements. The 333 Building was constructed at the same time to manufacture fuel elements 

for N Reactor using the new process.

400 Area

The construction o f the Fast Flux Test Facility complex commenced in 1970 and was completed in 1978. The reactor 

reached initial criticality in February 1980 and began operating at full power by 1982. Reactor activities were later 

expanded to include long-term testing and evaluation of reactor components and systems, fusion power materials testing, 

passive safety testing, production of medical isotopes, and space power system research (Mayancsik 1988).

During the mid-1980s, DOE constructed the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility in the 400 Area as a major addition 

to the breeder reactor technology development program at the Hanford Site. Its designed purpose was to inspect 

irradiated fuel materials from breeder reactors, namely the Fast Flux Test Facility at the Hanford Site and the Clinch River 

Breeder Reactor Plant in Tennessee. Because the breeder reactor development program was cancelled, the facility was 

never used for its designed purpose.

600 Area

During the Cold War period, existing roads were widened and new roads built to handle expanded site uses and 

missions. Some temporary construction structures in the 600 Area, such as the Hot M ix Plant for road materials, survived 

as permanent buildings, and several miles of temporary construction rail track, roads, and walks were converted for 

permanent use (Gerber 1993e).

The major expansion in the 600 Area, though, was the construction of anti-aircraft artillery batteries and Nike missile 

systems that provided air defense of the Hanford Site from 1950 through 1961. Nike missile installations supplanted the 

anti-aircraft artillery sites during the mid- and late 1950s in the United States. Between 1955 and 1961, the U.S. Army 

deployed Nike Ajax and Hercules missiles at four locations on the Hanford Site, three on the Wahluke Slope and one on 

the Fitzner-Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (see Figure 2-1.4). O f the four Nike missile launch sites and radar 

control sites that replaced the anti-aircraft artillery emplacements in the mid-1950s, only the one on the Arid Lands 

Ecology Reserve (H-52) remains intact.

The buildings and structures at each Nike site were organized into two separate installations: the launch area and the 

battery control area. The launch area (H-52 L) contained the underground missile storage magazines, launch equipment, 

motor pools, generator buildings, acid pits, missile refueling areas, missile assembly and testing buildings, and 

administrative, housing, recreation, and general maintenance facilities. The main function of the launch area was to 

maintain missile batteries in a combat-ready posture. The battery control area (H-52 C) contained all the radar, 

guidance, electronic, and communications equipment needed to identify incoming targets, launch missiles, and direct 

and guide missiles in flight to intercept enemy aircraft

The former battery control area is located at the top of Rattlesnake Mountain, while the former associated launching area 

is situated at the base of the mountain. The location of the battery control areas had to be "between a minimum of onehalf mile and a maximum of three miles from the launch area. The minimum distance was determined by the maximum 

tracking capability in elevation of the missile tracking radar, and the maximum distance by practical considerations of 

providing communication by cables" (Carlson and Lyon 1996.).

2 - 1 .1 2
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

Figure 2-1.4. Missile Launch Site at the Fitzner-Eberhardt A rid Lands Ecology Reserve

W hile the spatial arrangement of the buildings and structures in each launch and battery control area was site-specific 

with no standard layout plans, the H-52 launch area was divided into two separate zones for functional and safety 

reasons. One included the administrative, mess hall, residential, and recreational facilities. The other included the 

underground missile storage, missile refueling, missile assembly and testing, fuel storage, and generator facilities. The 

H-52 control center combined the administrative and barracks functions in one building w ith the radar equipment 

located in adjacent trailers. Some Nike sites nationwide designated separate areas for housing in the operating areas, but 

the Hanford Site's H-52 installation had barracks in both the launch and battery control areas (McMaster et al. 1984).

1100 Area

The 1100 Area underwent considerable growth during the early 1950s in response to the Cold War induced expansion of 

the Hanford Site. Representative of the expansion was the construction o f the 1167 Warehouse, 1170 Bus Terminal, and 

1171 Transportation Maintenance Shop. These facilities and the entire 1100 Area were strategically situated adjacent to 

rail connections and the main north-south site highway to expediently provide support services to the site.

2 - 1 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

In d u s t r ia l Ve r n a c u l a r Ar c h it e c t u r e

Vernacular architecture is defined as buildings and structures not classified as high style architecture, "...a catch-all term 

for the study of the kinds of buildings neglected by traditional architectural history.../'' (Rydell 1985, p. 401). Vernacular 

architecture can also be categorized as local or regional adaptation of widespread, high style architectural forms.

The design of the Hanford Site's industrial, utilitarian buildings is a vernacular adaptation of the International/Modernist 

style, an architectural expression of aesthetic functionalism that gained popularity during the post-World War II era. In 

this industrial environment, "a building was beautiful to the degree that it was functional" (Teague 1940, pp. 15). The 

Hanford Site's industrial vernacular facilities can be associated with architect Louis Sullivan's famous maxim, "that form 

ever follow function" (Sullivan 1896, p. 403). Architectural form can reflect industrial function not only in the design of 

individual buildings but also in the layout of an entire complex like the Hanford Site.

The Hanford Site is an evolving industrial vernacular landscape whose layout and design has been shaped by the variety 

of functional uses and changing site missions. Function plays a significant role in industrial vernacular landscapes, 

influencing the type of utilitarian facilities designed and constructed. In the case of the Hanford Site, this includes 

buildings and structures constructed in the production areas and infrastructure found throughout the site such as roads, 

railroads, communication and utility/electrical facilities. The Hanford Site's Manhattan Project/Cold War era landscape 

reflects unembellished industrial architecture, concrete and steel structures that express a sense of architectural balance 

and functional integrity devoid of non-essential decorative elements 

and ornamentation.

Co n s tr u c tio n Styles a n d M a te r ia ls

The built environment at the Hanford Site reflects industrial and 

utilitarian functions over aesthetic concerns, not only in the design 

and layout of the site's production areas but also in the design of 

individual buildings and construction materials used. Functional, 

unadorned concrete and steel were the most commonly used 

materials at the Hanford Site.

Concrete is a name applied to any number of compositions or 

combination of aggregate, consisting of sand, gravel, crushed stone, 

or other coarse material, bound together with various kinds of 

bonding materials, such as lime or cement. Various concrete 

applications include (Coney n.d.):

• Unreinforced concrete: composite material containing 

aggregate held together by a cement with water to form a 

paste. For an example of an unreinforced concrete 

structure, see Figure 2-1.5. The name derives from its not 

having iron or steel reinforcing bars.

• Reinforced concrete: concrete strengthened by the 

inclusion of iron or steel reinforcing bars, which increase 

the tensile strength of the concrete. For an example of a 

reinforced concrete structure, see Figure 2-1.6.

• Precast concrete: concrete that is cast and hardened away 

from the building site and then put in place in the building 

as a rigid component.

M

Hi $11* WmSmm

-.■I 1 - i ; -

Figure 2-1.5. Example o f Unreinforced Concrete

Structure, the 337-B Building in 1971

>;r *

; / 4

»-r ith ■ I r

^ 1 (■' ;■■■

Figure 2-1.6. Example o f Reinforced Concrete

Structure, the 337 Building in 1970

2 - 1 .1 4
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s tr u c t io n His t o r y

• Cast-in-place concrete: concrete poured on-site into a previously erected framework that is removed after the 

concrete has set.

One of the reasons the Corps chose the Hanford Site as one of the locations for the Manhattan Project was that sufficient 

aggregate would be available locally to provide enough concrete for site construction needs. Du Pont developed 

aggregate sources on site for the Corps as one of its first construction activities.

The amount of concrete used during the Manhattan Project was substantial. It was the most extensively used material in 

the construction of the Hanford Site. Laborers applied more than 780,000 cubic yards of concrete, an amount that 

equaled approximately 390 miles of concrete highway 20 feet wide by 6 inches thick. About 1,500,000 concrete blocks 

and 750,000 cement bricks were used in plant construction, enough to build a 1-foot by 6-foot w all over 30 miles long 

(Du Pont 1945a).

The urgent nature of the Manhattan Project at the Hanford Site dictated an emphasis on speed and functionalism, which 

translated into a preference for flat roof, concrete, box-like structures over more traditional architectural forms. Exterior 

walls exhibited minimal non-functional ornamentation. Their steel skeletons allowed the construction of nonioadbearing exterior walls made predominantly of concrete. Cladding consisted of various types of concrete 

applications, horizontal wood, asphalt/transite shingles, corrugated metal, and galvanized steel panels. Corrugated metal 

is a lightweight, ribbed cladding that is manufactured by rolling continuous flat sheets of lightweight steel or aluminum 

into ribbed profiles (Architecture 1995).

100 Areas

Three general types of permanent building construction were 

initially used in the 100 Areas: reinforced concrete, structural steel 

framing together with concrete block and/or reinforced concrete, 

and wood framing (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3). Common materials and 

stylistic features used in the 100 Areas during the entire Manhattan 

Project/Cold War period included concrete foundations and 

flooring, corrugated and shingled transite siding, concrete block 

walls, corrugated metal/pressed steel siding and roofing (see 

Figure 2-1.7 for an example), wood and steel framing, flat precast 

concrete roofs covered with tar and gravel surfacing or composition 

shingles, and doors constructed of corrugated, roll up metal or 

double leaf, single panel wood.

; i i.......

V * I jt - V

Figure 2-1.7. Example o f Corrugated Metal

Siding, 185.5-KW Building in 1995

Since sand and gravel deposits were found immediately under the

surface in the 100 Areas, two aggregate pits were opened in the 100-B Area. However, that aggregate could only be 

used for road construction and stabilization work. To make concrete, concrete aggregate had to be brought in from the 

Haven gravel pit located approximately 1/2 mile west of the 100-B Area. "The Haven pit was capable of producing 

9,600 tons of concrete aggregate daily. The Hanford Site gravel pit, located just west of Hanford proper, was capable of 

producing 14,832 tons of concrete aggregate daily" (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3, p. 650).

The Hanford Site concrete production plants were in the 100 Areas. "One concrete mixing plant was erected in the 

immediate vicinity of the 105 [Reactor] Building[s] in each of the 100-B and D areas by the Hanford concrete contractors 

to furnish ready-mixed concrete for construction. Since a sizable portion of concrete yardage was concentrated at the 

105 Building and the 185, 189 and 190 building group, a Pumpcrete method (concrete mix pumped through pipes) of 

placing concrete from a central pumping plant was used" (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3, p. 651).

The availability of prepared concrete materials expanded at the Hanford Site during the post-World War II period. In the 

100-H Area, the bulk of the concrete was prepared in the central mixing plant erected within the 100-H Area. Some 

amounts were also furnished from the W hite Bluffs plant.

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Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Figure 2-1.8. Example o f Reactor Building,

105-DR Building in 1995

The cladding of the buildings for each of the reactors was 

consistent. Reinforced concrete shielding wails and corrugated 

asbestos cement siding were commonly used. Roof construction, 

except for reinforced concrete slabs over the inner rod room and 

rear face enclosure, was poured insulated concrete. The ceilings 

were constructed of laminated gypsum board. The roofs were 

covered with precast concrete roof tile, except over the discharge 

area enclosure and the inner horizontal rod room. Over these 

areas, the roofs were composed of 6-foot-thick reinforced concrete.

The massive reinforced concrete walls around the reactor core at 

the lower levels provided additional radiation shielding.

The reactors rested on 23-foot thick concrete foundations topped 

with cast iron blocks that served as a thermal shield. The walls 

consisted of reinforced concrete in the lower portions and concrete 

block in the upper portions, varying from 3 to 5 feet thick. The 

graphite cores were surrounded by a cast iron thermal shield layer.

The entire thermal shield was surrounded on all sides (except the 

bottom) by a 52-inch thick biological shield that consisted of 

alternate layers of masonite and steel. For an example of the 

concrete buildings containing the reactors, see Figure 2-1.8.

200 Areas

Construction features and materials of the 200 Areas are similar to 

those used in the 100 Areas and other production areas. Due to the 

200 Areas chemical separations function, however, the Manhattan 

Project/early Cold War period facilities used considerably more 

concrete, fewer and smaller windows, symmetrical plans, and 

foundations constructed of poured concrete or reinforced concrete 

piers w ith spread footings. Floors, walls, and ceilings were made of

reinforced concrete or concrete block. Roofs were likewise constructed of reinforced concrete and covered with built-up 

felt, tar, and gravel material.

Five general types of building construction were initially used in the 200 Areas. In addition to the three types found in 

the 100 Areas, the 200 Areas also had reinforced concrete framing with concrete block and structural steel framing with 

wood siding (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3). The common materials and stylistic features found in the 200 Areas were similar to 

those in the 100 Areas.

The 200 Areas separations buildings used by far the most concrete of any other area. The amount is unknown but can be 

inferred by the dimensions of the buildings. The Manhattan Project separations buildings (U, T, B Plants) were massive 

reinforced concrete structures, measuring over 800 feet long, 65 feet wide, and 80 feet high. Because of the radioactivity 

present during the separation process, the concrete walls surrounding the separation cells were constructed 7 feet thick 

to provide necessary protective shielding. Cell covers were constructed of removable 7-foot-thick concrete blocks. For 

an example of a separations building built during the Manhattan Project, see Figure 2-1.9.

REDOX, like the other separations buildings, is a monolithic, rectangular (467 feet by 161 feet by 82 feet high), flat roof 

structure constructed almost entirely of reinforced concrete. Built in 1952, the Reduction-Oxidation Plant with its 

chemical separation process was chosen to replace the bismuth phosphate process employed at B and T Plants.

Figure 2-1.9. Example o f Chemical Separations

Building, 221-T Plant

2 - 1 .1 6

s
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

“As with other canyon [separations] buildings, its process equipment is contained in small rooms, called cells,

which are arranged in rows in an area spanned by a traveling crane. The cells are topped with 4-foot concrete

blocks that are removable by crane to provide access to the celt beneath.... Heavy concrete shielding walls...

are up to the level o f the crane rails, giving the appearance o f a canyon.... From a process view point, the

REDOX facility is divided into a canyon area and a silo area.

The canyon consists o f nine process cells arranged in two

parallel rows running east to west and separated by a pipe

tunnel. The five-foot thick concrete shielding walls

protected REDOX workers from the intense radiation found

in the process cells. The silo, located on the west end o f the

building is 84 feet by 41 feet by 132 feet high and contains a

process area and an operating area. Its extraction column

shaft is 12 feet b y 69 feet by 86 feet high and has eight floor

levels." - DeFord and Carpenter 1995, p. 2-1

• 'Ih r nam e A o i s tm t fin a l steel n ilh .in outer

-h r.ilh in ii m .iltnn in uni fu n d * (M o i to t k it nol

insulation and /ti-i.wut'f diee l steel. I h r flo o r

is m m i r l r slab: Ih r du< t lo w ! is sheet m r l.il ro o f

dot kina, and ih r setond lo\ c l A a t o n tie lr <lah.

I h r i o o i A insulated nn-fal dot k in ii In lrn u t w allare f<‘mitir<.c<( u im rv fv '■fvc/. mvf.W kfurf-. mi'I.V

lath, and plaster. The t ault and p ro t c--. ai ea dooi -

are t onsfrui le d iif steel... - -<•(• "iMulnniimi

I ini«hin“ l*Lint" in Appendix K nn flu* Inlcrnvl

Because the REDOX process used gravity flow columns, the 

columns were housed in a silo. By the time PUREX was 

constructed, pulsed columns were used instead of gravity flow 

columns so the silo required for the REDOX process was not

needed for the PUREX process. PUREX is a reinforced concrete, rectangular-shaped facility measuring 1,005 feet long, 

104 feet high (with approximately 40 feet below grade), and 61.5 feet wide. The Plant's main canyon portion was 

originally 860 feet long. The reinforced concrete cell blocks were fabricated outside PUREX prior to installation 

(Gerber 1993f).

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant) is 180 feet wide by 500 feet long, extending 9.5 feet below grade to 46.8 feet 

above grade.

Except for wood framing in the Manhattan Project administrative/ 

non-production facilities, most of the smaller, non-chemical 

separations buildings were constructed of structural steel framing 

with outer sheaths of aluminum panels, corrugated metal, or transite 

shingles. Some roofs were constructed of insulated metal decking.

Interior walls were made of reinforced concrete, sheetrock/ 

plasterboard, or general piaster covering. Early wood frame 

facilities had symmetrical features with repetitive, multipane, 

industrial-style windows, and gable roofs. Cladding consisted of 

corrugated metal or transite/asbestos shingles over the original 

horizontal wood siding.

300 Area

The three general types of building construction in the 300 Area 

were the same as those in the 100 Areas (Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 3).

Most of the materials and styles used in the 300 Area facilities 

constructed during the Manhattan Project and Cold War era were 

steel frames with reinforced concrete or concrete block, 

asymmetrical features, flat roofs, and corrugated metal cladding.

The hazardous materials storage facilities, like the 303 Fresh 

Materials Storage buildings for instance, were constructed of 

reinforced concrete and concrete block. For an example of a 

building constructed only with concrete block, see Figure 2-1.10.

Figure 2-1.10. Example o f Concrete Block

Structure, 3745A Building in 1994

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Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Figure 2-1.11. Example o f a Temporary Wood

Frame Structure, 3762 Building in 1995

Figure 2-1.12. Example o f Structure with Metal

Paneling, 309-E Building in 1995

■r-'i

- v

h

Vi

Figure 2-1.13. Example o f Transite Shingle

Cladding, 3707-B Building in 1994

Figure 2-1.14. Construction o f the Fast Flux

Test Facility in the Early 1970s

Some of the Manhattan Project and early Cold War period buildings 

were of wood frame construction with symmetrical rectangular 

plans (see Figure 2-1.11), transite (asbestos) shingle or corrugated 

metal cladding (over original wood siding), gable roofs, and 

repetitive, industrial style double-hung sash windows, and swamp 

coolers. Such buildings were non-manufacturing facilities, like the 

Manhattan Project administration facilities (for example, the 3702 

and 3703 buildings). The 303-J Building, however, has a wood 

frame construction even though it contained hazardous materials.

In the larger buildings composed of several wings or which are of 

considerable length (for example, administration and service 

buildings), fire walls of common red brick with salt glazed tile caps 

were used to reduce fire hazards involved in this type of 

construction. The 3706 Radiochemistry Laboratory has such a fire 

wall. Access openings through these walls were equipped with 

metal clad fire doors set in steel framing. Vaults attached to these 

buildings were also of brick and tile (Du Pont 1945a).

By the early 1950s, 300 Area building construction had adopted 

additional asymmetrical design features. Framing for the most part 

was constructed of concrete and steel, and cladding consisted of 

metal paneling (see Figure 2-1.12), asbestos transite shingles (see 

Figure 2.1-13), corrugated transite or corrugated metal. By the 

1970s and 1980s, new buildings, especially in the central and 

southern part of the 300 Area, were rectangular shaped, steel and 

wood framed, with a single story and aggregate pebble/stucco 

siding over plywood sheathing. Many of these facilities were 

prefabricated units, installed for office and laboratory use with 

premanufactured sidings and roofs constructed of fluted metal 

panels, sheet metal, or corrugated metal.

400 Area

Because the 400 Area buildings were built in the 1970s, their 

construction is similar to the post-1970 facilities in the 300 Area. 

The primary materials used in the, construction of the 400 Area Fast 

Flux Test Facility facilities included extensive applications of 

concrete, textured concrete facades, steel framing, fluted metal 

panels, sheet metal, and corrugated metal. Premanufactured 

construction materials were used in the bolted steel (Butler-style) 

buildings in the 400 Area. Several of the wood or steel frame, flat 

roof buildings have fluted concrete block walls or exterior finishes 

of stucco fascia material/aggregate stucco over plywood sheathing 

w ith tar and gravel built-up roof coverings. See Figure 2-1.14 of the 

Fast Flux Test Facility being constructed.

The Fast Flux Test Facility complex includes a containment 

building, reactor, heat removal equipment and structures, and core 

component, handling/examination, instrumentation, and control 

facilities (Mayancsik 1988). The containment building, which

2 - 1 .1 8
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

houses the reactor and plant operating equipment, is "a cylindrical carbon steel shell. Steel-lined reinforced concrete 

i cells occupy the lower portion of the containment building, from grade level to approximately 78 feet below grade.... A

structural steel mezzanine above the operating perimeter provides additional work area.... A 200-ton polar gantry crane 

and a jib crane are located above the mezzanine for handling large equipment and materials. The central portion of the 

operating floor is occupied by a steel operating deck" (Mayancsik 1988, p. 1-8).

The adjacent 403 Fuel Storage Facility has a below-ground cell that contains a carbon steel storage vessel 21 feet in 

diameter that provides storage in liquid sodium of the spent fuel assemblies from the Fast Flux Text Facility.

The 400 Area Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (427 Building) was designed in the mid-1970s and constructed 

during the early 1980s as a major addition to the breeder technology development program at the Hanford Site. The 

427 Building, a poured concrete building measuring 175 feet by 270 feet by 98 feet high, is typical of industrial, 

asymmetrical, flat roof facilities in the Fast Flux Test Facility complex. The building extends 35 feet below grade and has 

a total of 188,000 square feet o f operation space. The facility is divided into six operating floors with an attached 

mechanical equipment wing on the west side.

600 Area

The Nike missile sites were some of the facilities designated as 600 Area facilities, which were not all located 

geographically together. The thirteen Nike-period structures at the H-52 launch site, including the underground missile 

storage facility, are constructed mainly of concrete. Common stylistic features and construction materials include one 

story, flat roof, concrete block structures erected on concrete footings and on-grade concrete floor slabs. Wood or metal, 

multipane, double-hung sash windows, or fixed sash and glass block windows, are symmetrically placed. Roofs are 

constructed of wooden joists covered with wood sheathing and built-up cover of tar and gravel. Smaller support 

facilities (water pumping, sewage, storage) are constructed of concrete block or wood frame, with flat or shed roofs, 

minimal windows and metal doors. The fueling and missile maintenance and assembly areas were surrounded by dirt 

and grass berms for safety protection purposes. The only visible structures at the surface of the concrete underground 

missile storage facility are two entrance doors set in the mounds of earth that cover the concrete superstructure.

Concrete pads cover the former missile firing area.

The structural remains of the five most intact anti-aircraft artillery sites, situated in the Hanford Site's central plateau south 

and southeast of the 200 Areas, include artillery emplacement revetments and other sandbagged/cobblestone structures 

and the remains of concrete pathways/sidewalks, building slabs, entry pads, and flooring.

Other 600 Area facilities include fire stations, atmospheric and environmental monitoring facilities, weather station 

structures, and magazine storage facilities. The wood and steel frame buildings mainly have flat roofs and are 

constructed of concrete block walls with horizontal wood siding, while the weather and environmental monitoring 

(meteorology) towers and radar facilities are constructed of steel and set in poured concrete slabs. The 213 J and 

K magazine storage facilities, which stored purified plutonium-nitrate paste, contaminated sodium, and soil samples for 

fallout studies, are constructed of massive reinforced concrete. The remaining 600 Area facilities are Butler-type, storage/ 

support buildings constructed of bolted steel and corrugated sheet metal.

700 Area

Four DOE buildings/structures remain in the 700 Area, all constructed during the Cold War period. These one-to-two 

story, steel and reinforced concrete frame buildings have flat roofs, concrete block/reinforced concrete walls erected on 

concrete footings or on-grade concrete floor slabs. The premanufactured structures have aggregate stucco and 

corrugated metal cladding, flat roofs, and wood framing.

1100 Area

Common construction characteristics and materials in the 1100 Areas include steel framing, concrete block, corrugated 

metal cladding, and gable truss roofs with corrugated metal. Foundations and floors are mainly reinforced concrete.

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Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Some facilities have flat roofs, precast concrete walls, steel columns and roof beams. Pre-manufactured facilities include 

Butler-style buildings with corrugated metal siding and roofing, steel frames, situated on concrete foundations or ground 

level concrete slabs.

Te m p o r a r y Co n s tr u c tio n Fa c il it ie s

Because of the emphasis on speed and cost-efficiency during the Manhattan Project and Cold War Era, Hanford Site 

contractors constructed numerous temporary construction facilities. Many of the temporary construction facilities still 

exist. To accomplish speedy and low cost construction, standard design and assembly line construction were adopted 

and used throughout the site, especially in the construction camp at the former Hanford townsite, W hite Bluffs Shops, 

Central Shops, 3000 Area Camp, Camp Hanford, and in the 100-B, D, F, 200 East and West, 300, 700, and 1100 

/Richland Village) areas. W hile the structures appear to be standard issue shells on the outside, the interiors were 

typically redesigned to suit a particular operation. In assembly line construction, all materials for a certain building or 

group of similar buildings (for example, barracks, bathhouses) were prefabricated at the various craft shops and then sent 

to the building site for installation. Modified versions of the Navy's 800 series B-2 barracks were used extensively to 

house workers at the Hanford construction camp and the Richland Village. After the war, a considerable number of these 

barracks were moved to the 100, 200 and 300 areas for use as offices and other administrative purposes.

Four common types of wood framing were used in the construction of temporary buildings (Du Pont 1945a):

• Post-and-girder construction for large flat-roofed sheds, wide gable-roofed buildings, and multi-story structures 

having large deadweight loads. This type of framing was seen in many administration and service buildings, 

garages, warehouse, and shops.

• Column-and-truss construction for large roof spans and high ceiling clearances.

• Studded-and-gable roof construction for smaller width structures having dead-weight roof loads. This type was 

mainly used for barracks, small area construction offices, and for all buildings brought in on skids.

• Open-shed construction with the roof supported by post and girders. This type was used in the construction of 

storage buildings and field craft shops.

Common types of roofs used included gable, hipped, shed, and flat roofs. Corrugated, galvanized sheet iron roofs and 

plywood roof and wall sections were used for prefabricated sheds. Reinforced concrete roofs were used for vault 

construction. 5

The siding of temporary facilities in the Hanford construction camp,

3000 Area Camp, and administration buildings in the process areas 

consisted either of 1/2-inch Gypsum board applied horizontally in 

2-feet by 8-feet sheets w ith V-matched top and bottom edges,

1-inch by 6-inch tongue and groove, or 1-inch by 8-inch ship-lap 

siding (Du Pont 1945a).

In the process areas, interior building lining was used in S i l

administration/office construction. Walls, partitions, and ceilings JfltH # * | , i

were covered on only one side of the studs with 1/2-inch Celotex, . j

Firtex,'or Sheetrock. The doors were wood with the exception of 

the metal-clad fire doors and fireproof vault doors. W indow sash 

and frames were wooden throughout. Two standard types of

windows were used: double-hung or single-pivot/slide windows, Figure 2-1.15. Example o f a Butler Building,

all with either six or eight panes. Ventilation outlets consisted of 352-D Building in 1994

gable louvers, roof and wall evaporation coolers, sheet metal roof

ventilators, wooden roof ventilators, and wall and ceiling exhaust fans (Du Pont 1945a).

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Se c t io n 1 - Co n s tr u c t io n His t o r y

Pr e fa b r ic a te d Un it s

To accommodate the larger than expected work load during the 

Manhattan Project and Cold War Era and for speed and costefficiency, prefabricated units were shipped to the Hanford Site for a 

wide variety of construction uses. All the process areas had 

prefabricated sheds that included Hobb's Pacific huts and Butler 

type huts. Pacific huts were used mainly for barracks, commercial 

facilities, and offices at the Hanford Site construction camp. The 

larger Butler huts were used as special storage warehouses, 

especially in the 200, 300, and 1100 areas. The smaller Butler huts 

were used for offices, warehouses, and small shops in most areas. 

The Butler-type buildings were constructed of corrugated metal or 

sheet metal and bolted steel, commonly resting on a poured 

concrete slab (see Figure 2-1.15).

Figure 2-1.16. Example o f a Quonset Hut,

3746-D Building in 1994

Several types of prefabricated units, which included Quonset huts (see Figure 2-1.16), were transferred from other 

government projects and used principally for field offices and warehouses. Quonset huts (still in use in the 200, 300, 

400, 600, and 1100 areas) are prefabricated units constructed of semi-cylindrical roofs of galvanized, corrugated sheet 

metal attached to metal purlins supported by steel ribs. Hook bolts with nuts and washers connect the purlins to the ribs. 

The semicircular ends of the building are of board and batten construction. The windows and flooring are constructed of 

wood.

Hig h Sty le Ar c h ite c tu r a l Fo r m s

W hile the vast majority of Hanford Site buildings are industrial vernacular structures, several of the facilities exhibit high 

style architectural features, such as the following.

Brutalism: The 337/337-B buildings and certain features of the 331 Building exhibit the architectural characteristics of 

Brutalism. The term comes from the French "Breton Brut," meaning rough or untreated concrete. The goal of this style is

an honesty in structural, spatial, organizational, and material concepts that result in buildings characterized as rude and

ruthless, where the scale or relation of mass and detail to human beings is often referred to as brutal. The distinguishing 

characteristics of the style (Kirk 1997), which experienced its peak popularity from the years 1955 to 1970, include:

• Concrete exposed at its roughest

• Exaggerated structural members

• Raw and unfinished simple materials

• Formalist (building forms clearly express their function)

• Grand scale

• Exposed mechanical systems, ducts, pipes

• Functional elements doubling as decorative elements

Art Deco/Art Moderne: The architecture of the 3760 Building, the former Hanford Technical Library, is a vernacular 

adaptation of Art Deco/Art Moderne features and styles. Distinctive elements include the building's streamlined but 

angular, hard-edged form and a projecting concrete entrance/frontispiece placed in a modified front facade setback. The 

symmetrical design of the front facade is highlighted by parallel concrete piers/pilasters. A strong, decorative horizontal 

banding is expressed in the repetitive ribbon windows.

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Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

La n d s c a p e M o d if ic a t io n s

The Hanford Site's flat, arid environment was perfectly suited to the needs of the federal government for the Manhattan 

Project and wartime mobilization effort. Like other desert environments in the American West used by the federal 

government, the Hanford Site was viewed as an isolated wasteland, remote from population centers, to be used 

indiscriminately for national defense or natural resource extraction purposes. The resources of the desert landscape were 

seen as inexhaustible, like the Hanford Site's abundant water supply from the Columbia River and the area's glacial 

sediments that provided sand and gravel aggregate for constructing large concrete structures.

The establishment of the Hanford Site with restricted public access because of the production of plutonium and nuclear 

technologies research had a two-fold effect on the area landscape. W hile the Hanford Site landscape was radically 

altered by construction activities associated with the Manhattan Project/Cold War period, the construction of the Hanford 

Site also resulted in removal of most pre-1943 buildings from the Hanford and W hite Bluffs townsites as well as other 

rural structures. Most of the early settlements and farmsteads were situated along the Columbia River as were later the 

plutonium production reactors and ancillary facilities.

Soon after the end of W orld War II, many of the wartime mobilization structures or temporary construction facilities were 

removed. For example, the Hanford construction camp located at the former Hanford townsite was totally removed 

w ithin a year after the end of the war. At its peak occupancy in 1944, the camp housed approximately 

45,000 construction workers, a city in itself that consisted of hundreds of temporary construction facilities, trailers, stores, 

schools, churches, barracks, medical, and tent units. During the life of the camp, a total of 1200 buildings and 9 service 

facilities were constructed. W hile no structures remain at the Hanford construction camp, aerial photographs detect the 

grid system of the former townsite.

Other similar modifications to the landscape from the Manhattan Project and Cold War period are scattered over the 

Hanford Site landscape. The former Central Shops facility (a major maintenance and servicing area for Manhattan 

Project construction activities located north of 200 West and removed shortly after the end of W orld War II) left a 

landscape dotted with concrete slabs, foundations, and pits. Similarly, the concrete slabs, foundations, walkways, roads, 

and grids of former anti-aircraft artillery and Nike facilities are still evident in stark contrast to the surrounding desert 

landscape.

The Hanford Site's distinctive Manhattan Project and Cold War landmarks still standing include the reactors, separations 

buildings, water towers and stacks, yellow radiation markers to identify surface and sub-surface contamination, nuclear 

waste burial grounds for contaminated material, waste storage ponds, railroads and roads, and the production/process 

areas themselves.

Since 1987 when the last of the nine reactors was shut down, operational activities have shifted toward cleanup of areas 

contaminated by radioactive and/or chemical wastes. The mission change to environmental restoration/remediation has 

had a significant impact on the industrial landscape. Decommissioning and decontamination activities have led to 

extensive alteration and demolition o f many o f the remaining Manhattan Project/Cold War buildings and structures. For 

example, the site's military landscape (located in the 600 Area) has also been dramatically altered with demolition of 

most of the Nike and anti-aircraft artillery sites. O f all the production areas, the 100-B, C, D, DR, F, and H areas have 

been the focus of the most extensive demolition activities.

W hile the industrial landscape at the Hanford Site has been significantly affected by cleanup activities through the 

demolition of numerous buildings and structures, the basic design and configuration of the site production areas has 

remained relatively intact.

2 - 1 .2 2
Se c t io n 1 - Co n s tr u c t io n His t o r y

P r i m a r y Co n t r a c t o r s / S u b c o n t r a c t o r s

Throughout its existence the Hanford Site has been a government-owned, contractor-operated facility. Ownership of the 

Hanford Site has been passed between four different government agencies, and a total of seventeen different contractors 

have been responsible for a wide array of site operations, including construction. The Hanford Site's management and 

contractors' history can be organized into three phases: single contractor, diverse contractors, and consolidation of 

contractors. Because the construction history of the Hanford Site was affected by the various contractors, it is important 

to know who the contractors were.

Sin g l e Contracto r

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company

The Corps, Manhattan Engineer District, entered into a cost-p 1 us-fixed-fee contract with Du Pont for the design, 

engineering, construction, equipping, training personnel, and operation of the Manhattan Project at the Hanford Site.

Du Pont, the prime contractor at the Hanford Site from December 21, 1942 to September 1, 1946, had general 

supervision of all construction activities. Du Pont designed the Hanford Site structures on the basis of technical and 

process information developed and furnished to Du Pont by the University of Chicago and other scientists under 

government contracts.

The Hanford contract during the Manhattan Project allowed the work to be subcontracted. The two principal attractions 

of subcontracting work were economy and speed. "Many subcontractors specialize in certain types of work and 

maintain well-trained and highly-skilled organizations which are available for transferring to the project site and starting 

work shortly after acceptance of the subcontracts.... Hence the tim e and cost are saved which would be spent in 

recruiting skilled workmen...or in training unskilled employees...." (Du Pont 1945e, Vol. 2, pp. 289-290).

Whenever practical, Du Pont subcontracted work to use the administrative expertise and personnel of as many firms as 

possible. Du Pont subcontracted portions of the work considered to be of a specialized nature, such as masonry work, 

roofing, construction of roads and railroads, and erection of tanks, structural steel, boilers, stacks, and coal handling 

equipment. For example, a subcontractor mixed the concrete at the five concrete plants, but Du Pont poured the 

concrete in the buildings. On a larger scale, Du Pont and the subcontractors jointly constructed the central 

administration area known as the 700 Area.

Other subcontracted work included the construction of infrastructure facilities. For example during the Manhattan 

Project, a subcontract was awarded to the Guy Atkinson Company "for the construction of the Permanent Railroad 

System and the Temporary Railroad Facilities... Approximately 30.8 miles of temporary railroads were constructed..."

(Du Pont 1945a, Vol. 4, p.1092).

In a few cases, critical labor shortages were important factors considered in reaching decisions to subcontract parts of 

work instead of having it performed by Du Pont employees. "Some of the well-known contractors, because of their past 

experience and many contacts in the contracting field, had large labor followings from which available workmen could 

be drawn" (Du Pont 1945e, Vol. 2, p. 290).

The types o f work subcontracted for the Hanford Site were practically the same as those subcontracted in the 

construction of other war projects handled by Du Pont. "However, the remote geographical location and mammoth size 

of the Hanford plant necessitated the provision of housing and eating facilities for practically all of the construction and 

operation employees, and resulted in the awarding of some contracts that were not common to the other projects... 

Because of these abnormal conditions, subcontracts were awarded for the operation of commissaries and eating facilities 

and for the design o f Richland Village" (Du Pont 1945e, Vol. 2, p. 290). It was practical for Du Pont to subcontract out 

commissary responsibilities due to their lack of previous experience in this field, as it was desirable to secure the services 

of a local architect familiar with local conditions and lessen the war-imposed load on the Architectural Section of the 

Du Pont Design Division. 1

2 - 1 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c h u ie s

Atomic Energy Commission and General Electric Company

On September 1, 1946, the General Electric Company replaced Du Pont as the prime site contractor. General Electric 

remained the prime contractor until 1965. Soon after the arrival of General Electric at the Hanford Site, ownership of the 

Hanford Site was transferred from the Corps, Manhattan Engineer District, to the newly created Atomic Energy 

Commission on January 1, 1947.

General Electric was directed to build two new production areas, 100-DR and 100-H. The Design and Construction 

Divisions of General Electric were responsible for the design, specifications, material and equipment lists, and direction 

of the work for the process units. For 100-H Area alone, approximately 2,500 drawings were made by General Electric 

and their prime architect-engineer and construction subcontractor. y

As prime site contractor, General Electric relied upon numerous subcontractors to conduct their site-wide operations and 

management responsibilities. The construction procurement division of General Electric and the purchasing section of 

Atkinson-Jones Company were jointly responsible for the procurement of building materials, construction equipment, 

and miscellaneous materials and supplies. General Electric often procured cement from the Spokane Cement Company 

and the Lehigh Company, both of Washington State. Curtis Sand and Gravel Company, a Hanford Site subcontractor, 

supplied the concrete aggregate (GE 1952a).

J. A. Jones and Vitro Engineering were two contractors who arrived at the Hanford Site in 1953 to provide engineering 

and construction services. The J. A. Jones Company remained at the Hanford Site until 1987 and was responsible 

initially for construction of three plutonium production reactors, complete w ith support facilities that included fuel 

preparation stations, water treatment and storage plants, retention basins, powerhouses, and associated roads, rail lines, 

and utilities. J. A. Jones provided a variety of services at the Hanford Site that included construction, maintenance, 

fabrication, and property management services. Their administrative offices in north Richland included fabrication 

shops, warehousing, a weld test laboratory, and heavy equipment and automotive shops. Vitro Engineering was initially 

awarded the Hanford Engineering Services contract and provided design-engineering functions at the Hanford Site until 

1981.

The architect-engineering firm Giffels & Vallet, Inc., of Detroit, Michigan was a major subcontractor during the 1940s 

and 1950s. The firm had a large specialty group of architects and engineers performing a wide range of design and 

engineering services. For example, Giffels & Vallet was responsible for the design and field supervision of all buildings 

and service facilities in the 100-H Area, including the 105-H Reactor facility. Because Giffels & Vallet already had staff 

w ith security clearances, they were selected during the late 1940s due to the emergency nature o f the contract that had 

considerable national security implications.

Div e r s e Contracto rs

By the end of 1963, all nine Hanford Site reactors and their supporting fuels preparation, reprocessing, and waste 

management facilities were operating at full capacity. Employment was nearly 9600 people: 8300 with operating and 

service contractors, 1000 on construction and miscellaneous contracts, and 290 with the Atomic Energy Commission's 

Richland Operations Office. General Electric held the primary plant operating contract. Vitro Engineering provided 

engineering services, and J. A. Jones Construction Company provided minor construction services. In 1964, the Atomic 

Energy Commission decided the operation of the Hanford Site should be transferred from General Electric to several 

other contractors. By the end of 1965, the transition from essentially a single contractor to multiple contractor operation 

had been completed, and a new era had started.

The period from 1965-1987 was a time of contractual diversification at the Hanford Site. Between 1965 and 1967, 

seven contractors would take over from General Electric, who left the Hanford Site in 1967. For example in 1965, 

Battelle Memorial Institute assumed responsibility for managing the Hanford Site laboratories that had been operated by 

General Electric. These were renamed the Pacific Northwest Laboratory.
Se c t io n 1 - C oN sm vcnoN His t o r y

The selected contractors included (UW 1977):

• Pacific Northwest Laboratory: Batteile Memorial Institute-Pacific Northwest Division (BMW)

• Reactors and Fuels: Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc. (DUN), joint venture between McDonnell Douglas Aircraft 

Company and United Nuclear Corporation

• Chemical Processing: ISOCHEM, Inc. which transferred to Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company (ARCHO) in 

1967

• Support Services:

- General Services: ITT Federal Support Services (transferred to ARCHO in 1971)

- Computer Services: Computer Services Corporation (replaced by Boeing Computer Services in 1975)

- Bioassay Dosimeter Analysis: U.S. Testing Company

- Industrial Medical: Hanford Environmental Health Foundation

- Plant Engineering: Vitro Engineering, a division of Automation Industries, Inc. (replaced by Kaiser Engineers 

in 1982)

- Minor Construction: J. A. Jones Construction Company

The Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company succeeded General Electrical as prime operator at the Hanford Site in 1967.

Rockwell Hanford Operations, a component of the Atomics International Division of Rockwell International, was 

responsible for operating one of the world's largest radiochemical processing complexes at the Hanford Site. Rockwell 

succeeded Atlantic Richfield Hanford on July 1, 1977, assuming control of the reprocessing operations until 1987

(UW 1977).

The Westinghouse Hanford Company arrived at the Hanford Site in 1970 to build and operate the Fast Flux Test Facility, 

a state-of-the-art research reactor, and operate the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, a center for breeder 

technology.

In 1975, ownership of the Hanford Site was transferred from the Atomic Energy Commission to the newly established 

Energy Research and Development Agency. Two years later, DOE was established and assumed control of the Hanford 

Site.

Co n s o lid a tio n of Contracto rs

In 1985, the DOE announced it would consolidate the operations/management and engineering/construction contract at 

the Hanford Site, a process completed in 1987 with the Westinghouse Hanford Company awarded the consolidated 

management and operations contract that included control over reactor operations, fuel manufacturing, chemical 

engineering, and waste management activities. Kaiser Engineers took over the consolidated engineering/construction 

contract, and Boeing Computer Services was awarded the computer subcontract providing data processing and software 

development services.

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

Constructing facilities for processes, which were in the midst of being developed, was a major challenge. Add to that the 

schedule pressures to win the war and the need for secrecy and it is a wonder that the Hanford Site went from desert to 

the startup of the B Reactor in 1-1/2 years. That initial period of construction and the subsequent years of increasing 

production capacity and keeping the facilities and equipment in step with the latest research findings still has many 

facets to be explored. Because this narrative is a history of facilities and not intended to be the definitive history of 

construction at the Hanford Site, the details of the construction challenges, successes, and failures and the construction 

workers' perspectives could not be examined. Hopefully, this narrative w ill serve as a guide for future researchers to 

pursue more extensive study of important issues noted in this section, such as

2 - 1 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Relating the architecture or at least the construction materials to the function for the main facilities, especially 

the nuclear reactor and chemical separations facilities. For example, was reinforced concrete required for 

buildings with potentially explosive structures in them, such as the reactor buildings, or was wood used only for 

buildings with no hazardous operations in them?

Studying how the Hanford Site represents scaled-up and industrialized versions of reactors at the Oak Ridge 

Reservation

Exploring how Lieutenant General Leslie Groves persuaded E.l. Du Pont de Nemours to accept a prominent role 

at the Hanford Site
Se c t io n 2

Fuel

Ma n u fa c t u r in g

D.W. Ha r v e y

P a c i f i c N o r t h w e s t N a t i o n a l L a b o r a t o r y
Se c t io n 2 - F uel M a n u f a c t u r in g

Sec tio n 2 - Fu el M a n u fa c tu r in g

f t

f S e p a ra tin g Q u &

fDrmkg a ciatin g M aflem itm ! EjemeRtt Metal §&3Ssg*

Uranium fuel elements were the heart of the plutonium production process. The 

manufacturing of the elements was the first step in the process at the Hanford Site and one 

that illustrates the magnitude of the uncertainties that accompanied every step.

" The manufacturing o f fuel elements represented the expenditures o f vast amounts

o f research and development efforts to extrapolate on a commercial scale what...

had been purely research data. The employment o f uranium, prior to its inception in the... program, had been

confined generally to its application in small amounts; measured in grams, in the laboratory. Therefore, the

immediate fabrication o f amounts ultimately aggregating hundreds o f tons imposed an extremely difficult

assignment on the Du Pont company, and necessitated the inauguration of., .developmental programs to

determine...the influence on these o f microscopic quantities o f impurities present in uranium. Because the

factor o f speed dominated all phases o f the project...it was necessary that all developmental and experimental

work be performed simultaneously with research, design, fabrication and actual construction in the field." - 

Du Pont 1945a, pp. 356-357

Fuel fabrication workers manufactured nuclear fuel in the Hanford Site's 300 Area in the form of solid uranium pipe-like 

cylinders or fuel elements encased in aluminum cans. The fuel elements contained fissionable uranium-235, the source 

of neutrons needed to produce plutonium-239. "Slugs" was another term used for fuel elements at the Hanford Site, at 

least until the early 1950s (Weakley 1999).

The process of manufacturing fuel consisted of foundry and 

machine shop operations that converted uranium billets into fuel 

elements. Figure 2-2.1 shows the finished fuel elements. When 

completed, the fuel elements then went on to the second step in the 

plutonium production process to be irradiated in the reactors 

located in the 100 Area.

The fuel manufacturing process was a step-by-step operation 

beginning with the delivery of uranium billets to the Hanford Site. 

The uranium ore had been mined from Africa, Canada, and the 

United States. After the uranium ore was processed and delivered

, , _ , , „ , to the Hanford Site, workers stored the billets in one of the nine

Figure 2-2.1. Finished Fuel Elements, 1964

303 buildings (303-A, B, C, D, E, F, C, J, and K) 

within the 300 Area. Before the billets were sent to 

the 313 and 314 buildings to begin the fuel 

manufacturing process, inspectors tested samples of 

these billets at random in the test reactor in the 

305 Building to ensure purity and quality. The 

313 Building was the Metal Fuels Fabrication 

Building, and the 314 Building was the Metal 

Extrusion Building. For information on the 

buildings, see the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Forms for the 305 and 314 buildings and 

the Historic American Engineering Record for the 

313 Building in Appendix B on the Internet.

( O N T I N T S

Uranium Preparation......................................... 2-2.4

Fuel Manufacturing Process..........................................2-2.6

Post World War II Fuel Manufacturing

for Single-Pass Reactors...............................................2-2.14

N Reactor Fuel Element Ptocess.................................2-2.18

Commercial/Non-Defense fuel

Manufacturing...............................................................2-2.25

Recovery. Reuse, and Recycling M ethods................2-2.25

Management of Fuel Manufacturing W aste..............2-2.27

Areas for Further Research..........................................2-2.28

D ivider Page Photo: fu e l Elements f’Neg. £>20i457-3cn)

2 -2 .1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The fuel manufacturing process involved selecting billets of suitable quality to be extruded into rods, machined into 

cores, cleaned and canned in aluminum or zirconium cladding, machined and welded into finished fuel elements, and, 

finally, subjected to quality assurance testing. Fuel fabrication workers produced aluminum-clad fuel for the single-pass 

reactors in the 313 and 314 Buildings from 1944-1971, while zirconium-clad fuel production (co-extrusion process) for 

N Reactor took place in the Fuel Cladding Building (333 Building) from 1961-1988. Researchers developed the 

co-extrusion process in the 1960s in the 306-E Development, Fabrication and Test Laboratory, and fuel fabrication 

workers applied the co-extrusion process in the 333 Fuel Cladding Facility. For more information on the 306-E and 

333 buildings, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet

The mission of the 333 Building was to manufacture fuel elements for the N Reactor using the newly developed coextrusion process. Co-extrusion was an unprecedented process in which the exterior of the zirconium alloy (Zircoloy-2) 

was pressed together (co-extruded) with the uranium interior using extrusion machinery. This process fundamentally 

altered the way fuel elements had been made since World War II at the Hanford Site and throughout the rest of the 

world. Co-extrusion provided a more complete, uniform bond that was superior to the bond used in previous canned 

elements, which were subject to bubbles and other flaws between the layers. Zircoloy-2 was superior to aluminum as an 

outer layer because it could tolerate greater temperatures inside the pressurized system of the new reactor with a lower 

rate of corrosion.

Problems in obtaining a successful bonding and, therefore, canning of fuel elements had plagued the project from the 

| beginning. There was real concern that not enough canned elements would be ready for the startup of B Reactor in

1944. Even though researchers found solutions for successful bonding, distortions of the cores and blistering of the fuel 

elements continued during the post W orld War II era. Nevertheless, research and development efforts progressed to 

improve the fuel manufacturing process and metallurgical properties of the uranium metal (Weakley 1999).

Knowing that worldwide supplies of uranium were finite, the United States embarked upon a large research effort to find 

alternate supplies of reactor fuels. Researchers sought methods to stretch or diversify the uranium fuel supply for 

commercial nuclear reactors by creating oxide fuel blends. This was the result of President Eisenhower's Atoms for 

Peace program, unveiled in 1953, which envisioned nori-defense utilization of nuclear technology to fuel civilian and 

industrial power needs. The Atomic Energy Commission pursued a program o f developing alternative nuclear fuels for 

industrial and commercial uses. M ilitary defense needs still generated numerous research and development programs at 

the Hanford Site, including the initial production of tritium, which was used in hydrogen bombs.

From the beginning, the Hanford Site attempted to recover expensive and non-renewable resources such as uranium. As 

the demand for weapons-grade plutonium grew in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was important that uranium 

materials be recovered, recycled, and reused whenever possible. Development of the nuclear fuel production process as 

w ell as recovery and recycling of uranium occurred concurrently, first at the Manhattan Project sites, later at the Atomic 

Energy Commission sites and at private companies under contract with the federal government.

Public scrutiny and environmental concerns in the 1970s and early 1980s were primarily focused on reactors and their 

operation as opposed to the fuel production process. Every step in the plutonium production process at the Hanford Site, 

however, generated a considerable amount of waste and other by-products. Forty years of plutonium production 

produced a legacy o f waste that led to safety and environmental upgrades and an accelerated program to reduce 

• radioactive discharges in every operation to the lowest practicable levels. This was later expanded to cover all

j hazardous wastes. Fuel manufacturing activities, especially in the 313, 314, and 333 Buildings, generated acidic liquid

(chemical) waste from cleaning, testing, and uranium scrap processing. The environmental issues woven together with 

j the end of the Cold War shutdown the N Reactor in 1989 and with it the era of fuel manufacturing at the Hanford Site

i came to a close.

I

2 - 2 .2
Se c t io n 2 - Fu el M a n u f a c t u r in g

signilic.int TvenK: F'uvl ,m<l Target Fabrication

(adapted from DOE 1997b, p. 22)

During the Manhattan Project, fuel for the Cltnlon X-10 reactor (later Oak Ridge National Laboratory) 

and the Hanford 8 , D, and f production reactors was manufactured by companies in Detroit, Michigan; 

Columbus, Cleveland, Toledo, Warren, and Hamilton, Ohio; Fort Wayne, Indiana; Reading, New 

Kensington, and Springdale, Pennsylvania; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Chicago. Illinois.

Bv the spring of 1945, Hanford's 300 Area had assumed all of the fuel fabrication responsibilities for the 

site’s reactors except extrusion. Hanford extruded uranium rods onsite from 1946 to 1948, then shifted 

to rolled rods supplied by offsite private contractors. Hanford rolled uranium rods from 1950 to 1952. 

Hanford manufactured lithium targets for tritium production from 1949 to 1952 and again from 1965 to 

1967. The site also made bismuth targets for polonium -210 production and lead-cadmium rods used as 

a neutron-absorbing "poison" to control reactors.

The M Area at the Savannah River Site was built in 1952 lo clad and assemble fuel elements for the five 

production reactois located there.

Facilities at the Savannah River Site M Area manufactured lithium-aluminunt targets for tritium 

production and targets for manufacturing americium, curium, plutonium-238, and other isotopes. 

Uranium slug machining for Hanford and the new Savannah River Site reactors was taken over by 

FMRC at Fernaid, Ohio, which opened in 1952, and the Weldon Spring plant in Missouri which 

opened in 1956. Extrusion was performed by private contractors in Adrian, .Michigan, and moved to 

Ashtabula, O hio in 1961. Fumald produced roiled uranium rods unsite.

To meet the demands of supplying fuel for 13 oj>erating production reactors, private contractors 

continued to support Fernaid and Weldon Spring by machining uranium slugs in the 1950s.

In the 1 9 5 0 s, production reactor fuel changed in several respects: natural uranium was replaced by LEU 

flow enriched uranium), solid cylinders were replaced by tubes, and, with the opening of the \ Reactor 

at Hanford in 1963, aluminum-clad fuel was supplemented by fuel dad with zirconium.

By the time N Reactor -started up at Hanford in late 1.963. there were sufficient stocks in LEU at Eernald 

to supply the reactor w ithout requiring additional LEU from the gaseous diffusion plants.

Weldon Spring shut down in 1966, and Fernaid subsequently assumed all of the fuel fabrication

In 1968, ihe Savannah River Site converted to HEU (highly enriched uranium) fuel and DU (depleted 

uranium) targets. The HEU was supplied by recycling research, Naval and production reactor spent 

fuel and recovering the HEU at the Savannah River (Site H Canyon) and Idaho National Engineering 

Laboratory (Idaho Chemical Processing Plant). Weapons-grade HEU stored at Y-12 was also used to 

supply some fuel for the Savannah River Site reactors. Fernaid continued to supply LEU slugs tor ihe 

S Reactor and DU targets for the Savannah River Sile reactors.

Hanford's 300 Area made only N Reactoi fuel after 1971. The facilities siiul down in 1972 and later 

resumed production on N Reactor fuel in 1981.

Fuel and target fabrication at Hanford's 300 Area ceased permanently in 1987 with the closure of 

\ Reactor. Production at the Savannah River Site M Area and Fernaid ended in 1989 w ith the 

shutdown o f the last Savannah River Site reactor.
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Ur a n i u m P r e p a r a t io n

The manufacture of minute amounts of plutonium required significant quantities of uranium ore. "For each kilogram of 

plutonium made for the U.S. arsenal, miners took roughly 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the ground" (DOE 1995e,

p. 13). The uranium had to be converted into metal 

before it could be used in the production of nuclear 

fuel. Metallurgical properties of uranium were 

unknown before the Manhattan Project Most of the 

early uranium metallurgical research was 

accomplished from 1942-1943 at various research 

facilities in the United States, including the 

University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory.

Iowa State University researchers developed the 

process that became the standard for converting 

uranium ore into metal (DOE 1997e).

In addition to investigating the metallurgical properties of uranium, the scientists faced the question of enrichment. The 

early research efforts concluded that "because enriched uranium was not available in large quantities until 1945, and 

enrichment focused on producing highly enriched uranium for weapons, Manhattan Project reactors used fuel made of 

unenriched natural uranium metal" (DOE 1997e, p. 150).

"Three basic types o f production reactor fuel and targets were manufactured. Some o f the production reactors

used natural o r low-enriched uranium as fuel. The uranium-235 in the fuel sustained the chain reaction while

the uranium-238 in the fuel captured neutrons to produce plutonium. Other reactors used 'driver fuel' (made

with highly enriched uranium) and separate targets (made o f depleted uranium) for the same purposes. " -

DOE 1997e, p. 150

To have a substance that could be used by the reactors to create plutonium involved mining the uranium, refining it, and 

shaping it into a form for insertion in the reactors.

M in in g

During the Manhattan Project, the United States purchased hlgh-assay uranium ore from the Belgian Congo (Zaire), 

supplemented w ith ore concentrate from sites in Canada and the Colorado Plateau in the United States. Various 

contractors in several states refined the wartime uranium. The procurement of uranium ore in quantities sufficient for 

large-scale production of fissionable materials began when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers obtained the option to 

purchase some 1200 tons of Belgian Congo ore already in the United States and another 3000 tons in the Belgian Congo 

(Hewlett and Anderson 1972a).

By the end of 1944, the Corps had received Congo ore containing approximately 370 tons of uranium oxide. At the 

same time, the Eldorado Mining and Refining Company in Canada had produced about 400 tons of uranium oxide. "The 

first imported uranium, high-grade pitchblende ore containing up to 65 percent uranium oxide by weight, was milled 

both in Canada and by domestic contractors" (DOE 1997e, p. 19).

Uranium mining expanded dramatically after World War II, from 38,000 tons of ore in 1948 to 5.2 m illion tons in 1958 - 

nearly all of it for nuclear weapons production. The domestic uranium industry began to supply significant quantities of 

uranium ore to plutonium production facilities, like the Hanford Site, shortly after the end of World War II. A ll total, the 

United States mined about 60 m illion tons of ore to produce uranium during the Cold War era. By the early 1950s, more 

than 400 uranium mines had opened in the United States, primarily in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and 

Wyoming. Imported uranium was purchased in the form of already mixed concentrates and high-grade ores. Domestic 

uranium was purchased as either ore or concentrate (DOE 1997e).

"M o rkvi - ,if thv I vi th iltl uranium i nim di i.. < » m v rlv d

h u n ih rih o i to n - til tita n iu m h v \a ilu a ri(lr (thv I,til-, lio m

llw vnrn h n w n t p io r in to u i.m iu n i a lt' < n - /.i/-

Ih v -v < r i <-/.)/- i t (■/«.' h lr m h tl w ith m .iy n il-/u r» u i.v u ilr- and

I t (in h fif in a th v n n \tu iv /y m fi'-, < o n w rlim i the

"ii'v n .-a /t in to ur.uuum m vtal. *>onw m th i- m rta l n.i«.

m adv in to rv.n tor m vl.. un pln tn n in m p io d u t h im /<wt lot -S p il 

H a n fu rd a n d >a\ann,ih R iw t IXlL |>. 11
Se c t io n 2 - F uel M a n u f a c t u r in g

Re f in in g

Mining and refining the uranium involved "extracting uranium ore from the earth's crust and chemically processing it to 

prepare uranium concentrate, sometimes called uranium octaoxide or yellow" (DOE 1997e, p. 19). Uranium ores and 

concentrates were sampled and assayed to determine uranium content, as well as impurities and the existence of other 

constituents. Uranium mills shipped the yellowcake to plants that refined the concentrate into forms suitable for several 

different roles in weapons production, roles different from the Hanford Site mission. One facility was the Fernald Plant in 

Ohio, where thousands o f tons of uranium were refined and sent to the enrichment plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; 

Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. (DOE 1997e).

Improvements in the efficiency of uranium ore production progressed during the Cold War period. Uranium 

accountability was improved in order to upgrade environmental and worker safety, economical usage of the substance, 

and national security. For instance, by the early 1970s, approximately 40-60 pounds of uranium a year were recovered 

from used pre-braze acid solutions and recycled back to the vendor (Vinther 1996, Tokarz 1984).

During the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission built government-owned uranium refineries in Fernald, Ohio and 

Weldon Spring, Missouri. The two sites produced ingots of natural, low-enriched and depleted uranium. The ingots 

were extruded into billets for shipment to the Hanford and Savannah River sites for cladding and assembly. The 

extrusion was performed by Bridgeport Brass Company in Adrian> Michigan from 1954-1961 and then by its corporate 

successor, Reactive Metals, inc., in Ashtabula, Ohio (DOE 1997e).

Uranium concentrates were refined or chemically converted to purified forms suitable as feed materials for the next step 

in the process. "Examples of these feed material [sic} were uranium hexafluoride for enrichment at gaseous diffusion 

plants, and uranium tetrafluoride, or metal, for fuel and target fabrication. Refining.,.also involves the recycling of 

various production scraps, production residues, and uranium recovered from fuel processing" (DOE 1997e, p. 20).

De l iv e r y of Billets

The form of the uranium arriving at the Hanford Site changed in the early years. Initially in October 1943, the uranium 

arrived in the form o f extruded rods from offsite suppliers. Beginning November 1944 with the expectation of installing a 

press to extrude rods from billets, the uranium was shipped to the Hanford Site as billets (Gerber 1992c). The press was 

installed early 1945.

To transport the uranium billets from the Fernald Plant to the Hanford Site's rail yard (the Riverland Classification Yard) 

near the present site of Vernita Bridge, E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company contracted with the Chicago, Milwaukee, 

St. Paul and Pacific Railroad to move them under military guard. (See the section on Site Security for information on 

security procedures to protect shipments). The billets, which measured 4.5 inches in diameter, 12-20 inches in length, 

and weighed at a minimum 125 pounds, were then transported by government railroad from the Riverland Yard to the 

300 Area. Until the railroad line from the Riverland Yard to the 300 Area was completed, the uranium billets were 

transferred to the 300 Area by semi-trailer trucks. In the 300 Area, the billets were unloaded onto flatbed trucks and 

moved to the 303 Fresh Metal Storage buildings.

During storage, the rods and after November 1944 the billets were inspected for correct measurements and components. 

Sample billets were taken from the material in storage and tested at the 305 Test Reactor/Hot Cell Verification Building 

for purity. The test reactor functioned as a quality assurance tool to test samples of graphite, uranium, aluminum tubes 

and canning materials (for fuel rod jackets), and other materials to be used in the Hanford Site production reactors. 

"Measurements of material purity using instrumentation and calculation were too time consuming for wartime schedules. 

Therefore, actual performance tests of material purity using samples in a reactor were deemed necessary"

(Gerber 1992c, p. 63).

The reactivity of uranium samples tested in the 305 Building against samples of known purity could be used to predict a 

sample's efficiency if loaded in a full-scale production reactor. Fuel impurity tests consisted of artificially poisoning the

2 - 2 .5
I F ^ Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

uranium fuel elements with one to four layers of copper foil to determine the effect on radioactivity. As needed, the 

billets that passed the test would be transferred to the 313 and 314 buildings to begin the fuel manufacturing process.

Billets found not fit for irradiation in the 100 Area reactors were brought back to the 303 Buildings to be cleaned,

re-measured and inspected for possible reuse. For information on the 303-A Building, see the Historic Property Inventory 

Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

M a t e r ia l Ac c o u n ta b ility

"As might be expected of any program involving the fabrication of more than 1500 tons of a rare and expensive metal, 

strict and adequate controls had to be instituted and maintained to account for all uranium on hand at the various 

locations, whether it be in the form of cast billets, fabricated pieces, finished elements, or scrap" (Du Pont 1945a, 

p. 364).

When the boxes of uranium rods/billets were 

delivered to the 303 buildings, they were weighed 

and checked against the shipping invoices. "Each 

billet was assigned a number that w ould be a part of 

the subsequent fuel rod as it moved through the 

entire fabrication process" (Kubik 1997, p. 21). The 

uranium was weighed to make sure it matched the 

weight given by the vendor.

During machining, small chips and fines of uranium 

(tiny, dust-like particles from the m illing and other 

processes) were produced as scrap. The weight of such scrap, rejected cores, and processed cores was carefully tracked 

against the billet's original weight. A t the end of each day, reports were submitted to the various Hanford Site 

departments showing yield summaries for each uranium billet and accounting for all of the uranium (Kubik 1997).

Fu e l Ma n u f a c t u r in g P r o c e s s

Because fuel manufacturing was the least likely of the production processes to experience a serious accident, it was 

considered safe enough to be located near populated areas like Richland. Therefore, the fuel manufacturing facilities 

were built much closer to Richland than the areas where the reactors and chemical separations facilities were located.

The manufacturing of nuclear fuel took place in the 300 Area 

(Figure 2-2.2). It was known initially as the Meta! Fabrication and 

Testing Area and consisted primarily of facilities for manufacturing 

uranium fuel elements and testing samples of graphite 

(DOE 1997e). The fuel manufacturing process included the m illing 

of metallic uranium billets obtained from offsite production facilities 

into fuel elements in the form of pipe-like cylinders. The uranium 

billets were extruded into rods. The rods were extruded, outgassed, 

and straightened in the 314 Building (Figure 2-2.3). The rods were 

transferred to the 313 Building (Figure 2-2.4) for machining into 

cores and canning the cores into fuel elements. The fuel elements 

were trimmed to the specified diameter and cut to the required 

length in a series of turret lathes. Then they were subjected to a 

final testing in the 305 Test Reactor prior to being sent to the 

100 Areas for irradiation in the reactors. Figure 2-2.5 shows cross 

sections of two fuel elements.

Figure 2-2.2. Aerial View o f the 300 Area in

1944 Looking Northeast

"'In Lite 1*1“ I. (ic n c ia l I I n h it in stitu te d a -ta lis liia l .im .i/w *

system that allo w e d a itw iv w o f the \ endot ’•* tita n iu m fue l to ie

ju ra n iu m in u n i> w enihl* to he lO in p a te d w ith ih n -r o i the

le t e h e t ■- tita n iu m fue l to t t* I hat \e,u ,i t o n ifia ih o n ot

tn e i one m illio n tita n iu m fue l elem ent* rc\e a le d a w eight

diffe re nt e o f .0 1 4 '.. between the fue l elem ent* i i o i i i

le rn a lfl d itto to the same lu e l elem ent* le t eixed at lla n io rtl. " -

2 - 2 .6
Sec tio n 2 - Fuel M anufacturing

Ea r l y Fu el Ma n u fa c tu r in g Efforts

Early on, scientists came to the conclusion that "...uranium could 

be extruded, and though little else was known of its physical 

characteristics, it was agreed that production of the slugs [fuel 

elements] should start from extruded material. By June 1943, 

extrusion had been demonstrated to a point where it was no 

longer experimental, but nevertheless was still capable of 

considerable improvement" (Du Pont 19451945a, pp. 366-367).

Along w ith the extrusion process, researchers needed to address 

how to package the uranium for it to be irradiated. Uranium is 

very reactive with water. Water both corrodes the uranium metal 

and forms rapidly expanding uranium oxides that distort its shape. 

To prevent corrosion and distortion and, more importantly, to 

"prevent the release of highly radioactive fission products into the 

coolant" and subsequently into the Columbia River, the uranium 

fuel needed to be "canned" (DOE 1997e, p. 150).

Early research efforts focusing on different methods for canning 

the fuel elements took place at the Metallurgical Laboratory in 

Chicago. The laboratory was "actively engaged in 

developing...aluminum-silicon bonding, zinc bonding and the 

unbonded canning processes. The process most favored was the 

aluminum-silicon bond. In addition, a request was made...to 

install equipment...for the canning of unbonded slugs [fuel 

elements]. This line...was to be...installed for developmental 

purposes and as insurance against failure to produce a 

satisfactorily bonded slug" (Du Pont 1945a, pp. 218-219). As 

time went on, the aluminum-silicon process improved to the 

point where the zinc bonding process was abandoned by October 

1944 (Du Pont 1945a).

"Crawford Creenewalt, Du Pont's technical liaison with the

Metallurgical Laboratory and later president o f Du Pont, 

"agreed to build a small slug-production unit at Wilmington

in an effort to translate the more promising canning

techniques into a process which w ould be practical on a

large scale. In the meantime...several bonding schemes

showed promise... [including] the possibility o f developing an

unbonded, canned slug or even a coated slug which would

withstand the extreme operating conditions in the Hanford

piles [reactors]. During 1943, the Metallurgical Laboratory

investigated a variety o f bonding methods. The two principal

methods involved using an aluminum-silicon alloy as the

bonding material between slug [core] and can and

incorporating a zinc bond in a special canning technique. In

each process, there were hundreds o f variables in applying

the bond and inserting the slug [core] in the can. By the

beginning o f 7 944, some line o f development had to be

established if the company was to have enough slugs to start

the B pile [reactor] in August, [but] it was extremely difficult

Figure 2 -2.3. Metallurgical Engineering Laboratory

(314 Building) in 1944/1945 Looking Northeast

i ST.. k, S~u28

Figure 2 -2.4. M etal Fuels Fabrication Facility

(313 Building) in 1943/1944 Looking Northeast

usoiMorw* masfCWDM

W R t W K tt'R iffM

iuwmcAS

AL-S! BRAZE

Figure 2 -2.5. Cross Sections o f Two Fuel Elements

2 - 2 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

to achieve an uniform distribution o f the bond, which was necessary to avoid hot spots on the slug surface. In

fact, some o f the best minds at Chicago were convinced that the unbonded slug would be the most easily

fabricated and the most reliable. Creenewalt readily admitted the complications o f bonding, but he saw its

distinct advantages too. Not only would the bond facilitate heat removal from the slug, but the bond itself

would protect the uranium from corrosion and swelling even if the can did leak.” - Hewlett and Anderson 

1972a, pp. 223-224

Despite intensive experimentation at laboratories across the country to develop a process to manufacture fuel elements, 

progress at coming up w ith a reliable production system was discouragingly slow during the winter of 1943-1944.

Du Pont concluded that the widely dispersed laboratories were amassing a lot of data but not developing a process. 

Accordingly in March 1944, they transferred to the Hanford Site all Wilmington experimental fuel element operations as 

well as most of the Du Pont engineers at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. Du Pont's plan was to eventually 

locate all fuel manufacturing steps, from uranium billets to finished fuel elements, at the Hanford Site.

Initially, though, work was limited to the 

experimental canning processes. The first fuel 

jacketing equipment to go into operation was 

known as the experimental line. This equipment 

included an electric heater press to heat and bond 

the uranium fuel cores to their aluminum jackets. 

However, the heaters burned out frequently, did 

not heat the cores and cans to consistent 

temperatures, and did not produce a uniform 

bonding. This problem was serious because nonuniform bonding caused thin places in the 

jacketing that, under irradiation, heated up more 

than other places. These hot spots could cause 

fuel element ruptures in the reactors 

(Gerber 1992c).

Du Pont and the Corps were deeply concerned 

over the lack of progress in solving the problems 

of fuel manufacturing in the 300 Area. In 

retrospect, it is hard to imagine how tens of 

thousands of fuel elements needed for the first 

loading of the reactor were ever completed on time. Walter Simon, Hanford Site chemist, and the Site's first operations 

manager, described the situation: "One of the most difficult problems...was the making of uranium fuel slugs [elements]. 

The uranium was held in an aluminum can, a slug [fuel element], about eight inches long and [an] inch and five-eighths 

in diameter. The can had to fit very tightly with no air space or bubbles. They couldn't leak because if water got into the 

uranium it destroyed the ability to react" (Sanger 1995, pp. 153-154).

Frustration increased at the Hanford Site over the lack of progress in solving the fuel element manufacturing problems. 

The crisis over fuel element manufacturing was not unexpected, it had been long assumed that the development and 

production of fuel elements was the most critical job facing the project, but the future of the Hanford Site was uncertain 

as long as the success of the canning process was not determined. "As a safety measure, the Army [Corps of Engineers] 

had contracted with a Chicago manufacturer to fabricate one charge of unbonded slugs for B pile [reactor]." However, 

Du Pont "finally succeeded in concentrating at Hanford the last remnants of the canning operations previously located in 

Chicago, Cleveland, and W ilm ington" (Hewlett and Anderson 1972a, pp. 303-304) and with that came a solution to the 

uniform bonding problem of the fuel elements.

‘ The iits t e \p e i im e iita l um ninn operations v a rie d in thv

U } huddini; at lla n io rd on Xf.in h JO. I U44. I ho d e w lo p m e n t lino

io n *is te d u t little m o ii' lh .it j sent1- o i open tanks in w h u h -i ii/co l opeiators dipped l I i isle t* o i nun h ined sinus jiu e l elem ents!...in

m olten h ro n /e , I hi. and ■\l-i>i. s im e the le m p c ra lu ir. < tnupo*dhm

and duration o r oa th dip were extrem e!* ir iliia l. the operators had

ereat d im m lt> in ath ie xin n u n ifo rm results oi de le i tin*; ta u lt\

slut’s \fto i the fina l d ip the sluti* it o ris ! m c i v to n e ti in to the

alum inum ta n * w ith In d r ju lii presses, a lin k \ p i o re * % that

p ro d u i ed a lam e nutnhet o f rejects. Thv n v \t step n n o lv e d endin m m iiii’ and the < o m p lit ated task o f ar<-w eldini* the alum inum

< ,i/i Ho the i a n i in an ar**on atm osphere. ( om plefeh a m anual

itpe talinn. the w elding step required weeks o f training to . i t / w i r

reasonable results. \ \ hen the end had been rac o il and ma< lunetl.

(he slugs ii ore *uh(et to d to a series ,yv tests to detexl u e ld failures,

pinholes m l.u k ni honcl u n ifu rm it\. In the tiis t tw o weeks the\

sin < eeded in t annin^ a to ta l o i th n l\ -s/x sheas. and none ot these

fonkivia< ic p la b lr.lieu left «m<l Vider-nii I V J .i, pp. 2J4-JJ~

2 - 2 .8
Se c t io n 2 - Fuel Ma n u f a c t u r in g

Dr. Raymond Grills, a chemist from 

Illinois, and his associate Ed Smith, 

were assigned to the Hanford Site 

by Du Pont to study uranium 

canning and come up with a 

solution.

Leona Marshall Libby, one of the 

few female scientists on the 

Manhattan Project, toured the fuel 

element canning operations in the 

300 Area with Enrico Fermi, who 

had achieved the world's first selfsustained nuclear reaction, and 

observed:

( Irilb "/iff/f■</ f/i.rf thv w/i-cu i <•••■.//// M*.

j)l c i rn ii it ,1 p v rii-i ll\ 1 1 rij < (Mfinii. in

(In id l'd In lt \ thv w hale f.i/i/i/nu n/u*i

oiirf.Kr1 o i ih v m olten -itlrler. 7In* m.»i

sid ci o f ih v slug mvi1 u f'u h i fin/» in*

f ,////' *u hn ivriicd f/ir •./»» /(/nv*; /«

fi/i'd la i .in it h ru v .ith the •*>in'.u i1...»■»

i*ii(ifA u iu fa iin hv.it ti.m ^ ii'i Hat llu 71

h u n w d .1 hnlv thioui>h the alum inum

lii]iu d in the hath u .ii •>/> /m;/i f/i.if it n

ofw rA liiH i w o uld h a w f» in* iVdiiv

f/i/o i/iin*: f/ic if*/ ttnd i/iiti Itntkvd ijfiiu

,i < .mm/ii; ff( ii/ii(/iif /i.if/ /ii'i'/i ih u /k/

" We passed great vats of

melted tin, eutectic, and

cookbook flux in which the

slugs [cores] were being heated, after which they were plucked out with forceps, fitted to the open end o f empty

thin-walled aluminum cans, inserted in presses, and crump, the can folded up like an accordion. The problem

was solved over the next 24 hours - by one o f the production line crew. The metal solder into which the

uranium slug [core] was dipped melted a couple degrees below the temperature at which the aluminum can

melted. The temperature o f the solder was held constant at these few degrees difference, the slug [core] and the

can were soaked in tin, and then the slug [core] was slid into the can while both were immersed in liquid solder.

It was called underwater canning." - Libby 1979, p. 176

Once the problem of canning the cores was solved, the production line for canned fuel elements made a round-the-clock 

effort and produced thousands of fuel elements needed for the start-up of B Reactor. Fortunately for the fuel 

manufacturing team, minor adjustments and changes to the completion of B Reactor delayed the entire project for 

several weeks, which gave the team additional time to catch up. The yields of acceptable fuel elements went up, and the 

number of failures in autoclave tests declined even more sharply. Thus, an adequate number of bonded fuel elements 

were ready for the first reactor charge. The canning crisis was over, and Du Pont felt confident they had enough fuel 

elements to supply all three reactors.

313 an d 314 B u ild in g s

The first steps in the fuel manufacturing process occurred in the 313 Metal Fuels Fabrication Building and the 314 Metal 

Extrusion Building where the fuel cores were manufactured and jacketed. For information about these buildings, see the 

Historic American Engineering Record for the 313 Building and the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the

314 Building in Appendix B on the Internet. The two buildings had equipment for the extrusion, outgassing, and 

straightening of the uranium rods, machining them into short cylinders (cores), canning the cores, and testing the 

resulting fuel elements in preparation for use in the transmutation process.

Completed in the autumn of 1943, the 313 Building was the Hanford Site's original fuel manufacturing facility and 

produced fuel for the Hanford Site's eight single-pass reactors from 1944-1971. Its primary mission originally was to 

extrude and machine uranium rods to specific dimensions required for the cores, jacket or can the cores, and test the 

jackets for proper bonding and sealing. Until the 314 Building was completed and the press for extruding billets into 

rods installed in it, the first uranium billets were extruded into rods offsite and the rods sent to the Hanford Site for 

completion of the process. With eight additions in 1944, the 313 Building contained three fuel-jacketing areas, a 

welding area, a fuel jacket (can) cleaning area, and a control room (Gerber 1993b).

2 - 2 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The 314 Building was completed in 1944. After the 1000-ton extrusion press was installed in the 314 Building in early 

1945, the 313 and 314 buildings assumed all of the fuel manufacturing responsibilities. The press allowed the Hanford 

Site to process raw uranium billets into extruded rods that were suitable for manufacturing into fuel cores. The uranium 

billets were taken to the 314 Building to be extruded into rods, then outgassed and straightened. The rods were then 

transferred to the 313 Building for machining the rods into cores. Bate uranium rods were lathed into cores that were 

then canned (called the jacketing or canning process) in a triple dip bath procedure that involved first coating them with 

bronze, then tin, and finally an aluminum-silicon braze (Gerber 1992c). They were then marked with a fluoroscope, 

end-machined, stamped with identification numbers, and had end caps welded on. A final etching in a compound of 

hydrofluoric acid and nitric acid, followed by a methanol rinse, completed the fabrication process. Three final quality 

assurance tests were conducted. The first one (the frost test) took place in the 313 Building, and the final two, autoclave 

and radiograph testing, took place in the314 Building (Gerber 1992c). If a fuel element passed the autoclave test, it then 

underwent a final radiograph (x-ray) test in the 314 Building to detect porosity in the end weld bead. Any porosity could 

have become a pathway for water to contact the uranium core and cause the fuel element to rupture (Gerber 1992c).

The extrusion of uranium rods took place in the 314 Building until 19^8 when the process shifted to rolled uranium rods 

supplied by offsfte private contractors. Although its mission and equipment changed, the 314 Building continued to 

straighten the uranium rods and took over the autoclave and radiograph equipment from the 313 Building to test the 

canned fuel elements, in addition, the 314 Building staff conducted uranium scrap processing operations until the 

closure of the single-pass reactors and end of fuel element preparation activities in the 300 Area (Gerber 1992c).

By 1954, the canning method had changed to a lead-dip 

process (Weakley 1999). By the late 1960s, a Hot Die Size 

(nickel-plating) canning process had just been developed 

when fuel manufacturing operations ceased in the 313 and 

314 buildings in 1971 when the Atomic Energy 

Commission ordered the shut down of all reactors.

Fu e l M a n u fa c tu r in g Process -

St e p - b y -Ste p

The fuel manufacturing process for the single-pass reactors 

at the Hanford Site consisted of extrusion, outgassing, 

straightening, machining, triple dip baths, cleaning, 

canning, final machining, quality assurance, and 

autoclaving. Figure 2-2.6 shows the fuel manufacturing 

process for reactors at the Hanford Site from 1945-J 954.

Extrusion, Outgassing, and Straightening

The uranium billets were taken from storage in the 

303 buildings and transferred to the 314 Building for the 

first steps of the fuel manufacturing process: extrusion, 

outgassing, and straightening. Metallic uranium, in the 

form of billets about 4-1/2 inches in diameter and 12 to 

2 0 inches in length, were heated in a muffle-like furnace in 

an inert gas (argon) atmosphere to about 1700 degrees 

Fahrenheit. The uranium billets were extruded into rods 

measuring 1.5 inches in diameter by 12 to 14 feet in length 

by the high powered hydraulic press, and then through a 

die (Du Pont 1945c). Figure 2-2.7 shows a billet being 

loaded onto an extrusion press.

Figure 2 -2.6. Fuel Manufacturing Process for Reactors at

the Hanford Site from 1945-1954

2 - 2 .1 0
Se c t io n 2 - Fu el M a n u f a c t u r in g

"A t the start o f the [extrusion] process, workers preheated uranium billets in a rotary electric resistance furnace.

They quickly placed the hot billet into the extrusion container after brushing or flattening it as necessary to

remove rough or swollen spots. A hydraulic ram pushing against a block at the back o f the billet forced the hot

metal through a die at high pressure. In about ten seconds, the extrusion press formed a 20 inch long,

200 pound billet into a 14 foot long rod. Workers quickly straightened and quenched the finished rod in water.

They removed the unextruded butt end o f the billet from the press and recycled it as scrap." - DOE 1997e,

p. 151

After the extrusion, the rod was outgassed and straightened. The 

outgassing and straightening procedures, which began in the 

314 Building in September 1944, were essential to prevent the cores 

from distorting in the reactors. The rods received a preliminary 

straightening manually, were quenched in water, and then 

outgassed to remove hydrogen frorri the metal to prevent formation 

of gas pockets or bulky chemical compounds of uranium and 

hydrogen, either of which might result in serious difficulties in the 

reactor operation. After outgassing, the rods received a final 

straightening in a mechanical device and were then ready for 

machining (Du Pont 1945c).

Machining

The Hanford Site began machining uranium rods on turret lathes in 

December 1943 (Du Pont 1944) in the 313 Building. The rods 

came from outside sources until the 314 Building was completed

and could begin supplying the rods. The uranium fuel rods fabricated from billets in the 314 Building were machined in 

the 313 Building. If the fuel rods were too rough, they were scrapped or returned to the 303 buildings for storage and 

possible future use (Weakley 1999). Extruded or rolled uranium fuel rods, 12-14 feet long and averaging 1.5 inches in 

diameter, had to be cut and finished into 8 -inch long, 1.36-inch diameter cores with tight tolerances. To do this, a 

machinist finished one rough end of an outgassed, straightened uranium core on a lathe. Then he used the lathe to 

reduce the core to its proper diameter, cut off the core to its proper length, finished the cut end of the core, and rounded 

off the corners. During this process, a large flow of coolant prevented the uranium chips from igniting.

After the cores were machined and visually inspected for surface flaws, "they were placed in baskets and moved by an 

electric hoist and a monorail to the degreasing tanks, where the dirt and oils from shipping, handling and machining 

were removed. After inspection to assure [sic] that there were no serious defects which would adversely affect pile 

[reactor] operations and to make certain that the slugs [cores] were within the dimensional limits of tolerance, they were 

given an acid bath for removal of any grease which may be on the surfaces" (Du Pont 1945a).

The cores were then dipped in a boiling vapor degreasing solvent, rinsed in cold solvent and dried in hot solvent vapors. 

As each core was degreased, it became coated with a thin oxide film that had to be removed by immersion in a hot 

pickling solution of 80% nitric acid. The cores were then water rinsed, dried, and given a visual quality assurance and 

quickly moved to the triple dip bath (UPOA 1977a).

Triple Dip Baths

Beginning in August 1944, the uranium cores in the 313 Building were jacketed in a triple dip method that consisted of 

bathing them in molten bronze, tin, and then a molten aluminum-silicon mixture. Each of the three baths randomized 

the shape and the size of the uranium grains. This process helped prevent core distortion and swelling in the reactor 

(Gerber 1992c).

Figure 2-2.7. Loading a Billet onto an Extrusion

Press, 1984

2 -2 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The first of the three metallic baths in the triple dip process was a bronze bath. An operator used tongs to dip and agitate 

each core in the bronze bath for 45 seconds. The bath was used to bring the core up to a uniform temperature, called 

the uranium beta phase. At this temperature, the core would alloy with the bronze, and a thin coat of the bronze would 

adhere to the bare and cleaned uranium core (UPOA 1977a, Gerber 1992c).

W ithin 5 seconds of the bronze bath, the core was taken to the second bath where it was washed free of molten bronze 

from the bronze bath by dipping it into a tin bath for 45 seconds. The tin bath was made of 99.9 percent tin with 

0.1 percent aluminum added to prevent the tin from oxidizing (Kubik 1997, UPOA 1977a). The tin bath cooled the core 

to the uranium alpha phase and removed the excess bronze (Gerber 1992c, Kubik 1997). Following the tin bath, the 

core was taken to the centrifuge, set vertically in a rack and spun to remove the excess tin (UPOA 1977a).

The third and last bath was a blend of 8 8 percent aluminum and 

12 percent silicon. This blend was a standard eutectic alloy that 

Du Pont purchased in ingots. The aluminum-silicon bath acted as 

the key bonding agent between the uranium core and the 

aluminum can and cap (UPOA 1977a, Kubik 1997).

The lead-dip process, a simpler canning scheme, replaced the triple 

dip process in 1954. "The lead dip process had two principal 

advantages over the triple dip process: (1 ) canning costs were 

lower because fewer operations and less equipment were required, 

and (2 ) the structure and properties of the uranium metal were 

essentially unchanged in the canning process, thus the uranium 

metal retained its desired properties obtained during fabrication 

and heat treatment of the uranium" (Ballinger and Hall 1991, 

pp. 2 .2 -2 .3).

Canning

The next step in the process was the vital one of coating and 

canning each core. The resulting fuel elements had to meet the 

"most rigid requirements with respect to materials and tightness.

The materials of which the can is made must have a very low 

absorptive capacity for neutrons; they must possess a high 

resistance to corrosion by the action of water; and they must be 

able to transmit the tremendous amount of heat generated in the 

uranium slug [core] to the surrounding cooling water" (Du Pont 

1945c, p. 7).

Triple-Dip Canning Process

Bare Uranium Cores

I Hanford Test Reactor (

|core Cleaning & Inspection]

I Bronze Bath I

Tin Bath Aluminum Components

y —

Centrifuge

Canning Furnace

Cleaning & Inspection

3

Water Quench

Can-Sleeve Assembly I

Steel SleeveClearting {

Marking Fluoroscope

End Facing

- -----

Stamping

End Welding

Frost Test Spray

(ACENAPHTHENE IN C C ^}

" ...............

Frost Test

T

Frost Removal

Fuel Element Etch

Weld Inspection

........

Autoclave Testing — * .

Final Inspection

Radiograph

— r — Storage & Shipping

In 1943, the only materials known that would meet the canning 

requirements were aluminum and an aluminum-silicon alloy. The 

can had to be perfectly tight and bonded because uranium is very

reactive with water. The failure of a single fuel element would stop the flow of cooling water, necessitating the complete 

abandonment of an entire reactor area. A tight fit or bonding was needed to prevent the fission by-product elements 

formed in the core from being washed away by the cooling water resulting in serious radioactive contamination of the 

reactor area and the Columbia River.

Development of sealed cans that would allow sufficient cooling of the uranium cores was a difficult task. The steps in 

the canning process were performed under precisely controlled conditions of temperature, time, and materials purity. 

"Each slug [core] is coated with bronze and then with tin by dipping in baths; this is followed by centrifuging for removal 

of excess tin. After a dip in the aluminum-silicon bath, the canning operation is performed by inserting the fuel element

2 - 2 .1 2
Se c t io n 2 - F uel M a n u f a c t u r in g

[core] into an aluminum can below the surface of another 

aluminum-silicon bath followed by the placing of an aluminum top 

cap" (Du Pont 1945g, p. 8 ). The aluminum can was contained in a 

steel sleeve that held the shape and dimensions of the core during 

the high temperatures of the canning phase and protected the outer 

surface from the molten aluminum-silicon. The assembly was 

quenched in cool water and the steel sleeve and excess 

aluminum-silicon were removed (UPOA 1977a). Figure 2-2.8 

shows the cleaning area with the uranium fuel elements and 

aluminum cans inside sleeves on a conveyor belt.

The aluminum cans, caps, and steel sleeves were cleaned and 

inspected before use in the Canning process. Aluminum caps and 

cans were vapor degreased, cleaned in a sodium dichromate 

solution; followed by a methanol dip and air drying (Weakley 

1999). Steel sleeves surrounding each can were cleaned in sodium 

hydroxide (Kubik 1997). Each can, cap and sleeve then underwent 

a final visual quality check before being sent to the canning lines 

(UPOA 1977a).

a m

i '■ '■ „ Tie

Figure 2-2.8. Cleaning Area with the Uranium

Fuel Elements (left) and Aluminum Cans in

Sleeves (right) on a Conveyor Belt, 1964

To improve the bond between the core and the can, the inside of the aluminum can was degreased, cleaned, and etched 

(Weakley 1999). A solution of 20 percent hydrogen phosphoric acid was poured in the can and allowed to stand for five 

minutes before it was rinsed. Next it was cleaned, first w ith a degreasing solvent and then with an aqueous wash 

solution. After that, the aluminum end cap was machined and brazed on, and the finished fuel element was etched in 

nitric acid.

Final Machining

Following canning, the ends were machined to marks made under a fluoroscope, which ensured an equal amount of 

aluminum at each end for heat transfer and a minimum of aluminum to prevent excess neutron absorption (Du Pont 

1945c). Fluoroscopic examination o f the fuel elements also measured the precise thickness o f the aluminum cans and 

caps and the aluminum-silicon bonding inside the can, and compared the total thickness to the placement of the core in 

the can (UPOA 1977a). "After degreasing, the top cap is then welded to the can by means of an argon shielded arc to 

assure [sic] maximum freedom from leaks" (Du Pont 1945g, p. 8 ).

Quality Assurance

At each step of the fuel manufacturing process, the cores, canning components, materials, tools, equipment, and baths 

were all carefully subjected to a rigorous, visual check. After final machining and welding, inspections, testing, and a 

quality assurance of each canned fuel element were performed to "assure [sic] acceptance only of those which meet the 

specifications for surface defects, dimensions and warpage, penetration of aluminum-silicon through the aluminum can, 

and bonding of the uranium slug [core] to the can" (Du Pont 1945g, p. 8 ). The fully automatic, bond and penetration 

testers separated out the fuel elements not passing the test. These testers examined the fuel elements "internally and 

externally for completeness of bonding and for residual aluminum jacket wall thickness" (Weakley 1958, p. A-44).

The finished fuel elements then underwent three tests. The first was the Frost Test, used to detect defects in the 

aluminum-silicon bonding. The test consisted first of cleaning and spraying canned fuel elements with acenaphthene 

mixed with carbon tetrachloride and heated to test the bond between the fuel element and the can. The acenaphthene 

left a white film or frost on the fuel element that gave the test its name. The fuel elements were then passed through a 

heated induction coil. Defects in the fuel element or in the aluminum-silicon bonding caused the fuel element's surface 

temperature to rise, melting the acenaphthene's frosty film and visually revealing any defects as a shiny area (Du Pont 

1945d, Gerber 1992c, Weakley 1999). Once the fuel elements were defrosted, the acenaphthene was removed with

2 - 2 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

trichloroethylene. The fuel elements then underwent a second test, an Etch Test, where the fuel elements were etched for 

1 0 minutes in a solution of nitric acid. If this procedure revealed gas bubbles or nonbonded spots on the aluminum can 

where the aluminum-silicon bonding materia! might have penetrated the can and weakened it, the fuel element then 

would be rejected and sent back through a recycling process.

The canned fuel elements were then given a visual inspection for dimensional specifications, weld quality, and surface 

flaws, and if the bonding had been completed successfully, they were transferred to the steam autoclaves (Du Pont 

1945d, Kubik 1997).

Autoclaving

The third and final test was insertion into a pressurized autoclave. The fuel elements were heated in a steam autoclave in 

the 314 Building to test for leaks. The fuel elements were loaded into wire baskets and lowered into the autoclaves 

where they were subjected to steam pressure of 100 pounds per square inch for 40 hours. The steam pressure in the 

autoclave, in combination with undetected defects in any part of the fuel manufacturing process, caused the defective 

fuel elements to burst (Du Pont 1945d). The fuel elements passing the autoclave test were then radiographed to check 

the porosity of the weld and then subjected to a final visual assurance test before the canned fuel elements were taken to 

the 100 Area reactors (UPOA 1977a). By the end of World War II, canning quality was such that fewer than one failure 

occurred per 2000 fuel elements surviving the inspections and tests (Du Pont ?945g).

Quantity Requirements

Along w ith strict quality assurance requirements, there were several quantity requirements. The following indicates the 

magnitude of the fuel manufacturing and canning processes: "more than 1250 tons of billets were required for the initial 

charging of the three piles [reactors]; more then 130 tons of billets were required for normal placement each month; 

more than 2 1 0 , 0 0 0 canned slugs [fuel elements] were required for the three initial charges; and, finally, more than 

23,000 canned slugs were required each month after routine operations had been established" (Du Pont 1945g, p. 8 ).

P o s t W o r ld W a r II F u e l M a n u f a c t u r i n g f o r S i n g l e -

P a s s R e a c t o r s

Fu el Ma n u fa c tu r in g Ch a ng es

In the 5 years following the successful production of the first plutonium at the Hanford Site, Du Pont and its successor, 

General Electric, continued to improve the fuel manufacturing process. Some of the changes were meant to improve the 

process, some were meant to improve plutonium production, and others were meant to use the fuel manufacturing 

materials more economically. One means was by attempting to vary the fuel element dimensions to minimize the 

distortions (see Figure 2-2.1).

The fuel manufacturing process went through numerous changes after W orld War II, most notably in the 313 and 

314 buildings. The Hanford Site stopped extruding uranium rods in 1948, switching to rolled rods from offsite suppliers 

as the rolling of uranium rods was found to be a less expensive process and possessed metallurgical advantages over 

earlier fabrication efforts (DOE 1997b).

By 1950, the Hanford Site began making rolled uranium rods when a rolling m ill was installed in the 314 Building. But 

the process in the 314 Building was short-lived. The follow ing year, the Atomic Energy Commission shifted the rolling 

work to Fernald's Feed Materials Production Center and its supporting contractors (DOE 1997e).

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the number of plutonium production reactors greatly expanded. By 1955, there 

were a total of thirteen production reactors, eight at the Hanford Site and five at Savannah River. To supply fuel for all 

these reactors, the Atomic Energy Commission established the Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald in 1951 and
Se c t io n 2 - Fu e l M a n u f a c t u r in g

■ /« iiu rv .i'-c ftlu h im u m /m x lm liu n i7v H .m m td /ii'y.MJ .iddinu Io n -

w r it hvel nr.m ium fuel ■>/(/«,'- .'/cm-/ i'/chm'h/v" /i» /V- riu< /«/»■ ,i» «*.»//\ .?*

/ OT/l. lim it I ta i ur,m inm lu t / .i/m; a llo m 'd li.m rn id I'/iyi’/icc/- fri vu-n 

//it* ;c,k hi/ *<. ffvn/MT.i/M/i1 rjnr//inner d h iiih u tio n . ic iiiu in ii />ri»We/n» 

t . n w d I n u tw w n tlw n ih d e\p.imfi>n and r.u lM tu m -h n h n t'd siu dlinn ot

tin ■ iih ifjh itr < ru £’. Xcif/ron ,th-othinii...-hr^> lu'IfH 'd In v w n nu l

I ho i t'.u /«»/ s /« /u (V d i'trib u tn m . M iM n t lho*v v n rit hod nr.wmtm shin*

ue/t* m.im/Mt /ih<v/ iis//ii» (/?!' n.jhh* lot hniquc'. ,!>■ r/»c th ilu r.il u -.ininm

’./uy*. HiMiCKT. wi/nt1 nf //»e file/ clom onl■. m ere imji/u i»//i/y/i/i 

o m it hod ur.iiuum .ilh n o d iw'f/i .ilu in in u in w h iih required s/jui r«r/

n h r iitilto n 1o< /irw/m»s /<» (ire \o n l .m id o n l.il t t ilii .i/f//c*. //n'-il "i/r/iei ' 

c/cim’iiA Mere oz’/eii i;->ei/ hi f ihm/hii.i/hih m/V/i »/«'< 1,1/l.iri}ols -m h ,i> Iho

lith iu m Mrycf- usei/ In tn .ih r h ittu m . Im prtncincnl*. in ruol dm : detain

•!r,nhi.ilh ir d u i od iho londom \ n i Iho fuel dug* In hot.nmo n if'jliu n i'd

im id e the r e .u lo i." - D O f I lW v , |j. I “4

the Weldon Spring Plant in 1953 (Weakley 

1999). In addition, commercial contractors 

continued to support the Atomic Energy 

Commission's fuel manufacturing needs 

throughout the 1950s (DOE 1997e)

In 1954, the Hanford Site switched to a 

new, lead-dip process for canning the fuel

(Weakley 1999).

" The process consisted o f immersing

the uranium fuel cores [elements] in a

bath o f molten lead covered with

molten aluminum, followed by a

molten aluminum-silicon bath. At

about the same time, the bonding test

was changed, eliminating the use o f

acenapthelene [sic] and carbon

tetrachloride. Between 1955 and

1964, about 30,000 single-pass reactor

fuel elements were canned each week. A 'hot die size'process involving nickel plating which incorporated

nickel sulfate, nickel chloride, and boric acid was developed in the early 1960, but never implemented on a

large scale." - DOE 1997e, p. 157

During the 1950s, the 300 Area was the locale for numerous research and development efforts to improve the fuel 

manufacturing process. The research and testing was a daily process, meant to take advantage of operator and 

technicians' suggestions, safety inspections, and the latest technologies and creative scientific thought. Some of the 

research and testing explored new methods o f converting the uranium billets to fuel rods. Others altered the times, 

temperatures, and contents of the baths or the temperature and length of the welding process. As problems with core 

distortion in the reactors continued, scientists explored ways to alter the dimensions o f the fuel elements in an attempt to 

alleviate the swelling, blistering, and warping. Other research and testing projects sought ways to reuse fuel 

manufacturing materials through various recycling programs (Kubik 1997). A 1957 report, Production Tests: 300 Series -

A Bibliography, documents over 1,000 research tests that occurred in the 300 Area during a 13-year period from 1944- 

1957 (Schmidt 1957). See the Research and Development Section for more information on research tests.

Fu el El e m e n t Dis to r tio n s a n d M o d ific a tio n s

In October 1945, the first fuel element distortions occurred during the irradiation process in a Hanford Site reactor. 

Investigations and research efforts were undertaken to comprehend why some fuel elements warped, others swelled and 

burst the aluminum cap or can, and others acquired surface blisters or bubbles (Dahlen 1946).

The General Electric Company was convinced that part of the problem with fuel element distortion lay with human error. 

In their annual report for 1952, General Electric noted: "The incentive to develop mechanical methods stems primarily 

from the need for canned fuel elements of constant, uniform quality, devoid of the infrequent but costly deviations due to 

the human element. Mechanized canning is expected to assist in the development of an even better slug" (GE 1953b,

p. 35).

To combat human error, General Electric sought to automate as much of the fuel manufacturing process in the

313 Building as possible. "The building was to contain the most modern semi-automated and automated fabrication

process lines, non-destructive quality assurance testing, material recovery programs and conveyance systems available.

2 - 2 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Plans were made to install radiography equipment to inspect the cap-can welds, ultrasonic testing equipment to replace 

the frost test and ultrasonic transmission testing equipment to check the uranium fuel elements' [cores'] grain size and

orientation" (Kubik 1997, p. 35).

Automation affected the canning line, where an automatic spray unit replaced the rinse tank. A mechanical quench unit 

was installed, and the welding equipment was converted to a semi-automatic system (GE 1953b).

A system was devised, although not entirely successful, to assist in tracking down the causes of core distortions. At the 

start of the fuel manufacturing process, each fuel element was assigned a number. As the fuel elements were fabricated, 

careful and detailed records were kept of each process step. It was easy to trace a distorted fuel element back through 

the manufacturing process. It was more difficult to ascertain the cause of the distortion (UPOA 1977a).

Operations and technical personnel in the 100 Area and the 300 Area worked together to resolve the problems of fuel 

element distortion. Valuable production time was lost each time a uranium fuel element failed in a reactor because the 

reactor had to be completely shut down to remove the damaged fuel element (Burley 1956, Kubik 1997).

For example in 195-1, a total of 102 fuel elements failed in the five reactors, resulting in a loss of 2,282 hours of reactor 

time. That year, the average removal time for fuel elements was nearly 24 hours (Warren 1952). The following year, the 

aluminum cans on seventeen fuel elements failed, resulting in a loss of 268 hours of reactor time to remove nine of those 

fuel elements (Kubik 1997). It was not unusual for each reactor to be shut down at least once a month due to fuel 

element failures.

Careful examinations of the distorted fuel elements led researchers to believe fuel element length was a factor in the 

ongoing problem of fuel element distortion in the reactors (Kubik 1997). In an attempt to better control the fuel element's 

temperature in the reactor and to improve the flow of cooling water around the fuel elements, the fuel element's 

configuration and dimensions were changed, and the length varied (Kubik 1997). Figure 2-2.1 shows fuel elements with 

varying configurations and dimensions.

I ncreased Po w e r Levels - In Pu r s u it of t h e Perfect Fu el El e m e n t

Ideally, the perfect fuel element would produce record amounts of power in the reactor w ithout warping, swelling, or 

blistering. Plutonium production was costing the United States a great deal of money, so support for increases of reactor 

power levels was growing. Increased power levels allowed more plutonium to be produced per hour, which achieved 

greater economic efficiency as w ell as increased production.

During the late 1940s, the power levels of the Hanford Site reactors were increased to generate additional production. 

W hile the subsequent increase in temperatures kept the graphite from swelling further, and in some cases, even shrank it 

to its original size, the hotter conditions limited the already short time in which fuel elements could remain in the 

reactors. The higher heat also caused blistering or distortion of the fuel elements and sometimes rupturing of the cans. 

"By 1947, operators at Hanford developed a series of methods for detecting fuel element swelling and failures. One of 

these was a simple optical list. The decrease in light intensity through the process tube indicated the presence of blisters 

on the cans" (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 62).

Additional research conducted during the late 1940s and early 1950s investigated fuel element failures, "looking 

specifically at how uranium acted in fission reactions. The results of experiments provided important information for 

improving the designs of the fuel elements...several relatively simple mechanical expedients adapted the reactors to 

higher operating temperatures and higher power levels" (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, pp. 62-63).

Pushing the operating levels of the Hanford site reactors entailed a number of risks, including the effect on the source of 

power and the fuel elements that

2 - 2 .1 6
Se c t io n 2 - F uel M a n u f a c t u r in g

“ needed constant redevelopment in order to withstand the intense heat to which they were subjected. By

1950,...General Electric substantially increased exposure time for slugs, up to three times the level feasible in

1946, without encountering blistering and warping. One method, involving the use o f 2% zirconium alloyed to

the slug [core], helped stabilize the slug, even under very high exposures. Improved inspection techniques, new

watering treatment processing, and enhanced instrumentation also extended fuel slug lifetime and increased

overall production levels." - Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 64

The Atomic Energy Commission "supported increased power levels in part because these tended to lower plutonium 

production costs per gram. ...improved slug designs had allowed higher power levels and cut raw material requirements 

by 50%. Not only did the procedures allow for better use of scarce uranium, but the steps led to dollar savings..." 

(Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 64).

It was not until 1954 that the fuel 

manufacturing processes and reactor 

operations were perfected to the point 

where a reactor could run longer than 

1 full month. During that year,

DR Reactor completed a record run of 

almost 50 straight days. In February 

1959, all eight single-pass reactors ran 

continuously for almost 9 days (DeNeal 

1965).

During the mid 1950s, new facilities 

were constructed in the 313 Building that 

increased Hanford's capability to 

produce weapons-grade plutonium by 

230 percent. The expanded and 

automated fuel manufacturing process 

could produce 615 tons of uranium fuel 

elements each month (GE 1956a). The 

following year fuel manufacturing and 

production capabilities had increased to 

750 tons per month, producing eight 

new fuel elements with a total of 

21 variations (Kubik 1997).

Efforts to increase the power levels of the Hanford Site reactors were concurrent with core distortion research that 

continued into the 1960s. It was agreed that part of the problem laid with "the demand for more weapons-grade 

plutonium [which] was accompanied by a demand for increased power in the reactor. This in turn led to performance 

demands for the uranium fuel elements and stress from increasing levels of power. ...scientists, engineers and 

technicians ascribed the problems associated w ith slug distortion to the changing crystalline structure of the uranium fuel 

rods [cores], to the fuel fabrication process in Building 313, to the dimensional specifications of the slugs and to human 

error on the fabrication line" (Kubik 1997, p. 33).

Internally and externally cooled fuel elements were tried in 1957 to minimize core distortion (Weakley 1999). "They had 

a tubular hole down the middle, allowing cooling water to run both around and through them in the reactors'"

■ (Gerber 1992c, p. 5).

10 |m nlui r Itic pcrivc t lucl clrmcnt. rcMMrihcr* in Ihv mid-1 "hi'y.i/i

to espvrim ent h ilh .1 non (arm ing prtu. oduro i.d lo il llw H ot I H r S i/o

p ro to s-...to ivp lao o Iho :< ilum initm -4lii on: fuo l i.ih m alum pro<ess.

...tho non proLo— it.i*. n u n c <‘t fiin/m k.i/ and n u n c prtnhn ti\ c <1m i

\iv w e d ,i' tho ho-t ruol ta h rn a tio n pm toss irp L u onivnl fo i 1hr tw o stnglo-

/j.i-s-. iiw< /fir- - t ill in operation, h i and h \\. Tho H ot Ih o v— w ould

p rrn id e .1 '-olid -M /f d iiiu -itm bond hotwoon tho fu o l«o n 1 .elem ent. .ind

tho alum inum <an, u-inu .in t'lr itr o - n iih o i d iifu -io n h.111 ioi. a n d p la te d

11 ilh n it hoi: thv n it hoi plating w o u ld < ro.do .1 hot I n h a rrie r hotwoon tho

alum inum ta n and the uranium tuol to r i': a h a trio t that w o u ld p ro w n t thv

ta p id d iflu -io n hotwoon tho alum inum and the uranium that tt.i- h c h c w d

h i ho uno o f tho < au-o- 01 shut -it ollhut and di-U n lion. Tho fu rl

a—rm h lio — m -rc prohoatod In tho p ru p o r hooding tr n ip r ia lu r r in an inort

atn uisp ho ir tu iih ic r In h o n tl Iho n it hoi p la lin it lo tho uranium 1 nro.

Ox n a il. Iho hnnding hotwoon tho uranium t ore a nd tho alum inum t an

w u uld ho h o ttn and tho (.bidding m oto uniform . Iho p rm c— n.is m ore

flv \ih lc : uranium m ol tores < m ild ho made in ton- and tw oh o-im .h

lo iu ilh - uisload o f m tir- and o itih t-iru h longlhs. In <h tuber W hit t>nr

tin t U io ’si/e fa h iu a tim : lino vt.i- installed in Huildim t t l <■ r.~ ton- fir

uranium fuo l elements w o io p to rh n e d n -iny tho now m ethod " -

Kuhil. 1947. pp. 4$-44

2 - 2 ,1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pi u t o n iu m Pr o d u c h o n Fa c il it ie s

N Re a c t o r Fu e l El e m e n t

P r o c e s s

The co-extrusion process, or the N Reactor fuel manufacturing 

process, was developed in the 1960s to accommodate the fuel 

needs of the N Reactor. The co-extrusion process was developed 

in the 306-E Development, Fabrication and Test Building and 

implemented in the Fuel Cladding Facility (333 Building)

(Figure 2-2.9).

En r ic h e d Ur a n iu m

I

V

Figure 2 -2.9. Fuel Cladding Facility (333 Building%

N Reactor used slightly enriched uranium fuel. The fuel was a 7 996

tube-in-tube design consisting of a metallic uranium fuel element

surrounded by a thin Zircoloy-2 cladding. The inner fuel tube was enriched to 0.95-percent uranium-235. The outer 

fuel tube was enriched to either 0.950- or 1.25 percent (DOE 1997e).

Fernald and Weldon Spring facilities produced the enriched uranium ingots and sent them to the Ashtabula Plant to be 

extruded into tubular billets. The Fernald Plant then shipped the billets to the Hanford Site where in the 333 Building 

they were clad with Zircoloy-2 into finished fuel assemblies using the co-extrusion process. By the time of the startup of 

the N Reactor in late 1963, the Fernald Plant had sufficient stocks of enriched uranium to supply the N Reactor without 

additional uranium from gaseous diffusion plants (DOE 1997e). "The Hanford Site also chemically recycled enriched 

uranium from its own fuel, and enriched 'm ined' uranium for reactor fuel from the high level waste tanks on site, using 

the U Plant. Enriched uranium from the gaseous diffusion plants was not needed for the Hanford Site until 1985, shortly 

before N Reactor was shut down" (DOE 1997e, p. 157).

3 0 6 Fu e l El e m e n t P il o t P l a n t

The 306 Building, the Fuel Element Pilot Plant, was completed in 1956 to assist the 313 Building operations and to pilot 

process improvements in fuel manufacturing methods for single-pass reactors. In 1960, the facility was expanded to 

approximately double its original size to contain the co-extrusion process for N Reactor fuel elements. The addition 

became known as the 306-E Building, and the older section became the 306-W Building. For more information on the 

306-E and 306-W buildings, see the Expanded Historic Property

Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet. The 306-E Building T " - ' *, v w s e

housed a complete fuel element manufacturing line, including r A 1

component preparation, canning, finishing, and all inspections except . — r^3® s’" l f •1 J r ‘ 1 '1TM

autoclaving.

3 3 3 Fu e l Cl a d d in g Bu il d in g

The 333 Fuel Cladding Building was completed in 1960 as the new 

fuel cladding facility for the N Reactor. For more information on the 

333 Building, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in 

Appendix B on the Internet. The original mission of the 333 Building 

was to manufacture fuel elements for N Reactor using the newly 

developed co-extrusion process. This process fundamentally altered 

the way that fuel elements had been made at the Hanford Site since 

W orld War II. Essentially, all of the fuel element components, 

including the uranium fuel element and all of the cladding materials, 

were cleaned, assembled, and extruded together. This method

Figure 2-2 .1 0 . Billet Ovens (lower left) and

2700-Ton Extrusion Press in the Fuel Cladding

Facility (333 Building)

2 - 2 .1 8
Se c tio n 2 - Fuel Ma n ufacturing

CCLEXTRUSOM

provided a more uniform bond than the earlier process of jacketing or cladding single-pass reactor fuel elements.

Figure 2-2.10 shows the 2700-ton extrusion press in the 333 Building. <

Fuel element manufacturing in the 333 Building was an unprecedented type in which the Zircoloy-2 exterior and the 

internal cladding were pressed together with the uranium core by the extrusion machinery. Because co-extrusion 

provided a more complete bond, it was superior to previous canned fuel elements that were subject to bubbles and other 

flaws between the layers. Zircoloy-2 provided a superior outer layer than the previously used aluminum because it 

could tolerate greater temperatures inside the pressurized system of the new reactor with a lower rate o f corrosion.

N Reactor's light-water recirculation design configuration required a fuel element with a tougher exterior resistant to the 

higher pressure necessary to operate its cooling system.

In the older single-pass reactors, corrosion had been a principal cause of fuel element failure. Zircoloy-2 lasted longer 

than aluminum and allowed the reactor to function more efficiently. Problems associated with the canning method for 

the single-pass reactors were a lack of uniform temperatures and thickness of layers in the metal dipping process, 

extensive training of personnel to achieve the high level o f weld necessary, the lack of bonding between the layers, and 

pinholes (Hewlett and Anderson 1972a).

Seq uence of Op e r a tio n s

The sequence of operations for the co-extrusion process for N Reactor fuel elements included component cleaning, billet 

assembly and preheating, extrusion, machining to length, cleaning, and welding of the end caps. Figure 2-2.11 shows 

the manufacturing process for fuel elements for the N Reactor. Specifically, the

"Zircoloy-2 cladding materials

(an alloy o f zirconium with nickel, 

tin, chromium and iron) were

degreased in an organic

solvent, rinsed with nitric and

hydrofluoric acid, and

air-dried. The uranium billets

were degreased with

perchloroethylene, etched

with nitric acid, rinsed with

water, dried and inspected.

The uranium, copper, and

zirconium parts were

assembled and welded,

tested, heated and extruded

together. The extruded

elements were cooled, cut,

and machined. Nitric acid

rinses removed copper and

silicon residues and nitric

sulfuric acid chemically

m illed away excess uranium

on the ends o f the slugs. A

final nitric and hydrofluoric

acid etching preceded the

brazing on the ends o f the

caps. The end caps were degreased and etched as well. After additional finishing, the parts were given a final

etching in nitric hydrofluoric acid, tested and assembled. The process reached a peak volume o f250 fuel

elements per week in the mid-1980s." - DOE 1997e, p. 157

URANIUM CORE

ZRCALOY-2 COMPONENTS

srea&os EXTRUDED TUBE 

COMPONENT ASSEMBLED SECTIONING

CLEANING BILLET

BILLET PREHEAT

teffK-ttOET

H K x r p fS s m i' FRBireeFWB SEWSCEMJE

■8SM>PSSSntfS

COWER JACKET COMPONENTS

rT"

NONDESTRUCTIVE 

BOND TESTING 

END CLOSURE

EXTRUSION ASSEMBLY

END RECESSING COUNTBtSORE

OXIDE RBJOVAL 

GRIT BLAST

END FACING MOLTEN SALT 

HEATTREAT

END CLOSURE 

BRAZING

NONDESTRUCTIVE CLAD 

THICKNESS AND BOND TESTBiS

ACID COPPER

REMOVAL

INSPECTION END RECESSING "

CHEMICAL WLUNG AMD 

PREBRAZE CLEAMNG

V--X

PREWELD

CLEANING

WELDING

INSPECTION

AUTORADIOGRAPH

END WELDING 

AND INSPECTION

FINAL BRIGHT ETCH AUTOCLAVE

COMPLETED INNER AND OUTER FUEL

FINISHED ASSEMBLY 

*

TO REACTOR

Figure 2-2.11. Manufacturing Process o f the Fuel Elements for the N Reactor

2 - 2 . 1 9
I f r Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

N Reactor Fu el Ma n u fa c tu r in g Process -

St e p - b y -Ste p

Most of the fuel element components were manufactured 

offsite and then assembled in the 333 Building. Exceptions 

were the front and rear preshapes, which were produced in the 

313 Building. The components manufactured offsite were the 

pre-shaped uranium billets, Zircoloy-2 inner and outer shells 

and end caps, inner and outer jackets, front and rear end 

plates, evacuation tubes, and braze rings. Jack Miller, former 

300 Area employee, noted that "...the uranium billets [for 

N Reactor] ranged 250 to 350 pounds. They were round, and 

not very big since uranium is heavier than lead..." (Sanger 

1995, p. 174). Following delivery to the 333 Building, each 

component was visually inspected to make sure that no 

Figure 2-2.12. Zircoloy Element Being Cleaned, 1985 obvious flaws existed. Then each component was degreased

with a vapor agent to remove any oils remaining from handling 

and cleaned before assembly (Clemens 1988). Figure 2-2.12 shows a Zircoloy-2 element being cleaned.

Billet assembly occurred next. This process consisted of welding the rear end plate to the inner and outer jackets, 

placing the uranium billet, Zircoloy-2 shells, and pre-shapes inside the jackets, and welding on the front end plate with 

an evacuation tube attached. The tube was connected to an evacuation system, which removed air from the assembly to 

help ensure a bond between the Zircoloy-2 shells and the uranium billet. The billet assembly was then lubricated and 

placed in the preheated ovens (Figure 2-2.10). Over a period of approximately 12 hours, the billet assembly was 

gradually brought up to a temperature of about 1400 degrees Fahrenheit through a stepped process that allowed for the 

varying expansion rates of the metals involved. The billet assemblies were removed from the preheated equipment one 

at a time by a crane and loaded onto the extrusion press feeder (Clemens 1988).

The billet assembly then was fed into the 2,700-ton extrusion press and pressed through a die (mold) to form it into the 

proper shape and size. Prior to co-extrusion, the uranium billet was about 20 inches long and 8 inches in diameter.

After co-extrusion, the resulting tube was about 32 feet long, 2-3/4 inches in diameter. The tubes, which had a 

temperature of about 750 degrees Fahrenheit, were rotated on the roll-out table for about 5 minutes each to promote 

even cooling and reduce warp (Clemens 1988, Weakley 1999). The heat and pressure of the co-extrusion process not 

only changed the size but also, more importantly, facilitated the formation of a metallic bond between Zircoloy-2 and 

uranium. This decreased the likelihood of a bond failure (one of the most common fuel element problems) and 

increased the ease of heat transfer once the fuel was within the reactor.

Once cooled, the approximately 32-foot long outer tubes were sawed two at a time into about 12 sections. The inner 

tubes were 40 feet long, cut into about 18 sections. The length of the sections depended on the needs of the reactor at 

the time and the uranium enrichment involved. The reactor process tubes, which held the fuel elements and carried the 

cooling water, tended to warp within the reactor - the more warp, the greater the need for the shorter elements, which 

could be pushed through more easily (Vinther 1996).

During the sectioning process, the ends that extended beyond the parts suitable for use as fuel elements were cut off and 

returned to the 313 Building for recycling into preshapes - one of the many instances of recycling integrated into the 

process.

Copper-silicon was used for many of the parts (preshapes, jackets, end plates, and braze rings) and copper for the tubes. 

Characteristics of copper-silicon that made it an important and useful part of the process were its softness that helped it 

slip through the die with relative ease and superior welding properties. End cropping also removed sections that did not 

meet the standards for wall thickness of the various layers and hence may have contained some uranium as well.

2 - 2 .2 0
Se c t io n 2 - Fuel M a n u f a c t u r in g

Various cut-up patterns were used over the years to try to achieve the maximum use of uranium. The uranium was so 

expensive that saving even a small amount of it meant a significant reduction in production costs (Remaize 1996).

The cutting process included one of the many quality-control checks made throughout the manufacturing cycle. A 

1/4-inch slice was removed from the front, middle, and end of the coextruded tube. The small pieces were then cut on a 

band saw to check on the bond between the Zircoloy-2 and the uranium. If the bond was found to be incomplete, the 

tube was scrapped and sent to the Fernald Plant for recycling. All tests for unbonded fuel elements were especially 

important as a lack of proper bond was the single largest cause of rejects (Remaize 1996).

After the desired length was achieved, uranium was milled out from both ends of the pieces to create a recess. The 

recess provided a space into which the end cap would later be inserted. The uranium fines (tiny, dust-like particles from 

the m illing and other processes) and chips were originally collected, encased in concrete in the 304 Concentration 

Building, and shipped to the Fernald Plant for recycling. Beginning 

in 1983, however, the fines and chips first went to the new 303-M 

Oxide Burning facility and were then shipped to the Fernald Plant 

(Remaize 1996, Weakley 1999).

The fuel elements were transported to the 333 Building's chemical 

bay, where, in four separate processes, the now unnecessary 

copper-silicon was chemically stripped and the ends etched with 

acid to clean the uranium and Zircoloy-2 surfaces. The acid used 

to etch the uranium ends was kept separate so that it could be 

pumped to the 313 Building for separation of the uranium, which 

was then shipped to the Fernald Plant for recycling.

A quality control inspection was the next step. Each fuel element 

was visually inspected as well as measured to determine whether 

proper wall thickness, outer diameter, and inner diameter had been Figure 2-2.13. Inspection o f the Fuel Rods in the

achieved (see Figure 2-2.13). 333 Building, 1985

The next step, the end closure brazing process, closed off each end of the fuel element with a Zircoloy-2 end cap. The 

end cap was placed in the recess with the brazing alloy, a mixture of Zircoioy-2 and beryllium, placed on top of it. The

fuel element was then inserted into the brazing chamber. A glass jar of sufficient height and width was placed over the

vertical fuel element and sealed to the brazing chamber. The air in the chamber was removed by a vacuum pump. An 

induction coil came down over the glass enclosure and was heated so that the brazing alloy would melt and begin to 

seal the end. Final end closure was achieved by pressurizing the brazing chamber with argon gas to push the now liquid 

alloy into any remaining voids. The induction coil was turned off and the fuel element allowed to cool for a few minutes 

before removing the jar. The fuel element was turned over and the process was repeated on the other end (Weakley 

1999).

A molten salt bath followed to heat treat the uranium to randomize the grain structure that had formed during the 

co-extrusion process (Weakley 1999). Were the grains left aligned, they could push the end cap off in the reactor, 

resulting in contaminated cooling water within the process tubes and a reactor shutdown. For the salt bath, the fuel

elements were hooked vertically onto a carousel mechanism and lowered into the salt bath. Another quality control

check was done here to ensure that the fuel pieces were within the acceptable tolerances for straightness. After being 

checked in the warp gauge, a fuel section was either deemed straight enough and passed on to the rest o f the process or 

rejected for further straightening. A fuel element could be re-straightened and re-heat-treated twice before being 

completely rejected and sent to the Fernald Plant for recycling.

2 -2 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

A machining process followed, whereby the excess brazed metal on both ends was removed and a small cut made into 

both the inner diameter and the outer diameter. The cuts were used to help align the welding of the end cap. 

Vacu-blasting came next, which used a grit blast to remove the zirconium oxide scale that built up during the salt bath.

The end brazing was then tested using a non-destructive, ultrasonic method to make sure the brazing alloy had 

completely filled all the voids in the ends. Improper brazing was the second largest cause of fuel element rejects. 

However, if the brazing was incomplete on one of the longer elements, the cylinder could be sent back to be cut to the 

next shorter length and proceed through the other steps again. If the fuel element was already as short as it could be, it 

was rejected and recycled.

The next step was an acid cleaning that removed grit left on the Zircoloy-2 surface during the vacu-blasting. This etching 

prepared the fuel element for end welding, during which a weld bead was put over the step cuts for the second and final 

closure of the end. The fuel enrichment and unique identification number was stamped into the end of the fuel. The 

completed fuel elements then moved into another series of non-destructive tests to measure clad thickness and find areas 

that had not bonded (see Figure 2-2.14). The fuel elements were submerged into a tank of water for testing. After the 

fuel element was lowered into the water, mechanical devices, called transducers, checked for cracked bonds and 

thickness of the cladding (Figure 2-2.15). These tests were a major source of error detection.

*

s s u m

Figure 2-2 .1 4 . Non-Destructive Testing o f Fuel

Elements, 1984

Figure 2-2.15, Cross Section o f a Fuel Element Showing the

Transducers, Which Check for Cracked Bonds and Wall Thickness

The spot welding of the Zircoloy-2 projection supports and springs 

comprised the next step. The support hardware was welded onto 

the outer diameter of each fuel element. Those designated as outer 

fuel elements also had a locking clip welded into its inner 

diameter. Those designated as inner fuel elements also had a 

locking clip welded to their outer diameters. The locking clips 

allowed for the inner and outer fuel elements to be locked together 

into a completed fuel assembly. The springs helped position the 

inner fuel element w ithin the outer fuel element. The supports on 

the outer diameter of the outer fuel element helped position the 

completed fuel assembly within the reactor process tubes. The 

spot welding was followed by a final acid bath.

To test the fuel elements, autoclave operators placed the completed 

fuel elements in baskets and inserted the baskets into autoclaves. Figure 2-2.16. Autoclave Area in the 333 Building,

1984

2 - 2 .2 2
Se c t io n 2 - Fu el M a n u f a c t u r in g

u » ..

- r .

Figure 2-2,17. Inspection o f the Fuel Elements in

the 333 Building

The autoclaves subjected the fuel elements to reactor-like conditions in terms of pressure and temperature 

(Figure 2-2.16), especially testing the fuel elements for potential ruptures. Also, the high pressure and temperature of the 

autoclaves caused the Zircoloy-2 to form a black oxide on the surface. This precluded further oxidation and, therefore, 

provided a protective coating over the Zircoloy-2.

One of the causes of ruptures was water. Autoclave operators 

heated the fuel elements in the autoclave for 72 hours to allow 

enough time for any water to evaporate. Ruptured fuel elements 

were detected by checkingior hydrogen within the autoclave. The 

presence of hydrogen indicated that water had penetrated the 

Zircoloy-2 cladding and had reacted with the uranium core.

Ruptured fuel elements were rejected and recycled (Remaize 1996,

Weakley 1999). As the quality of the fuel elements increased, the 

testing time was reduced to 48 and sometimes as low as 32 hours 

(Peterson 2000). Figure 2-2.17 shows the inspection of the fuel 

elements in the 333 Building.

A final quality assurance inspection was made following the 

autoclave test. The completed outer and inner fuel elements 

subsequently were placed in a hydraulic press, pushed together, 

turned, and locked to form a completed fuel assembly. A thin steel

shoe was applied to the outer supports on the outer fuel element at this time to aid the assembly's passage through the

reactor process tubes, which were also made out of Zircoloy-2. W ithout the steel in between, the Zircoloy-2 fuel slugs

and Zircoloy-2 process tubes would tend to cohere, metaliurgically speaking, therefore impeding the progress of the fuel 

assembly during the charging/discharging operation and possibly creating unwanted grooves or scratches in the process 

tubes (Remaize 1996). The finished assembly was steam cleaned and packaged for shipment to N Reactor.

N Reactor Fu el M a n u fa c tu r in g Process M o d if ic a t io n s

There were no radical changes in design of the coextruded fuel assemblies from their first use in the N Reactor in 1963 to 

final shutdown of the reactor in 1986. However, numerous small but significant modifications were made to continually 

refine the design and production process in an ongoing quest to improve reactor performance, achieve worker safety and 

environmental quality goals, promote cost-effective production, and accommodate experiments. For example, a system 

of grading fuels according to their uranium enrichment level was instituted in 1963 so that the higher grade fuels, which 

could withstand more severe reactor conditions, could be arranged selectively and strategically within the reactor to 

achieve the most efficient level of operation. Several enrichments of uranium were used in the reactor at any given time 

- the lower the number of high-grade assemblies, the lower the cost.

Recycling of billet components and testing and etching substances were other common methods of controlling costs and 

addressing environmental concerns as well. Solutions to environmental questions were sought constantly, especially 

during the 1970s-1980s. Many o f the cleaning and stripping chemicals used in the production process were highly toxic 

and/or carcinogenic. A study o f one such substance used in stripping copper, hexavalent chromium, was successfully 

concluded with the finding that it could be rendered harmless by mixing it w ith sodium sulfite, sulfuric acid, and water. 

That finding eliminated a potential groundwater pollutant.

Often, experiments were conducted to test hypotheses regarding improvements to the production process. For example, 

tests were carried out in 1984 to investigate possible factors affecting the success, or lack thereof, of the co-extrusion 

bond. Four tests were run on 36 billets using slight variations on the thickness o f the front end plate, a faster than 

standard speed for pushing the billets through the press, using a front preshape with a different silicon content, and using 

a different drying process on the front and rear preshapes (UNI 1984).

2 - 2 .2 3
E llF^ Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

One particularly difficult problem to solve was that of the design of and materials for the inner supports. The supports, 

which had shown -promise and were actually used in the early coextruded fuel slugs, were determined to be inadequate 

due to their tendency to crack (Lewis 1996).

Sa fe ty a n d Qu a l it y Assurance

Because successful reactor operation was dependent on properly functioning fuel slugs, a major emphasis was placed on 

quality assurance throughout the manufacturing process. Nuclear and worker safety also were overriding concerns. It 

was infinitely more economical and safer to uncover flaws in the fuel slugs before they were placed into the reactor. The 

sooner a flaw could be detected, the less expensive it was to either fix the fuel element or reject it for recycling. If a fuel 

element ruptured in a process tube, thereby releasing uranium into the cooling water, the reactor had to be shut down 

and the contamination removed. Shutting down and re-starting the reactor was quite an expensive proposition with 

ramifications for meeting deadlines on plutonium and power production (Krieg 1996).

Another means of ensuring safety was the practice of coding every fuel element with an identification number that 

indicated its level of enrichment, from which extrusion it originated, and from which part of the extrusion. Logs were 

maintained that indicated at which point in the production process any given fuel element was and exactly how it had 

been made. These life histories not only allowed staff to keep track of where the uranium was at any given time within 

the 333 Building and thereby avoid a criticality but also to document the progress of a fuel element through the 

production process. When a fuel element ruptured within a process tube and was pushed out of the reactor, the number 

could be read by remote means and the cause of the rupture possibly traced back to the production process 

(Vinther 1996). If a number of fuel elements that shared a common characteristic ruptured, such as all having been 

heated in the same autoclave, the autoclave operators would examine the chart paper of the suspect autoclave for 

irregularities, such as abrupt temperature increases (Peterson 2000).

Similarly, problems that occurred prior to a fuel element being inserted into the reactor could be traced to their source. 

For example, a high rate of unbonds between the interior uranium and exterior Zircoloy-2 cladding on the outer diameter 

of the outer fuel extrusions was detected in early 1976 following their co-extrusion. The problem was the direction in 

which the ingots were fed into the dies. A slight change in the fabrication process in 1972 had resulted in the reversal of 

the direction in which the uranium ingots were fed into their extrusion dies. The vendor changed the production process 

to have the ingots fed through the other direction so that problem was traced and solved. Through a series of tests and

experiments, the fuel fabrication workers determined that the most cost-effective way of dealing with the subject billets 

already on hand was to send them off-site for reworking into a different size billet (Bowles 1976).

Tr it iu m Pr o d u c tio n

A major campaign to diversify the production possibilities of the N Reactor, and therefore the 333 Building, was a 

mid-to-late 1960s trial co-production of tritium. Tritium was the key component of hydrogen bombs. Tritium "was used 

to boost the plutonium detonation in both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons" (Carlisle 2000). W hile tritium was not 

the only co-product within the capabilities of the N Reactor, it represented one of the most attractive ongoing financial 

opportunities. Tritium isotopes decay at a much faster rate than plutonium isotopes. It cannot be stockpiled or recycled 

in the same manner as plutonium and therefore must be produced in an essentially continual fashion to maintain 

weapons capability. The N Reactor could not be operated economically on a power-production only basis. The reactor 

had to produce plutonium, tritium, or some other product to perform on a profit-making basis.

Tritium was created in the N Reactor during a major campaign from 1965-1967 using fuel assemblies that consisted of an 

outer, or driver, fuel element manufactured in the 333 Building, and an inner target element made in the 3722 Area Shop 

(Gerber 1993b, Lewis 1996, W illiams 1966). For further information on the 3722 Building, see the Historic Property 

Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet. Instead of uranium, the inner target elements contained lithium 

aluminate, a ceramic material. Lithium aluminate powder was formed into a solid through a sintering process, which

2 -2 .2 4
Se c t io n 2 - F uel Ma n u f a c t u r in g

used heat and pressure to fuse the material into a pellet. The pellets were then placed into an aluminum can clad in 

Zircoloy-2, which replaced the usual inner tube of the standard fuel assembly (Dickeman 1962).

Once completed, the targets were transferred from the 3722 Building to the 333 Building for autoclaving, cleaning, 

inspection, and insertion into the driver fuel element. The driver fuel element was made in the 333 Building by 

following the same procedures for fabricating the outer tube of a fuel element for producing plutonium (Gerber 1993b). 

The only difference was the outer driver tube was constructed with a higher than normal uranium enrichment

The N Reactor was occasionally used to produce tritium in the 1970s and again during the late 1980s. Associated 

alterations and upgrades were made to the 333 Building between 1987 and 1989 in preparation for once again 

producing the target assemblies but in a different configuration than in the 1960s. N Reactor was placed in cold standby 

status in 1988, and when the final shutdown occurred in 1991 the fuel production life of the 333 Building was 

discontinued (Remaize 1996, Gerber 1993b, Stapp and Marceau 1995).

Co m m e r c ia l / N o n -D e f e n s e Fu e l Ma n u f a c t u r in g

Knowing that worldwide supplies of uranium were finite, the United States embarked upon a large research effort to find 

alternate supplies of reactor fuels. Research was undertaken to find methods to stretch or diversify the uranium fuel 

supply for commercial nuclear reactors by creating oxide fuel blends. This was the result of President Eisenhower's 

Atoms for Peace program unveiled in 1953 that envisioned non-defense utilization of nuclear technology to fuel civilian 

and industrial power needs. In response, the Atomic Energy Commission pursued a program of developing alternative 

nuclear fuels for industrial and commercial uses. The Hanford Site was the locale o f an extensive research effort to 

demonstrate the effectiveness of fuels blended from the combinations of plutonium oxide, uranium oxide and other 

mixed oxide materials.

The 300 Area's Plutonium Fabrication Pilot Plant was completed in 1960 to provide research laboratories and fuel 

manufacturing facilities for the development of reactor fuels containing plutonium. The earliest fuels manufactured in 

the Plutonium Fabrication Pilot Plant (308 Building) were irradiated in the adjacent Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 

(309 Building). Both buildings were constructed at the same time to demonstrate the effectiveness of the various 

plutonium oxides containing blends of plutonium, uranium, and other metals. For more information on the 308 and 

309 buildings, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet

Later in the decade, the 308 Building " produced neptunium-aluminum alloy fuel target slugs [cores] clad in Zircoloy-2 

for a Plutonium-238 production test that was conducted in N Reactor. ...lithium aluminate fuel targets with a rod-in-tube 

configuration and Zircoloy-2 cladding also were manufactured in the 308 Building for coproduct (tritium) production 

testing in N Reactor. Over 2000 fuel configurations were produced in the 308 Building before 1976, many for a variety 

of offsite reactors" (Gerber 1993b, p. 36).

Additionally, "in the late 1970s, a Training Research Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor was installed in the 

building to perform neutron radiography QA testing of fuel elements and fuel jackets" (Gerber 1993b, p. 36). At the 

same time a high bay addition was completed to the 308 Building that contained laboratory facilities for the storage, 

handling, quality assurance testing, assembly and instrumentation of Fast Flux Test Facility fuel.

Re c o v e r y , Re u s e , a n d Re c y c l in g Me t h o d s

The materials used in the fuel manufacturing process in the 313 Building, including the uranium fuel elements and the 

copper, tin, and aluminum-silicon used in the triple dip process, were expensive, non-renewable resources. As the 

demand for weapons-grade plutonium grew in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the fuel manufacturing process consumed

2 -2 .2 5
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

even greater quantities of these costly materials, it was important that these materials be recovered and reused or 

recycled whenever possible.

Difficulties with early fuel canning techniques produced thousands of rejected fuel elements by mid-1944. "Scrap slugs 

were utilized whenever possible in the experimental w ork...in order to release equal quantities of acceptable slugs for 

production purposes" (Du Pont 1945a, p. 365).

By the mid 1950s, "between 10 and 30 percent of the fuel elements do not meet specifications and are rejected. These 

rejected fuel element cores are recovered by a chemical process and prepared for recanning" (Weakley 1958, p.126).

Along with rejected fuel elements, there were also uranium scraps to be recovered. During the earliest fuel 

manufacturing operations at the Hanford Site, uranium scraps consisted of lathe turnings, rod ends, and rejected fuel 

elements from the machining and canning operations in the 313 Building.

Beginning w ith the startup of the extrusion press tests in January 1945, extrusion butt ends, oxides, and container

residues were collected. By early 1946, however, the volume of uranium scraps accumulated from operations in the 313 

and 314 buildings and the resulting expense and fire and security hazards brought a change in-policy. A chip recovery 

operation began in the 314 Building. It involved collecting all chips and turnings from machining operations, "sorting 

them, breaking them into small pieces, washing, drying, and then pressing them into briquettes" (Gerber 1992c, p. 7).

In the spring of 1946, an additional scrap recovery operation known as the oxide burner began on the north side of the 

314 Building. All uranium-bearing dust and particulate matter that could be collected, as well as the tailings or settlings

from washes and quenches, was burned to convert it to oxide (powder) form (Kubik 1997).

The General Electric Company refined the uranium core recovery process, making it safer and less labor-intensive. In the 

mid-1950s, the 313 Building experienced extensive remodeling and expansion to accommodate recovery processes 

along with new fuel canning technologies (Gerber 1992b). "A process for the recovery of rejected slugs [cores] was 

developed in the 300 Area. These rejected slugs [cores] represented a form of recoverable uranium that was jacketed in 

an aluminum can bonded w ith aluminum-silicon, and it was desired to remove the coating so that the slug [core] could 

be recanned or reclaimed as scrap metal" (Du Pont 1945a, p. 218).

Canned uranium fuel elements that failed any one o f the non-destructive quality assurance tests in the 313 Building were 

immediately sent to Recovery Operations in the building's south end. Here, the aluminum cap and can base were 

removed. The aluminum can and the compound layers were dissolved with a series of three baths, first in sodium 

hydroxide and sodium nitrate solution, second in hydrofluoric acid, and finally in nitric acid. The cores were then 

cleaned, rinsed, dried, and returned to the canning line to be recanned (Du Pont 1945a, Weakley 1999). In 1953, the 

hydrofluoric acid and nitric acid baths were replaced with a boiling 50-percent sodium hydroxide solution that does not 

release explosive hydrogen gas (Weakley 1999).

A canned, rejected uranium core could be sent through the recovery process a maximum of three times before it no 

longer met the dimensional specifications (weight, length, and diameter) for Hanford's single-pass reactors. Cores that 

lost their dimensional integrity during the recovery process were shipped back to the original vendor for reprocessing 

into new uranium billets. The recanned uranium cores were designated Z fuel elements, and as with all steps of the fuel 

manufacturing process were carefully checked for flaws prior to and during the recanning process (Burley 1956, Kubik 

1997).

By mid-1947, there was a large stockpile of copper-contaminated tin from the triple dip baths. General Electric began to 

cool and strain this contaminated molten tin to collect and remove the copper-tin crystals that formed in the cooling 

process. The recovered tin could be recycled back to the canning line several times. Each year, the tin recovery process 

became more economical and efficient, with fewer impurities (Kattner 1949).

2 -2 .2 6
Section 2 - Fuel Manufacturing

According to Kattner (1949, p. 5), "the principal value of the process lies in the fact that it eliminates the necessity for 

using virgin tin. During this tim e (November t, 1947 to March 3, 1948) about 24,000 lb. of tin from the scrap stockpile 

have been recovered, equivalent to an estimated 40,000 lbs. of virgin tin."

There were continuous discussions over the years dealing with the problems associated with the large accumulation of 

scrap, which included canned, rejected uranium cores, aluminum-silicon, and tin. The focus was on reclaiming all 

possible scrap for reuse in the fuel manufacturing process, and in doing so, reduce the quantities of accumulated scrap. 

Cores and tin were given a top priority (Kattner 1949, Kubik 1997).

Over the decades, the ability to recover, recycle and reuse the rejected canned uranium cores was a key factor in each 

proposed new step of the fuel manufacturing process. Any recovery method had to be cost effective, simple, and 

relatively waste-free (Kattner 1949). The materials used to recover the canned and rejected uranium cores could not be 

so strong as to corrode the core or cause it to lose its dimensional integrity (Kubik 1997).

Ma n a g e m e n t of Fu e l Ma n u f a c t u r in g Wa s t e

Every step in the plutonium production process at the Hanford Site generated a considerable amount of waste and other 

byproducts. Until 1973, all low level, radioactive solid waste from fuel manufacturing activities in the 300 Area was 

disposed of in the 300 and 600 Area burial grounds. After 1973, 300 Area low level, radioactive solid waste was 

transported to the 200 Area for disposal. From the time of their construction in 1944, the numerous 300 Area 

laboratories and fuel manufacturing facilities were connected to a common process sewer that collected low level 

radioactive liquid waste and disposed o f it in a single pond located east of the 300 Area near the Columbia River. The 

original process pond dike broke in 1948, spilling most of the pond's contents into the Columbia River. Following this 

accident, a new process pond was built to the north of the original pond, and the two ponds were used in tandem. 

Periodically, the sludge from the ponds was dredged to recover uranium (GE 1953!). The process ponds were phased out 

in 1974 and replaced by the 300 Area Process Trenches (Kubik 1997). For additional information see the Waste 

Management Section.

For four decades, fuel manufacturing activities, especially in the 313 and 314 buildings, generated acidic liquid 

(chemical) waste from canning, capping, sleeve cleaning and testing, and uranium scrap processing. The liquid 

chemical waste from the 313 and 314 buildings that did not contain recoverable uranium was discharged to the process 

sewer until the shut down of the single-pass reactors. From the early 1960s to 1973, the 333 Building discharged waste 

acids (nitric, sulfuric, hydrofluoric, and chromic nitric sulfuric) containing uranium, zirconium, copper, beryllium into an 

underground tank containing limestone. The waste acids trickled through the limestone and entered percolation ponds 

through a process sewer (Weakley 1999).

Public scrutiny and concerns in the 1970s-1980s were primarily focused on reactors and their operation as opposed to 

the fuels production process. In 1970, the Atomic Energy Commission instituted an accelerated program to reduce 

radioactive discharges in every operation to the lowest practicable levels. The program was later expanded to cover all 

hazardous wastes (Vinther 1996, Weakley 1976). One of the results of this program was the installation, beginning in 

1973, of the Waste Acid Treatment System, which routed toxic and carcinogenic materials left oyer from the N Reactor 

fuels fabrication process into tanks for treatment and storage rather than into settling ponds from which the materials 

could leach into the Columbia River (DOE 1996c).

The Waste Acid Treatment System process was developed in the 333 Building and placed in service in 1973 to process 

waste acids and chemical wastes disposed of by various 300 Area laboratories and fuel manufacturing facilities (Weakley 

1999). Specifically, the treatment system caught and neutralized waste acids from the 333 Building's fuel manufacturing 

activities. Waste acids were collected in the Acid Pump House (334-A Building) and then pumped to tanks in the south 

end of the 313 Building for neutralization. "The uranium sludge collected from the automatic rinse tank is also added to 

the neutralizer tank and the uranium recovered" (Weakley 1958, p. 129).

2 -2 .2 7
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

One of the major achievements in the area of fuel manufacturing was the development of the co-extrusion process, 

which fundamentally altered the way fuel elements had been made since World War II at the Hanford Site and 

throughout the rest of the world. Because this narrative is a history of facilities and not intended to be the definitive 

history of fuel manufacturing at the Hanford Site, the details of such achievements as co-extrusion, issues concerning 

waste, and other areas of interest could not be explored. Hopefully, this narrative w ill serve as a guide for future 

researchers to pursue more extensive study of important issues noted in this section, such as

• According to Kubik (1997, p. 33) "...scientists, engineers and technicians ascribed the problems associated with 

slug [fuel element] distortion to the changing crystalline structure of the uranium fuel rods [cores], to the fuel 

fabrication process in the 313 Building, to the dimensional specifications of the slugs and to human error on the 

fabrication line." O f interest to future researchers would be to uncover how they arrived at these conclusions 

and to uncover if possible the cause of the dramatic increase in fuel element failures from 3 in 1950 to 115 in 

1951.

• Future researchers may also want to look into the invention of the co-extrusion process: its origin, inventor, etc.

• One theme that deserves more coverage is the test reactors and fuel manufacturing pilot facilities in the 

300 Area. During the Cold War era several test reactors and pilot plants were constructed and used for 

non-defense purposes. With the worldwide uranium supplies limited, efforts were undertaken to develop and 

test alternate fuels in these facilities, focusing on the effectiveness of plutonium oxide and mixed oxide fuel 

blends. What research and development programs were initiated to improve the fuel manufacturing process in 

these test facilities?

• More in depth research on the effect of the Hanford Site's fuel manufacturing technology on the development of 

the nondefense/commercial nuclear industry could be undertaken. W hat has been the connection between 

commercial nuclear research at the Hanford Site with offsite nuclear power companies like Siemens?

• Another theme that could be the focus of future research efforts is the relationship of the Hanford Site's fuel 

manufacturing technology with other U.S. Department of Energy plutonium production sites, such as the 

Savannah River and Oak Ridge sites.

• Also to be explored is what protective measures the U.S. Department of Energy undertook for workers while they 

manufactured fuel? W hat industrial health and safety issues were associated with fuel manufacturing activities? 

W hat numbers of workers were employed in fuel manufacturing at the Hanford Site? W hat were the names and 

types of worker positions? W hat was the organizational structure in regard to the fuel manufacturing workforce?

• More extensive research is needed into the wastes generated by fuel manufacturing and what technologies were 

developed to recover or at least neutralize these wastes.

2 - 2 .2 8
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i
Section 3 - Reactor Operations

Sec tio n 3 - Reacto r Op e r a tio n s

If manufacturing the fuel elements was the heart of the plutonium production process, then 

irradiating those fuel elements was the soul. Irradiating the fuel elements as part of 

Reactor Operations, was the second step in the process at the Hanford Site and one that 

continues to illustrate the magnitude of the uncertainties that accompanied the 

plutonium production process.

in ihe U a n lu ll.in fta jv t /, .m tl d u un i: the t \ \ r n l\ ir-ir- io llo u //i;j

it. N .m m /d * \\i>rL ,im l m le n ete defined h \ //«• pra dtn lio n ie,u /<>/-. ' -

Hndl.iv and I p. 141

To make plutonium for the atomic 

bomb (the Hanford Site's primary 

purpose), the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers constructed the world's 

first full-scale nuclear reactors to 

irradiate uranium. Over a 25-year

period, the government constructed and operated nine different production reactors at the Hanford Site to produce 

plutonium. With this capability, the Hanford Site served the nation as the government's major source of plutonium 

during World War II and the Cold War era.

The expertise Hanford staff gained in constructing and then operating the early reactors (B, D, and F) as well as the later 

reactors made the site one of the primary centers of nuclear reactor technology. From 1945 through the mid-1950s, the 

Hanford Site was the only full-scale reactor center in America (Goldschmidt 1982). Using knowledge and experience 

gained during these years, Hanford staff contributed significantly to the field of nuclear technology by helping to develop 

reactor technology for energy production, develop strategies for managing nuclear waste, and understand health effects 

of reactor-related radiation. During the 1950s, General Electric, Combustion Engineering, and Westinghouse were the 

three primary companies involved in building nuclear energy plants. Because General Electric was the prime contractor 

at the Hanford Site (1946-1964), they were in an optimal position to apply the knowledge and experience gained at the 

Hanford Site to their commercial nuclear division in San Jose, California.

The achievements, however, did not come without a price. Because of the pressure to produce large quantities of 

plutonium, the power levels of the reactors were increased beyond design expectations, which led to such problems as 

leaks and ruptures in the fuel elements. Because the first eight of the nine reactors did not have closed-loop systems for 

the cooling water, environmental problems arose when irradiated cooling water was returned to the Columbia River.

Beginning in 1944, the U.S. Government started construction of the first full-scale nuclear reactors. The Hanford Site 

provided the plutonium for the implosion bomb, while its sister site, the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, provided 

the enriched uranium for the gun-type bomb. The 

Corps shipped the finished product to Los Alamos, 

where staff constructed the bombs. The Hanford 

Site also produced polonium, an important 

material used in the final assembly of the bomb.

As more fully described in Chapter 1, the roots of 

plutonium trace to work conducted in the early 

1940s at Ernest O. Lawrence's Radiation 

Laboratory at the University of California at 

Berkeley. O f the two main isotopes of uranium 

(element 92), namely uranium-235 and uranium238, only uranium-235 fissions in a way that

C ON I I’NTS

Designing and Constructing the Hanford

Roaclors ..................... ........ ............ .....................2 -

Reactor Operating History......................................... 2-3.4

Reactor Operating System*..............................

Technological Challenges and Developments 2-

Contributions of Hanford Reactots............. ............ 2-3.30

Areas for further Research........................................ 2-332

Divider Page Photo: B Reactor, 7945 (Neg.PSO,

2 - 3 .1
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

makes it suitable for a bomb. In 1940, however, scientists at the Lawrence Laboratory confirmed that the other isotope, 

uranium-238, could absorb a neutron and decay into the transuranium element, neptunium (element 93). Glenn 

Seaborg then discovered that neptunium decayed into element 94, which he named plutonium. When Seaborg's team 

showed that plutonium was more likely under some circumstances to fission than uranium-235 atoms, the seeds of the 

Hanford Site were sown (Gosling 1994).

Seaborg's discovery was important because it confirmed another technological path leading to the atomic bomb. 

Scientists already believed they could make a bomb with uranium-235 atoms, the isotope comprising 0.7 percent of the 

atoms in natural uranium, but separating uranium-235 from its natural uranium state required immense effort (hence the 

construction of the massive gaseous.diffusion plants at the Oak Ridge Reservation). The discovery of plutonium, in 

particular the work of Enrico Fermi and his graphite reactor at the University of Chicago, spurred government support. 

Table 2-3.1 shows the evolution of the reactor technology that resulted in the work at the Hanford Site.

Table 2-3.1. Evolution o f Reactor Technology in the 1940s

Date Event Location

1940 Enrico Fermi shows a chain reaction possible using large amounts of uranium in a reactor Colum bia University

1941 Glenn Seaborg discovers plutonium -239 more likely to fission under some circumstances University o f California at Berkeley

than uranium-235

1942 Fermi achieves first self-sustaining chain reaction w ith CP-1 Reactor at Stagg Field University of Chicago

1943 A ir cooled pilot-scale graphite reactor completed Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennesse

1944 W ater cooled graphite production reactors completed Hanford Site, Washington

1945 First atom ic explosion - Trinity test W hite Sands Proving Ground,New M exico

In September 1942, Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves took command of the Manhattan Project. At the time, the 

federal government was sponsoring research on four major processes for producing or separating isotopes (Gosling 1994, 

p. 14):

• Electromagnetic methods for separating uranium-235 isotopes being researched at the University of California at 

Berkeley under the direction o f Ernest O. Lawrence

• Centrifuge methods being researched at the University of Virginia under the direction of jesse R. Beams

• Gaseous diffusion methods being researched at Columbia University under the direction of John R. Dunning

• Graphite reactor technology at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago under the direction of Enrico Fermi.

On December 2, 1942, Fermi confirmed that he could create a self-sustaining nuclear reaction with graphite. Fermi 

used the graphite as a moderator to slow down the neutrons from the high speeds caused by the fission process. The 

moderator made it possible to keep the chain reaction going. Fermi's graphite moderator was one among the three 

moderating methods being explored, which paved the way for producing plutonium. By late December 1942 after much 

debate by various committees, the Manhattan Project was developing a full-scale gaseous diffusion plant, a pilot-scale 

graphite reactor as w ell as full-scale graphite reactors, and a small electro-magnetic plant, which later was enlarged 

(Gosling 1994, pp. 14-16).

De s i g n in g a n d Co n s t r u c t in g t h e Ha n f o r d Re a c t o r s

The design for the Hanford reactors came out of the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago under the general direction of 

Arthur Compton. Building upon Fermi's basic graphite moderator concept, designers were faced with a major challenge: 

how to design a reactor that would 1) be safe, 2) be controllable, and 3) have enough neutron multiplication to sustain a 

reaction. Three primary designs were the major contenders in 1942 (Gosling 1994, pp. 26-27). The contenders differed 

according to the method used to carry away the heat produced by fission in the reactors:

2 -3 .2
Section 3 - Reactor Operations

• Helium-cooled design pursued by Thomas V. Moore.

• Water-cooled design developed by Eugene Wigner and Gale Young

• Liquid metal cooled design pursued by Leo Szilard.

In October 1942, Groves pushed Arthur Compton to make some decisions regarding the reactor design to be pursued. 

Out of this came the decision to build a pilot-scale graphite reactor constructed at the Oak Ridge Reservation in 

Tennessee even before Fermi had demonstrated that he could achieve a self-sustaining chain reaction. The pilot scale 

reactor was not really a prototype for the Hanford reactors. It was air-cooled rather than water-cooled, but it was useful 

for various engineering design purposes. According to Alvin Weinberg, one of the principles in the Metallurgical 

Laboratory, the main significance of the graphite reactor was that it produced significant quantities of plutonium for the 

first time ever (1 gram per day), w hich made it possible to test separations processes on a larger scale than had been 

done heretofore (Sanger 1995, p. 35).

In early 1943, the Hanford Site was selected as the site for the full-scale plants authorized by President Roosevelt. By this 

time, the Metallurgical Laboratory staff were pursuing two major reactor designs: water cooled and helium-cooled. A 

tri-partite system was in place to make design decisions. The conflicts and synergies resulting from this tri-partite system 

were a major reason for the success of the Manhattan Project The tri-partite system involved

Scientists, mostly at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, who provided the theoretical expertise

Du Pont engineers, who provided the practical construction, operations, and engineering expertise

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Manhattan Engineering District, who made the high level decisions and any 

necessary to resolve disagreements between the Metallurgical Laboratory scientists and Du Pont engineers

In February 1943, Crawford H. Greenewalt of Du Pont was debating which reactor cooling design to pursue:

" Greenewalt's initial response to the water-cooled design was guarded. He worried about pressure problems

that might lead to boiling water in individual tubes, corrosion o f slugs [fuel elements] and tubes, and the onepercent margin o f safety for k [neutron multiplication]. But he was even more worried about the proposed

helium-cooled model. He feared that the compressors would not be ready in time for Hanford, that the shell

could not be made vacuum-tight, and that the pile [reactor] would be extremely difficult to operate. Du Pont

engineers conceded that Greenewalt's fears were well-grounded. Late in February [1943], Greenewalt

reluctantly concluded that the Met Lab's model, while it had its problems, was superior to Du Font's own

helium-cooled design and decided to adopt the water-cooled approach" - Gosling 1994, p. 30

W hile the basic water-cooled graphite moderated design was agreed upon, numerous other design decisions awaited 

resolution. Du Pont followed an approach in which they would freeze the design of a key component, thereby freeing 

them to design associated components and subcomponents (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 80).

The basic components of the Hanford Site design were the following:

Fuel - The aluminum-clad fuel elements contained metallic uranium. They measured 1.5 inches in diameter 

and 8 inches in length (see Chapter 2, Section 2, Fuel Manufacturing).

Moderator - A graphite moderator was used to moderate or slow the neutrons so that a chain reaction could 

occur.

Control System - The control system initiated and controlled the nuclear reaction. Boron rods were moved in or 

out of the reactor as necessary. The rods could also be used to shut down the reaction.

Coolant - River water was the liquid coolant, which circulated through the reactor to carry away the heat 

produced in fission. It was necessary to treat the cooling water to control corrosion.

Shielding - To protect workers, a combination of heavy iron and concrete was placed around the reactor core to 

absorb the radiation created by fissioning.

Construction of the first three Hanford reactors (B, D, and F) began in March 1943. Over time, decisions related to the 

shielding, water flow control, loading and unloading devices, coating of the uranium fuel, and water purification 

emerged. W ith these decisions, the reactor plants began taking shape. The three reactors were completed one after

2 - 3 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

another: B Reactor in September 1944, D Reactor in December 1944, and F Reactor in February 1945. Plutonium 

production commenced almost immediately upon completion of each reactor. Eventually, six more reactors were 

constructed at the Hanford Site. The DR, H, C, KE, and KW reactors were quite similar in design with the two K Reactors 

differing from the older reactors mainly in the number, size, and type of process tubes, the size o f the moderator stack, 

and the type of shielding employed. The ninth reactor, N, while based on the original graphite design, differed 

considerably. Information on reactor block size and construction materials used for all nine reactors are provided in 

Table 2-3.2. The events surrounding the operation of these and the later reactors are discussed in the sub-section,

Reactor Operating History. First, an overview of the function and operation of reactor system components is provided.

Table 2-3.2. Reactor Core Characteristics for Hanford Reactors

Characteristics B

(1944-

1968)

D

(1944-

1967)

F

(1945-

1965)

H

(1949-

1965)

DR

(1950-

1964)

C

(1952-

1969)

KW

(1954-

1970)

KE

(1955-

1971)

N

(1963-

1987)

Graphite Stack 

(Core + Reflector) 

Axial (m) 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 10.21 10.21 11.88

Vertical (m) 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.97 10-97 12.50 12.50 10.06

W idth (m) 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.97 12.50 12.50 10.06

Mass o f Graphite 

Moderator (tons) 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1542 ' 1542 726

Reflector (tons) 544 544 544 544 544 544 907 907 907

Lattice Pitch (cm) 21.27 21.27 21.27 21.27. 21.27 21.27 19.05 19.05 20.32x

Carbon/Uranium 101 99 100 109 106 100 77 78

22.86

34

Atom ic Ratio 

(Typical Loads)

Number of Process Tubes 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 3220 3220 1003

Material of Process Tubes Al. Al Al Al Al Al Al/Zr Al/Zr Zr-2

Horizontal Control Rods 9 9 9 15 9 15 20 20 84

Vertical Control 29 29 29 45 29 44 41 41 107

Rods/Ball Channels 

Boron Ball Channels 29 29 29 45 29 45 51 51 0

Re a c t o r Op e r a t in g His t o r y

Between 1943 and 1987, the government constructed and operated nine graphite-moderated, water-cooled, plutonium 

production reactors at the Hanford Site (Table 2-3.3). Over these 44 years, international, national, and regional events 

impacted the production reactors at the Hanford Site in various ways. Many of these were political in nature, some were 

technical, and others social (see sidebar box). The purpose of this sub-section is to illustrate the effect of these events on 

the reactor facilities and operating systems. To facilitate the discussion, the Reactor Operating History sub-section is 

divided into three phases: 1) fhe Manhattan Project, 1943-1945, 2) an initial Cold War period, 1946-1957, and 3) a final 

Cold War period, 1958-1989.

Phase 1 - M a n h a tta n P ro je c t ( 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 5 )

From the time the reactor program was approved until the plutonium for the first bombs was produced, those working on 

the Manhattan Project were pressured to get the job done. The initial stimulus for getting the plants built as fast as 

possible was to beat the Germans at doing the same. Later, after the Army learned that Germany was far from producing 

a bomb, the stimulus became ending the war as soon as possible. Once German military leaders surrendered on 

May 7,1945, the focus of the atomic bomb effort shifted from Germany to Japan. With emotions against Japan running 

rampant across the country, pressure to deliver the bomb stayed high.

2 -3 .4
Se c t io n 3 - Re a c t o r Op e r a t io n s

Table 2-3.3. Hanford Reactor Dates of Operation

Reactor Construction

Start

Operations

Start

Operations

Stop

B Aug 1943 Sep 1944 Feb 1968

D Nov 1943 - Dec 1944 Jun1967

F Dec 1943 Feb 1945 jun 1965

DR Dec 1947 O ct .1950 Dec 1964

H . M ar 1948 O ct 1949 Apr 1965

C )un 1951 Nov 1952 A p r1969

KW Nov 1952 Dec 1954 Feb 1970

KE Jan 1953 Feb 1955 Jan 1971

N M ay 1959 Mar 1964 Jan 1987.

By February 1945, the B, D, and F reactors were up and 

running. The Corps placed well-defined production goals 

on the Hanford Site reactor department, which the staff at 

the three reactors worked hard to m eet After 6 months 

enough plutonium had been produced for two bombs. The 

first was used for the Trinity Test at what is now the W hite 

Sands Missile Range in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. The 

Trinity Test confirmed that the plutonium-type bomb would 

work, and planning commenced for the bombing of Japan.

The Little Boy bomb, fashioned from uranium-235, was 

produced from the gaseous diffusion plant at the 

Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee and was dropped on 

Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Three days later, the Fat Man bomb, made with plutonium from the Hanford graphite 

reactors, was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945, thereby eliminating the planned drop 

of a second Fat Man bomb, which was the third and final bomb left in the arsenal.

The events of World War H established a role for the Hanford Site that would define its future over the next three 

decades. Had more bombs been needed for the war effort, plutonium bombs were the only option available to the 

United States. The uranium-235 supply was exhausted and additional supplies of uranium-235 would not be available 

for some time. W hile both plutonium-239 and uranium-235 bombs worked, Hanford reactors could produce material 

for the plutonium bombs faster than the gaseous diffusion plants at the Oak Ridge Reservation could produce material for 

the uranium bombs. This fact influenced the post-World War II atomic weapons strategy.

Phase 2 - In it ia l C old W a r P erio d ( 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 7 )

Following the end of World War II, America had an atomic weapons monopoly and no enemy. In 1946, the weapons 

program tended to flounder. The Atomic Energy Commission took control of the atomic weapons complex from the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers late that year following passage of the Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946. The Atomic 

Energy Commission conducted ah assessment o f the weapons program in early 1947, only to learn that the nuclear 

arsenal everyone assumed existed, in fact> did not. The Commission found that Belgian supplies of uranium to feed the 

Hanford Site reactors were not adequate, that problems with the reactors such as graphite expansion (discussed in the 

Technological Challenges and Developments sub-section) were emerging, and that no ready supply of bombs existed. As 

Los Alamos engineer Jacob Wechsler explained:

"We had lots o f capsules - nuclear cores - 1 guarantee you. But we didn't have weapons, we had lots o f pieces.

The idea was, if there was a threat, you would start putting them together. The fusing systems weren't there, the

initiators needed to be changed, the detonators needed to be stored in desiccated boxes and you put them in

when you needed them and then put them on again. And it went on and on this way We didn't have any

weapons, we had piles o f pieces." - Rhodes 1995, p. 284

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal, recalled how President Truman responded when 

informed about the sorry state of affairs: "He turned to me, a grim gray look on his face, the lines from his nose to his 

mouth visibly deepened. W hat [did] we propose to do about it? He realized the difficulties" (Rhodes 1995, p. 284). 

Churchill's Iron Curtain speech March 1946 and the Truman Doctrine, announced in March 1947, gave the Atomic 

Energy Commission further justification to move aggressively in developing a nuclear production system to maintain 

American supremacy.

Over the next decade the Atomic Energy Commission developed the weapons program as it saw necessary to stay ahead 

of the Soviet Union. The Atomic Energy Commission assigned three objectives for the reactor program: a) prolong useful

2 - 3 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iu t iis

ke\ l'\en K M'r'vt ling Ihc Itv.u lor I’rngi.im «il the Hanford Site 

from the L'nilvtl ShiteU rvr<|>e<1i\ t-

• July 16, 1945 - Trinity explosion confirmed success of plutonium bomb.

« August 9, 1 945 - Plutonium bomb was used on Nagasaki, Japan.

• March 5, 1946 - Premier Minister Winston Churchill gave Iron Curtain speech recognising the state

• July 1946 - Weapons testing program began on Bikini Atoll, which created a requirement for 

continued quantities of plutonium.

• March 12. 1947 - President Truman asked Congress to support the Truman Doctrine to help "free 

peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.'7

• April I, 19 4 8 - Berlin Blockade began and lasted 321 days.

• September 23, 1949 - President Truman announced that the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb.

• February 1950 - McCarthyism movement began.

• April 1950, - National Security Council 68 called for nuclear weapons build-up in response to Soviet 

design for world domination.

• June 25, 1950 - North Korea invaded South Korea.

• November 1,1952 - Atom ic Energy Commission exploded hydrogen bomb on Enewetok, using 

plutonium for a key component.

• August 14, 1953 - Soviet Union exploded first hydrogen bomb.

• July 1955 - U.S. feared Soviet Union possessed significantly more bombers than the United States.

-• November 1956 - Soviet Union crushed Hungarian revolt.

• November 17, i 956 - Khrushchev made "w e w ill bury you" statement.

• October 4, 1957 - Soviet Union launched Sputnik.

• December 1957 - Gaither Report to the National Security Council identified missile gap with Soviet 

Union (determined in the 1960s to not be accurate but not reported to the public).

• October 23, 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis began.

• October 7, 1968 - Kennedy signed Limited Test Ban Treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere,

under water, and in outer space.

• August 7. 1964 - Congress approved G ulf of Tonkin Resolution, which led to an escalation of U.S.

• July 1, 1968 - Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty signed by the United State's, the Soviet Union,

• October 17, 1973 - Arab oil producers began embargo against the United States.

• March 28,1979 - Accident at Three M ile Island nuclear plant occurred.

• July 1980 - President Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 lelracting capacity to v\age limited and

gajg«Magtthm

• April 26, 1986 - Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded in Soviet Union.

• October 1989 - Cold War ended.

life of existing equipment through rehabilitation and efficient operation, b) build replacement reactors and additional 

facilities for increasing production, and c) develop new and more efficient techniques for operating the reactors and 

processing their products.

Tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States continued to escalate and reached a threshold in the spring of 

1948 when the Berlin blockade began. One response from the Atomic Energy Commission was to authorize the restart 

of B Reactor, which had been shut down since 1946 due to concerns about graphite expansion. Also during this time, 

the Atomic Energy Commission debated whether to build reactors at new areas of the Hanford Site or replace reactors at

2 - 3 .6
Sec tio n 3 - Reactor Oper a tio n s

existing areas. When it appeared that a solution to the graphite 

expansion problem might be at hand, the Atomic Energy 

Commission scaled back its plans, authorizing one replacement 

reactor at D area, called DR for D Replacement, and one new 

reactor at a new area, H (Figure 2-3.1), located between F and 

D areas.

In 1949, D, F, and B reactors were operating, DR Reactor was 

unloaded and standing by because it had no water system, and 

H Reactor was still under construction. The Hanford Site began 

running the reactors at higher neutron flux and thus higher 

temperatures, which led to more production and less graphite 

swelling. When the announcement came in September 1949 that 

the Soviets had exploded their first nuclear weapon years earlier 

than most had predicted, the order came to complete the 

waterworks for the DR reactor.

The Cold War intensified in the 1950s as the Korean war began. With concerns over another world conflict mounting, 

the Atomic Energy Commission began constructing its sixth Hanford reactor, C Reactor, June 1951. January 1952, 

President Truman decided to increase the ratio of plutonium over enriched uranium supplies, which in turn resulted in 

authorization and construction of the jumbo KE and KW reactors at the Hanford Site.

The K reactors represented a second generation reactor. Although still using the same basic graphite-moderated, watercooled design, they differed from the earlier reactors in several significant ways (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, pp. 96-99). 

First was the enormous increase in power levels. K reactors were designed for 1,800 megawatt-thermal, while the first 

Hanford reactors were designed for 250 megawatt-thermal. (These numbers represent heat generation levels used to 

define the capacity of the production reactors and should not be confused with numbers used to describe electric-power 

reactors, which used megawatt-electrical, a figure representing electrical output.) The increase in power levels were 

made possible by advancements in technology and reactor design and many improvements in reactor fuel technology, 

hydraulics of the reactors (not to mention greatly increased cooling flow). K reactors also marked a first by capturing 

heat from the cooling water to heat the facilities. Improved control systems enabled the K reactors to operate with fewer 

staff than the other reactors, thereby increasing cost efficiency. And finally, they used new materials as well as new types 

of equipment.

W hile it was the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States that conceptually drove decision making 

regarding Hanford reactors, it was the concept of the nuclear arsenal that drove the specific requirements. Weapons 

testing at the Nevada Test Site (Ranger, Buster-Jangle, and the Tumbler-Snap per series) demonstrated the viability of the 

plutonium-weapons program. The thinking within the congressional Joint Committee for Atomic Energy was to continue 

to increase the stockpile of plutonium weapons, which increased the demand for plutonium. Even the hydrogen bomb 

developed in 1952 required plutonium. Decisions, such as the Atomic Energy Commission's in 1947 to build 150 Fat 

Man bombs (Rhodes 1995, p. 298), were what drove the plutonium production requirements. The pressure to meet 

these requirements had three important effects on the Hanford reactor program:

• A constant tug of war between production staff, who needed to keep the reactors running at the highest power 

levels possible, and safety staff in Washington D.C. and at the Hanford Site, who were responsible for ensuring 

the safety of workers, surrounding populations, and the environment (Findlay and Hevly 1995, pp. 147-150). 

Thus in the drive to deliver plutonium and polonium for the arsenal, additional risk to human and environmental 

health were taken.

• A consistent return to the basic graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactor design each time a new Hanford 

reactor was authorized. Although it was understood that other designs such as a beryllium or heavy water 

moderator might be more efficient, decision makers also understood the risk that developing new technology

Figure 2 -3 .1 . H Reactor at the Hanford Site

Around 1950

2 - 3 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

entailed. The Hanford reactor design might not be the most efficient, but it could guarantee plutonium. This 

topic is explored further in the sub-section on Technological Challenges and Developments.

• By using the same basic design, reactor staff were able to dramatically increase the efficiency of the existing 

reactors. Moreover, staff were able to make a dramatic increase in scale with the design of the jumbo K reactors 

as well as incorporate several technological advancements to improve efficiency and safety. These 

advancements were part of a $500 m illion expansion program at the Hanford Site, which included reactor 

improvements, new reactors, and new separations facilities.

Phase 3 - F in a l C old W a r P e rio d ( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 8 9 )

As the Korean War Armistice was signed in 1953, the demand for plutonium began to diminish. Because plutonium has 

a half-life o f 24,000 years, the only threat to plutonium inventories was actual use in weapons. By projecting the amount 

of plutonium being produced and the amount that was needed for the weapons testing program, planners in the mid1950s could see that plutonium supplies would be adequate before long and, therefore, the Hanford production capacity 

in 1958 was sufficient for the foreseeable future.

Several other factors, however, led to a proposal in 1957 for a new production reactor at the Hanford Site. These 

included increasing interest in President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative of 1953, increasing concern for human 

and environmental safety, and the drive to reduce plutonium production costs. In response to these factors,

General Electric proposed a dual purpose reactor for the Hanford Site in 1957. The fundamental difference of the 

N Reactor was, in addition to producing plutonium, the heat from the cooling water could be used to produce electricity 

for commercial purposes, thus promoting the goal of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. Key features of the new 

reactor were the following:

• Closed-loop, primary cooling system to eliminate cooling water discharges to the Columbia River, a cause of

extensive contamination, and with it some of the concern for human and environmental safety

• Heat exchangers to generate steam that could power electricity-generating turbines

• Confinement system to lim it the spread of radioactivity in the event of an accident

• Advanced materials and instrumentation to improve safety and efficiency as practicable

Congressional approval and funding for the new reactor was not automatic as the funding for the 

first eight reactors at the Hanford Site had been. President Eisenhower, for example, did not support the new reactor 

because he did not see the need for more plutonium production capability. Others questioned the need since the

" \ttv r mm oral .iffrfiip r * la ahl.tm h in d m ii i\» tho -lo.m i plant .uul

iatod in ira s tru i Into. ,i moasuro t v i- fin a lh apprtn r d in

thank* laro.oh ta ,*u pp nrl Ira n i Ih o -id o n l fuhn / . Konnod\.

W hen P ro+idrnl konnod\ c ,im o lo I ho H anford *>iio in Septomhoi

7 ‘# ti! fu r tho " lu tin d hrvakin<> at Iho *>foam plan t '.in o w n l that

aponod the H am m d site to 1hv p u h lu 101 I ho iii* t Im io o io i .in ti

ii,f> ationdod in .ih a tif W W W poop/a-, ho i/zv-.-.ci'/ the im p ort,u d

to lo fh .il the dual p u ip n -o r c .n lu i m .i- pl.nino, in m aintainim :

w tirld w iilo nut loat to« hnotm ’u a f •*uporii>rit\.’ - ( .iilis lc ,ind

Zvn/cn I pp. 11 -»- IJ 1

important step in keeping the United States at the forefront of nuclear technology. The support from the Atomic Energy 

Commission and the joint Committee on Atomic Energy was sufficient to obtain congressional funding for the new 

reactor with one important change: the electricity producing portion of the reactor would not be built, although the 

reactor portion would be designed so that the steam plant could be added in the future. Design of the N Reactor began 

in 1958 and construction in 1959. The reactor officially started up December 31, 1963 to meet the deadline.

required quantities for the plutonium stockpile were 

easily achievable with existing capacity. Additional 

opposition

related to the potential for electricity generation. 

Coal and hydropower companies were threatened 

by potential competition from nuclear power and 

used their political connections to oppose the 

new reactor.

One of the major advocates for the N Reactor, as the 

new reactor came to be called, was Henry "Scoop" 

Jackson, Congressman and later Senator from 

Washington State. He argued that the new 

production reactor at the Hanford Site was an

2 - 3 .8
Se c t io n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

Mark Jensen, a member of the operating crew who shut the N Reactor down, talked with some of the early operators of 

N Reactor. His understanding from those discussions is "the reactor was fueled enough to go critical, then immediately 

shut down to complete construction, and started up again for testing in March 1964" (Jensen 1999).

The N Reactor began producing plutonium in 1964. The steam 

plant began producing electricity in 1966, and for many years it was 

the largest nuclear power plant in the world (Figure 2-3.2).

Producing 800 megawatts of electricity, it roughly equaled the total 

output of-all nuclear power producing reactors in America at the 

tim e (Carlisle and Zenzen, note 40, p.248). W hile the government 

operated the reactor that produced the steam, a consortium of 

public and private utilities operated the turbines that produced the 

electricity. "The fence was physical, but it nicely symbolized the 

intellectual and ideational division between the weapons and the 

civilian sides and between the government preserve and the 

commercial w orld" (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 113).

N Reactor and the steam plant construction occurred during the 

same time that the commercial nuclear power industry was starting Figure 2-3.2. N Reactor and Electricity

to take off. As a result, the international and national industry Generating P ant Aroun 1985

showed considerable interest in N Reactor. Many industry and

governmental groups came to the Hanford Site to tour the facility. The project helped put the Hanford Site on the 

nuclear industry map, which would have important implications in the future for non-defense related work.

Because by the 1960s the plutonium stockpile was much greater than deemed necessary, the requirements for plutonium 

decreased. Most significant was the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, a showdown between the two superpowers 

that nearly led to deployment of nuclear weapons. The absurd size of the nuclear arsenal combined w ith the realization 

that nuclear war could happen helped change the direction of the Cold War. In 1963, Britain, the United States, and the 

Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which outlawed nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in 

outer space.

On January 8, 1964, President Johnson, announced that some Hanford reactors would be shut down. The Atomic Energy 

Commission selected H, DR, and F reactors for closure based upon their age and condition (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, 

p. 148). in 1967, another announcement came for a closure at the Hanford Site (D Reactor), and in 1968, the Atomic 

Energy Commission announced that B Reactor was to close.

The economic impact of these closures was severe and resulted in efforts to find new missions for the Hanford Site. The 

Tri-City Nuclear Industrial Council, later called the Tri-City Industrial Development Council, formed and began looking 

for ways to leverage Hanford assets. In 1965, the General Electric contract, which had been in place since 1946, was 

spread among six different companies, each of which was to diversify. Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc. (a joint venture 

between McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company and United Nuclear Corporation) won the contract to operate the fuel 

manufacturing and reactor complexes. A brochure prepared to illustrate potential uses of Hanford assets (Hoisted and 

Albaugh 1964b) indicates that reactors and their associated facilities were thought to have various uses to the burgeoning 

nuclear industry. Thus, in addition to diversifying the Hanford Site away from a single contractor, the Hanford Site was 

also attempting to diversify away from the Atomic Energy Commission (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 156-160).

In 1969, another closure announcement reverberated across the Hanford Site. All remaining production reactors (C, KE, 

KW, and N) were to-be shut down. Fuel manufacturing and the separations plants would close as the need for their 

services ended. This decision would have effectively ended the mission of the Hanford Site. Recognizing the economic 

consequences to the local community, local economic leaders undertook a major effort to keep the N Reactor operating 

to provide steam for the Hanford Generating Plant. An eleventh hour agreement kept N Reactor running so at least

2 - 3 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

electricity could be produced. This required 

several modifications to operations. The 

conversion was completed in 1971, and 

N Reactor generated steam for use in producing 

electricity throughout the 1970s.

As the Hanford Site entered the 1980s, several 

events suggested that the diversification efforts 

might pay off. The concept of using the 

Hanford Site as a dedicated nuclear facility for experimental and commercial reactors never fu lly materialized, but it did 

arrive in a fashion. See Hoisted and Albaugh (1964a) for their proposal for the Hanford Site to be an experimental 

reactor site. The Washington Public Power Supply System, which had provided the funding for the Hanford Generating 

Plant at N Reactor, chose Hanford as a site for three new power reactors. However, because of rising interest rates, cost 

overruns, and decreased use of energy by the public, only one power reactor was completed, and the investors suffered 

major losses. Other events though made diversification look promising. The Atomic Energy Commission chose the 

Hanford Site for a new prototype breeder reactor, the Fast Fuel Test Reactor, later renamed the Fast Flux Test Facility.

Also, Exxon Nuclear Fuels constructed a commercial fuel manufacturing facility, later sold to Siemens.

Several events, external and internal to the Hanford Site, that affected the Hanford reactors began in the early 1970s.

The 1970s for the nuclear industry was not a good decade. Increasing concerns over nuclear technology, public media 

events such as "The China Syndrome," and actual accidents such as Brown's Ferry and Three M ile island led to 

increasing scrutiny, more regulation, more procedures, and more training. The N Reactor, the sole operating Hanford 

production reactor at the time, was only operating to produce electricity. Because its long-term operation was tenuous, 

maintenance budgets tended to shrink during this decade, and, as a result, the condition of N Reactor declined 

somewhat. Procedures and training, however, increased dramatically as the federal government promulgated new rules 

and regulations. Security was upgraded during this period due to the worldwide increase in terrorism.

In the late 1970s, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate. President Carter started 

a military buildup, which accelerated when President Reagan took office. The federal government decided to reinstate 

the production of plutonium at N Reactor. As plutonium production commenced, numerous modifications and 

adjustments were needed to comply with safety and other regulatory requirements. A major upgrading was required and 

new programs commenced. By 1982, weapons-grade plutonium was once again being produced at N Reactor.

The N Reactor continued producing weapons-grade plutonium throughout the 1980s. Irradiated fuel elements continued 

to be deposited in the fuel basins where most of the fuel processed in the 1970s also was located. The Chernobyl 

explosion in 1986 led to a shutdown of N Reactor and national assessments of its ability to operate safely. Because of 

concerns over safety, electrical production ceased as well. W hile it may have continued to operate had plutonium been 

needed, when the Cold War ended in 1989 there was simply no need to continue production. With N Reactor's 

transition to cold standby, the Hanford Site's production mission ended, and the cleanup mission began.

Re a c t o r Op e r a t in g Sy s t e m s

The purpose of the reactor operating systems at the Hanford Site was to produce plutonium and other radioisotopes. As 

described in the Construction History Section, each reactor area at the Hanford Site was essentially self-sufficient, 

containing all the buildings and processes needed to operate a reactor (Figure 2-3.3). The reactor operating systems and 

examples of the buildings and structures that represent them are presented in Table 2-3.4 and discussed in greater detail 

below.

< onir.ulors Rv-ponsihlv for Hanford Rv.ulor"*

1943-1943 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours

1946-1964 General Electric Company

1963-1987 Douglas United Nuclear, Inc.

1987-1994 Westinghouse Hanford C

1995-present Bechtel Hanford, Inc.

2 - 3 .1 0
S ec tio n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

I r r a d ia t io n Sy s t e m

The irradiation system was the primary system. Virtually all other reactor systems supported the irradiation system in one 

way or another. To effect irradiation, reactor control operators placed natural uranium into a graphite reactor stack 

where the uranium-235 atoms fissioned and uranium-238 atoms were transformed into plutonium-239.

The majority of irradiation related activities took place in the reactor building, designated as a 105 building. Each of the 

105 buildings contained a reactor block, a reactor control room, a spent-fuel discharge area, fuel storage basin and 

associated fuel handling equipment, fans and ducts for the ventilation and recirculating gas systems, water cooling

Table 2-3.4. Production Reactor Systems and Representative Buildings Selected for Mitigation

System Function Example Buildings

irradiation Irradiate fuel to make plutonium 105B, 105KW, 105.N

Water Treatment Provide treated water to cool reactor 163N, 181 B,181 KW, 181N, 182B, 182N,183KW, 183N, 183 NA,

183NB, 190KW

Waste Management Manage reactor-related wastes 105KW-RTC, 107KW, 107N,116B, 116KW, 116N, 117B, 117KW,

117N, 118B-1, 119KW, 119N, 183H, 218-E-16,1301N, 1310N, 1313N, 

1314N ,1325N

Operations Support Provide support to reactor operations 212N, 4 3 6 ,1116N, 2101M, 4703

Facilities Support Provide support to reactor facilities 108N, 1705N, 1705NA, 1712N, 1714N, 171 7K, 1722N, 1908KE, 4621W

Administrative Support Provide administrative services 1720K, 4710

Security Provide security to reactor area 181NA, 1112N, 1701K

Power Generation Provide power to or from reactor 105N, 109N, 155N, 184N, 185N

Research and Development Provide research and development 190D Complex, 305, 305B, 309/309E, 318 Complex, 321 Complex, 326,

337B 405 1706KE, 1706KER

W A T E R F L O W LE G E N D i

AND I

R E A C T O R A R E A - 100-H

Figure 2-3.3. Map o f a Typical Hanford Reactor Area (100-H) Showing Key Buildings and Structures

2 -3 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

systems, and supporting offices, shops, and laboratories. A typical reactor building (Figure 2-3.4) was a reinforced 

concrete and concrete block structure roughly 250 feet long by 230 feet wide by 95 feet high (75 by 70 by 30 meters). 

The building had massive reinforced concrete walls 3-5 feet thick (1 -1.5 meters) around the reactor block to provide 

radiation shielding with lighter construction above (either concrete block or corrugated asbestos-cement). Roof 

construction was primarily precast concrete slab or poured insulating concrete.

Figure 2-3.4 illustrates several key areas of a reactor building. Fuel operators would load the uranium fuel elements into 

the process channels located in the front face of the reactor block, a process referred to as charging. As operators loaded 

the reactor w ith new fuel elements, the irradiated fuel elements already in the reactor were pushed out the back, a

process referred to as discharging. Fuel discharge and storage areas were located adjacent to the rear face o f the reactor.

To start the chain reaction, reactor control operators would first withdraw vertical safety rods and then

horizontal, neutron-absorbing control rods on the left side of the reactor block 

(when facing the front of the reactor). The neutron-absorbing 

control rods absorbed neutrons and thereby suppressed 

the chain reaction when in the reactor. To slow the 

chain reaction or stop it if necessary, control operators 

would move the control rods back into the reactor 

block. To stop a reactor quickly, that is to SCRAM the 

reactor, control operators would trip the vertical safety 

rods, dropping them into the reactor block from the top 

of the reactor. An additional shutdown system was also 

located on top of the reactor, that being the boron ball 

safety system in which neutron-absorbing steel-andboron balls were dropped into vertical safety channels for 

emergency reactor shutdown.

Spent-Fuel

Storage Basin

Vertical Safety Rods

and Ball Safety System

Reactor niters

Block Front

Face

Horizonta

Control

Control Room and

Support Facilities

Figure 2-3.4. Layout o f a Typical Reactor Facility To determine when the proper amount of plutonium was 

ready and stop the fission process, physicists made 

calculations daily based on the heat generated by the reactor and the length of time the fuel

elements had been in the reactor. These calculations were important because if the fuel elements were irradiated too 

long, too much plutonium-239 would absorb further neutrons and turn into plutonium-240 and plutonium-241. 

Plutonium-240 was undesirable. It had a short half-life of 12.4 years, after which it decayed into americium.

Americium, because of

j " "" its high toxicity, created

logistical, problems 

related to handling. 

Plutonium-241 

spontaneously fissions, 

which made it 

undesirable for weapons 

use (Albright et at. 1993).

The Meaning oi s(. It \M | | 1

■'/*i O n c n ih t'i the h Di U i\ first nut lc .it teat ta r had been se<rell\ < n ii'-lrtu ted j I the M |

I . n i \ a w fi of ( /i/t.ig ff. The d e \ic e, intended to p to d u t <• a to n tn d ie d < hain teat lion. I | | | |

i (/ndstcd o f a ’p ile a t graphite blot h* in w h it h uranium it.is embedded. It it .is assembled | | | | 

in <i squash »ou rt itndei the west stands o f Kf.nj!* / ieid, the I n i\ e rsit\ "s fo o tb a ll stadium. F r t|||| 

lim it the rear lion, c o n tm l tods n<»;r mmv ted in to the p ile, 'u m e ncutm ns tno uuh l about | | | | 

fissmn. the < o n lrn l m ds it ere m ade o f m aterial that w o u ld absorb neutrons, lik e ,i b lo tte r S p 

and thus regulate the rate at it h it h tisstnninn took place. V a saret\ d e \h e . a special | | | | 

em etiieiH V co n tro l itn l was suspended o \e t the pile. It it .is he ld /n a top e -o that saivh t|g | 

o iiu e r s - ’the suit ide stjuad. th e i were ta ile d co u ld tu t it in an enieiuen<\ and d io p the | | | | | 

to d in to the teat tor. \n ,n n.i« p ro \id e d fo r this purpose. • Ih e c in c itie n c \ shutdow n ot

reat lot. w h it h on tttdas m odels is at i om plished h \ elahoiate autom ated etiuipm enl. is s till j 

reterred to .i- a M K \V( short lo r s.i/eft tn n ir o l to d ,ix n u n .> " - lo it l I •){}-, p. Z0 |

The physicists made 

calculations for each 

process channel because 

the reaction varied 

depending upon the 

location. Areas central to 

the reactor block tended

2 - 3 .1 2

L
Se c t io n 3 - Re a c to r Op e r a t io n s

to have a higher neutron flux and thus required less time. Generally, about 25 percent of the process channels would be 

discharged at a time. When the physicists informed reactor staff that enough fuel elements were ready for discharge, an 

outage was scheduled, the reactor shut down, and the fuel elements discharged. When operating the reactor to only 

produce electricity, the irradiation time could be longer, resulting in fewer discharges and, therefore, less down time.

As the fuel operators loaded the reactor w ith new fuel elements, the irradiated fuel elements were pushed out of the rear 

face, falling into a pool of water. When the B Reactor started up, boxes of fuel elements and dummy elements (used for 

spacing;fuel within the reactor) were brought to the reactor front face from the 103 Building. Using the C-elevator 

(charging), workers positioned themselves in front of the tubes to be charged and uncoupled the endcaps. At the same 

time, workers on the D-elevator (discharging) would uncouple the endcaps of the same process tubes at the rear face. 

These workers would then raise the D-elevator to a level higher than the highest row of process tubes to be charged/ 

discharged and exit the rear face. Operators on the front face would then use the charging machine to push new fuel 

and dummy elements into position w hile pushing the irradiated and dummy elements out the rear face.

This was the most problematical and dangerous step in the operation as exposure to an irradiated element was lethal. 

The B Reactor workers used periscopes to monitor the discharging elements as they exited the rear face. In theory, the 

elements would exit the rear face by dropping into a discharge funnel through an aiming tube, enter an underwater 

discharge chute, pass through an escapement gate, and come to rest in the discharge area of the fuel storage basin. In 

practice, the process was too complicated w ith too many snag points that had to be cleared. W ithin 2 months of 

commencing operations at B Reactor, the removal of the escapement gates simplified the process somewhat, and 

3 months later the aiming tubes and discharge funnel were eliminated. W ith these improvements and added experience, 

charge/discharge efficiency rose from 10 tubes per 8-hour shift to 50. '

Shielded by 20 feet of water, the B Reactor workers used long tongs first to remotely separate the irradiated fuel elements 

from the dummy elements resting together on the bottom of the discharge basin, then to place the elements into their 

designated steel buckets, each with a holding capacity of approximately 1000 pounds. Working from the wooden floor 

suspended over the basin, workers then used long rods to attach each bucket to an overhead monorail system that 

allowed them to position the bucket according to its content within the fuel storage area of the basin. Dummy elements 

were retained for reuse in the reactor. For further details, see the B Reactor Historic American Engineering Record in 

Appendix B on the Internet.

Once the fuel elements had cooled for a sufficient time, about 30 days, the buckets were pulled out of the basin and the 

elements placed in railroad cars for transport to the cooling basin where they stayed until ready for shipment to the 

200 Area. In addition to producing plutonium and other isotopes for weapons, 

some of the Hanford reactors had experimental test penetrations 

located on the right side of the reactor block where 

irradiation experiments could be performed.

Step Plug

Steel Outer Sheil

T-Scction Web 

(Steel)

Three aspects of the 105 buildings warrant further 

description:

. • Reactor block

• Control room

• Fuel storage basin.

Reactor Block. A typical reactor block (Figure 2-3.5) 

consisted of a graphite moderator stack encased in cast 

iron thermal shielding 8-10 inches thick ;

(20-25 centimeters) and a biological-shield (alternating 

layers of steel plate and Masonite or heavy aggregate 

concrete 40-80 inches thick - 100-200 centimeters).

Gunbanel Flange

raphrte

T h e r m a l S hfefcl Horizontal 

Contml Rods

Thermal Shield Blocks 

(Cast Jronj (Aiuminflro)

Biological Shield Thermal Shield

Stee

to Plates)

Cooling Tubes

Gas Sea?

Labyrinth Joint

12.2 sn^ X

Expansion 

Joint Seal 

(Neophrene)

Front (inlet) Face 

Thermal Shield 

Lead (Pb) 

Cooling Tube

Figure 2-3.5. Cutaway o f a Reactor Block

2 - 3 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The entire block rested on a massive concrete base and foundation. Atypical reactor block assembly weighed 

approximately 9000 tons (8000 metric tons including the weight of the base) and had overall dimensions of 46 feet high

by 46 feet wide by 40 feet deep (14x14x12 meters). Additional details concerning the reactor block are provided in

Tables 2-3.5 and 2-3.6. The principal components of a production reactor block were:

• Reactor moderator stack, an assembly of graphite blocks cored to provide channels for process tubes, control 

rods, and other equipment

• Thermal and biological shields, surrounded by a heavy, vault-like steel outer shell equipped with gas-tight seals 

for the reactor block penetrations

• Process tubes, which held the uranium fuel elements and carried the cooling water

• Foundation

• Horizontal control rods

• Vertical safety rods and boron ball safety system

• Monitoring and experimental/test equipment

Table 2-3.5. Components o f a Typical Hanford Nuclear Reactor Block (7 00-F)

Graphite Moderator Stack

Thermal Shield

Biological Shield

Process Tubes

Foundation

The encapsulated graphite moderator stack measures 36 feet high, 36 feet wide, and 28 feet long (11 x 11 x 8.5 meters).

Its total volume is 36,288 cubic feet (1,028 cubic meters). Individual graphite blocks, stacked tightly in a crisscross 

pattern, are 4.2 inches square by 44.5 inches in length (10.5x122 centimeters).

The graphite stack is bordered underneath by a layer o f 10-inch thick (26-centimeter) cast-iron blocks (the bottom w all of 

the thermal shield). A massive steel-reinforced, high density concrete base completely underlies the thermal shield, 

serving as a support pad. The full six-sided thermal shield is composed of a single layer of approximately 3,300 cast-iron 

blocks, varying greatly in size and weight.

The top, bottom, and side thermal shields contain slots that hold cooling tubes. The cooling tubes are held in place by 

lead poured into the slots around the tubes.

The next layer of shielding is the biological shield. It is 52 inches thick (132 centimeters) and forms an integral 

encasement on the top and four sides. O n the top and tw o sides, steel plate T-section flanges, each approximately 46 feet 

long, 4 feet wide, and 4 feet high (14x1 x 1 meters), form the inner w all and ribbing of the biological shield. An outer 

shell o f 0.25-inch (0.635-centimeter) steel plate was welded in place to co m pletely seal the top and side walls o f the 

biological shield.

The top biological shield is not welded to the side walls o f the reactor block. The shield was laid in place w ith edges o f all 

four walls meeting in diagonal, stair-step labyrinth joints. A ll seams are enclosed by gas-tight expansion seals. The 

reactor's front and rear face biological shielding was fabricated in the same alternately layered pattern o f Masonite and 

steel but in sectioned blocks rather than solid walls. There are a total of 264 such blocks (called B-blocks), 132 on each 

face.

Extending through the reactor block from the front to the rear face are 2,004 symmetrically located 1.7-inch diameter 

(4.4-centimeter) aluminum process tubes. These tubes are connected to the cooling water piping on both the front and 

rear face.

The reactor block rests on a massive reinforced concrete foundation. The foundation is 64 feet long, 56.5 feet wide, and 

22.5 feet deep (20 x 17 x 7 meters). The concrete base of the reactor block is separated from the foundation by a 

0.25-inch thick (0.635-centimeter)steel membrane plate.

Table 2-3.6. Estimated Weight Comparison o f the Six Oldest (B, D, F, DR,

H, and C) and the K Reactor Blocks

Component

Estimated

Weight (pounds)

Estimated

Weight (kilograms)

Graphite moderator stack 3,607,565 1,636,364

Thermal shield blocks (top and bottom) 680,728 ' 308,773

Thermal shield blocks (sides) 562,178 255,000

Thermal shield blocks (front and rear) 1,002,602 454,773

Biological shield (top and sides) 5,411,345 2,454,545

Biological shield (front and rear) 4,415,056 2,002,636

Process tubes and gun barrel 433,909 196,818

Reactor base 1,780,733 807,727

Estimated total weight, 6 oldest reactors 17,895,000 8,117,000

Estimated total weight, K Reactor 24,251,000 11,000,000

Control Room. The reactor irradiation 

and water cooling systems contained 

numerous instruments to monitor 

performance. The reactor control 

room was the information center for 

most of these monitoring systems 

(Figure 2-3.6). Unless otherwise 

indicated, the information for the 

control room came from Wahlen 

(1989). Each reactor building 

contained the following six types of x 

instrumentation:

2 - 3 .1 4
Se c t io n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

..'■'/TiS

Figure 2-3.6. B Reactor Control Room Showing

Instrumentation Gages

• Reactor Safety Circuits - Visual readout devices provided 

information on the status of the irradiation process. The 

instruments were connected directly to reactor safety 

circuits so that the reactor would shut down if limits were 

exceeded.

• Reactor Process Controls - The reactor process instruments 

provided information so the operators could control the 

efficiency of the reactor.

• Temperature Monitoring Instruments - These instruments 

monitored the temperature of the effluent water, the 

graphite moderator, and the thermal shield.

• Pressure Gauges — Many miscellaneous pressure gauges in 

the control room indicated the pressures at various points 

in the primary and secondary cooling systems.

• Rupture Monitor - The rupture monitor system detected 

fuel element failures in the reactor. It continually sampled 

effluent water from both ends of the rear cross header 

before the effluent entered the rear riser. Visual and 

audible alarms annunciated when trip points were 

exceeded.

• Reactor Power Calculator - The total power level of the 

reactor was computed by a calculator using total flow to 

the reactor and the bulk coolant temperature increase 

across the reactor.

• On the initial startup, three types of circuits could initiate a 

SCRAM (automatic insertion of control and/or safety rods) if 

conditions warranted: manual trip circuits, power failure 

circuit, and the Beckman-Neutron Flux Monitor.

• To increase production, operators had to run the reactors closer to the safety limits. This was made possible by 

adding more,devices, such as the pressure monitor, seismoscope, vertical safety rods/horizontal control rods 

interlock, zone temperature monitor, bypass switches, and mercoid switches.

The nuclear instrumentation range requirement was from normal background or shutdown flux levels to approximately 

one hundred billion times normal background. A single instrument was not available with a range this large. This 

required instruments divided into different process control systems to monitor reactor operation at various flux levels. 

Other systems monitored the temperatures in the reactor of the moderator, thermal shield, and effluent water.

Fuel Storage Basins. Each reactor building contained a spent-fuel storage basin, which served as a collection, storage, 

and transfer facility for the fuel elements discharged from, the reactor. The storage, located behind the reactor, was 

typically divided into three zones: the spent-fuel discharge area, the storage area, and the transfer area. Each basin had 

a wash pad, and some had an underwater fuel-inspection facility. The above-grade structures in the storage basin were 

constructed with concrete block walls and precast concrete (panel) tile roofs from 10-39 feet (3-1-2 meters) in height. The 

below-grade portion was 20 feet (6 meters) deep with reinforced concrete columns and walls. The average thickness of 

the outside walls of the basin was 1.5 feet (50 centimeters). The bottom o f the basin was about 6 inches (15 centimeters) 

thick. The total volume o f concrete in each basin was about 750 cubic yards (573 cubic meters). The total spent-fuel 

storage basin area ranges from 650 square meters to 929 square meters, depending on the specific reactor.

Under 20 feet (6 meters) of water in the spent-fuel discharge area, irradiated fuel elements were sorted into storage 

buckets by long, hand-operated tongs. The buckets were then transferred by an overhead monorail system to the storage 

area where they were held for a time to allow the decay of short-lived radionuclides. Following the storage period, the 

buckets of fuel elements were moved on an overhead monorail system to the transfer area.

2 - 3 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The transfer pits, which measure 6 by 9 feet (2 by 2.5 meters), were located at one corner of the fuel storage basins and 

at the inner end of the fuel transfer area. The transfer pits were 5 feet (1.5 meters) deeper than the basins and were 

connected to the basins by a canal over which the monorail system ran. Here the irradiated fuel elements were loaded 

into casks, then raised by a crane and placed in special railroad cars for shipment to the chemical reprocessing facilities 

in the 200 Area.

Wa te r Co o lin g Sy s t e m

Nuclear reactors produce an enormous amount of energy in the form of heat during fissioning. Nearly 94 percent of the 

heat generated in the reactor is generated in the uranium fuels with the remaining 6 percent generated in the graphite

moderator. The temperatures must be kept 

below certain thresholds or damage w ill 

occur, creating the potential for a severe 

accident. Coolants used to control reactor 

temperatures can be gases (for example, 

carbon dioxide, helium), liquids (for

i_ _______________________________ i example, ordinary water, he

fluid organic compounds), and liquid metals 

(for example, sodium) (Caines 1970, p. 20). The Hanford approach was to use ordinary water as the coolant, passing it 

through the fuel-bearing process tubes in the reactor. A system was devised to deliver a continuous supply of cooling 

water to avoid overheating. Severe overheating could lead to the melting of the fuel core and release of fission products 

to the environment.

-X i/w r.K te iM u a lu m l H .m io id r'« that f/n 'sttv i> cinirnu>u*>. hut

the n u t to i /- ,i w '/i -m a ll th in 1; ,m d a ll the /*■«./ i- n.ifcf Ire.ilm viU . Mo-./

oi the nu m c\ w ent in to vxatci fiv a ttn c n l.' - Herbert Xndcismi ii* quolvil

in S,in$»i‘i I W > . p 4h

Three major factors drove the design of the water cooling system. The first was the volume of water required. By the late 

1950s, when the Hanford reactors were operating at maximum power levels, the average flow of cooling water through 

eight reactors combined was over 500,000 gallons per minute (Foster 1957, p. 6). C Reactor, for example, was designed 

to handle 62,000 gallons per minute and could handle up to 80,000 gallons per minute if necessary. Providing this 

amount of water required an enormous pumping, piping, and storage infrastructure.

The second was the need to purify and treat the water for use in the reactor. A large-scale system of settling basins, 

mixers, pumps, sampling stations, and storage tanks was constructed to ensure the massive volumes of water met the 

stringent requirements for purity and chemical composition. For example at B Reactor, a coagulant was added to the raw 

river water to aid in filtering out suspended solids. Solids in the cooling water could become activated (made 

radioactive) as they passed through the reactor, creating an additional radioactive waste for disposal. Sulfuric acid was 

added before the coagulation and filtration process to reduce the pH below 7.5. (The Columbia River's pH ranges from 

7.6 to 8.4). After filtration, lime was added to raise the pH to 7.5 to 7.8. To inhibit the corrosion on process tubes and 

fuel elements, 1.8 to 2.2 parts per m illion of sodium 

dichromate was added (Gerber 1993a, p. 16).

The third was the need for multiple backup and 

emergency systems. The integrity of the water supply 

had to be maintained, which was no small task given 

the number of pumps, pipes, storage vessels, and 

valves involved. Each of the older type of reactor 

facilities at the Hanford Site incorporated three 

systems to maintain adequate flow of cooling water.

(N Reactor, although water cooled, was a different 

design from the earlier Hanford reactors and, 

therefore, incorporated a modified water treatment 

system that nonetheless shared many of the same 

components as the older reactor facilities). The

iH

Hanioicl Silt- Spouiiialions mi Cooling tt.ile i

(Gerber 1993, p. 16)

1 :

Turbidity 0 to 2 parts pel m illion

Iron not to exceed 0,1 part per m illion

pH 7.5 to 8.2 (7.5 to 7.8 preferred;

Total Chlorine not to exceed 2 parts per m illion

Free Chlorine not to exceed 0.2 part per m illion

Manganese not to exceed 0.01 part per m illion

Aluminum not to exceed 0.05 pari per million

2 - 3 .1 6
Se c t io n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

Primary Cooling System consisted 

of an electric motor driven pump 

system. The Secondary Cooling 

System consisted of a steam power 

pumping system. The third, the Last 

Ditch Cooling System, consisted of 

a dual system of elevated storage 

tanks and an interconnecting 

pipeline that connected all of the 

reactor plants. A flow chart of the 

water cooling system can be seen in 

Figure 2-3.7.

181 182 183 130 | 105

Building Building Building Building I Building

CBeiruca

A dd itio n

Building 4 Storage Tanks

Reservoir Filters

ClearweH Pumps

River DeepW til Pumps

Effluentto 

Retention 

Basins

Figure 2-3.7. Water Fiow for a Typical Cooling System in a Production Reactor

The Primary Cooling System consisted of five steps (Wahlen 1989, pp. 5-13):

Step 1 - Pump Water from Columbia River. Each reactor area had a river pump house (referred to as the 181 buildings) 

with the exception of the 100-K Area, which had two pump houses. At 100-B and 100-D areas, the pump houses served 

as the water supply for two reactors each: B and C reactors, D and DR reactors, respectively. Water was drawn from the 

Columbia River by vertical deep well pumps. The impellers and submerged pump bowls extended to about 11 feet 

(3.5 meters) below the normal low water point of the river. The intake channel at each of the pump houses was dredged 

and lined with boulders and concrete to form a forebay. The water entered the deep well of the pump house through 

traveling screens that precluded the entrance of large river debris and fish. The water was pumped to a reservoir, referred 

to as the 182 buildings.

Each 181 building had a transformer station that reduced the 13.8 kilovolts to 2,300 volts, which then supplied a 

minimum of two 2,300-volt buses. A bus is a set of two or more electric conductors that serve as common connections 

between load circuits and each of the polarities (in direct-current systems) or phases (in alternating-current systems) of 

the source of electric power. Each bus carried about one-half the electrical load of the facility. The electric motors 

driving the submerged pump impellers were in a squirrel cage and had three phases, 2,300 volts, induction motors, and 

manual control panels. The 181-B and 181-D buildings had remote control systems. The pumps in the 181-B Building 

could be controlled from the 183-C Head house, and the pumps in the 181-D Building could be controlled from the 

183-D Building.

Step 2 - Store Water and Pump to Treatment Facilities. The 182 buildings typically provided primary and reserve water 

to cool the reactors, water for the steam condensers, and water for the facility. The 182 buildings for the B and 

C reactors also provided raw water for the 200 Area separations plants. Pumps transferred water from the 182 buildings 

to the 183 buildings for treatment. The 182 buildings also provided water for emergency cooling of the reactor by the 

Last Ditch Cooling System.

Step 3 - Add Chemicals, Settle, and Filter. Before use in a nuclear reactor, Columbia River water had to be purified to 

prevent film build-up in the reactor process tubes. These treatments took place in a series of buildings and structures 

referred to as the 183 buildings. The 183 building facilities consisted of the Chemical Addition Building, flocculators and 

settling basins, filters, clear wells, pump room, and filtered water storage tanks (Wahlen 1989)

Step 4 - Store Treated Water and Pump to Reactor. Four large tanks were provided at each of the reactors, excluding 

100-N, which was a different design. The filtered water storage tanks supplied water to the coolant pumps for each 

reactor. The tanks for the B, D, F, and H reactors were housed within the 190 buildings. For the DR and C reactors, the 

tanks were external to the buildings. The tank's discharge lines tied to a common header that supplied the pumps in the 

190 annex facilities. At the DR Reactor, the filtered water flowed directly to the storage tanks by gravity from the effluent 

flume in the 183-DR Building.

2 - 3 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Step 5 - Pass Water through Reactor, Cool in Retention Basins, and Return to River. From the pumps in the 

190 buildings at each reactor, cooling water passed through the reactor once in a single pass. The water was collected in 

a large discharge piping system that discharged to retention basins and ultimately to the Columbia River or to the soil 

column near the river. A notable exception was the N Reactor, which incorporated recirculation of the primary coolant 

and used demineralized water on a feed and bleed system. The bleed portion of this system was discharged exclusively 

to the soil column near the reactor buildings. Additional discussions on the flow of effluents from the reactor are 

included in the section, Waste Management

Because the Primary Cooling System was run on electricity, the Secondary Cooling System was a steam powered system, 

designed in case the electric power at the Hanford Site failed. In the Secondary Cooling System, steam-driven turbines 

and pumps kept the water flowing through the Primary Cooling System facilities. The Last Ditch Cooling System was 

available should both the electricity and steam powered systems fail. The Last Ditch Cooling System was comprised of 

two parts: the reactor high tanks and the export water system. The reactor high tanks were two 300,000-gallon high 

tanks that automatically supplied water when conditions warranted.

Sa fe ty Co n tro l Sy s t e m s

When a Hanford reactor was fully charged (loaded with fuel) and experiencing a self-sustaining chain reaction, it 

presented a serious potential hazard. If an accident occurred that led to an explosion and meltdown, the effect on the 

local environment and population would have been severe. Because of this great threat, safety control systems were put 

in place to reduce the likelihood that such an accident would occur as well as the potential effect of an accident. Also in 

place were various monitoring systems, dress codes, and procedures to protect staff working in the reactor building.

Reducing Effects of a Severe Accident. As discussed in the Construction History Section, placing the Hanford reactors in 

remote areas, away from population centers, was one mechanism for reducing the impact of any severe accident on the 

local populace. Still, if there were an explosion or meltdown, the release of radionuclides would have been extensive. 

The first eight Hanford reactors were constructed with no way to contain the spread of radionuclides should an accident 

occur. Gerber (1992a, pp. 101 -103) comments on the attention given this matter by the Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (called the Reactor Safeguards Committee from 1947-1953), which reported to the Atomic Energy 

Commission. Their concerns escalated throughout the 1950s as the Hanford Site continued to increase the power levels 

for the reactors. Finally in 1958, the pressure from the Advisory Committee resulted in the addition of filters and fog 

sprays to the reactor safety systems at a cost of about $4 m illion. Fog sprays condensed the steam around the reactor 

core, cooled the atmosphere, and rained out fission products.

When it came time to design and construct the ninth and final production reactor, N, the General Electric Company 

opted for a confinement system rather than a containment system, primarily for cost considerations. The Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards again took issue w ith this decision. By this time, all commercial reactors being 

constructed in the United States had containment systems, essentially steel and concrete shells constructed around the 

reactor core, which would prevent the release of any materials during an accident. With the N Reactor confinement 

system, the initial burst of steam resulting from a postulated reactor coolant-pipe break would be released to the outside. 

Once the confinement pressure subsided and before any fission products were released, the steam vents would be closed 

and ventilation valves opened. The ventilated steam would be filtered through charcoal and high-efficiency filters to 

prevent any release of fission products from fuel failure (WHC 1989). Eventually, the Advisory Committee approved the 

confinement system and allowed N Reactor to begin operations.

Reducing the Risk of System Failures. The Hanford reactor design incorporated the notion of triple redundancy, meaning 

that there were two backup systems for any system whose interruption could lead to a severe accident. The systems and 

their backup are described below:

• Shutdown System - If it were necessary to shut down the reactor because the cooling water supply was

interrupted or the core temperature was too high, control operators could automatically drive the control rods
Se c t io n 3 - Re a c t o r Op e r a t io n s

into the reactor and stop the reaction. If the automatic shutdown did not perform, operators could inject the 

rods manually. If that did not work, they could drop the boron balls into the graphite core channels of the 

vertical safety rods. The boron ball technology was developed in 1952-1953 and used thereafter. Existing 

reactors were retrofitted.

• Cooling System - The water system, described in greater detail above, consisted of the main water system, a 

secondary system, and the emergency cooling (last ditch) system (water towers).

• Electrical System - The two main electrical supplies into the Hanford Site were commonly referred to as A and

B buses. Any important system had to be connected to both buses in case one bus failed. An additional backup 

was provided by diesel generators at key functions.

Emergency Procedures. The Atomic Energy Commission established procedures for reactor staff to follow in the event of 

an emergency. Types of emergencies prepared for in the mid-1950s included the following (GE 1955c, 01.1):

• Evacuation - If a severe radiation hazard occurred at a reactor area, operations would be discontinued and the 

area would be evacuated. The evacuation signal was a 5-minute steady siren or whistle blast. The events were 

classified as Glass I if the threat to other areas was considered remote and Class 11 if other areas could be 

affected.

• Radiation Warning - When an area was evacuated because of radiation hazard, the Control Center in the 

7211 Building in the 700 Area sent out a radiation warning. Upon receipt of the warning, area security 

personnel would relate w ind conditions to the Meteorology Station (Building 622) every 15 minutes until the all 

clear message was given.

• Civil Defense Alert - This evacuation would arise from the possibility of enemy activity at the Hanford Site.

Upon issuance of the alert, all lights/perimeter lights would automatically be dimmed, which was the signal that 

staff had 1 hour to evacuate to a staging area 10 miles distant from all operating facilities. Before 1955, facilities 

were ordered to turn off all lights during an alert, a condition referred to as a blackout.

• Civil Defense Take Cover - This action would result from enemy activity occurring in the region. Personnel 

would seek immediate cover in the designated facilities near their workplace. All lights/perimenter lights would 

automatically be dimmed. The signal was a 3-minute wailing siren or short whistle.

Reducing Risk to Workers. The health and safety of workers was a major theme at the Hanford Site. Much effort 

focused on general worker safety such as wearing gloves to avoid cuts, wearing goggles to avoid eye accidents, wearing 

hard hats, etc. Lost work time due to such routine industrial accidents was a problem w ith an easy solution. Thus, one 

can find an article in nearly every weekly Hanford General Electric News reviewing these common industrial safety 

practices. Reducing routine industrial accidents was one strategy for meeting production quotas.

The major focus of the health and safety programs was radiological. Radiological issues were not, however, commonly 

discussed in the weekly Hanford paper. This was presumably both for security reasons and to avoid alarming people. 

General work procedures involving radiation zones and radiation areas are discussed more fully in the Health and Safety 

Section. Safety measures specific to Hanford reactors during the mid-1950s (GE 1955c, 06.2.1) are presented below.

Many aspects of work in a reactor area were driven by the radiological classification of the area. The 105 buildings and 

area w ithin their perimeter fences were defined as Radiation Areas. All individuals entering a Radiation Area faced the 

following requirements:

• Record no more than 2 millirem on Exposure Estimate Card for each shift during which 2 hours or more were 

spent inside

• Take a hand and foot count before leaving

• Eat only in lunchrooms and offices

• Smoke only where permitted, not in Radiation Zones and other posted areas

• Wear personnel meters at all times

W ithin Radiation Areas, certain areas were defined as Radiation Zones. These were defined in the mid-1950s as 1) areas 

where the radiation level exceeded 1 millirem/hour, 2) where surface contamination was significant, or 3), where

2 - 3 .1 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

airborne contamination exceeded .1/10 of the applicable permissible concentration. W ithin the Radiation Area, however, 

the 1 millirem/hour requirement was raised to 5 millirem/hour "...because it is necessary for personnel to routinely pass 

through these areas it would be decidedly inconvenient to either permanently or intermittently establish them as

Radiation Zones" (GE 1955c, 06.2.1).

Normal work clothes were sufficient for work in Radiation Areas. In Radiation Zones, clothing requirements depended 

on specific conditions, which were posted for each reactor area on a Radiation Zone Status Board located in the Monitor 

Room. Areas w ith low-level contamination required workers to wear a cap, coveralls, gloves, and shoe coverings. Areas 

with gross contamination allowed no personal outer clothing and required two pair coveralls, a hood, shoe covers,

British Leggings, gloves, and coverall openings taped. Under certain conditions, respiratory equipment was also 

necessary.

The Atom ic Energy Commission required supervisors to be notified whenever the following radiological incidents 

occurred:

• Contaminated injury in a Controlled Injury Zone (certain zones in the 105 reactor buildings)

• Skin contamination of 10 millirem/hour or greater

• Skin contamination that cannot be reduced to less than 100 counts/minute

• Personnel exposure above 100 millirem

• Any unexpected or unplanned contamination spread or radiation exposure

• Any discharge of radioactive material to the air, river or ground beyond the customary applicable limits

• Unsafe working conditions, practices, or incidents arising from work with radioactive material that might be the 

subject of an investigation

• Ingestion or inhalation of contamination in amounts greater or suspected to be greater than the permissible lim it

• Any other incident involving radiation or radioactive materials or of obvious immediate interest to management,

such as fires, explosions, etc.

• Emergency reactor shutdowns, including SCRAMs

To determine radiation levels and identify unexpected contamination in the workplace, a series of radiation monitors and 

alarm systems were put in,place. Fixed type instruments were commonly used in reactor facilities to protect individual 

workers, determine the radioactivity of various samples, and to control radiation in working areas. Ion chambers were 

widely used to provide continuous monitoring of the radiation fields. Such continuous monitoring would indicate 

abnormalities and long range trends.

Fixed instruments were in all radiation monitoring laboratories to radioanalyze air samples, water samples, and other 

samples required in the hazards evaluation program. The major fixed instruments commonly used in the Hanford 

reactors were the following:

• HM chambers were used in areas where radiation levels were so high, personnel entry could not be allowed.

HM chambers also were used to confirm continuous low radiation levels at locations where portable instrument 

monitoring was not usually required.

• Five Fold Hand Counters were used to take hand and shoe readings of workers after leaving a radiation zone, 

before eating, and before leaving a radiation area. These instruments were placed at convenient locations within 

the 105 buildings.

• The Kanne Gas Ionization Chamber was used in connection with a Beckman Am plifier and recorder to measure 

and record the amount of radioactivity in the stack exhaust air as well as certain exhaust air from certain specific 

locations in the 105 buildings. For example, in the 105-C, H, KE, and KW buildings, Kanne Chambers were 

used to monitor the air from the reactor front face, the rear face, and the top of the reactor. Locations varied for 

each reactor.

Hanford reactor staff also made use of a large number of portable detection and dose rate instruments in the mid-1950s, 

although as the following statement indicates, such was not always the case:

2 - 3 .2 0
Se c t io n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

"The inception o f the atomic energy program found us sadly lacking in portable instruments to properly evaluate

the hazards associated with the program. Ten years o f never ceasing development have produced a very large

number o f portable instruments, which, when properly used and interpretedgive a concise and clear picture o f

the radiation hazards in and around the reactors ” - GE 1955c, 05.4, p. 1

By the mid-1950s, the following portable-type instruments were available and commonly used:

• Juno (beta, gamma, and alpha) and C.P. (Cutie Pie) (beta and gamma) meters

• Zueto and Alpha meters used primarily for low energy beta radiation

• Several types of Geiger-Mueller (CM) counters: EGM, TGM, VGM, and NGM (beta and gamma)

• BF3 Neutron Counter used to measure slow and intermediate neutron fluxes

• Neut meter, a portable, fast, neutron monitoring instrument

• Samson meter used to measure gamma, beta and alpha radiations but primarily for determining beta activity of 

reactor effluent water

Two types of air samplers were used widely in the reactor areas. These air samplers were portable or semi-portable types 

that sample only one location. The Moto-aire samplers were used for long or continuous samples and were semipermanently installed in some locations for such sampling. The Staplex was a high volume portable air sampler also 

commonly used but only for sampling in less than 30 minutes.

Key work areas in the 105 buildings that required radiological controls included the following:

Work Area - The portion of the reactor building in front of the reactor proper, used for storage of process 

material and equipment used for charging and other front face shutdown work.

Discharge Area - The area in back of the reactor proper, used for handling of irradiated materials discharged 

from the reactor. It was the most hazardous location, radiation wise, for workers.

Reactor Charge Face - The front portion of the reactor proper, where fuel elements are loaded, process tubes 

replaced, and a wide range of operational and maintenance activities occurred.

Experimental Levels - Experimental level installations were used for special research and experimental projects 

and for special irradiations.

Top of the Reactor - Located on top of the reactor were the vertical safety rods and the channels in which they 

operated, the boron ball safety system hoppers containing the balls, parts of the ball recovery equipment and 

ball transfer equipment. Because of the high neutron flux that was present when operating, this area was 

generally only accessed during shutdowns.

Inner Rod Room - This room contained racks that supported the horizontal rods and the openings in the reactor 

in which the rods operate. During reactor operation, high gamma and neutron dose rates prevented entry by 

personnel.

Outer Rod Room - The outer rod room contained the racks that supported the horizontal rod assemblies, the rod 

drive mechanism, and the cooling water system for the horizontal rods. Few entries were made during reactor 

operations.

Transfer Area - This area contained facilities for loading irradiated process material in w ell (rail) cars for transfer 

to the separations facilities. Empty shipping cases were removed from the well cars, lowered into the loading 

pit, loaded w ith material, and returned to the well cars.

Storage Area - Located directly behind the reactor's discharge area, this area consisted of a large water-filled 

basin, pick-up chutes, metal handling facilities and equipment to remove material from the basin.

Reducing Risk to the Environment from Ongoing Operations. The major environmental risk of reactor operations 

concerned the discharge of reactor cooling water to the Columbia River. As discussed above, the water was diverted to 

retention basins for several hours to reduce both the temperature and radionuclides with short half-lives. Nevertheless, 

substantial volumes of radionuclides entered the river every day. Little effort was made over the years to reduce the 

number of radionuclides.

2 - 3 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

As the Hanford Site began increasing the power levels of reactors, fuel element failures increased in frequency. Due to 

the high amounts of environmental contamination created by these fuel failures, various improvements were made over 

the years to reduce failures, improve detection of failures, and lim it the impact of failures. These are reviewed in greater 

detail in the sub-section on Technological Challenges and Developments.

Waste M a n a g e m e n t Sy s t e m

Operating reactors and supporting functions generated various gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes during operations. The 

systems designed to manage these wastes are described in the section, Waste Management.

Se c u r it y Sy s t e m

The government considered any information concerning reactor technology or production of radioisotopes as extremely 

sensitive and instituted a variety of measures to protect the information. One method involved lim iting access to 

different areas o f the site. A ll staff had to have either "P" approval, permitting entrance to the Plant Controlled Area (the 

area bounded by the perimeter fence surrounding the plant); a Formal P ("FP") clearance allowing unescorted access to 

production lim ited areas (such as the individual reactor areas); an "L" clearance, which allowed access to certain 

classified information; and a "Q " clearance, allowing access to all classified information, except "Top Secret." O nly 

individuals with FP clearance were allowed into the reactor area. To ensure that no one went in who did not have the 

proper clearance, guards were posted at the entrances to the reactor areas to inspect the badges o f those entering.

A second form of security pertained to documents containing restricted information that were considered classified. The 

security classifications for such documents included "Top Secret," "Secret," "Confidential," "Confidential - 

Undocumented," and "Restricted Data." Strict guidelines governed the handling of such documents, for example, what 

security level one needed to handle the documents, where they needed to be stored, and how they were to be destroyed. 

Even waste materials containing classified information had to be protected. Staff were directed to tear classified scrap 

into small pieces, deposit the scrap in an envelope, seal the envelope, mark it "Classified Scrap," and deliver it to the 

Security Patrol for destruction (GE 1955c, 03.4).

Te c h n o l o g ic a l Ch a l l e n g e s a n d De v e l o p m e n t s

Hanford reactor staff faced major technological challenges during the four decades of operation. Some challenges were 

critical to ensure plutonium production. Other challenges were necessary to enhance safety. And finally other 

developments were related to the drive to improve cost efficiency. Each of these areas is reviewed below.

Cr it ic a l Pr o b le m Areas

Three critical problem areas encountered immediately following startup of the B Reactor were:

• Understanding and reducing corrosion

• Xenon poisoning

• Graphite expansion

Understanding and Reducing Corrosion. With the large amount of water used in association with metals to operate the 

reactor systems, corrosion was a constant battle. For example, as cooling water passed through the process tubes, film 

composed of metallic oxides and other corrosion products in the water would build up. This film affected cooling water 

performance and increased corrosion buildup on the process tubes. The need to avoid corrosion was a major driver in 

the design o f the cooling water treatment system. As a result, much work was done to understand the relationship of 

water, water treatment processes, and the way reactor systems were corroding (see B Reactor Historic American 

Engineering Record in Appendix B on the Internet). Trying to reduce corrosion is a good example of the dilemma the 

Hanford Site regularly faced when trying to solve a problem. A modification might fix one problem while worsening
Se c t io n 3 - Re a c to r Op e r a t io n s

another. Hanford systems were so complex that a beneficial change in one system inevitably created a negative impact 

on another part of the system. Hanford staff routinely had to balance the costs and benefits of technological and 

procedural changes and make a decision. The following water corrosion example illustrates this point:

In the 1950s "the Hanford Works [former name for the Hanford Site] began an intense review o f intake water

treatments. Sodium dichromate> a key corrosion inhibitor that had been added to reactor water since World War

If was evaluated closely. Because sodium dichromate was .known to have detrimental effects on the fish o f the

Columbia River; much experimentation with other corrosion blockers was undertaken. However, due to the

dramatic rises in tube and fuel element corrosion when sodium dichromate was withdrawn, site scientists

decided to continue using it " - Gerber 1995, p. 34

Higher power levels increased corrosion and failure of the reactor process tubes. The extraction process technology 

improved for aluminum process tubes over the years, resulting in tubes w ith more uniform thickness, helping improve 

performance (GE 1963d), p. 117). By the late 1950s, new applications for materials such as zirconium were developed 

and incorporated into Hanford reactors. Process tubes, for example, started being fabricated from Zircoloy-2. Zircoloy-2 

had its own problems, however, and efforts to inhibit the hydriding commenced (DeNeal 1970, pp. 32-39). For 

descriptions of corrosion facilities, problems, studies, and solutions, see the 190-D Building Historic American 

Engineering Record in Appendix B on the Internet.

Xenon Poisoning. The Hanford reactor chapter would be incomplete without retelling the story of the initial operations 

failures, commonly referred to as the xenon poisoning problem (Rhodes 1986, pp. 557-560). Walter O. Simon, the first 

Hanford operations managers recalled the event:

" The night B Reactor went critical [September 26, 1944] we had a lot o f high-ranking technical people watching

this startup, and when it went critical and then shut itself down, the silence was deafening. It was complete

consternation. As background to this, the scientific people, the Chicago people, the Nobel Prize winners,

Wigner and Fermi and Szilard, were all much more on the risk taking side than Du Pont was. Du Pont was a

conservative organization. For instance, if someone asked for a two-story building, Du Pont design would put

enough steel in it for four stories, being convinced that sooner or later someone would add a floor or two.

Du Pont conservatism paid o ff on the reactors. Enough extra tubes had been added to overcome the fission

productpo/son/'ng." - Walter O. Simon in Sanger 1995, p. 152

The Princeton theoretician, John A. Wheeler, is credited with solving the xenon problem. Wheeler had been concerned 

for some tim e about fission product poisoning. As the chain-reaction occurred, a non-neutron absorbing mother fission 

product would decay within hours to a neutron-absorbing daughter product. As the volume of the daughter product 

increased, the chain reaction would slow and eventually stop. As the daughter product decayed into a non-neutron 

absorbing third element, the chain reaction would start again, The solution to overriding this poisoning effect was to 

increase the reactivity by feeding more uranium into the reactor.

Fortunately, Wheeler had counseled Du Pont about this problem and convinced them to add about 500 channels in the 

corners of the reactor. At considerable cost and schedule delay, this had been done over the objection of other scientists. 

Once Wheeler and Fermi were convinced that more uranium was the solution, Du Pont only had to connect the 

channels to the water supply, add process tubes, and load with uranium, Had these channels not been constructed into 

the graphite core during the original construction, it would have taken many more dollars and many more months to 

modify the reactor. This event illustrated the value o f having experienced engineers working with theoretical physicists 

to design and construct something as new and complex as a nuclear reactor.

Graphite Expansion. Reactor staff identified the graphite expansion problem, also referred to as graphite creep or the 

Wigner effect, soon after the reactors started operating (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, pp. 58-59). Physicist Eugene Wigner 

had hypothesized in 1942 that fast neutrons in the reactor could induce changes in the graphite. The intense radiation 

from the reactor's neutron flux caused the carbon atoms in the graphite's crystal lattice to realign themselves.

2 - 3 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Reactor staff recognized by late 1945 that the exterior dimensions of the reactor were changing. In January 1946, 

pre-measured samples were removed from the graphite stack of one of the reactors. Post-irradiation measurements 

indicated that the graphite had expanded significantly. Staff also observed that the process tubes were bowing as a result 

of graphite growth, particularly at the upper portions of the stack (DeNeal 1970, p. 52).

The Atomic Energy Commission first responded by shutting down B Reactor in 1946 to preserve its capability, especially 

for producing polonium, an important material used in the final assembly of the bomb. The assumption was that the first 

three reactors would be shut down and new ones would be constructed with a design that avoided graphite expansion. 

DR was the first such reactor to be constructed.

General Electric researchers in 1947 found that annealing graphite helped. They accomplished annealing by operating 

the reactors at higher temperatures and allowing them to cool (Nightingale 1962). This finding enabled the Atomic 

Energy Commission to scale back their original expansion

plans (Gerber 1996, pp. 2-4). In 1947, reactor staff began I , . , . ., J#

r ' I '/.in .n ix * it h .u l,i /u ttr r h v.tl r f im n . ili.ifh it tl\ Itum

experimenting with carbon dioxide environments. By 1 . . , ., „ , , , . x( , .

r ® , , , , 7 p In'hum . i O ih i t.irh n it atum- in th v qi.i/i/u/c

1949, researchers were convinced that higher graphite . . , .. .............................. ' o o r a t'p h u v tl in irr.ulM tion, lit he.il up. w itm iv

temperatures created by the carbon dioxide environment m u , , , , , , ,

limited the graphite growth, thus enabling the reactors to I Hell ,,,,,

keep operating (DeNeaM 970, p. 52). I , . r r ° I w il/i •> i,1.* ' .J /m n -z i/ifif um iptt+ vtl o t 40 ftv u r n l

The graphite expansion issue affected aspects of reactor I Jntl 1,(1 vn1 ( ■ - f,l*rl,t’r 1 c,<) »■ P- > '*

technology beyond justifying new reactors. For example,

as graphite growth distorted the process tube channels making charging and discharging difficult, especially in the upper 

portions of the reactor, the length of fuel elements was reduced from 20 to 10 centimeters (DeNeal 1970, p. 6). This 

distortion also affected the performance of the vertical safety rods when placed in the reactor, which lead to the 

development of the boron ball safety system being installed in 1952 (DeNeal 1970, p. 9).

I m p r o v in g He a lth a n d Sa fe ty Concerns

Human and environmental health and safety were significant issues at the Hanford Site from the beginning (see the 

Health and Safety Section). For reactors, these concerns fell into the following areas:

• Reducing fuel element failures

• Understanding and reducing the effects of reactor effluents on the Columbia River

• Reducing the likelihood and effect of a serious reactor accident

• Improving worker safety

Reducing Fuel Element Failures. As shown in Table 2-3.7, fuel elements began to fail beginning in 1947. By 1951, the 

Atomic Energy Commission understood the severity of the problem. The higher operating temperatures caused the fuel 

elements to blister arid rupture. Fuel element failures were a serious problem because harmful fission products entered

the water cooling system follow ing a failure. If undetected, the radionuclides passed to the Columbia River, thereby

creating an environmental problem. When radionuclides were detected in the water cooling system, the reactor would 

be shut down and the cooling water would be diverted to a trench or crib, thereby avoiding environmental damage. 

Frequent shutdowns impacted production schedules because it could take 24-36 hours to restart the reactor.

Improvements in three major areas helped reduce the frequency of fuel element problems: manufacturing of fuel 

elements, detection of fuel element failures, and reactor performance. The design and materials were improved in the 

manufacture of the fuel elements. For example, uranium powder began to be forged into cylindrical elements in such a 

way that the crystal structure throughout was anisotropically oriented (aligned in different directions). Also using 

2-percent zirconium alloyed to the fuel element reduced the number of failures. (See the Fuel Manufacturing Section for 

details.)
Sechon 3 - .Reactor Operations

New methods to detect fuel swelling and failure improved detection of fuel element failures.

"O ne o f these was a simple optical test: the decrease in light intensity through the process tube indicated the

presence o f blisters on the cans. Another method involved measuring the level o f radioactivity discharged from

the process tube water. An alarm sounded when the reader encountered a sudden increase in neutrons, 

indicating that a slug [fuel element] had ruptured and released some o f its radiation to the cooling water. The

Panellit gauge allowed immediate tracing to the particular offending tube and slug." - Carlisle and Zenzen 1996,

p. 62

Table 2-3.7. Frequency o f Hanford Fuel Element Failures

Number of Failures

Another problem related to fuel failures, known as boiling 

disease, also required a technological solution to improve 

reactor performance and thereby reduce fuel element 

failures.

As shown in Table 2-3.7, improvements helped reduce 

fuel element failures but did not completely eliminate 

them. The problem continued at N Reactor even with a 

new type of fuel element (see the Fuel Manufacturing 

Section) and higher operating temperatures. Studies and 

modifications to procedures and equipment enabled 

reactor staff to minimize the number of fuel failures (DOE 

1997a).

Understanding and Reducing the Effects of Reactor

Effluents. The initial concern was the effect of reactor 

effluents on fish in the Columbia River. The Manhattan 

Project commissioned studies before the first reactors were 

built. These studies, conducted by Richard Foster, began 

at the University of Washington laboratories, in 1945,

Foster came to the Hanford Site and set up a biology 

program in facilities at the 100-F Reactor. As the biology

program grew, additional short- and long-term studies on fish, animals, and the environment commenced (Becker 1990, 

Stannard 1988). When the Hanford Site began to increase power levels in the early 1950s, the Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards increased its focus on the 

impact to the river and cabled for more river studies.

Year

1948 2

1949 0

1950 3

1951 115

1952 142

1953 93

1954 211

1955 242

1956 191

1957 201

1958 . 174

1959 71

1960 130

1961 86

1962 95

1963 68

1964 97

1965 89 I

1966 17 I

1967 29

1968 20 (

1969 16 (

The initial strategy for reducing the effects of 

reactor effluents focused on two areas:

• First, delay the disposal of effluents to the 

river by holding the effluents in tanks for 

several hours

• Second, prevent disposal of additional 

contamination from fuel element failures 

by detecting such failures early and 

diverting the water from the holding tanks 

to cribs and trenches

This strategy stayed in place until the N Reactor.

By using a closed primary cooling loop in the 

N Reactor, the Atomic Energy Commission was able 

to effectively eliminate all effluent flow to the

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/in ic a -w l s/»” lu e l elem ent i upline*. The tlun alum inum -

/in o n n tm t nalm ii nn the "luu* w o uld e\pand. hlisiet. t r.ii /, and

'•pill the to n le n l* in to the tube-. R uptm ed -h im in q u ire d

*h u ltim i dow n the teat to i and then le itn e im u the damaged '•lut',

w h u h m i'jh t bt ‘■tut h in ,i fu/x . Dr.i/ini; with Mu* problem ii d

<>L to de*ian n ru to n lm l im liu n w n l- \ l the on->ol ot hn ilu iii

disca-e ihe+c d e \n e*+i ra n im w l the p ile * ie .n tin * ' redin mu

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2 - 3 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Columbia River. When fuel elements failed in the N Reactor, the water was diverted to the 1301 trench. Some of the 

contaminated water in the 1301 trench did eventually start to reach the Columbia River through N Springs, requiring 

, construction of another trench, 1325. The contamination problem created at N Springs notwithstanding, the closed

| primary cooling loop eliminated an enormous amount of contamination going to the Columbia River. The contaminated

I effluent going to the river from the single-pass reactors is shown in Tables 2-3.8 and 2-3.9.

1 Reducing the Likelihood and Effect of a Serious Accident. Because of the great amount of energy contained in a reactor

| and the radioactivity that could be released if a fire or explosion occurred, much attention was given to reducing risk as

i much as possible. Isolation was the initial strategy used at the Hanford Site. Technology-based strategies were also

I incorporated in the initial designs and were enhanced over the years. Technologies focused on the following areas:

• Detecting a problem as early as possible so that the reactor could be shut down or, in the case of a fuel element 

failure, the water diverted

I • Shutting down the reactor quickly and completely

• Providing backup systems to ensure all critical functions continued to perform, thereby reducing the risk that 

j problems would escalate

I • Confining the spread of radioactivity in the event of an explosion or fire

j • Determining the risk of an accident

Concern for environmental safety and health intensified beginning in the 1960s, largely in response to the 

j commercialization of reactor technology to generate electricity. As commercial reactors began to appear across the

; nation, the public began to express concerns, such as the impact on local water temperatures and the harm to

I neighboring populations from radioactive releases. But the overriding concern was the threat of an accident, such as a

: melt-down, which would potentially lead to a large release of radioactivity.

' The large increase in size of the K reactors (1800 megawatt-thermal) led to increasing discussions on safety measures,

j One item pursued by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was development of a comprehensive startup

program to be conducted before initial operations. Such a startup program would help alleviate the concern about 

| auxiliary process tube cooling and graphite wetting for handling loss of cooling water accident The Advisory Committee 

also wanted safety devices installed to warn of approaching criticality and to shut down the reactor whenever cooling 

! water was lost. General Electric disagreed because such instruments did not exist nor were they likely to (Carlisle and

| Zenzen 1996, p. 100).

< Differences in philosophy on risk started emerging in the 1950s. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards focused

I on the worst case scenario (a catastrophe), avoiding that scenario, and the possible consequences. Their focus was on

safety devices. General Electric and those in the emerging field of nuclear engineering defined risk as a combination of 

probability and magnitude of an event. General Electric would modify procedures to minimize probability even though 

• operations were increasing in scale. The following incident in 1955 at KW Reactor showed General Electric that

j procedures could not always eliminate the chance of an accident (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 101).

' On January 4, 1955, after 17 hours o f operation at low levels, the reactor cooling water was blocked by a plug. That

j problem should have been avoided if startup procedures had been followed. At the same time, the pressure gauge for

measuring flow through the process tube turned out to have been improperly set and calibrated. The combination of 

events showed that measures o f reactor safety had to be based on more than just the chances of a single catastrophic 

I incident. The KW Reactor event had shown that two unlikely events could occur in series, thereby compounding each

! other and causing a serious problem.

In 1960, confinement facilities were installed in the first eight reactors to control the release of radioactive matter from 

j the reactor buildings in the event o f a nuclear incident (GE 1963d). By keeping the confinement zone at slightly negative 

1 pressure, using a fog spray system, and ventilating through filters, radionuclide release was reduced. Although the

i N Reactor was the first Hanford reactor to incorporate a confinement system in the original design, all commercial

2 - 3 .2 6
Se c t io n 3 - Re a c to r Op e r a t io n s

Table 2-3.8. Relative Abundance o f Radionuclides in Reactor Effluent

MAJOR MINOR

(Accounted for 90% o f (Accounted for 8% o f • TRACE

radioactivity in effluent) radioactivity in effluent) (Accounted for 2% o f radioactivity in effluent)

Sodium-24 Phosphorus-32 Carbon-14 Cadmium-115 Neodymium-149

Silicon-31 Zinc-65 Calcium-45 Iodine-131 Promethium-149

Chromium-51 Zinc-69 Scandium-46 Iodine-132 Promethium-151

Manganese-56 Gallium -72 Scandium-47 Scandium-137 Europium-152

Copper-64 Yttrium-90 Manganese-54 Barium-140 Samarium-153

Arsenic-76 Yttrium-92 Iron-59 Lanthanum-140 Europium-156

Neptunium-239 Stroritium-91 Cobalt-60 Lanthanum-141 Samarium-156

Strontium-92 Strontium-85 Cerium-141 Europium-157

Yttrium-92 Strontium-89 Cerium-143 Terbium-160

Yttrium-93 Strontium-90 Praseodymium-142 Tungsten-187

Niobium-97 Yttrium-91 Praseodymium-143 Polonium-210

Iodine-133 Zirconium-95 Cerium-Praseodymium-144 Actinium-227

Iodine-135 Molybdenum-99 Praseodymium-145 Uranium-238

Uranium-239 Ruthenium-103 Neodymium-147 Plutonium-239

Silver-111 Promethium-147

Table 2-3.9. Total Releases to the Columbia River from Eight Single-Pass Hanford Production Reactors, Curies per Year

(Median Values o f 100 Realizations in Curies per Year)

Yr Na24 P32 Sc46 Cr51 Mn56 Zn65 Ga72 As76 Y90 1131 Np239 Beta

44 905 216 57 4211 18530 708 4820 1178 300 2 17060 34300

45 34900 2890 2533 44920 95930 10518 75150 20340 3279 54 192100 114230

46 28360 2190 2058 29090 142281 8688 64780 14212 2452 41 153400 68140

47 25450 1860 1839 17785 57049 7457 57360 12319 1436 35 127840 39990

48 33970 2219 2161 30180 98137 8362 69960 15772 2351 47 151100 51630

49 46870 3175 2961 49520 204630 11713 96070 24660 2617 75 214600 105130

50 72590 4027 3762 66090 256090 14546 131730 30510 3636 116 279900 282200

51 99020 3333 2495 86430 232300 11153 113690 23660 6044 694 261700 549300

52 132690 5050 1799 127380 317000 9037 98400 34740 9909 1091 259000 989600

53 202500 8688 2253 173700 962300 8691 120410 98940 13102 821 316200 1481100

54 243400 7261 6545 153860 815000 21910 206900 91380 9938 1562 391600 1702400

55 318000 7184 5269 276600 1471000 26670 267400 139530 15008 3070 419400 2158000

56 407800 7722 6522 252400 1611800 31940 317500 134280 16569 2645 450300 2264000

57 644700 12325 6334 381300 4602000 27560 268600 212130 24230 3500 500100 5065000

58 • 751400 18484 5931 405800 4081000 27180 258420 293300 32180 5029 422300 4613000

59 1019000 17993 4753 418400 5068000 32030 271978 218400 310.10 1986 275100 5321000

60 1382900 19490 9069 592800 7160000 42720 299650 236900 53270 4944 354800 6411000

61 1096300 21526 3313 634400 6370000 47110 236170 166890 49670 . 4825 243910 6551000

62 1094200 13845 3988 1085600 7965000 56010 92580 86660 37760 4302 257100 5407000

63 887900 11738 6432 592400 5586000 14920 101660 100630 29810 3115 211800 4733000

64 960000 12311 7469 536600 5873000 15710 144080 114480 24980 2827 247500 4425000

65 764500 12126 7968 390200 6364000 13379 94400 124600 21200 2076 168400 3554000

66 613000 7365 6485 256220 4000700 9656 80190 74600 13421 778 78950 2712700

67 671900 10118 8616 298200. 5324000 15360 77260 94010 17889 1407 114970 2853000

68 499500 8632 3589 148940 4207000 7734 59090 71670 9798 1150 99790 2397000

69 359200 5478 4571 75730 5618500 6451 41602 61250 5095 473 59820 1523300

70 178041 1759 1135 55297 1026430 3394 32720 20253 7198 1194 36879 822860

71 13200 235 31 7040 85400 386 2660 2440 566 20 3540 72100

Sum 12582196 229239 119937 7191093 79613077 490993 3685230 2519734 444718 47878 6309159 66300980

2 - 3 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

reactors being constructed at this time had containment systems. Thus, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

struggled with approving General Electric's reactor design but eventually did (DOE 1997a).

All o f these efforts related to the differing methods used to determine the risk of an accident. See Carlisle and Zenzen 

(1996, pp. 138-142) for an overview of the difference between the deterministic approach, which characterized reactor 

design in the 1940s and 1950s, and the probabilistic approach, which became vogue in the 1960s.

Improving Worker Safety. Worker safety was also a major concern as workers regularly needed to perform tasks in 

radiation zones. The government and its contractors generally felt that the risk was known and manageable and could 

be minimized by good working conditions and procedures. In the early reactors, shielding was placed around the 

reactor core to afford a minimum level of protection. Protective clothing improved over the years (see the History of 

Workers Section), as did methods of detecting radiation in the workplace (see the Health and Safety Section). Also over 

time, the Hanford Site started incorporating remote systems into the day-to-day operations. For example at N Reactor, 

the charging and discharging of fuel was semi-automatic.

I m p r o v in g Co st Ef f ic ie n c y

The cost of making plutonium became an issue in the early 1950s as costs associated with the nuclear weapons program 

started to escalate. This led to numerous efforts to increase efficiency o f the Hanford reactors, which accounted for a 

significant portion of the cost associated with producing plutonium. As shown in Figure 2-3.8, these efforts to improve 

efficiency were successful. Specific efforts in the areas of increasing power levels, enlarging area of neutron flux, and 

using waste heat are described below.

Increase Power Levels. The increasing cost of plutonium 

production led the Atomic Energy Commission to support higher 

power levels because it lowered the cost per gram.

General Electric showed that improvements in the fuel elements 

allowed higher power levels, which in turn cut raw material 

requirements 50 percent. By reducing the amount of uranium 

needed, the Hanford Site was able to produce 40 percent more 

plutonium per dollar of operating cost in 1949 when compared 

to 1947 (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 65; Gerber 1996, pp. 2-4).

When DR and H reactors were planned, it was recognized that 

power levels would be increased. To increase safety, the 

numbers of horizontal control rods and vertical safety rods were 

increased. Graphite blocks were machined w ith slightly concave 

faces (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, pp. 60-61). General Electric 

experimented with different concentrations of carbon-dioxide/ 

helium gas. Helium was used to prevent graphite from catching 

fire as oxygen levels associated with operating at high 

temperatures (needed for higher power levels) increased.

Experimenting showed that carbon dioxide was also inert, but it 

had poorer heat transfer properties and thus allowed greater 

control o f graphite temperature. The solution was to use a 

mixture. Annealing with other modifications allowed reactors to

operate at temperatures higher than design levels (Carlisle and 1MS 1g4g 1g60 1g51 1gS2 1g53 1g54 1g55 1g56 1gs7

Zenzen 1996, p. 62).

„ i , _ „ . . . _ , Figure 2 -3.8. Comparative Costs Demonstrating

By 1951, when the C Reactor was authorized, General Electric lmproved Efficiency o f Producing a Cram o f

was able to increase power levels still farther by enlarging the Plutonium Nitrate

2 - 3 .2 8
Se c h o n 3 - Re a c to r Op e r a t io n s

plumbing facilities to increase the flow of cooling water and by 

reducing the ratio of graphite to uranium, thereby increasing the 

probability of neutron absorption. The C Reactor was rated at 750 

megawatt-thermal when it started November 1952 compared to 250 

megawatt-thermal for the earlier reactors.

By the time of the K Reactors, designers increased .the power levels to 

1,800 megawatt-thermal. Changes in the water systems allowed higher 

power levels. Improved pump designs reduced the number of pumps 

while increasing the amount of water fourfold: 125,000 gallons/minute 

in the K reactors and capable of increasing to 140,000. Table 2-3.10 

identifies the original design levels and maximum levels eventually 

reached for each reactor.

Running the reactors at higher power levels had several impacts. On the beneficial side, plutonium production rates 

improved. In addition, higher power levels helped reduce graphite expansion, a good example of an inadvertent 

beneficial effect. On the negative side, increased power levels led to increased corrosion, fuel element failures, and 

required many modifications throughout the reactor systems. The increased risk to the health and safety of the workers, 

surrounding populations, and the environment posed by increased power levels resulted in considerable attention to this 

issue by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Enlarge Area of Maximum Flux and Stabilize Temperature. The variation in neutron flux within the reactor core during 

irradiation was another target of inefficiency and adverse effect. The neutron flux within the reactor graphite core was 

greater in the center portions of the reactor than it was toward the sides, front, and back. On a graph, the plot resembled 

a bell curve in both directions (front to back and side to side). This meant that the fuel elements in the central portions of 

the middle process tubes would be irradiated quicker than those along the perimeters. The impact could be partially 

reduced by leaving the fuel elements in the perimeter process tubes longer and discharging the central process tubes 

more frequently. W ithin the central process tubes,, however, little could be done to eliminate the variation between 

central and perimeter fuel elements, because they all had to be discharged at the same time. In addition, the neutron 

flux pattern caused heat temperature variations, w hich led to increased graphite expansion in certain portions.

Reactor staff recognized these problems early on and explored various mechanisms for leveling out the neutron flux 

distribution. Much progress was made by shifting the positions of the neutron absorbing control rods during operation to 

enlarge the area of maximum flux (Gerber 1996, p. 2-1). These measures helped flatten the curve and create a more 

even neutron flux distribution, though the problem could never be totally eliminated. Even with the later N Reactor and 

its advanced instrumentation, staff continued to search for ways to reduce this phenomenon (Burnside et al. 1986).

Use Waste Heat. An innovation in the K Reactors was the use of waste heat as energy to heat and cool the building's 

work areas. According to Carlisle and Zenzen (1996, p. 97), this was the first time this concept had been demonstrated 

at a nuclear facility. To accomplish this, once the water left the graphite block, it was pumped to a heat exchanger, 

which transferred heat from the cooling water to an ethylene glycol water solution. This solution was then pumped 

through the air ducts to different buildings. General Electric was proud of this innovation, which cost $614,000 but 

saved about 1.5 m illion gallons of fuel oil per year. The Atomic Energy Commission thought it could have been done 

earlier, but the higher power levels of the K reactors finally made it economical for General Electric to do (Carlisle and 

Zenzen 1996, pp. 97-99).

The ultimate use of waste heat was at the N Reactor, as discussed previously. In this case, heat generated during the 

irradiation process was converted into steam to power turbines, which generated electricity for use off the Hanford Site. 

The revenue generated by selling this power to utilities through the Bonneville Power Administration helped offset the 

cost of plutonium production. The N Reactor was built just as the nuclear power industry was beginning to build 

commercial-size plants and thus it attracted much national and international industry exposure (DOE 1997a).

Table 2-3.10. Increases in Hanford Reactor

Power Levels

Year Design Level 1963-64 Level

Reactor Built (MWt) (MWt)

B 1944 250 1,940

D 1945 250 2,005

F 1945 250 1,935

DR 1949 250 1,925

H 1950 250 1,955

C 1952 750 2,310

KW 1955 1,800 4,400

KE 1955 1,800 4,400

N 1963 4,000 3,950

2 - 3 .2 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Co n t r ib u t io n s o f Ha n f o r d Re a c t o r s

Hanford reactors made significant contributions across two major fronts. First and foremost, Hanford reactors produced 

the plutonium and other isotopes needed for the nuclear arsenal. W hile the military, moral, and economic debates can 

question the need for nuclear materials, the point is that Hanford staff managed to deliver the product. The second 

significant contribution, admittedly less definitive, relates to the contribution of Hanford reactors to the nuclear industry 

in general. Viewed in the context of technology development spectrum, Hanford reactors played an important, if largely 

indirect, role in the development of the industry.

Ha n fo r d Sit e ’s Co n t r ib u t io n to th e Nuclear Sto c k pile

The Hanford Site managed to construct the world's first full-scale plutonium production reactors and make enough 

plutonium in time to significantly impact the ending of World War II. Following W orld War II, when military leaders 

chose the plutonium bomb to be the hallmark of the nuclear weapons program, the Hanford Site constructed more

reactors and delivered the ordered amounts of plutonium (see 

Figure 1.7 in Chapter l and Table 2-3.11). In all, over 

67,000 kilograms of plutonium were made at the Hanford Site of 

which 13,000 kilograms were fuel-grade plutonium. The Hanford 

Site produced 100 percent of the plutonium between 1945 and 1953 

and over 65 percent of the plutonium during the history of U.S. 

plutonium production.

In addition to plutonium, Hanford reactors also produced other 

isotopes for the nuclear weapons program. For example, polonium, 

with a half-life of 138 days, was needed for bomb initiators in the 

early bombs. The need to ensure polonium supplies was the major 

reason for shutting down B Reactor following the World War II to 

maintain one reactor in good operating condition (Carlisle and 

Zenzen 1996, pp. 55-56).

The Hanford Site also produced 10.6 kilograms of tritium (Roblyer 1994, pp. 7-8), a key ingredient of the hydrogen 

bomb. In general, while tritium production at the Hanford Site was more in the experimental than production vain, it 

demonstrated the capability. Other defense-related isotopes that were experimented w ith included the following

(DeNeal 1970): ,

• Thorium was irradiated to produce uranium-233 from 1954 into the 1960s

• Depleted uranium was irradiated to produce plutonium-240 from 1958 into the 1960s

• Neptunium target elements were irradiated during the 1960s

• Lithium-aluminum splines were tested to demonstrate a method for making tritium

• Studies involving uranium-oxide fuels were conducted as part of the NASA Lewis Research Center program for 

the development of the space propulsion system

• Samples of americium were charged to produce medical grade plutonium-238

Had the Hanford Site not been so consumed w ith requirements to stockpile plutonium, alternative isotope production 

may have played a bigger role. The significant fact, perhaps, is that the Hanford Site had the capability to produce a 

wide range of nuclear materials.

Tabie 2-3.11. Total Production o f Plutonium at

the Hanford Site

Reactor

Total

Plutonium kg

Fuel-Grade

Plutonium kg

Number of

Production

Years

B 5,532 606 22

C 6,471 571 17

D 5,489 654 12

DR 3,836 51 14

F 4,499 55 20

H 4,136 99 15

KE 13,498 1,042 16

KW 12,836. 1,789 15

N 10,965 8,173 22

Total 67,262 13,040 153

2 - 3 .3 0
Se c t io n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

Ha n fo r d Sit e ’s Co n t r ib u t io n to th e De v e l o p m e n t of th e Nu c lea r I n d u s tr y

Findlay and Hevly (1995, pp. 143-146) make the point 

that the Hanford Site was a production facility, and that 

the story has more to do with making technology work 

than anything else. When viewed within the context of 

technology development, the Hanford Site does belong 

towards the production or applied end of the spectrum. 

But the Hanford Site was far from simply a production 

facility insofar as that term implies a factory.

The Hanford Site was the first full-scale reactor complex for a decade and that gives it a special place in the history of the 

nuclear industry. Technology development continues to occur even after production begins because frequently critical 

issues surface that must be resolved. The experience gained by those involved in the early stages of operation can be 

instrumental in the development of an industry, and that was the case for the Hanford Site's effect on the nuclear industry.

By the mid-1950s, a limited amount o f non-production-related reactor research and development was ongoing across the 

country. National Laboratories involved in developing breeder reactors and other types of power reactors included 

Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The major 

industrial concerns included Battelle Memorial Institute; the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Company; E. I. Du Pont 

de Nemours; the General Electric Company; North American Aviation, Inc.; Pratt & W hitney Aircraft Division of the 

United Aircraft Corporation; Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.; and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (ASME 1952, 

pp. 18-23).

By the late 1950s, with the advent of the Atoms for Peace Program and the Atomic Energy Commission's prototype 

program, reactor research and development were beginning to move out of the laboratory. But even as late as 1960, 

only two centers in America had reactors in full-scale operation with proven records of operability: the Hanford and 

Savannah River sites. Thus it is not surprising that the staff at the Hanford Site served as a resource for non-production 

related research and development efforts— which at least had an indirect if not a direct effect on the nuclear industry. 

W illiam j. Dowis was an electrical engineer, who 

worked at the Hanford Site from 1943-1983, 

supervising the maintenance and design of electric 

systems for the reactors.

Dowis (1986, pp. 28-33) goes on to identify several 

studies that the Division of Reactor Development 

requested Hanford staff to pursue:

• Use converted Hanford reactors to serve as 

electric central stations

• Use converted Hanford reactors to provide 

power for pumping water from the mouth 

of the Columbia River to California

• Use converted Hanford reactors to provide heat in Los Angeles to cause a rising column of warm air that would 

cut through the inversion air layer and relieve smog conditions

• Use converted Hanford reactors to provide heat for desalination of seawater

• Prepare a critique of a Russian nuclear-electric plant design

• Provide interpretations to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency about the nature of buildings, pipelines, roads,

and substations shown in an aerial spy photograph of a Russian installation

• Evaluate the potential for nuclear thermal plants in the Pacific Northwest, an area dominated by hydroelectric 

plants

"in the ,ind «',»/« I'lh il'- h e to rr the f»en e i.il I la t in

( w »/M /n Uis/fm i/iocM 1, ,m d < onihustion I niiin ve rin ” h.id

H ill\ de\ eloped Ih e ir ih u it e- nl nun lo i t \ /»<-< m r clet tin

/urnvi "vnvi.tlmn, the Monm / nerjx ( oiimn-Mwi Hit hi

K e .u to r l)e \e lo fn n e n t -fu n n n rvd -<iudic- «n n \u Itu t \ /)«"•

•.uit.ihle lo t p o w e i-a n h opent Inni» The t\p c - 01 rear/nr- in

m e .it H .u n o id ,ind ‘vii.im u /t K iw i we/e < nn+idered. o l i u.ir>o

i ' l t i »/me f/iei it ere tin un i i ft/ie - tlu il lu id heen in u-e t r / i

font;, m lh p w \e n r t i uni-, u\ o p c t.d n liu . - I li iA p. 21;

" / never th o u g h t o f H .n im r d in fem e 01 h e u m ,t t.n fv ri 

I h e w ii.i- a M-rise n t . id \ m 1 iu e .ih o til it. /.is -e i itile it w ith

in tm e e riiv j. I w o u ld th in k i t vi.t- lik e th e tir+ t -/lu iiis /iip f/i.if 

m in i h. u e f»ven ext ///ny. I h e In s t .m p h n c via- e x ti/in i;. th e

m - t h u o n io tn e tt.i- e \ i i lin ii I fe e l th e -e tu m p .itn o n - ,u e

th e i h h l lo n ifM ii+ n m . '-W h e e le r in Sander I p. I "

2 -3 .3 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Hanford staff also conducted studies for outside commercial and other governmental entities. Dowis (1986, pp. 28-40) 

recalled the following projects:

• In 1954, Hanford staff helped General Electric evaluate reactor technologies in search of the best one to 

commercialize. The graphite-moderated types were considered, eventually losing out to the light-watermoderated boiling-water reactor.

• In 1955, Hanford staff prepared the McCurdy Report, which resulted from their investigation of the legal, 

financial, engineering, and administrative aspects of commercializing the Hanford type of reactor. This work 

was done for the General Electric Atomic Rower Study Group in Schenectady, New York and for a number of 

privately owned utilities in the Pacific Northwest.

• In 1965 and 1966, staff with Hanford experience (W. J. Dowis and Art Carson) served on General Electric's 

Division Safeguards Evaluation Function, which evaluated General Electric's procedures in producing atomic 

equipment. Dowis noted, "The work was extremely interesting; it covered all safety aspects of work in progress, 

and included discussions w ith the forward-thinking men in Division Safeguards Evaluation Function with respect 

to how atomic products might affect the health or well-being of customers and the general public. The 

committee made recommendations, but much of its value probably resulted from the GE Section managers 

knowing that their procedures would be scrutinized, so they kept a tight rein on their people" (Dowis 1986,

p. 36).

• In the 1960s, many Hanford staff were involved in a safety review of the reactor design for KRB, a 

General Electric nuclear plant to be sold in West Germany. This was one of the first boiling water reactors.

• In 1970, reactor staff did a general Hanford Site study for the City of Richland to evaluate the best locations for 

new power reactors.

• In 1970, reactor staff did a study to evaluate the use of warm water discharged from nuclear power plants for 

irrigation. Such a use could make the nuclear plant more attractive economically for certain locations and 

would remove the objectionable environmental effect of discharging warm water to cold water streams and 

lakes. '

As development of the nuclear power industry accelerated in the 1960s, the Hanford Site continued to play an important 

role. The N Reactor immediately became the largest power producing reactor in the world. Newspaper accounts and 

photographs from the mid-1960s show a steady stream of national and international industry people touring N Reactor, 

and contemporary stories in professional journals confirm the station that N reactor held within the emerging power 

industry at the time. Many Hanford reactor staff then moved on to construct the Fast Flux Test Facility, a major 

development in the field o f breeder reactor technology. Finally, the concept of the Hanford Site as a nuclear park 

captured the imagination of many in the nuclear industry although it did not come to fruition.

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

The story of nuclear development is one of the major technology stories of the twentieth century. The nuclear weapons 

part of the story is of interest for its technological achievement. The Hanford experience contributes to this topic. As a 

result, scholars and the public w ill likely continue to express interest in the history of nuclear weapons development in 

general and the Hanford Site in particular. The non-defense aspect of nuclear technology is equally interesting from a 

scientific, technology, and cultural standpoint.

As shown in this section, the Hanford Site also played a significant, if small, role in the development of the nuclear 

industry. As historians, social scientists, and others seek to understand w hy the non-defense nuclear industries failed to 

reach their promise in the late twentieth century, experiences from the Hanford Site w ill be sought.

With the basic facts now.well documented through the scholarship of researchers such as Carlisle and Zenzen (1996), 

Findlay and Hevly (1995), and Gerber (1992a), scholars can now place the Hanford reactors into a theoretical 

framework that provides important insights into topics such as technology and culture, war and bureaucracy. Inevitably, 

as researchers pose new questions, additional research w ill be needed. W hile it is difficult to predict when the next
Se c t io n 3 - Rea c to r Op e r a t io n s

wave of research w ill come or the research paradigms that w ill be in vogue, the following Hanford-specific areas could 

benefit from further research:

• When budget information is released, what did it cost to operate the reactors? What factors and events 

increased and decreased the budget?

• W hat was the decision making process for determining how the reactors operated and the quantity of plutonium 

produced?

• It was argued in this section that the operating experience of Hanford staff and the technology were important to 

the nuclear industry, since the Hanford Site was the only full-scale operating plant into the mid-1950s. Are there 

any specific examples of contributions from the Hanford Site? Did any managers, engineers, or scientists 

involved in reactor-related work rise to prominence within the industry? Are there cases where industry 

standards may have been different if Hanford staff had had more influence?

• W hat is known about Soviet espionage directed toward Hanford reactors? Are records from the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation available? What is known about the 305 reactor designs identified in Rhodes (1995) as having 

been stolen?

• How did Hanford reactor design, safety, and performance compare with other plutonium production reactors, 

and how did they compare to Soviet and other graphite moderated reactors used around the world?

• W hat is the history of improving worker safety for reactor employees? For instance, which remote systems were 

incorporated in which reactors? W hat was the relationship between production and risk analysis?

• The decision to shut down the PUREX facility and not process the fuel produced in the N Reactor resulted in the 

processed fuel being stored at the 100-K fuel basins for periods much longer than originally planned. The fuel 

canisters stored at 100-K emerged as Hanford's number one safety hazard in the early 1990s. Did the decision 

makers have all the facts when that decision was made? Was it clear that the fuel would be stored in a condition 

that would become a major site safety problem within a few years?

2 - 3 .3 3
C W M C M S £ P

t j %f i § i a

omt je t ew w i, !w.

w

C A CWWAW
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

Sec tio n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a tio n s

^Manufacturing

HP

Figure 2-4.1. First Chemical Separations Plant

(T Plant) Built at the Hanford Site

Plutonium production at Hanford depended as much on chemical separations as it did

on chain-reacting piles."- Rhodes 1986, p. 603

Once the fuel elements were irradiated, the plutonium had to be separated out 

Separating plutonium for use in the atomic bomb was known as chemical separations 

because of the chemicals used in the process. Chemical separations was the third of 

four steps in the plutonium production process used at the Hanford Site—a step that 

added its own degree of uncertainty to the plutonium production process.

The day after Christmas 1944, the operators for E. I. Du Pont 

de Nemours and Company started the first production run at the 

T Plant (see Figure 2-4.1) to separate plutonium out for use in an 

atomic bomb. Forty-six years later in 1990, the U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE) ordered the last chemical separations plant at the 

Hanford Site, the PUREX Plant, shut down.

During the Manhattan Project and throughout much of the Cold War 

era, the central purpose of chemical separations was to extract 

plutonium from the uranium and fission products contained in 

irradiated fuel elements. During the Cold War, the Atomic Energy 

Commission and Hanford Site contractors expanded the scope of 

chemical separations. The expanded scope included saving the 

uranium as a by-product during production as well as recovery and 

reprocessing of uranium and fission products already in 

underground waste storage tanks.

From 1945 to 1990, nuclear operators and engineers at the Hanford Site witnessed dramatic increases in plutonium 

produced at the chemical separations plants. Cold War pressures to increase plutonium output led to the use of new 

processes designed to maximize plutonium recovery. The results were more plutonium for America's nuclear weapons 

arsenal and more wastes. "Contaminated environmental media and facilities from chemical separations of irradiated 

reactor materials pose unusual and severe restoration problems" (DOE 1997e, p. 171). O f the four steps in the 

plutonium production process, chemical separations created the most and the worst waste. "The plants [T and B plants] 

sent approximately 10,000 gallons of waste to the 

tank farms for every metric ton of uranium fuel they 

processed" (DOE 1997e, p. 174). Nuclear waste 

from the chemical separations processes at the 

Hanford Site comprise 58 percent of the total 

volume of the DOE nuclear weapons waste from all 

sites (DOE 1997e, p. 36). Therefore, nuclear waste 

management at the Hanford Site was inextricably 

tied to chemical separations.

The chemical separations process began when 

irradiated fuel elements from reactors in the 

100 Areas were loaded into shielded cask cars and 

began their rail journey toward processing plants in 

the 200 Areas. The chemical separations process 

ended when plutonium nitrate paste was shipped to

Co n i i n i s

Research in Chemical Serrations and

the Discovery of Plutonium...................... 2-4.2

Operating Histories of Chemical

Separations Plants.................................... 2-4.5

Chemical Separations Process............. 2-4.7

Chemical Separations Processes

Modified for Recovery Missions..........................2-4.23

Technological Challenges......................................2-4.27

Areas for Further Research.................................... 2-4.32

D ivider Page Photo: T Plant iNeg. 850 3592-80)

2 -4 .1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

'/ de-itfnctl I ho ()>tk Kidt>c -rfh ir.itio n * p l.tn f hut il w a* '•m .illt'i ,tnd

n iu d i 'im p li'i tlu w H .u u n id /h ’c.u/m 1o f th r sm .dicr .w u iiin t*

in vo h cd . In to< t n r Iim I llto b.i«it de-'ii'n o f the H .in in rd p u tjrt t

doth' bonne u c s I jr lo d . il O .ik Hidife. I hi-, / \ //i<- n 'l H - i ’ o f w hot

uenor.dh h.tpiw n*. t -u ,ill\. u n i do .1 sem i-w ork- in otd ot to y c f 

sontr dope Itu .1 m .ijtn ftl.m l." - K .im iih ik I I*, ( ic n v re ju x , D u Pout's 

(lcsi“ iii‘i o f t h v m it.il s rp d r.ilio iis at ih r il,in fo r< i she.

<|iiolC'(l in s .in i;p r I'W * . p. I l l

the Plutonium Finishing Plant for finishing, storage, and subsequent transfer to other sites in the DOE complex such as 

Los Alamos and Rocky Flats for the next phase in the process of building an atomic bomb.

Re s e a r c h i n

Ch e m ic a l

Se p a r a t io n s a n d t h e

Dis c o v e r y of

P l u t o n iu m

By 1941, Glenn Seaborg had used chemical 

separations methods to discover plutonium. 

When the discovery was verified, scientists 

continued experimenting w ith chemical separations processes with an eye toward applications. Chemical separations 

methods used from 1940-1943 refer to processes that chemically separate, extract, and purify plutonium from materials 

such as uranium. Manhattan Project officials used information from chemical separations experiments to determine 

industrial requirements for chemical separations at the Hanford Site.

During 1941, a rush was already on to develop m ilitary weapons that used atomic energy. At this time, only a select 

group of scientists were privy to knowledge of the destructive potential of a bomb made with plutonium. Although the 

verdict was mixed when it came to the ethics of making weapons capable of such broad destruction, many scientists 

were worried if the United States did not develop this technology, Germany would. The chemical separations plants at 

the Hanford Site are testimony to the urgency. They became an integral part of the quest to make a bomb with 

plutonium. Specifically, the first full-scale architectural expressions of a total commitment to extract plutonium exist in 

the form o f the chemical separations plants at the Hanford Site during World War II: T Plant (1944) and B Plant (1945). 

U Plant was built but never used during World War II.

G lenn Seaborg and E lem en t 94: A pplied R ad io -C h em istry

itrurJd n jm e U rm e n t *)4 lo t PluUt, the n in th pkm et tn ilw .ttd

Irtn n Ih r ''tin. di'-t <u cred in I tf 10, ,m d n.i/»rrf fo r the (n o c k yur/ o t the

u n d e rw o rld -th e nod o f e .n lh \ fc rtilit\. h u l .il-o the qod o f the deod

p/ulcmium." - Ulvulc . p. 5>“»

In an entry from his journal dated Monday, 

June 3, 1940, a young American named 

Glenn Seaborg noted an important challenge 

facing chemists. The challenge, as Seaborg 

saw it, was to master a new form of chemistry 

and apply this knowledge to the development 

of military weapons for America. In this 

entry, Seaborg writes that he was, "eager to 

work in this exciting field" (Seaborg 1994, p. 7). The exciting field Seaborg spoke of is known as applied radiochemistry. Applied chemistry concerns itself with problemsTaced by industry. Applied chemists often work towards the 

development and application of technology. The chemical separations processes used at the Hanford Site were forms of 

applied radio-chemistry, which concerns itself w ith radioactive chemicals.

On February 25, 1941, while conducting experiments with colleagues in his Berkeley laboratory, Seaborg is credited 

with the discovery of a new element, plutonium. In his journal entry for that day, Seaborg summarizes an on-going 

series of chemical separations experiments by writing, "alpha activity is due to the new element with the atomic number

94" (Seaborg 1994, p. 29).

2 - 4 .2
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

Seaborg used carrier chemistry, similar to Marie Curie's and Otto Hahn's fractional crystallization (Rhodes 1986, p. 603), 

to make the discovery. But Seaborg took carrier chemistry from the laboratory into the realm of operations. He writes of 

putting chemistry into industrial practice in a related journal entry. "One of the major earlier developments in plutonium 

chemistry was the discovery of the 'oxidation-reduction principle' whereby plutonium can be reversibly placed in 

different oxidation states whose chemical properties differ markedly. It is this principle that forms the basis for several of 

the extraction and decontamination processes that have been evolved" (Seaborg 1994, p. 260). Carrier chemistry and 

the "oxidation-reduction principle" formed the basis for specific radio-chemical processes and facilities at the 

Hanford Site.

Th e M eta llu r g ic a l La b o r a to r y: A Second Ro ute Via th e Ha n fo r d Sit e

Physical separation plants, located at the Oak Ridge Reservation, divided isotopes of uranium one by one to produce 

material for a bomb (see the Reactor Operations Section). The goal of this route to an atomic bomb was to separate the 

fissionable isotope of uranium, uranium-235, from the 99.3 percent of uranium-238 that occurs naturally. The physical 

separation methods developed for this route were still posing problems in 1942. When Manhattan Project officials sized 

up the situation, they decided a second route using 

chemical separations should proceed full speed

ahead. >-\\ /„•/,, ,s/h t untlvi Du Pont iloniin.iliou.

. _ . i . .. . .1 >tiuu>thvi «i/if/ tiuivlvi rvljiittnihii) t r/i the Manhattan Proiect decision makers thought ' ' ;

, - i • ui i i t hvn iish m u I Ih i I ’nnl. - Coslm” I'PM . p. Ml plutonium promised a viable second route because

physicists calculated it was 1.7 times more likely to --------— —«— .......■...... ......

fission than the uranium-235 frontrunner (Gosling

1994, p. 7). Reflecting on this, John A. Wheeler, the physicist who co-developed the general theory of the mechanism of 

fission, said, "Plutonium is like, what is the best grade of gasoline, super? Plutonium is the super-premium of fissile 

material" (quoted in Sanger 1989, p. 127). Additionally, under the proper conditions ordinary uranium would produce 

the new element plutonium. Seaborg's laboratory studies spurred the mission on by proving that plutonium could be 

extracted and purified through chemical separations. However, it still was not known if Seaborg's laboratory chemical 

separations could guide the complex transitions to industrial radio-chemical processing of plutonium.

To speed up and concentrate research in one place, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers set up the Metallurgical Laboratory 

at the University of Chicago. Metallurgical Laboratory officials pinned their hopes on the idea that an element more 

likely to fission was also more likely to provide the massive burst of energy the Corps was hoping to deliver in a bomb.

Based on Seaborg's experiments, bismuth phosphate and lanthanum fluoride emerged as the two best chemical methods 

for separating plutonium from uranium. However, chemical separations were not as far along as the physical separations 

methods. "The lack of actual irradiated uranium for experimentation, ignorance o f the chemical properties of plutonium, 

and engineering inexperience with high radiation levels, complicated the development effort tremendously" (DOE 

1997e, p. 171). As a result, one of the central missions of the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago was to provide a 

baseline of plutonium chemistry and validate the Corps' plan to operate massive industrial plants that would extract and 

purify plutonium after it was created from ordinary uranium. Some of the best minds in chemistry were exploring a 

method for isolating plutonium via chemical separations, and military officers noted for their singularity of purpose 

targeted successful results as a goal.

On a date much noted by historians, December 2, 1942, Enrico Fermi "proved the chain reaction" (Rhodes 1986, p. 496) 

and added momentum to the Manhattan Project. Glenn Seaborg witnessed this event and wrote about it from the 

standpoint of chemical separations. "One thing is certain; although Fermi has demonstrated that we now have a means 

of manufacturing 23994 [plutoniumj in copious amounts, it is the responsibility o f the chemists to show that the 94 can 

be extracted and purified to the degree required for a working bomb" (Seaborg 1994, p. 217). Seaborg and his group of 

applied radio-chemists continued the tedious work of extracting infinitesimal samples of plutonium and attempting to 

purify them "to the degree required."

2 - 4 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

On October 5, 1942, almost two months before Fermi proved the chain reaction, Du Pont asked a chemical engineer 

named Raymond P. Genereaux to design the chem ical separations plants for plutonium. "I went out to the M et Lab that 

month. It turned out they didn't know what chemical process they would use, wet, dry, you name it. We realized 

immediately we had to design flexibility into it if we were going to move ahead and get any designing done before we 

knew for sure what we were doing, before we knew what the process would be" (Genereaux, quoted in Sanger 1989, 

p. 40). Genereaux completed design work for the original Hanford Site chemical separations plants in March 1943.

That same month people who lived within the newly annexed area were told to leave for good by the War Department.

In May 1943, Du Pont pressed their head representative on the Manhattan Project, Crawford Greenewalt, to decide 

whether bismuth phosphate or lanthanum fluoride would be the chemical separations method used at the Hanford Site. 

"Greenewalt chose bismuth phosphate, though even Seaborg admitted he could find little to distinguish between the 

tw o" (Gosling 1994, p. 30). However, it should be noted that Greenewalt and Seaborg did wind up using lanthanum 

fluoride for the final concentration steps. Meanwhile, the Manhattan Project was pressing ahead at the Hanford Site no 

matter what method was chosen. "Construction o f the separation plants began even before the process had been 

selected" (DOE 1997e, p. 173).

A Billio n fo ld Scale Up : Fr o m Test Tu b e to Hu n d r e d Ga llo n Ce n tr ifu g e

, ........;____ ___ ____ ___ ____ __ __ __ _____ May 1944, Seaborg visited the

, . , , , 1 chemical separations plants being

• Sr.Wui/i* s < -cr/Mvr/ r i m m o n ' n.iuntuw . to r w ln lr u ilrs h.ul to »<• 1; . . . _ ' . .

: , , . ,, 1 constructed in the 200 Areas at the

'•ii.ilra u n Icn h> Z iw -ufi lm w - a ‘•rih u a tio n n l.m t lu i n liito m u m \M nihl /m ri/w * 1 , , ,

. , , , . , ' ............................... 1 Hanford Site. "To reach these areas,

a ^ la lr-u n o r th r la h in a tn n c \n v n n w n t nn the ttr d fi o f a h ilh itn 'T itltl - § , , , $ we drove over some of the flattest, 

(■ o -lin u I'M U . n. d " 1 , - ! 1 most lonesome territory 1 have ever

seen" (seaborg 19 9 4 , p. 463). On

that same day, he noted that it was

an "awe-inspiring experience to see the thousands o f workmen busily engaged in the building of these complicated

edifices" (Seaborg 1994, p. 463). Seaborg's response was partly based on the land and space occupied by the chemical

separations plants, but his awe must have also stemmed from a corporeal sensation that gargantuan plants were being

built before his eyes to work out test tube chemistry he had formerly held in his hands. Figure 2-4.2 shows a chemical

separations plant (B Plant) during construction.

Seaborg was not alone in being awestruck by the magnitude. Du Font's engineers were confounded by the scale up from

Seaborg's earlier experiments. So were the hired hands who dug the dirt and poured concrete for the windowless

rectangular forms. These guys held shovels, wore hard hats, and

quickly learned to quit asking "why?" They shared a secret with

Du Font's radio-chemical design engineers. The immense gray

rectangular blocks actually did rise up out of the desert. They

shared knowledge that a substantial portion of the buildings was p .

below ground level. Workers soon started personalizing the •*'

strange buildings and deflecting the desire to guess their purpose - 

and risk being fired - by calling them Queen Mary's because of 

their shape and size. The nickname stuck even though they were 

much larger than the ocean liner of that name.

Chemical separations began in the laboratory with specks of 

plutonium in a petri dish. The billion-fold scale-up of chemical 

separations at the Hanford Site resulted in 8-gallon batches of 

plutonium nitrate, which then went on to the plutonium finishing 

process. Figure 2-4.2. Construction o f the B Plant in the

221 Building for Chemical Separations

2 - 4 .4
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

Op e r a t in g His t o r ie s o f Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s Pl a n t s

During the Manhattan Project, three 

chemical separations plants were built 

along with their related bulk reduction 

facilities; T Plant (221-T and 224-1

buildings), B Plant (221-B and 224-B 

buildings), and U Plant (221-U and 

224-U buildings). U Plant never 

operated as a facility for separating out 

plutonium. Instead the 221-U Building 

was used for training, decontamination, 

and repair, and was later modified to 

recover uranium. Its bulk reduction 

facility, the 224-U Building, was not used 

until 1956 when it was modified to 

convert uranium to uranium trioxide.

The main architectural forms of these 

original complexes were massive 

rectangular reinforced concrete canyons. 

Raymond P. Genereaux explained the 

term "canyons." "Incidentally, do you 

know why we called the main 

separations buildings a canyon? 

Originally, we were going to build them 

with walls, no ceiling. It became 

apparent there would be radiation to the 

sky, then reflected. We added a roof, 

three feet of concrete" (Raymond P. 

Genereaux quoted in Sanger 1989, 

p. 41).

Table 2-4.1. Chemical Separations Facilities at the Hanford Site

Years of Official Vernacular Building

Operation Name Name Number

1944-1956 T Plant T, T Canyon 221-T

1945-1956 B Plant B ,B Canyon 221-B

1952-1958 U Plant U, U Canyon 221-U

1952-1967 Reduction Oxidation REDOX, S Plant 202-S .

Plant

1956-1988 Plutonium-Uranium PUREX, A Plant, 202-A

Extraction Plant A Canvon

1956-72/1983-91 Uranium Trioxide Plant U 0 3 Plant 224-U

Table 2-4.2. Chemical Separations Facilities M odified for Other Functions

Modified Facilities and Operations Operations

New Mission Start Stop

U Plant (221-U)

Training, Decontamination, and Repair

U Plant (221-U)

Uranium Recovery, also known 

as tri-butyl phosphate

Uranium Trioxide P lant/U 03 Plant 

(224-U5)Conversion o f Uranium 

to Uranium- Trioxide

T Plant (221-T)

Decontamination

1945

November

1952

1956

1983.

1958

1968

1951

March

1957

1972

1991

Operational through 

the tim e period 

covered in this 

document, 1990

Cesium recovery 

completed September 

1983. Strontium 

recovery completed 

February 1985.

B. Plant (221-B)

Fission Products Processing

Two additional chemical separations 

complexes were built during the Cold 

War. They were known as REDOX 

(S Plant) and PUREX (A Plant). The

PUREX Plant resembled the architectural shape of the T and B plants, while the REDOX Plant was more compact 

because of a high silo at one end. Table 2-4.1 shows the chemical separations facilities and their years of operations. 

Table 2-4.2 shows which facilities were modified to take on new roles.

T, B, a n d U Plants

During the Manhattan Project, the number 221 designated the main processing structure within each chemical 

separations complex. Individual plants were distinguished by a single letter following 221, such as 221 B. The letters T, 

B, or U referred to the location of groups of buildings that, together, were basically self-sufficient, shared resources, 

typically worked toward a similar general mission, and were located in the same area.

The T, B and U plants shared an identical architectural form. The U and B Plants were approximately 810 feet long,

85 feet wide, 102 feet high (20 feet below grade). The T Plant had an additional head end area that made it 65 feet 

longer than the B Plant. The head end contained scaled-down versions of all equipment. The purpose of the head end

2 - 4 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - P l u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iu t ie s

was to conduct applied research for modifications to the chemical 

separations processes. The plants were composed of two separate 

areas: gallery and process. Galleries consisted of electrical, pipe, 

and operational floors. The galleries were separated from the 

process areas by thick reinforced concrete shielding that was 

approximately 7 feet thick. The process side consisted of an open 

canyon area w ith a floor called the canyon deck. Standing on the 

canyon deck, a worker saw big yellow hairpin hooks rising from 

the floor. B Plant had 40 of these hooks, and T Plant had 42. 

These hooks allowed the canyon bridge crane to lift the huge cell 

block covers that shielded the equipment. Typical cells were 

approximately 20 feet deep and about 30 percent below grade. 

Figure 2-4.3 shows workers installing equipment in a cell in the 

PUREX Plant in 1955.

REDOX Pla n t

The REDOX Plant was 467.5 feet long, 161 feet wide, 82 feet 

9 inches tall in the canyon area, and 131 feet 10 inches high in 

the silo area. Two parallel galleries consisted of operating, pipe, 

and sample areas. These galleries were separated by the canyon 

area. The process area o f the canyon contained cells A through J. 

These cells)fed the 60-foot tall solvent extraction columns in the 

silo. Operational control galleries were also located in the silo 

area. The silo area had eight floors, two elevators, and a narrow 

internal staircase.

PUREX Pla n t

The PUREX Plant was 1,005 feet in length, 104 feet 

high (40 feet below grade), and 61.5 feet wide 

(Gerber 1996, p. 4-12). Like the other chemical 

separations plants, the PUREX Plant was divided 

into process and gallery areas. Twelve process cells 

were arranged in a single file in the canyon (A to H 

and j to M). "Each cell was 14 feet wide, 42.5 feet 

deep" (Gerber 1996, p. 4-12). Cells contained 

process vessels. A 5-foot thick concrete wall 

shielded the process area from the galleries. 

Galleries at the PUREX Plant included storage, 

sample, pipe/and operations area, and crane cab. 

Figure 2-4.4 shows a cutaway of the PUREX Plant. 

Because the REDOX process used gravity flow 

columns, the columns were housed in a silo. By 

the time PUREX was constructed, pulsed columns 

were used instead of gravity flow columns so the 

silo required for the REDOX process was not 

needed for the PUREX process.

iViCAu U6M. uvNr*w&»7 tvN DISSOLVE* 1 H'i Uf 

, *

PUSEX BUILDING ■. 

PERSPECTIVE CUTAWAY

Figure 2-4.4. Cutaway o f the PUREX Plant

Figure 2-4.3. Workers Installing Equipment in a

Cell at PUREX, 1955

2 - 4 .6
Se c h o n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s P r o c e s s

The purpose of chemical separations at the Hanford Site was to extract and purify plutonium from fuel elements 

irradiated in the 100 Area reactors. As described in the Construction History Section, each chemical separations plant at 

the Hanford Site was a self-sufficient entity. This means each complex contained all the necessary buildings, equipment, 

and labor to conduct chemical separations. Among the primary reasons for the self-sufficiency of the various operational 

plants was compartmentalization

Table 2-4.3. Chemical Separations Processes/ Support Operations, and Related

Facilities

of information and processes, 

physical security, and redundancy 

to ensure that a shutdown at one 

facility did not compromise 

operations at another. The 

exception to the redundancy 

principle at the Hanford Site was - 

the Plutonium Finishing Plant of 

which there was only one.

Table 2-4.3 shows the main 

processes in chemical separations, 

the support operations, and the 

facilities in which they were 

housed.

Ov e r v ie w of th e

Processes

A t its most basic level, chemical 

separations existed because as 

plutonium was created in the 

reactors other new elements were 

also created. This happens 

through a phenomenon called 

transmutation. To envision the 

task of chemical separations, 

imagine a cylindrical fuel element, 

about 8 inches by 1.5 inches, that 

was made of heavy uranium metal.

W hile sitting at just the right 

distance from other fuel elements 

in a reactor, atoms were 

transmuted. In other words, they 

were instantaneously changed 

from one element into another

through the fission process. Although the nuclear composition of the fuel element changed, it was still a solid cylinder of 

metal. New elements, including plutonium, were created but they were stuck in the fuel element. It was the job of 

chemical separations to get the plutonium out of the fuel element.

Government contractors used three types of chemical separations processes at the Hanford Site: 1) bismuth phosphate 

batch, 2) solvent extraction through reduction oxidation, and 3) solvent extraction through plutonium-uranium 

extraction. Processes that were common to the three forms of chemical separations included transportation, storage,

System Role/Function Facilities

Transportation 

(Operations Support)

Receive irradiated fuel 

elements from reactors

202-A, 202-S, 221-T, 221-B, 221-U

Dissolving 

(Main Production)

Dissolve irradiated fuel 

elements

202-A, 202-S, 221-T, 221 -B, 221-U

Aqueous Makeup 

(Main Production)

Prepare chemicals for 

processing

202-A, 202-S, 271-T, 271-B, 271-U, 

276-B

Laboratory Support 

(Operations Support)

Manage process 222-B, 222-T, 222-U, 2703-E

Precipitation/Centrifugation 

(Main Production)

Extract and purify 

product from feed

221-T, 221-B, 221-U

Solvent Extraction 

(Main Production)

Extract and purify 

product from feed

202-A, 202-S

Ion Exchange 

(Main Production)

Extract and purify 

product from feed

202-A, 233-S

Ventilation 

(Operations Support)

Provide fresh air flow 

to process cells and 

out stack

221T-A, 222S-B, 291-A, 291-B, 291-T, 

292-T,.293-A, 294-A,

Wastes

(Waste Treatment)

Release and/or store 

wastes

202-A, 216-U 10,218-E14, 218-E15,

218-WR, 241 -AW, 241 -T, 241 -TX,

241-TY, 242-T, 244-UR, 291-A, 291-U, 

292-T, 293-A, 2706-T, 2706-TA, BC 

Cribs, B5 Reverse Well

Steam Heat Generate steam for 

processing and heating

284-E, 284W

Research and Development Provide research and 

development

209-E, 222-S, 321, 323, 325, 325-A, 

3706-A

Water Treatment Treat and supply process 

cooling and sanitary water

284-E, 284W

2 - 4 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

dissolving, preparing chemicals, ventilation and filtration systems and are described in this sub-section. Processes that 

were unique to these three technologies, such as precipitation for bismuth phosphate batch processing at the T and 

B Plants, or the use of pulse columns at the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Facility, are discussed in following 

sub-sections.

The discussion that follows is not intended to address the range of operational conditions encountered through nearly

50 years o f chemical separations at the Hanford Site. For source material, the writer of this document relied upon

technical manuals, operator training manuals, interviews with retired operators, and secondary historical accounts. This 

narrative reflects the perspectives of these sources and draws on them to relate technological function to built structure. 

Potential sources of interest to the reader are Foote (1997), Barthel (1996, pp. 67-77), Linenthal (1995), Bodnar (1992), 

Johnson and Schene (1987), Lowenthal (1985), King etal. (1977, pp. 190-195). Readers interested in pursuing actual 

operational conditions in radio-chemical processing history may wish to consult 200 East and West Area plant log books,

and the "off normal" and "unusual occurrence" reports for these areas. Most of these documents are available for review

at the U.S. Department of Energy's Public Reading Room at the Consolidated Information Center, Washington State 

University-Tri-Cities, Richland, Washington.

Loading, Transportation, and Storage of Irradiated Fuel Elements

The chemical separations process began with irradiated fuel elements. Reactor workers used high pressure water to eject 

irradiated fuel elements out of the reactor core through the rear face of the reactor. During this step, reactor workers 

remotely guided the irradiated fuel elements into fuel storage basins filled w ith water. At this point, the fuel elements

emitted extremely high levels of electromagnetic radiation beams, 

and the water in the storage basins functioned to shield workers and 

equipment from this hazard. Fuel elements were strewn about on 

the bottom of the storage basin after they were expunged from the 

reactor core, and the first step to ready them for the next leg of their 

journey was to group them. This process, called loading, began 

when reactor operators used long tongs to remotely move fuel 

elements into metal transport buckets. These buckets were about the 

size of a 2-foot cube. The loading process for the irradiated fuel 

elements continued when reactor crane operators placed full 

buckets inside heavy shielded casks. Next, reactor crane operators 

placed the casks in well sections o f special railroad cars called cask 

cars. The cask cars were constructed of concrete and steel and were 

filled with water. Figure 2-4.5 shows a rail cask car.

From 1945 through the mid 1950s, the transportation of the irradiated fuel elements was a two step process. Step one 

was temporary storage. Step two was transportation to a chemical separations plant. In step one, railroad crews 

delivered irradiated fuel elements, housed inside the cask cars, to temporary storage facilities called lag storage buildings. 

For information on the 212-N Lag Storage Building, see the Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the 

Internet. The lag storage buildings were located in the 200 North Area about midway between the reactors and chemical 

separations plants. Operators unloaded the cask cars at a lag storage building by lifting the casks with an overhead 

crane, removing the buckets from the casks, and placing the buckets at the bottom of a pool of water called a cooling 

basin. Attached to each cart was a long metal post with a cork at one end. Information on this piece of cork was secret 

and pertained to the history of that particular load of irradiated fuel elements.

When Hanford Site managers decided that it was time for a load of irradiated fuel elements to continue toward a 

chemical separations plant, operators loaded the railroad cask cars by placing the buckets inside the casks. The casks 

went inside the water filled wells within rail cask cars. Step two commenced when the cask cars began to move along 

the rails toward a chemical separations plant. Although the exact distances vary for each reactor and chemical

Figure 2-4.5. Rail Cask Car Used to Transport

Irradiated Fuel Elements

2 - 4 .8
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

separations plant, irradiated fuel elements traveled an average of 10 miles by rail to reach a chemical separations plant 

on the Hanford Site.

in the mid 1950s, the lag storage buildings in the 200 North Area began to be used for other miscellaneous purposes 

such as storage of equipment (DOE 1998b). They eventually became surplus because Hanford management decided the 

temporary fuel storage basins in the reactor areas were sufficient and because of increased capacity at the chemical 

separations plants. They based their determination of sufficiency on guidelines and later regulations as to how much 

iodine contamination was tolerated on vegetation. The on-going consideration was between the pressure for more 

plutonium coupled with concern for how much iodine was going

out of the chemical separations facility stacks. This juxtaposition 

was re-evaluated as new pressures arose or new filtering technology 

was made available.

The decision to skip temporary storage in the lag storage buildings 

meant the transportation o f irradiated fuel elements was one step 

instead of two from the mid 1950s through the end of the Cold War.

The fuel elements were shipped directly from reactor areas to 

chemical separations plants. Railroad operators used diesel 

powered engines to push cask cars along rails toward one o f the 

chemical separations plants. At all Hanford Site chemical 

separations plants, the entry point for the rail cask cars was known Enters the Plant

as the railroad cut (see Figure 2-4.6). The railroad cut was

characterized by high earth berms. These berms were roughly 100 feet high and extended out about a quarter mile on 

either side of the rail tracks. The tracks ran into one end of the chemical separations buildings through huge doors on a 

rail entry to the canyon. The area behind the door was called the tunnel, and the entire plant was called a canyon.

Figure 2*4.6. Railroad Cut Where the Rail Line

W h .il Was (he Purpose o f S lo iin g Ir ra d ia t'd Tut1! L lcm vn ts'

Kvt’ j i d l v o f \\hi>thvt inuduiled lui'l elements w rit* stored at flu* 200 Ntirlh \rva oi in liiel storage Immiis near the

reactor*. lliv pinpcise ul icnipuinrv -lo iii^ r vv>i' In i educe hi^l) i.idinfion levels l>\ allowin'.; some oi the shoH-lixcil

rodioisnlope*- ot IjioIouk nl concern like iodine I >1 to pnrliallx dec ax. knchoacli\t* decax is also known .is h.ih-hfi . Hiv

radiohnlopi" pertained to the < h«‘tni<al separations pioc e-s Iirt nUsv file radioisotopes xapon/vd dm in" .111 initial slop

«.lilt'd f u.itiii" lem m a/ .ind then e\d<*d 200-runt pknil *!.»< k- .i'- Jirhorne radio-chemical emissions. I lu* ••vnvi.il

print iple hvhinrl storayc and cooling; 01 ihv irradiated mcl elements w.is simple1 Winner s|nr.i'»c meant It's* i.itliv.>Ui\its.

This print iplv w a* m cnie-lan*«omli< I with the pivsMiro In tut 11 tuii nioie plutonium in shorter periods of lime

■shni tenin:; Ihv sluiauv lime ol Ihv in.idi.ilvil fuel elements was .1 mvlhnd lor im reason; <l,ul\ piodiu lion output. I his

was the tase hcc.nusc ilicn m a l sep.ir.ilioiis fat ililies <ould process met elements Taster than it took r« .11 tors to irradiate

them. Cspvciidh duiuv; the Manh.itl.in f*io|ecf Inil also at time's (hiring I he ( old War, chemical sepuulicMis M<ililies

were ie,id\ to process hut w eie without level he< au-e 01 Ihv lived to "1 mil oil * fuel. Ihiis Ihv hislorii .il p ai.m vlei- nu

( nolinu limes varied depending on a numlivr 01 i.u lor-, im ludini; tin* inilitarx - perceptiun oi the ir need tin plutonium,

opeuiluv; uni ms duiin” .1 pjrlic ul.ir pioduclion lime pel u>d, and experiments conducted duiin” opviatioiis al the plants

i(ioldhei$; IM«i{» pp. h l-iili. slack liltralion s\stems designed lo capture r.id io .u liw oii-s».is omissions vxmv also p.ut oi

iliis vc|U.ilion cliinn” lliv C old W.u. cording to one Irishman's leading 01 Ihv dec In'Hlied hislnric.il rvcoid, the minthvi

ol cUxxs iii.uli ilvd uiel el<*ini*nls were allouvil lo tool livloie \ii*;usl a) I ‘i4 * 1.111141 (I lim n I ’ hi H w ti than til clavs.

Ilow exei Iliis historian does noli lh.il "Ihe ox.u I lennlli 01 loo liu ” time duiiii" Ihis pvnod is unknown or is t lassirivd'

■ C.erliei I ‘lo j.i, p. 44». In the d.ixs followin'.; du use 01 an atomu vxeapon made with plutonium irom the IlniMoid Mtv

011 N.i'-M..iki. Japan nradialvd tuel vlemvnl cooling limes xxeiv fewm ihan "(I davs I atci. duiirv; lliv ( old W .11 -.hitai;f

[fvnods uvvrauvd *)(! 1u I 20 davs. 1 01 adtlilioii.il iiiloim .iliini. sev MLDU f 1004.1'.

1

i

2 - 4 .9
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Dissolving Process: Coordination between Dispatcher, Crane

Operator, and Others

Each chemical separations plant had a dispatcher, who controlled all 

access to the plant. Among other control duties, the dispatcher maintained 

a log of all canyon entries and exits. The train crew would contact the 

dispatcher of the chemical separations plant and inform them the train was 

waiting at the railroad cut with a load of cask cars. Once the dispatcher 

verified that the plant was ready to receive the cars, they unlocked the 

tunnel door from the dispatch office with a remote switch. The dispatcher 

picked up an internal phone and placed a call to an operator posted near 

the tunnel door. The dispatcher told the operator when the door could be 

opened to receive cask cars and informed the.rail crew when to proceed 

into the tunnel. The rail crew used the train to push the cask cars into the 

tunnel to a specific spot, unhooked the cask cars being delivered, arid 

departed. An operator then closed the huge tunnel door.

The dispatcher informed an operations supervisor that the cask cars were 

inside the tunnel. The supervisor would request the crane operator to 

unload the cask cars into dissolver tanks. Before this process began, the 

dispatcher ensured no personnel were inside the canyon. The dispatcher

unlocked the

Figure 2-4.7. Bridge Crane in the B Plant

Canyon during Modification

\ \ h.it W.1*. .1 C .m von B ridge C ra n e f

Bet auxv nl Ihv need fen ivm olv ii|ivr.i1i»n duo hi hit>h

radiation fic liK e.i< h « hemic.il icp.ir.itiuiis pl.ml to lied

upun ,i < .inxiiii hiid“c tram - loi some opei<dion.il

'•fop',, removal uiid ivpl.ic emvnl o i efftiipmertl 'see

Fmure J - 4 .~ T h e hii(l»e poilion oi ,i t.inxon bridge

trane sii.iddled Ihv width oi the cam on. The hridt«e

c m h o mo\ vd .ilont» ox vrhciid rails all.u hod to both

sides or Ihv tanvon. Ihv hiid"o < r.me was ,ihle to

m o w Ihv full lont»1 h or Ihv tanvon i.ippm xim alvh

IIIHI fvvii. ^ winch motor was all.uhvd to thv hrid-je.

The winch eilhvi reeled up oi sent out a metal table

with a honk oi other de\i< e, sue h as an imp,it.I

wrenc h, at the end. I he winch motor w.w able to

m o w side to side alonsi the crane hritU»e. ( anvon

aivas were* appioximalelv ~"i feet wide. Ih v t ram*

vxas controlled lie an operator in the < lane < ah. I he

< ranv tab was a heaxilv shielded operatinu area llial

moved alons; w ith I he bridge ciane. Ihv operating

m om in the ci.ine «ab was separated from Ihe <ancon

area l>\ a lliii k paiapel wall 'wihm.iimv like

perisc o|Kas allowed a a n e operators lo sec while

c ontiolhm* Ihv train* 'see I igun*

crane cab entry 

and gave the 

crane operator . 

permission to 

enter the crane 

cab and load 

the dissolver.

A crane 

operator began 

by positioning 

the bridge 

crane over the 

dissolver cell.

The operator 

removed the 

dissolver cell 

cover block

and placed it on the canyon deck. Next, the lid was 

removed from the dissolver tank and buckets of fuel 

elements were emptied into this water-filled tank. Each tank 

held one "charge," which consisted of three buckets of fuel 

elements, weighing a total of 3 tons. After the crane operator 

charged the dissolver, the lid was replaced on the dissolver 

tank and the cover block on the dissolver cell. The crane 

operator informed the dispatcher that the cell was closed 

and charged.

Figure 2-4.8. Crane Operator Lou Walker

2 -4 .1 0
Section 4 - Chemical Separations

When the dissolver was charged the dispatcher 

contacted the weather group at the Meteorological 

Tower and informed them that operations intended 

to start the dissolver. The weather group provided 

the current conditions to the dispatcher, such as 

dilution factor of air, wind velocity, wind direction.

A forecast of weather conditions was also 

provided. The dispatcher then forwarded the 

weather data to the supervisor, and the supervisor 

determined if the weather data fell within operating 

parameters. According to one historian's reading 

of the record, dilution ratios of 1000:1 were 

favorable, 500:1 to 1000:1 moderately satisfactory, 

and 500:1 or lower unfavorable (Gerber 1992a, --

pp. 80-81). These ratios referred to the difference

between the concentration of a substance when it exited the stack and when 

it deposited on the surface of the earth. If the weather was not within 

operating parameters, the dissolving process may have been placed on hold 

until favorable conditions emerged. If the weather data fit dilution 

specifications, then dissolving operations continued.

One of the primary reasons the chemical separations plants obtained weather 

data before dissolving was to control the dilution of emissions to specified 

operating levels. The emissions posed health and safety concerns because of 

the radioactive and chemicai fumes produced during the dissolving process. 

For additional information see DOE (1998c, p. 2.5), Hales (1997, pp. 144- 

150) and Gerber (1992a, pp. 81-82).

To begin dissolving operations, the chief operator at the process control board 

unlocked each piece of equipment required for the dissolving"steps. The

Table 2-4.4. Examples o f Entries in a Run Book and a Data Sheet for

Decladding Operations

\ \ h .it W .is a D is s o lv e r T .in k f

Dissnlvvr tank*. were vn< .wed in prntet Nve < rlh near the lunnrl.

f h«‘\ were l.«n»e « vlmiiiic .<1 vessel*- with ’.hum toils on ihv side,

<.lilt'd lulu* bundles, and a lid. W hen a ti.m e operator filled a

dissolver tank with a load ot fuel elements il was said 1o he

i barged. I wo »eparale prm esses occurred after a dissolver tank

had heen t harmed. 1 he liM pnn ess was «oatinu removal, the

second dissolulion. Duiinv. i oat inn removal the aluminum c mix

sinmundiiiy ihe luel elements were clieniM allv dissolved.

During dissolution, Ihe fuel elements w eie transformed from a

solid h» a slum . I igure 2-4/1 shows j dissolver tank.

Run Book for Decladding Data Sheet for Decladding

1. Turn on steam to A-1 tu b e bundle to 

heat wash w ate r and fuel elements.

2. Jet wash w ate r from A-1 dissolver to 

A -3 tank.

3 . A d d 42 00 lbs 50% caustic to A-1

4. Turn on A-1 a ir sparger

5. Turn on steam to A-1 tub e bundle

6. H eat A-1 to 185 degrees F

7. H o ld at 185 degrees F until A-1 Sp. 

Cr. Reaches 1.15

1. Run No. 

A pproval 

Date

2. Tim e jetted 

A -3 W.F.

Sp. Gr.

3. Tim e added 

A-1 W.F.

Sp. Gr.

4. Tim e on

5. Tim e on

6. Tim e

7. Time

. (signature)

N ote: This table o n ly pertains to decladding (rem oval o f the m etal coating around the fuel 

elem ent) and is m eant as an exam ple o f the steps an operator m ight take in th is process. 

A ctual operational practices differed fo r each fa c ility and tim e period. Please refer to the 

text fo r general inform ation on decladding.

Figure 2-4.9. Dissolver Tank at B Plant

dissolver operator would then follow the 

procedures in the run book and fill out 

the data sheet as each procedure was 

accomplished (see Table 2-4.4). The 

process engineering group prepared the 

run books, which defined the sequential 

steps necessary for the chemical 

separations process. Instructions 

contained in the run books were scaledup from data provided by laboratory 

experiments and pilot plant testing. In 

conjunction with using a run book, the 

operator filled out a data sheet. W hile 

the run books were hardbound 

documents that remained at the process 

control board, data sheets recorded

2 -4 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n FAcnm ES

• .. # * » . 1 *

r» ■

i tjm/ATM

•\/> in s fi

It IUIH / 

fjrtH <‘»

~ ^ ~ ^ ^ , nth vi. /'/I'w /m im n i th>' s/jo; i till)!1 unshed r/im n r»n

Figure 2-4.10. O perators at Process C o n tro l , , , , , ,

Boards in the B P lant m .tnnm rirt m l w line p r t^ u i e rrnm the lony rum1 pushed me

n il up inlo the niMumwlei lube. Ihv m .innm vh'i iv.idine

information about the process as it was happening. would induniv ihr diiieicine in Ihr ludro'-t.dit pfi-wfn- or

Figure 2-4.10 shows a process control board. Often It) indies involution 'KHO l*i"'j.i,|i. 11 - It)

all steps were not completed before the end o f a shift.

When this happened, the operators would initial and 

draw a line under the step they completed last.

To remove the aluminum can surrounding the fuel element, a caustic agent such as sodium hydroxide was added to the 

water in the dissolver tank. The addition of a caustic caused a chemical reaction inside the sealed dissolver tank. The 

caustic agent reacted with the aluminum but did not react with the uranium. As the aluminum changed from a solid to a 

liquid, it increased the weight per volume (the specific gravity) of the caustic solution in the tank. Instruments, such as 

manometers, measured the specific gravity, which indicated when the aluminum had been liquefied. When the 

aluminum was liquefied, the dissolver tank was cooled and the liquid aluminum solution jet transferred to a waste tank.

After the aluminum can was removed, the irradiated fuel elements were dissolved. The objective was to turn solid 

irradiated uranium into a slurry. The operators rinsed the fuel elements w ith water and then added an acid, such as nitric 

acid. As the acid reacted with the fuel elements, the acid dissolved a portion of the fuel element into slurry. As the 

reaction continued, the acid became saturated and lost its effectiveness. Typically, it took three separate additions or 

"cuts" of fresh acid to completely dissolve the fuel elements. Each charge (three buckets of fuel elements weighing 

3 tons) slurried into approximately 3,000 gallons of liquid feed. Although fuel elements were completely dissolved, a 

heel was often left on the bottom of dissolving tanks. This happened when a portion of the dissolved fuel solution was 

not transferred out o f the dissolver tank. Upon cooling, the remaining feed solution turned into a solid heel.

Preparing Chemicals: Aqueous Makeup

All chemical separations plants had units called Aqueous Makeup Units. These units prepared chemicals in liquid forms 

needed for the various steps in the chemical separations process. The term Aqueous Makeup Unit "indicates that 

chemicals are dissolved in an aqueous (water) solvent. Although some plants use organic solvents that are not water, the 

term AMU Is still widely used and accepted for operations involving any type of chemical makeup or chemical 

handling" (RHO 1979a, p. 3-27). Examples of the tasks performed by an Aqueous Makeup Unit operator included (RHO 

1979a, pp. 3 - 3 7 , 3 -3 8 ):

• Received and stored chemicals, both dry and in liquid form

• Made up chemical solutions and had them available for use in the plant processes

• Inventoried chemicals in storage

• Conducted some of the chemical analytical tests required for makeups

• Prepared equipment for maintenance

• Took necessary samples

• Housekeeping

2 - 4 .1 2

l'
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

Figure 2-4.11. Aqueous Makeup Unit for the

Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Facility

Operations personnel requested chemicals from the Aqueous 

Makeup Unit by calling up and asking them to "send some K-O-H"

(potassium hydroxide), for example. An Aqueous Makeup Unit 

operator would open a.valve and send potassium hydroxide to a 

header. A header was a device that held liquids for future transfer.

The Aqueous Makeup Unit operator would let the process operator 

know when the potassium hydroxide was in the header and ready

to be drawn into a process vessel (RHO 1979a, pp. 3r37 to 3-41).

Figure 2-4.11 shows the Aqueous Makeup Unit for the PlutoniumUranium Extraction Facility.

Ventilation and Filtration Systems

All the chemical separations plants relied on ventilation systems to 

operate. Ventilation systems brought washed, filtered, and dust-free 

outside air in the direction of the most contaminated portions of the

plant and exhausted this air from the building. Ventilation systems operated to protect electronic equipment and to 

control the spread of radioactive contamination. The intake system brought air into the facility and the exhaust system 

sent it up and out the stack.

The air flow in a 

building was 

controlled by 

varying the static 

pressure, causing 

the air to flow in the 

direction of the 

lowest pressure. In 

chemical

separations plants, 

the highest 

pressures were 

maintained in the 

areas occupied by 

workers.

Potentially 

contaminated areas 

were maintained at 

levels lower than 

the occupied areas. 

Finally, the lowest 

pressures were 

maintained in the 

cells and inside 

process vessels, 

which were the 

most contaminated 

areas.

W h a t Was the Purpose o f D ilu tio n ?

Ihv purpose of diluting the exhaiM was lo bring Ih r (oiuvntr.ilion of xarinus contaminates in line

with Ihv release limits. Dilution specificalions vxvir based on tab illations made l>\ (In*

Meteorological Department and the Health Instruments Section. Dilution rum tinned bx dispersing

exhaust -Ireanis into a lame atmospheric spatial aiva. Release limits ror aithom • exhaiM streams

< hanged over time as iniorm.ilimi on health r u n Is and biological activitv was studied and

estimated, factors which alive ted the selection of the release limits itu hided: 1' production

(juantih directives from the militarv and later Atomic Energx ( ommissjon. Ji status of scientific

knowledge on ihe emission problem, »i knowledge of filtialion tediimlogc, 4.' s«.ieiilill< knowledge

oi Ihe relationship between contaminants and biological iespouse. 1 > design i onstiainls of the

plants. This i omplex talc ulus of dilution liecanie more (nm plicaled wlien Ihe pressure lo produce

plutonium c ame lace to fac e with the* limited alnlilv of Ihv plants p> contain eonlamination during

the WauhaMau Project. -V World W ar II ended, infoimalion affecting release limits coiiliriued to be

collected and interpreted In Hanroid site sc ienlixK Hanford site management, in turn, was able

lo draw ii|Hin this inform,ilion during the ( old W ar to make dec 'm o i i s alioul ihe implementation of

additional emission control technologies and formulate aiihom e icle.ise programs isee (ivrher

1‘t‘JJ/, pp. 7 7 .| | j ; Halt's i«i*t“ i. ("Mien decisions regarding dilution rales w eie not based on new

understandings oi Ihe dangers hut rather from i oncerus tegai ding the int reasing numhei of |>eople

being exposed to those dangers. \ report issued bv the lee hnical steering Panel for the Hanford

l-iwironmenlal Do-e Reconstruction Project cunt .tins the following slatvmvnt on this topic;

"During the «ir>1 tew w ars of operalions, large ainnurils or i.idioac tivr materials - pmnarilx ludrneI $ I were released to the atmosphere from the separation* plants. IJrttor filler sxsfenis. new

knowledge about radiation ha/atils, and s h i t let operating pioc vduies all but eliininaled I I i c m *

releases b\ Ihe m id-DtlUs." - IIFDR I't'M a. p. ’«

2 - 4 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Four ventilation systems operated simultaneously in a typical chemical separations plant. The service ventilation system 

handled the areas housing administrative staff and Aqueous Makeup Units where airborne radioactive contamination 

was not a hazard. A second system ventilated the occupied work spaces in electrical, pipe, and operating galleries. A 

third system ventilated air in the process areas. The final system, known as a vessel vent system, ventilated air from the 

vessels themselves.

Between 1944 and 1947, the sole function of the ventilation systems was to dilute contaminates to tolerance levels. 

Tolerance referred to an allowable amount of contamination as designated by Hanford Site officials at a particular point 

in time. See the Worker Health and Safety Section for more information on tolerance levels. Dilution in these ventilation 

systems worked by adding fresh air to the exhaust stream. For more information on these ventilation systems, see the 

Historic Property Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet for the 291-T Exhaust Stack, 291-Z Air Filter and Exhaust 

Stack, and 292-T Fission Products Release Laboratory.

After W orld War II, three exhaust filtration devices were used in conjunction with dilution. The purpose of these 

filtration systems was to remove the majority o f target radioactive and chemical contaminates from the process and 

vessel exhaust systems. The three filter systems were:

• Caustic scrubbers

• Sand filters and fiberglass filters

• Silver reactors

Caustic scrubbers were the earliest filtration systems used in vessel vents to remove radio-chemical vapors from the 

process vessels. They were first installed in 1947 and 1948.

Sand filters were also installed in 1947 and 1948. Sand filters used at the chemical separations plants were columns of 

graded earth. Earth was arranged in these columns from coarse (pebbles) to fine grades of sand. Exhaust streams entered

at the coarse end and exited out through the fine end. Figure 2-4.12 

shows a model of a sand filter system. Fiberglass filters operated on the 

same principle as sand filters but were constructed of fiberglass.

O ff gases from dissolver operations were passed through a silver reactor. 

The function of a silver reactor was to remove iodine-131 from exhaust. 

"The silver nitrate bed in the filters would chemically react with 

radioiodine to form silver iodide thus binding the 1-131 more tightly than 

could physical capturing devices" (Gerber 1992a, p. 92). The silver 

iodide was disposed of along with the other wastes from the chemical 

separations plants. Silver reactors were first installed in 1950 and were 

used through the remainder of Cold War.

The effectiveness of these ventilation and filter systems was investigated 

by the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project. The

Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project estimated the 

radiation doses people may have received from the release of 

radioactive material from the Hanford Site from 1944-1992. The results 

showed "about 92 percent of Hanford radioactive iodine-131 releases to 

the air occurred from December 1944 through December 1947. In all, 

an estimated 740,000 curies of radioactive iodine-131 were released to 

the air" (HEDR 1994b, p. 4). See Table 2-6.4 in the Waste Management 

Section for the annual amounts of six radionuclides released to the air 

from the chemical separations plants at the Hanford Site from 1944- 

Figure 2-4.12. M odel o f a Sand Filter System 1972. Since this table was published, corrections for the releases

2 - 4 .1 4

i

L
Section 4 - Chemical Separations

starting August 1951 and after have been made. The corrections increase the releases from August 1951-1972 by about 

25%. For details concerning the corrections, see http://www.pnl.gov/eshs/cap/hra/pub/hedr.html on the Internet.

Bis m u t h Ph o sph a te Ba tc h Process: T a n d B Plants

The bismuth phosphate process produced plutonium nitrate. The chemical separations plants built by Du Pont workers 

during the Manhattan Project were designed to produce plutonium in batch runs. A batch was based upon one fully 

charged dissolver (three buckets of fuel elements). A basjc rule of thumb in chemical separations at the Hanford Site was 

that as the concentration of 

plutonium increased in a batch, 

the concentration of uranium and 

other fission products decreased.

G a s e s to

R e c y c le Efflue nt

B yp ro d u c t

PrectM tation

B iP O

1-131

L a F ,

At a general level, the bismuth 

phosphate batch process was 

used to separate plutonium, as 

plutonium nitrate, from dissolved 

irradiated fuel. Before a batch 

process could start, operators 

transferred the dissolved fuel feed 

solution from the dissolver tank 

into another tank for 

precipitation. The first cycle 

extracted most of the plutonium 

from the uranium and fission 

products in the dissolved fuel 

feed through two steps of 

precipitation and centrifuging.

The uranium and fission products 

were considered waste and were 

sent to waste tanks. The 

plutonium was the product As 

the plutonium was transferred 

down the process line, it became 

progressively more concentrated.

This product solution continued 

down the process line into a 

second cycle that was similar to 

the first cycle. The goal was to 

concentrate the plutonium and

remove the uranium, fission products, and impurities. The plutonium product then entered a decontamination stage that 

used a process similar to the first two cycles. The result was a 330 gallon batch of plutonium nitrate. This 330 gallon 

batch was, in turn, concentrated down to 8 gallons of plutonium nitrate paste. Figure 2-4.13 shows the bismuth 

phosphate process at the Hanford Site.

The bismuth phosphate chemical separations process at Hanford's B and T Plants worked by alternating steps of 

precipitation and centrifuge. Altering the chemistry of bismuth phosphate created a precipitation of either plutonium or 

waste. During a plutonium precipitation, plutonium was carried out of the solution as irradiated fuel solution along with 

the bismuth phosphate as semi-solids. Centrifuging caused the plutonium to stick to the bowl while uranium and fission 

products went out the top of the bowl as supernate, and into waste tanks. The plutonium cake left on the bowl was then

N a O H - s o d iu m hyd roxide

Figure 2-4.13. Bismuth Phosphate Process at the Hanford Site

2 - 4 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

dissolved and transferred into a product holding tank for further purification and concentration. During byproduct 

precipitation, uranium and fission products turned into semi-solids by reaction with another chemical form of bismuth 

phosphate. Centrifuging caused the plutonium to exit out the top of the centrifuge bowl as supernate and into a product 

holding tank, while the uranium, fission products, and impurities remained on the bowl.

The wastes on the centrifuge bowl were then dissolved and transferred to a waste tank. In the final concentration step, 

lanthanum fluoride was used in the place of bismuth phosphate, but the process steps remained similar.

The bismuth phosphate chemistry worked by repeatedly alternating the valence state of plutonium-239 from plus four to 

plus six and back. Valence refers to the combining capacity of an element in a compound. In the plus six valence state, 

plutonium-239 remained in solution, while the uranium and fission products precipitated w ith the bismuth phosphate.

In the plus four valence state, plutonium-239 precipitated. This means it turned into semi-solids along with the bismuth 

phosphate. Supernate was the clear liquid

above a precipitate. Oxalic acid or ferrous ions Table 2-4.5. Bismuth Phosphate and Plutonium-239

were added to the bismuth phosphate solutions 

to achieve the plus four state. Sodium 

bismuthate was used for the plus six state 

(Gerber 1996, p. 4-6). Table 2-4.5 shows how 

the valence state of plutonium-239 affects its 

reaction with bismuth phosphate.

Plutonium-239

Valence

Plutonium-239 Reaction

with Bismuth Phosphate

Plutonium-239

Status in Centrifuge

+ IV (plus fou r) Precipitates, turns in to sem i-solid

+VI (plus six) No reaction, stays dissolved in solution

Cake, stuck on bow) 

Supernate, liquid, out 

top o f bowl

Precipitation

Precipitation refers to a process in which, under controlled conditions, a chemical may be added to liquid that causes the 

targeted material to turn into a semi-solid and become suspended in liquid. A household experiment illustrates 

precipitation: add a couple teaspoons of vinegar to a glass of milk. The mixture w ill separate into solids and liquid.

Precipitation was used for two phases: extraction and decontamination. The extraction phase separated plutonium from 

uranium and "about 90% o f the fission products" (Gerber 1996, p. 4-6). Decontamination separated plutonium from the 

majority (about 99 percent) of the remaining fission products. Extraction purified plutonium to the specifications 

required for the plutonium finishing process. Among other reasons, decontamination was required to reduce the gamma 

and beta radiation levels in the plutonium-239. For information on gamma and beta radiation, see the Worker Health 

and Safety Section.

For extraction, the dissolved fuel solution from the dissolver tank was jet transferred to an agitator tank. The operator 

turned on the agitator (a propeller like device at the bottom of a tank) and chemicals were added. In the byproduct 

precipitation cycle, bismuth phosphate and oxalic 

acid were added to change the valence of 

plutonium-239 to a plus four state. To do this, an 

operator added the chemicals called for in the run 

book at a specified rate. For the product 

precipitation cycle, bismuth phosphate and sodium 

bismuthate was added to obtain the plus six 

valence for plutonium-239. For decontamination, 

the dissolved feed solution was reduced in-volume, 

and the byproduct and product precipitation cycles 

were repeated.

Centrifugation

Next the centrifuge was started and, depending on 

the exact specifications, held at 870 or

W h .il I*. ,i O n lrifn n 'V

\ c vntriuii'v wa* a vrs-.fl v\ illi a ia - r anil a how I. I hr howl

hold appm xim alvk I Oil gallons of lii|iii<l and w a- mount rd on

a vvrlkal shall insidr llir < a-v. \n c lr d iit moloi sal alop Ihr

<a -r anil spun llu* howl. \a Ih r Im»\\| -,pun w illi a prr* ipilalv

in-idr. < cnlrifimal lori r c aii-cd -rmi-sohds to slii k to Ih r side

of Ih r howl. Ih r - r srmi-solids w rtv i allrcl "lakv." Ih r

rvinaindrr of Ih r soliiliun, i allrd -aiprrnalr. ovrrflnw rd thr

howl and w a- vilhvi irla in rd lor lu h h rr usr or ifn l lo wa-.tr

lank-, rij-urr 2-4.14 show- a trnlrifugc on a c anvon Jr< k. mil

in il- opnalional pu-ilion in-idr a ir ll.

2 - 4 .1 6
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a tio n s

1740 revolutions per minute (rpm). After verifying the empty 

centrifuge was spinning at the appropriate rpm, the operator began 

to jet the precipitation mixture at a precise rate into the centrifuge.

The precipitate slurry entered the centrifuge bowl from the bottom. 

In the first byproduct precipitation with plutonium in a plus six 

valence, the plutonium remained in solution and overflowed the 

spinning centrifuge bowl into a catch tank. The operator then 

washed the uranium and fission product cake and removed it from 

the side of the bowl. This step was called cake removal in which 

acid was transferred to the centrifuge and rapidly moved up and 

down by manipulating the speed of the bowl. The centrifuge was 

then stopped and the uranium and fission product solution jetted 

to a waste tank. Following this, a skimmer was used to remove 

excess water. A skimmer ..was a curved piece of pipe mounted on 

the inside of the centrifuge bowl. Using a remote lever on a panel 

control board, an operator activated the skimmer to move it from 

the center until it was near the wall of the bowl. The remaining 

uranium and fission product solution created by using the skimmer 

was then jet transferred into a waste tank.

Figure 2-4.14. Centrifuge on a Canyon Deck (Not

in Operational Position inside a Cell)

When the plutonium was in its plus four valence state, the cake consisted of plutonium. Following a cake wash and 

skimming to remove the plutonium from the bowl, the plutonium was sent down the process line as plutonium nitrate.

As the plutonium was sent down the line, the extraction and decontamination steps were repeated. The original design 

called for two extraction steps followed by three decontamination cycles (DOE 1994a, pp. 2-10-2-11).

Concentration

After the final decontamination steps, the plutonium nitrate was sent in 330 gallon batches, via underground pipe, to a 

receiver tank in one o f the bulk reduction buildings (224-T and 224-B). There the 330 gallons of plutonium nitrate were 

concentrated to 8 gallons. Concentration also purified the plutonium nitrate by removing "the lanthanides (cerium, 

strontium, lanthanum, etc.) that the BiP04 [bismuth phosphate] could not carry out o f the stream" (Gerber 1996,.p. 4-7).

Plutonium-239 is an alpha emitter. Alpha emitters require different industrial protection than when mixed w ith gamma 

and beta. The main difference for industrial protection from alpha sources is that measures are designed to avoid 

ingestion, inhalation, and injection. The plutonium nitrate solution sent to the bulk reduction buildings was relatively 

free of gamma and beta sources. This meant electromagnetic beam radiation was relatively absent and, therefore, the 

massive shielding used in the chemical separations buildings was not needed in the bulk reduction buildings. 

Additionally, process vessels (centrifuges, agitator tanks, etc.) were available for direct contact maintenance. Therefore, 

w hile the processes in thp bulk reduction buildings were roughly similar to processes in the chemical separations 

buildings, the architectural structure of each was dramatically different (DOE 1992d).

The concentration steps in the bulk reduction buildings were similar in principle to the bismuth phosphate process in the 

chemical separations buildings. The key difference was that hydrogen fluoride and lanthanum salts were used instead of 

bismuth phosphate. For this process, the basic steps of precipitation and centrifugation remained the same. However, 

instead of extraction and decontamination being the primary goals, purification and volume reduction were the 

objectives.

2 - 4 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Loadout

When the plutonium nitrate had been purified and the volume reduced, it was ready for "loadout." Loadout referred to 

the transfer of the concentrated plutonium nitrate to the plutonium finishing plant. Loadout of the plutonium in the bulk 

reduction buildings took place at the F-10 Tank inside the PR Cage. PR Cage stood for product receiver cage.

The F-10 Tank was the last tank in the chemical separations process. It was approximately 4 inches wide, 24 inches 

long, and 24 inches high. The shape of the tank was determined by criticality prevention requirements. One of these 

requirements was the absence of any moderating material that would slow down neutrons. Therefore, the F-10 Tank was 

very thin and designed to allow neutrons to escape.

The loadout process began by preparing the F-10 Tank, containing 8 gallons of concentrated plutonium nitrate, for 

transfer to a product receiver can. To do this, the loadout operator verified the amount of plutonium nitrate in the tank 

raised the product receiver can to the proper height near the drain spigot on the F-10 Tank. A special absorbing material 

called diaper paper was placed around the Product receiver can to absorb any excess plutonium nitrate. Following this, 

the operator pushed the product receiver can underneath the F-10 spigot. The spigot on this tank was equipped with a 

quick opening ball valve. The spigot came straight out from the F-10 Tank an inch or so and then went straight down for 

about 6 inches. Next, the product receiver can was slowly raised up until the spigot was inside the product receiver can. 

At this point, the operator opened the ball valve and drained the contents of the F-10 Tank into the product receiver can. 

The full product receiver can was placed on a truck, which transported the product receiver can to the plutonium 

finishing plant for further processing of the plutonium nitrate.

Co n tin u o u s So lven t Ex t r a c tio n Processes: REDOX a n d PUREX

Continuous solvent extraction replaced the bismuth phosphate batch process for plutonium production at the Hanford 

Site in the 1950s (DOE 1997e, p. 175). A former Hanford chemical separations engineer, Charles A. Rohrmann, 

explained the switch from batch to continuous processing in a June 1956 Nucleonics article: "Economic considerations 

favor the continuous solvent extraction processes over batch processing. Batch processing, generally more costly in 

industry, is unusually high for the processes employed in Pu [plutonium] handling because of the costly raw materials 

used and the large volumes of waste for which costly storage facilities must be provided" (Rohrmann 1956, p. 66). Two 

forms of solvent extraction were used at the Hanford Site: reduction oxidation (known as REDOX) and plutoniumuranium extraction (known as PUREX). According to a DOE historical overview, the REDOX process was developed at 

the Hanford Site in the 3706 Building and tested in the 321 Building (DOE 1997e, p. 175). For information on the 3706 

and 321 buildings, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet.

The REDOX Plant (S Plant/202-S Building) was built in 1952 to house the REDOX process. The REDOX process was the 

only process used at that facility, and no other Hanford Site chemical separations plants used the REDOX process. The 

PUREX process was developed by Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (DOE 1997e, p. 175). The PUREX Plant (A Plant/

202-A Building) was built in 1955 to house the 

PUREX process. The PUREX process was the only 

process used at the A Plant, and no other Hanford 

Site chemical separations plants used the PUREX 

process.

One main difference between the solvent extraction 

and bismuth phosphate batch processes was that the 

former used a constant process stream flow. Instead 

of constituting a batch, irradiated fuel elements 

were dissolved and added to an on-going stream. 

Another significant difference between batch and 

continuous processing was that the latter was based

W li.it Is ,i Produc t Receiver Can*

I In* p m d iitl rti( eixei t .ms (l.m>v\n a* "PR were used

tor transporting < ouienliaied plutonium solution* iruni the

liulli Redui linn buildinys to tin* Plutonium I inMnnt* Plant.

I hex w viv made of siaiulc** steel and le-vnihlrd common

" gallon propane tanks. Ihe-o t litkalilx sale produc I

rec t'ixei cans vxvre transported inside a lame ixlindric al

mi'l.il shipping c onlamer. 5-loot diameter and 4 feel tail, .is a

hac kup in case o f an accident and to ensin e adequate

»eoinclii< spa< ins* foi t liliia litv saiefx.

2 - 4 .1 8
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

on a different kind o f chemistry. This 

chemistry, solvent extraction," used 

countercurrent flow to take advantage 

of the transfer capacity of two 

immiscible solutions. Immiscible refers 

to a condition in which two liquids do 

not mix but form separate layers. In the 

process, a solution with greater density 

flowed to the bottom of a vessel. To 

illustrate, consider that water has a 

greater density than oil and when 

combined, oil rests on the top of water.

! Countercurrent flow was a process of

sending the solution with the greatest

density (called the aqueous) through the top of a column, flowing downward, while a solution with less density (called 

the organic) was fed into the column from the bottom, flowing up. As these immiscible solutions passed by one another, 

selected isotopes were transferred from the aqueous to the organic. This was called extraction. If the selected isotopes 

were transferred from the organic to the aqueous, the process was called stripping (DOE 1994a, pp. 2-24-2-25). The 

logic of the chemistry formed the basis for continuous solvent extraction at the Hanford Site.

■'f/ie -rf/K'/if rx tr.n tio n p u n e-M's are /u - r i/ on Ih r h u t thnt h o t! 1u r.in iu ni

arid pluton ium t an h r p u l in \ a/eru e s/u/es m it h it h lh r \ urn -o /u b /rin

.ip p m p ri.ilr otnunit tolulion-.. u h ilr in other v.r/eru e sf,ife« th r\ Uio not

’i/n rc plu to n iu m /- n u n r e .w /i r c ilin r t l lh.ni ur.im tim , th r > o l\m l rx lr.u In in

p i in i'ssl", li.ivr flu- uhi/itv to recover plutonium and m.in/mn sepai alc/v.

li f t ,i»m ' Ih r tnLi.m ii ,uu l a r/ire m ;- /j/ijs c s < on h r iv ,u iih m ixed nnd

^rp .u .itrd , Ih r p m v w s lend llic n iic l\n > to .1 to n lin u o ti". n w lti—l<n{r

n p rr.iliu n in I h r evt/ac lio n io lu m n ■>. Rv sw t i —/ \ r oxidations. reductions

r x lr .u lio n - u n d h .u k r x lr . u lio n lu p h h p tiriu v d ur.uiium .m d pluton ium

pro du t /«• . n r nbt.iirU H l/ - l)OL" 1‘iV l.i, pp 4-‘» lo 4-10

WI1.1I I'* <1 Solx vnl txtr.K (ion ( oliimn?

A wii|xt«ni extrac limi column was .1 long pipe with enlarged bowl-, tailed disengaging fcei lions, at eac ii end. (lie

disengaging - in 1 inn- had inlets lor aqueous and organic solulions lo enlvi. Aqueous enleicd al upper points and oiganic ■

vnlvrvd al loxxer point*. Aqutniu- exited at the bottom disengaging -e< lion, and the uigamc exited thti'Ugh the lop of tlu- j

disengaging section. X tai I ridge, con-i-ling ol a pole with rial fH'i'tui.iled plalos spue ed along die pole, lil in-ido the

pipe. I he perforaled plate* had a hole in die < enler where thev vxeie plac ed 011I0 the |Hile. I he puiposv of a solvent

c-sti action column w a- to 1 realc. an emulsion wherein- tw o immisuhlc- solution- were to ned into <lose «o ntail with one

another. I lie goal of sin h a m illion vva- to inaxiiiii/e (he suii.u e aiea ni lontac I hrlvvcen (lie I wo solutions. M the !

Maniord ^ite. solvent extrai lion (oluinns vxere 01 two txpes: gravilv llow and pulsed, (.ravilx flow lolumns were used j

.it the R ID O X Plant, t ounteii uiienl flow in gravilv columns opeiated ex< lusivelv on the lendemv 101 solutions w i’h j

more densitv to flow down and solutions that aie le— dense to flow up. Pulse columns, on (he other hand, were iniliallx |

designed for the U Plan! though never useil lo pmdm e plutonium there. Ihev were used ini plulonmm prodm lion at !

the Pl-REX Plant. Thev operated on the same principle as giavilv flow lolumns except thev had .1 piston driven pump. !

I his pump, called .1 pulscr. caused the contents 01 die column (aqueous and organic -lieam s' to surge up arid down in I

strokes. Pulse columns provided more surface aiea for contact helween streams lhan gravilv llow columns. tti<(aiisc .

pulse columns < rcaled more suiface contact per volume ol liquid. I hev were suhstanliallv shoiler than gravilv llow ]

columns. This dil'feieiue in runction explains w in I In* ai< hitectural stun tine ol Ihe R F D O \ Plant does not resemble lli.il '

of (lie PURI X Plant. Ihe K! IJOX Plant operated w illi gravilv flow column*- that were housed in an tt-sioiv high hav silo j

located at r»ne enrl of the plunl. Figure 2-4.1" shows tin* high hav silo at the RCIX >X Plant. Itvcause 01 tin* sj|o, (he !

R! l)O X Plan! represents a hriel' s|clj,di delour in (.old W ar 1 hemir a I scp.11. rlion- cltuclural design al Ihe Hanford tile .

Ihe 1*11 lit X Plant did nol have a high hav silo. Its pulsed columns were roughlv die same height as the* original

Manhattan Piu|e< I pro« ess vessels and so minric Led the arc hr tec Icir.tl form ot the original chemical separations plants

I I and li/. Viom an aviial perspective, il could not ea-ilv he dislinguished from the T and li plants, which enhanced its i

set initv. I igurc J 4. Il> shows an aeiial view of the PL Rl X Plunl. i

2 - 4 .1 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

REDOX Process

The REDOX process produced plutonium nitrate and 

uranium. One way of contrasting the REDOX process with 

the bismuth phosphate batch process is through the notion of 

efficiency. Efficiency was defined from the standpoint of 

maximizing plutonium production. Among a host of other 

engineering criteria, efficiency related to the capacity for 

processing fuel elements, percentage of plutonium extracted 

from a given tonnage of irradiated uranium, and overall 

output of plutonium. W ith these criteria in mind, the REDOX 

process was more efficient than the bismuth phosphate batch 

process. The REDOX process also differed from the bismuth 

phosphate batch process in that it saved uranium as a 

byproduct (AEC 1951 a). From a production operation 

standpoint, the REDOX process had a distinct disadvantage 

because it used an undiluted solvent, hexone (methyl 

isobutylketone), that had a low flash point. The low flash 

point required substantial precautions to betaken against 

explosion (DOE 1998b, DOE 1993, DOE 1992c). Hexone 

also posed difficulties in attempts to reuse it in the REDOX 

process because of its solubility in water and instability with 

nitric acid (DOE 1991a, p. 4-1,0). Wastes from the REDOX 

process also greatly complicated the management of 

underground tanks because o f their intense radioactivity, 

noxious chemicals, and thermal heat (DOE 1997e, p. 180, 

DOE 1992c).

7 The three main steps o f the REDOX chemical separations

Figure 2-4.16. Aerial View o f the PUREX Plant process took place in these columns. These columns were

the crux of the REDOX process. Columns at REDOX range 

from 27 to 57 feet tail and in diameter from 3 to 16 inches. They are located at the silo in the west end of the facility.

Radio-chemistry at REDOX was based on the transfer of a salt from one immiscible solvent to another solvent. Uranium 

and plutonium dissolve readily in nitric acid. The resulting nitrate, salts are able to be manipulated chemically.

Therefore, uranium and plutonium nitrate were chosen for the REDOX process. For example, if hexone (an organic 

solvent) is added to a beaker of uranyl nitrate, some of the uranyl nitrate w ill transfer to the hexone. After adequate 

mixing, the amount o f uranyl nitrate w ill reach equilibrium in each phase. The addition of a third chemical, such as 

aluminum nitrate, sodium nitrate, or calcium nitrate w ill break the equilibrium and cause more uranyl nitrate to shift into 

the hexone. Reversing the process by adding an aqueous to the hexone w ill cause the equilibrium to shift again, 

resulting in more uranyl nitrate exiting the hexone and entering the aqueous phase. The REDOX process; is based on 

successive alternations of these processes. The specific chemistry that allows this to happen is based on a process called 

"salting out." In the REDOX process, hexone is salted w ith aluminum nitrate nonahydrate to allow extraction of 

plutonium into the hexone. After the plutonium is extracted into the hexone, it is then sent to another column and 

stripped into the aqueous stream because no salt (aluminum nitrate nonahydrate) is present in the aqueous. In the 

REDOX process, columns 1C, 2E, 2B, etc. are stripping columns and columns 1 A, 15, 2D, 2A, etc. are known as 

extraction columns.

After irradiated fuel elements had been turned into liquid feed, the REDOX process had four main steps: 1) precycle,

2) partition, 3) uranium cycles, and 4) plutonium cycles.

Figure 2-4.15. High Bay Silo at the REDOX Plant, 7 98 7

2 - 4 .2 0
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

The precycle cycle partitioned the feed into three separate streams. These three streams were the plutonium, uranium, 

and fission products streams. The extraction cycle began when the feed solution, as an aqueous stream, was introduced 

into the 1A and 1S columns. Aluminum nitrate was added to this aqueous stream to alter the valence of the uranium and 

plutonium to a plus six. As the hexone flowed upward through the aqueous stream, it extracted the uranium and 

plutonium. The plutonium and uranium continued through the process. The aqueous stream, traveling down through 

the column, retained the remaining fission products. The fission products in this aqueous stream were then transferred to 

the D -l 3 Waste Receiver waste tank and thus eliminated from the process. The plutonium and uranium product from 

columns 1A and IS formed the feed line for column 2E. In column 2E, the plutonium and uranium were stripped into an 

aqueous phase and transferred to the F-2 Concentration Tank for further concentration. The hexone, traveling up through 

column 2E and carrying fission products, was sent to column 10. Hexone was recovered in column 10, sent to the G-3 

Hexone Still for further processing, and fission products were sent to the D -l 3 Waste Receiver Tank. This completed the 

precycle cycle.

The partition cycle began when plutonium and uranium were transferred from the F-2 Concentration Tank to the F-1 

Feed Tank, entered the 2D column, and were extracted into an up flowing hexone stream. The plutonium/uranium in the 

organic (hexone) solution was then sent to the IB column. In this column, the plutonium and uranium were separated 

from one another. To accomplish this, the plutonium was stripped downward into an oncoming aqueous solution, and 

the uranium continued up the column with the hexone. The 1B column was unique because fission products remained 

during this phase, split equally between the uranium and plutonium streams. Plutonium was stripped into the aqueous 

phase by altering its chemistry from plus-six yalence down to plus-three valence. In the plus-three valence, plutonium 

was no longer dissolved in hexone. Changing plutonium's valence to plus three was accomplished by adding ferrous 

sulfamate. The uranium was unaffected by the addition of ferrous sulfamate.

The uranium, still irt the organic (hexone) solution, was then extracted into an oncoming aqueous stream in the IC 

column. "The aqueous stream was then stripped of the dissolved hexone, concentrated, and simultaneously adjusted to 

the required pH in the effluent concentrator" (DOE 1994a, p. 3-13). The uranium, then in an aqueous phase, was 

transferred to the F-5 Concentration Tank and finally transferred to the F-4 Feed Tank. The plutonium, then in an 

aqueous phase, was transferred to the E-6 Rework Receiver and finally transferred to the E-5 Oxidizer Feed Tank.

The uranium cycles began with the transfer of the uranium aqueous phase into column 3D. The uranium was then 

extracted into hexone and sent to column 3E where it was stripped and sent to the E-10 Concentration Tank. From the 

E-10 Concentration Tank, uranium was prepared for transfer to the 224-U Building for concentration. Fission products 

and plutonium in the salt waste flowing from the bottom of the column were not typically sent to waste tanks at the 

Hanford Site. Rather, they were sent to the F-2 Concentration Tank in preparation for the 2D column. This completed 

the uranium cycle.

The plutonium cycles decontaminated the plutonium by removing the fission products still remaining in the plutonium. 

To do this, sodium dichromate and nitric acid were added to change the valence o f the plutonium into a plus four or six. 

This aqueous solution was then sent from the E-5 Tank to the 2A column where the plutonium was extracted into the 

upward moving organic flow. Plutonium was stripped back into the aqueous stream in the 2B column. The plutonium 

was then loaded out at the Plutonium Concentration Facility or at the 3B column and transferred to the plutonium 

finishing plant. Fission products were sent to waste tanks, and hexone was sent for recovery and reuse.

The function of the Plutonium Concentration Facility was to concentrate plutonium nitrate. Although the operational life 

of this facility was shortened due to an accident that occurred after the installation of an anion exchange column, the 

original equipment concentrated plutonium nitrate from the REDOX Plant by boiling off unwanted solvents and water.

A process called solvent recovery functioned to reuse hexone at the REDOX Plant. The main steps involved 

decontaminating the hexone by removing plutonium, uranium, and fission products. The hexone was then tested for 

purity, combined with fresh hexone, and added to on-going processes at the REDOX Plant.

2 -4 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

PUREX Process

The PUREX process was similar to the REDOX process. To avoid repetition, the PUREX process is presented in a 

simplified form. The primary process steps both used solvent extraction and operated with continuous countercurrent 

flow to isolate radioisotopes. The differences were the PUREX process used pulsed solvent extraction columns and a 

different solvent, tri-butyl phosphate.

The solvent extraction process at the PUREX Plant produced weapons-grade plutonium, fuel-grade plutonium, depleted 

uranium, slightly enriched uranium, neptunium, and thorium (DOE 1994a, p. 3-1). Six steps produced these products:

1) co-decontamination cycle, 2) partition cycle, 3) uranium cycle, 4) plutonium cycle, 5) neptunium cycle, 6) N cell 

cycle. Figure 2-4.17 is a flow chart of the PUREX process.

PUREX PROCESS FLOW

The co-decontamination cycle 

was the beginning of the 

solvent extraction process at 

the PUREX Plant. In this cycle, 

99 percent of the fission 

products remained in the 

aqueous stream while 

plutonium, uranium, and 

neptunium were extracted into 

an oncoming organic stream. 

The feed tank for this first step 

was TK-H1. The extraction 

took place in the HA Column. 

At this point, the organic stream 

was laden with plutonium, 

uranium, and neptunium as it 

flowed upward and out of the 

column as feed for the partition 

cycle.

Plutonium was removed from 

the uranium and neptunium in 

the partition cycle. This cycle 

took place in the 1BX Column. 

Plutonium was stripped from

the organic stream in this step. Plutonium then entered the aqueous stream transferred to a feed tank (TK-J5). Uranium 

and neptunium overflowed the 1 BX Column with the organic stream and entered the bottom of the 1C Column where 

they were stripped from the organic into the aqueous stream.

In the uranium cycle, the uranium product was decontaminated by removing fission products through solvent extraction. 

Uranium entered as an aqueous stream into Column 2D, was extracted into an organic stream, and entered Column 2E 

where it was stripped into the aqueous stream again. The uranium was then concentrated in tank E-K4-1 and stored in 

tank TK-K5 for shipment by tanker truck to the Uranium Trioxide Plant.

The second and third plutonium cycles further separated plutonium from the uranium and fission products. Plutonium 

entered the 2A Column as an aqueous stream, was extracted into an oncoming organic stream, and overflowed into the 

2B Column. Plutonium was then stripped from the organic phase back into an aqueous stream that flowed into tank TKL3. The third plutonium cycle further decontaminated the plutonium through solvent extraction. The plutonium product 

ended up in tank TK-L8.

• r

u

Figure 2-4.17. Flow Chart o f the PUREX Process

2 - 4 .2 2
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

The neptunium cycle used a back-cycle waste stream as feed. The repeated extraction/stripping steps were used to 

remove neptunium. When the neptunium levels reached a desired concentration, an ion exchange column was used to 

isolate this target isotope.

N Cell was the plutonium product loadout area for the PUREX Plant.

Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s P r o c e s s e s M o d if ie d f o r

Re c o v e r y Mi s s i o n s

Several challenges for chemical separations emerged at the Hanford Site as the United States entered the nuclear arms 

race with the Soviet Union. One response to a perception of increasing tension in the nuclear arms race resulted in 

on-going discussions between the Atomic Energy Commission and Hanford Site officials concerning the efficient use of 

chemical separations resources. O f the many topics discussed, the idea of using existing facilities to tackle new missions 

was underscored. As a result, officials at the Atomic Energy Commission and the Hanford Site made three major 

modifications to the chemical separations plants during the Cold War. Their first modification altered the U Plant to 

enable it to reprocess uranium that was previously stored in underground waste tanks. A second modification allowed 

the Uranium Trioxide Plant to convert uranyl nitrate hexahydrate to a dry form of uranium trioxide for shipment off-site.

In the third case, the B Plant was modified to reprocess and encapsulate fission products from underground waste tanks 

and the waste streams of the PUREX Plant.

So lven t Ex tr a c tio n fo r Ur a n iu m Rec o ver y: A Gold M in e in th e Ta n k s

During the Manhattan Project, uranium ore from ... ...... ...... .......

the Belgian Congo was used to manufacture fuel...................................

elements at the Hanford Site. After the plutonium ,, ,„M l w „, kni..h, , |

had been extracted from the irradiated fuel in the 

original bismuth phosphate chemical separations

plants, the uranium was sent to underground waste tanks. This original process did not anticipate or envision a need to 

use uranium at a later date. With the Cold War, the demand for uranium increased in the 1950s. Uranium supplies 

became viewed as an important strategic security issue by military leaders and high-ranking politicians in the United 

States. As a result, an original bismuth phosphate chemical separations plant that had been held in reserve as a backup,

U Plant, was modified in 1952 to recover uranium from huge underground waste tanks (AEC 1951 b).

To modify the U Plant, however, precluded using the REDOX solvent extraction process that made its debut the same 

year in 1952. Because the REDOX process used gravity flow, columns were housed in a silo eight stories high.

According to Roger Hultgren, a former Hanford Site manager of operations in chemical separations, it was out of the 

question to use gravity feed columns based on the REDOX process for the uranium recovery mission at U Plant because 

there was no robm for nearly 60 foot columns in the existing structure. "They [REDOX Plant columns] were so tall that 

none of them would have fit into the old canyon facilities" (Hultgren 1999a).

Instead of using gravity flow columns that would have required construction of a new structure, the solvent extraction 

process for uranium recovery employed pulsed,columns at U Plant. In their Industrial and Engineering Chemistry article, 

"Scale-Up Problems in the Plutonium Separations Program," O. F. H ill and V. R. Cooper consider the application of the 

pulsed column a noteworthy event at the U Plant. "A significant development o f this program was the pulse column as a 

solvent extraction contractor" (Hill and Cooper 1958, p. 602). The significance H ill and Cooper assigned to the 

implementation of the pulse column was primarily defined in terms of increased efficiency.

Pulsed columns were designed to fit into existing process cells at the U Plant. The process cells were 20 feet deep. The 

reason operators and engineers were able to fit vertical pulsed columns into existing cells designed for tank like vessels is 

explained by their function. The function of a pulsed column is defined in the Hanford Site General Radio-Chemical

2 - 4 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il t iie s

Training Manual: "Some columns are equipped with reciprocating pumps that move the solutions up-and-down as they 

migrate through the column. This up-and-down motion is called 'pulsing' and the pumps are called 'pulsers'" (RHO 

1979a, p. 12-17). The pulsing action allowed for shorter columns and eliminated the need for the high silo that 

characterized the architectural form of the REDOX Plant. "If you use pulse columns for solvent extraction process you 

no longer need 60 foot high columns, they can be 15 feet high" (Hultgren 1999a).

Feed for the uranium recovery process at the U Plant came from underground waste tanks. This feed consisted of 

"uranium bearing effluents" (DOE 1994a, p. 3-8) that were sluice mined from the bottom of the waste tanks. Sluicing 

refers to spraying water to change a solid into a slurry. For further information on the composition of materials inside the 

waste tanks, see the Waste Management Section.

Before the actual sluicing operation could commence, a pre-set amount of water was sent to an accumulating tank. 

Operators used a strain gauge to determine when the accumulating tank had the right amount of water. This step 

prepared the tank to hold the sluiced uranium. Next, water from the accumulator tank was pumped to the sluice nozzle 

in the waste tank. As the uranium was sluiced and became a slurry, it was continuously sent to the accumulator tank. In 

the accumulator tank, the uranium settled out and the water recirculated back through the sluicing nozzle.

The preparation of feed for the uranium recovery process at the U Plant was described by two longtime veterans of 

chemical separations at the Hanford Site, Roger Hultgren (1999a) and Russ Knight (1999a).

Russ Knight:

Roger Hultgren:

Russ Knight:

" The feed for U Plant was prepared by sluicing the uranium that was left in the tank farms. Most o f

the uranium was collected in the first tank in a cascade o f three. I do recall that there was from 7

to 9 feet o f uranium in [tank] 101 T. I think that was sort o f a typical situation. The T farm tanks

consisted o f three tank cascades, this is similar to other Hanford tank farms. Twelve tanks were in

the farm and each one is about 75 feet in diameter."

"The liner o f the tank was 16 feet high. The cascade was a gravity feed. You would fill the first

tank up to that 16 foot level and it would overflow into the next tank and so forth. In most cases

there was m inimal amount o f carry over o f uranium. The thing that was very significant here

concerned how to actually extract it for uranium recovery. A number o f methods were proposed,

but sluicing eventually won out. The sluicing operation consisted o f first pumping the liquid on

top o f the uranium to another tank. The sluicing itself was done with a high pressure gun."

"The sluicing operations consisted o f three pits being put on the tanks. The first was called a sluice

pit, the other was called a pum p pit, and the third was a pump out. Sluicing operation consisted o f

a sluice nozzle, which was a high pressure nozzle. It was an actuating eccentric cam at the top

and we could set a given position that w e wanted to sluice in the tank. The nozzle was adjustable

and we could direct it at one quarter o f the tank, the eccentric cam at the top would oscillate the

nozzle back and forth."

W h.il K «i Sh.iin (i.um of

A «1i<iin ,.».iuy,v was an rlr< Ir ii al < n il iiiu u iilv d hcn ivilh an 

■K cuim ilalnr lank. V Ihi* to il w .i- io m p ir w d , .1 siqn.il was 

rran»nt(M<'(l lf> a rrc ord er tl 7.1l ir .id m il in ln l.il pounds. I m 

example, 1.IMM) “ .llhm s o f w a le i at ». » ll»v;i.il = «>. I Ul !!»•>.

The water-uranium slurry flowed to a slurry pump and 

was continuously pumped back to the accumulator, 

tank. Because sluicing is a continuous process, the 

slurry pump functioned to keep the surface of the 

uranium free from liquid. This made the highpressure sluicing operation much more efficient at 

removing uranium.

The sluicing process continued to a specified strain 

gauge reading. For example, the accumulator tank 

may begin with a reading of 8,330 pounds water and be finished when the strain gauge read 10,330 pounds. This 

example reading would indicate 2,000 pounds uranium in the accumulator tank.

2 - 4 .2 4
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

After sluicing was completed, acid was added to change the slurry into a feed solution. Nitric acid was added while the 

contents were circulated through a photo-electric chamber. As the slurry dissolved, the solution clarified.

Roger Hultgren: " Once the solution was collected in the tank farms it was pumped into U Plant into a large receiver

tank. These tanks actually received the sluiced uranium, it was the feed for this uranium recovery

process through solvent extraction."

The uranium recovery process at the U Plant began by centrifuging the uranium slurry to remove solids. The next step 

was to send this uranium slurry to a set of columns. Roger Hultgren described this process. "Solvent extraction with a 

pulse column takes place through countercurrent flow. The uranium is brought in from the top of the column. This is 

called the aqueous stream. The pulser would pulse the organic as [tri-butyl phosphate] from the bottom of the column 

and that was used as the extractant" (Hultgren 1999a). A general overview of the technical specifics of the uranium 

recovery process highlights these steps. "The decontamination column used TBP [tri-butyl phosphate] to selectively 

extract uranium from the plutonium, fission products, and other ions in the aqueous phase. An aqueous scrub stream of 

nitric add was introduced at the top of the column to scrub residual traces of the fission products and plutonium from 

the uranium containing TBP stream... The plutonium and fission products were retained by the aqueous effluent while 

the uranium was left in the TBP stream" (DOE 1994a, p. 3-8).

Roger Hultgren was present at the startup of U Plant's recovery mission for uranium. "Startup at U Plant was a headache 

for everybody because we were the first ones to get deeply involved with solvent extraction... The U Plant startup had a 

shakedown period, we took our lumps" (Hultgren 1999b).

One o f these "lumps" concerned a problem that caused uneven mixing of the aqueous and organic streams. Hultgren 

(1999a) recalls,

"We had the columns on the deck o f U Plant before we had the process going. We walked out on the deck

because it was a cold run. The columns they had built did not work properly. We set up a dummy run and they

put thermometers on the columns with duct tape. The thermometers would tell you if you were getting hot

spots. They wanted it evenly spread out and constant pulsing. You could change the stroke over here on the

pulser from ten strokes to thirty strokes a minute. It looked just like a horses tail until we got good extraction.

That was for uranium."

Hultgren sums up his work experiences with the uranium recovery process by noting, "basically it recovered the material 

and we ended up with a process that met all expectations" (Hultgren 1999b).

Ur a n y l Nit r a t e He x a h y d r a te Co n v e r s io n a t th e Ur a n iu m Tr io x id e Pla n t

During the Cold War, chemical separations both salvaged uranium from waste tanks and produced it as a byproduct from 

. the plutonium production operations. Uranium typically arrived at the Uranium Trioxide Plant as uranyl nitrate 

hexahydrate. Concentration and calcination processes were used at the Uranium Trioxide Plant to convert uranyl nitrate 

hexahydrate to uranium trioxide powder because uranium trioxide powder could be used for armor for tanks, base 

material for military projectiles, and fuel for nuclear submarine and other reactors in the nation's plutonium production 

complex. The uranium trioxide powder was stored in shipping casks at the Hanford Site until it was shipped off-site for 

various defense purposes.

Three steps in the uranium trioxide process were:

• Concentrate the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate by boiling off excess liquid from the solution. The goal was to 

increase the uranium concentration from 4 Ibs./gal to 10 Ibs./gal.

• Calcine the concentrated uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. This was accomplished by submitting the uranyl nitrate 

hexahydrate to 800 F degree heat. At this point, uranyl nitrate hexahydrate spontaneously oxidizes into uranium 

trioxide powder.

• Load milled uranium trioxide powder through hoppers into shipping containers.

2 - 4 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n FA cnm E s

Fis s io n Pro ducts Pr o c essin g : Ce s iu m a n d St r o n t iu m En c a p s u la tio n a t B Pla n t

According to the B Plant Operations Training Manual the purpose of fission products processing was "to isolate the 

longer-lived fission products by fractionalization for storage in a safer form, and to return the short-lived fractions to 

underground storage and ultimate solidification" (RHO 1979b, p. 1-1). To accomplish these goals, facilities at the 

B Plant were modified to remove two isotopes (strontium-90 and cesium-137). Figure 2-4.7 shows the B Plant during 

modification.

Three main steps for isolating 

strohtium-90 and cesium-137 from 

other fission products were:

1) receive feed and partition,

2) purify strontium-90, and 3) purify 

cesium-137.

Nuclear waste was feed for the 

fission products processing. The 

fission products processing 

operations at B Plant received feed 

from underground storage tanks and 

from the PUREX Plant. The feed 

arrived as liquid, w ith some 

suspended semi-solids of 

strontium-90. A centrifuge was 

used to remove strontium-90 from 

the cesium-137 and the remainder 

of the liquid. Suspended 

strontium-90 stuck to the side of the 

bowl as cake product. The

supernate, which still contained strontium-90 and cesium-137, became feed for a precipitation process. In this 

precipitation process, phosphotungstic acid was added to the supernate. Approximately 98 percent of the cesium-137 

precipitates or turns to a semi-solid. In turn, this solution was jet transferred to a spinning centrifuge. The supernate 

from this step contained the remaining strontium-90. The cake was cesium-137.

Purification of strontium-90 took place through solvent extraction. Strontium-90 feed for this process was the supernate 

from the above partitioning step. Four pulsed columns, 1 A, 1S, 1 B, 1C, alternately extracted and stripped strontium-90 

from the remainder of fission products in the feed solution. The feed entered the 1A Column as an aqueous stream and 

the strontium-90 was extracted into an organic stream consisting of di (2-ethylhexl) phosphoric acid with a tri-butyl 

phosphate modifier and normal paraffin hydrocarbon diluent (RHO 1979b, p. 6-4). The aqueous stream continued 

down the pulsed column with some cesium-137 and other fission products and was sent to underground waste tanks. 

Strontium-90 was stripped into an aqueous stream in the 1B Column. The strontium-90 was then removed from the 

aqueous and made ready for isolation and eventual encapsulation.

After cesium-137 cake was removed from the centrifuge, purification of cesium-137 began in a 2,000 gallon ion 

exchange column (RHO 1979b, 6-4). Cesium-137 and some sodium were loaded into the resin bed in the column.

Next, a dilute ammonium carbonate solution was passed through the resin bed to scrub out the sodium. In the eluting 

step, concentrated ammonium carbonate was passed through the resin bed. Eluting carries the cesium-137 with the 

solution. The cesium-137 and strontium-90 were then transferred to the 225-B Waste Encapsulation Storage Facility. In 

the 225-B facility, operators converted cesium-137 and strontium-90 to a solid, encapsulated the radioisotopes, and 

placed them into storage. For information on the 225-B Facility, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in 

Appendix B on the Internet.

W li.il l« .in An ion Ext Iw ngc C olum n?

"1n anion e \th a n u e i nlum n wa- «i p ip e /■,« /.<•*/ u Hit ncu,)1i\ i'l\ d ia iiic d

.ih-anhuia /ew'n-. Ari ion e \i lu /n ji1< nlum n wnr/.-, on the -ame p u iu /pie- hu l /-

pile keel it ilh /><w f/\ c li t h .i/iic d ah+orhiny resins A nioti e\< hanpe i olunuis

wen- s/fn/f.ir in turn lio n In < im inion hom e w.i/er -(j/friu 'f-. h p u a l hom e ii.ife/

-oi/enei - iciiiui c m in c t.il»like i a k iu m and irnn Iro in water. In the i a-e n f

anion e\thani>e r nlum n*, the\ h u ll) absorbed and tclc.isvd -e/cU rrf

i.uU nt'.iiiopc*. This ii,i- ,ir i um ph-hed w ith the re-m In pawns; ih c n iii.il

solutions through the lo ltn n n . InA w e u /w n i,1!1i olunuis n p v i.itc il in th ic c

stapes. In the tirst 'tape. /u,i(//ni£{. the teed stic.un p n ^ c d thnm uh the re-in

hed .1nd -Wee le d r.idioi-u/t/pe- were tr.m *w n c d in to I h r rt'sin Sec nnd. dntinp

.1 p h .i-c (.tile d s iru h h in p .1 < h e n m .il -n/ufinn via- p.i—erf through the e olum n

to ic n u n r unw anted i.ulitdsn lop e- tm m the ic d n . In the elution phase. <1 

chcm U .il solution w.i- passed th io u tih ihe icsin icm o vim i the target

r.id io i'o to p c ,m d earn in;; it .dotn* in the solution, \n iu n e\< h.mne < olum nt\p ii.d h rc i/in tc d re c o il" ilio ttih .d tiL .iln ic n t- h i rc'-lurt' the .th-.otplioti

i«ip.ici/t o l tesins ' - ( .trlinvH

2 - 4 .2 6
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a tio n s

Te c h n o l o g ic a l Ch a l l e n g e s

Chemical separations posed a number of challenges for Hanford Site management, engineers, and operators. One of 

these challenges, the pressure to continually maximize the efficiency of production, is reflected quantitatively in the 

output figures. Figure 1.7 in Chapter 1 shows the plutonium produced from 1947-1987. However, the qualitative 

aspects of the pressure to produce are less tangible. Qualitative aspects refer to social experiences in the past that were 

not often recorded. The three areas of technological challenge discussed below were chosen because they reflect both 

quantitative and qualitative aspects of responses to the pressure to produce plutonium during the Manhattan Project and 

the Cold War.

Ra d ia t io n Ex po su r e to Wo r kers o n Ca n y o n Decks

The canyon deck was where workers received the most exposure 

in the original bismuth phosphate plants (T and B plants).

Figure 2-4.7 shows the canyon deck. Samplers were required to 

be on the canyon deck to take samples of process solutions from 

risers on the canyon deck. Over-exposure while taking these 

samples was a job hazard for the samplers.

This exposure was eliminated in the REDOX and PUREX plants 

because they had remote sampling stations. This meant that 

samplers no longer had to go onto the canyon deck to take 

samples. Because workers were not anticipated on the decks of 

the REDOX and PUREX plants during normal operations, the 

canyon decks were not shielded from and so generated high 

electromagnetic and alpha radiation levels. As a result, the 

canyon decks of both facilities were much more radioactive than 

those of T and B plants.

Russ Knight (a chemical separations technician, 1945-1989) (Knight 1999), Joe Soldat (a health physicist, 1948-1994) 

(Soldat 1999), and Roger Hultgren (chemical separations technician 1944-1989) (Hultgren 1999b) discussed the 

differences between taking process samples from the canyon deck and from remote stations.

Russ Knight: "The process that was going on in the canyon was a remote process. It was controlled in the

facility as to what the intent was to be in that facility. But in order to understand [what] they really

had going on they had to take samples, and those samples were brought into the laboratory. We

did radioanalysis on the materials to assure them that they were getting the product that they were

looking for at that time, which was plutonium, in the specific phase that they wanted it, in the

process.

The 222 B and T Laboratories were direct support facilities for the B Plant and T Plant chemical

processing, which was bismuth phosphate batch processing... The reason I mention ihe

importance o f batch processing is that in order to know what position the materials were in the

plant, they would sample [see Figure 2-4.18] and bring those samples to the laboratory. The

laboratory would provide the analysis back to operations so that they knew exactly where they

were and if they needed to do anything additional [which] was required at a given point. That is

basically what the process control laboratory emphasizes. As the process continues, it needs to be

monitored, and the laboratory provided the monitoring services based on the samples that were

brought to us.

Figure 2-4.18. Worker Taking a Sample o f

Radioactive Solutions

2 - 4 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

A true evaluation with what was going on in the process would indicate that 1) we knew what

product we had and where it was in the process, and 2) what was going o ff in the waste streams to

ensure that we were not putting any product out that we were in so dire need of.

The T, B, and U buildings all required sampling to take place on deck. Samplers had to enter the

canyon building and that was w hy these controls were placed on the doors. The dispatcher's job

was to ensure that safety procedures were followed for entry into the canyon."

Joe Soldat: In "1949 at T Plant, I took a reading and turned around and left. They were taking samples out

and putting them on diaper paper on the deck. They said, "we want to go in there and do contact

maintenance." They had this labyrinth you went into and you call the operator, he unlocked the

door."

Brian Freer: " This is on the canyon deck at T Plant?"

Joe Soldat: "Yes. And I stuck the meter around the corner, it went o ff scale, I turned around and left. I said,

'forget it/"

Russ Knight: "To enter the canyon, samplers had to put on a breathing mask, it was called an assault mask then.

It had a canister on it to absorb vapors and particulates. Usually the samplers brought their own

masks over from 221, because they would suit up in the 271 and then go to the 222 building.

They would go in, go to the specific cell, and engage the samplers into the sample port. In the

sampling team there was a health physics person who monitored for dose rate o f the samplers,

both for entry and for unusual conditions. If they encountered an unusual condition they would

exit the canyon and alert the dispatcher that there was something unusual and this would be

corrected before they would proceed. Under normal

circumstances they would proceed to the position of

requested sample.

The sample ports are installed between cells on the canyon

deck. In between the cell blocks there is a sampler for each

cell. It is recessed into the concrete and has a cover shield

over it. It has a small pipe coming up with a cap. They had

tools for removing the cover plate, they had tools for removing

the cap from the cover plate, also had tools for operating the

valves. Before they would actually take the sample they

would turn the sampler on, and circulate out o f the tank up

into this small sampler cup and that was a free flow for

10 minutes to ensure they got an ambient mixture for the

sample.

Exposures to personnel were a concern in the canyons and as

we improved our ability for processing, getting away from

bismuth phosphate batch into continuous extraction

processing. Two new plants came on line, first REDOX. The

design o f the plant was unique because we reduced the

exposure to personnel by not having them go directly onto the

canyon deck to take samples. Instead, sampling took place in

sample galleries. The sample gallery was a much better Figure 2-4.19. Trombone

approach to sampling because o f adequate shielding and Sampler Used with the Doorstop

because o f the type o f sampling that we did. Instead o f the Sample Carrier in T and B Plants

2 - 4 .2 8

\

.1
Se c t io n 4 - C h em ical Se p a r a t io n s

trombone sampler [see Figure 2-4.19] and

doorstop sample carrier [see Figure .2-4.20],

we used a C ilm ont sampler. A Gilmont

sampler gave us a direct aliquot o f sample.

This eliminated double handling. We had

the dilution made up, we would send the

dilution flask with the sampler and they

would put the aliquot directly into the

sample vile and it was diluted at a safer level

to work at.

REDOX was unique because, it had a north

and a south sample gallery. The north

sample gallery was the one that was

prim arily used on the plutonium extraction

side and the south sample gallery was used

for the uranium operation. The sampling

gallery was designed similar to the operating

gallery except that it was designed for

sampling only. You had sample boxes made

up and shielded at stations. Sample ports

and sample identifications indicated the process.

- " ' 4

; \ ,<A~

3*

Figure 2-4.20. Doorstop Sample Carrier Used in

T and B Plants

Roger Hultgren:

This was safer for two reasons. One, the volume o f samples was small and dilute. The radiation

levels were much reduced. The sample carriers were smaller and not as heavy to carry. This was a

major improvement over the bismuth phosphate process. Many times today they talkALARA, as 

low as reasonably achievable. We were ALARA conscious in the early days as well."

" Thinking back to what we learned over the years. One o f these things relates to the exposures

that people were receiving doing the sampling at T and B Plants. About 1954 I left the B and T

Plants and went into scope and design for PUREX. A t that time, we discussed the merits of, from a

design standpoint, how do you get away from exposure?

What actually occurred was this sample gallery. It was parallel to the canyon itself. The samplers

could actually walk, they would have to wear clothing forgoing into the canyon but all the

samplers were in this particular sample gallery. The samplers could actually take a samp/e in a

hood, remotely. We did not use doorstops there, except on rare occasions. It was all pipettes

through small aliquot samples. So the exposure to samplers was reduced in PUREX."

REDOX R uthenium P ro b lem

The REDOX Plant commenced plutonium production operations in 1952 (ABC 1951b). Right after operations began, 

process problems developed with the solvent, hexone, and its inability to remove an isotope of the element ruthenium.

George Backman (personnel protection supervisor for chemical separations at the Hanford Site, 1948-1988) (Backman 

1999), John Jech (health physicist at the Hanford Site, 1950-1988) (Jech 1999), and Joe Soldat (a health physicist, 1948- 

1994) (Soldat 1999) discussed the REDOX Plant during the time when this problem occurred. They described their 

experiences.

2 - 4 .2 9
Ch a r t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

George Backman:

John Jech:

Joe Soldat:

George Backman:

Joe Soldat:

George Backman: 

Joe Soldat:

BrianFreer:

Joe Soldat:

George Backman:

Joe Soldat:

George Backman:

Joe Soldat:

John Jech:

George Backman:

" One o f the major problems they had occurred right after operations began. The solvent extraction

material was hexone. It did a pretty good jo b except it didn't take out the ruthenium as well as

they wanted. So they had a special cell that was used after they dissolved the fuel, they sent the

solution there and oxidized with potassium permanganate in there and it volatized the ruthenium

into R U 04 [ruthenium- tetraoxide], which is a gas. Then they ran it through a scrubber and then

they routed that line directly out to the stack. They ended up with failures in this caustic scrubber

system."

"That was a J-l system."

"Yes, the caustic scrubber failed"

"Consequently once that failed the ruthenium tetraoxide was free to go out the stack, which it

did."

"It was one o f those things that seemed to always happen on a holiday. It was New Years 1954."

"That was one o f the bad times, 400 curies."

" We had guys trying to pick up specks all over the project. There ended up being one big release

and two smaller ones, about what you said George. The first release was either 300 or 360 but

there was another 400. When the ruthenium was going up an aluminum nitrate would go out

when they dissolved the cans o ff the fuel elements. Ruthenium was occluded, which means inside

o f aluminum nitrate flakes."

"For those who weren't there, what did these flakes look like?"

"They looked like snow."

"There were some big ones and some tiny ones. A lot o f them you couldn't even see. But the size

had nothing to do with the amount o f radiation. Sometimes, the ones you couldn't see would be

hotter than the ones you could see, one couldn 't tell by just looking."

"W hat they did to help solve the problem o f this continuing slough o ff from inside the stack, they

got a crane and installed a wash ring at the top o f the stack - a big round pipe with holes in the

bottom and nozzles. They hoisted it over the top o f the stack and sprayed it down inside so that it

would wash the lining out and into the p it sump and then it was pumped into a tank somewhere."

"They had to use an extra crane with an extension to prop up the first one because the stack was

too high to install the washer. The second one had to lift up the extension until the angle didn't

have so much strain. They pretty much solved that problem in that manner. They ran that stream

through the sand filter. We could find, from taking measurements from this filter, ruthenium from

this stream.

The stuff that hit the top o f the stack as R U 04 {ruthenium-tetraoxide] changed to RU 02

[ruthenium-dioxide] and it was so small that it almost went like the wind. It made these big long

streaks."

"W e found it on the roof o f the 100 D building."

"A ll the way to Spokane."

"I remember one big streak went right across to 100 B."

2 - 4 .3 0
Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

Joe Soldat: "/ have got a map that shows the path."

George Backman: " That is why they had this big cleanup area around B Plant and T Plant, mainly B Plant, because o f

this"

"July 4th weekend all the monitors were out there picking up particles at the PUREX construction

site because the contractor had a no radiation zone contract and here is all this screaming hot

stuff."

" What were the occupational health and safety concerns with this problem."

" They posted all o f the 200 Areas and some o f the roads. [The signs said] "stay on the road, don't

go in the field." The roads were washed o ff or blown o ff or the w ind took them off, but the field."

"The Fire Department also helped here."

George Backman: "And it washed o ff pretty good."

Joe Soldat: "/ monitored people from transportation that put up the signs, they would go into the fields to put

up these signs."

Brian Freer: "Were these called speck hunts?"

John Jech: "Even before this there were many speck hunts."

George Backman: "This was a special one."

joe Soldat: "W e learned from the old ones."

Cr a n e Ma in te n a n c e

Many operations and radiation protection personnel 

who worked at the REDOX Plant during the early to 

mid 1950s recall it as an intense time. The REDOX 

Plant was in its heyday as a plutonium production 

workhorse. The pressure to maintain plutonium 

production at the REDOX Plant is illustrated by challenges that arose when it came to servicing and repairing the bridge 

crane. George Backman (personnel protection supervisor for chemical separations at the Hanford Site, 1948-1988) 

(Backman 1999) described the problem.

George Backman: The crane maintenance problem was "related to the ruthenium problem. ...when they opened up

H Cell, ruthenium gas would come out, particles and all. [This was] very hot and it would

contaminate the crane badly. The inside [crane cab control area] was still all right. [Management]

decided one time that they were going to clean up that crane. We used to have electricians lined

up from all over the plant to go in and work for a few minutes fixing any crane problems that we

had.

It was the contamination on the outside o f the crane. One day they decided that they wanted to

steam clean the crane. They decided, "By golly, we are going to clean this crane up." They got up

there and burned all the motors out. So they had to take all the motors off. Then they took them

all down into the pipe gallery to re-wind them. And there was all kinds o f pressure, at that time,

from the m ilitary to get the plutonium out. This was 1954. That was a real mean and w ild time."

After this incident, the crane was routinely decontaminated by spraying it with a non-electrolyte organic solution.

i iniltln o t m u w d h o iil the f nine. I h r <iane lo.nl*

fm in the tailm ad . 'Ih e ie /\ a ra ilro a d and the\ /i.n e lc lift out

iJu* fuel and p u l it in to cr* \\ ithouf t/n c r.mv i <>u .» e

dead. ;iM i.in / do aio-lhinn. ' - (ii*oi»o li.it km.in,

personnel p m tvitiim supcrx isur for th cm it.il «.vp.ir.iliuii> .it the

Hanford Sih\ |<t4iS-l<if;st

Joe Soldat:

Brian Freer: 

Joe Soldat:

John jech:

2 -4 .3 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

Chemical separations posed a number of challenges for Hanford Site management, engineers, and operators. Despite 

; that chemical separations was a newly discovered field, all workers were continually under pressure to chemically

| separate out more and more plutonium. To address both the production demands and subsequent waste disposal

1 problems, all involved thought outside of the box by developing processes to mine plutonium from the waste. O f the

j four steps in the plutonium production process, chemical separations created the most and the worst waste. Because this

| narrative is a history of facilities and not intended to be the definitive history of chemical separations at the Hanford Site, 

neither could we fully explore the successes and failures of mining plutonium from the waste nor the correlation between 

the waste produced, how it was stored, and the environmental and health consequences, nor numerous other aspects of 

j interest. Researchers investigating chemical separations at the Hanford Site in the future have numerous avenues to

’ travel, a few o f which are:

| • Correlating the chemical separations production process to the waste produced and that to the disposition of the

waste and environmental and health consequences. The Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction study of 

emissions from the chemical separations plants and radionuclide pathways and the subsequent health studies 

contributed to our knowledge of environmental and health consequences, but uncovering information, such as 

j whether any attempts were made to reduce waste by changing the chemical separations process, has yet to be

I done.

• Investigating what was done with the desorbed materials from filters and silver reactor

j • Seeking more information on the technical problems PUREX experienced in the 1980s that resulted in an 11-year

shutdown because of it inability to comply with environmental and safety measures

• Gathering a better understanding of the effect the chemical separations process developed at the Hanford Site

had on chemical separations processes in the industry and other countries

I.j

2 - 4 3 2
Se c t io n

Pl u t o n iu m

Finish in g

M .S. GfitBEK

F l u o r H a n f o r d , I n c .
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Sec tio n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

•M a im fa 'c tu rln

A t the end of the chemical separations process, the plutonium was in the form of 

plutonium nitrate. This nitrate solution had to be converted into plutonium metal for use 

in weapons. This process of converting plutonium nitrate into plutonium metal is called 

plutonium finishing and was the fourth step in the process.

Plutonium finishing began at the Hanford Site on january 16,1945 (Du Pont 1946a, 

Section 12) in the 231-Z Plutonium Isolation Building located in the 200 Area (GE [sic Du Pont] 1944, Section C). The 

231-Z Plutonium Isolation Building was originally named the 231-W Building. When the plutonium arrived at the 231-Z 

Building for finishing, it was in a nitrate solution. Nuclear operators further purified the plutonium by adding hydrogen 

peroxide to 8-gallon batches, which separated the plutonium from the nitrate solution. The code name for the resulting 

plutonium was the "AT solution." Through World War II and until July 1949, the rest of the plutonium finishing process 

at the Hanford Site consisted of drying the plutonium and shipping it in containers to the Los Alamos Site in 

New Mexico. At the Los Alamos Site, it was made into metallic plutonium and then formed for use in nuclear weapons 

(Du Pont 1946a, Section 12).

When W orld War ll ended and the rush for immediate 

production slowed, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who 

managed both the Hanford and Los Alamos sites, began to 

investigate process improvements and production efficiencies. In 

1946, they asked the new operating contractor at the Hanford 

Site, the General Electric Company, to design a new facility that 

could handle the entire plutonium finishing process. The process 

consisted of converting plutonium nitrate first into oxalate, then 

oxide, next into a metallic form for use in atomic weapons. With 

this conversion, the plutonium would then be in a safer and more 

stable form to ship the long distances to the weapons assembly 

facilities (GE 1953], Streid 1949).

On january 1,1947, the Hanford Site, along w ith the other 

federal atomic defense production sites, passed to the control of 

the newly created Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic 

Energy Commission embarked on a large 

expansion program in response to projected

military needs and new tensions in the Cold War. : |'1"N IS

As a key part of the expansion program at the 

Hanford Site, the Atom ic Energy Commission 

accelerated design and construction of the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant (Hewlett and Duncan 

1969, Streid 1949). The code name for the plant 

was MJ-2. A description of the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant can be found in the Expanded Historic 

Property Inventory Form for the 234-5Z Building in 

Appendix B on the Internet.

Figure 2-5.1. Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, 

1949

Design. Layout, and Construction............................. 2-5.2

Operations ..................................... 2-5.5

Quality Control: Analytical Laboratories..............

Research and Development: Developmental

and Metallurgical Laboratories.................................2-5.23

Recovery and Recycling of Plutonium.....................2-5.23

tnluenls and Effluent C ontrol................................... 2-5.27

Stabilization and Deactivation.................................2-5.28

Areas for Further Research .................................... 2-5.29

Divider Page Photo: Plutonium Button

iNeg. 8808O2H0-bcn)

2 - 5 .1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The Plutonium Finishing Plant commenced operations w ith radioactive materials on July 5, 1949. Figure 2-5.1 shows 

the Plutonium Finishing Plant the year it began production. For many years after that time, however, the Hanford Site 

continued to ship small amounts of plutonium nitrate to the Los Alamos Site for use in special research projects. A 

remote, mechanized system was incorporated in 1952. The Plutonium Finishing Plant made weapons-grade plutonium 

until May 1989, with some interruptions in service for upgrades and modifications. The facility also processed fuel-grade 

plutonium for use in power reactors from the early 1960s through the 1970s. Significant events in the history of 

plutonium finishing at the Hanford Site may be seen in Table 2-5.1. For a definitive description of the history of the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant, see Gerber (1997).

Table 2 -5 .1 . Significant Events: Plutonium Finishing

Date Event Project No. Reference

Aug 1942 U.S. Corps of Engineers

Manhattan Engineer District

Dec 21,1942 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours - Site Contractor for 

plutonium manufacturing operations including 

plutonium finishing

Jan 16,1945 Receipt o f plutonium nitrate in 231 -Z Building 

to begin finishing operations

Du Pont 1946a, Section 12; 

GE 1944, Section C

Sep 1,1946 General Electric Company - Site Contractor 

for plutonium manufacturing operations including 

plutonium finishing

Jan V, 1947 Atomic Energy Commission

Jul 5,1949 Start up of Rubber Glove (RG) Line in the newly Project 234-5 W ork 1948, B e lli 952,

completed Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant) QE 1953j

M ar 18,1952 Startup o f the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) 

Line in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant)

Project C-198 

combined w ith C-413

GE 1952e, Stark 1952

1954-1955 Installation of Task 1 in the RMA Line and 

Expansion of the 234-5Z Building

Projects CG-549 

and CG-551

GE 1955d, 1955f

1956 Moving chemical processing w ork from the 

231-Z Building to the Plutonium Finishing Plant

GE 1953g, Thomas 1956

1957 Combination of Tasks 1 and II in the RMA Line Project CG-691 Ketzlach 1955b, Fritz 1955,

Baker 1957t

O ct 1960 Startup of the Remote M echanical C (RMC) Line Projects CG-734 Fritz 1958; Swain 1959;

and CG-745 GE 1960i, 1960j

M ay 1964 Startup of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility Project CAC-880 Low 1967

(236-Z Building)

Jan 1,1966 Isochem, Inc. - Contractor for chemical processing 

facilities including plutonium finishing

GE 1965b, 1965c, 1966

Sep 5, 1967 Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company - Contractor Isochem 1967, ARHCO 1967a

for chemical processing facilities including 

plutonium finishing

1975 Energy Research and Development Agency

1977 U.S. Department of Energy

Jul 1, 1977 Rockwell Hanford Operations - Contractor for 

chemical processing facilities, including 

plutonium finishing

Jul 1987 Westinghouse Hanford Company - Site Contractor, 

including plutonium finishing

M ay 1989 Shutdown of Plutonium Finishing Plant

De s i g n , La y o u t , a n d Co n s t r u c t io n

The design and layout for the new plutonium finishing facility at the Hanford Site were based on the facilities at the 

Los Alamos Site (GE 1954j) with notable improvements. During World War II, the plutonium finishing operators at the 

Hanford and Los Alamos sites used rubber gloves inside a protective box to manually manipulate the plutonium. In 

conjunction w ith designing a new plutonium finishing facility, General Electric soon decided that to meet the health and 

safety standards as w ell as to process the increased amounts of plutonium that were forecast a remote, mechanized
S e c tio n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

operation would be necessary. The mechanized system would also have one containment barrier more than that used at 

the Los Alamos Site (GE 1947b, Beil 1952). Other technical challenges that affected the design, layout, and construction 

of the new plutonium finishing facility involved the use o f slightly enriched irradiated uranium rather than the strictly 

natural uranium used during World War II and working with a plutonium nitrate resulting from evolving chemical 

separations processes.

During the years the Plutonium Finishing Plant was being designed and built, the United States responded to early 

Cold War events by increasing plutonium production. Two methods of increasing production included placing slightly 

enriched uranium in Hanford's production reactors and developing the REDOX (reduction oxidation) chemical 

separations process to replace the bismuth phosphate process that had been used in Hanford's T Plant and B Plant during 

World War II. Like most building projects, the original design for the Plutonium Finishing Plant continually changed as 

planners strove to make the process more productive and safe. Such changes began w ith the selection o f the location.

Throughout the initial design period, planners of the Plutonium Finishing Plant assumed that the facility would be located 

in an area of the Hanford Site known as the 400 Area (originally planned near the 200 West Area and not the same 

location as the present 400 Area). Hence, they often referred to the feasibility examination effort as the "400 Area 

Study." However in August 1947, to be efficient and economical with the use of existing utility and support facilities, 

General Electric recommended that the new structure be located within the fence of the 231-Z Plutonium Isolation 

Building. They realized that existing boiler, water filtration, electric, telephone, warehouse, road and guard facilities 

would have to be expanded to support the new plant, but they

11 it

Figure 2-5.2. Plutonium Button Produced on the

Remote Mechanical C Line, 1988

decided that this course would be cheaper and faster than building 

an entirely new support infrastructure. Because the new facility 

would house the very last steps in plutonium metal production,

Hanford personnel began calling it the Z Plant, the plant at the end 

of the line (Streid 1949, GE 1947c).

Along with the selection of a location, General Electric also 

established the layout of the process, parameters, and procedures 

for the analytical and developmental laboratories, waste disposal 

practices, ventilation needs, temperature cycles for the plutonium 

finishing processes, and various other operating boundaries. Parts I 

and II were terms used to denote the two key phases in the 

plutonium finishing process. Part I was the production of 

plutonium buttons— metal chunks of plutonium (see Figure 2-5.2).

Part II was fabrication of weapons components'by casting, grinding

and lathing the plutonium into pits. General Electric initially planned to place Parts I and II of the plutonium finishing 

operations in separate portions (sections 234 and 235) of the new building. However in November 1947, General 

Electric planners decided to combine Parts I and II into one line to keep the plutonium confined w ithin the glove boxes 

(then known as dry boxes or hoods) at all times. When they combined the lines, they began to designate the structure as 

the 234-5Z Building. Hanford workers soon coined the vernacular name "Dash 5" for the facility (Work 1947a, GE 

1953j, Prudich 1947, GE 1947d).

Another aspect of the layout that deviated from the original design was the retreat to a manual instead of mechanized 

process. In February 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission communicated its need to further accelerate the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant schedule. As a result, the planners decided to install a manually operated process similar to the one used 

at the Los Alamos Site during W orld War ll on a rush basis, w hile continuing to design the mechanized, remote process. 

Because in the manual process operators handled the plutonium through ports in the glove boxes outfitted with rubber 

gloves, Hanford planners named it the Rubber Glove (RG) Line. Designers then designated the RG Line, along w ith the 

basic service structures and facilities essential to operate it, as Phase I of the 234-5 Project (Work 1948, Bell 1952,

GE 1953j).

2 - 5 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

In June 1948, the construction crew poured the foundations and footings for the 234-5Z Building (Streid 1949) and had 

the bulk of the building ready to turn over to the operations crew by the end of April 1949. By mid-May, twenty-seven 

operators were on staff. Operations personnel conducted simulated runs to test process and laboratory equipment and 

practiced moving material in and out of gloveboxes using electronically sealed plastic bags (GE 1949a, p.4).

According to a technical contractor report, the 234-5Z Building was designed to be a "self-contained and independent 

plutonium fabrication plant with all necessary supporting services and facilities" (Streid 1949, p. 12). The Atomic Energy 

Commission had called out a key specification stating that the chemical and metallurgical processes in use at Los Alamos 

be used. However, a main difference from Los Alamos was that at the Hanford Site the entire manufacturing process was 

carried out within enclosed glove boxes. At Los Alamos, some steps o f the process at that time were not executed in 

completely enclosed glove boxes, and not all of the glove boxes in the process line were interconnected. The initial 

RG Line in the 234-5Z Building had three separate air zones for contamination control. Zone 2 was the air in the 

operating areas. Zone 3 was air in the equipment areas. Zone 4 was inside the glove boxes. Zone 1 was the name 

reserved for air in the office area. The facility operated such that air from all of the contaminated zones was drawn to a 

common air exhaust manifold, passed through Chemical Warfare Service filters, and discharged out the 200-foot high 

291-Z Stack at a velocity up to 30 miles per hour (Streid 1949, Work 1947a, Christensen and Maraman 1969).

In addition to the 234-5Z Building itself, Phase I of the construction of the Plutonium Finishing Plant built the 2704-Z 

Office Building, the 2705-Z Temporary Technical Office Building, the 2719-Z First Aid Building, the 291-Z Stack, the 

2901 -Z Elevated Water Storage Tank, 216-Z-1 and 216-Z-2 waste cribs, the 241-Z Waste Storage Facility, an exclusion 

area badge house, a gas bottle storage building, and the 272-Z shop and warehouse. The project also extended the 

284-W Boiler House to the east w ith the addition of a boiler, combustion control equipment, coal conveyor extension, 

and stack interface. Likewise, it extended the 283-W Filtered Water Plant to the east with the addition of another settling 

basin, pumps, and piping. (Plock 1949, Work 1947b, GE 1953J).

Approximately 180 staff began processing plutonium nitrate in the 234-5Z Building on July 5, 1949 at 11:00 p.m. using 

the RG Line. At the same time, the General Electric Laboratory in Schenectady, New York was working on the design of 

Phases II and III of the 234-5 Project. Phases II and III together were known as the 432 Project, a reversal o f numbers for 

security purposes. Phase II consisted of completing some rooms for the analytical laboratory, a crucible shop, a chemical 

development laboratory, maintenance shop "D " (a shop for repair of contaminated equipment and tools), instrument 

repair rooms, and two maintenance glove boxes. Additionally, Phase II included preparation work for the installation of 

the remote mechanical processing line (GE 1953J).

The Remote Mechanical (RM) Line itself was the major component of Phase III. In September 1949, the Atomic Energy 

Commission specified that the RM Line would need to handle the output of REDOX (the reduction oxidation facility - a 

new chemical separations plant being constructed at the Hanford Site). Phase ill of the 234-5 Project also included the 

completion o f a mechanical development shop, men's locker room, a special products shop, a recovery area for the 

re-work of scrap and out-of-specification metals and oxides (see the Recovery and Recycling Sub-Section), and 

miscellaneous rooms (Gross and Greninger 1949).

On October 24, 1949 in response to events in Korea, the Atomic Energy Commission issued dramatic calls for increased 

production in the RG Line and authorized construction o f two more RM lines w ithin the Plutonium Finishing Plant, along 

with a building addition to house the third line, even though the first remote mechanical line had not started production. 

The second RM Line would be located on the first floor of the 234-5Z Building at the west end of the south-center 

corridor (GE 1950d, GE 1951 d). At that time, plutonium finishing workers began calling the first RM Line the RMA Line, 

and they termed the second RM Line the RMB Line. The Atomic Energy Commission soon dropped the third RM Line 

from the work scope along with the building addition to house it. Years later in 1957, a third, different RM Line was 

authorized.

On April 30, 1951, the original Plutonium Finishing Plant construction project was closed out administratively, although 

none of the RM Lines were operational nor were the crucible shop, some of the laboratory rooms, and some other

2 - 5 .4
Se c tio n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

features of Phase III completed. The Atomic Energy Commission and General Electric combined the remaining work on 

the original project with the more recently authorized RMB Line project and incorporated the design changes for 

increased capacity, which had been developed at the General Electric Laboratory (Bell 1952, GE 1954)).

Finally on March 18, 1952, the RMA Line began to process the plutonium(IV) oxalate prepared in the 231-Z Building.

The initial operations of the RMA Line performed all of the process steps in plutonium metal reduction and fabrication 

except for the first step. The first step, precipitating the plutonium-nitrate feed solution with oxalic acid and other agents 

(GE 1952e, Stark 1952), was still being done in the 231-Z Building. Additionally on May 17, 1952, cold shakedown tests 

began on the RMB Line (GE 1952h). Builders finished other Phase 11 and 1)1 facilities internal to the 234-5Z Building later 

in 1952. Figure 2-5.3 shows the layout of the Plutonium Finishing Plant as it was in 1995.

CONTROL

ROOM OFFICE

AREA

LAB AREA

: STAGING 

• . AREA

STORAGE' 

AREA |

PROCESSING AREA

TES TIN G AREA

O F F IC E 1 

A R E A |

' TOOL 

AREA f AREA

Figure 2-5.3. Simplified View o f the Plutonium Finishing Plant, 1995

Op e r a t io n s

The history of plutonium finishing at the Hanford Site is one of continually being pressed to expand production during 

the Cold War era. The production capacity of the Plutonium Finishing Plant is reflected in the overall production of 

plutonium at the Hanford Site. As shown in Figure 1.7 ("Total Annual Production of Plutonium at the Hanford Site" in 

the Reactor Operations Section), post World War II production went from fewer than 500 kilograms per year in the late 

1940s and early 1950s to around 4500 kilograms in the mid 1960s. To produce those amounts, operators and 

equipment in the Plutonium Finishing Plant had to keep pace with those in the reactors and chemical separations plants.

Key to keeping pace was the move from the manual to mechanical production lines. The year the RG Line began 

operations in 1949, the Hanford Site produced approximately 250 kilograms of plutonium. The year the first remote 

mechanical line (the RMA Line) began in 1952, Hanford Site production increased to approximately 750 kilograms and 

climbed steadily to over 3500 kilograms in 1959. The year the second and greatly improved remote mechanical line 

(the RMC Line) began in 1960, Hanford Site production increased to over 4000 kilograms, topping out at over 

4500 kilograms in 1965.

2 - 5 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

As the Cold War subsided in the late 1960s, plutonium production switched from that used for weapons to that used for 

commercial reactors. For 10'years from 1972-1982, mostly fuel-grade plutonium was produced. Consistent with the 

defense build up of the 1980s, only weapon-grade plutonium was produced from 1983-1987. The final campaign took 

place from July 1988 through May 1989, making weapon-grade plutonium. Approximately 475 staff were employed at 

the Plutonium Finishing Plant during its last year.

With the demise of the Cold War and increased concern over the effect of contamination from the Hanford Site on 

human health and the environment, production of plutonium stopped at the Hanford Site. Beginning in 1989, the 

Hanford Site's mission turned from production to waste cleanup with the signing of the Hanford Federal Facility 

Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement - TPA), the cleanup pact between the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington Department of Ecology (Ecology 1994). Also at 

that time, the Cold War ended and DOE began to develop final plans to achieve cleanout and shutdown of most of the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant. Ironically, the Plutonium Finishing Plant's highest staffing periods came during the cleanout 

and shutdown years of the early 1990s when about 600 people were employed in the complex.

Staff at the Plutonium Finishing Plant were basically three types. The supervisors were typically chemical engineers. The 

workers were mostly health physics technicians (sometimes called radiation control technicians) and nuclear operators 

with nuclear training and experience. Other workers were carpenters, pipe fitters, and those with skills needed to 

maintain any operating plant.

Ru b b e r Glo ve (RG) Lin e

Operators began to process plutonium on the RG Line July 5, 1949 on a three-shift schedule, Mondays through Fridays 

(Bell 1950). The initial RG Line was composed o f 28 stainless steel glove boxes, measuring 180 feet in total length. 

Plutonium handling activities took place in Zones 2, 3, 

and 4 with Zone 4 (inside the glove boxes) having the 

most negative pressure for contamination control. Metal 

plates extended from the floor to the glove boxes and then 

from the glove boxes to the ceiling, separating Zones 2 

and 3 so as to minimize cross-contamination from highhazard to low-hazard activities (Streid 1949, Work 

1947a).

The basic plutonium finishing operations carried out in 

the RG Line consisted of several standard steps known as 

tasks. Tasks I through VIII are shown in Table 2-5.2.

Tasks IX through XIV were identified as topics not actual 

process steps. Instrumentation was Task IX, Control was

Task X, Ventilation was Task Xl, The Conveyor System was • *

Task XII, Maintenance of equipment was Task XIII, and 

Sampling was Task XIV (Gerber 1996). A flow chart of 

Tasks I through III is shown in Figure 2-5.4.

PLUTQrtiUH SETA'.

Figure 2-5.4. First Three Tasks o f the Plutonium Finishing

Process

Soon after processing began, General Electric reported that "operational and mechanical difficulties...did not permit the 

forecast July production schedules to be met..Innumerable leaks were found in the [vacuum] system" (GE 1949b, pp. 39, 

52). By autumn, the contractor had found "a number of design deficiencies...that contributed to a production capacity 

bottleneck" (Gross and Greninger 1949, p. 2). General Electric concluded that the "air locks...were wholly inadequate" 

(Bell 1950, p.15). Indeed, the RG Line did not meet the Atomic Energy Commission production schedules for the 

remainder of 1949 (GE 1949c, 1949d, 1949e, 1949f). In December, the Atomic Energy Commission relieved the facility 

of production commitments to make necessary repairs (GE 1950c).

2 - 5 .6
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Table 2-5.2. Tasks in Plutonium Finishing Operations

Task Name Function

] Purification, Oxalate Precipitation, 

Wet Chemistry, or Feed Preparation

Precipitate the plutonium -nitrate feed solution with 

oxalic acid and other agents

II Hydrofluorination or Dry Chemistry Diffuse hydrogen fluoride gas through the precipitate

III Reduction Combine the plutonium tetrafluoride w ith calcium; 

fire at high temperature until fused into a plutonium 

metal chunk called a button

IV Casting Render plutonium buttons into pits

V Machining Machine the pit to specified dimensions

VI Cleaning Chemically cleanse the pit

VII Coating Coat the pit for radiation safety

VIII Final Inspection Inspect the pit for correct specifications

Although the technology had been tested on the rubber glove line at the Los Alamos Site, their-volume was much smaller 

than that at the Hanford Site. The operation of the RG Line at the Hanford Site was continually plagued w ith problems. 

Its history is one of solving problems by making improvements either to the process or the equipment.

Airborne contamination was a problem in the new building. Throughout 1949, the monitoring organization, the Health 

Instruments Division, obtained positive air samples in some of the processing rooms and in the analytical laboratory at 

high enough levels that the site standards required personnel to wear assault masks of the same type as those worn by the 

Army's Chemical Warfare Service. During the first year, engineers, chemists, and operators began work on the daunting 

problems in the new line. General Electric reported that "it was necessary on several occasions to suspend [operations] 

completely...and devote all efforts to decontamination work."

Although first hand accounts by process operators present in the 234-5Z Building for the startup of operations in July 

1949 are not available, the building superintendent 

did commit to writing the opinion that the work 

force was very discouraged. The superintendent, 

blamed the very rapid construction and startup 

period, driven by production quotas, for the 

"continual mechanical and process difficulties" 

encountered. His report, he stated, was "intended 

to serve not only as a review o f 234-5Z operations 

during this [initial operations] period but also as a 

documentary evidence of the difficulties 

experienced and the manner in which they impeded 

startup." When operations began, he wrote, the

"training program was not fully complete...[the] equipment....could hardly have been considered as functioning 

satisfactorily...[and the] operating procedure [was] lacking in detail in several respects" (Bell 1950, p. 2). Thus, he 

concluded, the continual equipment failures and contamination events "were to the dismay of many, but to the surprise 

of none" (Bell 1950, p. 7).

Ihv m«Mv» «im Um in.tiinn ini idvnl* lowvivd priidui tinn anil

tl.impvnriJ the morale of facililv \\ ni Lur* a* thv < onlr.u for

j» kno\\lv«l!»i‘«l .il w a r's end: "fh e lost / in k ('w / n; tim e. the

flour* or hard. unp/iMsmt u or A under uin onnnrtxihle

lo n tlitu m s, «>nr/ the f t i ir-pn"-ent p o te n tia l health h a /.iitl lu \ <•

had -ivnm - c ffci t o/i the p iv iirc ** oi /firs operation a n ti on the

m orale o l vm phnees to m .t‘in e d .“ - Kell >d. p. 1 “

2 - 5 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Throughout 1950, the vacuum systems on various glove boxes w ithin the RG Line, especially the coating Glove Boxes 

25 and 26, experienced recurring difficulties. Corrosion failures of parts within glove boxes likewise took place 

repeatedly (Hildreth 1950). Table 2-5.3 outlines the major modifications made to the RG Line.

Table 2-5.3. Modifications to the Rubber Glove Line

Date Need/Problem Modification Reference

1951

1951 -1952 Meet production Workers installed a 100-line intercommunication phone system

goals and augment w ithin the 234-5 Building, duct level floor w ork and safety showers,

safety altered laboratory facilities to provide for Plutonium metallurgy studies

in the building, and constructed new waste cribs. They replaced air Jock 

doors, constructed the 711 Waste Storage Hut, designed fire protection 

equipm ent for the 234-5 Building filter room, emplaced a soundproof 

operator's booth for the 234-5 Building control panel, and installed a 

vacuum leak detection equipment for improved contamination control.

July 1952 Rubber Glove (RG) Line process engineers decided to retire the RG Line's

purification glove boxes (Hoods 5, 6 and 7) and to prepare all PFP-feed 

material in the 231 -Z Building. That same summer, they emplaced a 

new casting furnace in the RG Line and designed and fabricated a pit 

machining unit for the line.

In October, RG Line process engineers investigated improved drying Kerr 1952a

procedures for Task 11/ including the use o f heat lamps w hile pulling air 

through the oxalate before hydrofluorination.

Facility engineers undertook several process changes to improve the Q uinn 1952a, 1952b;

performance and expand the production, (n December, they adopted Chapman and Mobley

a pressurized argon purge (displacing air from the crucible assembly in 1952; GE 1953d,

Task III by admitting argon under pressure), instead o f a vacuum purge, 1952d, 1952i

as a standard operating procedure. Fabricators completed an 

experimental coating unftth a t had been started in 1951, and 

operators began testing a variety of new procedures to lower the high 

coating rejection rate being experienced at RFP.

In early 1951, the Atomic Energy Commission authorized multiple RG Line improvement projects, including installation 

of an additional coating unit for Glove Box 26, installation of auxiliary stainless steel ventilation ducts for Glove Boxes 

4-8, fabrication of an experimental coating glove box, and installation of an additional casting unit for Glove Box 13 

(Bell 1951 a, 195Tb). Plutonium Finishing Plant engineers also instituted several process changes in the RG Line to , 

expand and improve production. During the summer and autumn, they continued efforts to standardize the chemical 

addition step in Task 111 so as to simplify operations and save money (Cooper 1951, Endow and Kendall 1951). However 

throughout 1951, operators of the RG Line continued to experience difficulties with the vacuum systems of several glove 

boxes.

During 1951 and 1952, the Atomic Energy Commission continued to call for increased production o f weapon-grade 

plutonium. In November 1952, C Reactor, the fifth production reactor at the Hanford Site started up, and the Atomic 

Energy Commission notified the 200 Area facilities of which the Plutonium Finishing Plant was a part that they should 

plan to handle a major increase in reactor output (Carr 1958). As a result, plutonium finishing planners studied ways to 

increase 234-5Z Building capacity to meet the needs of the expansion (GE 1952m, 1952n).

2 - 5 .8

October 1952

1952

GE 1951e, 1952c, 

1952d, 1952g, 1952j, 

1952k> 1952m, 1952n; 

Schallioland W ick 1951

GE 1952j

Difficulties w ith Operators installed a continuous gas analyzer detection system

vacuum systems for the Zone 3 area as a safety measure in mid-year. As a result

o f safety problems, Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) management 

discontinued the practice of preparing buttons directly from 

lathe turnings late in the year.
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Rem ote M e ch a n ic a l A (RMA) Line

The remote mechanical line was scheduled to start up in 1951. However, the Atomic Energy Commission had 

General Electric modify the line to increase production and to produce a second model pit in addition to the one for 

which the RMA Line was already designed (GE 1953I, 1953m). To accomplish this, plutonium finishing engineers made 

46 pre-startup modifications to the RMA Line. Additionally, the Atomic Energy Commission directed that both the 

RG Line and the RMA Line acquire the capacity for "reconversion of the plutonium parts in stockpile to the required 

design for new weapons models" (GE 1954], p. 11).

March 18, 1952, the RMA Line began to process plutonium from the 231-Z Building. At the end of that month,

General Electric described operations as "successfuL.No serious equipment problems have been evident, although 

minor maintenance and revision were necessary" (GE 1952e, p. FI).

Tasks II through VIII of the RMA Line identified the same process steps and equipment as those in the RG Line. Tasks IX 

through XIV were added to the RMA Line to identify components that affected the entire line as opposed to a step in the 

process: instrumentation, control, ventilation, conveyor system, maintenance, and sampling (GE 1954], Stark 1952).

The RMA Line at the Hanford Works consisted of a row of 30 interconnected stainless steel glove boxes, 30 control 

desks, 10 control cubicles, 24 instrument panels, 9 resistance furnaces, 5 induction furnaces, a sample can handling 

assembly, a 110-foot long general conveyor and manipulator, other smaller conveyors and furnace loaders, and 

miscellaneous support equipm ent It was located in rooms 232, 233, 235-A1, 235-A2, and 235-A3 of the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant. A "mechanically unpierced solid barrier...made of steel...[with windows for]...observing operations in 

Zone 4 (the space in the hoods where actual handling of product occurs)" was a key feature of the line (GE 1954], 

pp. 13, 18). The barrier separated Zone 2 (the operating side) from Zone 3 (the equipment side). Office space and 

corridors in the 234-5Z Building occupied Zone 1, the designation for the area with highest positive air pressure for 

purposes of contamination control. For a detailed description of the RMA Line, see the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Form for the 234-5Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet.

Production

As would be expected of a mechanical versus manual operation, the RMA Line out produced the RG Line. For example 

during the closing months of 1952, the RG Line's share of production hovered between 30-50 percent, and the RMA 

Line's share varied between 50-70 percent (GE 1952], 19521).

Throughout 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission issued major, overall expansion directives to begin construction of the 

PUREX (plutonium uranium extraction) Plant, the KE and KW jumbo, reactors, five new laboratories, other significant 

facilities in the 300 Area, and Phase 1 of a multi-year REDOX Capacity Increase Project. Hanford workers were asked to 

substantially increase the plutonium production over that of 1952 (GE 1954g). The plutonium finishing operators 

fulfilled and often exceeded their production commitment to the Atomic Energy Commission with the RMA Line doing 

the vast majority of the processing, despite the continual problems (GE 1953e, 1953f, 1953g, 1953h, 1953i, 1953k, 

1953m).

In early 1953, plutonium finishing planners decided not to modernize the RG Line as planned to achieve increased 

production but to modify the RMA Line instead. In the opening months of 1953, the RG Line processed only 5-6 percent 

of the total plutonium-nitrate sent to the 234-5Z Building and did no fabrication work at all (GE 1953e, 1953f, 1953g).

At the end of March, the Atomic Energy Commission placed the RG Line in standby condition with the exception of the 

coating units (Glove Boxes 25 and 26). The coating glove boxes continued to operate during April and the Atomic 

Energy Commission ordered them into standby status in May. The RG Line conducted no further processing with the 

exception of 2 weeks of Task III operations (plutonium tetrafluoride reduction) in September when a serious 

contamination event closed parts of the RMA Line for decontamination activities (GE 1953i, 19531). In 1955, plutonium 

finishing operators and crafts personnel removed and buried the equipment for Tasks I and II of the RG Line (GE 1955j).

In an immediate move to increase production in the RMA Line, plutonium finishing engineers doubled the batch sizes in

2 - 5 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c t u t ie s

1953 (Brown 1953, GE 1953g). By year's end, they were conducting 40 percent of the reductions as

To allow for simultaneous fabrication of two different models of weapons components plutonium finishing engineers 

moved the primary machining glove box of the RMB Line (Glove Box 200-B) into the Zone 3 area of the RMA Line 

(GE 19531). Throughout 1954-1956 as they tried more experiments and continued modifications in the RMA Line, 

plutonium finishing personnel realized that the RMB Line was becoming obsolete. In fact, it never processed any 

plutonium. Construction forces removed the RMB Line still unused when they installed the RMC Line in 1957-1959 

(Travis 1958a).

September 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission raised the production quotas sharply as the Hanford Site began to ship 

plutonium buttons as well as plutonium nitrate to the new Atomic Energy Commission site (Rocky Flats) in Colorado. 

Defense production facilities at the Rocky Flats plant functioned solely to fabricate pits for weapons from metallic 

plutonium, and so they depended on a steady supply of buttons as feed material from the Hanford Site. A year later, 

however, the Hanford Site's new sister plant in South Carolina, the Savannah River Plant, began reactor operations, 

plutonium separations, and plutonium finishing. Finishing operations at the Savannah River Plant were confined to 

making plutonium buttons not pits for weapons. The Savannah River Plant began shipping buttons to the Rocky Flats Siteautumn 1954, thus relieving some pressure on the Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant. However, the Atomic 

Energy Commission issued calls for further production increases, thus rendering this reprieve temporary (Bebbington 

1990, p. 66).

Plutonium finishing workers fabricated weapons components for two different designs throughout 1954. Commitments 

to the Atomic Energy Commission for the production of buttons and finished weapons components were either met or 

exceeded for most of the year. One exception to the high production performance occurred in the weeks after July 27 

when a serious fire of plutonium turnings in the RMA Line curtailed the fabrication of pits for 3 weeks. The fire occurred 

when plutonium metal turnings ignited while being removed from a machining hood. General Electric reported that the 

"entire rear area" of the RMA Line (air zone 3) was "grossly contaminated and all production operations were 

suspended" (GE 1954f, 1954h, 1954k, 19541, 1954n, 1954o, 1954p). The same held true in 1955 when nuclear 

operators and engineers set new records for high plutonium output with the exception of the early months when RMA 

Line operations were closed for the installation of new equipment.

By 1956, nuclear operators and engineers produced pits for a variety of weapons models (GE 1956f). During 1957-1961, 

operators and engineers manufactured pits for 9 different weapons designs in the 234-5Z Building. In addition to 

producing new models, plutonium finishing operators also started processing plutonium nitrate from the new PUREX 

separations plant in February. In April, they then processed the last plutonium nitrate from T Plant (GE 1956h) and 

started accepting the first shipment of plutonium nitrate from the Savannah River Plant in July (GE 1956k).

Over the next several years, the pattern continued. As the Atomic Energy Commission expanded plutonium production 

capacities at the Hanford Site and across the nation, the plutonium finishing workers increased their production by 

continually improving the process and equipment. For example, a significant process improvement in 1957 was to 

combine Tasks I and II on the RMA Line (Baker 1957). The result was almost immediate. Plutonium Finishing Plant 

workers achieved the largest single leap in production in February 1958 when they manufactured by a large margin more 

plutonium metal than had been produced during any previous month in the history of the 234-5Z Building (GE 1958c). 

Management deemed the continuous Task I-Task II process so proficient they decided not to maintain the older, standard 

glove boxes for back-up (Harmon and Reas 1957, GE 1957h). By 1959, General Electric found the overall process and 

equipment improvements in the RMA Line's Tasks I and II resulted in a vast rise in plutonium metal production over 

1958, and 1960 ended with an annual record for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. In January 1960, they again exceeded 

all previous monthly records for the production of buttons, and, in April 1960, they exceeded the January record itself 

(GE 1960d, 1960f).

Task III in March 

double-batches.

2 - 5 .1 0
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Problems

The record setting production levels are most impressive when set against the background of equipment and process 

failures. The RMA Line, like the RG Line, was continually plagued with problems. Whereas the RG Line was tested 

technology, though, the RMA Line had ground for problems. It was the first large scale, remote mechanical system used 

in the world to finish plutonium. The history o f RMA Line operations is basically one of learning from the problems, 

changing the process and equipment to address the problems, and applying what was learned to the next remote 

mechanical line design. For details of the modifications made to solve the problems, see Table 2-5.4.

Table 2-5.4. Modifications to the Remote Mechanical A Line

Date Need/ Modification Project No. Reference

Problem

1952 The 234-5 Building personnel fabricated and began testing new m ixing Benoliel 1952

equipment for Task ill of the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Additionally, 

to help improve performance, designers developed a new general conveyor for 

the line, as w ell as a new hood conveyor for Task 111. Plutonium Finishing Plant 

(PFP) personnel also fabricated a new p it machining unit, emplaced additional 

waste gas disposal lines for Task II, and built a new chip cutter for the RMA Line.

Late in the year, facility engineers authorized a new method of argon purging 

for Task III to allow equipment simplification and thus save wear and tear 

on some of the pumps and valves.

1952 Facility engineers undertook several process changes to improve the performance

and expand the production o f both lines. In December, they adopted a pressurized 

argon purge (displacing air from the crucible assembly in Task III by admitting argon 

under pressure), instead o f a vacuum purge, as a standard operating procedure.

Fabricators completed an experimental coating unit that had been started in 1951, 

and operators began testing a variety of new procedures to lower the high coating 

rejection rate being experienced at PFP.

M ay 1953 General Electric Company engineers combined various design strategies for RMA

improvements into tw o key projects. Project CG-549 focused on building a Task I 

process into the 234-5 Building, capable o f bypassing the precipitation and purification activities then being carried out in the 231-Z Isolation Building. Project CG-551, 

entitled "Expansion o f Building 234-5," focused on a sweeping series of revisions to 

Tasks II and III, including the addition o f a seventh furnace to Task II. This project 

also provided for the relocation and expansion of final product inspection facilities 

w ithin the PFP Building.

Facility engineers instituted a cylinder sampling and testing program w ith the GE 1953h, 1953i

requirement that cylinders be purged to remove hydrogen before they were 

placed in service.

After a period of testing, facility engineers adopted a faster, hotter fluorination cycle GE 1954e

as the regular cycle at PFP.

The new Task III equipment consisted o f a welded, stainless steel reduction vessel, CG-549 W irta 1954;

with redesigned heating coils, packing glands, valve stems, and seals. Designers CG-551 GE 1954k;

realized that a key need in the new Task 111 equipment was to ensure a completely Shaw 1953a,

tight seal to prevent water from entering the reduction crucible. Additionally, PFP 1953b, 1953c,

personnel worked on site preparation (ventilation duct w ork and electrical power 1954

connections) to install a new Final Inspection Area in Room 192 of the PFP, and on 

expansions to the process air requirements for the RMA Line, in attempts to provide 

for better contamination control, and for more efficient re-use of Plutonium-bearing 

scraps, PFP engineers began design on a new casting storage hood, to replace the 

many individual storage hoods then being used in the RMA Line. They also 

designed and emplaced another briquetting hood in the RMA Line to package 

plutonium-bearing scraps for recycle.

M ay 1953 Furnace 

failures

Dec 1953 

1954

CG-549 G E1953i, Ingalls

CG-551 1953, Helgeson

1953

Quinn 1952a, 

1952b; Chapman 

and M obley 

1952; GE 1952c, 

1952h, 1953d

2 -5 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Date Need/ Modification Project No. Reference

Problem

1954 Additionally in 1954, safety experts decided to emplace CambridgeTM "fire-proof' M obley 1957; GE

filters in the filter boxes of the RMA Line and analytical and technical laboratories 1954k, 1954n,

o f the 234-5 Building. However, the bonding material around these filters soon 1954r, 1954s

failed, causing increased emissions from the 291-Z Stack. Safety experts then proposed a new fire detection system for the building, but managers deferred a 

decision on installation of such a new system. Engineers and construction forces 

also undertook a complete re-balancing of the 234-5 Building ventilation system.

Workers in the 234-5 Building's Crucible Shop tested several new crucible alloy 

and fabrication methods, for use in the Plutonium processing lines.

Apr 1955 PFP personnel emplaced new Task II and Task III equipment in the RMA Line in GE 1955f, 1955k,

Project CG-551. In A pril, engineers began hot shakedown runs w ith Plutonium 19551; Shaw

and reported that "generally the [new] equipment is operating satisfactorily." 1955

In Task IV of the RMA Line during 1955, engineers directed efforts at developing 

a permanent mold casting process and at increasing production and reducing the 

amount of waste metal turnings through double-casting. In Task V, they focused 

on designing a remote, automatic lathe. In Task VII, they conducted trials early 

in the year to compare various new thermocouple designs. At the same time, 

they took an intense look at the overall RMA Line conveyor system. In the autumn, 

they issued a recommendation that a slat-type conveyor be substituted in the area 

serviced by tw o sections of the folding arm conveyor.

Apr 1955 Nuclear operators and chemists occupied the new Final Inspection area "w ith no Reas 1956,

difficulties encountered." Later in the year, chemists and physicists undertook Helgeson 1956a,

studies to improve and mechanize this area w ith emphasis on faster and more Ketzlach 1955b

accurate gauging methods and improved cleaning and polishing equipment. At

the same tim e, Health Instruments Division personnel used improved radiation

monitoring instruments and techniques to reveal that the surface gamma dose

rates o f the Plutonium metal was 40 percent greater than previously had been

thought. Also in 1955, construction workers completed installation ofthe

RECUPLEX (recovery of uranium and plutonium by extraction) Facility in

Room 221 o fth e 234-5 Building.

1956 PFP designers began w ork to develop equipment to combine Task 1-Task II in the Fritz et al. 1956

RMA Line.

1956 PFP personnel began studies on the conversion o f RECUPLEX to a manufacturing Harmon 1957;

i facility and designed an office annex to the 234-5 Developmental Laboratory. GE 1956e, 1956f,

; They completed design for a new mechanized cleaner and polisher for the final 1956g, 1956i,

finishing operations and developed equipment for mechanizing radiography 1956j; Travis

operations in the inspection facility. 1956; Helgeson

1956b

PFP personnel began several other projects to improve operations, including a 

project entitled Permanent M old Casting th a t m o d ifie d Task IV equipment, designs 

for equipment to fabricate test and experimental weapons components, and designs 

for yet more changes to the conveyor system. They also drafted a prototype, manually 

operated vacuum pick-up device for handling uncoated plutonium metal pieces, a 

remotely operated final machining lathe in order to reduce worker exposure, a remotely 

operated Task V briquetting press, improved process ventilation machinery, a prototype 

transfer can for transporting material from one hood to another through Zone 3 o fth e line 

w ithout the use o f a plastic bag, and changes to the duct systems and drive mechanisms 

of Task VII units to provide better distribution of nickel plating around Plutonium pits 

made in the RMA Line.

1956 Task III operations continued in a fairly routine manner throughout 1956, w ith some GE 1956e, 1956f,

process changes and repairs. In mid-year, engineers allowed an increase in Task III 1956g, 1956i,

capacity through the use of larger crucibles and larger charges. In Task IV, maintenance 1956j, 1956k,

crews replaced the heating elements in all four units in january along with tw o thermo- 1956!, 1957e

couples and a furnace lift mechanism. In May, June, July, August and December, they 

had to perform still more maintenance in the casting furnaces. Also .in 1956, crews 

executed additional repairs on equipment in Tasks V, VII, and the RMA conveyor system.

2 - 5 .1 2
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Date Need/

Problem

Modification Project No. Reference

1957

1957-1958

1958-1960

1958-1959

1958

1958

Excessive

exposure

Excessive

exposure

1959-1962

1960

1962

CGC-800

CCC-826

Completion and startup o fth e continuous Task l-Task II process CG-691

Other projects undertaken by PFP personnel to support the production requirements 

o fth e late 1950s and early 1960s included the installation o f Cambridge Type G fire 

resistant exhaust filters during 1957-1958. At the same time, building managers 

instituted a program o f close housekeeping control of flammable solvents in the PFP 

complex buildings.

Building managers installed still more fire protection improvements, including fire 

detectors throughout the 234-5 Building, carbon dioxide fire suppression systems in 

the hydraulic lines, and a series o f automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems in some of 

the corridors and vestibules.

In late 1958, designers and engineers began working toward a vacuum system 

improvement project In the 234-5 Building w ith completion in autumn 1959.

This project consisted of modifications to the 26-inch vacuum source located 

in the 291-Z Building and to the connection and service points in the analytical 

laboratory, development laboratory, the RECUPLEX Facility, and the RMA Line.

Many feet o fth e old vacuum lines were replaced.

Facility engineers installed additional barrier-shielding between operators and 

Zone 3 in the Task l-IV space, extending the new vacuum cleaning system 

being installed in the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line to RMA Line Tasks i-IV, 

and providing a new storage hood for Plutonium powder produced in Task II.

Another Atom ic Energy Commission (AEC) project also reduced exposure in the 

RMA Line by increasing the vacuum system's power to sweep powders and 

other small debris from RMA Line hood floors. In the Vacuum System Improvements project, construction forces installed new vacuum system connections 

from the 291 -Z Stack to service points in Tasks I, II and 111 ofthe A-Line, and to 

other points w ithin the 234-5 Building.

Beginning in 1959, PFP engineers and weapons experts began a series of CGC-811

modifications to both the RMA and RMC Lines, and designed a specialized, 

vault-type cell inside a 3,600 square foot addition on the northwest corner of 

the 234-5 Building. Even though the RMC Line was still being constructed,

AEC needs were changing so rapidly that pre-startup modifications were necessary.

PFP personnel completed this project, known as Additional Fabrication Facilities, in 

1962. The project provided equipment flexibility capable o f processing fuels that 

had been exposed to much higher levels o f irradiation and of fabricating many new 

weapons. Essential ly, this equipment gave the RMA Line particularly the capability 

to participate in special, experimental weapons fabrication programs. This project 

also completely overhauled casting operations in both lines. The reinforced, 

poured concrete and metal addition to the 234-5 Building contained a heavily 

shielded cell w ith 4-foot thick w alls that measured 20 feet wide by 30 feet long 

by 30 feet high on the inside. It housed a new, consolidated final inspection facility 

with a m illion-volt (MEV) x-ray unit. The facility also ontained an 8-foot by 5-foot 

by 5-foot deep covered pit for servicing the x-ray unit, a lead-shielded dark room, 

and a personnel air-lock entrance.

The platinum liner of the fiuorinator tube of the continuous Task l-Task II equipment 

in the RMA Line failed and was replaced.

In October, the AEC funded tw o additional projects to fit the line for a role in the CGC-983

fabrication of Plutonium components for specialized weapons tests. In the Plutonium

Ingotingand Auxiliaries Facility project, construction forces installed facilities in the

RMA-Line for handling ingoting feed (buttons), briquettes, and miscellaneous metal

scrap, as well as casting mold preparation, make-up and breakout, and weight

density determination of castings and ingots produced. Workers completed this

project in August 1963.

Baker 1957

Palmer 1957; 

Finch 1957; 

Mobley 1957

Ager and Knights 

1963

Ciccarelli 1958, 

Tabasinske 1959, 

LaRiviere 1959

Braden 1958

Tabasinske 1959, 

LaRiviere 1959, 

Fritz 1957

Ciccarelli 1959a; 

McKee 1959; GE 

1960f, 1960g,

1960h, 1960i

G E1960f

Travis 1962

2 - 5 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Date Need/ Modification Project No. Reference

Problem

1962 In the Electrical and Hydraulic Equipment Mezzanine - RMA Line project, construe- CGC-984 Fillmore et ai.

tion forces installed mezzanine space along " D " w all o f the RMA Line area to house 1964

motor control centers to provide fo r systematic distribution of electrical power,

electrical cubicles, as w ell as hydraulic equipment for prototype equipment used in 

research and development in special weapons fabrication. The new, individual 

prototype units were not connected to regular RMA production systems.

1963 In the Metal Stabilization Facility project, workers emplaced a unique cell for CAC-987 Travis 1963

research and development w ork for experimental weapons fabrication.

1962-1963 Equipment PFP personnel completely renovated Task l-Task II equipment in Hood 9-A during the

difficulties winter. They placed new filters in the lines leading to the filtrate pumps and in the

off-gas lines, and they installed a new stainless steel reactor vessel and new valves in 

m id-1963. However, they had to perform more renovation work, particularly to the 

vacuum system, at year's end.

1972 Facility planners began designing another fire protection upgrade that eventually was Cochrane 1977;

completed in the PFP during 1976-1977. in that project, construction forces emplaced Lee 1972a,

stainless steel filter screens, smoke and heat detectors, and automatic shut-off dampers 1972b; Jones

in the E-3 (operating area) and E-4 (glove box) HEPA filters o fth e 234-5 Building. In 1973; Laws 1973

1973, they also installed a new gamma indicating radiation monitoring system in the 

PFP, as w ell as criticality overflow drains in some glove boxes.

1978 PFP engineers replaced lucite panels remaining on some o f these hoods with Lexan.

In mid-1952, the Atomic Energy Commission authorized research to recommend improvements to the RMA Line. By late 

summer, internal contractor recommendations focused on both the technical and mental aspects of operating the new 

system (Collins 1952, p. 2). The research committee concluded that "remote operation of all plutonium purification and 

fabrication equipment is ultimately desirable. However, until reliable, tested, remote-control equipment is available, the 

remote control requirement may have to be compromised on some steps of the process to allow non-remote or rubber 

glove operation in order to obtain equipment with sufficient operating reliability" (Ingalls 1952, p. 3). By then, the 

plutonium finishing engineers had directed a majority ofthe facility's Task III work to the RG Line because ofthe RMA 

Line operating problems. These problems were eventually resolved to varying degrees over time.

Re m o t e M e c h a n ic a l C (RMC) Lin e

From 1957-1961, Plutonium Finishing Plant designers undertook many projects in an effort to accommodate the vast 

production increases. The most significant of these began in 1957 when the Atomic Energy Commission authorized 

construction of a new remote mechanical line in the 234-5Z Building to incorporate all of the improvements and 

changes that had been made over the previous years of RMA Line operations. The new line, designated the “ C" Line, 

was installed where the former RG and RMB lines had stood. General Electric completed removal ofthe majority of 

RG Line equipment in early 1957 (GE 1957f, 1957g; Ciccarelli 1959b).

The original Atomic Energy Commission authorization for the RMC Line called for it to operate only Tasks l-lll ofthe 

plutonium finishing process and not to fabricate any weapons pits. The RMC Line was "to provide for forecasted 

increases in Pu [plutonium] production, to assure [sic] production continuity, and to provide for short-term peak loads 

from the primary solvent extraction plants" (GE T955i, p. Ff-5). Soon after the PUREX Plant, which began operations in 

1956, proved its vast production capacity, the Atomic Energy Commission decided to add Tasks IV-XII to the RMC line.

In April 1957, the agency officially authorized two projects: CG-734, RMC Button Line, and CG-745, RMC Fabrication 

Line. The RMC Line was essentially similar to the RMA Line, but the RMC Line had an automatic vacuum cleaning 

system that served Tasks l-IV, greater radiation shielding, and improved radiography facilities (Fritz 1958, Swain 1959). 

General Electric completed the entire installation effort in 1959 at a cost of nearly $1.9 m illion (Moorman 1960, Shaw 

1960).

2 - 5 .1 4
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

f

n

The RMC Line consisted of a completely self-contained, remotely 

operated series of glove boxes fabricated from high-grade 

Austenitic 304L stainless steel with all welded construction.

(Austenitic 304L is stainless steel composed of austenite made 

stable by alloying it with nickel.) It was installed with seamless 

Austenitic 304L stainless steel piping and castings for corrosion 

resistance. All glove boxes except the conveyor glove boxes were 

fabricated with 1/4-inch thick steel floors and ceilings, 1/4-inch 

bent angles for the framework, plexiglas1TM panels, and molded 

neoprene,m gaskets as air-tight seals around all windows and ports.

Lucite or homalitetm ports equipped w ith plastic bags were provided 

for maintenance and equipment removals. The conveyor glove 

boxes were fabricated of 3/16-inch thick stainless steel plate, with 

3/16-inch bent angle framework. The button line portion of the 

RMC conveyor was known as HC-1, and served 17 glove boxes 

and various tanks. It was 60 feet long and was constructed of 

stainless steel slats mounted on a stainless steel frame. Figure 2-5.5 

shows a nuclear operator in the control room for the RMC Line in 

1988.

Leaded glass, carbon steel, and piexiglas shielding were designed 

for the RMC Line in 1957 and strengthened in 1959 because new 

information showed some line operators could be over exposed.

Causal factors included increased production, materials with higher 

activity levels, and more precise instrumentation in measuring 

neutron dose rates (Swain 1959). Designers added carbon steel 

plates to the internal floors of RMC Line glove boxes as well as 

supplemental shielding external to the glove boxes at many points 

(Fritz 1960, Ciccarelli 1959b). For a detailed description ofthe 

RMC Line, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for 

the 234-5Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet.

After many months of cold startup tests and resultant adjustments, 

plutonium finishing engineers and operators began processing 

plutonium nitrate feed in the RMC Line in October 1960. By 

November, the new line was operating so w ell that it was 

performing all ofthe Task l-ll work and 80 percent o fthe firing of 

buttons (GE 1960i, 1960j). In December, the contractor described 

the new line as "generally satisfactory" (GE 1961c, p. D-2).

However, during the early months of 1961, the RMC Line produced 

buttons of poor quality with high reject rates. After engineers 

adjusted equipment, production rose (GE 1961d, 1961e, 1961f,

1961g). For details ofthe modifications made to solve the

problems on the RMC Line, see Table 2-5.5. The RMC Line operated with increasing success and by 1964 had taken 

over the bulk of plutonium metal processing and was operating on a 7-day work week schedule due to the high demand 

for production. An elite crew of four to six operators w ith one line manager per shift operated the line (Rodgers 1986). 

Figure 2-5.6 shows operators checking the RMC Line equipment.

Figure 2-5.5. Nuclear Operator in the Control

Room ofthe Remote Mechanical C Line> 1988

Figure 2-5.6. Nuclear Operators Check Idle

Equipment on Remote Mechanical C Line, 1982

2 - 5 .1 5
Date

Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Table 2-5.5. Modifications to the Remote Mechanical C Line

Modifications Project No. Reference

7962

7962

1963

1964 

1966

1972

1972

1973 

1973 

1984

1986

1987

The A to m ic Energy C om m ission (AEC) authorized the project, Rem ote M echanical C (RMC) Button 

Line Filtrate Handling Facility, in m id-1962. This project emplaced equipment to concentrate 

filtrate resulting from Task I operations.

The AEC authorized the Personnel Protection, Storage Hood Shielding - 234-5 Building project.

This project provided, for fabrication and installation of ten-inch thick, water-filled shielding tanks 

around the three operating sides'of storage glove boxes HC-22-SR and HC-45-S in the RMC-Line. 

General Electric Company justified the project in February 1962 by stating that these tw o storage 

glove boxes were being used at four times their design capacity to satisfy weapons specifications.

This situation was increasing neutron radiation exposure to personnel working nearby, to the point 

where the site lim it o f five rem per year would be exceeded if corrective actions were not taken.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) engineers and safety experts instituted a m ajor change in the warning 

systems in the 234-5 Building, when they changed the siren alarm signaling a .nuclear excursion to 

the "ah-oo-gah" sound. That December, they placed a new air sample counter in service in the 

facility, making possible faster detection o f airborne contamination.

PFP personnel equipped the RMC Line w ith a new paging system.

PFP personnel overhauled receiving glove box HC-4. Facility personnel discovered and removed 

Plutonium that had built up in duct w ork and filter boxes downstream of Hood 9B. At the same 

time, PFP engineers and safety experts engaged in a number of critical mass control studies and 

safe conditions studies in various aspects o f Hanford's Plutonium finishing and transport.

Also, they began designing another fire protection upgrade that eventually was completed in the 

PFP during 1976-1977. In that project, construction forces emplaced stainless steel filter screens, 

smoke and heat detectors, and automatic shut-off dampers in the E-3 (operating area) and E-4 

(glove box) HEPAfilters o fth e 234-5 Building.

AEC m odified the fluortnator off-gas water jet system in the RMC Line, by installing a recycling jet 

scrubber system in glove box HA-46.

Construction forces also installed a new gamma indicating radiation monitoring system in the PFP, 

as w ell as criticality overflow drains in some glove boxes.

PFP engineers retrofitted the fluorinator off-gas w ate r scrubber system in the C -Line w ith a

recirculating water system for effluent reduction.

PFP personnel inspected instrumentation and electrical systems on RMC glove boxes, repaired or 

replaced equipment as needed, and dismantled furnace assemblies for inspection and upgrading.

Shut down once again for a series of mechanical and safety upgrades.

Westinghouse Hanford personnel braced the HF cylinder banks and Hoods HC-15-A, B, and C of 

the RMC Line to withstand seismic disturbances; upgraded hood lights; modified the Hood HC-9B 

transfer mechanism and graphic display panel; replaced the hydrofluorination gas line penetration 

into Hood HC-9B; obtained new pressure gauges; temperature indicators, liquid level controllers, 

tubing, hydrofluorination gas sensors, HEPA filters, the Hood HC-9B calciner filters, and circuit 

breakers for the breathing air system; redesigned the Hood HC-15 furnaces and o f the hydrofluorination gas interlock system; installed conveyor upgrades; changed out some lead glass glove box 

panels; and modified the argon gas supply and the Hood HC-9B fire damper. They also upgraded 

the RMC Line continuous oxalate precipitator, changing it to a mixed-suspension mixed-product 

removal draft tube precipitator. They made this change to improve the particle size o fth e plutonium 

oxalate product. They also modified the feed blending systems in the 234-5 Building, and upgraded 

other support equipment for the RMC Line and for building systems in general.

CGC-978

CGC-953

Braden et a). 

1962

GE 1962c

GE 1963c; 

G E1964c

Patton 1964

Knights 1966; 

Sloat 1963a, 

1963b, 1963c

Cochrane 1977; 

Lee 1972a, 1972b

McKnight 1972a, 

1972b

Jones 1973; Laws 

1973

Fecht et a). 1973

Yoo 1985

RHO 1986a, 

1986b, 1986c

2 -5 .1 6
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Du a l Op e r a t io n o f t h e Re m o t e M e c h a n ic a l A a n d C Lin e s

With two lines running, the production and problems of one line affected the other. Therefore, jointly describing their 

production and problems from the time the RMC Line started gives the reader a broader perspective of the plutonium 

finishing process.

Production

On January 8, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson announced a decreased national need for special nuclear materials due 

to the sufficiency of the existing stockpile and to the recent treaty banning atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. Soon 

afterward, the Atomic Energy Commission announced plans to shut down the Hanford production reactors in a phased 

fashion. The agency began the reactor closures in December 1964 with the DR Reactor, followed by the F and 

H Reactors in 1965. Ironically, the Plutonium Finishing Plant produced its all time record number of pits in December 

1964 (DeNeal 1970). As a result of decreased production needs and equipment problems, the Atomic Energy 

Commission ordered the RMA Line out of service completely near the end of 1964.

During the second half of 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission also announced a decision to remove the weapons 

fabrication work from the 234-5Z Building and to concentrate that work at the Rocky Flats Site. The agency continued 

small-scale, experimental fabrication projects at the Los Alamos Site. The weapons fabrication program at Hanford 

concluded in mid-Decerriber of 1965. Immediately, facility personnel undertook layaway (but not yet removal) of the 

fabrication portion of the RMA and RMC Lines, and they essentially completed these tasks in March 1966. Building staff 

levels fell from a Cold War high that had approached 300 people to 240 people in 1966. The plutonium metal 

conversion portions of the RMC Line continued to operate, and engineers added a button bag-out and sealing operation.

As a result ofthe Atomic Energy Commission decision to move plutonium fabrication work out o fthe 234-5Z Building, 

General Electric undertook a diversification study late in 1965 to plan alternative future uses for the facility. The resulting 

report envisioned an expanded role for the Plutonium Finishing Plant in non-defense work (GE 1965b). Throughout the 

period 1966-1972, plutonium finishing management did pursue non-defense work, and operations in the facility were 

split between defense and non-defense work.

At midnight on December 31, 1965, General Electric turned over the 

operation of all its Hanford Site chemical processing facilities, 

including the 234-5Z Building, to a new operating contractor,

Isochem, Inc. (GE 1965a, 1965c, 1966). In mid-1967, the Atomic 

Energy Commission awarded a new operations contract for Hanford 

Site chemical processing operations to the Atlantic Richfield Hanford 

Company (ARHCO), and operations in the Plutonium Finishing Plant 

were interrupted by the contractor changeover between August 18 

and September 5 of that year (Isochem 1967i, ARHCO 1967a).

In September 1967, the Atomic Energy Commission authorized 

plutonium finishing engineers to reactivate glove box HA-39 (part of 

the closed RMA Line's fabrication equipment) in order to grind 

plutonium-aluminum scraps into turnings suitable for plutonium

recovery (ARHCO, 1967a). A year later, the Atomic Energy Figure 2-5.7. Oxide Produced on the Remote

Commission ordered the RMA Line's Tasks l-lll cleaned out and Mechanical A Line; December 1979

re-activated to participate in expanded programs for commercial

(non-defense) nuclear experiments and development (ARHCO 1968a). For the remainder of 1968, the RMA Line 

produced oxides for early experiments in the development of Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility (the nation's prototype 

breeder reactor that would be built at the Hanford Site). ARHCO reported mechanical efficiency as 91.6 percent and 

stated that product purity was within specifications (ARHCO 1968b). Figure 2-5.7 shows the oxide produced on the 

RMA Line.

2 - 5 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iltt ie s

Meanwhile, the RMC Line operated on a mixed schedule, producing some weapons-grade plutonium and an increasing 

amount o f fuel-grade plutonium and oxides. For example in 1966, the RMC Line produced weapons-grade plutonium 

buttons throughout the early months of the year, but operators cleaned and inventoried the line on April 25. Three days 

later, they began processing fuel-grade plutonium from N Reactor and continued this work throughout the rest of the year 

(ARHCO 1967a). In general, the RMC Line performance was excellent. Three campaigns in March 1969 produced 

buttons of average yields of 98.4 percent, 97.8 percent, and 98.2 percent, respectively (ARHCO 1969a).

Because the RMA Line produced only oxides from 1968 on and the RMC Line mostly metals, Hanford Site personnel 

referred to the RMA Line as "the oxide line" and to the RMC Line as "the metal line" (ARHCO 1968a).

During 1968, the Plutonium Finishing Plant began participating in an International Safeguards Experiment in which some 

of the plutonium nitrate in the 234-5Z Building and some stored in the 224-T Building were accessed and inspected by 

the International Atomic Energy Agency, a multi-national, non-proliferation group headquartered in Vienna, Austria 

(Elgert 1968). Throughout 1969, cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency expanded as did attention to 

waste effluents and scrap receiving, identification, sorting, and re-packaging.

In 1970, Plutonium Finishing Plant engineers implemented the Plutonium Retrieval System, an inventory system to 

account for nuclear materials. The computerized system fed into the National Nuclear Materials Management and 

Safeguards System maintained for the Atomic Energy Commission at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee. 

Unfortunately, the Plutonium Retrieval System was plagued with inaccuracies and discrepancies for many years (Murphy 

1976, 1978; Brown etal. 1980; Glasscock et a!. 1982).

The Energy Research and Development Agency, which had taken over for the Atomic Energy Commission in 1975, 

decided to replace ARHCO w ith a new chemical processing contractor at the Hanford Site. Rockwell Hanford 

Operations took over the management of the Plutonium Finishing Plant and the other ARHCO facilities July 1, 1977. 

Among its first acts, Rockwell initiated reviews of "all procedures" for the Plutonium Finishing Plant and measurements 

of plutonium build-up in all glove boxes throughout Z Plant operating areas (Cockeram 1977, p. 11).

DOE, which replaced the Energy Research and Development Agency late in 1977, directed Rockwell in January 1978 to 

study the possibi lity of decontaminating and decommissioning most of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (Hopkins and Jones 

1978, Graves and Kusler 1978). Rockwell formulated a scenario in which the plutonium storage vaults (2736-Z and 

2736-ZA facilities) would remain in use for decades, the plutonium finishing laboratories would remain operational to 

support the PUREX Plant, and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (see Waste Management Section) would continue to 

process scraps from the Plutonium Finishing Plant cleanout and other ongoing Hanford Site activities (RHO 1979a).

In response to a build-up of nuclear arms ordered by President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, DOE restarted the 

Hanford Site's PUREX Plant in November 1983. That same year, DOE considered tentative plans to reactivate the RMA 

Line to process the plutonium nitrate coming from PUREX. The PUREX facility had a new internal facility (N Cell) that 

was supposed to process plutonium nitrate into plutonium oxide before shipment to the Plutonium Finishing Plant. 

However, no one knew for certain if N Cell could perform adequately. Plutonium finishing personnel prepared a new 

flow sheet for RMA Line operations along with a safety analysis (Crocker 1984, Wilson and McClusky 1983). As it 

happened, N Cell operations performed well, and DOE decided in 1984 to keep the RMA Line in standby status. It never 

again operated. Today the RMA Line in the 234-5Z Building consists of 25 glove boxes and 3 conveyers in a complex of 

4 rooms (235-A3, 235-A2, 235-A1, 235-B) and the control room in Room 233.

In 1984, DOE ordered the RMC Line to prepare to restart production of weapons-grade components. Plutonium finishing 

personnel mounted an intensive project to upgrade the RMC Line, bringing in a team from the Los Alamos Laboratory to 

review the startup safety analysis.

Plutonium Finishing Plant personnel achieved restart of the RMC Line on July 1, 1985 and operated it until October of 

that year. According to a contractor report, "the initial startup period...extended until the last week of September due to

2 -5 .1 8

j
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

repeated operational problems and key equipment failures...The production run started in earnest on September 30,

1985 w ith the last [plutonium nitrate] ...load-in occurring on October 18" (Rodgers 1986, p. 14). In total, the RMC Line 

produced about 63 percent of DOE's target goal. Plutonium finishing personnel then conducted cleanout and shutdown 

activities in the RMC Line through October 31.

The RMC Line restarted after multiple repairs in April 1986 and operated for 6 months making weapons-grade 

plutonium. Plutonium finishing personnel then shut it down once again for a series of mechanical and safety upgrades 

(RHO, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c). In July 1987, the Hanford Site's operating contract was consolidated, and the chemical 

processing work, along with other work, was awarded to a new contractor, Westinghouse Hanford Company. The RMC 

Line conducted one more campaign after that and was shut down permanently in May 1989.

Problems

Although the frequency of problems in the Plutonium Finishing Plant continually dwindled, they did continue to appear. 

For example, from 1962-1963 nuclear operators and engineers at the Plutonium Finishing Plant struggled w ith offstandard feed, high in plutonium-240 isotopic content from the REDOX and PUREX facilities (Bruns et al. 1963). They 

also had difficulties in the inspection facilities with new, m illion-volt x-ray equipment Additionally, personnel were 

hampered by the effects of a criticality accident at RECUPLEX (RECovery of Uranium and PLutonium by Extraction) and 

the consequent loss of much of the 234-5Z Building's plutonium scrap recovery capabilities. The April 7, 1962 accident 

occurred when batches of plutonium solution came together in an amount large enough to cause the solution to go 

critical. The resulting flash of radiation contaminated the entire room housing the RECUPLEX equipment and brought 

about the permanent closure of RECUPLEX operations.

ARHCO conducted evaluations at the Plutonium Finishing Plant from 1976-1977, looking at worker safety and health 

issues. These evaluations revealed multiple conduct of operations violations in the areas of chemical storage, material 

storage, and other hazards (Draney and H ill 1976).

ARHCO summarized its overall assessment ofthe Plutonium Finishing Plant conditions and capabilities in mid 1977 by 

stating: "During the early 1970s, it became increasingly obvious that corrosive process solutions were exacting a toll in 

terms of deterioration of piping and equipment.. Considering the obsolescence and general deterioration of equipment, 

as w ell as the evolutionary upgrading of regulatory requirements...extensive repairs and revisions are necessary..." 

(Szempruch and Szulinski 1977, p. 1).

In January 1978, DOE completed an engineering study that found the 234-5Z Building and the 291-Z Stack had 

"insufficient capacity to withstand tornado or SSE [safe shutdown earthquake] loadings ... tornado forces could overstress 

[these facilities].... Lateral restraints ofthe ventilation ductwork and piping...are lacking. Critical equipment items and 

components (glove boxes, primary filters, electrical panels, criticality alarms, master fire alarm boxes, fire protection 

systems controls, continuous air monitors, etc.) do not have good connections and anchorages to the building ... the 

emergency utility systems for the 234-5Z Building are not separate, self-contained systems.... Hence the loss of normal 

power may also prohibit the use of emergency power" (Cockeram 1978, pp. 13-14).

in response to the need to control contamination, plutonium finishing engineers de-pressurized the 234-5Z Building in 

1978 for the first time in its history. Since its construction, the building had been operating at a positive pressure relative 

to the outside atmosphere to prevent the inflow of "unconditioned dust and air." To operate potentially contaminated 

areas at negative pressure relative to adjacent areas as now required, Rockwell reconfigured the 234-5Z Building's air 

flow systems "in such a manner to cause air flow from areas of low contamination potential to areas of high 

contamination potential." In the changeover, engineers rearranged ventilation ducts within the building, provided air 

locks between clean zones and potentially contaminated areas, sealed the exterior of the building adjacent to 

contaminated areas to prevent leakage into the building, placed new dampers and fans in the 291 -Z Building, installed 

new air monitoring and warning systems and new zone pressure control instruments (Glover 1978b, p.3).

2 - 5 .1 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Production problems also continued in the later years. In 1985, Rockwell found that only 25 percent ofthe plutonium 

buttons produced by the RMC Line were within specification limits. Rockwell then recommended several modifications 

to the RMC Line equipment as well as entire replacement of the vacuum drum filter, the fluorinator off-gas scrubber, and 

several lines within the RMC system. It prepared a list of 125 maintenance items and identified the most important 

40 items. By December 1985, it had received DOE approval to proceed and had initiated engineering design to rebuild 

or replace the 40 items (Rodgers 1986). For details of the modifications made to solve the problems on both the RMA 

and RMC Lines, see Table 2-5.6.

Table 2-5.6. Modifications to Both the Remote Mechanical A and C Lines

Date Need/

Problem

Modification Project No. Reference

1969 Replace The Atom ic Energy Commission (AEC) commissioned a study o f the safety and fire

existing resistance o f glove box windows at the Hanford Site. The study indicated a need

plastic to replace existing plastic panels, usually a methyl methacrylate known as plexiglas.

panels Eventually, during 1974-1975 and in the 1980s, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA - successor agency to the AEC), and the Department of 

Energy (DOE - successor agency to ERDA) ordered several such replacements with 

Lexan polycarbonate plastic on A-Line, C-Line and the Plutonium Finishing Plant 

(PFP) laboratories glove boxes- /

1970 Both contractor and federal management agency personnel spent a great deal o f time

planning effluents control initiatives during this period. Also in 1970, they initiated 

planning for a m ajor fire protection, fire alarm and electrical improvements project 

in many areas o f the PFP complex.

1975 Upgrading M eanwhile in 1975, the new ERDA ordered reviews of many practices, policies

o f instru- and conditions in the PFP complex, particularly safeguards and security policies,

mentation plutonium storage practices,.and the integrity o f plutonium storage and shipping

containers. As a result, the PFP personnel wrote a complete, new plutonium 

processing manual. They identified the need for an overall upgrading o f instrumentation throughout PFP facilities. ERDA also produced a.new manual, 

revising mandates for the safety of non-reactor nuclear facilities. PFP engineers 

then undertook a series o f comparisons between ERDA's plutonium storage 

criteria and the physical conditions and accoutrements of rooms storing plutonium 

in the 234-5 Building. W hen they learned that several of the storage rooms in the 

old structure did not com ply w ith the new ERDA criteria, they recommended a 

series o f SAS upgrades and special nuclear materials accountability improvements 

to make.the facility as secure as possible. On August 30,1976, a serious accident 

in the 242-Z facility shut down all PFP complex operations.

1976-1980 During 1976-1980, designers, engineers and construction forces implemented

the new recommendations in several projects. In Project B-157, Safeguards and 

Security Upgrading, they built the 2701-ZA Central Alarm Station (CAS), located 

just inside o fth e PFP protected area fence. (A description of the CAS can be found 

in the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 234-5. Building in 

Appendix B on the Internet.) They also installed intrusion detectors at various 

locations in the complex, additional alarming systems in the existing door ,

surveillance system, and a secondary perimeter fence. In Project B-158, Z Plant 

Calorimeters, they installed a multi-calorimeter system, along w ith associated 

hardware and software. In Project B-195, Materials Management Information 

System, they provided an on-line nuclear materials tracking system that served 

as the first phase toward the goal of a real-time inventory. In Project B-169,

C riticality Alarm Systems, they installed new criticality alarms in the 234-5, 236-Z 

and 224-T Buildings.

FMRC 1969, 

Olson 1974, 

Corbel! 1975

B-157, 

B-158, 

B-169, 

B-195

Teeple and 

Tabasinske 1970

Uebelacker 1975; 

ERDA 1976b; 

Gimpel et al. 

1975a, 1975b, 

1975c, 1975d, 

1975e, 1975f,

1975g, 1975h; 

Hinkson 1977

Gallant 1977a, 

1977b, 1977c; 

W illiam s 1976; 

Garfield and 

Clausen 1978; 

Corbell 1978, 

1979

2 -5 .2 0
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

Date Need/ Modification Project No. Reference

Problem

1976 During the same years, in Project B-184, they added improved fire protection

equipment and systems to PFP facilities and the 224-T Building. During 1976,

PFP personnel replaced all o fth e E-4 filters in the 234-5 Building. In 1977, in 

response to ERDA audits, they instituted preventive maintenance program 

upgrades in the A-Line, the PRF, the PFP laboratories, and the 234-5 process 

systems in general.

1978 Due to the directive to plan for D&D of most PFP complex facilities, DOE in Cowley 1978;

1978 modified the PFP ventilation upgrade project that had been designed in Heubach 1979a,

1977, to include only replacement o fth e galvanized metal filter boxes for the 1979b, 1979c;

E-4 fijter system with stainless steel boxes, replacement o f the exhaust collection VEC 1980

headers associated with filter boxes, replacement of some duct work, and 

upgrading o f selected circuit breakers. Construction personnel implemented 

this downsized version of the project during 1980-1981. They also completed 

an upgrade to the 291-Z Building's 17" vacuum system. During 1979-1980, 

in a separate effluents upgrade project, construction workers relocated the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant's 26" mercury vacuum pumps and made other 

ventilation modifications.

1979 Contingency They also installed additional lead glass shielding, and installed glove box

for criticality drain screens "to provide an additional level, o f contingency for criticality

prevention prevention."

In the 234-5 Building itself, personnel installed a new criticality alarm, 

upgraded the gamma alarm system, installed new hand and foot counters, 

leak-tested fire suppression systems, verified and corrected as-built drawings, 

upgraded waste storage and staging facilities, wrote new procedures, safety 

analyses, process and operating specifications, and performed many other 

modifications. They re-roofed the 234-5 Building in 1983. Additionally,

DOE authorized construction of the 270-Z Office Building just north of the 

234-5 Building.

N o n -D e f e n s e W o r k

Beginning in the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission undertook new initiatives to interface with the burgeoning 

commercial nuclear industry. During subsequent years, the Hanford Site produced approximately 13 metric tons of 

fuel-grade plutonium (plutonium-239 in various blends with plutonium-240 and other plutonium isotopes). The RMA 

Line in the Plutonium Finishing Plant processed much of this amount as well as much fuel-grade plutonium shipped to 

the Hanford Site from off-site. Among the customers for fuel-grade RMA Line oxides during these years were some of the 

prime developers of commercial nuclear fuels.and experimental projects in the nation.

In 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission asked General Electric to investigate the feasibility of receiving, storing, and 

disbursing fuel-grade plutonium at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The Atomic Energy Commission wished to buy back 

plutonium produced by power reactors that operated on uranium fuel supplied by the Atomic Energy Commission. The 

Atomic Energy Commission then planned to sell the economically valuable plutonium at a later date for use in research 

programs. Nuclear Fuels Services facilities in West Valley, New York would separate Plutonium from spent fuels and 

purify it for shipment to Hanford as plutonium nitrate (Warren 1963, Kendall 1964, Braden 1965, Gifford 1965). The 

Atomic Energy Commission authorized Project CGC-180, Plutonium Buy-Back Facility, and construction forces installed 

it in the 234-5Z Building (Shaw 1966).

The Plutonium Finishing Plant began production of specially blended, fuel-grade plutonium oxide for EURATOM 

(European Atomic Energy Community - a consortium of the governments of France, West Germany, Italy, the 

Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) for commercial nuclear power development in September 1964. That same

Walser and 

VanDerCook 

1979a, 1979b; - 

Cahow et al. 

1979a, 1979b

Veneziano 1983, 

RHO 1984

B-184 Cochrane 1977;

Pinto 1979; 

ARHCO 1976a, 

1976b, 1977; 

Berube 1977a,

1977b, 1977c,

1977d

2-5.21
C h a p te r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pb o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

year, the 234-5Z Building began supplying fuel-grade plutonium (also known as unclassified plutonium) to Hanford's 

209-E Critical Mass Laboratory for experimental purposes and to a commercial firm for fuel development tests for the 

Southeast Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (GE 1966, Walser and Lyon 1965, Hewlett and Hoi I 1989).

When the Atomic Energy Commission announced its decision to withdraw weapons-grade plutonium fabrication work 

from the Plutonium Finishing Plant in late 1965, facility personnel undertook a diversification study for the building. The 

study concluded that the Atomic Energy Commission should encourage "the growth of a competitive commercial 

capability in the field of plutonium processing and fabrication ... comprehensive plutonium fabrication service [should 

be made available] to industry and government." (GE 1965b, p.2).

Beginning in 1966, the Plutonium Finishing Plant's interaction with the commercial nuclear industry, nuclear research 

customers, and foreign nuclear customers expanded rapidly. The RMC Line began processing fuel-grade plutonium from 

N Reactor. For the remainder ofthe year, plutonium finishing personnel shipped both weapons-grade and fuel-grade 

shipments of plutonium. Many national laboratories, private laboratories, and companies in the commercial nuclear 

industry became customers.

i

As the commercial nuclear industry continued to expand, plutonium finishing workers spent about 30 percent of their 

time and effort in non-defense work in 1968. ARHCO anticipated further non-defense work in the facility: "Plutonium 

oxide or mixtures of plutonium-uranium oxides for reactor programs w ill probably be supplied in large quantities" from 

the 234-5Z Building (Knights 1968, p. 1).

In 1976, a serious accident occurred at the 242-Z facility when a chemical explosion took place in a column that 

contained plutonium and americium. (This accident is discussed further later in the text.) Shortly after that time, the 

Energy Research and Development Agency began a long evaluation of the continued viability of the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant facilities. In late 1976, the agency gave the contract to produce oxides for Fast Flux Test Facility Cores 3 and 4 to 

the Savannah River Plant. These oxides then were shipped to the Hanford Site for sampling, blending, and re-packaging 

in part of the inactive fabrication equipment in the RMC Line. However, this work was a small fraction of the work that 

plutonium finishing workers had been expecting. They completed this work January 31,1979 (Reberger 1977,

Cockeram 1978, RHO 1979a).

At the same time, national policy regarding nuclear energy and nuclear fuel re-processing was changing in significant 

ways. The federal breeder reactor program, for which the Fast Flux Test Facility was a prototype, was cancelled In 1979. 

Policy preferences of the Carter Administration, as well as contamination events at the West Valley facility, led to a 

decision to stop re-processing and blending defense materials with commercial nuclear materials. In 1978, DOE ordered 

the deactivation of the Plutonium Finishing Plant facilities. Non-defense work in the facility was halted, although some 

fuel-grade plutonium was still produced as a by-product of shutdown.

Qu a l it y Co n t r o l : An a l y t ic a l La b o r a t o r ie s

As originally constructed, the 234-5Z Building contained only one analytical laboratory, also known as the sample 

laboratory or the process control laboratory. All of the building's safety bases and criticality assumptions depended upon 

knowing the isotopic content and amounts of plutonium being handled. This laboratory functioned to analyze samples 

ofthe plutonium product from various stages of the finishing process to ensure the materials were within safety and 

isotopic specifications. The laboratory also supported chemical analysis-of materials used in the finishing process.

The analytical laboratory was located at the east end of the Plutonium Finishing Plant toward the south side. Phase II of 

the plutonium finishing construction project included the completion of two more rooms in the analytical laboratory. 

Chemical laboratory assistants known as "laboratorians" (later called laboratory technicians) initially worked in openfaced hoods, but for safety purposes, federal and contractor management converted many hoods to glove boxes over the 

years (Roemer 1970).

2 - 5 .2 2
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

The analytical laboratory began operation when the RC Line started up in July 1949. By 1951, the analytical laboratory 

went from a two-shift to a four-shift operation 5 days a week to accommodate plutonium production increases 

(GE 1951 g). By April 1952, the analytical laboratory operated on a two-shift, 7-day per week basis to accommodate 

even further production increases (GE 1952f). In March 1953, the 231 -Z analytical laboratory closed and sent its work to 

the Plutonium Finishing Plant analytical laboratory, thus increasing the workload on 234-5Z chemists performing sample 

analyses (GE 1953g).

Throughout the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, the plutonium finishing laboratories worked to support the 

Plutonium Reclamation Facility, the U 0 3 Plant and RMC Line campaigns as well as the modifications and upgrades 

associated with them. Chemists revised laboratory procedures and sample and analysis plans for these campaigns 

(RHO 1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c). During 1994-1996 as plutonium finishing and other personnel wrote the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant Environmental Impact Statement, laboratory chemists studied ways to analyze, verify, and 

stabilize the nearly 8000 containers of multi-faceted plutonium-bearing scrap stored in the Plutonium Finishing Plant 

complex. DOE plans to deactivate the laboratories once the stabilization campaigns are completed. For more 

information, see Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization: Final Environmental Impact Statement (document no. DOE/ 

E1S-0244-F), dated May 1996.

Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t : De v e l o p m e n t a l a n d

Me t a l l u r g ic a l La b o r a t o r ie s

The developmental laboratory also was known as the Plutonium Chemistry Laboratory, process improvement laboratory, 

research and development laboratory, and in later years the Chemical Technology Laboratory. It was located at the 

southwest corner of the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Previous to the availability of a developmental laboratory in the 

234-5Z Building, chemists carried out early research and development for plutonium finishing in the nearby 231-Z 

Building (GE 1953j, Bell 1950).

In addition to the developmental laboratory, a plutonium metallurgy laboratory operated in the Plutonium Finishing Plant 

from late 1952 to late 1956 when it moved to the 231-Z Building. The metallurgy laboratory examined the material 

properties of plutonium in its metallic state, studying alloys, tensile properties, stability, and fabrication and coating 

methods (GE 1953d).

As soon as processing began in the Plutonium Finishing Plant in 1949, personnel in both the developmental and 

analytical laboratories directed their efforts to improving the accuracy of measurements, reducing product losses, and 

trouble-shooting process difficulties that arose. They were intensely interested in the development of methods to recover 

and recycle plutonium from scrap and waste materials (Kendall 1949). The other field they mainly pursued was how to 

couple the plutonium products ofthe separations plants directly to the RG Line process, thus bypassing 231-Z Building 

operations (Groswith 1949, Barton 1950a, 1950b). Throughout the operation o f the Plutonium Finishing Plant these 

laboratories contributed to process improvements that enhanced both the quality of the product and the productivity of 

the plant, improvements in product measurement techniques, plutonium recovery and recycling techniques and support 

to PUREX and the U 0 3 Plant (Gerber 1997).

Re c o v e r y a n d Re c y c l in g o f P l u t o n iu m

Nearly as soon as they began processing plutonium nitrate in the RG Line in 1949, building personnel began to look for 

ways to recycle and recover plutonium from wastes generated in the process. Atomic Energy Commission and contractor 

personnel considered these studies important because of the high economic value of plutonium and the desire to 

implement better waste management practices. In fact, over the years of plutonium finishing operations, they gave more 

attention to recovery activities than to anything else except production.

2 - 5 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Early recycling efforts included skull recovery, recycling analytical laboratory wastes, and the recovery of Task I 

supernatant. Skull recovery was the retrieval of plutonium from metallic plutonium-bearing scraps (GE 1952n). These 

scraps, known as skulls, were the hardened residues left on the molds in which the plutonium metal was cast. Operators 

commenced operations in the facility November 1952 and performed so successfully that they were able to recapture 

1000 grams of plutonium for use in the process of preparing plutonium (IV) oxalate in the 231-Z Building during the first 

month (Facer and Weidenbaum 1951; GE 1952n, 1953d).

Major recycling efforts included the operation of the RECUPLEX Facility, the 232-Z Incinerator, the 242-Z Waste 

Treatment Facility and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility

RECUPLEX Fa c il it y

In 1951, plutonium finishing chemists piloted the RECUPLEX (RECovery of Uranium and PLutonium by Extraction) 

process in the developmental laboratory (GE 1951 h, Cooper 1951 b). The process produced a plutonium solution in a 

concentration range from 50 to 60 grams per liter as suitable feed for the 234 Building metal line. By the end of 1951, 

plutonium finishing engineers were designing a RECUPLEX process for placement in Room 221 and duct level Room 263 

of the 234-5Z Building. Demonstrations showed plutonium nitrate produced in the RECUPLEX process had a high purity 

(99.9+ percent) and a good yield (approximately 99.9 percent) (H ill and Leitz 1952, p. 5). On May 1, 1953, construction 

forces began work, and they completed the facility in March 1955. Engineers began processing with plutonium feed 

material (supernates from Task I) on July 11 (GE 1953i, 1955h, 1955h; Lane 1965).

The RECUPLEX Facility consisted of three large, stainless steel glove boxes with lucite panels. Glove box operations 

were largely manual. Operators manipulated a control panel in the RECUPLEX room as w ell as gloves attached to the 

boxes themselves. The majority o f RECUPLEX feed was solid waste in the form of slag and crucible fragments, scrap 

powders from RMA Line operations, oxidized plutonium turnings from Task V, and remnants from metal samples. 

Operators placed this material in the slag and crucible glove box, where equipment dissolved and filtered it. Pumps then 

sent the liquid product from this glove box to the receiving and blending glove box to be blended with other 

contaminated liquid feed streams from the 234-5Z Building. The receiving and blending glove box functioned as a feed 

preparation facility for the solvent extraction glove box where the plutonium-bearing liquid feed was mixed with 

15-20 percent tributyl phosphate in carbon tetrachloride solution and processed through a solvent extraction system.

The end product was a plutonium-nitrate stream concentrated to between 80-100 grams per liter plutonium (Judson 

1956).

During 1958^1960, the plutonium finishing operators and engineers frequently set new processing records at RECUPLEX. 

In March 1959, they recovered 94 kilograms of plutonium. That July, they set another record and then surpassed that in 

December. Due to increasing production needs, plutonium finishing managers changed RECUPLEX operations from a 

5-day to a 7-day work week in late 1960 (Smith 1958; GE 1959c, 1959d, 1960c, 1960J). However, high production at 

RECUPLEX was accompanied by a series of serious radiation events and a mounting number of equipment failures. 

Throughout 1958-1960, plutonium production levels at the Hanford Site continued to increase. As a consequence, 

throughput in all facilities rose, and the RECUPLEX equipment was subject to increasing stress from the high volume of 

very corrosive solutions. Also, the buildup of nuclear materials in equipment joints, crevices, and other inaccessible 

areas brought about constantly rising radiation readings in the RECUPLEX room itself. General Electric stated that 

because of these high levels, RECUPLEX shut down for "an extensive cleanup of hoods and equipment" in February 

1960. When a criticality accident (nuclear excursion) resulted in widespread contamination throughout the RECUPLEX 

room on April 7, 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission decided in May 1962 to deactivate the RECUPLEX Facility on a 

permanent basis.

2 3 2 - Z In c in e r a t o r

Spring 1958, plutonium finishing engineers proposed construction of the 232-Z Incinerator as a way to recover 

plutonium from miscellaneous solid wastes generated in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Candidate wastes would include

2 - 5 .2 4
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

cartons, filters, rags, paper, gloves, clothing, tools, and small equipment components. In the vision of the engineers, 

plutonium-bearing materials first would be hand-sorted into burnable or leachable fractions. The combustible materials 

would be incinerated, and then the plutonium would be recovered by a wet leaching of the ash. Noh-combustible 

materials would be leached in nitric acid and then transferred to RECUPLEX (later the Plutonium Reclamation Facility) for 

solvent extraction recovery of plutonium.

Plutonium finishing personnel carried out design revisions and construction of the 232-Z Facility during 1959-1961.

They executed pre-start acceptance tests and additional modifications during late 1961. On January 8, 1962, they began 

full-scale operations with waste materials. (As soon as it is published, a description of the 232-Z Facility can be found in 

Appendix B on the Internet.) Early leaching operations proceeded smoothly. At the incinerator itself, however, the 

conveyor belt began to fail within just 2 months of startup. Furthermore, it continually jammed or slipped and needed 

tightening, and the chopper blades also needed frequent replacement. Because of these problems, plutonium finishing 

operators were able to log only small amounts of time on the 232-Z Incinerator (from zero to a maximum of 12 hours per 

week) during the first 3 months (Bruns et al. 1963).

Operators continued with sporadic incinerator performance throughout the rest of the year, never achieving more than 

17 hours per week of operating time (Bruns et al. 1963). Yet, despite all ofthe problems, the 232-Z Facility did recover 

enough plutonium to achieve economic pay-back of its costs within the first operating year (Reinker 1964).

In 1973, ARHCO shut the incinerator down as part of an overall review of the Plutonium Finishing Plant's interfaces with 

the environment. Although plutonium finishing workers made many suggestions for the improvement of incinerator 

operations throughout 1974-1976, the Atomic Energy Commission never restarted the 232-Z Facility (Felt 1974).

2 4 2 - Z Wa s t e Tr e a t m e n t Fa c il it y

As a part of the overall effort to reclaim plutonium from wastes at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, the Atomic Energy 

Commission authorized Project CGC-912, 242-Z Waste Treatment Facility, in 1960. W hile the RECUPLEX Facility 

recycled solid wastes and organic liquid wastes and the 232-Z Facility recycled combustible and leachable solid wastes, 

the 242-Z Facility recovered plutonium from aqueous waste streams produced in the Plutonium Finishing Plant.

The 242-Z Facility is described in Appendix B on the Internet. In the spring of 1962 after the criticality event occurred at 

RECUPLEX, the Atomic Energy Commission undertook intensive criticality reviews of the 242-Z Facility. The agency 

decided to add neutron monitors, samplers, and filters as well as interlocks and flow rate regulators. The facility began 

operations in late 1963 (Battey 1962, Graf et al. 1962, Braden 1963, Braden et al. 1963).

In 1964, construction forces installed an americium-241 recovery system in a glove box in the 242-Z Facility. It became 

operational in May 1965. The product was americium nitrate. In 1969, plutonium finishing workers installed equipment 

in the 242-Z Facility to convert the americium-241 recovery operation from a batch to a continuous process and to 

increase the purity and concentration ofthe americium product (Braden and Ciccarelli 1963, Lane 1965, Krigens and

Laws 1968, ARHCO 1969b).

On April 30, 1976, a strike by the Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council stopped virtually all processing at the Hanford 

Site. W hile operators were restarting the americium recovery equipment in the 242-Z Facility on August 30, 1976, an 

explosion occurred in a column o f one of the glove boxes (the cation exchange column W 14A within the WT2 glove 

box). This column contained about 100 grams of americium-241 that had accumulated on the resin before shutdown. 

The chemical operator who was standing in front of the column was grossly contaminated and suffered facial cuts, burns, 

eye damage, and some americium-241 deposition.

An Environmental Research and Development Agency investigation determined that the probable cause of the explosion 

was an exothermic reaction between the 7 molar (a measure of acid concentration) of nitric acid and the radiolytic 

degradation products from the resin in the column. The column's pressure relief system was not adequate. Following 

the accident, the Environmental Research and Development Agency closed the 242-Z Facility permanently

2 - 5 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

(ERDA 1976a, Heid et al. 1979). The accident also had a far-reaching effect on operations throughout the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant because it prompted a series of evaluations that led DOE to decide in 1978 to decontaminate and 

decommission most of the Plutonium Finishing Plant facilities.

P l u t o n iu m Re c l a m a t io n Fa c il it y

During 1960, General Electric proposed to the Atomic Energy Commission the construction o f a multi-purpose plutonium 

reclamation facility at the Hanford Site. The reclamation facility would be an enlarged, safer, and more flexible version 

of RECUPLEX. The Atomic Energy Commission agreed and approved construction the same year (GE 1960h, Travis 

1960). After the April 1962 criticality closed the RECUPLEX Facility permanently, the rapid completion of the Plutonium 

Reclamation Facility became a virtual necessity for plutonium finishing operations (Zangar 1962, GE 1962d).

Construction ofthe Plutonium Reclamation 

Facility began June 1962 and concluded 

December 1963. After initial test runs, 

operators began processing in May 

1964. The Plutonium Reclamation 

Facility (236-Z Building) differed from 

RECUPLEX in that it used a continuous 

organic treatment and recycling process, 

operated remotely, and contained 

geometrically favorable equipment 

rather than relying on administrative 

controls to ensure nuclear safety (Low 

1967). Geometrically favorable 

equipment was equipment built in 

sizes and configurations that would 

avoid an accumulation of plutonium 

large enough to cause a criticality.

Figure 2-5.8 shows a schematic of the 

Plutonium Reclamation Facility.

wS&ENANCE

MISCELLANEOUS TREATMENT

Figure 2-5.8. Schematic o f the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, 1984 The Plutonium Reclamation Facility 

(236-Z Facility) is described in Appendix B

on the Internet. The Plutonium Reclamation Facility process began w ith the Miscellaneous Treatment system, a 

collection of five (later six) glove boxes located on the fourth floor of the facility. Operators dissolved or leached 

plutonium-bearing scrap in a Miscellaneous Treatment glove box. Plutonium-bearing scrap that already existed in 

aqueous solution bypassed the Miscellaneous Treatment system and entered the next phase of processing (solvent 

extraction) from a transfer station located in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. In upgrades completed in 1983, 

construction forces installed equipment for the transfer of plutonium-bearing scrap already in aqueous solution in a glove 

box located in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (Upington 1968, Ludowise 1980).

Operators accomplished solvent extraction in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility through remote operation of 

equipment in a large central cell known as the canyon. They used a solution of tributyl phosphate diluted with carbon 

tetrachloride to strip metal nitrates and other wastes out o f the plutonium-bearing feed. Then they used a nitric acidhydroxylamine solution to separate the product. They concentrated the product stream as plutonium nitrate to be ready 

as feed for the RMA and RMC Lines (Ludowise 1980).

By 1969 according to ARHCO, the Plutonium Reclamation Facility was processing approximately 4000 scrap items per 

month. The facility routinely processed ash from the 232-Z Incinerator, dissolved solids (plutonium metal and plutonium 

oxides), performed solvent extraction, and operated several unique processes for materials "not adaptable for direct input

2 -5 .2 6

L
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

to other processing" (Kuklinski and Olson 1969, p. 7). One glove box processed chloride scraps, and another began 

burning polystyrene cubes embedded with plutonium for recovery of product material. During June and July 1969, 

operators executed another successful process test that paved the way for routine dissolving of the magnesium oxide 

crucibles used in the reduction step of the RMC Line. Again, they were burdened with ongoing equipment breakdowns 

and corrosion caused by the high corrosivity of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility process solutions (ARHCO 1969b).

Maintenance outages and repairs continued to impact the operation ofthe facility. In mid-1975, ARHCO reported that 

the Plutonium Reclamation Facility operated only about 25 percent ofthe time because of the need to replace corroded 

pumps, valves, and lines. The Energy Research and Development Agency shut down the Plutonium Reclamation Facility 

in late December 1975 for maintenance upgrades and reviews of criticality prevention specifications and procedures. 

After restart, the Plutonium Reclamation Facility operated only a short time until the explosion in the 242-Z Facility 

resulted in the shutdown of the entire Plutonium Finishing complex. The facility did not again resume full operations.

Ef f l u e n t s a n d Ef f l u e n t Co n t r o l

Cr i b s , Dit c h e s , a n d Ta n k s

Over the years, the various federal agencies and contractors who managed the Plutonium Finishing Plant built 22 soil 

disposal facilities, including cribs, ditches, tile fields, reverse wells and French drains to receive liquid wastes from the 

various Plutonium Finishing Plant facilities. The facilities were designated as 216-Z structures. Suffix numbers were 

applied in sequence according to when the structures were constructed. During the early years of plutonium isolation 

and finishing activities at the Hanford Site, plutonium finishing workers disposed all wastes not designated for plutonium 

recovery or recycling to the soil column. They fed these wastes to the soil through the 241 -Z Facility, a system of holding 

and sampling tanks and associated piping and auxiliary facilities (Smetana 1976/Marshall 1977, Pinto 1978).

Throughout the operating years at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, personnel replaced cribs when plutonium breakthrough 

occurred beyond limits defined as acceptable at the time. For example in 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission 

authorized replacement of crib 216-Z-3 when soil samples indicated 

that plutonium had reached a depth o f 50 feet above the water table.

The various federal management agencies authorized many other crib 

replacements over the years. As the result of crib disposal of organic 

solvents from plutonium finishing processes for many years, a large 

amount o f carbon tetrachloride entered the ground just south and east 

of the 236 Z Building. !

Z - 9 Cr i b M in in g

One unique aspect to the management of effluents from the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant was the mining of the Z-9 Crib. The 216-Z-9 Crib was 

a 21-foot deep underground soil disposal facility with an enclosed 

cavern (a wooden void-space) at the head end, located just southeast 

of the 234-5Z Building. It was covered by a 9-inch thick concrete 

slab measuring 90 feet by 120 feet, but the crib sloped inward toward 

its bottom and was only 30 feet by 60 feet at the floor. The crib was 

built during 1954 to serve the RECUPLEX Facility, and it received the 

current acid waste stream of both aqueous and organic wastes from 

RECUPLEX operations as well as unwashed fabrication oil from the 

RMA Line from 1955-1962. Figure 2-5.9 shows the above ground 

equipment used to mine plutonium from the 216-Z-9 Crib. Figure 2-5.9. Equipment Used to Mine

Plutonium from the 216-Z-9 Crib> 1976

2 -5 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

General Electric took samples of crib soil in 1964 and 1965 and concluded that the crib posed a "potential criticality 

hazard" (Fillmore 1965, p. 1). The company developed a soil mining and leaching plan as early as 1966. Essentially, the 

plan called for the use of modified mining equipment to remove the top 1 -foot layer of crib soil and to leach out the 

plutonium by dissolving batches ofthe soil in mixtures of nitric-hydrofluoric acids. The plan further specified that the 

leached soil would be packaged into drums and buried in specified Hanford Site solid waste burial grounds (Bierman 

1964, Borgeson 1966).

In 1967, sampling personnel revised estimates ofthe plutonium content ofthe Z-9 Crib from the 27.5 kilogram figure 

given in 1965 to 196 kilograms. Wide variations existed in soil sample results based on where in the crib (position and 

soil depth) samples were taken. Hanford scientists advanced a number of theories to explain the differing results, 

including postulating that gelatinous precipitates had formed when RECUPLEX waste contacted local soils, and that ion 

exchange reactions between solvents and the soil were "holding up" plutonium in the soil's upper layers. At the time, 

neither cation, anion, nor organic residue analyses had been run, nor had pulsed neutron reactivity measurements been 

taken (Anderson 1972). Because of the widely varying soil sample results, Hanford scientists modified project proposals 

for the mining activity as well as the chemical flow sheets for the leaching process many times. These changes, as well 

as the changeover in the Hanford Site chemical processing contract from Isochem, Inc. to ARHCO in 1967, delayed the 

soil mining project (Ingalls 1967, Borgeson 1967, Knights 1969).

After a number of other delays, on August 17, 1976, plutonium finishing personnel began the first removal of 

contaminated soil from the Z-9 Crib. Nine days later, the Energy Research and Development Agency shut down the 

operation to resolve differences in two methods of soil analysis being used. On January 11, 1977, they authorized the 

resumption of mining operations. Plutonium finishing personnel removed the top 1 foot of soil from the north half of the 

crib and produced a total of 28.5 kilograms o f plutonium. When they mined the south half, they produced

29.5 kilograms of plutonium and completed the operation July 14, 1978 (Matody 1976; Hanson 1977, 1978).

Efflu e n t Cle a n u p Project

By the late 1960s, Hanford Site records indicated that about 80 percent of the plutonium discharges to Hanford Site soils 

came from Plutonium Finishing Plant facilities. The Atomic Energy Commission directed ARHCO to recommend 

program upgrades to correct this situation (Sloat 1967). In response to ARHCO proposals, the Atomic Energy 

Commission authorized Project HCP-669, Plutonium Effluent Cleanup, in March 1972. This project was designed to 

"provide final disposal of the collected organic wastes [produced by the plutonium finishing operations and] to isolate 

and im mobilize the associated radioactivity" (Hall T972, p. 2). The project entailed three components: conversion of 

high-salt aqueous waste (mostly from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility) into a salt cake, using the 242-T Evaporator; 

recovery of carbon tetrachloride from spent organic extractant at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility through a steam 

distillation process; and storage of the degraded organic phosphate residue from the extractant in existing tanks (Hanson 

1971, 1972; Chiaramonte 1972; Nemzek 1972).

St a b il iz a t io n a n d De a c t iv a t io n

After the Plutonium Reclamation Facility shut down in 1987 and the RMC Line shut down in 1989, the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant entered a waiting period while the world witnessed some of the most historic events of the twentieth 

century. In late 1991, the former Soviet Union began to dissolve into fifteen separate and independent republics.

January 1993, President George Bush signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) with Russian 

President Boris Yeltsin. The result was that U.S. policy makers decided not to manufacture more weapons-grade 

plutonium.

DOE signed a Record of Decision on the final Environmental Impact Statement for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. This 

Record o f Decision outlined the manner in which the agency would complete stabilization. Unlike traditional 

approaches, the Plutonium Finishing Plant Record of Decision identified a toolbox of multiple stabilization and cleanup

2 - 5 .2 8

1

:i
Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

alternatives that could be used as needs arise during the various processes. Among the alternatives were the cementation 

of some plutonium bearing solids, thermal stabilization of some plutonium-bearing liquids, and various treatment 

methods for plutonium oxide polycubes and other unusual items. Selection of the alternatives would be determined 

more precisely as laboratory characterization and knowledge of treatment alternatives went forward. Monitoring and 

control systems could be changed as various nuclear inventories were moved, removed, and stabilized. The various 

degrees of cleanout over time at the 232-Z Incinerator, the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, and the 231-Z Plutonium 

Isolation Building nearby were not prescribed completely, but options were bounded that would allow stabilization 

methods and time frames to change. There are no agreements to remove the plutonium vaults that are located in 

buildings separate from the main plants in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (Vogt 1996; Nuclear Waste News 1996a,

1996b).

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

As with the other operations in the plutonium production process, the history of plutonium finishing is one of continually 

being pressed to expand production during the Cold War era. Key to keeping pace was the move from the manual to 

mechanical production lines. That move, however, was fraught with problems, which researchers and workers raced to 

solve. This narrative addresses many ofthe remote mechanical line problems and solutions, but because this narrative is 

a history of facilities and not intended to be the definitive history of plutonium finishing, there are areas not addressed, 

which future researchers may want to explore, such as:

• How did plutonium finishing work at the Hanford Site compare with plutonium finishing operations at the

Los Alamos and Rocky Flats sites?

• Did the needs and requirements of the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site have an effect on the 

production rates, separations chemistry, or other operations? If so, what changes were made at other facilities to 

accommodate the plutonium finishing needs? O r was the Plutonium Finishing Plant able to be responsive to the 

other Hanford production facilities, handling whatever materials were sent to it?

• How can the decision to construct and begin operating the Plutonium Finishing Plant without connecting it to 

existing underground, high-level waste storage tanks or to construct new tanks specifically for the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant, be understood? At what level and by whom was this decision made, and what evidence can be 

found for the rationale? Did anyone argue in favor of high-level waste tanks for the early Plutonium Finishing 

Plant? If so, who and what arguments did they advance?

• Storage of finished plutonium and plutonium scraps, leftovers from experiments, and other concentrated, nonwaste, alpha emitting substances at the Hanford Site took place largely at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The 

entire topic of the storage of plutonium and plutonium bearing materials should be explored. What facilities and 

standards were used? How were these facilities upgraded over time? Were the facilities and upgrades adequate? 

What, inventory of plutonium bearing materials is left in the Plutonium Finishing complex today, and what are 

the future plans for stabilization and storage of these materials?

2 - 5 .2 9
StCffW §

W m t o

MANAGEMENT,

sSSlS

-■-. •-;• :„ ■ .'il

i i r,A
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

Sec tio n 6 - Wa ste Ma n a g e m e n t

Manufacturing fuel, irradiating the elements, separating out the plutonium, and finishing the end product for use in 

weapons required numerous industrial, chemical, and radiological processes. Each process generated huge quantities of 

hazardous and/or radioactive waste at the Hanford Site. The character of this waste and the manner in which it was 

handled, transported, stored, and disposed of varied depending on the source of waste, era, location, and evolving 

knowledge, practices, and regulations.

Given the near lack of knowledge at the start o f Hanford's operations, the early managers had to develop waste 

management practices based on a limited understanding of nuclear physics, engineering, radiochemistry, and the effects 

of ionizing radiation on living organisms. E.l. Du Font de Nemours and Company, the contractor who designed and 

constructed the industrial complex necessary to manufacture plutonium, acted in concert with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to establish the initial waste management practices necessary to bring the early facilities on-line and to operate 

them through the final years of the World War II. Management by an experienced explosives manufacturer, exigencies of 

the war, pressure for plutonium production, practical expertise, and trial-and-error contributed to the initial family of 

waste management methods employed at the Hanford Site.

Some o fthe initial practices proved undesirable or impractical, and adjustments were made. Open ponds and trenches 

gave way to reverse wells, which yielded, in turn, to cribs. Burial containers that collapsed under the weight of cover 

materials were replaced with metal drums and concrete boxes. Segregation and retrievable storage was implemented as 

the special hazards of transuranic waste became apparent. Double-shell storage tanks replaced single-shell tanks for 

storage of high level waste. Record keeping improved.

Early waste management planners appear to have relied heavily on future technology to resolve problems that seemed to 

have no immediate solution. Herbert M. Parker, Hanford's chief health physicist during the Manhattan Project, stated in 

1948 that "Projection ofthe problem to [the] future...appears to be irrelevant in terms of the technological progress in 

corrective measures that can be anticipated" (Parker 1948a). With this reliance on future technology to resolve 

problems, waste management planners stored high level waste, stabilized contaminated soil by covering it.with fresh 

soil, disposed of low level liquid waste in the soil, and buried solid waste in shallow trenches. The waste has not gone 

away, although radioactive decay has reduced the magnitude ofthe radionuclide content O nly in the latter 1990s had 

Parker's expected "technological progress" begun to be applied in large scale to clean up the Hanford Site.

On the regulatory side, the Atomic Energy Act of 

1946 gave the Atomic Energy Commission control 

over radioactive waste and standards for managing 

the waste. The Leaf versus Hodel decision in 1984 

opened the legal door for increased environmental 

oversight by the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency and the Washington State Department of 

Ecology. In 1989, the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the State of Washington signed an agreement (the 

Tri-Party Agreement), which dictated a schedule for 

the many tasks needed to cleanup the Hanford Site 

(Ecology 1994).

Although managed, much of the waste at the 

Hanford Site remains. Some forms o f waste have 

at times crossed the boundaries ofthe Hanford Site

Co n ti nts

Waste Management Legislation................. 2-6.8

Process Facilities and Resulting Waste Streams 2-6.5

High Level Radioactive Liquid W aste .................2-6.6

Low Level Radioactive Liquid Waste ................2-6.1 j

Low Level Radioactive and Transuranic Solid

Waste............................................................... . 2-6.18

Airborne Radioactive Effluent................................ 2-6.26

Sanitary Liquid W aste (Sewage)................................. 2-6,28

Sanitary Solid Waste (Trash;....................................2-6.80

Areas for Further Research.....................................2-6.82

Divider Page Photo: Double-Shelf Tank Farm

2 -6 .1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

and impacted neighboring communities. With the full disclosure policy established by DOE in 1986 and the release of

19,000 pages of previously classified waste management and other data, much public criticism has been directed toward 

DOE and its predecessor agencies for allowing the waste to accumulate and, in some cases, to escape its artificially 

imposed boundaries. This criticism has served to improve cleanup efforts, openness, and accountability for managing 

the waste at the Hanford Site.

Table 2-6.1. Hanford Site Waste types and Nuclear Materials

Depth if Spread

on a Football

To appreciate the scope of the 

waste management task,

Table 2-6.1 shows what Hanford's 

current inventory of waste and 

nuclear materials includes.

DOE recognizes several distinct 

classes of waste that have been 

generated by the nation's nuclear 

industry and that must be 

managed. These include 

hazardous waste, low level waste, 

high level waste, transuranic waste, 

uranium m ill tailings, and various 

combinations of classes such as 

mixed low level waste. Because 

uranium m ill tailings are not 

present at the Hanford Site, they 

are not addressed further

(DOE 1992a). Most countries define high level and low level waste according to their level o f radioactivity. In the 

United States, however, DOE defines the classes of waste according to the waste source. This leads at times to "low level 

waste" having more radioactivity than waste classified as "high level" (Gephart and Lundgren 1997). Table 2-6.2 

provides definitions used in the United States for each of the classes of waste.

Volume Field Curies* Chemicals

Tank Waste 54 million gai 150 feet ZQQ million I 240,000 tons

i Solid Waste 25 million ft* | 500 feet 6 million [ 70,000 tons

Soil and

Groundwater

40 billion ft3 J 2Q8 miles 1 million I 108,600 to

| 300,000 tons

m k

Facilities 175 million ft? | 4000 feet 10 million j trace

mm Nuclear

Material

25,000 ft3 l 0.5 inch 200 million J none

Table 2-6.2. Classes o f Waste Generated at the Hanford Site

Waste Type Definition

H azardous W aste N on-radioactive solid waste, such as lead and other heavy metals, solvents, paints, oils, oth er hazardous organic m aterials, or

m aterials th a t pose a risk to th e environm ent and hum an health because the y e x h ib it certain characteristics o f corrosivity, 

ignStability, reactivity, o r to x ic ity (see 40 CFR Parts 260-279 fo r details)

L o w Level W aste A n y waste containing radioactive m aterials, e ith e r so lid or liq u id , that are n o t classified as high level waste, transuranic waste,

spent n u cle a r fuel, or by-prod uct m aterial

Transuranic W aste W aste contam inated w ith alpha e m itting radionuclides w ith half-lives greater than 20 years in concentrations m ore than

1 te n -m illio n th o f a curie per gram o f waste (DOE 1997e)

H igh Level W aste Solid and liq u id waste fro m the reprocessing o f spent reactor fuel to extract p lutonium and con taining some elem ents that

decay s lo w ly and rem ain radioactive fo r thousands o f years, requiring perm anent isolation. D ue to intense levels o f 

radioactivity, high level waste m ust be handled by remote con trol from behind protective shielding and is ty p ic a lly stored at 

the H anford Site in underground tanks (see 42 USC 10101 et seq. fo r details).

M ixe d W aste C om bination o f hazardous waste and lo w level o r transuranic waste

Sanitary W aste N on-regulated waste

2 - 6 .2
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

The above waste categories represent the end-product of many years of waste management regulation and are useful in 

managing today's waste inventory and waste currently being generated. However, these distinctions among waste types 

have not always existed. In the early years of Hanford Site operations, radioactive waste was more simply treated, and 

only two categories were generally recognized: high level and low level. High level waste was stored in underground 

tanks, and low level waste was disposed of in the soil. For practical purposes, low level waste was divided into liquid 

and solid waste categories with different disposal methods for each. Over time, additional waste categories were 

recognized, and associated waste treatment, storage and/or disposal methods were mandated.

Waste management practices at the Hanford Site have been characterized by evolving concepts of the physical behavior 

and environmental safety of radioactive and hazardous waste. This section is organized around the historical waste 

disposal practices employed at the Hanford Site rather than by modern waste categories.

Wa s t e Ma n a g e m e n t Le g is l a t io n

Legislation that has impacted the management of Hanford's waste has evolved over time and reflects the needs and 

desires of an interested and vocal populace.

No legislation relating specifically to waste management can be identified for the early years of operations at the Hanford 

Site. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Manhattan Project conducted its wartime affairs under a policy of strict secrecy. 

In the absence of knowledge, the public could only be minimally interested, demanding little or no regulatory legislation. 

Not until the Atom ic Energy Act of 1946 did the federal government begin to develop legislation dealing with atomic 

energy. The following chronology provides a partial characterization of legislation that has impacted the management of 

nuclear processes and the resultant waste.

1942 The Manhattan Project was the U.S. Government's top-secret program to produce an atomic bomb for use 

during World War II. Internal Army and contractor standards and procedures were developed to dictate the 

management of waste.

1946 The Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2011 et seq.) placed production and control of nuclear materials within a

civilian agency, originally the Atomic Energy Commission created in 1947. The Atomic Energy Commission was 

succeeded by the Energy Research and Development Administration (1975), which, in turn, was replaced by the 

U.S. Department of Energy (1977).

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 USC 1251 et seq. 1948) provided the original framework for water 

pollution control. It was later amended and renamed the "Clean Water Act."

The Clean Air Act (42 USC 7401 et seq.) was enacted to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air 

resources. Its primary application is through permits to regulate new and existing facilities.

The National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC 4321 et seq.) established the requirements for conducting 

environmental reviews o f federal actions that have the potential for significant impact on the human 

environment.

The Atomic Energy Commission Immediate Action Directive 0511-21 defined transuranic waste and directed that 

transuranic waste could no longer be buried and should instead be segregated and placed in retrievable storage.

1972 The Maritime Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (33 USC 1401 et seq.) was enacted to regulate ocean 

dumping of waste and, thereby, prohibited the dumping of any waste from the Hanford Site in the ocean.

1973 Atomic Energy Commission Order 0511 amplified and enlarged on the Immediate Action Directive (IAD)

0511-21 of 1970.

1974 The Safe Drinking Water Act (42 USC 300f et seq.) was enacted to protect drinking water supplies. Standards 

developed under these amendments are used in groundwater monitoring programs.

1948

1955

1969

1970

2 - 6 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

1976 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 USC 6901) established a national policy to reduce or 

eliminate hazardous waste and treat, store, and dispose to minimize the threat of pollution. The Hazardous and 

Solid Waste Amendments amended RCRA in 1984 to expand RCRA's scope and add detailed requirements.

1976 The Toxic Substances Control Act (15 USC 2601 et seq.) was enacted to protect human health and the 

environment from exposure to and manufacture, distribution, use, or disposal of substances containing toxic 

chemicals.

1977 The Clean Water Act (33 USC 1251 et seq. 1977) amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Its 

objective is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters."

The act addresses surface water only.

The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System is a provision of the Clean Water Act, which prohibits 

discharge of pollutants into U.S. waters unless a special permit is issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, a State, or a Tribal Government of an Indian reservation.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 USC 9601 et seq.) 

was enacted as a federal statute (also known as the Superfund) that provides the statutory authority for cleanup of 

hazardous substances that could endanger public health, welfare, or the environment. It was reauthorized and 

amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 1986.

The National Priorities List is a list of the most serious uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste sites 

identified for possible long-term remedial action under CERCLA.

The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program is a DOE program that addresses the cleanup of sites and 

adjacent properties contaminated by activities of the Manhattan Project.

1982 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (42 USC 10101 et seq.) was enacted. It directs DOE to design, site, and 

construct a geologic repository for the disposal of defense, high level radioactive waste and for spent fuel from 

civilian (commercial) nuclear reactors.

NWPA established a Nuclear Waste Fund to fund the geologic repository by assessing fees on the public 

utilities that w ill use the repository. The fund resulted in the construction of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near 

Carlsbad, New Mexico.

1984 The Leaf versus Model decision required DOE to comply more fully with RCRA and CERCLA. Neither RCRA nor 

CERCLA had a major impact on DOE production systems before the Leaf versus Model decision. With that 

decision, DOE applied the ruling department wide, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and 

Washington State Department of Ecology became more involved as regulators of RCRA and CERCLA.

1989 The Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology 1994) was signed.

An agreement among DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington State Department of 

Ecology, it legally requires DOE to safely manage and dispose of liquid and solid waste at the Hanford Site. It 

contains milestone deadlines by which specific waste management and cleanup activities are to be 

accomplished.

1991 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510) was enacted, requiring DOE to 

identify and monitor certain categories of underground high level waste tanks.

In addition to the legislation listed above, the following current DOE Orders, listed by order number, regulate today's 

waste management at the Hanford Site.

1540.2 Hazardous Material Packaging for Transport outlines administrative procedures for the certification and

use of radioactive and hazardous material packaging.

' 1980

: ]

i x

|

2 - 6 .4
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

5400 Series . General Environmental Protection Program ensures that all DOE environmental restoration program 

activities w ill comply with applicable local, state, and federal environmental protection laws and 

regulations.

5440.1 C National Environmental Policy Act establishes DOE procedures to implement NEPA.

5600 Series Management of DOE Weapons Program and Weapons Complex assigns responsibilities and authority

for the packaging and transportation of nuclear materials.

5820.2A Radioactive Waste Management establishes policies to manage high level, low level, and transuranic

waste.

P r o c e s s Fa c il it ie s a n d Re s u l t in g Wa s t e St r e a m s

Several industrial-scale process facilities operated in concert to produce Hanford plutonium. The production process 

began with the receipt of purified uranium billets at the 300 Area fuels manufacturing facility. Through a series of 

extrusion and m illing processes, operators transformed the raw uranium into 6-inch long, rod-shaped reactor fuel 

elements, referred to as slugs. Because the fuel elements were to be in direct contact with cooling water in the reactor 

core and since uranium oxidizes rapidly in water, the fuel elements had to be jacketed in a material that did not react 

with water. The operators used a dipping process to apply an aluminum alloy that fully coated each element. Operators 

followed strict quality control procedures to weigh and measure the fuel elements and check the integrity of the jacket 

These fuel manufacturing processes produced uranium-contaminated liquid and solid waste that were disposed of in 

300 Area waste sites.

i

Trucks transported the fuel elements to one of nine production reactors where the elements were loaded into a reactor 

core and irradiated for a specified period of time and power level. In this process, neutrons generated in the reactor core 

interacted with uranium atoms to form plutonium. The fuel elements were then discharged from the reactor core into 

fuel storage basins where they were allowed to cool under 20 feet of water. The cooling process reduced the 

temperature of the elements and allowed for decay of short-lived radioisotopes created in the irradiation process.

Reactor operations generated several waste streams including solid waste that was disposed of in burial grounds, low 

level liquid waste that was disposed of in the soil, and reactor cooling water, another form of low level liquid waste.

After passing through the reactor, the cooling water (reactor effluent) from the reactors without closed loop systems was 

allowed to cool in holding basins before release to the Columbia River.

After the now intensively radioactive fuel elements cooled in the reactor fuel storage basin, operators transferred them by 

remote handling methods into heavily shielded shipping casks and transported them by rail to one of the chemical 

separations plants located in the 200 Areas. There, the fuel elements were dissolved in acid, and through a wet chemical 

process the plutonium was separated from the uranium matrix of the fuel elements. The processes involved in chemical 

separations resulted in high level liquid waste.that was transferred through underground lines to underground storage 

tanks. Low level liquid waste was also generated and disposed of in ponds, trenches, French drains, and cribs (see 

Glossary for definitions). Solid waste was shipped by truck or rail to 200 Area burial grounds for disposal. Airborne 

contaminants were vented up stacks and released to the atmosphere.

The separated plutonium, a gelatinous semi-solid, was transferred to the Plutonium Finishing Plant in the 200 West Area 

where it was converted into plutonium metal and then formed for use in weapons. The Plutonium Finishing Plant 

generated small quantities of high level waste as well as larger quantities of low level liquid and solid waste, all of which 

were stored or disposed of in 200 West Area disposal or storage facilities.

Scientists conducted extensive research and development in support of the plutonium production technologies, primarily 

in the 300 Area laboratories. The low level liquid and solid waste generated from this research was disposed of in the

2 - 6 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

300 Area ponds, trenches, burial grounds, and at waste disposal facilities in other areas. Some 300 Area laboratory solid 

waste was high level waste that required special handling and burial facilities. Low level solid waste was also received 

from offsite locations for disposal at the Hanford Site.

All program areas generated conventional solid waste that was disposed of in landfills and sanitary liquid waste that was 

disposed of in conventional septic tank and other sewage treatment facilities.

The agencies in charge of the Hanford Site have monitored groundwater on the Hanford Site since the 1940s to help 

determine what chemical and radiological contaminants have made their way into the groundwater and the vadose 

zone—the soil between the ground surface and the water table. Regulatory requirements for monitoring increased in the 

1980s.

Hig h Le v e l R A D ib A cn v E Liq u id Wa s t e

H igh Lex cl U .ulio.u lix c W«i-4e

" H r jih i.u lin .n li\e u . !«./«' n i.ite ii.il resultinu tru in the

teprtnessm n m spent n u ile .ii tuvl, in i ludinn liq u id » .i« h i 

pru dm v il d in \ tl\ in iv p im i ’W M i' and m u solid m .ilv ii.il

d e n ie d in n n s u ili liq u id n a - f r th .it t fffi/.i/n - risdon p io d iu Is

in siiffi< icnt t fa it e iitia tio iis . .in d o lhe i /ir y /i/i i.id m .n ti\ c 

n u ite ii.d tli.it is de le tn iin e d t a n .M e n / w ith o \i*tu ii; I.m , In

require perm anent isolation '-!)<>[ J001

Five chemical separations plants primarily produced 

Hanford's high level radioactive waste, although the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant and other operations 

contributed small quantities. T and B Plants were the 

pioneer plants that operated from the mid 1940s 

through 1956. Improved technologies led to the 

Reduction-Oxidation Plant (REDOX) that operated from 

1952 to 1967, and to the Plutonium-Uranium 

Extraction Plant (PUREX) that operated from 1956 to 

1988. U Plant (221 -U) operated from 1952 until 1958 

to recover uranium from T and B Plant high level 

radioactive waste. All plants used complex, toxic and 

corrosive chemicals in their separation processes.

At each separations plant, operators dissolved the irradiated 

uranium fuel rods in nitric acid, which removed both the 

protective outer jacketing and reduced the uranium-plutonium 

metal to a liquid state. They then extracted plutonium from the 

uranium nitrate solution and sent it to the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant to be purified into plutonium metal.

Each step of the plutonium extraction process produced high 

level radioactive waste that was transferred through underground 

lines to large underground storage tanks located in tank farms 

(see Figure 2-6.1 and the Historic Property Inventory Form for 

the Chemical Handling Facility/Tank Farm, 334 Building, in 

Appendix B on the Internet) near each separations plant. Much 

of this high level radioactive waste continues to be in storage 

today.

Ch a r a c t e r iz a t io n

Figure 2-6.1. Double-Shell, High Level Radioactive

Waste Tank Farm under Construction, 1978

High level radioactive waste is difficult to characterize. The differing chemical separation processes employed over time 

produced twenty-six different waste streams that were chemically dissimilar but were combined in the underground 

tanks to form even more complex waste combinations. Exposure to air, heat, cascading, settling, radioactive decay, 

kinetics, and subsequent chemical treatments further complicated the nature of the high level radioactive waste w ith

2 - 6 .6
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

radical differences developing from tank to tank. The addition of 

sodium hydroxide, an acid neutralizes caused portions of the waste 

to form solid particles and to separate into layers. Evaporation of 

liquids led to salt cake (see Figure 2-6.2) and slurry formation, 

causing further uneven distribution of chemical compounds and 

radioisotopes. Waste was transferred from tank to tank as it went 

through subsequent treatment and isotope recovery campaigns. All 

of these factors contributed to waste complexity and to the difficulty 

of sampling and characterizing the high level radioactive waste to 

plan for its remediation.

High level radioactive waste characterization is further complicated 

by the activities of U Plant, which was used from 1952 to 1958 to 

recover valuable uranium from T and B Plant high level radioactive 

waste. U Plant was originally constructed as a bismuth-phosphate 

chemical separations plant, identical to its sister plants, B and I.

But its capacity proved unnecessary and it served only as a training 

facility until 1952 when it was redesigned for its new mission.

Figure 2-6.2. High Level Radioactive Waste in

Underground Storage Tank with Salt Cake Visible

on Surface, 1971

Since B and T Plants extracted only plutonium from the uranium fuel elements, the resulting high level radioactive waste 

remained rich in uranium. The high value of uranium drove a decision to convert U Plant to a uranium recovery 

mission. Using tributyl phosphate and saturated kerosene chemistry, U Plant reprocessed T and B Plant high level 

radioactive waste to recover uranium. Its waste stream included tributyl phosphate, saturated kerosene* nitric acid, 

oxalic acid, and other chemicals. Unfortunately, the U Plant uranium recovery process generated about twice as much 

waste as it processed, placing additional strain on the storage tank farms that were nearing capacity.

As each chemical separations plant came on line, the designers improved the technologies to reduce the quantity of high 

level radioactive waste per unit of irradiated fuel processed. For instance, PUREX generated only about 250 gallons of 

high level radioactive waste per ton of irradiated fuel, a major improvement over the 10,000 gallons per ton generated by 

T and B Plants. However, production capacity also increased with PUREX processing 33 tons of fuel per day, compared 

with T or B Plant's mere 30 tons per month in their best and final years. Ultimately, nearly 245 m illion gallons of high 

level radioactive waste were transferred to Hanford's 177 underground storage tanks from the five separations plants 

(Anderson 1990, Gephart and Lundgren 1997).

B and T Plants used bismuth-phosphate chemistry in a batch process employing repeated dissolution, precipitation, and 

centrifugation, which produced about 10,000 gallons of high level radioactive waste per day. Process chemicals 

included nitric acid, phosphoric acid, bismuth phosphate, sodium bichromate, bismuth nitrate, potassium permanganate, 

sodium nitrate, and others. All of these, plus aluminum, uranium, plutonium, and numerous fission products were 

included in the high level radioactive waste. The highly acidic waste was acid neutralized with large quantities of 

sodium hydroxide before transfer to the storage tanks (Anderson 1990).

REDOX came on line in 1952 with an improved separation process and different chemistry. Its solvent extraction 

process used methyl isobutyl ketone (hexone), aluminum nitrate, nitric acid, sodium bichromate, and other such 

chemicals. REDOX high level radioactive waste included all o f these chemicals plus solutions containing ferrous ions.

PU REX became operational in 1956 as Hanford's final and most advanced separations plant by using a continuous flow 

extraction process, involving tributyl phosphate, saturated kerosene, nitric acid, oxalic acid, ammonium fluoride, 

ammonium nitrate, and numerous other chemicals. All became part of the PUREX high level radioactive waste stream. 

Concentrators reduced the waste volume to 250 gallons per ton of processed uranium. The concentrators evaporated 

liquids to reduce the volume. This did not reduce the radioactivity. Production, however, increased to 33 tons per day, 

largely offsetting the net waste volume decrease that might otherwise have been realized (Anderson 1990).

2 - 6 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Surface

Levei

Probe

Liquid 

Observation 

Well Solids

Lewi

Detector

Camera 

O bservation 

Point

Leak

Detection

Wdl

Filter

Dome 

Elevation 

Bench M ark

Figure 2-6.3. Typical Single-Shell Tank at the Hanford Site

with Numerous Access Ports and Risers for Monitoring and

Waste Sampling

C am era

O b se rv a tio n

P ort

L eak 

D e te c tio n 

P it

A n n u lu s 

P u m p P it

S o lid s

Elevation

Bench

P ro b e M ark

T e m p e ra tu re

P ro b e

to Scale

\

A n n u lu s b e tw e e n 

S te e l L in e rs

R e in fo rced

C o n c re te

Figure 2-6.4. Typical Double-Shell Tank at the Hanford Site

with Numerous Access Ports and Risers for M onitoring and

Waste Sampling

Waste Ha n d l in g Fa c il it ie s

Facilities associated with high level radioactive 

waste include the five chemical separations plants, 

the lines and encasements used to transfer high level 

radioactive waste about the 200 Areas, diversion 

stations, storage tanks, and evaporator buildings. For 

a description of the chemical separations facilities, 

see Section 4, Chemical Separations.

The primary method used to transport high level 

radioactive waste across the Hanford Site was 

through underground process lines that ran, for the 

most part, through concrete encasements. Most 

process lines are 3-inch diameter, stainless steel pipe 

with welded joints. Encasements are underground 

concrete fixtures designed to contain and protect 

from one to seven process lines. The encasements 

vary in width, depending on the number of lines 

within them. Diversion stations located at the 

process facilities and tank farms permit rerouting of 

high level radioactive waste through different lines to 

alternate locations.

For high level radioactive waste, the lines carried the 

liquid to underground storage tanks, clustered into 

tank farms. Storage tanks are of two types. Both 

types, single-shell and double-shell tanks, are 

cylindrical shaped concrete structures with carbon 

steel inner liners (see Figures 2-6.3 and 2-6.4 and the 

Historic Property Inventory Forms for the 

241 Buildings in Appendix B on the Internet). 

Single-shell tanks have a single inner liner while 

double-shell tanks have two liners with a space 

between them. This space provides a pathway by 

which leakage from the inner liner may be trapped, 

collected, detected, and recovered. Leakage has 

occurred only from single-shell tanks.

Single-shell tanks are generally smaller but more 

numerous than double-shell tanks. Starting in 1945, 

149 single-shell tanks were constructed, providing 

94 m illion gallons of storage capacity. They range in 

capacity from 55,000 to 1 million gallons and are 

buried with their upper surfaces 6 to 11 feet below 

grade. The earth cover provides shielding from the 

intense radiation of the high level radioactive waste, 

permitting tank farm workers to move about the 

areas above the tanks. Numerous and various 

openings exist in the tank dome to accommodate

2 - 6 .8
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

vents, filters, detection tubes, probe access wells, pumps, cameras, and the many kinds of instruments necessary to 

monitor content of the tanks. For information on the instruments used to monitor the tanks, see Gephart and Lundgren

(1997).

Between 1968-1986, 28 newer double-shell tanks were built and now provide a storage capacity of 31 m illion gallons. 

They range in size from 1 to 1.1 m illion gallons and are buried 7 feet below grade. Similar openings exist in the tank 

dome to provide instrumentation, process, and sampling access to tank contents.

To reduce the volume of waste, operators sent the waste 

from the tanks to the waste evaporator buildings 

(see Figure 2-6.5), one of which is still operating today.

Waste evaporator buildings are large, rectangular concrete 

structures. Evaporators are steam-heated containers, which 

boil the liquid out of the particulates, leaving a condensate 

from the evaporated liquid and a concentrated slurry. The 

condensate can be treated as low level liquid waste and so 

be disposed of in nearby trenches or cribs. Evaporation

generated a thick, high level radioactive waste slurry that *

was returned to the high level radioactive waste 

underground storage tanks where it cooled and formed salt “

cake. Well over 200 m illion gallons of liquids were 

evaporated from high level radioactive waste storage tanks

in this manner (Agnew 1997). In the course of ~ ~ r

evaporation, a small amount of radioactivity was vented to Figure 2-6.5. Building Containing Evaporator Used to

the atmosphere and as liquid to the ground (Gephart and Reduce Volume o f HiSh Level Waste bY Boi!inS o f f Water

Lundgren 1997).

Keeping TRAC

The extreme complexity of Hanford high level radioactive waste presents an unprecedented record keeping and 

modeling challenge. A high level radioactive waste inventory program called TRAC (Tracks Radioactive Components) 

was developed in the 1970s to provide managers with inventory tracking and modeling capability. All existing high level 

radioactive waste transfer records were incorporated into the TRAC database. TRAC serves to track and predict waste 

inventory by tank, estimate radionuclide content, estimate solids precipitation, and correct for radionuclide decay. It can 

assist remediation planners by modeling and simulating waste recovery processes. Before TRAC, managers used 

non-automated transfer records to track the waste and manage the tank farms.

Re d u c in g Waste

Reducing Hanford's high level radioactive waste gained in importance over the years as the problems caused by the 

waste became more apparent. Reducing the volume of high level radioactive waste, took several forms, the most 

successful was the more efficient extraction technology, which generated less waste in the REDOX and PUREX plants. 

The following chronological description identifies the waste reducing and other waste management activities undertaken 

to reduce as much high level radioactive waste to be stored in the limited underground tanks as possible.

1944 - 1945 First alkaline slurries of high level radioactive waste were transferred from T and B Plants to the 64

original, underground tanks. Waste was cascaded through a series of tanks to allow solids to settle out 

in the earlier tanks and only the supernatant liquid (liquid left on the surface) to reach tanks at the end of 

the cascade. T and B Plants originally produced over 10,000 gallons of high level radioactive waste for 

each ton of uranium processed.

2 - 6 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

As underground tank storage capacity became strained, authority was granted to dispose of a portion the 

high level radioactive liquid waste from the T and B plants in the soil after cascading through three 

tanks.

1947 - 1948 30 new single-shell tanks constructed with capacities ranging from 530,000 to 758,000 gallons.

Hot Semiworks (C Plant) began operations to pilot technologies for REDOX and PUREX processes and 

generated high level radioactive waste.

30 new single-shell tanks constructed, each w ith a capacity of 758,000 gallons.

242-T and 242-B Evaporators began processing T and B Plant high level radioactive waste stored in tank 

farms to reduce volume by boiling off the liquid. Together they processed over 16 m illion gallons of 

waste, achieving over 80 percent reduction in volume. The concentrated waste was returned to the 

storage tanks and the evaporated condensate was disposed of in the soil. For more information on the 

242-T Waste Evaporator, see the Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

U Plant began a 2-year uranium recovery campaign, generating between 5,500 and 9,200 gallons of 

waste per ton of uranium in 1952. Waste evaporators reduced this rate to 3,600 gallons but could 

process only about 700,000 gallons per month, while U Plant generated over 1.7 m illion gallons per 

month of high level radioactive waste. Scavenging of U Plant high level radioactive waste with 

potassium ferrocyanide and nickel sulfate to settle out cesium-137 permitted disposal in the soil of

11.6 m illion gallons of relatively inactive supernatant liquid. Sodium ferrocyanide was used as well 

because it was less expensive to manufacture than potassium ferrocyanide. Another 29 m illion gallons 

of waste were disposed of in the soil after scavenging at U Plant removed long half-life fission products 

(Anderson 1990).

Cesium-137 scavenging continued for several years with about 41 m illion gallons of supernatant liquid 

discharged in the soil. About 150 tons of ferrocyanide were added to 18 underground tanks (Gephart 

and Lundgren 1997). Studies show that over time ferrocyanide breaks down into less reactive chemicals 

(Meacham et al. 1996). The concentration of ferrocyanide in the Hanford tanks is 10-40 times lower 

than that needed to sustain a fire or explosion. For this reason, the ferrocyanide safety issue was closed 

out in 1996 and the remaining tanks were removed from the Watch List established by Public Law 

101-510, Section 3137 (Public Law 1990).

1952 REDOX began operation, generating high level radioactive waste at a rate of 4,378 gallons per ton of

uranium in 1952.

1953 Self concentration was approved for REDOX high level radioactive waste at S Tank Farm. Self 

concentration involved disposing of vapor condensates in the soil instead of returning it to the 

underground tank. Over the life of the REDOX Plant, self concentration and REDOX process 

improvements reduced REDOX high level radioactive waste generation rates from 4378 gallons per ton 

of uranium in 1952 to 594 gallons per ton of uranium by 1964 (Anderson 1990).

1953 - 1955 21 new single-shell tanks constructed.

1954 - 1956 In addition to disposing of the low level liquid waste in the soil, the sediment on the bottom of the

evaporators was also disposed of as low level waste. From 1954-1956, 4.8 m illion gallons

(10,200 curies) of high level radioactive supernatant liquid waste and 1.9 m illion gallons (11,600 curies)

of evaporator sediment from the B and T plants were disposed of in the soil. Disposal was limited to

areas of soil capable of retaining liquid without its penetrating through to the water table 

(Anderson 1990).

1949

1 9 5 0-1 9 5 2

1951

1952

2 - 6 .1 0
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e Ma n a g e m e n t

Chemical scavenging of high level radioactive waste from the B and T plants was also accomplished 

during this period. Ferrocyanide compounds and nickel sulfate were added to high level radioactive 

waste to cause cesium-137 to settle out, thus allowing the resultant cesium-free supernatant liquid to be 

disposed of in the soil. From 1954-1956, 3.1 m illion gallons were disposed of in this manner.

In total, these waste volume reduction efforts reduced the high level radioactive waste volumes in 

underground storage from the B and T plants by a factor of 3.25, reducing net waste generation from

17,000 gallons per ton of uranium to 5,240 gallons per ton of uranium (Anderson 1990).

1956 PUREX began operating, eventually generating high level radioactive waste at a rate of 250 gallons per

ton of uranium and processing 33 tons of uranium per day. PUREX high level radioactive waste was 

sufficiently concentrated that its heat producing fission products caused the waste liquid to boil. This 

self boiling accelerated to a point in 1957 that boil off reached 10 gallons per minute, and it became 

necessary to add water to the waste liquids to maintain a reasonable level (Anderson 1990). Self boiling 

ended the practice of cascading.

All PUREX high level radioactive waste was acid neutralized with large quantities of sodium hydroxide, 

greatly increasing the waste volume.

1963 - 1964 4 new single-shell tanks constructed.

1966 Thorium recovery campaign generated 1.4 m illion gallons of high level radioactive waste.

1968 - 1988 28 new double-shell tanks constructed.

1968 - 1978 B Plant operated to recover cesium and strontium. This process recovered strontium-90 from high level

radioactive waste sludge and cesium-137 from high level radioactive supernatant liquid waste stored in 

underground tanks. Removal of these isotopes from the high level radioactive waste had the effect of

reducing the heat generating capacity o f the waste. The strontium and cesium isotopes were 

encapsulated for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory isotope program. Remaining waste was evaporated 

with condensates disposed of in the soil and the concentrates returned to underground storage. A large 

inventory of encapsulated strontium and cesium remains stored at the 200 East Area Waste 

Encapsulation and Storage Facility (see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the Waste 

Encapsulated and Storage Facility, 225 Building, in Appendix B on the internet).

1973 - 1976 Two new evaporator plants, 242-S and 242-A came online. 242-A remains operational today.

Over the history of the Hanford Site, the volume of high level radioactive waste that was stored was reduced by almost 

80 percent. O f the approximately 245 m illion gallons of high level radioactive waste generated and stored from all 

processes, approximately 55 m illion gallons remain in the underground storage tanks today, awaiting treatment and 

permanent disposition. Approximately 190 m illion gallons were removed through the methods such as evaporation and 

scavenging or through tank leakage (Gephart and Lundgren 1997, Anderson 1990).

I n c id en ts

Numerous incidents relating to high level radioactive waste have occurred over the operating history of the Hanford Site. 

Two examples of incidents are given here to demonstrate the challenge and complexity of managing high level 

radioactive waste: a chemical reaction at a tank farm and leaking transfer lines.

The chemical reaction that occurred in 1953 in an underground vault at the U Tank Farm is an example of incidents 

resulting from undesired chemical reactions. The chemical reaction caused surface contamination in the area adjacent 

to the vault. Cleanup crews placed lead sheeting over the contaminated area and covered the sheeting with clean soil to 

prevent spreading the contamination (GE 1953a).

2 -6 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Another type o f incident was leaks from transfer lines. Transfer line leaks occurred when line sections separated or when 

temporary connecting jumpers loosened, causing contamination of the soil adjacent to the leak sites. Because the 

resulting liquid contaminate was quickly absorbed by the gravel soil, cleanup crews typically remediated the problem by 

removing the contaminated soil for burial elsewhere or covering the contaminated area With an overburden of clean soil

(Maxfietd 1979).

An example of such a line leak occurred near T Plant in 1955 when leaking contaminants formed a pool on the surface 

that produced radiation readings of 100 rads/hour near the surface. The spilled liquids were allowed to soak into the 

soil, which was then covered with fresh soil and then with asphalt (Maxfield 1979).

All spill sites, no matter the cause, were marked with warning devices and are included in waste site remediation 

planning.

Sto rage Ta n k Leakag e

Due presumably to the corrosive nature of high level radioactive waste, the temperature ranges generated by decaying 

fission products, and the aging of the storage vessels, some of the single-shell underground storage tanks have begun to 

leak. W hile the actual mechanism of leakage is uncertain, it seems probable that the causes include stress, corrosion, 

cracking, and mechanical tearing of the liner (Anderson 1990). Sixty-seven single-shell tanks (but no double-shell tanks) 

are known or suspected to have leaked.

The single-shell tanks are steel-lined concrete vessels with a design life of 20 years. That life has been exceeded by more 

than 30 years and w ill have been exceeded by 50 years before workers can remove all waste by 2018 in accordance 

with the Tri-Party Agreement (Ecology 1994). Despite the 20-year life expectancy, leakage o f the single-shell tanks began 

with a 55,000-gallon leak in 1956, only 10 years after the first tanks were b u ilt The most severe tank leak occurred at 

the T Tank Farm in 1973 when 115,000 gallons of high level radioactive waste were released in the soil.

As tanks continue to age, additional instances of leaking are likely to occur. As of 1995, as much as 1 m illion gallons of 

waste may have entered the soil beneath the tanks. This volume is estimated to contain as much as 1 m illion curies of 

radioactivity, mostly from cesium-137 (Gephart and Lundgren 1997).

Detecting leaks is difficult. The depth at which the underground tanks are buried, the hazardous nature of high level 

radioactive waste, and the impossibility of fully emptying tanks makes direct tank inspection nearly impossible. Workers 

must rely on indirect means to detect and gauge tank 

leakage by comparing measurements over a period of 

time. Approximately 800 vertical monitoring wells 

(dry wells) have been drilled near the single-shell tanks.

Radiation readings taken at different depths in the wells 

give indications of leakage that may have occurred.

Wells drilled laterally to extend beneath the tanks are 

also used (Gephart and Lundgren 1997). Figure 2-6.6 

shows a worker monitoring a high level radioactive 

waste tank.

In addition, groundwater monitoring wells are placed at 

hundreds of locations to detect and measure 

contaminants that may reach the underlying aquifer.

Environmental monitoring determined that the 

groundwater under the B-BX-BY tank farms, located in 

the 200 East Area, has been contaminated with 

chemical and radiological contaminants either from 

leaking tanks or spills (DOE 1998e).

Figure 2-6.6. Worker Monitoring the High Level Radioactive

Waste Tank at the Hanford Site, 1988

2 - 6 .1 2
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

When tanks are discovered to have leaked, cleanup crews applied several remedies. Waste was transferred to sound, 

usually double-shell tanks. Diatomite was added to some tanks to solidify the remaining liquids. Finally, tank 

evaporators were used to further reduce the fluid levelsand minimize further leakage to soil.

Low L e v e l R a d i o a c t iv e L iq u id W a s t e

Low Level Radioactive Waste is typically 

contaminated with small amounts of radioactivity 

dispersed in large amounts of material, but some 

high activity and/or high concentrations can exist.

Low level radioactive waste may exist in liquid or 

solid form.

All Hanford program areas generated low level 

radioactive liquid waste that was disposed of into 

the soil near the facility generating the waste or into the Columbia River. Several methods were devised to dispose of 

low level radioactive liquid waste in the soil, including open ponds and trenches, reverse wells, French drains, and cribs. 

Some methods were discarded due to adverse environmental impacts. The method used was dependent on the degree 

of waste concentration, the presence o f radionuclides that emitted high-energy radiation, and the prevailing disposal 

standards at the time.

1 0 0 Ar e a s

Hanford production reactors generated low level radioactive liquid waste that was disposed of into the soil through cribs 

and trenches or directly into the Columbia River through effluent lines. The eight original reactors used vast quantities of 

Columbia River water to cool the reactor cores to safe operating temperatures. This cooling water created the greatest 

volume of low level radioactive liquid waste. Hanford's ninth reactor, N Reactor, used a different cooling system design 

that did not discharge cooling water directly into the river.

The purified water entered the reactor cores at flow rates up to 200,000 gallons per minute. Passing in direct contact 

with the reactor fuel elements, the cooling water carried away heat created by the fission processes occurring in the fuel, 

and maintained the core temperature at desired levels. At exit, the water temperature had been raised to near boiling

(90-95 degrees C).

The high neutron flux of the reactor core activated elements in the cooling water, creating a number of radionuclides, 

including calcium-41, chromium-51, and zinc-65. The water was also contaminated with activation products from the 

reactor core and with fuel element fission products such as cesium-137, strontium-90, tritium, and transuranics, such as 

uranium and plutonium when fuel cladding failures occurred (DeFord and Einan 1995). The radionuclides of greatest 

environmental impact from this process were sodium-24, neptunium-239, arsenic-76, zinc-65, and phosphorus-32 

(HEDR 1994a).

After passing through the reactor, the cooling water was transferred through effluent lines to a retention basin located 

near the river where it was held for 2.5 to 4 hours, allowing it to cool and short-lived radionuclides to decay. From the 

retention basin, the water passed through an outfall structure and large underground line followed by underwater pipes 

to the river bottom at mid channel. The outfall structure was designed to divert effluent to an open concrete spillway if 

the underground line were to become plugged.

The quantity of radionuclides released to the Columbia River in reactor effluent began high and increased over time. 

From five radionuclides alone (see Table 2-6.3), more than 200,000 curies were released to the river in each of the first 

two full years of reactor operations, 1945 and 1946. This rate doubled three times between 1945 and 1960 to more than 

2 m illion curies during 1960, the peak year. The volume of reactor effluent had increased ten fold as cold war demands

I ovx I o w l Kndio.i< live W ish*

' Ml n.7sIf* not i .i-> hfah /i*n7 u.i*lc

,?/?/< ti.ftfr*, spo/if nut Awr tin'). >>r th tfiii.il u i.m iu n i m ill

llu u itn n b x ftn itlu t I m .d c ru l {fanned under set lio n 1 le J ' o f the

A ln tn ii In e rtu -\t t ,1-. M nondt'd." - 4 1 1 S( 2011 <»1 seq.

2 - 6 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

for plutonium production led to reactor power level increases and the construction of five additional reactors. After 

1960, discharges of low level radioactive liquid waste to the river began to diminish as the reactors without closed-loop 

systems began to shut down at an approximate rate of one per year (Clukey 1957, HEDR 1994a). Table 2-6.3 is a 

summary of curies released to the Columbia River from five radionuclides between 1944-1971. For a more complete 

listing of radionuclides released to the Columbia River, see Table 2.3-9 in Section 3, Reactor Operations.

Table 2-6.3. Annual Summary o f Curies o f Five Radioactive Materials

Released to the Columbia River from the Hanford Site> 1944-1971

N Reactor used a closed-loop cooling system 

that did not discharge cooling water directly 

to the river. Instead, water heated by the 

reactor core passed through a heat 

exchanger, yielding much of its heat, and 

then returned to the core in a continuous, 

closed, loop. As cooling water became 

contaminated, it was bled off and routed to a 

covered trench for disposal in the soil 

(see Figure 2-6.7) (DOE 1997a).

Workers disposed of low level radioactive 

liquid waste in numerous cribs from sources 

such as overflow of fuel storage basins, 

decontamination activities, drainage from 

building filters, and floor drains. Some 

reactor sites also used a crib to dispose of 

highly contaminated cooling water from a 

single process tube that had been 

contaminated by a ruptured fuel element. In 

some cases, this crib was merely an open pit 

into which effluent was directed through a 

hose attached to the rear face of the reactor 

(WIDS 1998).

Fuel element failures caused by a rupture in 

the cladding were an all-too-frequent 

occurrence at Hanford production reactors 

with nearly 2000 occurring between 1951 and 1965 (DeNeal 1965). Some were no more than a pin-hole-sized breech 

in the outer, protective cladding of a fuel element. Others were more severe and exposed much of the fuel elements 

irradiated uranium fuel to the cooling water, which became grossly contaminated with uranium, fission products, and 

trace quantities of plutonium.

In the early years of fuel rupture experience, water from only the affected process tube was diverted from the rear face of 

the reactor to a crib where it was disposed of in the soil. In later years, the cooling water from the affected process tube 

was allowed to m ix with that from all other tubes and, after cooling in the retention basin, was either released to the river 

or to a large trench that had been excavated for that purpose. Water diverted to these riverside trenches was allowed to 

percolate into the soil rather than being released directly to the river. This provided for ion exchange with the soil and 

for additional radioactive decay before the effluents eventually reached the river through the soil.

Ex p e r im e n t a l An im a l Fa r m

An additional source o f low level radioactive liquid waste was the Experimental Animal Farm located at the 100-F Area. 

The Experimental Animal Farm operated from 1945-1976 to measure the effects of ionizing radiation on living

Year Sodium-24 Phosphorus-32 Zinc-65 Arsenic-76 Neptunium-239

1944 905 216 708 1178 17060

1945 34900 2890 10518 20340 192100

1946 28360 •x 2190. 8688 14212 153400

1947 25450 1860 7457 12319 127840

1948 33970 2219 8362 15772' 151100

1949 46870 3175 11713 24660 214600

1950 72590 4027 14546 30510 279900

1951 99020 3333 11153 23660 261700

1952 132690 5050 9037 34740 259000

1953 202500 8688 8691 98940 316200

1954 243400 7261 21910 91380 391600

1955 318000 7184 26670 139530 419400

1956 407800 7722 31940 134280 450300

1957 644700 12325 27560 212130 500100

1958 751400 18484 27180 293300 422300

1959 1019000 17993 32030 218400 275100

1960 1382900 19490 42720 .236900 354800

1961 1096300 21526 47110 166890 243910

1962 1094200 13845 56010 8,6660 257100

1963 887900 11738 14920 100630 211800

1964 960000 12311 . 15710 114480 247500

1965 764500 12126 13379 124600 168400

1966 613000 7365 9656 74600 78950

1967 671900 10118 15360 94010 114970

1968 499500 8632 7734 71670 99790

1969 359200 5478 6451 61250 ' 59820

1970 178041 1759 3394 20253 36879

1971 13200 235 386 2440 3540

Sum 12582196 229239 490993 2519734 6309159

2 - 6 .1 4
Se c ijo n 6 - Wa s t e Ma n a g e m e n t

organisms. Early researchers focused on the effects of reactor 

effluents on Columbia River fish. Later, researchers included the 

use of swine, sheep, dogs, rats, and plants.

Operations varied widely depending on the nature and scope of the 

particular experiment but generally involved the introduction of 

radioisotopes into living tissue with follow-up study to identify and 

measure its effect over time. Researchers tested the effect of 

iodine-131, strontium-90, cesium-137, isotopes of plutonium and 

uranium and other isotopes by having the animals inhale, ingest, 

and absorb the isotopes or by inoculating the animals w ith them 

(DeFord 1993).

Low level radioactive liquid waste streams included contaminated 

cleaning water resulting from animal pen cleaning, waste from the 

radio-botany and pharmaceutical labs, and various liquid waste 

from the biology lab. Most low level radioactive liquid waste went 

to 100-F cribs or trenches. Some was injected into reactor effluent 

and flushed to the Columbia River through the reactor outfall or 

passed directly to the Columbia River through a separate waste line 

and outfall (DeFord 1993).

2 0 0 Areas

Numerous sources of low level radioactive liquid waste have 

existed in the 200 Areas. Five chemical separations plants 

generated many forms of low level radioactive liquid waste. The 

Plutonium Finishing Plant added its share, including hazardous 

chemical waste such as carbon tetrachloride. Waste evaporators, 

used to reduce the volume o f high level radioactive waste, 

produced large quantities of low level radioactive waste in the form 

of condensate that was released in the soil. Scavenged waste from 

some high level waste tanks was also disposed of in the soil as low 

level radioactive liquid waste.

In 1945-1946, all 200 Area low level radioactive liquid waste that 

did not meet the prevailing criteria for high level waste was 

disposed of in the soil in open trenches and ponds (see 

Figure 2-6.8). Narrow, radioactively contaminated beach zones 

developed, which were intruded upon by insect, bird, and animal 

life. These along with high winds spread contaminants to nearby 

downwind locations. After 1946 to protect personnel and the 

environment, only low level radioactive liquid waste with low 

activity continued to flow to open ponds and trenches. The 

deactivated ponds and trenches were flushed with fresh water and 

eventually backfilled (WIDS 1998).

Figure 2-6.7. One o f Two Covered Trenches Used

at N Reactor to Dispose o f Reactor Effluent in the

Soil, 1981

X

'3

Figure 2-6.8. Low Level Radioactive Liquid

Waste Pond with Overflow Lobes and REDOX

(Center) in the Background, 1973

Rather than dispose of low level radioactive liquid waste w ith higher activity in open ponds and trenches, in 1946 

workers increasingly disposed of it below grade where contamination would be confined to sub-surface soil. To do this, 

numerous reverse wells were placed into service. These were deep, well-like shafts with perforated casings drilled to a 

depth above groundwater. The wells had a tendency to become plugged with solids suspended in the low level

2 - 6 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

radioactive liquid waste and had the disadvantage of introducing the waste liquids near groundwater. Reverse well use 

was discontinued after about a year and no new ones were constructed.

French drains were constructed about the same time as reverse wells. French drains are shallow shafts used to dispose of 

low volumes of low level radioactive liquid waste with low activity. The shaft is typically a 3-6 foot concrete pipe about 

36 inches in diameter buried vertically and filled w ith rock or gravel. The liquid usually entered the shaft from a waste 

line at the top of the pipe, which was at ground level and flowed through the pipe to the soil below. French drains 

continued to be used through the operational history of the Hanford Site for disposal of low level radioactive liquid waste 

w ith low activity. Numerous French drains are scattered throughout the Hanford production areas.

Low level radioactive liquid waste was also disposed o f in cribs. Cribs were constructed with their upper surfaces only a 

few feet below grade to maximize the distance to groundwater, yet avoid the surface contamination problems associated 

w ith open ponds and trenches. Cribs are underground chambers used to dispose of large volumes of low level 

radioactive liquid waste. They were usually constructed of loosely spaced timbers, creating a chamber of more than 

1000 cubic feet The liquid would percolate through the chamber to the underlying soil. Numerous cribs exist in the 

100, 200, and 300 Areas. Some cribs were used in conjunction with settling tanks in which waste solids would settle out 

before the supernatant liquid waste passed on to the cribs.

Over time, some cribs began to fail due to silt or chemical deposits, and overflow drain fields were attached to improve 

dispersal in the soil. These were not unlike the drain fields used in sanitary sewage systems, and they proved equally 

effective for low level radioactive liquid waste. Since 1960, many cribs have been constructed with drain fields, and a 

few drain fields have been constructed without cribs (WIDS 1998).

Open trenches and ponds as large as 50 acres continued in use for low level radioactive liquid waste with low activity or 

that was highly diluted, such as steam condensate and cooling water from certain contaminated facilities (WIDS 1998).

3 0 0 Ar e a

The management and disposal of low level radioactive liquid waste at the 100 and 200 Areas was largely decentralized, 

w ith each facility manager responsible for waste generated at that facility. Most facilities were supported by dedicated 

cribs, French drains, ponds, and trenches.

The 300 Area differed from its sister areas in that the management and disposal of low level radioactive liquid waste was 

centralized. From their construction in 1944, the many 300 Area laboratories and fuel manufacturing facilities were 

connected to a common process waste sewer that collected low level radioactive liquid waste and discharged it in a 

single process pond located east of the area near the river.

The original process pond, a 353,000 square foot by 5-foot deep facility, overflowed its banks in 1945, and a retaining 

dike was added. The cause was determined to be poor percolation to the soil resulting from buildup of impermeable 

precipitants on the bottom of the pond. Waste level rose over time and the dike failed in 1948, releasing more than 

14 m illion gallons of low level radioactive liquid waste into the Columbia River. The dike was repaired, and the pond 

returned to service (Young and Fruchter 1991).

A second pond was constructed immediately north of the original, and the bottoms of both were periodically scraped 

with the scrapings piled onto the dikes to further reinforce them. The ponds continued in operation until 1974 when 

they were replaced by a pair of 1500-foot process trenches.

Additional low level radioactive liquid waste processing improvements occurred in the mid-1950s when the Radioactive 

Liquid Waste System was constructed to replace the aging and by then leaking process waste sewer. O f modern design 

and stainless steel materials, the Radioactive Liquid Waste System fed a low level radioactive liquid waste retention and 

neutralization facility capable of sampling and diverting high activity waste to tanker trucks for disposal at 200 Area

2 - 6 .1 6
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e Ma n a g e m e n t

cribs. Low level radioactive liquid waste with low activity continued to flow to the 300 Area ponds and trenches. A 

railroad load-out facility with shielded railcars was added in 1965 to replace tanker trucks (DeFord 1994).

The Waste Acid Treatment Facility became operational in 1975 to process waste acids disposed of by various 300 Area 

laboratories. This waste was sampled, neutralized, centrifuged, and otherwise processed before being released for 

disposal to various locations including 200 Area waste disposal sites. Before 1975, 300 Area acids were disposed of in 

300 Area ponds and trenches along with all other low level radioactive liquid waste (DeFord 1994).

A few cribs and French drains were used in the 300 Area as needed to meet specific and usually temporary needs of 

laboratories and other facilities (DeFord 1994).

4 0 0 Ar e a a n d Fast Flxjx Test Fa c il it y

The Fast Flux Test Facility is a sodium-cooled breeder reactor, with associated facilities located in the 400 Area. It began 

operations in 1980.Although several French drains exist for disposal of cooling water and floor drain waste, no low level 

radioactive liquid waste is known to have been disposed of in the soil at this facility.

I n c id e n ts

Several incidents involving low level radioactive liquid waste have already been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. 

A few additional descriptions w ill help to demonstrate the scope and complexity of managing low level radioactive 

liquid waste.

• The groundwater has been contaminated by waste from U Plant. The 216-U-1 and 2 Cribs are side by side 

facilities that received U Plant cell drainage and other low level radioactive liquid waste during the operation of 

U Plant for its uranium recovery mission. About 4000 kilograms of soluble uranium were drained to the cribs 

and became insoluble as it reacted with the soil beneath the cribs. Acid waste, inadvertently discharged to the 

cribs, combined with the uranium, making it both soluble and mobile in the soil column but in insufficient 

volume to move the uranium far enough in the soil to reach groundwater.

A high volume, low activity waste crib, 216-U-16, was installed nearby. Low level radioactive liquid waste 

discharges to the 216-U-16 crib were sufficient by 1985 to collect atop an impermeable caliche layer located 

about 165 feet below the crib. The low level radioactive liquid waste moved laterally along the caliche layer, 

passing beneath the 216-U-1 and 2 Cribs and transporting the now soluble uranium through openings in the 

caliche layer to groundwater beneath. Groundwater contamination was detected soon thereafter and pumpand-treat techniques were used in 1985 to remove uranium contaminants from the groundwater. Uranium 

contamination levels were thereby reduced from 72 nanocuries/liter to 17 nanocuries/liter (Baker et al. 1988).

• The Process Waste Sewer has leaked in the 300 Area. Portions of the stainless steel lines in the 300 Area Process 

Waste Sewer have corroded and leaked low level radioactive liquid waste into the underlying soil.

• The reactor retention basin has leaked and overflowed. Each Hanford production reactor, except the N Reactor,

used large metal or concrete retention basins to hold contaminated cooling water for a few hours before

releasing it to the Columbia River. Each of these basins has developed leaks, allowing low level radioactive 

liquid waste to escape to the underlying soil. Also, basin outflow gates have become blocked, causing the basin 

to overflow and form, in one case, a deep erosion ditch flowing to the nearby riverbank.

• Cribs have overflowed and vegetation has become contaminated. Occasional overflows would occur at cribs

when low level radioactive liquid waste was introduced at rates greater than the underlying soil could absorb.

In these cases, low level radioactive liquid waste would sometimes overflow through the crib vent pipes, 

contaminating the surface area at and near the crib. Deep-rooted vegetation, such as Russian thistle, would 

sometimes intrude into contaminated soil, resulting in the plant becoming contaminated. Burrowing animals 

such as rabbits and gophers would also intrude into underground contaminated soil, becoming contaminated in 

the process and spreading that contamination about in the wake of their movements.

2 - 6 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

L o w Le v e l Ra d io a c t iv e a n d Tr a n s u r a n ic So l id Wa s t e

Solid waste includes non-liquid, non-soluble material ranging from municipal garbage to industrial waste that contains 

complex and sometimes hazardous substances. Radioactive solid waste contains materials that are contaminated with 

radionuclides. Low level radioactive solid waste is 

frequently found mixed with non-radioactive

hazardous;waste and is called mixed low level lr«iiv.iii.iiiit Solid U .is ir

waste. When mixed w ith transuranic waste, it .... . . , , . , , , ' "M .M r i \it m u u u u iim -J • • in

becomes transuranic mixed waste. , . , , , . Wl . , , tw itto tJ ls h.n ///«,' n i m e t JO h m t * m t<Jti<

Radioactively contaminated solid waste has been m,lr,‘ 1 in •> (w ivper y/.i/n ot h.m c -

disposed of by shallow earth burial since the P

beginning o f Hanford operations in 1944.

Although incinerators disposed of low level 

radioactive solid waste at other sites, they were not

a part of a waste management program at the Hanford Site. Burial grounds were established in support of each o f the 

Hanford production programs, including fuels manufacturing, reactor operations, chem ital separation, plutonium 

purification, and research and development. Each burial ground has received vast quantities of low level radioactive 

solid waste. At least 28 sites in the 100 Areas, 28 in the 200 Areas, and 11 in the 300 and 600 Areas have been used for 

this purpose (WIDS 1998, M iller and Wahlen 1987). (By 1990, the "600 Area" defined all land within the Hanford Site 

not occupied by the 100, 200, 300, 400, 1100, or 3000 Areas.) Management practices for Hanford burial grounds may 

be generally described as follows (Dorian and Richards 1978):

1 9 4 4 -1 9 5 4

• No intensive waste segregation program. Hazardous waste, low level radioactive solid waste, and transuranic 

waste were commingled for disposal

• Combustibles and non combustibles buried in the same trench

• Burial records contain minimal information

• Decentralized disposal with virtually all waste buried near point of origin 

1 9 5 5-1 9 6 5

• Alternate disposal methods and sites studied, documented, and, in some cases, implemented

• Intentional burning of combustible low level radioactive solid waste in burial trenches began and ended in 1955

• Records improved

19 6 6 -19 73

• Burial grounds centralized. Central landfill constructed for sanitary solid waste.

• Measurement of burial materials improved

• Burial records much more complete

• Some segregation of waste by category

• Beginning in 1968, increasing amounts of low level radioactive solid waste transported to 200 Areas for disposal

• After May 1970, all transuranic waste stored or disposed o f in the 200 Areas

Post 1973

• Sanitary solid waste disposed of at the Hanford Site Solid Waste Landfill

• All low level radioactive solid waste disposed of in the 200 Area burial grounds

• Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility constructed in 1995

2 - 6 .1 8
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e Ma n a g e m e n t

Low Level Ra d io a c tiv e So l id Waste

Some types of low level radioactive solid waste, such as contaminated protective clothing, are common to all production 

programs and, therefore, to all burial grounds, while other waste types are unique to the facility that generated them. 

Although general descriptions of the contents of low level radioactive solid waste burial grounds are available, detailed 

content descriptions are typically available only for the latter years of Hanford operations.

100 Areas

Reactor operations generated significant quantities of low level radioactive solid waste, which workers disposed of in the 

TOO Areas burial grounds and, after 1973 along with the Fast Flux Test Facility waste in the 200 Areas. Twenty-eight 

major reactor area burial sites exist in the 100 Area (Miller and Wahlen 1987). The greatest portion of low level 

radioactive solid waste from the reactor area consists of large quantities of obsolete or failed reactor hardware. To this 

was added contaminated protective clothing, tools, and miscellaneous process related materials.

200 Areas

Low level radioactive solid waste generated by the chemical separations and related processes was disposed of in 

200 Area burial grounds. As with reactor operations, the majority of solid waste was contaminated process hardware 

made useless by failure or obsolescence. To these were added construction and demolition waste resulting from 

upgrades to the chemical system tools and protective clothing, and miscellaneous process related materials. Also 

included were soil and other materials contaminated by various chemical plant spills and leaks.

Some large, highly contaminated items are stored on flatbed railcars in the PUREX railroad tunnels that w ill require future 

decontamination or disposal in the 200 Area burial grounds (Anderson 1996).

The product of the chemical separations plants was an impure plutonium nitrate solution that was delivered to the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant in the 200 West Area for purification. Its processes generated low level radioactive solid waste 

that was disposed of in 200 West Area burial grounds. Again, obsolescent process hardware and materials such as tanks, 

pumps, piping/ valves, and instrumentation provided the greatest quantity of waste. To these were added contaminated 

tools, protective clothing, rags, filters, and other materials.

300 Area

Fuel elements for the Hanford reactors were manufactured at Hanford's 300 Area from uranium stock. Using extrusion 

and cladding processes housed in the 306, 313, 314, and 333 Buildings, workers produced vast quantities of rod-shaped, 

reactor fuel elements and shipped them to Hanford's nine production reactors for irradiation. Numerous types of 

contaminated solid waste resulted from the fuel manufacturing processes, including industrial hardware and tools, 

protective clothing, equipment, glassware, swipes, and miscellaneous process related materials. The waste stream also 

included quantities of uranium millings, shavings, and dust resulting from fuel manufacturing processes. Large quantities 

of contaminated demolition waste were also disposed of during renovation activities at the fuel manufacturing buildings. 

Until 1973, all low level radioactive solid waste from fuel manufacturing was disposed of in the 300 and 600 Area burial 

grounds. After that year, 300 Area low level radioactive solid waste was disposed of in the 200 Area burial grounds.

Research and Development

Research and development played an essential role in improving the processes at all stages. Most research and 

development activities were housed in the 300 Area in laboratory facilities such as the Pile Technology, Radiochemistry, 

and Radiometallurgy laboratories, Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor, High Temperature Lattice Test Reactor, High 

Temperature Sodium Test Facility, and others.

All of these labs generated low level radioactive solid waste, most of which was buried in 300 and 600 area burial 

grounds. Some research and development labs, especially Radiochemistry, produced low level radioactive solid waste 

with remarkably high dose rates that required special handling and disposal procedures, discussed later in this section.

2 - 6 .1 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Two additional major research and development laboratories, Hot Semiworks and the Critical Mass Facility, were located 

in the 200 East Area. Low level radioactive solid waste generated there was disposed of in the 200 Area burial grounds. 

Hot Semiworks created an additional quantity of low level radioactive solid waste when in 1987 the laboratory was 

decommissioned and its contaminated demolition rubble was disposed of in the 200 East Area burial grounds 

(DOE 1998f).

Off Site Waste

Not all solid waste in the burial grounds was generated at the Hanford Site. W hile early records are incomplete, at least 

58 off site waste generators are known to have shipped low level radioactive solid waste to the Hanford Site for disposal, 

essentially all going into the 200 Area burial grounds. These waste generators include universities, other DOE sites and 

laboratories, the military, and commercial companies that have been involved in government programs resulting in low 

level radioactive solid waste.

Types of programs that have generated low level radioactive solid waste disposed of at the Hanford Site include 

(Anderson 1996):

• Accelerator studies

• Animal studies in DOE facilities and universities

• Basic research

• Cleanup and restoration projects

• Department of Defense waste (U.S. Army and Navy)

• Reactor studies

• Irradiators and sources

• Fuel fabrication facilities

• Laboratory waste

An unusual form of off site waste received at the Hanford Site is 

more than 50 reactor compartments from nuclear submarines, 

which are disposed of in a 200 East Area burial ground. When 

U.S. Navy nuclear submarines are decommissioned, the spent 

fuel is removed and the entire reactor section of the hull is cut 

from the rest of the vessel, removed, sealed, and shipped to the 

Hanford Site for disposal. The intact section is transported by 

barge to a Hanford receiving dock where the section is loaded 

onto a massive wheeled trailer for transport to the burial ground 

(see Figure 2-6.9).

Tr a n s u r a n ic Waste

Figure 2-6.9. U.S. Navy Nuclear Submarine Reactor

Section Arriving by Barge at Hanford Receiving Dock, 

1989

Transuranic waste contains radioactive materials contaminated with alpha emitting radionuclides with half-lives greater 

than 20 years in concentrations of more than one ten-millionth of a curie per gram of waste (DOE 1995e). Before 1970, 

transuranic waste was not recognized as a separate waste category and was disposed of in burial grounds as routine 

waste. Nearly all of it was buried in the 200 Area burial grounds with only small amounts entering a 100-F Area site and 

two 600 Area sites (Anderson 1996).

Atomic Energy Commission Immediate Action Directive 0511-21 defined transuranic waste and directed that after May 

1970 waste with known or detectable contamination of transuranic waste radionuclides must be segregated from other 

waste categories. No further burial of transuranic waste was permitted, and it must instead be placed in retrievable . 

storage. This was accomplished through use of a new style burial trench designed to permit transuranic waste recovery 

at a later date (see Figure 2-6.10). A EC Order 1511, issued in 1973, established a segregation lim it of 10 nanocuries/ 

gram. Transuranic waste with concentrations of radioactivity greater than 10 nanocuries/gram must be segregated and

2 - 6 .2 0
Se c t io n 6 - W aste Ma n a g e m e n t

retrievably stored. Transuranic waste with lower concentrations 

need not be segregated. Since 1988, transuranic waste has 

been stored above ground in the Central Waste Facility.

Before 1980, liquid organic waste was sometimes disposed of in 

low level radioactive solid waste burial grounds. This type of 

waste was banned from burial ground disposal in 1980 because 

of its potential chelating effect on other waste in the burial 

trench and due to its potential damage to ion exchange 

properties of the soil. Liquid organics were subsequently stored 

in burial grounds in the same retrievable manner as transuranic 

waste.

To conform with Washington State Administrative Codes on 

waste storage, an additional low level radioactive solid waste 

category was defined in 1987. Hanford's Extremely Hazardous 

Waste has been segregated and stored as retrievable waste after 

this date.

•* - - j r . * - v -

- i » s .-" ® *

i

-

Figure 2‘6.10. Transuranic Waste Drums on Floor o f

Hanford Burial Trench, a Burial Method Permitting

Later Retrieval 1980 To meet the need for storage of extremely hazardous waste in 

buildings, the Central Waste Facility buildings were constructed.

The first was completed in 1988 with another dozen completed shortly thereafter. These are 4000 square foot buildings 

that meet Washington State Code, RCRA (42 USC 6901), and other requirements for extremely hazardous waste and low 

level radioactive solid waste storage. Another seven, 35,000-50,000 square foot buildings have subsequently been 

constructed or are under construction (Anderson 1996).

Record K eep in g

Burial ground record keeping was minimal in the early days of the Hanford Site with little information on the amounts 

and types of low level radioactive solid waste buried. During the 1950s and 1960s, some documents were issued on 

waste disposal activities, but these records are not complete. Studies have estimated the volume and radioactivity of 

previously unrecorded buried waste based upon the ratio of the radionuclides present in the fuel elements and on other 

known and deduced waste generation and disposal information.

Beginning in the late 1960s, routine reports of low level radioactive solid waste in the 100 and 200 areas became more 

complete and included the amount of land area used, volume of waste, curie content of the various waste radionuclides, 

and the coordinates of the burial location.

Since 1971, the contents of burial grounds have been tracked on automated databases. A succession of automated 

information systems have been used, culminating in the current system, the Solid Waste Information and Tracking 

System. The Solid Waste Information and Tracking System is a state-of-the-art waste inventory and projection system that 

can calculate the activity of all radionuclides in each waste container. Its query capabilities include waste generator, 

date, location where waste was generated, burial location, activity at time o f burial, and current activity 

(Anderson 1996).

Re d u c in g Waste

An essential element of waste management is reducing waste. This includes those practices calculated to minimize the 

quantity or volume of waste materials requiring disposal. Chief among these are manufacturing practices that are 

improved to produce less waste and waste volume reduction by compaction, incineration, or other methods. Hanford 

operations have used all of these and other waste minimization practices.

2 -6 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Low level radioactive solid waste was burned at some Hanford burial grounds to reduce the volume before the Clean Air 

Act Amendments of 1970 and other environmental legislation precluded the practice.

From 1962 to 1973 to salvage plutonium, workers incinerated plutonium contaminated waste that would otherwise have 

been packaged and buried. Such waste included contaminated filters, rags, paper, protective clothing, gloves, and other 

combustible items used at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, REDOX, and PUREX. Once incinerated, the plutonium was 

recovered from the residual ash. The incineration and removal of the plutonium resulted in a 98 percent reduction of 

this particular waste stream (Anderson 1996). See the sub-section on the 232-Z Waste Incinerator in the Plutonium 

Finishing Section for more information on recovering plutonium via incineration and the Historic American Engineering 

Record in Appendix B on the Internet.

A novel waste minimization activity at Hanford involves the regulated fleet of trucks, tractors, locomotives, rail cars, and 

other high value vehicles that have become radioactively contaminated but continue in use as regulated equipment.

Such contaminated equipment would otherwise be disposed of by burial and replaced with new equipment when it was 

no longer repairable. Instead, the Hanford Site has established a program that keeps these regulated vehicles available 

for work in radiation zones where they are subject to additional contamination. Such vehicles continue in use as long as 

they may be safely used by operating personnel in protective clothing.

Bu r ia l Gr o u n d De s c r ip tio n s

Burial grounds for low level radioactive solid waste vary widely in their size and configuration from small pits at reactor 

sites to mammoth trench excavations in the 200 Areas. Burial ground designs vary from simple, unlined excavations to 

lined excavations that permit recovery of pit contents to burial grounds that use underground caissons and burial pipes or 

vaults.

Burial grounds in the 100 and 300 areas are close to the Columbia River and are underlain with permeable materials.

The depth to groundwater of some burial grounds is as little as 5 meters. The 200 Areas burial grounds lie on a geologic 

plateau and are underlain by a considerable thickness of materials with low permeability. Waste buried there is 

55 meters or more above groundwater. Groundwater movement beneath these 200 Areas burial grounds has extremely 

low flow rates and the soil has a large capacity for ion exchange. The slow movement allows time for ion exchange, 

which acts to remove and retain radionuclides (Anderson 1996).

Initially, almost all of the radioactive solid waste was buried near the area in which it was generated. Beginning in 1968, 

however, increasing amounts of waste were transported to the 200 Areas for disposal. Because of increased attention to 

all radionuclides discharged to the environment, by 1970 most low level radioactive solid waste was disposed of in 

200 Area burial grounds. The last 300 Area burial ground closed in mid-1972 and only minor use was made of 

100 Areas burial grounds until they fully closed in 1973. In all, 75 solid waste burial grounds exist at the Hanford Site 

(DOE 1997c).

100 Areas

With the exception of the 100-N Area, all reactor sites used burial grounds to dispose of low level radioactive solid 

waste. Each site had at least one large burial ground and several smaller ones that varied from small burial pits to large 

burial trenches. For example, the main burial ground at the 100-F Reactor site measured 600 x 500 x 20 feet deep, while 

the 118-H-5 Thimble Pit, used to bury a single waste item, was only 30 x 2 x 5 feet deep (WIDS 1998).

The vast majority of 100 Area low level radioactive solid waste is reactor components and hardware that became 

irradiated and required disposal due to wear, failure, or obsolescence. These include items such as aluminum spacers, 

boron splines, graphite, process tubes, lead shielding, control rods, nozzles, and cadmium sheets. Also included are 

contaminated tools and protective clothing, glassware, swipes, and miscellaneous process materials (Miller and 

Wahlen 1987).
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

The quantities of low level radioactive solid waste from all reactors except N Reactor from 1944 through the end of 

reactor operations in 1971 are (Miller and Wahlen 1987):

• 1,700,000 aluminum fuel spacers 425 tons

• Lead-cadmium poison elements 1,059 tons lead

44 tons cadmium

• 142,000 boron-aluminum splines 652.5 tons aluminum

8.4 tons boron

• Carbon-14 (graphite and desiccant) 15,500 pounds

• 28,000 process tubes 266 tons aluminum

• Lead (brick, sheet, wool, casks) 258 tons

• Miscellaneous hardware 146 tons

• Cadmium sheeting 800 pounds

• Thermocouple Wire 372 pounds

• Soft waste (paper, plastic, clothing) that 129,000 cartons 

contains a very small percentage of total

radionuclide inventory but makes up more 

than 75 percent of the total low level 

radioactive solid waste volume from all 

reactors except N Reactor

A few small burial sites in the reactor area were established for disposal of single, highly contaminated or irradiated 

waste items, such as a reactor test loop or a collection of contaminated fuel spacers. An unusual form of low level 

radioactive solid waste from the Experimental Animal Farm was buried at 100-F burial grounds. Extensive research was 

conducted on living animals and many were sacrificed as part of the research process. Contaminated animal carcasses 

were disposed of in a large, vented, steel tank that was periodically topped off with diesel oil and set afire to reduce 

waste volume. When the tank was no longer needed, it was dragged to the 118-F-6 Burial Ground and buried 

(DeFord 1993).

After 1973, most low level radioactive solid waste from the reactors, including all waste from the 100-N Reactor, was 

disposed of in the 200 Area burial grounds.

All 100 Area burial grounds are simple, unlined, trench or pit excavations. None remain in service and all have been 

backfilled to grade with native soil. Each is identified with signs and radiation warning devices. Most are unfenced with 

access only controlled through Hartford Site access security.

200 Areas

Because it was expedient to dispose of low level radioactive solid waste near the generating source, burial grounds were 

opened at nearly all Hanford areas. However, environmental considerations such as water table and proximity to the 

Columbia River have made 100 and 300 area sites less desirable. The 200 Areas burial grounds were recognized as 

superior sites in terms of environmental protection. In 1973, 200 Areas sites became the centralized burial grounds for 

all low level radioactive solid waste at the Hanford Site (Anderson 1996).

2 - 6 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c u l t ie s

Operating since 1944, these burial grounds are massive excavations that have received low level radioactive solid waste 

items as large as contaminated trucks and railroad locomotives. Some burial grounds are as long as 1500 feet and over 

90 feet wide at the surface. Most are at least 18 feet deep. Bottom treatment varies with era and type of waste to be 

disposed. Most have bottoms of native sediment with no special treatment. Those designated for retrievable storage may 

have asphalt paving. For a time, transuranic waste drums were placed in V shaped burial grounds rather than the 

traditional flat bottom excavations to expedite retrieval of waste (DeFord 1991).

All burial grounds are identified by permanent concrete markers that denote the burial ground by number and flag it as a 

disposal site for radioactive waste. Most but not all 200 Areas burial grounds are protected by security fencing. Hanford 

Site drawings further delineate the location of burial grounds w ith each individual trench identified.

Before 1970, 200 Area burial grounds could be divided into six waste type categories.

• Dry waste burial grounds received low level radioactive solid waste packaged primarily in cardboard boxes 

containing various forms of dry waste. These included contaminated protective clothing, rags, paper, wood, and 

soil. Hardware contaminated with plutonium and various 

forms o f off-site waste were also included.

• Industrial burial grounds received low level radioactive 

solid waste packaged in large wooden or concrete 

containers (see Figure 2-6.11) containing obsolete 

equipment from chemical plants and 300 Area labs that 

were heavily contaminated with fission products.

• Construction burial grounds received low level radioactive 

solid waste with low activity from construction and 

demolition work.

• Railroad tunnels at PUREX are used to store numerous large 

pieces o f contaminated equipment on railroad flatcars.

• Underground vaults located at 222-B, T, and S Analytical

Laboratories received small quantities of low level 

radioactive solid waste w ith high activity and dose rate 

from contamination by mixed fission products and Figure 2-6.11. Bulldozer Pushes Soil onto

plutonium. Concrete Burial Box on Floor o f Hanford Burial

• Caissons located at two burial grounds were used to Trench, 1980

dispose of low level radioactive solid waste with high

activity from the 300 Area hot cells and low level

radioactive solid waste with high plutonium content. Caissons are either tubular metal pipes buried vertically in 

the trench or larger circular tank-like containers made from corrugated metal or concrete, buried in the trench 

with offset feed chutes reaching above grade (DeFord 1994).

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility

The Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility began operations July 1996. Located between the 200 East and 

200 West areas on Hanford's central plateau, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility is a disposal facility for 

waste generated during the environmental restoration, deactivation and decommissioning efforts at the Hanford Site and 

is notable as Hanford's most advanced and most recent disposal site for low level radioactive solid waste. The specific 

site on the central plateau was selected because of its distance from the Columbia River, its elevation above groundwater, 

and its centralized access to transportation and utility systems.

The facility is a deep trench that w ill be the central disposal facility for large quantities of low level radioactive solid 

waste generated during environmental restoration work. Upwards of 12 m illion cubic yards of contaminated materials 

may be disposed of at the facility. Hazardous and mixed waste w ill also be disposed of there. The facility is not 

authorized to receive transuranic waste.

2 - 6 .2 4
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e Ma n a g e m e n t

The Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility has been designed as a series of cells, each of which is 500 feet by 

500 feet at the bottom with a ratio of 3:1 sloped walls, 70 feet deep, and w ill hold about 800,000 compacted cubic yards 

of material. Each cell is double lined and built with a leachate system to collect and remove moisture. Each w ill be 

filled to the brim with low level radioactive solid waste, covered with a 15-foot-thick engineered barrier (consisting 

mainly of native soil), and w ill be planted with native habitat when waste capacity has been reached. Four such cells 

have been constructed to date. Two are full to their operating capacity and capped with an interim cover, and the other 

two are receiving waste. Additional cells w ill be constructed to meet the disposal capacity needed for environmental 

restoration, deactivation, and decommissioning (Crigler 2001).

300 Area and 600 Area

Fuel manufacturing processes and research and development activities in the 300 Area generated large quantities of low 

level radioactive solid waste that before 1973 were buried in 300 and 600 area burial grounds. After 1973, 300 Area 

low level radioactive solid waste was transported to the 200 Areas for disposal.

The distinction between 300 and 600 area burial grounds is sometimes confused. Essentially all waste disposed of in 

both area burial grounds was generated in the 300 Area. However, where other areas located their burial grounds within 

the area security fences, 300 Area did not. The 600 Area designation was devised to encompass all locations outside of 

area security fences and so includes those 300 Area burial grounds located adjacent to, but outside of, the 300 Area 

security fence. For that reason, 300 and 600 area burial grounds are included in this section.

The first burial ground to support 300 Area activities, 618-8, operated for only about a year in 1944. It was located north 

of the area under what is now an employee parking lot. A second burial ground, 618-1, was also north of the 300 Area 

and operated for 6 years beginning in 1945. The 618-2 Burial Ground followed in 1951 and operated until it caught fire 

in 1954. Another, 618-3, was excavated in 1954 but was filled to capacity the following year with demolition rubble 

from remodeling activities at the fuel manufacturing buildings (DeFord 1994).

Contamination repeatedly being spread, high dose rates, and waste fires in burial grounds near the 300 Area led to 

planning for burial grounds farther removed from facilities and employees. The 300 North Burial Ground, 618-10, was 

excavated in 1954 several miles north of the 300 Area and was followed by the 618-11 or Wye Burial Ground even 

farther north. For more information on the 618-10 Solid Waste Burial Trench, see the Historic Property Inventory Form in 

Appendix B on the Internet.

In addition to routine low level radioactive solid waste, these burial grounds received waste with a high dose rate from 

the Radiochemistry and Radiometallurgy laboratories. Exposure rates as high as 5 roentgen/hour were measured during 

waste disposal activities, and revised disposal methods were developed. To reduce dose rate to burial ground workers 

who handled the waste during disposal, waste was transported in various kinds of truck-mounted, shielded casks. These 

casks were designed so the waste containers could be dumped directly into metal caissons. The metal caissons had 

previously been buried in the disposal trench with only their openings visible at the surface. Once the waste with the 

high dose rate was dropped into the caisson, sand or gravel and sometimes concrete was placed in the caisson to reduce 

the dose rate at the surface.

Numerous instances of burial ground contamination were recorded at 300 and 600 area burial grounds. Most occurred 

during disposal when waste containers would rupture and contaminants would settle over the site. High dose rates also 

continued to be a problem until the 300 Area low level radioactive solid waste was transported to the 200 Areas for 

disposal, mostly in shallow burial grounds in the 200 West Area.

The 300 Area burial grounds ranged in size from 4000 to 40,000 square feet. The largest, 618-11, consisted of three 

burial trenches (each 900 x 50 x 25 feet deep), 50 pipe caissons, and at least 4 large diameter caissons. The pipe 

caissons were constructed by welding together five bottomless 55-gallon drums. The resulting 15-toot-long cylinders 

were buried vertically and spaced 10 feet apart in rows. Large diameter caissons were 10 feet high, 8-foot diameter

2 - 6 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Piu t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

corrugated steel tanks, each buried 15 feet below grade. The caisson was connected to the surface by an offset, 

36-inch-diameter pipe through which waste could be dropped into the tank (DeFord 1994).

I n c id en ts

Three categories of incidents involving low level radioactive solid waste occurred with some frequency, mostly in the 

1950s and 1960s, and all o f which resulted in contamination being spread to burial grounds and adjacent areas. These 

included fires in the burial grounds, burial containers that collapsed, and contamination spread when waste was in 

transit to burial grounds.

Fires occurred in 100, 200, and 300 area burial grounds. Most appear to have been caused by spontaneous combustion 

in waste materials with the fire spreading to adjacent refuse. The spread of contamination was sometimes severe, 

covered large areas adjacent to the burial grounds, and required major decontamination efforts by Hanford personnel. 

Fires in 100 and 300 Area burial grounds and the associated spread of contamination contributed to the decision to 

centralize the disposal of low level radioactive solid waste in the 200 Areas.

One of several burial ground fires in the 300 Area occurred in 1954 when a fire at the 618-4 Burial Ground spread 

contaminated particles as far as 1500 feet to the northeast with individual particles reading as high as 4.5 roentgen/hour

(Anderson 1996).

The collapse of burial containers was an occasional problem at the 200 Area burial grounds where large boxes were 

frequently used to transport and bury contaminated hardware and apparatus from process facilities. The containers were 

placed on the floor of the burial trench and the trench backfilled. The weight of the backfill soil would sometimes 

collapse the burial box, causing a rush of contaminated air from the box interior to transport contaminants to the area of 

the trench and sometimes beyond. Areas as large as 4 square miles were contaminated in this manner (Anderson 1996).

Similar problems occurred at the burial ground in the 300 Area, especially the 618-10 and 618-11 burial grounds, when 

paper cartons or metal cans containing waste with some activity would rupture when dropped into pipe caissons, 

resulting in a column of contaminated air that rose upward in the pipe and onto the surface of the burial ground 

(Gerber 1992c).

Occasionally, radioactive releases would result during transport and contaminate the roadway, railroad, and/or transport 

vehicles, requiring significant decontamination over large areas. One such incident occurred in 1957 when a burial box 

containing REDOX hardware was pulled from its railcar when one of the box swing cables came loose and caught on a 

railroad tie. The ground where it landed was contaminated to a level of 2 roentgen/hour (Anderson 1996).

Incidents were not the only source of hazardous conditions at the burial grounds. Even the routine handling of the waste 

could result in exposure rates as high as 200 roentgen/hour (Anderson 1996). To dispose of the waste, employees often 

had to use heavy equipment with all the hazards incident to bulldozer and crane operations. Backfilling required skillful 

use of tractors working on steep slopes in soft soil conditions.

Ai r b o r n e Ra d io a c t iv e Ef f l u e n t

Especially in its early years of operation, the production of plutonium at the Hanford Site generated large quantities of 

airborne radioactive effluent. Being airborne, the contaminants affected both employees working on the Hanford Site as 

w ell as neighboring populations. Table 2-6.4 is a summary of six radioactive materials released to the air from 

1944-1972. Since this table was published, updated data for the releases starting August 1951 have been published.

2 - 6 .2 6

\
Se c t io n 6 - W a ste M a n a g e m e n t

Table 2-6.4. Annual Summary o f Curies o f Six Radioactive Materials Released to the A ir

from the Hanford Site, 1944-1972

Year Iodine-131 Ruthenium-103 Ruthenium-106 Strontium-90 Plutonium-239 Cerium-14>

1944 2,139 0.49 0.035 0.021 0.0012 1.57

1945 555,089 87 12 6.94 0.39 460.15

1946 96,298 87 18 10.53 0.58 650.03

1947 31,909 . 51 12 7.38 0.41 451.30

1948 1,842 12 4.6 2.94 0.16 166.82

1949 8,694 0.42 0.19 0.12 0.006 6.15

1950 5,379 0.81 0.35 0.20 0.010 10.40

1951 27,397 2.4 0.58 0.28 0.014 16.92

1952 . 5,108 32 11 0.40 0.013 23.33

1953 1,747 266 89 0.52 0.015 31.05

1954 827 485 , 168 • 0.67 0.021 4Q.66

1955 671 6.87 2.00 0.78 0.025 43.30

1956 ' 118 5.76 2.63 1.24 0.014 72.88

1957 274 12.6 4.58 1.90 0.015 118.73

1958 822 16.6 . 4.38 1.98 .0-011 130.08

1959 227 15.2 5.27 2.30 0.008 144.41

1960 232 16.6 5.84 2.58 0.007 161.88

1961 92 15.0 6.16 2.81 0.011 171.68

1962 29 9.13 5.39 2.59 0.009 150.80

1963 78 7.53 5.10 2.47 0.011 139.79

1964 11 9.26 5.77 2.85 0.015 160.78

1965 6.08 7.84 5.40 2.71 0.014 154.25

1966 . 9.10 5.41 4.75 2.45 0.018 127.84

1967 1.28 3.82 4.35 2.12 0.001 107.41

1968 0.021 1.97 4.78 2.18 0.001 103.48

1969 0.0013 0.73 3.61 1.74 0.0004 72.81

1970 0.0011 0.19 0.89 0.42 0.0001 17.19

1971 0.000063 0.11 1.14 1.09 04)003 30.34

1972 0.000000 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.00003 3.55

SUM 7 38,999 1,160 388 64.32 1.78 3,770

The updated data increase the releases from August 1951-1972 by about 25%. For details concerning the updated data, 

see http://www.pnl.gov/eshs/cap/hra/pub/hedr.html on the Internet

Ch a r a c t e r iza tio n

Air contaminated by the chemical separation processes passed from the separations buildings through 200-foot high 

stacks into the atmosphere (see Figure 2-4.1 in the Chemical Separations Section). During the first 3 years of operation 

(1945-1947), the predominant radionuclide was iodine-131 released from the fuel during the nitric acid dissolution steps. 

Over time, improved technology and revised procedures reduced iodine-131 stack emissions to a small fraction of the 

original levels.

Other contaminants were ruthenium-103 and 106, which tended to become concentrated on the inner surfaces of the 

separations plant ventilation ducts. After a time, paint and metal flakes contaminated with ruthenium from the fans and 

vent ducts began to break free and in the absence of filtration before 1947 were carried out the stacks into the 

atmosphere. Being of greater mass than the iodine-131 gasses, these contaminated flakes fell to earth near the stacks, 

contaminating the area around the separations plants. Additional contaminants, including iodine-131, cesium-144, 

strontium-90, and others, were also found to have contaminated these small flakes. Flake contamination became as 

concentrated as 50 flakes per square foot near the stacks. During that period of high concentration, plant personnel were 

required to wear protective masks to avoid inhaling the "contaminants (HEDR 1994a, Roberts 1958).

2 - 6 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Techno lo g ical I m p r o v e m e n t s

The primary technological improvements that reduced air contaminants were air filtration systems. Because no adequate 

filtration systems were available before 1947, none were used. Sand filters were devised and installed at the T Plant and 

B Plant in 1947. The sand filters were effective in reducing the levels of contaminants reaching the atmosphere. Some 

were replaced with improved, high efficiency fiberglass filters in 1950. Silver reactor filters were also added to further 

reduce airborne contaminants.

Pr o c edu r a l Cha ng es

Equally important in reducing airborne contaminants were procedural changes that increased the length of time the 

irradiated reactor fuel was allowed to cool before being processed at the separations plants. Due to its short half-life of

8.04 days, much of the primary contaminant, iodine-131, would decay away if given sufficient cooling time. If the 

irradiated fuel elements were processed too soon, increased quantities of the gaseous isotope were liberated into the air 

as the fuel elements were dissolved in acid (HEDR 1994a, Roberts 1958).

The rush to produce plutonium during World War II tended to minimize the time that reactor fuel was permitted to cool 

in the reactor fuel basins before being processed at the separations plants. Initial schedules allowed only 32 days and 

occasionally less cooling time. As the war ended, cooling times were extended to 35-80 days and by 1949 to 

90-125 days. Iodine-131 emissions decreased accordingly (HEDR 1994a, Roberts 1958).

Other procedural remedies in die mrd-1940s were schedule related. Wind dispersal forecasts were consulted before 

dissolving operations were begun at separations plants. Dissolving operations were sometimes delayed due to 

unfavorable forecasts. Meteorologists determined in 1945 that night time w ind conditions were generally more favorabie 

than daytime, and dissolving operations were moved to the night shift.

Technological and procedural improvements did much to reduce the iodine-131 atmospheric release problem by 1948. 

However, Table 2-6.4 shows the result of an isolated release occurring in 1949 from the "Green Run." To measure how 

radioactive contaminants were spread, an experimental batch of green reactor fuel (fuel allowed to cool"for a reduced 

period of time) was dissolved atT Plant. Normal air filtering was bypassed to ensure that measurable levels of 

contaminants were released into the atmosphere. More than 8000 curies of iodine-131 were released during the 

Green Run. For more information on the Green Run, see Jenne and Healy (1950).

Table 2-6.4 also shows the result of another set of iodine-131 releases in 1951 from additional experiments in reduced 

fuel cooling time and from failure of silver reactor filters at B and T Plants. After 1951, iodine-131 releases generally 

decreased and have not exceeded 100 curies per year after 1960.

Sa n it a r y Li q u id Wa s t e (Se w a g e )

With its thousands o f W orld War II era construction workers, the Hanford Site quickly grew into one o f Washington 

State's largest cities with all of the infrastructural needs of a community of such size.

The predecessor communities of Hanford, W hite Bluffs, and Richland did not have municipal sewage treatment plants, 

so provisions had to be made to meet the needs of the Hanford Site. State of the art sewage treatment plants were 

planned and constructed at a time when primitive out-house technology was more the rule than the exception. Each 

Hanford program area was supported. The Hanford construction camp alone had three modern, if temporary, sewage 

treatment plants, and numerous septic tanks—the envy of any 1940's era city of comparable size. Reactor sites and 

chemical separations plants were similarly provided with indoor plumbing connected to septic tanks and drain fields 

(Du Pont 1945b).
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

As most of the Hanford Site was blessed with excellent drainage due to deep surface layers of alluvial sands and gravels, 

septic tank and drain field technology proved adequate for all Hanford production areas. Each reactor site had three to 

five septic tanks, and the 200 and 300 Areas had more due to larger employee concentrations.

Central Shops and temporary housing areas had much larger concentrations of personnel, including housing for 

thousands of construction workers and many of their families. Sewage treatment plants were required to supplement 

septic tanks at those areas. As construction at the Hanford Site was completed, the construction camps were abandoned 

and their sewage treatment plants shut down. Many of their remnant foot-prints are still visible today (DeFord 1996).

New septic tanks and drain fields were constructed as sanitation needs increased with plant growth and expansion. A 

single, recent, exception to septic tank/drain field technology is the 124-N-10 Central Sewer System, constructed near the 

100-N area. It is a lagoon and aeration facility that remains operational to support current 100-N Area sanitary waste 

requirements.

Today, 85 septic tank/drain field systems are in operation (WIDS 1998). More than 100 others have been abandoned, 

some because of the failure of the system to meet sanitary needs. However, most were abandoned because the facilities 

they supported were shut down. Septic tank deactivation is typically accomplished by crushing the top of the tank and/ 

or filling the void with sand and gravel.

Fa c il it ie s

Hanford sewage systems may be divided into two general classifications: temporary, construction era systems and 

permanent, production era systems.

The 1940's construction era facilities at the Hanford and 3000 Area construction camps and at Central Shops were 

considered to be temporary facilities established to support the construction of the permanent production plants at the 

100, 200 and 300 Areas. As temporary facilities, they were provided with sewage treatment systems of temporary 

design.

The Hanford construction camp was equipped with 76 temporary septic tanks and drain fields. Septic tanks were 

standard design, three-pass wooden baffle boxes of varying sizes and were located throughout the camp area. 

Additionally, three gravity-fed sewage treatment plants were constructed adjacent to the Columbia River. Each treatment 

plant included sewage lift sumps, chlorinators, flocculators, and settling basins. Sewage reaching these plants was 

chlorinated to control bacteria and flocculated to remove grease. Solid matter was settled out before the supernatant 

liquid was released to the river. During the peak month of July 1944, these facilities processed more than 4 million 

gallons of sewage daily, using 1400 pounds of bottled chlorine gas per day (Du Pont 1945b).

The 3000 Area construction camp and the Central Shops were also equipped with temporary sewage treatment plants. 

These were gravity-fed systems consisting of main trunk lines flowing into large septic tanks, thence by means of an open 

ditch to open settling basins. Two such basins were provided for the Central Shops plant and three for the 3000 Area 

plant (Du Pont 1945b).

Richland Village, now the City of Richland, was also provided with temporary sewage facilities while a municipal 

sewage treatment plant was constructed. These temporary facilities consisted of two Imhoff type septic tanks and 

1600 feet of sewer line. One tank was located east of Goethals Drive between Williams and Jadwin and the other east of 

George Washington Way between Swift and Williams. These operated until April 1944 and were replaced by a 

municipal sewage treatment plant located south of town and east of George Washington Way (Du Pont 1945b).

Permanent, septic tank/drain field sewage treatment systems were provided for all of Hanford's production areas. A 

typical permanent septic tank was unremarkable in its construction, meeting industry standards in all respects. All were 

of concrete construction and varied in size from 500 to 15,000 gallons with overflow capability into perforated concrete,

2 - 6 .2 9
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

vitrified clay or PVC drain fields. Drain fields were typically of herring-bone design and were buried to a depth of 3 to 

4 feet below grade. Actual system size and configuration was determined by capacity demand and local soil conditions.

Septic tanks were sometimes pumped out and their contents disposed of elsewhere. Designated trenches at the Sanitary 

Waste Landfill received this waste until 1987 and the 100-N Sewage Lagoon has been used since. Commercial off-site 

sewage disposal facilities are now being used (DOE 1996e).

I n c id e n t s

No incidents have occurred in the sanitary waste septic tanks when used for the purpose of their design. However, 

process area septic tanks have become contaminated with improperly disposed hazardous or radioactive waste. Such 

septic tanks are provided an appropriate waste site status that flags them as having additional regulatory and remediation 

requirements. Examples are the 1607-F-2 Septic Tank in the 100-F Area and the 3607 Septic Tank in the 300 Area. 

Radioactive contaminants in the sludge from the 3607 Septic Tank were measured at 25,000 counts per minute (DeFord 

1994, Gerber 1992c).

All sanitary waste treatment facilities are documented in the Waste Information Data System (WIDS 1998). The Waste 

Information Data System is the single, official repository of information on the existence and character of all the Hanford 

waste sites and may be accessed on the Internet at http://www.bhi-erc.eom/proiects/p m/eis/wids/wids.htm.

Sa n it a r y So l id Wa s t e (Tr a s h )

When established in 1943, the Hanford Site inherited several municipal sanitary solid waste landfills (garbage dumps) 

from the predecessor communities of Hanford, W hite Bluffs, and Richland. These were primitive, shallow dump sites 

where household and community trash was dumped and periodically burned to reduce volume. Some back filling is 

thought to have occurred, but this was a costly and uncommon community practice in that era. Numerous additional, 

small, private dumping grounds existed at farm sites and elsewhere within the Hanford Site boundaries (DeFord 1996).

The municipal landfills continued in use for a short time to support Hanford construction activities but were eventually 

backfilled with adjacent native soil. Larger and deeper sanitary landfill sites were excavated at the Hanford construction 

camp, the City o f Richland, the 1100 Area, 300 Area, at each reactor site, and at the 200 East and 200 West Areas. At 

least one existing gravel pit, Pit 11, was also used for sanitary solid waste disposal. Waste volume was reduced by 

burning at most sites until the practice was discontinued in accordance with modern air quality standards. Before 

hazardous waste was defined by the regulatory agencies, a few small burial pits were designated for disposal of paints, 

solvents, and other volatile materials, most of which were burned in the pit before being covered over with backfill.

Most of the above remained in use until the Central Landfill was constructed in 1973.

Construction debris was sometimes buried in excavations adjacent to the major Hanford construction sites. Construction 

debris included scrap lumber, concrete, piping, roofing materials, siding, metal, and other scrap building materials. No 

hazardous or radioactive materials are known to have been included.

Landfill management was decentralized to program area managers until 1973 when site-wide responsibility for sanitary 

solid waste management was assigned to a site contractor. A centralized, trench-type landfill was then constructed near 

the geographic center of the Hanford Site. This solid waste landfill operated from 1973 until 1996 as the primary 

sanitary solid waste disposal site. Since 1996, all Hanford sanitary solid waste has been transported to the City of 

Richland Landfill located south of the Hanford Site (Rohay 1997).

So lid Waste La n d f il l

The Solid Waste Landfill, often referred to as the Central Landfill, has served as the Hanford Site's primary disposal site

for non-hazardous and non-radioactive solid waste from 1973 until its closure in 1996. Hazardous and radioactive

2 -6 .3 0
Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

waste was disposed of at other Hanford areas designated for that purpose and are described in previous sub-sections of 

this section.

The Solid Waste Landfill received common office waste., construction debris, asbestos waste, and other types of waste 

common to a large industrial community. It is a conventional, excavated, trench-type land disposal facility that covers 

approximately 66 acres. It is 2977 feet in length, 965 feet in width and was divided into five units, each consisting of a 

series o f parallel trenches (DOE 1996e).

Trenches were o f two sizes, single and double. Single trenches measured 16 feet wide at the base, 46 feet wide at the 

top, and 15 feet deep and were filled with waste to a depth of 11 feet. Double trenches were 52 feet wide at the base,

92 feet wide at the top, and 20 feet deep and were filled with waste to a depth of 16 feet. Trenches varied in length from 

463 feet to 657 feet. Single and doublewide trenches were backfilled with a 1 -foot layer of cobble or gravel covered 

with 3 feet of native soil (Rohay 1997).

Wa ste Vo l u m e a n d Ch a r a c t e r iza tio n

Hanford sanitary landfills were reserved for non-hazardous and non-radioactive plant waste. Although landfill logs were 

not maintained before 1982, estimates have been developed for the Solid Waste Landfill based upon trench geometry 

and the thickness of the waste layer. Over 524,000 cubic yards of solid waste, 19,000 cubic yards of asbestos, and 

1,226,000 gallons of sewage and other liquids were disposed of at the Solid Waste Landfill. Volumes for other sanitary 

landfill sites are not available (DOE 1996e).

Based upon volume estimates for Solid Waste Landfill, approximately 40 percent of landfill content is office waste, 

consisting largely of waste paper products. Asbestos waste accounts for 10 percent and bulky items such as appliances 

and furniture account for another 10 percent. Construction and demolition debris, consisting of waste wood products, 

concrete scrap and soil, account for another 30 percent. The final 10 percent is made up of all other materials, including 

food materials, industrial waste, medical waste, and various inert materials. Other than for asbestos, these percentages * 

probably approximate the contents of other Hanford solid waste landfills (DOE 1996e).

An estimated 1-1.5 m illion gallons of sanitary sewage was disposed of at the Solid Waste Landfill from 1975 to 1987.

The sewage originated from portable toilets and septic tanks and was dumped into designated trenches along the east 

and west perimeter of the Solid Waste Landfill.

Approximately 10,000 gallons of liquid organic waste from the 1100 Area motor pool catch tanks was also disposed of in 

the sewage trenches from 1985-1987. These volatile organics were used for cleaning and degreasing motor vehicles and 

for other purposes. Trace amounts of each have been found in the groundwater below the Solid Waste Landfill. No 

sewage or other liquid waste has been disposed of at the Solid Waste Landfill since 1987. The volatile organics found in 

the groundwater include the follow ing (Rohay 1997):

Chloroform 

Carbon Tetrachloride

1.1-Dichloroethane

1.1.1-Tr i ch I oroeth an e 

Trichloroethane 

Tetrachloroethane

No n -R a d io a c t iv e , Da n g ero us Waste La n d fil l

The Solid Waste Landfill was originally divided into three units for operational purposes. In 1975, the northern most 

unit, about 10 acres, was isolated for the disposal of asbestos waste materials and non-radioactive chemical waste.

Because of the presence of regulated dangerous waste, this northern most unit was designated formally as the 

Non-Radioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and is regulated under RCRA(42 USC 6901) as a land disposal facility.

2 -6 .3 1
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Asbestos waste is defined as asbestos or material containing asbestos that is non-radioactive and non-hazardous. It 

accounts for approximately 10 percent of all waste disposed of at the Solid Waste Landfill. Disposal has been in 

accordance with 40 CFR 61, Subpart M.

The Non-Radioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill continued to receive asbestos until 1988 at which time it was 

operationally closed. Since then, all Hanford Site asbestos waste has been disposed of in other dedicated trenches in the 

Solid Waste Landfill until its closure in 1996.

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

The process of producing plutonium generated huge quantities of hazardous and radioactive waste at the Hanford Site. 

Early waste management planners hoped future technology would resolve disposal problems that had no immediate 

solution. The waste has not gone away, although radioactive decay has reduced the magnitude of the radionuclide 

content. Public criticism has been directed toward DOE and its predecessor agencies for allowing the waste to 

accumulate and, in some cases, to escape its artificially imposed boundaries. This criticism, however, has served to 

improve cleanup efforts, openness, and accountability for managing the waste at the Hanford Site. W hile much is 

known about waste management at the Hanford Site, much remains to be discovered and documented. Scholars may 

find any of the following subjects suitable for additional research:

• Develop a guide to all waste at the Hanford Site: its source, present location, planned final disposal, and 

regulators, indicating the level of assurance that all Hanford waste sites are known and documented

• Research how the initial waste management standards and practices were arrived at for the Manhattan Project 

and how they have evolved over time. Who were the key players in their development? What was the quality 

of initial waste management practices in light of 1940's science and engineering?

• Research the history of risk assessment in relation to determining how the waste would be managed. W hat were 

the procedural and managerial issues and how was risk evaluated whenever waste was deposited into the soil or 

released into the air or the Columbia River?

• Research how the historic funding levels affected the waste management legacy problems. To what extent were 

requested waste management improvements rejected by legislatures due to funding constraints

• Develop a calendar of waste management regulations, decisions, results of delaying decisions (providing 

temporary storage), and implementation dates, including the numbers of waste management structures built each 

year

• Develop a history of all means of projecting, processing, and inventorying waste

• Develop a comprehensive list of incidents

• Research the effectiveness of waste management at the Hanford Site. For instance, while low level radioactive

liquid waste was centrally controlled in the 300 Area, it was decentralized in the 100 and 200 areas. What 

effect did this difference have, if any, on contamination and waste characterization problems in the respective 

areas?

• Research the best industry practices for managing waste for each time period. How have Hanford waste 

management practices compared w ith those of other nuclear defense production sites and those of other 

nations?

• Research how the Atomic Energy Commission arrived at the decisions defined in their Immediate Action 

Directive 0511-21

• Research how the Washington State Administrative Codes on waste storage came about

• Research to what extent and in what manner public disclosure of waste data has impacted subsequent waste

management practices at the Hanford Site. How has disclosure affected those who live in neighboring 

communities and may have been impacted by waste releases into the environment? What has been their 

response?

• Research to what extent waste management decisions were politicized (location of the Waste Isolation Pilot 

Plant, for example)
Se c t io n

Research

De v e lo p m e n t

C.F. Noonan and D.C. Stapp

P a c i f i c N o r t h w e s t N a t i o n a l L a b o r a t o r y
Section 7 - Research and Development ^ 8

Se c tio n 7 - Research a n d De v e lo p m e n t

The majority of the research and development (R&D) conducted at the Hanford Site, especially during the early decades, 

was connected directly or indirectly to the production of plutonium. From the outset, the Hanford Site's main 

contribution was not innovative research but the production of fissionable material for bombs as quickly and cost 

efficiently as possible (Findlay and Hevly 1995). R&D efforts focused on increasing the amount of plutonium being 

produced, increasing the life of equipment, improving health and safety for the workers and public, and reducing costs. 

As the years progressed, R&D staff steadily increased their work away from plutonium production and began working for 

other clients outside the Hanford Site.

| R&D efforts at the Hanford Site covered a wide variety of

I topical areas including the physical sciences (metallurgy,

I chemistry, atmospheric sciences, etc.); medicine, biology, and 

| i related life sciences; improved nuclear reactors and reactor

systems; and energy applications. W ithin each of these areas, 

h R&D could fall anywhere from basic research to process and

I product improvement. The type of research directly impacted 

1 the staff and facility requirements. Basic research would

I typically require theoretical scientists and laboratory settings,

1 w hile process and product improvements might involve

I engineers, technicians, and test facilities such as test reactors

\\ and high bays.

I The federal government has historically been a major funding

I source for R&D of national importance. Major areas include

I national defense, energy, and basic science. The

I U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor

I organizations have contributed significantly to these efforts

I across the nation. The Hanford Site has played a small but

significant role in this national research agenda. 

Understanding the research problems undertaken 

and the accomplishments achieved at the Hanford 

Site contributes to the historical record on 

government funding of R&D.

This narrative relates the history and 

accomplishments o f R&D activities at the Hanford 

Site between 1944 and 1990. The focus is the work 

the R&D staff assigned to the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory (as it is presently known) and 

its predecessor organization, the Hanford 

Laboratories, conducted. The narrative also 

includes the R&D work Hanford staff conducted 

before the Hanford Laboratories was formed.

Our goal in this narrative is to give the reader a 

basic understanding of the types of R&D performed

Contents

| Historical C ontext..........................................................2-7.2

I Organizational and Operational Selling.....................2-7.4

I Important Areas of Research.........................................2-7.7

I Other Major Studies.................................................. 2-7. 11

I Research and Development Facilities ............... 2-7.24

I National and International Interactions o f

I Hanford Research and Development Staff..............

I Areas for further Research.........................................2-7.

I Biological and Ecological Research Projects

I at the I lanford Site, 195 1-1990..................

I Physical Science Research Projects ;

] at the Hanford Site, 1951-1990.................................2-7.40

I Divider Page Photo: Parly Researchers at the Applied

I Fisheries Laboratory, circa 1914 fBecker 199(1 p- bJ)

Tv pus o l Research

; (Adapted from A EC 1960j

Basic Research: Primary aim is fuller understanding 

: of the subject undci study rath e r than any practical

I application or immediate useful goal.

\|>|iliuil Kr-carch and (ivnei.tl Development:

. General resfc-orch undertaken with the clear

I probability th a t it w ill have a useful end result.

ProjvtI Development: * 11 ■ i I- « . ■

solution o f specific problems and producing an end

I'rocvsK and I’m d u tt Improvement: ' i •

lowering cosls and increasing tire effk iency of 

products or systems that have been developer 

j put inio production or operation.

2-7.1
Chapter 2 - Piu to n iu m Production Facilities

at Hanford (see sidebar box), especially those not related to the production of plutonium. Research directly related to 

plutonium production is also discussed here and more fully described in the sections on production: Fuel 

Manufacturing, Reactor Operations, Chemical Separations, and Plutonium Finishing. Our secondary goal is to link R&D 

activities to buildings and properties contributing to the Hanford Site Historic District. The physical structures that 

housed research teams play a vital role today in comprehending R&D at the Hanford Site.

His t o r ic a l Co n t e x t

The nature of R&D at the Hanford Site changed over the years in response to the national and international context in 

which events occurred. This context helped define eras different from those described in the other sections of this book, 

which are defined by the production of plutonium. The R&D eras were affected by such events as the rise o f civilian 

nuclear power, the environmental movement, the energy crisis, and the information revolution. The dates o f the eras are 

not precise but are instead indicators of generally when events had the most effect on R&D at the Hanford Site. Some of 

the events overlapped as indicated by the dates. The eras that affected R&D at the Hanford Site were:

• Pre-World War II (Pre-1942)

, • Manhattan Project Era (1942-1946)

• Weapons Complex Era (1946-1988)

• Energy Era I (1955-1970)

• Energy Era II (1971-1988)

• Cleanup Era (1989-present)

Pre-World War II (Pre- 1942)

It was not until the late 1800s that a significant scientific community emerged in the United States. This community was 

primarily supported by industry, universities, and independent research centers with industry in the forefront. By the 

beginning of the 20th century, industrial research was decentralized and competitive, major institutions performed 

research and technical services, and government work was contracted out, usually to universities. Basic research and 

applied research, especially military, were in dire straits on the eve of World War II (Kleinman 1995, Smith 1990).

The story of the development of nuclear technology is one of the major R&D stories in the history of the world and is 

central to the story at the Hanford Site. Chapter 1 sketches this historical tale and the introduction of fission to the 

United States. Although the U.S. Government was interested in the subject of fission and wanted to be kept informed 

about any progress in the field, it would not devote any funding for research until more information could be obtained.

It was not until 1940, after several research facilities in universities across the country had made significant progress on 

the fission problem, that federal funding for research was anticipated (Hewlett and Anderson 1990).

M a n h a tta n P ro je c t E ra (1942-1946)

All efforts of developing atomic energy as a power source were diverted toward developing an atomic weapon when the 

United States entered World War II (Groves 1983). In 1942, President Roosevelt agreed the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers should be in charge of designing plans to develop atomic weapons. Many physicists in America were soon 

involved in solving the complex problems surrounding production of radioactive isotopes, isotope refinement and 

separation, and weapon design.

By 1945, this massive R&D effort had proven successful. The R&D teams at the University of Chicago and Los Alamos 

developed the technology. The engineers and others at the production sites of the Oak Ridge Reservation and the 

Hanford Site produced the isotopes. The scientists and engineers at Los Alamos designed and assembled the test bomb, 

Trinity, and those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Section 7 - Research and Development

W eapons C om plex E ra (1946-1988)

Following the end of W orld War II, the Cold War began and efforts commenced to increase and improve the nuclear 

arsenal. Weapons designers first increased atomic bomb yields, then developed the new more powerful hydrogen bomb 

(Rhodes 1995). As nuclear weapons technology advanced, the government embarked on an aggressive weapons testing 

program that released large amounts of radionuclides into the environment (Hacker 1994). These events, in concert with 

a generally increasing awareness of the dangers of radiation, stimulated considerable R&D on human and environmental 

health effects of radiation.

Developing the atomic bomb had started out as a theoretical academic question and ended in a tangible result. This 

result of the Manhattan Project led the federal government to place an increasing priority on science, not only for defense 

but in the other federal agencies as well.

E n erg y E ra I (1955-1970)

In early 1946, just a few months after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. Congress passed the Atomic 

Energy Act. This legislation called for the development of federally funded research programs to secure scientific and 

technical accomplishments in the field of nuclear energy. This was a new and exciting field, and private industry 

expressed interest in using nuclear technology for power production. Private industry, however, made little advancement 

in the nuclear energy field until the 1950s. Two reasons commonly cited are the control the government maintained on 

nuclear materials and the great technological risk that industry was unprepared to assume (Hewlett and Holl 1989).

President Eisenhower gave a boost to nuclear energy w ith his Atoms for Peace initiative of 1954. The U.S. Congress 

amended the Atomic Energy Act in 1955 to provide funds for a series of demonstration projects. Demonstration plants 

were constructed, the Navy began using nuclear technology to power its submarines and ships, and the nuclear energy 

industry began to develop. By the 1960s, utilities across the nation were constructing nuclear power plants, and 

expectations were high throughout the world for this new source of power. Before 1966, electric utilities had ordered 

fewer than ten reactors total. In 1966-1967, that number quadrupled. After declining slightly in 1969, nuclear power 

reactor orders peaked in 1972-1973. Government and industry funded substantial R&D efforts to increase the efficiency 

and safety of nuclear energy.

Also during this era, alternative uses for nuclear technology were being sought. Project Plowshare represented one of the 

more commercial efforts related to alternative uses. R&D efforts within this program were associated with using nuclear 

explosive devices for large-scale construction and other non-military purposes, such as using nuclear devices to construct 

canals, to improve oil exploration efforts, and for mining. The U.S. Congress committed $3M to the program in 1958 

and 1959, but the program fizzled shortly thereafter as a result of President Eisenhower's moratorium on nuclear testing 

(Hewlett and H oll 1989; O 'N eill 1995, 1998).

E n erg y E ra II (1971-1988)

This era was marked by the energy crisis of the early 1970s, which was related to the rapid increase in oil prices from 

Middle East suppliers. The crisis set off an unprecedented growth in R&D work related to non-carbon energy sources, 

such as nuclear, wind, and solar. The breeder reactor program dominated R&D efforts related to nuclear energy.

Also characteristic of this era was the increase in environmental awareness and demands for environmental protection 

(see Balogh 1991, D'Antonio 1993, Pope 1998, W ellock 1998). One significant impact of the environmental movement 

on the Hanford Site was a rapid rise in the number of laws and regulations governing nuclear technology and radioactive 

waste management. R&D efforts were increasingly needed to assist in developing regulatory guidelines as well as 

developing waste management technologies. The environmental protection movement placed pressure on the Atomic 

Energy Commission, which had taken over from the U.S. Corps of Engineers in 1947 to manage the Manhattan Project 

sites. This pressure led to the splitting o f the Atomic Energy Commission in 1975 into the Energy Research Development 

Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

2 - 7 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Nuclear power reactor construction peaked in 1974 as the industry faced continued pressure from new regulations, high 

interest rates, increased public scrutiny, and large cost overruns. This marked the start of a downward spiral for nuclear 

energy that was furthered by the Three M ile Island incident in 1979 and the Chernobyl meltdown in 1986. Budgets for 

nuclear-related R&D suffered accordingly.

Recognizing that earlier projections for recycling waste were grossly exaggerated and because of the lack of public 

confidence,in industry's ability to deal with waste, the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 

(42 USC 10101). It relieved industry of the responsibi lity for waste disposal and identified the need for long-term storage 

of high level radioactive waste. This Act initiated a variety of efforts to develop a national repository, first in Kansas, and 

later at a variety of locations, including the Hanford Site. R&D efforts were needed to determine locations acceptable for 

long-term storage of waste as well as to develop systems for managing and containing the wastes.

Finally, the environmental movement had another important effect on R&D: the public's growing interest in and concern 

about nuclear technology. This increased the number of studies relating to the potential effects and risk of radionuclides 

and nuclear power generation.

Cleanup Era (1989-present)

During the 1970s and 1980s, environmental concerns heightened regarding contaminant releases to waterways and 

lands and their impact on people. Contamination discoveries such as those at Love Canal in New York State, where 

residents were exposed to harmful chemicals that had been dumped in the nearby Love Canal, and Times Beach, 

Missouri, where dioxins had been mixed with tar and sprayed on roads throughout the community, alarmed many.

These events contributed to the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act, better known as the Superfund, and a rampant increase in cleanup of contaminated lands across the nation. 

However, because the DOE complex was still focused on nuclear weapons production and its high security prevented 

outside scrutiny and pressure for cleanup, the DOE sites experienced little impact from the environmental cleanup 

movement until the late 1980s.

By the end of the 1980s, events converged to move DOE into its own era of cleanup. The 1986 Chernoybyl nuclear 

power plant explosion in the Soviet Union led to a general opening of DOE's nuclear production facilities to outside 

inspection, especially at the Hanford Site where design similarities with the N Reactor gave great cause for concern. By 

the late 1980s, the cold war was waning and the need for nuclear weapons production, especially plutonium from the 

Hanford Site, disappeared. Pressure from anti-nuclear advocates led to the eventual shutdown of the Hanford Site 

production facilities and demand for cleanup.

During this period, the Environmental Protection Agency began pressuring federal agencies to sign federal facility 

compliance agreements, which were legally binding agreements between regulators and agencies that set standards and 

schedules for compliance with environmental statutes. The Hanford Site, under the leadership of Michael J. Lawrence, 

was the first DOE site to sign a compliance document in 1989, which is now in the third revision (Ecology 1994). As 

cleanup activities commenced, recognition of the enormity and complexity of the cleanup problem associated with 

radioactive wastes identified a need for new technologies to characterize, monitor, and remediate contamination 

(Congress 1991).

Or g a n iz a t io n a l a n d Op e r a t io n a l Se t t in g

Over the years, the Hanford Site has had several contractors manage the day to day operations as well as conduct R&D. 

E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company and the General Electric Company were responsible for all activities at the 

Hanford Site. In 1965, however, the Atomic Energy Commission decided to disperse the activities among several 

contractors. The Battelle Memorial Institute assumed responsibility for the R&D activities at the Hanford Site. The 

sidebar box shows the directors responsible for R&D at the Hanford Site.

2 - 7 .4
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

E.I. Du Po nt de Ne m o u r s

a n d Co m p a n y

As has been thoroughly documented 

elsewhere (Thayer 1996), the success of 

the construction and startup of the 

Hanford Site by E.l. Du Pont de Nemours 

and Company can be accredited to 

Du Font's organizational and managerial 

characteristics. The most important, for 

purposes of this section, was Du Font's 

emphasis on industrial research and 

development. In the 40 years before its 

wartime assignment at the Hanford Site, Du Pont had made research the principal basis for its products and resulting 

income (Du Pont 1946a, Thayer 1996). This organizational emphasis on R&D encompassed all aspects of Du Font's 

construction and management of the Hanford Site.

The Du Pont departments listed’below were the key organizations responsible for R&D at the Hanford Site during the 

Manhattan Project.

Instrum ent D e p a rtm e n t was responsible for the maintenance of all project instruments as well as new installations 

and alterations to existing equipment and instrument development (Du Pont 1946b).

P D e p a rtm e nt was in charge o f process improvement, provided the consultation and checking services for the 

Construction Division and Pile Operations, and developed and expanded the Fish Lab. Operations of the 

P Department were located at a variety of buildings including 1 07 ,146-F, 303, and 305 (Du Pont 1946d, 1946e).

S D e p a rtm e nt was concentrated in the 200 Areas. This department was concerned with all aspects of separation 

facilities and isolation buildings. Another very important function of this group was the emphasis on 

meteorological and climatological research. The meteorology group worked closely with the chemical separations 

personnel to schedule dissolver operations when weather conditions were the safest for releases from those 

operations. They also studied wind direction and velocity, precipitation, conducted forecasts, and determined 

stack-to-ground dilution factors. This departmental role expanded when airborne waste began to be linked to 

vegetation contamination. The S Department was concentrated at the 622 Meteorology Complex (Du Pont 

1946e). For information on the 622 Meteorological Complex, see the Historic Property Inventory Form in 

Appendix B on the Internet.

T D e p a rtm e n t was responsible for all plant process technology, operated the plant control and development labs, 

maintained the Technical Manual and the Operating Standards, issued reports of technical progress, provided 

isolation technology and plant assistance, and produced canning, reactor, and separation technology. The 

T Department, along with the Fish Labs, also carried out Columbia River studies to ensure adequate control of 

effluent materials for the protection of fish and other forms of aquatic life. These studies were later taken over by 

the Health Instruments Section (Du Pont 1946f, 1946g).

M e dical D e p a rtm e n t/H e a lth Instrum ents Section was a specialized safety and technical group primarily 

concerned with the problems of occupational and public health hazards. This group was responsible for reporting 

hazard conditions, assisted the Production and Technical Departments in determining safe working conditions 

from radiation, recorded personnel exposure, and maintained medical records. A variety of radiation monitoring 

devices (Betty Snoop, Cutie Pie, pencils, etc.) and medical examinations (urine samples, thyroid checks, etc.) were 

used to ensure Hanford worker radiation protection. This group was concentrated in a variety of buildings such as 

231-Z, 292-T, 321-Complex, 3706, 3745-A/B, and 3746 (Du Pont 1946c). For information on these buildings, see 

their Historic Property Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet. For more information on the Medical 

Department and its Health Instruments Section, see the Worker Health and Safety Section.

D ire c to rs o f lliv K c s v a ith la b o ra to rie s

V iin r ( onip.inv V \irs

Herbert M. Parker General Electric Company

Sherwood L Fawcett Batteile Memorial Institute

F red W. Albaugh Batteile Memor 1967-1971

Ronald S. Paul Battelle Memorial Institute wwiipi

Edward L. Alpen Batteile Memorial Institute S ilp Tommy W. Ambrose Batteile Memorial Institute 1975-1979

Douglas E. Olesen Batteile Memorial Institute 1979-1984

W illiam B. Wifey Batteile Memorial Institute 1984-1994

2 - 7 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Personnel

1946 <1

1947 V

1948 5

1949 7

1950 ' 7

1951 9

1952 9

1953 10

1954 9

1955 8

1956 9

1957 9

Gen er a l Electric Co m p a n y

After the General Electric Company assumed the primary contract for Table 2 -7.1. Hanford Site Research and

operation of the Hanford Site in 1946, R&D activities were reorganized and Development Personnel, 1946-1957

expanded (see Table 2-7.1). During the first postwar expansion from _____________________

1947-1949, plutonium production was of primary importance at the v _

Hanford Site. However, because of the Atomic Energy Act regulations, 

which were issued in 1946, the peaceful uses of atomic energy also had to 

be explored.

R&D activities carried out by General Electric included radiobiology; 

radioactive isotope production; design and development of reactors, water 

treatment plants, separation facilities and equipment; radiological and 

meteorological monitoring; aquatic life studies; and biological studies of 

animals using radioactive elements.

In 1953, all departments conducting R&D were consolidated under one 

new organizational name-the Hanford Laboratories - to reflect their primary 

mission, research. Research facilities were not necessarily identified as

"laboratories" before this time but rather were distributed throughout the production organization facilities. Construction 

on the Hanford Laboratories complex in the 300 Area was completed in 1953 (GE 1954a). This concentration of 

research groups in one primary area created better communication and eliminated duplicate research. The Hanford 

Laboratories continued research and development programs in support of irradiation processing, chemical processing, 

waste management, and reactor fuels preparation. Laboratory personnel also provided advanced research in the physical 

and life sciences as well as radiation monitoring. These studies took place onsite at a variety of buildings, laboratories, 

and farms because the 300 Area initially did not have the capacity to handle all research activities.

Battelle M e m o r ia l I n s tit u t e

In 1963, General Electric, which had operated the Hanford Laboratories since 1946, announced that it wished to end its 

contract, citing potential conflict w ith its desire to pursue work in the commercial nuclear field. In 1964, the Atomic 

Energy Commission decided to split the Hanford Site operating contract among several different contractors. Batteile 

Memorial Institute, a research and development organization from Ohio submitted a proposal to operate the Hanford 

Laboratories.

Batteile had a longstanding relationship with the Atomic Energy Commission and had played a significant role in the 

Manhattan Project with 400 staff working round the clock on fuel rod fabrication, alloy development, and other projects. 

These wartime projects were followed by numerous Atomic Energy Commission projects, several of which were in 

collaboration w ith the Hanford Laboratories (Boehm and Groner 1986).

In its proposal, Batteile committed to invest the net fee resulting from the contract plus an initial appropriation of 

$5 m illion of its own funds into laboratory facilities to promote research and development in the Tri-City and Pacific 

Northwest areas (Boehm and Groner 1986, p. 72). In return, Batteile asked for the ability to use the laboratories for 

private research. It would eventually take 2 years to negotiate the finer points of this private use contract with the Atomic 

Energy Commission, but it would prove to be well worth the effort in terms of benefitting both the government and 

private industry by sharing facility costs and expertise.

On May 28,1964, Senators Jackson and Magnuson announced that Batteile had been awarded the contract to operate 

the Hanford Laboratories. When Batteile took over in 1965, the research facility was separated from Hanford Site 

operations and renamed the Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The government also issued Batteile a Use Permit, which 

enabled Batteile to conduct research for government agencies as well as private companies (PNNL 1999). Figure 2-7.1 

shows the announcement of Battelle's selection to operate the laboratories at the Hanford Site.

2 - 7 .6
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

O L* .t ".

A: Cut to. s’ iif "

I Objectives t:, /

■ B e g

H rm ld ■

! V--.L

Figure 2~7.1. Article Appearing in the Tri-City

Herald Announcing Batteile as the New Operator

o f the Laboratories at the Hanford Site, M ay 7 964

The initial mission of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, as 

it is currently called, was to focus on nuclear technology and the 

environmental and health effects of radiation. The Use Permit 

enabled Batteile to do research for others, obtain patents, license 

technology, and develop partnerships with industry. By the 1970s, 

the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's mission had evolved to 

include a wide range of services and research in the areas of 

energy, environment, and the economy (PNNL 1999) (see sidebar 

box for listing).

Oth e r Research Contractors

After 1965 when numerous contractors took over various 

operations at the Hanford Site, each of these contractors had their 

own R&D organizations to experiment with new materials, process 

improvements, and methods. Because these advancements were 

typically restricted to production, we have not covered them in this 

section.

In one case, however, an organization other than Batteile did take 

on a major R&D effort not related to production. The Hanford Site 

was selected as the location for the Fast Flux Test Facility, a 

prototype breeder reactor. Westinghouse Corporation won the 

contract in 1970 to construct and operate the Fast Flux Test Facility.

Approximately 800 Batteile employees who had been working on 

the Fast Flux Test Facility Project up to the time the contract was 

awarded transferred to Westinghouse.

Im p o r t a n t Ar e a s o f Re s e a r c h

When the Hanford Site was chosen to produce plutonium, questions immediately arose about the possible 

environmental impacts. Radiation tolerance limits were not completely understood in World War II America. No 

tolerance limits were established for the hazards that would be encountered during production or the number of 

radionuclides that would be produced. Scientists did not comprehend how these isotopes would behave in soluble or 

insoluble form. It was uncertain if they entered the body through inhalation, ingestion, or absorption through the skin. 

They did not know how the isotopes would concentrate in the food chain in plants, insects, fish, birds, mammals, and 

eventually humans. Furthermore, very few studies of the sandy earth and extreme winds of the Columbia Basin had been 

undertaken. This compounded the uncertainties of the entire project and forced almost immediate inquiry into broad 

biomedical and ecological research (Gerber 1992a, Stannard 1988). Thus, research was performed concurrently with 

construction and production at the Hanford Site.- Indeed, wastes were present in the area's air, ground, and water. 

Emissions occurred repeatedly above levels that were then defined as permissible or tolerable. Radioactive substances 

entered the food chain through both the air and river and were exacerbated by dust storms and construction activities.

To; ameliorate some of these problems, Hanford researchers first focused on worker health and safety followed by 

environmental studies.

An immense array of research and development has been conducted at the Hanford Site over the years. Hanford's depth 

and breadth of nuclear expertise created a demand for Hanford staff as the nuclear industry evolved. Studies in the 

physical and biological sciences have been carried out at the Hanford Site since the early 1940s. Human health and the 

health of the surrounding environment provided the primary focus for these early studies. Potential hazards to these 

groups provided the foundations for extensive biological and radiological programs at the Hanford Site.

2 - 7 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Rvscm ixh iin d D v x o lo p in v n l C ip a b ililic s in tin - I ‘ ITUs o f Ih v l\ic ifi< N o iiIh m ‘%1 N .ilio n .il I .lh o rd lo rx

A ii &■ Walt?)' Pollution

Aiio\ Development

Analytical Chemistry

Applied Mathematics

Aquatic. Biology

Alrr>ospheric Sciences

Biomedical Science & Technology

Catalvsrs-Surfacfc Chemisirv

Cellular & Molecular Biology

CerjmtCh <K Cements

C h w .it at Development & Processes

Comparative Pathology

A Physiology

Composite Materials

Computer Simulation & Svstem-. AnalysK 

Computer Technology 

Con-osion Tec htiulogy 

Ecology-Radioecology 

hlecirodicrmstry

Electrochemical Devices. & Systems 

ElvUronic Devices, Circuits

Energy Conversion Processes 

rn v iF O n rtie iiU tl 5 cie n c .e »

Fluid .Mechanics 

fo o d Technology 

Geosciences 

Graphite Ter hnologv

Heat Transfer 

l-k d rn to av

Industrial & Applied Chemistry

Industrial Economics

Inhalation Toxic ology

inorganic Chemistry

Instrum entation

Laser Technology

Marine Science & Technology

Materials Separation & Purification 

Met ham'cal Components & Device6- 

Mtrrost.opv: X-Ray. O ptical & Electron 

Muic-ralogv

NondusU uclivp. Testing 

Nuclcai Economics 

Nuclear Fuels Development,

Prcx essing & Separations 

Nuclear Instrumentation 

Nuclear Physics 

Nuclear ReactTM Technology 

Nuclear Reavtoc Materials 

Nuclear Safcguaids Evaluation 

Operations Research

Organic. Chemistry

Pioc ess & Physical Metallurgy

Phvsjt j l Chemistry

Ptanl N utrition

I’rot ess Development 

Radiation Biology

Radiation,'Inadiation Effect:, on Mateuals 

Radiation Shielding & Prelection 

Radioactive Wastes Processing &. Disposal 

Radio & Radiation Chemistrv 

Rndiobiolugv

Radioisotope Technology & Applications 

Radiological Science & TechnologyRegional Economics

Semiconditi fors-Solici Stale Dev ices 

Solid State Physics 

Spectroscopy

System1- Development S. Analysis 

Theoretical & Applied Mechanics 

Theoieiical & Mathematical Phvsics 

Thei modvriamics 

Tdxti ologv

bltrajorouisc Measurement Methods 

Ultrasonics

WaU.'T Treatment, Use &. Rccovc-vy 

W clding-loining fechnolngy

2 - 7 .8
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Major areas of R&D were conducted at the Hanford Site outside of producing plutonium for weapons. Charts at the end 

of this section list both the biological and ecological research projects as well as the physical research projects at the 

Hanford Site from 1951 -1990.

Eight main areas of R&D were important at the Hanford Site: detecting radiation, human radiation experiments, 

meteorology and atmospherics, applied fish studies, radioactivity field and reactor effluent studies, environmental and 

biological monitoring, radiobiology, and inhalation (pulmonary radiotoxicology) studies.

Detec tin g r a d ia t io n

Detecting radiation was one of the first areas of research initiated at the Hanford Site and was essential to secure the 

health and safety of Hanford workers and area residents. Although good plant construction and design was necessary to 

protect workers and the environment from any possible dangers, Hanford managers were aware that an onsite team of 

health physics experts was needed for their radiation detection program (Gerber 1992b).

The first health protection and instrumentation team arrived at Hanford in early 1944. They researched the biomedical 

effects of ionizing radiation and devised a variety of methods of shielding and monitoring radiation workers (see the 

Health and Safety Section). They quickly established themselves in an organization known as the Health Instruments 

Section. The Health Instruments Section was instrumental in defining and measuring radiological hazards, safety 

procedures, and developing and calibrating instruments (Gerber 1992a, 1992b; Stannard 1988). The Health Instruments 

Section was incorporated into Du Font's Medical Department. The Medical Department/Health Instruments Section 

specialized in safety and the problems of occupational and public health hazards.

The Health Instruments staff placed a number of new and unique radiation detection instruments into use at the Hanford 

Site (Gerber 1992a, 1992b; Howell et al. 1989). These included integrons (air monitors), gas and liquid sampling 

vessels, Geiger-Mueller counters, and other devices for personnel monitoring. A variety of radiation monitoring devices 

and medical examinations (urine samples, thyroid checks, etc.) were used to ensure worker radiation protection.

To assist in improving the quality and decreasing the expense of radiation protection, many portable health physics 

instruments were designed, modified, or fabricated onsite (see Table 2-7.2). Portable health physics instruments have 

always been at the forefront of maintaining radiation control programs at the Hanford Site. The two functional types are 

those designed to monitor contamination and those designed to measure exposure rates. Most R&D of portable health 

physics instruments occurred in the 318, 3745, 3745-A, 3745-B buildings (Howell et al. 1989, Roesch 1964).

Hu m a n Ra d ia t io n Ex p e r im e n t s

In early 1942, officials of the Manhattan Project realized they would need a special medical program to monitor the 

exposure of scientists and workers to materials produced during plutonium production. Determining adverse health 

effects were a priority for safety as well as the risk that any excessive radioactivity spread outside the facilities might be 

detected, which could compromise the security and with it the schedule of weapons production.

Human radiation experiments were one of the most controversial R&D activities undertaken. Government sponsored 

human radiation experiments occurred within the broader context of biomedical science, which encompassed 

experimental research as well as the diagnosis and treatment of disease. The Corps and its successors also had related 

interests in radioecology, radiological warfare, civil defense, and nuclear fallout. The chief objectives were to determine 

the biological effects of radioactive material, measure doses from injected, ingested, or inhaled radioactive substances, or 

measure the time it took such substances to pass through the body (also called uptake studies). At Hanford, these were 

manifest in a variety of formats, and research subjects included Hanford Site employees, medical patients, prisoners, and 

routine monitoring of area children. The experiments at the Hanford Site were divided into two main subject areas, 

environmental releases and human plutonium injections. A few of the Hanford studies w ill be discussed below. For 

more information on complex-wide experiments, see DOE 1995a, 1995b; CEC 1986; and Welsome 1999.

2 - 7 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Table 2-7.2. Portable Instruments Used to M onitor Contamination and Measure Exposure Rates at the Hanford Site,

1944.1988

Name of Type of Date Designed at Modified at Fabricated Date

Instrument Detection Intro. Hanford Hanford On/Off Site Retired

Contamination Monitoring Equipment 1940s

Victoreen GM Beta-gamma 1944-49 Yes O ff 1950-59

Eltronics GM Beta-gamma 1944-49 1950-59

Victoreen 389C (Thyac) Beta-gamma 1948 Yes O ff

Zeus Beta-gamma 1947

Sandy Alpha 1944 1950-59

Portable Poppy Alpha 1949 1950-59

Exposure (Dose) Rate Monitoring Equipment 1940s

Beckman Beta-gamma 1944 1950-59

Hanford Cutie Pie (CP) Beta-gamma 1948 Yes (1944) O ff 1950-59

Juno Alpha-beta 1945 1980-89

Epsey Junos Alpha-beta 1949 1950-59

BFP Instrument Neutron 1948

The Neut Neutron 1948 1950-59

Contamination Monitoring Instruments 1950s

Nuclear Chicago GM Beta-gamma 1950 1950-59

Victoreen 389 CD GM Beta-gamma 1953 1960-69

HAPO GM Beta-gamma 1956 Yes O ff .1970-79

Scintillation Portable Poppy Alpha 1955 1970-79

Victoreen Alpha Meter Alpha-beta 1950

Zeuto Alpha-beta 1950

Chicago Samson Alpha-beta gamma 1955

Exposure (Dose) Rate Monitoring Instruments 1950s

Red Face Juno Alpha-beta 1950 Yes On 1980-89

Yellow Face Juno Alpha-beta 1950 Yes On 1980-89

Improved Cutie Pie (CP) Beta-gamma 1954 Yes O ff

Improved Juno Alpha-beta 1954 Yes O ff

Totem Pole 1950s Yes On

TPC Yes

LPC Yes

BFP 1958 1960-69

Contamination Monitoring Instruments 1960s

Eberline E-120 CRM Alpha 1968 Partial Partial

Eberiine E-140 CRM Alpha 1969 Partial Partial

Radeco 225 CRM Alpha 1969 Partial Partial 1970-79

Exposure (Dose) Rate Monitoring Equipment 1960s

HPC Gamma 1961 Yes On

BFQ Neutron 1963 Yes On 1970-79

Snoopy Neutron 1969

Contamination Monitoring Instruments 1970s

Eberiine PAC-6 Alpha .1977

G M detector Beta 1972

G M detector (pancake probe) Beta 1972

Exposure (Dose) Rate Monitoring Instruments 1970s

Eberiine Teletector Gamma 1972

Eberiine R0-3B Beta 1975

Bumblebee (modified Eberiine R0-3B) Alpha, Beta Gamma 1976

Contamination Monitoring Equipment 1980s

Bicron "Surveyor" Alpha 1984

Exposure (Dose) Rate Monitoring Instruments 1980s

Johnson "Extender" Gamma 1984

Victoreen Model 325 1985

"Black W idow " Alpha-beta gamma 1980

Yes Off?

m

%

2 - 7 .1 0
Sec tio n 7 - Research a n d De v elo pm en t

In 1949, a voluntary tissue sampling program was initiated to analyze the deposition of plutonium in humans. Bone, 

liver, and lung tissue were obtained from former, employees during autopsies. This program grew into the current 

U.S. Transuranium Registry administered by Washington State University. In 1951, fourteen subjects participated in a 

study that examined the percutaneous absorption of tritium oxide. As a result of this study, researchers recommended a 

50 percent reduction in the maximum level for atmospheric tritium oxide (Delong et al. 1954). To determine uptake by 

the human thyroid, eight Hanford workers consumed milk during 1963 from dairy cows fed iodine 131 (Watson et al. 

1964). From 1963-1971, 64 inmates at the Washington State Penitentiary received x-rays o f their testes to examine the 

effects of ionizing radiation on human fertility and testicular function (CEC 1986, Welsome 1999). And children were 

subjected to routine monitoring in whole-body counters to determine what kinds of radionuclides may be present in their 

bodies from living in the vicinity of the Hanford Site and eating locally grown produce (Honstead 1967). Many of the 

human radiation experiments performed w ith research monies by the Atomic Energy Commission and its predecessor 

agencies would not currently be allowed under more rigorous research guidelines. Many of these studies were 

developed in conjunction w ith larger research programs such as meteorology and atmospherics, inhalation studies, 

health physics, and radiobiology.

M eteo ro lo g y a n d Atm o s p h e r ic s

Because process gas would be released from the chemical separations plants, temperature and other atmospheric 

conditions were environmental safety concerns for the Hanford Site from the beginning. A meteorologist was sent to 

inspect the Hanford Site and its topographical features when construction first began in 1943. Soon after the Hanford 

Site designed a comprehensive meteorological and atmospheric research program.

Preventing harmful effects of plutonium production by-products required the continued study and monitoring of 

meteorological conditions. The S Department, located in the 622 Complex, was responsible for Hanford's 

meteorological and atmospheric research program. The Meteorology Group within the S Department worked closely 

with the chemical separations staff to schedule when process gas could be released during dissolver operations. This 

depended on the most favorable weather conditions. For information on the 622 Meteorological Complex, see the 

Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

Du Pont's S Department built the first meteorology tower in 1944. The tower was used to study wind direction and 

velocity, precipitation, forecasts, and determine the stack-to-ground dilution factors. This departmental role expanded 

due to concerns with airborne releases and resulting contamination of vegetation.

Du Pont's meteorological and atmospheric research program became more comprehensive over time. Between the years 

1959 and 1974, more than 300 atmospheric studies were completed involving surface and elevated releases of tracers 

(Nickola 1977, Nickola et al. 1983, Ramsdell et al. 1985). Tracers were used to track the movement of stack effluents 

across the landscape. These planned experiments were necessary to analyze atmospheric conditions and develop tracer 

techniques. Charles E. Elderkin measured the dispersion characteristics of the atmosphere with respect to particles in one 

of the largest atmospheric diffusion experiments ever conducted. In addition to Elderkin, Jake Hales was another 

eminent researcher in the field of meteorology and atmospherics (see sidebar box).

Before the 1950s, most radioactive material releases into the air were the result of operating processes or were 

accidental. However, one release called the "Green Run" was a planned experiment. It occurred in December 1949,

3 months after the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear device. The purpose of the experiment was to measure how 

an airborne release of radioactive materials spread through the environment in hopes of monitoring the Soviet nuclear 

weapons program. During this experiment, "green" fuel still containing large amounts o f radioactive iodine was 

discharged through the stacks Of T Plant.' Weather conditions at the time of the test were unfavorable and radioactive 

gases were dispersed over populated areas. The radioactive iodine came to rest on surrounding ground, vegetation, and 

water. A 1993 review of classified materials revealed that this test was not "intended to be a radiation warfare 

experiment or a field test o f radiobiological effects on humans" (GAO 1991).

2 ~ 7 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

CHARLES E. ELDERKIN - H a n fo rd S ite 1 9 5 9 - p r e s e n t

Charles Elderkin has contributed to science at the Hanford both as a research scientist and as the 

Manager of the Atmospheric Sciences Program. His research has focused the physics and chemistry of 

clouds and precipitation, evaluations of wind characteristics to plan sites and designs for energyproducing wind turbines, clim atic effects from energy developments, modeling and field observations 

of wind dispersion characteristics for pollution control, and meteorological forecasting. He has made 

significant research contributions in the field of boundary layer dispersion. In Operation Green Glow, 

an experimental release of radionuclides in the atmosphere, he measured the dispersion characteristics 

of the atmosphere with respect to the particles. This was the largest atmospheric diffusion experiment 

ever conducted, and information from this test helped Hanford scientists assess the impact of placing nuclear power 

plants in climates of differing type and terrain. Elderkin was also the project manager for the W ind Characteristics 

Program Element of the Federal Wind Energy Program, for which he evaluated wind characteristics to plan sites and help 

design energy-producing wind turbines (Elderkin and Fuquay 1965).

JAKE HALES - H a n fo rd S ite 1 9 6 2 -1 9 9 1

Jake Hales is an atmospheric chemist who came to the Hanford Site in 1962. He quickly rose to senior 

scientist and Manager and Director of Atmospheric and Earth Science Programs. His research interest 

has been in the application of chemical engineering to environmental sciences, atmospheric sciences 

in particular. He has focused on particle transport and reaction-rate phenomena in his research. Hales 

research at PNNL includes the Multi state Atmospheric Power Production Pollutant Studies, for which 

he,performed fundamental research on the removal of material by clouds, which is later released as 

rain. This acid rain is the wet deposition of sulfate particulate matter. He performed theoretical 

modeling, along with field observations, to determine how removal of particulate matter, such as sulfates and nitrogen 

oxides, affect rain. Hales created the Pluvious Model, created to model storm, cloud and atmospheric chemistry at small 

scales. From this model, the GChM-Globa! Chemistry Model grew, which modeled the same parameters but on-a global 

scale. This model was designed for multi-day simulations over a wide range of spatial scales to solve air pollution 

problems.

As a result of public concerns about these releases causing adverse health effects, the exposures from the Green Run as 

well as other releases were estimated by the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project, which began in 1988 

with the work performed by Batteile under the supervision o f the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The 

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also funded the follow-on study, the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study, in 

1989. The mission of the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study was to determine whether an increased incidence of thyroid 

cancers existed in the populations living at or around Hanford in the 1940s and 1950s. The results of these studies are 

not covered within this document, but information can be obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy Public Reading 

Room located in Richland, Washington (http://reading-room.pnl.gov) and the Hanford Site web page 

(http://www.hanford.gov).

Public concerns about the hazards of atmospheric nuclear fallout testing and the siting of proposed nuclear facilities 

were mounting between the 1950s and mid 1970s. This prompted researchers at Hanford to conduct a large number of 

diffusion grid experiments involving surface and elevated releases o f radioactive tracers. The first and best-known group 

of experiments was conducted in the summer o f 1959 and called Operation Green Glow. It consisted of 28 releases of 

fluorescent pigment during relatively stable night-time atmospheric conditions (Nickola et al. 1983; see also sidebar box 

on Elderkin). In 1962 and 1963, Hanford intentionally released small amounts of iodine 131 from the REDOX Plant to 

study the dispersion of radioactive iodine into the air and soil. During the emission, plume trajectories were plotted and

m

2 - 7 .1 2
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

samples collected at several altitudes and up to distances 50 miles away. In addition, vegetation and m ilk samples were 

collected. This study was designed to evaluate the spread and behavior of iodine released into the atmosphere and 

provide data to estimate the hazards potentially associated with weapons testing or nuclear fallout. To obtain data on 

inhalation uptake, two Hanford employees and several beagles stood directly in the path of the release (Gamertsfelder 

1963, DOE 1995c).

During the 1970s experiments were conducted to determine whether radioactive particles from various study sites on the 

Hanford Site were resuspended and transported by wind. Interrelationships between wind speed, direction, airborne 

soil, and radioactivity levels on airborne particles indicated that airborne concentrations increased with wind speed, the 

weathering half-life was greater than previously reported, and concentration rates were more concentrated than fallout 

levels. These studies were useful for determining the extent of cleanup operations, i.e., soil cover-up, areas to clean up 

first, and modeling concentrations for down w ind and offsite. The meteorology and atmospherics group continues to 

provide information on weather forecasts, preparing climatological summaries for the Hanford region, and observe and 

record weather conditions. .

just as researchers were concerned with atmospheric releases of radioactive materials, Hanford scientists were also 

concerned about radiation and heat effects on the Columbia River and plants, algae, insects, fish, and introduction to the 

food chain. These concerns led to the development of comprehensive research programs focusing on applied fish 

studies, radioactivity field studies, studies on reactor effluents, and environmental and biological monitoring.

Ap p l ie d Fis h Stu d ie s

Initially very little was known about the interactions of ionizing radiation and the immediate environment, therefore, it 

was essential to monitor the safety of reactor operations through a number of scientific studies. The secretive nature of 

activities at the Hanford Site necessitated that initial investigations occur offsite. In August 1943, the Fisheries 

Department at the University of Washington was contracted to undertake special studies on the effects of radioactivity on 

aquatic organisms, especially fish. The Fisheries Department soon thereafter organized as the Applied Fisheries 

Laboratory and became an active component of Hanford research.

Figure 2-7.2 shows early researchers at the Applied Fisheries 

Laboratory, circa 1944 (Becker 1990, p. 63).

Initially the Applied Fisheries Laboratory used x-rays to study the 

effects of radiation on fish. However, those involved in the project 

believed the specific isotopes involved in reactor operation had to 

be studied because the isotopes were flushed into the Columbia 

River, thereby, affecting the fish (Becker 1990). As a result, Du Pont 

opened a small onsite facility in 1945 in the 100-F Area, the 

Aquatic Biological Laboratory. For more information on the 

Aquatic Biological Laboratory, see the 108F Building in Appendix B 

on the Internet.

The results of the few classified studies the Applied Fisheries Figure 2-7.2. Early Researchers at the Applied

Laboratory conducted between 1943-1945 were not published until Fisheries Laboratory Around 1944

1947-1948 (Becker 1990, Bonham et al. 1948, Welander et al.

1948). The Applied Fisheries Laboratory connection with the Manhattan Project was acknowledged after World War II 

when the group was renamed the Laboratory of Radiation Biology to better reflect their expanding line of investigation 

(Becker 1990). Later studies involving the Columbia River and its organisms were carried out within the reactor effluent 

program, biological monitoring, and radioactivity field studies.

2 - 7 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Ra d io a c t iv it y Fie l d St u d ie s a n d Reacto r Efflu en t Stu d ie s

Radioactive material releases to the Columbia River came prim arily from the Hanford Site's first eight production 

reactors. These reactors, called single-pass or once-through reactors, used river water for cooling. Once circulated 

through the reactors, hot effluent water was discharged into cooling ponds and eventually returned to the river. The 

result was a release of fission products and other radioactive materialsinto the river. In concurrence w ith the applied fish 

studies, collection of Columbia River water began in 1944. However, routine analysis of radioactivity in river organisms 

began in 1946. From these studies, researchers learned that the amounts and distribution of radioactivity in the 

Columbia River were controlled by complex ecological factors including seasonal variations in aquatic communities, 

food chain relationships, and river temperature and flow. The studies on artificial radioactivity and river ecology were 

interrelated and led to the development of the scientific field known as radioecology (Becker 1990).

Controlled reactor effluent studies were related to both the applied fish and radioactivity field studies. All three were 

concerned with the impact radioactive isotopes would have on the area's main source of water used for drinking and 

agricultural purposes in addition to cooling the reactors. The most effective way to examine the biological effects of 

reactor cooling water effluent was in laboratory experiments. Fish were reared in tanks filled with varying dilutions of 

reactor effluent. The objective of these studies was to determine what conditions (radioactivity, chemical toxicity, 

temperature, or any combination of factors) caused adverse effects on the fish. Effects were evaluated by comparing 

mortality and growth rates between control and exposed groups offish (Becker 1990).

Other field studies involving use of Columbia River water included use as irrigation on controlled vegetable plots. The 

data were used to predict the relative hazard of different isotopes associated with Hanford operations. Migratory fish 

were also monitored to study how radionuclides would disperse from the Columbia to the Yakima and Snake rivers 

(Kornberg 1964).

En v ir o n m e n t a l a n d Bio lo g ic a l M o n it o r in g

First implemented in 1943, environmental monitoring was essential to secure the health and safety of Hanford workers 

and area residents. Detection instruments monitored workers, residents, and the environment for radiation (see previous 

sub-section on Detecting Radiation). In view of what we know today, unvoiced concerns for the health and welfare of 

Richland residents and Hanford Site employees were masked with consumption and behavioral recommendations by the 

Medical Department (Gerber 1992a, pp. 72-73). For instance, the use of iodized salt was encouraged because animal 

experiments in 1945 suggested inert iodine reduced thyroid uptake of carrier-free radioiodine. In mid-1947, atmospheric 

tests determined airborne radioactive contamination deposited readily on sagebrush. The Richland Public Health 

Section then advised residents to remove them on the premise that they aggravated allergies and harbored ticks. And in 

1949, traditional hunting areas near the Hanford Site were closed due to the discovery of high radioactivity levels of 

iodine-131 in game animals.

The rush to successfully complete construction and start plutonium production at the Hanford Site necessitated 

minimizing potential health and safety problems. Consequently, public suggestions were the only way to alert residents 

and employees to potential health concerns at the Hanford Site without causing too much alarm and panic, in the early 

phases of environmental monitoring and radiation protection, it was often unclear what acceptable tolerance doses were 

and what the limits should be. Initial studies at the Hanford Site helped establish these guidelines and studies have 

continued to the present day. For more information on tolerance doses and limits, see the Health and Safety Section.

Monitoring of various species has been of primary importance at the Hanford Site. Transmission of radioactive materials 

through biological chains revealed information about radionuclide transfer. Controlled laboratory experiments on 

animals fed or injected with radioactive compounds aided the development of exposure levels for humans and provided 

a baseline for comparing anomalies of w ildlife on the Hanford Site. Field studies on various biological species (plant and 

animal) have contributed to basic knowledge of the processes of radionuclide uptake and transport (GE 1951 c, Kornberg 

1964, Pearce 1967). Area livestock were also examined and though positive but low thyroid readings were found in
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

almost all animals, researchers felt comfortable in stating that it was very "unlikely that animals or persons consuming 

m ilk and meat products grown in the vicinity of Hanford were in any case damaged" (Herde quoted in Stannard 1988, 

p. 762).

RADIOBIOLOGY

When the production plants at the Hanford Site and other areas started operations in the 1940s, scientists did not 

understand w ell the effects that radiation could have on workers, the public, or the environment The programs that 

began initially with the applied fish studies expanded over the years to include aquatic life studies, plant life studies, 

ranch and w ildlife studies, the development of an experimental animal farm, human radiation studies, therapy with 

radioactive materials, and general biology (Parker 1948b, GE 1951 c). Stannard (1988) summarizes the range of 

radiobiological research across the weapons complex and at the Hanford Site, identifying three major areas at the 

Hanford Site:

• Fish studies (described in a previous sub-section) to understand the biological effects of reactor effluents released 

to the Columbia River on indigenous fish.

• Large and small animal studies to introduce radioisotopes into living tissue of animals such as sheep, pigs, dogs, 

and rats, and study them over time to identify and measure effects. Inhalation, inoculation, ingestion, and 

adsorption methods were used to

introduce radioisotopes such as 

iodine-131, strontium-90, cesium-137, 

and plutonium and uranium isotopes into 

the animals.

• Radioecology studies to understand the 

effects of soil containing radionuclides.

Greenhouses and garden plots were 

maintained to grow cereal grains, alfalfa, 

and other crops in soil containing 

controlled amounts of strontium-90 and 

cesium-137.

The Radiobiology Program at the Hanford Site 

along w ith the parallel programs at the Oak Ridge 

Reservation in Tennessee, and Brookhaven,

New York, played an important role in the nation's 

efforts to understand the impact of ionizing 

radiation on living tissues (Gerber 1993b, 

pp. 172-199).

Three of the central researchers of radiobiology at 

the Hanford Site were Herbert M- Parker,

W illiam Bair, and Ethel Gilbert (see sidebar box).

INHALATION (PULMONARY

Ra d io to xic o lo g y) Stu d ie s

Inhalation experiments at the Hanford Site were a major area of research within the general Radiobiology Program. They 

began by placing mice in the atmosphere of a chemical processing plant expected to contain radioactive particles. In the 

early 1950s, the inhalation program was more formally organized under the title Pharmacology Operation. The program 

then concentrated on introducing radioactive elements to animals via intratracheal instillation (Stannard 1988). Hanford 

researchers reported the first clear-cut demonstration of the development of lung cancer from plutonium in 1955 

(GE 1956b). To further address health and safety concerns regarding worker inhalation of radioactive particles and

'R c *(\u tlu 'is At the I Ion fo rd kite (on dtn le d fjio n ftrin y ,

r.id io b iitlo iiit .1/«.lu d ii■» during thv-e 1 <*,»•>; l '*4 >-1 VO 7 /. / / i n 

e \.i m in t'd thv vuot. N at I - 1 i t 1 io d in e -1 j l j on dieep, I he

b ttin it'tlii id I'fh 't /- h i In tiu m And plutonium , .m il the tcAt tinn*

01 p lo n l life In lA iliA lion. And f//m p .irlitip A lc d in the ifiie^f m i

riid u ilio n Ihet.ipie- H xin la id '- 1 h iv i heA lth p h i sit is /.

Dr. H e rh e il \ f . P.irkei. «i/sii helped la <M.i/>ii*./i ta le tw u e do*v*

m i 1 A nnie fa rm - 01 e \p n *u ie la r.idi.ilia n, \d d ilitin ,ill\. the

/ t.im ord kite phn cd .1 ,em iiud rale m trn< kini> M id *•tu d \ in i; the

e lfv i l-i ai Udlaut tram disf.inl Atom u hom h I n K an llw P.n ilh

\a tth w e > l ,m d an nthei reiiions. in i Indian the v iir f / i Pai irii

And M.exk. 1. V im annA lion (lo\ rla p e d aIuhiI the hiom eiln .1/ 

w it-i /- u l ia n i/m u i.u liA lio n in Ihe tw o de<Atle* A lter the

io un din ii o f Ihe Hah ford Pl.inf reseAn her* in ih e m e ln .

p h \ s/i m edn ine. And At>ri( allure. 11 e ll a- nw m hei s a f Ihe

p u h lii who le n d p a p u lA i -< le n lifii /o u /n .i/-. <.m ii* la ret n ‘>ni/v

the nuinnilude nn tl in li.m -i^ e n i i* at the e lle < N 01 i.id io A itix it» 

an liiin n fissile. - ( ivi h n 1‘1‘M h, p. I “ 2

2 - 7 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

HERBERT M . PARKER - H a n fo rd S ite 1 9 4 4 -1 9 8 4

I

*" | Herbert M. Parker was a medical physicist who started his career in Enrico Fermi's Metallurgical Lab.

J Before coming to Hanford, he researched the new and unstudied field of the effects of beta-particle 

' wet I radiation in fission products. One of Parker's earliest concerns was the effect of inhaled radiation.

- V I In the early days of the Hanford Site, he was the first chief health physicist and Head of the Health

J / m Instruments Section. Parker was responsible for expanding what had been a primarily monitoring 

i vt d j i i W i and control operation into a world-renowned radiobiology and health physics research program.

In the days of the General Electric Company, Parker was made Director o f the Hanford Laboratories. 

He was one of the leading researchers into dilemmas of radon lung dosimetry and modeling for dosimetry (measuring the 

number of roentgens absorbed due to exposure to radiation). He wrote the earliest summary on the probable 

mechanisms of the biological action of beta particles, assisted in the development of the first standards for maximum 

permissible plutonium concentration levels in biological tissue, and subsequently devised standard units of ionizing 

radiation dose, first known as the rep or roentgen equivalent physical. Parker was a member of the National Academy of 

Engineering, and a U.S. representative for multiple national and international committees on radiation standards, 

W ILLIAM J. BAIR - H a n fo rd S ite 1 9 5 4 -p re s e n t including the first Atoms for Peace Conference in 1955 (Parker 1977 and Parker et al. 1986).

Bill Bair was the first in the world to earn a Ph.D. in the brand new field o f Radiation Biology from 

the University of Rochester in 1954. He was a health physicist, who spent his entire career at the 

Hanford Site, first as a staff scientist and ultimately as the manager of the Life Sciences Program, 

studying the respiratory and non-respiratory effects of toxins (radioactive and non-radioactive) on 

biological organisms. Bair developed the inhalation toxicology program at the Hanford Site into a 

major center for all aspects of inhalation toxicology. Bair designed and developed the means for 

aerosolizing radioactive materials safely by devising exposure chambers, aerosol generators, 

measuring systems, and administration devices to administer toxic aerosols to test animals. He 

studied the effects of the toxins on the animals, including the development of tumors and safe means of removing 

cancerous lumps, and was the first person to demonstrate the production of a lung tumor by plutonium. He also studied 

the relative toxicity of plutonium isotopes, including their role as cancer agents. The results of this study helped deduce 

the relative long-term risk associated with each isotope. His research led to devising new admissible radiation standards 

for the Natural Resources Defense Council. In addition to radionuclide research, his studies focused on the role o f toxic 

agents other than radon and its associated daughter products in animal research, including cigarette smoke, diesel 

exhaust, and uranium ore dust (Bair 1965,1988; Thompson and Bair 1972).

ETHEL S. GILBERT - H a n fo rd S ite 1 9 7 3 -1 9 9 4

Ethel Gilbert was a senior scientist in radiobiology and epidemiology. Her career has focused on the 

health effects of high level and low level radiation on humans, including modeling cancer risk from 

radiation. W hile at the Hanford Site, she conducted an analysis of health data and mortality data 

from 44,500 Hanford Workers from 1944-1978 and studied the effects on survivors of the 1945 

atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. During Gilbert's career, she also developed models for 

estimating cancer risks, including a model on risk in the event of a nuclear disaster and the risk of 

lung tumors from toxic substances (Gilbert and Marks 1979, Gilbert and Sever, 1987).

2 - 7 .1 6
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

determine safety guidelines, controlled research experiments were performed on mice and later involved beagles, sheep, 

and swine bred and raised in laboratory facilities. These studies aided investigations of levels of toxicity in various 

organs and the blood, concentrated deposition throughout the body, and other defects on the organism (Pearce 1967). 

Studies on the inhalation and ingestion of iodine in laboratory animals concluded that iodine was Usually rapidly 

absorbed and transported, quickly excreted, and primarily deposited in the thyroid (Stannard 1988).

During the 1960s, the Pharmacology Group concentrated most of its research on the inhalation toxicology of plutonium. 

The ultimate concern was its long-term toxicity on workers, which eventually led to other studies extending into the 70s 

and 80s on the inhalation of uranium ore dust, diesel exhaust fumes, and cigarette smoke. The inhalation toxicology 

program also grew in size to accommodate studies on transplutonics, piutonium-sodium aerosols, and radioisotope 

toxicology.

En v ir o n m e n t a l Research

During the creation of the Hanford Site, the 

formation of a large buffer zone around the central 

facilities was imperative for security and public 

safety. As a result, several portions of the Hanford 

Site have remained relatively undisturbed by 

human activities. Approximately 4 percent of the 

site's 560 square miles has been used to produce 

plutonium and contains waste treatment and 

research facilities.

In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission set aside 

120 square miles of shrub-steppe land at the 

Hanford Site to preserve a natural ecosystem for 

research and educational use (Hinds and Rogers 1991). This outdoor laboratory, originally called the Arid Lands Ecology 

Reserve, is managed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory . The Arid Lands Ecology Reserve was later named 

after Richard E. Fitzner, and Lester E. Eberhardt, who had spent many years observing animals at the reserve before they 

died in a plane crash while studying w ildlife near Yakima, Washington in 1992. The Fitzner-Eberhardt Arid Lands 

Ecology Reserve has remained primarily undisturbed and fits the classification used by federal land management 

agencies to designate lands on which various natural features are preserved for research and educational purposes 

(PNL 1993).

In 1977, the Hanford Site was designated a National Environmental Research Park by the U.S. Department of Energy. 

W illiam H. Rickard was the driving force behind the establishment of the park (see sidebar box). The Hanford National 

Environmental Research Park, one of seven national environmental research parks (see Figure 2-7.3), includes (see 

Figure 2-7.4):

• Fitzner-Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (formerly the Arid Lands Ecology Reserve)

• Industrial zone of the Hanford Site

• Buffer zones on the opposite shore of the Columbia River - the U.S. Department of the Interior's Saddle 

Mountain National W ildlife Refuge and the Washington State Wahluke W ildlife Area.

The national environmental research park concept is an outgrowth of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and 

the public desire for a clean environment The Hanford National Environmental Research Park provides the foundation 

for present and future studies in the areas of environmental restoration, waste and land management, and the 

maintenance of plant and animal species. A vast variety of studies have been completed at Fitzner-Eberhardt Arid Lands

X iv«»m v w.is cstahlM ivcl In " P r r - m r portion-* in w u v ta tio n | 

t\p tr* fii.it m u v im n v d «1 L 'ltu f c*\/j. i/ ? t o f the lie *./.. i ‘t iif / |

/.i/h /- / 1o lo s\ li r - r n r ! i- inlcntlccl lit m .tinl.iin -/y/iif'/i ,m tl\ /.ir» r| 

/c riw .in f- n f the n .ili\ v plan t and anim al i o n m n in ih t"... l*ro\ id r | 

.i/i nndi-’U n b i'il u /io /r n ta n cx.r/ii/n r |

v m ito n n w n la l i/w -fiu /i-... I'n n id v an area /.iryv rn o u ^h Iha l | 

re *///*!{/"*/■■ < an ( nndtn I lO nlroU cd m anipulation^ n ilh m ii |

r /o fr m //i“ the in tr u iit\ or the natural - i *.tcm .. / ’//»» itlc tiv k l | 

-f///A ,ir/w - lo r Ih r -/ in n tilh and I'd tn a lio n a l to m m u n i1\ |

p .irf/i yr.itfu.ifc -.h/ffvnf'- in N if pfn irtin n ifril.W -nV /u »■-»/' - | 

or.wn'11 M»T{ 1

2 - 7 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

W ILLIAM H. RICKARD - HANFORD 1960-PRESENT

W illiam Rickard is a terrestrial ecologist whose research has centered around field sampling 

to measure primary productivity, soil-plant mineral relations and man-imposed perturbations, 

especially cattle grazing, severe soil disturbances, and airborne chemical contaminants in the 

shrub-steppe desert of the Columbia Basin. As a senior staff scientist, he has dedicated his 

life to the long-term monitoring of vegetation and w ildlife. He joined Hanford's young 

terrestrial ecology program to study the effects of radioactive fallout on the environment, and 

to do a pre- and post-shot assessment of the proposed Project Chariot, which was a plan to 

excavate a harbor in Alaska with a nuclear device. His in-depth research has included 

monitoring the effects of fallout and soil contamination on the terrestrial systems, including root uptake and the effects on 

the transfer of radionuclides through the food chain. Rickard's greatest contribution to the field of ecology, in his 

estimation, is his role in establishing the Hanford Site as a National Environmental Research Park (Rickard 1972, 1979, 

1988; Vaughan and Rickard 1977; Sackschewsky et al. 1992).

Hanford 

Research Park

\{1 9 7 7 )

Idaho

Research Park 

/ (1975)

Research Park

Los Alamos

Research Park Savannah River

Desert Shruo & Rockies E. Deetiuoos Forest 

S.E. Mixed Foresa Jumper-pinyoft

Figure 2-7.3. Seven National Environmental Research Parks

Designated by the U.S. Department o f Energy

Cokmbia National 

Wtldhfe Refuge

r.ihluke Wildlife

Hanford Site

Ecology

Rattlesnake slope /

Wildlife Area x *

fWAStatet

Richland "t;

Kennewick

0 4 8 kilometers

0 2 4 6 Saule*

Figure 2-7.4. Hanford National Environmental

Research Park

Ecology Reserve, including many in the disciplines of geology, microclimatology, ecology, botany, soil science, and 

animal ecology. As of 1990, over 40 species of mammals, 187 species of birds, 3 species of amphibians, and 9 species 

of reptiles had been documented, some of which spend part or all o f their life-cycle on the Reserve (Fitzner and Gray

1991).

2 - 7 .1 8
Section 7 - Research and Development

Nu c lea r Pr o d u c tio n

Following W orld War 11, the Hanford Site played an increasing role in R&D activities in response to demands from the 

government for greater weapons production and demands from private industry to commercialize nuclear energy. As 

nuclear technology expanded and became better understood, the government increased its research on means of 

controlling the atom, from the mining of uranium to the safe disposal o f spent fuel.

Much of the R&D initially related to plutonium production are found in the respective sections on Fuel Manufacturing 

(Section 2), Reactor Operations (Section 3), Chemical Separations (Section 4), and Plutonium Finishing (Section 5). This 

section focuses on R&D activities that extended beyond the boundaries of Hanford plutonium production.

By the early 1950s, nuclear technology was in a growth mode. Although no technology beyond weapons production 

had yet been developed, scientists were eager to explore the atomic energy and its place in every day living. The utility 

industry was preparing for its arrival, universities were starting programs to train students, and politicians were pressuring 

the Atomic Energy Commission to begin transferring the technology (Hewlett and H oll 1989b, American Nuclear Society

1992).

By the mid'1950s, the nation, especially the government, faced a great need for nuclear expertise to fulfill its growing list 

of responsibilities. The Hanford Site with its staff and facilities represented one of the major centers of nuclear 

technology in the world, and the only national resource with seasoned reactor operating experience. As a result, much 

R&D work came to the Hanford Site. One of the main nuclear researchers was Spencer H. Bush (see sidebar box). An 

indication of the value of this expertise is demonstrated by the number of Hanford staff who GE took with it when it left 

the Hanford Site to develop its commercial business.

SPENCER H. BUSH - H a n fo rd She 1953-present

Spencer Bush began his career at the Hanford Site. Coming to the Hanford Site was natural for him. He 

^ had been involved in the Manhattan Project at the Los Alamos Laboratory while an enlisted man. He

was the driver of the truck that delivered the bomb from Los Alamos to the Alamogordo Bombing Range, 

* New Mexico for the world's first atomic explosion, the Trinity test in 1945. His interest in nuclear

n u . technology led him to the Hanford Site after finishing his Ph.D. in 1953. He first contributed to Hanford

fc p d u ' * ■ research as a senior staff scientist, Physical Metallurgy and Fuel Fabrication Program and later as a

■ M B *i J M i Consultant to PNNL. His main research contributions have been in the fields of physical and 

mechanical metallurgy of nuclear materials and reactor safety and more efficient reactor and fuel design. He has studied 

and solved problems concerning the effects of irradiation on metal components, and stress corrosion on pipes, and 

subsequent cracking. His research has also Considered the effect of fabrication variables on properties of zirconium 

alloys, irradiation effects in uranium alloys and reactor structural materials and stress corrosion, all aimed at improving 

safety and efficiency of reactors, specifically N Reactor (Bush 1965).

Nuclear research at the Hanford Site that went beyond the immediate production needs focused on:

• Fuel Performance

• Reactor Performance

• Nuclear Waste Management

Waste forms

- Interim storage

- Long-term storage

- Transportation

- Regulations

- Environmental Restoration

2 -7 .1 9
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

• Policy and Regulatory Analysis

• Environmental Restoration

Fuel Performance

Hanford staff gained considerable expertise in manufacturing fuel, assessing fuel failures, and improving fuel 

performance. Hanford reactors used metallic fuel, recognized early on as an inefficient form of uranium compared to 

oxide fuel blends when used to produce energy. Much of this work was in response to fuel failures, which increased as 

the Hanford Site increased the performance of the reactors.

When it came time to design the advanced K Reactors at Hanford, much work went into exploring alternatives for the 

standard Hanford fuel assembly. Again, when the N Reactor was being designed, a substantial amount of R&D went into 

the m anufacturing^ fuel elements using a coextrusion process (see the Fuel Manufacturing Section). All of this work 

established Hanford staff as a resource for nuclear fuel technology.

Because of Hanford's fuel expertise, the Atomic Energy Commission chose the Hanford Site to develop methods to 

increase the efficiency of uranium fuel by creating oxide fuel blends. Hanford's expertise relative to uranium fuel was 

limited to metallic fuel, conducive for producing weapons grade plutonium but not efficient for producing energy. 

Nevertheless, in the mid-1950s, few had the operating experience of the Hanford Site. Thus, the Hanford Site was 

chosen for a large fuels diversification program known as the Plutonium Fuels Utilization Program begun under 

President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. The hallmark of this program was the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor, 

which was located in the 309 Building (Purcell 1966). Tests on a variety of powdered and pelletized fuels continued 

throughout the 1960s using plutonium oxide blended with uranium oxide and other metallic oxides. For information on 

the 309 Building, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

As a result of this and other Hanford research on the performance of fuel, nuclear power plants began using solid, 

ceramic-like pellets of enriched uranium, slightly larger than pencil erasers, stacked atop each other and sealed in strong 

metal tubes, called fuel rods. By the early 1970s, Hanford fuels researchers were called upon to work on breeder fuels. 

This included work at the Chalk River Reactor in Canada. And in 1986, Hanford fuels researchers were chosen to play a 

new role in a new space technology development program known as SP-100. The SP-100 nuclear reactor, designed by 

General Electric, would produce continuous power for at least 7 years. The 309 building was modified to prepare for 

this work, although the program fizzled after a few years.

Reactor Performance

By the mid 1960s, public interest in containing a reactor accident increased in large part due to suspicions about 

regulatory problems (such as the use of m ill tailings for construction purposes), thermal pollution, radiation standards, 

environmental protection, and waste disposal. When The Atomic Energy Commission's reactor development studies were 

going on in the mid-1950s, Hanford staff were busy working on the K Reactors to address the Korean Expansion and did 

not play a substantive role in the various studies. The K Reactors had, however, despite the fact that they were still using 

the basic Hanford graphite moderator technology, introduced many new technological aspects, especially in the area of 

new materials, such as zirconium.

Following the construction of the K Reactors, considerable R&D went into the design of N Reactor, which was still a 

graphite reactor but incorporated many new elements of technology, such as enhanced core design, new fuel making 

technology, new materials, and a closed-ioop system (DOE 1997a). See the Reactor Operations Section for more 

information on the design of the N Reactor. These developments attracted much attention from the rapidly emerging 

nuclear energy industry. N Reactor quickly became one of the world's best known, power-producing reactors. W hile 

everyone recognized the limitations of the core technology, it was the various elements of the N Reactor system that 

attracted interest - the piping, safety systems, fuel rupture detection system, and controls.

Hanford staff also did a variety of lattice testing for the design of different light-water-cooled reactors, including those at 

the Hanford Site. Tests were conducted in the Plutonium Recycle Critical Facility, also in the 309 Building, to determine

2 -7 .2 0
Section 7 - Research and Development

which geometrical arrangement of fissionable materials would work best in a reactor. Spacing, fuel size, number of fuel 

elements, choice of material, and other factors all had benefits and drawbacks. The challenge to researchers was to 

determine which combination worked best. Much of this work was done under the auspices of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission for commercial companies such as Westinghouse Corporation, Babcock and W ilcox Corporation, and 

Combustion Engineering.

By the mid-1960s, interest in containing a reactor accident increased. The Atomic Energy Commission focused its 

attention on the emergency core cooling system. The thought was that if the emergency core cooling system was 

properly designed and constructed, the system would prevent the core from melting when overheated and contain any 

radioactive releases. Hanford staff were called upon to assist in this effort by conducting containment integrity 

experiments (Walker 1992).

An indication of Hanford's reactor development expertise is the contribution of the Hanford Site to the Nation's Breeder 

Reactor Program. The breeder reactor was a fast reactor, not requiring a moderator. Liquid metal, such as sodium, was 

used to control the heat generated during the reaction. The breeder technology was desirable because the reaction 

actually produced more plutonium than it used. Research into breeder reactors began in the 1950s and was pursued by 

the United States, United Soviet Socialist Republic, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. -The Clinch River Breeder 

Reactor Project in the United States built a prototype breeder. The Hanford Site supported the Clinch River Project in a 

variety of ways.

As a result of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project, the U.S. Government decided to build a full scale breeder reactor. 

The Hanford Site was chosen, largely though the efforts of its powerful Senators, Senators Magnuson and Jackson. The 

Atomic Energy Commission commissioned Battelle to start designing the new breeder reactor known as the Fast Flux Test 

Facility in the late 1960s. Westinghouse Corporation won the contract to both construct and operate the Fast Flux Test 

Facility and with that approximately 800 R&D staff who had been working on the design for Battelle transferred to 

Westinghouse. Construction began in 1970, and the Fast Flux Test Facility began operations in 1980.

"Fast flux" means the neutrons move faster in a sodium-cooled reactor than they would if the reactor were cooled with 

water (WHC 1994). Heat was removed from the reactor by circulation of liquid sodium through three primary loops 

including primary pumps, piping, and intermediate heat exchangers, all located within the containment building housing 

the reactor.

The Fast Flux Test Facility was designed specifically to test the irradiation of fuels and materials. Reactor activities were 

later expanded to include long-term testing and evaluation of reactor components and systems, fusion power materials, 

passive safety systems as well as the production medical isotopes and research on space power systems (Mayancsik 

1988). In 1984, the future of the facility became uncertain. The U.S. Government abandoned the program because of 

cost over runs, design failures, a vote by the U.S. Congress, and the belief it could undermine non-proliferation treaties.

In the late 1960s, PNNL researchers also worked on how to derive nuclear power. Much of this R&D was funded 

through the electric power industry consortium known as the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). EPRI was created 

in 1965 to address an increasing concern over electric power capability. The great northeastern blackout of 1965 

exposed serious vulnerabilities in the nation's electricity supply system. The Middle East war in 1967 increased 

awareness of the dangers of relying on foreign sources for energy sources, such as oil. The National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969 kicked off decades of environmental legislation that would challenge utilities' scientific and technical 

capabilities. These and related issues led many to question the ability of the existing energy infrastructure.

In response, the industry formed a collaborative science and technology organization to serve the entire power industry 

from energy conversion to end use. EPRI began offering scientific expertise and innovative technology to help its 

industry partners increase efficiency and prepare for the future. U.S. electric utilities established EPRI as a nonprofit 

membership corporation to manage a national research program on behalf of its funders, the industry, and society. In

2 -7 .2 1
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

forming one of the first industry-wide research consortia, electric utilities pioneered the concept of pooling their 

resources for .maximum benefit

EPRI funded an enormous amount of R&D over the years, utilizing R&D organizations such as the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory. Researchers developed computer models and designed changes to increase the efficiency of 

cooling towers used by the nuclear power industry.

Nuclear Waste Management

Managing the waste created by nuclear facilities was a consideration from the beginning. Although low-level, liquid 

radioactive wastes were originally disposed of directly in the ground or in open ditches, they were believed to be 

temporary holding areas until safer and more effective means of disposal could be developed. High level radioactive 

waste was stored in underground tanks, and low level radioactive waste was disposed of in the soil, much of which 

would not be permitted by today's regulations. Little in the way of R&D efforts were expended at the Hanford Site during 

the first few decades. The means of managing waste were considered effective, and little pressure was applied to 

improve methods. Nuclear regulation began to intensify in the 1960s, though these new measures tended to focus on 

reactor siting and performance issues (Walker 1992).

As utilities started building and operating nuclear power plants in the 1970s and spent fuel began piling up, the 

government recognized the need to address the long-term management of spent nuclear fuel. The spent nuclear fuel 

assemblies, which were highly radioactive from the fission process, had to be isolated from the environment for long 

periods of time. Radionuclides in spent fuel assemblies have half-lives ranging from hours to millions of years. Ten 

half-lives must lapse for the radiation to be deemed safe by reaching acceptable levels.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 established the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within the 

U.S. Department of Energy to develop, construct, and operate a system for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive 

waste disposal. This included a permanent geologic repository, an interim storage capability, and a transportation 

system.

Scientists and engineers, some of them from the Hanford Site, had studied many options over the years for disposing of 

spent fuel. These options included leaving the waste at the reactor sites, burying it in the ocean floor or a deep geologic 

repository, putting it in polar ice sheets, and rocketing it into outer space.. Based on a final Environmental Impact 

Statement prepared in 1 980 that evaluated all of these options, deep underground geologic disposal was determined to 

be the safest solution (DOE 1980). The Nuclear Waste Policy Act established a specific funding mechanism for 

developing the waste disposal system, the Nuclear Waste Fund. This mechanism included collecting funds from those 

who used the electricity produced by nuclear reactors rather than the general taxpayer.

In the search for a site for the permanent repository, the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management had initially 

conducted a national search for a potential site. Eventually the agency chose nine sites to be studied in six different 

states. President Ronald Reagan approved three sites from a candidate list of five for more detailed study. These 

potential locations for permanent repositories for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste were the Hanford 

Site, Deaf Smith County in Texas, and Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

To evaluate the Hanford Site for a long-term waste storage repository, the Basalt Waste Isolation Project was initiated.

The Hanford Site was chosen for its 15,000 feet of basalt, believed to be viable for a geological repository. The Basalt 

Waste Isolation Project generated an enormous amount of R&D at the Hanford Site in the areas of site characterization 

and deep surface repository engineering. The project ended December 1987 when Congress amended the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act and directed the U.S. Department of Energy to study only one site, Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to 

determine whether it was a suitable site for a repository.

The 1987 Amendments Act also authorized the Secretary o f Energy to site a Monitored Retrievable Storage facility. (DOE 

1981 b, 1983). This facility differed from the geologic repository in that it was an above-ground facility that would store a

2 -7 .2 2
Section 7 - Research and Development

limited amount of spent nuclear fuel temporarily before sending it to a permanent repository. Hanford researchers, in this 

case primarily those at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, were very involved in the design work, workforce 

analysis, and siting requirements for the Monitored Retrievable Storage facility. The temporary storage method used by 

utilities was to place fuel in large pools of water contained in steel-lined concrete basins. Rather than using water for the 

Monitored Retrievable Storage facility, spent nuclear fuel assemblies would be stored in a dry environment, aboveground, using heavy containers or casks made of steel and/or concrete. Casks would be either placed upright on 

concrete pads or stored horizontally in metal canisters in concrete bunkers. The advantage of dry storage was a more 

stable environment with lower maintenance costs. Like pool storage, dry storage was not intended to be a permanent 

solution. However, funding to build the Monitored Retrievable Storage facility never materialized.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, also included requirements for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive 

waste to be transported in containers certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. To safely and efficiently move 

radioactive waste around the country, PNNL researchers helped develop special containers for highway and rail 

transport. Each shipping container was designed to maintain its integrity under normal transportation conditions and 

during hypothetical accident conditions. The designs had to demonstrate protection against radiological release to the 

environment under the following hypothetical accident conditions:

A 9 meter (30-foot) free fall on to an unyielding surface

A puncture test allowing the container to free-fall 1 meter (40 inches) onto a steel rod 15 centimeters (6 inches) 

in diameter

A 30-minute, all-engulfing fire at 800 degrees Celsius (1475 degrees Fahrenheit)

An 8-hour immersion under 0.9 meter (3 feet) of water

Compliance with this sequential series of tests was demonstrated by computer modeling, scale-model or full-scale tests, 

parts of which were developed or evaluated by PNNL researchers.

In addition to the spent fuel from commercial reactors, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also covered disposal of high level 

radioactive waste from the government's plutonium production facilities. In addition to storage and transportation issues, 

research had to address how to convert radioactive waste into a stable waste form, one capable of encapsulating the 

radionuclides for thousands of years. W hile Hanford researchers pursued a variety of stabilization technologies for high 

level and low level radioactive waste, vitrification technology was a major focus. Vitrification was an adaptation of 

melter technology developed in the glass making industry (Larson 1996).

Other waste-related R&D focused on the decommissioning of the Shippingport Reactor near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

Shippingport was one of the early demonstration reactors funded by the Atomic Energy Commission and private industry 

in the 1950s. The Shippingport plant was a pressurized water reactor design, based on Argonne National Laboratory's 

submarine reactor technology. This first commercial light water reactor plant operated from 1958-1982 (Beaver 1990).

Once operations at Shippingport ceased, the plant had to be decommissioned. Decommissioning this reactor was seen 

as an opportunity to learn much about reactor decommissioning, a process every reactor would eventually have to 

undergo. PNNL researchers assisted the U.S. Department of Energy in a wide range of studies surrounding materials 

performance, extent of contamination, cost models, and decontamination approaches.

Policy and Regulatory Analysis

Asa result of concerns about the dangers of nuclear fallout and exposure to radiation in general, scientists, health 

professionals, and the public demanded standards for the protection of public health and safety. In 1954, the Atomic 

Energy Commission set up a regulatory program to do just that (Walker 1992). PNNL researchers assisted the Atomic 

Energy Commission for many years both in the development of regulations and in the implementation of policies and 

regulations. Such activities occurred for both the commercial and defense industries. This work continued under the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission when the Atomic Energy Commission was split up in 1977.

2 -7 .2 3
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Environmental Impact Statements were required under the National Environmental Policy Act. PNNL researchers were 

often called upon to supply scientific evidence for Environmental Impact Statements, such as those for the Hanford 

Defense Waste and the Commercial Wastes Environmental Impact Statements.

Hanford R&D staff also conducted similar work for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The International Atomic 

Energy Agency, created in 1957, is a specialized agency within the United Nations. Headquartered in Austria, the 

International Atomic Energy Agency serves as the world's central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field, and as the international inspector for the application of nuclear safeguards and verification 

measures covering civilian nuclear programs.

Environmental Restoration

As the Cold War started to wane, the U.S. Department of Energy came under increasing pressure to clean up its legacy 

wastes created during four decades of plutonium production. In 1986, the U.S. Department of Energy released 

19,000 pages of documents on the history of the Hanford Site. From these, the public learned that radioactive and 

chemical wastes had been released in greater quantities than had been previously assumed. The issue o f waste disposal 

became more prominent and once again, R&D staff were called upon to develop and evaluate cleanup methods and 

technologies that could assist w ith the cleanup efforts.

In situ vitrification is a good example of a technology developed by Hanford R&D staff, which may have widespread 

industrial applications. In 1988, Battelle Memorial Institute created Geosafe Corporation for the purposes of developing 

and commercializing advanced vitrification technologies for site remediation and waste treatment worldwide. The 

Corporation acquired rights to the U.S. Department of Energy's patent for the In Situ Vitrification technology, which was 

developed to treat TRU-contaminated soil in place.

Ot h e r Ma j o r St u d ie s

Space nuclear system studies were designed to test the potential biological problems connected with the utilization of 

reactors or radionuclide power sources in space. The spread of radioactive contamination of operations in space could 

constitute a human hazard. These studies employed swine, rats, and dogs to explore possible dangers of inhaled and 

ingested particles. This research was an offshoot from the basic inhalation research program discussed above 

(PNL 1967a, Stannard 1988). In 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission launched proposals for the development of 

industrial uses o f nuclear explosives, such as power generation by explosions, oil and mining operations, and large-scale 

earth excavations. Dubbed Project Plowshare, these proposals stemmed directly from the Atoms for Peace Program of 

1953. Project Chariot, a program within Plowshare, was a planned excavation of a harbor near Cape Thompson, Alaska. 

Because the project site had not been thoroughly investigated before the planned work, bioenvironmental and public 

safety programs were initiated. The Hanford Biology Program contributed to three Project Chariot related environmental 

studies in Alaska: limnological investigations, ecology of terrestrial invertebrates, and radioecology of terrestrial and 

fresh water communities. The controversial Project Chariot program was suspended in the early 1960s due to public 

concerns about health hazards (O 'Neill 1995, 1998). Other work in Alaska included studying the repercussions of 

radioactive nuclear fallout. A fairly large ecological program was started and food chain studies were undertaken for a 

number of years (GE 1960a, Stannard 1988).

Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t Fa c il it ie s

The Hanford area most associated with R&D is the 300 Area. Although the 300 Area was originally known for fuel 

manufacturing, as R&D increased at the Hanford Site, research facilities were located in the 300 Area for three main
Section 7 - Research and Development

reasons. The infrastructure was in place. The risk of accident was less than the areas where the reactors and chemical 

separations plants were in the 100 and 200 Areas, and the 300 Area was closer to residential areas for easier 

accessibility.

During the Cold War period, several test reactors and fuel fabrication pilot facilities in the 300 Area were used for nonmilitary purposes. With the worldwide uranium supplies limited, research efforts were undertaken to develop and test 

alternate fuels. The most ambitious efforts were focused on the effectiveness of plutonium oxide and mixed oxide fuel 

blends. The Physical Constants Test Reactor and Thermal Test Reactor in the 305-B Building, the Plutonium Fabrication 

Pilot Plant, the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor in the 309 Building, and the High Temperature Lattice Test Reactor in the 

318 Building were constructed to develop and test alternate fuels as well as conduct other experimental testing programs.

During the period of considerable growth of the 300 Area in the early 1950s, many buildings and facilities were 

constructed under the Hanford Laboratories Operation Program for R&D activities. The most prominent developmental 

laboratories and shops included:

• 108-F Biology Laboratory - In 1949, the Biology Laboratory was completely remodeled to provide office and 

laboratory space for the Hanford Site Biology Program (DOE 1992b, DeFord 1993). The building was expanded 

in 1953 and again in 1962 to provide additional space for biological experiments. For over a quarter of a 

century, the building served as the main biology lab at the Hanford Site to study the effects of animals and plants. 

The Biology Program moved to the 337 Building in 1977, and the 108-F building was abandoned. In addition to 

the 108-F Laboratory, numerous other facilities, such as laboratories, barns, pens, pastures, gardens, and kennels, 

supported the Hanford Biology Program. For more information on the 108-F Biology Laboratory, see the 

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

• 305 Test Pilot/Hot Cell Verification Building - Built to house a small reactor that tested samples of the graphite, 

uranium and other materials used in essential Hanford operations. The 305 Reactor functioned as a quality 

assurance tool to house testing of samples of each lot of graphite, uranium, aluminum jacketing material, and 

other materials used in the large production reactors. The reactor was removed and buried in 1977-1978. For 

more information on the 305 Test Pilot/Hot Cell Verification Building, see the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet

• 320 Low Level Radiochemistry Building - Completed in 1966, was virtually the last Hanford facility dedicated 

solely to national defense missions. The building's original mission was to house analytical chemistry services 

and provide plant support for work involving low level and non-radioactive samples. Twenty-two laboratories 

were located in the structure, including several devoted to wet chemistry, a large radiochemistry laboratory, an 

analytical R&D laboratory (Gerber 1993b, p. 52). Several pioneering techniques were researched in the 

building. These included radiometric techniques, new mass spectrometric techniques, combined atomic 

absorption analysis, and laser-based spectrometric techniques. The 320 Building currently provides a low level 

radiochemistry facility in which very sensitive radiochemical analysis, sample preparation, and methods 

development can be performed. For information on the 320 Low Level Radrochemistry Building, see the 

Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

• 324 Waste Technology Engineering Laboratory - Completed in the mid-1960s as the Fuel Recycle Pilot Plant, 

designed partially to support PRTR operations by housing chemical reprocessing and metallurgical examination 

on the PRTR's fuel elements. As such, it was built as a dual facility with both radiochemical and 

radiometallurgical hot cells and laboratories. It also was designed to house the Waste Solidification Engineering 

Project, one of the first high level waste vitrification demonstration programs in the world (Gerber 1993b,

pp. 48-50).

• 325 Radiochemistry Laboratory/Cerium Recovery Building - Completed in 1953, built to safely house and 

handle multi-curie level chemical development work with high activity substances, initial building missions 

listed as high priorities included production support and process improvement (Gerber 1993b). The High Level 

Radiochemistry wing addition in 1959-1960 made the 325 Building the largest among the laboratories at the 

Hanford Site (Gerber 1992a). The addition, with its three larger hot cells, housed isotope research activities. For 

more information on the 325 Radiochemistry Laboratory/Cerium Recovery Building, see the Expanded Historic 

Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

2 - 7 .2 5
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

• 326 Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory - Completed in 1953, designed to ensure the maintenance and 

improvement of reactor operations while developing new technologies for future reactors. The primary physics 

mission was to conduct the exponential reactor physics development work. The primary metallurgical mission 

was to examine reactor components and fuel elements to evaluate characteristics and performance (Gerber

1993b). For information on the 326 Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory, see the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

• 327 Post Irradiation Test Laboratory - Completed in 1953, built to house the examining and testing of irradiated 

materials, particularly fuel elements and fuel cladding materials from and for the production reactors, and of the 

effects of higher power levels of irradiation on new and different reactor structural materials. For information on 

the 327 Post Irradiation Test Laboratory, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on 

the Internet.

• 328 Mechanical Development Building (later called the Engineering Services and Safety Shop) - Built as a 

central shop to support the above laboratories. For information on the 328 Engineering Services and Safety 

Shop, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

• 329 Biophysics Laboratory - Built to support the pioneering environmental monitoring and bioassay programs 

that were developed at the Hanford Site during the 1940s and 1950s. The initial mission of the facility was to 

house the preparation and counting of radioactivity levels in air, vegetation, soil, wildlife, river and well water 

samples (Gerber 1993b, p. 24). Missions ranged from monitoring nuclear atmospheric fallout from nuclear 

bomb tests to fallout deposition studies on terrestrial organisms in Alaska to examinations of Mount St. Helens 

volcanic ash. For more information on the 329 Biophysics Laboratory, see the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

• 335 and 336 Sodium Test Facilities - Completed in 1968 and 1969, respectively, built to conduct sodium-related 

tests for the development of the Fast Flux Text Facility and cold sodium purification and characterization systems 

used in Fast Flux Text Facility studies. The sodium test loops were deactivated in 1977. Building 335 was 

known initially as the Fast Reactor Thermal Engineering Facility and Building 336 as the Core Segment 

Development Facility.

• 337 Technical Management Facility Completed in five segments from 1970-1972, was the preeminent 

300 Area structure built to support the development of the Fast Flux Text Facility. Originally, it housed 

engineering studies, including sodium loops and large mechanical mock-ups, and was a technical support 

facility for the mock-ups performed in the adjacent 337-B (high bay) Building. The 337-B Building initially 

housed R&D activities that included a core mechanical mock-up, a test bed for selected Fast Flux Text Facility 

components. For more information on the Technical Management Facility, see the Historic Property Inventory 

Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

• 427 Fuels and Materials Examination Facility - Completed in 1983 in the 400 Area, was a major addition to the

breeder reactor technology program at the Hanford Site. Its function was to inspect irradiated fuels and materials 

from the Fast Flux Text Facility. :

• Battelle Complex - When the Battelle Memorial Institute took over the Hanford Laboratories in 1965, it 

committed to build its own facilities on a square mile of land that it purchased at the southern end of the 

Hanford Site. The research complex was originally known in local lore as "Fort Courage," because "the building 

style and color reminded one a bit of something out of Beau Geste, and because the whole idea seemed w ildly 

optimistic at that time" (Moore 1992, p. 122). Since this is a private facility, it is not being documented as the 

others are.

N a t io n a l a n d In t e r n a t io n a l In t e r a c t io n s o f

Ha n f o r d Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t St a ff

Disseminating research results and sponsoring symposia and seminars are indicators of the interactions of the Hanford 

R&D staff with their national and international counterparts.

2 -7 .2 6
Section 7 - Research and Development

Pu b l is h in g Research Results a n d Pa r t ic ip a t in g in Se m in a r s a n d Conferences

The Hanford Site had a strong tradition of participating in regional, national, and international conferences. One of the 

most important conferences was the First Atoms for Peace Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1955 

(Fermi 1957). According to the list of participants, only Herbert Parker attended the conference from the Hanford Site 

(IC 1956). When the second conference occurred 2 years later, however, many Hanford staff attended and gave papers, 

especially in the area of potential health effects (IC 1958).

Participation in regional, national, and international conferences increased as national security concerns lessened over 

the years.

Sp o n s o r in g Se m in a r s a n d Sy m p o s ia

Beginning in 1962, the Hanford Laboratories and its successor, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, sponsored 

annual seminars and symposia on subjects directly related to research activities at the Hanford Site (Stannard 1988, 

p. 447). Before this time, seminars and symposia were not held on a regular basis. Table 2-7.3 shows between 

1962-1990 symposia and seminars were held every year except in 1969 and 1982. Seminars may have been held in 

1969 and 1982, but no references have been found to indicate as much. Both national and international scientists and 

researchers attended these meetings, which provided many opportunities for peer review. A significant number of 

symposia were held on radioisotope toxicology, a subject that contributed to Hanford's reputation as one of the prime 

centers for biological research in the subject (Stannard 1988, p. 450).

Table 2-7.3. A Sampling o f Symposia and Seminars Held at the Hanford Site, 1948-1990

Year Symposia and Seminars

1948 Fish and Fish Problems o f the H anford Reservation (Olson 1948)

1949 The Present Status o f P olonium Tolerance Estimation (H ackett 1949)

1955 Symposium on the Iodine Problem (H ill 1955)

1962 B iology o f theTransuranics (Thom pson 1962)

1963 Foliar Sorption o f 1-131 b y Plants: B iology o f R adioiodine (Bustad 1964)

1964 Inhaled Radioactive Particles and Gases (Bair 1965)

1964 B iology o f R adioiodine (W atson et al. 1964)

1965 R adiation and Terrestrial Ecosystems (Hungate 1965)

Sw ine in B iom edical Research (Bustad and M cC lellan 1966)

1966 Sym posium on Gastrointestinal Radiation In ju ry (Sullivan 1968)

1967 Diagnosis and Treatm ent o f D eposited R adionuclides (Kornberg and N orw ood 1968)

1968 M yelo pro liferative Disorders o f A nim als and M an (Clarke et al. 1968)

1970 P ollution and Lung B iochem istry (M enzel 1970)

1971 B iological Im plications o f the Transuranium Elements (Thom pson and Bair 1972)

1972 R adionuclide Carcinogenesis (PNL 1972a)

1973 Cell C ycle in M a lig nan cy and Im m unity (H am pton 1973)

1974 R adiation and the Lym phatic System (Ballou 1974)

1975 B iological Im plications o f M etals in the Environm ent (D rucker and W ild u n g 1975)

1976 P ulm onary M acrophage and Epithelial Cells (Sanders 1976)

1977 D evelopm ental Toxicology o f Energy-Related Pollutants (M ahlum 1977)

1978 Biological-Effects o f Extrem ely Low Frequency Electrom agnetic Fields (Phillips 1978)

1979 Pulm onary Toxicology o f Respirable Particles (Sanders 1979)

1980 Coal Conversion and the Environm ent: C hem ical, B iom edical, and Ecological Considerations 

(M ahlum et al. 1980)

1981 B iological A v a ila b ility o f Trace M etals (W ildung and Jenne 1981)

1983 Life Span Radiation Effects Studies in A nim als: W h a t Can They Tell Us? (Thom pson and M ahaffey 1983)

1984 Interaction o f B iological Systems w ith Static and ELF Electric and M agnetic Fields (Anderson et al. 1984)

1985 H ealth and E nvironm ental Research on C om plex O rg anic M ixtures (G ray 1985)

1986 Radiation Protection: A Look to the Future (Bair 1988)

1987 M o d e lin g fo r Scaling to M an: Biology, Dosimetry, and Response (M ahaffey 1989)

1988 M ulti-Level Health Effects Research: From M olecules to M an (Park and Pelroy 1989)

1989 Environm ental M o nitorin g, Restoration, and Assessment: W h a t Have W e Learned? (G ray 1990)

1990 Indoor Radon and. Lung C ancer: R eality o r Myth? (Cross 1992)

2 -7 .2 7
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

In the early years, the Hanford Site was the dominant client for the research staff. As the need for nuclear weapons 

subsided and other research needs arose, sites such as Hanford pursued diversification. Researchers found their 

knowledge of materials, physics, mathematics, the environment, etc. could be applied to new areas, particularly those in 

industry. In this regard, Hanford R&D underwent a fundamental shift from being a specialized research institution 

supporting a clear-cut national mission - nuclear weapons production - to a generalized research institution supporting a 

combination of national missions such as energy efficiency, economic competitiveness, environmental quality, and 

education. Government needs also changed as the government increasingly called on research staff not just to develop 

technology but to evaluate technologies, develop protocols, and provide independent oversight. Therefore, virtually 

limitless areas exist for future research of R&D activities at the Hanford Site and in relation to academia, other nuclear 

installations, and the history of science and technology in the United States.

• R&D activities at the Hanford Site have undergone a variety of changes during the past 50 years. In many fields, 

the history of basic research has gone undocumented and passed over in favor of the more lucrative commercial 

applications of applied research, project development, and process and product improvements. A thorough 

analysis and chronology of Hanford's basic research programs since the late 1940s should be undertaken in the 

future.

• W ith this in mind, oral interviews with pioneering researchers at the Hanford Site may also prove of interest to 

the general public and historians of science and technology.

• It would be of interest to document how national and international seminars and symposia may have impacted 

research ideas and design between researchers in academia, industry, and government.

• Were techniques and instruments developed at the Hanford Site applied in non-governmental settings?

• How have Hanford researchers influenced R&D in non-governmental settings? What patents resulted from 

research at the Hanford Site?

• The origins of the U.S. Department of Energy's national laboratory concept arose out of compelling national 

need because of the nuclear weapons race. In that regard, the concept of a nationalized R&D industry was 

successful, concerns about environmental and human health notwithstanding. In the absence of any emergency 

situations, is a nationalized R&D force effective?

• Were the R&D contributions to nuclear energy, energy conservation, addressing environmental and nuclear 

legacy waste problems commensurate w ith their costs?

• Are there alternative ways to structure a nationalized R&D group? How does working in a national laboratory 

differ from other R&D settings such as industry and higher education?

• Hanford's R&D budgets have not been made available to the public. When they are, it would be useful to 

evaluate how much money was spent on basic research versus applied R&D. These figures would also prove 

useful in compiling a comparative data set of R&D spent at other nuclear sites around the country.

• The use of humans in radiation experiments financed by the U.S. Department of Energy and its predecessor 

agencies remains a topic of considerable interest and controversy. To the authors' knowledge, not one source 

document exists detailing all of the human experiments performed at the Hanford Site or by Hanford researchers 

off-site. It would be beneficial to compile these data and conduct ora! interviews with both the researchers and 

the human subjects. Many scheduled follow-up studies proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy were never 

conducted or were cancelled. More work is needed to understand how researchers and decision makers

% rationalized the use of human subjects and the possible long-term health consequences they may have 

experienced.

• Radiation detection programs at other national laboratories have been linked to research on important military 

applications such as nuclear warfare, detecting radiation that could compromise the functioning of nuclear 

submarines and detecting radiation on the nuclear battlefield. Were any of the results of human radiation 

programs or radiation detection programs at the Hanford Site used in these other studies? If so, how were the 

results applied?

• It w ould be o f value to document the popular views held by area residents about R&D at Hanford. Did their 

knowledge about particular experiments with animals and occupational injuries influence their attitudes toward 

atomic energy and government installations in general? Did these views affect the types of research performed?
Section 7 - Research and Development

B i o l o g i c a l a n d E c o l o g i c a l R e s e a r c h P r o j e c t s a t t h e

H a n f o r d S it e , 1 9 5 1 -1 9 9 0

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

1951

(GE 1951b)

1952

(GE 1952b, 

1953c)

1953

(GE 1954a)

1954

(GE 1955a)

1955

(GE 1956b)

1956

(GE 1957a)

1957

(GE 1958d)

1958

(GE 1959a)

1959

(GE 1960a)

Biological Sciences: radioactive isotope studies on aquatic organism s; m ean activity density o f iodine-131 in ja c k rabbits; 

du ck exposure to p ile effluent; tritiu m and tritiu m o xide absorption and retention studies on humans, rats, and plants; uptake 

o f radioactive strontium , yttriu m , cesium , and iodin e in plants; p lutonium fixa tio n in rats; biolo gical effectiveness o f 

radiation in bacteria; pile effluent w a te r to x ic ity to fish and bean plants; iodin e-131 studies on sheep

Aquatic Biology: p ile effluent m onitorin g w ith Silver salm on, C hino ok salm on, R ainbow tro ut; algae grow th in p ile effluent

Metabolism Studies: plu tonium and tritiu m absorption and deposition in rats and rabbits; percutaneous absorption o f tritiu m 

o xide in m an; absorption and translocation o f various fission products in plants; ch ro n ic effects o f p ile effluent on plants; 

effects o f radiation from various isotopes on the grow th o f algae

Toxicology: radioiod in e in sheep to study grow th, b irth defects, tum ors, etc.; rem oval o f plutonium in dogs v ia sirconium 

salts

Biological Services: b iolo gical m onitorin g o f goats, plants, w ild life and w ate rfow l, sheep, rabbits, and cadaver ashes

Biological Sciences: rem oval o f radiophosphorus contam inant from w ater in an aquarium co m m u n ity; extended retention o f 

R ainbow tro u t in d ilu te reactor effluent; effect o f reactor e fflu ent on young Silver salm on; chronic effects o f pile effluent w ater 

on cereal plants; m etabolism o f tritiu m gas in the rat; long-term retention o f tritiu m in the rat and sheep; m etabolism o f 

hydrogen isotopes b y afgae, rat m etabolism o f deuterium and tritiu m ; plutonium absorption studies o f the rat; intravenous 

effects o f p lu tonium on the d o g; radioactive elem ents in "jangle" soil; absorption and translocation o f fission products by 

plants; radium analysis in humans

Biological Sciences: abundance and radioactivity o f crustacea in the C olum bia River; reactor effluent m onitorin g w ith 

C hino ok salm on, effects o f reactor effluent on cereal plants; absorption and translocation o f plutonium -23 9 and cerium -144 

by plants; physical and chem ical properties o f soil types; m utagenic effects o f phosphorous-32; effects o f tritiu m oxide on 

C horella pyrenoidosa; hydrogen isotope incorporation in grow ing algae; rat studies w ith deuterium and tritiu m , studies on 

the absorption o f plutonium in rats; absorption and distribution o f ruthenium in fo w l; radium abundance in cadavers from the 

P acific N orthw est; com parison o f CaEDTA w ith zircon ium citrate in prom oting excretion o f plutonium from the dog; to x ic ity 

o f io d in e -1 31 in sheep, beta irradiation o f the skin o f the sheep

Biological Sciences: effects o f reactor effluent on a q uatic and p lan t life; p la n t and anim al absorption and m etabolism o f 

several fission products, plutonium , and tritiu m ; effects o f iodine-131 and external radiation adm inistered to sheep; to x ic ity o f 

radioactivA Particles; new or im prov_dA techniques o f possible ap plication to radiobiology

Biological Sciences: efficacy o f isoto pic d ilu tio n ; effects o f productio n fa c ility effluents on biota; studies on radioactive 

particles; plan t and m icro biolog ical studies o f several radioisotopes; anim al m etabolism studies o f several radioelem ents; 

b iolo gical effects o f iodin e-131 in sheep and pigs

Biological Sciences: skin irradiation and decontam ination; studies u tiliz in g radioactive particles; plant and m icro biolog ical 

studies; effects o f production fa c ility effluents on biota

Biological Sciences: uptake, distrib ution , and turnove r o f radioelem ents in plants, anim als, and com m unities; biological 

effects o f io n izin g radiations on certain organs and organisms; effects o f reactor effluent on plant and anim al life

Biological Sciences: strontium and calcium m etabolism uptake in plants and anim als; cesium accum ulation by aquatic 

plants and anim als; observations o f bio lo g ica l effects o f iodine-131 in sheep and sw ine; studies on th e retention and 

elim in a tio n o f p lu tonium in sw ine; studies to determ ine a safe d a ily lim it fo r ingestion o f phosphorus and z in c ; tungsten 

m etabolism in rats; p o lo nium distrib ution in yeast; radioactive particles inhalation studies; radiation effects and protection 

experim ents on rats; effects o f productio n fa c ility effluents on biota

Biological Sciences: strontium -calcium and cesium -rubidium -potassium studies on rats, ewes and suckling lambs, plants, 

and soil; strontium to x ic ity studies on m iniature sw ine and ra in b o w trout; physiology and therapy studies on m iniature sw ine 

and rabbits; iodin e studies on sheep, sw ine, and leaves; phosphorus studies in m ice and fish; z in c studies in rats and ram; 

radioactive particles in m ice; b iolo gical effects o f radiation in the rat and yeast; laboratory techniques; environm ental studies 

o n contam ination in w ild life , C hino ok salm on, m arine m ollusks, and C. C olum naris

2 -7 .2 9
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production faciltties

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

1960 • Biological Sciences: strontium and calcium m etabolism and to x ic ity studies in R ainbow tro u t, rats, m inia ture swine,

(GE 1961a) large anim als, and meal m oths; io d in e m etabolism and to x ic ity studies in sheep and sw ine, m ilk, and thyroids; zinc, cesium ,

cerium , n e p tu n iu m ,a n d p lu tonium m etabolism and to x ic ity studies in pregnant ewes, sheep, rats, and rams; inhalation 

studies o f plu to n iu m and ceriu m -144 oxygen-2; physiology, therapy, and radiation effects on trout, yeast, bean plants, barley 

plants, m ice, and rats; hem atology studies on m iniature sw ine, R itm an-M oore sw ine, and Palouse and H orm ei sw ine; 

environm ental studies on fish, m arine organism s, salm on, geese, grass fields, and C. C olum naris

• Biological Sciences: stro ntium and calcium to x ic ity and m etabolism studies in sw ine and tro ut; radioiod in e to x ic ity and 

m etabolism studies in sheep and sw ine; heavy elem ents to x ic ity and m etabolism studies in m ilk ; inha lation studies; 

m o d ifica tio n o f radioelem ent deposition and radiation response studies; an im al and ce llu la r physiology studies in w ater 

absorption and ingestion, regenerating liver, Ephestia larvae, proliferating cells, and yeast; p lan t physiology studies on barley 

plants and others; ecology studies on w ate rfow l, salm on, C olum naris, beetles, natural p lan t com m unities, desert soil, and 

A rctic plants and anim als

1962 • Biological Sciences: to x ic ity and m etabolism o f radioelem ents (transuranium and rare Earth elem ents; ra dioiod in e; strontium ;

(GE 1963a) other elem ents; inha lation studies); m o d ification o f radioelem ent de position and ra diation response; anim al and ce llu la r

physiology; plant physiology

• Ecology: reactor effluent m o nitorin g; C hino ok salmon spaw ning near H anford; sw im m in g perform ance o f C hinook salm on 

reared in reactor effluent; incidence and virule nce o f C olum naris; piankton-w ater chem istry cycles in the C olum bia; soil 

m oisture depletion in a sagebrush and a greasewood com m unity; radiocesium in northern Alaskan Eskimos and th e ir foods; 

gam m a-em itting radionuclides in Alaskan fish and plants

Biological Sciences: to x ic ity and m etabolism o f radioelem ents (radioio dine studies; inha lation studies; transuranium and rare 

Earth elem ents studies; strontium studies; oth er elem ents studies); m o d ification o f radioelem ent deposition and radiation 

response (rem oval o f inte rn a lly deposited plu to n iu m ; excretion o f plutonium -23 9 in the intestine; effects o f p lu to n iu m in 

sw ine; influence o f internal em itters; graft-host response in xenogenic chim eras; etc.); an im al and ce llu la r physiology - 

various studies; p lan t physiology (deposition o f iodin e-131 on vegetation; accum ulation o f iodid e by barley plants; cesium 

to x ic ity in plants; rem oval o f p lu tonium -23 9, tungsten-185 and lead-210 from plants)

• Ecology: second survey o f ra d io a ctivity in northern Alaskan Natives and th e ir foods; incidence and virule nce o f C olum naris; 

C hino ok salm on spaw ning near H anford; sw im m in g perform ance o f C hinook salm on reared in reactor effluent; to x ic ity o f 

industrial chem icals to fish; plankton-w ater chem istry cycles in the C olum bia; vegetational analysis in a sagebrush stand; 

potassium and sodium cy clin g by greasewood and hopsage

• Biological Sciences: inha lation studies on beagles and rats; effects o f strontium in m iniature sw ine and m o ltin g crayfish; 

radioiod in e effects on sheep and cattle, sheep m ilk, and skin exposure; effects o f cesium on sheep, tro ut, and feed and rum en 

contents; effects o f transuranium and oth er rare earth elem ents on sheep, fatty livers, and m inia ture sw ine; studies on z in c - 

65, cad m ium -115 m , copper, and x-rays; m o d ification o f radioelem ent deposition and radiation response studies on dogs, 

rats, and cow s-to-m an v ia m ilk ; anim al and cellu la r physiology studies on rats, flo u r beetles, chim eras, Escherichia C o li, 

Neurospora, lung m ito chond ria; p lan t physiology; ecological studies am ong Alaskan Natives, anim als, and forage plants; 

nu clid e fa llo u t studies on plants and brow sing anim als in W ashington; annual forage.yield and fa llo u t deposition in a 

cheatgrass com m unity; C olum bia R iver plankton studies; C hino ok salm on spaw ning; and reactor effluent m o n ito rin g

• i Biological Sciences: radiation effects - general; to x ic ity o f radioelem ents; inhalation studies; com bating detrim ental effects o f 

radiation; m o le cular and c e llu la r level studies; environm ental radiation studies - terrestrial and aquatic

• Geology and Hydrology: stratigraphy o f the upperm ost pa rt o f the basalt sequence; variations in the gravity fie ld at 

H anford; prediction o f vertical in filtra tio n as influenced b y errors; horizontal infiltra tio n o f liquid s into porous m edia; 

extension o f solution capabilities b y fin ite differences m ethod; etc

• Mineral Chemistry: m o n tm o rillo n ite exchange e q u ilib ria w ith strontium -sodium -cesium ; self-diffusion o f sodium in 

ve rm icu lite ; exchange o f alka li m etal cations o n a natural stiibite; a lka li m etal cation e q u ilib ria w ith chabazite; u n it c e ll size 

and cesium loading; cation exchange properties; dispersion characteristics o f strontium ; cesium and strontium distribution 

beneath liq u id waste disposal sites

• Particles and Gases: a p plication and perform ance o f a spinning disc aerosol generator; subisokinetic sam pling o f particles in 

an a ir stream; errors in sam pling w ith nozzles; particle deposition and re-entrainm ent in long vertical conduits; an iodine-131 

generator fo r fie ld release studies; release o f no ble gases from aqueous solution

1966 • Biological Sciences: inha lation studies on dogs, rats, leukem ia patients, and lung tissue; space nuclear systems studies on

(PNL 1967a) dog lungs, sw ine, and rats; detrim ental effects o f radiation studies on sw ine; m o le cular and cellu la r studies; environm ental

radiation studies (terrestrial) on Alaskan Natives, H anford geese and gulls, native rodents, plants, soil, and potato tubers; 

environm ental ra diation studies (aquatic) on tro u t, salm on, bottom organism s, other vertebrates, freshw ater mussels, a d ult 

Caddis flies, Fairy shrim p, and Fisherola N utalli

1964

(RNL 1965a)

1965

(PNL 1966a, 

1966d)

1963

(GE 1964a)

1961

(GE 1962a)

2 -7 .3 0
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

1967 * Biological Sciences: radiation effects studies; strontium-90 studies in miniature swine; inhalation studies (dogs, rats); space

(PNL 1968a) nuclear systems studies (dogs, rats, leaves); radioelement toxicity studies (sheep, swine, rats); radioelement removal studies

(rats, dogs); molecular and cellular level studies (Neurospora Crassa, human testes, intestinal cells, fish)

• Terrestrial Ecology Studies: Eskimo food chain; rodents; Darkling beetles; desert plants; local soil; greasewood; cheatgrass

• Aquatic Ecology Studies: Chinook salmon; Steel head trout; bottom organisms; Sockeye salmon; freshwater mussels

1968 • Biological Sciences: radiation effects studies (rats, miniature swine, rabbits, mice); strontium-90 studies in miniature swine

(PNL 1970a) (various studies); inhalation studies (dogs, rats, etc.); radioelement toxicity studies (rats, sheep, swine, crustaceans);

radioelement removal studies (rats, dogs, etc); molecular and cellular level studies (salmon, trout, etc)

• Biological Sciences: gastrointestinal irradiation studies; irradiating skin; radiation and human spermatogenesis; radiation 

effects in mice; structural effects o f temperature in fish; metabolism and effects of radionuclides in the developing fetus and 

the young; effects of radioiodine in sheep and swine; effects of radiostrontium in swine; radiation induced leukemogenesis in 

swine; inhalation studies (rats, dogs, uranium miners); space nuclear systems studies; removal o f internal emitters; blood 

irradiators; malonaldehyde as a radiolysis product o f biological materials

• Environmental Studies: ecological micrometeorology and clim atology of the ALE Reserve; geology and paleoecology of the 

ALE Reserve; hydrologic cycling on the ALE Reserve; characteristics o f Hanford project soils

• Terrestrial Ecology Studies: plant and animal ecology; mechanisms of transport and uptake o f radionuclides in Alaska; 

mathematical simulation of radionuclide transfer and food chain processes

• Aquatic Ecology: characteristics o f Columbia River; freshwater ecology of Rattlesnake Springs; rates and mechanisms of 

biogeochemical processes of the Columbia; effects o f modification on the Columbia River ecosystems

• Geology/Hydrology: Yakima basalt formation; incidence o f earthquakes at Hanford; geophysical seismic exploration; 

bouguer gravity anomalies in the Hanford Res.; acceleration factors for flow o f fluids through soils; flow system surfaces; 

transport analysis

• Mineral Chemistry: dispersion characteristics o f strontium; geochemical processes; strontium and cesium equilibrium 

distribution coefficients; cation exchange properties

• Particles and Aerosols: compact high speed spinning disc aerosol generator; particle deposition and re-entrainment in 

vertical conduits; etc.

Biological Sciences: gastrointestinal irradiation studies; radiation effects; metabolism and effects o f radionuclides in the 

developing fetus and the young; effects o f radiostrontium in miniature swine; radiation-induced leukemogenesis; inhalation 

studies; low-level plutonium inhalation studies in beagles; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; space nuclear systems 

studies; removal of internal emitters; structural effects of temperature in fish; blood irradiators

• Terrestrial Ecology: w ildfire, animal ecology studies; plant ecology studies; ecological micrometeorology and clim atology of 

the ALE Reserve; characteristics of Hanford soils; geology and paleoecology of ALE Reserve; Hydrologic cycling on the ALE 

Reserve; Alaska studies; analysis o f natural systems

Aquatic Ecology: ecological characteristics of the Columbia River; freshwater ecology of Rattlesnake Springs; rates and 

mechanisms of biogeochemical processes of the Columbia River; effects o f modification on the Columbia River ecosystems; 

effects o f modification of the Columbia River ecosystems; effects of short range, particle irradiation on embryogenesis of 

marine Teleost fish; fixation and long-term accumulation of tritium in an experimental aquatic environment 

Biological Sciences: gastrointestinal irradiation studies; effects o f irradiating skin; radiation effects on chylomicron synthesis 

and capillary permeability in mice; miniature swine as model' for intracavitary irradiation; cellular regulatory mechanisms; 

metabolism and effects of radionuclides In the developing fetus and the young among rats; effects on radiostrontium in 

miniature swine; radiation-induced luekemogenesis; inhalation studies among experimental animats; low-level plutonium 

inhalation studies in beagles; inhalation hazards to uranium miners (biological studies); space nuclear system studies; 

removal of internal emitters; fine structural effects of temperature in fish; development and evaluation of blood irradiators; 

biological effects o f intracorporeal radioisotope heat source

• Aquatic Ecology: effects o f thermal discharge on aquatic biota; effects of tritium on aquatic environs; factors affecting 

biogeochemical cycling; synergistic effects of temperature, pollutants, and disease in aquatic organisms

• Terrestrial Animal Ecology: perturbed environs; irradiation effects; population dynamics and reproductive habits; 

environmental quality; Alaska studies; analysis of natural systems

■'x

1971

(PNL 1972a, 

1972b)

1970

(PNL 1971a, 

1971b)

1969

(PNL 1967d, 

1970d, 1970e)

2 -7 .3 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Terrestrial Plant Ecology: vegetational dynamics and characterization; nutrient and hydrological factors; influence of environ 

factors on arid soil respiration rate; ecological micrometeorology and climatology of the ALE Reserve

• Biological Sciences: toxicology o f ingested, injected, and topically applied radionuclides (swine, rats); toxicology of inhaled 

plutonium and transplutonium elements (rats, dogs, etc.); inhalation hazards to uranium miners (beagles, hamster, rats, 

mice, mine atmosphere); evaluation o f radionuclides in man; removal o f radionuclides (rats, etc.); nuclear-powered 

prostheses and other human applications; mechanisms o f radiation effects;

• Plutonium Studies: 'interactions of plutonium aerosols w ith plant foliage; Nevada test site; behavior o f waste radionuclides in 

soil-plant systems; methods for measuring plutonium complexation in soil and uptake by plants

• Marine Sciences: thermal resistance; effects of short-range particle irradiation; geochemical ocean sections study 

(GEOSECS); physical and radiological chemistry o f ocean solutions

• Analysis of Natural Systems: sampling for radionuclides and other trace substances; bias in capture-recapture studies; 

sampling sagebrush on ALE; Antarctic seal study

• Characteristics of Hanford Soil and Aquatic Sediments: influence o f environmental factors on arid soil respiration rate; 

temperature and moisture; livestock grazing; mercury levels in particulate matter suspended in waters o f Lower Columbia 

watershed

• Freshwater Ecology: effects of thermal discharge on aquatic biota; effects o f tritium on aquatic environs; factors affecting 

biogeochemical cycling; combined effects of temperature, pollutants, and disease in aquatic organisms

• Terrestrial Ecology: terrestrial plant ecology studies; grasslands biome; terrestrial animal ecology; Alaska studies

• Biological Sciences: toxicology o f ingested, injected, and topically applied radionuclides in rats, miniature swine, and mice; 

toxicology o f inhaled plutonium and transpiutonium elements in dogs, rats, and other rodents; inhalation hazards to uranium 

m iners w ith rats, mice, and dogs; evaluation o f radionuclides in man; removal of radionuclides in rats, miniature swine, and 

blood; mechanisms o f radiation effects in N. Crassa, miniature swine, and mammalian cells

• Analysis of Natural Systems: quantitative ecological aspects o f nuclear power development; sampling for contaminants; 

modeling ecological systems; statistical and mathematical aspects o f ecology

• Environmental Chemistry: the potential for plutonium complexation in soil and uptake by plants; characteristics of Hanford 

soils and aquatic sediments; fate and effects of oil on marine coastal ecosystems; Hanford intercontractor support; 

radioecology of iodine-129; suspended particle interaction

• Freshwater Ecology: effects o f thermal discharge on aquatic biota and fish behavior and sensory physiology; combined 

effects on temperature, pollutants, disease; effects o f tritium on aquatic environs; factors affecting biogeochemical cycling

• Marine Sciences: bioenvironmental effects of effluents discharge from nuclear power plants to coastal waters; fate and effects 

o f oil on marine coastal ecosystems; physical and radiological chemistry of ocean solutions; geochemical ocean study 

section (GEOSECS)

• Radiological Sciences: radiological health research; iron-55 in human populations; radioanalytical procedures development; 

fate and effects o f radionuclides in Alaska

• Terrestrial Ecology: energy and water relations; mineral nutrients; manipulated ecosystems; consumer studies; primary 

producer studies; radiation studies; modeling

Biological Sciences: low-level plutonium and transpiutonium oxide inhalation studies in beagles; toxicology o f inhaled 

plutonium and transpiutonium elements in rodents; toxicology of inhaled beryllium compounds; development o f aerosol 

exposure and analytical techniques; mechanisms of inhaled plutonium toxicity; toxicology o f radionuclides in the fetal and 

juvenile mammal (rats); factors modifying radionuclide metabolism and effect in mice; toxicology o f chronically fed 

strontium-90 in miniature swine; gut related studies o f radionuclide toxicity (rats); acute toxicity of reactor catastrophe 

effluent; inhalation hazards to uranium miners (dogs, hamsters, rats, mice); evaluation of radionuclides in man (tissue 

samples, Richland school children); treatment for radionuclide incorporation (rats, dogs); chemical radiation protection; 

mechanisms o f radiation effects (N. Crassa, miniature swine, leukemia virus)

• Analysis of Natural Systems: sampling for contaminants; modeling ecological systems; statistical and mathematical aspects 

of ecology; quantitative ecology o f impact evaluation

1974

j: (RNL 1975a,

i; 1975b)

| i

!l

1973

(RNL 1974a, 

1974b)

1972

(PNL 1973a, 

1973b)

2 - 7 .3 2
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Environmental Chemistry: potential for plutonium complexation in soil and uptake by plants; characteristics of Hanford soils 

and aquatic sediments; suspended particle interactions; Hanford intercontractor support

• Environmental Impact Assessments

• Freshwater Sciences: thermal effects on aquatic biota; combined effects o f temperature and pollutants on fish; cold shock; 

Gable Mountain pond studies; salmon spawning studies; effects o f modifications on aquatic ecosystems; ecological 

distribution and fate of plutonium and americium in processing waste ponds; effects of tritium on aquatic systems

• Marine Sciences: non-nuclear effluents; thermal effects of effluent discharges; biological availability and effects o f effluents; 

effects o f low-level chronic irradiation; physical and radiological chemistry of ocean solutions; geochemical ocean sections 

study (GEOSECS); in situ pollutant studies; biogeochemistry of plutonium and americium in marine systems

• Radioanalyticaf Procedures Development

• Terrestrial Ecology

1975 • Biological Sciences: development of aerosol exposure and analytical techniques; biological behavior of plutonium released

(PNL 1976a, w ith sodium; low-level plutonium and transpiutonium oxide inhalation studies in beagles; low-level plutonium nitrate

1976b) inhalation studies in beagles; toxicology of inhaled plutonium and transpiutonium elements in rodents; disposition and

biological effects of inhaled plutonium in miniature swine; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; inhalation hazards to coal 

miners (coal and diesel engine exhaust); toxicology o f tritium and the noble gases; delayed effects o f exposure to acid 

aerosols; toxicology of radionuclides in the fetal and juvenile mammals; factors modifying radionuclide metabolism and 

effects; gut-related studies o f radionuclide toxicity; acute toxicity o f reactor-catastrophe effluent; toxicology of chronically fed 

strontium-90 in miniature swine; biochemical indices o f pollutant carcinogenicity; effects o f pollutant metals in nutritionally 

deficient populations; effects o f inhaled oil shale and spent shale particles in animals; evaluation o f radionuclides in man; 

chemical radiation protection; treatment of radionuclide incorporation; treatment of toxic metal exposure associated with 

non-nuclear technologies; blood irradiation for medical applications; mechanisms o f radiation effects; interaction o f fossilfuel derived toxic metals w ith biological membranes; biological effects o f intracorporeal radioisotope heat sources; artificial 

heart program; alveolar clearance o f inhaled metal oxides; effects of sulfur pollutants on lung physiology and biochemistry

• Analysis of Natural Systems: sampling and modeling; population studies; statistical and mathematical aspects o f ecology; 

quantitative ecology o f impact evaluation; quantitative aspects of environmental plutonium studies

• Environmental Chemistry: the potential for plutonium complexation in soil and uptake by plants; influence of soils and 

aquatic sediments on the chemical behavior, transport, and bioavailability of pollutants resulting from energy production; 

suspended particle, interactions

• Freshwater Sciences: effects of thermal discharges on aquatic biota; combined effects of waste heat and environmental 

factors acting in concert; effects o f hydroelectric generation on riverine ecology; effects of water quality alterations on fish 

behavior; effects o f behavior o f fossil fuel elements in freshwater ecosystems Pacific Northwest energy related regional studies 

program; ecological distribution and fate of plutonium and americium in a processing pond; sublethal effects o f tritium on 

aquatic systems; salmon spawning studies

• Marine Sciences: effects o f thermal discharges to coastal waters; non-nuclear effluents; bioavailability and impact of effluents 

on coastal ecosystems; effects of low-level chronic irradiation on embryonic development o f marine fish and invertebrates; . 

biogeochemistry o f plutonium and americium in the marine environ; physical -and radiological chemistry on ocean solutions; 

geochemical ocean sections study (GEOSECS)

• Radioanalyticaf Procedure Development

• Terrestrial Ecology: Hanford Reservation support services; weathering and aging of transuranics and radioecology o f iodine129; ecological micrometeorology and climatology o f the ALE Reserve; terrestrial ecology studies; grassland biome; terrestrial 

animal ecology studies

• Shale O il: terrestrial effects o f oil shale development; development of chemical reactions, stability and transport model of oil 

shale process wastes in soil

• Oil and Gas: fate and effects o f petroleum hydrocarbons in marine coastal ecosystems; long-term effects o f hydrocarbons on 

selected ecosystems and associated organisms

• Nuclear Wastes (Fission): suspended particle interactions and uptake in terrestrial plants; transuranic complexation in soil 

and uptake by plants; quantitative aspects of plutonium field studies; ecological distribution and fate of plutonium and

2 - 7 .3 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - P i u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

americium in a processing waste pond on the Hanford Reservation; use of analog elements to predict the equilibrium 

behavior o f transuranic elements in the environ; weathering and aging of transuranics; biogeochemistry o f plutonium and 

americium in the marine environ; radioecoiogy.of waste management areas (ROWMA); radioecology o f uranium; 

radioecology o f iodine-129 and technitium -99; influence o f soils and aquatic sediments, on the chemical behavior, transport, 

and bioavailability of pollutants

• Nuclear Fusion: reviews for division of magnetic fusion energy; sub.lethal effects of tritium on aquatic systems; effects of 

low-level chronic irradiation on em bryonic development of marine fish and invertebrates

• Solar Hydroelectric Generation: effects o f hydroelectric generation on riverine ecology

• Multitechnology Report: analysis of natural systems; quantitative ecology o f impact evaluation; geochemical ocean sections

study (GEOSECS); chemistry o f ocean solutions; in situ pollutant study o f the New York bight; effects of water quality 

alterations on fish behavior; effects of thermal discharges on aquatic biota; combined effects o f waste heat and environmental 

factors acting in concert; power plant heat and chemical effluent effects on selected marine and estuarine communities; 

immediate effects of anti-fouling biocides from coastal and offshore power plants; effects of thermal discharges to coastal

waters; biological availability o f energy related effluent material in the coastal ecosystem

• Hanford Support Services: ARHCO studies

• Land Use and Coal Technology: Hanford National Environmental Research Park (NERP) and ALE administration; terrestrial 

ecology; restoration o f surface-mined lands; fossil fuel effluents in freshwater ecosystems

• Nuclear Wastes (Fission): suspended particle interaction and uptake in terrestrial plants; transuranic complexation in soil 

and uptake by plants; quantitative aspects o f plutonium field studies; ecological distribution and fate o f plutonium and 

americium in a processing waste pond; use o f analog elements to predict the equilibrium and behavior o f transuranic 

elements in the environment; weathering and aging o f transuranics; radioecology o f uranium and waste management areas; 

transport and bioavailability of pollutants

• Nuclear Fusion: biomagnetic effects; sublethal effects o f tritium on aquatic systems; effects of low-level chronic irradiation

on embryonic development of marine fish and invertebrates; effects of beryllium and lithium on aquatic systems; terstogenic

effects of low-level magnetic fields

• Oil and Gas: fate and effects of petroleum hydrocarbons in marine coastal ecosystems; effects o f refinery wastes and oil from 

transfer facilities; long-term effects of hydrocarbons on selected ecosystems and associated organisms

• Hydroelectric Generation: effects o f hydroelectric generation on riverine ecology

Coal: inhalation hazards to miners; lung toxicity; effects of pollutant metals; alveolar clearance o f inhaled metal oxides; 

factors influencing cross-placental, transfer and tetrogenicity o f m etallic pollutants; solvent refined coal biostudies

Conservation: mutagenic effects of electric fields

Fission: aerosol and analytical technology; inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; inhaled transuranics in rodents; 

toxicology of plutonium-sodium/sodium; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; toxicology o f krypton-85; toxicology of 

thorium cycle nuclides; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; m odifying radionuclide effects; gut-related studies of radionuclide 

toxicity; removal of deposited radionuclides; viral and radiation carcinogenesis; blood irradiators; cigarette smoke and 

plutonium

• Fusion: biomagnetic effects

• O il Shale: late effects o f oil shale pollution; mutagenicity o f oil shale; development

• Multitechnology: toxicology o f inhaled acid aerosols; m obilization o f deposited metals; metal-membrane interactions toxic

effects o f geothermal effluents

• National Environmental Research Park & Land Use: various

• Synfuels: various

• O il and Gas: fate and effects of petroleum hydrocarbons in marine ecosystems; long-term effects o f hydrocarbons on 

ecosystems and organisms

1978

(PNL 1979a, 

1979b)

2 - 7 .3 4
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Nuclear Wastes: transuranic behavior in soils and plants; quantitative aspects of plutonium field studies; analog elements for 

transuranic chemistry; transuranic weathering in plants; radioecology o f nuclear fuel cycles; environ behavior and effects of 

technetium and iodine

• Nuclear Fusion

• Solar/Hydroelectric Generation

• Satellite Power Systems

• Multitechnology and Supporting Research

• Alaskan Environmental Research

• Coal: inhalation hazards to coal miners; effects o f pollutant metals; alveolar clearance of inhaled metal oxides; factors

influencing the cross-placental transfer and teratogenicity of m etallic pollutants; solvent refined coal biostudies; perinatal

effects of pollutants; mutagenicity o f synfuels

• Conservation: mutagenic effects o f electric fields; electric field dosimetry; in vivo mutagenesis (electric fields); in vitro 

effects on electric fields

• Fission: aerosol and analytical technology; inhaled plutonium oxide and plutonium nitrate in dogs; inhaled transuranics in 

rodents; cigarette smoke and plutonium ; toxicology o f plutonium -sodium ; toxicology o f sodium and lithium ; inhalation 

hazards to uranium miners; toxicology o f krypton-85; toxicology of thorium cycle nuclides; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; 

m odifying radionuclide effects; gut-related studies of radionuclide toxicity; removal o f deposited radionuclides; viral and 

radiation carcinogenesis; development of blood irradiators; transuranic behavior in soils and plants; quantitative aspects of 

transuranic field studies; analog elements for transuranic field studies; transuranic weathering in plants; radioecology of 

nuclear fuel cycles; environmental behavior and effects o f technetium-99 and iodine-129

• Fusion: biological effects of magnetic fields; sublethal effects o f tritium on aquatic systems; ecological effects of lithium and 

beryllium on important aquatic organisms and communities

• Coal Studies: inhalation hazards to coal miners; pollutant metals and malnutrition; alveolar clearance o f inhaled metal 

oxides; factors influencing the cross placental transfer and teratogenicity of m etallic pollutants

• Conservation: mutagenic effects of electric fields; AC E-field dosimetry; in vivo mutagenesis; in vitro effects of electric 

fields

• Fission: aerosol technology development; inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; inhaled transuranics in rodents; cigarette 

smoke and plutonium ; toxicology o f plutonium-sodium/sodium-lithium; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; toxicology of 

krypton-85; toxicity of thorium cycle nuclides; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; modifying radionuclide effects; gut-related 

studies of radionuclide toxicity; viral and radiation carcinogenesis; blood irradiators

• Fusion: biological effects of magnetic fields

• O il Shale: health effects of synthetic fuels, terrestrial effects o f development

• Multitechnology: toxicology o f inhaled acid aerosols; metal-membrane interactions; toxic effects o f geothermal effluents

• National Environmental Research Park & Land Use: terrestrial ecology; dynamics o f w ild populations; restoration of 

surface-mined lands; long-term ecological monitoring; application o f long-term chemical biobarriers for U-tailings; 

re-vegetation

• Alaskan Resource Research: ecological investigation o f Alaskan resource development

• Synfuels: ecological effects of coal conversion; toxicology

• Nuclear Waste (Fission): transuranic behavior; analogs for transuranics; long-term plant availability o f actinides; 

radioecology of nuclear fuel cycles; environmental behavior and effects o f technetium and Iodine

1980

(RNL 1981a, 

.1981 b)

1979

(PNL 1980a, 

1980b)

Marine Research Programs: effects o f energy systems effluents; bioavailability o f effluent materials in coastal ecosystems; 

marine chemistry
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Nuclear Fusion: sublethal effects of tritium on aquatic systems; ecological effects o f lithium and beryllium on aquatic 

communities; teratogenic effects of low-level magnetic fields

• Pumped Storage & Hydroelectric Development

• Electric Field & Microwave Research

• Coal: mutagenicity o f SRC materials; solvent refined coal .biostudies; health effects of synthetic fuels; perinatal effects of SRC; 

teratology o f SRC-II materials; inhalation hazards to miners; factors influencing the cross-placental transfer and teratogenicity 

of metal I ic pol lutants

• Conservation: mutagenic effects of electric fields; electric field dosimetry; in vivo mutagenesis o f electric fields; in vitro 

effects of electric fields

• • Fission: aerosol technology development; inhaledplutonium oxide/nitrate and americium dioxide in dogs; inhaled

transuranics in rodents; low-level plutonium-239 oxygen-2 lifespan studies; toxicology o f plutonium-sodium; cigarette smoke 

and plutonium ; toxicity o f sodium and lithium ; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; toxicology of krypton-85; toxicity of 

thorium cycle, nuclides; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; gut-related radionuclide studies; statistical health effects studies; 

radioisotope customer list

• Fusion: biological effects o f magnetic fieldsMultitechnology: metal-membrane interactions; alveolar clearance of inhaled 

metal oxides

• Multitechnology: metal-membrane interactions; alveolar clearance of inhaled metal oxides.

• National Environmental Research Park & Land Use: terrestrial ecology; dynamics o f w ild populations; quantifying 

energy-related effects on m obile species; restoration of surface mined lands; long-term ecological monitoring; application of 

long-term chemical biobarriers for U-tailings; re-vegetation

• Alaskan Resource Research: ecological investigation of Alaskan resource development

• Shale Oil: terrestrial effects of development

• Synfuels: ecological effects of coal conversion; coal liquefaction health and environmental effects

• Nuclear Waste (Fission): transuranic element behavior; transuranic chemical species in ground water; quantitative aspects of 

transuranic and other radionuclide field studies; analog elements for transuranic chemistries; long-term plant availability of 

actinides; radioecology o f nuclear fuel cycles; environmental behavior of technetium-99 and iodine-129

• Marine Research: trace metals metabolism in marine animals; bioavailability o f energy-effluent materials in coastal 

ecosystems; marine chemistry o f energy related pollutants

• Nuclear Fusion: sublethal effects o f tritium on aquatic systems ecological effects o f lithium and beryllium on aquatic 

communities; teratogenic effects of low-level magnetic fields

• Pumped Storage & Hydroelectric Development: effects o f hydroelectric generation on riverine ecology

• Pathways Modeling, Assessment, and Hanford Project Support

• Electric Field Research

• Coal Studies: mutagenicity of SRC materials; solvent refined coal biostudies; health effects of synthetic fuels; perinatal effects

o f SRC; teratology of SRC-II materials; effect of pollutant metals

• Conservation: teratology o f guinea pigs exposed to electric fields; mutagenic effects o f electric fields; electric field dosimetry; 

in vitro effects o f electric fields

• Fission: aerosol technology development; inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; inhaled transuranics in rodents; low-level 

plutonium -239 oxygen-2 lifespan studies; cigarette smoke and plutonium ; toxicity o f sodium and lithium ; inhalation hazards 

to uranium miners; toxicology o f kryton-85; toxicity o f thorium cycle nuclides; modifying radionuclide effects; fetal and 

juvenile radiotoxicity; gut-related radionuclide studies; blood irradiators; health effects studies; radioisotope customer list

1982

(RNL 1983a, 

1983b)

1981

(PNL 1982a, 

982b)

• Fusion: biological effects of magnetic fields
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Multitechnology: metal-membrane interactions; alveolar clearance of inhaled metal oxides

• Terrestrial and Riverine Ecology: terrestrial ecology; response of Columbia River fish to man-induced flo w alterations; 

determination o f long-term biological responses; ecological investigations in Alaska

• Marine Research: entrance,, behavior, and fate o f trace metals in coastal waters; transport and bioavailability of trace metals 

in coastal ecosystems; biological effects of trace metals on marine animals

• Ecological Effects on Coal Conversion: transport and fate; effects on aquatic and terrestrial systems; food chain transfer

• Solid Wastes (Mobilization, Fate, and Effects)

• Radionuclide Fate and Effects: environmental transport processes; radionuclide transport parameters; ecological interactions 

influencing remedial actions at waste sites; transuranic chemical species in groundwater; analogs for transuranic chemistries

• Statistical and Theoretical Research: examining the fate o f contaminants from energy developments; censuring w ild and 

stray populations of large animals; designing studies to detect effects on mobile species

\

• Statistical and Quantitative Research: developing methods to evaluate environmental behavior o f radionuclides and 

population dynamics o f large animals

1984 • Human Health Effects from Energy Generation: statistical health effects study

(PNL 1985a,

1985b) • Carcinogenesis: biostudies of complex mixtures; inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; low-level 239Pu02 lifespan

studies; cigarette smoke and plutonium ; toxicology o f thorium cycle nuclides; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; fetal 

and juvenile radiotoxicity

• Mutagenesis: mutagenicity of complex mixtures

• Systems Damage: gut-related studies o f radionuclides; teratology o f complex mixtures; perinatal effects o f complex mixtures; 

tissue dose in fossil fuel exposure; aerosol technology development; biological effects of magnetic fields

• General Life Sciences: metal-membrane interactions

• Health and Environmental Risk Analysis: complex mixtures-reiative potency matrix

• Medical Applications of Nuclear Technology: blood irradiators; radioisotope customer list

• Western Arid and Semi-Arid Ecosystems: NERP; dynamics of arid land ecosystems

• Marine Sciences: toxicity o f sea-surface contaminants; metabolism of trace metals in marine animals; uptake and depuration 

o f silver in mussels; partitioning coefficients (Kp) for metals in sediments and water column

• Mobilization, Fate, and Effects of Energy-Derived Chemicals: hydrochemical phenomena controlling solute behavior; 

contaminant transfer through aquatic organisms

• Radionuclide Transport Research: characterization o f plant-produced ligands; metabolic behavior of technetium in plants; 

radionuclides transported by insects and fish

• Statistical and Quantitative Research on Wild Populations: population studies of large animals; quantifying energy-related 

effects on m obile species

1985 • Human Health Effects: statistical health effects study

(PNL 1986a,

.1986b) • Health Effects of Radiation: inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; oncogenes in radiation carcinogenesis; cigarette smoke

and plutonium ; low-level plutonium -239 oxygen-2 lifespan studies; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; toxicology of 

thorium cycle nuclides; aerosol technology development; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; gut-related studies of radionuclides

• Health Effects of Chemical Mixtures: mutagenicity of complex mixtures; biostudies of complex mixtures; teratology of 

complex mixtures; perinatal effects of complex mixtures; health effects of complex mixtures; tissue dose in exposure to 

complex mixtures

• Medical Applications of Nuclear Technology: blood irradiators; radioisotope customer list

2 - 7 .3 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Arid Land Sciences: dynamics of arid land ecosystems; ecological studies at the NERP; biotic transport research

• Marine Sciences: marine chemistry o f energy-related contaminants; environmental stress and disease in marine animals; 

trace metal metabolism in marine animals

• Biogeochemical Phenomena in Indirect Exposure Pathways: soil and plant processes controlling cation behavior in 

terrestrial systems; environmental behavior of inorganic anions; bioaccumulation and biochemical behavior of xenobiotic 

organic compounds in terrestrial systems; aquatic food chain transfer

• Subsurface Transport: subsurface behavior of organic compounds and mixtures; hydrogeochemical phenomena controlling 

solute behavior

• Theoretical (Quantitative) Ecology: dynamics of w ild populations; quantifying energy-related impacts on m obile species; 

designs for environmental field studies

• Human Health Effects: statistical health effects study

• Health Effects of Radiation: inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; oncogenes in radiation carcinogenesis; low-level 

plutonium -239 oxygen-2 lifespan studies; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; toxicology of thorium cycle nutrients; 

aerosol technology development; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; gut-related studies o f radionuclides

• Health Effects of Chemical Mixtures: mutagenicity o f complex mixtures; complex mixtures biostudies; teratology of complex 

mixtures; perinatal effects of complex mixtures; tissue dose in complex mixture exposures

• Medical Applications of Nuclear Technology: blood irradiators for medical applications development; radioisotope 

customer list

• Environmental Sciences: detecting and managing change in terrestrial ecosystems; remote sensing; biotic transport processes 

in arid ecosystems; installation of precision-weighing lysimeters for evapotranspiration measurements at Hanford's ALE 

Reserve; biogeochemical phenomena; subsurface transport; marine sciences; theoretical ecology; exploratory research; 

university interactions; technology transfer

1987 • Human Health Effects Research: statistical health effects study; iron stores and risk o f cancer; interlaboratory toxicology data

(PNL 1988a, base; benefit-cost analysis o f OHER research

1988b)

• Health Effects Research in Biological Systems: inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; inhalation hazards to uranium 

miners; mechanisms of radon injury; aerosol technology development; oncogenes in radiation carcinogenesis; molecular 

events during tum or initiation; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; molecular markers during development; molecular control of 

lung development;, mutational studies in DNA targets

• Medical Applications of Nuclear Technology: radioisotope customer list and shipment summary

• Environmental Sciences: detecting and managing change in terrestrial ecosystems; biogeochemical phenomena; subsurface 

transport; marine sciences; theoretical ecology; exploratory research; university interactions; technology transfer; 

international relations

• Human Health Effects Research: statistical health effects study; iron stores and risk o f cancer; interlaboratory toxicology 

knowledge base

• Health Effects Research in Biological Systems: inhaled plutonium oxide/nitrate in dogs; low-level plutonium -239 oxygen-2 

studies; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; mechanisms o f radon injury; microdosimetry of radon daughters; growth 

factors in radiation carcinogenesis; oncogenes in radiation carcinogenesis; molecular events during tum or initiation; aerosol 

technology development; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; m olecular markers during development; molecular control of lung 

development; mutation of DNA targets; synthesis o f human genome information; genome graphics interface

• Medical Applications of Nuclear Technology: radioisotope customer list

• Detecting and Managing Change in Terrestrial Ecosystems: arid lands water balance; the effect o f water and nitrogen 

perturbations on gas exchange in arid lands ecosystems; spatial variability in ecological factors influencing surface water 

distribution in the shrub-steppe; measuring landscape-level processes; floristics and climate in the deserts of Western United 

States

1988

(RNL 1989a, 

1989b)

1986

(PNL 1987a, 

1987b)

2 - 7 .3 8
Year

Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

1989

(PNL 1990a, 

1990b)

1990

PNL 1991a, 

1991b)

Biochemical Phenomena: soil and plant processes controlling cation behavior in terrestrial systems; environmental behavior 

o f inorganic anions

Subsurface Science: subsurface chemistry o f organic chemical mixtures; subsurface behavior of organic fluids; radon 

transport modeling in soils; a finite element model of radon advection and diffusion in unsaturated cracked soils; subsurface 

microbial phenomena

Marine Sciences: environmental stress and disease in marine invertebrates

Theoretical Ecology: designs for environmental field studies; dynamics of w ild populations; quantifying energy-related 

effects on m obile species

Exploratory Research: biogenic cycling of volatile nitrogen-containing species; remote thermal data for determining 

evapotranspi ration in arid landscapes; comparison of techniques to elucidate adsorption phenomena in aqueous solutions; 

optimal measurement scales and experimental design for detecting and predicting global ecosystem change; variability and 

speciation o f atmospheric mercury; environmental detection and fate o f genetically engineered microorganisms; modeling 

salmon spawning habitat through remote sensing and geographic information system techniques

Human Health Research: statistical health effects studies; iron stores and risks o f cancer

Biological Research; inhaled plutonium oxide and plutonium nitrate in dogs; national radiobiology archives; low-level 

plutonium -239 oxygen-2 life-span studies; inhalation hazards to uranium miners; mechanisms of radon injury; 

microdosimetry o f radon daughters; growth factors in radiation carcinogenesis; oncogenes in radiation-induced 

carcinogenesis; molecular events during tumor initiation; mutation o f D N A targets; fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity; aerosol 

technology development

General Life Sciences Research: synthesis o f human genome information; GnomeView, a graphical interface to the human 

genome

Medical Applications: radioisotope customer list

Detecting and Managing Change in Terrestrial Ecosystems: understanding terrestrial ecosystems; landscape ecological 

studies; arid lands water balance; a microcosm-level gas exchange study

Subsurface Science: subsurface m icrobial phenomena; groundwater dating at the SRS; subsurface chemistry of organic 

compounds and mixtures; chemistry/microbiology controlling chelated radionuclide transport; intermediate-scale subsurface 

transport of co-contaminants; subsurface flow physics of im miscible organic liquids; subsurface science program liaison; 

estimating steady date diffusive and advective fluxes from different soil types

Marine Sciences: cause and progression of leukemia in a marine invertebrate

Theoretical Ecology: dynamics o f w ild populations; designs for environmental field studies

Exploratory Research: biogenic cycling of volatile nitrogen-containing species; optimal measurement scales and 

experimental design for detecting and predicting global ecosystems change; a knowledge-based system for evaluating human 

disturbance and global climate change in arid regions; remote sensing of plant stress; fluxes o f biogenic gases from the ocean 

surface; development of a passive diffusion sensor for the measurement of ambient mercury vapor concentrations

Human Health Research: statistical health effects studies; Tatum Dome cancer incidence study; iron stores and risk of cancer

Biological Research: inhaled plutonium oxide and plutonium nitrate in dogs; national radiobiology archives; low-level 

plutonium-239 oxygen-2 life-span studies; inhalation hazards to miners; mechanisms o f radon injury; dosimetry of radon 

progeny; aerosol technology development; growth factors in radiation carcinogenesis; oncogenes in radiation-induced 

carcinogenesis; mutation o f D N A targets; molecular events during tum or initiation; genotoxicity of inhaled energy effluents; 

fetal and juvenile radiotoxicity

General Life Sciences Research: GnomeView II, a graphical interface to the human genome; synthesis of human genome 

information

Subsurface Science: subsurface chemistry o f organic chemical and organic-radionuclide mixtures; subsurface microbial 

phenomena; hydrogeologic and geochemical controls on microorganisms; pore water chemistry; chemistry/microbiology 

controlling chelated radionuclide transport; subsurface organic fluid flo w research; intermediate-scale subsurface transport of 

co-contaminants

2 - 7 .3 9
Year

Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Biological and Ecological Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports)

• Terrestrial Science: vegetation as a controlling influence in shrub-steppe water balance; landscape ecological studies; gas 

exchange dynamics and the effects o f nitrogen and water; effects o f soil water deficit and plant age; dynamics of soil 

inorganic nitrogen; the effects of fire on nitrous oxide flux; dominated old-fietds; artificial intelligence in environmental 

research; environmental research parks; designs for environmental field studies

• Exploratory Research: engineered microbes; contaminant transport modeling; Hollaender fellowship in contaminant 

transport; geostatistics; m onitoring network design for risk-based groundwater remediation; remote sensing of plant stress; 

optimal measurement scales and experimental design for detecting and predicting global ecosystems change

P h y s i c a l S c ie n c e R e s e a r c h P r o j e c t s a t t h e H a n f o r d

S it e , 1 9 5 1 -1 9 9 0

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

1951

(Mickelson

1951)

1952

(GE 1952b)

1953

(GE 1954c)

Radiological Records and Standards: general; design standards; radiation m onitoring activities; instrument calibrations

Biophysics: general; control, laboratory and counting room; regional survey; synoptic meteorology; control services; 

experimental meteorology; geology; industrial hygiene; methods; radiochemical standards; soil science

Biophysics: REDOX stack effluent gas and process water studies; determination o f oil content in oil fog dispersion; 

radioactive isotopic build-up in 100-C reactor effluent; recirculated water analysis for 100-H; environmentalcontaminants 

originating from Hanford

Synoptic/Experimental Meteorology: weather forecasts; clim atological statistics; oil-fog studies; air contaminant trajectory 

studies

Geology/Hydrology: drilling exploration; ground water contamination studies

Industrial Hygiene/Medical: particle exposure studies from 200 Areas, REDOX stack, 314 Building; non-radioactive health 

hazard studies (toxic metals, gases, or vapors)

instrument Development: single channel gamma spectrometer using a sodium iodine acintillator; portable alpha survey 

instruments with scintillation detectors; C.P. meter; equipment for measuring the temperature below the river bottom; 

equipment for monitoring test wells; recording anemometer using an uninterrupted light beam; metal evaporator; etc.

Soil Science: absorption of cesium; studies o f tank waste solutions penetrating the groundwater; accumulated sludge in the 

105-H storage basin; polargraphic procedure for determining the total cation exchange capacities of soil

Physics

Radiological Engineering

Radiological Records and Standards

Biology Studies: general; aquatic; metabolism and toxicology; biology controls

Biophysics Section: general; control laboratory and counting room; regional survey; synoptic meteorology; control services; 

experimental meteorology; earth sciences; industrial hygiene; instrument development; methods; physics; radiochemical 

standards

1954

(GE 1954d)

Radiological Engineering: disposal o f liquid wastes; disposal o f process wastes to Colum bia River; im provement of radiation 

protection design criteria; mechanical development

. Biology Program: deduction of permissible human exposure by biological experimentation; effects of process effluents on 

aquatic organisms; effects of process effluent on plants and animals

Biophysics Program: m onitoring methods; environmental studies and adequacy of waste disposal systems; instrumentation 

for radiation detection and measurement

2 - 7 .4 0
Se c t io n 7 - Re sea r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

1955 • Radiological Engineering: disposal o f liquid wastes from separations processes; disposal o f process wastes to Columbia River

(Mickelson 1955) - effluent dispersion patterns, ruptured fuel element waste disposal, downstream domestic usage of river water, reactor purge

waste disposal, disposal of reactor experimental control solution, metal preparation area waste disposal; Columbia River 

studies

• Radiation Protection Design: radiological disaster studies; radioactive particle hazard studies; hazards o f possible process 

materials

1956*

(GE 1956c,

1956d, 1957b, 

Parker 1956)

1957*

(GE 1957c, 

1957d)

1958*

(GE 1958e,

1958f, 1958g, 

1959b)

1959

(GE 1960b)

Mechanical Development

Biology Program: deduction of permissible human exposure by biological experimentation - tritium absorption and 

metabolism, fission product absorption and metabolism, plutonium and absorption, respiratory metabolism and toxicity of 

radioactive particles, skin irradiation; effects o f process effluents on aquatic organisms; effects o f process effluent on plant and 

animal life - effect o f reactor effluent on plants, absorption and translocation of radioelements on plants, toxicity o f iodine131 in animals

Biophysics Proyam: analytical methods; monitoring methods; counting methods; bioassay methods; special studies; 

geological studies; soil chemistry; soil physics; process waste disposal; diffusion and transport study; particle pick-up study; 

trajectory study (200 m ile scale); atmospheric contamination problems; aerosol sampling; respirator testing; toxic materials

Dosimetry: gamma ray dosimetry; beta ray dosimetry; neutron dosimetry

Instrumentation: survey instrumentation; biological instrumentation; laboratory instrum entation; special purpose

instrumentation

Biology Program: aquatic biology studies; experimental animal farm studies; metabolism studies; pharmacology and 

experimental therapeutics; plant nutrition and m icrobiology; m inor problems research; biological analyses

Biophysics: chemical and monitoring methods; geological studies; meteorology studies; industrial hygiene studies 

Dosimetry Program: gamma ray; beta ray; and neutron dosimetry; body monitor 

Instrumentation Program: survey; biological; laboratory; and special purpose instrumentation 

Chemistry and Separations: analytical chemistry; chemical effluents technology

Biology Program: aquatic biology; experimental animal farm; metabolism studies; pharmacology studies; plant nutrition and 

m icrobiology; biological analyses; radioecology

Physics and Instrumentation; meteorology; radiation dosimetry; instrumentation

Chemistry and Separations Processes: analytical chemistry; chemical effluents technology

Biology Program: aquatic biology; experimental animal farm; metabolism studies; pharmacology; 

plant nutrition and m icrobiology; radioecology

Physics and Instrumentation: meteorology; radiation dosimetry; instrumentation 

Chemistry and Separations Processes: analytical chemistry; chemical effluents technology

Analytical and Counting Methods: gamma ray spectrometric analysis; radiostrontium procedures w ith nitric acid; analysis of 

plutonium in urine; phosphorescence photons; determining radioactive ions in reactor effluent

Bioassay Studies: measurements o f zinc

Environmental Studies: radioactivity in foods; measuring fallout radioisotopes on vegetation

Reactor Studies: the origin o f effluent radioisotopes; sources of fission product radioisotopes in effluent; kinetics o f arsenic 

retention; effects of temperature and flow velocity on the decontamination o f reactor effluent

Radiation Chemistry: chemical protection from ionizing radiation; protolysis and hydrolysis reactions of erioglaucine in 

aqueous solutions; susceptibility of solutes to attack by free radicals in aqueous solution; electron-spin resonance studies; 

membrane electrode cell for the determination of dissolved oxygen

2-7.41
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

1960 • Atmospheric Physics: diffusion and transport; tracer technology; dispersion measurements

(GE 1961b)

• Radiological Physics: radioactivity in Hanford employees; whole body counter; retention o f radioisotopes; scanning counter; 

shadow shields; polyethylene long counter; radioactive neutron sources; Periow neutron spectrometer; Van de Graaff 

accelerator helium ion source; positive ion accelerator target prep.; gamma ray source measurements; stopping power of 

aluminum for electrons; precision instrumentation for an electron; linearizing thermistor thermometer; data in calorimetry; 

liquid nitrogen level controller

• Radiological Chemistry: analytical and counting methods - various; environmental studies - various; reactor studies - 

various; radiation chemistry - various

• Chemical Effluents Technology: special geological studies - various; geochemical and geophysical research - various; 

effluents research and development - various; equipment and instrumentation - various

• Instrumentation: contaminated air monitoring techniques; biology operation support instrumentation; dosimetry 

instrumentation; radiation detection development; general radiological m onitor development; automatic monitoring and 

recording methods; special purpose instrument development

1961 • Atmospheric Physics: diffusion and transport; deposition of airborne materials; vertical exchange coefficients and the vertical

(GE 1962b) flux o f matter; precipitation scavenging processes

• Radiological Physics: shadow shield whole body counter; iodine-131 levels in human thyroids after nuclear fallout; factors 

influencing measurement o f plutonium in wounds; retention o f isotopes; detection o f phosphorous-32 in vivo; precision long 

counter; radiation effects in BF3 tubes; neutron energy degradation; secular variation in neutron emission from plutonium ; 

neutron moderator; target contamination; etc.

• Radiological Chemistry: analytical and counting methods; radiation chemistry; environmental studies; reactor studies

• Chemical Effluents Technology: soil chemistry, geochemistry; soil physics; geology; instrumental techniques; uranium 

oxidation and fission product volatility; micromerrtics

• Instrumentation: contaminated air monitoring techniques; biology support instrumentation; dosimetry instruments; radiation 

detection development; general radiological m onitor and circuitry development; automatic m onitoring and recording 

methods

1962 • Atmospheric Physics: diffusion, deposition, and transport; precipitation scavenging processes; advances in tracer technology

(GE 1963b)

• Radiological Physics: whole body counters; cesium-137 in Eskimos; cesium-134 in Eskimos and fallout; cesium-137 urinary

excretion by Eskimos: determination o f phosphorous-32 in vivo; plutonium x-ray scintillation counters; pulse shape

discrimination in fast neutron dosimetry; lithium sandwich fast neutron spectrometer; precision long counter; calibration of 

the polyethylene double moderator; cosmic-ray neutron measurements; film activation studies; calorimetric determination of 

antimony-124; heat output of plutonium ; input and source impedance corrections in high precision voltmeter standardization

• Radiological Chemistry: reactor studies; environmental studies; radiation chemistry

• Chemical Effluents Technology: soil chemistry, geochemistry; soil physics; geology; radioisotopes as particles and volatiles; 

uranium oxidation and fission product volatility

• Instrumentation: automatic m onitoring and recording methods; general radiological monitoring and circuit development; 

dosimetry instrumentation; radiation detector development; contaminated air m onitoring techniques

1963 • Atmospheric Physics: prediction o f environmental exposures; comparison of results of atmospheric diffusion; dispersion

(GE 1964b) from elevated sources; precipitation scavenging processes? atmospheric tracer technology

• Radiological Physics: radioactivity in Alaskan Eskimos; human uptake of cesium-137; determination of the avg. cesium-137 

body burden o f a population; scintillation counter for in vivo detection of plutonium ; determination of phosphorous-32 in 

vivo; w hole body counters; pulse shape discrimination; response of paired ion chambers; precision long counters; low energy 

fast neutrons; fast neutron medical facility & shielding; heat amplifier; theory on measurementon beams

• Radiological Chemistry: radioanalytical models; reactor studies; environmental studies

• Chemical Effluents Technology: soil chemistry, geochemistry; soil physics; geology; radioisotopes as particulates and 

volatiles

2 -7 .4 2
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Physical Sdence Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

• Instrumentation: automatic m o n ito rin g and recording m ethods; bio lo g y instrum entation; dosim etry instrum entation

1964 • Atmospheric Physics: model for diffusion and transport for a continuous release in stable atmosphere; measurements of

(PNL 1965b) dispersion; point source in an unstable atmosphere; atmospheric turbulence measurements; area dosage relationships;

v precipitation scavenging studies; sampler for recording concentration o f airborne zinc sulfide; improvements in

micrometeorological instrumentation

• Radiological Physics: radioactivity measured in Alaskan Natives 1962-64; seasonal variations of cesium-137 in Alaskan 

Eskimos; Urinalysis for cesium-137; sodium-22 and iron-55 in people and food; radioactivity in an Eskimo; whole body 

counting; cesium-137 in Trappist monks; humans exposed to uranium mine atmospheres; etc.

• Radiological Chemistry: radiation chemistry; radioanalytical methods; reactor studies; counting studies; environmental 

studies

Chemical Effluents Technology: soil chemistry and geochemistry; atmospheric radioactivity and fallout - aerosol studies

1965

(PNL 1966b, 

1966c)

1966

(PNL 1967b, 

1967c)

1967

(PNL 1968b, 

1968c)

1968

(PNL 1970b, 

1970c)

Instrumentation: radiological measurement methods and instrumentation; biological and biomedical instrumentation; 

dosimetry and atmospheric physics instrumentation

Atmospheric Sciences: precipitation scavenging studies; Midas computer program for evaporation o f failing drops and 

isentropic stream functions and trajectories; radio-telemetered meteorological and radiation observation network; 

instrumenting o f the Queen A ir aircraft for sampling o f a zinc sulfide atmosphere tracer; prediction of exposures from an 

elevated source; spectral distribution of atmospheric turbulence

Radiological Physics: fast pulse averaging; time-resolved spectroscopy; specific ionization o f monoenergetic protons in 

tissue-equivalent gas; grid-walled proportional counter; self-absorption in scintillation crystals; pulsed x-ray machine; local 

energy density and hit theory; long-term change of plutonium -beryllium neutron sources; local-eneigy-density distributions; 

calorimetric measurement of polonium-210; low energy fast neutron spectrometer; transition zone density; etc

Radiation Chemistry: determination of erythocyte size distribution; radiation induced hemolysis o f erythrocytes; effect of 

chloride ion on the radiolysis of erioglaucine solutions; electron spin resonance detection instruments; cobalt-60 irradiator

flow system for electron spin resonance long-lived organic radicals formed in irradiated aqueous solutions; reaction kinetics 

of free radicals

Radiological Chemistry: alpha-emitters in the C olum bia; reduction o f reactor e fflu ent radionuclides; the effect o f reduced 

alum addition on the removal o f arsenic-75 at the KW reactor; ion exchange studies; seasonal variations in sediment 

deposition; use o f zinc-65/cobalt-60 ratios to determine age and deposition rates; method fo r determination of phosphorous32 and other radionuclides; behavior and transport of radionuclides in the Columbia; natural and artificial radionuclide 

concentration in farm produce; distribution and excretion o f technetium in humans; lead-210 in Alaskan biological samples; 

etc.

Atmospheric Sciences: lateral plume growth; diffusion studies; turbulence investigations; wake studies; instantaneous 

plume detection; precipitation scavenging studies; real-time sampling of airborne tracers w ith aircraft; meteorological 

analyses of PLUMBBOB nuclear tests; raindrop charge measuring systems; identification and measurement of hydrogen 

chloride gas in the atmosphere; krypton-85 as an atmospheric tracer; portable boom-type air sampler

Radiological Chemistry: tracers o f atmospheric precipitation processes; atmospheric behavior o f airborne radionuclides; 

krypton-85 as an atmospheric tracer; air sampling; gamma-ray spectrometer studies; trace elements in marine organisms and 

sediments; etc

Radiological Physics: instrumentation for time-resolved spectrometry; proton irradiation of gases; programmed distribution 

generator; whole-body counter design and calibration; film dosimeter performance criteria; etc

Radiological Chemistry: trace elem ents absorption, content, a n d m easurement; autom atic real-tim e a ir monitoring; 

radionuclide distribution in salmon; use o f photon spectrometry; liquid scintillation counting; etc.

Radiological Physics: hit theory; delta rays of heavy particles; microdosimetry; gas pressure control; etc.

Earth Sciences: landslide cause and significance; tectonic deformation and seismic activity; infrared imagery over surface 

water; paiynology; geophysical evaluation o f thick basalt sequences in the Pasco Basin; etc

Radiological Chemistry: determination o f trace levels o f various elem ents in soft tissue; ra dionu clid e d istrib ution and

concentration; radium and radiobarium measurement in seawater; iron-55 concentrations in sea organisms; transfer of 

airborne radionuclides; multielement analysis of aquatic organisms; etc.

2-7.43
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

• Radiation Chemistry: rate constants o f organic compounds; long-lived organic radicals formed by irradiation; flash 

photolysis

• Radiological Physics: radiation dosimetry; hit theory and microdosimetry; energy absorption straggling, distribution, and 

spectra; pulse read ion chamber system; beam current regulator; fast pulse signal averaging; etc.

• Instrumentation: solid state detectors; smoking control for canines; radon m onitoring; tritium target scanning using surface 

contoured diodes; miniature high voltage supply; etc.

• Atmospheric Sciences: diffusion and transport; boundary layer studies; BOMEX studies; fallout studies; precipitation 

scavenging studies; radioisotopes as particles and volatiles; ecological micrometeorology and climatology

• Radiological Chemistry: inhalation hazards to uranium miners; rates o f deposition in Alaskan environ; physical and 

radiological chemistry of ocean solutions; geothermal ocean section study (GEOSECS); in-cloud scavenging; radioanalytical 

procedure development; radioactive fallout rates and.mechanisms; iron-55 in the human population; radiation 

instrumentation

• Radiological Physics: internal depositions o f radionuclides in man; characterization o f radiation-induced free radical 

reactions in aqueous systems; nuclear techniques in medical science; radiation dosimetry; radiation physics

• Atmospheric Sciences: precipitation scavenging studies; diffusion and turbulence studies; radioisotopes as particles and 

volatiles; ecological m icrom eteorology and climatology

• Radiological Chemistry: inhalation studies; rates o f deposition of airborne radionuclides in the Alaskan environment; 

physical and radiological chemistry o f ocean solutions; geochemical oceans sections study (GEOSECS); in-cloud scavenging; 

radioanalytical procedure development; radioactive fallout rates and mechanisms; iron-55 and lead, in human population of 

the w orld; radiation instrumentation; tracer studies in the Northeast Colorado Hail experiment program

• Radiological Physics: internal depositions o f radionuclides in man; characterization o f radiation-induced free radical 

reactions in aqueous systems; nuclear techniques in medical science; radiation dosimetry; radiation physics

• Atmospheric Sciences: precipitation o f scavenging tracers; raindrop trajectories; w in d shear; precipitation washouts of 

various compounds; aerosol particle size distributions; isentropic trajectories; climatological measurements; radioactive 

particles; aircraft instrumentation; tracer studies; fallout rates and mechanisms; turbulence measurement studies; lab 

procedures

• Radiological Chemistry: inhalation hazards to uranium miners; rates o f deposition of airborne radionuclides in the Alaskan 

environment; physical and radiological chemistry o f ocean solutions; geochemical oceans sections study (GEOSECS); incloud scavenging; radioanalytical procedure development; radioactive fallout rates and mechanisms; iron-55 and lead in the 

human population; radiation instrumentation; tracer studies in the METROMEX experiment; radionuclide decline in the 

Columbia River water

• Radiological Physics: dosimetry o f radionuclides in man; characterization of radiation-induced free radical reactions in 

aqueous systems; nuclear techniques in medical science; mechanisms o f environmental exposure; radiological evaluation of 

post mortem tissue samples; radiation dosimetry; radiation physics

Atmospheric Sciences: diffusion, deposition, and turbulence studies on various terrain and surface types; experimental and 

modeling efforts for deposition of ..particulates; resuspension of surface contamination; controlled tracer experiments; 

distribution o f resuspended soil particles; removal of pollutants by wet scavenging processes; various scavenging 

experiments; METROMEX studies; global distribution of contaminants

• Radiological Chemistry: inhalation hazards to uranium miners; fate and effects o f radionuclides in Alaska; physical and 

radiological chemistry o f ocean solutions; geochemical ocean sections study (GEOSECS); precipitation scavenging; 

radioanalytical procedure development; radioactive fallout rates and mechanisms; iron-55 in human populations; radiation 

instrumentation; tracer studies in the national hail research experiment; tracer studies in the metropolitan meteorological 

experiment; survey study o f radionuclides and chemical pollutants; radionuclide decline in Columbia River water

• Radiological Physics: characterization of radiation-induced free radical reactions; nuclear techniques in medical science; 

mechanisms o f environmental exposure; evaluation o f radionuclides in man; radiation dosimetry; radiation physics; radiation 

biophysics

1972

(PNL 1973c, 

1973d)

1971

(PNL 1972c, 

■ 1972d)

1969

(PNL 1970f, 

1970g)

1970

(RNL 1971c, 

1971d)

2 - 7 .4 4
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

1973

(PNL 1974c,

1974d)

1974

(PNL 1975c, 

1975d)

1975

(PNL 1976c, 

1976d)

1976

(PNL 1977c, 

1977d)

Atmospheric Physics: characterization o f sources and ambient pollutants; transport, diffusion, and turbulence studies; 

atmospheric transformation processes; rem oval and resuspension processes (wet rem oval, d ry deposition particles, and

resuspension of particles); special studies (cooling tower and cooling.pond atmospheric impact and ecological 

micrometeorology and clim atology o f theALE Reserve)

Instrumentation Technology: radiation instrumentation - radiation chemistry; nuclear techniques in medical science

Radiological and Chemical Physics: radiation physics studies; radiation dosimetry; radiation biophysics

Nuclear Medicine Technology and Other Health Applications: nuclear powered prostheses; medical uses o f isotopes

Artificial Heart Program: medical grade plutonium-238 from americium-241; recipient radiation exposure; population 

radiation exposure

Atmospheric Sciences: survey o f radioactivity and chemical pollutants studies; radioactive fallout rates and mechanisms 

studies; atmospheric aerosols and trace gases studies; regional transport o f effluent studies; fallout phenomenology; Hanford 

regional meteorological, studies; atmospheric diffusion, deposition, and transport phenomena; fundamental turbulence 

studies; tracer studies in the METROMEX experiment; precipitation scavenging studies; cooling tower and cooling pond 

atmospheric impact studies; radioisotopes as particles and volatiles; particle resuspension and translocation; ecological 

micrometeorology and clim atology on the ALE Reserve

Instrumentation Technology: radiation instruments; in situ monitoring; activation analysis technology; chemical and 

molecular composition technology; environ pollution analysis; real-time measurement of airborne plutonium ; nuclear 

techniques in medicine

Radiological and Chemical Physics: radiation physics studies; radiation dosimetry and radiation biophysics studies 

Analysis and Evaluation: toxic substances in nuclear fuels; methodology for the assessment of social values 

Nuclear Medicine Technology & Other Health Applications: nuclear powered prostheses; medical use of isotopes 

Artificial Heart Program

Instrumentation Technology: low-level radiological chemistry laboratory techniques; in situ monitoring; environmental 

pollution analysis; in situ pollutant measurements; trace constituent analysis by laser excitation; analytical techniques for 

measurement of technetium-99 in environmental samples; fast real-time measurement o f extremely low-level airborne 

plutonium ; environmental applications o f holography; chemical reaction kinetics

Radiological and Chemical Physics: radiation physics; radiation dosimetry and radiation biophysics; dosimetry of particulate 

sources in the lung

Health Protection: dosimetry of internal emitters

Analysis and Evaluation: toxic substances in nuclear fuels; assessment of social values in thermal plant siting; considerations 

and methodologies for studies concerning the effect of low-level exposures to environmental contaminants

Regional Studies: Pacific Northwest regional assessment program

Atmospheric Sciences: survey of ambient airborne pollutants; radioactive fallout rates and mechanisms; atmospheric 

chemistry o f coal conversion pollutants; chemical and physical properties of pollutants in the Colstrip power plant effluents; 

tracer studies - METROMEX; theoretical studies; atmospheric boundary layer studies; particle resuspension and translocation; 

radioisotopes as particles and volatiles; precipitation scavenging; aerosol and trace gas transformations; safety analysis and 

environmental effects studies; Pacific Northwest energy related regional assessment program; atmospheric impacts

Atmospheric Sciences: surveys and weather m odification; air flo w and dispersion; deposition and resuspension; pollutant 

scavenging; pollutant transformations and interactions; composite models for atmospheric processes;

Physics and Chemistry of Pollutant Interactions in the Environment: reaction kinetics of combustion processes

Radiological and Chemical Physics: radiation dosimetry and radiation biophysics; dosimetry o f particulate sources in the 

lung; radiation physics-basic collision cross sections, radioluminescence studies

2 - 7 .4 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

• Characterization, Measurement, and Monitoring: radiation instrumentation; environmental.pollution analysis,-oil shale and 

tar sand research; dosimetry o f internal emitters; analytical techniques for technetium-99 measurement; trace constituent 

analysis by laser excitation; application to holography; real-time measurement o f plutonium in air below MPC levels

• Atmospheric Sciences: precipitation scavenging in MAP3S; aerosols and trace gas transformations; MAR3S modeling studies; 

atmospheric boundary layer studies; particle resuspension and translocation; urban pollution characterization; transport and 

deposition; coal conversion pollutant chemistry; regional studies; air pollution dry deposition; comprehensive study of 

atmospheric diffusion prediction from meteorological parameters; alternate fuel cycle technologies; hemispheric pollution 

behavior studies o f chemicals and radiation substances; fallout rates and mechanisms; meteorological effects o f thermal 

energy releases (METER)

• Solar: various studies ^

• Oil Shale: dual tracer deposition; revised method of energy flux calculations; transport and dispersion in complex terrain; 

verification statistic for numerical models; etc.

• Coal: formation of fly fish in coal combustion; mass spectrometric studies of gaseous effluents from in situ coal glassification

• Fission: various studies

• Geothermal: heavy-metal gaseous emissions from power plants; measurement o f potentially toxic materials in geopressured 

geothermal fluids

• Multitechnology: various studies

1978 • Atmospheric Sciences: aerosol and trace gas transformations; precipitation scavenging in MAP3S; MAP3S modeling studies;

(PNL 1979c, regional studies; atmospheric boundary layer studies; coal conversion pollutant chemistry studies; particle resuspension and

1979d) translocation; alternate fuel cycle technologies/thorium fuel cycle technologies; meteorological effects of thermal energy

releases; fallout rates and mechanisms; air pollution dry deposition studies

• Radiation Physics: initial interaction processes; track structure; energy transport; radiation dosimetry and radiation 

biophysics; microdosimetry of internal sources; dosimetry of internal emitters; real-time measurement of plutonium in air; 

analytical techniques for environmental sampling; radiation instrumentation

• Geothermal, Oil Shale & Coal Studies

• Multitechnology: environmental pollution analysis; pollutant characterization; applications o f holography; certifies research 

materials

• Atmospheric Sciences: Project ASCOT; radiation measurements; tracer experiments; micrometeorological measurements; 

sulfur surface flux measurements; particle deposition studies; pollutant transformations and models; MAP3S studies; regional 

scale assessments; aircraft measurements/research; in-cioud conversion rates; w ind and cloud studies; particle/gas deposition 

studies; deposition measurements; resuspension studies; airborne plutonium transport at Hanford; atmospheric radionuclide 

concentrations near Richland; Hanford dispersion model; research needs in the oil shale industry; atmospheric transport 

studies; Hanford turbidity

• Coal: reaction kinetics of combustion products; solvent refined coal effluent/product characterization

• Radiation Physics: initial interaction processes; track structure; energy transport; radiation dosimetry and radiation 

biophysics; microdosimetry and radiation biophysics; microdosimetry o f internal sources; dosimetry of internal emitters; 

real-time measurement o f plutonium in air at bebw-M PC levels; analytical techniques for measurement o f technetium-99 in 

environmental samples; radiation instrumentation; magnetic field dosimetry development

• Geothermal: heavy-metal and noxious-gas emission from geothermal resource development

• Oil Shale: oil shale and tar sand research

• Multitechnology: environmental pollutant characterization by direct-inlet mass spectrometry; trace analysis by laser 

excitation; direct coupled plasma emission spectroscopy; applications o f holography

1980

(PNL 1981c,

1981d)

• Atmospheric Sciences: behavior o f air pollution; types o f pollutants emitted; transport and diffusion; physical and chemical 

transformations during transport; removal by wet and dry deposition processes; pollutant impacts on climate, bodies of water 

and organisms; deposition and resuspension studies o f particulates; removal by deposition studies; o il shale studies

1979

(PNL 1980c, 

1980d)

1977

(PNL 1978c, 

1978d)

2 - 7 .4 6
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

1981

(PNL 1982c, 

1982d)

1982

(PNL 1983c, 

1983d)

1983

(PNL 1984c, 

1984d)

1984

(PNL 1985c, 

1985d)

Coal: reaction kinetics o f combustion products; modeling cellular effects of coal pollutants

Fission/Radiation Physics: initial interaction process; track structure; energy transport; radiation dosimetry and biophysics; 

microdosimetry of internal sources; dosimetry of internal emitters; radiological chemistry; magnetic field dosimeter 

development; transuranic chemical species in groundwater

Geothermal: heavy-metal and noxious-gas emission from geothermal resource development 

Oil Shale: oil shale and tar sand research studies

Multitechriology: environmental pollutant characterization by direct inlet mass spectrometry; trace analysis by laser 

excitation; applications o f holography

Atmospheric Sciences: atmospheric diffusion in complex terrain; atmospheric boundary layer studies; pollutant 

transformation in the atmosphere; atmospheric carbon dioxide abundance; meteorological effects o f thermal energy releases; 

theoretical studies and applications; air pollution d ry deposition; particle resuspension and translocation; oil shale fugitive air 

emissions

Coal: reaction kinetics o f combustion products; modeling cellular effects of coal pollutants

Radiation Physics: initial interaction process; energy transport; radiation dosimetry and biophysics; microdosimetry of 

internal sources; dosimetry of internal emitters; radiological chemistry; magnetic field dosimeter development

Oil Shale: oil shale and tar sand research studies

Multitechnology: environmental pollutant characterization by direct inlet mass spectrometry; trace analysis by laser 

excitation

Atmospheric Sciences: pollutant characterization; boundary layer meteorology in complex terrain; dispersion, deposition, 

and resuspension of atmospheric pollutants; particle resuspension and translocation; theoretical studies and applications; oil 

shale fugitive air emissions

Analytical Studies: coal liquefaction product characterization; o il shale and tar sand research m aterials preparation and 

documentation

Measurement and Dosimetry: characterization of synfuels and combustion products; trace analysis by laser excitation; 

procedures development

Radiation Physics: initial interaction process; track structure; energy transport

Dosimetry and Biophysics: modeling and cellular studies; dosimetry; microdosimetry of internal emitters

Atmospheric Sciences: transformation of energy related contaminants; atmospheric diffusion in complex terrain; atmospheric 

boundary layer studies; dry deposition; particle resuspension and translocation; theoretical studies arid applications

Analytical Studies: chemical basis for the biological response to conversion materials; oil shale and tar sands research

Measurement and Dosimetry: characterization o f synfuels and combustion products; lasers in analytical chemistry

Radiation Physics: initial interaction processes; track structure; radiation dosimetry; modeling and cellular studies; radiation 

biophysics; m odeling cellular response to genetic damage; internal microdosimetry

Atmospheric Sciences: atmospheric studies in complex terrain; atmosphere boundary layer studies; coupling/decoupling of 

synoptic and valley circulation; air pollution by dry deposition; oil shale fugitive air emissions and plume depletion; particle 

resuspension and translocation; theoretical studies and applications; processing of emissions by clouds and precipitation

Analytical Studies: chemical basis for the biological response to complex organic mixtures

Measurement and Dosimetry: supercritical fluid analytical methods; lasers in analytical chemistry

Radiation Physics: initial interaction processes; track structure; radiation dosimetry; modeling and cellular studies; radiation 

biophysics; m odeling cellular response to genetic damage; internal microdosimetry

2 -7 .4 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

1985

(PNL 1986c)

1986

(PNL 1987c, 

1987d)

1987

(PNL 1988c, 

1988d)

1988

(PNL 1989c, 

1989d)

1989

(PNL 1990c, 

1990d)

1990

(PNL 1991c, 

199ld>

Atmospheric Sciences: atmospheric diffusion in complex terrain; coupling/decoupling of synoptic and valley circulation; 

atmospheric boundary layer studies; dry deposition and resuspension; processing of emissions by clouds and precipitation

Atmospheric Sciences: atmospheric diffusion in complex terrain; coupling/decoupling of synoptic and valley circulation; 

atmospheric boundary layer studies; scavenging studies; Soviet accident fallout measurements

Analytical Studies: chemical basis for biological response to energy-related organics 

Measurement and Dosimetry: supercritical flu id analysis methods; lasers in environmental research

Radiation Biology: initial interaction processes; track structure; radiation dosimetry; modeling and cellular studies; radiation 

biophysics; modeling cellular response to genetic damage

Atmospheric Sciences: atmospheric studies in complex terrain; large-scale atmospheric transport and processing of 

emissions; measurement and analysis techniques; air-surface interaction

Analytical Studies: D N A adducts as indicators of health risks; Chernobyl database management

Measurement and Dosimetry: supercritical fluid analytical methods; lasers in analytical chemistry

Physical Processes in Radiation Biology: radiation physics - initial interaction processes, track structure; radiation dosimetry 

- dosimetry, modeling and cellular studies, radiation biophysics, modeling cellular response to genetic damage

Atmospheric Sciences: atmospheric studies in complex terrain; large-scale atmospheric transport and processing of 

emissions; measurement and analysis techniques

Analytical Studies: Chernobyl database management

Measurement and Dosimetry: supercritical fluid analytical methods; lasers in environmental studies; laser measurements of 

lead-210; DNA adducts as indicators o f health risks; biological effectiveness o f radon particles

Physical Processes in Radiation Biology: radiation physics; radiation dosimetry; testing cell response models; radiation 

biophysics; m odeling cellular response to genetic damage

Atmospheric Studies in Complex Terrain: direct numerical simulation of turbulent boundary layer flows; modeling o f slope 

flows; modeling and observations o f a v a lle /s heat budget; planning for Oak Ridge experiment; observations o f thermally 

developed wind systems in mountainous terrain; atmospheric mass and heat budgets for a canyon land basin; use of a 

nonhydrostatic mesoscale model to simulate drainage flows in the presence o f ambient winds

Large-Scale Atmospheric Transport and Processing of Emissions: precipitation chemistry observations; concentration and 

distribution o f atmospheric peroxides over the Pacific; overview o f the frontal boundary study; effect o f uncertainty in RSM 

meteorological parameters on predicted pollutant w et deposition; MAP3S precipitation chemistry network; proposed test of 

tw o hypotheses related to concentration fluctuations :

Climate Change: another Gremlin in the greenhouse (anthropogenic sulfur); preliminary analysis o f deep convection in an 

ocean generaf circulation model; experiments on the influence o f whitecaps on air/sea gas transport rates; second-generation 

model o f greenhouse gas emissions; regional effects o f climate change and carbon oxygen-2 fertilization on the natural and 

human environment

Dosimetry Research: Chernobyl database management; determination of radon exposure; D N A adducts as indicators of 

health risks; biological effectiveness of radon alpha particles; biological behavior and dosimetry

Measurement Science: capillary electrophoresis-mass spectrometry; lasers in environmental research

Radiological and Chemical Physics: radiation physics; radiation dosimetry; radiation biophysics; m odeling cellular response 

to genetic damage

Atmospheric Research: atmospheric diffusion in complex terrain; heat budgets of valley and basin atmospheres; atmospheric 

boundary layer studies; atmospheric chemistry program/PRECP; continuing development of the G-1 aircraft

Climate Research: atmospheric radiation measurement (ARM) program; carbon dioxide ocean research; progress report on 

the second generation model; resources analysis research project - M IN K study

2 -7 .4 8
Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

Year Physical Science Research Projects (As Indicated by Annual Reports and with Asterisk by Quarterly Reports)

• Dosimetry Research: Chernobyl database management; determination o f radon exposure; D N A adducts as indicators of 

health risks; biological effectiveness o f radon alpha particles

• ' Measurement Science: capillary electrophoresis-mass spectrometry; lasers in environmental research

• Radiological and Chemical Physics: radiation physics-various; radiation dosimetry-various; radiation biophysics-various; 

modeling cellular response to genetic damage-various

2 - 7 .4 9
’" 1 <'7'*<i'|-v ■,; '*’ ^ *'rV

''i1l'‘’ ,l"',y^."^':.V *,.>f-'^fi

r.^3S r'-aS

‘^"'VfV'V
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e S E C in tirv

Sectio n 8 - Sit e Sec u r ity

f d t r r im m I’ir-rdciil I Miiklin I). RookcxvII In I ivutvn.ml fii'iivrol

l.tMii* R. (ii'oxes, (iimmandui »i" Ih r M.inh.iM.in I’lojccl. |u k» -*#

I *>4 ►: */ .m? w tilin g lo u>» .?•> the one w ho h.e- < /w rtjr o f n il the

tle\e iop nie nt and m .inui.u taring fs o i f/w*. k m k frv ie rrin g In

the M tinhnll.in h o je t 1:. I know 1ha1 there .ire m*i er.ri £jrcw/is o f

«c ienli-,1«. w orking untier \o u r direr lio n on x.ninie- piuees n ith e

program . File T.n I lh .it the tm lt nine 01 then /.i/in is i- o i ■>«< /) ij/c.W 

'■rgnifU.uu (* fn the n e lin n require- Ih.tl f/i/- p rn je t I he ci en rnnre

d r.i-tn ,rll\ guarded than o th e r hig h l\ ■»<-< te l u .ir tlc\elo(H nenl \» 

w iu know. I h .n e fh e te ru rr given direr tinn* lh .it f t ei i p re i.u itm n

he l.rkvn lo /n -if/c /m'i / the s e tu rih n i\o u r p in je t / . ' - 

l l * ( ) \ | <1-7, hk. I io l. 14. .i|>p. A-1

The purpose of security at the Hanford Site during 

the Manhattan Project was to prevent others from 

learning how to create an atomic bomb by 

zzprovid[ing] the secrecy and protection necessary 

to prevent all possible espionage, sabotage, 

damage, interference or other harmful effects 

which might endanger the successful completion of 

the Program" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, p.1.2). 

Throughout the Cold War, the purpose of the 

Safeguards and Security Program (as it was then 

called then) was to ensure "that appropriate 

protection is provided for government property and 

equipment to prevent the loss of classified 

information, and to prevent the loss, theft, 

diversion, or sabotage of SNM [special nuclear 

materials]" (DOE 1990 p.8-5).

As the first contractor at the Hanford Site, E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company (Du Pont) conceived and developed 

the security measures for the Manhattan Project. These measures were modified over the years in reaction to world 

events, increased knowledge of security, and subcontracting changes in the 1960s. The Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 

1954, for instance, were pivotal in determining how information and materials were to be handled in relation to national 

security. In the background of all security measures was the need for secrecy during the Manhattan Project and the need 

to guard classified information during the Cold War.

The main security organization at the Hanford Site has been the Hanford Site Patrol from 1943 to the present with 

support from other organizations. Since the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the Hanford Site Patrol has been the 

watchdog monitoring access to the Hanford Site. The major organizations teaming with the Hanford Site Patrol were the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1943-1947) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1943-present).

Security regulations established during the Manhattan Project contributed to the Hanford Site culture. Employees were 

surrounded daily in one way or another by aspects of security. They passed security slogan billboards on their daily ride 

to work. They presented their security identification badges to Hanford Site Patrol officers wherever they went. They 

had their personal belongings searched. They knew nothing about their work except what was necessary for their 

immediate assignment. They had to follow strict regulations regarding classified information and its accessibility. They 

had to be careful about what they discussed at work and at home. This was the environment employees accepted as part 

of life while living in a government town and 

working at the Hanford Site, and it continued to be 

part of the Hanford culture throughout the Cold 

War. With the change in mission, regulations have 

decreased, resulting in security becoming a less 

restrictive aspect of working at the Hanford Site.

Although less restrictive from an employee 

viewpoint, many of the security measures of the 

Cold War are still in practice today. Because 

numerous sources dealing with security issues at the 

Hanford Site are still classified, information about

Conti n is

Historical Elasticity........................................................2-8.2

Role o f Secrecy..............................................................2-8.4

Site Security Organizations..........................................2-8.7

Security Measures....................................................... 2-8 .14

Aieas for Further Research............................ 2-8.34

Divider Pdge Photo: Guard Tower, ca / 9 4 1 (Du Pont

1945;v

2 -8 .1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

site security during the Cold War could not be fully developed in this section. For instance, it was very difficult to obtain 

any information concerning the practices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the Hanford Site.

His t o r ic a l El a s t ic it y

The security measures undertaken were numerous: background investigations of new employees, security education and 

information programs, classified areas and documents, security safeguards, and emergency preparedness. Each of these 

measures has required elasticity, stretching to support increased security needs and contracting when those needs no 

longer existed. Increased security needs that stretched the system were mainly caused by unexpected events or changes 

in the Hanford Site mission, funding, and international affairs.

One such unexpected event that stretched the security system during the Manhattan Project occurred when Japanese 

balloons, carrying incendiary and fragmentation bombs, appeared over the Hanford Site in 1945. Hanford security was 

put on alert and reinforcements from the Pasco Naval base were dispatched as backup to help intercept the balloons. 

Although security was not breached, the event did impact plant operations. One balloon, entangled with a transmission 

line of the Grand Coulee and Bonneville generating stations, caused a power surge on the lines connected to the 

reactors. Power to the reactors was knocked out only briefly because the automatic backup system temporarily restored 

power (Jones 1985, Sanger 1995).

Elasticity again came into play at the end of World War II. Secrecy was no longer as important as protecting classified 

information and nuclear materials. Increased attention was given to "strengthen [mg] security control from a physical and 

internal standpoint. This was accomplished gradually, and with a minimum of publicity by redistribution and 

augmentation of the exterior guard forces, higher clearance standards for old and new employees, a strict publicity 

control, and other similar measures based upon the principle of safeguarding that which the Project is known to possess" 

(UPOA 1977b, bk. 4, vol. 6, p. 11.1).

The elasticity of the security system was especially flexed when the Korean War started in 1950. Air patrolling increased 

to 24 hours per day (Rokkan 1997), and military troops were brought to the Hanford Site for protection against the threat 

of attack on the facilities. The U.S. Arm y established Camp Hanford and a network o f anti-aircraft artillery and Nike 

missile sites. A description of these installations can be found in Section 9, M ilitary Operations.

With the end of the Korean War, some security measures were relaxed (Ogletree 1977, Rokkan 1997). Routine air 

patrolling ended in 1964. The Hanford Site's main roads were opened for fam ily and guest tours in 1967. The double 

badge system was replaced w ith a single badge indicating all pertinent access and clearance authorizations. Personnel 

and vehicle searches became less common. The Columbia River was opened to the public from the 300 Area to 

Ringold. However, the channel and the shoreline between the 300 Area and the island east of the area remained off 

limits. M-8 light-armored cars, vehicle rovers, and manned fence towers were no longer used.

The threat of international terrorism in the aftermath of the 1972 Olym pic Games in Munich again triggered increased 

security. During this time, the Hanford Site Patrol increased its vigilance over all the major production areas. Officers 

patrolled the 300 and 400 Areas 24 hours a day and increased surveillance at the 100 Area river pump houses and the 

200 Area tank farms. Detex clocks were installed at the Fast Flux Test Facility. Patrol officers used them to clock in at 

each of the locations in the Fast Flux Test Facility where they patrolled. "Razor wire fencing was installed, and several 

more patrol officers were assigned to guard the nuclear material (Ogletree 1977). The Hanford Site Patrol organized a 

Tactical Response Team in 1977 to better combat terrorism. Members of the Tactical Response Team were specially 

trained patrol officers with additional skills in special weapons, counter-terrorist tactics, crowd control, aerial 

surveillance, and forced entry (Thielman 1995).

2 - 8 .2
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

\, v

I

/

/

is§£ e s i

During the late 1970s and into the 1980s, security measures 

were increased and upgraded at the PUREX Plant (although 

measures were appropriately reduced while it was not operating 

between 1972-1983), the Plutonium Finishing Plant, and the 

100 N Reactor, which were the main operating plants at the 

time. Extra security fences with detection and alarm systems 

were constructed around the operation areas, and all personal 

possessions were searched at security checkpoints when anyone 

entered and left these areas. At the N Reactor, for example, 

several structures were added, such as rooftop guardhouses, 

river guard towers (see the Historic Property Inventory Form for 

the 181-NA Pump House Guard Tower in Appendix B on the 

Internet), and pill boxes in the hallways of the reactor building 

that armed security guards used for cover to watch for 

suspicious activity (DOE 1997a) (see Figure 2-8.1).

W hile certain measures were taken to increase security against 

terrorism, other security measures were relaxed in the 1970s 

and 1980s (Cadd 1998, DOE 1994c, Thielman 1995, Rokkan 

1997). The entire stretch of the Columbia River through the 

Hanford Site was officially opened to the public in 1979 after 

being restricted since 1943. Air restriction over Hanford was 

modified to allow for more open air space. Magnetic cards 

were used to access buildings, which reduced the need for 

security personnel. The number of protected areas requiring 

high security was reduced when the 209-E Critical Mass 

Laboratory was closed and N Reactor and PUREX were placed

on cold stand-by status in 1988 and 1990, respectively. The Hanford Site implemented the island concept in which only 

three areas were designated^ highly protected areas: the Plutonium Finishing Plant, the Fast Flux Text Facility, and the 

K Basins.

Another area calling for elasticity concerned trespassers who, either innocently or maliciously, entered the Hanford Site. 

When innocent motorists, sightseers, photographers, and boaters unknowingly wandered onto the Hanford Site, the 

Hanford Patrol simply turned them around. Malicious trespassing was rare. These infractions included escaped 

criminals crashing through a barricade, poachers entering the Hanford Site from the Columbia River or on Rattlesnake 

Mountain to hunt, and pot hunters trespassing on the shoreline and islands to search for archaeological artifacts. In 

malicious trespassing cases, the Benton County Sheriff's Office or the Hanford Site Patrol issued citations or made arrests.

In the mid-1980s, on the day set aside to commemorate the bombing of Japan, demonstrators protested Hanford's 

continuing role in the creation of nuclear defense weapons. Some protestors were arrested for trespassing and inhibiting 

traffic (Curtis 1999). This demonstration, followed by the demise of the Cold War, signaled the change in the Hanford 

Site mission. With the mission; changing from nuclear material production to environmental cleanup, it became apparent 

that the Safeguards and Security Program would need to be reevaluated. In May 1990, a team of contractor staff 

evaluated security and "discuss[ed] the proposed transition from a defense security posture to an industrial posture, with 

additional protection for remaining nuclear materials and classified information" and initiated the Security Transition 

Program at the Hanford Site (Thielman 1995, p;9).

This team gave way to a multi-contractor team led by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that identified and 

implemented areas of change, such as consolidating materials in conjunction with consolidated security areas, reducing 

clearances, simplifying access to the Hanford Site, and using automation and technological security devices where

Figure 2-8.1. Pill Box Used for Security Surveillance

in the Hallway o f the 100-N Reactor; 1986

2 - 8 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

possible (DOE 1994c, Thielman 1995). DOE saved time and money by drastically reducing the number of high level 

security clearances called Q and L (those already issued and to be issued) beginning July 1990. Other changes resulting 

from this effort were the closing of the 300 Area protected areas, consolidating materials requiring security measures, 

closing of most badge houses, and turning law enforcement over to the Benton County Sheriff's office (DOE 1994c, 

Thielman 1995) - all reflecting the elasticity that has been the mainstay of security at the Hanford Site.

The story of security at the Hanford Site involves 

the concept of secrecy, especially during the 

Manhattan Project when the United States was 

trying to develop nuclear weapons to end World 

War II. The shroud of secrecy played a major role 

in the daily lives of Hanford Site employees. 

Hanford Site employees were told little to nothing 

about the project on which they were working. 

They were told only that their work at the Hanford 

Site was going to help the United States win the 

war. Thus, secrecy and efficiency in their work 

was essential. Even the Selective Service, who 

deferred those working at the Hanford Site from 

m ilitary service, knew only that the Manhattan 

Project was related to a wartime effort (Van 

Arsdol 1992).

To keep employee spirits high while not knowing the Hanford 

Site's purpose, Colonel Franklin T. Matthias, one of Lieutenant 

General Groves' top assistants, attempted to boost morale in a 

speech made in 1944 to Hanford Site workers. One worker 

recalls:

"Thousands came. He wanted to get it across to everybody

how important it was. Some people didn't seem as

dedicated as they could have been. He made a pretty good

speech. It gave us all a shot in the arm. When we left there

we were ready to build a plant. He did say that it was

impossible to tell us.what we were doing because the enemy

would like to know. We were not allowed, he said, to

discuss it with each other, just like our foreman had told us.

But he said I can tell you this much, that it's important and

the enemy, Germany, is attempting to do the same thing we

are, to build a plant like this. And whoever gets there first

w ill win the war. And that was enough said. We didn't ask

any further questions." - Sanger 1995, p. 91

" I f the i M anhattan j P i»/<•< 1 w .j* 1o he H u te ^ tu l it it.i

o-.jm !•> .iii»ltd il m axim um prutcc tion and to t/iuA il in the

utm ost r a \. Ih e re ucrc -tro n ti in d ii atinnx that the ($erman

iiO \em inent had aheadx em barked upon a '•im ilar pionram . II

u .i- ap pa ien t that the -m t issin i < om pletion o f the A nient an

Project filia l to the (ic im a n m itih t det ide the xourse n f the H.ir

and he «> dom inant fat. to r in the p o s t-u a t peat 0...I1 iv.i« to he

e \p e i le d Iha1 nth v the eneinie■« o f the I m te tl W .i/v learnetl o i

the Project thex w o u ld In vt ei i m ean- xxithin th e ir po w e i to

••aholaiio il. I he ah'-nlule net esdlx. then, o t keeping a ll

i /.iwYiiv/ in fo rm atio n c one ernine the Piojec I iro m the enwin

and o f taking even precaution to sh uri* if fio m attem pt* al

-.i/iffU tir u.is ohxiou*. * - 1 POA 1‘irrl), Ilk. I. \» l. 14. p.1.1

H(‘loru fhi* mission ul" tin* M,mh«itl.in I’rojrt I w is

public h rvlt’iisvil. " w m k e n la ig e lx d e p e n d e d

u p o n th e vio l d o t th e A im x th a t «■<•* rvt i it a*

im p o r ta n t a n d th e e x p la n a tio n h a d In h e < le a rlx

m a d e to th e m th a t, a llh o u n h thex h a d n o

kn o x x te d q e o t th e .11 tu a l p in p n ^ e o f th e

i^ ta n h a tla n ; P io je i t ih e x n e x v tth e lc ^ h a d

ir n p n r la n l in fo rm a tio n . Ih io u iih th e n laioxx le d u e

o f tx p c * o f e tfu ip m e n i ie>ed. m a te ria lx h a n d le d ,

o fh u ild iie ; - . a n d n u m b e r o f p e o p le o n th e

io h iir o u n d 'i lo t p io t e c tim i in fo r m a tio n u r n 1 

la m e lx p a f iio t h m lo x a ltx to th e u iih lin ii m e n .

a n d t in * te a -o n in ti th a t th e /<*-• p u h lh itx “ it e n th e

P r a ia t, th e m o re d ifin o il it w o u ld h e f o i th e

e n e m x to a tc fu iie in fo r m a tio n a h o n t it a n d a l* n

th e g r e a te r w o u ld h e th e e le m e n t o i \ u r p r h e . " -

11|’<) A I * r - h. hk. I . vol. 14. p. h.1 5

Although prohibited from doing so, employees and Richland

Village residents speculated about what was being produced at the Hanford Site since so little information was available 

to them. Some humorous theories included Pepsi-Cola, Kleenex, clothespins, fourth-term Roosevelt campaign buttons, 

and sandpaper - relating to the local dust storms and the abundance of sand. Other more serious theories included 

poison or nerve gas and solid rocket fuel to compete with the Germans (Sanger 1995, Loeb 1982). "All rumors regarding

2 - 8 .4
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

the purpose of the [Manhattan] Project, health hazards, or other rumors which might create unrest among the personnel 

were promptly traced to their source and disciplinary action was taken in the form of termination or reprimand" (UROA 

1977b, bk. 4, vol. 1, p. 6.2).

It has been reported that even the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (as Matthias has said) "rigged up a cover story right at 

the beginning... We ended up calling Hanford a place to make RDX [a new explosive]. Nobody questioned it. Du Pont 

was known as an explosives maker" (Sanger 1995, p. 79). The objective was to try to keep people from speculating 

about the Hanford Site.

Dec la r a tio n of Secrecy

To keep people from talking, each employee received a security orientation in which they signed a Declaration of 

Secrecy form. They signed this form again when terminating their employment. In signing the form, the employee took a 

pledge of faith and allegiance to the United States, agreed not to disclose any classified information or materials to 

unauthorized individuals or to misuse the material, and understood that violation of the National Espionage Act or the 

Federal Sabotage Act was punishable by up to 10 years in prison or up to $10,000 in fines (UROA 1977b). Information 

not to be disclosed to others included "references to the mission of the [Manhattan] Project, the size, scope, or nature of 

its operations, general problems worked on, materials and equipment used in restricted areas, connection and 

relationship to each other and to the [Manhattan Engineering] District of various projects and laboratories throughout the 

country, and professions or former connections of principal technical personnel" (UROA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, p. 6.12). 

Sincel 988, Hanford Site employees obtaining security clearances agree to and sign the Classified Information 

Nondisclosure Agreement, Standard Form 312, which serves the same general purpose as the original form.

COMPARTMENTALIZATTON

The main way to stop information leaks at the Hanford 

Site was to lim it the knowledge of each employee. This 

was called "compartmentalization of knowledge."

A Guide to Manhattan Project: The O fficial History and .

Documents (UROA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, app. B-7, p. 4) 

states that "to minimize risk or compromise, employees 

of the [Manhattan] Project shall be organized into small 

working groups or teams so far as possible, each 

working on its own phase of the job and not being 

permitted to inspect or discuss the work being done by 

others." Therefore, the amount of information one 

person or group of persons obtained was limited.

Employees were directed to focus only on their specific 

task and refrain from asking questions and unnecessarily discussing their jobs with fellow employees and even spouses 

or friends. O nly a select group of employees knew the goal of the Manhattan Project (Loeb 1982, p. 26).

Compartmentalization was practiced in other areas of the Manhattan Project as well. The Corps required "equipment 

orders to commercial firms specify that an item not be manufactured and assembled at the same location. And when the 

production plants reached the point of start-up operations, plant managers received instructions to split up orders for raw 

materials among a number of suppliers so that the purpose for which they were being used could not be readily 

ascertained" (jones 1985, p.269). In addition, blueprints were "broken down and distributed in such aw ay as to reveal 

as little as possible to any one individual about the overall character of the project" (jones 1985, p.269). General 

construction specifications had to be relayed to the workers through hand-drawn sketches since only specific people had 

clearance to view official drawings (Sanger 1995).

‘ ( n m p artnienta li/.dio n oi k n o u lcd u v lo m e th e \o i\

lu 'tii I o f set u n i\ V|i m il- u.i*. *im ple and not i.ip a h lv oi

m is in lc ifiiv tx ilio n -iv k /i m an *ho uid kim w n n vlh in ii ha

nvedetl to know to do hi* jn h and nothing ol*e Adherent v

lo th i«. ru le no l onls p m \ id c il an adequate m ea*ui v o f

*et w it\. b ill il ill callx im p im e d o \e t-a ll e ilit ieru \ h\

m aking ou i people >lii /, fit ih v ir knitting. And il ni.ii/i1 H

i/iiiie t jf.n h» al/ 1 ont erned that llir pm jet. I cxMcrJ 1 tt

prndut e ,i *pct ilii end p m d tn I - n o l lo enable individual*

In *a li*n Ih n r tu n o * il\ and to itiLicase their *<.ie n litit

k n n n lcd u c ' - (■row1' 1‘fiii, p. 140

2 - 8 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The concept of compartmentalization, later commonly called "the need to know," continued through the end of the 

Manhattan Project and into the Cold War era. However, during the Cold War, compartmentalization was not focused on 

the creation of the bomb (by then a known fact), but on general national security and business sensitive information and 

activities.

Cr it ic s of Secrecy

Some found the strict security regulations to be oppressive and excessive during the Manhattan Project Because 

background investigations had to be so comprehensive they "result[edj in delays in employment and hinder[ed] the 

already overworked recruitment drive" (Hageman 1945, p.73). "These security requirements, probably more than any 

other single subject, were a determining factor affecting practically every phase of the work performed under contracts 

supervised by the Manhattan District of the Corps o f Engineers, and in many instances delayed, or increased the difficulty 

of, the w ork" (Du Pont 1945c, p.36).

Compartmentalization was a particular nuisance to scientists. Many felt that the restriction prohibiting them from 

exchanging data and discussing the Manhattan Project kept the technology from developing faster, thus causing 

"extended delays in achievement of scientific and technical objectives of the program". This was the view of 

Leo Szilard, a Manhattan Project scientist. He stated in 1946, "compartmentalization of information was the cause for 

failure to realize that light uranium [uranium-235] might be produced in quantities sufficient to make atomic bombs. We 

could have had it eighteen months earlier. We did not put two and two together because the two two's [sic] were in a 

different compartment" (Jones 1985, p.270). Others have commented that compartmentalization:

• "puts you in the position o f trying to do an extremely difficult jo b with three hands tied behind your back" -

1943, Edward Condon, a physicist (Jones 1985, p. 271)

• "resulted in a general loss o f efficiency required more supervision to obtain proper coordination, and, despite all

attempts to counteract it, lowered morale and caused delays" - Du Pont 1945c, p.38

• "made it difficult to adequately impress workers with the importance and urgency o f the p ro je c t - Hageman 

1945, p. 73

• resulted in "bearing the seeds o f unfortunate mistakes, duplication o f research and ridiculous exaggerations.

Inevitably, in some cases, scientists m ight waste time and effort solving a problem that had already been solved

in another laboratory. They did not know it, however, because they had not been permitted to exchange

information" - Groueff 1967, p.43

Although, to take another look at it, Paul Loeb points out in his book Nuclear Culture: Living and Working in the World's

Largest Atom ic Complex:

"But if the security rules were frustrating, they removed from most Hanford workers the burden o f judging the

wisdom o f what they were creating. Simply assuming that their efforts were necessary to win the war, they could

immerse themselves in details. No one considered until much later (after the Hanford mission was revealed and

the war was won) what other choices might have been possible. They knew only that their labors had brought

to a close the war." - Loeb 1982, p.26

Breaches in Secrecy

Although no security breaches are known to have occurred at the Hanford Site, the need for security intensified when it 

was thought security had been breached at the Radiation Laboratory of the University o f California, Berkeley (Jones 

1985, p. 263). Secret information was allegedly leaked from the Radiation Laboratory by Communist sympathizers 

working there in 1942. This activity seemed to have been funded by a "high official in the Soviet embassy in 

Washington [D .C ]" (Jones 1985, p. 264). In 1943, counter-intelligence agents discovered this breach in security. 

Employees found to be connected to the leaks were discharged or transferred to non-sensitive assignments. The counterintelligence agents discovered and ended continued Soviet Union espionage activities at the Radiation Laboratory, 

Metallurgical Laboratory, and the Los Alamos Laboratory but not before crucial secret information about the reactor 

process, chemicals, and technical knowledge of the bomb reportedly had been leaked to Soviet agents (Jones 1985).

2 - 8 .6
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

No specific espionage cases were identified at the 

Hanford Site. However, the Soviet Union's first 

plutonium production reactor built in 1948, called F-1, 

appears to be almost an exact copy of the Hanford Site's 

305 Building Test Reactor built in 1943. Measurements 

of both were very similar in relation to power, uranium 

rod spacing, rod diameter, and amount of uranium in the 

reactors. Both reactors were constructed to evaluate the 

purity of graphite and uranium. The fact that the design 

details of the Hanford Site reactor were not released 

until after 1955, at least 7 years after the Soviet Union 

completed its reactor, adds to the notion of espionage 

although this remains unsubstantiated (Libby 1979,

Rhodes 1995).

Sit e Se c u r it y Or g a n iz a t io n s

Overall management of security at the Hanford Site has always rested with the federal agency assigned responsibility for 

operating the site. The federal agencies managing the Hanford Site have been the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(1942-1946), the Atomic Energy Commission (1947-1974), the Energy Research and Development Administration 

(1975-1976), and the U.S. Department of Energy (1977-present). Key players in the development and operation of 

security at the Hanford Site have been the subcontractors.

De v e lo p m e n t of th e Se c u r it y Pr o g r a m

In 1942, the Corps selected Du Pont as the prime contractor to create and operate the Hanford Site. In this role, Du Pont 

assumed the responsibility for protection and security of the Hanford Site. The first step Du Pont took in preparation for 

this responsibility was to gather a team from its Engineering, Explosives, and Patrol departments in Wilmington,

Delaware where they had experience working at other war material production sites (Du Pont 1944-1946). This team 

developed a Plant Protection Program to satisfy Du Font's security responsibilities and make "provisions for the 

establishment and operation of (a) an adequate plant patrol force, (b) effective personnel investigation measures, and 

(c) positive security regulations and practices for the safeguarding of military information" (Du Pont 1944-1946, sec.1/ 

Aug. 10, 1945, p.2). Colonel Matthias approved the Plant Protection Program in March 1943.

The overall security goals of the Plant Protection Program during the Manhattan Project were to "keep the Germans from 

learning anything about our efforts or our technical and scientific advancements, ensure a complete surprise when the 

bomb was first used in combat, [and] ...keep the Russians from learning of our discoveries and the details of our designs 

and processes" (Groves 1983, p.141).

In general terms, Du Font's responsibilities were to "establish, maintain, and operate a protection program for the 

purpose of protecting the personnel and all property at [the Hanford Site] connected with the design, construction, and 

operation work by the [Du Pont] Company" (Du Pont 1944-1946, sec. 1/Aug. 10, 1945, Exhibit E, p.1). Details outlined 

in the Plant Protection Program included (Du Pont 1944-1946, sec. 1/Aug. 10,1945, Exhibit E, p. 6):

• Establishing a qualified plant patrol force and ensuring patrol officers are provided appropriate training

• Operating effective administrative control and organization of the plant patrol

• Obtaining, constructing, and maintaining any equipment necessary for patrol officers to carry out duties 

(weapons, fences, towers, guard stations, administration buildings, communication links)

• Establishing patrol post orders and instructions

■•sot /(■/ d ip lo m .itit o n rf < n ii'u l.ir

o iiu m/s, tiin u 'il tit m vnitivr* o i the ( tm im unist P .ul\ o f f/ic 

I mfwf M .ilft Jiul lo p,irfi 'W M /M llif/e/- m i ./"M .im ic in

fte n v li.itin n V iii'm .ir i it.ii/f/iH 1 in ^ liiu iio n - ,itu l p n tjo t I*,

f l i r M / s s i. m - , m .ik in " th r fth u th,U the 1 n u 7 /< « i» s 

a m v tn n w n t it.i* n ith h u lilin u in ifto rl.in i in rorm .itinn .nut

thu - u iiih 'i i'-siir/Vx r/c /.n /n y A lh c ti \ it to n rut m iic d n i.im 

i M / i i r ( om m unisfs .nut teiiowfler* in . i - s is f Ih rm in

ithUuninu v il.il ■>«■< r r/i's .1/1011/11.11 tim e .?i ti\ i/ ir s . " - fo n t''

2- 8.7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

• Preventing any unauthorized removal of Manhattan Project information or equipment from the Hanford Site, any 

unauthorized access/entry of persons or vehicles to the site and specific site areas or buildings, and prohibited 

items from being brought on site

• Creating and operating a program to conduct background investigations on all employees, including fingerprints, 

photographs, medical exams, contacting personal references, obtaining Personnel Security Questionnaires, Data 

Cards, Espionage Act and Declaration of Citizenship papers on employees

• Preventing the inappropriate disclosure of Manhattan Project information by issuing safeguarding instructions 

and advice regarding classified areas arid property (documents, equipment) and by providing appropriate 

facilities and storage for use in safeguarding information

• Creating blackout and airraid facilities

Du Pont had the "responsibility of protecting the physical project facilities against theft, sabotage, and espionage, and for 

assisting county, state and federal authorities in the enforcement of laws on the plant and in Richland Village" (Du Pont 

1944-1946, sec. 3/Oct. 5, 1945, p.1). To accomplish this, Du Pont created a security force, the Hanford Site Patrol, 

which began its duties at the Hanford Site in 1943 when construction began (DOE 1997b, Du Pont 1944-1946). As 

construction was completed and operations began in 1944, the Hanford Site Patrol came under the new Protection 

Department, which was developed as an expansion of the Explosives Department (Du Pont 1944-1946). Around this 

same time, a M ilitary Police Detachment was assigned to the site, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation also 

established a local branch office, which played a supportive role.

Although at the end of World War II the Atomic Energy Commission replaced the Corps and the General Electric 

Company became the prime site contractor, the Hanford Site Patrol remained as the main security organization. The 

U.S. Army's Camp Hanford enhanced site security from 1951-1960. Camp Hanford was an anti-aircraft artillery and 

Nike missile complex. See Section 9, M ilitary Operations, for a description of this installation.

In 1965, the operation of the Hanford Site was diversified among several contractors (see Section 1, Construction History, 

for more information). Individual contractors developed their own accountability guidelines, including security. In 

general, the various contractors followed the Atomic Energy Commission's master guidelines. However, in some cases, 

contractor's interpretations had to be ironed out (Rokkan 1997).

Currently, the Safeguards and Security Program (as it is now called) basically still follows the original objectives of 

physically protecting facilities, property, and equipment; protecting and controlling special nuclear materials; preventing 

the unauthorized release of classified information; and protecting employees and the public (DOE 1990).

Ha n fo r d Sit e Patro l

The Hanford Site Patrol was established in mid-1943 to "prevent the loss, damage or destruction of Hanford Engineer 

Works' [Hanford Site's] property through theft or sabotage, protect the lives of the employees and residents of the 

[Manhattan] Project, enforce the laws of the United States and the State of Washington" (Du Pont 1945a, p. 189). By july 

1944, the Hanford Site Patrol consisted o f approximately 1300 officers whose responsibilities included patrolling 

construction areas and verifying clearances for access to the Hanford Site (Du Pont 1945a).

The responsibility to protect the Hanford Site was decentralized because of the distance between the various operations. 

"Operational direction [was] broken down by areas; each area reporting to a central headquarters. [This system] 

provided for the establishment of self-contained patrol forces in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas, the Hanford Camp 

[Hanford construction camp], and Richland" (Du Pont 1945a, p. 188) and eventually the 400 Area.

The types of infractions handled by the Hanford Site Patrol included insecure storage of classified materials, 

unauthorized entry, presence of prohibited items, improper use of keys, and, later, improper handling of classified 

materials in electronic communications. As a result of such activities, approximately 12 to 24 citations were issued per 

year. This number decreased as the number of employees and amount of classified material decreased. The disciplinary 

actions for these offenses depended on the severity and details of the infraction (Curtis 1999).

2 - 8 .8
Se c t io n 8 - Su e Se c u r u y

Patrol Headquarters buildings for which Historic Property Inventory Forms have been prepared are 1720-K for the 

100 Areas, 2721-E for the 200 Areas, 3701-D and 3707-D for the 300 Area, and 4790 for the 400 Area: (see the Historic 

Property Inventory Forms for these buildings in Appendix B on the Internet). The Patrol Headquarters building 

maintained communication through the Patrol Operations Center, which coordinated and relayed secure information in 

case of an emergency or security breach. The 3701-D Building also contained an Emergency Control Center in its 

basement for several years that could be isolated from outside air and, thereby, protect the emergency team inside from 

any airborne materials while they dealt with an emergency. The Patrol Operations Center has been located in the 

200 East Area since 1982. It was previously located in the basement of the Federal Building in Richland. The Patrol 

Operations Center functioned as the main security operations communication headquarters for the Hanford Site. It was 

the main emergency center on the Hanford Site, as well as central dispatch, responsible for initiating emergency actions.

Patrol officers "were also sworn in as Auxiliary [Military Police] and, in emergency, would be subject to military control" 

(UPOA 1977b, bk. 4, vol. 6, p. 11.4). Hanford Site Patrol officers carried the highest security clearance on the Hanford 

Site (and still do today), the Q clearance, and were also held to the same requirement as other Hanford employees not to 

discuss their work or the Hanford Site with anyone (Beardsley 1998).

In 1952, the total number of Hanford Site Patrol officers had decreased to 595. It was again reduced to 149 officers by 

1973. Reasons for the decrease were reactor and guard post closures, reduction of services, and budget constraints 

(Ogletree 1977). During the next 15 years, however, from 1973-1988, staffing increased because of continued tensions 

during the Cold War. By 1988, the number of patrol officers had increased to about 450 but was again reduced to less 

than 400 by 1990 after the threat of the Cold War had subsided (Walton 1999).

As of 1990, a force of Hanford Site Patrol officers was on duty at all times, 7 days a week, 24 hours per day operating as 

the primary security agency on the Hanford Site. By this time, the role of the Hanford Site Patrol was to provide 

protection service for the DOE and Site contractors by protecting certain nuclear materials, classified information, 

facilities, property, and personnel and enforcing federal, state, and local laws "through criminal investigation, traffic 

enforcement, access control, property inspections, and response/investigation of security incidents, and communication 

of emergency situations on and off the Hanford Site to Hanford personnel" (DOE 1990, p. 8-1).

Resources of the Hanford Site Patrol in 1990 included sufficient security staff for routine duties, an airborne Special 

Response Team, a criminal investigation unit, a canine (K^-9) unit trained to detect explosives and drugs, a hostagenegotiation team, the Patrol Training Academy, standard and specialized alarm systems and weapons, and a vehicle fleet 

including sedans, four-wheel drives, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and boats (DOE 1990).

Benton County Sheriff Deputy Status

Although law enforcement was under the 

jurisdiction of Benton County, the Benton 

County Sheriff deputized the Hanford Site Patrol.

This status gave the patrol officers authority to 

administer state laws across the Hanford Site, an 

area too large for the county to cover adequately 

(Du Pont 1945a).

In their role as specially assigned Benton County 

deputies, the Hanford Site Patrol had to deal with 

drunk and disorderly persons, gambling, 

prostitution, fighting, homicides, and robberies 

(see Table 2-8.1). "During the construction 

period a clerk of the Kennewick, Washington,

Justice of the Peace Court was stationed at

2 - 8 .9

''H r t a ii'C o i th e < o m p a r .itiv i' m a a n ilu d o o f th e H .in l'm tl F .n u in t'c i

U n ih * . ;H a n U n d S ite ! and th e n tim b o i o i p c i- o n * o m /d o ic d d m iir .i

th e l o n t i m i lin n p e rio d . Ih o p r o b le m o f f . m e n to u e m e n t a n d

j u t i 'd u fiun u a - rum ii tifiM ler fh.ui vrn ntm fvred .1! flic 

( n i\ 01 ' i t 1 o f < b i i a$:» 01 ,11 ( U n io n L a b o ra to rie s A ilo i t o n re ro m c

h v iw r v n s ta te a n d h e d o ia l o t f ii m/- i t 11,1* d o t i d r d lh .it u i/it u tr o n l

t u r b d ii tio n !o \ o t th o I la n fo r d s jle i »t o u ld i r . i d to i o n tib io n «o it

i t .!«■ de< ided id leave the a d nu m -lral/rin and o n io n e m e n t o i slate 

/aiv- to f/ie s ta te a n d 01 it - - iib d i\ id n n *. «*» /h/i?; a*. «.»< h /an » d id

n o t tm d u is in le iie r e u /l/i th o /iik Ic i lio n o l th e P w ie t I \ t o i t o l tin

Prof o i t /re- i t ilh in Menton < o u n li and a- die 1 o u n l\ ita«. not

p ie p a ic d to .b iu m r the e n lito hm don tho Menton < urizi/v s h v iiff

d o fiu tu e d tho Prim e ( n n h .n tor'> !l)n Pont: fh itro l offn 01

I ID A l* r r l> . Ilk. 4. m l. I. pp. 7. I - 7.J

1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m .P r o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Table 2 -8 .1 . Summary o f Incidents the Hanford Site Patrol Dealt with in Their Role

as Specially Assigned Benton County Deputies between March 15, 1943 and

August 28, 1944

Hanford and a jail was 

established as a branch of the 

Benton County Jail. From 

May 1943 to August 1944 a 

total of $72,986.24 was 

collected by Benton County as 

bail forfeitures and fines on 

the Project" (UROA 1977b, 

bk. 4, vol. 1, p. 7.3).

Although some lawbreakers 

were terminated, in general it 

was more important to return 

the employees to their jobs 

and keep them working on the

project at hand (Sanger 1995). "Un-Americanism" was a catch-all category, which included possession of two-way 

radios and criticism or protest against President Roosevelt (Bubenzer in Sanger 1995, p. 94).

Incident No. incident No. Incident No.

Intoxication 3,156 G am bling 161 Sex Cases 69

Burglary 1,124 Trespassing 144 D raft Evasion. 50

Petty Larceny 593 D runken D riving 123 U n-A m ericanism 44

Assaults 522 M issing Persons 108 Natural Death 25

P ublic Nuisance 478 A uto Theft 105 M ob Dem onstration 19

G rand Larceny 450 Juvenile D elinquency 97 A ccidental Death 19

W anted Elsewhere 217 M ental Gases 89 V iolent Death 5

Vagrancy 197 Bootlegging 88 Suicide 4

Robbery 177

Patrol O iTimmn W vre Required to M aintain a Proper Xppearauce

Hanford Site patrol officers were trained not only on security enforcement matters but also on what was 

expected both on and off duly in proper and acceptable appearance, courtesy, etiquette, discipline, and 

speech. For example, below are some of the guidelines discussed in the Hanford Engineer Works Patrol 

Training Manual fGE f 958b, sect. XT, pp. 7-8):

• A lack of interest in what is being told one is a breach of courtesy. Do not allow your attention to 

wander while another person is speaking.

• Be strictly punctual at all engagements, whether business or social.

• Do nol loan against a building or assume a loafing attitude while engaged in conversation, or

iM lfe iiH ltiilS

• The Patrolman should refrain from making 'wise cracks' and sharp retorts regardless of the occasion.

• A pleasant facial expression is an asset. It is a smile (not a grin) that has been said to speak all

! § i l l f » i »

• When you are in uniform, whether you are technicallv on or off duty, to the general public you arc on 

duty. Be exemplary in your conduct and edifying in your conversation.

• Every Patrolman owes it to himself and to the profession as a whole to be scrupulously clean in person

• Cleanliness of person calls for frequent visits to the bathtub and showers; for a cleanshaven face; for 

the hair properly cut, clean, and w ell brushed; and for clean hands and fingernails. A sprinkling of 

dandruff on the collar and shoulders of a coat suggests slovenliness.

• Proper care of tho icoth is essential not only because of appearance flhis alone would compensate for

the trouble), but for the preservation of health. Every precaution should be taker .1

• It is an inexcusable breach of etiquette to sneeze or cough in the presence of others without first 

covering the mouth with the handkerchief.

2 - 8 .1 0
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

The Hanford Site Patrol also handled traffic infractions. "The Highways on the Project could not be classed as public 

highways so the Commissioners of Benton County enacted a set of traffic regulations to be enforced by the special 

deputies on the Project. Other State laws pertaining to public health, sanitation, hunting, and fishing are administered 

and enforced throughout the area" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 4 , vol. 1, pp. 7.1 -7.2). The Washington State Patrol held the 

primary traffic enforcement jurisdiction for State Highway 240 in the southwestern part of the Hanford Site, and the 

Hanford Patrol, as Benton County deputies, functioned as a secondary enforcement.

In the early 1990s, security programs were cut back due to budget constraints and the relaxation of certain aspects of 

security at the; Hanford Site. At this time, the Benton County Sheriff deputy status of the Hanford Site Patrol was 

terminated, but the federal status was maintained (Cameron 1998). In 1993, the Benton County Sheriffs Office took over 

the secondary traffic enforcement on Highway 240 and the primary traffic enforcement of roads on the Hanford Site.

Patrol Training Program

During the Manhattan Project, workers came with varied degrees 

of security enforcement knowledge. A detailed training program 

was organized in 1944 including "handling disorderly, violent, or 

injured persons," firearms and weapons, the Hanford Site Patrol 

systems and methods, and understanding the importance of the 

Hanford Site Patrol (Du Pont 1945a, p.195). In addition, workers 

were required to attend classes on such subjects as courtesy and 

discipline, Hanford Site geography, physical training, fire fighting, 

writing reports, and radio operation (Du Pont 1945a).

Throughout the Manhattan Project and Cold War era, patrol 

officers had hands-on training. They were trained in the use of 

38-caliber revolvers, 45-caliber submachine guns, 30- and 

50-caliber machine guns, 37-mm gas grenades and guns, smoke 

bombs, tear-gas guns, carbine, riot guns and other special weapons 

(Du Pont 1945c). A shooting range near the southern end of Gable 

Mountain was used for shooting practice (see Figure 2-8.2). Other 

firing ranges were located along Horn Rapids Road. Patrol officers 

were also trained in the operation of M-8 light armored tanks (see 

Figure 2-8.3) equipped with a turret 37-mm gun, a 30-caliber 

machine gun, and a 50-caliber machine gun (GE 1955b). All 

patrol personnel were eventually trained to work around and 

within radiation areas. They attended an initial 3-day course with 

an 8-hour refresher course every other year to obtain and keep 

their RAD (radiation absorbed dose) Worker Training current. 

Radiation training was necessary in case security situations on the 

Hanford Site required patrol officers to enter radioactive zones. 

This training is still required today, and Hanford Patrol training 

instructors have become certified as Radiation Worker Training 

instructors (Cameron 1998).

Figure 2-8.2. Hanford Patrol Officers at Shooting

Practice

1

Figure 2-8.3. Hanford Patrol Practice Exercise

with Armored Tank Around 1949-1950

Classes were initially taught at the training school building in the Hanford Site construction camp. Eventually, a training 

academy was established in buildings within the 1100 Area. In 1980, a new Patrol Training Academy complex was built 

on Horn Rapids Road where the firing ranges were located (Du Pont 1945a). This new Hanford Patrol Training Academy 

provided a range of training environments including classrooms, library resources, practice shoot houses, an exercise 

gym, and an obstacle course. In these environments, patrol officers have been taught defense and control tactics, crisis 

negotiation, safety and first aid, communication systems, and use of special equipment.

2 -8 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Site. The members of the Tactical Response Team were specially

was also trained in the operation of Fast Attack Vehicles (similar

to dune buggies) and V-150 armored personnel carriers (DOE Figure 2-8.4. Special Response Team Practicing

1985). In the mid-1980s, a Special Response Team was Building Entry, 1994

developed as a supplement to the security provided by the

Hanford Patrol and Tactical Response Team. The Special Response Team was centrally located in the 200 East Area and 

could quickly respond to any security need by using helicopters. The two teams were eventually combined.

Co u n te r - I n tellig en c e a n d M il it a r y Police

For the first year "internal security in the MED [Manhattan Engineer District] was supervised by War Department Counter 

Intelligence and was thus a responsibility of the Army The War Department's area of responsibility was to include all its 

civilian employees, as well as all civilians on military reservations or under military control" (Groves 1983, p. 138).

In late 1943, changes in philosophy of the counter-intelligence operations of the War Department "made it impossible to 

rely any longer on the formerly very satisfactory centralized organization" (Groves 1983, p;139). The Corps was forced 

to create its own counter-intelligence operation.

The counter-intelligence operation maintained a liaison w ith the Du Pont security organization and "outside agencies: 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, State 

Police and, in most cases, local police and sheriff's offices in Washington, Idaho, Oregon, Montana, and Wyoming" with 

relation to prevention of sabotage and espionage of the Hanford Site (UPOA 1977b, bk. 4, vol. 6, p. 11.2)

During the Manhattan Project, typical counter-intelligence activities aimed at preventing sabotage and espionage toward 

the Hanford Site included a variety of methods such as monitoring conversations, censoring the media, conducting 

personal investigations, and editing outgoing mail. The focus was on safeguarding activities and personnel clearances 

and conducting investigations related to military but not civilian operations. Du Font's security organization handled 

civilian operations. However, if Du Pont discovered questionable personnel, the case would be turned over to the Corps' 

counter-intelligence agents for investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation handled any espionage or sabotage 

cases outside the Hanford Site but could be a joint effort if the case appeared to be focused at Hanford (UPOA 1977b). 

For a detailed historical account of overall security and counter-intelligence at the Hanford Site, see A Guide to

Manhattan Project: O fficial History and Documents, Book I, Volume 14, "Intelligence and Security" (UPOA 1977b) and 

Manhattan: The Arm y and the Atom ic Bomb, Chapter XI, "Security" (Jones 1985).

The 744* M ilitary Police Battalion, Company D, was assigned from Fort Lewis to the Hanford Site in July 1944 as a 

supplement to the Hanford Patrol. By the end of the month, this battalion was designated the M ilitary Police 

Detachment No. 2. From 1943-1947, the M ilitary Police patrolled the site perimeter and barricades set up around the 

Hanford Site, which at that time were the Richland, Prosser, and Yakima barricades (Ogletree 1977). They also secured 

the 213 Final Storage Magazine Building, the Hanford construction camp, the Midway Substation, and the Hanford Ferry 

and were used to guard classified shipments off site (Du Pont 1944-1946, Du Pont 1945a). In addition, two military 

police officers were assigned to patrol the Richland Village, mostly on weekends, to keep the peace (CREHST 1998). In

2 - 8 .1 2
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u b it y

1947, the M ilitary Police force was slowly phased out as the perimeter patrol, and their other security duties were 

transferred to the Hanford Site Patrol (Rokkan 1997). Eventually, the need for increased security capabilities lead to the 

development of Camp Hanford into which the troops from Fort Lewis were incorporated. At this time, the National 

Guard unit left the Hanford Site. For further information on the military at the Hanford Site, see Section 9, Military 

Operations.

Fed er a l Bu r e a u of I n v e s tig a tio n

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established an office in Richland Village in the 1940s. The FBI had no criminal 

investigative jurisdiction at the Hanford Site. This duty was the responsibility of Benton County. Nor did the FBI 

maintain any security duties at the Hanford Site. However, since the Hanford Site was a federal project, the FBI received 

security clearances allowing them access to the entire Hanford Site and its buildings. The FBI had three main functions at 

the Hanford Site:

• Investigate federal crimes against the government, such as theft and fraud

• Investigate employee backgrounds for security clearance

• Investigate violations of the Atomic Energy Act, such as theft of classified materials or trespass in classified areas

(Del I wo 1999, Parkhurst 1999)

Several permanently assigned agents maintained the office until 

1961, when only one agent was permanently assigned.

Supplemental agents were assigned during times of increased 

investigations. During the mid-1940s, normally 15-20 agents 

were present (see Figure 2-8.5). This office was part of the 

Washington State Resident Agency of the FBI and presumably 

was initially established to support the Hanford Site. However, 

the Richland office eventually was assigned to also cover all the 

southwest counties of the state in cases of violations of federal 

criminal statutes.

The Sheriff's office or the FBI, depending on the jurisdiction, was 

called in to handle any crimes committed on the Hanford Site.

Crimes that required the involvement of the FBI most commonly 

included classified material and theft of government property 

even when the theft was minor or concerned an item that 

probably was just misplaced. A former FBI agent recalls that 

employees would take everything from tools and building 

materials to office supplies during the mid-Cold War period 

(Parkhurst 1999). An odd occurrence on the Hanford Site, as the 

same agent recalls, involved the increased use of office supplies 

during August, the month of lowest employee attendance. It was 

suspected that employees were taking extra office supplies home 

to stock up their children's school supplies before school started 

in September. However, petty theft such as this was a low 

priority during a time when the focus was to produce and protect

plutonium. The attitude was that it would be more expensive for the FBI to catalog and track all the government supplies 

than it would be to purchase new supplies (Parkhurst 1999).

The FBI focused instead on investigating serious crimes. One unusual and unsolved case occurring during the early-mid 

Cold War era involved the disappearance of twelve copies of the same classified document over a weekend. The 

courier, who was supposed to deliver the registered documents from the 300 Area to the Federal Building on a Friday

Figure 2-8.5. Agents o f the Federal Bureau of

Investigation Assigned to Richland, February 10,

1948

2 - 8 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

afternoon, never showed up. It turned out he was killed in an auto accident the next day in Idaho. The accident scene 

was searched, but the documents were never recovered. On another occasion, an employee ending employment at the 

Hanford Site decided to take a souvenir with him when he moved. He took a fuel element. When this was discovered, 

the FBI tracked down the individual and recovered the souvenir (Parkhurst 1999).

The FBI also investigated fraud against the government (misrepresentation or false facts reported to the government) and 

prosecuted some of the cases. Such investigation included payroll and cost misrepresentation (Parkhurst 1999).

In 1943, the FBI set up an office in Portland, Oregon, which was part of the Soviet Infiltration of the Radiation 

Laboratories Surveillance Program. Although not totally devoted to Hanford Site security, the program was set up 

because U.S. Army Intelligence in their top secret Operation Venona discovered a national security threat. The Soviet 

Union had implemented a major espionage endeavor directed at U.S. atomic weapons facilities (Del I wo 1999). Because 

the Soviets were considered allies at the time, the Portland FBI office tracked Soviets entering the country through the 

Portland area using undercover and secret operations. The FBI agents installed listening devices and wiretaps in the 

Portland area in vehicles, apartments, conference rooms, the Purchasing Commission office, and even a local communist 

party book store. The FBI monitored approximately 15-20 wiretaps in what was called "The Plant" where monitoring 

equipment was located.

The result of the monitoring was the FBI discovered that along with the Soviets coming to Portland for legitimate reasons 

under the Lend-Lease Program, many Soviet espionage agents also were entering the area. Some of these Soviets were 

trained chemists and physicists with an interest in the Hanford Site. A group of ten Soviets (some of whom were identified 

as having knowledge of nuclear science) requested a tour of the Columbia Basin region. Special undercover security 

precautions were taken to protect the secrecy of the Hanford Site. The tour vehicles were equipped with listening 

devices, and at least one undercover FBI agent accompanied the tour as a Columbia Basin Irrigation Project engineer.

The tour was routed such that the Soviet agents were not near the Hanford Site, and when they asked what was done at 

the site, the reply was that the work was related to hydroelectric 

power. No Soviet espionage agents were ever discovered to have 

gained access to the Hanford Site (Dellwo 1999). For additional 

discussion of foreign espionage, see Dark Sun: Making o f the

Hydrogen Bomb (Rhodes 1995).

Se c u r it y Me a s u r e s

Security measures were activities the Hanford Site Patrol and other 

organizations undertook to ensure secrecy in producing the atomic 

bomb during the Manhattan Project and to prevent the loss of 

classified information and loss, theft, diversion, or sabotage of 

nuclear materials during the Cold War.

Pa t r o l l in g

Patrolling the Hanford Site was the most obvious of all the security 

measures. The foot and motor patrol routes covered the entry f/gljre 2-8.6. Typical Guard Tower Around 1945

points along the fence and shore lines of the 100, 200, 300 and 700

Areas (CE n.d.(a)). At one point in 1945, a total of 225 patrol officers on rotation were manning towers (see Figure 2-8.6) 

along the 200 East Area fence lines before surveillance along these lines was done by vehicle (Sanger 1995). Patrol 

duties also included patrolling inside facilities and checking for unlocked filing cabinets containing classified materials 

(Beardsley 1998).

2 - 8 .1 4

i
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

Initially, the Hanford Site Patrol was responsible for patrolling the perimeter of the Hanford Site. The M ilitary Police took 

over that responsibility in August 1944, which included responsibility for the Midway Substation and the barricades 

around the perimeter. The M ilitary Police were ordered not to hesitate to fire their weapons if an unauthorized 

individual tried to force through the barricades. This patrol 

duty also included a 24-hour-per-day patrol of the Rattlesnake 

Mountain area by vehicle (CREHST 1998, UPOA 1977b). In 

1947, patrol of the perimeter boundary and operation o f the 

perimeter barricades was reassigned to the Hanford Site Patrol.

The Columbia River became restricted to the public along the 

Hanford Site shoreline beginning February 1943, and the river 

remained off-limits until 1979 (Rokkan 1997). During that 

time, the river and shoreline were under surveillance by boat 

and air patrols (see Figures 2-8.7 and 2-8.8). Initially, the 

government took over the ferry at the Hanford town site in late 

1943 and assigned its operation to Du Pont (Hanford Site 

Patrol) in association with the development of the River Patrol.

Between 1944 and 1965, the River Patrol equipment and 

administration was transferred at various times between the Figure 2-8.7. Hanford Boat Patrol Around 1949-1950

government and Hanford Site Patrol. River patrolling was

discontinued in the 1970s while the responsibility of the I

Hanford Site Patrol and then reinitiated in the early 1980s until <)

Benton County took over the responsibility in the early 1990s 

(Du Pont 1945a, Ogletree 1977). Patrol officers used the 

181-NA Pumphouse Guard Tower (see the Expanded Historic 

Property Inventory Form for the 181 -NA Tower in Appendix B 

on the Internet) to monitor the river access to the 100-N Area 

and general area security.

The Corps established a restricted air space over the Hanford 

Site during the Manhattan Project to prohibit unauthorized 

flights across the area. The Air Patrol was organized to enforce 

this restriction and protect the Hanford Site. The Corps 

operated the Air Patrol using L-5 and Cub aircraft. Later, 

civilian pilots working for the Atomic Energy Commission and 

then the U.S. Department of Energy took over the operation 

and covered seven different air patrol routes, each averaging 55 miles. These patrol routes supplemented the perimeter 

patrols (described above), and pilots could communicate any security infractions to each other. The pilots looked for and 

investigated suspicious activity and flew low enough to identify vehicles (Oregonian 1949). Most o f their flight hours 

were dedicated to patrolling but also included transportation, photography, and spraying vegetation. The Air Patrol was 

scheduled as a daytime patrol but was on call 24 hours per day (Rokkan 1997).

When the Korean War started in 1950, the Atomic Energy Commission changed the Air Patrol to operate 24 hours per 

day for extra protection against possible air attacks. As a supplement, air reinforcements could be requested to dispatch 

fighter planes to the Hanford Site if necessary. In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission had connections with the Air 

Force's Othello Radar Station and the base at Moses Lake, both of which could be called to help track and intercept 

trespassers. The bases in Spokane, Portland, and McChord were also available for assistance. Trespassers were reported, 

chased, and forced to land so the incident could be investigated and possible fines issued by the Federal Aviation 

Administration (GE 1955b, Rokkan, 1997). Routine patrolling of the Hanford Site by aircraft ended in 1964, but the

Figure 2-8.8. Hanford A ir Patrol Around 1949-1950

2 - 8 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Air Patrol remained as an organization to monitor the restricted air 

space over the Hanford Site. The air restriction was modified in the 

mid-1970s to allow limited flights.

In 1983, the U.S. Department of Energy purchased two helicopters 

to enhance the Air patrol's capabilities (see Figure 2-8.9). The 

helicopters provided aerial observation, investigation and pursuit, a 

24-hour air patrol capability, aerial night vision (infrared), and 

quick transport of a Special Response Team to any area on Hanford 

Site in case of a security threat. A secondary duty of the helicopter 

fleet was to aid in the case of emergency or unusual occurrences 

outside of their main duties. Helicopters were discontinued, along 

with riverboat patrols, in the early 1990s (RHO 1986-1987, DOE 

1985, Thielman 1995). Figure 2-8.9. Hanford Site A ir Patrol Helicopters

M e a s u r e s Re l a t e d t o Se c r e c y d u r in g t h e M a n h a t t a n Pr o jec t

Secrecy was extremely important during the Manhattan Project because of an overriding fear the enemy would learn 

how to create the atomic bomb. Lieutenant General Groves said it was necessary to "minimize the likelihood of vital 

secrets falling into enemy hands" and the "free exchange of information had to be stopped, if we were to beat our 

opponents in the race for the first atomic bomb" (Groves 1983, p. 140).

Because so many people with varied backgrounds were necessary for the Manhattan Project, it was probable that some 

potential spies and saboteurs were inadvertently hired. Manhattan Project officials assumed Germany, Japan and the 

Soviet Union "would learn of the atomic energy program and...use espionage to expand their knowledge of it and 

sabotage to destroy America's military advantage" (jones 1985, p.260). Thus, the Corps bought time by using extensive 

counter-intelligence activities.

Conversation Monitoring

In 1943, agents from the Corps counter-intelligence organization began undercover work to identify any security 

breaches within the Hanford Site or the local community. The agents "occupied strategically located positions in the 

project offices, laboratories, and plants, set up listening posts, checked intensively into persona! and other records of 

individuals under suspicion, and took other measures designed to solve espionage cases" (Jones ^ 985, p. 262). During 

personal espionage investigations, the Corps used special equipment, such as concealed listening and recording 

instruments and cameras with special telephoto lenses. Undercover agents would pose as regular members of the work 

force or community, such as painters, contractors, hotel clerks, tourists, electricians and even gamblers (jones 1985).

One agent had regular informants who would frequently eavesdrop on employees and residents. An agent recalls: "One 

story they picked up was that we [the Hanford Site] were making rockets, anti-personnel rockets. They told me who had 

said it. I told my office this person was starting rumors and they took care of it. The guy was young, and unmarried, and 

he got drafted real quick" (Sanger 1995, p. 140). However, as one former FBI agent remembers, he was amazed at the 

overall loyalty and trustworthiness of the American citizens w ith a few exceptions (Del Iwo 1999). See Jones (1985) and 

Rhodes (1995) for further detail.

The counter-intelligence agents investigated unauthorized releases of classified information and in most cases "found that 

the information leaks...were the result of carelessness or ignorance on the part of the employee or individual with 

knowledge of the project. But because it was always possible such leaks were surface ramifications o f much more 

dangerous espionage activity, all cases o f careless handling of classified data received prompt and rigorous corrective 

action" (Jones 1985, p. 260). One former employee recalled a specific instance of sensitivity to careless talk: "When they 

spoke of radiation during that time they referred to it as 'activity.' I made the mistake in the hearing of one of our

-t-.'A i f t.

■

•« «-

. JL ._>

2 - 8 .1 6
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

managers, I used the word radioactive, because I knew what I was talking about. But, oh my, I was taken into an office 

and security people told me that word is a No-No, NEVER say that again" (Sanger 1995, p. 176).

In July 1944, the counter-intelligence agents began monitoring telephone conversations as well (Du Pont 1944-1946). 

One agent recalls, "I was supposed to find out if anyone said anything that sounded wrong. I didn't know what I was 

listening for, except for anything that sounded covert or to find out if anyone were speculating about what was going on 

at the plant" Sanger 1995, p.135).

Code Words

Even though no public or private discussions of classified information was allowed, communication was necessary in 

many job situations between co-workers. Thus, they were advised to create code words for those classified matters 

which had to be discussed (UPOA 1977b). Code words between employees were never written down but simply 

memorized (Thayer 1996). This practice applied not only to construction workers but also to upper management who 

were forced to use code words as well. When Enrico Fermi and Arthur Compton (two experimental physicists and major 

figures involved in the Manhattan Project) visited the Hanford Site, they used the aliases Dr. Farmer and Mr. Comas so no 

one would link their names to the Manhattan Project and determine what was being produced at the Hanford Site 

(Groueff 1967).

The Hanford Site's technical employees used the following official code words, which were classified as secret 

(GE 1950a):

F Material finished or purified graphite

Monster shipping cask

MJ-1 Redox Process

MJ-2 234-5 Plutonium Finishing Plant

P-9 heavy water

P-10 Tritium

P-11 Critical Mass Program

P-12 Exponential Pile (Reactor) Program

RW radiological warfare

Vendors and Purchasing

Individuals not on the Hanford Site employee list (such as vendors, consultants, and labor representatives) who required 

access to certain types of information or areas were cleared for those activities during the Manhattan Project (Du Pont 

1945a). However, for security reasons, in most cases no information could be given to vendors regarding the plant 

product, which made the urgency and importance of materials difficult to communicate to vendors. In fact, it was 

mandatory for vendors who were manufacturing extremely important or critical pieces of equipment for the Hanford Site 

to have guards stationed in their shops to protect the equipment To prevent a single vendor from obtaining too much 

classified information on one piece o f equipment, several vendors would be used to manufacture different parts of that 

equipment (Du Pont 1945c).

Specialized procurement procedures were in place to ensure security of classified equipment orders. Purchase orders 

were designed to reveal no connection to Hanford's national defense mission. O nly project numbers and purchase order 

numbers identified equipment, and some items were purchased using code names. No signatures of government 

employees appeared on any procurement paperwork unless it was used as the project's copy (Du Pont 1945c).

Media Censorship

Media censorship was critical because it would help ensure that "nothing [was] published that would in any way 

disclose vital information... [or] might attract attention to any phase of the project." These matters were kept out of "any

2 - 8 .1 7
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

magazine or newspaper that was likely to be read by an enemy agent or by anyone whose knowledge of scientific 

progress would enable him to guess what was going on" (Groves 1983, p.146).

Colonel Matthias and his staff went to the local and regional newspapers and radio stations to ask that they help keep the 

Manhattan Project quiet by not publishing or broadcasting reports Or seeking any further information about the Hanford 

Site since it was related to an important war project. He also requested that any articles related to the Hanford Site not 

be published until he approved them. However, this was difficult for newspapers to do since they worried that their 

competitors would not hold back their stories. Special attention was given to the local community media because the 

government takeover of large amounts of land and the increase in population had raised questions and concerns in the 

community. Matthias encouraged cooperation by promising to provide reports of breaking news to newspapers that 

complied with his requests. In fact, the day the bomb was dropped he kept this promise and reported the event to the 

newspapers (Findlay and Hevly 1995, Sanger 1995, UPOA 1977b).

A larger effort.than Matthias' local request was the Director of Censorship sending the Censorship Code notification to 

U.S. editors and broadcasters in 1943. This notification stated that no reports were to be released about "new or secret 

military weapons...experiments...involving: Production or utilization of atom smashing, atomic energy, atomic fission, 

atom splitting, or any of their equivalents. The use for military purpose of radium or radioactive materials, heavy water, 

high-voltage, discharge equipment, cyclotrons. The following elements or any of their components: Polonium, uranium, 

ytterbium, hafnium, protactinium, radium, thorium, deuterium" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, pp. 6.15-16).

Counter-intelligence agents were assigned to seek out any breach in the media that mentioned the Hanford Site or related 

Manhattan Project subjects. As one reviewer recalls: "Each of us was assigned so many periodicals and newspapers and 

we had to watch for words. One of the words was 'atom '" (Sanger 1995, p. 140).

The newspaper Hanford employees read was the Sage Sentinel, which the Hanford Engineer Works Employees 

Association published from July 1943 to February 1945. This publication was for Hanford employees only and was not 

allowed to be taken off the Hanford Site even though the paper was under strict regulations not to publish any 

information revealing the purpose or progress of the Manhattan Project. Beginning in 1944, a City of Richland edition of 

the Sage Sentinel was published. However, it was edited to focus on world, national, and non-sensitive local news 

(Findlay and Hevly 1995, Du Pont 1945a).

M easures Rela ted to Ric h la n d Villa g e

No fence was installed around Richland Village 

although counter-intelligence agents closely 

watched its residents, and the Village Police kept a 

copy of a key to every house in town. Matthias 

asked Du Pont to keep the town clean and 

presentable since it would be open to outsiders 

and possibly a reflection on the Hanford Site 

(Findlay and Hevly 1995).

Richland Village was not fenced in but was still on 

federal property and thus "subject to regulations 

imposed by the Area Manager," as well as those of 

Washington State and Benton County (GE n.d.(b), p.3-4). The Hanford Site Patrol contained a separate patrol force 

located in Richland called the Village Police. They also held special Benton County deputy status and enforced the law 

within the City of Richland until 1958 when Richland became incorporated and was no longer a government-run city. 

Village Police responsibilities also included security of the 700 Area (see Figure 2-8.10), which was the Hanford Site's 

main administrative area (Du Pont n.d, Hunter 1998).

"()m r i o n *tn n lin n o f Ihe H iid d .m d i \d h iie h.ul ended.

C i rn t*< .iiid iiilh intended In h u ild .m il p a lto l ,i tvnt v

.» m in d il, /»«./ . is had hecn done .it O aA Ridtiv and I »s \l.im o*.

Ih e \ wan t it I lo keep operation* pet*onnel 'under in n h n l lo t

*ei u r ili riMson- and .it the same lim e p re \ enl .it < «•-«, to

RU hland irn m u n h id e the Pro/ei t. Hut I Hi Pont o b ja le d In

si/t h u n d m l* n \e i I he U )nn*pcople and a p p a ie n lh mu < eedvd

in i hanuinu the \ ir r n 's m in d ." - 1 indl.n and H r \K p. 19
Section 8 - Site Security

Although attempts may have been made to make Richland Village 

appear to be a normal town, the necessity for strict security still 

played a role. The Richland Village phone book was stamped as 

classified or restricted information. Richland residents'mail was 

examined to ensure no sensitive information was being 

communicated out of town through the mail. Telephone calls 

were tapped to listen for a breach of security or loose talk. 

Counter-intelligence agents disguised as ordinary residents of the 

town kept an eye on suspicious characters. Photography within 

Richland Village was permitted with the exception of the 

Administration Area. However, photos could not be commercially 

sold or published without the approval of the Area Manager. 

Residents owning firearms had to register them with the Hanford 

Site Patrol, and using personal radio transmitters required approval 

from the Security and Intelligence Office of the Atomic Energy 

Commission (Findlay and Hevly 1995, GE n.d.(b), Parkhurst 

1999).

«•

B il

Figure 2-8.10. Guard House to the West Entrance

o f the 700 Area Staffed by the Richland Village

Police Around 1951-1952

No one was allowed to live in Richland Village unless they were Hanford Site employees or family members. 

Background investigations were conducted to some degree on all the residents of the village (Parkhurst 1999). In one 

instance, when a vehicle w ith out-of-state license plates entered Richland, the Village Police followed the vehicle until 

the driver reached his destination and then questioned the driver to find out why he was in Richland Village (Rokkan

1997).

Se c u r it y Ed u c a tio n Pr o g r a m

"The Security Education Program was designed to educate District personnel to become instinctively securityconscious. [Personnel were reminded not to] discuss nor [sic] to circulate news articles or rumors concerning

specific types of project information. Appeal was made on the grounds o f patriotism, loyalty to the fighting men

and the desirability o f preventing project information from reaching the enemy." - UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, 

pp. S8-S9

The educational campaign to inform and remind employees of the importance of security was played out in films, 

posters, billboards, hanging mobiles, literature, specialized talks, telephone disks or stickers, and paycheck inserts 

(Du Pont 1944-1946, Du Pont 1945a, UPOA 1977b). For examples, see Figure 2-8.11 and Figure 2-12.3 in the 

Section 12, History of Workers. Other security slogans used on the Hanford Site were (Loeb 1982, p.33):

"Caution. Engage brain before starting mouth."

"A secret can circle the globe without refueling."

a secret.' fELPS”f$!3z

S i. . ’- -*• ?

ZXSSVrlEl

Figure 2-8.11. Security Billboards in the Mid-1950s

The security education campaign even extended into the lives 

of those living in Richland Village-to employees'family 

members, relatives, and others living in the community and 

supporting but not working at the Hanford Site. Security 

awareness talks and films were delivered at different 

community meetings to bring awareness to the townspeople. 

Signs with security slogans were posted around the village 

(Du Pont 1944-1946). Some Dupus Boomer (a local cartoon 

character) cartoons appeared in the Richland Villager

2 - 8 .1 9
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

S e c a n t? re g a lu tto a s be re o r e v e ry r ig i d - s a d these 

w h o w a u id d e lib e ra te ]? v io la te th e m , raigfct afcso 5o d 

them selves in a s h n tlttr c o n d itio n .

<90U.y-l MOPE I NEVER F0R6ET MY P«&-

L o c a l re g u la tio n s a r e so c o m p le x th a t in o r d e r to 

h ir e a p e rs o n w e m u s t f i r s t g iv e h im th e bu sine ss.

%

RIT 6 1 ti.lt - SO 1 OOTIfl t i l l OBT H a THOSE T O W - HAVE W 

peCTURE TOOK * BE EWOEBMUNTEtt - TftKE ft PBVRCftl ANA

s iy tf? I h u t S0MN8 e t u o e m ' * « io n s t k n o w .

N eve r a sk a .w ic n tis lw b a t he know s, i f be to ld yo n it m ig ht 

cause y o u to b a te a ue rto u s bre akdow n Trent ly in g aw ake 

nig hts w o n d e rie g w b a lttw a s b e said.

>>!■'/; ATOMIC i v^.; RESEARCH hk®.“ il‘ I utaoRAToav

iRKTSuaa

AREA

0 0 M O T

e n t e r

Wi kid's W o t u 'v a k n o w ?

W c w o n d e r .a il y e a r w h a t S n u ta O flu s is m a k in g i 

b is w o rk s h o p —b a t be p ro b a b ly w a n d e rs th e sam e 

a b o a t us, so th a t m ake s as, even.

a t e H R . C LA U S „ V1W , P T . 

W O T C H A G O T IN T H E ' N O W L E T S SEE

newspaper during the late 1940s. They contained 

humorous security reminders to which residents 

working at the Hanford Site could relate 

(see Figure 2-8.12).

Security Bulletins were also used to keep the employees 

informed and reminded of security issues. These 

bulletins were distributed as early as February 1945 

until January 1951. They covered issues such as 

safeguarding classified information, plant protection, 

explanations for recent security changes, proper security 

badge use, and prevention of espionage. Employees 

received the bulletins on an as-needed basis.

One of the paragraphs in Security Bulletin #3 illustrates 

the need for this form of security information. As World 

War II was ending and the world was becoming aware 

of the Hanford Site's mission, employees needed to 

understand that the world did not know everything 

about the Hanford Site and security must still be 

enforced:

" Recent progress made by the United Nations

atomic control committee does not lessen our

responsibility. The opinion that the m ilitary

application o f atomic energy must be placed under

absolute universal control increases our obligation

at the present time. Collectively and in many cases individually we possess sufficient knowledge o f process or

operational secrets, which if exposed through violation o f our Oath o f Secrecy, would undermine or nullify our

Government's advantage in its efforts to establish an effective control plan. The fact that our country must retain

full control o f the atomic bomb secret until controls are in actual operation is a somber reminder that our silence

m ight w ell mean our salvation." - Farley 1946

Another paragraph in Security Bulletin #21 in 1948 illustrates the use of bulletins to emphasis certain security issues:

" Wives o f project workers also come within this danger zone, not only because o f the influence they might exert

on their husbands, but because o f the unfortunate habit some people have, o f being less cautious about

discussing their work in front o f their wives than they are with social acquaintances or total strangers. Not being

sworn to secrecy as were their husbands, they may feel free to discuss all matters that they feel might be o f

mutual interest to members o f their bridge club, social acquaintances o r o f more concern as a topic for group

discussion. Espionage agents are always alert to such gossip, not so much for the value o f the second hand

information they might obtain, but as a means o f identifying the originator o f such revelations as a potential

contact for further disclosures." - Farley 1948

Cla s s ifie d M a te r ia ls Co ntro l

Two types of materials were classified, documents and nuclear material, and access to them was controlled. 

Documents

Figure 2-8.12. Dupus Boomer Cartoons Related to Hanford

Site Security

Much of the information created on the Hanford Site during the construction and operation phases of the Manhattan 

Project and Cold War eras, such as documents and blueprints, were (and are) considered sensitive. A classification 

program was created to handle the distribution, control, and destruction of such information. Management and key

2 - 8 .2 0
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

scientists determined the classification assignments. Nearly all information created was designated as classified

(Gydesen 1999).

The main classification levels were Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Restricted. These classifications remained in use 

throughout the Manhattan Project and Cold War eras (Du Pont 1945a, UPOA 1977b, GE n.d.(b)). However, the 

definitions have been slightly modified over time, and the following categories have been added: Restricted Data, 

Formally Restricted Data, and National Security Information. To access classified information, the employee had to have 

the appropriate clearance and the "need to know." The definitions below are those used in the 1940s:

TOP SECRET classification referred to "certain secret documents, information, and material, the security aspect 

of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to the 

nation" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, app. B-7, p. 2). This covered information such as production figures of 

end product and materials, m ilitary use of product, successful methods, plant locations, and set-ups.

SECRET classification referred to "information or features, the disclosure of which might endanger national 

security, cause serious injury to the interest or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity, or would be of 

great advantage to a foreign nation" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, app. B-7, p. 2). Manhattan Project 

information involving technical design, processes, construction methods, scope and size of the project, maps, 

and photographs was covered under this classification.

CONFIDENTIAL classification referred to "information or features...the disclosure of which might be prejudicial 

to the interest or prestige of the United States, a governmental activity, or an individual, or be of advantage to a 

foreign nation" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, app. B-7, p. 2). Information involving statistics on the materials 

and personnel required to construct the facility and the construction and production progress was covered under 

this classification.

RESTRICTED classification referred to "information or feature for official use only, or when disclosure should be 

limited for reasons of administrative privacy, or denied the general public" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, 

app. B-7, p. 3). Administrative and organization information was covered under this classification. This 

information was available to employees in general, such as through the security bulletins, but was not publicly 

available.

UNCLASSIFIED information included 

data that did not need safeguarding. 

Classified information was identified by a 

stamped mark denoting the classification 

level and category. The stamped marks 

were usually found on the top and bottom 

of each page of unbound documents, 

front and back of photographs, on the first 

few pages of securely fastened books or 

pamphlets, and under the scale on maps 

(UPOA 1977b). When mailed, the 

classified information (except Top Secret 

documents) was placed in double-sealed 

envelopes and sent by registered mail 

requiring a receipt (Du Pont 1945c).

Only authorized couriers were allowed to 

transport Top Secret documents. The couriers 

carried the documents inside two sealed 

envelopes under their shirts. The documents 

never left the courier's control until they were 

delivered.

A Son'* Keniembiance uf His Frilhvr's Joli .is .in

\lomi< rn<‘ri»x Commission ( ouiivi inlhc 195ns

Darrell House o father. as lie remembers, was alwaxs armed din* In lib

inb. D anell ,iiid his sihlini*-, know their lather was .11 ouricr and his

juh was veix imporl.ml. I low oxer. drev were luld noi In di-< uss iheii

father's juh wilh am one. If am one asked ahoul their la lh e i\ work nr

where he was during one nr his deliveries. the children were In refer

people In I heir mother who would field Iho <|ui‘slions. Darrell’’* falhei

was (ml of lowai on »mirier deliveries lor a (omhinvd folal of

4-(» munlhs per vear. These I rips would arise siiddenh, sometimes

si hedulcd onl\ a dav before Ihe trip. Darrell’s father would come

home from work and ask his wife In pack ennui'll t lollies for \ number

<il dais, this was die nnh wax his wife knew how lorn* he would he

•lone, she evenluallv was .ihle »uess wheie he was heading di'peni.in*'

on wlial i Indies she was told In par k. One suit prnbahlv me.inl he was

making a one dax tliuhl delixcrx to Washinyjon D.C . and 5 nr sir da\s

of < lollies me.ml he was prohjhh making a deliverx to 11><. Alamos or

elsewhere In train (Nmise I

2 -8 .2 1
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Each employee who had access to classified information or documents was responsible "not to discuss such information, 

either orally or in writing, with anyone without first being assured of the other party's authority and need to receive such 

information" (Du Pont 1944-1946, sec. 2/Oct. 2, 1945, p. 13). To identify employees who were cleared to receive or 

transport classified materials, different types of authorization cards and material passes were issued during the Manhattan 

Project era:

• Authorization Cards contained the "name of the individual, the category of work for which he was 'cleared/ a 

description of his type of duties, reference to his supervisor, and personal data" (Du Pont 1945c, p.39). These 

cards identified the type of information the employee was authorized to see.

• Material and Package Passes were used to "control the movement of material and equipment between plant 

areas and off the plant" (Du Pont 1944-1946, sec. 2/Oct. 2, 1945, p. 9). These passes were issued only for 

approved transfers and only to authorized employees. In addition, Authorized Messenger passes were given to 

employees authorized to transport classified documents outside the barricades (GE 1955b).

Employees were also responsible for physically safeguarding the classified documents in their possession by following 

specific guidelines including preparation, mailing, handling, accountability, and disposal. A document accountability 

program had always been enforced at the Hanford Site, which inventoried the location and custodians of classified 

documents. Originally, teams of clerks personally inspected each employee's classified document holdings to verify the 

inventory. In the mid-1950s, the system used a punch card system in which a worker would feed a punch card to a 

computer that would print an individual's classified document inventory. This inventory was sent to the individual to 

verify, sign and return. Inventory audits were conducted to ensure that the inventory list detailed exactly what was in the 

individual's possession. Initially, individuals were required to verify inventories every 30 days; this was later changed to 

every 3 months, then every 6 months, and by the 1970s, every year (Gydesen 1999, Rokkan 1997). The document 

accountability program was discontinued in the early 1990s.

The storage of classified information had specific requirements. Information needed to be locked in fireproof cabinets or 

safes that had at least two separate combination locks or were secured by other reasonable measures during the 

Manhattan Project (Du Pont 1944-1946, UPOA 1977b). Hanford Site Patrol officers inspected offices each day in search 

of unlocked files containing classified materials. If found, the patrol officers investigated to determine if any information 

was missing (Beardsley 1998, Du Pont 1944-1946). During the Cold War era, classified information continued to be 

stored securely either within individual offices or storage vaults.

In 1944, the Classified Files Department developed two major holding locations for controlling classified information 

including storage, document tracking, and accountability: the 3706 Building in the 300 Area and the 712 Records, 

Printing, and Mail Office Building in the 700 Area (Du Pont 1944-1946, Gydesen 1999). In addition in 1975, the 3727 

Classified Vault Storage Facility was built to securely store classified printed materials. This building was built with 

1 -foot thick walls and had a traditional lock and key entrance but with an additional secured entrance to the interior 

vault. That door was made of thick metal and had a combination lock. For more information, see the Historic Property 

Inventory Forms for the 712 and 3727 Facilities in Appendix B on the Internet.

To destroy classified information, either an authorized employee (in the presence of an authorized officer) or staff in the 

Classified Files Department shredded or burned the material. When the material was successfully destroyed, the 

witnessing officer signed a Certification of Destruction as well as a destruction report, if one was filed. The destruction 

report contained a description of the material, the location where it was destroyed, the date of destruction, and any other 

details pertaining to the destruction. This destruction procedure was followed for all classified documents, even 

worksheets (notes), drafts, carbon paper, etc. (UPOA 1977b).

The Operations Security program provided a process to evaluate and control technically unclassified information so that 

adversaries did not obtain bits and pieces of unclassified information that could help them identify classified information, 

projects, or activities. During the Manhattan Project and into the Cold War era, operations security was practiced at the 

Hanford Site to a certain degree through general site security regulations and classified information. However, no

i _ _

2 - 8 .2 2
Section 8 - Sit e Security

organized program addressed all the issues of operations security. An official and organized concept of operations 

security was developed as a result of problems during the Vietnam War. The United States instituted Operations Security 

in many government programs to avoid the release of unclassified information that could be beneficial to adversaries 

(Luczynski 1999).

The purpose of Operations Security at the Hanford Site has been described as "continual evaluation and reporting of 

routine operational activities to determine whether classified, sensitive/unclassified or company proprietary information 

is being inadvertently made available to an adversary or outside unfriendly element" {RHO 1978-1986, chap. 28, p. 1). 

Communication of information for general operations (such as procurement records, job announcements and resumes, 

telephone connections, drawings, and travel information) was examined as possible references for adversaries. 

Countermeasures were developed, recommended, and implemented to resolve any operations security issues (Luczynski 

1999, RHO 1978-1986).

With the mission at the Hanford Site changing from nuclear material production to environmental cleanup, the 

U.S. Department of Energy has been declassifying many of the classified documents. See Chapter 3 for resources to 

finding information on the present status of formerly classified documents.

Nuclear Material

Classified and Radioactive Materials Passes were used to control "movement of process material or material which 

should not be inspected due to radioactivity, toxicity, possibility of contamination, security classification or similar

reasons" (GE 1955b, sect tX, pp. 2).

The most common movement of nuclear material on the Hanford Site involved transporting non-radiated fuel rods from 

the 300 Area to the 100 Areas reactors, irradiated fuel rods from the reactors to the 200 Areas separations plants, and 

plutonium from the 200 Areas to the storage vaults. In each case, the Hanford Site Plant Railroad transported the nuclear 

material in specialized rail cars escorted by armed security guards who were also sworn as Auxiliary M ilitary Police. (For 

more detail, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the Hanford Site Plant Railroad in Appendix B on the 

Internet.) Shipments of uranium billets (feed material for fuel manufacturing in the 300 Area) arrived at the Hanford Site 

from Chicago on rail cars highly protected by security guards, who on the trip back guarded shipments of classified metal 

scrap and turnings. The scrap and turnings were by-products of the production process at the Hanford Site that were 

shipped to other plants for reprocessing (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, vol. 14, p. 5.3). The rail shipments came onto the Hanford

"A lo r m e r w o rk e r th e H .m iu r d site i'\ p l. iin - th e m e th o d o f

tr.m s fe r rin ii p lu to n iu m r to m th e 2 » '/- / P lu to n iu m V ie l.illu ttn

I at i l i l i lo th e 21) /V/i.i/ Sto r,m e M .iy.iziin* i M ills in th e d d e o l

C t.ih lv M u im h iin : ' l t c w o u ld n u ik e u p .i lit t le i .u.iv.in o f o n e

i ,u ii ilh th e p lu to n iu m , one i ,i/ .d ie ,id o f u - , w d o n e i ,u

h e h iiu l » \ w ith \ rim p e rs o n n e l w ith , 4 t - .itu i I th in k n u n h in e

n u n s th e la u lt d o o rs ,n th e -fo /.iyc h u ild in i> re q u ire d tw /i

( o m h in a tn u is to o p e n . -U I /c i.i// n o h n th h .i- to

k n o w h o lh ( o m h i o . i t i o n s . s.m yci I •)*»>, p . l'i ?

in Appendix B on the Internet.

In 1970, the 2736-Z Primary Plutonium Storage Facility was constructed as the first building on the Hanford Site to be 

planned especially for the safe storage of plutonium and plutonium products and scrap. (For more information, see the 

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 2736-Z Facility in Appendix B on the Internet.) This building was

Site through the Riverland Classification Yard (near 

the Midway Substation west of the Hanford Site) 

where the War Department turned over the rail 

cars and materials to Du Pont (Du Pont 1944-

1946, UPOA 1977b).

Armed Hanford Site Patrol officers and military 

guards have always been assigned to escort 

classified material being moved on the Hanford 

Site, an assignment that remains essential today 

(Du Pont 1944-1946). The 213 vaults were also 

protected by a guard tower, mounted machine 

guns, a security fence, and roving patrol (CREHST

1998). For more information, see the Expanded 

Historic Property Inventory Form for the 231 -Z Builc

2 - 8 .2 3
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

constructed with important security and safety features in mind, such as the 6- to 8-inch thick, reinforced concrete walls, 

doors, and ceiling with vibration sensors; combination door locks and alarm system; and a detection, measurement, and 

alarm system called the Vault Safety and Inventory System that was installed in the mid-1980s. The Hanford Site Patrol 

always had controlled access to this building. Visitors were required to sign a log sheet when they entered and exited.

The most significant transfers of classified nuclear materials off site occurred when plutonium was taken to the plant at 

Los Alamos, New Mexico for use to produce the atomic bomb. Colonel Matthias and a M ilitary Intelligence escort 

hand-carried the plutonium to Los Alamos the first time in February 1945. They drove to Portland, Oregon and then 

took a train to Los Angeles where they met a Los Alamos agent who had no idea that the "wooden box wrapped in 

brown paper" contained a flask of plutonium "suspended between shock absorbers" (Sanger 1995, p.195). Matthias 

urged the agent to request a locked compartment on the train to Los Alamos for security reasons. He reinforced the 

importance of protecting the package by stating that it cost $350 m illion dollars to make. The agent followed Matthias's 

advice (Groueff 1967).

As the amount of plutonium transferred to Los Alamos became larger, a more efficient transfer system was necessary. 

M ilitary Intelligence controlled the delivery. . By mid-1945, they were using a convoy of Army olive-colored panel 

trucks with no windows or markings that were modified to hold 24 containers of plutonium. These trucks were typically 

used as Army ambulances and thus aroused little suspicion. Ten agents were assigned to each delivery convoy, which 

consisted of three trucks with one m ilitary police car in the lead and one at the rear. The agents were armed with 

shotguns, 38-caliber revolvers, and machine guns. The convoy vehicles were all in radio contact with each other, and 

they were instructed that in case of an accident they were to drive off the road up wind from the accident.

The convoy drove from the Cable Mountain vaults on the Hanford Site (where the trucks had been loaded by Hanford 

Site agents) approximately 700 miles to Fort Douglas in Salt Lake City, Utah to meet the Los Alamos convoy of agents. 

The agents responsible for transferring the plutonium from the Hanford Site convoy to the Los Alamos convoy dressed in 

protective clothing and wore "health badges"

(dosimeters) (Sanger 1995, pp. 196-7). The transfer 

agents unloaded and loaded the convoys out of 

view of both sets of escort agents. At this point, the 

Hanford Site's role in the transfer was complete, 

and delivery to New Mexico became the 

responsibility of the Los Alamos escort agents 

(Groueff 1967). In two instances, rush deliveries of 

two containers were made to Los Alamos using 

C-47 airplanes (Sanger 1995).

In August 1946, it became more acceptable to use rail transportation rather than truck convoys for these deliveries 

(UPOA 1977b). Security guards escorted the plutonium, which was transported in a vault in the middle section of a 

specialized rail car (Rokkan 1998).

Cl a s s if ie d Ar e a s a n d Co n tr o l Ov e r Access to Th e m

Access to the Hanford Site has always been controlled and limited to authorized persons wearing the appropriate badge. 

Not every badged employee could access every location or facility at the Hanford Site, and these restricted areas 

changed over time. For example, during construction "employees having access to 100 and 300 Areas were, as a 

general rule, not given access to 200 Areas and vice versa" (Du Pont 1944-1946, sec. 2/Oct. 2, 1945, p.15). Later on, 

employees were permitted access to all areas. However, specific buildings were still restricted to only authorized 

employees.

.During the initial phases of construction, access to specific areas was constantly changing as construction progressed. 

During this period "certain sections and buildings in plant areas were restricted, and access to them was limited to

"# u v p l n it .in u n ite r in the .m ihu i.un e none n i thv

d rix v i«■ o r -o h livr* knew xxh.it tlw \ n w c h.m -po itin u.

in*i<*lcil nn the to n \o \ •> i.ikm ti iliilv re n l route-- .m il

iic \ 1 7 <topfn'nti .if the -.tnw fil.n «■ to t\ it . " O n tn u.i-iiin. lie

vwiulil sviul i u u n lfi ■irilvlligem i* .iitunh to lo llo u Ihv u>nvo\

and m.iKo sini' llicv vxvrc not dvvvlopini' lo u lin v .a tix iliv s lh.il

<nul<l i)c i m ‘<1 to '•.iholn-ie thi* lo iix m . - tiro u v fl p. i l l

2 -8 .2 4
Se c t io n 8 - Su e Se c u r it y

persons who had been cleared to receive classified

information and who had business to perform A m rm rt < rmslnn lion vxoi ker .il I lit* Kill 15 \t t \i reuills .111

within the area" (Du Font 1944-1946, sec. 2/ w im p le 01 llu - 1 Inin^in^ .vxvs*. rrquiremvni-.: ’■ Th.it Ihinx

Oct. 2, 1945, p. 9). These initial areas included itlw li K r.u to t; u.i* -ri t r l. n u \ h r .1 u 011UI h r

the 100 B Area, 100 D Area, 100 F Area, Test Pile < Ir.u cd lo t o n l\ tnw -id r 01it. I out -/«/<■- sf/i/.ire. am / m,n/i<-

(Reactor), Metal Fabrication, Cold Semi-Works ,1 »m w ould h r t. ir.it r d u tr the int.ihv i/r/c /»»/ /ir w m ild n 'i h r

(300 Area), 200 Area Canyon and Isolation t lr . u r d fo r th r cx/w tM -/dr. \tu l rw rs h o rh u .i- n o t tlr o r r d

Building, Temporary Construction Building, and lo i»<> u/» in if. >01/ «*■/ .l/xw t ludfw .n up....me/ f/iei tl h r .m

105 Warehouse. (Du Pont 1944-1946). .irm rd m u m l ,w d h r m o u ld 1h n k v un nut and i f v uu/

11.1- 1111 //)«• //<f m u 1 m i/d yo /». /i'/f u,is»'/ f/i.if k .i- .1- far .1-.

Each area on the Hanford Site was under one of 

three access designations: M ntukn ,m d \tiit m uldn '1 i>o Ziicfdtii.' - Sungvr Ml1) ' p. I ih

® C o n tro lle d .Area vvhere "control of

entrance is desirable for general security,

but within which all 'Restricted Data' is protected further by guarded repositories or confinement within 

'exclusion' or 'lim ited' areas" (GE 1955b, sect. Vlll, p. 1).

• Lim ite d A rea where "activities involving 'Restricted Data' are safeguarded, and within which freedom of 

movement of any individual does not in itself constitute access to 'Restricted Data' meaning that access is 

available to authorized personnel but their access to further information is restricted by guards or other internal 

controls" (GE 1955b, sect. Vlll, p. 1). Limited areas required a specific clearance level to enter.

• Exclusion A rea where "vital operations involving 'Restricted Data' [were] performed, and within which the 

freedom of movement of any individual of itself constitutes access to 'Restricted Data' meaning that just having 

access to this area would cause classified information to be available to the employee" (GE 1955b, sect. VIII, 

p. 1). Exclusion areas required the highest clearance level (Q) to enter (GE 1955b, GE 1958b).

In the mid-1980s, the Hanford Site was divided into five access categories, all of which required a security identification 

badge. However, badges were marked with different symbols to identify the employee's type of access clearance (see 

the Background Investigations and Clearances Sub-Section below):

• The definition of a C o n tro lle d A rea basically stayed the same and covered the 700 and 100 Areas.

• The new S e cu rity A rea covered controlled access including the area between the Wye and Yakima Barricades 

where the space was "subject to physical protection" (RHO 1986-1987, sect 72-01.1, p. 3).

• The Lim ited A rea became an "area enclosed by a physical barrier [and] subject to physical protection" such as 

the 100, 200, 300, and 400 Areas (RHO 1986-1987, sect. 72-01.1, p. 3).

• The P rotected A re a was normally located within a Limited Area and was also enclosed by a physical barrier. An 

example is the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) (a protected area) within the 200 West Area (a limited area).

• The M a te ria l Access Area contained special nuclear materials located inside a Protected Area and was protected 

by a physical barrier (RHO 1986-1987).

Fences, Barricades, and Badge Houses

The Hanford Site was constructed with access control points at several locations. The main access control points were 

the perimeter barricades along the Hanford Site boundary, which was entirely enclosed by a three-strand barbed wire 

fence (see Figure 2-8.13). This fence carried "N o Trespassing," "No Parking," and "N o Photography" signs and warning 

signs at each end of Highway 240 as it entered the Hanford Site telling motorists to quickly leave the area if the light was 

flashing for threat of radiation (Rokkan 1997). The fence line displays only "N o Trespassing" signs today.

The original perimeter barricades or badge houses, built in the early to mid-1940s, were the Richland/300 Area 

Barricade (see Figure 2-8.14), Prosser Barricade, and the Yakima Barricade. These barricades were located along the 

main access routes to the Hanford Site: Route 4 South near the 300 Area, Route 10 near the Yakima River, and Route 11A 

near its connection to Highway 24. The Richland and Prosser Barricades were consolidated and taken out of service 

with the construction of the Wye Barricade located at the intersection of Route 4 South and Route 2 South in 1959

2 -8 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

(see Figure 2-8.13). The Yakima Barricade was replaced 

in 1982. (See the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 

Yakima Barricade, 604 Building, in Appendix B on the 

Internet for more information.)

The Hanford Site Patrol staffed these barricades and 

checked for the presence of security badges on individuals 

entering the Hanford Site. During the Manhattan Project 

when the M ilitary Police staffed the perimeter barricades 

(badge houses) and employees were bussed on and off the 

Hanford Site, the M ilitary Police stopped every bus at the 

barricade and a patrolman boarded, checked every 

individual for their security badge, and examined all 

personal items such as lunch boxes (CREHST 1998).

Secondary access control points were located at the main 

entrances to each of the construction areas, later 

operation areas. These were the area badge houses (also 

called guardhouses) and area fences. The Hanford Site 

Patrol, who checked the security badges of those entering 

the specific area for the appropriate clearance, staffed the 

area badge houses. It was also at this badge house where 

employees picked up their Area Badges and dosimeter (as 

described in Badges and Passes below). Examples of 

typical area badge houses are 1701-K and 3701 -N (see 

the Historic Property Inventory Forms for these buildings 

in Appendix B on the Internet for more information).

* .CREST OF

200 N AREAS

R Q irre ii*

i * BARRICADE

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AREA

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309 AREA i 

gAR R IC A D E i AREA

HANFORD WORKS

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Figure 2-8.13. Map Showing the Security Barricades at

The security fences around the operation areas, such as the Hanford Site, Revised 1988

the reactor and separation areas, were installed as certain

facilities within the areas were completed and consisted mainly of tall, chain-link fences topped with strands of barbed 

wire. For example, when a river pump house was completed, a fence was erected all around it for protection. Then

when another building such as a power house or office was 

completed, the fence was re-routed to also enclose those 

buildings until eventually the entire area was fenced off and 

accessible only through the area badge houses (Du Pont 1944- 

1946).

' I I X I I I I I $ A third level of access control points was located at the entrances

to specific protected areas (within the operation areas) requiring 

further access control and authorization to enter. These areas.

■ i 1 ' s iT i"jy | were surrounded by another chain-link security fence topped

with strands of barbed and/or coils of razor wire and were 

11111^^ accessed through a specific badge house. One example was the

PUREX protected area, which was accessed through the 2701-AB 

PUREX Badge House and contained increased security measures 

such as metal detectors and x-ray machines (such as those at 

airports), special nuclear material detectors, key card access (issued for personnel accountability and interior area access 

controls), and alarm systems (RHO 1986-87). The 1112-N Badge House is another example. See the Historic Property 

Inventory Forms for the 2701-AB and 1112-N badge houses in Appendix B on the Internet for more information.

Figure 2-8.14. Access Control Point at the 300 Area

Barricade, 1951

2 - 8 .2 6
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

Badges and Passes

The employee badge system was one of the crucial access control tools supporting the Hanford Site security system. No 

one without a badge was allowed through any badge house. In addition, the badges indicated which areas the 

individual was authorized to enter. The major types of badges that have been worn on the Hanford Site are listed below 

(Du Pont 1944-1946):

• The Photo-Identification Pass was the general badge issued to every employee. It was used very generally to 

identify the employee and to gain access to the Administration Area (700 Area) and through the main Hanford 

Site perimeter barricades. An Employee's Temporary Tag Pass was sometimes used to temporarily identify the 

employee until a Photo Identification Pass could be issued. During construction before many areas were subject 

to more controlled access restrictions, the Photo Identification Pass (also called the Project Badge) was the only 

pass necessary on the Hanford Site. As the Hanford Site and its facilities developed, more and different areas, 

buildings, and sections of buildings were restricted according to the progress of construction and the security 

department discretion. This evolution led to the need for Area Badges to control access (Du Pont 1944-1946,

Du Pont 1945a).

• The Area Badge was used as a secondary employee identification, but this badge allowed personnel access to 

the manufacturing areas to which the individual was authorized or cleared to enter because of their job. Instead 

of being carried by the employee at all times as was the case with the Photo-Identification Pass, this badge was 

issued and surrendered along w ith a personnel dosimeter or health instrument for radiation monitoring at the 

area badge house. To obtain an Area Badge, the

employee had to call out his badge number to the 

patrolman at the area badge or guard house and show 

his Photo-Identification Pass (see Figure 2-8.15). The 

patrolman was responsible for obtaining a positive 

identification comparison between the two badges.

Once the Area Badge was issued, the employee was 

allowed to enter the area. Infrequent; authorized visitors 

to an area would pick up an area clearance card upon 

entering the area. Employees were notallowed inside 

specific buildings in the area unless their Area Badge 

Was marked by a specific symbol (see the Background 

Investigations and Clearances Sub-Section below) or 

unless the supervisor in charge issued them a red tag 

pass for that building. Upon leaving the area, the Area 

Badge and dosimeters were returned to the patrol officer 

and stored in that area's badge house. Monthly lists 

were sent to department heads showing employees who 

had Area Badges. They were reviewed and updated as 

necessary to control and monitor employee access 

(Du Pont 1944-1946).

Figure 2-8.15. Hanford Patrol Officer Checking

Photo Identification Pass and Issuing Gamma Pencil

Dosimeter

Patrol officers at the badge houses have always been required to visually verify that the individual passing through the 

checkpoint was the same person appearing in the photograph on their security badge. Badge photos had to be kept upto-date with the person's appearance. For instance, a new picture was necessary if a beard was shaved or grown. If the 

visual comparison was not accurate enough, employees were advised to get a new photo taken (GE 1958b).

Background Investigations and Clearances

The personal and professional backgrounds of potential Hanford Site employees were (and continue to be today to a 

certain degree) investigated before they were employed. The goal of the personal background investigations in the early 

years of the Hanford Site was to make "every effort to find out before employing anyone whether there was anything in 

his background that would make him a possible source of danger, paying particular attention to his vulnerability to

2 - 8 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

blackmail, arising from some prior indiscretion" (Groves 1983, p. 141). Generally, this basic goal held throughout the 

Cold War w ith additional attention added to ensure the applicant was in fact the person they claimed to be 

(Parkhurst 1999).

The investigation process began with employees filling out Personnel Security Questionnaires that detailed personal 

history, education (sometimes even including attendance and grades), employment history, organization memberships, 

foreign countries visited, and personal references (Du Pont 1944-1946). Attempts were made to verify this information 

and determine the character of the individual.

Originally, potential employees were investigated further if their job duties would require them to handle confidential or 

secret information or their Personnel Security Questionnaires revealed information that might lead to questionable 

loyalty, such as birthplace or m ilitary service in any country other than the United States, employment not fully detailed, 

and membership in questionable organizations. Sometimes the more thorough investigations went back as far as 

childhood. Even more thorough investigations were required for individuals who had oriental ancestry, were emigrants 

from enemy countries, had visited or previously lived in enemy countries since 1933, had family in an enemy country, 

had a criminal history of a nature that might endanger the Manhattan Project, or had served in the m ilitary in an enemy 

country (Groves 1983, UPOA 1977b).

Because the Hanford Site was on a fast track and required a large construction work force, occasionally investigators had 

to cut corners on background investigations and security clearances of employees to supply enough hands to Manhattan 

Project. "Faced with a continuing shortage of scientifically and technically trained personnel, project leaders early on 

had adopted the policy of weighing the degree of risk against the contributions an employee with security clearance 

problems could make in development of atomic weapons" Qones 1985, p. 260). In addition, even when background 

investigations were not quite complete, employees were placed on non-classified assignments until cleared for other 

work (Groves 1983).

A ll employees were fingerprinted. The fingerprints of any individual matching arrest records at the FBI were further 

investigated. The arrest record was compared with what the individual had reported when applying. If any 

discrepancies existed, the individual was questioned. "Depending on his attitude when questioned, the seriousness of his 

arrest record, the quality of his work, his absentee record, and the need for men of his particular ability, he was either 

retained or discharged. No one was hired or kept on who had been convicted of rape, arson, or narcotics charges. Such 

persons were felt to be unreliable because of their demonstrated weakness in moral fiber and their liability to blackmail" 

(Groves 1983, p. 145).

The standards for employment of the construction employees were less strict than that of the operations employees. So 

when construction came close to completion in the mid-1940s and employees would be free to transfer to the operation 

department, each construction employee was re-investigated to guarantee that they met the standards for the new 

position. Re-investigation included reviewing references, re-interviewing, and obtaining more personal history details.

In some cases, the re-investigation determined that certain individuals who had worked on construction did not pass the 

requirements for operations work. They could be assigned jobs in non-classified areas with notes in their files that they 

were not to receive any area badges that gave clearance to enter the production areas. Even when current Du Pont 

employees from other sites where transferred to the Hanford Site, their personnel files were reviewed to ensure 

compliance with Hanford's security standards (Du Pont 1944-1946). <

The same security requirements were applied to the hiring of subcontractors to work on the Hanford Site. "District 

contractors or subcontractors first had to be cleared before classified information could be made available to them. 

Company clearance[s were] designed principally to eliminate contractors with potentially subversive foreign affiliations 

and to prevent fraud and collusion, by disclosing the financial assets of the company, members of the directors, principle 

stockholders, etc. Clearance was based on...a credit report, and agency checks of key personnel" (UPOA 1977b, bk. 1, 

vol. 14, pp. 3.7-3.8).

2 - 8 .2 8
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e S E C im rr

Each Hanford Site employee was authorized or cleared to receive only certain types of information and enter only certain 

areas on the Hanford Site for security and secrecy reasons. To identify what clearances an employee was given, a 

clearance symbol system was established. The symbol that appeared on the employee's badge identified the clearance 

categories that the individual had been granted. The clearance symbols used were the Q, L, and WA.

The Q clearance was the highest clearance 

category and was originally indicated by a blue 

background on the badge. It cleared the individual 

for access to all types o f classified information "as 

determined by job-related need-to-know" (RHO 

1986-87, sect 72-01, p. 1). The Q clearance also 

authorized the employee to transport classified 

documents and to have access to special nuclear 

materials and protected areas (RHO 1986-87, 

sect.72-01.1, p. 2). An L clearance was the next 

clearance category and was originally indicated by 

a yellow background on the badge. It also cleared 

the individual to receive classified information, but 

only at the confidential and restricted level and 

authorized the employee to have access to 

protected areas. The "W A" (work authorization) 

status was for employees who were not cleared to 

receive any classified information or enter any 

protected areas (RHO 1986-1987). Other badge 

symbols that were used previously to indicate 

access authorization to specific areas and buildings 

are shown in Table 2-8.2.

During the Manhattan Project, many employees were required to hold Q clearances thus necessitating a large number of 

background investigations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted many of the background investigations for 

Q clearances on Hanford Site applicants for the Atomic Energy Commission. The load of background investigations 

would frequently require the Richland Federal Bureau of Investigation office to bring in additional agents. The policy on 

these investigations was that all contacts were made personally. This meant they had to rely on other Federal Bureau of 

Investigation offices if an applicant ever lived, worked, went to school, etc., in another state. The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation agents in that state made the personal contacts, and reported back to the Richland Federal Bureau of 

Investigation office. By 1971, the number of Q clearance background investigations had dropped significantly.

However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had begun to conduct reinvestigations on current employees in high 

security clearance positions to update their personal files (Parkhurst 1999).

During the late 1980s, all badges had a green (DOE standard) or gray (Hanford Site- specific) background, and the 

symbols were simplified. The letter clearance code was replaced with numbers, the higher the number, the more access 

allowed. The Q clearances were indicated by a 3, L clearances by a 2, and WA clearances by a 1. The Q/3 clearances 

had access to all types of information and areas as before. The L/2 clearances had access to limited and protected areas 

(K Basins, Plutonium Finishing Plant, Fast Flux Test Facility) and secret and confidential information. The WA/1 

clearances had access to everything else not requiring a Q/3 or L/2 clearance. The only other symbol was Z clearance 

(referring to the building number of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, 234-5Z), which allowed access to the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant for those with at least a L/2 clearance. This information is available only on a secure, not public, website. 

For further information or verification of this information, contact Larry Wonch (Administrative Security at B&W 

Protection, Inc.).

Table 2-8.2. Badge Symbols for Secured Areas in the M id- 7 980s

Access Badge

Controlled Areas Location Symbol

Limited Areas 100 Area 1

200 Areas 2

300 Areas 3

400 Areas 4

Protected Areas K Storage Basin K

100 Areas N Reactor N

Vital Area (N Reactor/Control Room) V

200 Areas 209-E Building E

PUREX Facility. X

PFP . z

300 Area 308, 324, and 325 Buildings A

400 Area Permanent Key Card Entry P

Temporary Key Card Entry T

. Yard Access O nly Y

700 Area Data Processing Center (Federal Bldg.) D

2 - 8 .2 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

NSiVEHl

Figure 2-8.16. Subject to Search Billboard

Sa feg u a r d s

Security measures included safeguards, such as 

conducting searches, prohibiting certain items, 

establishing a lock and key system, securing 

computers, and installing electronic security devices.

Searches and Prohibited Items

As part of the security measures against sabotage and 

espionage at the Hanford Site, patrol officers 

conducted both body and vehicle searches to prevent 

contraband items from entering the Hanford Site and 

classified materials from leaving it.

Searches were more necessary and frequent during the 

Manhattan Project than during the later Cold War era. 

However, everything and everyone were still subject to 

search at any time (see Figure 2-8.16). in some 

restricted areas, every person and every vehicle were 

searched upon entry and exit (Du Pont 1944-1946, 

sec. 2/Oct. 2, 1945, p. 4). By the mid-1980s, locations 

requiring personal property searches during entry and 

exit were reduced to the following protected areas and 

facilities: 100 N Area, 100 K Basin, Plutonium 

Finishing Plant (234-5Z), Plutonium-Uranium 

Extraction Facility (202-A), Critical Mass Laboratory 

(209-E), Plutonium Fabrication Pilot Plant (308), and 

Fast Flux Test Facility (405). Routine and random 

searches were still performed across the rest of the 

Hanford Site (RHO 1986-1987). Personal searches 

included sporadic searches of the person's body and 

clothing and examination of bags, lunch pails, purses, 

etc. (GE 1958b). Vehicle searches involved 

examination of the interior (including glove 

compartment), trunk, under the hood, and under the 

vehicle body (chassis) (see Figure 2-8.17) (Du Pont 

1944-1946, GE 1955b).

Items considered contraband or prohibited on the 

Hanford Site included firearms or weapons, cameras 

and recording or transmitting devices, illegal drugs and 

alcohol, explosives, and incendiary devices (RHO 1986-1987). Originally, the list also included binoculars, telescopes, 

film, and persona! vehicles (Du Pont 1945a). Prohibited items were confiscated unless the individual had a Prohibited 

Articles Property Pass, which was issued for prohibited items approved for use on the Hanford Site because they were 

necessary to conduct specific work (RHO 1986-1987). Today, personal vehicle access is permitted on most of the 

Hanford Site w ith the exception of much of the 300 and 400 Areas and parts of the 100 and 200 Areas. The Hanford Site 

Patrol can periodically conduct vehicle and personal searches anywhere on the Hanford Site.

Figure 2-8.17. Hanford Patrol Officer Inspecting a Vehicle at

a Perimeter Barricade, 1957

2 - 8 .3 0
Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

Lock and Key System

A lock and key system was started at the Hanford Site during the mid-1940s. "Each area [had] an independent key 

system, consisting of a single grand master with several master and sub-master keys subsidiary to it" (Du Pont n.d, p. 12) 

for buildings and equipment. "A group of these master type keys [were] the individual keys for (1) building door lock sets 

and padlocks; and (2) special purpose padlocks" (Du Pont n.d, p. 13). The Hanford Site Patrol has been responsible for 

the key system since October 1944 (Du Pont n.d.).

Magnetic (mag) Cards began to be used 1979 as a type of key to control access to buildings by authorized employees. 

The magnetic card was inserted into a reader at the entrance to a building. The reader scanned the card to identify the 

magnetic strip inside (Cadd 1998). If accepted, the door briefly unlocked for the employee to enter. Similarly, Key Cards 

were issued in some locations, such as PUREX, as employees passed through area badge houses. These cards were 

individually programmed to allow access to authorized locations within the area; for example, through certain doors and 

into certain rooms. OM NI Locks (key pads) were another device used at the Hanford Site to control access to restricted 

buildings or rooms. These locks used a security access code that had to be correctly punched into the keypad.

By the mid-1980s, two types of locks and keys existed: security and non-security. Upon official request, security keys 

were issued to employees with Q or L clearances for access to areas, buildings, etc., containing classified information or 

equipment when necessary to perform their work. Non-security keys to unclassified and non-sensitive areas were issued 

upon official request to any prime contractor employee. Keys were issued to other contractor employees when the 

contractor's security department submitted a request in writing and only for the areas, buildings, etc., associated with the 

contractor (RHO 1986-1987).

Computer Security

In the early days of computers, computer security consisted only of employees using passwords, backing up the 

information on their computers, and setting up lock and key systems to protect sensitive information. It was not until the 

U.S. Department of Energy issued Order 1360.2, Unclassified Computer Security for Sensitive Systems in 1980 that an 

official computer security plan was put into effect (Fluckiger 1998).

Computer security has been defined as "the protection resulting from all measures designed to prevent deliberate or 

inadvertent unauthorized disclosure, acquisition, manipulation, modification, or loss of information contained in a 

[computer] system" (RHO 1978-1986, chap. 21, p. 3). Computers were ranked as classified or unclassified. Classified 

computers were stored in fully enclosed rooms with security access alarms. Only authorized employees had access to 

the computer room and the computer system via access locks, identification-verifying systems, and password protection. 

Users of classified computers had to have the appropriate security clearance and special computer security training.

Users of unclassified computers received computer security training as well. Even unclassified computers require a 

certain amount of security, such as the use of passwords. The Safeguards and Security personnel randomly examined 

unclassified computer systems to ensure they contained no classified information. (RHO 1978-4986).

Electronic Security Devices

Over the years, electronic security devices were incorporated into the Hanford Site security system. The use of 

electronic devices added state-of-the-art technology, efficiency, and effectiveness to security and allowed the Hanford 

Site Patrol to streamline its patrol routes and posts. The electronic devices cover two main areas, nuclear materials and 

intruders, and consist basically of detection systems, alarms, and complex computer systems. Because many of the 

electronic systems are presently in use, this discussion is limited to a few examples of either discontinued or nonsensitive systems.

Nuclear Material Control Systems: Until the 1960s, nuclear material was tracked manually on paper. During 

the 1960s, the General Electric Company used a punch card system to track nuclear material. Beginning in 

1965 with contractor diversification at the Hanford Site, various systems were developed and used by individual 

contractors to track the material for which they were responsible. In 1967, the Atomic Energy Commission

2 - 8 3 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

established the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System. This system (applied at all the Atomic 

Energy Commission nuclear material sites and still in use) had a computerized database to track nuclear material 

at all the sites. The Hanford Site submitted nuclear material data each month to this database (Walker 1999).

From 1980-1992, the Westinghouse Hanford Company used the Safeguards Active Response Inventory System 

(SARIS) to track the inventory and location of nuclear material on the Hanford Site. It consisted of three separate 

computer systems: SARIS I located in the 308 Plutonium Fabrication Pilot Plant and the 309 Plutonium Recycle 

Test Reactor facility, SARIS II located in the 427 Fuels Materials and Examination Facility, and the Nuclear 

Material Safeguards Computer System located in the 234-5Z Plutonium Finishing Plant. At each of these 

locations, a nuclear material custodian logged in information on the movement and storage of the nuclear 

material. SARIS systems were later replaced with new and improved operating systems. See the Expanded 

Historic Property Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet for more information on the buildings 

mentioned above.

The fourth computer system used by Westinghouse, the Vault Safety and Inventory System, was installed in the 

2736-Z Primary Plutonium Storage Facility in 1985/1986 for "on-line, real-time monitoring of the items stored in 

vaults" (DOE 1990, p. 8-4). (For more information, see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Forms for these 

buildings in Appendix B on the Internet.) This system was a state-of-the-art detection, measurement, 

annunciation, and alarm system. It could monitor the inventory of individual canisters containing plutonium by 

the unique electronic signature that each canister contained. This system is still in service.

The Plutonium Finishing Plant had an associated Central Alarm Station in the 2701 -ZA Building (for more 

information, see the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 2701-ZA Building in Appendix B on the Internet).

From this building, patrol officers watched the activities in the Plutonium Finishing Plant complex, including the 

shipping/receiving area, access gates, and storage vaults 24 hours per day. Alarms would alert the Hanford Site 

Patrol to breaches in security, and they would take appropriate action. This system is still in service.

Intruder Detection: During the early days at the Hanford Site, the only way to detect intruders was visually.

Later, technological advances brought detection equipment to the Hanford Site. Many of these intruder 

detection systems are still in place and therefore cannot be discussed in detail. The types of detection systems 

that have been used on the Hanford Site include, but are not limited to, motion sensors of various types, 

surveillance cameras, night vision equipment, and metal detectors, such as those used at airports. The locations 

and use of these systems have changed over time as security requirements of specific areas have changed.

Em e r g e n c y Pr epa r ed n ess

The Hanford Site Emergency Preparedness Program was initiated in 1943 as the Project Emergency Plan to cover a range 

of emergency situations. Types of emergencies affecting site security include sabotage and hostage situations. For 

specifics about emergency situations such as natural disasters, fires, and medical emergencies, see Section 10, Worker 

Health and Safety. The original mission of the Project Emergency Plan was to provide "maximum protection to life and 

property during a period of emergency" (Du Pont 1945a, p. 1373).

The Project Emergency Plan during the Manhattan Project called for a response group, made up of a variety of staff 

members under a central coordinator, to report to the field manager for emergencies whether security related or not. This 

group received backup and support from a parallel response group consisting of the area engineer and the Hanford Site 

Patrol. The support group was prepared to contribute staff and equipment during emergencies. The Project Emergency 

Plan mainly consisted of warning notifications and procedures for emergency evacuation of personnel from the 100 Area, 

200 Areas, and the Hanford construction camp. Evacuations were originally monitored and controlled within the 

Emergency Control Center located at the construction camp Patrol Headquarters. A secondary control center was 

located in Richland Village (Du Pont 1945a, GE 1958b). ,

Since the beginning of the Manhattan Project, practice evacuations were conducted regularly. The crash alarm 

emergency telephone system installed in the 100 and 200 Areas in late 1945 was tested during these practices (Du Pont 

1944-1946). One scenario outlined emergency procedures in case of a night air raid on the Hanford Site. A total plant

2 - 8 .3 2
Se c t io n 8 - Sh e Se c u r it y

blackout was planned so that enemy aircraft would have difficulty sighting the targets (presumably the production 

facilities). As described in Security Bulletin #54 (Jaynes 1950), the Hanford Site Patrol would be responsible for notifying 

all key departments with duties to perform during this type of emergency. Employees would also be notified of the 

blackout It was the employees' responsibility to remain indoors and turn off all exterior and interior lights. If it was 

necessary to use indoor lights, windows and doors would be covered with blackout curtains such that no light could 

escape. Any emergency outdoor lights used during a blackout were to be pointed downward. Passengers in vehicles 

(including both automobiles and trains) would stop the vehicle, turn off all lights, and enter the nearest building or, if not 

near a building, remain in the vehicle. The patrol officers would restrict vehicle traffic from entering or exiting the 

perimeter barricades and would be stationed at main road intersections on the Hanford Site to stop and hold traffic with 

their lights off until the blackout was canceled (Jaynes 1950).

With the Cold War, emergency preparedness concerns increased and the program's goal focused on protecting the 

Hanford Site employees first, the environment second, and the facilities last (Schuette 1998). The potential for sabotage 

of critical facilities and holding the world hostage with nuclear materials became the greatest concern during the 

Cold War era. By 1962, Radiological Emergency plans dictated the organization of Radiological Emergency Staff, 

personnel whose special skills and experience made them useful in responding to a radiological emergency. The 

Radiological Emergency Staff included plotters to track the radiological emissions and emergency status (levels of staff, 

equipment, and exposure), a message clerk to relay messages from the plotters to the radio room, runners to maintain 

team communication, a meteorologist to track the effect of the weather on the emergency, radiation survey team 

members, and a supervisor.

Although called the Radiological Emergency Staff, the members of this team were notified in case of emergencies caused 

by any release including biological, chemical, or radiological. When notified, the members reported immediately to the 

Plotting Room located in the basement of the last wing of the 703 Administration Building (for details see the Historic 

Property Inventory Form for 703 Building in Appendix B on the Internet). If the emergency occurred during off hours, the 

members were notified through the Richland Crash Alarm System, which was a "block of twenty ordinary residential 

telephones in member's [sic]

Table 2-8.3. Hanford Site Emergency Alarms

Meaning Employee Action

H o w le r (ah-oo-gah)

C ong o r H orn 

W avering/W ailing Siren

Steady Siren

Continuous A ir M o n ito r

or Ringing Bell and 

Flashing Red Light

Crash A larm (telephone)

C rrticality

homes, all of which could be 

connected into a conference call 

from the master phone at the 

Security Patrol Emergency 

Officer's desk in the basement of 

the 703 Building" (Heid 1962, 

no. 01.1, p.11). These phones 

would ring continuously, 

interrupt any busy phones while 

cutting off that connection, and 

deliver an emergency 

notification, instructions, and a 

call to duty.

In the case of a radiological 

emergency, Hanford Site 

employees would be notified by

the "Take Cover" and "Evacuation" Hanford Site Emergency Alarms (see Table 2-8.3). In the event of a radiological 

emergency evacuation, a caravan transported employees to staging areas located past the Yakima Barricade in the 

community of Whitstran, southwest of the Hanford Site (Heid 1962). Later, staging areas were developed in each 

Hanford Site area. In many cases, individual buildings had specific staging areas that were also used for general building 

emergencies such as fires.

Fire

Take C over

Evacuation

A irborne

R adioactivity

Emergency

Instructions

Run, d o n 't w alk, o u t o f the b u ild in g to staging 

area at least 100 feet aw ay

Evacuate bu ild in g and go to staging area

Stay inside or seek shelter, do not leave b u ild ing, 

close w indo w s, doors, and v e n tila tion systems

G o to staging area after securing w o rk station

Evacuate area im m ediately; stop w o rk and e x it b u ild in g

A nsw er telephone crash alarm and listen fo r instructions

2 - 8 .3 3
The Emergency Preparedness Program was continually updated, modified, and streamlined to meet changing conditions. 

Training, testing, and practices were carried out throughout the year by individual contractors involved in the program, 

and once a year the Emergency Preparedness staff conducted a large-scale emergency exercise at the Hanford Site. In 

the event of an actual emergency, an incident command post would be set up in the field to handle the situation. Also, 

the Emergency Operation Center in the Federal Building in Richland would be staffed with appropriate personnel to 

support the command post and handle off-site public notification. Site security personnel stationed in the Emergency 

Operation Center would stay in contact with the Emergency Control Centers, which have been located in the 100-N,

200 East, 200 West, 300, and 400 Areas since the early 1980s (Schuette 1998).

The Emergency Operation Center (now called the Patrol Operations Center) is located in the 2721-E Building in the 

200 East Area. Before 1983, the Patrol Operations Center was located in the basement of the Federal Building in 

Richland. Some specific examples of the Emergency Control Centers located at the Hanford Site over the years include 

one located in the 703 Building basement, one in the basement of the 3701-D Building that was a self-contained center 

with pressure-seal doors, and one located within the 6652-L Nike Missile Base Underground Missile Storage Facility 

where a war board would be assembled to track events in case of a nuclear accident or attack. See the Historic Property 

Inventory Forms in Appendix B on the Internet for the 3701-D and 6652-L facilities for more detail.

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

Security at the Hanford Site has undergone many changes and challenges since the end of the Cold War. Security 

measures have been evaluated and reassessed as a result of the change in the Hanford Site mission. Security has become 

more relaxed in certain aspects and yet increased and improved in others. Along with this, the employee view of 

security sometimes focuses too much on the fact that the Cold War is over, not necessarily realizing that that does not 

change the security goals. Further research into the security changes and challenges caused by the end of the Cold War 

and new mission at the Hanford Site would be worthwhile.

Because many of the security measures of the Cold War are still in practice today, numerous sources dealing with 

security issues at the Hanford Site are still classified. When these documents are declassified, future researchers w ill be 

able to give a fuller account of site security during the Cold War than could be developed here. The following 

U.S. Department of Energy documents detail the transition effort:

• Security Transition Program Office Progress Report (Nousen 1994)

• Security Transition Program Office (STPO): Technology Transfer o f the STPO Process, Tools, and Techniques

(Hauth et al. 1994)

• Hanford Vision 2000 Team Security brochures:

- Security Transition: Changing the Face o f Hanford (DOE 1994c)

- Lessons from Hanford: Managing Change in the DOE Complex (DOE 1994d)

Hanford Security Transition: Tools for Change (DOE 1994e)

A collection of unedited, unpublished, narrated video footage exists in the U.S. Department of Energy's Video Production 

department (currently run by Lockheed Martin Services, Inc.) in the Federal Building, Room 127. This collection 

includes historic and current footage of security operations, specifically, Tactical and Special Response Team exercises, 

special security vehicle use (helicopters, fast attack, tanks), patrol officer fitness training and requirements, K-9 Unit 

training, security control rooms, vehicle searches, check points, and examples and explanations of electronic security 

devices (x-ray machines, the Nuclear Material Tracking System, motion detectors). This footage, along with a supportive 

narrative and oral interviews, could be used to create a video history of security at the Hanford Site.

One of the sub-themes of Hanford Site security is the operation of the counter-intelligence organization, Further research 

into the detailed operations of counter-intelligence at the Hanford Site and in Richland Village would provide a view of 

an underground security force involved in security-related activities aimed at protecting national security. Although

2 - 8 .3 4
S e c tio n 8 - S h e S e c u rity

counter-intelligence operations are not unique to the Hanford Site, details of its operations during the Manhattan Project 

and Cold War would lend insight into counter-intelligence activities at a plutonium production facility and the 

relationship with national security.

Classification policies used by the Atomic Energy Commission and later the U.S. Department of Energy shielded both 

agencies from questions concerning releases of radioactivity, environmental degradation, and environmental health risks 

to workers and public. Questions concerning whether security practices were legitimate or valid could be a focus for 

future research.

Specific areas of study concerning the effect of site security on environmental and human health, labor unions, and 

research might be:

• How did the atmosphere of security during World War II affect what workers learned of the hazards of working 

at the Hanford Site? How did it influence the ways industrial injuries and diseases were handled in the medical 

and legal system?

• How did compartmentalization and secrecy affect the work place? How did these conditions impact future 

environmental and occupational health problems at the facility?

• How did the security and background checks shape community life in areas such as the environment, civil 

liberties, and civil rights? W hat issues were not raised at the Hanford Site for security reasons?

• W hat was the impact of the security system on the development and activities of labor unions? Did security 

regulations repress unions?

• How did the security system affect scientists and engineers. Did the security system restrict dissent among 

scientists?

2 - 8 .3 5
W ;.
Se c t io n 9 - Mil it a r y Op e r a t io n s

Sec tio n 9 - M il it a r y Ope r a tio n s

M ilitary operations first came to the mid-Columbia region when the U.S. Naval Air Station in Pasco was completed in 

July 1942, 6 months before the Hanford Site was established (DOE 1995d). The U.S. Naval Air Station controlled 

25 airfields, operated and maintained a base for naval aircraft units and aviation personnel, and conducted advanced 

training maneuvers. The only relationship between the Naval A ir Station and the Hanford Site was, after the war, 

barracks from the U.S. Naval Air Station were barged up the Columbia River for use at the North Richland Construction 

Camp and the U.S. Army's Camp Hanford. Other military operations during World War II in the mid-Columbia region 

were at Fruitvale, a former airfield located 1 mile west of the Hanford Site's 300 Area, which was also used as a training 

range for bombing exercises.

W hile the Hanford Site played a critical national defense role, providing along with the Savannah River Site 

approximately two-thirds of the nation's weapons-grade plutonium between 1944-1964 (Albright et al. 1993), the 

Hanford Site was not considered a military'installation. Even when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers controlled the 

Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project (1943-1946), actual military operations were minimal. During the early 

post-World War II period, the United States recognized the need for substantial military protection of the Hanford Site 

because of the increased Cold War era tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and the concurrent 

increase in plutonium production and expansion of Hanford Site facilities.

To provide military protection of the Hanford Site, the U.S. Army established Camp Hanford in 1951. Camp Hanford 

was a military post operated by the Army until 1961. Camp Hanford consisted o f an extensive military compound in 

North Richland and various forward positions situated throughout the Hanford Site. The forward positions were the 

areas on the Hanford Site where the anti-aircraft artillery and later Nike missiles were located.

W hile Camp Hanford operated, the Atomic Energy Commission controlled the Hanford Site, and the Army occupied 

Atomic Energy Commission lands with a permit. The Atomic Energy Commission, a civilian agency, had taken over the 

Hanford Site from the Corps in January 1947. A comprehensive agreement between the Army and the Atomic Energy 

Commission, simply titled the "Army Agreement" (Contract No. DA-45-164-eng-1187) and dated March 1, 1951, 

provided the basic terms under which the Army would occupy, use, and develop, sometimes jointly, Atomic Energy 

Commission lands, structures, services, and utilities for Camp Hanford, both in the North Richland military compound 

and at the anti-aircraft artillery and later Nike missile positions. W hile the Army provided important military protection 

for the Hanford Site, the Atomic Energy Commission's authority was dominant unless the site came under hostile enemy 

attack.

The agreement between the Atomic Energy 

Commission and the Army was amended by 

several supplements. The later supplements 

provided for the restoration and return to the 

Atomic Energy Commission o f various lands and 

facilities remaining under Army jurisdiction with 

the closure of Camp Hanford in 1961. The 

termination of a permanent military presence at the 

Hanford Site came about because of the rapidly 

changing military technology brought on by the 

international arms race. Soon after their 

introduction at the Hanford Site the 120 millimeter 

anti-aircraft guns became obsolete and were 

replaced with the more sophisticated Nike missiles.

2 - 9 .1

( ’ON II NTS

M ilitary Operations During the Manhattan

P roject............................................. ............... .......... 2-9-2

Establishment of Camp Hanford During the

Anti-Aire raft Artillery Sites........... .......... 2-9.5

Nike Mis>ile Installations............................... U W H |

Firing Activities and Ammunition Storage 

Facilities........................................................... ........2-9.12

Camp Hanford Industrial Area...................... ........ 2-9.13

Closure o f Camp H anford............................. ....... 2-9.-13

Areas for f urlher Research............................ ........ 2-9.14

D ivider P.ige Photo: Nike M i& U es (NORAD photoj
Chapter 2 - Piv to n iu m Production Facilities

The Nike missile systems subsequently became outdated with the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

in the United States and the Soviet Union.

With U.S. national defense relying on the nuclear triad of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Trident submarines, and 

Strategic A ir Command B-52s, protecting strategic defense facilities no longer required permanent military installations 

such as Camp Hanford. Security of the Hanford Site's plutonium production facilities for the rest of the Cold War 

became the responsibility of the Hanford Site Patrol.

Mil it a r y Op e r a t io n s Du r in g t h e Ma n h a t t a n P r o je c t

From the beginning, the Corps had utmost concern for security of the plutonium production facilities at the Hanford Site 

(see the discussion in Section 8, Site Security). In addition to the Hanford Site Patrol officers the Corps hired when 

construction began in 1943, the Corps also assigned a small force of m ilitary police and intelligence personnel to protect 

the Hanford Site. The following year, the m ilitary police were assigned to patrol the perimeter of the site. By the end of 

World War II, all patrol functions for the Hanford Site were turned over to the m ilitary police units (DOE 1995d).

Although the number of military police steadily increased after World War II, facility expansion as plutonium production 

increased brought pressure for a larger, more permanent military presence at the site. Troops from Fort Lewis arrived in 

1948 on extended maneuvers to replace the military police. By 1949, a small group of National Guardsmen were 

assigned to the Hanford Site in addition to the troops from Fort Lewis, and at the same time the Atomic Energy 

Commission assigned guard duties to General Electric's security patrols, who were issued light armored tanks. The Army, 

however, viewed the contingent of National Guardsmen and the use of security patrols as inadequate to handle the 

increased security needs because they lacked anti-aircraft capabilities and sufficient manpower (Gerber 1992a).

The National Guardsmen and security patrols were stationed in North Richland, an area that underwent considerable 

growth during the late 1940s due to the expansion of the Hanford Site. By 1950-1951, approximately 25,000 people 

were living in North Richland, which included the first members of the Army's newly established Camp Hanford.

Es t a b l is h m e n t o f Ca m p Ha n f o r d Du r in g t h e Co ld

Wa r Er a

The increasing strategic military importance of the Hanford Site and the growing number of personnel brought about a 

call for a permanent military installation in the area. In response, the U.S. Department of Defense established air defense 

systems at the Hanford Site and placed the U.S. Army in charge of operating those systems. The Army in turn established 

Camp Hanford.

The Atomic Energy Commission had constructed 

most of the structures in Camp Hanford's military 

compound beginning in 1947 when they built the 

North Richland Construction Camp as housing and 

offices during expansion of the Hanford Site. The 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was brought in to 

complete the construction of Camp Hanford, 

including structures in the compound and at the 

anti-aircraft artillery sites.

The final boundaries of the camp were set in 1955 

when the Atomic Energy Commission transferred 

1100 acres in North Richland to the Army

t .imp M.uiioid'v militarv tonipm m d in Nnrih Rkhland

tiinsistrd or an .ulntinUlr.ilht' wira K .imp H.im'urd I

I liMtlqu.irlvrs wliii.li lalei hv< ame (lie Opvi Jliuiii .mil )

V>rvi(i“ liiiililinn for the l\i<ili< K m llm c-1 National

Itibur.ilun.i, l),irr.Kk» Kanlonniviil areas i, (h r li.tilvi p.nk,

"liiem erlnn" hoiismt- (picfahi haled ivsitlvnh.il unil* hom ;i

l*ut»et Miuntl Naval ships aid in l*i vmci tun), a to iiiin em ul

/lis jitit hifspii.il m i ililivs. le tI'i m I I m ii tvnlvrs. a school. power

house, reservoir, pump house, an indusliial area, and liiirm

r.in«»vs isee I iguie l-* l. 11.

2 -9 .2
Se c t io n 9 - M il it a r y Op e r a t io n s

Figure 2-9.1. Layout o f Camp Hanford's M ilitary Compound in North Richland, 1951

(Franklin 1988), increasing its total area to 3700 acres. By 1955, Camp Hanford encompassed the former North 

Richland Construction Camp, including portions that had been the 3000 Area Camp used in World War II, most of the 

rest of the 3000 Area, and reportedly one of the largest trailer courts (2200 units) in the country at the time 

(Tri-City Herald 1961). Along with the land, the Army also acquired 68 barracks, 2 mess halls, 140 trailer lots, and 

6 bathhouses.

The 1951 "Index Sheet to General and Detail Site Plan and Building Use Map" (available at the Library of the 

U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory) noted approximately 100 structures at Camp 

Hanford. The early housing consisted of two-story barracks obtained from the Pasco Naval Station, one-story barracks, 

and other buildings from the former construction camp at the Hanford townsite. The 1957 Index Sheet to General and 

Detail Site Plan and Building Use Map (available at the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural 

Resources Laboratory) indicates 90 buildings plus approximately 140 "Bremerton" style duplexes. The buildings were 

arranged in a symmetrical layout with repetitive rows of barracks and other Army buildings of the 700-800 series of 

mobilization-type construction.

In 1950, the Sixth Army's 5th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group and four attached gun battalions (the 83rd, 501st, 518th, and 

519th) began to replace the National Guardsmen at the Hanford Site before the formal establishment of Camp Hanford. 

The 770th Gun Battalion, a Washington National Guard unit, was assigned to Camp Hanford in July 1951. The battalion 

returned to reserve status in 1952 when the 83rd Gun Battalion replaced it.

2 - 9 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The first Army contingents to arrive at the Hanford Site to operate the air defense systems lived in temporary barracks 

until Camp Hanford was established in 1951. The initial Camp Hanford contingent "consisted of only eight officers and 

fourteen enlisted men plus civilians" (Army 1958, p. 1). At full strength, the contingent consisted of the four battalions, 

each responsible for four batteries (A, B, C, and D). Battery was the name used both for the sub-groups in the battalions 

and the locations where the artillery was installed. Each battery had 100 Army personnel assigned to it. In addition, 

another 400 soldiers were assigned to each of the four battalions along with 1500-3000 personnel including civilians 

who provided support at the Camp Hanford Headquarters in North Richland. Thus, roughly 5000 personnel were 

stationed at Camp Hanford at any one time, including civilian government employees and non-federal workers 

(Wellington 1998, Army 1961).

The 501st, 518th, and 519th battalions served at the Hanford Site from 1950-1958. The 83rd Gun Battalion, activated in 

1950 as a 120 millimeter gun battalion, was assigned to Camp Hanford in 1952. The battalion was redesignated the 83rd 

Missile Battalion in 1954 in preparation for replacing the 120 millimeter guns with Nike Ajax missiles the following year. 

Beginning in late 1956, the 120 millimeter guns from the 501st, 518th, and 519th gun battalions were removed from 

Camp Hanford and reassigned to National Guard units (Aradcom Angus 1958). In 1958, the Nike Ajax missiles were 

removed from Camp Hanford and the 83rd Missile Battalion was deactivated.

The Mtinioid Site mission rvc|iihrd tighl m*< untv .mil Mir Mildirrs

know hi lit* ui llio tisrs <ii iho u< ililiv*. Ihov u e ie .is'ignrd lo

(Joionrl. Ihrx know that Ihv site helped in.nuii.Kluri’ .ltunm

Inimhs hut knew liMlo 01 Mir other she mission*, fi.m k livnt.

t .imp M.mimd \elvr.m , lem.nked, "A/I I knew n.is u r u o rr

th e ie to deiend it ith e lla n io id S ile i. .. it an an plane dew n \c i.

and it n .is n o t tdentnied, it r w e rr supposed to sho ot it d im n. ‘ -

M u lk k IW Ii. p. C I

l

Camp Hanford soldiers had to cope with the 

Hanford Site's intricate security and secrecy 

requirements and contend with harsh living 

conditions in the field. Knowing little of their 

mission or the nature of some of the facilities they 

were assigned to protect, the first anti-aircraft 

artillery personnel were transported to the forward 

positions that initially consisted of nothing more 

than sand and sagebrush. Initial assignments were 

to carve out roads and paths, set up 12- by 24-foot 

tents, and construct sandbagged gun emplacements. 

The batteries of each battalion rotated between the forward positions, where the anti-aircraft artillery (Jater the Nike 

missiles) were located, and the m ilitary compound in North Richland. But for "about [the first] two and one-half months, 

[the soldiers] were picked up each evening and driven back to North Richland to sleep" (Gerber 1992a).

Initial improvements to 

the forward positions 

were completed by 

spring of 1951 and 

included construction of 

revetments (walls) made 

of sandbags and wood 

planking to protect the 

gun emplacements, 

wire communications, 

roads, and temporary 

housing. By the end of 

the first 2 years, living 

conditions for the 

soldiers in the field had 

improved considerably.

New latrines, mess

halls, and sewage facilities were built, and water and power supplies were upgraded.

< .imp I liiniuul i\.i> ' . . iii'i (V m iit h n n v v th a n .»m ako-shiit n iihta r i b.t'-c ...' 'MijIm k

I OOK. p. ( >; «iu ordini* to -oniv w Ii'm iis. ( ontliNon-. in tlir forw.irrl positions during tin*

v.irlx xv.Hs xxciv dvswibrd .w primitixv. ' h n lia lh n r lin 'd in tents, hauled tun wafer,

dim la/tine-. ,)/(• m u d lih c ia lh spunk le d m ith -and. hathed in helm ets and undot hom emade to ld show cis.... T h f equipm ent and \ ch it It"- u r /e hequenllx ob lite rated h \ sand

'-Ivrni'-. I he i title d m ails -c m /i hed nut at the desert m ade haxeling s/on. u n to m io rla h le

and tan kedm a itucn ain e lo hot vine a "te a l fnu hlo m 'i \iin x lo t * , p. ‘n. Pr.ink lirn l,

( .imp ll.iniord xrli r.m, ' ...le m e n ih e r- hu nting shoe polish inside the tent- and sle rp itn*

hat k-to-hai k during m a id ium/in nigh t- /</-/ to keep w atm . .. soldiers also heated then

squad tents h \ stealing healer* ho rn ta il toa d »/i«>r/*>". I liv -.uldn'is h.ul xvrx little limp oil.

’•'tnldieis w o tke d three straight weeks along the p e tnne te r holm e w orking a week out o f

ha na t ks in n in th R uhland. w here th e \'d p e ilu im tnam ienaiu e and othei upkeep tasks.

s o ld ic is u e ie !»/. tided then onlx o il lim e during that w e e k ...' - W uliik I mi;}, p. ( <

2 - 9 .4
Se c t io n 9 - M il it a r y Op e r a t io n s

An t i-A ir c r a f t Ar t il l e r y Sit e s

The primary mission of Camp Hanford was to establish air defense 

systems throughout the Hanford Site including the Riverland area, 

North Slope, and the area now known as the Fitzner/Eberhardt 

Arid Lands Ecology Reserve. This was accomplished by 

encircling the 100 and 200 Areas with sixteen anti-aircraft 

artillery batteries to protect the reactors and chemical 

separations plants (DOE 1995d) (see Figure 2-9.2). Position 

numbers, such as PSN 21, designated the batteries. Seven 

anti-aircraft artillery batteries were located on the North 

Slope, seven in the central area, and two in Riverland. No 

anti-aircraft artillery batteries were established in the area 

now known as the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology 

Reserve. Two base camps without gun emplacements were 

also located in the central area just south of the Columbia 

River. "Base Camp 130 and PSN 71, the D battery of the 83rd 

AAA gun Battalion, both immediately south of the Columbia 

river were abandoned by 1954, possibly because they were 

subject to periodic flooding..." (Maas 1993).

Typically, Camp Hanford's anti-aircraft artillery sites were 

each roughly 20 acres in size and contained any number of 

buildings (typically around 20), various utility distribution 

systems, roads, and sidewalks. Each site consisted of 

emplacements protected by revetments made of sandbags 

and wood planking, wooden structures, prefabricated metal 

buildings, and, later, permanent, concrete block structures.

The most commonly constructed prefabricated buildings 

had aluminum walls and roofs w ith wooden or concrete 

floors set on concrete pier blocks.

 ..

9 ..

0 »

s.Sfies

&snK*u£az!vnt&Seifti&>vf&*

KEY;

s is e s B © 519thA ntiaircraftA rlB leryB att3lion, BatteryD 

Y Former Am m unition Storage Site 

s e e itto 'Q Battalion Headquarters 

B C atoO Base Camp/Site Lacking Gun HAHFORO ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY SITES

SOURCES- U.S. A rm y Command Reports, 1SS2

U.S. D epartm ent o f the Army, 1955

U £ . A rm y C orps o i Engineers, Basic

Inform ation, General Site Map, 1958

Figure 2-9.2. Camp Hanford Anti-Aircraft Artillery Sites

The permanent structures included barracks, latrines, mess halls, craft shops, pump houses, 

motor pools, and radar facilities. Each site typically had a small arms range, water storage 

cistern, sanitary and sewage waste facilities. Pathways, sidewalks, roadways, and 

parking lots connected the structures. Some of the anti-aircraft artillery sites (later 

Nike missile sites) were larger and designated as battalion headquarters sites as 

well as administrative headquarters in the military compound. These 

headquarters sites had administrative facilities, recreation halls, and power

The layout and design of the anti-aircraft artillery sites reflected a 

standard military arrangement o f facilities separated by function. 

The four semi-circular, artillery emplacements with revetments 

were arranged in a square or rectangular plan separate from the 

residential and administrative facilities (see Figure 2-1.3 in 

Section 1).

The first Army defense weapons at the anti-aircraft artillery sites 

consisted of "64-120 mm antiaircraft guns, 64 - .50-caliber

US 120-mm AAGun M-1

Calibre: 120 mm 

B evation: -510*80 degrees 

Travsres: 360detireescoRtinueua 

W efgitii 21-8 tons

Khczla Velocity: 3.100 feet-per»econd 

Rata o f Fire; 12 rounds.peraninuto 

7lm ett-EmpJacc: 40ininutes .

_______________TYPICAL 120mm AOTAiRCRAFTSUN

US Army Corps of Eng frier 1-5

Gffce«6eM996 OrdnanceRecords Search 

7613-021-CdS Hanford, Wastwymn

Figure 2-9.3. 120 M illim eter Anti-Aircraft Cun

Used at Camp Hanford, 1950-1956

2 - 9 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

- . Cl

e r e o

Central A/ea

P S tfts #i A n tia irc ra ft A rtille ry B attery

V Form er A m m unition Storage Site 

N -S -t-B NikeM issH eS ites

X S hrapnel Area 

S O tR C eS : U.S. A rm y Command Reports, 1352

U.S. SOE N orth Slope ERA Proposal, 1393

U.S. A m y Corps o f E ngineers, S a tie E S S E S "

in fo rm a tio n . G eneral S ite M ap, 1952.1958

J . tia e s , Camp Hanford F orw ard P o sitio n , 1993

machine guns, .30-caliber machine guns, antitank 

rockets, hand grenades, and small arms such as pistols 

and rifles" (DOE 1995d, p. 26). Each battery was 

assigned four 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns (see 

Figure 2-9.3). The 120 millimeter gun was "...designed to 

supplement the capabilities of the 90 mm gun and to 

provide an effective defense against high-altitude heavy 

bombers" (DOE 1995d, p. 28).

The most intact anti-aircraft artillery sites remaining on 

the Hanford Site are Positions 61, 51, 50, and 42 located 

along Army Loop Road, and Position 40 on 200 East Hill 

(see Figure 2-9.4). Position 61, a battalion headquarters 

facility, lacked gun emplacements and barracks. Today, 

these sites "consist of specially sparse debris-scatters 

associated with demolished buildings and their contents, 

concrete building pads, traces of former roads and paths, 

ammunition boxes, and the sandbagged [doughnutshaped] revetments, wooden structures and other 

sandbagged/cobblestone structures associated with the 

former antiaircraft artillery sites" (Archaeological Site 

Form HCRC #95-600-005 on file at the Library of the 

U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources 

Laboratory) (see Figure 2-9.5).

Specific remains associated with the above sites include a 

cement obelisk at Position 40, a monument to the 518th

Figure 2-9.4. Camp Hanford Anti-Aircraft Artillery and

Nike Positions

Gun

Battalion, 

Battery D. 

Painted on it 

is "D Battery 

518th" (see 

Figure 2-9.6). 

At several of 

the positions 

a number of 

the partially 

collapsed 

emplacements 

include 

wooden tool 

sheds that 

feature 

painted tool

outlines on the walls (see Figure 2-9.7). A concrete monument is at 

Position 50 with a painted inscription "518th AAA GUN BN (120 mm)" (see 

Figure 2-9.8). The opposite side of the monument has an inscribed 

description of the battalion's colors, coat of arms, and World War II service 

location (Archaeological Site Form HCRC #95-600-005 on file at the Library

Figure 2-9.5. Revetment at Anti-Aircraft Artillery

Position 42, 1994

■ „ * <

Figure 2-9.6. Obelisk at Anti-Aircraft

Artillery Position 40 with Inscription o f

"D Battery 518th," 1994

2 - 9 .6
S ectio n 9 - M il it a r y Op e r a t io n s

V

I

Figure 2-9.7. Interior o f Tool Shed at the AntiAircraft Artillery Position 40, 1994

of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources 

Laboratory).

Beginning in 1954, the Army supplemented the anti-aircraft 

artillery guns with Nike surface-to-air missiles. In late 1957 and 

early 1958, thirteen anti-aircraft artillery sites were phased out of 

service, and their associated structures and equipment were 

declared excess. The other three anti-aircraft artillery sites were 

retained and modified to support the three North Slope Nike sites.

N ik e Mis s il e In s t a l l a t io n s

The Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules missile defense systems were 

developed in response to heightened Cold War tensions and the 

escalating international arms race. Nike missile systems were 

capable of engaging high speed aerial targets at greater ranges than 

conventional anti-aircraft artillery. From the early 1950s to the 

mid-1970s, Nike Ajax and Hercules missiles (see Figure 2-9.9) 

were deployed by the U.S. Army at 292 sites throughout the 

continental United States to protect major metropolitan areas and 

strategic military installations from enemy aerial attack.

During the mid-1950s, Nike missiles gradually replaced most of 

the 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns at the Hanford Site. The Nike 

Ajax was the first generation, pioneer surface-to-air Nike missile.

The Nike Ajax systems employed liquid-fueled missiles armed with 

conventional warheads and "...used a ground-based guidance 

system w ith three integrated radar systems" (Bender 1998). First 

deployed nationally in 1954, the Nike Ajax missile (see 

Figure 2-9.10), 35 feet in length with a range of 10-12 miles, was a 

two-stage missile using a solid-fueled booster and a liquid-fueled sustainer motor to deliver high explosive warheads to a 

radar-determined intercept point with a targeted aircraft (McMaster et al. 1984).

Figure 2-9.8. Concrete Monument to "518th AAA

Cun Battalion ( 120mm)," at Position 50, 7 994

The Nike Hercules missile (see Figure 2-9.11), 39 feet long with a range of 75-80 miles, was introduced in

1958 and gradually replaced the Ajax. "The Hercules was a two-stage missile which differed from Ajax 

in that the sustainer motor was solid-fueled, and the warheads were primarily nuclear" (McMaster 

et al. 1984, Summary Page). The Hercules missile was more powerful than the Ajax. It was 

faster, had more than seven times the range, protected more than nine times the area, and 

used conventional as well as nuclear warheads. "The advantage of the Hercules

missile was its ability to attack high speed, high-flying aircraft formations at greater 

range with a single nuclear warhead" (DOE 1995d, p. 24).

Between 1955 and 1958, the Army deployed Nike missiles at four 

locations on the Hanford Site. Whereas the position numbers for the 

anti-aircraft artillery were designated by "PSN," "H " designated 

those for the Nike missiles. Each of the four Nike missile sites 

had a control site and a launch site, which were indicated by 

"C " and "L" at the end of their position numbers. Three of 

the Nike installations were located on the Wahluke 

Figure 2-9.9. Nike Missiles Ajax, Hercules, and Zeus (North) Slope (H-06-C and H-06-L on Saddle Mountain,

2 - 9 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

■ Nose Warhead

-Arming Mechanisms (2)

Center Warhead

Tunnel No. 4

L e n g th : 21 fe e t( 3 5 ‘ w /b o o s te r) 

D ia m e te r: -1 2 in c h e s 

W e ig h t, L o a d e d : 2 ,46 0 lb s .

P a y lo a d W e ig h t: 3 0 0 lb s .

R a n g e : 10-12 m ile s 

A ltitu d e : - 2 5 m ile s 

V e lo c ity : 1 ,4 9 0 m p h 

S u s ta in e r T h r u s t -2 ,6 0 0 .Ib s .

S u s ta in e r P r o p e lla n t N itr ic A c id & J P - 4 

S u s ta in e r F irin g T im e : 3 0 s e c o n d s 

B o o s te r P r o p e lla n t S o lid

H-12-C and L at Othello, and H-83-C and L at Priest Rapids) and one on the 

Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, H-52-C and L (see

'//n - -/7m-; oj \ ik v lu llo i/<->. ii.i«.

''a w rn i'tt In /im /ii t.u liir*. in i luriitty:

m m l.ilin m . 1 otu t'rn inv m inim um

i ctfuii vd (//s/.iiK (‘.s t.vp.u.itinii populated

.Him-, from in-st.ill.uhm- «.hnins* known

.im m m l- o r o\plo->hcs- m axim um and

m inim um / e<ti i< lion's on the di-ta m t’

•svfy.ii,ifin ii h u m h .m il < o n fro l a rv.i-'

fh r Itn.U ion o f Iho < o n lio l area on ,i

io p o w a p h ii hiah o r othoi atva w ith an

i/n o b -tru t tod radai \ iv it ; .1m l the

arransiemvnt 01 n il lu ttc iie - m .1 -inuiv

doicn-v in to . 1 1 oho te n t rini> p o -ifio n n l

,1/ .i/i optim um txidiu- tio m tlw

m c tio p n liln n u r -str.itoiin r vn lo i lo ho

de fended. . Itindrr p. 1

Aft Warhead

Handling Loops

_______ N IK E A J A X W A R H E A D

US A rm y C orps o f Engineers 

December 1994 O rd n a n ce * Explosive W tiste Records Search 

7618-021 *005 Hanford, W ashington

Figure 2-9.10. Nike Ajax Missile

Length: 27 fee t (39 w/booster) 

Diam eter: 31.5 inches 

Span: 8,75 feet 

W eight, Loaded: 5,000 lbs. (10,400 w /booste 

Payload W e ig h t -1 ,00 0 lbs.

Range: 75-80 m iles 

A ttitude: -3 5 m iles 

Velocity: 2,200 m ph 

S ustainer T h ru st: -10,000 ibs.

S ustainer P ropellant: Solid 

B oo ster P ropellant: Solid 

B o o s te r Firing T im e: 4 seconds

NIKE HERCULES WARHEAD

US Army Corps o f Engineers 

December 1994 Ordnance & Explosive Wasle Records Search 

7618-021 *C0S Hanford, Washington

Figure 2-9.11. Nike Hercules Missile

A ll four batteries were of 

similar construction and 

layout, consisting of the 

control center, launch area, 

and associated barracks and 

administration buildings.

Each Nike missile site had 

tw o launch sites, two 

underground missile storage 

magazines, twenty Ajax 

missiles, and eight 

launchers.

In 1958, H-06-L was 

modified to accommodate 

twelve Hercules nuclear

missiles as well as retain the -------------------------------------------------------| | j

capability to launch Ajax 

missiles (DOE 1995d) (see 

Figure 2-9.12).

Differences in the technology o f the Hercules missile and its

related systems necessitated changes in the design and

configuration o f the sites that were equipped with this more

advanced missile type. The changes made to the Nike Hercules

launcher areas typically included: the addition o f a separate

warheading building; enhancements to the standby power

generating facilities; a second (inner) layer o f security fencing

directly surrounding the underground missile storage and

ground-level launch facilities; enhanced site security features and

additional sentry stations; and, a kennel for sentry dogs. The need

for increased site security reflected the fact that the Hercules

missile - unlike its predecessor, the Ajax - could be armed with

either conventional (high-explosive) o r nuclear [W -31] warheads.

Modifications to the control. . . areas o f Hercules-equipped sites

typically included the following elements: standby power

generating system enhancements; . . . additional radar towers and

improved radar systems; and, new buildings housing equipment

related to those radar systems (Bender 1998).

Whether a Nike site had Ajax or Hercules missiles, the battery control area 

and the launch area were located from 1000 to 6000 yards apart. "The 

minimum distance was determined by the maximum elevation tracking rate 

of the missile-tracking radar, and the maximum distance was determined by 

the maximum length of the cable available to connect the battery control 

trailer w ith the launcher control trailer" (Artillery School 1955, p. 3).

2 - 9 .8

i
Se c t io n 9 - M il it a r y Op e r a t io n s

W hile the layout and type of structures within each area was sitespecific, each installation had certain design and layout features 

and structures in common. The battery control area generally was 

located on 10-50 acres of land while the launch area was located 

on approximately 40-60 acres. Barracks were situated in either the 

launch area or the battery control area or both, as was the case at 

the Hanford Site. When located in the launch area, they were 

approximately one-quarter to one-half mile away from the actual 

launch sites (IT 1992).

Battery Control Area

The battery control areas were normally placed on the highest 

possible point. They contained all the radar, guidance, electronic, 

and communications equipment needed to identify incoming 

targets, launch missiles, and direct and guide missiles in flight to 

intercept enemy aircraft. The areas included the acquisition radar, 

the target-tracking radar, the missile-tracking radar, the radar control 

trailer, the battery control trailer, and the maintenance and spare 

parts trailer.

r a ^ r a g g g g g g g p

Figure 2-9.12. Former Nike Missile Launch Area

(Position H-06-L) Located on the North Slope

Ground-based radar and guidance systems were a 

unique and defining feature of the Nike missile 

system. The ground-based radar and guidance 

systems were situated in mobile trailers and 

interconnected with communication cables. The 

radar units were either located atop metal towers or 

set on concrete foundation structures, piers, or pads 

with a variety of radar antennas (Bender 1998).

"//ft- .7m om nii'J t.im ot it,it id vnliiU 'd In Ihv .n q o id lin n radar

a n ti then tra n -ie n c d to the U ru v t 1i,n Liny radar, m /iu/i fr.n Led

the target thio ug ho ut it*, flig h t to the in tv n <yif point. 7o t o n tro l

flig h t and eiv.agv the \/At* \ja \ m i-d le * u -vtl a

UuidaiH i* st s/i'/n < t/ordinatcd it ith ra d ii unil-, on thv ground

th e \ja \ ix a s la u n th rd ln rem ote w n tr o l from a neaih 1 e rtu ,1/

p o d tiu n .. ' ( s i t I igurv J-‘J. I S'. - \U Xt.istvr v! al. p. 1-1

Figure 2-9.13. Nike Ajax-Missile System for

Tracking and Intercepting Targets

The most important trailers were the battery and radar control trailers. 

"The battery control trailer contained the acquisition radar cabinet 

assembly, the battery control console assembly, the computer 

assembly, an early warning plotting board, and an event recorder... 

The battery control console assembly contained the displays and 

controls required... The radar control trailer contained the target 

console assembly, the missile console assembly, the radar power 

cabinet assembly..." (McMaster et al.1984, pp. 5-7). The controls 

and displays necessary for the tactical operation of the battery were 

located in the battery control console. Two automatic plotting boards 

were mounted directly above the console. The larger board displayed 

the target position and the predicted point of interception. The 

smaller board plotted the altitude of the predicted interception point 

and provided the estimated time of flight to assist in plotting the 

interception (Artillery School 1955).

The Nike Ajax and Hercules missiles were guided by electronic 

beams and directed to their targets using the complex system of radar 

and tracking computers described above. Because of limitations in

2 - 9 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

the tracking and guidance systems, only one missile could be in flight at a time. The Nike Ajax was armed with three 

high-explosive warheads that tw o arming mechanisms and five detonating cords activated after the computer in the 

battery control trailer issued burst orders.

Launch Area

The launch areas contained underground missile storage 

magazines and launch equipment, including buildings 

and structures used for testing and servicing the missiles.. 

These included generator buildings, missile fueling and 

warheading facilities, missile assembly buildings, pump 

houses and other utilities, and administrative, housing, 

and recreation buildings. Most maintenance activities 

were conducted in the launch area.

"D u rin g Ih r tlig h l /i/i.m * -Iv e iin g c om m antls arc

lia n ^ n n tle d In Ihv m M f r \ia ih v heaiu o f the mi-.+ilcti.u k in g la d a i,... I h r n u b ile /m i'/ tn n in u m d is

a u tu m a tita lh tia iw iiille d Ito m the tu n ip u le t tu ih r

n u i'iilr \ hi llw m M ilv -tr.u king radar * - Xrli’Hrrv

>chiMil M/ t l , p. /■

'\ f / " i / f n i.n n lrn a iu t‘ u«is < ondu< led

in lo u r lo t.ilio n ^: Ih r m .igastnr.

<ih n \r ijiiiiiw f.il ih r Itu im h ri Ih r

lu rlin g aiea and ih r «i»*<arii/»/i

innlding. \ \ h r r r 1hc m a in lrn a iu e

look pku e d rjirn d e d tin the -fie t n il

opetation . . \ia jo i \ fiu i fm .i/ irp a irin ju r e d that the nu>>dr h r d e lu d e d

a iu l return ed In ih r j w m hh

huilding LI 1C VH.f,, p W

The main function of the launch areas was to maintain the missiles in a 

combat-ready posture that required the assembly, storage, handling, and 

disposal of missile components and propellants as well as solvents, fluids, 

fuels and other materials required for a variety of support functions. A ll the 

operations necessary to make the missile flight-ready were conducted in the 

launch area.

Missiles arrived at the launch site partially disassembled in thirteen 

individual components, unarmed, and defueled. On arrival, the missiles 

were taken to the Missile Assembly and Testing Building. Next, the missiles 

were transported to the Fueling and Warheading Station for fueling/ 

defueling and warheading. The process involved installing the two 

warheads, connecting the accessory power supply, and joining the missiles 

to the rocket boosters. For safety in case of an accidental explosion, the 

station was encircled by earth berms 8-10 feet high.

From the Fueling and Warheading Station, the missiles were taken to the underground missile storage facility, also called 

the magazine. "The [underground] magazine stored missiles and contained storage racks and a rail system used to

deliver the missiles to the elevator. Once above ground, the missile was moved on 

rails to the launchers" (LETC 1986, p. 34). The launchers and 

transport rails were situated on top of the magazine. The missiles 

were brought up to the ground level on the elevator and 

manually pushed out the elevator door and into position on 

either side of the door. Firing procedures involved 

launching missiles from the elevator launcher and reloading 

until the magazine was exhausted (BOMARC/AF TALOS 

1990) (see Figure 2-9.14).

A single site usually had 12 launchers with 4 missiles at 

each launcher: 1 missile in position and 3 reloads for a

total o f 48 missiles per site. All the Nike missiles at the

Hanford Site were rotated from underground storage to the 

ready line regularly as part of a maintenance program. The 

missiles were fueled and defueled with each rotation.

Figure 2-9.14. Underground Storage Magazine and Fueling and defueling was completed in the acid pit in the

Launcher-Loader Assembly warheading area.

Laancher

Ground

level

2 - 9 .1 0
Se c t io n 9 - Mil it a r y Op e r a t io n s

The launcher control trailer, located adjacent to the fueling and warheading area, contained the controls necessary to 

connect the trailer with the launcher designated to launch a missile. The trailer was also connected by cable to^he 

battery control trailer located in the Battery Control Area.

Despite their widespread distribution throughout the United States and other parts of the world, Nike missiles were never 

used in actual warfare. Nike missiles were launched for training purposes only from remote desert sites in New Mexico 

and Texas. By 1960, the hardware for the Nike missile systems was transferred off site.

E xistin g Exam ple o f a N ike M is s ile Site: H -5 2 -C and H -5 2 -L

O f the four Nike missile installations on the Hanford Site, only the launch and radar control site on the Fitzner/Eberhardt 

Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (H-52-C and H-52-L) remains relatively intact. The former battery control area, H-52-C, is 

located on top of Rattlesnake Mountain, w hile the former associated launching area, H-52-L (see Figure 2-9.15), is 

situated at the base o f the mountain. The distance between the H-52 control and launch areas is approximately 3 miles.

The spatial arrangement of the buildings and structures in the 

launch and battery control areas was site-specific with no standard 

layout plans. The H-52 launch area was divided into two separate 

zones for functional and safety reasons (see Figure 2-9.16). One 

zone included the administrative, mess hall, residential, and 

recreational facilities. The other zone included the underground 

missile storage magazines, surface launcher-loader equipment, 

missile refueling and warheading area, missile assembly and testing 

building, launch control trailer, fuel storage sheds, pump house and 

generator facilities. W hile some Nike sites designated areas for 

housing separate from the battery control and launch areas, the 

H-52 installation had barracks in both areas (McMaster et al.1984).

The underground missile storage facility, 6652-L (see Figure 2-9.17), for the H-52 launch area consisted of two 

underground storage magazines, elevator, and surface launcher-rail equipment. The two magazines had the storage 

capacity for twenty Ajax missiles and eight surface launchers. Each magazine contained a small personnel room with all 

the controls for raising and lowering the elevators and launchers, selecting the missile to be launched, and manually

firing a missile if the signal cable from the control center 

failed. Adjacent to the personnel room was a large area 

and sub-floor for the storage of missiles and an elevator 

to carry the missiles to the surface. The magazines 

contained storage racks and a rail system used to deliver 

the missiles to the elevator. Once above ground, the 

missiles were moved on rails to one of four launcherloader assemblies for firing.

Following the deactivation of the Nike missile program, 

the south magazine was converted to an emergency 

relocation center for use in the event of a nuclear 

accident or if the Hanford Site came under attack. The 

north magazine remains relatively intact except for the 

removal of the missiles, elevators, launcher-loader 

assembly from both magazines, and concrete surfacing of 

the elevator doors.

Figure 2-9.16. Layout o f the H-52-L Nike Missile Launch

Area, 1998

U ndafgroond 

S torag e Facll

W 4 Type 'O ' Letrtne

R esfe atfcn & 

S torag e Bldg.

Figure 2-9.15. H-52-L Nike Missile Launch Site

at the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology

Reserve> 1994

2 -9 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Figure 2-9.17. Underground Missile Storage

Facility (8652-L) at the H-52-L Nike Missile

Launch Site, 1995

Figure 2-9.18. Existing Barracks/Administration

Building (6652-C) with '1st Missile Battalion,

52nd Artillery, Battery D " on the Wall at the

H-52-C Battery Control Area, 1997

Figure 2-9.19. Layout o f the H-52-C Battery

Control Area, 1998

The Crows Nest/Observation Post and a guard shack are located at 

the entrance of the H-52 Nike installation. The Crows Nest was an 

elevated security observation post where guards could view the 

launch site and the surrounding area. The guard shack/sentry box 

is adjacent to the tower and located at the entrance to the facility. 

Since security was of the utmost importance at the Nike site, the 

sentry post was manned 24 hours a day.

Other H-52 launch area facilities that are extant include the 

barracks, mess hall, administration and recreation hall, pump 

house, latrine, paint shed, acid storage shed, and jet propulsion 

fuel storage pad (see Figure 2-9.16).

The H-52 battery control area combined the administrative 

functions and battalion officers' quarters in one building (6652-C). 

The target tracking radar, acquisition radar dome, and missile 

tracking radar equipment was situated on either concrete pads or 

concrete piers. Other radar equipment was housed in the Battery 

Control and Radar Control trailers. The trailers, interconnected 

with communication cables, were attached by a covered walkway 

to the barracks/administrative building. All that remains of the 

control center are the former administrative/barracks building 

(6652-C) (see Figure 2-9.18), concrete pads and piers, protective 

earth berms, walkways, and a parking lot (see Figure 2-9.19).

Fi r i n g Ac t iv it ie s a n d

Am m u n i t i o n St o r a g e

Fa c il it ie s

During its tenure at Camp Hanford, the Sixth Army's 5* 

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group conducted firing training at the nearby 

Yakima Firing Range using 120 millimeter guns. "Training was 

conducted approximately twice weekly with each of the battalions 

rotating from active status to training status. Prior to a training 

session at the firing center, only the guns from one battery of one 

battalion were moved to the Yakima Firing Center. The other 

battalions would then borrow the training guns during their firing 

at the Yakima Firing Center. This schedule permitted a sufficient 

contingent of men and guns to be on alert status at Camp Hanford 

at all times" (DOE 1995d, p. 15).

Three documented firing ranges included the Gable Mountain 

Firing Range, Hanford Firing Range, and the range west of the 

300 Area, while small arms shooting ranges existed at a number of 

individual anti-aircraft artillery batteries (Maas 1993) (see 

Figure 2-9.20). Ammunition caches were stored at each of the 

batteries to provide small arms for men on assignment.

2 - 9 .1 2
Se c t io n 9 - Mil it a r y Op e r a t io n s

Each battery had an ammunition storage area that was constructed and 

located in whatever manner was functional to the mission. There was 

no apparent standard procedure for the construction and location of 

storage areas. For example, one battery had tents for storage, another 

had partially buried storage tents, and a third battery had completely ' 

dug-in and constructed ammunition dumps (DOE 1995d).

In addition, two central ammunition storage areas, sometimes 

referred to as "igloos," were established at the Hanford Site.

One storage area with two igloos side by side was located on 

the North Slope between the 519th D (PSN 01) and C Batteries 

(PSN 04). The second storage area had two separate igloo 

clusters near the 501st A Battery (PSN 61) in the central area (see 

Figure 2-9.2). Additionally, small arms were stored and used at 

a number of locations on the Hanford Site, specifically at 

ammunition caches, anti-aircraft artillery batteries, and firing 

ranges.

Ca m p Ha n f o r d In d u s t r ia l

1 t E

3 Hies

fi firing Range Location

X Small Aims Shooting Range Location

(As per personal communication with

J. Maas, 1994

SOURCES: North S lops ERA Propose!, October 1BS3

Manhattan Projac! B uildings & Facilities

a ! /fie R anfo/d Site. September, 1393

Figure 2-9.20. Camp Hanford Firing Range Positions

Camp Hanford's industrial facilities (see Figure 2-9.1) 

provided maintenance and repair of anti-aircraft artillery 

guns and the brigade motor pool (automobile maintenance 

and repair) and included craft workers/carpenter shops; 

metal fabrication shops; ordnance storage; warehouses for 

shipping and receiving dry goods; laundry; cleaners; photo 

and x-ray facilities; central steam plant; oil, fuel and paint

storage depots; and other support services for the Camp's defense installations in the forward positions (anti-aircraft 

artillery and Nike installations) throughout the Hanford Site. A branch of the Hanford Site Plant Railroad terminated in 

the industrial area, and several spurs were situated adjacent to warehouse docks for the loading/unloading of supplies. 

By the late 1980s, nine buildings/structures remained in the industrial area associated with the Camp Hanford era.

Cl o s u r e o f Ca m p Ha n f o r d

By the late 1950s, the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles had rendered Nike missiles obsolete. On July 1,

1959, Camp Hanford became a sub-post of Fort Lewis. In October 1960, the Camp and its missile battalion and batteries 

were deactivated. On December 21, 1960, the Atomic Energy Commission terminated the land use permit for the former 

anti-aircraft artillery sites. The following year the Camp Hanford compound and structures were transferred to the 

Atomic Energy Commission. Camp Hanford officially closed on March 31,1961.

The numerous barracks and other residential and recreational facilities located outside of the industrial zone, including 

the large trailer park, were built as temporary structures and were removed in the years following the closure of Camp 

Hanford. The industrial area buildings (former 3000 Area), concrete reservoir and pump house, roads, concrete pads, 

and walkways (now covered with grass) are the only extant remains of the Camp Hanford structures above ground.

2 - 9 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

I To provide m ilitary protection of the Hanford Site, the U.S. Army established Camp Hanford in 1951 and Operated it until

it closed in 1961. W hile the Army operated Camp Hanford, the Atomic Energy Commission controlled the Hanford Site. 

The Army occupied Atomic Energy Commission lands w ith a permit. The Atomic Energy Commission's authority was 

dominant unless the site came under hostile enemy attack.

Camp Hanford closed because rapidly changing military technology eliminated the need for the type of defense system 

Camp Hanford provided. Soon after their introduction at the Hanford Site the 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns became 

obsolete and were replaced with the more sophisticated Nike missiles. The Nike missile systems subsequently became 

outdated with the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in the United States and the Soviet Union— all 

I this within a 10-year period:

Once the U.S. national defense relied on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Trident submarines, and Strategic Air 

Command B-52s, Camp Hanford and other similar military installations were no longer needed to protect strategic 

defense facilities, such as the Hanford Site. The 10-year life of Camp Hanford lends itself to future researchers to study 

as a reflection of the world political situation and changing technology at the time. Some areas of study might be:

• Various national m ilitary crises affected military operations at the Hanford Site.. Future researchers may wish to 

investigate the results o f heightened moments of crises on the military operations at the Hanford Site.

• W hat were the financial, logistical, political, and technical hurdles to overcome when within the 10-year period 

of Camp Hanford the military installed and then replaced the 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns with Nike missiles 

and then removed the Nike missiles because they had become obsolete?

• How did the Army function under the authority of the Atomic Energy Commission, and what effect, if any, did 

their relationship have on both the military protection and production of plutonium at the Hanford Site?

• Another topic would be a detailed exploration of the daily work situation at Camp Hanford.

)

\

2 - 9 .1 4

Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

Sec tio n 10 - Wo r k er Health a n d Sa fety

The production of plutonium began at the 

Hanford Site in 1944. The Plutonium 

Finishing Plant and the Fast Flux Test Facility 

both shut down in 1989, leaving a legacy of 

worker health and safety concerns. Thus, the 

history of worker health and safety at the 

Hanford Site spans a period from Buck Rogers to Star Wars—from technology based in the 1930s to that of the 1980s. 

During this time, industrial radiation protection developed in conjunction with the nuclear industry.

When the Manhattan Project began, worker health and safety programs emerged from 1) industrial hygiene with its basis 

in early industrial experience and 2) medical, occupational, and scientific experiences with radium and x-rays. This is 

not to say that the Hanford Site worker health and safety programs emerged directly from these two areas. Rather, 

Hanford Site worker health and safety decision makers took what they could from these two areas, and, because of a lack 

of previous experience in industrial-scale plutonium production, they improvised the rest during the Manhattan Project 

and the early years of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, worker health and safety programs at the Hanford Site built on Manhattan Project experiences by 

applying lessons learned. In addition to Hanford Site experiences, worker health and safety professionals drew on 

knowledge gained at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory from 1942-1943 and the Oak Ridge 

Reservation from 1943-1944 (Wirth 1951, p. 19ff). Lessons learned often resulted in new technologies and process 

modifications. These changes were often driven by increased demands for defense mission plutonium production. 

Worker health and safety programs at the Hanford Site during the Cold War also had access to safety data that had been 

accumulated in the work place and the results of applied research on specific processes and facilities. This information 

offered an opportunity to evaluate mistakes, accidents, and design flaws to improve policies, programs, and practices.

A major challenge of developing a worker health and safety program at the Hanford Site was addressing the unknown 

problems of producing plutonium. It was, therefore, necessary to develop health and safety practices through trial and 

error as well as through tried and tested industrial health and safety knowledge. This mixture of ad hoc and proven 

approaches was applied to the theoretical understanding of full-scale plutonium production at the time because there 

was no precedent.

Another major challenge was to incorporate radiation safety w ith general industrial safety and communicate the 

importance of complying with an emerging combination of safety practices without jeopardizing national security 

(Cantril and Parker 1951, p. 476ff). Worker health and safety dilemmas arose as disclosing information to protect 

workers from harm was weighed against the directive not to compromise the secret.

2 -1 0 .1

The Hanford Site's responses to these challenges 

are reflected in part in the historical records of 

fatalities and accidents at the Hanford Site.

Hanford Site data from these records compare 

favorably with other industries (Strom 1997). The 

production of plutonium and cleanup of the site 

each bring their own challenges in the field of 

worker health and safety. Issues such as whether 

Hanford's worker population has an increased 

mortality level due to radiation exposure as well as 

questions about the relationship between

...'■uWt '•l.ttul.ird* p ri'w n / m i« j . i / . j - n o il.7' /«■< h n it.il/i/o /)/i‘m V - li.irlo n 

H a t Lei, » (iv n tv aiul tc< hnoUry. historian ■ I ia< I'JitT. p. <J)
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

occupational exposure to chemicals and illness are the subject of ongoing research and debate (see, for example, 

Mancuso et al. 1977, Gilbert et al. 1989, and Stewart and Kneale 1991) but not the subject of this section. The subject 

of this section is the history of worker health and safety at the Hanford Site in relation to the Manhattan Project and 

Cold War Era facilities.

|i. D t s c t p t o f

" /m / iM / w / '..iff/i n u h i'.lib l In a ii'tw , i.ulhU ion p w tn lio n . ,nn l in v .irt* .ill | " U V . i i v x

tlin v n 'M <//<( ijiliiH '* hut .a tu .ilh (fii'i .iII m crf.ifi .i little ." - W illi.im l.u Ini, | WORKER HEALTH

Iw liio lfM l S ii'r h f » » m m «ii th r li.i/iln rrJ '• ilr U .iv lo r I W illi ■

An d Sa f e t y

At the Hanford Site, the three main disciplines of industrial health and safety are: 1) industrial hygiene, 2) industrial 

safety and fire protection, and 3) radiation protection. Before the Manhattan Project, knowledge from these areas was not 

consolidated into one discipline or even connected by a set of related approaches. Throughout the Manhattan Project 

and Cold War, these three disciplines co-existed but remained separate at the Hanford Site.

Industrial hygiene is the "recognition, evaluation and control of those environmental factors or stresses, arising in o r from 

the work place, which may cause sickness, impaired health and well-being, or significant discomfort-and inefficiency 

among workers or among citizens of the community" (Corn 1983, p. 13). Radiation protection is the practice of 

monitoring and controlling ionizing radiation for the protection of workers, industrial safety and fire protection assists 

workers in meeting the challenge of reducing their exposure to industrial hazards encountered in work environments. 

Industrial safety and fire protection often help workers find ways to accomplish their jobs while complying with the 

advice of industrial hygienists and radiation protection professionals.

W hile each of these fields developed separately at the Hanford Site, the urgency of the Manhattan Project demanded 

overlaps between them. In 1958, industrial hygienist Frank Patty (1958, p. v) noted that industrial hygienists "w ill find it 

increasingly necessary to acquire a working knowledge in radiation hygiene." According to Patty, radiation protection 

professionals "w ill find it increasingly necessary to recognize the health problems attending other physical forces - such 

as sound, heat, and light - [and] chemical contaminants." At the Hanford Site, the Manhattan Project created a 

combination of new challenges that health and safety professionals did not face before World War II. Despite overlaps in 

these fields, an integrated approach to worker health and safety was not developed at the Hanford Site. It is .beyond the 

scope of this history to fully examine the results of such a lack of integration among the fields of worker health and safety, 

and future researchers may wish to explore this question.

According to managers responsible for worker health and safety at the Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project, many 

workers at that time possessed a basic knowledge of standard industrial hazards. Management believed this practical 

knowledge of workplace safety was sufficient for the new field of radiation protection to build on. The goal was to 

rapidly tailor workers' practical knowledge of industrial safety to basic radiation protection principles without 

compromising the Hanford Site's secret purpose. Basic principles of standard industrial safety, such as keeping work 

areas clean of debris, were thought to be similar to the basic safety principles o f radiation protection. After completing 

training, workers were expected to be able to practice the fundamental rules of both without a great deal of trouble. On 

August 31, 1944, the head of radiation protection, Herbert M. Parker, wrote a letter to Assistant Plant Manager 

D. O. Notman that illustrates the point: "All operators [are] require[d] to know that they handle radioactive materials 

which emit alpha, beta and gamma radiation similar to the radiation from radium. The absorption of these types of 

radiation in matter can be explained on an elementary basis, and hence [also] the steps that each man must take at all 

times for his own protection and the protection of co-workers in addition to [using] the permanent protective devices. 

This is necessary and sufficient to enable men to do their jobs safely" (Parker 1944, p. 1).

At the end of W orld War II, the breakneck pace of the Manhattan Project gave way to the slow buildup of the Cold War. 

Brand new worker programs in radiation protection were in place, and they drew on proven industrial safety practices

2 - 1 0 .2
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

where it was useful. With the threat of war over, industrial hygiene, industrial safety and fire protection, and radiation 

protection continued to develop independently at the Hanford Site. Each program responded separately to the diverse 

array of worker health and safety challenges at the Hanford Site by defining the boundaries between them and ensuring 

their area of responsibility was fulfilled.

In d u s tria l Hygiene '*<m *%in *</.»<' w«< /»iriimo m/m# vim ,uo/»■»/»a <<>

in la m * i lie m it.tK - i/i/t k m l.mi nol ,i m otoi .m il il » ill c \o n lo ll m u w lu l

Industrial hygiene is at the intersection , i-o to p o o i r.id i.ilm n \o u .u v dvAlin# n ith ." - H<l IJ v ik . In d u -tri.il H x iiiv n is l .it

of industry, safety, and medicine. j th v H .m im tl s iiv rJii'J lu d . iiv ilii-tl» IV»i}i

Examples of areas where industry, | I

safety, and medicine intersect are

noise, heat, toxic chemicals, fumes, and dust. The role of industrial hygiene is to identify conditions that can lead to 

occupational disease and to analyze and control those conditions. This role is prevention of occupational disease, 

which differentiates industrial hygiene from other areas of worker health and safety. Industrial hygienists identify 

occupational maladies, such as repetitive motion disorder, before problems emerge in the workforce. An industrial safety 

and fire professional at the Hanford Site would often request an industrial hygienist to characterize a work site for 

hazards. The results of such hazards might be falling, tripping, electrocution, and suffocation. Industrial hygienists 

evaluated all types of work areas but in radiological work areas evaluated only non-radiological hazards.

Industrial hygiene is the most inclusive of the industrial health and safety fields at the Hanford Site because of its wide 

responsibilities. Reflecting on the nature of this work, one veteran industrial hygienist observed, "the work w ill never 

become monotonous or routine because the chemist, the engineer, and the physicist w ill keep introducing new and 

more or less hazardous materials and processes that require new developments for the evaluation and control of 

exposure attendant to their use" (Patty 1958, p. viii).

Historically, industrial hygiene developed expertise on worker safety from studies of World War I munitions factories. 

These studies stand out for their close attention to qualitative detail. For example, in their review of World War I 

research, Hamilton and Hardy focus on one case where "body cleanliness was more important than the removal of 

fumes. This seemed to be proved by the quite striking increase of cases of T.N.T. poisoning on hot summer days, when 

the skin was flushed and covered with sweat" (Hamilton and Hardy 1949, p. 3). As this anecdote indicates, knowledge 

often came as a result o f sickness or accidents.

The scientists, Army officers, and Du Pont managers in charge of the Manhattan Project at the Hanford Site felt the 

production of plutonium posed tremendous risks. Just what these risks were from an industrial hygiene perspective was 

not clear at the outset of the Manhattan Project, However, the production schedule set by Lieutenant General 

Leslie R. Groves, commander of the Manhattan Project, was too rushed to diminish the level of uncertainty before 

pressing ahead with industrial plutonium production (Goldberg 1998, p. 61). In the face of substantial gaps in industrial 

hygiene knowledge of industrial plutonium production, the Manhattan Project went ahead as planned.

To the extent possible, Manhattan Project decision-makers at the Hanford Site based their general health and safety 

premises on applicable lessons already learned from an industrial hygiene perspective. Industrial hygienists amassed a 

record of applied research in the 1930s that was designed to improve industrial safety programs. In turn, Du Pont's 

industrial safety programs at munitions plants used industrial hygiene research. These programs were then used as 

templates for worker health and safety .training plans at the Hanford Site. Du Pont's official history of the Manhattan 

Project at the Hanford Site attests to this: "In the original planning to provide a Safety Program for the Hanford Engineer 

Works [Hanford Site], as a result o f previous experience in safety training on other war construction projects, it was 

agreed that Supervision would be responsible for the necessary safety education of the employee" (Du Pont 1945a, 

p. 173, italics added).

One area where previous industrial hygiene knowledge could be applied was hazard prevention analysis, which entailed 

an exhaustive evaluation of all known risks to a particular industrial process. Data from these evaluations were then

2 - 1 0 .3
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

incorporated into plans for design, construction, operation, and maintenance. At the Hanford Site, hazard prevention 

analysis took the form of the Job Hazard Breakdown. A 1958 manual, "H Reactor Operation: Job Hazard Breakdowns, 

All Buildings" contains a detailed list of potential job hazards for each task at the facility. Corresponding to this list of 

potential hazards is a list of "Safety Points." Workers were instructed to incorporate the safety points into their work

routine to reduce the risk of injury from hazards.

Fr.mk A illiV s .m o u n t of how iinlustii.il Inn ien r vi.i-. first

applied ul the H.mhnd Nile: '/>/. I l v r h P .u k n r wa- iv '-p o n -ih h 1

to r h t \ d lh [> h \ t i t «. h v .d th m af/efs ,n n l h e ie.fs .trfi i- c d U i g c l «i/i 

tn d u H r i.ii /n spen/sf tu t a s/>i-< i,d p r o b le m /ie h a d . H e it as

.ii/w’sed In t on/,u I /);. P h ilip I I r in k a o f Ih e In iiu - tr u d lU u ii'n e

I ie p a rtm e n t .if H an .irr/ s s( /pon/ or P u h lit I le .d lh in llo - lo n . I fe

d id -i» ,ir></ I h in k e i * .u d h e 'd n u o m m e n d h . in k \ d lc \ . th e n in

Nc,iff/e. />r. P .n l.e r h ir e d m e o n tin ih i* " p e t p r o b l e m . I m m

f/i/s pif/nf on. in d u '- lr u l h u iie n c r/i w /e, /i.n/m ; set cr.i/

/uo ien /o n a/ Av«j/Vn/if- j/h /iN o no Ai/jor.ifo/i. f t h iii" t t i, d

h \ id e n e h a n d le d . ill u i H . m in r t l\ u< i u p n tio n .d h e .d lh p i u h le m -

o f ,m indu'yfriiil h \iiie n e n .itiiii'.” - \d lv \ I ‘I'lli, p. I

For example, the task, "Working in Pits," lists 

suffocation as a job hazard. Safety points for the 

hazard o f suffocation included "Pit should be free of 

toxic gases before entering" and "If in doubt about 

pit contamination, use approved gas mask or self 

contained breathing apparatus." The final safety 

point for the job hazard of suffocation while 

working in pits notes: "Become familiar with 

methods of artificial respiration" (GE 1958a, 

p. H 5.72).

I According to Frank Ad ley, the first industrial

I hygienist hired at the Hanford Site, "there was no

industrial hygiene on the plant at startup" (Adley 

1998, p. 1). As Ad ley recounts the Manhattan 

Project health and safety situation, "In the early production days at Hanford, radiological hazards were handled by 

Health Physics and those of a chemical nature were handled by Safety in [the] Chemical Processing Department."

When industrial hygiene started at the Hanford Site in the late 1940s, it was organized within the Medical Department. 

W illiam D. Norwood, an industrial physician (see Figure 2-10.1), was the Superintendent of the Hanford Medical 

Department. P.A. Fuqua, also a physician, was the Assistant Director of the Medical Department (Wilson 1987, p. 1.5). 

The function of early programs in industrial hygiene was to monitor the workforce for known industrial diseases and to 

conduct assessments of work environments to promote healthy job sites, Other duties of the medical program included 

pre-employment and post-employment physical examinations for all 

workers (CantriI 1951). These practices continued at the Hanford Site 

w ith modifications.

I n d u s t r ia l Sa f e t y a n d Fir e Pr o t e c t io n

"Industrial safety in general is the mundane and the everyday

stuff that is real easily forgotten, but more often than not it causes

the accidents" - Ed Beck, Industrial Hygienist at the Hanford Site

1989 to date (Beck 1998).

" The General Electric Company furnishes all safety equipment

except safety shoes and common sense" - General Electric 

Company, Manual o f Standard Practices (GE 1954b).

W hile industrial safety and fire protection can be complex, "good 

housekeeping" is one of its basic messages. The "Master Safety 

Rules" the Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company posted at all 

workplaces at the Hanford Site in 1971 illustrate this point 

(see Figure 2-10.2). The first rule emphasizes using common sense 

while on the job, "Follow instructions. Don't take chances. If you

don't know, ask." ^ ^ . . .

Figure 2-10.1. William D. Norwood (on right)

Shaking Hands with Worker

2 -1 0 .4
Section 10- Worker Health and Safety

w m m m m m

M A STER SAFETY RULES

|®*|S|p 

, 3 S<

i w w i i l

g ^ iip ii^ » li» ifJ ^ g M S lS |

a r-r r e n a if C K U iy ite iv .

Figure 2-10.2. Master Safety Rules, Atlantic

Richfield Hanford Company, January 7, 1971

O f course, industrial safety and fire protection involve much more 

than simply posting lists o f safety rules. The industrial safety record 

at the Hanford Site is partly based on the extent to which the 

workers practiced "good housekeeping"— applying safe practices to 

specific work situations. H. Sudmann's 1992 paper on the causes 

of hand wounds at the Hanford Site's 200 Areas demonstrates that 

this emphasis is well placed: "The glamorless operations like 

housekeeping rarely receive the level of safety analysis or coverage 

as the production process does. Hands-on maintenance and 

cleanup of gloveboxes is [sic] still necessary and should be 

recognized as an accident waiting to happen. O f the 19 wound 

events, 12 (63%) resulted from hands-on cleanup or waste 

handling" (Sudmann 1992, p. 11).

The Hanford Site established industrial safety and fire protection 

standards to protect workers from avoidable accidents, such as falls 

and spills, and encourage them to properly operate and maintain 

mechanical equipment and systems. These standards were posted 

on the applicable equipment (see Figure 2-10.3). Beginning with 

the Manhattan Project and continuing through the Cold War, 

contractors employed safety engineers to carry out operational 

industrial safety.

The Hanford Site established the general framework for safety and 

fire protection on January 1, 1944, upon review of a comprehensive 

safety analysis conducted during the first few months of construction at the Hanford Site (Du Pont 1945a, p. 173). Safety 

personnel consisted of inspectors, often called safety engineers, who worked in the field w ith craft workers such as 

welders and carpenters. Safety inspectors reported to assistants who in turn reported to the Safety Superintendent. All 

safety personnel reported to the Central Safety Department, which reported to Operations. The Central Safety 

Department had inspectors assigned to each of the operations, such 

as fuel/manufacturing, and those inspectors reported directly to the 

managers of their assigned operation. The logic of this reporting 

system formed the basis for operational industrial safety at the 

Hanford Site throughout the Cold War.

Ra d ia t io n Pr o t e c t io n

By the end of the 19th century, radiation safety was not foremost in 

the minds of the relatively few experimental scientists working with 

x-rays and the new found naturally occurring radioactive elements 

(Caufield 1989,-,p. 25). "Experimenters and physicians, laymen and 

physicists alike set up x-ray generating apparatus and proceeded 

about their labors with blithe lack of concern regarding potential 

dangers" (Kathren and Ziemer 1980, p. 1). Scientific fascination 

with documenting the strange properties of radioactivity, along with 

public curiosity about its uniqueness, were main features of the 

history of radiation in the late 19th and early 20th century (Caufield 

1989, p. 29). Historian Barton C. Hacker observed, "As 1895 

ended, Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, professor of physics at the 

University of Wurzburg, published his discovery of x-rays and

-

i .

msM mxuAUY

i w&tAm te w est vm vss

Figure 2-10.3. Safety Sign and Protective Gear

at Valve Station in 221-T Operating Gallery

2 -1 0 .5
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

explained how to produce them. He made 

headlines worldwide. Photographs like 

windows opened into Irving bodies 

amazed the public, but science was no less 

excited to learn that the physical world still 

held real surprises"(Hacker 1987, p. 10).

As a result of these discoveries and the 

slow realization that health effects were 

part of the new discovery, the "first decade 

saw proposed, if not widely adopted, almost every technique since used to..prevent or control harmful effects of 

radiation" (Hacker 1987, p.10). The decade of the 1920s was marked by "the introduction of film badges for routine 

z personnel monitoring, recognition of genetic effects of x-rays (for which Hermann M uller won the Nobel Prize in 1946), 

and the adoption of a unit for measuring radiation by the Second International Congress on Radiology in 1928" (Kathren 

and Ziemer 1980, p. 3). The Manhattan Project drew from this radiation protection information.

Radiation protection, also known by its Manhattan Project code name health physics, is concerned with the control, 

monitoring, protection, and evaluation of effects from radiation in a variety of settings. Large-scale industrial radiation 

protection came of age during the Manhattan Project, and the story of its subsequent development in the United States is, 

in many ways, tied to the Cold War. Comparing Manhattan Project radiation safety with pre-war experience, Hacker 

notes: "Although applied on a vastly larger scale, the trial-and-error methods devised over four decades to protect 

radiation workers mostly met the need. Radiation sources were shielded, careful work habits instilled, workplaces 

closely watched, workers screened to detect early signs of damage" (Hacker 1987, p. 4).

In 1942 as a first step in radiation protection on an industrial scale for the Manhattan Project, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and the University of Chicago established a special health physics division at the plutonium pilot plant (the 

Clinton Semiworks) at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee to study the health hazards posed by the plutonium 

production process. This health physics division developed monitoring instruments, standards for the measurement and 

control of radiation, and trained doctors and health physicists to work at the Hanford Site (Gerber 1992a, p. 28).

Herbert M. Parker and Simeon T. Cantril were the principal architects of the health physics program at the Oak Ridge 

Reservation (Kathren et al. 1986, p. xvii). Parker was a noted British radiological physicist who had worked w ith Cantril 

at the Tumor Institute in Seattle since 1938. Parker and his senior assistant, the x-ray diffraction scientist, Carl C. 

Gamertsfelder, then headed a small group who arrived at the Hanford Site in the summer of 1944 to assume primary 

responsibility for radiological health and safety. Parker became Chief Supervisor of the Health Instruments Section on 

ju ly 3, 1944, and Cantril became Assistant Supervisor in charge of the Industrial Medical organization on September 12, 

1944 (Cantril 1945, p. 2).

Parker and Gamertsfelder's expertise fit well with the experience of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours. One of the reasons 

Du Pont had been selected as the primary contractor for the Hanford Site was because it "had emerged during the 1930s 

as a corporate leader in the still novel field of industrial safety, highly respected for efforts to protect workers in the 

notoriously risky manufacture of explosives" (Hacker 1987, p. 53).

When they arrived at the Hanford Site, Parker and Du Pont set about to establish radiation protection practices. Factors 

that played a part in the development of these practices were:

• Du Pont's emphasis on safety and experience in dealing with munitions production in World War I

• A large portion of the early craft workers (welders, carpenters, pipe-fitters) were unionized, which usually meant 

they had experience in safety practices and industriar hygiene

' In the e.nh d ii - then- u rn * no n m n n l/irns’r.im - in h r jtlh /i/n -/< *.if

tu m e td h e ^. mi Mum- oi i t - .n rh e d ■>/ ll.m h n d a- he.dth /t/n -tt h u t nc

h.ul s u m r h.u k iin n u u l 7 he Hi - / h e .d lh /i/m - i t - i /.!-» < •- a / H .tnfurd were

held .if H t. I ’.u k e r - hnm e in Ru hLm tl Thoie were .tlu n tl iw e h e tn ifiin .tl

henllh />/» -ti t-N who took llu ^ e f'/r-f < /a w -." - lio«ivi H u h gm i.

()p i‘r.iliiiii- and Radial inn Prolec linn al thv M.mfnnl Siu- |<j44-1<mh>

Mtulluivn l ‘i‘*‘ia»

2 - 1 0 .6
S ection 1 0 - W o rk e r He a l t h a n d S a fe ty

• Wartime secrecy prevented workers from receiving a full disclosure of the health and safety hazards.

Information that might reveal the secret was not communicated to workers. A big part of the secret was 

radiation. Therefore, routine safety practices, industrial housekeeping, and sloganeering had to be stressed 

instead of information about radiation protection.

A t the Hanford Site, radiation protection was first organized as the Health Instruments Section. The Health Instruments 

Section was within the Medical Department, and although the names of the organizations changed minimally over the 

years this organizational arrangement continued for three decades until the end of General Electric's tenure at the 

Hanford Site. Battelle Memorial Institute took over support of radiation protection duties in 1965. Herbert Parker was 

the first director o f the Health Instruments Section, and he continued to influence the course of radiation protection at the 

Hanford Site through the early 1980s (Kathren et al. 1986).

In his history of dosimetry and its use in radiation protection programs at the Hanford Site, Robert Wilson notes that, "the 

original plans for Hanford included only a small 'hazards engineer' 

group assigned to the technical department for radiation control.

This group's functions were envisioned as being similar to 

conventional production plant safety engineers or inspectors.

However, the experience of du Pont staff and both Cantril and ^ u> ’

Parker at the Clinton {Oak Ridge Reservation] and University of h 9

Chicago Laboratories indicated that a much larger, technically * k

oriented group was required" (Wilson 1987, p. 1.6).

In the early days Of the Manhattan Project, "the HI [Health

Instruments] Section was divided into three groups: survey, % ‘

personnel meters, and special studies. By August 1944 there were ■";<> \ K- ‘ m" \.

27 members working in the section" (Wilson 1987, p. 1.5) although *

Parker had requested an initial staffing level of 138. Later, "under 

Parker's direction, it evolved quickly from a group concerned with 

shielding estimates to one concerned primarily with detection and 

measurement of radiation, and the translation of these data into 

necessary protective measures" (Kathren et al. 1986). Figure 2-10.4 Figure 2-10.4. Workers with Different Field

shows a variety of field instruments for detecting radiation. Instruments for Detecting Radiation

Health and Safety Challenges

At its most basic level, the challenge of developing health and safety programs at the Hanford Site consisted of 

controlling known hazards and anticipating unknown problems that might be encountered during the production of 

plutonium. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed by trial and error in some areas while developing health and safety 

practices that applied tried and tested industrial health and safety knowledge to what was at the time a theoretical 

understanding of full-scale plutonium production.

Du Pont's lengthy experience in industrial safety for the manufacture of hazardous chemicals and munitions was retained 

in its corporate memory, embodied in the practical knowledge of many workers, and documented by industrial 

hygienists. The next step was to combine information on hazardous chemical production with knowledge of radiation 

gained at the University o f Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory (1942-1943) and the Oak Ridge Reservation (1943-1944) 

(Wirth 1951, p. 19ff). The resulting information was available to health and safety management at the Hanford Site to 

anticipate hazards stemming from the first full-scale attempt to produce plutonium.

Physicists working on the Manhattan Project expected that the large-scale production of plutonium would generate and 

release both known and unknown radiological hazards (Rhodes 1986). For this reason, and a host of others including 

secrecy, Lieutenant General Groves and the weapons designers of the plutonium-239 bomb decided to build the

2 - 1 0 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Ta c u jt ie s

plutonium production facilities in a remote area. In constructing the plutonium production facilities, officials acted with 

great urgency and ruled out time to test scale models. Therefore, while some worker health and safety concerns that 

were unresolved at the time of construction became factors in site layout, other dangers were considered secondary to 

the mission of plutonium production. The huge buffer zones at the Hanford Site were there primarily to protect facilities 

from other facilities. The isolated location of the Hanford Site also exemplifies a Manhattan Project response to a 

perceived high level o f known hazards as well as huge uncertainties. Hazards in this case relate to both engineering and 

health and safety concerns (Groves 1983). These concerns included the possibility of a massive explosion of reactors or 

a criticality at chemical separations facilities.

Another health and safety challenge was the unknown hazards that could result from producing a new element— 

plutonium. By the time of the Manhattan Project, the only experience with a similar element was "the thousand or so 

curies of radium that had up to that time been separated and used for radiojuminous compounds, [which] resulted in 

many deaths in perhaps a fevv thousand occupationally exposed dial painters. At Hanford there was potential for 

exposure of tens of thousands of workers to the millions o f curies"(Kathren et al. 1986, p. xviii). The radioluminous 

compounds referred to were from radium being used as "glow-in-the-dark" paint for dials on clocks, watches, and 

gauges. The number of deaths arose from dial painters tipping small brushes with their wetted lips and unintentionally 

ingesting radium. As the health effects began to emerge in the young female dial painters, "there were, of course, the 

usual protestations of innocence on the part of the company. It was not the paint but something else, even syphilis" 

(Stannard 1988, p. 24).

From this tragic episode in occupational health and safety history, standards had been implemented for work with 

radium, and protection of health and safety in Hanford Site plutonium production was based on knowledge derived from 

these experiences. H ow the tragedy of the young radium dial painters influenced worker health and safety on the 

Manhattan Project cannot be underestimated: "Had the radium cases not occurred, or had they begun to appear 15 or 

20 years later than they did, or had the cases gone unnoticed, or had they come to the attention to less perceptive 

investigators, the story of the atomic energy program might have been a sad one. The radium martyrs provided the proof 

that even small quantities of radioactive substances can be lethal if strict standards of hygiene are not adhered to" 

(Eisenbud 1968, p. 6).

Although the production of plutonium at the Hanford Site was on a scale much larger than previous industrial experience 

with radium (Hacker 1987, Stone 1951), the hazards presented by plutonium and radium were comparable when scale 

was taken into account. For example, the soluble forms of radium and plutonium are similar in that they both have long 

half-lives compared with the human life span. However, at the Hanford Site, plutonium also existed in an insoluble form 

that had its own special characteristics. The half-life of radium-226 is 1602 years, and the half-life of plutonium-239 is 

24,110 years (Stannard 1988, p. 3; Seaborg 1994, p. 380).

W hile using the experience with radium as a baseline, scientists sought to discover the properties peculiar to plutonium. 

The new isotope, plutonium-239, had never been analyzed until Glenn T. Seaborg transmuted a small amount from 

uranium in 1941. Scientists found that in addition to its inherent high toxicity, plutonium emits high energy alpha 

particles with particular hazards from ingestion or inhalation. Protection programs needed to prevent ingestion, 

inhalation, and skin absorption of these particles. In addition to plutonium, numerous other radioisotopes were formed 

during the plutonium production process. As with plutonium, scientists studied each new radioisotope and gauged its 

hazards (Hacker 1987).

Scientists conducted these studies by observing the health effects of these radioisotopes on animals. "It was soon 

apparent from experiments in rodents that Pu [plutonium] was about 15 times more acutely 'toxic' than radium-226 for 

acute (lethal) effects based on the radioactivity injected per unit body weight" (Voelz 1991, p. 682). Health and safety 

scientists from the Health Instruments Section at the Hanford Site drew on this research to establish tolerance levels for 

plutonium in water and air (Parker 1945). During the Cold War, concerns with toxicity and acute effects were 

augmented by research into dose and cancer-induction and incorporated into Hanford Site protection programs.

2 - 1 0 .8
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

In an interview, the first Superintendent o f the Hanford Medical Department, W illiam Norwood, puts the early tolerance 

levels at the Hanford Site in perspective: "the worst possibility is plutonium. The amount allowed, total whole body was 

.04 microcuries, an amount equal to what you could put on the point of a very sharp pencil" (Sanger 1989, p. 150). 

Research on the metabolism of plutonium in humans informed detection programs by pointing out that bone and liver 

were the.organs most likely to receive the highest concentrations from ingestion, while the lungs were an organ of

concern when intake was through inhalation (Voelz 1991 pp. 688-690). As Stannard's (1988) review of the radiobiology 

literature indicates, a sizeable body of basic and applied research on the relationships between plutonium and health 

was conducted during the Cold War at the Hanford Site.

Another challenge was how to develop a method to determine whether workers had ingested plutonium. Norwood 

developed such a method and put it into practice by conducting applied occupational medical research on plutonium at 

the Hanford Site: "The people at greatest risk were working in the separations plants...Plutonium did show up, but well 

below the permissible limits" (Sanger 1989, p. 150). Norwood's research detected the presence and measured the 

amount of plutonium in the bodies of workers. Detection and measurement are not, in themselves, evidence of health 

effects. Norwood's research measured only what existed as a result of normal working conditions. He did not subject 

workers to experiments (DOE 1995c, pp. 5, 46-49). Future health effects researchers may well use Norwood's Hanford 

Site data as one source in their studies. However, Voelz (1991) notes it is crucial to understand that data on the detection 

and amount of radiation do not, in themselves/say anything about health effects. Even when this distinction is made, 

"Continued studies are also necessary, because long latent periods, probably over 30 years, are anticipated" (Voelz 1991, 

p. 692).

Re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r He a l t h An d Sa f e t y

On October 3,1944, a meeting was 

held to define responsibilities for 

health and safety at the Hanford Site. 

The purpose of this meeting was to 

"clarify the position of the Medical 

Department and the HI [Health 

Instruments] group in relation to the responsibilities for radiation safety throughout the plant" (Norwood and Cantril 

1944, p. 1). The Medical Department, the Health Instruments Section, a management official representing the Operating 

Department, and a management official representing the Maintenance Department attended the meeting.

On November 4, 1944, management at the Hanford Site received a statement of responsibilities, based on the items 

agreed to at the meeting. This memorandum contained two key points, 1) "Responsibility for maintaining radiation 

within safe limits in the operating areas rests with the area superintendent or those delegated by him ," and 2) "The 

Medical Department, through representatives in the HI [Health Instruments] group, has the responsibility to management 

to insure [sic] that over-exposure does not occur" (Norwood and Cantril 1944, p. 1). Thus, the various operations 

organizations were responsible for day-to-day worker health and safety by lim iting emissions and exposure. The Health 

Instruments Section advised management on strategies for avoiding worker over-exposure.

This document illustrates a principle that became a rule of thumb for worker health and safety at the Hanford Site: 

ultimate responsibility for health and safety rested with operations. Individual workers were responsible for their actions 

while on the job as in any other industrial setting. The rule of thumb was further clarified in a collection of papers 

published after the extreme secrecy of wartime ended, which the scientists who formulated health and safety programs 

for the Manhattan Project had written. Reflecting on the issue of responsibility for worker health and safety, the authors 

of one o f these papers state, "From their experience the authors feel that the responsibility for protection against 

radiation, as against any other hazard, must rest with those who are charged with the primary program, not with the 

health service. Ultimately, those directing the work must assume the responsibility for the health of the workers who 

carry out their plans" (Cantril et al. 1951, p. 277).

•• lh e m /W i at ,ill cnifth>\ I'cs »<■ ,t rv -p tm -ih ih t\ n i tiir ( ir i w u l W.i/i.is'tv ,w tl ||T 

m/<i vi'dinti lo \e l <>i M / p m /mVi/i' - c.vnciul llvttric ( iim |w n\, \i,m u ,il tn s t.m d m l || |

/';,>< //V i»s tfil l*J14hi |lt

2 - 1 0 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

In December 1954, the Hanford Site's main contractor, General Electric, issued the first edition of its Manual o f Standard

Practices (GE 1954b). This document contains a section titled "Safety and Health," which confirms that the rule of 

thumb set down during the Manhattan Project was carried through into the Cold War, meaning the bulk of routine health 

and safety activity was conducted in operational settings as a part of the job. Oversight of health and safety fell to 

separate groups and professions.

At the Hanford Site, this fundamental distinction meant that the health and safety groups served in a support capacity. 

"The responsibility of the health service is to give full cooperation and advice in the prevention and control of hazards 

and in the furtherance of safe working conditions" (Cantril et al. 1951, p. 277).

Although the statement of responsibilities document issued in November 1944 uses the specific term "radiation safety" 

(Norwood and Cantril 1944), a review of the historical record generally shows that the responsibilities formulated during 

this meeting applied to all phases o f worker health and safety.

H ealth and Safety Support ■ — 5

"Mi1 lu iix h l •) In *' m riot h u ild in x boioru th e ir ci v; ii.is. one * -

The support fields were industrial hygiene, |lm lu. w t ,lntrir<. < i,;,.,-. , in. n,.|>.,rlmt,nl. |-14-.

industrial safety and fire protection, and , y i w n v

radiation protection. The primary role of the

health and safety professionals was

consultation rather than implementation. The health and safety professionals generally followed the three steps of any 

consultation process: 1) examine the situation, 2) write an evaluation and recommendations, and 3) follow-up when 

asked to return to evaluate mitigation efforts and compliance with recommendations.

The process of consultation at the Hanford Site may be illustrated by an example from an industrial hygiene report dated 

August 11, 1949 (Gill 1949). An industrial hygienist, Wallace E. G ill, examined the degreaser operation in the 

105 Building at H Reactor on June 29 and July 13, 1949 and wrote a report based on an examination of the degreaser 

operation. G ill (1949) notes that an industrial hygiene study of this degreaser was "done at the request of the Medical 

Division" (Gill 1949, p. 2). The "Medical Division" referred to was the Industrial Medical Division, which was a part of 

the Medical Department. The primary reason for the request from the Industrial Medical Division was to evaluate the air 

concentration of a solvent used in the degreaser operation. Degreasing in this facility was defined as, "removing grease, 

oil, or wax from metal parts by immersing them in solvent vapor and/or boiling solvent, generally trichloroethylene or 

perchloroethylene" (Gill 1949, p. 5). The solvent used in this degreaser operation was trichloroethylene, which in 1949 

had a specified maximum allowable concentration in air. Degreasing in the 105 H Building required operators to be 

near the large solvent tank used to clean metal parts. Therefore, the Industrial Medical Division initiated an investigation 

into the health aspects of this operation.

To examine the situation, G ill obtained access to the 105 H Building to take measurements o f the workspace and make 

drawings of the degreaser. He observed workers using the degreaser and characterized this process. Finally, he took a 

series of air samples for velocity and trichloroethylene concentration.. In this degreaser area, the highest air 

concentration found during tests on June 29, 1949 was 30 parts per m illion. The maximum allowable concentration was 

100 parts per million.

Although the air concentration Gill found was under the lim it, he listed ten recommendations "for the improvement of 

health and safety in these operations" (Gill 1949, p. 8). For example, recommendation number seven states, "Washing 

hands in the solvent should be forbidden" (Gill 1949, p. 11).

Anticipation and pre-planning were also aspects of health and safety support. One illustration of pre-planning was the 

Pre-Fire Plan program conducted by the Hanford Fire Department. This program commenced in the 1950s. In an 

interview, Towne discussed this form of health and safety planning:
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

Gordon Towne: "The Pre-Fire Plans were detailed plans for every building on the complex. We would go

through each building and write a plan as to how we would attack any fire at any given location in a building.

This included a breakdown o f all hazards, radiological aspects as w ell as chemicals... Pre-Fire Plan documents

contained maps, written narrative, and diagrams. The Pre-Fire Plan for PUREX was 40 pages. They detailed

everything pertaining to fire. We had fu ll cooperation with building managers."

Brian Freer: "/ liked what you said earlier, 'we fought a fire in every building before there ever was one.'"

Gordon Towne: "We would have sessions. Officers would get together, and brainstorm all the hazards we

would think o f in each building. We went through each o f the buildings ourselves. The Fire Department closely

followed the construction o f each facility at Hanford. We knew them as they built them. We knew about plans

and followed the construction all the way through. We received a number ofAEC [Atomic Energy Commission]

awards for this aspect o f our fire safety. We actually took that idea and applied it throughout the AEC facilities.

We went and explained the Pre-Fire Plan program, as it was developed at Hanford, to fellow firefighters at

Oak Ridge, Livermore and other facilities." - Towne 1998

Not all health and safety support work was conducted for one specific organization. In an interview, Towne recalled that 

fire prevention safety was the one aspect of Hanford Site safety that cross-cut operations, maintenance, construction, 

research and development, and administration areas.

In addition, the threat of fire extended beyond the built environment. According to Towne (1998), the natural 

environment at the Hanford Site accounted for a large portion of fire events historically and could easily transform the 

spark from a lightning strike into a threat to construction projects or reactor operations. Pre-planning then had to include 

the entire area of the Hanford Site.

Du Font's history of the Hanford Site concurs with Towne's assessment: "One of the greatest concerns of the Fire 

Department was the thousands of acres covered with cheet grass, bunch grass, and sagebrush surrounding the plant areas 

and Hanford Camp. A potential fire hazard existed at all times" (Du Pont 1945a, p. 182). To illustrate the danger and 

unpredictability of "natural cover fires," as they were known to firefighters, consider that wind changes caused one fire 

on Rattlesnake Mountain to burn in four different directions in a 24-hour period. For Gordon Towne, the recurring 

hazards of natural cover fires are illustrated by a cluster of them he did not fig h t When Towne was on vacation in 

July 1971, the Hanford Fire Department fought 64 natural cover fires in a 2-hour period (Towne 1998).

Relatio n ships Betw een the Su ppo r t Dis c ip lin e s and Operations

Authority is one issue that emerges when the 

responsibility for worker health and safety rests with 

operations. Another issue is compliance with 

recommendations. Together they lead to the 

question of what authority the health and safety 

support organizations had to enforce the 

recommendations they made to operations.

From the time of the Manhattan Project to the early 

the radiation protection organization. Radiation monitors were the first line of defense from overexposure at the Hanford 

Site. They took readings from survey instruments and calculated worker exposure to radiation. Because the radiation 

monitors were not under the operations chain of command, they maintained their professional independence. However, 

by the mid 1950s most radiation monitors reported directly to the management of a particular facility rather than the 

Health Instruments Section. The Health Instruments Section still maintained a staff of radiation monitors primarily used 

for research purposes. With this alteration in the chain of command, the oversight and control function of radiation 

protection was less independent from the day-to-day concerns of operational activities. On the other hand, because the 

radiation protection function was responsible for the prevention of overexposure, the Health Instruments Section could

"/J’ f / i f / r vi.p, i)D lirv M't* yi.li/ f«‘i om nu'ntl.tlion ,iu th n n l\ i>nl\. It

t lw ir ii,is .1 nV f in ,i huiUlinc. thvn lh a 1 Im ildnn! M o m ;r d to

- fitir d u n Im v n v , V -M -L in t I in* < luvi, H .m u ird Fin* l)<‘|ia rlin i» n t, 

|') 4 7 . | i r i i flo w in ' I W ill

1950s, radiation monitors reported to the Health Instruments Section,

2 -1 0 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

now spend more time reviewing and investigating overexposure. Herbert Parker was one of the managers responsible 

for this change. He described the rationale behind it as reflecting "an attitude that ultimately each operator must take 

care of his own radiation monitoring, just as he protects himself by not walking under a ladder or by not handling acid 

without protective equipment" (Parker 1955, p. 903).

“ The i t i n l n u lo r. (> [ h .u l th e n m m i. u ii. ilio n n u n u lo b .m il tlw

-u /ip rir! 'I 'l m (•<> u r u iifj H .u v tir d I,ih t> r,tU n h "> . h ,u i llw n o itti 

m o n itm . O n e m n n ilo r /•» ,11 tib ilh tr p t it h n i* lo t lw o p e ra tio n *

n u n . iiit 'i .»m/ ,i -<•< o n d M a t 11 o u lt ! h e n 'p o i li w ; u p I h e t li.im lo

f/h*l.ih m .U o r ii»-« In th e b r g in n m n i h r ( i n i to n lin n •* th . it

h a p p e n e d to n iv o r * o i l u s e d lo h u lh e i m e . I 'd h e o u t I l i n e in

th e m id d le o f n iu h l w h e n th e ic.u tm it .is i/m i n .in d i t M , jlu id to net tim e ito i ie s v ,u th i..„ Hut there u,i% ,i good

it .is,hi rot it , lit e r I th o u g h t.th o til this tot ,i mIdle, th e gu\ I

brought iw l/i me knew ihow to m o n ilo i fo r n o rese.irt hi, hu l

he d id n 't net o **.iril\ know the te.it to i p la n t *o thv\ w o u ld ij/k * 

m e sam elunh IIm I knew the fd.m l. Su th e ie n .is s rw if 

«u/t .m l.igc to h .n in ti th.it filn n l h,isrd i.u li.d io n m o n ito i w ith

m e just to keep m e o u l oi tu m b le *•n .lite r <> w h ile I thought

te .i/i this is ,i i> o o d fiie t.lu tio n , h u t it . i/ i i a i - a rir/e rf.i < ouplv o f

houis to ih e io h ." - i,n Im I ‘MN»I>

These changes meant that radiation monitors who 

commenced employment after the mid 1950s 

were less likely to have broad working experience 

in operational health physics at the Hanford Site.

As a result, the work experience of radiation 

monitors became more and more facility specific.

Radiation monitors who arrived after the mid 

1950s also would have fewer opportunities for 

work experiences that would allow them to see 

how Hanford Site processes and functions were 

related to one another.

This division of work sometimes lead to confusion 

because of different lines of authority as a former 

industrial safety inspector, W illiam Taylor, relates 

(see sidebar box). Lines of authority were more 

clear when it came to compliance issues. Towne 

(1998), relates;

Gordon Towne: " When we would get a request o f that nature [on a compliance issue] we would respond as

soon as possible, the evaluation was made and we made our recommendation to the operations manager.

Normally it was corrected, or if there was a problem it was remedied."

Brian Freer: " D id you have a follow up after the recommendation was made?"

Gordon Towne: "O h yes, always."

Brian Freer: "W hat kind o f authority did the Fire Department have to enforce the recommendations?"

Gordon Towne: " If there was no fire we had recommendation authority only. If there was a fire in a building, 

then that building belonged to us."

Brian Freer: "Compliance with recommendations. Was it typically right away? Were there ever tough spots

where compliance with fire safety recommendations was difficult? What might you do to facilitate that

compliance?"

Gordon Towne: "Often it depended on money. If the money was in the budget, we got action. Suppose we

recommended a sprinkler system for a building. They were expensive."

Brian Freer: "Were your recommendations factored into budgetary decisions?"

Gordon Towne: "I don't know h o w to answer that. Give you one example. We recommended that a sprinkler

system be installed in all the power houses. Money wasn't in the budget. Then we had a fire in 184 East

Powerhouse. Then all the Powerhouses were sprinklered. Where did all the money come from? I don't know.

Money flowed after a major problem."

Communication was an important ingredient in the relationship between operations and support groups. From the 

perspective of worker health and safety, at times this meant providing operations with information in a format that was

2 - 1 0 .1 2
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

directly relevant to operational objectives. An 

interview with Joe Soldat, health physicist at the 

Hanford Site from 1948-1995, illustrates this point 

(see sidebar box).

The Health Instruments Section at the Hanford Site 

put a great deal of effort into their calculations for 

acceptable operational activities and were 

responsible for informing operations of the 

importance of adhering to their guidelines.

" . . . it / ir n I ii.i- i h.iu'^inu sf.uk samples, i i 'l n n lii e d .i high

rc,i(fm!* I u /iu M no talk In tlw o p e r.ilio m m an.iiicr m t furs*c. 

O iw lin w I U d d .i» ufM 'i.itions /ht-hm . it /</oA- In n w like \o u

h.t\ r p u t nut lo o i» tit h iodine. H v replied. */<• that b .id t I

«»/».' / e \p l,lin e d lo him the "itu .itin n and he rlni

w h a triv i v t .i - »«■« c s - . m i W hen n v tint lo K r iX ) \ n r hod

anolhei iiu u n .itin n . H i1p u t tlw .d.irnis ho rn tlw m u n i rate

m eter on the -/.it A m nn itnt in the opeialm g orrii <• that the

i»t/t in there m u ld lonl* ,if the le t a id in g < hart He didn I h.n e

lo vi.i/f u n til somehndx t lum ped the <.im /de to m.iAt* 

.u liu -ln w n ls / - SulH.il

Joe Soldat recalls: " / have a letter A rt Keene

[head o f radiation protection in the 200 Areas]

wrote to Koberg (Keene 1957). [Keene was

responding to a letter that said], "we have a

need for an extra push for plutonium. You said

we can not release more than 10 curies a week. What if we did a special push and you allowed us to put out

30 curies in one week and we wouldn't do anything the rest o f the time?" He wrote back, "N o." Because the

10 curies per week was based on average long term meteorology, and if you put 30 in one week it might, at that

particular time, put too much in the environment. Parker made it stick." - Soldat 1999

An example of an instance in which the normal relationship between operations and support was abrogated is the Green 

Run, a secret military experiment conducted at the Hanford Site in December 1949 at the 221 -T chemical separations 

facility. During the Green Run, operations suspended operational guidelines established by the Health Instruments 

Section on the authority of the U.S. military. This experiment became known as the Green Run because irradiated 

uranium fuel was still "green" when the chemical separations process began. "Green" meant the fuel had not been aged 

in a holding basin for the length of time recommended by the Health Instruments Section.

The Green Run set a benchmark for measuring environmental radiation levels emitted in the chemical separations 

process. At the Hanford Site, this test was accomplished by controlling the number of days spent fuel was cooled, 

bypassing filtration systems intended to capture emissions, carefully monitoring the chemical separations process, then 

measuring levels of airborne radioactivity. Exhaust stacks released a gaseous by-product, iodine 131, into the 

environment when the spent fuel was dissolved in acid. Airplanes traced the presence of iodine 131, as did stationary 

and mobile ground-based monitoring instruments as it moved through the atmosphere and subsequently deposited on 

the ground (Jenne and Healy 1950).

The nuclear arms race was behind this experiment because the United States wanted to know if the Soviet Union was 

neglecting to age their irradiated fuel. If the Soviet Union was not taking the same amount of time as the United States 

was to age the fuel, estimates of nuclear weapon stockpiles would have to be revised. Thus, the Green Run was an 

attempt to "test a methodology for monitoring the emerging Soviet nuclear program" (DOE 1995a, p. 216).

Although this test was not intended as a study of radiological effects on humans living in the pathway of this airborne 

release, "this test did result in the exposure of populated areas near the site" (DOE 1995a, p. 217). To put the Green Run 

release in historical context of other airborne radioactive releases, approximately 8,000 curies of iodine 131 were 

released into the atmosphere .during this test: "Radioactivity released during the Green Run was, however, dwarfed by 

the amount of radioactive materials released during routine production activities at Hanford in the 1944-1948 period, 

before the installation of emission reduction equipment" (DOE 1995a, p. 217). Occupational and public health effects 

from the Green Run are still in litigation. This event was an aberration from operating limits already established, not an 

experiment to set standards.

2 -1 0 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

I Re la tio n s h ip s Am o n g th e

■ the lir^t th.it \ou ii<‘f /- th.it then .lie .» radiation monitor« mi e\en | SUPPORT DISCIPLINES

■ im/iMr/.i/ -.irV/v pi-wm .1/ H.iniotd tiul then when \ou take .1 look at the |

i onset fuem ««s »/> //if fiuhln tu th oat\ u> this .ire. 111here Me.ire ^iliim; it i-> not | According to health and safety

Urn h.ud to iatinn.ili/v. I didn't think the\ Moiked.is hard a- »<• did." - William I professionals who worked at the

lax loi, Inthi-liul *».xiVi\ I nt»nu*vi .11 I hr H.inii>r<l silv 1 l.ulor l r)<)iili) | Hanford Site during the Cold War, the

I emphasis was on radiation protection.

The historical emphasis on radiation

protection, at times at the expense of other protection programs in areas such as chemical exposure, is supported by a 

recent report the National Economic Council issued at the request of President Clinton. An inter-agency panel of U.S. 

government departments (for example, Health and Human Services, Labor) reviewed occupational epidemiological 

studies pertaining to the Hanford Site and identified significant findings for this National Economic Council report, The

Link Between Exposure to Occupational Hazards and Illnesses in the Department o f Energy Contractor Workforce (NEC 

2000, p. 2). The report notes: "there is a general lack of industrial hygiene monitoring data for chemical and physical 

hazards."

A 1992 historical overview, written from the standpoint of operational radiation protection at the Hanford Site, supports 

this assessment: "The previous emphasis on radiation safety, in many cases to the exclusion of industrial safety, no 

longer exists" (Sudmann 1992, p. 11). This does not imply that messages about standard industrial safety were not 

transmitted to individuals. To the contrary, the archival record indicates that the promotion of basic industrial safety was 

a highly visible, slogan-oriented, regular feature of an individual's work world at the Hanford Site from the Manhattan 

Project through the Cold War.

According to the remarks of the Closing Panel on "The Use of Risk Information in Making Clean-up Decisions" presented 

at the Second Annual Health of the Hanford Site Conference, the emphasis on radiation protection at the Hanford Site is 

a historic artifact (Takaro 1998). One reason for the emphasis was the perception of danger posed by radioactive 

materials being produced on an industrial scale for the first time. W ith the uncertainty of such factors in mind, 

management for worker health and safety at the Hanford Site decided early on to keep radiation exposure records on 

personnel, and they maintained an extensive radiation dosimetry record for work sites.

In contrast, large volumes of chemicals had been produced industrially for a number of years before the Manhattan 

Project. General familiarity with large-scale chemical usage in industry may, along with other reasons, have contributed 

to the fact that from 1943-1990, the Hanford Site did not maintain a database on chemical exposure to workers. On the 

issue of chemical exposure, the National Economic Council noted: "little is known about the actual levels of worker 

exposure to these materials. DOE does not maintain a centralized repository of industrial hygiene information on 

exposures to individual chemicals" (NEC 2000, p. 5). The National Economic Council report would be a good starting 

place for readers interested in exploring this topic further because it contains summaries of reports and a useful 

bibliography.

The recollections of Hanford Site health and safety professionals allow further exploration of radiation protection as it 

pertains to relationships between the disciplines. One health and safety professional, Les Cronk, had the unique 

perspective of working at the Hanford Site for many years, then transferring to a laboratory research setting at the 

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, and finally returning to „ „

the Hanford Site. He draws a ,. . . , . . , ,, , , ,, . . . . . radiom an ,11 .it ti.m io id . ih e \ aie a lo t dntetent \t H .m ro rd v>» h .n e health

distinction between industry and . . . . . . . . . ' , /»»-« «pvi'onnvl 11 no .»<• pciiurminn i.idiolnyn.d >uni-t-, t.ihm<> ,w

research in his interpretation of . . . . . , ..... 1 .m a - u ih \\h v iv ,e , in o lh e i t.n ihtii"> th.it pci'stiii w o u ld he ,m \ d l .uo tm d t\n e

relationships between health and , ,

r pei*.on to iu e in e rl w ith he.ilth .m d M ft'fi m nenei.d tn n n .1 hm .idet

safety support at the Hanford Site .. 7 pei-ipot tne. - < 1011k low*.

(see sidebar box).

2 - 1 0 .1 4
Section 10- Worker Health and Safety

The emphasis on radiation protection at the Hanford Site required a special force of radiation monitors and professionals 

more broadly trained in the field as a whole. Over time, a two-tier occupational structure in radiation protection 

emerged at the Hanford Site.

However, routine monitoring

required less formal training ..... ................................ , . , ...

, . , . . .... , " \ \ r didn l tht .tm t.n h o lo iiu .ii u n rk a l .1// ■.?■* 11n lu -l11.1l In n tfn u l- : / (Inn I think i! /i.n

than did data analysts. W ith , , . . ' „ , „ ............................................. .

, . c \ r r licen f»i u r iifi'n a/lovvi-d. IV v//. <1 »• fv trrto n . Miv ffP N 'H v .ilm Wu i k - f

fo ih n n hins. u n m o ih li.u li.ilia n W onittits, to n lin u i»lo It \ In "i*/ in lu n u h i-lii.il /iv^/Vni’

.1/ IL v iro n l cvcm lo d ,i\. £i m iih c ir i7-i* in //#«' rc .il w in hi, lihc ,if I onuuonw o.illh

hh'-on and nlfivi p /a u s in fin- 1 i\ili.tn nut ii-.u iv.tt fui r.it i7/fic». Nfif. ' \ u t fv.tr

R vuuhilon < tunm i—iim i ir u u l.ilr d n ut h \ir h n ililw -. or in iv -i-.m h f.u ilitic - lh .il u-v

r.Khnisninfh's u h it h use R t f h iltjd i.ilio n M if h O flit t‘i ! .in d in th r-c t ihv

in th i'lii.il iiv^ii'nt' d.i .1- mm ii r.ulio/miK.W timfc i/iv Ihv

in d u s lih il udks d o n't •.;!*« ih r /jj/k i'*, h iii f/icv .ire1 -n t.itI cnounh lo fiiitir r ih iim -

ou l .1 nd iis<» tin* - 11/ w i in -tw n n 'n h . I le r r .1 / H .tn ln rd i l is .tlm o-l on Ve I o i( ,o d lo do .1

i.i(ho/i>Ui.tl no m .itfrr ul»> \o u .in*." - llvi I. In ftii

the unionization of radiation 

monitors, training in this 

technical field became 

geared more to vocational 

schools, community colleges, 

union halls, and contractors 

than to research universities.

However, health physics 

became a field of study at 

several major universities, 

with professional certification 

from the American Academy 

of Health Physics becoming a reality in 1959.

Herbert Parker noted that Hanford Site radiation monitoring was unique in its approach to the task of radiation 

protection. The reason for this, as he put it, was a "tendency in industry to incorporate the radiation protection function 

w ith overall safety and health functions." According to Parker, at the Hanford Site radiation protection was more closely 

related to operations than at other nuclear facilities: "protection requirements apply to practically every operating task, 

phase of design, and construction of improved facilities" (Parker 1955, p. 903).

Wo r k er Per spec tives o n He a lth a n d Sa fe ty

Workers often faced the conflicting demands of ensuring health and safety while meeting the production requirements. 

Two sources relate the health and safety experiences o f former Hanford Site workers in their own words: Hanford and

the Bomb: An Oral History o f World War II (Sanger 1989), which is an oral history focusing on the Manhattan Project, 

and the transcript of a February 3, 2000 public meeting the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Environment, Safety, 

and Health sponsored (DOE 2000). According to Assistant Secretary of Environment, Safety, and Health,

David Michaels, the purpose of this meeting was to listen to the health and safety experiences of current and former 

workers. The meeting was held at the Richland Federal Building. An estimated 600 people attended this meeting, and 

50 people provided testimony. The time period discussed at the February 3, 2000 public meeting was from the start of 

operations to the present.

O rville F. Hill shared his perspective on work and radiation during the Manhattan Project:

"I wasn't ready concerned about radiation in those days, but I had respect for it. When I look back, we did a lot

o f foolish things. We took risks, to get results rather than spend days and weeks designing equipment so that you

could do everything without getting very close or taking any risks. We went ahead and did the work." - Sanger 

1989, p. 156

Former Hanford worker Jack M iller worked on the reactors. He recounts an experience removing spent fuel elements 

from one o f Hanford's reactors:

"I can remember being on the rear face, wearing coveralls, cloth boots, cloth gloves, rubber boots and rubber

pants, rubber hat and jacket and rubber glove and assault mask. It's difficult to talk into the communications

mike [microphone] when you're wearing an assault mask, which is like an Arm y gas mask. I was trying to raise

the front face, 'rear to front, rear to front,'no response. Then I tried 'rear to control,' there's always somebody

2 -1 0 .1 5
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

there. No response. I got so damned disgusted. I started to slam that mike down and noticed I only had a foot

o f cord on the mike, one o f the pieces o f machinery coming by had cut the cord. I got m y hands contaminated a

number o f times, because o f a leaky glove. We would wash o ff with soap and water." - Sanger 1989, p. 143

Mac MacCready offered this perspective on precautions:

"In those days, we did a lot o f precautions because we didn't know. A ll this process, you see, was designed on

the basis o f work done in the laboratory with a few micrograms o f plutonium ."- Sanger 1989, p. 147

Wakefield W right had these recollections of his work life at Hanford:

" When we first came here, for years, they would come by and leave a bottle on the porch. And you were

required to urinate in that bottle and then they would come and pick it up. We were tested once a month,

during the war and afterward. We had yearly physical examinations. And, every day somebody would check

your feet for radioactivity.... It was much easier after they dropped the bombs. Before the bombs, you would

have to tell them, 'Put your confidence in me, because I am not letting you go somewhere where you would be

hurt but at the same time I can't tell you what you are doing either.' Not many o f them guessed. I couldn't say

anything about radioactivity, not until after August 6." - Sanger 1989, p. 155

Retired Hanford worker George Foster spoke at the February 3, 2000 public meeting, (DOE 2000, pp. 73-79). He shared 

a story that illustrates how some of the occupational health and safety history of Hanford's Manhattan Project and 

Cold War era went undocumented. Foster arrived at the Hanford Site on February 2,1948. He received a puncture 

wound with plutonium on December 29, 1952, but as he recounts below, he didn't know this at the time of the accident:

" / had on two pair o f surgeon gloves, then a pair o f canvas gloves, and then a big heavy rubber glove, working in

that hood. And I couldn't quite reach the pipe. Well, when I pulled that up over there, why, I pricked m y hand. I

knew that I had ruptured the glove. And so I told them, 'I ruptured m y glove.'

So they peeled that outer garment off, put it in a proper container, right on down to the last surgeon glove, and it

was hot, over a m illion count again. They didn't know that [the puncture] had actually went into the skin,

because there wasn't any blood or anything. They didn't even report it as an accident. I asked Dr. Brockman, she

was the head o f all the nurses — I mean, all the doctors and nurses, and I asked her about cutting it out. Oh, she

talked back in her throat, oh, she says, it w ill just make another sore, just make another sore. So that was out.

But anyway, I quit GE and went back out on construction." - DOE 2000

Foster goes on to recall a conversation with co-workers over a poker game. A co-worker said a woman at a Hanford 

laboratory was scared when she brought in a certain worker's urine sample because it was so "hot" with plutonium. f>lo 

names were on the labels for bottled urine samples; the labels were numerically coded with employment identifiers. 

According to Foster,

" The lab worker said the number on the hot bottle was 6204. That was m y number, 6 identified me as a

pipefitter. Well, B ill Rice, the foreman, right away...called me in and wondered where I got it. And so at first I

was at a loss. They told me I had plutonium, i was working in the 300 Area at the time. And they told me, they

asked me if I knew where I got it. And he.says, 'Well, there isn't any plutonium in the 300 Area. You must mean

uranium, don't you?' And he says, 'No, plutonium .'W e tore a hood out o f a certain building in the 300 Area and

[he] said we thought maybe you got it [there]. I told him, 'Oh, that's where I got the contamination, was with

that wire brush.'" - DOE 2000

Later, Foster consulted with Hanford occupational medical doctors regarding his plutonium deposition.

"So they said they wanted that man [Foster] followed up with bottles...regardless o f where that man went. [The

doctors said I] should have been followed with bottles immediately [after the accident]. [Regarding his case,

Foster overheard one Hanford medical professional say,] 'Well, we didn't have enough systems set up at that

tim e.' [Another medical professional responded] 'Oh, yes, we did. That system was set up.' They [occupational

medical doctors reviewing his case] were really chewing on each other in there." - DOE 2000

2 - 1 0 .1 6
Section 10- Worker Health and Safety

Another worker, Maffeo, arrived for work at the Hanford Site in 1949. He worked in the laboratories of the 200 East and 

200 West Areas:

" The H ot War was over and the Cold War ensued. And there was a lot o f pride out here, a lot o f pride. You talk

about safety. Yes. There was a lot o f safety. And all the analytical procedures we had, we had a procedure on the

left-hand side and safety on the step by step. If it had 20 steps; there would be 20 comments, beware o f this, be

careful o f that, don't do this, don't do that. So there was a very, very —And yet there was problems. Always

something popped up that would be wrong. And it was rectified. And there was a lot o f pride in the people here.

And I really thought that it was a magnificent effort. I mean, solid. And it wasn't just an individual effort. It was

everybody that participated in this tremendous effort, because production, production, production was the key,

and safety, safety, safety ran right alongside o f it." - DOE 2000, pp. 104-105

These first person accounts of worker health and safety suggest that occupational experiences were diverse and that 

workers remembering these experiences often do so in different voices and from heterogeneous vantage points. W hile 

some former Hanford workers highlight the plant's accomplishments, others point out the failures and accidents. As 

such, these remembrances also suggest not one single worker viewpoint typifies the Hanford occupational experience. 

Rather, these accounts may be a starting point for a closer look at other individual occupational experiences as a way of 

learning more about worker health and safety at the Hanford Site. Such personal accounts are important to the historic 

record of health and safety at the Hanford Site because the undocumented accident alongside the everyday experience 

demands the same attention and scrutiny as is given to statistical data. Through close attention to the detail of 

occupational experience, future historians w ill begin to shape a more complete picture of health and safety at the 

Hanford Site.

Re s e a r c h a n d St a n d a r d s

Early in the 20th century, standards for radiation exposure were based on the concept of a tolerance dose. A tolerance 

dose was a fraction of the amount of radiation (x-rays in those days) that resulted in erythema (reddening of the skin).

The tolerance dose, therefore, was a product of the directly observable, external physical effect of ionizing radiation and 

was defined as "the dose which an operator can, for a prolonged period of time, tolerate without ultimately suffering 

injury" (Arthur Mutscheller quoted in Hacker 1987, p. 15). After the Manhattan Project, the concept of tolerance was 

discarded in favor of "permissible radiation exposure" (AEC 1951 c, p. 2103). The term "permissible radiation exposure" 

reflects a change in philosophy from earlier notions of "tolerance." For worker health and safety at the Hanford Site, the 

main difference between the two was that "permissible radiation exposure" assumed that any dose carried with it some 

degree of risk. In operational settings at the Hanford Site, a conservative limit, called an operational control, was set at a 

figure lower than the maximum permissible exposure. As of 1990, radiation protection philosophy was based on the 

concept of ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable). This philosophy attempted to achieve optimization between the 

costs of the detrimental effects of radiation exposure and the benefits derived from the use of radioactive materials. 

ALARA included technical as w ell as social and economic factors.

Ap p l ie d Research

Scientists at the Hanford Site knew that information, practices, and policies regarding radiation health and safety had to 

be systematically evaluated through applied research. Because the Hanford Site was primarily a production facility, the 

applied research tended to be focused on real problems as they were discovered. As Findlay and Hevly (1995, p. 13) 

have observed, "this industrial story— less glamorous, perhaps, than the scientific story— has been slighted by historians, 

but it is every bit as important and as complicated." Health and safety professionals at the Hanford Site could inform 

themselves with basic research being conducted at the facility, at other sites associated with the nuclear defense mission, 

and at universities, but ultimately the identification and solution of problems was based on the constraints of operational 

requirements (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 72). For additional information, see Section 7, Research and Development.

2 -1 0 .1 7
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

SSI

Figure 2-10.5.

o f Thyroid

Worker Conducting Self-Survey

The newly emerging field of health and safety in a plutonium 

production facility developed in tandem with day-to-day 

operations. At the Hanford Site, applied research was the most 

direct route of obtaining feedback on operational activities.

Applied research used data from operational practices and routine 

monitoring: "their solutions tended to emphasize a high level of 

hands-on knowledge and direct problem-solving techniques"

(Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 52). One source of data from routine 

monitoring was equipment workers could use to survey their 

thyroid glands (see Figure 2-10.5). Such sources of information 

were used to keep the exposure levels of onsite workers beneath 

accepted limits and to prevent other industrial dangers from causing 

them harm (Selby and Soldat 1958).

Beginning in 1949, applied research at the Hanford Site began to 

include measurement o f plutonium in the bodies of deceased 

workers. In an effort to correlate models of worker radiation dose 

with the actual amounts of plutonium absorbed into the body, tissue 

samples were taken from some deceased plutonium production workers with suspected high concentrations of internal 

contamination. A sample of non-plutonium workers, local residents, and residents from the northwest region were also 

autopsied to determine if any plutonium was present (see, for example, Newton et al. 1966). These tissue samples were 

taken at the time o f autopsy and underwent laboratory analysis (Kathren 1995, p. 349). Before 1968, no informed 

consent was requested from the families of subjects specifically requesting permission to remove tissue and conduct 

analysis for plutonium. Between 1949 and 1968, fam ily members appear to have authorized most of the autopsies, but 

the research to measure plutonium in tissues removed during autopsy was not commonly disclosed to those granting 

permission. Funds for this research most likely came from the budget of the Medical Department. However, other 

Hanford Site departments also may have contributed funds, although these are difficult to account for in the official 

records.

In 1968, the tissue analysis program became a voluntary program the Atomic Energy Commission formally recognized.

In 1970, this program was named the United States Transuranium Registry. Through 1990, this program provided 

important feedback to verify models of radioisotope uptake into the human body based on the actual exposures of 

workers to plutonium and americium (Stannard 1988, p. 1469). This information was then factored into protection 

programs at the Hanford Site and elsewhere.

Another example of applied research on worker health and safety undertaken by Hanford Site staff is illustrated in an 

October 14, 1977 edition of Battelle's newsletter, The Creenie. This newsletter contains an article that profiled the Safety 

Analysis Section of the Energy System Department The Associate Manager of that group, Ed Watson, called his 

environmental consequences team "tail-end Charlies" because they represented the last step in the process of protecting 

humans from "toxic materials at every stage of energy production" (Battelle 1977). Applied research this group 

conducted at the Hanford Site included sampling waste streams in various environmental media and checking the 

efficiency of emission filtration systems.

Applied research at the Hanford Site increased after the passage of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). 

President Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970. For these "tail-end Charlies," as Ed Watson noted, "NEPA is 

the biggest impetus for our business. It really spelled out the need for assessing the consequences of technologies to man 

and his environment. Now we have an overload of projects that touch on a variety of energy-generating systems" 

(Battelle 1977, p. 1).
Section 10- Worker Health and Safety

Another applied research study was the whole body count of local 

school children that took place from the early 1960s to the 

mid-1970s (Honstead and Eichner 1972) (see Figure 2-10.6}. This 

study was part of a larger worker surveillance program (Honstead 

1968). A mobile whole body counter was used to detect and 

measure internally deposited radioactive material. For a physical 

and technical description of this mobile whole body counter, see, 

for example, Eichner 1969 or Brady and Swanberg 1965. Scientists 

studied the uptake measured in relation to the diet of the school 

children as a means o f verifying environmental models (Wilson 

1987, p. 4.15). The purpose of this program was to monitor the 

local population for fallout of nuclear weapons and to evaluate the 

Columbia River as a pathway for radionuclides to enter the human 

body through food intake. According to findings based on this 

study, the radiation found in the bodies of local children were trace 

amounts, enough to be detected but negligible when compared to 

public body burden limits. Thus, this particular study did not affect 

radiation standards for workers at the Hanford Site.

The literature on applied research efforts includes numerous other 

examples of studies conducted at the Hanford Site. For example, 

Parker "initiated expansion into a practical program in 

[radiobiologyl linked to the hazards to humans and the 

environment that had arisen in their work" (Stannard 1988, p. 434). 

Commenting on this research, Stannard (1988, p. 435) notes, "the 

bulk of the work involved feeding contaminant [radio iodine] to 

sheep to tie as closely as possible to problems in the field"

(see Figure 2-10.7). For additional information on the Biology 

Laboratory where the sheep were kept (108-F Building), see the 

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the 

Internet. These studies consisted of both basic and applied 

research and contributed to basic scientific understanding of the 

relationship between radiation and health. However, the topics of 

experiments were often based on outstanding problems stemming 

from operations at the Hanford Site.

Ep id e m io l o g ic a l Research o n Ha n fo rd

Wo rkers

Figure 2-10.6. Mobile Whole Body Counter

Used for Monitoring School Children

1 i

r

Figure 2-10.7. Worker Feeding Sheep Radioactive

Food at the 7 08-F Building Worker health and safety at the Hanford Site has been the subject 

of ongoing epidemiological research since the 1960s. The primary

question that scientists are interested in answering centers on whether or not a statistically significant relationship exists 

between worker radiation dose and increased mortality. Mancuso et al. (1977) published the first peer-reviewed article 

based on data from the Hanford Site in the open scientific literature. This study, "an investigation of mortality among 

Hanford workers," found "elevated mortality for multiple myeloma and cancers of the lung and pancreas" (Wilkinson 

1991, p. 715). Gregg S. Wilkinson, editor of Occupational Medicine's "State of the Art Review on the Nuclear Energy 

Industry" goes on, "This was subsequently followed by another analysis conducted by Gilbert and Marks that disputed 

some of Mancuso's findings but confirmed the presence of excess multiple myeloma and pancreatic cancer mortality" 

(Wilkinson 1991, p. 715). According to Wilkinson, "An enormous controversy erupted...which continues to this day. 

The excess of multiple myeloma has continued, whereas the pancreatic cancer has diminished with additional

2 -1 0 .1 9
p g p F Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

follow-up" (Wilkinson 1991, p. 715). The recent National Economic Council report includes a table, "Summary of 

Statistically Significant Elevated Findings for Cancer at Department of Energy Sites," which lists cancer of the pancreas as 

a standardized mortality ratio study with statistically significant findings for specific organ site cancer. Cancers indicated 

by a statistically significant trend analysis for radiation versus indicated cancer include liver, pancreas, genital cancer, 

Hodgkin's lymphoma, and m ultiple myeloma (NEC 2000, p. 9).

The general reader should be aware that this is a complex issue specialists in the field of occupational health are 

currently debating. Readers may wish to consult overviews of the various papers to gain a sense of the differences of 

statistical interpretation assigned to the data sets. The National Economic Council report (NEC 2000), contains a useful 

overview o f findings from occupational epidemiological studies: The Hanford Health Information Network website, 

http://www.doh.wa.gov/hanford/. contains, among many other useful health and safety-related publications, 

"Hanford-Related Studies" and "Hanford-Related Projects." "Hanford-Related Studies" provides an annotated list of 

health studies with a Hanford component. "Hanford-Related Projects" contains descriptions and contact information on 

projects, such as the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project.

Sta n d a r d s

Guidelines for radiation protection standards at the Hanford Site came from three main sources. The first source 

consisted of recommendations made by advisory committees such as the National Council on Radiation Protection and 

Measurements and the Federal Radiation Council. The recommendations they made did not carry a legal requirement 

for implementation at the Hanford Site. The second source o f guidelines came from the federal agency responsible for 

the Hanford Site: the Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Research and Development Agency, and the 

U.S. Department of Energy. The standards these agencies set typically followed standards o f the National Council on 

Radiation Protection and Measurements and were legally binding and enforceable at the Hanford Site. The third source 

of radiation protection standards were set at the Hanford Site. These standards, known as operational controls, set lower 

working limits to ensure compliance w ith those set by the federal agency responsible for the Hanford Site.

Dade W. Moeller (1989), a health physicist, gives a historical perspective on the development of radiation protection 

standards in the 20th century. At the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and 

Measurements, Moeller discussed what he termed seven stages in the development of radiation protection standards. 

These stages show the trend toward lower limits and the transition from the concept of a tolerance dose to A LARA (as 

low as reasonably achievable):

Avoidance of Acute Effects (1900-1930)

Concern for Chronic Effects (1930-1950)

Concern for Genetic Effects (1950-1960)

Concern for Somatic Effects (Primarily Leukemia) (1960-1970)

Concern for Somatic Effects (Primarily Solid Tumors) (1970-present)

Application of a Risk-Based Approach (1980-present)

Approach to Professional Maturity (1990-present)

A historical overview of radiation protection guidelines enforceable at the Hanford Site is shown in Table 2-10.1. The 

general trend is toward lower worker exposure limits.

The Health Instruments Section established operational controls at the Hanford Site in conjunction with operational 

management. The purpose of operational controls was to maintain a conservative first line of protection against 

overexposure and ensure facilities operated within their safety envelope and in accordance with their design. 

Operational controls were always set lower than the maximum permissible limit.

The 1954 issue o f the General Electric manual Radiation Protection Standards notes that operational controls were 

"substantially more conservative than official maximum permissible limits" (GE 1954q, p. 1). On October 12, 1967, the 

head of radiation protection in the 200 Areas, Art R. Keene, wrote a letter to Fred W. Albaugh to clarify the role of

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Se c t io n 1 0 - W o rk e r He a l t h a n d S a fe ty

Table 2-10.1. Chronology o f Radiation Standards: Occupational External Whole Body Dose Equivalent Limits,

7947.7977

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

National Council on Radiation International Commission Energy Research and Development

Protection and Measurement oh Radiological Protection 1960 Federal Radiation Administration (ERDA)

■____________ (NCRP)___________________________(ICRP)__________________Council (F R C ) Department of Energy (POE)

Year Criteria_________ Reference________ Criteria__________ Reference Criteria______ Reference_____ Criteria__________Reference

1947 0.1 rad/day N B S1934 0.2 rad/day 0.1 rad/day NCRP N B S1934

0.5 rad/wk (H andbook 18) 1.0 rad/wk (H andbook 18)

1949 0.3 rad/wk NBS 1949 0.2 rad/day 0.1 rad/day

(Handbook 42) 1.0 rad/wk

1950 0.3 rad/wk 0.3 rad/wk 0.3 rad/wk NBS 1950

3.9 rad/13 w k (H andbook 47)

AEC (DBM)

1951 0.3 rad/wk 0.3 rad/wk 3.0 rad/Series AEC (LASL

2.0 rad/Series 1952 - WT 204)

3.9 rad/13 wks AEC (Ranger/

Greenhouse) 

AEC (DBM)

1952 0.3 rad/wk 0.3 rad/wk 3.9 rad/13 wks AEC (DBM)

1954 3.0 rad/13 wks NBS 1954 0.3 rad/wk 3.0 rad/13 wks NCRP NBS 1954

0.3 rad/wk Max (H andbook 59) 0.3 rad/wk Max (H andbook 59)

15 rem/y 15 rem/y

1957 5 rem/y Ave Addendum 0.3 rad/wk 3.0 rad/13 wks

12 rem/y Max NBS 1954 0.3 rad/wk Max

(H andbook 59) 15 rem/y

1958 0.3 rem /wk Max Addendum 0.1 rem/wk ICRP 1959 0.3 rem/wk NCRP NBS 1954

3 rem /13 wks NBS 1954 3.0 rem/13 w ks (Report 1) 3.0 rem/13 w k (H andbook 59)

12 rem/y Max (Handbook 59) 5 (N-18) rem* 12 rem/y Max

5 (N-18) rem* 5 (N-18) rem*

1959 0.3 rem/wk Max 0.1 rem/wk 0.3 rem/wk

3 rem /13 wks 3.0 rem /13 wks 3.0 rem/13 wk

12 rem/y Max . 5 (N-18) rem* 12 rem/y Max .

5 (N-18) rem* 5 (N-18) rem*

1960 0.3 rem/wk Max 

3 rem/13 wks 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem*

0.1 rem/wk 

3.0 rem/13 wks 

5 (N-18) rem*

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem*

FRC 1960 

(Report 1)

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

5 (N-18) rem*

FRC 1960 

(Report 1)

1965 0.3 rem/wk Max 

3 rem/13 wks 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem*

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Max

ICRP 1966 

(Report 9)

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem.*

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

5 (N-18) rem*

1971 3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y

NCRP 1971 

(Report 39)

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Max

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem*

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

5 (N-18) rem*

1974 3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Max

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem*

3 rem/13 wks 

5 rem/y

NCRP 1971 

(Report 39)

1977 3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y

5 rem/y 

acceptable risk

ICRP 1977 

(Report 26)

3 rem/13 wk 

5 rem/y Ave 

12 rem/y Max 

5 (N-18) rem*

3 rem/13" wks 

5 rem/y

*N-18 is years of occupational exposure after age 18, where N is the worker's age in years - a guideline used historically to show maximum cumulative 

occupational radiation dose to an adult worker. This approach is no longer used in either the DOE or NRC occupational exposure regulations.

2 -1 0 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iiit ie s

operational controls at the Hanford Site. In this letter, Keene wrote that operational controls "provided a rational tool for 

operating management to control their exposure in a manner which would assure [sic] compliance w ith the basic limits 

and still provide reasonable latitude throughout the month" (Keene 1967, p. 1; Hicks and Yesberger 1967).

In 1954, operational controls at the Hanford Site were based on a 20 percent safety factor for most types of radiation 

exposure. The same conservative approach was still evidenced in 1967. The operational control for radiation exposure 

was set at 4 rem. The Atomic Energy Commission maximum permissible lim it was 5 rem, reflecting a safety factor of 

20 percent. The 1951 REDOX technical manual provides a window into this topic from an operations perspective: 

"Because [of] the lack of full, exact knowledge, the permissible exposure limits at the Hanford Works [Hanford Site] are 

conservatively set and frequently reviewed in light of new information. The safety factors involved are not exactly 

known. In some cases they may be quite large; in others, just adequate" (AEC 1951c, p. 2103). Operational controls 

were the first line of

administrative defense Table 2-10.2. Occupational Exposure Limits for Radioisotopes at the Hanford Site> 1954

against overexposure Maximum Permissible Amount o f Radioisotope in Total Body and Maximum Permissible Concentration

throughout the Cold War. rn A ir and Water for Occupational Exposure at Hanford Atom ic Products Operation*3’

In the case of external 

exposure, when a worker is 

removed from a radiation 

field the exposure stops.

However, exposure from 

radioisotopes inside the 

body continues until the 

substance is removed, 

eliminated, or decays to 

stability. A body burden is 

the maximum permissible 

amount of a radioisotope 

allowed in a worker's body.

At the Hanford Site, 

operational controls for 

body burdens have 

historically been set at 

one-fifth of the maximum 

permissible exposure limit.

Radioisotope

(Body-soluble)

Critical

Organ

Microcuries

in Total Body

Microcuries per

cc of Water

Microcuries per

ccof Air

H 3(H T O or T O) Body 3 0 0 0 <bl 2 x 10-1lb) -1.2 x 70-sw

Si3’ Body 76 *=’ ' 2 x 1 0 -l(c) 3 x 1 0 - 5(c)

Ci4(COJ Fat 250 3 x 1 0 -3 5 x 1 0 * (bone)

R 32 Bone 10 2 x 10-4 1 x 10-7

S35 Skin. 100 5 x 10-3 1 x 1 0 *

C135 Body 200 2 x 1 0 -3 4 x 1 0 ""

A41 Body .30 5 x 10"4 5 x 10-7

Fe5S Blood 1000 4 x 10-3 6 x 10-7

Fe59 Blood 11 1 x 10-4 1 .5 x 1 0 *

Co60 Liver 3 2 x TO'2 9 x 10*

Ni59 Liver 39 2 .5 x 1 0 -' 2 x 1 0 *

Cu64 Liver 150 8 x 10'2 6 x 10*

KR85 (4.4 hr) Body 80 (c) 1 x 10**4 1 x 1 0 *(c)

Sr89 Bone 2 7 x 1 0 -5 2 x 10*

S r^t/Y 90) Bone 1 8 x 10"7 2 x 1 0 -10

Ru106(/Rh106) Kidneys 4 1 x 10**b) 3 x 1 0 *

I131 Thyroid 0.3 SxlO-5 3x10-9

Xe135 Body 100 1 x 10"3 2x10*

Po210 Spleen 0.02 SxlO"5 2 x 1.Q*°

Rn222 (/Daughters) Body — 2x10* 1x10*

Ra226 (/ 1/2 Daughters) Bone 0.1 4x10* 8 x 10*2

Th234 Bone 120 3 6 x 10"7

u 233 Bone 0.04 1.5x10* 1 x 10*°

1 )2 5 3 Bone 0.07 *4 6 x 10* *d 1 X 10-10*4

Pu239 Bone 0.04 1.5x10* 2 x 10*2 *4

Pu239 (insoluble) Bone 0.008 . . . 2 x 10 *2

Am 241 Bone 0.056 1 x 10* 3 x 10 *1

Cm242 Bone 0.05 9x10* 2x10*°

(a) Recommendations o f NBS 1953 (Handbook 52) unless otherwise indicated

(b) Recommendations o f H. A. Kornberg

(c) Calculated by H. V. Clukey

At the Hanford Site, primary 

operational controls for 

preventing internal 

depositions were 

established by lim iting the 

concentrations of

radioisotopes in air and water. Secondary operational controls were maintained through the use of personnel protective 

gear such as filtered breathing masks. Thus, operational controls for internal exposure were different from controls for 

external exposure. However, they were often used in conjunction with one another.

Maximum permissible limits for air and water were first set down by Parker in "Tolerance Concentration of Product in 

Drinking Water" on August 4, 1945 (Parker 1945). The 1954 Radiation Protection Standards (GE 1954q, p. 3) manual 

lists occupational exposure limits for radioisotopes by microcuries per cubic centimeter of water and air (see 

Table 2-10.2).

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Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa e e t y

P r e v e n t io n a n d Pr o t e c t io n

The prevention of health and safety problems was one of many factors decision-makers considered at the beginning of 

the Manhattan Project when the sites were selected. The primary goal during the Manhattan Project remained the 

production of a specified amount of plutonium by a set date. Manhattan Project management incorporated worker 

health and safety planning into the Hanford Site's wartime operations to the extent that it was feasible and did not 

jeopardize the ultimate goal.

For both the Manhattan Project and Cold War era, understanding the prevention and protection measures at the Hanford 

Site required understanding the types and effects of radiation. It is commonly thought that as the energy level of 

radiation increases, so does biological damage. This is not always the case. Consider cosmic rays, which have very 

high energy but most pass right through us without any interaction. Biological damage is instead a function of both the 

mass and energy of the impinging radiation. Massive particles such as alpha particles cause a great deal of damage in 

very small areas, whereas gamma rays may have only a few ionizations with the same unit volume. Ultimately, how 

damaging the type of radiation may be is a function of its ability to transfer energy to the medium it is traveling through.

Barrie Lambert (1991, p. 725) notes "it is generally accepted now that all exposure to ionizing radiation results in some 

damage to biologic tissue." However, he goes on, "the evidence for biologic effects" at extremely low levels is "scanty," 

or, in other words, at certain extremely low levels the damage caused may be within the ability of the body to heal itself. 

Repeated exposures to low levels of ionizing radiation are another matter. Repeated exposures are the main subject of 

ongoing discussions in the scientific literature regarding radiation dose and biological response. This type of radiation 

exposure is often referred to as chronic exposure. Acute exposures are larger doses of radiation that have been 

demonstrated to cause serious injury or even death at sufficiently high exposures. One related, and unresolved, scientific 

question pertains to the existence of a threshold level at or below which no biological harm occurs from ionizing 

radiation (Cronkite and Musolino 1996, Nussbaum 1998). For a scientific description of radiation, see the various 

publications on the Hanford Health Information Network website at http://www.doh.wa.gov/hanford.

Ra d ia t io n Pr o tec tio n : Sh ie l d in g , Dis ta n c e, a n d Tim e

The three main radiation 

protection principles are 

shielding, distance, and 

time, in earlier days, 

bronze foundries and 

blacksmith shops 

safeguarded artisans from 

molten metal w ith heat 

shields and by distancing 

workers from heat sources.

W hile the tools of radiation 

detection and

measurement have become 

more precise, the 

principles of shielding, 

distance, and time have 

remained constant. "Safety 

against sources of highly 

penetrating radiation is 

maintained, in general, by 

three methods. Massive

[\amplv of Radiation Scuiri v- Rvquiriny, Protection

Workers in reactor buildings al the Hanford Sile had to be protected from all 

sources of radiation. The reactors themselves were heavily shielded with a thermal 

shield and a biological shield. But alt reactor internals and coolant piping became 

radioactive to a greater or lesser extent. Thus objects and materials to be monitored 

and protected against included the following:

• Discharged fuel slugs, which contained fission products and gave off alpha, 

beta, and gamma radiation in all energy ranges

• AH pieces of equipment (fixtures, tubing, piping, fittings) removed from the 

reactor, which were generally highly radioactive

• Control rods' used to control and stop the chain reaction

• Air and gases in the reactor

• Cooling water, which came in contac ii..ih i id el- r n .m 

contained minerals made radioactive by neutrons in the reactor

• Miscellaneous contaminated materials such as dust and moisture, which

fe lJ Is liiillM

• Tools used to service contaminated or activated reactor components

2 - 1 0 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c h it ie s

shields are placed about the radiation source, or smaller movable shields may be erected about a temporary hazard. 

Where workers must handle radioactive material that emits penetrating radiation, they perform their tasks from a distance 

or they work only for brief periods in the radioactive area and thus lim it total exposure, since the amount of radiation 

received is a factor not only of its intensity but also of duration of exposure" (AEC 1956, p. 19).

Shielding

The first principle in radiation protection is shielding. Shielding refers to physical barriers that block substances or 

energy from passing through. Lead, cement, earth and water are often used as materials in shielding against 

electromagnetic forms of ionizing radiation because of their high densities.

Reactors at the Hanford Site were surrounded by special layers of material to stop alpha and beta particles and gamma 

radiation as well as slow down and absorb neutrons. A concrete wall shielded the discharge face of the reacton Once 

slugs of irradiated fuel were discharged, they fell into and were shielded by a deep pit of water. The chemical 

separations buildings at the Hanford Site are an example of facility design being driven by shielding requirements. As 

with the reactors, reinforced concrete walls separated operators from process equipment. Portable and temporary 

shielding was often used for maintenance and repair work in reactors and chemical separations facilities.

Shielding is not regulated. The regulations address maximum allowable exposure rates and accumulated dose. Shielding 

helps keep exposure rate and dose below allowable levels.

Distance

Maintaining distance from radiological materials is the second principle of protection against radiation. A basic rule of 

radiation physics is that radiation (except machine-generated radiation beams) is emitted equally in all directions. 

Radiation monitors, therefore, often use the inverse square law to calculate radiation intensity, "It states that the radiation 

dose rate from a small source drops off as the square of the distance from the source. That is the dose at 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. 

meters from a small source w ill be 1/9, 1/16, 1/25, etc. o f the 

dose at 1 meter" (Frigerio 1968, p. 23-24). Radiation monitors use 

this rule of thumb to estimate radiation dose in specific areas.

At the Hanford Site, remote handling devices allowed workers to 

reduce exposures by maximizing their distance from a source. For 

instance after slugs were discharged ipto the pit of water on the 

back face of a reactor, they were handled with remote-controlled 

equipment.

Time

Limiting the time of exposure is the third principle in radiation 

protection. Time is a factor because radiation dose produces 

cumulative effects. Thus, when a radiation zone is established in 

an occupational setting, the amount of radiation present in that 

area is described in "exposure unit per hour." Hand-held radiation 

dose instruments used for monitoring work areas, such as the Cutie 

Pie (see Figure 2-10.8), give readouts in dose units per hour. The 

time allowed in a given radiation zone varied with the amount of 

radiation present. Workers in charge of reading the Cutie Pies were 

responsible for keeping track of the exact length of time allowed.

Dosimetry

Dosimetry refers to a measurement used to calculate a worker's Figure 2-10.8. Worker Taking a Dose-Rate

exposure record. A program o f personnel dosimetry was carried Reading in a Radiation Zone with a Cutie Pie

2 -1 0 .2 4
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d S a fe ty

out at the Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project and throughout the Cold War. Two basic types of dosimetry are 

external and internal. External dosimetry measures radiation from .sources outside the human body. Internal dosimetry 

measures radioisotopes that are deposited within the human body.

Three devices measured externa) dosimetry of workers at the Hanford Site: film badges, pocket ionization chambers, and 

later thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). Workers were assigned these devices to track their individual exposures.

Film badges, pocket ionization chambers, and TLDs were issued in the badge houses. The TLDs were first used at the 

Hanford Site in the 1970s and were calibrated to ensure they provided accurate exposure data. They were calibrated at 

the 3745 Standards Building and the 3746 Irradiation Physics Laboratory (for more information see the Expanded Historic 

Property Inventory Form for the 3746 Building in Appendix B bn the Internet).

Film Badges

Workers had film badges clipped to outer clothing on the chests.. The film badges used Eastman-Kodak Nuclear Track 

Emulsion, Type A film. This method of dosimetry was used because ionizing radiation darkens photographic emulsions 

on film badges (Kathren 1974, p. 60). As Wilson (1987, p. 2.28) notes, "the film badge was considered the official record 

of exposure to external radiation on a long-term permanent basis."

Pocket Ionization Chambers

Pocket Ionization Chambers (PICs). "were the signal for investigating a potential unusual exposure and requesting special 

processing of the film badge to assist in determining the actual radiation exposure" (Wilson 1987, pp. 2.29-2-.30).

Workers often called these dosimetry devices "pencils" because of their shape. As with the film badge, Hanford Site 

workers wore pencil ionization chambers on the front of outer clothing. Two PICs were worn to reduce the chance of 

error in a PIC readout. The PICs were the dosimeters of choice whenever workers entered radiation fields sufficiently 

intense to warrant periodic evaluations of worker exposure as the work progressed. The extended processing times 

required for film badges and TLDs precluded their use under such circumstances.

Thermoluminescent Dosimeters

Dosimetry technology advanced in the 1960s.,.and personnel radiation protection programs at the Hanford Site used the 

new technology.. In 1972, the TLD replaced the film badge for radiation workers at the Hanford Site (Wilson 1987, 

p. 2.16). A former head of radiation instrumentation at the Hanford Site, Ron Kathren, explains how a TLD works: 

"Thermoluminescence is a property of all inorganic crystals. When exposed to ionizing radiation, some of the energy 

absorbed is stored via electrons..,When the material is subsequently heated, these electrons return to the ground state, 

accompanied by the emission of a photon of visible light. The amount of light is proportional to the dose absorbed 

within the crystal" (Kathren 1974, p. 62). Table 2-10.3 compares photographic film and thermoluminescence.

Bioassay

Bioassay refers to measuring radiation in the human body from samples such as feces, tissue, breath, and urine. 

Instruments were designed to measure levels of radioactive materials in such samples. At the Hanford Site, if a bioassay 

reading was positive a technician calculated the percentage of the maximum permissible lim it to which the worker had 

been exposed and estimated the total dose the worker would receive from the radioisotope uptake. This information was 

then related with previously recorded internal exposure (if any) and entered into a worker's ongoing exposure record.

Whole Body Counters

W hole body counters are instruments that measure the amount of internally deposited radiation without requiring a 

sample of body fluid or another component to be read in a laboratory (see Figure 2-10.9). At the Hanford Site, whole 

body counters were originally placed in large mobile trailers in the 1960s and used near operational areas. Later, a 

permanent whole body counting center was built in Richland. Workers were requested to go to this counting center for 

routine monitoring and evaluating potential internal exposure.

2 -1 0 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Table 2-10.3. Comparison o f Two Personnel Dosimeters in Terms o f the Ideal

Dosimeter

Characteristic Photographic Film Thermoluminescence

Response

Accuracy in the field +25% +10%

Energy dependence High, factor of 30 Low, ±25% from 0.1

at 30 keV to 1.25 M eV (LiF)

Angular dependence High Low

Range 10 mR to 10s R 10 m R to 10; R(a)

Mixed radiations Good Fair

Cost Low Low

Small size and convenient shape Fair Very good

Ease of handling and ruggedness Fair Very good

Adaptability Poor Excel lent

Longevity o f wearing interval 1 month Indefinite

Shelf life 1 year Indefinite

Resistance to environment Poor Excellent

Readout (includes rapidity,. Fair Good

capability for subsequent readout, 

or reuse)

(a) May be extended to 10s or more by proper dosimeter selection. Two methods were used to 

measure internal exposure: bioassays and whole body counters.

Ra d ia t io n Pr o t e c t io n I n s t r u m e n t s

In addition to the instruments used to measure radiation for the 

calculation of a worker's exposure record, Hanford personnel 

protection programs used a variety o f survey instruments to measure 

the presence of radiation and to set exposure and dose rates. Three 

categories of survey instruments were: detection, exposure rate, 

and dose rate.

Detection instruments are designed to signal the presence of 

radioactive materials and display their data in relative units such as 

counts per minute. They are used to detect the presence or confirm 

the absence of radiation. A Geiger Counter is an example of a 

hand-held detection instrument used to survey workers for 

contamination before entering and exiting radiation zones (see 

Figure 2-10.10)

Exposure rate instruments measure ionization in the air. They,are 

used to establish regulatory boundaries such as the boundary of a 

radiation zone.

Some whole body counters have 

large crystals that translate the energy 

emitted from internally deposited 

radioactive materials into electric 

signals. These signals are then 

translated into information about the 

energy and relative abundance of the 

radionuclide present. When a 

positive reading occurs, a technician 

calculates a radiation dose for the 

worker. This technique is applicable 

only to the assay of gamma-emitting 

isotopes.

A wound counter was also 

developed to take readings of alpha 

radiation contamination that 

deposited in cuts and punctures in 

the skin.

.. - ~ X

Figure 2-10.9. Whole Body Counter Equipment

Dose rate instruments compensate for the effect of the radiation energy on its ability to produce a dose in tissue. They 

display results in some unit of dose per unit time (such as, millirem/hour). They are essential tools in radiation work 

because they establish the level of hazard present on a job site. The information dose rate instruments provide allows 

work plans to be timed accurately so worker exposure is kept as low as possible. The Cutie Pie was the mainstay doserate meter at the Hanford Site and was used inside radiation zones to monitor worker dose rates (see Figure 2-10.8).

Hanford procedures required workers to be monitored whenever they exited a radiation zone. The environment around 

the radiation zone was also monitored.

2 - 1 0 .2 6
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

1

Exit Surveys

Exiting radiation zones called for special procedures. A piece of 

yellow and magenta tape on the ground identified the entry to 

radiation zones. Before workers crossed over the tape to exit a 

radiation area, a radiation protection technician surveyed the 

surface of their bodies and hands with a detection instrument 

Next, the technician passed the probe attached to the instrument 

slowly across the bottom of shoes. The worker being surveyed 

lifted up one foot at a time and stepped across the line of tape into 

a clean area after the bottom of the shoe was cleared (see 

Figure 2-10.10).

At some locations at the Hanford Site, workers surveyed themselves 

when leaving a radiation control area instead of having a 

technician do the survey. The self-detection instruments were often 

designed to take readings of the hands and feet. When a selfsurvey was called for, workers placed their hands and feet inside 

ports of the machine for a few seconds. The machine then 

instructed the worker to exit the radiation zone or re-survey 

(see Figure 2-10.11).

Continuous Air Monitors

Workplace air monitoring instruments included mobile units with 

audible and visual alarms. These units processed information and 

activated an alarm if a radiation level exceeded its pre-set lim it. 

Other air monitoring instruments pulled air through a filter that had 

to be removed and taken to a laboratory for analysis. The monitors 

with filters were better for obtaining relatively accurate estimates of 

airborne concentrations. Emission stacks at chemical separations 

facilities were equipped with stack monitors to provide a reading of 

radiation levels in the exhaust stream.

Environmental Monitoring

Radiation monitoring also included a comprehensive 

environmental surveillance program. Surveys were used for off-site 

monitoring whereby samples were taken from continuous air 

monitors stationed throughout the Pacific Northwest (for more 

information, see the Historic Property Inventory Forms for the 

2614-E-2 and 2614-W-2 Air Monitoring Stations in Appendix B on 

the Internet). Vegetation samples and water samples taken from the 

Columbia River downstream from the Hanford Site and in the 

Pacific Ocean were part of this data collection program. Farm 

products were also monitored. Samples were drawn from 

representative farms in areas surrounding the Hanford Site.

Figure 2-10.10. Worker Being Surveyed with a 

Geiger Counter upon Exiting a Radiation Zone

Figure 2-10.11. Porta! Instrument Used for SelfSurvey When Exiting a Radiation Zone

One of the main isotopes measured for was iodine-131. Iodine131 was released to the atmosphere as an off-gas during the

process of extracting plutonium. Because of the air-ground-vegetation-animal-human pathway of iodine-131, milk and 

other agricultural products including poultry, beef, and produce were monitored for its presence (DOE 1995a, p. 91).

2 -1 0 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Iodine-131 was also an isotope o f interest because of its ability to preferentially collect in the thyroid gland, thus possibly 

predisposing some individuals to increased risk of thyroid health problems. Readers interested in the results of these 

ongoing surveys should refer to annual editions of the Hanford Site's Environmental Report and the Hanford 

Environmental Dose Reconstruction project publications (see References Cited and Bibliography for Further Information).

M e d ic a l Ex a m in a t io n s

Monitoring for radiation exposure 

at the Hanford Site was part of a 

larger occupational program of 

medical examinations.

Prospective workers at the 

Hanford Site underwent preemployment and postemployment physical 

examinations. Medical 

evaluations also were an ongoing 

series of routine interval 

examinations.

' /fid u -ti id / rnedii me and ,’//?«•, eniphn ee both pain m n -t when the p i cv enhon or

rtf i up alion al i/i-i* js c /« the m ain o h je d iv v ot then jo in t e tfo il». I n i thi> reason ,i 

pttnira m ot irc i/n e n i m edii a l exam inations u . i- o rn p lh w /c ij I he purposes m the se

o\,im tnatit>ns u r n "

/. h i p e r m it th e e n ip h w e e to d is tils * w ith th e p la n t p h \ s ii r.i/i .m i - im /iM m ' or

p ro b le m '* re la te d to h e a lth , a n d p . i r l K i i l a i h th o s e w h ir h m .n h a w h a d an

n i i u p a lm n a l o in > in o r iii.ii h a \e i o n h ih n te d to a h .e n te d - m

J to deles I e e n rra la * w e ll a* -pei ia l abnorm alities that m a\ h a \e ari-en bet ante

m the w ork 01 n o ik im i < ondthon*. F/ic aim iv.i- to tr\ and d e te it the e.uhest

possible "inn in than}*e resulting n o m o L iu p a tio n and. In iie tp ic n f

reexam inations, In n ilh iw the c 0111-0 or *in\ «.»< h abnorm ality. Ireatm ent

< hani>c o i ii ork. o r in rfln r in \cstiu a tio n depended upon the s p e tifu hndinn'>

and the la m a th e .i^c/if.

lu detei I an\ w o ik m ii lo iu litio n in airn plan t that m ,» haxo pro dm c tl

deleterious o tie i 1- upon the health o t the w o ikets so that -m / i < om illion s in

he t o tre t ted.' - l . i t i l r i l

At a conference presentation in 

December 1954, Herbert Parker, !

placed the role of occupational 

medicine at the Hanford Site in a 

wider industrial context. His |

thoughts were based, in part, on 

confidence in the Hanford Site 

worker safety program: "Annual physical examinations and periodic blood counts have their place, but not significantly 

more so in the atomic energy industry than in other industries" (Parker 1955, p. 903).

Sa f e t y Pr o c e d u r e s

The managers responsible for the work being undertaken determined the safety procedures. They consulted w ith support 

services at the Hanford Site, typically the industrial safety and fire protection groups, to develop these procedures. Safety 

procedures were posted at all job sites and included in manuals available for workers to review. For example, safety 

rules are documented in General

Electric's Manual o f Standard Practices Table 2-10.4. Examples o f Special Hazards Bulletins Issued in the 1950s

published in 1954 (GE 1954b).

At the Hanford Site, radiological safety 

procedures were first expressed to 

workers through the Special Hazards 

Bulletin that the Special Hazards 

Committee prepared. This Committee 

was a branch of the Central Safety 

Committee (Cantril 1951, p. 304). As

SHB No. Radiation Protection Standard Subject Issue Date

Responsibility for W ork in Radiation Zones

Procedure at Time of a Radiation incident

Radioactive Solid Waste Disposal

Radiation Zone Injuries

Shipment o f Radioactive Materials

Radiation Incident Investigation

Release o f Equipment from Radiation Z o ne Status

Emergency in a Radiation Zone

August 1, 1952 

August 1,1952 

December 15,1954 

August 1, 1952 

August 1,1952 

May 1,1953 

August 1, 1952 

August 1, 1952

Wilson (1987, p. 1.10) notes, "the

SHBs [Special Hazards Bulletinsjhad official sanction at Hanford. The first bulletins were published in 1945. Three 

other bulletins were subsequently published to provide guidance in handling situations that required control and special 

consideration because of radiological conditions." Table 2-10.4 lists some of the Special Hazards Bulletins issued in the 

1950s. , '

2 - 1 0 .2 8
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

In addition to the information the Special Hazards Bulletins disseminated, the Special Work Permit was designed to 

control exposure to radiation hazards. The Special Work Permit established procedures for and communicated 

information about radiation safety. "This control form was completed prior to starting any radiation work in order to 

define the task, identify locations, and specify the type of special protective measures that would be required for the 

duration of the permit" (Wilson 1987, p. 1.10). Many former Hanford Site workers recall the daily routine of changing 

into and out o f "SWP" clothing such as coveralls and gloves. Special Work Permits sometimes also required workers to 

wear additional equipment such as respirators with special filters (see Figures 2-10.12 and 2-10.13).

*

■ ' X

rJ , tl**

✓ f'-bsas-

/ ■

/

&

\ £

t

- ' ■, * & T

h ' . * m \

4 i \ •> 1

n f? r

A i l l

Figure 2-10.12. Special Work Permit Clothing Figure 2-10.13. Workers in Special Work Permit

Arranged on Floor Clothing

Em e r g e n c y Pr e p a r e d n e s s

Emergency Preparedness was the plan to handle a range of emergency situations. Types o f emergencies affecting health 

and safety include natural disasters, fires, and medical emergencies. The procedures planned for any emergency 

situation along with 

specifics concerning 

such situations as 

sabotage and the taking 

of hostages are 

discussed in Section 8,

Site Security.

One of the key 

emergency situations for 

which the Hanford Site

"/ \e n though .illp r.u t ii. il m cd-i/ic- arc Liken to m in im i/v the /iin /u /ii/i/i n r ,i ••iv/nii

t.u h .ilin n <m ffi/ m i u n in u .U the H \P () !H .in io id M m n ii 1’rtn liu t* O peration* - non Ham 'm d

Site;. l/ie rc n ill .i)i< <m ' iv m .i/n /h r /)ossih//ih that an <‘i c n t ta n m iu r . I he m tenl ni th i*

A1.inu.il nr l.nierjenc v Radinloui* .1/ is In p n n id e im p im c d lapahditx ittrm p in g w ith

mu h an c i <71/ It is m il intended th .il th r-e plan* ,m d fn o t edure* he < ntwidered .is ii.ilr \ih le

1 0111 si>s nr action 11h ith cannot he de\ i.itv d U oni. hut rathe r lh .it ih e \ sent* as uuides to

*upplem ent the u*e or ynnc/ judgem ent. A m emergent, v action d io u ld he d itc ite d tn w a n l the

yn.W u i n im m ii/in i> /icimimmW - Ik - itl l «n.2 p iv l.it c

prepared was

radiological accidents. The Emergency Radiological Plans and Procedures manuals were for large-scale radiological 

accidents. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory maintains a historical collection of these manuals. See the sidebar 

box for an example of the type of information in these manuals.

-X

2 -1 0 .2 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Tr a in in g a n d Co m m u n ic a t io n

The Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 formalized national security policies pertaining to atomic energy. Thus, 

federal law influenced programs designed to protect worker health and safety at the Hanford Site. The Hanford Site 

established a hazard-disclosure policy that was based on national security policies regarding classified information about 

nuclear weapons. The national security policies dictated what subjects were only available to workers on a need-toknow basis as security clearance determined. In summarizing a November 1944 report issued by Cantril, Responsibilities

o f Health Group for Radiation Safety, Wilson (1987, p. 1.7} observed, "those in charge of the work had the responsibility 

to inform their workers, within the limits of security, of the nature of the hazards they encountered." Another document

has a slight variation, "within the limits o f the security clearance of 

the employee and in line with the hazards-disclosure program" 

(Cantril 1951, p. 303).

i'. i ' t ” : ' A major concern was that secrecy inhibited communication about

V f f ” radiation hazards. Most workers could not even be told that

* I radiation existed at the Hanford Site. Uranium was referred to as

U "base metal," and plutonium as "product." Concerns about secrecy

^ also stemmed from project leaders' fears that an already tight labor

■ 1 j supply (Cantril 1951, p. 292) might become tighter if previously

|H undisclosed aspects of the job were suddenly emphasized. After

the Hanford Site completed its initial mission at the end of World 

I ’ ' War II, it became evident that management's fears had some basis

in fact. "Once employees learned what they had been making, 

they inundated Du Font's Medical Department with questions

********** “ about the dangers of the workplace" (Findlay and Hevly 1995,

P- 53). Cantril and Parker wrote a document entitled Status o f

" Health and Protection at the Hanford Engineer Works "shortly after

I the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan...to reassure [the

6*9* j workforce] concerning their safety on the job and to emphasize the

W M ^act t*ia t 8reat care had been taken to safeguard their welfare"

■ -r[ Tnpnnim $ , (Stone 1951, p. 476).

'.V J If t - Zr • • • . ' » , '■

Figure 2-10.14. Billboards Displaying Safety

Slogans

What could be communicated was stressed heavily in safety 

slogans and posters. According to Hacker (1987, p. 56), "training 

and indoctrination had become a growing part of the [Manhattan 

Project] Health Division plan. Constant reminders of the hazards 

and directions on how to cope with them helped workers protect 

themselves. They also helped avoid stalling the project." DuPont 

and later General Electric continually reminded workers of the 

need for safety. Billboards displayed safety slogans that often 

related to a specific time of year, such as Valentines Day (see 

Figure 2-10.14).

Articles in the Hanford Engineer Works News also reminded 

workers of the need for safety, although a review of these articles 

suggests that the plant newspaper was not used as a forum to 

educate workers on the relationship between radiation safety and 

industrial safety. Few articles on safety link radiation and safety or 

even mention radiation. Most articles could have applied to 

non-radiological industries, such as the article, "Learn Safety

2 - 1 0 .3 0
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a it h a n d Sa f e t y

Instructions and Follow Them" or the industrial cartoon character Safety Sam exhorting fellow workers to "Report or 

Eliminate Hazardous Conditions Promptly" (GE 1947a, p. 4).

All communications campaigns portrayed safety as something to be excited about, and workers were given incentives to 

be involved. Contests were held, such as the 100 B Safety Contest (see Figures 2-10.15 and 2-10.16).

Introductory safety training took place when workers began employment or started a new job. Training consisted of a 

review of technical and operations manuals. One such manual is the General Electric Manual o f Standard Practices with 

a section on "Safety Program-Safety Orientation." The manual states, "New General Electric employees receive their first 

formal contact with the safety program from the Employee and Public Relations Department. In addition, the area Safety 

Engineers w ill arrange for safety orientation of new employees within one week after arrival in production area. The 

employee's immediate supervisor is responsible for instructing new personnel on departmental and building safety rules" 

(GE 1954b, p. 2.1). A review of such manuals was often followed by formal class instruction and on-the-job-training.

M e d ic a l De p a r t m e n t

W illiam Norwood played a central role in organizing the Hanford Site Medical services and facilities. Du Pont hired 

Norwood in February 1943. From February 1943 to March 1944, Norwood divided his time between the Metallurgical 

Laboratory in Chicago and the Oak Ridge Reservation. His 

primary mission during this time was to develop an industrial 

medical program for the Hanford Site and to assemble qualified 

personnel to take on responsibilities in the new program.

Norwood arrived at the Hanford Site in March 1944 as 

Superintendent of the Medical Department. He held this position 

into the 1960s.

Norwood organized the Medical Department into divisions and 

sections. The two divisions were Milage Medical and Industrial 

Medical. The Village Medical Division handled the health care 

needs of people living in the town of Richland. The Industrial 

Medical Division provided occupational medical services to 

operating personnel at the Hanford Site. The Industrial Medical 

Division contained two sections: Plant Medical and Health 

Instruments. The Plant Medical Section's responsibility was the 

health and safety of the workers. The main functions of the Plant ,

Medical Section included (Cantril 1945, p. 2):

• Examine workers to detect over-tolerance amounts of 

radioactive substances either on or in the body, which 

might lead to later injury

• Conduct tests that give early warning of injury

• Care for workers' plant traumatic injuries and emergencies

• Care for workers' minor illnesses at First Aid Stations

To staff the Plant Medical Section, J.A. Quigley, Hanford's first 

industrial physician, arrived in December 1943 (Cantril 1945, 

p. 4). Quigley's arrival coincided with the initial manufacturing of 

fuel in the 300 Area. A Supervisor of Nurses arrived in July 1944, 

who set up procedures and gave specialized training to industrial 

nurses. Three industrial physicians were on staff at the Hanford 

plants through September 1945 (Norwood and Fuqua 1945), 

located as follows:

Figure 2-10.15. 100-B Reactor Safety Contest:

H ow Many Sait Tablets?

VLCf

Figure 2-10.16. Prizes Awarded fora Safety

Contest in 1953

2 -1 0 .3 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

• One in the 200 Areas

• One in the 100 B and 100 D Areas with one day a week at the 100 F Area

• One in the 300 Area two days a week, in the 100 F Area one day, and the remainder at Kadlec Hospital to

assist w ith exams

As of August 1945, the remainder of the Plant Medical Section staff consisted of:

• Six physicians

• Twenty-six registered nurses

• Twenty-six laboratory and x-ray technicians

• Four medical helpers

• One Receptionist

This staffing arrangement remained throughout the mid-1960s. The Hanford Environmental Health Foundation began 

providing occupational health services for the Hanford Site in the mid-1960s. From that time onward, industrial 

physicians began practicing in administrative settings in north Richland.

Kadlec Hospital opened on March 15,1944. Pre-employment physical examinations for the Plant Medical Section were 

conducted there throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

The Hanford Site contained seven First Aid Stations. The main functions of these facilities included:

• Care for industrial injuries

• Examining center for the Plant Medical physician

• Care for minor illnesses/thus aiding in keeping the employee on the job

Each First Aid Station was equipped with:

• Treatment room

• Recovery room with bed

• Clinical laboratory

• Physician's office

• Toilet facilities

Special equipment included:

• Resuscitator

• Diathermy

• Small trunk packed with emergency supplies for use in event of area evacuation

• Two ambulances always ready at the Richland Station

• One or two ambulances always on call at the Patrol Headquarters in each area

From the start of operations in 1944 until August 1, 1945, the First Aid Stations performed 5,768 treatments and 17,908 

re-treatments.

Ha n fo r d Fir e De p a r t m e n t

Whereas shielding, distance, time, monitoring, safety procedures, training, and communication were preventive 

measures, the Hanford Fire Department was one of the established protection measures. Since 1943, the Hanford Fire 

Department has been responsible for fire safety at the Hanford Site. During 1943 and 1944, the Hanford Fire 

Department built eight fire stations: Richland, W hite Bluffs, Centra! Shops, 100-B, 200 West, 200 East, 100-D, and 

100-F, in that order. The available equipment the fire department used to fight fires consisted of several 1000-gallon tank 

trucks, several 60-750-gallon pumpers, one gas truck, one foam truck, and several personnel vehicles. The Inspection 

Division, developed in 1943, detected and corrected fire hazards. This included educating Hanford workers about

2 - 1 0 .3 2
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

hazards and the use of fire extinguishers. The first fire breaks along roads, railroad tracks, and utility lines were created 

during 1943-1944 and totaled approximately 1260 miles. Since none of the vehicles were capable of off-road fire 

response, grass fire vehicles were created out o f Army Weapon Carriers that were equipped with 287-gallon water tanks 

and pumping units (Du Pont 1945a).

As the Hanford Site developed and began operation, the recognition of operational and industrial fire hazards lead to 

increased fire response capabilities, equipment, and further advancement of the Hanford Fire Department. It developed 

into a multi-dimensional emergency response force dedicated to the protection of life and property at the Hanford Site.

The fire department's duties not only included fire fighting and prevention, but also several other emergency response 

activities. The fire department was the lead within the Hanford Site's Incident Command Agency that "works closely 

with facility management to assure [sic] that emergencies are mitigated in an effective and efficient manner" (HFD n.d., 

p. 3). This agency ensured that appropriate organization and staffing were set up to handle each emergency and that all 

involved understood the situation. The department was also trained and equipped to respond to medical emergencies 

with basic life-support service, ambulance transportation, and extraction tools such as the "Jaws of Life."

The Hanford Fire Department's capabilities also included special situations involving hazardous materials. For these 

situations, firefighters were trained and equipped to respond to and control radiological and chemical events, such as 

spills, and provide medical care or decontamination of contaminated or exposed individuals. The specialized hazardous 

material response vehicle contained the necessary equipment and information to assess and mitigate such events. It 

included protective clothing, weather data, an unknown substance categorization kit, and a computer system aiding in 

emergency operation recommendations (safe evacuation distances, plume forecasting, correct protective clothing for 

particular situations). The Hanford Fire Department was also trained to rescue individuals from above- or below-ground 

spaces, confined spaces, contaminated spaces, water, and collapsed structures (HFD n.d., DOE 1998d). Although mainly 

dedicated to the Hanford Site, the Hanford Fire Department also assisted local communities and other fire districts when 

needed. Hanford Fire Department firefighter training is still ongoing and includes structural and wilderness firefighting.

The types of fire response vehicles assigned to each station were based on the needs of the station's response area. For 

example, a 5,000-gallon truck was assigned to the 100/600 Area station (609 Building) because of the probability of its 

responding to natural cover or grass fires. The first response hazardous material vehicle was assigned to the 200 Area 

station (609-A Building) because of the nature of the surrounding facilities and probability of hazardous materials 

response calls occurring there (Rice 1998).

Hanford Site structures were equipped with fire alarm and/or fire suppression systems that signaled the 200 Area fire 

station when triggered. The Hanford Fire Department regularly tested and maintained these systems (HFD n.d.).

Hanford Site buildings were required to post a fire emergency exit plan so workers would know how to exit the building 

and where the staging areas were outside the building.

None of the original eight fire stations exist today. The Hanford Fire Department force is currently located in four fire 

stations (Brown 1994, DOE 1998d): the 100/600 Area fire station built in 1961, the 200 Area fire station built in 1965, 

the 300 Area fire station built in 1964, and the 400 Area fire station (4704-S Building) built in 1973. These fire stations 

are staffed 24 hours per day, 7 days a week by rotating firefighting platoons. The platoons consist of one officer, four fire 

fighters, and one paramedic or emergency medical technician. For more information on the 300 Area fire station (3709- 

A Building), see the Historic Property Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

Ra d io lo g ic a l De c o n t a m in a t io n

Along with the Hanford Fire Department, the Hanford Site set up radiological decontamination procedures and facilities 

as protection measures. If a radiological accident occurred, each facility had decontamination procedures in place. An 

example of general radiological decontamination guidelines is detailed in Norwood (1975, p. 208-212). Historically, 

procedures for personnel decontamination stipulate that decontamination should occur in an area close to where the

2 - 1 0 .3 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iit t ie s

exposure took place. "Unless the skin is broken, most

decontamination is done by the radiation monitors who receive 1

special training in this field" (Norwood 1975, p. 207).

Personnel decontamination refers to a process of removing 

radioactivity from clothing and the body. A worker who was 

contaminated w ith radioactivity was not to leave the Hanford Site 

until decontamination had been completed. Between 1943 and 

1990, facilities that posed risks of exposure to radiation had 

decontamination stations. These stations included showers and 

•sinks w ith storage cabinets positioned nearby for convenient access 

to supplies for washing away surface contamination from the skin 

and hair (see Figure 2-10.17). Norwood describes the procedure 

for transporting workers who were injured and emitting 

radioactivity from their bodies:

"After removal o f an injured contaminated employee from the

zone o f exposure, operating personnel have been instructed to 77. T_plant Decontamination Supply

measure the emanation and, if high, to remove all clothing and Cabinet

wash the patient thoroughly with water. This m ight be a

lifesaving procedure. Then patient would then be wrapped in

blankets. Morphine would be quickly given for pain. ■ Cross hemorrhage or other emergencies would be treated

by the occupational nurse or physician to combat major shock." - Norwood 1964, p. 474

Before the Emergency Decontamination Facility was 

completed in 1967 (seethe Expanded Historic 

Property Inventory Form for the 748 Emergency 

Decontamination Building in Appendix B on the 

Internet), facilities for providing emergency medical 

care of radiating patients were "made available in 

each of the operating areas" (Norwood 1964, 

p. 475). Grease pits were decided on as the site for

medical care of this special situation.

Six years before the Emergency Decontamination 

Facility was completed, an uncontrolled, selfsustaining critica lly called a "nuclear excursion" 

occurred at the SL-1 Reactor in Idaho Falls in 

January 1961. Three fatalities resulted. Very high 

dose rates were documented in the facility and in the area nearby. The experience of radiological response teams and 

accident analysis caused health and safety professionals at the Hanford Site to re-assess their ability to treat a medical 

situation involving radiation. As a result of the assessment of the accident in Idaho Falls, the Emergency 

Decontamination Facility (748 Building) was built at the Hanford Site to safeguard a medical team and provide a space 

for treatment of a medical injury involving radiological contamination (Norwood and Quigley 1968, p. 608).

The historic significance of the Emergency Decontamination Facility (748 Building) is augmented by its role as the 

treatment facility and temporary residence for Harold R. McCluskey (1912-1987), a Hanford worker involved in the 1976 

accident at 242-Z Waste Treatment Facility. At 2:55 a.m. on August 30, 1976, McCluskey was working the graveyard 

shift as a nuclear operator recovering americium. The process equipment consisted of ion-exchange columns housed 

inside glove boxes. Ion-exchange columns function like home water softeners and are designed to remove a desired 

metallic element, in this case americium, from a waste stream. Before August 30, 1976, this facility had been on standby

| " U r k ‘tile d to r giva+v p ih w h it h .hv axailahlv in .u ra

jj io i uic m i instant n o tit v. Ihvsv ate unm/Zv w ilh in a In in ih rd

| i.itrfs o f o u r area iiiih Ui a l fat //rf/r- I h i* is a rrm r/if p it used

I ror yrc.rs/ny i .ir*. Ih v pa tient w o uld hv p lat r d on 1hr iv n irn t

I ilo o ia d ia i r n t to the p il. w h ile Ihv d o t lo i and a-snc iatv* stand

■ in Ihv p it. Ih v p it w a ll w ill p r o tv il ih v u hodivs. I ’m la h lr tra il

I H'hiss s u m is a n ti lead h rit A- a ir »Ziim/ in ih v liarativs and h ° _

t tiu h l hv if n il A/i assviuhlvd to p ro lv t I Ihv heads and n n A- ni

the m vm bvis u flh v m v d ita l Ira n i and radiation m on ilm . w h d r

p v im rm in ji r/nrrycnt i h ra tin v n l." - Norwood 1*1(14, p. 4~<>

2 - 1 0 .3 4
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

-s

for 4 months due to a strike, which started April 30, and ongoing labor-management negotiations. Once the strike 

ended, the americium recovery equipment in the 242-Z Facility was restarted. A short time after startup, McCluskey 

noticed an unusual sound and dark brown smoke coming from inside the glove box. He placed a small step ladder near 

the portal to investigate and soon thereafter the ion-exchange column exploded. "He was externally contaminated with 

241 Am [americium-241], sustained a substantial internal deposition of this isotope, was burned with concentrated nitric 

acid and injured by flying debris about the face and neck" (Breitenstein 1983, p. 855).

After receiving first aid at the 242-Z Facility, at 5:14 a.m.

McCluskey arrived by ambulance at the Emergency 

Decontamination Facility approximately 25 miles away. A team 

commenced medical treatment and decontamination of 

McCluskey. It soon became apparent to team members that 

McCluskey would be unable to be transferred to the main hospital 

because radiological contamination continued even after repeated 

decontamination. Medical treatment and decontamination were 

restricted to the Emergency Decontamination Facility and so was 

McCluskey. The Emergency Decontamination Facility became a 

temporary home to McCluskey and he remained confined there for 

78 days. On the 79th day, McCluskey, his wife, and dog moved 

into a mobile trailer parked along the north w all of the Emergency 

Decontamination Facility. After 103 days, McCluskey visited his 

home in Prosser, and 47 days later moved home permanently 

(Breitenstein 1983, pp. 860-861). McCluskey was known to have 

remarked, "that was the longest graveyard shift I've ever worked."

The Emergency Decontamination Facility was originally designed 

for short-term care of patients in special situations. Although the FiZure 2m10: 18; Emergency Decontamination

McCluskey experience is an exception, the Emergency Equipment in t e 748 Bui ing

Decontamination Facility remains operational for the temporary

care of patients injured from radiation. The main goal of the facility is to prepare patients for transfer to the appropriate 

medical facility. The Emergency Decontamination Facility is staffed only during emergencies. It is owned by th e '

U.S. Department of Energy and presently operated by the Hanford Environmental Health Foundation. Figure 2-10.18 

shows decontamination equipment in the Emergency Decontamination Facility, and the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet gives further information about the facility.

Re s u l t s of P r e v e n t io n

a n d P rc

Ef f o r t s

"In 1071 thv iin iM i.il in t u rrv iu v iv p v rtin sj ■'( <>/?■ h.iin ih .itv d hv the L> -Uihiiu /nrrijv t o in tn i^ u m R n hl.m tl | AND PROTECTION

O p t'ta lio n * O llh c . ftv lu w n l'>~2 ,7/ir/ !•),'{(,. / ‘ 4 1 1 O R - n v r r

i-.u v d m i v \ n it * 1h.it m tu r n 'd in ih c m ii.il f)rinv"->in'> M i //ft/ein Ihv lltin ln r tl 100 \rv .i* In I'K M Ihv L .V D v p .v ln iv n l nr I

rnvn>\ if) O I ■ Rn hl.tn d H e ld O ff it r ;RL> d trv tlv d ih .it v w n i- j The results of prevention and protection efforts at

m '/rn < fi/iNi-t/i/fjii <- than .in I OR j/m> hv dm um cn tvd Ih v I Hanford Site are reflected in the fatality,

Ou \orm .il K,Vvtt , f ) \ . »..* .indhvtnw n I.,ml j accident, and property damage/ioss rates.

I.ooorvfunnunvi^uvd. Ihv'.v rvptnn ,unl { According to official definitions applicable to the

.»,■ .n.ii/.iW<-1„ rtwpuhht .it thv norR nhLm d [ Hanford Site, accidents were reported according to

OpiT.itnwi I’nhln Rc.idinn Romn in Kithl.md W.nlinifiltw * - | ^w o categories: A and "B ' (AEC 1975, pp. 147-

Miilm.um l '“ )2 . ji. 1 | 150). Type A category accidents included fatalities,

I damage of $100,000 or more, or excessive over

2 - 1 0 .3 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

exposure to radiation. Type B accidents were below this category but above certain thresholds with regard to the severity 

of injury and included property losses above $25,000. Other accident categories have emerged over time. The following 

fatality, accident, and property damage/loss rates from 1943-1990 found in Strom (1997) and Warner (1993) provide only 

the Type A and B category accident rates.

Fa ta l itie s

No occupational fatalities through acute exposure to radiation as a result of Hanford operations have been officially 

documented. See the references cited in the above section, Epidemiological Research on Hanford Workers for estimates 

of the number of fatalities caused through chronic occupational exposure to radionuclides and chemicals resulting from 

Hanford operations. Epidemiological data cannot determine the cause o f individual fatalities. In the categories of

construction and operations, a total of 45 fatalities on the project have been documented for the period 1943-1990. Of 

the total fatalities, 36 or 80 percent occurred before 1965. Through 1990, the most recent fatality involved a non-project 

salvage operator who died as a result of injuries when a bunker collapsed at the 184 Building in July 1981. Dan Strom 

observes that fatalities at the Hanford Site have, "a 20 year average rate of about 2.2 per 100,000, or 1 per 45,000 

worker years" (Strom 1997, p. 337).

Co m p a r is o n w it h Na t io n a l Sta tis tic s

The injury rates at the Hanford Site as well as rates for other accidents have been below the national averages for 

industry as reported by the National Safety Council. As Strom (1997, p. 333) points out in his review of the data, "The 

highest fatal accident rate at Hanford, 55 per 100,000, occurred in 1944. For comparison, the 1976 National Safety 

Council fatal accident in the construction sector was 56.8 per 100,000." Hanford's worst year, 1944, was better than an 

average year for industry in 

the 1970s. In 1976, the 

Hanford Site fatality rate per

100,000 was 2.2. This 

compares with rates of 11.1 

for the government sector,

31.3 for the transport and 

public utilities sector for the 

same year (Strom 1997, 

p. 338), Table 2-10.5 

compares the fatality rates 

for the Hanford Site and 

other industries for 1976,

1991, and 1994.

Table 2-10.5. Comparison o f Fatal Accident Rates between the Hanford Site and Other

Industries

Fatal Accident Rates Mean Rate 1976'*’

(1O*3 y 1)

Mean Rate 1991,b)

(10-5 y 1)

Mean Rate 1994<d

(lO-sy1)

A ll groups 14.2 9.0 4.1

Hanford 2 .2 (d) 1.3<e) 1.3le)

Trade 6.4 4.0 1.6

M anufacture 8.9 10.1 3.8

Service 8.6 4.0 1.5

G overnm ent 11.1 9.0 2.8

Transport and p u b lic u tilities 31.3 2 2 .0 12.1

C onstruction 56.8 31.0 14.7

M ine s and quarries 62.5 43.0 26.7

A g ricultu re (1973-80). 54.1 44.0 26.2

(a) N ational Safety C o u n cil. Accident Facts. C hicago: N ational Safety C o u n cil; 1976 ed.; 1977.

(b) N ational Safety C o u n c il. Accident Facts. C hicago: N ational Safety C oun cil; 1991 ed.; 1992.

(c) N ational Safety- C oun cil. Accident Facts. Itasca, Illin o is : N ational Safety C oun cil; 1994 ed.; 1995.

(d) Tw enty-year average, 1976-1995.

(e) Ten-year average, 1986-1995.

From 1943-1990, the 1944 

Hanford Site fatality rate of 

55 per 100,000 is more than 

double the next highest 

figure of 23 per 100,000 set 

in 1943, both of which were

construction years. Figure 2-10.19 compares the fatalities that occurred on Atomic Energy Commission projects with 

those that occurred nationwide and provides a breakdown of the causes of the Atomic Energy Commission fatalities. 

Figure 2-10.20 compares the severity rates for injuries that occurred on Atomic Energy Commission projects with those 

that occurred nationwide.

2 - 1 0 .3 6

1
Section 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

I n te r n a l De p o s it io n Accidents -

Ra d io lo g ic a l

According to statistics radiological health and safety support 

kept at the Hanford Site, eight occurrences have resulted in 

workers receiving internal depositions exceeding standards. The 

maximum internal deposition of 170 body burdens resulted from 

the ion exchange accident that occurred August 1976. No 

internal exposures exceeding DOE standards have been 

documented between January 1985 and 1990. In January 1985, 

a worker in the 234-5Z Plutonium Finishing Plant received 

1.6 times the maximum permissible body burden from a 

puncture wound.

Who le Bo d y Pe n e tr a tin g Ex p o s u r e

Ac cidents - Ra d io lo g ic a l

A total of seventeen workers have received occupational, whole 

body penetrating radiation exposure that exceeded 5 rem per 

year or 3 rem per quarter from operations at the Hanford Site.

O f the seventeen exposures, six exceeded 10 rem. The 

maximum dose was 110 rem whole body penetrating radiation 

exposure. No whole body over exposures have occurred at the 

Hanford Site since December 1977.

Ex t r e m it y Expo su r e Ac cidents -

Ra d io lo g ic a l

NSC

—X^-

DEATH RATES AEC - NSC 1943 T 0 1874

HU.SSRFAUIKG 

0708 ygWCLE 32

GOVERNMENT

TYPES OF FATALITIES M AEC PROGRAMS 

1945 TO 1975

Figure 2-10.19. Comparison o f Fatalities at Atomic

Energy Commission Facilities with Those Reported

by the National Safety Council, 1943-1974

Extremity exposure is exposure to hands, arms, legs or feet. This 

is the most common type of exposure. A total of

twelve workers have received exposures to their 

hands, which exceeded the level of 75 rem per 

year or 25 rem per quarter. A highly localized 

maximum dose was 80,000 rem to a portion of the hand of a laboratory chemist who was operating an 

x-ray diffraction unit. Only one over exposure to an extremity has occurred since 1972. That 

was in June 1983 as a result of a technician putting his hand in front o f an x-ray beam.

Cr it ic a l it y Accidents -

Ra d io lo g ic a l

A criticality accident is an event where fissionable 

material undergoes nuclear fission in an uncontrolled 

fashion. This causes a sudden release of energy in the 

form of particulate radiation, electromagnetic 

radiation, and heat. Two criticality accidents 

occurred during operations at the Hanford Site: one 

on November 16, 1951 at the Critical Mass 

Laboratory (209-E Building) and the other on April 7, 

1962 at the RECUPLEX Facility. A historical accident 

review document notes the following points of interest 

in the Critical Mass Laboratory accident:

1945 1950 1956 1980

•N UM BE R OF O A YSpH ABSED PER Ifflt-U O N MAN-HOURS

1965 1970

Figure 2-10.20. Comparison o f Injury Severity Rates at Atom ic

Energy Commission Facilities with Those Reported by the

National Safety Council, 1943-1974

2 - 1 0 .3 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

” The Hanford Homogeneous Reactor Experiment was an experimental program carried out in the Critical Mass

Laboratory. Its purpose was to investigate the physics o f plutonium solutions to determine safety limitations for

process facilities. During one such experiment a partially full spherical assembly containing plutonium nitrate

solution as fuel was accidentally brought to a prompt critical condition by too-rapid withdrawal o f the safety

rod... Analysis indicated that a total energy release o f about 3MWs (about 8 x 10'6 fissions) had occurred...There

was no physical damage to the facility...Radiation doses to personnel in the control room, which was located

200 feet away as a protection against such occurrence, measured up to 600 mrem [millirem]." - DOE 1991a, 

pp.2-7

During the 1962 RECUPLEX criticality accident, three workers received whole body penetrating radiation exposures 

exceeding standards. A process review history provides this description of the accident:

"A nuclear excursion occurred in a general purpose transfer tank (the K-9 vessel) in the Recouplex [sic]

plutonium waste recovery facility o f the 234-5 Z building. A t the time o f the incident, Recouplex [sic] was not in

operation. It had been shut down for a cleanup which was essentially complete. Two employees who were

present observed a blue flash and heard a noise like an electric arc. Evacuation was immediate, and all

emergency procedures were executed properly. Exposures for the three most exposed individuals were 110, 43,

and 1.43 rem ."-D O E 1991a, pp. 2-13

Tr a n s p o r ta tio n Ac cidents

Six significant accidents have involved the transportation of radioactive material. However, in only one of those 

accidents was any radioactive material (uranium oxide) released to the environment. This accident occurred April 1956.

Pr o p e r ty Da m a g e o r Loss Ac cidents

Property damage or loss exceeding $50,000 has occurred forty times. The maximum loss of $1,174,000 resulted from 

damage to a hot process pipe trench when a 32-ton cover block fell during remote crane operations in the B Plant in 

February 1980.

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

The history of health and safety at the Hanford Site is broad in scope, and researchers are in the early phases of writing 

about the subject. Issues such as whether the Hanford Site's worker population has an increased mortality level due to 

radiation exposure as well as questions about the relationship between occupational exposure to chemicals and illness 

are the subject of ongoing research and debate (see, for example, Mancuso et al. 1977, Gilbert et al. 1989, and Stewart 

and Kneale 1991) but are not the subject of this section. This section discusses the programs established to monitor 

worker health and safety and the environment in relation to the Hanford Site facilities. The long-term effectiveness of 

these programs and the effects of working with or living near radiation and chemicals are only briefly discussed. Even 

within the limited scope of this book, however, many avenues for further research are still available:

• W hat was the effect of security on health and safety? Did restrictions on communication cause health and safety 

problems?

• Are health and safety programs more effective when managed by operations or when divorced from conflict of 

interest and managed by separate health and safety organizations? What lessons have been learned from 

radiobiology research conducted at the Hanford Site?

• Despite overlaps in industrial hygiene, industrial safety and fire protection, and radiation protection, an 

integrated approach to worker health and safety was not developed at the Hanford Site during the Manhattan 

Project and Cold War Era. W hat effect did this lack of integration have on worker health and safety?

• Taken as a whole, what do the results of health studies that use Hanford Site data tell us about the relationship 

between radioactivity and human health?

• W hat does the occupational safety record tell us about the relative safety of these industries?

2 - 1 0 .3 8
Se c t io n 1 0 - Wo r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

What might be learned about the Cold War by comparing health and safety aspects of plutonium production

facilities in the United States with those in the former Soviet Union?

• W hy does ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) refer only to radiological exposure at the Hanford Site?

Numerous health studies and projects have been conducted to determine the effect on people's health of the operations 

at the Hanford Site. Future researchers may wish to follow up on the results of these studies as a way of measuring the 

success of the prevention and protection efforts. The seven health studies and projects listed below, each of which 

published a series o f reports, use Hanford Site data. Some o f the data researchers used in these studies and projects 

included occupational external dosimetry records, social security records, county death certificates, airborne radioactive 

release information, and medical case history combined with medical evaluation. Some of the studies focused on 

occupational health, others on public health, and the Epidemiological Evaluation of Childhood Leukemia and Paternal 

Exposure to Ionizing Radiation combined the two approaches.

• The Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR) Project covers the time period 1944-1972. The aim of 

this project was to determine the amount and identify the pathways of past radioactive releases from the Hanford 

Site. This information was then used in the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study.

• The Hanford Thyroid Disease Study was carried out by the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle, 

Washington. The Center collected data from the years 1944-1957 to examine whether thyroid disease is 

associated with residence in the vicinity of the Hanford Site. An act of Congress in 1988 authorized this study 

and the HEDR Project and they were funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

• The Epidemiological Evaluation of Childhood Leukemia and Parental Exposure to Ionizing Radiation was a study 

pertaining to the years 1957-1991. This study examined whether an association exists between parental 

preconception radiation exposure and childhood cancer.

• The R-11 Survey used data from graduating high school senior classes and fourteen representative towns in the 

vicinity of the Hanford Site to examine whether or not an association exists between radiation exposure and 

health effects. This survey was funded in conjunction with a legal case involving the Hanford Downwinders 

Coalition.

• Research for the Hanford Mortality Study began in 1965. The Atomic Energy Commission initially sponsored 

this study.. Thomas Mancuso was the original director of this project. The research was designed to identify 

correlations between mortality rates and occupational radiation exposure (Stewart and Kneale 1991, Gilbert 

1991).

• The Hanford Worker Study covers the time period 1944-1986. It used the same basic data sets as the Hanford 

Mortality Study but received private funding. The results of the Hanford Worker Study were published in March 

1993 in the American Journal o f industrial Medicine.

• The Comprehensive Epidemiological Data Resource is a U.S. Department of Energy program. It is intended to be 

a public-use database of epidemiological information for health research.

Additional information on the relationship between health and radioactivity is maintained by the Hanford Health 

Information Archives, which is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy and located at Gonzaga University's Foley 

Center Library.

2 -1 0 .3 9
IS
Se c t io n 1 1 - Tr a n s p o r ta tio n , Co m m u n ic a t io n , a n d Sit e Su p p o r t

Sec tio n 11 - Tr a n s p o r ta tio n ,

Co m m u n ic a t io n , a n d Sit e Su p p o r t

Many of the siting criteria the Manhattan Engineer District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established for the 

nation's first plutonium production facility at the Hanford Site related to the available infrastructure: transportation, 

water, and power.

The Hanford area already contained functioning roads and railroad tracks for local and regional transportation of people 

and goods. To produce plutonium, the Hanford Site required convenient access to allow construction activities to begin 

without first having to build roads and railroad tracks. A viable road system was necessary to transport employees, 

construction vehicles, and other supplies across the Hanford Site. Because of the widespread location of construction 

areas and the volume and tvoes of materials involved, railroads were also a necessary method of transportation.

To produce plutonium, the Hanford Site required a reliable 

water supply that was relatively pure, cold, close to the 

project area so only a minimum pumping head would be 

required, and could provide the necessary volume of water 

(HAI 1987). The Columbia River, which flowed through the 

Hanford area, provided the necessary water volume, 

reliability, purity, temperature (averaging between 

50-60 degrees Fahrenheit), and proximity to potential 

process areas requiring minimum pumping head.

A reliable and nearby power source was also needed to 

avoid building long transmission lines, which would have 

been difficult due to the wartime scarcity of metal. The 

power source had to be dependable and able to supply at least 100,000 kilowatts. This capacity was necessary to power 

the water pumps to cool the reactors, operate machinery, and supply water for workers at the Hanford Site (HAI 1987).

The Bonneville Power Administration was already established in the area and producing electricity year round from the 

Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams. It also operated the Midway Substation located northwest of and adjacent to the 

Hanford Site. The Bonneville Power Administration and the Pacific Power and Light Company already operated power 

lines that serviced the nearby towns within the 

proposed project area (Du Pont 1945c). Existing 

Bonneville Power Administration operational 

facilities meant additional generating equipment 

did not have to be installed for year-round water 

availability and no storage of extra emergency 

supplies of coal or oil were needed for power 

production (HAI 1987). This convenient and 

capable power source provided the electricity the 

Hanford Site would need with relatively minor 

construction of additional transmission lines and 

substations until growth requirements dictated 

otherwise.

The Hanford area met the infrastructure siting 

criteria better than the other candidate areas on the

Transportation Plan .................................. 2-11.5 j;

Roads........................................................................... 2-11.3 !

Hanford Site PI am Railroad ..................................2-11.5 j ;

Transportation Equipment.................... ................ 2-11.8 j:

Water U tilities..........................................................2-11.11

Electrical Power Utilities ............... ................ 2-11.15 \\

Sewer Systems..........................................................2-11.20 j ;

Telephone Communication System.................... 2-11.22 i

Areas for Further Research................... ...............2-11.2.5 !

D ivider Page Photo: Hanford Site Buses, October 12, J

i 962 (Neg. 3022 J -4, Box PH 7 00 r>} \;

A p p ro \iin ,ite l\ SO.OOO gpm '".i/Avi- pe r m inutet o f the

purest n.tlvr .llf.im .iMe hi .iv ii't/m icd lo r p ru t

< onling in c.H h ot the 100 -t/v.is in .itltlilio n to the

“ Otto i*pm n i filtc re tl n .ifiv in r.u /i J00 Ami.

■\(hti1inn,ii q ih in lilio a bo /w ere I requited io i hoifer

m ,ike-up < n iu irn d n u p u ip o -i^ . .m il to r •..inil.it \ .im/

m i-t ell.uieou*. w rt ic v*. In .ill, the .ner.iuc requirem ent

in i f,7(li IDO A rt.i :\.ir ie tli trnm ~0.000 to hti.OiM gpm

w ith em eiiiem t tlem tin (b iq i 00.000 *p n i. - Du h in t

2 -1 1 .1
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

West Coast the Corps was considering. (For more information on site selection criteria, see Section 1, Construction 

History.) The components within the existing infrastructure, although relatively minimal in relation to what the site 

would require, offered a base from which to begin construction.

After W orld War II, the Hanford Site experienced several expansions beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through 

the 1960s in response to increased Cold War tensions. International events associated with the intensification of the 

Cold War during the late 1940s increased allocations to national defense and expanded America's nuclear weapons

program. The schism between the United States and the Soviet Union "led to a dramatic increase in plutonium 

production and construction of ancillary buildings and structures at all [Atomic Energy Commission] facilities, including 

Hanford" (DOE 1997b, p. 5.7).

Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission (which took over management of the Hanford 

Site from the Corps in 1947) built six new reactors (DR, H, C, KW, KE, and N). Also during this time period, the 

U.S. Department of Defense installed antiaircraft artillery sites and Nike missile sites (see Section 9, M ilitary Operations). 

The expansion of the plutonium production facilities and m ilitary installations at the Hanford Site resulted in an 

increased need for and subsequent expansion of transportation, communication, and other support facilities.

Table 2-11.1 shows the structures built during the Cold War era that contributed to the expansion of infrastructure 

facilities.

By the 1980s, growth still continued but as the result of a changing Hanford Site mission. Environmental restoration and 

research and development activities became the main focus of Hanford Site projects and programs, in support of the 

new mission, the infrastructure expanded.

Table 2-11.1. Hanford Site Structures Contributing to infrastructure Growth during the Cofd War Era

Where When W hat

100 A reas

2 0 0 A reas

3 0 0 A rea

4 0 0 Area 

600 A rea

1100 Area 

3 0 0 0 Area

late 1940s-1960s 

1952

1 963-1964 

late 1940s 

late 1940S-1980s 

1950s

1 970-1990 

late 1940s 

1 950s

1 960s

1 970s 

late 1970s 

1950s

1970s-1980s 

early 1950s 

1950s

Post-W ar R eactors (DR, H, C, KW, KE, and N)

E xperim ental A nim al Farm an d A quatic Biology Lab a t 

TQ0-F A rea

Electrical G enerating Plant in 100-N Area 

Plutonium Finishing Plant, C Plant H ot Sem iw orks 

High-Level W aste Storage Tanks (Tank Farms)

Reduction O xidation C hem ical Processing Plant (REDOX),

U -Piant, Plutonium U ranium Extraction Plant (PUREX)

M odular O ffice U nits

A nalytical C hem istry Laboratory

Laboratories: R adiochem istry, Physics and M etallurgy,

Radiom etallurgy, Biophysics, M etal F abrication D evelopm ent,

R eactor T echnology; C hem ical M aterials Engineering

Fuels M anufacturing (C oextrusion Shop), P lutonium Fuels Pilot

Plant, Plutonium R ecycle Test Reactor, Liquid M etal Fast B reeder

Reactor, C hem ical Engineering, S hielded M aterials, Sodium Test

Facilities, Fast R eactor T herm al Engineering, C ore Segm ent

D evelopm ent

H igh-Tem perature Sodium Facility, Life S ciences Laboratory 

Fast Flux Test Facility

A ntiaircraft A rtillery and N ike M issile Positions 

W ashington Public Pow er Supply System

C onsolidated Transportation Facility, Southern C onnection Railroad 

C am p H anford (N orth Richland)

2 -1 1 .2
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

" Ih v isolation o f the iH a n fo rd i -ito and Ihv

f//sf,im « i th r hm m z/.n h /n n y

/M .if/f f / f f i->i,}hli-hm i'nl mi .1 < tnnplvlv

tr.in'-parM tion n rlw o ik .1 n rt.c ^ ilx \n c \tc n -i\c

M s fv m o i'm .itf- ,i»i(f w .t- d v -n ’rivi# .1 uf

c fiiM z iff /c t/ fu i'\fU ‘iU lv / m / m it n/ /h r r /h fr fiiu if' 

f/ii.ifi/f/frs of"< w i- f f i/ i /fo il rc /iff/J /firn / .im / 

/iT .ifc/i.iN li» fh r 1.7/ iff if s «ihm- .1- n r l f .1- fo 

p rrn id r .ido ifu.tli' /m M '/m /i /.//ii>n f.u iiitir> in < . i- r 

<jz iff) r m r / '1,i ,/n 1 111 »nt* fii /n»r< n r f/ie ./m u 

(ltnini> fil.in t iifK-r,01011“." - 1 TO \ I*)r7.i. IJonK 4.

Tr a n s p o r t a t io n Pl a n

The Corps planned the Hanford Site to be spread out with miles 

of space between each reactor in the 100 Areas, between the 

operations in the 100, 200 and 300 Areas, and between those 

operations areas and the Richland townsite. With so much 

space required, efficient transportation to and from these areas 

during the construction and operation eras was an important 

component for success of the project. Figure 2-11.1 shows the 

roads and railroads on the Hanford Site in 1973.

Railroads — 

Two-Lane Roads 

Four-Lane Roads

Ro a d s

A viable road system was necessary to transport 

employees, construction vehicles, and other 

supplies across the Hanford Site. When the Corps 

assumed ownership of the Hanford Site, a total of 

570 miles of roads were present. They consisted of state, 

county, township, and private roads. The Corps incorporated 

as many existing roads as possible into the design of the road 

grid for the Hanford Site (see Table 2-11.2). The present State 

Highway 11-A was originally the Hanford-Cold Creek Road, 

which ran east-west across the project area and was eventually 

rebuilt along the same route as a double separateddane road 

(Du Pont 1945a). The Hanford-Cold Creek Road "formed the axis from which 

all Project roads were later developed" (UPOA 1977a, Book 4, Vol. 5, p. 2.5). 

The present Route 1 was originally the Allard Road and also ran east west 

across the project area, north of the Hanford-Cold Creek Road. The present 

Route 10 and Route 2 South were originally the Hanford-Horn Road, which 

ran north-south through the Hanford Site from Horn Rapids on the Yakima 

River to the town of Hanford. Route 2 North was originally the North 

End Cut-off Road and generally paralleled the Columbia River 

between the towns of Hanford and W hite Bluffs. Route 6 

and Highway 24 were originally the Upper River 

Road, which ran west from the west end of the Allard

Colum bia Rrvef

Columbia Fiver yO &jpxFT BET7IE

To Otftelio' B rifise j NANCY f . White Buffs To Vantage

\ Remove * 

I fiftd “ 6 " Track «E3S tSSSUi \

G a l* M ountain".

r2?rsJg?U-ft R oute 11A

VaiJey Road

Scale m F w t 

6006 72,000 13,000

Legend

* faS en ttro w //%

Federal Heney

UPTew*^ AkBBndLCotoimWs

Figure 2-11.1. Roads and Railroads at the Hanford Site). 1973

Road to a point near the Vemita 

Bridge (the Route 6 portion) and 

then south to the Hanford-Cold 

Creek Road. The north-south , 

section of Route 6 was originally a 

branch roadthat ran between the 

east end of the Upper River Road 

and the Hanford-Cold Creek Road.

Table 2-11.2* Hanford Site Use o f Pre-1943 Roads

Pre-1943 Roads Adapted by the Hanford Site

Hanford-Cold Creek Road 

Allard Road 

Hanford-Horn Road

North End Cut-off Road 

Upper River Road and branch 

to the south

Route 11 -A (between Yakima Barricade and Route 2 South) 

Route 1 (north o f Hanford Cold-Creek Road)

Route 10 and Route 2 South (between Yakima River's Horn 

Rapids and Route 11-A)

Route 2 North (between Route 11-A and 100-D Area)

Route 6 (between Vernita Bridge Area and 100-B Area) and State 

Highway 24 (section between Vernita Bridge and Route 11-A)

2 -1 1 .3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The majority of the new Hanford Site roads were constructed of asphalt w ith a 2-inch-thick bituminous mat surface over 

a 3 or 5-inch base of crushed rock or stabilized aggregate. In addition, a network of graded and graveled roads existed 

within and between towns, substations, and along transmission lines. These ranged from 62 miles of black-topped roads, 

107 miles of gravel-surfaced roads, 16 miles of graded and drained roads, and 385 miles of unimproved roads and trails 

(Du Pont 1945f). '

The Corps constructed approximately 95 miles of temporary roads to accommodate the heavy road traffic during 

construction of the Hanford Site. The subcontractors, Guerin Brothers and Myer Bros.-N.M. Ball and Sons, Excavating 

Contractors, constructed the majority of these roads with the exception of those built in the 700 Area and Richland 

Village by Smith-Hoffman and W right and some secondary roads built by the prime contractor at the Hanford Site,

E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company. Some of these roads were constructed along grids that could later be used as 

permanent road locations (Du Pont 1945f, Du Pont 1945a). These "temporary roads were constructed of compacted 

sand and gravel eight to twelve inches thick, varying from 16 feet to 50 feet in width" (UPOA 1977a, Book 4, Vol. 5, 

p. 5.28). Sand and gravel used in road construction and stabilization was obtained from building excavations or local 

borrow pits (Du Pont 1945f, p. 25).

Many of the temporary roads were constructed in the Hanford construction camp and paved with a plant-mix bituminous 

surface. The Hanford construction camp was the only place bituminous surfacing was used for temporary roads 

(Du Pont 1945a, p. 484).

The Corps based the design of the road system on the estimated peak construction-phase traffic requirements and traffic 

requirements during operation in case of an emergency evacuation of the site. All main roads were improved to support 

the traffic load of the project by being reshaped, widened, and 

resurfaced with asphalt and gravel. New major roads 

included Route 3 between the 200 East and West 

Areas, Army Loop Road (also called the Valley r o a d s y s te m

Road) running along the south and west side of 

the 200 Area from Route 4 South and 

Route 11 -A (Hanford-Cold Creek Road), and 

the access road to Rattlesnake Mountain 

(Du Pont 1945a, UPOA 1977a).

For the Manhattan Project, the Corps 

designated the Hanford Site roads as 

Inter-Area or Intra-Area roads. Inter-Area 

(sitewide) roads provided access within 

and across the Hanford Site (see 

Figure 2-11.2). The main north-south 

and east-west Inter-Area roads had two 

20-foot lanes divided by a 10-foot strip.

Primary interconnecting roads and area 

approach roads were 30 feet wide. Intra-Area 

(those w ithin an area) roads provided access within 

individual operation areas on the Hanford Site (see 

Figure 2-11.2). Du Pont's Wilmington Design 

Division created the Hanford Site's intra-area road 

layout. These roads varied in width from 12 to 20 feet (Du Pont 1945f).

The majority of roads constructed w ithin the process areas were placed at right angles to each other and ran north-south 

or east-west. A total of 56.64 miles of roads and 6.82 miles of walks were constructed inside the 100 (B, D, F), 200 (East, 

West, North), 600, 300, and 700 Areas by the end of construction in 1945 (Du Pont 1945a).

Paved Reads

improved and Patrol Roads

Road System Consists of:

(approx. distances)

260 Miles o f Paved Roads 

600 Miles o f Improved Roads 

and Patrol TraBs

Route 11A

Routs 4S

300 Area 

Route 10

Federal ra@tiway To Prosser

Figure 2-11.2. Roads at the Hanford Site Around 1950

2 - 1 1 .4
Se c t io n 11 - Tr a n s p o r ta tio n , Co m m u n ic a t io n , a n d Sit e Su p p o r t

In the 1950s-1970s of the Cold War era, the Atomic Energy 

Commission constructed additional operation areas, such as 

the remaining 100 Areas (C, D, H, K, N) and 400 Area. 

These new construction activities required the 

expansion of the Hanford Site roadway grid (see 

Figure 2-11.3). In addition, maintenance, repairs, 

and resurfacing of old roads (all roads were 

resealed every 4-7 years) and construction of 

new roads were undertaken to bring the 

Hanford Site road system into compliance 

with Washington State Highway Department 

standards (GE 1950b). By 1957, the 

approximate total miles of roads was 868, 

including 268 miles of primary roads,

175 miles of secondary roads, and 425 miles 

of trails and dirt roads (GE n.d (a)).

To accommodate the increase in traffic in the 

1970s and 1980s, major access routes, such 

as Route 4 South and Route 10, have been 

reconstructed. Approximately 32 miles of the 

Hanford Site inter-area roads are now fourfane. All of the 122 miles of intra-area roads 

are two lane (DOE 1990).

Ha n f o r d Sit e Pl a n t

Ra il r o a d

WAHLUKS STATE WAXHJFE

GABLE UOWIAIN

LEGEMP

IweooB&eiMO

INN9M1SWNP

PERIMETER FENCE 

— HANFORD BOUNDARY 

RAILROAD 

® STATE HIGHWAY - pRiraAsnrROAD

 SECONDARY ROAD

WEST RICHLAND

The Priest Rapids branch line of the Chicago,

Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad had been

constructed in 1913 between Beverly junction and the Figure 2-11.3. Roads and Railroads at the Hanford Site, 1994

towns of W hite Bluffs and Hanford, a total of 46 miles.

This railroad branch followed the southern side of the Columbia River and serviced the fruit growers and ranchers in the 

area. Approximately 25 miles of this branch line was located in the northern section of what was to be the Hanford Site's 

reactor areas (100 Areas). The Corps took over this section of the railroad in April 1943 for use on the Hanford Site.

The Corps began immediately to improve and extend the existing line to support the needs of the construction activities 

and to speed up delivery and distribution of construction materials. The Guy F. Atkinson Company handled the railroad 

modifications, construction of temporary and permanent railroad track, and construction of the Riverland Classification 

Yard. During the expansion of the existing railroad line, material shortages and wartime priorities meant that mostly 

salvaged materials were used. A total of 35 miles of standard gauge, temporary rail, weighing 65-85 pounds per yard, 

were laid to the construction material plants and storage areas, such as the ballast and concrete aggregate plants 

(Du Pont 1945f). The Hanford Site used these tracks for transportation of equipment and materials across the site during 

construction.

It was also necessary to build branch lines to other construction areas of the Hanford Site. Some of these same tracks 

were used during operation of the site's production areas. In the 200 East and West Areas, 4200 feet and 5000 feet 

(respectively) of standard gauge railroad track were converted from temporary construction period track to permanent 

operation track (Gerber 1993c).

2 - 1 1 .5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c iu t ie s

ST

CH14BL-5TP. & FAC. R.R 1M-D

20tN?V

1QS-F

?R

SUCH 1. AND 

CUtSSy=!CATIOk

YARD

SBdTOMCrPf RfCHLAND

HANFORD WORKS 

Connection w t» U .ft & *.P. fi.ft XEKHEWtC

Figure 2-11.4. Hanford Site Railroad System Around 1950

By the end of W orld War II, the Hanford Site had 158 total 

miles of railroad tracks. The railroad track connected all 

the major operation areas including the Richland Village 

and the Administration Area (see Figure 2-11.4). The ' 

railroad system included improved track of the Chicago, 

Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad line and temporary 

track at the River!and Yard and between the former original 

townsites of W hite Bluffs and Hanford (Hageman 1945).

The Corps had constructed the site tracks during W orld War 11 from 

what was available, which was often inferior materials of low standards, 

w ith the assumption that they would only be in service for a limited time 

With the decision to continue production at the Hanford Site after World 

War II, it was necessary to replace the temporary, low-standard tracks 

with new treated ties, tie plates, and rails as w ell as improve the 

grades, alignments, and create safe roadbeds and tracks 

(GE 1950b). Morrison and Knudsen Construction 

Company did this work between 1948 and 1949 (Brands 

1949). As the Hanford Site grew with the addition of 

more reactors and operation areas, the tracks were

extended to tie these areas together with the railroad system. After a 1979 inspection, the Federal Railroad 

Administration recommended replacing rail that was laid before 1936 or weighed less than 90 pounds per yard with 

heavier, updated rail. During the 1980s, rail weighing 115 pounds per yard was installed on the main lines in the 100-K, 

100-N, 200, and 300 Areas as well as 5 miles of the southern connection lines south of the Hanford Site (Haakenson 

1998).

Riv e r l a n d Cl a s s if ic a t io n Ya r d

The Riverland Classification Yard was constructed in 1943 on the northwestern edge of the Hanford Site because that 

was where the tracks of the Priest Rapids branch entered the site. The Hanford Site Transportation Department assumed 

control over and classified incoming rail cars before they were sent across the site (DOE 1995d, p. 7). "Classification" 

refers to the process of tracking incoming rolling stock by recording when each rail car arrived onsite, when the car was 

delivered to its destination, what cargo was unloaded, and the date the car was to leave the site. "Declassification" was 

the process in reverse for outgoing rail cars, including when the rail car left and what cargo it was carrying (Haakenson 

1998).

The Riverland Classification Yard had a capacity of 225 cars, contained 7 tracks, and was where the majority of the 

Hanford Site's railroad maintenance and operations facilities were initially located. To supply water to the steam 

locomotives, the Riverland Yard had a 25,000-gallon, elevated storage tank for treated water. At an additional 

25,000-gallon, elevated storage tank, a centrifugal pump pulled the water from a deep w ell into the water storage tank 

(Du Pont 1945a). The only railroad access to the Hanford Site was through the Riverland Yard until the Richland 

Classification Yard and Southern Connection line were built in 1950. By 1964, the Richland Yard had taken over all the 

rail transportation responsibilities and the Riverland Yard was decommissioned.

Ric h l a n d Cla s s if ic a t io n Ya r d - So u th e r n Co n n ec tio n

The Corps had constructed the Riverland Classification Yard in the northwest corner of the Hanford Site because the only 

rail access to the Hanford Site in the 1940s was via the Priest Rapids branch, which ran through the northern section of 

the site. Because the section of track from Beverly to the Riverland Yard was considered "extremely vulnerable to 

sabotage, natural rock slides, and damage from floods" (GE 1951a, p. 1), the Corps had considered installing a railroad 

junction south of Richland but to expedite construction of the Hanford Site decided against it. Another problem was the

2 -1 1 .6
Se c tio n 11- Transportation, Communication, and Sit e Su p p o r t

Riverland Yard was the only connection to the Hanford Site so "freight traffic from the south and southwest, or 

originating from any point in the United States and transported by carriers other than the Milwaukee, could not make 

reasonable connections w ith either the Hanford Works [Hanford Site] railroad system or the Milwaukee system for 

economical interchange" (GE 1951a, p. 1). Thus after World War II, it was decided an additional access route and 

classification yard were necessary.

It was not until 1949 that plans for the Southern Connection and the Richland Classification Yard in the 1100 Area 

materialized when construction and growth of the Hanford Site increased in response to the Cold War. J. A. Terteling 

and Sons, Inc. won the contract for the new railroad, which was completed in 1950. The length of the Southern 

Connection is approximately 10 miles. It travels between the Richland Yard on the southern end of the Hanford Site, 

along the west edge of the City of Richland, and across the Yakima River to the Richland "Y" area where it connects with 

the Union Pacific Railroad main line near Columbia Center (GE 1951a).

This project also included the construction of the Yakima River railroad bridge crossing. The Yakima River railroad 

bridge was constructed in spans, using bridge sections salvaged from older bridges in the Pacific Northwest. Two o f the 

spans used had originally been built in 1899 and three other spans in 1910.

Once completed, the southern connection became the main access port from which supplies entered the Hanford Site. 

The Richland Classification Yard eventually expanded and took over the role from the Riverland Yard as the maintenance 

shop for rolling stock as well as other site vehicles.

Process a n d Se r v ic e Tracks

Railroad tracks were constructed either as process tracks or as service tracks. Process tracks required higher standards 

because they would carry special loads. For instance, the tracks that carried the irradiated fuel rods from the 100 Areas 

reactors to the 200 Areas chemical separations plants were process tracks and were constructed of heavier rail and on a 

wider roadbed than service tracks. Process track rail weighed a minimum of 80 pounds per yard, and the roadbeds were 

28 feet wide, whereas service track rail weighed 65-85 pounds per yard, and the roadbeds were 18 feet wide. There are 

approximately 40 miles of process track. All other tracks were considered service tracks and were used to transport 

construction materials, coal, chemicals, fuel, equipment and other materials.

M a in te n a n c e

Maintenance of railroad tracks and components has been an important ongoing task because railroad operations 

involved the transportation of special nuclear materials, chemicals, and supplies between areas, in the 1950s, railroad 

tracks were maintained comparable to common standards of the era. The process track for special loads was maintained 

comparable to mainline track levels of common carrier railroads. The service track for general freight was maintained 

comparable to branch line levels of common carrier railroads, 

while the remaining track for construction and industrial uses was j

maintained at safe and economical levels (GE 1950b). H1(1 Hjninnl site K.iilro.i<l upeijir*

Maintenance included activities such as adding ballast and oil to lii-twvrn kit hl.mtl |mn lion "w lw ic it /,>/»•. thv

the railroad bed, removing sand, re-aligning ties, and replacing , p.u h it to m n w u L d tr.uk* and mm-v- m

materials. During the Manhattan Project and early Cold War era, tlw ahandum-tl < hh.a-o. Udwauhoe. M. Paul

maintenance of the rolling stock took place in the Riverland and Pat iht tr.it A- m ur iht- \rrn it.i iindnv at the

Classification Yard (Gerber 1993c). boundsm the Hantnrd Mu-.

1980s H a n fo rd S ite P la n t R a ilro a d „nhC lon-.ult'tcu m *(‘1X1(1'la j t tn i-h u ilittV '-tU io **

Even while new railroad spurs were being laid into the 100-N Area j *•»/<' Rouqhh mWc*. •» ti.u A art- in

and th e 400 Area as those areas were being developed, the old j Mandh\ ot o tii-n i~ v i\h o to n d iih m ."- n o i

spurs servicing the other 100 Areas were deactivated along with the l ‘»W. j». MM

reactors. As the coal fired powerhouses on the Hanford Site were

2 -1 1 .7
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

replaced with diesel run systems, much of the railroad system was released from the responsibility of transporting coal 

(Taylor 1998a). However, the Hanford Site Plant Railroad still operates in a limited capacity to service the current 

Hanford Site missions. For more information on the Hanford Site Plant Railroad, see the Expanded Historic Property 

Inventory Form in Appendix B on the Internet.

Tr a n s p o r t a t io n Eq u i p m e n t

M a n h a tt a n Project

As important as the roads and rails at the Hanford Site was the equipment that ran on them. The Corps established the 

Area Engineer's Transportation Department in 1943 to manage the transportation equipment used on the Hanford Site. 

This equipment consisted of the railroad rolling stock, ferry, buses, cars, trucks, and construction vehicles.

Rolling stock was scarce during the Manhattan Project due to wartime needs. Rail cars and locomotives were leased 

from the Milwaukee Road and other companies. Additional rolling stock was transferred from the U.S. Army supply. 

Most of the rolling stock was standard scale but in poor condition. The rolling stock fleet included 120-ton and 80-ton 

diesel electric locomotives, cabooses, gondolas, and specialized cars such as transformer, box, dump, cask, flat, and tank 

cars (GE 1950b, UPOA 1977a). Custom rolling stock was necessary for transportation of special materials such as 

irradiated uranium, which was carried by "well-bottomed flat cars with special buckets and shielded casks" (Du Pont 

1945c, p. 180). A couple of 40-ton furnace cars and some 90-ton underslung cask cars were fabricated or modified on 

the Hanford Site. The cask cars carried irradiated fuel rods from the reactors to the chemical separations plants (see the 

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the Hanford Site Plant Railroad in Appendix B on the Internet).

During construction in 1943, the Milwaukee Railroad was delivering 600 carloads of building materials and equipment 

per week to the Riverland Classification Yard. Material from aggregate pits on the Hanford Site was carried to 

construction areas across the site at a total of 50 cars per day. By the 1950s, the majority of movement on the railroad 

tracks was for delivery of coal across the site and transportation of irradiated uranium fuel rods (for more information see. 

the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the Hanford Site Plant Railroad in Appendix B on the Internet).

The Hanford ferry that operated along the Columbia River out of the town of Hanford had been servicing the towns and 

surrounding region when the Corps took it over and Du Pont operated it during construction of the project. The Corps 

acquired all the ferry equipment in the takeover, including tugboats. Under the Corps, the ferry continued to connect 

State Highway 11 -A (running east-west from the Yakima Barricade to the original Hanford townsite) and U.S. Highway 

No. 395 (along the northeast side o f the river) for vehicle and passenger traffic crossing the Columbia River (Du Pont 

1945f). The Corps had also acquired the Richmond Ferry operating near the Vernita Bridge and used the equipment 

(a barge-type ferry and small boat) at the Hanford Ferry location (Du Pont 1945a).

In 1944, the Corps faced the problem of how to 

transport 45,000 workers to work locations 

scattered across 670 square miles. The problem 

was complicated by the fact that during World War 

II tires and gasoline were rationed. The Corps 

decided to establish a free bus service. The 

Transportation Corps o f the Army provided the 

buses (see Figure 2-11.5). Peak bus use was in 

September 1944 with 904 buses in service. This 

system was the "largest bus operation in the world 

for any given territory or city" at this time (UPOA 1977a, p. 9.5). During construction of the Hanford Site between 

1943-1945, approximately 340,000,000 bus service passenger-miles were driven. By 1950, the monthly average alone 

was approximately 4,500,000 of bus service passenger-miles (Hageman 1945, GE 1950b, UPOA 1977a).

I hv Hcinfuul bus scixitv shulllvfl v\tn keis "/icJiiirn J/ir Kit hland

residential r/M rk h anti the 'Vr.i fii/s let tninal. non-^lop .-n \ k o

lir liiir n tlw />i/s terminal anti -pet iut w iitl. are.)'-' and -.huttle

sen /< c it ithin the 100 and JOO Manut.u Inrm ii I \< lu^nin Iriws.

L \io p l lo r p i n atch owned o r other (onem inent w h it /r1- the

sisrwi t'wa-i the sole mc.ifis In w h iih operating peitonne!

'.t o td d l /v .ii h tlw SUnutat turin u lr « \K ( , [ | ‘i»cih, |».

2 -1 1 .8
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

Cctloftwood gt.

0 HUNT

0 GOETHALS 

® COMSTOCK 

® SNOW 

(§ } WfttOHT 

© COTTONWOOD 

® SHUTTLE BUS STOPS

~}l A»«

jmhSTSwi

'wtw^Mumwr

jto tp i vteiMaatoa Wav

Lssjgr

Figure 2-11.5. Map o f the Richland Area Bus System Around 7 950

The Corps also established a public bus service for Richland. It was a separate bus service from the one used by 

employees for work. The Richland public bus service had a fleet of 37 buses and carried approximately 47,000 

passengers each month (GE 1950b).

In the mid 1940s, the fleet of transportation vehicles at the Hanford Site included approximately 1800 road vehicles 

(sedans, carryalls, trucks), 900 buses, 2600 construction vehicles (dump trucks, tractors), 50 emergency vehicles (fire, 

ambulance), and 500 railroad cars and locomotives (Matthias n.d.). Other types of vehicles consisted of construction 

equipment such as cranes, bulldozers, graders, scrapers, and tractors; and road maintenance equipment such as 

snowplows, dump truck sanders, and tractors. A towing fleet of vehicles provided emergency service for the Hanford 

Site vehicles and equipment (GE 1950b).

Cold Wa r Er a

After W orld War If, the 1100 Area was established along Stevens Way in north Richland as the support services center for 

the Hanford Site containing general stores, shipping, receiving, transportation, maintenance, and warehouse facilities. 

During W orld War II, these services had been dispersed among the various areas on the site (see Figure 2-11.6) and in 

Richland (GE 1950b, Matthias n.d.).

2 -1 1 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The 1100 Area expanded during the 1950s with the increase in 

shipping, receiving, vehicle repair, and maintenance activities in 

response to Hanford Site growth. The 1171 Main Shop Building, 

completed in 1954 as the Transportation Maintenance Shop, 

consolidated the Hanford Site transportation and maintenance 

shops across the site into one facility. The 1171 Building was built 

to service the 2000 various vehicles used on the Hanford Site at the 

time. The facility consisted of a body repair and paintshop, a 

high-bay area for locomotives and larger equipment repair, a few 

maintenance shop areas, a vehicle wash facility, and an Figure 2-11.6. 100-H Area Garage and Service

automotive parts storage area (for more information, see the Station Around 1950

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 1171 Building 

in Appendix B on the Internet).

Another facility with vehicle maintenance and repair services during the 1950s and 1960s was the Army's Camp Hanford 

Brigade Motor Pool facility located in the 3000 Area. The Army had established the Motor Pool to maintain its vehicles

supporting the anti-aircraft artillery sites and Nike missile installations. Located in the 1226 Building in the industrial 

area of Camp Hanford in North Richland, the Motor Pool continued to provide vehicle maintenance services for the 

Hanford Site until 1971 even though Camp Hanford closed in 1961 when the Nike missile sites were shut down. With 

the Army's departure from North Richland, the 1226 Building came under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission. 

A branch of the Hanford Site Plant Railroad terminated in the 3000 Area, and several spurs extended to industrial 

facilities and warehouses, including the 1226 Building, for the purpose of loading and unloading supplies.

Ha n fo r d Air p o r t

The Corps built the Hanford Airport to support the need for airplane security surveillance of the large area encompassing 

the Hanford Site. Air surveillance continued through 1964. The Hanford Airport also gave key construction managers 

quick access to major regional airports and provided air-express delivery of items critical for constructing the Hanford 

Site. The first airstrip on the Hanford Site was located in the Hanford construction camp at the former original Hanford 

townsite. The airstrip consisted of a 30-foot wide, 2000-foot long, single lane landing strip constructed of blacktop.

Two elements led to the need for a new airstrip. As the camp grew larger and closer to the airstrip, proper take-off and 

landing clearances could not be obtained. At the same time, the number of Air Transport Command air-express 

shipments ordered for the Hanford Site was increasing. The original airport was abandoned and a new Hanford airport 

was constructed by 1945 at a location between the Hanford construction camp and the south end of Gable Mountain. 

This airport consisted of two landing strips of bituminous material, each 200 feet wide, one 2400 feet long and the other 

4000 feet. The airport included two wooden hangers, one hutment, and refueling capabilities for army planes that 

consisted of electric gasoline pumps and underground storage tanks. The airport was enclosed by a barbed wire fence 

(Du Pont 1945a). In 1944, the "Day's Pay" B-17 bomber (see Figure 2-12.4 in the Worker History Section) made its 

ceremonial visit to the Hanford Airport. "Day's Pay" was purchased for the U.S. Air Force (at the time called the 

U.S. Army A ir Corps) by the Hanford Site employees who each donated a day's pay to the cause (Thayer 1996). This 

airport was abandoned, probably around 1964 when the air patrol security surveillance was terminated.

The Richland Airport, built in 1944 west of the City of Richland, was used as the headquarters for the Hanford air patrol 

employees and air fleet. According to a retired air patrol pilot, the fleet consisted of a twin-engine Beechcraft, a 

Stearman spray plane, and two Super Cub planes. In 1960, the Port of Benton acquired this airport from the Atomic 

Energy Commission, and it was opened to private air traffic (POB 1998).

1

2 -1 1 .1 0
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

Wa t e r Ut il it ie s

Figure 2-11.7. Typical Floating Pump House on

the Columbia River Around 1945

When the Hanford Site was constructed, existing water supply 

services consisted of domestic water systems and wells; town water 

systems in Richland, Hanford, and W hite Bluffs; and irrigation 

districts w ith associated powerhouses, pumping stations and 

irrigation ditches (Du Pont 1945f, Parker 1979, Harris 1972). These 

systems produced inadequate volumes of water needed for 

construction and operation of the Hanford Site.

The water supply for the Hanford Site needed to cool the reactors, 

refrigerate, feed boilers, condense steam, put out fires, provide 

drinking water and sanitation services (Hageman 1945). The 

existing systems were updated with new equipment (storage tanks, 

booster pumps) and improved by drilling more wells and adding 

new pipelines to increase the capacity.

In 1943, the Corps acquired the water system that had serviced the 

town of W hite Bluffs. This system was expanded by combining 

existing wells w ith a new well and connecting them to a new 

system with pipelines, a booster station, and an elevated storage 

tank to provide water service in the area. The Corps also acquired 

the water system that had serviced the town of Hanford for use at 

the Hanford construction camp. However, this system alone was 

not sufficient for the camp's requirements. The Corps constructed a 

new system for the camp and operated it in addition to the original 

system. The new system included wells, pumps, storage tanks, and 

water mains (Du Pont 1945a).

The 100 Areas were supplied with Columbia River water through 

pumping stations and 108 miles of temporary water lines (Du Pont 

1945f). The first water pumped from the Columbia River was to the 

100-B Area concrete plant via a river pump house (Du Pont 1945a).

This temporary system also included a chlorinator station, wooden

storage tank, and a piping system. The 100-D and 100-F Areas obtained the same type of system, although their pump 

houses were located on floating rafts in the Columbia River (see Figure 2-11.7) (Du Pont 1945a). Each of the 100 Areas 

reactors was eventually supplied with a Columbia River pump house and water lines, which subsequently supplied all 

the water needed on the Hanford Site for use as sanitary, fire, and process water.

A well at the McGee Ranch supplied water to the 200 Areas and Central Shops during construction. The McGee Ranch 

had been built in 1928 in the northwest corner of what is now the Hanford Site (see Figure 2-11.8). The Corps took over 

the McGee well and water lines in 1943 and connected them to the booster station constructed in the 200 East Area.

The Allard/Coyote Pumping Station had a line connected with the McGee line near the Central Shops area. Together, the 

McGee-Allard/Coyote Water System comprised 93,000 linear feet of pipe (44,800 feet of which was wooden), five 

storage tanks providing several functions (general storage, emergency water storage, elimination of natural gas in water, 

and reduction of pipe line pressure), and seven booster pumps (gasoline and electric-driven) (Du Pont 1945a).

Once the 100 Areas were equipped with river water pump houses and the 200 Areas were equipped with reservoirs and 

filter plants, water lines between the two areas completed the export water system in 1944. The export water system (see 

Figure 2-11.9) was designed to supply water from the Columbia River to the 100-B, 100-D and 200 Areas. The export

M

Figure 2-11.8. McGee Well, Ground Water

Storage Tank, and Booster Around 1945

2 -1 1 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

water system also supplied water to various locations in the 

100 and 600 Areas, and the 251 -W Electrical Substation (DOE 

1994b). "About 232 miles of pipe [was] installed for steam 

and water services of which more than half were 

required for construction purposes. This is exclusive 

of the large quantities of larger sized water pipe and 

special stainless steel process piping" (Hageman 

1945, p. 70).

The export water lines (still in existence today) 

connecting the 100 and 200 Areas were 

constructed of reinforced concrete, measure 

24-42 inches in diameter, and total 

approximately 25 miles (DOE 1994b).

Concrete, which was already in use elsewhere 

in the United States and performing well, was 

chosen as the materia! best suited for the lines.

In addition, the use of concrete eliminated using 

valuable steel and saved the cost of transporting 

materials because the pipes were constructed on 

the Hanford Site from existing aggregate materials 

(Du Pont 1945c). The 100-B Area contains the primary 

water pumping facility from which export water is 

distributed to other areas. The 100-D Area contains 

the emergency backup water pumping facility.

Until 1967, when reactor operations were being reduced, 

the water system was maintained to comply w ith the reactor 

operation standards. During the 1970s, the system 

was repaired and maintained on an as-needed

basis only until 1978 when the pumps, valves,

screens, and buildings were rehabilitated. The F!Sure 2' 11-9' ExPort Water SYstem at the Hanford Site Around 1990

reinforced concrete export lines between the

100 and 200 Areas were inspected in 1984 during valve modifications and determined to still be "in a highly reliable 

and very good condition" (DOE 1994b, p. 2-2). Today, the export water system is still in operation to supply the 

200 Areas w ith raw water. However, as the 100 Areas and their individual water systems have been deactivated, ties to 

the export lines have been made to continue to supply water to the 100 Areas for limited usage needs.

WATER FLOW ROUTE

In each 100 Area, water was pumped from the Columbia River by motor-driven pumps (steam-driven pumps for backup) 

in the 181 River Pump Houses (see Figure 2-11.10) through concrete water lines into the two reservoirs within the 182 

Reservoir and Pump House facility, one of which was for emergency storage (see Figure 2-11.11). The 182 Reservoir and 

Pump House facility then distributed water to the 183 Filter Plant/Chemical Treatment Building for purification (see 

Figure 2-11.12).

Originally it was thought that the 185 Deaeration Plants would be needed at this step to remove gases from the water, 

however, that turned out to be unnecessary. The 186 Demineralization Plants were also believed to be necessary for 

further purification. O nly one 186 Demineralization Plant was built. It was determined to be unnecessary and so was 

never used.

10OB&C

2 -1 1 .1 2
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Sh e Support

Water from the 183 Building was pumped to ciearwells for later use 

in the reactors. Two 300,000-gallon, above-ground water storage 

tanks at each area were also filled with an emergency water supply 

(see Figure 2-11.13). If both steam and electrical power were to 

fail, gravity would flow water from the tanks through the reactor to 

keep it cool for at least a short time (UPOA 1977a, Hageman 1945).

The 183 Pump Houses in the 100-B and 100-D areas also pumped 

water to the 200 Areas via the export water line. In the 200 Areas, 

water from the export water line is received at the 282 Reservoir 

and Pump House and pumped to the 283 Filter Plant for treatment 

and storage in ciearwells until used as sanitary water within the 

200 Areas line (see Figure 2-11.14}.

Sit e Wa te r Sy s te m s

As the 100 Area reactors were shut down, the only water needed 

was for the minimal activities still ongoing and in case of fire. The 

100-B Area's original system was deactivated w ith the exception of 

the export water system. A small hydro-chlorinator system was 

brought in to supply the 100-B Area with the limited amount of 

water it needed. The 100-D Area also added a hydro-chlorinator 

system to provide backup for the export water system, water for its 

own minimal needs, and water for the 100-F and 100-H Areas. 

When the 100-F and 100-H Areas water systems were deactivated, 

they were networked to the 100-D Area's system for their limited 

water needs. The 100-K Area water system was constructed in 

1955 with two identical systems (KE and KW) to service the 100-K 

Area. The 100-KW system was deactivated, and the 100-KE system 

was maintained to service the limited needs in the 100-K Area and 

its treatment plant (Kelly 1998, Rohl 1998).

Because the N Reactor, constructed in 1964, had a ciosed-loop 

cooling system requiring much less water than the once-through 

reactors, the 100-N Area's water system contained a smaller riverwater pumping facility than that of the other 100 Areas. However, 

itmaintained the same basic pump houses, filtration plant, and 

dearwell facilities. The 100-N Area's water system was unique in 

that it also provided water to generate steam as the fuel source for 

producing electricity at the Hanford Generating Plant. The 100-N 

River Water Pumping Station was deactivated in 1990, leaving the 

water line originally designed to provide emergency cooling water 

for the 100-N Area as the primary water source (DOE 1994b, 

1997a).

&

Figure 2-11.10. 181-D River Pump House from

Aerial View Looking South Around 7 945

%

Figure 2-11.11. 182-D Reservoir and Pump

House from Aerial View Looking North Around

1945

I I TM-r r | ’ «l»

The water supply for 200 North was independent of the Hanford 

Site water system. It contained two drilled wells and water lines 

running from the wells to each of the 212 buildings (the only 

buildings needing water in 200 North) and on to the 251-N 

Electrical Substation. A separate line ran from the wells and connected to the export water lines running from the 

100 Areas to the 200 East and West Areas (Du Pont 1945a, Gerber 1993c). The 251-W Electrical Substation, built in

Figure 2-11.12. 183-D Filter Plant from Aerial

View Looking Northwest Around 7 945

2 -1 1 .1 3
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

i

Figure 2-11.13. Typical Water Storage Tank at the

Hanford Site Around 1945

Figure 2-11.14. 282-E Reservoir and Pump

House, 283-E Filter Building, and 284-E

Powerhouse from Aerial View LookingSoutheast,

.1994

1944, contained its own sanitary water system. The export water 

system for 200 East and 200 West, also constructed in 1944, 

supplied water for the chemical separations process and also for 

sanitary, fire, and other process needs (DOE 1994b). The export 

water system remains today as the water supply for these areas.

During construction, the 300 Area received water temporarily from 

small Columbia River pumping facilities and existing irrigation 

lines. The 300 Area's water supply system eventually developed 

into a system independent of the rest of the Hanford Site and 

serviced "research, laboratory, engineering development, fuel 

fabrication, and support facilities" (DOE 1994b, p. 1-7). The 

300 Area's water system contains a river water pump house, 

treatment plant and storage tanks. Emergency or backup water can 

be obtained from the City of Richland. The water is chlorinated 

before it is distributed to the 300 Area buildings for various uses 

such as processing, heating, cooling, laboratory use, and sanitary 

use.

The 400 Area water system was constructed in 1978 to service the 

Fast Flux Test Facility and support buildings. The water is pumped 

from three deep-water wells (DOE 1994b). Each w ell can 

individually support the pumping capacity for the total system flow 

so the other two wells are used for backup and emergency needs. 

Water is pumped to three above ground tanks, chlorinated, and 

distributed for use as sanitary, fire, and process water. The 

distribution pumping station for the 400 Area is the 481 Primary 

Pump House, which contains two sanitary water pumps. The 

481 -A Secondary Pump House is for emergency backup.

In the 600 Area, each of the following was built with its own water 

system: 609 Fire Station, 622 Meteorological Complex, 6652-C 

Rattlesnake Mountain Observatory, 6652-K ALE field laboratories, 

Patrol Training Academy, and the Yakima Barricade systems. Each 

individual system was designed to service specific buildings at a 

specific location. These systems contain packaged water treatment 

plants, developed springs, pressurized tanks, and wells (DOE 

1994b).

The water supply for the 700 and 1100 Areas during the Manhattan 

Project was obtained from individual wells in the Richland area. 

The water was chlorinated before it was distributed for sanitary, fire, laboratory, heating, cooling, and drinking uses. This 

system contained a 25,000-gallon storage tank (Du Pont 1945f, 1945a)

Sa n it a r y Wa t e r

Sanitary water is the term used to define raw water that has been purified or chlorinated for consumption by humans. 

The raw water was purified in treatment plants located within each of the areas. The resulting sanitary water was then 

stored ip ciearwells or tanks or piped directly to the buildings and facilities for use.

2 -1 1 .1 4
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

Table 2-11.3. Hanford Site Export Water Systems

Water Source and Capacity

System Distribution Facility (gallons per minute)

100-B Area Columbia River - Pump House 70,5000

100-0 Area Colum bia River - Pump House 54,000

100-K Area Columbia River - Pump House 200,320

100-N Area Columbia River via Export System 420,000

200 East Columbia River via Export System 2,600

200 West Columbia River via Export System 2,600

251-West Packaged Water System 30

300 Area Colum bia River - Pump House 3,200

400 Area Three Deep Water Wells 220 each

609 Fire Station Packaged Water System 125

622-R Packaged Water System 30 .

Meteorological Complex

I6652-C Rattlesnake Mountain Spring Well <30

Rattlesnake M t. Observatory

6652-K Deep Water Well approx. 60

ALE Field Station

Patrol Training Academy Deep Water Well <30

Yakima Barricade Deep Water Wei I <30

When construction of the Hanford 

Site first began, the Corps brought 

sanitary drinking water to the site in 

water trucks and barrels. By the end 

of 1943, however, the water lines 

designated for sanitary water use 

were chlorinated and ready for 

distribution (UPOA 1977a).

Sanitary water was supplied through 

15 individual systems on the 

Hanford Site within the 100, 200,

300, 400, and 600 Areas and mainly 

serviced process plants, laboratories, 

and office buildings (see 

Table 2-11.3). As of 1990, ten of the 

systems obtained raw water from the 

Columbia River with river water 

pump houses, and the other five 

used underground deep-water wells (DOE 1994b).

Wa t e r f o r Fir e Co n tr o l

Water for fire control was provided via raw and sanitary storage distribution systems and stored in elevated storage tanks 

at each of four headquarters buildings. The Corps established the four headquarters buildings in the 100, 200 and 

300 Areas. In the 200 East and West areas, an extra reserve water tank for fire control was located at the T, U, and B 

process areas. The 300 Area system had a series of storage tanks and five electrically driven water pumps.

Pro cess Wa t e r

Process water is the term used to define water that has been purified to an acceptable level for use in the manufacturing 

process. Large quantities of process water were needed in the 100, 200, and 300 areas to cool the reactor cores, create 

steam condensate for power, and flush away waste from the chemical separation process. The most economical way to 

provide a dependable, continuous water supply to the operations areas was to pump water stored in one area to the 

other area. The Corps built the water storage system in the 100 Areas and pumped it from there to the 200 Areas. An 

equally dependable power supply was needed to power the water pumps. The 230-kilovolt distribution loop out of the 

Midway Substation powered motor-driven pumps, which were backed up by steam-driven pumps in case of an 

emergency. In case power to both types of pumps failed, elevated emergency water tanks would supply water to the 

reactors for at least a short time. W ithin the 200 East and West areas, process water supply lines ran from the 

282 Reservoir and Pump House to the 221, 224, and 231 buildings for use in the chemical separations process (Gerber 

1993c).

El e c t r ic a l P o w e r Ut il it ie s

Electrical power was as critical as water for the Hanford Site to function. The Corps estimated that an 86,000-kilovoltamperes, uninterrupted power system at 95 percent power would be required. This estimate led to the need for major 

additions to and upgrades of the existing system.

When the Hanford Site was established, the Bonneville Power Administration was producing electricity year round. The 

Bonneville Power Administration operated a double transmission line of 230-kilovolts each that ran between the

2 -1 1 .1 5
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams on the Columbia River and crossed the northwest section of the Hanford Site. The 

Bonneville Power Administration also operated a substation at Midway near the northwestern boundary of the Hanford 

Site. From the Midway Substation, a 115-kilovolt line extended east to the original Hanford townsite. Although the 

Bonneville Dam had no surplus power available at the time of the construction of the Hanford Site, the Grand Coulee 

Dam was able to produce surplus power immediately with the installation of more generators (Du Pont 1945c).

Existing transmission lines and substations provided a basic network for the construction and initial operations of the 

Hanford Site. The Pacific Power and Light Company operated a 66-kilovolt transmission line in the area that serviced 

nearby towns and connected to the Priest Rapids Irrigation District power lines at the Allard/Coyote Rapids Substation. 

The Bonneville 115-kilovolt line between W alla Walla and Midway connected with the substation of the town of 

Hanford (UPOA 1977a). The 66-kilovolt transmission lines were powered by the 115-kilovolt line connected to the 

Hanford Substation and by a branch line of the 115-kilovolt Bonneville line running between Midway and Walla Walla 

(Du Pont 1945c).

Early construction power was provided through portable gasoline-driven generators and the existing substations at 

Hanford, Richland, W hite Bluffs, and Allard/Coyote Rapids until additional substations were constructed (UPOA 1977a). 

The W hite Bluffs Substation and distribution system serviced the project shops and storage buildings, pipe fabrication 

plant, cement block plant and nearby wells. The Hanford Site used existing power and lighting connections during 

renovations of existing homes and buildings (Du Pont 1945a).

Ea r l y El e c t r ic a l Po w e r

Temporary substations were constructed in the 100, 200, 700 (Hanford Administration), and 3000 (Camp Hanford) areas 

with capacities of 3000-5000 kilovolt-amperes for use in those areas. The Corps acquired the 66-kilovolt transmission 

lines and substations the Pacific Power and Light Company and the Priest Rapids Irrigation District operated. Nineteen 

miles of branch lines were attached to the existing 66-kilovoit transmission lines to temporarily supply power to the 100 

and 200 Areas. Another 19 miles of 6.9-kilovolt distribution line were also installed to service the shops, wells, and 

other installations. Permanent, primary substations built in the 300, 700, and 1100 Areas provided construction power 

for those areas (Du Pont 1945a).

The main power supply for the Hanford Site was routed through the Midway Substation, located between and powered 

by the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Hydro-Electric Plants. This substation was reconfigured with "an additional 

50,000-kilovolt-ampere, 230-kilovolt to 115-kilovolt bank," by the Corps to satisfy the Hanford Site's permanent electric 

power needs (UPOA 1977a, Book 4, Vol. 3, p. 702). By 1944, the Midway Substation was the major power source for 

the Hanford Site (PRC 1992).

All the existing Bonneville Power Administration transmission lines remained intact within the newly established Hanford 

Site. An agreement was developed that directed the Bonneville Power Administration to continue to maintain the lines 

(PRC 1992). However, installation of additional lines was still required. The Bonneville Power Administration built 

52 miles of new 230-kilovolt transmission lines (Du Pont 1945c, UPOA 1977a).

The Corps acquired the 53.6-mile portion of the 66-ki!ovolt Yakima-Hanford-Pasco transmission line that existed within 

the Hanford Site between the Midway Substation and Richland from the Pacific Power and Light Company. O nly the 

reconditioned part of the line between Hanford and Pasco was used for permanent power distribution. The Corps also 

acquired the Allard/Coyote Rapids and W hite Bluffs substations and the Hanford Substation along with 8.5 miles of 

115-kilovolt transmission line (UPOA 1977a).

Transmission Lines

By 1953, after numerous additions and upgrades, the electrical system consisted of 230-kilovolt, 115-kilovolt,

66-kilovolt, and 13.8-kilovolt transmission lines that tied all the major operation areas to the Midway Substation and to 

each other (GE n.d.(a)) (see Figure 2-11.15).

2 -1 1 .1 6
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

N *

51-H Substation

751-KE Substation f ‘

151-KW

252-W

A— 230K.V.1.84E 

—gE—IIS K.V. iiN E

s~seK.y.

C 13.8 KAt 11NE

(S— SWCHiMS

VaWraa River V5$3-ASybstatien

Figure 2-11.15. High Voltage Transmission Lines at the Hanford Site, 1953

The 230-kilovolt lines were placed in loops 

throughout the 100 and 200 Areas. The major loop 

began at the Midway substation and extended to the 

200 East and West Areas where it tied in with the 

251 Substation. The line then continued east and 

north toward the 100 Areas. (At this location, a 

second 230-kilovolt line was connected that extended 

directly from the Midway Substation, bypassing the 

200 Areas.) Switching stations directed branch lines or 

loops at each of the 100 reactor areas to connect 

with a 151 Substation. Each branch line

reconnected w ith the major 230-kilovolt line 

at another switching station and the entire 

line went back to the Midway Substation 

to complete the loop. In general, the 

230-kilovolt grid extended through 

substations in each area where the 

power was reduced to varying voltages 

to service different needs of the specific 

areas (GE n.d.(a)).

One of the two main 115-kilovolt lines 

traveled at an east/west axis across the 

Hanford Site from the Midway 

Substation to a point west of the 

Hanford Substation. Here it turned and 

went to the Benton Switch Station where 

it divided. One branch crossed the 

Columbia River to Walla Walla and a

second branch headed south. The southern branch extended through the 352 Substation in the 300 Area and into 

Richland to connect with the 751 and 1151 Substations. Power distributed from the two latter substations was through

13.8-kilovolt and 2.5-kilovolt lines. A second 115-kilovolt line traveled across the Columbia River from Taunton and 

through the Hanford Substation. From here the line extended south to parallel the other 115-kilovolt line until a point 

near the Benton Switch Substation where it crossed the river again and headed to Walla Walla (GE n.d.(a)).

The one main 66-kilovolt transmission line primarily operated between the 100 Areas and North;Richland. The line 

originated at the Midway Substation and extended east through the northern section of the Hanford Site. At a point near 

the 100-F Area, a branch line extended directly north and tied in with the W hite Bluffs Substation. The main line 

continued along the Columbia River, passing through the Hanford Substation. The line then extended south to connect 

to the 115-kilovolt line at a point in North Richland (GE n.d.(a)).

The 13.8-kilovo)t lines were located mainly within the 100 and 200 Areas. A 13.8-kilovolt line existed between the 

Midway Substation and the 151 -B Substation in the 100-B Area. It passed through the Riverland jYard substation, 

powering the yard with a 2.3-kilovolt line. In addition, lines ran between all the other 100 Areas (F, H, D, K and 

eventually N) for emergency backup in case the 230-kilovolt loop lines in the TOO Areas should fail (Davie 1998). In the 

200 Areas, the 13.8-kilovolt lines looped between the 251 Substation and the 252 East and West Substations (GE n.d.(a)).

As the Hanford Site grew, additional transmission lines were installed to support the new developments. The 100-N

Area, established in the 1960s, was connected to the 13.8-kilovolt and 230-kilovolt transmission lines via its

151 Substation. The 400 Area Fast Flux Test Facility, developed in the late 1970s, had two 451 substations connected to

2 -1 1 .1 7
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

two 115-kilovolt lines: one line from the Benton Switching 

Station and one from the W hite Bluffs Substation. A

13.8-kilovolt tie line from the 300 Area was also connected 

to the 400 Area (DOE 1990) (see Figure 2-11.16).

Su b s t a t io n s

The Midway Substation was originally the main 

electrical distribution station. In addition, the 

Hanford Substation and the Richland Substation, 

which existed before the Manhattan Project, were 

also used in the electrical grid for the Hanford Site.

However, major upgrades, including additional 

substations, have been made to the electrical system 

to accommodate changing requirements brought on 

by growth of the Hanford Site.

The 100, 200, 300 and 700 Areas were all 

constructed with primary substations (see 

Figure 2-11.17). The primary substations 151 and 251 

in the 100 and 200 areas, respectively, were powered by 

230-kilovolt transmission lines and associated loops, 

whereas the primary substations 351-A and 351-B in the 

300 and 700 areas, respectively, were powered by 

66-kilovolt transmission lines (Du Pont 1945f). In 

addition, secondary substations and distribution 

stations were constructed in the 100 and 200 Areas 

as steps in the electrical distribution system. Two

substations were constructed in the 400 Area in the 1980s. The 451-A Substation serves the Fast Flux Test Facility and 

associated buildings, while the 451 -B Substation serves the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility and associated 

buildings.

Additional substations were also built throughout the 600 Area. 

The Benton Switch Substation was built in 1948. A new White 

Bluffs Substation was built in 1976 west of the 300 Area. The H.J. 

Ashe Substation, also built in 1976, is located on the east side of 

the Hanford Site. In 1986, the H.J. Ashe Substation took over the 

electrical maintenance and operations responsibilities from the 

Midway Substation, which had been an electrical maintenance 

headquarters (PRC 1992).

1QGD&DR

100B

$K*oc 

AREA

300 AREA

3000 AREA

FUCNIAND

Figure 2-11.16. Hanford Site Electrical System Around 1990

Figure 2-11.17. 151-D Primary Substation from

Aerial View Looking Northwest Around 1945

Between 1979 and 1985, the Supervisory, Control, and Data 

Acquisition System was installed at the 251-W Substation. This 

system "monitors, provides status, and [has] alarms to allow the

dispatcher to change electrical routings remotely through seven 

primary substations...and six secondary substations" within the 

100, 200, and 300 Areas (DOE 1990, p. 3-1).

2 -1 1 .1 8
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Sit e Support

"I in te r the .m ieem ent between the iW .id iin u to n

P uhlii /'m i iVi Supph M-it jjj,m d the ■■ \tn m ii

/'iieri't < o n m it-tio n 1. the iio *e n im e n t p .iid .ill

i »■./-. .invji i.ite il u if/> p ro dm inti the -tw in ; the

W .rthintilon Puhltt P tm et 'w p p h m s/rm h o ir .ill

• <»*/«. u w u m m / w ifh fi.mspoi tint* </iv kfi'.im fitim

the IO *)-\ Ihiihlin^. p im e iim : the tu ib in e - in the

li: ~ S U uilditni M id tr.vi'tpoi tin ii the elet frit i t i to

the Honncxilte Pmt <v \J/iu>i/sh,irrr>/> a rid .u - l)()L

Ha n f o r d Ge n e r a t in g Pl a n t

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy broke ground for the 

Hanford Generating Plant, which would generate electricity 

from steam the N Reactor produced. The N Reactor was 

completed in 1964 as a dual-purpose reactor to produce 

plutonium and use the heat generated to produce electricity in 

the Hanford Generating Plant.

During nuclear reactions w ithin the N Reactor core, the 

generated heat was absorbed by water pumped through the 

process tubes. The heated water was then sent to the 109-N 

Building's steam generators where the heat was transferred to a 

secondary system, causing water to boil and produce steam.

The water was then recirculated to the reactor core. Some of the steam produced was used within 100-N Area, however, 

the majority was transferred to the 185-N Export Powerhouse turbine, also known as the Hanford Generating Plant, 

where it fed two turbine generators producing approximately 860 m illion watts of electricity. This power was delivered 

to the 155-N Export Power Switchyard and on to the Bonneville Power Administration grid providing power to the 

Pacific Northwest. Because of occasional N Reactor outages, the electrical power the Hanford Generating Plant 

produced was not dependable on a daily basis without extra assistance, The Bonneville Power Administration provided 

that assistance by supplying power during outages.

Because N Reactor was built with a dual purpose, it was planned that if the production of weapons-grade plutonium was 

eliminated, the reactor could still be operated economically to produce steam for the Hanford Generating Plant In 

1973, this plan was realized when plutonium production at the N Reactor was halted, and the N Reactor's only function 

was to generate steam. However in 1982, N Reactor's dual purpose was reinstated to include weapons-grade plutonium 

production. In 1986, N Reactor was put on standby status for safety concerns and inspection. During this time no 

electricity or plutonium was produced, and in 1988 N Reactor was placed on cold-standby status. Eventual ly in 1991, 

the U.S. Department of Energy ordered the final shutdown of N Reactor, ensuring the end of producing power through 

the N Reactor and the Hanford Generating Plant For more information on the Hanford Generating Plant, see the 

Reactor Operations Section and the Historic Property Inventory Form for the Hanford Generating Plant (185-N) in 

Appendix B on the Internet.

St e a m Pr o d u c t io n

The production of steam on the Hanford Site was necessary as a 

backup power supply in case of power failure. It was also used for 

cooking, heating facilities and water. During construction of the 

Hanford Site, steam was used in some of the construction processes, 

such as heating bituminous materials to build roads (Du Pont 1945a).

The steam production system consists of powerhouses and a network 

of steam lines. Temporary steam lines were first installed and totaled 

approximately 39 miles, the majority of which were in the Hanford 

construction camp area. These steam lines had an average operating 

pressure of 70 pounds per square inch and ran above ground on 

wooden pipe supports (see Figure 2-11.18), except in the 1100 Area 

and in parts of the 200 Areas where the lines were underground

(Du Pont 1945a). The steam lines were made from seamless steel pipe Figure 2-11.18,

with welded and flanged joints, except for the lines in construction Around 1945

areas that were made of screwed steel pipe.

Typical Overhead Steam Lines

2 -1 1 .1 9
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Wherever temporary steam was needed on the Hanford Site, portable, single-unit boilers were used. In the case of the 

Hanford construction camp, railroad locomotive boilers were used to make steam for the powerhouse (Thayer 1996). 

W ithin the Hanford construction camp, Central Shops, and Camp Hanford, a total of 24 semi-permanent powerhouses 

were constructed containing hand-fired boilers. However, an estimated maximum of over 331,000 pounds per hour of

steam would be required for each reactor. Thus, additional powerhouses were installed throughout the 100, 200, 300,

and 700 Areas (Du Pont 1945c). The powerhouses supplied power to steam turbine pumps for the secondary reactor 

coolant system in the 100 Areas and supplied heat to facilities 

throughout the Hanford Site where needed.

In the 100 Areas, a powerhouse was built in each of the B, D and F 

reactor areas during the Manhattan Project (see Figure 2-11.19).

They each contained four coal boilers with capacities of 

100,000 pounds per hour and were able to "generate steam at 

225 pounds per square inch pressure and at about 50 degrees 

superheat" (Du Pont 1945c, p. 167). Powerhouses were built at 

each additional reactor area (H, K, and N) as they were 

constructed.

The 100-KE and KW reactors operated with a dual-purpose 

capability to provide heat to their work areas. Heat exchangers 

transferred the heat in the waste water from the reactor's graphite 

block to an ethylene glycol water solution. This solution then 

transferred the heat into the air ducts o f the 100-K Reactor buildings 

(Carlisle and Zenzen 1996).

Figure 2-11.19. 184-B Powerhouse from Aerial

View Looking Northeast Around 1945

The 100-N Area steam system was unique because o f its production of electricity at the Hanford Generating Plant.

Steam production was terminated in the 100-N Area in conjunction with N Reactor going to standby status. Oil-fired 

boilers.(one with a capacity of 575,000 pounds per hour and two with a capacity of 200,000 pounds per hour) supplied 

standby power (DOE 1997a).

The 200 East and West Areas each have one powerhouse (for more information see Figure 2-11.14 and the Historic 

Property Inventory Form for the 284-E Powerhouse in Appendix B on the Internet). The original boilers were designed to 

operate at 225 pounds per square inch pressure (Du Pont 1945c). Steam served industrial equipment and process needs 

in the 200 Area (Rockwell n.d.) These two powerhouses are connected by a 4.5-mile, two-directional, steam tie line 

built in 1989.

Fuel elements were fabricated in the 300 Area. An electrical power failure in the 300 Area did not pose the serious 

threat to the production of fuel elements that it did to the production and separation of plutonium. Nevertheless, the 

384 Powerhouse was built in 1943 to supply steam to the 300 Area for facility heat, compressed air, humidification, and 

emergency electrical power via coal-fired boilers and later oil-fired boilers (Du Pont 1945c, Gerber 1993c). Steam was 

also used to produce fuel elements. New and more efficient package boilers have been installed in the 200 and 

300 Areas to replace the old powerhouses (Taylor 1998a).

Se w e r Sy s t e m s

Because the existing sewage systems in the 1940s did not provide the capacity or locations needed by the Hanford Site, 

additional sewage lines, tanks and treatment plants were constructed. Service began with temporary installations during 

construction. As construction was completed, many installations were deactivated because of decreased usage and 

permanent installations were placed into service. The Hanford Site created two types of sewer systems: sanitary and 

process.

2 -1 1 .2 0

-I
Section 11- Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

Sa n it a r y Se w e r s

Sanitary sewers handle general sanitary waste. During the Manhattan Project, the greatest demand for sanitary sewer 

systems was where the largest number of workers was located— in the Hanford construction camp, 3000 Area Camp, and 

the Central Shops. In addition to using existing building sewer systems and improved former sewer systems at the 

original Hanford townsite, the Hanford construction camp contained many septic tank and drain field systems and three 

gravity-flow sanitary sewage treatment systems that chlorinated, flocculated, and settled sewage before it was disposed 

into the Columbia River. The 3000 Area Camp and the Central Shops area each contained a main sewage line 

connected to individual buildings. The main sewage line drained into a large septic tank and then to settling basins 

(Du Pont 1945a).

During construction, "33 gravity flow independent sanitary sewage system{s] were provided with individual septic tanks 

and drain fields" within the 100, 200, 300, and 600 Areas (Du Pont 1945f, p. 29). Where the Corps was reusing existing 

buildings that had plumbing, the systems were either connected to a more permanent sewer system or the existing system 

was upgraded with new septic tanks and drain fields. Indoor sanitary sewers only existed within office buildings in the 

100, 200 and 300 Areas that had individual systems with underground septic tanks connected to drain fields (Du Pont 

1945a). Currently, the Hanford Site contains 85 operational septic tanks and drain field installations and a Central Sewer 

System consisting of a lagoon and aeration facility located near the 100-N Area.

The sanitary sewer system contains sewer lines constructed of concrete and vitrified clay and spigot pipe (Du Pont 

1945f). Sewer lines were connected to septic tanks, except in the 700 and 1100 Areas where they were connected to the 

Sanitary Sewer Disposal Plant in Richland Village. Septic tanks were rectangular and had anywhere from 8-inch to 

1 -foot-thick walls and floors depending on the number of people served each day. The tanks drained.to the soil through 

drain fields built around the tanks (Gerber 1993c). The reactor areas each contained three to five septic tanks, whereas 

the 200 and 300 Areas required additional tanks due to the greater number of employees in those areas.

Pro cess Se w e r s

Process sewers handled the removal of process waste (also known

as effluent) from the reactors and other operations buildings. A * ” ■

minimum of one process sewer was located in each of the 100,

200, 300, and 600 Areas. The effluent in the 100 Areas was 

neutralized and if necessary transferred through effluent pipelines 

to a retention basin (see Figure 2-11.20) where it was cooled and 

then deposited in the Columbia River via outfall sewer lines o r 

open trenches. Process facilities in the 200 East and West Areas 

each contained three separate process sewer systems. Effluent

from the 221, 222, 224, and 291 buildings was carried to F'Zure, Retention Basin from

. , . , . ° _ Aerial View Looking Northwest Around 1945 underground composite storage tanks in one system. Process

cooling water from the 221 and 224 buildings was carried to

cooling water retention basins in a second system, which emptied into open trenches or ponds. Chemical waste water, 

building drainage, steam condensate, and acidic and non-acid effluent were carried in the third system directly to open 

drainage ditches. The 300 Area effluent lines drained directly to two process ponds until 1974 after which process 

trenches were used (Du Pont 1945f).

Process sewer lines were of two types: acid proof and non-acid proof. Acid proof lines were mainly vitrified clay and 

earthenware pipe with acid proof joints. However, cast iron, wrought iron, steel, stainless steel, and concrete pipes were 

also used for specialized purposes. Non-acid proof pipes were constructed of vitrified clay and concrete with concrete 

joints (Du Pont 1945f).

For further information on the handling of waste at the Hanford Site, see Section 6, Waste Management.

2 -1 1 .2 1
Ckapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Te l e p h o n e Co m m u n i c a t i o n Sy s t e m

The existing telephone companies providing service in the area were the Columbia River Telephone Company, 

Kennewick Valley Telephone Company, Oregon-Washington Telephone Company, Eltopia Telephone Company, and 

Mesa Telephone Company. The Columbia River Telephone Company serviced White Bluffs and Hanford. The 

Kennewick Valley Telephone Company serviced an area that included the town of Richland. These companies, however, 

had insufficient experience, technical capability, and equipment to support the telephone system needs of the 

Hanford Site.

M a n h a t t a n Pr o jec t

For the Manhattan Project, the Corps acquired the Columbia River 

Telephone Company and the portion of the Kennewick Valley 

Telephone Company system servicing Richland. The Columbia 

River, Kennewick Valley, and Oregon-Washington Telephone 

companies made new connections to their existing systems for use 

during construction after which the Corps acquired these 

installations (Du Pont 1945a).

The Prime Contractor at the Hanford Site (Du Pont), American 

Telephone and Telegraph Company, and the Chief Signal Officer of 

the Corps designed the communication system for the Hanford 

Site. The Corps' Signal Corps Division of the Ninth Service 

Command was in charge of expanding the existing systems, using the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company to do 

the work. The telephone system was designed "in accordance with War Department regulations governing the 

installation of [a] Government-owned telephone system" (UPOA 1977a, Book 4, Vol. 3, p. 7.6). Three individual 

exchanges were installed in the 100 Areas, and two exchanges were installed in the 200 Areas. The main exchange (the 

702 Central Telephone Exchange Building) was constructed in the 700 Area. It contained all the central telephone 

switching equipment and personnel to provide connections to Hanford Site facilities.

During construction, the Signal Corps also installed temporary telephone lines that tied into the existing system during 

construction. Four temporary switchboards (Richland, Central Shops/Cold Creek, Pasco, Hanford) were set up initially 

and provided 1100 lines. In the construction of these exchanges, 75 miles of trunk cable and 3000 miles of local circuits 

were installed. Modifications were made to some existing lines to increase the service. For instance, a "repeater station 

on the main truck line north of the 300 Area was installed to improve transmission" (UPOA 1977a, Book 4, Vol. 3, 

p. 5.33). However, lines were also removed if they interfered with project construction.

Three permanent exchanges (Olive, Pine, and Maple) were built in 1944 and contained manually operated switchboards 

within the 1720 Patrol Headquarters buildings. The 200 East and West Areas also had individual permanent exchanges, 

servicing the Riverland Classification Yard, 200-North Area, and 622 Meteorological Complex. The 700 and 1100 Areas 

had a single system with four types of service: official and administrative, private residence, commercial stores, and 

emergency/service/ administrative (Du Pont 1945a).

The telephone service consisted of five systems. The first system was the Inter-Area System, which connected the various 

area telephone exchanges across the Hanford Site. From a main switchboard in the 702 Central Telephone Exchange 

Building, connections were made to each area's patrol headquarters, the supervisors' offices in the 200 Areas, and to the 

300 Area's 3706 Radiochemistry Laboratory Building "with inter-connecting trunk lines between the 100 and 200 

Process Areas" (Du Pont 1945f, p. 31). The second system was the Intra-Area System with connections within each area. 

The third system was the Teletalk/Inter-Communication System existing w ithin each area's major buildings and between 

process buildings. The fourth system was the Power Dispatch System that connected each primary substation magneto

Ihv Signal C imjin (Iclcim m rri thal "sewn

IH 'm uw vn l m ,m u,dl\ -o ftrr.ilrd Iv b p lu m v

w o u ld bo m /i/in v / to r lu tu llin n the

me* r>/><’/,if/ijy ,i/cus tho c\i>otinw ntxif i 100! \r o j

.mm/ llw lii(h l,in d Vilhiqv: in .td dition f<» o n r

Irin p o r.n i c\(h .w t*o fo r I h r

I o fi'tim lio n ( ,inip j l H .in lo trl.' - |)u Pont

2 -1 1 .2 2
Section 11 - Transportation, Communication, and Site Support

PLANT TELEPHONE SYSTEM

WHITE BLUFFS 

100-BEXra, 50QUNECAP

teauN EC AP.

I9 6 0

MIDWAY 190 B

BY H u m s 

TRUNKING OmCEAND 200 E-W HWFOR3EXCH

K B UNE CAP.

300 AREA 

EXCH. 

400 USE

RICHL6

EXCH,

600 UNE CAP

tCHLAND TO PASCO

RICHLAND 

EXCH. 

4000 LIKE CAP

TO KENNEWICK

CONVERSATIONS

N UM BER

RICHLAND AND OUTER AREAS 6 0

RICHLAND AND NORTH RICHLAND 3 9

RICHLAND AND 300 3 3

RICHLAND AND KENNEWICK (COM W L) 3 9 

RICHLAND AND PASCO (TOLL LINES}

Figure 2-11.21. Telephone System at the Hanford Site in the 1950s

phone to the Chief Power Dispatcher in the 251 -N Substation.

The fifth system was the Railroad Dispatch System that connected 

the railroad dispatcher stations to the Chief Dispatcher at the 

Riverland Classification Yard (Du Pont 1945f, 1945a).

The telephone network, when completed in 1944, serviced 

connections between all offices in the area. When the Central 

Shops/Cold Creek Exchange and the Hanford Exchange were 

closed, the remaining security telephones were routed to 

the Hanford Fire Station.

Co ld Wa r Er a

A t the end of 1946, the telephone systems were 

converted to dial operation to increase speed of 

service and decrease cost. To make the 

unattended (no operator) lines safe from failure, 

they were tested remotely and emergency manual 

switchboards were installed (UPOA 1977a).

By 1957, the Hanford Site was using seven 

telephone exchanges throughout the 100, 200, 

300, 600, and 700 Areas with a total of 6520 lines 

in service (see Figure 2-11.21) (GE n.d.(aj). The 

network expanded and improved with the growth 

and technological needs of the Hanford Site. Two 

telephone switching equipment exchanges 

supported the Hanford Site: North Richland 

exchange and the 200 Area exchange. These 

exchanges could access the public Switched 

Network, Federal Telephone System, and operator 

assistance.

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

The Corps selected the Hanford area to produce plutonium because the area already had the key infrastructure 

components needed to begin construction: transportation, water, and power. Between initial construction and the 

height of the Cold War, the infrastructure systems at the Hanford Site expanded exponentially. The Corps, their 

successors, and contractors transformed agrarian support systems to an industrial scale system of roads, railroads, and the 

equipment that traveled on them, water and power utilities, sewer and communications systems. Each of these systems 

offers areas for further research. Specific areas of interest future researchers might explore are

• Day-to-day problems the Corps and Du Pont faced in scaling up an agricultural infrastructure system to 

industrial scale in less than a 2-year period

• How the Corps and Du Pont improvised substitutions for materials normally needed when expanding an 

infrastructure but not readily available during World War II

• Beyohd what is already described in this book, what effect the need for secrecy and site security had oh the 

Hanford Site infrastructure systems

• Whether in the course of expanding the water and power systems during the Manhattan Project and Cold War 

Era, the engineers designed energy and water conservation into the expanded systems

2-22.23
S ectio n 12

His t o r y o f

a t t h e Ha n f o r d

D.C. St a p p

P a c i f i c N o r t h w e s t N a t i o n a l L a b o r a t o r y
Section 12 - History of Workers at the Hanford Sh e

Se c tio n 12 - His t o r y of Wo rkers a t th e

Ha n fo r d Sit e

Life as a worker at the Hanford Site differed according to the particular era. What it was like to be a Hanford worker 

depended on whether the worker was one of the first to hire on in 1943 when the Manhattan Project was gearing up for 

World War 11, was hired on in 1990 as the mission changed from production for the Cold War to environmental cleanup, 

or hired on in any of the other years during the Manhattan Project and Cold War, 1943-1990. So far as work at the 

Hanford Site is concerned, that period is divided into three eras:

• 1943 to 1945, when workers designed and constructed the Hanford Site

• 1944 to 1957, when workers operated and expanded the Hanford Site

• 1958 to 1990, when workers operated and diversified the Hanford Site

In November 1942, the government decided to pursue full-scale construction of plutonium production facilities that

ultimately were located at the Hanford Site (Gosling 1994, p. 15). Although construction would not begin until March 

1943/E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, the contractor in charge, knew that obtaining the workforce would be a 

major task and thus began almost immediately to seek employees for the Hanford Site. After recruiting the workforce,

Du Pont built two reactors, a separations plant, and support structures, which were operating by the end o f December 

1944.

This accomplishment was amazing considering that design decisions had to be made for untried technologies, workers 

had to be brought to an area w ith no existing housing and limited infrastructure, and the operating facilities had to be 

constructed. In addition, these activities had to be conducted with the utmost secrecy and security while worker health 

and safety, union, and minority issues were taken into consideration.

Much has been made of the strategy the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers used to design the plutonium production facility at 

the Hanford Site. The strategy, a tripartite scheme, involved the

• Theoretical expertise of physicists and scientists located at various centers but primarily in the Metallurgical 

Laboratory at the University of Chicago

• Construction and operations experience of E. I. Du Pont de Nemeurs and Company in Wilmington, Delaware

• Decision making and funding of the Manhattan Project by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The synergy resulting from the interactions between the 

scientific engineers and executives at Wilmington 

and the highly intelligent and theoretically inclined 

scientists at Chicago" (Groves 1983, p. 79), along 

with the ability of the Corps to manage the 

uncertainties associated with the reactors and 

separations technologies is often credited as a 

major key to the success of the Manhattan Project. 

Examples of the synergy are the decision to pursue 

the bismuth phosphate process over the lanthanum 

fluoride process and the decision to add extra fuel 

loading channels in the reactors. The former 

decision guaranteed that at least some plutonium 

could be extracted. The latter decision ensured that 

the reactors could sustain a reaction.

'hard-driving, thoroughly competent, industrial minded,

CONTENTS

Workers W ho Constructed the Hanford Site;

Workers W ho Operated and Expanded th

Hanrord Site: 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 5 7 .................................................2 - 1 2.9

Workers Who Operated and Diversified the

Hanford Site: 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 9 0 .................. .........................

Areas for Further Research............................ 2 - 1 2 .2 7

Divider Page Photo: Wotkers F'assing through Security

Cate, 1944-19 45 (Fermi a n d Samra 799.5, p . J 3)

2-1 2 .1
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

. .in 1 c firi-if/t-ied b u ild in x .1 l.trxe deiom zinx />/.wf /or /he <•«■< and re.ii {mi su

fhaf .if /I'.isf m/ji’ or fhe f/iroc /ii/e^ fre .K tn is ! w o u ld < e it.iin h he opet.ihle .if ,1//

//m e- / n.is 1//-1 lin in g the .idxis,d )ilit\ o l this w ith ( 1. M. Re.id 01 D u Em il,

one m i'/if .if 11,infmd. when Dr. H illh e iry ( , 1/110 info fhe rim/ii. f .isked him lo r

his t/vn s ,,/»// he le ph ed Ih.tl he d id n ot think h i- w o u ld need die deionizing

p b n t. h u l i f we did. w e 1 o tild not do w ith o u t it I fu m e d In K e.id .m d s.i id.

'h o nhe.nl .1/1J h u ild V .‘ H illh e n x then .isked w /i.if if u m i l i / o i i l jih / f fu h / 

h im fh a f it w o uld he ‘.ninew here between six nnd ien m illio n d o lb rs. H o 

/ eplied. 'I in id.ul I d id n ’t know th.it u h e /i f tj.n e m i o p in io n .' Sut h qu it k

dei id o iis i i i ' i i 1 /!#>/ fo o frequent nnd thex n ete ,dw ,n - p ic ic d e d fn a* ;m/« h

rese.irt h. s fi/d i ,m d thought o- 1 n u id he d e \o te d 1o them w ith o u t le b x in x the

t om pletion o f the p i 010 1 1. \c x rrth c lo s s . Ihete n e /e m a m decision', th.it h.id

to he n u d e when the unknow n f.u fo r- f.u outw eighed the known. M e b u ilt

onlx the one d e io tii/in x p b n t .m d fo i tun.delx ne\ ct round .1/11 need tin it.... ' -

The Corps had a basic philosophy it 

followed in making Manhattan Project 

decisions. The philosophy can be 

characterized as "if it is necessary, do 

it." When the path to an atomic 

bomb was clouded by the uncertainty 

associated with both gaseous diffusion 

technology and reactor technology, 

Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves, 

commander of the Manhattan Project, 

decided to pursue both. The 

justification was that the United States 

could not fail, for, if we did, Germany 

might have the atomic bomb before 

us. This philosophy extended to all 

decisions the Corps made for the 

Manhattan Project

The Du Pont designers and managers were under intense pressure to make technical, cost, and schedule decisions in the 

face of constant uncertainty, knowing full well the price of failure. To make decisions in the face of uncertainty, Du Pont 

had a tradition of using the "flexible" approach (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, p. 109) of component sub-systems that could 

be changed as necessary. When building the Hanford Site, Du Pont focused on sub-systems for which design certainty 

existed and allowed time for sub-components that needed more research. Hounshell (1992, pp. 236-261) notes this

*. .D u Pont it.ii un de r u n tlr.it t to dosixn .m il b u ild th i* equipm ent follow in:; the fi./-/i ib l. i p ro x id c d h \ the xnm p in

( hU.nio. sf) the ietore when the urnup .11 ( hic.ixo a,Tie u- w h .it to 11- h ,I' o ttic i.il d.it.i we simplx h .id to m llow it. \ » u if (

h.ippened •‘exe i.il tim es d u rin x the dc-iq i! ,m d const n n lio n o f this p l.it e lh .il thex r e i.iliu b te d thinxs. see. this 11,1, ,j// w ri

new. / / f i t phx «•/< they w e ie hre.dunx w o u n d .ill the tim e. Ilu w r e i.iliu b te d the situ.ition ,1 few tunes m i «e il.u n dosixn ■

th.m iies. W ell, w e p i01 ceded to ni.d.e them, the n tiiu illx .us tim e 11a- iji/hiti to r one re.ison o r onothei. D u Pont ic ll we

should p u t .1 slop to Ihis it possible. .1 n d the t h i el enwnvct. slim Re,id. s.ud he w ,isn't xoinx to ./< t ept .inx m ore t h,ini>es.

O i < M.irn’ /sit/, lh .it is a position xou i.m hike hut xou <,1/17 ho ld it. si/ u hen the ( h ii.m o people <ume thtnuxh xxilh

.m other 1 h,mxe. 11 e h .id to n u k e it. oxen though 11 e *.1id n r w o u ld n ot m .ike ,\n\ m o ie \n d th .il is ex.ic Ih w h.it h.ippenetl,

lhe\ (.lin e thio uxh w ith .m other 1 h.iinie. .m d unless m> h .id ni.ide it lie h.id e iM 1 ream /i to suppose the p b n t w ouldn't

w ork. Ih .it 11,is the ch.inxe to odd some c x ir.i tubes. It 'corns the p b n t it.i- tlexixned to have .1 < e ri.iin d iix in u p o w e r in j

fcr/iii o f 1 . ip.n if 1 o f the p b n t to p e rm it the mwVim re./t lion. It .m xthinx it ere to h.ippon n> th .it tin «.rp.n/Vi 11./1 ch/TtinishfvJ.

then o f io ,trse I s ii! the p b n t w o u ld n 't run We h .id dei ided th .il w e keep .1 IV p e n ent s.ifelx f.ic lu i on this drixnn• powei,

IV p e rc e n t excess '/.' it w/ti w .m l the jargon

We m .ide the 1 h.inxe ( spet ified. hut He insisted theie s till he .1 IV p e n e n t excess -I, ,?s ,1 sulrfi M i to i. .u u l th.it s :

w I1.1I stixed the d .i\. h e m m e to .m il h e ho ltl when the\ h ie d to op er.lie the place some unexpi'i le d things happened .m d

unless ne h.ul this exic>s if w o u ld n 't h.ne run. We 11 ere glad vie h.id the excess. ,uu l the ext i’n it.is p to x id e d in the (/e-zan j

h \ (hanging i e rt.iin dim ensions .u u l settinx the num hei o f tubes m < .intied u r.inium in the p ile ire. it to il. Hie nef o l it i t ath .it m ote tubes were ni.ide .n a ila b le than the desixn c.dled to i to the extent o f I ft p e n e n t..u u l th.it le t us o p e i.ite even in

the Me e o f this unexpei led phenom enon lh .it u< tu rret/ .lfte i s t.n tu p ....''• fieorye (.i.ixes. I he Du Ponl enuineei t retliled

with making Ihe to nsrrv,ih \v detisiun li> add m m v lulies to the iv.u Im desinn, i|im1vd in saimer pp.

2 -1 2 .2
Section 12 - History of Workers at the Hanford Site

organizational model is the one that enabled Du Pont to develop nylon in the 1930s. Along with its flexible component 

sub-systems, Du Pont had a tradition of designing conservatively, which crept into many of the basic design decisions at 

the Hanford Site and was often a source of friction with academics.

The friction among the three groups, especially between the academics and Du Pont, is well documented by historical 

writers and by the participants themselves. We only describe it briefly here to illustrate the atmosphere within which the 

early workers constructed and operated the Hanford Site.

W o r k e r s W h o C o n s t r u c t e d t h e H a n f o r d S ite :

1 9 4 3 -1 9 4 5

Finding skilled and unskilled laborers for the construction and organization of the Hanford Site in the numbers needed 

during wartime was a challenge. The military had already taken a large portion of the labor pool for the fighting forces. 

In addition, the military's demand for weapons and general supplies further reduced the available labor supply. The 

Hanford Site's chief local competition for labor was

the Boeing Company in Seattle and Kaiser 

Aluminum in Vancouver (Goldberg 1998, p. 57). 

Du Pont, therefore, recruited workers nationwide. 

An additional challenge to recruiting workers was 

the remote location of the Hanford Site and lack of 

services. All manner of trades were recruited, from 

pipe fitters to machinists to secretaries, cooks, 

butchers, and photographers. Recruiters 

concentrated on men who were not liable to be 

drafted, such as those aged 38 or over with 

children, or men who had physical or occupational 

draft deferments (Sanger 1995, p. 68).

"D u I'n u i - re u n ite !* n u n ih c iiw i 17 ; .if the pv.ik. l.m netl o ut

.u ro -- 4 “ tin .u h iitio n In the Sf.ih' «>i H.is/imy/mi:, A/a-A.i

.im</ t .111.1(1.1 .uu l interx /«■ it vtl <i 1ot,il 01 JoJ.04u .ipp lit «m K llii>

v rto tt » ,is in iti.itcd , w ith tlw p .irtid p .itio n o t the 11.ir 

V .m /x fim ( n n iin istio n a m / tlw U.s / m ploxnw nt Sen it iJ. ,1/

fb<- fovtiinnm !; u f flic p m jc i I bet .n i-e it u .7- rJirn ic t o x n i/e tl th.it

tlw sf.ifc- o t W .i'.hinaliin p io x irle d o n m -u tfii ient w otket pool.

u'ne/i tlw w .irp ro io t I- then in /m>i</«»ss in western M .tsh injta n. ’

- TImx r r I W li. p. <« >

¥

F ig u re 2 -1 2 .1 . Number o f Construction

Workers, 1943-1944

Nevertheless with the Corps's assistance, Du Pont found 

construction workers. Construction at the Hanford Site began in 

March 1943. By May 1944, the labor force constructing the 

Hanford Site had peaked at approximately 45,000 (see 

Figure 2-12.1). Findlay and Hevly (1995, pp. 16-17) report that a 

severe labor shortage (up to 50 percent) existed for the first 14 

months of construction. Between 1943 and 1945, it took 260,000 

interviews to find 94,307 people to hire. After overcoming the 

initial labor shortage, the Hanford Site still experienced shortages of 

certain types of construction workers such as pipe fitters. To obtain 

the needed skills, Du Pont and the Corps used various creative 

strategies to obtain qualified workers.

One strategy cited for drawing workers to the Hanford Site was the 

high rate of pay. Many people were attracted to the Hanford Site for 

this reason alone. Rates at the Hanford Site averaged $8 per day for 

unskilled laborers, where $3 to $4 per day was typical for laborers 

in other parts of the nation. Skilled labor, pipe fitters, and 

electricians earned $15 per day compared to the typical $10 per 

day elsewhere.

2 -1 2 .3
Chapter 2 - Plutonium Production Facilities

Another strategy for dealing with the labor 

shortage was to increase the work week. 

Ten-hour days were the norm, and employees 

worked 5-1/2 to 6 days per week. A delicate 

balance existed between the pain of long hours 

and the reward of large paychecks enhanced by 

overtime pay (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 19). 

Many also worked Sundays.

"We worked enough people overtime on

Sunday so that what the rest o f them had to

do on Monday got o ff to a good start. They

used the day o ff to catch up on a lo t o f little

things that w ould be in the way next week.

They were buying time. The Arm y said,

'D on't hesitate to use money to buy time.

Every day may be s ig n ific a n t.-

Walter O. Simon, a chemist and Hanford's 

first operations manager with Du Pont, 

quoted in Thayer 1996, p. 93

rx .im p lc o f A dvertisem ent fo r (.o n s lru c lio n W orkers

(Van Arsdol 1992, p. ] 8)

War Workers Needed on 

Southeastern Washington 

Cons!ruction Project

Transportation Advanced 

Attractive Scale of Wages

• 54-59 Hours Per Week

* Immediate Living Facilities for Employed Persons O nly

• Applicants Must Possess Statement o f Availability

* Company Representative Interviewing Applicants 

8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

U.S. Employment Service W ar Manpower Commission 

Portland, Oregon

Once Du Pont obtained the workers to build the

Hanford Site, retaining them became the challenge. Thayer (1996, p. 93) reports a turnover rate of 4.2 hires for every 

1.0 worker, which was acknowledged as high. Thayer goes on to indicate the nature of work was such that the turnover 

rate did not impede progress as long as replacement workers were found. Because of persistent problems in recruiting 

and maintaining an adequate workforce, living conditions were made more tolerable w ith amenities, such as recreational 

facilities, churches, a gymnasium, and a library. In addition, workers were allowed to bring their wives and children. 

Four reasons commonly cited for the high turnover are isolation of the site, miserable living conditions, requirement to 

maintain secrecy, and the sense that the Hanford Site was not vital to the war effort.

We are all good American people

Who are trying to do our part

But to feel that you're blindly working

Will finally break anyone's heart.

” \ l /e x .ir/i.i/i.j, I i i . i i w orking .if ,i to m tc tv plant

m aking s 11.!},? m crk. that was good m nn v\ then

w in kin g .!>. .i ( om nittn I.th o rn . I w o rked there a

(tm p le o r vc a t•. and when I le if th e ie I h c .iu fa b o u t

th e io h in \ f r Me»U'r. O klahom a in about *4 .'. a

/M id / .i/i -tation . lh a t jo b kiiu la w ent r/o u /i. and wv

heard about fh i- jo b in W ashington *tale. I had an

» m /(• w ho im n e out here, and he w ro te bat k and

n iM f/ii’i was paxing a d o lla r a hoot. I -.it. 'W hat?

% ft bro th et -,ti '4 d o lla i an h o ur? ' I i.it to nn

b ro th er ')o u g o in g f VI» brother »./•. w orking on

the railnta d. H e '/ d o n't know I hem j o b s don't

/.M /mil*. I i,/i. 'M.m, I'm going, u n i do w hat »ou

want. I got enough nm ne\ I o t too to g o .' H e got

toe.eihei. m \ brolhei. Vani* tie >elf and anolhei ho \.

I l f <ame out to lla n io rd in the late sm nm ct or ‘4 J

l l r w ent to w ork on labor d m .' - W illiv Daniel*,

quoti'il in Nanqvr 11»*> >. |>. 114

There is something about really knowing

The thing that you're trying to do,

A sense of accomplishment maybe,

That warms one's heart through and through.

And that is the reason I'm leaving.

It's not that I hate the dust; .

Its not that my bunk mates snore too loud,

Or my lunches contain some crust.

It's just that I want to be doing

A thing I can see and know

Be it a ship or airplane or what not.

The thing is I just want to know.

- Lois May Lyon, head of employee placement at

the Hanford Site in 1944, quoted in Van Arsdol 1992, p. 19

2 -1 2 .4

1
Section 1 2 1 History of Workers at the Hanford Site

'H'c <li»In f l i \ to keep (in ’,m i'f r - j h . h . n r ,u < rp le d the idea oi

union H e d id not ha w* a p io jc t t r onhat t. H e

a^ie ed at the hi'a in n in ii w ith the lalun leaders in the rvg io i»th .il

in ' w o uld follow standanl union p r a ttu <•-. H v set the hasu r.ifc

,1/ >1 01, llw a\ (Vili'i1 V . iff/r» j/i/7 ^/juA.iric. //i.i/ u .i- /nr

t u/M/nnn /.i/)i>; / /<•< /ri< /.mi- <?ric/////it' idter<- ynf m o te ."-

.vt.illhi.i- quoin! in v.mgei I'M)-;, p. 7<i

Labor shortages prompted the recruitment of 

union workers. Using the war as justification, the 

Corps called on unions to accept responsibility 

for providing a quota of workers at the Hanford 

Site each month (Hales 1997, pp. 168-171).

Thus, organized labor was an important source of 

labor in building the Hanford Site, although, as 

Colonel Franklin T. Matthias (one of Lieutenant 

General Groves top assistants) recalled, no 

formal agreement was signed with any of the 

unions involved at the Hanford Site.

Union leaders, such as the Teamsters leader Dave Beck in Seattle, had trouble pressuring Hanford management on union 

issues because of the appeal from the Corps to support the war effort and the fact that the unions could not supply the 

numbers of skilled labor anyway because of labor shortages. Still, the fact that about one-quarter of Matthias'

construction journal entries were union related 

indicates that union matters required constant 

/ dealt w ith the unions, and D u Pont and I d id a xand jo h / | | i | | | | attention. Jurisdictional disputes between various

h a llim i problem s lu t k ,uid lo rlh and tonnism i> the laluu | | | | | | unions and between categories of jobs caused delays

Ivadet*. I d id that also w ith the i o lnnel in W ashington IK I .

w ho wa> head u i labor relations We kit ked p ioh len is hat k and

forth. I w o uld -at. tlh il hasiaid in Washine.lnn doesn't know

w hat he /- doini>. He w o uld do the same tiling, an ti hi,line me

to i a ll the problem s. It w orked y/v a t H'e kept k it km ii them

around u n til the\ disappeared."- M .ilthi.i- qiiolvri in v.m^ci

in construction schedules. The Building Trades 

Council of Pasco could not furnish enough workers, 

and shortages existed in some crafts while others 

had surpluses. Machinists were often asked to 

perform other duties such as m illwright work. This, 

of course, brought immediate protests that had to be 

resolved. In the summer of 1944, Matthias and 

Groves met with Martin Durkin, President of the 

United Association o f Steamfitters and Plumbers, to 

appeal to him on the grounds of "the country's most vital war project" and to issue instructions to release jurisdictional 

claims and help fill 1000 jobs (Goldberg 1998, pp. 59-60; Thayer 1996, pp. 89-93). When Harry Thayer asked Matthias 

how much time was lost in labor disputes, Matthias replied, "Very little" (Thayer 1996, p. 175).

The unions were strong in the 1940s, and many Hanford workers, especially skilled workers, were union members. Thus 

in training, skills, organization, and work habits, the Hanford Site was characteristic of the major large-scale engineering 

projects of the era. W ithout this experienced workforce, which existed nationwide, the project may never have been 

able to proceed as rapidly as it did.

Liv in g Co n d it io n s

When the Corps arrived to begin constructing the Hanford Site, little available housing existed in the general area for the 

workers needed to construct and operate the plant. The 800 or so residents of W hite Bluffs, Hanford, and the former 

Richland townsite also had to move and find new housing. The former and new residents found living quarters among 

the following options (Findlay and Hevly 1995, pp. 24-25):

• Construction workers, as many as 45,000, moved into the Hanford construction camp located where the town of 

Hanford had been, near the reactor construction areas. Workers initially lived in tents until the camp was 

constructed. At peak occupancy, it included 131 barracks for nearly 25,000 men, 64 barracks for 4,350 women, 

880 hutments for 10,000 men, and 3,600 trailer lots (see Figure 2-1.1 in the Construction History Section). In 

addition to housing, the workers had mess halls, recreational facilities, and various services. Segregated quarters 

existed for Americans of African descent.

2 -1 2 .5
g H ^ 5^ Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

• Key supervisors and essential office workers occupied much of the new government-owned village of Richland. 

The government constructed two-bedroom, single-story duplexes (for example, B house); three-bedroom, 

two-story houses (for example, F house) (see Figure 2-12.2); apartment buildings; prefabs; and dormitories for 

male (such as the K unit) and female (such as the J unit) workers. The commercial and residential buildings were 

all government-owned and maintained. O nly about twenty pre-1943 buildings were incorporated into the new 

design (Kubik 1994, pp. 33-47).

• Mechanics, common laborers, and their families tended to live in Pasco and Kennewick located to the south of 

the Hanford Site. Pasco would grow from 3,913 to 8,500 by the mid-1940s, Kennewick from 1,918 to 7,500, 

Richland from 0 to 7000 in March 1943 and 15,000 by 1945. African Americans were restricted to living in east 

Pasco. The few workers and their families'of Hispanic descent also lived in Pasco.

The construction crew worked long hours 6 days a week 

but still found time for recreation. Finding ways to keep 

the "troops" entertained was thought to be key to keeping 

them working at the Hanford Site. Dances, movies, and 

baseball games all became important, authorized

activities. Bars in the camp were w ell patronized, and 

unauthorized activities such as gambling and prostitution 

existed.

The presence o f a few thousand single women in a 

construction camp of over 40,000 men, mostly single, 

presented its own problems. The women's barracks had 

housemothers and were fenced and patrolled for security F ig u r e 2- 12.2. Two Styles o f Housing Built in Richland, 

and protection. Groves noted the women in the Hanford , Washington during the 1940s for Workers at the Hanford

construction camp suffered from their own morale Site

problems, as any group would "in an isolated area under

rugged conditions, with few of the amenities of normal life" (Groves 1983, p. 90). Groves cites Mrs. Maris, Supervisor of 

Women's Activities, as doing an excellent job of helping the women cope. She in turn credited Du Pont administrators at 

the Hanford Site with helping her do what was necessary to keep living conditions bearable for the women (Groves 

1983, p. 91). To recruit and retain workers, Hanford Site officials allowed married men to bring their wives and children 

with them. Measures taken to improve life for female workers and female fam ily members at the Hanford Site included 

development of a nursery and community center, schools, formation o f local Red Cross and Girl Scout organizations, 

introduction of a women's apparel store, initiation of 5:00 p.m. bus service to Pasco, and arrangements for women to 

attend dances with the Navy A ir Force contingent in Pasco.

More than one story exists about the adverse living conditions created by the large construction project. Winds were 

especially notable, made worse by the loose sand so prevalent in the area that led to horrific sandstorms. A local 

historian noted: "Residents nicknamed the winds 'termination winds.' The morning after a storm of high winds and 

blowing dust, there would be a long line of workers at the employment office seeking to draw their termination pay and

leave the area" (Kubik 1994, p. 44).

The sheer isolation of the project was also untenable to many. The adverse living conditions, housing shortages, and 

general lack of amenities resulted in the substantial turnover rate.

Se c r e c y a n d Se c u r it y

Few of the construction workers at the Hanford Site knew they were building a plant to produce materials for a new type 

of weapon. They were told that the work was related to the war effort but were required to avoid any discussions about 

their work. This prohibition applied to discussion with co-workers as well as fam ily members. Many stories abounded 

about what was being manufactured at the Hanford Site. Some of these included Eisenhower re-election buttons,

’sdwC | teroMKB

2 -1 2 .6
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t t h e Ha n f o r d Su e

explosives, and mining rare ore. Stories abound about workers who talked about their work being discharged 

immediately. Much speculation existed about the nature of work going on at the Hanford Site. Even after production 

began, only a few actually knew before the official announcement was made.

No incidents of espionage are known to have occurred at the Hanford Site during World War II, although records from 

those conducting investigations have not been released. Richard Rhodes (1995, pp. 38-39) indicates that the design of 

the first Soviet nuclear reactor matched the test reactor built at the Hanford Site in 1944, suggesting that some Soviet 

espionage was successful.

Perhaps the biggest challenge for security forces at the Hanford Site during construction was controlling the rowdy 

construction crews. Incidences recorded during peak construction are summarized in Table 2-8.1 in Section 8, the Site 

Security Section.

He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

Initial health and safety issues were construction related. The Hanford Site was a massive construction project involving 

many workers under a lot of pressure to keep to the schedule. However, the work was generally typical of large 

construction projects at the time. Engineering projects of this nature had begun in the 1930s with such undertakings as 

Grand Coulee Dam. Thus, a trained work force did exist. Thayer (1996, p. 93) reports a rate of 206,000 worker hours 

per major injury, which was about 2.5 times safer than for the general construction industry at the time.

Ur g e n c y a n d Co m m it m e n t

Although most construction workers did not realize the Hanford Site would produce materials for the atomic bomb, they 

did at least know their work was related to the war effort. Construction workers were regularly reminded of the urgency 

of their work and told every day it could spell the difference between victory and defeat.

"The pipe tille rs m n e s it m il lo t on houi ,nu l ,i /i.i/r o n e Munr/,11 m o t n i i e I took the - / . w in the rei reo lin n buildinn il

h e ld .? thousond people - .in d thev h .id Inud-piw ker- to t,ilk to thcn>-.ehes. \p p o ie n th the\ hod o dole \\i1h o union $ji#v -

.in o h iti.d -to he Ihete to help iheni. the re iv .i- one nu\ on the +Utie Iho l I knew - ,i vounn fellow th .il vt.i« ,i pipe filte i.

.n it/1 -oUt. ii w m e .1 (,/i.int v .if ihv nu'i n ip /m n c .' \n d lie '..i/if ( ..n>rj, f/iv - i y tiv - M irr 11m / M im rfh ii)!*.'

Si> / ".in 1 them 0 little t.dk .1 nd I s,iid )m i know to o j>ins ore hrcokint> \ n it r prom ise. \n u r union ourved th.it w e 'd hove

no siiikes Nun tor m ore im p o rlo n t Ih.ut thol. win ,7/r- hovinii 0 sit ike ond n o t w ot kina on ,1 p to je i I ih o i is or tremendous

im p o rt o n te to th e < iw n /n . V m I Ihoutiht \o u opptecioled Ihoi. h u t oppotenlh there .ue some 01 \o u Iho l ote m in im i

this strike, ond the\ re w o ikin a foi the (iem i.ins. ond it I knew w ho it it.is ih o l u.is fom entirni this thinii, I'd o n on iie lo

hove them »rn l h o ik to (.v rn io tn . where the\ lie h n ti ..'

It the 1 d hod liuns fhev w in tld h o w shot m e ' \n d o itc i I tint them 'lu te le d dow n I soid ’lo o k , toko it t\M . I'm not < oiling

u n i lio ilo rs . hut some tu wm .ire ,it fill" like il \«m how ohout i>oins» h.u k U> w o ik ond th in e w h o l vou pim nised. ond

w ho! m i* nri'd li.iilh . I 'll hove the huses o l the do or in ten minutes. ’ .\nd then the\ t heered ond tho l 11.is the end o f it.

rhev o il w ent /nitA to w o ik. ond th e ir union leoders lo rn e ,i- Ihev iv rrr rushinfi out ih e doors, ond thcv w o uld n't yn hoi k

in to listen lo them. •\n d I soid. '/ II <et up .1 deol. ond w e 'll distu-s o il these problem s w#u hove o nd w e 'll do som ething

ohout it...." - M .ilthi.i1* t|iml«'tl in Ih.ivfi pp. I — 1 “i»

Other reminders came in the form of billboards, pamphlets, speeches, and cartoons (see Figure 2-12.3). Such reminders 

did not mean the workers were not committed to the war effort. Hanford workers and their families purchased U.S. 

savings bonds and made financial sacrifices as was common throughout the country. An example of the level of 

commitment is the "Days Pay" story (see sidebar box and Figure 2-12.4).

2 - 1 2 .7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Major IKinl'ortl L\ent: D.ivs l\i\

f

i

in ih .itiw iHHt

in *>f‘i l’m 

\ ir c m /)•. 

linom [• r

>) n irn in r,

I o n v. \ I 

ii. i- b\

x f.i/i h

M irht'nt i*

01 h ii\ inti

it o rk m rn

(tt.V'hm H ii* the n u itt c n v ilix e dnnlo m o n th im ild v r (hinni* the

ja b .m il tiu l nun h h i c /ri <•/«/> .m .illilu d v o t ic.um xo ik .liu l t illin '

Figure 2-12.3. Examples o f Motivational and , , . ,. _. ,„ ,„ .,., ° , r , i , f» w lp the u . ir than .»iv iijm «i n iin i* - lh .m ‘r I'W ii, p. <)<>

Security Signs at the Hanford Site during the i

OPPORTUNmES FOR FEMALES AND MINORITIES

As was common during World War II, women and minorities 

helped solve labor shortages in almost all job categories. The 

wartime draft exaggerated this condition as it took a 

disproportionate number of white male workers, leaving the 

civilian workplace increasingly female and "colored" (Hales 1997, 

p. 191). At the Hanford Site, only whites and African Americans 

were actively recruited. Hispanic Americans were discouraged, 

even as labor shortages were in dire straits, because it would 

require building a third segregation of camp facilities.

In general, work at the Hanford Site conformed to gender and 

ethnic social and occupational stratification of the 1940s. Women 

and minorities were hired to do work deemed too menial and 

undignified for white men (Hales 1997, p. 219). The major job 

categories noted for women were nurses, file clerks, stenographers, 

secretaries, and other service and administrative roles. They also 

filled some of the more technical and scientific roles where not 

enough men were available. In the mess hall at the Hanford 

construction camp, white women served the food while African American women cleaned up afterwards. African 

Americans comprised the major minority group, generally holding laborer and other unskilled positions.

ii

Figure 2-12.4. Ceremony at the Hanford Site

Celebrating the Arrival o f Day's Pay

W hile state law did not mandate absolute racial segregation, as at the Oak Ridge Reservation and other installations, 

managers at the Hanford Site opted to segregate and prevent any possible racial problems. Living quarters such as the 

Hanford construction camp, trailer camp, and barracks were all segregated by sex and race. Additionally, mess halls and 

taverns were segregated by race (Sanger 1995, pp. 68-69). According to Sanger (1995, p. 68), of those living at the 

Hanford Site in 1944, 65% were white men, 25% were white women, 9% were "colored" men, and 1 % were "colored"

women.

2 -1 2 .8
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t t h e Ha n fo r d Sit e

Scholars have written little about the role of women at the Hanford Site, and even less about minorities, male or female. 

The noted exception is Their Day in the Sun: Women o f the Manhattan Project (Howes and Herzenberg 1999), which 

documents the experiences, accomplishments, and contributions of women. One of the most well known female 

physicists of the Manhattan Project, Leona Woods Marshall, worked at the Hanford Site assisting her husband, John 

Marshall, also a physicist, in overseeing the operation and construction of the plutonium production reactors. Jane Hall, 

also a physicist, worked on health physics and the development of radiation detection instrumentation (Howes and 

Herzenberg 1999, p. 129). In January 1945, Hanford's Laboratory Division began recruiting women, primarily from the 

local area, to fill technician positions in the chemical-analysis laboratories. Women like Marge Nordman DeGooyer 

came to the Hanford Site as news of jobs with good wages spread around the country. They were required to be between 

the ages of twenty-one and forty, have high school educations, pleasing personalities, and be alert and intelligent. After 

brief instruction on security and safety, they were given aptitude tests and received the essential training to complete their 

work.

Other women who worked at the Hanford Site included members of the Women's Army Corps (WACs). The WACs were 

assigned to work at all three of the Manhattan Project sites between 1943-1945. The Hanford Site had a small group of 

WACS, from sixteen to twenty-four, all assigned to production work. Buena Maris was personally recruited by Groves 

from her position as Dean of Women at Oregon State College in September 1943. Maris was made Supervisor of 

Women's activities and was the only woman who attended weekly senior staff meetings. Her primary mission was to 

deal with problems that led to high female turnover fates. Maris hired housemothers for each women's barracks, 

organized a library and G irl Scout Troop, started a Red Cross chapter, supported beauty contests and shopping trips, and 

even managed to get gravel walkways replaced with asphalt. The Girl Scout troop and library she founded are still in 

operation today (Gerber 1993d, Howes and Herzenberg 1999).

W o r k e r s W h o O p e r a t e d a n d E x p a n d e d t h e H a n f o r d

S ite : 1 9 4 4 -1 9 5 7

This section explores the lives of Hanford workers once the production complex started operating. The section is divided 

into three parts:

• World War II Operations

• Post World War II Operations

• Living Conditions.

Wo r ld Wa r I I Op e r a t io n s

As construction of the production facilities neared completion, it was time to transition the workforce to operations.

Many of the construction crew moved on to new construction projects, but some stayed to fill the multitude of jobs 

required to run the Hanford Site. No nuclear industry existed at this time from which to draw workers. As a result,

Du Pont had to find experienced chemists, metallurgists, electrical and mechanical engineers. In February 1943,

Du Pont planned for an operating force of 4000. Based on this estimate, 507 were to be above the rank of foreman, and 

116 were ranked as supervisors or above (Pehrson 1943, p. 5).

One strategy Du Pont used to obtain the operations staff was to transfer them from other Du Pont facilities. Findlay and 

Hevly (1995, pp. 41 -42) report that Du Pont moved 1532 employees to the Hanford Site between February 1944 and 

January 1945. Many of these individuals had worked at Du Pont ordnance plants in Colorado, Illinois, Tennessee, and 

Utah. Most were white, 30-40 years old, and generally had a science and engineering background.

To prepare for operations, workers went through a rigorous training program. Reactor control operators traveled to the 

Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee to train on the air-cooled prototype reactor that was operating and producing small 

quantities of plutonium. Other training, such as for crane operators in the separations plants, occurred onsite.

2 -1 2 .9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

In many respects, operating the Hanford Site was similar to operating other industrial plants, such as chemical and water 

plants, so little training was needed for many jobs. The major differences, according to Raymond Genereaux (design 

project manager for the chemical separations plants at the Hanford Site) were radiation and critical mass (Sanger 1995, 

pp. 58-65). Radiation meant protecting workers in ways industry had not done previously. Workers often had to perform 

work remotely using periscopes, through leaded glass or using sound only. Critical mass also required workers to design 

instrumentation and equipment that was smaller and had minute margins of error.

Health and Safety

Because operations at 

the Hanford Site posed 

the same type of health 

and safety risk as 

operating any 

industrial plant, the 

same type of health 

and safety measures 

were implemented. In 

addition, measures to 

protect against 

radiation were also 

required. This was 

accomplished w ith a 

variety of shielding 

materials, lim iting time 

of exposure, and 

increasing distance.

"...g u w iv t in i.irc n c -s ot H .in fn n l^ m k -io n n ib jtf h .n e t lr iir n l.ilm i .im .ii n u m Ih r siw In

trw .tlin n the risk* .i-m m /.ile d w ith filtih m m m p rtnh u tinn jlic u te n .m li ( .r n r r .il ( ,im r s

gcner.tlh It-.itrci h 'tlin u the \w>//.«■/ *■ Ir,u n lo o nun h .ihout the im i-i'M r d.ini'iv-. ^ u n in m d iii'i

H .m ronl. V the tim e to r \t.n tin g up the fir*.t w .u to i^ nc.ited. I h i I'n n t e w tittn e * in

W ilm ington o id v ie il th e ir manager'. .if H anford lit p r.H tit e ./ i um pleto rv ,i. n, it ion ot the ItUI

nnd 200 tit lm*> >i" it e ll .ft the i o n ^ triii tio n i amp. ( ,r n \in ,m d \ 1,i/thi.r- re iu^iul to allow tin. h >i 

p n lv n lia lh alarm ing d rill and p e rm itte d instead only ,i lim ite d c \a i notion n i the 100 li ,m d

100 D .)/(Ms. In h k di.n i M alth ia t e \p la in v d f/i.if .1 u h n lv -.ile ill ill ‘m ight he i/in i-frm /s* to the

p io te t I .I*- il m ight t.m -e a /.irejf- nu niher o f people to le a \e it then le .n - fo r n h V /i mere

i/ it re ^ e d . It w o u ld -if-.fi he •.u fiid e n th upsetting su th .it lie < nu ld e x p e if a tenous ehet t hoth

on wH u ril\ .m il ni.m pow ei f.u ilitie - lo finish the jn h . ' \e lo in g D u l* o n t\ request, the .V im 

determ ined lh .it fo r the ike o f e tfid e n c \ .m il set le t v «n n stiut tio n w o ikets ouuhl not to

le.irn .ib o u l .ill o f Hanford's wis.ui* n orking ton ditio ns. fL ie u te n .in i' h e n e t.il C n n c- and

( olo n vl d .tllh i.is , p io te t tin y 'the l*e>1 interest- ot the I m tv d H ik * * ,’ w o uld t.ike no steps to

•ile rt employees to the n t.iin risks the\ fa te d h \ w orking at H a n to td ." - N n ill.n .m il I Icvlx

shielding rf|iii\.iU>nts I sod al the H.inloid Sik*

(Sanger 1995, p. 62)

One fcxrt of lead equaled:

* One yard of steel

* One fathom of concrete (6 feet)

• One rod of earth ( 16.5 ft)

• One m ile of air

Dosimeters and clothing provided other protective measures 

for the workers. The health and safety risk posed to 

workers, especially during start-up, were apparently 

understood by those in charge.

The radiation in the separations plants created a logistical 

problem for workers, especially those working w ith the large 

cranes. Raymond Genereaux explained what it was like 

training crane operators to use a periscope so they could see 

® behind the 5-foot wall of concrete:

"O h, they thought that [using the periscope] would be terrible. The first thing you know they were getting the

biggest kick out o f looking through the periscope> with this great big hook going down and hooking on to a

wheelbarrow o f something down there in the cell area, picking it up and gently putting it down. They had a

ball. They were fantastic. The crane operators learned in ten hours or so. Once they got onto the idea, they

could do it. They were like kids." - Sanger 1995, p. 63

Genereaux also provides insight into how radiation concerns affected the separations plants:

"W e installed the equipment remotely even at first when there was no radiation, because we didn't want

workmen in the cells. That would violate the whole principle. You would eventually have to replace equipment

and you could not put anybody in the cells then. So you had to know how to do it ahead o f time. Sometimes

during construction, somebody would want to do things faster and not use the mockup building. We had some

battles and we had fun, but we were all friends." - Sanger 1995, pp. 63-64

2 -1 2 .1 0
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

The critical mass issue concerned making sure that the quantities of fissile material being stored were below the amount 

required to sustain a chain reaction. As plutonium began to be produced, separated, and concentrated, it became 

important to ensure that storage of the material was always below critical mass. Both radiation and critical mass 

concerns became major drivers for procedures that Hanford workers had to follow.

Technical Dilemmas

The Hanford Site entered the startup phase in spring 1944, beginning with the fuel manufacturing operation, followed by 

the B Reactor, and then the separations plants. The fuel manufacturing process provided the biggest technical dilemma 

for the workers. Walter Simon explains:

"Now, one o f the most difficult problems we had before plutonium production began was making the uranium

slugs [fuel elementsJ. The uranium was held in an aluminum can, a slug, about eight inches long and an inch

and five-eighths in diameter. The can had to fit very tightly with no air space or bubbles. They couldn't leak

because if water got into the uranium it destroyed the ability to react. So the concept was that the scientific

people would find out how to do this and give us instruction. They found out how to design it but they never 

made a slug in the laboratory that didn't leak.

Well, the summer o f '44 was coming along and the reactor was shaping up and there would be nothing to put

into it. We had a production superintendent at Hanford named Earl Swensson, who was a real dyed-in-the-wool

production man. This was a case where one man did sell an idea. He said you know they'll never make one o f

these in the lab, even if they work on it for 10 years. It's a statistical matter. Why don't we make a thousand a

day, w e'll examine each one and test them all, and the poor ones w e'll strip the aluminum can o ff and save the

uranium and the next day w e'll make another thousand. The first day a thousand failed, but there were maybe

10 better than the others and we tried to figure out why these 10 were better. The next day maybe they had 18

that were better. A nd they kept doing this and lo and behold after about three weeks there was one perfect

can.... They made five good ones the next day, and 7 0 the next and after a while out o f a thousand they were

making 500 and then 600 a day that were all right. That's how they did it. It was a little terrifying because if we

didn't have them it would stop the whole thing. The reactor would be ready on September 7 5 and we would

have nothing to put into it." - Walter O. Simon quoted in Sanger 1995, p. 154

Whereas the fuel manufacturing process provided the biggest technical challenge to the workers, the B Reactor startup 

presented the most dramatic. The B Reactor startup problem has been retold many times (for details see Section 3, 

Reactor Operations) and is a testimony to the value of Du Font's practical abilities and the physicists' knowledge.

The separations plants startup proceeded without any major problems. That is especially impressive given that scientists 

and engineers moved from producing micrograms of plutonium in a laboratory setting to kilograms in separations plants, 

which represented a billion-fold scale-up (Gosling 1994, p. 27).

Secrecy and Security

To those in the know, the startup phase for the plant and subsequent operations must have been engrossing, considering 

that ft affected the immediate race for the bomb and the long-term race for the scientific frontier. But few people knew 

much about these aspects of the job. Even those who knew about the mission knew little more than what their particular 

jobs entailed. By limiting knowledge, any one person could not reveal too much information to the enemy. Groves' 

philosophy toward communication was termed "compartmentalization," which meant "each man should know 

everything he needed to know to do his job and nothing else" (Groves 1983, p. 140).

In addition to internal security, external security was also a prime concern. External threats were primarily related to 

espionage and generally managed by Hanford security and undercover agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Checkpoints placed at strategic locations prevented anyone from getting onsite without proper identification (see 

Figure 2-12.5).

2-1 2 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

One external threat was the launching of Japanese balloon 

bombs. Following a United States raid on Tokyo after the 

Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the Japanese produced about 

nine thousand rice paper balloon bombs. Easterly winds carried 

them to the North American mainland, including some in the 

Hanford area. One of the balloons tangled in a power line that 

stretched between Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams resulting 

in a power outage at the Hanford Site. Although the power 

outage was shorter than a minute, it took 3 days to restore the 

reactors to full power (Jones 1985, Sanger 1995). For more 

information, see also McDowell (1993) and the Tri-City Herald

(1995).

The Japanese balloon bombs "were a real worry. Everybody

at the plant was always looking up because o f the statistical

chance o f one falling. I remember seeing 40 at one time

going over. The Navy planes at Pasco chased them regularly

but they had poor luck. Matthias and I went over to prod .........................................

them about getting better protection. They never managed Figure 2-12.5. Female Workers Proceeding through

tO}shoot one down, although a number came down on the Security Gates after Showing Badge> 1944-1945

project, but away from buildings. The bombs never went

o ff/b u t the balloons blew around and the m ilitary were a great sight trying to round these up without being

blown up themselves." - Walter O. Simon quoted in Sanger 1995, p. 155

When operations commenced, the push was on to 

produce as much plutonium as soon as possible. Small 

amounts were sent regularly to Los Alamos, initially to 

support research and then to make three bombs: the first 

for the Trinity test explosion at Alamogordo, New 

Mexico, the second for Nagasaki, and the third to be 

available if needed.

World War II ended on August 14, 1945. O nly 8 days 

prior w ith the bombing o f Hiroshima, the secret of 

Hanford's wartime mission was revealed to the workers 

and the rest of the w orld (see Figure 2-12.6). At last 

Hanford workers and their families learned how they had 

been instrumental in helping to w in the war. After the 

end of W orld War II, the full impact of atomic weaponry 

started to be realized by some at the Hanford Site just as 

it did around the world.

Po st W o r ld Wa r I I Op e r a t io n s

With the secret out and the war over, a brief period of 

uncertainty ensued. Would the Hanford Site close?

Would it be time to move on? Production continued. 

Plutonium separations activities increased, in fact, to maintain a nuclear stockpile, but the number of contractor staff 

dropped to 5,000 by the end of 1945, and the work week was reduced from 48 hours to 40 hours (Findlay and Hevly 

1995, p. 55). However by 1946, the situation became clear. America had a new opponent, the Soviet Union, and 

needed nuclear weapons to maintain its superiority. Over the next 9 years (1947-1955), five more reactors and three

" I co u ld n 't deep / lax w atchim ; the sAv l i i o n h e jile r the

rn c/ >ifiil /i/Y/s i i/m /ii” in to »few. I thought o r the

thousand* a n ti tho u-aiub and ih uu -.m d - o f \ eats in w hich

m vn /i»iw* In ed h j h iie rh and Inn. r -tm ii'J rd tnele-dx

tit i onquor the elem ent- and their «•<•< te l- a n d how m ell

the set re t- /m i e h o rn kept I thought or the i hwe rat e

hetw n -u< < c i i and failure on this d m o \ e n . \n d I

L u uh hi't help h u t heht n e that <*o d w e a n inn o t this Iona

and In rltin u - h.m , had frnallx. re ltu tan th \7 U 7 i u- th ite rrib le weapon w ith m/mi h lo end it. .

I w i-h uo co u ld keep this i/i-u n o n heie. Hut to

\\h o n ie \e i it i- entrusted /*• entrusted the tu lu re oi the

w ot Id. I hope that the keepei* o t the - e a r l w ill u«e il on l\

tot the aood f>t in an kirul and n e w i lo t \a in ot w liid i

putpO '.e' eithei tor t/ivm -c/vs <>/ the people the v

represent ' - ltv\a l?.iinnt‘«irlvn M .illhias Ihc wife oi

Colonel Mdllhi.i<< quolcd h i \ . i i i \i»<lnl |)|> ~~-7h
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t th e Ha n f o r d Sit e

e V i l l a g e r i b o s a

IT S AT

Surprises Everyone Here

ftffiw wn A-lc 

M W fcew ieaiiO f 

{to& ict M aniacs rt5 Hoe

new chemical separations facilities would be built at the Hanford 

Site requiring many additional workers (see Figure 2-12.7). An 

indicator of the number and type of scientists and engineers 

working at the Hanford Site during the post-war period is shown 

in Table 2-12.1.

Table 2-12.1. Number and Type o f Scientists and

Engineers in 1947

Chemical Engineers 104 Civil Engineers 36

Chemists 91 Physicists 28

Mechanical Engineers 65 Metallurgists 9

Electrical Engineers 52

The life of the worker following World War II was affected by a

• Shift in organizational culture

• Change in nature of the war being fought and quantity of 

plutonium needed

• Addition of onsite research and development expertise

• Increase in power of organized labor

• Awareness of health and safety

• Community alignment with the atomic mission

Shift in Organizational Culture

Major changes occurred on two organizational fronts following 

the war. First was the transition from military control to public 

control. On August 1, 1946, President Truman signed the Atomic 

Energy Act, which placed the control of nuclear weapons and 

technology under the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. On 

January 1, 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission took over 

control of the Hanford Site from the Corps. The shift from a 

military to a civilian organization changed the way decisions were 

made at the Hanford Site and the way site contractors were 

managed. Instead of Groves and his staff, a commission of five 

people appointed by the President ran the Atomic Energy 

Commission and made the major decisions affecting the Hanford 

Site. Four committees were established. The General Advisory 

Committee was composed of nine scientists who advised the 

Atomic Energy Commission on scientific and technical matters. 

Recognizing the need for a separate division and special advisory 

committee for the life sciences, the Advisory Committee for 

Biology and Medicine was formed. The M ilitary Liaison Committee provided expertise in military-related matters. The 

Atomic Energy Commission also established the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety to provide recommendations 

related to reactor safety. To maintain congressional oversight of the Atomic Energy Commission, Congress established the 

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The second major change was the change in site contractors. On September 1, 1946, General Electric Company took 

over management of the Hanford Site from Du Pont. This was significant because, as Carlisle and Zenzen (1996) point 

out, these two companies had drastically different corporate cultures and approaches to project management. For the

sractil~ t»d e> s«h6 Vdm Sews «etw> £-*8*6 emti# «<net

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Figure 2-12.6. News Article Telling Workers at

the Hanford Site What They Had Been

Producing

25000

20000

15000

10000

1943 18<M194S 1846194719481849 1950195119521953 195419551956195719S81956

Figure 2-12.7. Employment at the Hanford Site, 

1943-1959

2 -1 2 .1 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

next 10 years, General Electric maintained the organization Du Pont had established. On September 1, 1956,

-General Electric reorganized. Instead of the Manufacturing Department controlling all production activities (production 

of fuel elements, production of plutonium, etc.) and the Engineering Department controlling all research, development, 

and architectural services, the Hanford Site was reorganized according to steps in the plutonium production process:

• Fuels Preparation Department responsible for manufacturing the fuel elements

• Irradiations Processing Department responsible for irradiating the fuel

• Chemical Processing Department responsible for separating out the plutonium

• Hanford Laboratories Operations responsible for helping the operations departments solve technical problems as 

well as managing the Biology and Medicine program, plutonium recycling program, and miscellaneous minor 

research and development programs

• Relations and Utilities Operations responsible for general services such as patrol of the Hanford Site, operation 

of the Hanford community, electrical, telephone, transportation, and other services not economical to 

decentralize

• Construction Engineering Operations responsible for construction activities

The number of individuals working for the government, Du Pont, General Electric, and construction firms between 1943 

and 1957 is presented in Table 2-12.2. The totals are different from those shown in Figure 2-12.7 because the two data 

sets do not account for the same groups of employees.

Table 2-12.2. Hanford Site Personnel, 1943-1957

Government Admin Operations Construction Contractors

Date

Corps/

AEC Military Total Production R&D

Arch. Eng.

Mgb Ser.

Community

(Inc. Hosp.) Total

Major

Sub-Cont. Other Total

1943 07-03 143 143 4,271 1,840 6,111

[ 09-30 247 247 9,648 4,181 13,829

12-27 254 254 i21,517 8,942 30,459

1944 03-11 280 280 25,778 11,086 36,864

06-29 310 310 1,384 30,413 12,606 43,019

09-28 325 175 500 3,983 21,253 10,702 31,955

12-31 291 175. 466 5,289 10,958 5,248 16,206

1945 03-31 276 224 500 6,099 334 0 334

06-30 247 268 515 5,476 29 0 • 29

09-30 224 225 449 4,662 0 79 79

12-31 231 243 474 4,659 0 92 92

1946 03-31 232 316 548 4,662 0 403 403

06-30 274 259 533 4,303 0 260 260

' 09-30 300 290 590 3,317 23 850 4,190 0 335 335

12-31 332 270 602 4,479 0 141 141

1947 03-31 295 262 557 4,821 0 215 215

06-30 247 12 259 5,295 0 302-n 302

09-30 254 3 257 6,347 1,305 857 2,162

12-31 309 1 310 5,708 71 520 1,050 7,349 5,538 2,368 7,906

1948 06-30 345 345 8,658 9,704 6,495 16,199

12-31 343 343 5,775 299 1,438 1,115 8,627 8,397 6,274 14,671

1949 06-30 330 330 '7,403 2,705 2,565 5,270

12-31 338 338 5,486 396 635 884 7,401 792' 994 1,786

1950 06-30 347 347 7,758 3,080 1,563 4,643

12-31 341 341 5,809 451 804 822 7,886 3,953 1,855 5,808

2 -1 2 .1 4
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t th e Ha n f o r d Sit e

Government Admin Operations Construction Contractors

Corps/ Arch. Eng. Community Major

Date AEC Military Total Production R&D M gt Sen (Inc. Hosp.) Total Sub-Cont. Other Total

1951 06-30 346 346 8,650 4,145 2,635 6,780

12-31 358 358 6,677 • 675 1,055 700 9,107 5,391 1,916 7,307

1952 03-31 437 437 8,910 4,578 2,228 6,806

06-30 452 452 8,907 3,286 1,983 5,269

09-30 444 444 8,795 2,524 1,647 4,171

12-31 455 455 6,695 682 780 641 8,798 3,369 1,029 4,397

1953 03-31 449 449 6,507 759 812 630 8,708 4,686 1,297 5,983

06-30 462 462 6,455 760 844 631 8,690 6,536 942 7,478

09-30 453 453 6,325 723 890 607 8,545 7,158 1,338 8,496

12-31 444 444 6,353 680 882 611 8,526 7,705 1,238 8,943

1954 03-31 414 414 6,389 731 870 605 8,595 8,296 1,889 10,185

06-30 397 397 6,506 721 851 613 8,691 7,974 2,005 9,979

09-30 380 380 6,592 742 762 629 8,725 7,865 624 8,489

12-31 362 362 6,838 679. 762 614 8,893 5,417 937 6,354

1955 03-31 346 346 7,225 631 633 612 9,101 1,945 480 2,425

06-30 336 336 7,456 648 611 604 9,319 1,226 184 1,410

09-30 324 324 7,461 684 534 585 9,264 1,376

12-31 320 320 7,624 680 521 584 9,409 1,207

1956 03-31 318 318 7,682 638 499 573 9,392 337

06-30 304 304 7,707 680 484 547 9,418 909

09-30 297 297 7,526 767 49;8 393 9,184 1,568

12-31 295 295 7,468 749 625 361 9,203 1,428

1957 03-31 294 294 7,401 744 591 348 9,084 1,344

06-30 289 289 7,355 755 582 351 9,043 963

Change in Nature of the War Being Fought and Quality of Plutonium

During W orld War I I, Hanford workers knew that whatever it was they were doing they needed to accomplish it as fast as 

possible to win the war. The Government's announcement on August 12, 1945, was the first time the majority of workers 

knew what they were making at the Hanford Site. W hile the compartmentalization concept was still in place limiting 

workers' holistic understanding, at least they now knew what they were making.

Along with this change in understanding came a change in enemy and nature of the battle. Replacing the fascist regimes 

of Germany and Japan almost immediately was the Soviet Union, Stalin, and the threat o f communism; The nature o f the 

battle went from open warfare to a cold war in which the concept of the nuclear stockpile appeared. It was no longer a 

race for the bomb. Instead, it was a race to possess the most bombs. During the early years, the United States was in a 

comfortable position of strength as the only country to possess an atomic bomb. That changed on September 23, 1949, 

when President Truman announced theSoviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb during the previous month.

The fear of communism and gradual decay in Soviet Union and U.S. relations led to expansion at the Hanford Site for the 

next decade. W hile the urgency to produce may have been less than during World War II, an air of urgency still 

remained. The military established production goals, and the Atomic Energy Commission pressured contractors to meet 

these goals. Anything that might cause the goals to be missed was cause for concern. The production mentality 

intensified during this period and lasted throughout the Cold War.

The Soviet threat affected Hanford workers in various other ways as well. As the Soviet threat materialized, emphasis on 

security re-emerged. Espionage and anti-communism slogans became prominent. Cartoons and signs regularly 

reminded staff to keep their lips sealed about their work. The threat of enemy attack also became a greater possibility

2 -1 2 .1 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

than it was during World War II with the nuclear arms race necessitating anti-aircraft artillery sites to be established 

surrounding the Hanford Site. These were later replaced by Nike missile bases.

Addition of Onsite Research and Development Expertise

Various departments at the Hanford Site developed research capability soon after operations began to encounter 

problems such as graphite expansion and fuel ruptures. The desire for greater efficiency and safer operations stimulated 

other research efforts.

One major area of research concerned health effects from radiation. Even before construction of the Hanford Site was 

complete, research on the impact of reactor effluents on fish was sponsored at the University of Washington Applied 

Fisheries Laboratory (Becker 1990). By 1945, this research was conducted at the Hanford Site, which was the anchor for 

what was to become one of the major radiobiological research centers in the nation (Stannard 1988). The fisheries work 

quickly expanded into research on plants and animals (for more information, see Section 7, Research and Development). 

President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative in 1954 brought additional research projects because the Hanford Site 

was one of the few centers of nuclear expertise in the country if not the world.

By the mid-1950s, research and development at the Hanford Site had grown to the extent that it made sense to unite the 

researchers under one umbrella. When General Electric reorganized in 1956, it created the Hanford Laboratories under 

the direction of Herbert M. Parker. Parker was Hanford's chief health physicist and supervised the Health Instruments 

Section during the Manhattan Project. By 1958, 1200 staff were working at the Hanford Laboratories, most of whom 

were assigned to the following departments:

• Reactor Fuels Research and Development - 257

• Chemical Research and Development Operation - 221

• Laboratory Auxiliaries Operation - 220

• Radiation Protection Operation - 159

• Biology Operation - 77

Working in a research and development 

environment was significantly different from 

working in an operations environment. In the 

latter, work life could be relatively mundane except 

when breakdowns and malfunctions required r

attention. Research staff were generally of a 

different type, often possessing advanced degrees 

and an academic as opposed to an applied science 

orientation. Parker had cited in 1948 a report from 

an Atom ic Energy Commission board that identified 

the problems of attracting godd researchers to an 

operating site such as the Hanford Site.

The experience gained by building, operating, and 

refining nuclear production facilities made the 

Hanford Site one of the few centers for nuclear expertise in the country. The emerging leaders in the nuclear technology 

field were General Electric (the prime contractor at the Hanford Site), Combustion Engineering, and Westinghouse. As 

these and other companies gained experience in this emerging field and explored the idea of industrial applications, 

Hanford staff became recognized for their expertise. When President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative appeared 

in 1954, new opportunities for Hanford staff developed as they reached outside the Hanford Site to share information 

with their counterparts. This trend created a new breed of Hanford worker, one more dedicated to the nuclear field than 

to a particular cause.

" I reedoni nr enquit \ h n ! i urgent v <1/ a w V n n irn f. ( >wi tu the

niatoi *a1i*r,n.tion* til iiti im e s lig a to i in ,1 u n ix rts ih n r an

enlightened re -e .m h in titu le /» hi* freciion i l<> (lm o *e h is

rvscirt h problem *. I he m akei - o i A to m it I nergv ( om nu**ion

p o lk \ n ill realise 1h.il the m otixe* o f w .utim e * e t\u e m u*! mm

iim /i'rtio a change he t.n i*e > tie n lifit w o rke i* 11 ill find

p io g rjm m .ilit ie *e a tth o r im posedassignm ent* um .atism ng

unle-* <11 eetenetl » ilh freedom lo follow tin. ir <m n t h o it »■ o f

p to hle m lo r p a rt o t then w in kin g lim e, and al*o the

dexehtpm enl o f new idea* In th e *r w orker* max p ro \e n i

inestim able im p ortan ce.'1 - I’immJ n r K e \iew i»i liiu lo g it .il and 

M **di(«il K rs ra ri h in ,1 ln tlv t lo M r. I) .i\id I". L ilic n lh a l 4 ilv d in 

I'.n k v r r > 4 !ll>

2 - 1 2 .1 6
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t i m H a n fo r d Sit e

The concept of developing better ways to operate at the Hanford Site was Table 2-12.3. Results o f General

expected of all workers. The General Electric Company instituted an Electric Suggestion System, 1947-1957

employee suggestion system when it arrived at the Hanford Site. Individuals 

providing suggestions for better ways of doing things were given cash 

awards. Such awards were a common feature in the plant newspaper. The 

dollar value of these innovations, both to the employee and the government, 

is shown in Tabie 2-12.3.

Increase in Power of Organized Labor

Organized labor's role changed following W orld War IL During World 

War II, labor conflicts were minimized for several reasons. The Buildings 

Trade Council of Pasco was a dominant labor group at the Hanford Site as 

was the Western Conference of Teamsters, headquartered in Seattle. In

general, the unions supported a no-strike pledge and set aside jurisdictional boundaries (in other words, when shortages 

existed, machinists let carpenters work as millwrights, plumbers permitted boilermakers to work at plumbing, etc.) largely 

because of their appreciation for the critical nature of the work being undertaken.

Years Awards Savings

1947 $485 $12,746

1948 $2,065 $58,973

1949 $4,110 $84,838

1950 $7,605 $98,673

1951 $8,860 $94,239

1952 $13,885 $129,828

1953 $13,100 $108,390

1954 (6 mo) $7,160 $58,263

1954/55 $20,584 $59,089

1955/56 $22,770 $149,901

1956/57 $22,789 $214,556

Table 2-12.4. Labor Unions Representing Hanford Workers

Craft Name

Local

Number

General

1. Asbestos Workers International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers No. 82

2. Boilermakers International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers No. 104 and

3. Bricklayers

of America

Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union o f America ■

No. 541 

(Welders) 

No. 7

4. Carpenters United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners o f America No. 1849

5. Cement Masons Operative Plasterers and Cement Finishers International Association No. 478

6. Electricians (Wiremen) International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers No. 112

7. Iron Workers (Structural) International Assoc, o f Bridge Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers No. 14

8. Laborers (General) International H O D Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union o f America No. 348

9. Linemen International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers No. 77

10. Machinist International Association o f Machinists No. 1 743

11. M illwrights International Brotherhood o f Carpenters and Joiners of America No. 1699

12. Operating Engineers (Tractor) International Union o f Operating Engineers No. 370

13. Painters (Spray) Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America No. 427

14. Plumbers United Association o f Journeymen Plumbers and Apprentices o f the Plumbing and No: 598

15. Roofers

Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada

United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association No. 54

16. Sheet Metal Workers Sheet Metal Workers International Association No. 42

17. Teamsters Flat Bed, Misc. 1 -4 Ton International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers No. 839

Other

o f America

1. GE Maintenance, Operators, Hanford Atom ic Council Metal Trades

2.

Hospital Workers, Janitors 

and Firemen

j. A. Jones Office Workers Office Employees International Union No. 100

3. j. A. Jones Draftsmen and Surveyors Technical Engineers and Architects Association No. 17

4. Independent National Federation o f Federal Employees No. 788

5. Guards Hanford Guards Union No. 21

2 -1 2 .1 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Following the war, organized labor's presence at the Hanford Site strengthened. In 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission 

signed an agreement with the American Federation of Labor Building and Construction Trades Unions. The American 

Federation of Labor affiliates representing Hanford workers as well as two unions that were not affiliated, the National 

Federation of Federal Employees and the Hanford Guards Union, are shown in fable 2-12.4. In 1949, operating 

personnel were allowed to unionize and voted to be represented by the American Metal Trades Council of the American 

Federation of Labor (Findlay and Hevly 1995, pp. 73-75). This led to the birth of the Hanford Atomic Metals Trade 

Council or HAMTC as it is still known today. Despite the increasing power of the unions, the Atomic Energy 

Commission retained its authority to approve wage rates and benefits.

Between 1947 and .1955, approximately 80 work stoppages involving unskilled laborers occurred, most lasting less than 

1 week. Dispute over jurisdiction (which union had the right to do the work) was the most commonly cited reason for 

striking. Nearly 3 percent of work time was lost as a result of the work stoppages (GE n.d. (a), p. 80).

Awareness of Health and Safety

With the announcement of Hanford's 

role in atomic materials production 

came the awareness that workers were 

being subjected to radioactivity, 

something few knew anything about.

As discussed in Section 10, Worker 

Health and Safety, the Hanford Site 

monitored human and environmental 

health, but how much of this was 

understood by workers and their 

families is uncertain. Workers in the 

reactor and separations areas were 

told about the hazards. Others were 

not told. Concerns about health and 

safety became more common during 

the 1950s.

Table 2-12.5.

Class 1(al

Radiation Incidents; 1944-1957

Class I F

Year No. Incidents No. People No. Incidents No. People

1944 s 0 0 3 5

1945 35 100 6 11

1946 39 84 4 5

1947 27 46 2 2

1948 38 51 2 5

1949 36 53 0 0

1950 20 35 5 8

1951 25 70 13 53

1952 71 125 12 23

1953 69 199 26 43

1954 76 232 20 20

1955 147 329 15 25

1956 88 160 13 13

1957 (7 months) 11 56 5 5

(a) Class I incidents are those where the weekly radiation lim it is not exceeded but a potential 

exists. Class I incident rate reduction is largely due to a different definition of Class I 

incidents in 1956.

Class II incidents are over-exposures exceeding 300 M.R.E.P. per week. No lost time 

resulted from radiation overexposure. REP is an obsolete unit of absorbed dose in tissue. It 

was originally derived from roentgen equivalent physical and is approximately equivalent to 

the rem. M means m illi REP.

Getting "crapped up" (becoming 

contaminated with radioactive 

material) and sent to the first aid ^

station to shower off was fairly routine 

and not considered a big deal by many 

workers. Workers stationed in

radioactive areas were required to take bioassays (provide urine and fecal specimens) regularly and leave specimens on 

their front porch for pickup to measure possible radiation uptake. The number of radiation incidents recorded between 

1944 and 1957 are shown in Table 2-12.5.

The general impression of many former workers is they felt at the time that adequate measures were taken to protect 

them. This was evidenced on a 1997 trip to C Reactor when an artifact assessment inspection took place. Several 

former workers helping to conduct the assessment were surprised at the more stringent protective measures now required 

to enter radiation zones. As more knowledge about radiation emerged, greater advancements in protective measures 

were made (for more information, see Section 10, Worker Health and Safety).

Public concern about the hazard of nuclear testing, atmospheric nuclear fallout, and siting proposed nuclear facilities 

mounted in the 1950s. This led to increasing local concern for the effect of the Hanford Site on the environment. The 

Columbia River Advisory Group, which had been formed by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949 and consisted of

2 - 1 2 .1 8

j
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

"*>t*nietime- / Ju-t /./K‘H I'd dene r i m thine p e rfe i f/\ ond vt.i- t’eelinu p ie ltx ekitcd when n ld ’P lu to ' jth e n.im e vl/ir/i /» ozir

»j / / i f fu n d m -tiu n ie n l- t lu t snmed o ut u in l.u n in .ttin n 1 w o uld " i ir m e the vio td t lu t -om ehnw nt .inuthet the hot d u ti lu d

e -i.ip e d otu r m ore ,m d I n,is In lo r .1 session o i dot n nt.unin.diim

j U .i-ii it, m n /lj it. {H in t it t het k it .m il sometimes (!/»/><>-r /»f il- i n n ei i Jr.mciJ *>o m w li '-Iu ii lli.il .ilre .idt iu o k e d 1 Iran. I

| tcnu'm hvred the h r-l d.ix when I *.m .1 yir/ ■.< ruhhim : one p .irtu u b t .ire.i on the Thun It looked so «le.m I w ondeied w in

j d ie d id n 't on to .m other po rt or the llo n i— hut no. d ie sl.ixed in th.it one spot, tn e t .in d m r r . / m * .is -*ine she ot I » ./< •

ie .id \ rot the m oni.d hospit.il.

W hen we u n ild n t net o u r fu n d t ount dow n we dutd.ed them in .1 solution o t 'noo p.' L sualh o n l\ one dunkim : ot lh .it u.i*

n rtrs i.if 1 II iv.i- -iJ/ipfw f/ to l.ik r oh .1 j rrv Him l.m -i of'•Ain S'linoliior* if l»»oA th/re o r loin Wu»Ainti- «>»rf l/ir /»»-

w o u ld h.n e to u j i t lo r us to the u m -te tiu tio n o f the o th e r p.issemtet-.

f)n v my/if svi vi'.W e v il < im r on the ho- l.dv, .uid liter.dlx uln w itvi w ith c le.mlme-s w ith heir 1h.it stood -ir.iig h t up like if

| lu d iu -l h e rn w.i-hed, w ho h il / m i / . I hex I lie d to .ipp e.ir no m h.d.m l hut e\ fix one knew Ihex h.id te ,d l\ h e rn in .? h o i spot

I w ith ou t know ini: it 01 perh.ip- h,id .1 -p ill Ihex look .? n h h iin ; 1h.il tune.

So w e n u d e ioke- .rln n il the t oxet.dl- xxhuh w eren't .1Iw .n - o u r - i/e .u id p u l up w ith the d.iilx hnmpx bu- tides ,m d o u i

i Lonfidente I'rrn .»«. vi e found o m -elxe- 1 ontinuin:: in .1 -t.ile o f 'At m l hc.ilth. W r 11 r i r < het ked o tu e .? m onth I he ru m o rflew on t lu t s tin e , hut the blood te -l- .in d other test- belied ihe m in or s.'iu*ttr llvrix. lu im n w iiikci. ijuolvd in V.m

water pollution and public health officials from the U.S. Public Health Service and Oregon and Washington, became 

increasingly alarmed about the high levels of radioactivity being released in the reactor effluent. Such concerns led to 

more and more radiobiological studies being conducted at the Hanford Site (for more information see Section 7,

Research and Development and Section 10, Worker Health and Safety).

Community Alignment with Atomic Mission

Whereas the community had been aligned with the effort to win the war, during this period the local community began 

to align itself with the atomic mission. This attachment was a reflection of the individuals and their families who worked 

at the Hanford Site along with others in the community who either depended on the Hanford Site or were otherwise 

proud o f their community's association with i t Thus, symbols of the atomic era began to appear (for example,

"Richland, the Atomic Bustin Village of the West"). The Richland High School adopted the Hanford Bombers logo in the 

late 1940s. Organizations and businesses began taking atomic monikers as their theme in the 1950s, such as the 

Atomic City Kiwanis, Atomic City Toastmasters, and Atomic Lanes Bowling Alley.

. fhere w o uld undouhtedlx he ,1 p -x ih o lo t.it ,il h.is.u iI in .1

1oO‘ t r,im ped pl.in. A lthough 1 ilx dw id ler- .ire lo n firu ’d to

11.11 iow lo t- .m il 1 e -h it ted xiews these .lie .111 .u te p le d p u t o f

then rnxn on ino nt. In the de-erl where -p .n e i- the kex

< / i. t r . n tv ii-tn o t the xiexx. .1 < rom ped iillji> e o r ti.im p e d

hotis*- w o u ld he out o f ih .v .u te r .? p .d jt.ih le .ttid (o n -u o tith -< i.id . ’ - C . Alliin IN-hr-.on, l)u I'nnf .irih ilrt l-vMiiinvvr.

llu* di>i*»n nrrds ui Ritlil.m il in F\,hr»nn |<14 I. p. I ”

Liv in g Co n d it io n s

When plutonium production operations began, the 

Corps shut down the Hanford construction camp. 

Many of the new operations staff moved into 

Richland, doubling the population to 15,000 by 

early 1945. The importance of keeping workers 

satisfied with living conditions was clearly 

recognized by Du Pont and its architect-engineer, 

G. Albin Pehrson.

2 - 1 2 .1 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

C o m im m ilv S nap-hot - M jy I. 195 $

"RICHLAND, WASHINGTON - home o f permanent operating employee* at Hanford Works - is situated at the confluence o f

the Yakima and Columbia Rivers, comprises ten square miles o f land owned by lire United States o f America, and is Ofiemted

by General Electric Company, as agent o f the United States Atom ic Energy Commission.

It has a population o f 27,000 people at present, w hich is an increase o f 5,000 since 1 950. The Atomic Fneigy Commhsion

presently employs 450people whose annual going rale o f payroll is $2,400,000. Eighty [je n v n t o f thesv employees not', live

in Richland. General Electric Company presently employs 8.6b5 people whose annual going rate o t payroll is $46,500,000.

Eighty-two percent o t these employees now live in Richland.

Richland School D istrict 4400 comprises a high school, tw o junior high schools, and seven clcmentaty schools... Them are

6,06V housing units owned by the: Government and there are 1,000 housing units under < onsiruction by private capital;

860 dorm itory rooms that w ill accommodate 1,095 people. A ll houses both Government-owned and pnvatefy-owned, are

connected to sewer and water mains and there are 5,277 residential telephone connections. There are tw o hanks hero whose

combined deposits cuirently total 516,500,000. There are 8.000 automobiles registered by private owners rn Richland.

There are sc\ cntccn churc hes o f w hich three, are Go\ emtneni-owncd and fourteen have been constructed b y private capital.

Nineteen chibs and organizations occupy space in sixleen Government-owned quarters and three priva

A t present, there are two m ajor shopping districts located about a m ile apart, and five neighborhood shopping centers

-generally consisting o f a food and a drugstore and a service station... Modern hospital facilities are available in Richland

and medical and dental care is provided by twenty-seven doctors and dentists mgagud in private practice.

R khland at present, has a population that is equal to the combined populations o f hs ncar-hy sister cities o f Kennewick and

Pasco. Recent newspaper releases In the Hanford Office o f the Atomic Energy Commission indhate that Richland may climb

lo a population o f 30,000 in the not too distant future.

A t present then: is a am struciion cany:) known as North Richland five miles north o f Richland, which is owned by the

Government and opctated under private contract. The present population o f the Camp is 5,745 people; the number of

construction emplov ves as i>/A tay 7. 1955, is 5,802 whose (turent annual going rale o f payroll to $J f .9-16,560. The peek

fsic'i employment for the cuirent expansion program in progiess at Hanford is expected to reach >0.000 sometime in 1954,

and then decline as construction is completed. There is also a Class "'A* /Vrm - Camp at North Richland, but peisonne.1 and

payroll data arc not available.

There arc thirteen businesses in Noith Richland whose annual sales in 1952 amounted lo $2,718,159. Housing in North

Richland io r the civilian population is in Government-owned barracks, a large guvemmenl-ov/ned tiailer camp where many

people five, in their pnvateiv-owned trailers» and in 200 Government-owned temporary houses.r - A copy of this community 

snapshot is filed in the Pvhi-son 1943 document in the Reference Section of the Richland Public Ltbravv.

As Findlay and Hevly note (1995, p. 39), good housing would help employees cope with the inhospitable new country 

into which they had been thrust. They cite an example of Du Font's concern for its employees' living conditions, namely 

the fight to prevent fencing in Richland. W hile the Corps would still patrol the village and the residents' outgoing letters 

would still be read, Du Pont apparently drew the line at fencing in the village as was done at the Oak Ridge Reservation 

in Tennessee and Los Alamos, New Mexico. Du Pont ran the government-owned town, but the Corps continued to play 

a role and the two organizations did not always agree. The Army hired Du Pont to run and police the town as part of 

their contract When Du Pont acknowledged that they wished to do so without Army interference, Matthias resisted, 

citing corporate rigidity as a main factor. Tensions mounted between the Army and Du Pont in the fall of 1944 when

2 - 1 2 2 0

j
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t th e Ha n fo r d Sit e

Du Pont accused the Army of interjecting too much control over Richland Village affairs (Findlay and Hevly 1995, 

pp. 43-45).

The more than 50 social organizations, 13 churches, a weekly paper named The Villager, and the Villagers, Inc. (an 

umbrella organization of the various community groups) formed a cohesive community (Hales 1997, p. 235). Residency 

in Richland, beyond a small group of construction workers, was restricted to certain classes of workers (Findlay and 

Hevly 1995, pp. 35-37). For example, laborers, janitors, and other manual workers were excluded from residing in 

Richland. When one did qualify to live in Richland, the type of government house a worker could rent depended on 

one's job classification:

• Operator to Foreman Classification: Types A and B and Prefabs

• Assistant and Shift Supervisor Classifications: Types F and H

• Chief Supervisors and Superiors: Types D, E, and G

The 1946-1947 expansion at the Hanford Site caused another housing shortage and more houses were constructed in 

Richland. As a result, a new construction camp arose in North Richland (in the area around the present Battelle 

complex) that had a population of 13,000 by 1948. As additional housing was constructed, school teachers and truck 

drivers also were able to obtain housing in Richland (Findlay and Hevly 1995, pp. 40-41). By 1950, Richland had grown 

to nearly 22,000, an increase of about 50 percent in 4 years. Along with the new housing, the Atomic Energy 

Commission constructed another commercial district known as the Uptown Shopping Center.

However, living conditions continued to be intolerable. The winds continued to wreak havoc, compounded by the dust 

problems created by stripping off vegetation during construction. Over time, as lawns were seeded, parks planted, and 

other disturbed areas stabilized, the dust problem subsided.

W o r k e r s W h o O p e r a t e d a n d D i v e r s i f i e d t h e H a n f o r d

S ite : 1 9 5 8 -1 9 9 0

Worker life at the Hanford Site continued changing throughout this next Cold War period. Two factors were responsible 

for many of the changes: 1) the nuclear stockpile reached sufficient levels, leading to a stable period of bomb production 

as opposed to the earlier periods of rapid production and 2) increasing concern over human and environmental health 

risks posed by the nuclear complex.

Effec t o f a n Ad e q u a t e N u c l e a r St o c k p il e o n Wo r k e r s

From day one at the Hanford Site, military requirements for plutonium had led Hanford staff to push hard. First was the 

drive for bombs to end W orld War II, then came the demand for bombs for weapons testing to refine the capability, and 

finally came the increasing demand for larger and larger stockpiles of nuclear weaponry. Finally by the early 1960s, the 

nation's Cold War planners grew comfortable with the plutonium supplies, and projections for future production began to 

decrease. The Limited Test Ban Treaty (signed in 1963 by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States to ban 

nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water) was in place, and the nation possessed an enormous 

amount of plutonium.

As a result, the production capability at the Hanford Site was no longer needed. After almost two decades of annual 

production increases, the Hanford Site embarked on a plan in 1963 that led to the shutdown of eight of the nine reactors 

by 1971. The impact was two-fold:

• First, employment decreased. The elimination of some jobs was deferred as nuclear facilities had to be defueled 

and deactivated, but slowly the numbers of workers within the production groups declined.

• Second, employment diversified. To help offset the economic impact o f closing the reactors, the Atomic Energy 

Commission initiated diversification efforts to help maintain employment levels.

2 -1 2 .2 1
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

The Employment Roller Coaster

Beginning in the 1960s, the Hanford roller coaster of economic 

boom and bust intensified. The second major down cycle began in 

1963 (see Figure 2-12.8) (the first being immediately after the war in 

1945-1946) with the announcement that three reactors would be 

closing. This down cycle continued throughout the decade as more 

closures were announced. Finally in early 1971, the government 

closed the KE Reactor and gave notice that N Reactor would also 

close.

Figure 2-12.8. Employment at the Hanford Site,

1960-1990

Despite the shutdown of the reactors, the 1970s brought an end to 

the down cycle. Construction began on the Fast Flux Test Facility, a 

prototype breeder reactor in 1970 (for more information, see

Section 7, Research and Development). An agreement that kept the N Reactor operating for electricity production only 

was forged in 1972, preventing closure of that facility. Construction of the Washington Public Power Supply System 

(Supply System) nuclear power plants Numbers 2, 1, and 4, commenced in 1’972, 1975, and 1978, respectively. In 

1976, an evaluation of the Hanford Site for long-term storage of nuclear waste began.

By the mid 1980s, however, the bust cycle began again. Cost overruns and failed projections on electricity needs in the 

Northwest led to cancellation of two of the Supply System plants (Numbers 1 and 4). As a result of the Reagan 

Administration defense buildup, major improvements in the production facilities at the Hanford Site helped offset some 

of the decline, but that was short lived. In 1983, Congress canceled the breeder reactor program, jeopardizing the future 

of the Fast Flux Test Facility. In 1987, following the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor in the Soviet Union, the 

N Reactor was initially shut down for safety upgrades. Stockpiling of plutonium and citizen concerns about health and 

environmental issues led to the decision not to restart N Reactor, obviating the need for any further production-related 

work at the one remaining separations plant, PUREX (Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant). The Hanford Site's 

production era came to a close.

Diversification Efforts

Diversifying the Tri-City economy away from its primary dependence on plutonium production funding emerged as a 

theme at the Hanford Site in the early 1960s to help offset employment cutbacks. This theme continued throughout the 

remainder of the Cold War. The Atomic Energy Commission tried various mechanisms in concert with local community 

leaders to bring new nuclear missions in particular and new industries in general to the Tri-Cities (Findlay and Hevly 

1995, pp. 215-300). These efforts had roots in the 1950s as Hanford staff increasingly worked on projects not pertaining 

to the Hanford Site. Some of this work came through the Atomic Energy Commission as it built new facilities around the 

country at Savannah River, Rocky Flats, Idaho, and elsewhere. In some cases, other work opportunities for staff came 

through the General Electric Company, which was pursuing commercialization of nuclear technology at its San Jose

Another symbol o f diversification appeared when Congressional and local leaders launched a vigorous campaign to 

build a steam plant to generate electricity from N Reactor heat. This battle, termed the last major eruption of the public 

versus private power controversy (Dyke 1989, p. 161), was a catalyst for local involvement. During this time, local 

economic interests formed the Tri-City Nuclear Industrial Council (later named the Tri-City Industrial Development 

Council) to seek out opportunities. Also during this time, the Tri-City Herald emerged as a strong supporter for new 

programs at the Hanford Site (Pugnetti 1975).

A major diversification effort came in 1964 when the Atomic Energy Commission moved from a single-contractor to a 

multi-contractor approach. Several new companies replaced the General Electric Company, which had been the main 

site contractor since replacing Du Pont in 1946 (see chart at end of Chapter 1 for list of contractors). The new

2 -1 2 .2 2
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t ir e Ha n f o r d Sh e

/*.1 rv'f'.tri h and dwvfnpmrnl irnlvi ot

Ihc Motim /ririiji' ( am ini'don 11 ith .in .1nnu.1t US I ) Im d'icl

in vxi t"> '01 s Ui m illion, -tinit// nnv-third 0/ //?/- K \l> cffm f

is m «.uppoit 01 H .im vnl piodtn lion h/H'm/iV/ii- .m il the

ivm.undci /- «///■/•< led /ou.irt/ .1 i.in r/t u/'prnt c/i//

.ij»o//t(}///)H'« »Z .llom it m c n i\. \houl three-nnidlt^ iiflh is

ixoik /*• 1 ondudvd w ilhin Ihc l-Linnnd l.ihnt.itoifa*

m u I Ih c re m a in d e r In rv -c .in h j n t l o m ’in c c rin "

$•/ »////«• (//ret f/v j//.it /it1// fn p i o d in lio n or$i.>/i//.)l//i/is." -

H o M v d and \lliaut>h l'M«4a. |>. Id

contractors committed to promoting diversification by 

helping to create jobs that would not be dependent on 

the Atomic Energy Commission. These activities met 

with limited success.

Hanford's research and development capability 

continued to attract new work for staff. The Atomic 

Energy Commission elevated the status of the Hanford 

Laboratories in 1964, establishing it as a national 

laboratory (now called Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory) and awarding Battelle Memorial Institute 

the contract to run it. included in this contract was an 

innovative contracting mechanism that also permitted

Battelle to use government facilities for private work. Diversification efforts provided new opportunities for Hanford Site 

workers. By building on the unique experience gained at the Hanford Site, many staff were able to become involved in 

new nuclear applications.

Effect of Hu m a n a n d En v ir o n m e n ta l Safety Concerns on Workers

During the 1960s and 1970s, the issue of radioactivity and human and environmental health intensified. The stimulus 

for much of this was the rapid growth of the commercial nuclear industry. As public opinion increasingly opposed 

nuclear technology, anti-nuclear activists eventually turned their attention to the nuclear production complex, in 

particular the risk associated w ith the stored and newly generated wastes associated with the facilities (Wasserman and 

Solomon 1982, Del Tredici 1987). The increasing awareness, knowledge, and concern for radiation and its potential 

impact on workers, surrounding populations, and the environment had three major effects on Hanford workers:

1) increase in regulations and procedures, 2) increase in governmental oversight, and 3) development of a negative 

image of the Hanford Site to many outsiders.

Increasing Regulations, Orders, and Procedures

As safety concerns increased, the number of regulations, orders, and procedures requiring compliance grew in geometric 

proportion. This added to the bureaucracy as new divisions were created and others reorganized. For example, the 

Division of Biology and Medicine evolved into the Environmental Safety and Health Division. These changes were 

designed to balance power within the agency, which previously had been held mainly by the production division. To 

implement the various directives, the government had to add staff to ensure compliance. Over time, the system became 

bogged down with organizations that had overlapping responsibilities, requirements that conflicted, and audits that 

seemingly never ended. The impact on management and workers was significant. Many workers believed that the 

requirements to follow new work procedures actually reduced safety because they took away their ability to use 

common sense. Managers often complained that the time they spent with auditors and addressing their findings hurt 

their ability to get their work done. Nevertheless, the new requirements were successful in providing more balance 

between production and safety goals.

Increasing Governmental Oversight

The Hanford Site and the rest of the production complex are government-owned, contractor-operated facilities. The 

licensing and regulatory functions concern only commercial nuclear enterprises. The government maintains technically 

qualified staff at the facility to oversee the work of the contractors. Achieving the optimal balance of government to 

contractor staff is difficult. W ithout enough government staff, the contractor might abuse the system. With too much 

oversight, the contractor's progress might be impeded. At the Hanford Site, the number of federal employees is 

3-5 percent of the contractor staff. Typically, it has been hard for the government to maintain a well-qualified, 

experienced staff because it lacks the incentive systems of private industry.

2 - 1 2 .2 3
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

In 1975, the licensing and regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission were separated and placed into a new 

agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The remaining functions were placed into the Energy Research and 

Development Administration, which was reorganized into the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977.

In general, the increasing attention on the production complex resulting from concern about nuclear risk pressured the 

government to exercise more control on its contractors. By the 1960s, however, the bureaucracy was becoming 

unmanageable and simply adding staff to supervise, inspect, and monitor contractors only increased the bureaucracy. 

Adding DOE orders to implement regulations required writing numerous procedures that required audits and reports, all 

of which had questionable benefit. The effect on worker life was pronounced.

An example cited by former workers was the contrast of building N Reactor with building the Fast Flux Test Facility. By 

the 1970s, when the Fast Flux Test Facility was being designed and built, the government brought many Nuclear Navy 

people, such as M ilt Shaw (a protege of Admiral Rickover), into the Atomic Energy Commission and successor 

organizations to oversee nuclear activities, th e problem was the Nuclear Navy culture was very different from the 

production complex culture. Operating a nuclear reactor on a submarine was different from operating a nuclear reactor 

in the desert. The endless reviews and questioning of contractor recommendations made the experience frustrating for 

many.

Increasing Negative Image of the Hanford Site

On July 23, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in the Calvert Cliffs decision that the Atomic Energy 

Commission had violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 with regard to the environmental impact of 

proposed nuclear plants (Fehner and Hoi I 1994, p. 15). This marked the threshold of formal public involvement at 

Atomic Energy sites such as the Hanford Site. Through the 1970s and 1980s, various environmental impact statements 

were initiated that focused outside attention on the Hanford Site and provided a forum for those concerned about 

Hanford operations.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 identified the Hanford Site as a possible repository for high-level radioactive 

waste. Although the Hanford Site was not chosen, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act mandated public information and 

community hearings and also stated that "affected tribes" be included in the public involvement process. Hanford land 

has been used historically by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Yakama Indian Nation, and 

the Nez Perce Tribe. The government also consulted with the Wanapum Band, a group indigenous to the area and 

located at Priest Rapids just upstream from the Hanford Site. In general, the Tribes took a hard line on the need to. protect 

and restore the environment and questioned projects that conflicted with their traditional values.

By the mid 1980s, two of Hanford's most powerful advocates, Washington State Senators Warren G. Magnuson and 

Henry M. Jackson, left office. Although one of their successors, Slade Gorton, continued to lobby for Hanford interests, 

growing doubts and fears about nuclear energy and nuclear waste could be found nationwide, and Hanford's image, 

especially on the west side of the state, was suffering. During the same period, several citizen advocacy groups formed 

including the Hanford Education Action League, which defined its main goal as citizen advocacy and public access to 

information. They also challenged nuclear weapons policies, supported the permanent closure of PUREX, and promoted 

the safe disposal of waste. Many who lived downwind of the Hanford Site (known as "Downwinders") received publicity 

as they pursued claims that their health had been impacted by past radioactive emissions. Whistle blowers, employees 

who had been punished by employers for raising operational concerns, also received much publicity that contributed to 

the Hanford Site's negative image (D'Antonio 1993). This reached a peak in 1986 when Brock Adams defeated Slade 

Gorton's re-election bid by campaigning against Gorton's record of too strongly supporting Hanford's "bomb factory"

(D'Antonio 1993, pp. 189-190; Findlay and Hevly 1995, pp. 298-300).

The negative publicity also affected Hanford workers, their families, and their community. Some questioned the severity 

of possible health ramifications from working at or near the Hanford Site. Some fought back, organizing a local support 

group called the Hanford Family to defend the Hanford Site. Formed in 1986 by Mike Fox, a Hanford engineer, the

2 - 1 2 .2 4
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t th e Ha n f o r d Su e

Hanford Family educated the public about nuclear processes, challenged bad press, and campaigned for continued use 

of Hanford's reactors and work force. Other Hanford workers formed the group World Citizens for Peace to consider the 

morality of Hanford operations (O'Antonio 1993). Later, as the plutonium production era came to a close and waste 

management became the biggest priority, the former negative imagery was transformed as plutonium production workers 

were retrained as environmental technicians to clean up past messes (Noonan 2000, pp. 34, 38).

M is c e lla n e o u s Ch a n g e s

The period between 1960 and 1990 brought with it an assortment of other changes that bear on worker history.

Living Conditions

In 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission transferred ownership of Richland to the residents after 11 years of efforts to 

privatize the town. Occupants were allowed to buy the properties they had been renting, a city council was elected, and 

the various governmental services were transferred to the city. This had all been made possible by the Atomic Energy 

Community Act of 1955, which enabled residents of the three atomic cities (Hanford, Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge) to 

assume the obligations of local self government (Kubik 1994, pp. 62-72). After 15 years of Richland being a company 

town that the government and its 

contractors owned and operated, 

residents could finally live in a 

non-company town (Findlay and Hevly 

1995, pp. 8-113).

Changes in Security

President Kennedy's visit and speech to

37,000 Tri-Citians in 1963 marked the 

start of a gradual relaxation of security 

requirements at the Hanford Site.

W ithin the next few years, the Columbia 

River was opened to recreationists, 

except for the shore bordering the 

Hanford Site. Workers still had to go 

through checkpoints, vehicles were still subject to searches, the Hanford Site Patrol still guarded the site, and lockdowns 

(gates closed and all personnel searched before exiting the facility) still occurred regularly, but the threat of espionage

had peaked with the anti-communism movement of the 1950s.

Security requirements started tightening again in the 1970s with the 

advent of skyjacking and bombings. Concern centered in two 

major areas: the threat o f theft of special nuclear materials and the 

threat of causing a major nuclear accident. By the 1980s, the 

government ordered several security upgrades. These included 

fences with razor wire such as those surrounding the N Reactor 

and PUREX, pill boxes in hallways for security guards, patrol 

towers for armed guards, and generally increased patrolling, 

including the use of helicopters. Various efforts were funded to 

identify weaknesses in defenses that terrorists could exploit. 

Although these anti-terrorist measures were clearly seen and 

understood by the workers, they do not seem to have felt 

Figure 2-12.9, President John F. Kennedy at particularly at risk. For more detail on security, see Section 8,

Ground Breaking o f the Hanford Generating Plant $jte Security.

at N Reactor, October 1963

-Major Twnl - President kcnniMlv Visih thi1 Hanford Site

In OUobci 1963. President John F. Kennedy came to the Hanford Site tor 

the groundbreaking o f the Hanl’oid Generating Plan at the N Reactor (see 

Figure 2-12.9;. It was the first lime that the public could enter the Hanford 

Sift', and :m estimated 37/100 peoplcdidjustthat. Faced with sweltciing 

temperatures, the people heard (he President p ra is e rite accomplishments 

of the past and paint a rosy pictuie for the future. This was the biggest 

event ever held in the Tri-Cities and was a major morale booster foi 

Hanford employees and their families., in retrospect, the event is a symbol 

for die opening of the site that occurred in the corning years.

2 - 1 2 .2 5
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c h it ie s

Educated Workforce

By the 1960s, an influx of a new generation of nuclear workers began. Major universities had nuclear engineering 

departments and were producing a steady stream of nuclear engineers, who w ith their advanced degrees came to work at 

the Hanford Laboratories. Before long, the Tri-Cities were being recognized as having "...an unusually high percentage 

of professional and technical people, because of the highly technical character of the Hanford production and research 

and development activities" (Hoisted and Albaugh 1964a, p. 9). Throughout the period, the Hanford Site maintained its 

place as second only to the Seattle area for having the largest concentration of PhDs in the State of Washington.

1986 - A Year of Change

The year 1986 brought with it a series of events that forever changed the U.S. Department of Energy:

• January 1986 - The space shuttle Challenger exploded, killing all aboard. This event sent shock waves through 

everyone involved in technology, sending the message that things can go awry.

• February 1986 - Because of concerns from Downwinders and other environmental groups, DOE responded with 

the release of 19,000 pages of historical records documenting past releases of chemicals and radionuclides to 

the surrounding environment. This release of documents generated much attention toward and adverse publicity 

about the Hanford Site and signified the start of long-term investigations concerning potential health effects.

• March 1986 - Public involvement in the Defense Waste Environmental Impact Statement process began. This 

provided public forums for groups concerned about the effect of the Hanford Site on human health and the 

environment.

• April 1986 - The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant exploded in Ukraine. Reports circulated almost immediately that a 

nuclear plant with a similar design was operating at the Hanford Site, which brought interest by the media.

• Summer 1986 - W histle blower issues regarding illegal waste disposal, the removal of radioactivity signs before 

Governor Booth Gardener's visit to the Hanford Site, and routine nuclear engineering standards violations 

provided more negative publicity (D'Antonio 1993).

• Fall 1986 - Westinghouse is named winner of the Hanford Site Consolidation contracts, signifying a return to the 

concept of a single operating contractor for the Hanford Site.

Because of similarities between the Chernobyl plant and the Hanford Site's N Reactor (both were graphite moderated, 

water-cooled reactors), the press became intensely interested in the Hanford Site following the explosion at Chernobyl. 

Faced with external demands for the closure of the Hanford Site's last production facility, the response from workers was 

predictable. The N Reactor was safe and should keep operating. To verify or disprove that belief, numerous internal and 

external task forces and commissions reviewed the technical data over the next 2 years to determine if a similar 

explosion could occur at the Hanford Site. Most were unanimous that a similar explosion could not occur, but the 

N Reactor was shut down anyway because the end of the Cold War eliminated the need for more plutonium. Although 

the Chernobyl accident did not cause the shutdown of the N Reactor, public interest and the resulting DOE response 

marked the start of opening the DOE complex to the public.

Worker Complacency

During one of the N Reactor reviews following the Chernobyl explosion, the topic of worker complacency arose. The 

following quote from a member of the Roddis Panel (commissioned by the Secretary of Energy to evaluate the safety of 

Hanford's N Reactor) in 1986 indicates that complacency might have been a problem at the Hanford Site but goes on to 

explain the prevalence of complacency in the nuclear industry in general:

"/ regret to say that there was also evidence o f complacency at the plant, at the lower levels. Adm ittedly I have

had only a short visit, so some o f the observations may have simply been aberrations from the norm, but there

were an uncomfortable number o f small but significant deviations from fam iliar safety practice. The sense that

came through was one o f people doing a jo b in a context o f safety rules whose significance had somehow been

lost, and which were therefore not deemed very important. This was somewhat puzzling, since the upper

management seemed w ell focused; yet the plant workers must somehow reflect the values passed on from

above.

2 - 1 2 .2 6
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t t h e Ha n f o r d Sit e

This is not as defamatory as it may sound. It is virtually impossible to maintain the necessary sense o f insecurity

and concern for the occurrence o f improbable events, when everyday experience seems to belie the need. It

requires constant attention to maintain a taut ship. Pilots have a similar problem, as do the A ir Force personnel

who man the missile silos, to say nothing o f the vast majority o f drivers. And it is still a problem in the nuclear

industry, despite the Kemeny Commission report. Few humans w ill perform to the best o f their ability, year after

year, with only inspirational speeches to motivate them." - Lewis 1986, p. 4

Change in Mission from Production to Cleanup

By 1988, it was clear that Hanford's production era had come to a close. The Hanford Site's only remaining production 

reactor would remain closed, thereby obviating the need for any further fuel manufacturing or separations work. Within 

months, DOE declared that the Hanford Site had a new mission: cleanup. Hanford's job would be to clean up the 

contamination resulting from over 40 years of manufacturing plutonium. Preliminary estimates suggested the cleanup 

might require 30 years and $26 billion to accomplish.

Faced with cleanup legislation and motivated groups calling for action, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

and the Washington State Department of Ecology entered into closed door meetings to establish cleanup schedules and 

commitments. The result was a federal facility compliance agreement that identified milestones and a 30-year schedule, 

known as the Tri-Party Agreement (Ecology 1994).

The change in mission presented a new challenge for DOE. Environmental cleanup differs from nuclear production in 

significant ways. One primary difference is the uncertainty surrounding cleanup projects. Much of the cleanup work 

involves characterizing the contamination through sampling, assessing the risk contamination presents to human health 

and the environment, evaluating appropriate cleanup technologies, and doing remedial work. Such work was 

challenging enough in the industrial sector where contamination was primarily chemical. At the Hanford Site, where 

much of the contamination was radiological, the challenges were monumental. Because most of the staff in the late 

1980s came from a nuclear production background, they were often ill-equipped for the new type of work required 

(EMO 1992).

Ar e a s f o r Fu r t h e r Re s e a r c h

Throughout the Manhattan Project and Cold War Era, the types of occupations for which workers were hired reflect the 

changing mission of the Hanford Site. The changing mission affected how workers were recruited, their working and in 

the early days their living conditions, the number of workers on the site at any one tim e/their salaries, and the issues 

confronting them. This book on facilities only briefly touches on these topics.

Much remains to be discovered about work life at the Hanford Site. The combination of production of nuclear materials, 

new technology, radioactivity, and secrecy make work at the Hanford Site a topic of interest that should continue to 

attract researchers for a long time. Two general areas that could benefit from additional research are 1) seeking 

information that is presently lacking and 2) finding answers to historical questions concerning workers at the Hanford Site 

that could not be addressed within the scope of this book on facilities.

Ad d it io n a l I n f o r m a t io n

To enrich what is presently known about work life at the Hanford Site, researchers need to seek more first-person 

accounts, photographs/films/videos, and memorabilia.

First Person Accounts

Some first-person accounts of work life at the Hanford Site, also referred to as oral histories, do exist. Accounts collected 

by David Sanger (1995) focused on personal remembrances by key individuals regarding the design, construction, and 

operation of the Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project. Ted Van Arsdol (1992), a local newspaperman, collected

2 - 1 2 .2 7
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

stories and incorporated them in his history of the Hanford Site. Interactive interviews such as those conducted by 

Thayer (1996) and Stannard during the 1980s (Stannard 1988) provide good information because interviewers had 

particular questions and pursued the answers. Similar interactive interviews were conducted in the mid-1990s by 

Darby Stapp concerning the N Reactor (DOE 1997a, Volume 3) and Thomas Marceau and Michele Gerber. The 

Marceau-Gerber interviews are housed at the Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology but have 

not yet been approved for publication.

Despite the efforts of these researchers, much remains to be done. Given the advancing ages of Hanford Manhattan 

Project and Cold War workers, an active oral history program should commence immediately to complete previous 

efforts and conduct additional interviews with key informants. Beyond simply collecting reminiscences, a valuable effort 

in its own right, such a program must develop a research agenda to guide the interview process so that the types of 

questions identified in this volume can be pursued. The questions provided below are a start. Other sections in this book 

have similar additional research directions that may be applicable to oral historical work.

Photographs, Films, and Videos

One of the principal goals of worker history research is to enable the audience to understand what it was like to work at 

the Hanford Site. Words alone cannot accomplish this goal. Fortunately, thousands of photographs and many films exist 

that illustrate work life. Unfortunately, the photographs and films are not catalogued and in some cases have not even 

been located. With the rapid dismantling o f the site, it is imperative that these visual history treasures be located, 

catalogued, and preserved.

Memorabilia

Memorabilia also provide information about work life at the Hanford Site. Unfortunately, such materials are rare. Some 

signs, calendars, mementos, etc., have survived and are being preserved. Others can be reconstructed from photographs 

and films, but more memorabilia are needed.

One particularly rich item, the Hanford Site newspaper (CE News from 1946 

1964 and Hanford Project News from 1965-1980) does exist in its entirety.

The 30+ years of weekly newspapers contain much information about work 

life at the Hanford Site. Included are descriptions of workers, events that 

occurred onsite, and methods management used to change worker behavior.

These papers should be catalogued and indexed quickly so that future 

researchers can locate information relevant to their research.

His t o r ic a l Qu e s t io n s Co n c e r n in g W o r k e r s

O ur understanding of worker life at the Hanford Site w ill continue to improve as additional research is conducted. The 

following questions are some warranting further work:

• Is Gerber (1992a) correct that Hanford managers were irresponsible when they subjected workers, surrounding 

populations, and the environment to radioactive and chemical wastes? Or should Gerber have considered the 

Cold War context in which these decision makers had to work as Kathren (1993) suggests? More work is needed 

to understand ho,w decision makers faced tradeoffs regarding the need to fulfill a mission and the need to do so 

safely. The notions of acceptable risk and what is safe are relevant here. The following comment was made by a 

member of the Roddis Panel, commissioned by the Secretary of Energy to evaluate the safety of Hanford's 

N Reactor, which had certain design similarities to the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear plant. The Secretary 

wanted an independent assessment to ensure that a similar explosion could not occur at the Hanford Site:

"Let me say at the outset that your specific wish [your letter o f M ay 2 to Dr. Roddis] to be 'absolutely

certain. .. that there is no possibility o f an accident similar to the one that occurred in the Soviet Union'

. cannot be fulfilled/ simply because risk is a matter o f degree, and the complete avoidance o f risk is a fantasy.

I w ill stress this point throughout, because it seems to be imperfectly understood within the Department. We

Newspapers Published

for Hanford \\urkris

2 - 1 2 .2 8
Se c t io n 1 2 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s a t th e Ha n f o r d Sh e

often heard people opine that the reactor was 'safe' and that is a meaningless observation. Decision making

involves either overt or subliminal balancing o f risks and other costs against benefits. Just as there are

(allegedly) no free lunches, there are no risk-free technologies. The risk is real, and no risk is worth

accepting without commensurate benefit, while great risks are acceptable in return for great benefits.

The benefits associated with operation o f the N Reactor lie in its provision o f special nuclear materials

for defense programs, and the assessment o f the value o f these benefits lies without our charter...."

- Lewis 1986, p. 1

The Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction studies conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention and other future studies of worker health w ill help address these questions.

• In 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducted interviews for the Advisory Committee on Human 

Radiation Experiments (ACHRE). Among the many questions to investigate would be what was the effect of the 

experiments on the workers at the Hanford Site? Did the results of the experiments improve safety and health 

practices for the workers? The ACHRE Archive is at George Washington University, and the website is 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/index.html.

• During the 1980s as public concern over the nuclear industry heightened, safety concerns also were directed 

toward the DOE production complex. Charges such as the following were made that production complex staff 

had not kept pace with training and operational practices in the nuclear industry, suggesting that safety was 

being compromised at DOE facilities:

" The mishaps with the P Reactor [a reactor at the Savannah River Site where several safety-related incidents

occurred in the 1980s] showed just how far practices in the defense reactor program have diverged from

those in the commercial nuclear industry. The accident at Three M ile Island taught utilities that the

unexpected could occur and led to major improvements in operating practices and training, instrumentation,

accident analysis, and maintenance. But the veil o f secrecy surrounding the weapons program prevented

these changes from becoming part of the DOE knowledge base...

This Isolation was illustrated last year, when a well-known nuclear safety expert met with nuclear-safety staff

o f a DOE contractor. The expert wondered w hy he did not recognize any o f the employees from national

and international meetings. The staff members told him that they did not attend those meetings because

they could learn nothing from them. The employees seemed unaware that a gap had grown between their

practices and those o f their colleagues in the commercial nuclear industry." - Ahearne 1989, p. 27

Did a similar gap exist at the Hanford Site between Hanford nuclear workers and industrial nuclear workers? If 

so, in what areas did the Hanford Site differ, and why did the Hanford Site not keep up with Industry standards? 

Budget restrictions? Arrogance? The subject of maintaining contact with state-of-the-art industrial advancements 

and improvements has important implications for government-sponsored facilities.

• To better understand the impact of the Hanford Site on the nuclear industry, research is needed to determine the 

extent of worker migration from the Hanford Site to other nuclear settings. In particular, Findlay and Hevly

(1995) and others have suggested that many of the Hanford Site's best people transferred to General Electric's 

commercial nuclear operation when General Electric left the Hanford Site in 1964. Is that true? Did these 

individuals go on to make major contributions to the nuclear industry? Research focused on the extent to which 

the Hanford Site staff reached out to industry at conferences and through publication would also shed light on 

the question of the impact of the Hanford Site on the nuclear industry.

• In the 1970s, a major migration of staff from the nuclear division of the U.S. Navy to the Hanford Site occurred. 

The two organizations had drastically different approaches to operating procedures and conflicts emerged. 

Research is needed to understand how the interactions between these two distinct corporate cultures evolved.

• Comparative research is needed to explore similarities and differences among the nuclear production sites, 

between the production sites and the nuclear industry, and between the production complex and the military 

complex. Insights gained from the way the managers of these various entities organized their workers to develop

2 -1 2 .2 9
Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

new technology and manage complex and dangerous technology might have value to future large-scale 

governmental and private sector technology projects.

How have workers at the Hanford Site negotiated their roles as atomic weapons and energy employees with their 

personal lives? Were they afforded opportunities to partake in the forums of public activism or public 

participation? If so, how? If not, was it because of fear of redress by fellow employees or local residents?

A number of authors have examined the impact of the Hanford Site on the Tri-Cities (see, for example, . 

Deutschmann 1952, Findlay and Hevly 1995, Findlay 1996, Fleischer 1974; Noonan 2000). However, the 

social implications of nuclear communities need to be undertaken on a more comparative scale. How did 

workers shape or define life at the Hanford Site and in Richland versus social life at Los Alamos and the 

Oak Ridge Reservation? Did the conglomeration of people from all over the country create a unique mix of new 

social customs or invented traditions? Furthermore, the experiences of African Americans who worked at the 

Hanford Site during construction and operation are missing. Future studies need to address and document 

worker history for both minorities and women.

Concerning the larger history of work and labor relations in the United States, where does the Hanford Site fit in? 

What were the conflicts over union negotiations? How do worker experiences differ from other Du Pont and 

General Electric operations throughout the country?

Most recently reversing a position held for decades, DOE has admitted that many workers who built America's 

nuclear weapons products became ill because of exposure to radiation. In light of this, is it wrong to conclude 

that workers correctly remember feeling safe but that their trust was misplaced? How may this announcement 

affect the morale of workers at DOE installations today?
Ch apter

Gu id e to

Re s o u r c e

S .D . Cannon

P a c ific NaemwEST N a tio n a l L a b o k a to k y
Co n t e n t s

D ocum ents...........................................................................................3.1

Newspaper A rtic le s ........................................................................... 3.5

Photographs..........................................................................................3.6

Drawings, Maps, and Plans...............................................................3.8

Videotapes and Audiotapes...............................................................3.9

A rtifa cts .................................................................................................3.10

Automated Resources........................................................................ 3.10

Photo: Interior o f the H anford Technical Library (Neg. 25819-4)
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r c es

Ch a p te r 3 - Gu id e to Resources

The authors of the Hanford Site historic district book surveyed a broad range of resources in writing their respective 

sections. Sources they used are cited in the text and listed in the References Cited section of this book. Sources they did 

not use are listed in the section, "Bibliography for Further Information." W ith both listings available, the interested 

reader may pursue a topic at whatever level of detail they desire.

This guide to resources offers a springboard to future researchers by describing the collections of information about the 

Hanford Site. The focus is on the repositories at the Hanford Site and in the Tri-Cities area. Contractors for the 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operate many of the repositories described. Repositories of information about the 

Hanford Site not included in this guide are those such as the Washington State Historical Society, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, and former contractors, for example, Du Pont de Nemours (whose archives are housed at the Hagley Museum 

and Library in Wilmington, Delaware), General Electric, and Westinghouse companies.

Not all collections described are directly accessible by public researchers. Those denoted in the "Publicly Accessible 

Collections" sub-sections have staff available to help public researchers. Those in the "Other Collections" sub-sections 

are not accessible to public researchers. You can request materials needed from these "Other Collections" through the 

Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, E-Mail pubIic_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the 

Public Requests Service provides information that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that 

has not been cleared from the Freedom of Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop 

A7-75, Richland, Washington 99352, Tei. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other 

Collections" directly for information about access. In addition to this guide, the Internet has information on how to 

access Hanford Site information (http://www.hanford.sov/boards/openness/factsheets.htm).

The types of resources for which collections are identified in this chapter are:

• Documents

• Newspaper Articles

• Photographs

• Drawings, Maps, and Plans

• Videotapes and Audiotapes

• Artifacts

• Automated Resources

Do c u m e n t s

Documents about the Hanford Site are numerous. The collections described below represent the majority of the Hanford 

Site documents. Not all collections described are directly accessible by public researchers. Those denoted in the 

"Publicly Accessible Collections" sub-section have staff available to help public researchers. Those in the "Other 

Collections" sub-section are not accessible to public researchers. You can request materials needed from these "Other 

Collections" through the Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For 

a duplication fee, the Public Requests Service provides information that has been cleared for public release. You can 

request information that has not been cleared'from the Freedom of Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, 

P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A 7-75, Richland, Washington 99352, Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors 

should contact the "Other Collections" directly for information about access. In addition to this guide, the Internet has 

information on how to access Hanford Site information (http://www.hanford.gov/boards/openness/factsheets.htm).
Pu b l ic l y Ac c e s s ib le Co lle c tio n s

Hanford Technical Library

Location: Consolidated Information Center, Washington State University at Tri-Cities Campus, 2770 University

, Drive, Room 101, Richland, Washington

Mailing Address: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, Mailstop P8-55, Richland, Washington 99352

Telephone: (509) 372-7430

E-Mail: pnl.techlib@pnl.gov

Website: http://www.pn I .gov/tech I i b/home. htm I

Fax: (509) 372-7431

Hours: Monday - Friday 8 a .m .-9 p.m.

Saturday 10 a.m. - 4 p.m.

Sunday noon - 4 p.m.

Monday - Friday 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. (Technical Reports collection)

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operates the Hanford Technical Library to provide technical 

information support to PNNL and Hanford Site staff. The public is welcome to use the library's resources but may not 

check out materials. Self-service photocopiers, microform reader- printers, and computers are available to the public for 

research- purposes.

The library provides PNNL and Hanford Site staff with many resources and services, many directly at the desktop. PNNL 

and Hanford Site staff should refer to the library's internal web site or contact the library for additional information.

The library contains books, journals, industry standards, technical reports, and reference materials in print and microform 

as well as access to a variety of electronic resources. Many of the library's resources are related to the history of the 

Hanford Site, such as:

• Nuclear Science Abstracts

• Energy Research Abstracts

• Large collection of historical Hanford generated reports

Public Reading Room of the U.S. Department of Energy

Location: Consolidated Information Center, Washington State University, Tri-Cities Campus, 2770 University

Drive, Room 101L, Richland, Washington 

Mailing Address: P.O. Box 999, Mailstop H2-53, Richland, Washington 99352

Contact: Terri Traub, Tel. (509) 372-7443

E-Mail: doe.reading.room@pnl.gov

Website: http://reading-room.pnl.gov

Fax: . (509) 372-7444

Hours: Monday - Friday 10:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory operates the Hanford Public Reading Room to provide the public with 

access to information and documents about DOE and Hanford activities. The collection contains primarily paper 

copies of technical reports. Materials are for use in the Reading Room but copies can be made for a fee. A catalog of 

the collection is searchable over the Internet at http://rrcatalog.pnl.gov and, where available, contains links to electronic 

versions of reports. The Reading Room also provides the public with Internet access to DOE and Hanford related 

web sites.
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r ces

Administrative Record Public Access Room

Location: 2440 Stevens Center Place, Room 1101, Richland, Washington

Mailing Address: P.O. Box 950, Mailstop H6-08, Richland, Washington 99352

Contact: Debra A. Isom, Tel. (509) 376-2530

E-Mai I: Debra_A_Debbi_lsom@rl.gov

Website: http://www2.hanford.gov/arpir

Fax: (509) 376-4989

Hours: Monday - every other Friday 9-11:30 a.m. and 1-3:30 p.m.

The Administrative Record Public Access Room houses documents referred to in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement

and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) as administrative records. Administrative records are documents and 

information relied on to arrive at a final decision for remedial action or hazardous waste management. An administrative 

record is established for each operable unit and Treatment, Storage, and Disposal group and contains all documents with 

information considered in arriving at a record of decision or permit. A ll documents contained in the administrative 

record files are publicly available.

Public Requests Service

Contact: Anne L. Weaver, Tel. (509) 376-1418

E-Mail: public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov

The Public Requests Service allows individuals to obtain copies of a variety of cleared documents generated at the 

Hanford Site, including reports, speeches, procedures, videos, and photographs. The Service searches a number of 

databases, charges $0.10/page for most paper documents and duplication costs for other forms of information. If the 

Service is unable to provide a requested document, the requester may be referred to the Freedom of Information Act 

process.

Freedom of Information Act Requests

M ailing Address: Freedom of Information Act Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A7-75, 

Richland, Washington 99352

Telephone: (509) 376-6216

When information is not otherwise publicly available, anyone can request documents through the DOE Freedom of 

Information Officer at the Hanford Site. Requests must indicate that the request is being made under the Freedom o f

Information Act, identify the information being sought so an employee familiar with the subject can locate it in a 

reasonable amount of time, and must express a willingness to pay costs for search time and duplication of documents.

A public, non-commercial requester can receive the first 100 pages and 2 hours of search tim e at no cost Search and. 

retrieval of classified documents ,requested through the Freedom o f information A ct is no different than for unclassified 

documents. Classified documents, however, undergo a declassification review. A requester does not need to know 

where records are stored to make a request.

Ot h e r Co lle c tio n s

You can request materials needed from these "Other Collections" through the Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376- 

1418, E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the Public Requests Service provides 

information, which has been cleared for public release. You can request information that has not been cleared from the 

Freedom of Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A7-75, Richland, Washington 

99352, Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other Collections" directly for 

information about access.

3 .3
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r c es

Contractor Central Files

Contractor Central Files houses record copies o f unclassified documents the U.S. Department of Energy and its 

contractors have generated - both internal and external publications. Documents may be reviewed before ordering a 

copy. The Contractor Central Files also houses controlled unclassified documents, those that have been assigned a 

document control number and for which distribution is tracked. Controlled unclassified documents may be obtained by 

calling the Controlled Document Management Office, Federal Building, Room 386, Tel. 509-376-6831. Need-to-know 

is required for access to both unclassified and unclassified controlled documents.

Classified Document Control Center

The Classified Document Control Center is the repository for classified and declassified historical documents that are 

either Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) documents or DOE documents in the custody of PHMC. The 

documents are filed alpha/numerically by document number, but database searches may be performed using author 

name, key words, subject, or title. An appropriate security clearance and the need-to-know are required for access to 

classified matter.

Classified Matter Control Center

The Classified Matter Control Center is a repository for classified and declassified historical documents that are either 

PNNL) documents or DOE documents in the custody of PNNL. The documents are filed numerically by document 

number, but database searches may be performed using author name, key words, subject, or title. An appropriate 

security clearance and the need-to-know are required for access to classified matter.

Hanford Site Records Holding Area

Official records of the DOE Richland Operations Office and its contractors that must be retained because of their record 

value are retired to the Hanford Site Records Holding Area (RHA). When retired, records are packed into record storage 

boxes and sent to RHA. Information on the contents of each box is entered into an automated data system called the 

RHA-MIS, and the box is shelved in the 712 Building Records Storage Vault for a period of time. The length of time that 

a given class of records must be maintained in storage is specified by the applicable DOE Records Schedule, or in the 

more generic General Records Schedule published by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). If 

lengthy record retention is required by the applicable records schedule, the box is shipped to the Federal Records Center 

in Seattle, Washington, which is operated by NARA, or to other record storage facilities provided by DOE. The total 

volume of records in storage now exceeds 80,000 ft3. Other than the small percentage of records that have been 

identified for permanent (historical) retention, all other records are normally destroyed at the end of their retention 

periods.

Records in storage may be retrieved by DOE or by the contractor that retired them. To access official records in 

retirement, DOE Richland Operations Office, Office of River Protection, and contractor staff should make the request 

through their own records management group. Others should make the request by contacting the contractor:

DOE Records Officer Gail Splett 376-8274

Records Holding Manager George Vondruska 376-5087

Environmental Restoration Contractor Resource Center

The Environmental Restoration Contractor Resource Center contains documents from various Hanford Site contractors 

from the 1940s-1990s. The collection consists primarily of documents used for research on waste site characterization 

and remediation along with some documents and reference materials originating from the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, state, and other federal agencies.

3 .4
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r c es

CH2M HILL, Hanford, Inc. Geosciences Library

The Geosciences Library houses numerous technical reports and other geologic, geochemical, hydrologic, and 

geophysical documents from various DOE contractors at the Hanford Site from the 1950s-1990s. The collection relates 

primarily to Hanford Site wells, vadose zone, groundwater monitoring and remediation, and environmental monitoring 

and surveillance activities for buildings, facilities, and waste sites in the 100, 200, 300, 400, and 1100 areas.

N e w s p a p e r Ar t ic l e s

Local and regional newspapers have published many articles written about the Hanford Site and its facilities over the past 

50 years. This section describes newspaper collections of interest to Hanford Site researchers. These newspaper 

collections are publicly available.

Ric h l a n d Vil l a g e r

Location: Richland Public Library, 955 Northgate Drive, Richland, Washington

Contact: Kathy Knudsen, Tel. (509) 942-7457

E-Mail: referenc@richland.lib.wa.us

Website: www.richland.lib.wa.us

Fax: (509) 942-7447

Hours (Winter): Monday -Friday 9:30 a.m. - 9 p.m.

Saturday 9:30 a.m. - 5 p.m.

Sunday 1 - 5 p.m.

Hours (Summer): Monday -Thursday 9:30 a.m. - 9 p.m.

Friday -Saturday 9:30 a.m. - 5 p.m.

Sunday Closed

The Richland Villager newspaper was a weekly newspaper published for Hanford Site employees and their families from 

November 1, 1945 through March 2, 1950. The Richland Public Library has copies of the Richland Villager newspaper 

on microfilm from 1945-1950 and some but notail of the hard copies. The successor to the Richland Villager was the 

Columbia Basin News, which the Richland Public Library also has on file. You may ask reference questions on the 

Richland Library website by selecting "reference" - "select topic" - "information" and then sending an E-Mail with your 

reference question.

Ha n f o r d Pl a n t Ne w s p a p e r s

Location: Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology, 95 Lee Boulevard, Richland,

Washington 99352 

Contact: Connie Estep, Curator, Tel. (509) 943-9000

E-Mail: cestep@crehst.org .

Website: http://www.crehst.org

Fax: (509) 943-1770

Hours: Monday - Saturday 10 a .m .-5 p.m. .

Sunday noon - 5 p.m.

The Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology (CREHST) has bound volumes o f the Hanford Site 

weekly newspaper from 1947-1982. The newspaper is variously titled: Hanford CE News, Hanford Project News, and 

Rockwell News. Access to holdings not on exhibit is by advance appointment. Please allow a minimum of 2 weeks for 

access to holdings not on exhibit.

3 .5
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Re so u r c es

Co m m u n it y N e w s p a p e r s

Location: Mid-Columbia Library, Kennewick Branch, 1620 S. Union, Kennewick, Washington

Telephone: (509) 783-7878

E-Mail galaxy@mcl-lib.org

Website: www.mcl-lib.org

Fax: (509) 735-2063

Hours: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday 9 a^m. - 9 p.m.

Friday - Saturday 9 a.m. - 5 p.m.

Sunday 1 - 5 p.m.

The Tri-City Herald newspaper has published many articles on the Hanford Site. A ll issues (1948-curreht) are recorded 

on m icrofilm and are housed at the Mid-Columbia Library, Kennewick Branch. The library also has copies of the 

Kennewick Courier from September 9, 1943 to February 4, 1950. Other local libraries have copies of the Tri-City Herald

as well.

Re g io n a l N e w s p a p e r s

The Spokesman-Review in Spokane, Washington has published many articles on the Hanford Site. A computer database 

is available for keyword searches for articles dating back to July 1994. Hard copy files of newspaper clippings dating 

back to the 1920s are categorized by subject. Search requests may be directed to the Library Research Line 

(Tel. 800-789-0029, ext. 5576). Search requests for photographs should be directed to the Photo Research Line 

(Tel. 800-789-0029, ext. 5416). For both extensions, leave a message and someone w ill return your call. The SpokaneReview charges for their research service. The rates are available on request.

The Seattle Times and Seattle Post-intelligencer have also published numerous articles about the Hanford Site. An 

automated search service like that of the Spokesman-Review is not available. However, the Seattle Public Library has all 

the Seattle Times and Seattle Post-Intelligencer newspapers on file and available through the Magazine and Newspaper 

Department (Tel. 206-386-4680) for in-person research using CD-ROMs and microfilm. You can request the microfilm at 

your local library through an inter-library loan. The Business Technology Department (Tel. 206-386-4645) has a card file 

that indexes Hanford-related articles from 1945-1990s. The Humanities Department (Tel. 206-386-4625) also holds a 

card file index on the Hanford Site dating from August 1945 to April 1992 that includes articles from both newspapers.

P h o t o g r a p h s

Hanford Site photographs are stored at numerous locations. Below are the locations with the largest collections. Not all 

collections described are directly accessible by public researchers. The one denoted in the "Publicly Accessible 

Collection" sub-section has staff available to'help public researchers. Those in the "Other Collections" sub-section are 

not accessible to public researchers. You can request materials needed from these "Other Collections" through the 

Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the 

Public Requests Service provides information that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that 

has not been cleared from the Freedom of Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop 

A7-75, Richland, Washington 99352, Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other 

Collections" directly for information about access. In addition to this guide, the Internet has information on how to 

access Hanford Site information (http://www.hanford.gov/boards/openness/factsheets.htm).
C h a p te r 3 - Gu id e to Reso urces

Publicly Accessible Collection

Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology

Location: 95 Lee Boulevard, Richland, Washington 99352

Contact: Connie Estep, Curator, Tel. (509) 943-9000

-E-Mail: cestep@crehst.org

Website: http://www.crehst.org

Fax: (509) 943-1770

Hours: Monday - Saturday 10 a.m. - 5 p.m.

Sunday noon - 5 p.m.

The Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology (CREHST) has an extensive collection of historic 

photographs of the Hanford Site. CREHST's total collection numbers approximately 2500 photographs, including many 

photographs of the Hanford Site and City o f Richland from 1943-1945 with original negative numbers. CREHST has two 

indices to this group of photographs. In addition, CREHST has over 300 photographs with negative numbers, which are 

in the Hanford News volumes (1947-1982) stored at CREHST. CREHST also has a small collection of prints of the former 

Hanford and W hite Bluffs town sites from around 1910-1940. The museum w ill be creating a database of its photograph 

collections in the near future for retrieval by subject headings. As groups of photographs are entered in the database, 

they w ill be scanned and made available on the Internet. Copies of photographs are available. Please allow a minimum 

of 2 weeks.

Other Coiiections

You can request materials needed from these "Other Collections" through the Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376- 

1418, E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the Public Requests Service provides 

information that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that has not been cleared from the 

Freedom of Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A7-75, Richland, Washington 

99352, Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other Collections" directly for 

information about access.

Hanford Site Photography Archive

The Hanford Site Photography Archive provides complete photographic services and is the official, centralized repository 

of Hanford Site photographs. Its holdings include negatives of photographs taken at the Hanford Site since 1944. The 

Archive has a database and catalogs of its holdings. If the negative number of the desired photograph is known, an order 

may be placed with the Public Requests Service for a print. Negatives are not loaned.

Hanford Site Records Holding Area

The Hanford Site Records Holding Area has a collection of negatives dating from 1943 to the early 1990s that have been 

transferred from the Hanford Site Photography Archive and from various Hanford Site contractors. Roughly 

50,000-60,000 negatives are stored at this repository.

A collection originally housed by CH2M HILL was retired to the Records Holding Area in early 2000. This collection has 

around 75 binders (approximately 2000 photographs) of prints primarily o f site cleanup and building demolition 

activities dating from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s.

Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory

The Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory collection that PNNL operates consists primarily of prints (approximately 

200) and slides (several thousand) of cultural resource projects on the Hanford Site dating from the mid-1980s. The 

collection also includes aerial photographs of the Hanford Site (some dating to before 1943), two binders of photographs 

of the former Hanford and W hite Bluffs townsites, and Herbert Krieger's 1926 photographs of the Wanapum Indians.

3 .7
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r ces

Bechtel Hanford, Inc.

Environmental Information Systems at Bechtel Hanford, Inc. maintains photographs and negatives (approximately 2000) 

related to waste management, cultural resources, and geologic site projects. This collection includes five map drawers of 

aerial photographs of the Hanford Site as well as one file drawer of negatives of U.S. Geographic Survey aerial 

photographs from 1948. Their collection also includes approximately 2000 photographs that have been scanned into the 

Waste Information Data System.

Bechtel Hanford, Inc. maintains a collection o f approximately 1500 photographs of the B Plant from the 1950s-1990s. 

This collection covers construction and deactivation, operations, cranes, equipment, interiors and exteriors of buildings. 

Some of the photographs are organized by subject, such as canyon crane, cask loading, cell construction, HEPA filters, 

hot pipe trench, and sand filter building. In addition, Bechtel Hanford, Inc. maintains a collection of 1950s-1990s 

photographs of PUREX construction, operations, and equipment.

CH2M HILL, Hanford, Inc.

The CH2M HILL collection consists of approximately 100 photographs of construction at the Hanford Site from the early 

1940s through the construction of N Reactor in the 1960s.

Fast Flux Test Facility

The Fast Flux Test Facility maintains approximately 1500 photographs of the facility and the 400 Area dating from 

1970-1990s. The photographs at this repository are mostly color prints.

Fuel Fabrication Facility for N Reactor Fuel

The collection in the Fuel Fabrication Facility includes approximately 1000 photographs, primarily of the Fuel 

Fabrication Facility complex buildings from 1979-1990s, with most dating from the mid-to-late 1980s. Some exceptions 

in this collection included two binders of the construction of the Plutonium Recycle Critical Facility and photographs of 

the 313 Building dating from 1969.

Plutonium Finishing Plant

The Plutonium Finishing Plant maintains a collection of approximately 1500 photographs, primarily from the 

1950s-1990s o f interiors and exteriors of the 234-5Z Building, including instrumentation and equipment, shielded hoods, 

glove boxes, sludge stabilization, and non-destructive assay equipment. The collection also includes a small collection 

of World War II era photographs and some photographs from 1948-1949 of the construction of the Plutonium Finishing 

Plant.

T Plant

The photographic collection at T Plant consists of approximately 1500 photographs. This collection includes 

photographs of T Plant facilities, employees, interiors and exteriors of the T Plant Canyon Building, PUREX, 

decontamination of the centrifuge, decontamination activities, and aerial photographs of the rail yard.

Dr a w i n g s , Ma p s , a n d Pl a n s

Drawings, maps, and plans for the Hanford Site are numerous and in a variety of locations. Below are the collections 

containing the largest numbers of drawings, maps, and plans. The collections described are not publicly accessible. You 

can request materials needed from these "Other Collections" through the Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, 

E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the Public Requests Service provides information 

that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that has not been cleared from the Freedom of 

Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A7-75, Richland, Washington 99352,
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r ces

Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact these collections directly for information about 

access. In addition to this guide, the Internet has information on how to access Hanford Site information (http;// 

www.hanford.gov/boards/openness/factsheets.htm).

Ha n f o r d Cu l t u r a l Res o u r c es La b o r a t o r y

The Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory has a collection of historic and current maps of the Hanford Site, some of 

which are U.S. Geological Survey maps.

U.S. De p a r t m e n t of En e r g y

The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, has all original Hanford Site engineering drawings. Over

300,000 engineering drawings have been created, dating back to the early 1940s. The drawings cover all phases and 

aspects of the Hanford Site.

Vid e o t a p e s a n d Au d io t a p e s

Numerous Hanford Site videotapes and audiotapes exist. The following list describes the main collections and their 

locations. DOE contractors have collections of their own videotapes and audiotapes as well. O nly the Columbia River 

Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology collection is publicly accessible.

Pu b l ic l y Ac c e s s ib le Co lle c tio n

River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology

95 Lee Boulevard, Richland, Washington 99352 

Connie Estep, Curator, Tel. (509) 943-9000 

cestep@crehst.org 

http://www.crehst.org 

(509) 943-1770

Monday - Saturday 10 a.m. - 5 p.m.

Sunday noon - 5 p.m.

The Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology (CREHST) has several series o f oral history tapes, 

including 1998 interviews with former Camp Hanford residents, 1995-1996 interviews described below, the 1991 Old 

Timer's Topical Colloquium II, and 1990 interviews with former B Reactor staff. CREHST is just beginning to transcribe 

these tapes. Researchers may listen to tapes of these oral history sessions by making an appointment during office hours 

with CREHST a minimum of 2 weeks in advance.

Members of the Hanford Site Historic Buildings Mitigation Project interviewed several groups of former employees who 

volunteered to share their reminiscences about the Hanford Site. The interviews were conducted weekly from December 

14, 1995 to January 25, 1996. Attempts were made to record all the interviews. However, the recording equipment did 

not always work. Transcripts of the tapes were anticipated but have not been made. Conversations recorded on these 

tapes covered a broad range of topics such as working under tight security, specific accomplishments, challenges, 

entertainment, etc. Different aspects of the same topic might be explored each week, depending on the group's 

membership. Nevertheless, the centra! focus of "W hat was it like to w ork at Hanford?" always remained the same.

Ot h e r Co llec tio n s

You can request materials needed from this "Other Collection" through the Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, 

E-Mail public requests hanford docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the Public Requests Service provides information 

that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that has not been cleared from the Freedom of

Columbia

Location:

Contact:

E-Mail:

Website:

Fax:

Hours:
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r c es

Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A7-75, Richland, Washington 99352,

Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other Collections" directly for information 

about access.

Ha n f o r d Sit e Vid e o Ar c h iv e

The Hanford Site Video Archive is the official, centralized repository of Hanford produced and other videotapes and 

audiotapes depicting the Hanford Site and its operations. An automated index to videotape holdings exists.

Ar t if a c t s

Objects that illustrate the history of the Hanford Site are considered to be special visual images of the past. Artifacts such 

as historic signs, instruments, tools and equipment for various professions, facility models, uniforms, and furniture (to 

name a few) are collected by professionals to provide a sense o f life in the past. The Hanford Curation Strategy:

Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Artifacts and Records describes the methods used to select and preserve artifacts 

from the Hanford Site. Listed below is the contact information for locating the artifacts that have been preserved. This 

location is publicly accessible.

Co l u m b ia Riv e r Ex h ib it io n o f His t o r y , Sc ie n c e , a n d Tec h n o lo g y

95 Lee Boulevard, Richland, Washington 99352 

Connie Estep, Curator, Tel. (509} 943-9000 

cestep@crehst.org 

http://www.crehst. org 

(509) 943-1770

Monday - Saturday 10 a.m. - 5 p.m.

Sunday noon - 5 p.m.

The Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology (CREHST) is a nonprofit educational museum and 

science center that manages the Hanford Site Manhattan Project/Cold War Era collection of artifacts. The artifacts 

CREHST manages are in a variety o f locations. A few are continuously on display, but the majority are either stored in 

warehouses or are still in their original buildings. Call CREHST for information concerning particular types of artifacts. 

Access to holdings not on exhibit is by advance appointment. Please allow a minimum of 2 weeks.

Au t o m a t e d Re s o u r c e s

Numerous automated resources are available for accessing information about the Hanford Site. Not all automated 

resources described are directly accessible by public researchers. Those denoted in the "Publicly Accessible Collections" 

sub-section have staff available to help public researchers. The one in the "Other Collection" sub-section is not 

accessible to public researchers. You can request materials needed from the "Other Collection" through the Public 

Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the Public 

Requests Service provides information that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that has not 

been cleared from the Freedom of Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A 7-75, 

Richland, Washington 99352, Tel. 509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other Location" 

directly for information about access. In addition to this guide, the Internet has information on how to access Hanford 

Site information (http://www.hanford.gov/boards/openness/factsheets.htm).

Location

Contact:

E-Mail:

Website:

Fax:

Hours:
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r ces

Publicly Accessible Collections

Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System

Website: http://www2. hanford.gov/declass/

The Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System is the Internet site, along with OpenNet (http://www.osti.gov/ 

opennet/), where declassified documents are made available. The intent is to provide easy and timely access to recently 

declassified Hanford documents, including documents declassified in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. 

This database is updated regularly as more documents become available.

Hanford Geographic Information System

Website: http://www.bhi-erc.eom/profects/p m/eis/hgis/hgis.htm

^Location: 3350 George Washington Way, Mailstop H0-20, Richland, Washington 99352

Contact: Linda A. Dietz, Tel. 372-9378

E-Mail: ladietz@bhi-erc.com

Fax: (509) 375-4644

The Hanford Geographic Information System (HGIS) provides online Hanford Site geographical data. HGIS has detailed 

mapping of all areas at the Hanford Site, showing the location of buildings and other structures, underground lines, waste 

sites, test wells, fences, streets and highways, utilities, railroads, rivers, ponds, and lakes. High-quality Hanford Site maps 

can be generated from HGIS data (see http://www.bhi-erc.com/moiomap/hanford MF.htm).

U.S. Department of Energy Information Bridge

Website: http://www.osti.gov/bridge/

Mailing Address: U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Depository Library Program, 732 North Capitol Street NW, 

Washington, D.C. 20401 

Telephone: (883) 293-6498

E-Mail: gpoaccess@gpo.gov

Prerequisites: Internet Access. System functionality requires a 486 Pentium PC, MAC or UNIX work station capable

of running an Internet browser, Netscape 3.01 or greater or Microsoft 4.0 or greater and your browser

must be JavaScript enabled and accept cookies.

The U.S. Department of Energy Information Bridge is a public website that provides free access to the full text and 

bibliographic records of DOE research and development reports in physics, chemistry, materials, biology, environmental 

sciences, energy technologies, engineering, computer and information science, renewable energy, and other topics. This 

system includes a growing collection of over 2 m illion searchable pages in over 27,000 reports DOE and the DOE 

contractor research and development community have produced and released to the public since January 1996.

Unique functionality includes full-text searching of each page of the entire collection. Users can electronically access, 

locate, search and download reports, select easy or advanced search Options and lim it search queries to specific data 

fields combined w ith Boolean operators to increase search precision. Reports can be viewed in GIF, TLF, or PDF format 

and can be downloaded in PDF or native formats. Access to the DOE Information Bridge is available without passwords 

or registration restrictions.

3 .1 1
Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Reso u r c es

U.S. Department of Energy Information Locator

Website: http://www.directives.doe.gov/

E-Mail: explorer@lanl.gov

The U.S. Department of Energy Information Locator is a two-stage information database. The initial Locator allows a full 

text search of DOE records that have been submitted to the Information Locator. The Complex Search Form allows 

searches by field.

U.S. Department of Energy Open Net Database

Website: http://www.osti.gov/opennet/

Contact: Douglas Zimmerman, Tel. (301) 903-4864

E-Mail: Doug.Zrmmerman@hq.doe.gov

OpenNet is an electronic method of searching for documents, particularly those DOE has declassified. Many are 

available in full text form on the Internet, and all are available as paper copy. Other materials for which you can search 

on Open Net are historical records and weapons films. The O ffite of Science and Technical Information, an office of 

DOE, operates OpenNet.

Waste Information Data System

Website: http://www.bhi-erc.eom/proiects/p m/eis/wids/w?ds.htm

Location: 3350 George Washington Way, Mailstop H0-20, Richland, Washington 99352

Contact: Linda A. Dietz, Tel. 372-9378

E-Mail: ladietz@bhi-erc.com

Fax: (509) 375-4644

The Waste Information Data System (WIDS) is part of the Environmental Sites Database and offers Hanford personnel an 

online list and description of all Hanford waste sites. WIDS shows the official site name and alias, its location, 

description, history, dimensions, waste description and volume, process history, and other data, as applicable.

Ot h e r Co ll e c tio n

You can request materials needed from this "Other Collection" through the Public Requests Service (Tel. 509-376-1418, 

E-Mail public_requests_hanford_docs@rl.gov). For a duplication fee, the Public Requests Service provides information 

that has been cleared for public release. You can request information that has not been cleared from the Freedom of 

Information Act Officer (U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, Mailstop A7-75, Richland, Washington 99352, Tel. 

509-376-6288). DOE staff and their contractors should contact the "Other Collection" directly for information about 

access.

Hanford Environmental Information System

The Hanford Environmental Information System (HEIS) offers online data from analytical sampling results related to 

characterization, monitoring, and cleanup. HEIS includes air sampling, biota, groundwater, soil, and mixed media; for 

example, analyses of Hanford waste sites, fauna, flora, and groundwater wells. The potential contaminants of concern 

analyzed include radiological and chemical.
Ch a p t e r 4

Re c o m m e n d a t io n s

fo r Fu t u r e Us e s -

r.£. M akceau

Bechtel Ha n io k u , In c .
Co n t e n t s

Objectives of Preservation in P lace................................................4.1

Public P articipation............................................................................. 4.2

Recommendations fo r Public Education and Interpretation .... 4.2

Recommendations for Adaptive Use and Economic 

D evelopm ent.........................................................................................4.9

Photo: Departm ent o f Energy Transportation Maintenance

Building N o w Used by the Livingston Rebuild Center for

Locomotive Repairs and Railroad W orker Training.
Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r Fu t u r e Uses o f Str u c tu r es

Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r

Fu t u r e Uses

The purpose of this book is to preserve in words, diagrams, and photographs the structures at the Hanford Site because 

the majority of them have been or w ill be demolished. However, because of the national and international significance 

of the Hanford Site, certain properties should be left in place to illustrate the scope and scale of the various missions that 

developed the atomic energy program and supported national security. This chapter describes those properties proposed 

to be left in place, the public process that arrived at the recommendations, and introduces a vision of heritage tourism at 

the Hanford Site.

Whereas Chapter 2 describes the various missions, in particular the process for producing plutonium, as a way of 

preserving the Hanford Site in book form, this chapter recommends which structures should be preserved in their actual 

form. The highest form of preservation is retention in place. Properties that are occupied in association w ith ongoing 

functions are maintained and serviced so 

as to remain in operable condition.

Fortunately, the Hanford Site still retains 

the potential for in-place public 

interpretation. This is despite the fact 

that with the focus now on cleanup, the 

majority of Manhattan Project and Cold 

War Era buildings and structure no 

longer make a contribution to the 

Hanford mission and are scheduled for 

new uses or demolition. Having 

outlived their original usefulness, however, makes some of the properties that played key roles in the production of 

plutonium prime candidates for preservation. For example, given the international significance of the 105-B Reactor and 

its association with the initial development of atomic energy, this facility should be retained as an interpretive center. 

Likewise, the 100-K Area Flocculation Basins and Clearwells were not designed to accommodate the rearing of salmon, 

sturgeon and other fish species, but the operation of these pools as a hatchery by the Yakama Indian Nation is a perfect 

example of adaptive use that provides both economic benefit and returns a natural resource to the Columbia River.

Such examples of alternate use offer the opportunity for heritage tourism. Heritage tourism, defined as the visitation of 

sites of historic or cultural importance, would allow members of the local, national, and international communities to 

literally walk behind the fences and experience the facilities first-hand. Additionally, the identification, collection, and 

preservation of significant objects relating to Hanford's history (for example, tools, instruments, machinery, clothing) are 

key components of any public interpretation initiative. W hile it is not within the scope of this chapter to finalize the 

details o f how site visitation would be accomplished or how visitors would be accommodated, it is appropriate both to 

advance the concept and to identify the buildings and infrastructure that would allow for it.

Ob j e c t iv e s o f P r e s e r v a t io n i n Pla c e

The decision to retain a facility in place must be based on an explicit understanding of what its preservation w ill 

accomplish. As scholarly and public interest in the Manhattan Project and Cold War era continues to grow, attention to 

the Hanford Site's contribution to those periods w ill increase. Preservation of certain structures at the Hanford Site 

would contribute to public education and interpretation. Information of interest to researchers and the public w ill 

include topics such as the history of the Hanford Site, nuclear technology and accomplishments, environmental issues,

Q uestion'- Posed In the A d \ isorv C m nn.il on I lislo ric Prc^erx .ilio n

l> ii t'tum yh in <>('>' .in fr i/ir /i/e to c drsp/.u .ihn ui the d v w la p m v n t o f ihv

o ln m it ho rn h J W ould the o p p ititu n if\ to w en <?/> acfu.i/ /v>Os nut Ivor

re.it tot i o n tio l nw m o r Ihv H tnk-p .tt v- n h v iv lo t Man .m d h ttlv Urn

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4 .1
Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u t u r e Uses o f Str u c tu r e s

and social and cultural aspects of life at the Hanford Site. In addition to public education and interpretation, economic 

development is a second area in which Hanford facilities could make a continuing contribution to the local community.

However, the decision to retain a facility in place must be tempered by the long-term commitment of resources required 

to maintain that facility in a safe condition, particularly if the facility w ill be open to the public. In addition to funding, 

other factors that affect in-place preservation at the Hanford Site include environmental regulations that require removal 

of the structure, radiological or chemical contamination, disintegration of the structure, and limited or no educational or 

interpretive value.

P u b l ic P a r t ic ip a t io n

To help determine which structures should be retained as interpretive centers, museums, industrial or manufacturing 

facilities, or other private enterprises, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) invited the public to a series of meetings 

called Issues Exchanges. This was in keeping with the National Historic Preservation Act, which advocates that Federal 

agencies "seek and consider the views of the public when taking steps to identify historic properties, evaluate effects, and 

develop alternatives" (36 CFR 800 1986, 800.1 [c][2][iv]).

The first Issues Exchange was held on October 29, 1997. To acquaint those in attendance with the overall goals and to 

ensure participation on an equal footing, pertinent sections of the Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Coid War Era

Historic District Treatment Plan (Marceau 1998) were reviewed. The need for public involvement to identify buildings to 

retain in place was the central point of the presentation. On December 2, 1997 a second Issues Exchange was held to 

determine how the public could participate as decision-makers. As a result of this meeting, a Federal/Public working 

group was formed. Additional working sessions were held on January 27, February 11, March 4, and April 2, 1998.

Re c o m m e n d a t io n s f o r P u b l ic Ed u c a t io n a n d

In t e r p r e t a t io n

The Federal/Public working group decided that public education and interpretation would best be served by heritage 

tourism. To address the goal of preservation in place through heritage tourism, the working group envisioned a tour of 

the Hanford Site as it might take place some time after the year 2010. The working group reasoned that a full 

appreciation of the Hanford Site could only be obtained by ensuring that selected structures across the site be maintained 

in place so as to present to the visitor the true scale of the industrial landscape.

So visitors can understand the purpose for which the structures were built, the working group designated the thematic 

approach outlined in the Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era Historic District Treatment Plan (Marceau 

1998) as the organizing principle for determining the selection of buildings that would constitute the tour. Consideration 

was given to selecting buildings that would interpret the process for producing plutonium at the Hanford Site:

• First, preparing the uranium for the reactors, known as fuel manufacturing

• Second, irradiating the uranium in the reactors to produce plutonium, known as reactor operations

• Third, separating the plutonium from the base uranium, known as chemical separations

• Fourth, refining and then converting the plutonium for use in atomic weapons, known as plutonium finishing

Figure 4.1 shows these processes and the key structures where the processes took place. Interpretation would be linked 

to these processes, and the tour would be structured in the same order as the processes.
C h a p te r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s f o r F u tu re Uses o f S tru c tu re s

B egin

Storage of Fuel 181B 1

Components Water

Urti Needed Treatment

to Reactors

Storage of E *

i--------

Testing of

Uranium Fuel

Billets Components

111BN Irradiation Exhaust and 

Within Monitoring

Reactor

Canning of 

Shaping Fuel Rods

of Fuel Rods

212M

Irradiated

Fuel

Storage

Plutonium

Finishing

Plant

Exhaust and 

Monitoring

291T

Exhaust and 

Monitoring

Chemical

Separations

incinerator

Waste

Reduction

Chemical

Storage

Product Laboratory

Support

Product

Storage

Figure 4.1. Plutonium Production Process and Key Structures for Those Processes at the Hanford Site

He r ita g e Fa c il it ie s

Fuel Manufacturing (300 Area)

The first step in the production of plutonium was the m illing of uranium fuel elements (commonly referred to as "fuel 

slugs") within the 300 Area. This process began with the arrival of purified uranium billets from offsite sources. These 

billets, cylindrical bars of metallic uranium tetrafluride (UF ), were stored in specially designed buildings to ensure both 

security and accountability. Samples of these billets were tested at random to ensure quality. Billets of suitable quality 

were first extruded into rough uranium cores, then fabricated into fuel elements. Fabrication involved machining to 

proper size, grinding, cleaning, cladding, canning or jacketing as appropriate, and testing (see Chapter 2, Section 2 for a 

detailed discussion). Following fabrication, the fuel elements were sent to the 100 Area for irradiation within the 

reactors. The working group selected the follow ing buildings as those necessary to tell the story of fuel manufacturing:

303-A - Fresh Metal Storage Building: The 303-A Building was built in 1943 to store uranium billets (known as "fresh 

metal" because of the form in which they were received). It also functioned as a holding area where unirradiated fuel 

elements could be inspected, and tested for correct measurements and component assembly to ensure not only that 

fabrication had been successful but also that the fuel elements would not fail under irradiation. "Dum m y" fuel elements 

(metallic spacers used to arrange the fuel elements within the reactor core) were brought back from the 100 Area to the 

303-A Building to be cleaned, re-measured, and inspected for reuse. The 303-A Building is still used as a storage space 

for uranium billets received before the closure of N Reactor. The building is a one story, one room, concrete and 

concrete block structure. No architectural modifications are visible.

314 - Metallurgical Engineering Laboratory: The initial steps in fuel fabrication consisted of heating raw uranium billets 

in a furnace, then passing the heated billets through an extrusion press to produce fuel elements of specific dimensions. 

Both steps were conducted in an inert gas atmosphere within the 314 Building. After extrusion, hydrogen gas was

4 .3
Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u t u r e Uses o f Str u c tu r e s

removed ("outgassed") from the fuel elements, which were then straightened and sent to the 313 Building for machining 

and jacketing. These operations began in 1944. The 314 Building continued to heat, extrude, and straighten uranium 

fuel elements, provide autoclave and radiographic testing of canned elements, and assist in uranium scrap processing 

operations until 1971 when the last of the single-pass reactors closed. Modifications following that date allowed the 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to conduct a variety o f research projects w ithin the facility.

313 - Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility: The mission of the 313 Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility was to machine bare 

uranium fuel elements to desired dimensions for irradiation in Hanford's reactors, to jacket or can the fuel elements, and 

test the jackets for proper bonding and sealing (see the Historic American Engineering Record for the 313 Building in 

Appendix B on the Internet). Machining operations began in the 313 Building in December 1943. Canning operations 

began March 1944. The finished fuel elements were first irradiated in the 105-B Reactor in September 1944. In 1949, 

lithium-aluminum alloy fuel targets were fabricated. Following irradiation in the 105-B Reactor, these targets produced 

the tritium used in the first hydrogen weapons test. Over its operational lifetime, the 313 Building fabricated fuel for all 

of Hanford's single-pass reactors. This facility also produced some components of the fuel elements used in the 105-N 

Reactor. In addition to fabrication, researchers developed and continuously improved methods for canning fuel elements 

within the 313 Building. Lastly, uranium scrap recovery processes, recovery of uranium from waste acids, and recovery 

of chemical wastes were all undertaken within the 313 Building. The 313 Building has been emptied and is awaiting 

demolition.

305 - Test Pile (Reactor)/Hot Cell Verification Building: Built in 1944, the 305 Test Pile (Reactor) was the first operating 

reactor on the Hanford Site. "The low power (about 50 watts), graphite-moderated pile was originally used as a quality 

assurance tool to test samples of graphite, uranium, aluminum tubes and canning materials (for fuel rod [element] 

jackets), and other materials to be used in the original production reactors (B, D, and F Reactors)" (see the Expanded 

Historic Property Inventory Form for the 305 Building in Appendix B on the Internet). When analyzed against samples of 

known purity, the reactivity of uranium samples tested in the 305 Building could be used to predict the efficiency of the 

sample under full-scale production conditions. Because the graphite used in the production reactors had to be extremely 

pure, tests conducted on graphite samples w ithin the 305 Building were critical to the success of reactor operations. An 

addition was made to the building in the late 1970s "when most of the 305 Building was converted to the Hot Cell 

Verification Facility, a non-radioactive ('cold') prototype and all purpose support facility for the Fuel Manufacture and 

Examination Facility in the 400 Area" (see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 305 Building in 

Appendix B on the Internet). In light of this new mission for the 305 Building, uranium was removed from the test pile in 

1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 5 . The pile itself was removed and buried In 1977-1978. Further modifications followed in 1985 and the early 

1990s when the 305 Building was first adapted to support Rockwell's Process Facility Modifications Program and later 

the 100-K Spent Nuclear Fuel Basins Program, respectively.

Reactor Operations (100 Area)

Uranium fuel elements were irradiated within one of nine reactors over the productive lifetime of the Hanford Site.

Given the heat generated by fissioning, cooling of the reactor cores was an essential element in the production of 

plutonium. So too was monitoring the process itself to ensure minimal impact on the health of workers and the 

environment. The working group selected the following buildings as those necessary to tell the story of fuel irradiation 

within the reactors:

181-B - River Rump House: "The basic functions of the 181 Buildings were to draw water from the Columbia River for 

reactor cooling, emergency and fire water storage, and for sanitary water purposes" (see the Historic Property Inventory 

Form for the 181 -B River Pump House in Appendix B on the Internet), The 181 -B River Pump House provided these 

services for the B Reactor and the 100-B Area beginning in 1944. Following enlargement in 1951, it served the 

C Reactor as well. Water was also pumped from the 181 -B Building to the 200 Areas for use in the chemical separations 

process and to fulfill emergency and sanitary needs. The 181-B Building currently provides essential water services only 

to the 200 Areas.

4 .4

1
Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u tu r e Us es o f Str u c tu r e s

183-KW - Filter Plant: Before water could be used in the reactors, it had to be filtered and chemically treated. The 

183-KW Building was designed to filter and chemically treat the Columbia River water before its introduction into the 

KW Reactor. Treatment reduced or eliminated film on or corrosion of the process tubes within the reactor. In addition to 

measuring raw water, operations within the 183-KW facility included "chlorination of raw water, addition of coagulants 

to raw water, pH correction of filtered water, addition of corrosion inhibitor to process water, and influent and effluent 

control" (see the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 183-KW Filter Plant in Appendix B on the Internet). The 

183-KW Building was a multi-component, multi-operational complex that could operate as a single plant, two plants, or 

six plants. The facility started operating in 1955 and was deactivated in 1971. However, as with 183-KE, some o f the 

flocculation and sedimentation basins have recently been proposed for use in fish rearing.

1116-N - Control Room Simulator: The 1116-N Building is a mobile office building containing the N Reactor Control 

Room Simulator. The design and instrumentation of the simulator's interior is an exact copy of the layout of the control 

X room in the 105-N Building. Constructed in 1982, the simulator was an "essential part of the [operations and safety

upgrade] training program and was a manifestation of the trend toward greater safety and environmental protection" in 

the 1980s (see the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 1116-N Control Room Simulator in Appendix B on the 

Internet). As part of ongoing training, modifications to the equipment within the simulator were made as changes were 

introduced to the actual control room in the N Reactor. The Control Room Simulator, while in excellent condition, is no 

longer used.

105-B - B Reactor: Constructed in 1943-1944, the 105-B Reactor began operations on September 26, 1944 as the 

world's first full-scale, plutonium production reactor. It was the first of Hanford's original three reactors to attain full 

power and, hence, represents the beginning of the nuclear age. Plutonium produced in the B Reactor was used in the 

world's first nuclear explosion on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico and thus represents the beginning of the era 

of nuclear weaponry. B Reactor also produced the plutonium used in the Fat Man bomb exploded over Nagasaki, Japan 

on August 9, 1945 and, therefore, represents the culmination of the Manhattan Project. These first-of-a-kind 

achievements distinguish the B Reactor and caused it to be listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1992.

Due to the sustained efforts of the B Reactor Museum Association, B Reactor has been set aside for retention in place as a 

public museum.

116-B - B Reactor Exhaust Stack: Integral to the operation of the B Reactor, the 116-B Stack vented air from the 

confinement zone of the reactor to the atmosphere. Originally linked directly to the 105-B Building by concrete ducts, 

alterations in the 1950s diverted air first through the 117-B Exhaust Air Filter Building and then through the 116-B Stack. 

This diversion was undertaken as a means of diminishing exposure to waste gases created and released during reactor 

operations. The 116-B Stack still stands beside the B Reactor and is listed as a contributing structure on the National 

Register nomination.

212-N - Lag Storage Building: Built in 1945, the 212-N Building provided underwater storage of irradiated fuel elements 

from the 100 Areas until Chemical Separations was able to process them. The reinforced concrete storage basin was 

20 feet deep. This building is locked and radiological warning signs are posted due to residual contamination.

Chemical Separations (200 Area)

Once cooled, the irradiated fuel elements were transported to the 200 Area where plutonium and other derived isotopes 

were separated from the base uranium. M ultiple chemical baths were required for this process, and continued quality 

control was essential. Again, as with irradiation monitoring, monitoring for worker health and impact to the environment 

was integrated into the process. Waste reduction and waste control were other key elements of this step. The working 

group selected the following buildings as those necessary to tell the stoiy of chemical separations:

222-T - Process Control Laboratory: The 222-T Building was the first of three identical chemical separations support 

laboratories to be completed in 1944. B-Plant and U-Plant likewise each had a 222 support facility. "Because all work 

in the radioactively 'h o t'T Plant had to be conducted remotely, the 222-T Building provided a very necessary laboratory

4 .5
Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u t u r e Uses o f Str u c tu r e s

setting in which samples drawn from the chemical separations process could be radiochemically analyzed to make sure 

the process was working correctly" (see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 222-T Building in 

Appendix B on the Internet). The facility was first used to train instrument technicians. More important, however, staff in 

the Process Control Laboratory not only created, tested, and improved tools for remote handling o f hazardous materials, 

they also assisted in developing "methodical, standardized counting and measuring techniques" and the equipment 

necessary to ensure uniform analytical procedures across the U.S. Department of Energy national complex (see the 

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 222-T Building in Appendix B on the Internet). This facility now 

supports administrative functions.

221-T - T Plant: The 221-T Plant was constructed between 1943-1944 as the first radiochemical processing facility at the 

Hanford Site and the first full-size radiochemical processing plant in the world (see the Historic American Engineering 

Record for the.221-T Plant in Appendix B on the Internet). T Plant began processing irradiated fuel elements from the 

B Reactor on the night of December 26,1944. The nuclear materials for the world's first and third atomicexplosions 

were processed in T Plant. The importance of T Plant diminished with the startup of the more efficient REDOX Plant in 

1952 and diminished again with the startup of the even more efficient PUREX Plant in 1956. T Plant discontinued 

service as a chemical processing facility within 3 months of PUREX's activation. In 1957, the mission at T Plant changed 

dramatically when it was designated as the decontamination facility for equipment on the Hanford Site, a role it still 

fulfills today.

291-T - T Plant Exhaust Stack: The 291-T Stack "served to propel the off-gases from T Plant dissolver cel Is... upward and 

outward and to add a sufficient volume of diluting air so that gases could be dispersed in what was thought to be a safe 

manner" (see the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 291 -T Stack in Appendix B on the Internet). Meteorological 

monitoring, begun as early as 1943, and vegetation monitoring initiated in 1944-1945 indicated that improvements were 

required. Sand filters were added in 1947. Silver reactor filters replaced these in 1950. Together with the 221-B 

Building, these buildings "became the first radiochemical processing facilities in the world to have their air emissions 

filtered in such a manner. The silver filtration technology soon became the world standard and has been used by the 

nuclear industry and nuclear defense sites ever since" (see the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 291-T Stack in 

Appendix B on the Internet). The 291 -T Stack played a pioneering role in meteorological studies and air filtration 

techniques. The stack remains standing awaiting its final disposition.

276-B - Organic Make Up/Solvent Storage: The 276-B Building was constructed in 1965 "as part of the mid-1960s 

Waste Management Program transition of B Plant from a chemical separations plant into a waste reduction and storage 

facility" for processing waste streams from REDOX and PUREX (see the Historic Property Inventory Form for the 276-B 

Building in Appendix B on the Internet). The organic solvent solutions used in waste reduction operations within B Plant 

were made in the 276-B Building. These solutions were then pumped into the 221 -B Building to extract strontium 89/90 

from radioactive wastes being stored in the 200 Area single-shell tanks. W ith the recent deactivation of B Plant, this 

facility has no current function.

Plutonium Finishing (Z Plant-200 West)

Plutonium produced on the Hanford Site was first shipped to Los Alamos as plutonium nitrate paste, and later to Rocky 

Flats as metallic plutonium. The final processing of plutonium nitrate to metallic plutonium was accomplished in the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant. Here, as elsewhere along the process chain, waste control and monitoring were key 

concerns. The working group selected the following buildings as those necessary to tell the story o f plutonium finishing:

234-5Z - Plutonium Finishing Plant: The 234-5Z Building, constructed in 1948, was a plutonium conversion and 

fabrication facility wherein plutonium nitrate was first converted to metallic plutonium and then made into weapons pits. 

Operations began on July 5, 1949. Initial operations relied on manual manipulation of plutonium mixtures within glove 

boxes (Rubber Glove Line). On March 18, 1952, remote, mechanized processing commenced with startup of the 

Remote Mechanical A Line, which "although partially dismantled...still stands today as the best and only representative 

of the earliest technology in remote, mechanized final plutonium processing" (see the Expanded Historic Property

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Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u t u r e Us e s o f Str u c tu r e s

Inventory Form for the 234-5Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet). The A Line was modified and expanded several 

times over its operational lifetime. In the mid-1960s, the C Line was added in response to increased demands for 

finished plutonium. Before the decision in 1965 to concentrate weapons fabrication work at Rocky Flats and Savannah 

River, operations within the 234-5Z Building had begun to diversify to include the "production of 'tailor-made' blends of 

Pu [plutonium] oxide that served as experimental fuel for the emerging nuclear power industry" (see the Expanded 

Historic Property Inventory Form for the 234-5Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet). At this same time, the 234-5Z 

Building was designated as the site where plutonium nitrate recovered from commercial reactor spent fuels would be 

reprocessed (Gerber 1996, p. 5-4). All operations ceased in 1989 when the 234-5Z Building was shut down.

291 -Z - Z Plant Air Filter and Exhaust Stack: Constructed in 1948-1949, the primary function of the 291 -Z Building was 

to draw gaseous effluents from the 234-5Z Building and exhaust them into the atmosphere. Before their release, effluents 

were passed through filters and treated to reduce human and environmental exposure to the waste gases released during 

plant operations. Between 1962-1964, additional connections were also made to the 232-Z, 236-Z, and 242-Z 

Buildings. The 291-Z Stack continues "to circulate and exhaust air from PFP cdmplex facilities" (see the Historic 

Property Inventory Form for the 291 -Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet).

232-Z - Waste Incinerator Facility: In 1958, the Hanford Site Chemical Processing Department proposed the 

construction of an incinerator (to be known as the Contaminated Waste Recovery Process Facility) "to recover plutonium 

from miscellaneous solid wastes produced by the adjacent Plutonium Finishing: Plant (PFP), the Plutonium Isolation 

Facility [Building 231] and the REDOX and PUREX plants" (see the Historic American Engineering Record for the 232-Z 

Facility in Appendix B on the Internet). Operational in 1962, the 232-Z Facility was the first o f its kind, the archetype for 

pIutonium-recovery incinerators. Not only was plutonium recovered through this process, but incineration also served as 

a means to lim it additional sub-surface contamination by significantly reducing the amount of contaminated wastes that 

had to be buried. "Following the 1970 rebuilding and re-start, the 232-Z incinerator operated for approximately three 

years, when it was shut down as part of an overall PFP review of 'interfaces with the environment'" (see the Historic 

American Engineering Record for the 232-Z Facility in Appendix B on the Internet).

2736-Z - Primary Plutonium Storage Facility: The 2736-Z Building "was constructed during 1970-1971 as the first 

building on the Hanford Site to be designed specifically for the storage and safe keeping of plutonium (Pu) products and 

scrap" (see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form for the 2736-Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet). 

Construction of this facility was an outgrowth of increased safety and security concerns expressed during the late 1960s. 

In 1972, the Hanford Site was designated as the Central Scrap Management Organization for the Atomic Energy 

Commission;. The 2736-Z Building figured prominently in this decision. Between 1984-1987, a "state-of-the-art 

detection, measurement, annunciation and alarm system for Pu [plutonium] inventory protection" was installed which 

eventually attracted the notice of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see the Expanded Historic Property Inventory 

Form for the 2736-Z Building in Appendix B on the Internet). In 1994, the 2736-Z Building became a part of the 

International Safeguards Program. Plutonium is still stored in vaults in this building.

Sit e Vis it a t io n

The working group realized that a number of the structures selected for preservation are highly contaminated and may 

never be available for public access. Others among the facilities described above may be demolished because of 

existing Tri-Party Agreement milestones that may not be alterable. For those that are not demolished or irreversibly 

contaminated, the cost o f stabilization and long-term maintenance w ill depend on the current condition of the building, 

its size and complexity, and its intended use in public education and interpretation; for instance, visiting the interior or 

only viewing the exterior.

Assuming that the issues associated with cost are resolved and assuming further that issues are resolved surrounding the 

safety and health concerns of opening a former plutonium production complex to the general public, how might 

visitation proceed? Considering transportation first, three media are available: water, road, and rail.

4 .7
Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u t u r e Uses o f Str u c tu r e s

The Columbia River runs some 50 miles through the Hanford Site. Its waters, islands, and shorelines support abundant 

w ildlife, and the views change with each bend in its course. Taking advantage of this, Columbia River Journeys and 

Hanford Reach Columbia River Tours both offer guided tours of the river. Thus commercial access via the river is already 

in place.

Over its operational lifetime, 268 miles of primary paved roads and 105 miles of railroad track were laid out across the 

Hanford Site. The U.S. Department of Energy currently offers road tours of the Hanford Site on an as-needed basis.

Tours are conducted in large 

(47-passenger) or small 

(30-passenger) buses as required.

Tours are confined to the major 

paved roads, and no exiting from 

the bus is allowed during the tour.

Thus, visitor access to the interior 

of the Hanford Site is already in 

place.

The Washington State Historical 

Railroad Society has collected and 

continues to acquire rolling stock 

unique to or characteristic of the 

Hanford Site. Their goal is to 

exhibit this stock at the B Reactor 

Museum follow ing its opening.

A second goal long held by the 

Society is to use the rail system to 

transport visitors across the

Hanford Site. Working through the Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology, one scenario 

discussed in a number of public forums calls for the visiting public to buy a tour pass that would allow them to use any 

or all of these modes of transportation.

Having secured transportation, what w ill the visitor see? The Manhattan Project and Cold War Era resources comprise 

but one of many landscapes that together make up the Hanford Site. To ensure a broad audience, tourism should 

embrace all of the Hanford Site's heritage. The geological history o f the mid-Columbia Basin is contained within the 

mountains, ridges, vajleys, soils, and rocks now bounded by the Hanford Site. Grasses, plants, and brush are distributed 

across this natural landscape and support a wide variety of birds, insects, and mammals. These resources should be 

interpreted together with the river and its resources. A ll the forgoing constitute the cultural resources o f the Native 

American community. Working cooperatively w ith them, aspects o f their subsistence, legendary and religious heritage 

that may be shared with non-native peoples could be interpreted. The W hite Bluffs-Hanford Heritage group has personal 

knowledge of the agricultural history o f the region. Their membership is a source of information from which to interpret 

the historic-archeological resources left in place following forced abandonment of the towns of Hanford, W hite Bluffs, 

and the surrounding areas in 1943. Finally, the Hanford Retirees Association and the B Reactor Museum Association 

could be called on to script the story of the Manhattan Project and Cold War years. There is no lack of things to see and 

experience.

Actions that need to be taken to allow for tourism include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Studies to characterize the radiological and hazardous materials of facilities that w ill be opened to the public

• Market analysis to identify the potential visitor and the cost of visitation .

• Creation of a detailed Hanford Site Visitation Plan

• Development of design criteria to ensure uniformity in interpretive signs, exhibits, and displays

" / / i f - c iond segment < m is /if- or the -nisj/t1tra ik s hexond the W ashington I ’u h lii

I ’ow ei suppl i' Hi stern it h it h loop Ih io iiid w u l ;/ic H a nford Site w ith -/Jin line*,

in to eat h a n a 7/m- segment should he p i opened a- a rmwri- to help cd iu a te the

p u h lii on the iu ltu i.il rvsouri vs w ith in the H a nford site. h»i exam ple the

ta ilro a d w o u ld he .ui ext client me,ins o i transposing the xisiiing p u h lit out to

the 1 0 '-II lie.H tor. I he ro u te w o u ld allow to r the in terpretation ot the H a n fo n l

storx trn n i the g c o lo g ii,)/ ei enf- rc p u n s ililc to r the form atio n o f the \allex

through the dexelopm ent o f the M anhattan t'r n jr i i and I o ld W ar Ir a tin ilities.

s im e the i.iilio a d in it* piesent state is lu lh operational no a p p re tia h lc w o ik

w o u ld he m i o h ed in its m aintenam e and preset i ation. The tee o t the p i esenl

ta il si stem also nutum i/es the im pat t- to the <•< n/ny t o f the aiea. -m< e its

rc in m a l w o uld p io h a h h do m ote damage than leaxing it in p L ue . ( ontm ucd

prescrxation etiorts w o uld he m in im al due to the taxoiahle t lim a ic ti.e.. the Fort

o f lliu l*,is(o has to n \e a t o ld ta il s till in use. ’ • I.H. f.roni'ttalti, Prv-idcnl.

\\iishin"<nn SI air l-li-linii.il Railroad s<i< ivlv in Ciioncwild l l>W»

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Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u tu r e Uses o f Str u c tu r e s

Re c o m m e n d a t io n s f o r Ad a p t iv e Us e a n d Ec o n o m ic

De v e l o p m e n t

W hile tourism may support part of the costs associated with opening the Hanford Site for visitation, additional funding 

sources for in-place preservation need to be found. The cost savings associated with not demolishing structures represent 

one potential source. More promising alternatives are adaptive use and economic development.

On August 20, 1998, the Office of the Inspector General issued an audit report entitled, The U.S. Department o f Energy's

Facility Reuse at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (OIG 1998). The report criticized the Rocky Flats Field 

Office for "scheduling" demolition of all site facilities, "w ithout having formally analyzed the reuse potential of those 

facilities," and speculated that, "If reuse was feasible, the community surrounding the site could potentially realize 

significant economic benefits and DOE could avoid spending millions of dollars in demolition costs" (OIG 1998), In 

short, the Inspector General was calling Rocky 

Flats to task for failure to fully meet its 

responsibilities under the National Historic 

Preservation A c t

"P rtur In ,H q u ii mu. < o/Mruc turn, oi /I'.M’ng b u ild in g fur p u /p rw *

u f ia t n in u ant t iijf '/K v n '^fiiin ^ih ilitii"-. c .u h /V t/v v /.i'ic /u t ill

K -r. to the m .n iin im i v \lv n t u w ih lo , h i*lo iU i>h>[h,Hh,+ ,i\.u l.ih lv to

Z/u*./.'{i'/hv/ - National Historic I’rt^nxafion \ U . K« L**( -170

(TIOXaHl)

The working group recommends that the DOE,

Richland Operations Office continue to 

examine its future facility needs to determine 

which, if any, facilities may be retained in

support of future missions following site cleanup. This would be particularly true for facilities that could function for 

continued materials testing, process development, applied research and development, or other uses. This examination 

would not only be in keeping w ith the intent of the National Historic Preservation Act but would also eliminate any 

similar admonishment by the Inspector General that might be directed at the Hanford Site.

"...any Federal agency...shall, to the extent practicable, establish and implement alternatives for historic

properties, including adaptive use, that are not needed for current or projected agency purposes, and may lease

an historic property owned by the agency to any person or organization... if the agency head determines that the

lease...will adequately insure [sic] the preservation o f the historic property." -1 6 DSC 470 (111 )(a)

The 300 Area has been identified under a number of scenarios developed for the Hanford Site Comprehensive Land Use

Plan (DOE 1996d) as a location for "industrial and Commercial" development. To this end, DOE has begun to actively 

market this area of the Hanford Site through its Site Infrastructure Division. For example, Richland Specialty Extrusions is 

using the Sutton 

press (once used to 

extrude uranium 

fuel elements) to 

make aluminum 

baseball bats among 

other products in 

the 313 Building 

under a lease with 

DOE. Leases or 

property transfers 

have been 

accomplished for 

the 306-E, 308, and 

318 Buildings. The

Table 4.1. 300 Area Buildings Recommended to Be Retained for Adaptive Use and Economic

Development

Public Education/

Interpretation

Adaptive

Use

Economic

Development

305-B Engineering Development Laboratory Annex

306-W Materials Development Laboratory 

309/309-E Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 

325/325-A Radiochemistry Laboratory/Cerium Recovery

326 Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory

327 Post Irradiation Test Laboratory 

329 Biophysics Laboratory

337 Technical Management Facility 

337-B High Temperature Sodium Facility 

3709-A Fire Station 

3745-A Electron Accelerator Building 

3745-B Positive Ion Accelerator Building

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Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r F u t u r e Uses o f Str u c tu r es

314 Building is under discussion. Working on the principle that historic properties associated with ongoing functions 

w ill be retained in place, the working group identified an additional twelve buildings that should be advanced as 

preservation candidates. Table 4.1 lists these facilities.

DOE has made advances in preserving locations outside the 300 Area as well. For instance, the Port of Benton has 

acquired properties in the 400 Area, the 3000 Area, and more recently the 1100 Area. The Port then leases these 

properties to small businesses and startup companies to assist local economic development. The leasing of a portion of 

the 1171 Building to Livingston Rebuild Center for locomotive repairs and railroad worker training is a prime example of 

adaptive use coupled with local economic development Here the Port coupled private economic pursuit with historic 

preservation by including a restriction in the deed that ensures retention of the significant historic features of the facility. 

The working group strongly supports DOE's plan to take an aggressive role in championing the use o f its historic 

buildings as a means of promoting economic diversification in the Tri-Cities.

Ke y Da te s

Ke y Da tes of Ev e n t s a t t h e Ha n f o r d

Sit e 1 9 4 3 -1 9 9 0

Owner/Prime Contractor

Date Event

Feb 25, 1941

U.S. Corps of Engineers Manhattan Engineer District

Aug 1942

Nov 12, 1942 

Dec 2,1942

U.S. Corps of Engineers Manhattan Engineer District

E.l. Du Pont de Nemours and Company

Dec 21,1942

MANHATTAN PROJECT 1943-1946

1943 

Mar 1943

Nov 4, 1943

Dec 1943 

Mar 20,1944 

Sep 26, 1944

Dec 17, 1944 

Dec 26, 1944

1944-1945

1945

Glenn Seaborg at the University of California Berkeley 

discovers plutonium-239 more likely to fission than 

uranium-235

The U.S. Corps of Engineers is assigned to be in charge of 

the Manhattan Project

U.S. Government decides to build plutonium production 

reactors and separation facilities at the Hanford Site

Enrico Fermi achieves first nuclear reaction in the Chicago 

Pile-1 Reactor at the University of Chicago's Staff Field

Du Pont receives contract to construct and manage the 

world's first plutonium production facility

Test reactor in Building 305

Construction of Hanford Engineer Works (present Hanford 

Site) begins

Air cooled pilot-scale graphite reactor completed at Oak Ridge 

Reservation, Tennessee

Fuel manufacturing begins in 313 Building

First experimental canning operations start in the 313 Building

Startup of B Reactor, world's first full-scale plutonium 

production reactor

Startup of D Reactor

Startup of T Plant (bismuth phosphate separation process)

Installation of 64 underground, single-shell waste tanks

U Plant (221-U Building) and its bulk reduction facility 

(224-U Building) built but do not go on line; 221-U 

instead is used for training, decontamination, and repair

D .l
Owner/Prime Contractor

Date Event

1945

Jan 16, 1945 

Feb 25, 1945 

Apr 13, 1945 

Apr 1945 

May 7, 1945 

Jul16, 1945

Aug 6, 1945

Aug 9, 1945

Aug 14,1945 

Mar 5, 1946

Aug 1,1946

U.S. Corps of Engineers Manhattan Engineer District

General Electric Company

Sep 1,1946

COLD WAR ERA 1947-1990

1947.1949

Atomic Energy Commission

'General Electric Company

Jan 1, 1947

Mar 12, 1947 

jun 23, 1948

Original radiochemistry laboratory completed (3706 Building) 

Plutonium finishing operations begin in 231-Z Building 

Startup of F Reactor

Startup of B Plant (bismuth phosphate separation process) 

Construction of Hanford Engineer Works completed 

Germany Surrenders

First atomic explosion, Trinity test at Alamogordo,

New Mexico

First atomic bomb (Little Boy) made with uranium-235, 

produced from the gaseous diffusion plant at the Oak Ridge 

Reservation in Tennessee, dropped on Hiroshima, Japan

Atomic bomb (Fat Man) made w ith Hanford Site plutonium, 

dropped on-Nagasaki, japan

japan Surrenders

Winston Churchill gives his Iron Curtain speech saying a 

Cold War is well under way

Atomic Energy Act passed

General Electric Company becomes the prime site contractor 

of the newly named Hanford Works; the Atomic Energy 

Commission does not formally approve the contract until 

1947 when the Atomic Energy Commission takes charge of the 

Hanford Site

Installation of 42 underground, single-shell waste tanks

The Atomic Energy Commission takes charge of the 

former Manhattan Project sites; the site is renamed the 

Hanford Works

Truman Doctrine

Berlin blocked and air lift results
Ke y Da te s

Owner/Prime Contractor

Date Event

1949

Jul 5, 1949

Aug 29, 1949

Oct 29, 1949 

1950-1952 

1950-1952 

O ct 3, 1950

1951

Mar 28, 1951

1952 

1952

1952

1952

Mar 18, 1952 

Oct 31, 1952 

Nov 18, 1952 

1953-1955 

1953-1955 

Jul 27, 1953 

1954

Aug 30, 1954

Dec 1954 

Feb 1955

Startup of C Plant (pilot for reduction and oxidation' 

separation process - REDOX)

Startup of Rubber Glove (RG) Line in the newly completed 

Plutonium Finishing Plant (Z Plant)

Soviet Union detonates its first atomic bomb

Startup of H Reactor 

Korean War Expansion

Installation of 18 underground, single-shell waste tanks 

Startup of DR Reactor

Startup of 242-T and 242-B Evaporators to process T and 

B Plant radioactive high-level waste stored in tank farms 

to reduce volume by boiling off the liquid

Camp Hanford established

Startup of Physical Constants Test Reactor

Startup of S Plant (reduction and oxidation separation 

process - REDOX)

Startup of U Plant to recover uranium from T and B Plant 

radioactive high-level waste

Startup of Experimental Animal Farm and Aquatic Biology 

Laboratory

Startup of Remote Mechanical A Line in the (Z Plant)

First hydrogen bomb tested at the Pacific Proving Grounds 

Startup of C Reactor 

Eisenhower Expansion

Installation of 21 underground, single-sheif waste tanks 

Korean War Armistice signed 

Startup of Thermal Test Reactor

Atomic Energy Act (allows for more private, commercial 

atomic applications)

Startup of KW Reactor

Startup of KE Reactor

D.3
Ke y Da te s

Owner/Prime Contractor 

Date Event

1955

1956-1964

1956

1956

1956

Jan 1956

Mar 20, 1956

1957-1958

O ct 4,1957 

1958

1960

1961 

1961

O ct 12-28,1962 

1963-1964 

1963-1964 

Aug 5,1963

Dec 31,1963 

Mar 1964

May 1964 

Dec 31,1964

Jan 1, 1965

Installation of Nike missile sites 

Major Defense Production

Moving all chemical processing work from the 231-Z Building 

to the Plutonium Finishing Plant

Shutdown of B Plant

Startup of Uranium Trioxide Plant, which was modified to 

convert uranium to uranium-trioxide

Startup of A Plant (plutonium-uranium extraction process - 

PUREX)

Shutdown of T Plant

700 Area no longer a restricted area; fence removed 

and homes and commercial property sold to private owners

Soviet Union launches Sputnik

Shutdown of U Plant

Startup of the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (309 Building) 

Shutdown of Nike missile sites

Shutdown of Camp Hanford 1

Cuban missile crisis

Electrical Generating Plant in 100-N Area

Installation of four underground, single-shell waste tanks

Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union sign the 

Limited Test Ban Treaty to outlaw nuclear tests in the 

atmosphere, under water, and in outer space

Initial critical startup (deadline date) of N Reactor

Actual startup of operations of N Reactor, which is the first 

dual-purpose reactor operated in United States

Startup of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility

Shutdown of DR Reactor

U.S. Testing Company (assumes responsibility for bioassays, 

film badges, environmental samples)

D A
Owner/Prime Contractor

Date Event

jan 4, 1965

Mar 1, 1965

Apr 21, 1965 

Jun25, 1965 

Aug 1, 1965

Nov 1,1965

Jan 1, 1966

Jun 26, 1967 

Jun 30, 1967

Atomic Energy Commission

Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company

Sep 1, 1967

Dec 1967 

1968-1988 

Feb 12, 1968 

Apr 25, 1969 

Feb 1, 1970 

Jul 1, 1970

Jan 28, 1971

1972-1982

1972

Battelle Memorial Institute assumes responsibility for 

management of the Hanford Site laboratories, renaming them 

the Pacific Northwest Laboratory

ITT Federal Support Services, Inc. assumes responsibility for 

support services

Shutdown o f H Reactor 

Shutdown of F Reactor

Hanford Environmental Health Foundation assumes 

responsibility for health services.

Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc. (joint venture between 

McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company and United Nuclear 

Corporation) assumes responsibility for reactors and fuels

ISOCHEM, Inc. assumes responsibility for chemical 

processing and plutonium finishing

Shutdown of D Reactor

Construction completed on the High Temperature Lattice Test 

Reactor, 318 Building

Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company becomes prime operator 

and assumes responsibility for chemical processing

Shutdown of S Plant (REDOX)

Installation of 28 underground, double-shell waste tanks 

Shutdown of B Reactor 

Shutdown of C Reactor 

Shutdown of KW Reactor

Westinghouse Hanford Company contracts to build and 

operate the Fast Flux Test Facility in the 400 Area and to 

operate the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory

Shutdown of KE Reactor

Mostly fuel-grade plutonium produced

Shutdown of the Uranium Trloxide Plant
Owner/Prime Contractor

Date Event

1973-1976 

Oct 11, 1974

Energy Research and Development Agency

Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company

Jan 19, 1975

U.S. Department of Energy

Rockwell Hanford Operations

Jul 1,1977 

Oct 1, 1977

Feb 9, 1980 

1983-1987 

Nov 4,1983 

Jan 6, 1987 

Mar 1, 1987

U.S. Department of Energy

Westinghouse Hanford Company

Jun 29,1987 

1988

May 1989

Startup of two new evaporator plants, 242-S and 242-A

President Ford signs the Energy Reorganization Act 

abolishing the Atomic Energy Commission and establishing 

the Energy Research and Development Administration

Energy Research and Development Administration activated; 

site renamed the Hanford Reservation

Rockwell Hanford Operations becomes prime operator and 

assumes responsibility for reprocessing operations

U.S. Department of Energy replaces the Energy Research and 

Development Administration; site renamed the Hanford Site

Startup of the Fast Flux Test Facility 

O nly weapon-grade plutonium produced 

Restart of the Uranium Trioxide Plant 

Shutdown of N Reactor

ICF Kaiser Hanford Company assumes responsibility for 

architecture and engineering

Westinghouse Hanford Company awarded the consolidated 

management and operations contract, which includes 

reactor operations, fuel manufacturing, chemical engineering, 

and waste management activities

Shutdown of A Plant (PUREX)

Shutdown of Plutonium Finishing Plant

Fig u r e s

Lis t of Fig u r e s

Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

1.1 Hanford Site (Gray Area) Located in the Washington State along the Colum bia River (Neg. SG96100279.1).............................................1.1

1.2 Creation of Plutonium— a Product of Uranium Fissioning (Adapted from Smyth 1989, p. 3 4 ).............................. ..........................................1.5

1.3 Initial Map Designating the Area o f the Hanford Site, 1943 (Scan of poster marked "Litho, Det. 29th Engrs., Headquarters

Western Defense Command & 4 * Army, ‘4 3 " )........................................................................... 1.14

1.4 Hanford Site during the Manhattan Project Around 1945 When the Site Was Called the Hanford Engineer Works (HGIS 2001)........... 1.16

1.5 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex (DOE 1995, pp. 2-3)......................................... ..................................................................................................1.28

1.6 Plutonium Production Cycle as it Existed throughout the Manhattan Project at the Hanford S ite.................................................................. 1.29

1.7 Total Annual Production of Plutonium at the Hanford Site (DOE 1996b, p. 28) ............................................................................................... 1.60

1.8 Hanford Site during the Cold W ar Era Around 1965 When the Site Was Called Hanford Works (HGIS 2 0 0 1 ).................................. ....... 1.62

1.9 Control Zone and Secondary Zones at the Hanford Site (HGIS 2 0 0 1 )...................................................................................................................1.73

1.10 Hanford Site Around 1985 Showing Additions Since the Cold War Era (HGIS 2001) ..............................................................................1.74

Ch a p t e r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c t io n Fa c il it ie s

Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

2-1.1 Hanford Site Construction Camp Located at the Former Hanford Townsite Around 1944 (Van Arsdol 1992, p. 6 3 )................................. 2-1.2

2-1.2 G rid Pattern o f 300 Area Looking West, 1979 (Neg. 85668-11).............................................................................................................................2-1.3

2-1.3 Typical Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery Site (DOE 1995d)..................................................................... .......................................... ........................2-1.7

2-1.4 Missile Launch Site at the Fitzner-Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (DOE 1995d)......................................................................... 2-1.13

2-1.5 Example o f Unreinforced Concrete Structure, the 337-B Building in 1971 (Neg. 55205)................................................................... ;........2-1.14

2-1.6 Example o f Reinforced Concrete Structure, the 337 Building in 1970 (Neg. 54766)........................... 2-1.14

2-1.7 Example o f Corrugated Metal Siding, 185.5-KW Building in 1995 (Roll 197, Frame 23, Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)............................................................................................................. 2-1.15

2-1.8 Example of Reactor Building, 105-DR Building in 1995 (Roll 197, Frame 22, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)............................................................................................................2-1.16

2-1.9 Example o f Chemical Separations Building, 221-T Plant (Neg. P7848-0)........... 2-1.16

2-1.10 Example o f Concrete Block Structure, 3745A Building in 1994 (Roll 181, Frame 27, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)....................................................... 2-1.17

2-1.11 Example of a Temporary Wood Frame Structure, 3762 Building in 1995 (Roll 182, Frame 8, Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)............................ 2-1.18

2-1.12 Example o f Structure with Metal Paneling, 309-E Building in 1995 (Roll 182, Frame 16, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)............................................................................................................. 2-1.18

2-1.13 Example of Transite Shingle Cladding, 3707-B Building in 1994 (Roll 170, Frame 27, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory).......................................................................................................... 2-1.18

2-1.14 Construction o f the Fast Flux Test Facility in the Early 1970s (Neg. 63126-7cn).................................................................... 2-1.18

2-1.15 Example o f a Butler Building, 352-D Building in 1994 (Roll 181, Frame 36, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)............................................................................................................ 2-1.20

F.l
2-1.16 Example of a Quonset Hut, 3746-D Building in 1994 (Roll 163, Frame 10, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory) ......................................................... 2-1.21

Se c t io n 2 - Fu e l M a n u f a c t u r in g

2-2.1 Finished Fuel Elements, 1964 (Neg. 0642337) .................................... 2-2.1

2-2.2 Aerial View o f the 300 Area in 1944 Looking Northeast (Neg. 64279 in the U.S. Department o f Energy Records Holding A rea) 2-2.6

2-2.3 Metallurgical Engineering Laboratory (314 Building) in 1944/1945 Looking Northeast (Neg. P8022 in the U.S. Department of

Energy Records Holding A re a )......................................................................................... 2-2.7

2-2.4 Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility (313 Building) in 1943/1944 Looking Northeast (Neg. P8028 in the U.S. Department o f Energy

Records Holding Area).......................................................... ................................................................................1............................. 2-2.7

2-2.5 Cross Sections ofTw o Fuel Elements (Weakley 1 9 5 8 )....................................................................... .7........................................ 2-2.7

2-2.6 Fuel Manufacturing Process for Reactors at the Hanford Site from 1945-1954 (DOE 1997b, p. 155)............................. 2-2.10

2-2.7 Loading a Billet onto an Extrusion Press, 1984 (Neg. 8404360-55cn)............................................................................................................... 2-2.11

2-2.8 Cleaning Area w ith the Uranium Fuel Elements (left) and Alum inum Cans in Sleeves (right) on a Conveyor Belt, 1964

(Neg. 0642337-12).................................................................................................................................................................... 2-2.13

2-2.9 Fuel Cladding Facility (333 Building), 1996 (Roll 190, Frame 6 Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department of Energy's

Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory).................................................................................................. 2-2.18

2-2.10 Billet Ovens (lower left) and 2700-Ton Extrusion Press in the Fuel Cladding Facility (333 Building) (Neg. 96050163-3cn) .............. 2-2.18

2-2.11 Manufacturing Process o f the Fuel Elements for the N Reactor (Weakley 1 9 8 0 ).............................................................................................2-2.19

2-2.12 Z ircoloy Element Being Cleaned, 1985 (Neg. 8507256-58cn)..................... i............................................. 2-2.20

2-2.13 inspection of the Fuel Rods in the 333 Building, 1985 (Neg. 8507256-62cn)..................................................................................................2-2.21

2-2.14 Non-Destructive Testing of Fuel Elements, 1984 (Neg. 8401503-4cn).................................. 2-2.22

2-2.15 Cross Section of a Fuel Element Showing the Transducers, W hich Check for Cracked Bonds and W all Thickness

(Neg. 0641069) ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 2-2.22

2-2.16 Autoclave Area in the 333 Building, 1984 (Neg. 8401503-1 c n )..........................................................„ ........................................................... 2-2.22

2-2.17 Inspection of the Fuel Elements in the 333 Building (Neg. 4 1539-1)...................................... 2-2.23

Se c t io n 3 - Re a c to r Op e r a t io n s

2-3.1 H Reactor at the Hanford Site Around 1950 (Neg. 6454-12)..................................................................................................................................2-3.7

2-3.2 N Reactor and Electricity Generating Plant Around 1985 (Neg. 8505059-4cn).............. 2-3.9

2-3.3 Map of a Typical Hanford Reactor Area-(100-H) Showing Key Buildings and Structures (Hoisted and Albaugh 1964a)........................2-3.11

2-3.4. Layout of a Typical Reactor Facility (DOE 1989, p. A .4 ).................... .................................................................................................................2-3.12

2-3.5 Cutaway of a Reactor Block (DOE 1989, p. A .5 )................................................... 2-3.13

2-3.6 B Reactor Control Room Showing Instrumentation Gages..................................................................................................................................2-3.15

2-3.7 Water Flow for a Typical Cooling System in a Production Reactor (GE 1963a)...................................................................... 2-3.17

2-3.8 Comparative Costs Demonstrating Improved Efficiency o f Producing a Gram of Plutonium Nitrate

(Adpated from GE n.d., p. 5 4 a ).................................................................................................................................................................................. 2-3.28

Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

2-4.1 First Chemical Separations Plant (T Plant) Built at the Hanford Site (Neg. 8503592-80)........................................ 2-4.1

2-4.2 Construction o f the B Plant in the 221 Building for Chemical Separations (Neg. P-3370 in the U.S. Department of Energy

Records Holding Area)............................................................................... 2-4.4

2-4.3 Workers Installing Equipment in a Cell at PUREX, 1955 (Neg. 443110)........................................................................ ................................ :...2-4.6
Fig u r e s

2-4.4 Cutaway o f the RUREX Plant (Neg. 88083192-1 Sen)................................................................................................................. 2-4.6

2-4.5 Rail Cask Car Used to Transport Irradiated Fuel Elements (Neg. 000981 -9 8 cn ).......................................................................... 2-4.8

2-4.6 Railroad Cut Where the Rail Line Enters the Plant (Neg. 223451 -1 c n )............................................................................................................... 2-4.9

2-4.7 Bridge Crane in the B Plant Canyon during M odification (Neg. 40799-33)..................................................... .............................................. 2-4.10

2-4.8 Crane Operator Lou W alker (Neg. 49583-2cn)...................................................................................................................................................... 2-4.10

2-4.9 Dissolver Tank at B Plant (Neg. 81 E859-4cn).......... 2-4.11

2-4.10 Operators at Process Control Boards in the B Plant (Neg. 35085-16cn)............................................................................................ 2-4.12

2-4.11 Aqueous Makeup U nit for the Pfutonium-Uranium Extraction Facility (Neg. 88083192-5cn).......................................................................2-4.13

2-4.12 Model o f a Sand Filter System (Neg. 43798-117cn)............................................................................................................................................... 2-4.14

2 4 .1 3 Bismuth Phosphate Process at the Hanford Site (Adapted from DOE 1997, p. 172)............- .................... 2 4 .1 5

2-4.14 . Centrifuge on a Canyon Deck (Not in Operational Position Inside a Cell) (Neg. 700864-3cn).............................................................. ..2 4 .1 7

2-4.15 High Bay Silo at the REDOX Plant, 1981 (Neg. 81888-153cn).............................................................. 2 4 .2 0

2 4 .1 6 Aerial View of the PUREX Plant (Neg. 115565-2cn)..................................... 2-4.20

2 4 .1 7 F low cha rt o f the PUREX Process (Adapted from Copy on file at the Library o f the U.S. Department o f Energy’s Hanford

Cultural Resources Laboratory, Richland, W ashington) ..................................................... 2-4.22

2 4 .1 8 W orker Taking a Sample of Radioactive Solutions (Neg. 29756-8)................................................. 2 4 .2 7

2-4.19 Trombone Sampler Used with the Doorstop Sample Carrier in T and B Plants (Neg. 34658-4)................ 2 4 .2 8

2-4.20 Doorstop Sample Carrier Used in T and B Plants (Neg. 34658-3)................................................................................................................... ...2 4 .2 9

Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

2-5.1 Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, 1949 (Neg. 94061152-1 c n ).......................................................... 2-5.1

2-5.2 Plutonium Button Produced on the Remote Mechanical C Line, 1988 (Neg. 88080280-6cn).......... 2-5.3

2-5.3 Simplified View o f the Plutonium Finishing Plant, 1 995......................... 2-5.5

2-5.4 First Three Tasks of the Plutonium Finishing Process (Neg. 119862-lcn)................................... 2-5.6

2-5.5 Nuclear Operator in the Control Room o f the Remote Mechanical C Line, 1988 (Neg. 8803859-17cn)...................................................2-5.15

2-5.6 Nuclear Operators Check Idle Equipment on Remote Mechanical C Line, 1982 (Gerber 1997, p. 6 -9 )................................................... 2-5.15

2-5.7 Oxide Produced on the Remote Mechanical A Line, December 1979 (Gerber 1997, p. 5-25).................................................................... 2-5.17

2-5.8 Schematic of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, 1984....................................................................................................................................... 2-5.26

2-5.9 Equipment Used to M ine Plutonium from the 216-Z-9 Crib, 1976 (Neg. 60583-5cn).................. ................................ .............................. 2-5.27

Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

2-6.1 Double-Shell, High Level Radioactive Waste Tank Farm under Construction, 1978 (Neg. 7813231-26cn)........................ 2-6.6

2-6.2 High Level Radioactive Waste in Underground Storage Tank w ith Salt Cake Visible on Surface, 1971 (Neg. 711104-5cn).................... 2-6.7

2-6.3 Typical Single-Shell Tank at the Hanford Site w ith Numerous Access Ports and Risers for M onitoring and Waste Sampling

(Gephaft and Lundgren 1997, p. 15) (Neg. R9509091.39)....................... 2-6.8

2-6.4 Typical Double-Shell Tank at the Hanford Site with Numerous Access Ports and Risers for M onitoring and Waste Sampling

(Gephart and Lundgren 1997, p. 17) (Neg. R9509091.4 0 )........................................................................................................ 2-6.8

2-6.5 Building Containing Evaporator Used to Reduce Volume of High Level Waste by Boiling O ff Water (Neg. 94040672-3cn)..................2-6.9

2-6.6 Worker M onitoring the High Level Radioactive Waste Tank at the Hanford Site, 1988 (Neg. 88101363-44cn)......................................2-6.12

2-6.7 One of Two Covered Trenches Used at N Reactor to Dispose o f Reactor Effluent in the Soil, 1981 (Neg. 8110142-21 c n )...................2-6.15

F.3
2-6.8 Low Level Radioactive Liquid Waste Pond w ith Overflow Lobes and REDOX (Center) in the Background, 1973

(Neg. 6 2 4 4 0 -1 2 )............................................................................................................................................................................„ ........................................ 2-6.15

2-6.9 U.S. Navy Nuclear Submarine Reactor Section Arriving by Barge at Hanford Receiving Dock, 1989 (Neg. 89051057-22cn)............2-6.20

2-6.10 Transuranic Waste Drums on Floor o f Hanford Burial Trench, a Burial Method Permitting Later Retrieval, 1980

(Neg. 91824-21 c n ).......................................................................................... 2-6.21

2-6.11 Bulldozer Pushes Soil onto Concrete Burial Box on Floor of Hanford Burial Trench, 1980 (Neg. 44639-14 c n )......................... 2-6.24

Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

2-7.1 Article Appearing in the Tri-City Herald Announcing Battelle as the New Operator o f the Laboratories at the Hanford Site,

M ay 1964 .................................................. ....2-7.7

2-7.2 Early Researchers at the Applied Fisheries Laboratory Around 1944 (Becker 1990, p. 6 3 ).................................................................. ........2-7.13

2-7.3 Seven National Environmental Research Parks Designated by the U.S. Department o f Energy..................................................................2-7.18

2-7.4 Hanford National Environmental Research Park (Neg. S9508017 .7 )............ :.....................................................................2-7.18

Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

2-8.1 Pill Box Used for Security Surveillance in the H allway of the 100-N Reactor, 1986 (Neg. 8605029-162cn)............. ....................... ......2-8.3

2-8.2 Hanford Patrol Officers at Shooting Practice (Courtesy of the Hanford Patrol, Bruce Cameron; Available in the Library of the 

U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory).......................................................... ..........;....................................... ;........ .... 2-8.11

2-8.3 Hanford Patrol Practice Exercise w ith Armored Tank Around 1949-1950 (Neg. 348, Box 021094, 712 Building,

U.S. Department of Energy Records H olding Area) .................................. ...................................................................................................... ....2-8.11

2-8.4 Special Response Team Practicing Building Entry, 1994 (Neg. 94010187-1 Ocn)...................................................................................... ....2-8.12

2-8.5 . Agents of the Federal Bureau o f Investigation Assigned to Richland, February 10,1948 (Campbell 1989)............................................2-8.13

2-8.6 Typical Guard Tower Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945a, p. 1114)..................................................................................................................... ....2-8.14

2-8.7 Hanford Boat Patrol Around 1949-1950 (Neg. 1125-6, Box 021094, 712 Building, U. S. Department o f Energy

Records Holding Area).................... ...................................................................................................................................................................... ....2-8.15

2-8.8 Hanford A ir Patrol Around 1949-1950 (Neg. 1125-3, Box 021094, 712 Building, U. S. Department of Energy

Records Holding Area)............................. ............................................................................................................................................................. ....2-8.15

2-8.9 Hanford Site A ir Patrol Helicopters (Courtesy of the Hanford Patrol, Bruce Cameron; Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory).............. ......................................................................................................... ....2-8.16

2-8.10 Guard House to the West Entrance of the 700 Area Staffed by the Richland Village Police Around 1951-1952

(Neg. 29 85-4 , Box 02 1096 , 712 Building, U . S. Department of Energy Records Holding Area)...............................................................2-8.19

2-8.11 Security Billboards in the M id-1950s (Negs. 5109-1, 5109-2, 3872-2 in Box 2105, 712 Building, U. S. Department of 

Energy Records Holding Area, and Hales 1997, p. 2 5 1 ).................................................................. .................... ....... ................................ ....2-8.19

2-8.12 Dupus Boomer Cartoons Related to Hanford Site Security (Donnell 1948, pp. 22, 40, 47, 4 8 )............................................................ ....2-8.20

2-8.13 Map Showing the Security Barricades at the Hanford Site, Revised 1988 (Drawing H-6-366 in the M icrofilm Library,

2 4 4 0 Stevens)..........................................................................~..................................................................................................................................2-8.26

2-8.14 Access Control Point at the 300 Area Barricade, 1951 (Neg. 1875, Box 021095, 712 Building, U. S. Department of Energy 

Records Holding Area)............................................................................................................................................................................................ ....2-8.26

2-8.15 Hanford Patrol O fficer Checking Photo Identification Pass and Issuing Gamma Pencil Dosimeter (Neg. 19, Box 7422,

712 Building, U. S. Department o f Energy Records Holding A re a ).................................................................................................. ......... ....2-8.27

2-8.16 Subject to Search Billboard (Courtesy o f Don Sorenson; Available in the Library of the U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural

....2-8.30

2-8.17 Hanford Patrol O fficer Inspecting a Vehicle at a Perimeter Barricade, 1957 (Neg. 15659, Box 040530, 712 Building,

U. S. Department of Energy Records H olding A re a )........................................................................................................................................ .... 2-8.30
Fig u r e s

Se c t io n 9 - M il it a r y Op e r a t io n s

2-9.1 Layout of Camp Hanford's M ilitary Compound in North Richland, 1951 (Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of

Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory).................................................................................................... 2-9.3

2-9.2 Camp Hanford Anti-Aircraft Artillery Sites (DOE 1995, between pp. 28-29)................................................................ 2-9.5

2-9.3 120 M illim eter Anti-Aircraft Gun Used at Camp Hanford, 1950-1956 (DOE 1995, between pp. 2 8 -2 9 ) .................................................2-9.5

2-9.4 Camp Hanford Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Nike Positions (DOE 1995, between pp. 28-29)............................................................................ 2-9.6

2-9.5 Revetment at Anti-Aircraft Artillery Position 42, 1994 (Roll 165, Frame 3, Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of

Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)..................... - ............................................................................... 2-9.6

2-9.6 Obelisk at Anti-Aircraft A rtillery Position 40 w ith Inscription of "D Battery 518th," 1994 (Roll 165, Frame 14, Available in the

Library o f the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)......................................................... 2-9.6

2-9.7 Interior of Tool Shed at the Anti-Aircraft A rtillery Position 40,1994 (Roll 166, Frame 12, Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory) ................................................ 2-9.7

2-9.8 Concrete Monument to "518th AAA Gun Battalion (120mm)," at Position 50, 1994 (Roll 139, Frame 13, Available in the

Library of the U.S. Department o f Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory).......................... — ...............................2-9.7

2-9.9 Nike Missiles Ajax, Hercules, and Zeus (O fficial NORAD photo, Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department o f Energy's

Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory).................................................... 2-9.7

2-9.10 Nike Ajax Missile (DOE 1995, between pp. 24-25)...... ,2-9.8

2-9.11 Nike Hercules Missile (DOE 1995, between pp. 24-25)................................................................. ...2-9.8

2-9.12 Former Nike Missile Launch Area (Position H-06-L) Located on the North Slope (DOE 1995, between pp. 4 4 -4 5 ).................................2-9.9

2-9.13 Nike Ajax Missile System for Tracking and Intercepting Targets (McMaster 1984, p. 5 -4 ).............................................................................. 2-9.9

2-9.14 Underground Storage Magazine and Launcher-Loader Assembly (Artillery School 1955)............................................................................ 2-9.10

2-9.15 H-52-L Nike Missile Launch Site at the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, 1994 (Roll 124, Frame 4, Available in

the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)..............................................................................2-9.11

2-9.16 Layout of the H-52-L Nike Missile Launch Area, 1998 (Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford

Cultural Resources Laboratory)............... 2-9.11

2-9.17 Underground Missile Storage Facility (6652-L) at the H-52-L Nike Missile Launch Site, 1995 (Roll 287, Frame 7, Available in

the Library o f the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory)...........................................................................,.2-9.12

2-9.18 Existing Barracks/Administration Building (6652-C) with "1st Missile Battalion, 52nd Artillery, Battery D" on the W all at the

H-52-C Battery Control Area, 1997 (Roll 39, Frame 27, Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford 

Cultural Resources Laboratory).......................................... - ............ .2-9.12

2-9.19 Layout of the H-52-C Battery Control Area, 1998 (Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford

Cultural Resources Laboratory)................. 2-9.12

2-9.20 Camp Hanford Firing Range Positions (DOE 1995, between pp. 26-27)............. !... 2-9.13

Se c t io n 10 - W o r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

2-10.1 W illiam D. Norwood (on right) Shaking Hands with W orker (Neg. 6633-2 Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of

Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory) ............... ................................. .............................................................. ............................................. 2-10.4

2-10.2 Master Safety Rules, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, January 1,1971 (Original Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)..............................................- ............................................................................ 2-10.5

2-10.3 Safety Sign and Protective Gear at Valve Station in 221-T Operating Gallery (Neg 96709-3 Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)..............................................................................................................................2-10.5

2-10.4 Workers w ith Different Field Instruments for Detecting Radiation (Neg. 11491-3 Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)................................................................. ........................................................ 2-10.7

2-10.5 Worker Conducting Self-Survey o f Thyroid (Neg. 9865-3 Available in the Library of the U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural

Resources Laboratory)..................... 2-10.18

F.5
2-10.6 M obile W hole Body Counter Used for M onitoring School Children (Neg. 18769-84 Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)................................................................................. 2-10.19

2-10.7 W orker Feeding Sheep Radioactive Food at the 108-F Building (Neg. 5988-4 Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)................. :......... 2-10.19

2-10.8 W orker Taking a Dose-Rate Reading in a Radiation Zone w ith a Cutie Pie (Neg. 9852-4 Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory) ............................ 2-10.24

2-10.9 W hole Body Counter Equipment (Neg. 78611-01 Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural

Resources Laboratory) ........................ .............................................................................................................................................................2-10.26

2-10.10 W orker Being Surveyed w ith a Geiger Counter upon Exiting a Radiation Zone (Neg. 11972-6 Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Eneigy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)....................................................................................:..............;................ .....2-10.27

2-10.11 Portal Instrument Used for Self-Survey W hen Exiting a Radiation Zone (Neg. 22324-7 Available in the Library o f the

U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)................................................................................................ 2-10.27

2-10.12 Special W ork Permit Clothing Arranged on Floor (Neg. 9859-8 Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department of Enemy's

Cultural Resources Laboratory) ........................................................................................................... 2-10.29 -

2-10.13 Workers in Special W ork Permit Clothing (Neg. 16474-1 Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department o f Energy's

Cultural Resources Laboratory)................................................................................................................................................................................2-10.29

2-10.14 Billboards Displaying Safety Slogans (l-r starting at top Negs. 7459,16280-1, and 15884-1 Available in the Library of the

U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)..................................... 2-10.30

2-10.15 100-B Reactor Safety Contest: H ow Many Salt Tablets? (Neg. 643-50 Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's

Cultural Resources Laboratory)................................................................................................................................................................................2-10.31

2-10.16 Prizes Awarded for a Safety Contest in 1953 (Neg. 5937 Available in the Library of the U.S. Department of Energy's

Cultural Resources Laboratory)................ 2-T0.31

2-10.17 T-Plant Decontamination Supply Cabinet (Neg. 76834-8 Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department o f Energy's Cultural

Resources Laboratory)............................................................................................................... ............................................................................... 2-10.34

2-10.18 Emergency Decontamination Equipment in the 748 Building (Neg. 86835-8 Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department of

Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory)...............................................................................................................................................................2-10.35

2-10.19 Comparison of Fatalities at Atom ic Energy Commission Facilities with Those Reported by the National Safety Council,

1943-1974 (Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department of Energy's Cultural Resources Laboratory).............................................. 2-10.37

2-10.20 Comparison o f Injury Severity Rates at Atom ic Energy Commission Facilities w ith Those Reported by the National Safety

Council, 1943-1974 (Available in the Library o f the U.S. Department of Eneigy's Cultural Resources Laboratory).......................:.... 2-10.37

Se c t io n 11 - Tr a n s p o r t a t io n , Co m m u n ic a t io n , a n d Sit e Su p p o r t

2-11.1 Roads and Railroads at the Hanford Site, 1973 (AEC 1973).................................................................................................................................. 2-11.3

2-11.2 Roads at the Hanford Site Around 1950 (GE 1950, p. 2 1 )...................................................................................... ....................... ...................2-11.4 .

2-11.3 Roads and Railroads at the Hanford Site, 1994 (ICF KH 1994)........................................... 2-11.5

2-11.4 Hanford Site Railroad System Around 1950 (GE 1950, p. 5)....................................................................................................... ........................2-11.6

2-11.5 Map of the Richland Area Bus System Around 1950 (GE 1950, p. 11).................................... 2-11.9

2-11.6 100-H Area Garage and Service Station Around 1950 (GE 1950, p. 3 1 )................................. 2-11.10

2-11.7 Typical Floating Pump House on the Columbia River Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 5 3 1 ).................................................................. 2-11.11

2-11.8 McGee W ell, Ground Water Storage Tank, and Booster Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 529) ............................................................2-11.11

2-11.9 Export W ater System at the Hanford Site Around 1990 (Adapted from DOE 1990, p. 5-2)................... .....................................................2-11.12

2-11.10 181-D River Pum p House from Aerial View Looking South Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 7 2 2 )........................................................ 2-11.13

2-11.11 182-D Reservoir and Pump House from Aerial View Looking North Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 7 2 6 ).....................................2-11.13

2-11.12 183-D Filter Plant from Aerial View Looking Northwest Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 731)...............................................................2-11.13

2-11.13 Typical Water Storage Tank at the Hanford Site Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 1206)............................. 2-11.14
Fig u r e s

2-11.14 282-E Reservoir and Pump House, 283-E Filter Building, and 284-E Powerhouse from Aerial View Looking Southeast,

1994 (Neg. 94070043-27)....................................................................................................................................................................................... 2-11.14

2-11.15 High Voltage Transmission Lines at the Hanford Site, 1953 (GE n.d. Drawing No. SK-5-255) .......................................................... 2-11.17

2-11.16 Hanford Site Electrical System Around 1990 (Adapted from DOE 1990, p. 3 -2 ).................................. :.....................................2-11.18

2-11.17 151-D Primary Substation from Aerial View Looking Northwest Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 7 1 5 ).............................................2-11.18

2-11.18 Typical Overhead Steam Lines Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 1196).................. 2-71.19

2-11.19 184-B Powerhouse from Aerial View Looking Northeast Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 735).........................................................2-11.20

2-11.20 707-F Retention Basin from Aerial View Looking Northwest Around 1945 (Du Pont 1945c, p. 7 0 2 )....................................................2-11.21

2-17.21 Telephone System at the Hanford Site in the 1950s (GE n.d., p. 7 1 )........................................................................................................... 2-11.23

Se c t io n 12 - His t o r y o f Wo r k e r s

2-12.1 Number o f Construction Workers, 1943-1944 (Thayer 1996, p. 94)................................................................................................................2-12.3

2-12.2 Two Styles of Housing Built in Richland, Washington during the 1940s for Workers at the Hanford Site (Kubik 1994, p. 3 4 ).......... 2-12.6

2-12.3 Examples of M otivational and Security Signs at the Hanford Site during the 1940s (Absenteeism - Sanger 1995, p. 82;

W ar Bonds Advertisement - Sanger 1995, p. 93; and Security Reminder - Van Arsdol 1992, p. 3 3 )........................................... 2-12.8

2-12.4 Ceremony at the Hanford Site Celebrating the Arrival o f Day's Pay (Sanger 1995, p. 1 0 9 )................... 2-12.8

2-12.5 Female Workers Proceeding through Security Gates after Showing Badge, 1944-1945 (Fermi and'Samra 1995, p. 3 3 ).....................2-12.12

2-12.6 News Article Telling Workers at the Hanford Site W hat They Had Been Producing (Sanger 1995, p. 2 1 6 )......................................... 2-12.13

2-12:7 . Employment at the Hanford Site, 1943-1959 (DOE 1997a)..........„ .................................................................................................................2-12.13

2-12.8 Employment at the Hanford Site, 1960-1990 (DOE 1997a)........................................................................................................ 2-12.22

2-12.9 President John F. Kennedy at Ground Breaking of the Hanford Generating Plant at N Reactor, October 1963................................... 2-12.25

Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Resources

Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r Fu t u r e Uses of

Str u c tu r es

4.1 Plutonium Production Process and Key Structures for Those Processes at the Hanford S ite .............................................................................4.3

Lis t of Ta b les

Ch a p t e r 1 - His t o r ic Ov e r v ie w

Ch a p te r 2 - Pl u t o n iu m Pr o d u c tio n Fa c il it ie s

Se c t io n 1 - Co n s t r u c t io n His t o r y

Se c t io n 2 - Fu e l M a n u f a c t u r in g

Se c t io n 3 - Re a c to r Op e r a t io n s

2-3.1 Evolution o f Reactor Technology in the 19 4 0 s .................... 2-3.2

2-3.2 Reactor Core Characteristics for Hanford Reactors (Adapted from Toffer 1989, p. 2 4 1 )...................................................................................2-3.4

2-3.3 Hanford Reactor Dates of Operation (DeNeal 1970,pp. 5-41; DOE 1989, p. 2.1; and DOE 1997a, pp. 3 -5 )........................................ i..2-3.5

2-3.4 Production Reactor Systems and Representative Buildings Selected for M itigation (Marceau 1998)...................................... 2-3.11

2-3.5 Components of a Typical Hanford Nuclear Reactor Block (100-F) (DOE 1989, pp. A .6-A .9).................. 2-3.14

2-3.6 Estimated Weight Comparison of the Six Oldest (B, D, F, DR, H, and C) and the K Reactor Blocks (DOE 1989, p. A .9)........................2-3.14

2-3.7 Frequency o f Hanford Fuel Element Failures (DeNeal 1970, p. 4 4 )................................................................................................................... 2-3.25

2-3.8 Relative Abundance of Radionuclides in Reactor Effluent (Foster 1962)........................................................................................................... 2-3.27

2-3.9 Total Releases to the Columbia River from Eight Single-Pass Hanford Production Reactors, Curies per Year

(Median Values o f 100 Realizations in Curies per Year) (Heeb and Bates 1 994)....................................... '............... 2-3.27

2-3.10 Increases in Hanford Reactor Power Levels (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, pp. 104,147)............. 2-3.29

2-3.11 Total Production o f Plutonium at the Hanford Site (Roblyer 1994, p. 2 0 ).................................................................................................... 2-3.30

Se c t io n 4 - Ch e m ic a l Se p a r a t io n s

2-4.1 Chemical Separations Facilities at the Hanford Site (Adapted from DOE 1994a, p. 1-1)...................................................... 2-4.5

2-4.2 Chemical Separations Facilities M odified for Other Functions (Adapted from DOE 1991a, p. 3-6; DOE 1992c, p. 29;

Gerber 1994c, p. 3 9 )................................. 2-4.5

2-4.3 Chemical Separations Processes, Support Operations, and Related Facilities (Adapted from Marceau 1998).............................................. 2-4.7

2-4.4 Examples of Entries in a Run Book and a Data Sheet for Decladding O perations........................................................................................... 2-4.11

2-4.5 Bismuth Phosphate and Plutonium-239 ...................................................................................................................................................................2-4.16

Se c t io n 5 - Pl u t o n iu m Fin is h in g

2-5.1 Significant Events: Plutonium Finishing......................................................................................................................................................................2-5.2

2-5.2 Tasks in Plutonium Finishing Operations (GE 1953j, 1954j, Stark 1 9 5 2)............................................................................................................ 2-5.7

2-5.3 Modifications to the Rubber Glove Line............................ 2-5.8

2-5.4 Modifications to the Remote Mechanical A L in e ............................................................................... ...................................................................2-5.11

2-5.5 Modifications to the Remote Mechanical C Line.................................................................................................................................................... 2-5.16

2-5.6 Modifications to Both the Remote Mechanical A and C Lines ....... 2-5.20

Se c t io n 6 - Wa s t e M a n a g e m e n t

2-6.1 Hanford Site Waste Types and Nuclear Materials (Gephart 1 9 9 9 )........................................................................................................................ 2-6.2
2-6.2 Classes of Waste Generated at the Hanford Site (DOE 1997e)............................................................. 2-6.2

2-6.3 Annual Summary o f Curies o f Five Radioactive Materials Released to the Colum bia River from the Hanford Site, 1944-1971

(Heeband Bates 1994, p. v ii)................................................. 2-6.16

2-6.4 Annual Summary of Curies o f Six Radioactive Materials Released to the A ir from the Hanford Site, 1944-1972

(Heeb 1994, p. v ii)............................... 2-6.29

Se c t io n 7 - Re s e a r c h a n d De v e l o p m e n t

2-7.1 Hanford Site Research and Development Personnel, 1946-1957 (Adapted from GE n.d.(a), p. 6 )......... 2-7.6

2-7.2 Portable Instruments Used to M onitor Contamination and Measure Exposure Rates at the Hanford Site, 1944-1988

v (Adapted from Howell e ta l. 1989)...........................................................................................................................................................................2-7.10

2-7.3 A Sampling of Symposia and Seminars Held at the Hanford Site, 1948-1990............................................................................."................... 2-7.27

Se c t io n 8 - Sit e Se c u r it y

2-8.1 Summary of Incidents the Hanford Site Patrol Dealt w ith in Their Role as Specially Assigned Benton County Deputies between

March 15, 1943 and August 28, 1944 (Sanger 1995, p. 9 6 )........................... 2-8.10

2-8.2 Badge Symbols for Secured Areas in the Mid-1980s (RHO 1986-1987, sect. 72-01.1, pp. 4 -5 )...................................................................2-8.29

2-8.3 Hanford Site Emergency Alarms (DOE 1997d)......................................................................................................... ;......................;...........2-8.33

Se c t io n 9 - M il it a r y Op e r a t io n s

Se c t io n 10 - W o r k e r He a l t h a n d Sa f e t y

2-10.1 Chronology o f Radiation Standards: Occupational External W hole Body Dose Equivalent Limits, 1947-1977

(Adapted from DOE 1981a, p. 2 ) ............................................................................................................................................................................ 2-10.21

2-10.2 Occupational Exposure Limits for Radioisotopes at the Hanford Site, 1954 (GE 1954q, p. 3 )..........~....................................... 2-10.22

2-10.3 Comparison of Two Personnel Dosimeters in Terms o f the Ideal Dosimeter (Adapted from Kathren 1974, p. 6 1 )...............................2-10.26

2-10.4 Examples o f Special Hazards Bulletins Issued in the 1950s (Adapted from Wilson 1987, p. 1 .6 ).......................................... .................2-10.28

2-10.5 Comparison o f Fatal Accident Rates between the Hanford Site and Other Industries (Strom 1997, p. 339)............................................2-10.36

Se c t io n 11 - Tr a n s p o r t a t io n , Co m m u n ic a t io n , a n d Sit e Su p p o r t

2-11.1 Hanford Site Structures Contributing to Infrastructure Growth during the Cold War E ra................................................................................ 2-11.2

2-11.2 Hanford Site Use of Pre-1943 Roads......................................................................................................................................................................... 2-11.3

2-11.3 Hanford Site Export Water Systems (Adapted from DOE 1994b and Rohl 1 9 9 8 )........................................................................................2-11.15

Se c t io n 12 - His t o r y o f W or k e r s

2-12.1 Number and Type o f Scientists and Engineers in 1947 (Findlay and Hevly 1995, p. 151)........................... 2-12.13

2-12.2 Hanford Site Personnel, 1943-1957 (Adapted from GE n.d.(a), p. 6) ............................................................................................................... 2-12.14

2-12.3 Results of General Electric Suggestion System, 1947-1957 (GE n.d. (a), p. 1 6 )........... ................................................................................ 2-12.17

2-12.4 Labor Unions Representing Hanford Workers (Adapted from GE n.d. (a))....................................................................................................... 2-12.17

2-12.5 Radiation Incidents, 1944-1957 (GE n.d. (a), p. 2 1 )..................................... 2-12.18

Ch a p t e r 3 - Gu id e to Resources

Ch a p t e r 4 - Re c o m m e n d a t io n s Fo r Fu t u r e Uses of

Str u c tu r e s

4.1 300 Area Buildings Recommended to Be Retained for Adaptive Use and Economic D evelopm ent.................................................................4.9
S T .-''
Refe r e n c e s

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GE - General Electric Com pany. 1947b. Hanford Engineer Works Monthly Report, )uly 1947. HEW -7283 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1947c. Hanford Engineer Works Monthly Report, August 1947. HEW -7504 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1947d. Hanford Works Monthly Report, November 1947. H W -8267 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1949a. Hanford Works Monthly Report, May 1949. H W -13561 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1949b. Hanford Works Monthly Report, July 1949. H W -14043 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1949c. Hanford Works Monthly Report, August 1949. H W -14338 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1949d. Hanford Works Monthly Report, September 1949. H W -145 96 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1949e. Hantord Works Monthly Report, October 1949. HW-14916 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1949f. Hanford Works Monthly Report, November 1949. H W -1 52 67 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1950a. Hanford Codes and Jargon. H W -18223, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1950b. Hanford Works Transportation Division Operation. H W -22059, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1950c. Hanford Works M o n th /y Report, December 1949. H W -1 5550 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

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GE - General Electric Com pany. 1951b. Biology Research Annual Report. H W -25021, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1951c. Health Instruments Divisions Research and Development Programs for the Advisory Committee on Biology

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GE - General Electric Com pany. 1951d. Hanford Works Monthly Report, December 1950. HW-19842 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral E lectric Com pany. 1951e. Hanford Works Monthly Report, February 1951. H W -204 38 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1951 f. Hanford Works Monthly Report, March 1951. H W -20671 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1951 g. Hanford Works Monthly Report; May 1951. H W -2 1 2 6 0 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1951 h. Hanford Works Monthly Report, August 1951. H W -220 75 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1952a. Design and Construction History - Project C-165-A, Pile Area "H ." H anford W orks, R ichland, W ashington. 

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1952b. Radiological Sciences Department Annual Report 1952. H W -27814, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral E lectric Com pany. 1952c. Hanford Works Monthly Report, Januar)' 1952. H W -2 3 4 3 7 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1952d. Hanford Works Monthly Report for February 1952. H W -236 38 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1952e. Hanford Works Monthly Report, March 1952. H W -239 82 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1952f. Hanford Works Monthly Report for April 1952. H W -243 37 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric C om pany. 1952g. Journal, Project C-198 Phase I. CEV-6041, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1952h. Hanford Works Monthly Report for May 1952. H W -246 05 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1952i. Hanford Works Monthly Report for June 1952. H W -249 28 DEL, R ichland, W ashington,

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GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1952k. Hanford Works Monthly Report for August 1952. H W -25533 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 19521. Hanford Works Monthly Report for September 1952. H W -25781 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1952m . Hanford Works Monthly Report for October 1952. H W -260 47 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric C o m p a n y.. 1952n. Hanford Works Monthly Report for November 1952. H W -263 76 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953a. Manufacturing Department Radiation Incident Investigation No. 65. H W -280 21, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953b. 1952 at Hanford Works. H W -26705-D EL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953c. Biology Research Annual Report 1952. H W -28636, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1953d. Hanford Works Monthly Report for December 1952. H W -267 20 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1953e. Hanford Works Monthly Report for January 1953. H W -269 46 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953f. Hanford Works Monthly Report for February 1953. H W -272 88 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953g. Hanford Works Monthly Report for March 1953. H W -276 24 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953h. Hanford Works Monthly Report for April 1953. H W -279 32 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953L Hanford Works Monthly Report for May 1953. H W -282 67 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953j. Design and Construction History, Project C-198, 234-5 Building Program, Phases II and III. H W -24800-36, 

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GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1953k. Hanford Works Monthly Report for August 1953. H W -292 29 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 19531. Hanford Works Monthly Report for September 1953. H W -295 13 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

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GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1961 d. Chemical Processing Department Monthly Report for January 1961. H W -68345 DEL, R ichland, W ashington. 

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1961e. Chemical Processing Department Monthly Report for February 1961. H W -68700 DEL, R ichland, W ashington. 

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1961 f. Chemical Processing Department Monthly Report for March 1961. H W -69051 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

GE - General Electric Com pany. 1961g. Chemical Processing Department Monthly Report for April 1961. H W -69443 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

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GE - G eneral Electric Com pany. 1962d. Chemical Processing Department Monthly Report for May 1962. H W -73884 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

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'GE - General Electric Com pany. 1965a. Chemical Processing Department Monthly Report for June 1965. RL-SEP-618 DEL, R ichland, W ashington.

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Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 1: Atmospheric Sciences. BN W L-48T Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1967c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1966 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. BN W L-481 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1967d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1966 to the USAEC Division of Biology and Medicine,

Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 3: Earth Sciences. BNW L-481 Part 3, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1968a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1967 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-714, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1968b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1967 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. B N W L -715 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1968c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1967 to the-USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume2: Physical Sciences, Part 4: Earth Sciences. B N W L-715'P art 4, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - Pacific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1968 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 1: Life Sciences, Part 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-1050 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1968 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. BN W L-1051 Part 2, R icnland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1968 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 3: Instrumentation. BN W L-1051 Part 3, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1969 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 1: Life Sciences, Part 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-1306 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970e. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1969 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

V olum eh Life Sciences, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-1306 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970f. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1969 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume2: Physical Sciences, Part 1: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-1307 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1970g. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1969 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. B N W L-1307 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1971 a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1970 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 1: Life Sciences, Part 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-1550 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1971 b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1970 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume1: Life Sciences, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-1550 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - Pacific N orthw est Laboratory. 1971c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annua! Report for 1970 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 1: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-1551 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1971d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1970 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Voiume2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. BN W L-1551 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington. •

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1972a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1971 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume 1: Life Sciences, Part 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-1650 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1972b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1971 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume1: Life Sciences, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-1650 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - Pacific N orthw est Laboratory. 1972c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1971 to the USAEC Division o f Biology and Medicine,

Volume2: Physical Sciences, Part 1: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-1651 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

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Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. B N W L-1651 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1973a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1972 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Volume 1: Life Sciences, Part 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-1750 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1973b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1972 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Volume1: Life Sciences, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-175 0 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1973c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1972 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 1: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-1751 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1973d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1972 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Volume 2: Physical Sciences, Part 2: Radiological Sciences. B N W L-1751 Part 2 , R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1974a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1973 to the USAEC Division of Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 1: Biological Sciences. B N W L-1850 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1974b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1973 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-1850 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1974c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1973 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environm ental Research, Part 3: A tm ospheric Sciences. B N W L-1850 Part 3, R ichlana, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1974d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1973 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 4: Physical and Analytical Sciences. B N W L-1850 Part 4 , R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1975a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1974 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 1: Biomedical Sciences. B N W L-1950 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1975b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1974 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-1950 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1975c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1974 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 3: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-1950 Part 3, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1975d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1974 to the USAEC Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 4: Physical and Analytical Sciences. B N W L-1950 Part 4, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1976a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1975 to the ERDA Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 1: Biomedical Sciences. B N W L-2000 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1976b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1975 to the ERDA Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L-2000 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1976c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1975 to the ERDA Division o f Biomedical and

Environmental Research, Part 3: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-2000 Part 3, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1976d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1975 to die ERDA Division o f Biomedical and

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 19 77a. Pacific N orthw est Laboratory Annual Report fo r 1976 to the ERDA Assistant A dm inistrator for

Environment and Safety, Part 1: Biomedical Sciences. B N W L-2100 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1977b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1976 to the ERDA Assistant Administrator for

Environment and Safety, Part 2: Ecological Sciences. B N W L -2100 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1977c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1976 to the ERDA Assistant Administrator for

Environment and Safety, Part 3: Atmospheric Sciences. B N W L-2100 Part 3, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1977d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1976 to the ERDA Assistant Administrator for

Environment and Safety, Part 4: Pnysical and Technical Programs. B N W L -210 0 Part 4, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1978a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1977 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

P arti: Biomedical Sciences. PNL-2500 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1978b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1977 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

Part 2: Ecological Sciences. P N L-2500 Part 2, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1978c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1977 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

Part 3: Atmospheric Sciences. PNL-2500 Part 3, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1978d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1977 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1979a. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1978 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment, 

Parti: Biomedical Sciences. P N L-2850 Part 1, R ichland, W ashington.

PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1979b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1978 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1979c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1978 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1979d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1978 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1980b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1979 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1980c. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1979 to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment,

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1984b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1983 to the DOE Office o f Energy Research, Part 2:

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1987b. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1986 to the DOE Office o f Eneigy Research, Part 2:

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1988d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1987 to the DOE Office o f Energy Research, Part 4:

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PNL - P acific N orthw est Laboratory. 1990d. Pacific Northwest Laboratory Annual Report for 1989 to the DOE Office o f Eneigy Research, Part 4:

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Washington, D.C.

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Sehmel, G.A. 1977. R adioactive Particle Resuspension Research Experiments on the H a n fo rd Reservation. BNWL-2081, Pacific Northwest 

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Shaw, D.F. 1953. Activate Task I, R M A Line, B uilding 23 4 -5 (Project N o. C G -549). Directive No. HW -304, Directive No. HW -304, Modification 

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B . l l
Bib l io g r a p h y

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SrSiti •r4-6

l.wir«r>»'Ul- "pglgs

''V'.'/ ■ ■ . . . %■ :1K
G l o s s a r y

100 Areas

105 buildings

181 buildings

182 buildings

183 buildings

190 buildings

200 Areas

300 Area

400 Area

500 Area

600 Area

700 Area

800 Area

900 Area

1100 Area

3000 Area

ACHR

AEA

AEC

ALARA

ALE

background level

billet - uranium

site o f the Hanford production reactors, which include B, C, D, DR (replacement reactor), F, H, KE (K East), KW 

(K West), and N Reactors

buildings housing the production reactors

buildings housing the pumps that drew in water from the Columbia River

buildings where water drawn from the Columbia River was stored and then pumped when needed to the treatment 

facilities

buildings where water was treated prior to cooling the reactors

buildings where the treated water was stored and then pumped to the reactors

sites of the Hanford chemical separations plants, which include the bismuth phosphate process plants (B and T Plants), 

plutonium uranium extraction plant (PUREX/A Plant), and reduction and oxidation plant (REDOX/S Plant)

site of the research, development and fuel fabrication operations; the 300 Area had most of Hanford's research and 

development activities, chemical process laboratories, and test reactors

site of the Fast Flux Test Facility

a non-geographic area designating the electrical lines, distribution substations, fence and road lighting, fire alarm 

systems, and telephones and telephone cables

in 1990 all land w ithin the Hanford Site not occupied by the 100,200, 300,400, 1100, or 3000 Areas

enclosed (fenced) area that housed the administrative functions during the Manhattan Project and early Cold W ar years 

until the Atom ic Energy Commission sold it in 1958-1959

a non-geographic area designating the steam power plants and overhead pipe line facilities, specifically all pipe 

supports, steam lines, air lines, and process lines

a non-geographic area designating the underground pipe line facilities, specifically the export water lines and valve 

houses, raw water and fire protection lines, sanitary sewers, process sewers, wells, and pumps

in 1990, site o f the warehouse, vehicle maintenance, and transportation operations center; commercial district/ 

downtown Richland was part of the 1100 Area, except for the 700 Area, which was the administrative district for the site

in1990, site o f engineering, construction, and research and development activities

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

A to m ic Energy A c t (42 USC 2011 et seq.) federal law that administers and regulates the production and use of atomic 

power; passed in.1946 and amended substantially in 1954 and several times since then

Atom ic Energy Commission, created by the A to m ic Energy A c t in 1946 as the civilian agency responsible for the 

production of nuclear weapons and research and regulation o f atomic energy; federal overseer o f the Hanford Site from 

January 1, 1947 to January 19,1975; successor to the U.S. Arm y Corps o f Engineers and predecessor to the Eneigy 

Research and Development Agency (ERDA), now the U.S. Department of Energy

as low as reasonably achievable

Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve

measured level at which the concentration of a hazardous substance is consistently present in the environment that has 

not been influenced by local human activities

semi-finished, short, thick bar of uranium in the form o f a cylinder; produced offsite from ingots and began arriving at 

the Hanford Site November 1944 in preparation for Hanford's capability to extrude the billets into rods w hich started 

early 1945
breeder reactor

bus

button

calcine

canning

canyon

CERCLA

cesium

cfs

chain reaction

charging

chemical separation

cladding

Clinton Engineer Works

Clinton Semiworks

co-extrusion

Cold War

Corps

council

CREHST

crib

critical

criticality

nuclear reactor that produces more fissionable materia! than it consumes

set o f tw o or more electric conductors that serve as common connections between load circuits and each o f the 

polarities (in direct-current systems) o r phases (in alternating-current systems) of the source of electric power

metal chunks o f plutonium (resembling a hockey puck), which were the result o f converting plutonium nitrate into 

plutonium metal

process that uses heat to convert liquid, high level waste into a dry, powdery form ; also the powdered waste that results 

from this process

process of sealing the fuel core in either aluminum or zirconium cladding (also called a jacket) to create the fuel 

element; jacketing is another term used for canning

vernacular term used at the Hanford Site for the chemical separations plants, inspired by their long, high, narrow 

structure

Com prehensive E nvironm ental Response, C om pensation, a n d L ia b ility A c t o f 1980 (42 US C 9601 e t seq.as am ended);

federal law, enacted in 1980 and amended in 1986, that governs the cleanup of hazardous, toxic, and radioactive 

substances; the A ct and its amendments created a trust fund, comm only known as Superfund, to finance the 

investigation and cleanup of releases o f hazardous substances; the 1986 amendments included provisions that require 

the U.S. Department o f Energy and other federal agencies to clean up their facilities under Federal Facility agreements 

w ith the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

element chemically sim ilar to sodium and potassium; isotope, cesium-137, is one o f the most important fission, products 

w ith a half-life o f about 30 years

cubic feet per second

succession o f nuclear divisions; the neutrons set free in the nuclear divisions split the fissile nuclei (uranium-233, 

uranium-235, plutonium-239)

process of loading the uranium fuel elements into the process channels located in the front face of the reactor block

process for extracting uranium, plutonium , and other radionuclides from dissolved spent nuclear fuel and irradiated

targets; the fission products left behind are high level waste

outer layer of metal over the fissile material of a nuclear fuel element; usually aluminum or zirconium ; jacket is another 

term used for cladding

original name o f the Oak Ridge Reservation

pilot plant to produce plutonium at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee

process used to clad nuclear fuel elements for the N Reactor; a press extrudes uranium billets welded inside aluminum

or zirconium cladding material into tubes, bonding the uranium to the cladding materials

state of tension and m ilitary rivalry that existed between the United States and the former Soviet Union and their allies 

from 1945 to 1990

U.S. Arm y Corps o f Engineers, federal overseer of the Hanford Site from 1943 to January 1,1947; predecessor to the 

Atom ic Energy Commission

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

The Columbia River Exhibition o f History, Science, and Technology

underground chambers used to dispose of large volumes of low level, radioactive liquid waste, usually constructed of 

loosely spaced timbers several feet below ground level, creating a chamber of more than 1000 cubic feet; the liquid 

w ould percolate through the chamber to the underlying soil; numerous cribs exist in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas

condition in w hich a material undergoes nuclear fission at a self-sustaining rate

event of a material undergoing nuclear fission at a self-sustaining rate
curie

deactivation

decommissioning

decontamination

discharging

DOE

DOE-RL

dose

dose - external whole body

dose - reference

dose - tolerance

dosimetry

downcomer

Du Pont

Ecology

E1S

environmental

contamination

ERA

ERA

ERDA

ExHPIF

Fat Man

FFTF

fissile

fission

Glo s s a r y

unit w hich describes the intensity (strength) o f radioactivity in a material; a curie is a measure o f the rate at w hich a 

radioactive material gives off particles and disintegrates; one curie gives off 37 billion disintegrations per second; a 

typical home smoke detector contains about 1 m illionth of a curie of radioactivity

activities that ensure surplus facilities are secure in a safe and stable condition pending their ultimate disposition; 

includes elim inating immediate safety and environmental hazards as well as removing most contaminants w ithin the 

facility

retirement of nuclear facilities, including decontamination and/or dismantlement

removal o f unwanted radioactive or hazardous contamination by a chemical or mechanical process

process o f irradiated fuel elements being pushed out from the rear face o f the reactor block as operators loaded the 

reactor w ith new fuel elements

U.S. Department o f Energy; cabinet-level federal government agency responsible for nuclear weapons production, 

energy research, and the cleanup of hazardous and radioactive waste at its sites; federal overseer o f the Hanford Site 

from i 977 to present; successor to the Energy Research and Development Agency

U.S. Department o f Energy - Richland Operations Office

specific amount o f ionizing radiation or of a toxic substance absorbed by a living being; measured in rads or rem

measure o f radiological impact for a situation wherein all of the organs and tissues o f the body are essentially uniformly 

irradiated by radiation originating from a source outside o f the body

estimate established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for specific chemicals (with uncertainty spanning 

perhaps an order of magnitude) o f the daily exposure of the human population to a potential hazard that is likely to be 

w ithout risk of deleterious effects duringa lifetime

dose which can be tolerated for a prolonged period o f tim e without ultim ately suffering injury 

measurement and calculation o f radiation doses 

vertical pipe that delivers fluid from above to below

E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc.; prime contractor from 1942-1946 of the Hanford Site for the U. S. Army 

Corps o f Engineers

Washington State Department o f Ecology 

environmental im pact statement

release into the environment o f radioactive, hazardous, and toxic materials

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; established in 1970; responsible for enforcing environmental laws, including the 

Resource C onservation and Recovery A c t (RCRA); the Com prehensive Environm ental Response, Com pensation and

L ia b ility A c t (CERCLA); and the Toxic Substances C ontrol A c t (TSCA)

Energy Reorganization A ct, act signed October 11,1974 by President Ford abolishing the Atomic Energy Commission 

and establishing the Energy Research and Development Administration, which was activated January 19,1975

Energy Research and Development Agency; created in 1974 to take over the weapons production and research 

responsibilities o f the Atom ic Energy Commission; overseer of the Hanford Site from 19751977; successor to the Atomic 

Energy Commission and predecessor to the U.5. Department of Energy

Expanded Historic Property Inventory Form

second atomic bomb used in combat by the United Stated; Fat Man was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan on August 9,1945 

Fast Flux Test Facility

capable of being split by a low energy neutron? most common fissile isotopes are uranium-235 and plutonium -239 

nuclear reaction in which the nucleus of an atom breaks up into tw o or more nuclei and releases energy (radiation)

G .3
French drain

fuel core

fuel element

fuel - nuclear/reactor

fuel- spent nuclear

fusion

CE

Geographic

Information System

geometrically

favorable equipment

Green Run

HABS

HAER

half-life

Hanford Site

Hanford Engineer Works

Hanford Works

Hanford Reservation

Hanford Reach

HAPO

HCRMP

heavy metals

shallow shaft used to dispose o f low volumes o f low-level, radioactive liquid waste with lo w activity, typically a 3-6 foot 

concrete pipe about 36 inches in diameter buried vertically and filled with rock or gravel; the liquid usually entered the 

shaft from a waste line at the top (surface) o f the pipe and flowed through the pipe to the soil below; hundred of French 

drains are scattered throughout the Hanford production areas

uranium part o f the fuel element

pipe cylinder that contained the nuclear fuel fo r the plutonium production reactors at the Hanford Site; commonly 

referred to as a "slug'" at the Hanford Site; the process o f creating a fuel element consisted o f 

ingot initial form o f uranium

billet produced offsite from ingots and began arriving at the Hanford Site November 1944 in preparation for

Hanford's capability to extrude the billets into rods which started January 1945 

rod initially produced offsite from billets and began arriving at the Hanford Site October 1943; produced at the

Hanford Site beginning January 1945 

fuel core uranium part o f the fuel element produced from rods

natural or enriched uranium that sustains the fission chain reaction in a nuclear reactor; also known as reactor fuel

irradiated fuel discharged from a reactor; the constituent elements o f spent fuel have not been separated out

process whereby the nuclei of lighter elements, especially the isotopes o f hydrogen (deuterium and tritium ) combine to 

form the nucleus of a heavier element w ith the release o f substantial amounts of energy

General Electric Company

computerized system designed to efficiently capture, store, update, manipulate, analyze, and display all forms of 

geographically referenced information

equipment built in sizes and configurations that would avoid an accumulation of plutonium large enough to cause a 

criticality

secret m ilitary experiment conducted at the Hanford Site in December 1949 at the 221 -T chemical separations facility; 

this experiment became known as the Green Run because irradiated uranium fuel was still "green" when the chemical 

separations process began. "Green" meant the fuel had not been aged in a holding basin for the length o f tim e 

recommended b y H ealth Instruments; th e nuclear arms race fue led this experim ent because the United States w anted to

know if the Soviet Union was neglecting to age their irradiated fuel; if the Soviet Union was not taking the same amount 

o f tim e as the United States to age the fuel, this would mean revising estimates of nuclear weapon stockpiles

Historic American Buildings Survey

Historic American Engineering Record

tim e required for an initial number o f radioactive atoms to be reduced to half that number by radioactive decay; each 

isotope has its own characteristic half-life; they range from fractions of a second to billions of years

from 1978-present, name o f the site where the U.S. Government produced plutonium in south-central Washington State 

name o f the Hanford Site from 1943-1946 

name of the Hanford Site from 1947-1974 

name o f the Hanford Site from 1975-1977

segment o f the Columbia River that extends 85 kilometers (51 miles) downstream from Priest Rapids Dam to the head of 

the McNary Pool near the city of Richland, Washington

Hanford Atom ic Products Operation; term used by the General Electric Company for its internal corporate division that 

managed the Hanford Site; not to be confused w ith Hanford Works, which was the name of the site when the 

General Electric Company managed it

Hanford Cultural Resources Management Plan

m etallic elements w ith high atomic weights (for example, arsenic, lead, mercury, plutonium , and uranium) that can 

damage living organisms at low concentrations and tend to accumulate in the food chain

HEDR Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction - scientific study to estimate radiation doses the public may have received 

as a result of these releases
HEIS

heritage tourism

HEW

HGIS

historic district

historic property

holdup time

hoods

HPIF

HW

JCRP

industrial hygiene

ingot

initiator

ionization

irradiation

isotope

jacket

jacketing

Little Boy

lockdown

Manhattan Project

MED

meltdown

mill tailings

Hanford Environmental Information System; an electronic database that consolidates the data gathered during 

environmental m onitoring and restoration of the Hanford Site

visitation of sites o f historic or cultural importance

Hanford Engineer Works - name of the Hanford Site from 1943-1946

Hanford Geographic Information System database

significant concentration, linkage, or continuity o f sites, buildings, structures, or objects united historically or 

aesthetically by plan or.physical development

any.pre-historic or historic building, structure, object, site, or district.included in or eligible for inclusion in the 

National Register o f Historic Places

length of time a parent radionuclide spends in the reactor core, usually expressed in seconds; also length of tim e 

between harvest and consumption of food products

term workers used for glove boxes

Historic Property Inventory Form

Hanford Works; name of the Hanford Site from 1947-1975 

International Commission on Radiological Protection

science and art devoted to recognition, evaluation, and control of those environmental factors or stresses, arising in or 

from the w ork place, w hich may cause sickness, impaired health and well being, or significant discomfort and 

inefficiency among workers o r among citizens o f the community

initial form of mined uranium

device that produces a timed burst o f neutrons to initiate a fission chain reaction in a nuclear weapon; initiators made of 

polonium-210 and beryllium were located at the center o f the fissile cores of early atomic weapons

process by which a neutral atom or molecule loses or gains electrons, thereby acquiring a net charge and becoming an 

ion

exposure o f an object to radiation usually in a nuclear reactor; targets are irradiated to produce isotopes

form o f the same chemical element that differs only by the number of neutrons in its nucleus; most elements have more 

than one naturally occurring isotope; many more isotopes have been produced in nuclear reactors and accelerators

outer layer of metal over the fissile material o f a nuclear fuel element; usually aluminum or zirconium (also called 

cladding)

process of sealing the fuel core in either aluminum or zirconium cladding (also called a jacket) to create the fuel 

element; canning is another term used for jacketing

first atomic bomb used in combat by the United States; Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan on August 6,1945 

activity where gates were closed and all personnel searched before exiting facility

U.S. Government project, named for the Manhattan Engineer District, that produced the first atomic bombs during 

W orld W ar II; started in 1942, the Manhattan Project form ally ended in 1946; the Hanford Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, 

and the Los Alamos National Laboratory were created for this effort

Manhattan Engineer District established August 1942; name given by the U.S. Arm y Corps of Engineers to their 

organization that oversaw the design, production, and. testing o f the first nuclear weapons; January 1, 1947, the district 

transferred authority over nuclear weapons stewardship to the civilian authority o f the newly established Atom ic Energy 

Commission

accident in a nuclear reactor in which melting o f the fuel core occurs

sand-like materials left over from separating uranium from its ore; more than 99 percent of the ore becomes tailings, 

which typically contain about 85 percent of the radioactivity present in unprocessed ore
mitigation actions that lim it or compensate for the damage an undertaking does to historic properties

M.R.E.P.

NARA

NCRR

NEPA

neutron

NHPA

NPDES

NRC

nuclear materials

nuclear weapons complex

nucleus

NWPA

OSRD

PA

PFP

PFPP

PRCF

PRTR

PH

PIC

pile

pit

unit of measurement of dose equivalence; REP is an obsolete unit o f absorbed dose in tissue; originally derived from 

roentgen equivalent physical and is approximately equivalent to the rem

National Archives and Records Administration

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement

N a tio n a l Environm ental P o lic y A c t o f 1969 (42 USC 4321 et seq. as amended); federal law requiring the federal 

government to consider the environmental impacts of and alternatives to major proposed actions in its decision making 

process

massive, uncharged particle that comprises part o f an atomic nucleus; uranium and plutonium atoms fission when they 

absorb neutrons; the chain reactions that make nuclear reactors and weapons w ork thus depend on neutrons; 

man-made elements can be manufactured by bombarding other elements w ith neutrons in production reactors

N ation al H isto ric Preservation A c t (16 USC 470 et seq. as amended); passed in 1966 directing federal agencies to 

assume responsibility for all cultural resources under therr jurisdiction; Section 110 requires agencies to survey the lands 

under their control and evaluate all historic properties for eligibility for the National Register o f Historic Places;

Section 106 requires agencies to consider the effects of their actions on properties listed, or eligible for listing, in the 

National Register

National Pollution Discharge Elimination System

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; an independent agency o f the federal government created by the Energy

R eorganization A c t of 1974, which abolished the Atom ic Energy Commission and transferred its regulatory function to 

the NRC

A ll materials"so designated by the Department o f Energy. Presently, these materials are : depleted uranium, enriched 

uranium, americium -241, americium-243, curium , berkelium, californium , plutonium 238-242, lithium-6, 

uranium-233, normal uranium, neptunium-237, deuterium, tritium , thorium.

chain o f foundries, uranium enrichment plants, nuclear reactors, chemical separation plants, factories, laboratories, 

assembly plants, and test sites that produce nuclear weapons

cluster o f protons and neutrons at the center o f an atom that determines its identify and chemical and nuclear properties

N uclea r Waste P olicy A c t o f 1982 (Public Law 97-425); federal law that provides .for the development of geologic 

repositories for disposal o f high level waste and spent nuclear fuel and establishes a program o f research, development, 

and demonstration regarding disposal o f high level waste and spent nuclear fuel

Office o f Scientific Research and Development

Program m atic A greem ent A m o n g the U.S. D epartm ent o f Energy-R ichland O perations O ffice, the A d viso ry C o u n c il on

H is to ric Preservation, a n d the W ashington State H isto ric Preservation O ffic e fo r the M aintenance, D eactivation,

A ltera tion, a n d D e m o litio n o f the B u ilt E nvironm ent on the H a n fo rd Site, W ashington; document (DOE/RL-96-77) 

published by the U.S. Department o f Energy in .1996

plutonium finishing plant

Plutonium Fabrication P ilot Plant

Plutonium Recycle Critical Facility

Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor

term used to indicate the acidity and alkalinity of a solution; pH 7, the value for pure water, is regarded as neutral; 

pH values from 0-7 indicate acidity and pH values from 7-14 indicate alkalinity

Pocket Ionization Chambers

early term for plutonium production reactors

central core o f the primary stage of a nuclear weapon fabricated from plutonium metal buttons by casting, grinding, and 

shaping die buttons into forms needed for weapons
Glo s s a r y

plume

plutonium

plutonium - fuel-grade

plutonium - weapons-grade

PNNL

postum

production operations

proton

PUREX

rad

radiation

radiation - gamma

radiation - ionizing

radioactivity

radionuclide

RCRA

reactor - graphite

reactor - nuclear

reactor - power

reactor - production

reactor - research

RECUPLEX

REDOX

release

release factor

rem

volume of air, soil, or water containing contaminants released from a contaminant source

fabricated fissile element; pure plutonium is a silvery metal heavier than lead; material rich in plutonium-23.9 isotope is 

preferred for manufacturing nuclear weapons; the half-life o f plutonium-239 is 24,000 years

plutonium containing more than 7 percent plutonium -240 isotope by mass

plutonium containing 93 percent plutonium -239 isotope by mass

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

early samples of plutonium made in B Reactor

activities connected w ith the production reactors in the 100 Areas (B, C, D, DR, F, H, KE, KW, or N reactors) in which 

uranium or other fuel was irradiated with neutrons to produce radioactive materials; used prim arily at the Hanford Site 

to produce plutonium for weapons; used also for research

positively charged particle which, in conjunction w ith the neutron, forms all atomic nuclei

plutonium-uranium extraction; chemical separations plant (A Plant/202-A Building at the Hanford Site), which operated 

from 1955-1972 and 1983-1988

radiation absorbed dose, unit o f measurement used to describe absorbed dose

energy transferred through space or other media in the form o f particles or waves; certain radiation types are capable of 

breaking up atoms or molecules; splitting o r decay of unstable atoms emits ionizing radiation

high energy, highly penetrating electromagnetic radiation emitted in the radioactive decay o f many radionuclides; 

gamma rays are similar to x-rays

particles or photons that have sufficient.energy to produce ionization directly in their passage through a substance; also 

particles that are capable of nuclear interactions in w hich sufficient energy is released to produce ionization

spontaneous emission of radiation (alpha, beta, gamma rays, and/or neutrons) by some nuclides as they transform into 

other nuclides

radioactive isotope o f an element; for example, strontium-90 and tritium are radionuclides o f elements o f strontium and 

hydrogen, respectively

Resource C onservation and Recovery A c t o f 1976 (42 USC 6901 et seq. as amended, Public Law 94-580); federal law 

enacted in 1976 to address the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste

nuclear reactor using graphite blocks surrounding the nuclear fuel to slow the neutrons to low energy so that 

self-sustaining chain reaction is achieved; the first nuclear reactors built at the Hanford Site were graphite reactors

device that sustains a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction

nuclear reactor designed to produce heat for conversion into electrical energy o r mechanical propulsion

nuclear reactor designed to produce fabricated isotopes; plutonium and tritium are made in production reactors; the 

United States has 14 such reactors, 9 at the Hanford Site and 5 at the Savannah River Site; all have been closed

class o f nuclear reactors used for research on nuclear physics, reactor materials and design, and nuclear medicine; some 

research reactors also produce isotopes for industrial and medical use

RECovery o f Uranium and PLutonium by Extraction process /

reduction oxidation; chemical separations plant (S Plant/202-S Building at the Hanford Site), which operated from 1952- 

1967

discharge of a substance into the environment 

ratio of amount released to the amount processed

roentgen equivalent man; unit o f measurement used to describe dose equivalence; the amount of any type o f radiation 

that produces the same biological effect as is obtained from an absorbed dose o f 1 rad o f 200 kilovolt potential x-rays
retention basin

retention time

reverse wells

RG Line

RHA

Richland Village

RMA Line

RMC Line

rod

roentgen

S&C

salt cake

SCRAM

semiworks

SHPO

single-pass reactors

slug

SNM

stack

storage basin

strike

supernatant liquid

Supply System

tank farm

target

excavated and lined area used to hold contaminated fluids until radioactive decay reduced activities to levels 

permissible for release

length o f tim e effluent water was held in a retention basin before discharge to the Columbia River; normal ly expressed 

in hours

deep, w ell-like shafts with perforated casings, w hich were drilled to a depth above.groundwater; use o f reverse wells 

was discontinued after about a year and no new ones were constructed

Rubber Clove Line; initial processing line in the Plutonium Finishing Plant where rubber gloves were used inside a 

protective box to manually manipulate the plutonium

Hanford Site Records Holding Area

planned com m unity o f Richland known as the Hanford Engineer Works Village or Richland Village; the village included 

all o f the o rig inal to w n o f Richland and the new tow n designed and b u ilt by Du Pont and its architect C . A lbin Pehrson

Remote Mechanical A Line; second processing line in the Plutonium Finishing Plant, w hich used a remote process to 

mechanically manipulate the plutonium

Remote Mechanical C Line; third processing line in the Plutonium Finishing Plant, w hich used a remote process to 

mechanically manipulate the plutonium

extruded billet; initially produced offsite, arriving at the Hanford Site October 1943; produced at the Hanford Site 

beginning early "1945

unit of exposure o f ionizing radiation that produces a charge of 1 coulomb of electric charge per kilogram o f dry air 

slag and crucible

cake of dry crystals of radionuclides found in high level waste tanks

safety control rod ax man; initially a manual process, later an automatic insertion o f control and/or safety rods to shut 

down production reactors

pilot plant or small scale plant sufficient to test the actual operating capabilities of a new technique or process 

State Historic Preservation Officer

water cooled nuclear reactors which discharge their cooling water after a single use rather than recirculating it; the first 

eight.production reactors at the Hanford Site were single-pass reactors; N Reactor, the ninth reactor, had a water 

recirculation system.

commonly used term at the Hanford Site for fuel element

special nuclear material; plutonium , uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotope 235, and any other material 

w hich, pursuant to the provisions o f Section 51 o f the Atom ic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has been determined to 

be special nuclear material, but w hich does not include source material; or it also includes any material artificially 

enriched by any o f the foregoing, not including source material

tall chimney that was the primary release point o f exhaust air from a reactor or separations plant building

water-filled facility for holding irradiated reactor fuels w ith the water acting as a shield

addition o f hydrogen peroxide to further separate plutonium from its carrier solutions

liquid above settled solids, as in a gravity separator

Washington Public Power Supply System

complex of underground vessels used to store waste materials

material placed in a nuclear reactor to be bombarded w ith neutrons to produce radioactive materials; uranium-238 

targets are used to make plutonium ; lithium targets are used to make tritium ; thoria targets are used to make fissionable 

uranium-233 for nuclear weapons
TLD

traditional cultural site

traditional religious leader

transmutation

transuranic elements

Trinity Test

Tri-Party agencies

Tri-Party Agreement

triple dip

tritium

TSCA

uranium - natural

uranium - highly enriched

uranium - low enriched

uranium - mining,

milling, and refining

uranium - weapon-grade

USAGE

USGS

waste - hazardous

waste - high level

thermoluminescent dosimeters

any site included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register because of its association with cultural practices or 

beliefs of a living comm unity that is rooted in that community's history, and is important in maintaining the continuing 

cultural identity o f the comm unity

anyone w ho is recognized by members o f that Indian tribe as being responsible for performing cultural duties relating to 

the ceremonial or religious traditions of that group or exercising a leadership role in an Indian tribe based on the group's 

culture, ceremonial, or religious practices

process whereby one nuclide changes or is changed into another, usually by the addition o f nuclear particles

all elements beyond uranium on the periodic table, including neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium ; all 

transuranic elements are fabricated

test o f first atomic bomb July 16, 1945 at what was then called the Alamogordo Bombing Range and today is called the 

W hite Sands Missile Range

three government agencies (U.S. Department o f Energy, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the 

Washington State Department o f Ecology) that are signatories to the Tri-Party Agreement

Federal Facility Compliance Agreement signed in 1989 by the U.S. Department o f Energy, the State o f Washington, and 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; commonly known as the Tri-Party Agreement

first process used to clad reactor fuel at the Hanford Site; process involves successive baths of molten bronze, tin, and 

aluminum -silicon mixture

heaviest isotope of the element hydrogen; tritium is produced in nuclear reactors and is three times heavier than 

ordinary hydrogen; tritium gas is used to boost the explosive power o f most modern nuclear weapons; tritium has a 

half-life of approximately 12 years

Toxic Substances C ontrol A c t (Public Law 94-469); federal law enacted in 1976 to protect human health and the 

environment from unreasonable risk caused by exposure to or the manufacturing, distribution, use, or disposal of 

substances containing toxic chemicals

naturally occurring uranium (0.7 percent uranium-235 and 99.3 percent uranium-238), which is naturally slightly 

radioactive and can be refined to a heavy metal more dense than lead

uranium with more than 20 percent of the uranium-235 isotope, used for m aking nuclear weapons and also as fuel for 

some isotope production, research, and power reactors; weapons-grade uranium is a subset of this group

uranium enriched until it consists o f about 3 percent uranium-235 and 97 percent uranium-238; used as nuclear reactor 

fuel

process where uranium ore is extracted (mined) from the earth's crust and chemically processed (milled) to prepare 

uranium concentrate (U3O s), sometimes called uranium octaoxide or yellow cake; uranium concentrate is chemically 

converted (refined) to purify it into the form needed as feed

uranium made up of over 90 percent o f the fissile uranium-235 isotope

U.S. Arm y Corps of Engineers

United States Geological Survey

non-radioactive materials, such as lead and other heavy metals, solvents,.paints, oils, other hazardous organic materials, 

or materials that exhibit certain characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, or reactivity; defined under RCRA and its 

implementing regulations in title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 260-279, and corresponding state 

regulations

highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced 

directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient 

concentrations; the term is used to indicate the source of the waste not the level of radioactivity; lo w level waste can be 

more radioactive than high level waste
waste - low level

waste - mixed

waste - sanitary

waste - transuranic

W HC

WIDS

yellow cake

any radioactive material that is not spent fuel, high level, transuranic waste, o r the tailings or waste produced by the 

extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed prim arily for its source material

material containing both chemically hazardous waste, as defined under RCRA, and source, special nuclear, or 

byproduct materials as defined under the A to m ic Energy A ct

materials that does not contain radioactive or hazardous constituents sufficient to require special management; sanitary 

waste includes m unicipal solid waste, construction/demolition debris, and some waste water

materials contaminated w ith uranium-233 or transuranic elements having half-lives of over 20 years in concentrations 

more than 1 ten-m illionth o f a curie per gram of waste

Westinghouse Hanford Company

Waste Information Data Systems

common uranium compound (U3O g) named for its typical color; uranium is sent from the uranium m ill to the refinery in 

this form
H
I n d e x

INDEX

100 Areas

design of, 2-1.4 to 2-1.5,2-1.10,2-1.15 to 2-1.1 6

power in, 2-11.17,2-11.20

sewer systems in, 2-11.21

waste in, 2-6.13 to2-6.15, 2-6.19, 2-6.22 to 2-6.23

water supply to, 2-11.11 to 2-11.12,2-11.13

See also specific facilities (e.g., B Reactor, N Reactor)

100 8 Safety Contest, 2-10.31

100-N Sewage Lagoon, 2-6.30

105 Buildings. See reactors for plutonium production

107 Structures, 1.30,2-6.13,2-6.17

108-B Building, 1.49

108-F Building, 1.51,2-7.25,2-10.19

See also Aquatic Biological Laboratory; Experimental Animal Farm

109-N Building, 1.70

See also Hanford Generating Plant

116-B Stack, 4.5

See also ventilation systems

151-D Primary Substation, 2*11.18/

181 Buildings, 139,1.30,2-3.1 7 ,2 -1 1 .1 3 ,4 .4

181 -NA Building. See security

182 Buildings, 1.29 to 1.30,2-3.17,2-11.12,2-11.13/

183 Buildings, 1.30,2-11.12 to 2-11.13,4.5

183-KW Filter Plant, 4.5

See also filter and treatment plants

184 Powerhouses, 1.30,2-10.12,2-11.14/; 2-11.20/

185 Deaeration Plants, 1.30,2-11.12

185-D, 189-D, 190-D Complex, 1.60

See also D Reactor

186 Demineralization Plant, 2-11.12

189 Refrigeration Buildings, 1.30

200 Areas

design of, 2-1.5 to 2-1.6, 2-1.10 to 2-1.11,2-1.16 to 2-1.17

power in, 2-11.17,2-11.18,2-11.20

sewer systems in, 2-11.21

telephone system in, 2-11.22

waste in, 2-6.15 to 2-6.16,2-6.19,2-6.22, 2-6.23 to 2-6.25

water supply to, 2-11.11 to 2-11.12,2-11.13 to 2-11.14

See also specific facilities (e.g., PUREX Plant)

202-A Building. See PUREX Plant

202-S Building. See REDOX Plant

209-E Building, 2-10.37 to 2-10.38

212 Building, 1.30,2-4.8,2-4.9,4.5

213 Structure, 1.31 to 1.32,2-1.19

218-E 14 Building. See tunnels, railroad

218-E 15 Building. See tunnels, railroad

221 Buildings. See chemical separations plants

221-A Plant. See PUREX Plant

222-S Building, 1.32,1.49

222-T Building, 4.5 to 4.6

224 Buildings, 1.54, 2-4.17

See also U O , Plant

225-B Building, 1.71,2-4.26

231-W Building. See Plutonium Isolation Facility

231-Z Building, U 1 , 2-5.1, 2-5.5, 2-5.23

232-Z Building. See Waste Incinerator Facility

233-S Building, 2-4.21

234-5Z Building. See Plutonium Finishing Plant

236-Z Building, 1.61,1.72,1.75,2-5.26 to 2-5.27

242 Buildings. See evaporators

242-Z Building, 1.61,2-5.25 to 2-5.26,2-10.27,2-10.34 to 2-10.35,

2-10.37

276-B Building, 4.6

282 Reservoir and Pump House, 2-11.15

282-E Reservoir and Pump House, 2-11.14 f

283-E Filter Building, 2-11.14/

284-E Building, 2-11.14/

291 Building and Stack, 1.35, 2-4.14,4.6,4.7

Seeafsoventilation systems

291-T Stack, 4.6

See also ventilation systems

291-Z Building and Stack, 4.7

See also ventilation systems

292 Buildings, 1 32,2-4.14

See also ventilation systems

300 Area

design of, 2 -1 3 to 2-1.4, 2-1.11 to 2-1.12,2-1.17 to 2 -1.18,2-2.6/

power In, 2-11.17,2-11.18, 2-11.20

sewer systems in, 2-11.21

waste In, 1.34,2-6.16 to 2-6.17,2-6.19, 2-6.25

water supply to, 2-11.14

See also specific facilities, such as Radiochemistry Laboratory

300 Area Barricade. See Richland Barricade

303 Buildings, 1 .2 8,1.34,2-2.1,2-2.6,4.3

303-A Building, 1.28, 1.34, 2 -2 .6 ,4 3

303-1 Building, 1 3 8 ,1 .3 4 ,2 -1 .1 8

305 Building, 1.24,1.28,2-1.3,2-2.5 to 2 -2 .6 ,2 -7 3 5 ,4 .4

305-B Building, 1.55,2-1.3 to 2-1.4

306 Building, 1.63, 2-1.12,2-2.2,2-2.18

308/308-A Buildings, 1.64,2 -2 .25 ,2 -7 35

309 Building, 1.64, 1.65, 2-1.18/, 2 -7 3 0 to 2-7.21

313 Building. See Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility

314 Building. See Metallurgical Engineering Laboratory

318 Building, 1.64, 2 -735

320 Building, 2-7.25

321 Complex, 1.24,1.33

324 Building, 1.65,1.71, 2-7.25

325 Building, 1.55, 1.64 to 1.65, 2-7.25

f ■ figure, • ■ sidebar box, t ■ table

1.1
INDEX

326 Building. 1.55, 2-7.26

327 Building. 1.55 to 1.56, 2-7.26

328 Building. 1.56, 2-7.26

329 Building, 1.56, 2-7.26

331 Building, 1.72, 2-1.21

333 Building. See Fuel Cladding Building

335 Building, 2-7.26

336 Building, 2-7.26

337/337-B Building, 2-1.21,2-7.26

340 Building, 1.56

352-D Building, 2-1.20/

400 Area

design of, 2-1.6,2-1.12,2-1.18 to 2-1.19

power in, 2-11.17to 2-11.18

waste in, 2-6.17

water supply to, 2-11.14

See a/so specific facilities, such as fast Flux Test Facility

403 Fuel Storage Facility, 2-1.19

405 Building. See Fast Flux Test Facility

427 Building, 2-1.12,2-1.19,2-7.26

500 Area, 1.17,2-1.6

600 Area

design of, 2-1.6 to 2-1.7,2-1.12 to 2-1.13,2-1.19

power in, 2-11.18

sewer systems in, 2-11.21

waste in, 2-6.25

water supply to, 2-11.14

614 Buildings, 1.36

622 Meteorology Complex, 2-7.5, 2-7.11

700 Area, 2-1.7, 2-1.19, 2-11.14,2-11.18, 2-11.22

712 Records, Printing, and Mail Office Building, 2-8.22

800 Area, 1.17,2-1.6

900 Area, 1.17,2-1.6

1100 Area, 2-1.7,2-1.13,2-1.19 to 2-1.20,2-11.9 to 2-11.10,2-11.14,

2 - 11.22

1112-N Building. See badge houses

1116-N Building, 4.5

1171 Building, 2-11.10,4.10

1226 Building, 2-11.10

2736-Z Building, 1.75, 2-8.23 to 2-8.24,4.7

3000 Area Camp, 1.45,2-6.29,2-11.21, 2-12.20s, 2-12.21

3706 Building, 1.24, 1.33,2-1.11,2-1.18,2-8.22

3707-B Building, 2-1.18/

3722 Building, 2-2.24 to 2-2.25

3727 Building, 2-8.22

3745A Building, 2-1.17/

3746-D Building, 2-1.21/

3760 Building, 2-1.21

3762 Building, 2-1.18/

6652 Complex. See missile sites

66S2-C Building, 2-9.12

f ■ figure, $ • sidebar box, t ■ table

A

A Plant. See PUREX Plant

accidents and incidents

chemical reactions In tank farms as, 2-6.11

collapse of burial containers as, 2-6.26

contamination in septic tanks as, 2-6.30

criticalities as, 2-5.19,2-5.24, 2-10.37 to 2-10.38

dike failure as, 2-6.16

explosion in column as, 2-5.25,2-10.34 to 2-10.35,2-10.37

fatalities and, 2-10.36, 2-10.37/

fires as. 2-5.10,2-6.26

leaks from tanks as, 2-6.12 to 2-6.13

property damage and loss as, 2-10.38

radiological exposure as, 2-4.27 to 2-4.29,2-10.16 to 2-10.17,

2-10.37

reporting levels and, 2-10.35 to 2-10.36

transportation and, 2-6.26, 2-10.38

See also health and safety

Adley, Frank, 2-10.4

Administrative Record Public Access Room, 3.3

administrative support facilities, 1.32 to 1.33

African Americans, 1.17,2-12.6,2-12.8

aggregate, 2-1.15

air defense system

Air Patrol in, 2-8.15 to 2-8.16

anti-aircraft sites in, 2-1.7,2-1.19, 2-9.3/, 2-9.5 to 2-9.7,2-9.12 to

2-9.13

missile sites in, 1.63,2-1.12 to 2-1.13, 2-1.19, 2-9.7 to 2-9.12

Air Modeling Stations (614 Bldg), 1.36

Air Patrol, 2-8.15 to 2-8.16

air sampler, 2-3.21

airborne releases and mitigation

chemical separations plants and, 1.35, 2-4.13 to 2-4.14, 2*4.29 to

2-4.31,2-6.26 to 2-6.28,4.6

meteorology and, 1.36, 2-4.11, 2-4.13s, 2-7.5,2-7.11 to 2-7.12

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.4, 2-5.19,4.7

reactors and, 1.35,1.60

research and development on, 1.35

studies involving, 2-6.28,2-7.11 to 2-7.13,2-10.13

airplanes, 2-8.15 to 2-8.16,2-8.24,2-11.10

ALARA, 2-10.17

alarms, emergency, 2-8.33

alphabet houses, 1.21,2-12.6/

americium column explosion, 2-5.25, 2-10.34 to 2-10.35,2-10.37

americium toxicity, 2-3.12

ammunition storage, 2-9.13

anion exchange columns, 2-4.26$

anti-aircraft artillery sites, 2-1.7,2-1.19, 2-9.3/, 2-9.5 to 2-9.7,2-9.12 to

2-9.13

1.2
Applied Fisheries Laboratory, 2-7.13

Aquatic Biological Laboratory, 2-7.13

See also Biology Laboratory

Aqueous Makeup Units, 2-4.12 to 2-4.13,4.6

architectural forms, high style, 2-1.21

Area Badges, 2-8.27

Area Shop (3722 Bldg), 2-2.24 to 2-2.25

areas for further research

chemical separations and, 2-4.32

communication and, 2-11.23

construction and, 2-1.25 to 2-1.26

fuel manufacturing and, 2-2.28

health and safety and, 2-10.38 to 2-10.39

military operations and, 2-9.14

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.29

reactors and, 2-3.32 to 2-3.33

research and development and, 2-7.28

security and, 2-8.34 to 2-8.35,2-9.14

site support and, 2-11.23

transportation and, 2-11.23

waste management and, 2-6.32

workforce and, 2-12.28 to 2-12.30

Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, 1.73,2-7.17 to 2-7.18

armored tank and Hanford Patrol, 2-8.11 f

arms race

Cold War and, 1.52 to 1.53, 1.57 to 1.59,1.66 to 1.68,2-3.5,

2-12.15

Impacts of, 2-3.7

Manhattan Project and, 1.40 to 1.42

See also weapons

Art Deco/Art Modeme, 2-1.21

artifacts, 3.10

as low as reasonably achievable exposure, 2-10.17

asbestos, 2-6.31,2-6.32

Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, 2-1.25, 2-5.17,2-10.4, 2-10.5F

Atomic Energy Commission, 2-1.25,2-9.1

Atoms for Peace, 1.64 to 1.65,2-1.9,2-2.25,2-7J , 2-7.24

audiotapes and videotapes, 3.9 to 3.10

authorization cards, 2-8.22

Authorized Messenger, 2-8.22

autoclaving fuel rods, 2-2.14,2-2.22 to 2-2.23

autopsies, 2-10.18

B

B Plant (221-B Bldg)

design of, 2-4.4 f, 2-4.5 to 2-4.6

operation of, 1.71,2-4.26,2-4.27,2-4.28 to 2-4.29

shutdown of, 1.49

waste from, 2-4.31,2-6.7

See also chemical separations plants; ventilation systems

B Reactor, 1.22, U S to 1.26,1.43 to 1.44,2-3.9,2-3.23 to 2-3.24,4.5

See also reactors for plutonium production

background checks on staff, 2-8.27 to 2-8.28

Backman, George, 2-4.29 to 2-4.31

badge houses, 1.32,2-8.25 to 2-8.26

badges, film, 2-10.25,2-10.261

badges and passes, 2-8.22,2-8.27,2-8.29,2-8.30,2-10.25,2-10.261

Bair, William j., 2-7.16

balloon bombs, Japanese, 2-8.2,2-12.12

barricades, 2-8.25 to 2-8.26

Basin Recirculation Facility. See 107 Structures

batch extraction. See bismuth phosphate process

Battelle Memorial Institute

buildings at, 2-7.26

contractor role for, 2-1.24, 2-7.6 to 2-7.7

health and safety research at, 2-10.18

power production and, 2-7.21 and 2-7.22

radiation protection by, 2-10.7

See also Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; research and

development activities

battery control trailers, 2-9.9,2-9.12

Bechtel Hanford, Inc., 3.8

Benton County Sheriff Office, 2-8.9 to 2-8.11, 2-8.18

billet ovens, 2-2.18 f

bioassay, 2-10.16,2-10.25,2-12.18

Biology Laboratory (108-F Bldg), 1.51, 2-7.25, 2-10.19

See also Aquatic Biological Laboratory; Experimental Animal Farm

Biophysics Laboratory (329 Bldg), 1.56,2-7.26

bismuth phosphate process, 2-4.4, 2-4.15 to 2-4.18

blackouts and security, 2-8.32 to 2-8.33

body burden, 2-10.22

bombs. See weapons

Bonneville Power Administration, 2-11.15 to 2-11.16, 2-11.19

boron ball safety system, 2-3.12,2-3.24

Breeder Reactor Program, 1.71, 2-7.21

See also Fast Flux Test Facility

Brigade Motor Pool (1226 Bldg), 2-11.10

Britain, 1.7 to 1.8

Brutalism (architectural style), 2-1.21

bulk reduction buildings, 1.31,1.54,2-4.17

See also U 0 3 Plant

burial boxes, 2-6.24/"

burial grounds, 1.34,2-2.27,2-6.18 to 2-6.26

bus system In Richland, 2-11.8 to 2-11.9

Bush, Spencer H ., 2-7.19

Butler-type huts, 2-1.20f, 2-1.21

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t ■ table
c

C Reactor, 1.48, 2-1.10,2-3.9

See a/so reactors for plutonium production

caissons, 2-6.24,2-6.25 to 2-6.26

Camp Hanford

anti-aircraft sites in, 2-1.7,2-1.19, 2-9.3F, 2-9.5 to 2-9.7,2-9.12 to

2-9.13

creation of, 2-9.2 to 2-9.4

further research on, 2-9.14

infrastructure for, 2-9.13, 2-11.10

layout of, 1.51

living conditions at, 2-9.4

missile sites in, 1.63,2-1.12 to 2-1.13, 2-1.19, 2-9.7 to 2-9.12

shutdown of, 2-9.13

cancer, 2-10.19 to 2-10.20

canning process, 2-2.9 to 2-2.10,2-2.11 to 2-2.14,2-2.15,2-12.11

See a/so Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility; Metallurgical Engineering

Laboratory

Cantril, Simeon T., 2-10.6,2-10.30

canyons. See chemical separations plants

cast-in-place concrete, 2-1.15

caustic scrubbers, 2-4.14

censoring media, 2-8.17 to 2-8.18

Central Files, 3.4

Central Landfill, 2-6.30 to 2-6.31

Central Sewer System, 2-6.29

Central Shops, 2-1.22,2-6.29, 2-11.21

Central Waste Facility, 2-6.21

centrifugation, 2-4.15 to 2-4.16,2-4.16 to 2-4.17

cesium removal from waste, 2-4.26

CH2M Hill, Hanford, Inc., 3.5, 3.7

Change House and Custodial Services (3707-B Bldg), 2-1.18/"

charging a reactor, 2-3.12,2-3.13

chemical exposures to workers, 2-10.14

Chemical Materials Engineering Laboratory, 1.65, 1.71,2-7.25

chemical separations

approach to, 1.8 to 1.9,1.11

further research on, 2-4.32

overview of, 1.31 to 1.32

problems with, 2-4.27 to 2-4.31

processes for, 2-4.7 to 2-4.23

recovery as pail of, 1.45, 1.49 to 1.50, 2-4.23 to 2-4.25

chemical separations plants

decontamination as mission in, 1.62

design and construction of, 1.23, 2-1.11,2-1.16 to 2-1.17,2-4.4 to

2-4.6,2-4.18

facilities serving as

B Riant (221-B Bldg) (See B Plant)

PUREX Plant (A Plant or 202-A Bldg) (See PUREX Plant)

chemical separations plants (cont.)

facilities serving as (cont.)

REDOX Plant (S Plant or 202-S Bldg) (See REDOX Plant)

T Plant (221 -T Bldg) (See T Plant)

U Plant (221-U Bldg)(SeeU Plant)

U O , Plant (224-U Bldg) (See U O , Plant)

heritage facilities and, 4.5 to 4.6

Make Up Units in, 2-4.12 to 2-4.13,4.6

operation of, 1.45, 1.49 to 1.50, 1.54,1.61, 1.71, 1.75

overview of, 1.31 to 1.32

photos of, 3.8

problems with, 2-4.27 to 2-4.31,2-6.17

security at, 2-8.3

shielding in, 2-10.24

shutdown of, 1.49

siting of, 1.16

Startup of, 1.26, 1.49

ventilation systems and, 1.35, 1.50,2-4.13 to 2-4.14,2-6.28,4.6

waste from, 2-4.31,2-6.7, 2-6.17,2-6.19,2-6.27,2-7.11

See a/so chemical separations

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, 2-3.10

children and radiation studies, 2-10.19

chromium, hexavalent, 2-2.23

civilian control of Hanford Site, 2-12.13

cladding process. See canning process

classified areas, 2-8.24 to 2-8.29

Classified Document Control Center, 3.4

Classified Files Department, 2-8.22

classified information, 2-3.22,2-8.1 to 2-8.2, 2-8.13 to 2-8.14, 2-8.20 to

2-8.23,3.4

Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement, 2-8.5

Classified Matter Control Center, 3.4

Classified Vault Storage Facility (3727 Bldg), 2-8.22

clearance levels, 2-8.29

code words, 2-3.22,2-8.17

co-extrusion process, 2-2.2,2-2.18 to 2-2.24

See a/so canning process

Cold War

expansion of Hanford Site and, 2-1.8 to 2-1.9,2-11.2,2-11.5, 2-11.9

to 2-11.10,2-11.23

health and safety during, 2-10.2 to 2-10.3

history of, 1.42 to 1.68

research during, 2-7.3 to 2-7.4

security and, 2-8.2 to 2-8.3, 2-8.15 to 2-8.16

workforce and, 2-12.9 to 2-12.19, 2-12.21 to 2-12.23

Columbia River

releases from process pond to, 2-6.16

releases from reactors to, 2-3.25 to 2-3.26, 2-3.27t, 2-6.13 to 2-6.14,

2-6.17,2-7.14

releases from sewage plants to, 2-6.15,2-6.29

security of, 2-8.15

f ■ figure, s * sidebar box, t ■ table
I n d e x

Columbia River (cont.)

siting criteria and, 2-11.1

treatment of, 1 JO, 2-11.12 to 2-11.13, 2-11.14 /, 4.5

uptake for reactors from, 1.29 to 1 JO, 2-3.3, 2-3.16 to 2-3.18,

2-11.12 to 2-11.13,2-11.14/

Columbia River Advisory Croup, 2-12.18 to 2-12.19

Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology, 3.5,3.7,

3 .9,3.10

columns and chemical separations, 2-4.19$, 2-4.26$

See also chemical separations plants

commissary operations, 2-1.23

communication on health and safety, 2-10.30 to 2-10.31

communication systems, 2-11.22 to 2-11.23

community support of atomic mission, 2-12.19

compartmentalization, 1.22,2-8.5 to 2-8.6,2-12.11

See also secrecy

complacency of workers, 2-12.26 to 2-12.27

computer security, 2-8.31

concrete, 2-1.14 to 2-1.15,2-1.17/

conferences, 2-7.27

confidential classification, 2-8.21

confinement systems, 2-3.18, 2-3.26,2-3.28

construction

chemical separations plants and, 1.23,2-1.11,2-1.16 to 2-1.17,

2-4.4 to 2-4.6, 2-4.18

landscape modifications and, 2-1J 2

magnitude of, 1.15 to 1.16,1.24 to 1.25

Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility, 1.16, 1.23, 1.24, 2-1.11,2-2.9,

2-2.10, 2-2.17,2-2.26

missile sites and, 2-1.12 to 2-1.13, 2-1.19,2-9.8 to 2-9.9,2-9.11 to

2-9.12

periods of, 2-1.8 to 2-1.13

Plutonium Finishing Plant, 2-1.17,2-5.2 to 2-5.5,2-5.14 to 2-5.16

reactors for plutonium production and, 1.15, 1.22,1.48,1.70,2-1.9,

2-1.10,2-3.2 to2-3.4

secrecy and, 1.22 to 1.23,2-4.4

styles of, 2-1.14 to 2-1.21

tanks for radioactive waste storage and, 1.23,2*6.8 to 2-6.9

workers handling, 1.18,1.19$, 1.45,2-12.3 f (See also specific

construction camps)

See also specific facilities (e.g., PUREX Plant)

construction camp, Hanford

Infrastructure for, 2-6.29,2-11.4, 2-11.11, 2-11.20,2-11.21

• life at, 1.18to 1 JO

removal of, 2-1.22

construction camp. North Richland, 1.45,2-6.29, 2-11.21,2-12.20s,

2-12.21

continuous air monitors, 2-10.27

continuous extraction. See solvent extraction

Contractor Central Files, 3.4

contractors at Hanford Site

changes in, 2-1.23 to 2-1.25,2-12.13 to 2-12.14

economic diversification and, 1.71,2-12.22 to 2-12 J 3

list of, 1.78,2-3.10$

contributions by Hanford Site, 2-3.31 to 2-3.32

Control Laboratory (222-S Bldg), 1.32,1.49

control rods, 1.31,2-3.12,2-3.18 to 2-3.19

control rooms, 2-3.14 to 2-3.15,4.5

control zone at Hanford Site, 1.73/

controlled areas, 2-8.25

controlled unclassified documents, 3.4

conversation monitoring, 2-8.16 to 2-8.17

cooling irradiated fuel. See storing irradiated fuel

cooling systems for reactors

description of, 1 J 9 to 1.30,1.62 to 1.63, 2-3.16 to 2-3.18

heritage facilities and, 4.4,4.5

Improvements for, 1.60

studies of, 2-7.21

water releases from, 2-3.25 to 2-3 J 6 , 2-3 J 7 f, 2-6.13 to 2-6.14,

2-6.17,2-7.14

water uptake for, 1.29 to 1.30,2-3.3,2-3.16 to 2-3.18, 2-11.12 to

2-11.13,2-11.14/

See also Columbia River

Core Segment Development Facility, 2-7.26

corrosion and reactors, 2-3.22 to 2-3.23

corrugated metal, 2-1.15/

cost efficiency in reactors, 2-3.28 to 2-3.29

counter-intelligence, 2-8.12,2-8.16 to 2-8.18

couriers of classified information, 2-8.21

cranes, 2-4.10,2-4.31, 2-12.10

crapped up, 2-12.18

crash alarm system, 2-8.33

cribs, 2-5.27 to 2-5.28,2-6.14,2-6.15,2-6.16, 2-6.17

Critical Mass Laboratory (209-E Bldg), 2-10.37 to 2-10.38

criticalities as accidents, 2-5.19,2-5 J 4 , 2-10.37 to 2-10.38

Cronk, Les, 2-10.14

Crows Nest/Observation Post, 2-9.12

Cuban Missile Crisis, 2-3.9

Cutie Pie, 2-10.24

D

D Reactor, 1.26, 1.48,2-1.10,2-3.9

See also reactors for plutonium production

Dash 5 Facility. See Plutonium Finishing Plant

data sheet, 2-4.11 to 2-4.12

databases, 2-6.9, 2-6.21,2-6.30, 2-8.31 to 2-8.32, 3.11 to 3.12

Day's Pay, 2-11.10, 2-12.8$

deaeration plants (185 Bldg), 1.30,2-11.12

Declaration of Secrecy, 2-8.5

f ■ figure, % ■ sidebar bo x, t ■ table

1.5
demineralization plant (186 Bldg), 2-11.12

design of Hanford Site, 2-1.2 to 2-1.7

Development, Fabrication, Test Lab (306-E Bldg). See 306 Building

Development Laboratory Complex (190-D Bldg), 1.60

diaper paper, 2-4.18

diatomite, 2-6.13

dilution and atmospheric releases, 2-4.11,2-4.13s

See also meteorology

directors of research laboratory, 2-7.5s

discharging a reactor, 2-3.12,2-3.13

dispatcher, 2-4.10 to 2-4.11

dissolver operator, 2-4.11 to 2-4.12

dissolver tanks, 2-4.10,2-4.11 (, 2-4.11 s, 2-4.12

dissolving process, 2-4.10 to 2-4.12

distance and radiation, 2-10.23, 2-10.24

diversification, 1.69 to 1.73,2-3.9 to 2-3.10, 2-5.22,2-12.22 to 2-12.23,

4.9 to 4.10

document accountability program, 2-8.22

DOE. See U.S. Department of Energy

doorstop sample carrier, 2-4.29f

dose rate instruments, 2-10.24,2-10.26

dosimetery, 2-10.24 to 2-10.25

Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc., 2-3.9

DR Reactor, 1.44, 1.64, 2-1.10,2-1.16f, 2-3.7,2-3.9

See a/so reactors for plutonium production

drain fields, 2-6.16,2-6.28, 2-6.29

Du Pont

contract with, 2-1.23

Manhattan Project decisions by, 2-3.3

operating philosophy of, 2-12.2 to 2-12.3

reputation of, 2-10.6

research and development at, 2-7.5

Richland and, 1.20 to 1.21,2-12.20 to 2-12.21

security program and, 2-8.7 to 2-8.8

staffing and, 2-1.23,2-12.9

E

E. I. Du Pont de Nemours. See Du Pont

eavesdropping, 2-8.16 to 2-8.17

economic diversification, 1.69 to 1.73,2-3.9 to 2-3.10, 2-5.22,2-12.22

to 2-12.23,4.9 to4.10

effluent sewers. See process sewers

effluents. See waste from plutonium production

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1.53,1.64

Eldorkin, Charles E., 2-7.12

Electric Power Research Institute, 2-7.21 to 2-7.22

electrical power, 1.17,2-1.2, 2-3.19,2-11.1, 2-11.15 to 2-11.20

Electron Accelerator Building (3745A Bldg), 2-1.17 (

Emergency Decontamination Facility (748 Bldg), 2-10.34, 2-10.35

Emergency Operation Center. See Patrol Operations Center

emergency preparedness, 2-3.19, 2-8.32 to 2-8.34, 2-10.29

eminent domain, right of. See relocation of area residents

employment. See workforce

energy crisis, 2-7.3 to 2-7.4

Engineering Development Lab Annex (305-B Bldg), 1.55,2-1.3 to 2-1.4

environmental concerns

emergence of, 2-12.18 to 2-12.19

Impacts of reactors on, 2-3.10

research and development for, 2-7.3

work life changes and, 2-12.23 to 2-12.25

Environmental Impact Statements, 2-7.24

environmental remediation, 1.72 to 1.73, 1.75 to 1.77,2-3.21 to 2-3.22,

2-12.27

Environmental Restoration Contractor Resource Center, 3.4

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, 2-6.24 to 2-6.25

epidemiological studies, 2-10.14,2-10.19 to 2-10.20

See a/so health and safety

equipment contamination, 2-4.31,2-6.22

espionage and Manhattan Project, 2-8.6 to 2-8.7,2-8.14, 2-12.6 to

2-12.7,2-12.11

Etch Test, 2-2.14

evaporators, 1.50,2-6.9

exclusion areas, 2-8.25

Exhaust Gas Laboratories (292 Bldg), 1.32, 2-4.14

See also ventilation systems

exhaust systems

chemical separations plants and, 1.35,2-4.13 to 2-4.14, 2-6.28, 4.6

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.4, 2-5.19, 4.7

reactors and, 1.35,1.60

research and development on, 1.35

exit surveys, 2-10.27

Experimental Animal Farm, 2-6.14 to 2-6.15, 2-6.23,2-10.19

See also Biology Laboratory

export water lines, 2-11.11 to 2-11.12,2-11.13,2-11.14

exposure rate instruments, 2-10.26

extraction methods, 2-4.4,2-4.15 to 2-4.26

extrusion process, 1.28,2-2.2,2-2.10 to 2-2.11,2-2.18 to 2-2.24

Exxon Nuclear Fuels, 2-3.10

F

F material. See graphite

F Reactor, 1.64,2-3.9

See also reactors for plutonium production

F-IOTank, 2-4.18

facility specialization, 127

Fast Flux Test Facility (405 Bldg)

infrastructure for, 2-1.6, 2-1.18 to 2-1.19, 2-7.26

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t ■ table
I n d e x

Fast Flux Test Facility (405 Bldg) (cont.)

operation of, 1.72,2-1.12,2-7.7

oversight of, 2-12.24

overview of, 1.71 to 1.72,2-7.21

photos of, 2-1.18/, 3.8

waste and, 2-6.17,2-6.19

See a/so reactors for testing

Fast Fuel Test Reactor. See Fast Flux Test Facility

Fast Reactor Thermal Engineering Facility, 2-7.26

fatalities at the Hanford Site, 2-10.19 to 2-10.20, 2-10.36, 2-10.37/

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2-8.8,2-8.13 to 2-8.14,2-8.29

Federal Wind Energy FYogram, 2-7.12

fences, 1.17,1.20,2-8.25,2-8.26,2-12.20

ferries, 2-11.6

fiberglass filters, 2-4.14, 2-6.28

film badges, 2-10.25, 2-10.26f

fitter and treatment plants, 1.30,2-11.12 to 2-11.13.2-11.14/, 4.5

filters for air. See ventilation systems

fingerprinting of staff, 2-8.28

fire control and water, 2-11.15

fire protection, 2-10.10 to 2-10.11

fire stations, 2-10.32, 2-10.33

fire walls, 2-1.18

fires, 2-5.10, 2-6.26, 2-10.11

firing ranges, 2-8.11,2-9.12

First Aid Stations, 2-10.32

fish, 1.13,1.36,2-7.13,2-12.16

Fisheries Department, 2-7.13

fission, discovery of, 1.6 to 1.8

Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, 1.73,2-7.17 to 2-7.18

Five Fold Hand Counters, 2-3.20

floating pump house, 2-11.11 f

See also pump houses

Fort Courage, 2-7.26

Foster, George, 2-10.16

Freedom of Information Act Officer, 3.3

French drains, 2-6.16,2-6.17

Fresh Metal Storage Building (303-A Bldg), 1.28,1.34,2-2.6,4.3

Frost Test, 2-2.13 to2-2.14

Fuel Cladding Building (333 Bldg)

co-extrusion at, 2-2.2,2-2.18 to 2-2.19, 2-2.20

photos of, 2-2.21/, 2-2.22/, 2-2.23/

tritium targets In, 2-2.24

waste In, 2-2.27

Fuel Element Pilot Plant (306 Bldg), 1.63,2-1.12,2-2.18

fuel elements. Irradiated

cooling of, 1.30,2-4.8, 2-6.28,4.5

failures of, 2-2.15,2-2.16, 2-3.22,2-6.14

Improvements to, 2-2.16,2-3.24 to 2-3.25

transport of, 2-4.8 to 2-4.9, 2-11.8

fuel elements, unirradiated

design of, 1.60, 1.63, 2-2.1,2-2.7/, 2-2.22/, 2-33

quantity required of, 2-2.14

theft of, 2-8.14

See also oxide fuel blends

fuel manufacturing

automating, 2-2.15 to 2-2.17

billet storage for. 1.28,1.34

further research In, 2-2.28

heritage facilities and, 4.3 to 4.4

overview of, 2-2.1 to 2-2.3 s

problems with, 2-2.15 to 2-2.16,2-12.11

process for, 1.28 to 1.29, 2-2.2, 2-2.6 to 2-2.24

recovery and, 2-2.25 to 2-2.27

testing, 1.24.1.28,2-1.3,2-2.5 to 2-2.6,2-7.25

uranium preparation and, 2-2.4 to 2-2.6

waste and, 2-2.2,2-2.27,2-6.19

fuel Recycle Pilot Plant. See 324 Building

fuel storage basins, 2-3.13,2-3.15 to 2-3.16

Fuel Storage Facility (403 Bldg), 2-1.19

Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (427 Bldg), 2-1.12,2-1.19,

2-7.26

Fuqua, P. A., 2-10.4

future use recommendations, 4.1 to 4.10

G

Gamertsfelder, Carl C., 2-10.6

Garage and Service Station, 2-11.10/

gases. See airborne releases and mitigation

General Electric Company, 2-1.24,2-7.6,2-12.13 lo 2-12.14,2-12.16 to

2-12.17

Genereaux, Raymond P., 1.5,1.23,2-4.4,2-12.10

geologic repository studies, 2-7.22

Geosafe Corporation, 2-7.24

Geosciences Library, 3.5

Giffels 4 Vallet, Inc., 2-1.24

Gilbert, Ethel. S., 2-7.16

Gilmont samplers, 2-4.29

Global Chemistry Model, 2-7.12

government-owned, contractor-operated arrangement, 2-1.23

graphite, 1.24,1.43 to 1.44, 2-1.10,2-3.23 to 2-3.24

gravel, 2-1.15

graves and site selection, 1.13,1.15

gravity flow columns, 2-4.19$

Green Run, 2-6.28,2-7.11,2-7.12,2-10.13

See also iodine

Greenewalt, Crawford H., 1.21,2-3.3,2-4.4

Grills, Raymond, 2-2.9

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t • table
Groves, Leslie R. icont.)

career of, 1.10 lo 1.11

commendations by, 1,21,1.40

limited data and, 1.5,1.11,1.22,2-1.1

opinions on, 1.11

radiation releases and, 1.36

secrecy and, 1.37

urgency and, 1.27

waste and, 1.33

guard houses, 1.32, 2-8.19/

H

H Reactor, 1.44,1.64,2-1.10, 2-3.9

See a/so reactors for plutonium production

H-52 missile site, 2-1.12 to 2-1.13, 2-1.19,2-9.11 to 2-9.12

Hales, lakes, 2-7.12

Hall, |ane, 2-12.9

Hanford Airport, 2-11.10

Hanford Atomic Metals Trade Council, 2-12.18

See a/so labor unions

Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory, 3.7,3.9

Hanford Declassified Document Retrieval System, 3.11

Hanford Engineer Works, 2-10.30 to 2-10.31

Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project, 2-4.13s, 2-4.14 to

2-4.15,2-7.12

Hanford Environmental Health Foundation, 2-10.32,2-10.35

Hanford Environmental Information System, 3.12

Hanford Family, 2-12.24 to 2-12.25

Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, 2-7.4, 2-12.27,

3.3

Hanford Fire Department, 2-10.32 to 2-10.33

Hanford Generating Plant, 1.70,2-11.19

Hanford Geographic Information System. 3.11

Hanford Laboratories, 2-7.6,2-12.16

See a/so Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Hanford National Environmental Research Park, 2-7.17 to 2-7.18

Hanford Patrol, 1.37 to 1.38, 2-8.8 to 2-8.11, 2-8.11 to 2-8.12,2-8.15,

2- 8.22

Hanford Public Reading Room, 3.2

Hanford Site as experiment, 1 .5 ,1.16,1.22,1.77

Hanford Site Photography Archive, 3.7

Hanford Site Plant Railroad. See railroads

Hanford Site Records Holding Area, 3.4,3.7

Hanford Site Video Archive, 3.10

Hanford Technical Library, 2-1.21,3.2

Hanford Technical Library (3760 Bldg), 2-1.21

Hanford Thyroid Disease Study, 2-7.12

See a/so Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project

Hanford townsite, 2-1.22

hazardous waste, 2-6.21

health and safety

awareness of and views on, 2-3.7,2-10.15 to 2-10.17,2-12.18 to

2-12.19

disciplines of, 2-10.2 to 2-10.7

equipment for, 2-3.20 to 2-3.21 ,2 -7 .9 ,2-7.10f, 2-10.7/, 2-10.9,

2-10.24 to 2-10.27

further research in, 2-10.38 to 2-10.39

Hanford Fire Department and, 2-10.32 to 2-10.33

Health Instruments Section and, 1.35 lo 1.36,2-10.7

historical context of, 2-10.1 to 2-10.2,2-10.7 to 2-10.8

Increasing requirements for, 2-7.4,2-12.23

Medical Department and, 2*4.13s, 2-7.5,2-7.9,2-10.4,2-10.31 lo

2-10.32

medical examinations for, 2-10.16,2-10.25,2-10.28, 2-12.18

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.7

procedures for, 2-3.19, 2-8.32 to 2-8.34, 2-10.28 to 2-10.29,

2-10.33 to 2-10.35

protection measures for, 2-3.3,2-10.23,2-10.23 to 2-10.26,

2-10.24,2-12.10s

reactors and, 2-3.13,2-3.24 to 2-3.28

research and standards for, 2-10.17 to 2-10.22

responsibilities for, 2-10.9 lo 2-10.15

training on, 2-8.11 to 2-8.12,2-10.30 to 2-10.31,2-12.9 to 2-12.10

See a/so incidents and accidents; monitoring the environment

Health Instruments Section, 1.35 lo 1.36,2-5.7,2-10.7,2-10.9,2-10.11

to 2-10.12,2 - 1 0 .2 0

See also Medical Department

health physics. See health and safety

Heat Exchange (109-N Bldg), 1.70

See also Hanford Generating Plant

helicopters, 2-8.16

heritage tourism, 4 .1 ,4 .2 ,4 .3 /

hexone, 2-4.20, 2-4.21

high style architectural forms, 2-1.21

High Temperature Lattice Test Reactor (318 Bldg), 1.64,2-7.25

See also reactors for testing

High Temperature Sodium Facility (337-B Bldg), 2-1.21,2-7.26

high-level radioactive waste, 2-6.6 to 2-6.13

Hill, Orville F., 2-10.15

Hiroshima, lapan, 1.39,2-3.5

See also Japan

Hispanics, 1.17, 2-12.6, 2-12.8

Historic District, Hanford Site Manhattan Project and Cold War Era, 1.2

H M chambers, 2-3.20

Hobb's Pacific huts, 2-1.21

Hodel, Leaf v., 2-6.1

Hot Semiworks, 2-6.20

Hultgren, Roger, 2-4.24, 2-4.25,2-4.29

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t ■ table

1 8
I n d e x

| i human radiation experiments, 2-7.9, 2-7.11,2-7.13,2-10.14,2-10.18,

■ 2-10.19 to 2-10.20

I * huts, Butler-type, 2-12 0 (, 2-1.21

I hydro-chlorinator systems, 2-11.13

' i

I

' IAEA. 5ee International Atomic Energy Agency

I Igloos. See ammunition storage

I In Situ Vitrification, 2-7.24

; incidents and accidents

| chemical reactions in tank farms as, 2-6.11

' collapse of burial containers as, 2-6.26

. [ contamination In septic tanks as, 2-6.30

criticalities as, 2-5.19,2-5.24,2-10.37 to 2-10.38

dike failure as, 2-6.16

explosion in column as, 2-5.25, 2-10.34 to 2-10.35, 2-10.37

fatalities and, 2-10.36, 2-10.37f

] . fires as, 2-5.10,2-6.26

leaks from tanks as, 2-6.12 to 2-6.13

property damage and loss as, 2-10.38

! radiological exposure as, 2-4.27 to 2-4.29,2-10.16 to 2-10.17,

j 2-10.37

] reporting levels and, 2-10.35 to 2-10.36

j transportation and, 2-6.26, 2-10.38

See also health and safety

i Industrial hygiene, 2-10.2,2-10.3 to 2-10.4,2-10.14

See also health and safety

Industrial Medical Division, 2-10.31

industrial safety and fire protection, 2-10.2,2-10.4 lo 2-10.5

industrial vernacular architecture, 2-1.14 to 2-1.21

j industrial vernacular landscape, 2-1.14

Information Bridge, Department of Energy, 3.11

Information Locator, Department of Energy, 3.11 to 3.12

infrastructure, 1.16,2-11.1 to 2-11.23

Inhalation studies, 2-7.15,2-7.17

inspectors, safety, 2-10.5, 2-10.7,2-10.12

| Instalment Department, 2-7.5

I International Atomic Energy Agency, 2-5.18, 2-7.24

, International Safeguards Experiment, 2-5.18

iodine

decay of, 2-4.9

monitoring for, 2-10.27 to 2-10.28

releases of, 2-4.13s, 2-4.14 to 2-4.15, 2-6.27,2-6.28

tests using, 2-7.11,2-7.12 to 2-7.13,2-10.13

irradiation systems. 2-3.11 to 2-3.16,2-10.10

Isochem, Inc., 1.71,2-5.17

Issues Exchange, 4.2

J

J. A. Jones Company, 2-1.24

Jackson, Henry, 2-3.8

Japan, 1.38 to 1.40,2-3.5, 2-8.2,2-12.12

lech, John, 2-4.29 to 2-4.31

K

K Reactors. See KE Reactor; KW Reactor

Kadlec Hospital, 2-10.32

Kanrte Gas Ionization Chamber, 2-3.20

Kathren, Ron, 2-10.25

Kazakhstan. See Soviet Union

KE Reactor, 1.53,2-1.10,2-3.4,2-3.7,2-3.9

See also reactors for plutonium production

Keene, Art R., 2-10.20,2-10.22

Kennedy, John F., 1.70, 2-12.25F, 2-12.2Ss

Kennewick, 2-12.6

Kennewick Courier, 3.6

key cards, 2-8.31

key pads, 2-8.31

Knight, Russ, 2-4.24,2-4.27 to 2-4.28,2-4.28 to 2-4.29

Korean War, 1.48 to 1.56

See also Cold War

KW Reactor, 1 .5 3,2-1.10,2-3.4,2-3.7,2-3.9,2-3.26

See also reactors for plutonium production

L

L or 2 clearance, 2-8.29

labor unions, 1.18, 2-5.25,2-10.34 to 2-10.35,2-12.5,2-12.7$, 2-12.17

to 2-12.18

laboratorians, 2-5.22

Laboratory for Radiation Biology, 2-7.13

lag storage buildings, 1.30, 2-4.8,2-4.9,4.5

land procurement, 2-1.2'

land releases, 1.72 to 1.73

landfills, 2-6.30 to 2-6.32

landscape modifications, 2-1.22

lanthanum fluoride decision, 2-4.4

launch area for missiles, 2-9.10 to 2-9.11

launch control trailer, 2-9.11

lead-dip process, 2-2.12

Leaf v. Hocfel, 2-6.1

leaks from tanks, 2-6.12 to 2-6.13

legislation. See regulations

Life Sciences Laboratory (331 Bldg), 1.72,2-1.21

f • figure, s ■ sidebar box, t » table

1.9
limited areas, 2-8.25

limited Test Ban Treaty, 2-3.9

liquid waste, 1.34 to 1 3 5 , 2-6.6 to 2-6.17,2-6.28 to 2-6.30,2-6.31

loadout of plutonium nitrate, 2-4.18

lock and key system, 2-8.31

loeb, Paul, 2-8.6

Low Level Radiochemistry Building, 2-7.25

low-level radioactive waste, 2-6.13 to 2-6.20

Lyon, Lois May, 2-12.4

M

MacCready, Mac, 2-10.16

machining fuel rods, 2-2.11,2-2.13,2-2.20, 2-2.21,2-2.22

Maffeo, Ralph, 2-10.17

Magazine Product Storage Building. See Fresh Metal Storage Building

magnetic cards, 2-8.31

Main Shop Building (1171 Bldg), 2-11.10,4.10

Maintenance Offices/Shops (1171 Bldg), 2-11.10, 4.10

Manhattan Project

beginnings of, 1.10to 1.11

chemical separations during, 2-4.5 to 2-4.6

constructing Hanford Site for, 1.15 to 1.17,1.21 to 135, 2-1.8

health and safety during, 2-10.2,2-10.3 to 2-10.4,2-10.5,2-10.6 to

2-10.15, 2-10.15to2-10.17

Infrastructure for, 1.18, 2-8.17,2-11.4,2-11.6, 2-11.8 to 2-11.9,

2-11.22 to 2-11.23

living at sites of, 1.18 to 1.21

military vs. scientific attitude at, 1.7,1.10,1.11

number of bombs for, 2-3.5

operating Hanford Site for, 1.25 to 1.42

research and development during, 2-7.2

security during, 2-8.16 to 2-8.18

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and, 2-12.2

workforce and, 1.17 to 1.18,1.35 to 1.37, 2-12.3 to 2-12.9

maps and engineering plans, 1.22,3.8 to 3.9

Maris, Buena, 2-12.6,2-12.9

Marshall, Leona Woods, 1.33,2-12.9

Material Access Areas, 2-8.25

Material and Package Passes, 2-8.22

Materials Development laboratory (306-W Bldg). See 306 Building

Matthias, Franklin T., 1.12, 1.20,1.26,2-8.4,2-8.24

McCluskey, Harold R., 2-5.25, 2-10.34, 2-10.37

McGee Ranch water supply, 2-11.11

Mechanical Development Building (328 Bldg), 1.56,2-7.26

media and censorship, 2-8.17 to 2-8.18

Medical Department, 2-4.13$, 2-7.5,2-7.9, 2-10.4,2-10.31 to 2-10.32

See a/so Health Instruments Section

medical examinations, 2-10.16, 2-10.25, 2-10.28, 2-12.18

Metal Extrusion Building. See Metallurgical Engineering Laboratory

Metal Fuels Fabrication Facility (313 Bldg)

baseball bats and, 4.9

design and construction of, 1 .1 6 ,1 3 3 to 1.24,2-1.11,2-2.9,2-2.10,

2-2.17, 2-2.26

fuel manufacturing in, 1.29,2-2.9 to 2-2.10,2-2.11

heritage facility and, 4.4

photos of, 2-2.7 f

uranium storage in, 2-2.26

waste in, 2 -2 .2 ,2 -2 3 7

metal line. See Remote Mechanical C Line

metal paneling, 2-1.18f

Metallurgical Engineering laboratory (314 Bldg)

construction of, 1.23 to 1.24,2-1.11,2-2.10

fuel manufacturing in, 1.28, 1.29,2-2.10 to 2-2.11,2-2.14

heritage facility and, 4.3 to 4.4

photos of, 2-2.7 f

uranium recovery in, 2-2.26

waste in, 2-2.27

Metallurgical Laboratory (Illinois), 2-4.3

Meteorological Department. See S Department

meteorology, 1.36, 2-4.11,2-7.5,2-7.11 to 2-7.12

Meteorology Complex (622 Bldg), 2-7.5,2-7.11

Midway Substation, 2-11.16,2-11.18

military and recruitment, 1.17,2-12.3

military operations, 2-9.1 to 2-9.14

Military Police, 2-8.8,2-8.12 to 2-8.13,2-8.15

military protection

anti-aircraft artillery and, 1 .5 1,2 -1 .7,2 -1 .19 ,2-9.3f, 2-9.5 to 2-9.7,

2-9.12to 2-9.13

establishing of, 2-9.2 to 2-9.4

further research on. 2-9.14

missile sites, 1.63, 2-1.12 to 2-1.13,2-1.19, 2-9.6/', 2-9.7 to 2-9.12

motor pool for, 2-11.10

overview of, 2-9.1 to 2-2.2

See also security

military vs. scientific attitude in Manhattan Project, 1.7,1.10,1.11

Miller, Jack, 2-2.20, 2-10.15 to 2-10.16

minorities in workforce, 1.17,1.20,2-12.6,2-12.8

missile sites

battery control area at, 1.63,2-1.12,2-9.9 to 2-9.10

design and construction of, 2-1.12 to 2-1.13,2-1.19,2-9.8 to 2-9.9,

2-9.11 to 2-9.12

launch area at, 2-1.12,2-9.10 to 2-9.11

location of, 1.63,2-1.12,2-1.136 2-9.6f, 2-9.7 to 2-9.8

missiles at, 2-9.7,2-9.8

mixed oxide fuels

facilities for, 1.64,1.65,2-5.17,2-7.20,2-7.25

need for, 2-2.2, 2-2.5,2-2.25

research and development for, 2-7.20

M I-2. See Plutonium Finishing Plant

moderator use, 2-3.3

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t * table
I n d e x

Moeller, Dade W ., 2-10.20

Monitored Retrievable Storage facility, 2-7.22 to 2-7.23

monitoring equipment, 2-3.20 to 2-3.21,2-7.9,2-7.10/, 2-10.24 to

2-10.27

monitoring the environment

Cold War and, 1.51,1.56

fish and, 1.36,2-7.13,2-12.16

Manhattan Project and, 1 .3 5 ,1 3 6 to 1.37,2-7.14 to 2-7.15, 2-7.17

ongoing efforts and, 2-10.27 to 2-10.28

See also research and development activities

monitoring workers

autopsies and, 2-10.18

dosimeters and, 2-10.24 to 2-10.25

epidemiological research and, 2-10.19 to 2-10.20

medical examinations and, 2-10.16,2-10.25,2-10.28,2-12.18

start of, 1.35 to 1.37,2-12.16

U.S. and Soviet views on, 1.51

whole body counters and, 2-10.19,2-10.25 lo 2-10.26

myeloma and workers, 2-10.19 to 2-10.20

N

N Cell, 2-4.23, 2-5.18

N Reactor

confinement system at, 2-3.18

cooling water and, 2-3.25 to 2-3.26

design and construction of, 1.62 to 1.63,1.70, 2-1.10,2-3.8 to 2-3.9

fuel manufacturing for, 2-2.2,2-2.18 to 2-2.24

operation of, 1.74,2-3.9 to 2-3.10,2-3.29,2-12.22

outages and, 2-11.19

photos of, 2-3.9f

presidential visit to, 1.70, 2-12.25f, 2-12.25s

security at, 2-8.3

shutdown of, 1.74 to 1.75, 2-1.9, 2-3.9 to 2-3.10, 2-11.19,2-12.26

See also reactors for plutonium production

Nagasaki, Japan, 1.39 to 1.40,2-3.5

See also Japan

national environmental research park, 2-7.17 to 2-7.18

National Historic Preservation Act, 1.1 to 1.2

National Register, 1.1

Native American relocation, 1.12 to 1.13

need to know. See compartmentalization

negative Image of Hanford Site, 2-12.24 to 2-12.25

neutron flux in reactors, 2-3.29

newspapers, 2-8.17 to 2-8.18,2-10.30 to 2-10.31,3.5 to 3.6

Nike A/ax missiles, 2 -9 .7 ,2-9.8 f, 2-9.9 f, 2-9.10

Nike Hercules missiles, 2 -9 .7 ,2-9.8f

Nike missile sites. See missile sites

non-radioatiive, dangerous waste landfill, 2-6.31 lo 2-6.32

North Richland Camp, 1.45, 2-6.29, 2-11.21,2-12.20s, 2-12.21

Norwood, William D., 2-10.4,2-10.9,2-10.31,2-10.34

nuclear engineers, 2-12.26

Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System, 2-8.32

Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 2-7.22,2-7.23

0

objectives of book, 1.1 to 13

off site waste, 2-6.20

off-gases. See airborne releases and mitigation

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, 2-7.22

Operation Green Glow, 2-7.12

operational controls, 2-10.20, 2-10.22

operations support facilities, 1 3 2 to 133

Organic Make Up/Solvent Storage Building (276-8 Bldg), 4.6

See also Aqueous Makeup Units

organizational culture, 2-8.1,2-12.13 to 2-12.14

outfall structures, 2-6.13

outgassing process, 2-2.11

oxide fuel blends

facilities for, 1.64,1.65,2-5.17,2-7.20, 2-7.25

need for, 2-2.2,2-2.5,2-2.25

research and development for, 2-7.20

oxide line. See Remote Mechanical A line

P

P Department, 2-7.5

P-10. See tritium

Pacific huts, Hobb's, 2-1.21

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2 -7.7,2-7.8s, 2-7.27,2-10.29

See also Battelle Memorial Institute

Parker, Herbert M.

career of, 2-7.16,2-10.6,2-12.16

radiation perspective by, 2-10.2,2-10.12,2-10.15,2-10.28

waste perspective by, 1.34, 2-6.1

Pasco, 2-12.6

passes and badges. See badges and passes

Patrol, Hanford. See Hanford Patrol

Patrol Headquarters (1720 Bldg), 1.32,2-8.9

Patrol Operations Center, 2-8.9, 2-8.34

patrolling the Hanford Site, 2-8.14 to 2-8.16

See also Hanford Patrol

pencils. See Pocket Ionization Chambers

permissible radiation exposure, 2-10.17

Personnel Security Questionnaires, 2-8.28

photographs for further study, 3.6 to 3.8

Photo-Identification Pass, 2-8.27

f • figure, s • sidebar box, t ■ table

111
Physical Constants Test Reactor (305-B Bldg), 1.55, 2-1.3 to 2-1.4

See also reactors for testing

physical science research, 2-7.40/ to 2-7.49/

Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory (326 Bldg), 1.55, 2-7.26

Pile Technology Building. See Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory

piles. See reactors for plutonium production; reactors for testing

Plant Medical Division, 2-10.31 to 2-10.32

See also Medical Department

Plant Protection Program, 2-8.7 to 2-8.8

plutonium

chemistry of, 1.5/, 1.22, 1-29/, 1.30,2-4.16, 2-4.21

contamination by, 2-10.16 to 2-10.17

discovery of, 1.9,2-4.3

quantities of, 1.60f, 2-3.30,2-5.5 to 2-5.6

recovering and recycling of, 2-5.23 to 2-5.27,2-6.22

toxicity of, 2-7.15,2-7.17,2-10.8 to 2-10.9

undesirable Isotopes of, 2-3.12

See also reactors for plutonium production

Plutonium Concentration Facility (233-S Bldg), 2-4.21

Plutonium Fabrication Pilot Plant (308/306-A Bldg), 1.64, 2-2.25,2-7.25

Plutonium Finishing Plant (234-5Z Bldg)

air filter and exhaust stack, 4.7

design and construction of, 2-1.17,2-5.2 to 2-5.5,2-5.14 to 2-5.16

further research on, 2-5.29

heritage facilities and, 4.6 to 4.7

historical context of, 2-5.1 to 2-5.2

incidents at, 2-5.19, 2-5.24,2-10.37,2-10.38

operation of, 1.54,1.61, 2-5.5 to 2-5.6,2-5.9 to 2-5.10, 2-5.17 to

2-5.19,2-5.21 to2-5.22

overview of, 1.44, 2-1.11

photos of, 3.8

problems with, 2-5.6 to 2-5.8,2-5.11 to 2-5.14/, 2-5.19 to 2-5.21 /

research for, 2-5.22 to 2-5.23

security at, 2-8.3

shutdown of, 2-5.6,2-5.22,2-5.28 to 2-5.29

support facilities at, 1.44

waste from, 2-5.27 to 2-5.28, 2-6.19

Plutonium Fuels Utilization Program. See mixed oxide fuels

Plutonium Isolation Facility (231-Z Bldg), 1.31,2-5.1, 2-5.5, 2-5.23

Plutonium Reclamation Facility (236-Z Bldg), 1.61, 1.72, 1.75,2-5.26 to

2-5.2 7

Plutonium Recycle Critical Facility, 1.71,2-7.20 to 2-7.21

Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (309-E Bldg), 1.64,1.65, 2-1.18/, 2-7.20

to 2-7.21

See also reactors for testing

Plutonium Retrieval System, 2-5.18

plutonium storage. See Primary Plutonium Storage Facility

Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant. See PUREX Plant

plutonium-uranium extraction process, 2-4.22 to 2-4.23

See also PUREX Plant

Pluvious Model, 2-7.12

Pocket Ionization Chambers, 2-10.25

poisoning a reactor, 1.26, 2-3.23

police, military. See Military Police

police in Richland. See Hanford Patrol

policies. See regulations

polonium, 1.44,2-3.30

ponds, 2-2.27,2-6.15,2-6.16,2-6.17

Post Irradiation Test Laboratory. See Physics and Metallurgy Laboratory

post-1970 transuranic waste, 2-6.20 to 2-6.21

power calculator, reactor, 2-3.15

powerhouses. 1.30,2-10.12,2-11.14/, 2-11.20/

PR cans. See product receiver cans

precast concrete, 2-1.14

prefabricated units, 2-1.21

Pre-Fire Plan, 2-10.10 to 2-10.11

preservation in place, 4.1 to 4.2

Press Building. See Metallurgical Engineering Laboratory

pressure gauges, 2-3.15

Primary Plutonium Storage Facility (2736-Z Bldg), 1.75,2-8.23 to 2-8.24,

4.7

Primary Substation, 2-11.18/

private use contract at Battelle Memorial Institute, 2-7.6

process control boards, 2-4.11,2 -4 .1 2 /

Process Control Laboratory (222-T Bldg), 4.5 to 4.6

process sewers, 2-2.27,2-6.16,2-6.17

process tracks, 2-11.7

process water, 2-11.15

procuring materials, 1.18, 2-2.6, 2-8.17

product receiver cans, 2-4.18

Prohibited Articles Property Pass, 2-8.30

Project Badge. See Photo-Identification Pass

Project Chariot, 2-7.24

Project Emergency Plan, 2-8.32 to 2-8.33

See also emergency preparedness

Project Plowshare, 2-7.3,2-7.24

property damage, 2-10.38

Prosser Barricade, 2-8.25 lo 2-8.26

Protected Areas, 2-8.25

PSQ. See Personnel Security Questionnaires

public participation and historic preservation, 4.2

Public Reading Room, U.S. Department of Energy, 3.2

Public Requests Service, 3.3

pulmonary radiotoxicology, 2-7.15,2-7.17

pulsed columns, 2-4.19$, 2-4.23 to 2-4.24

pump houses, 1.29, 1.30, 2-3.17,2-11.13,2-11.14/, 2-11.15,4.4

PUREX Plant (202-A Bldg)

columns in, 2-4.19$

design and construction of, 2-1.17,2-4.6,2-4.18, 2-4.31

operation of, 1.61,2-4.22 to 2-4.23

overview of, 1.54, 1.75,2-1.11

railroad tunnels in, 2-6.19,2-6.24

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t ■ table
I n d e x

PUREX Plant (202-A Bldg) (cont.)

sampling In, 2-4.29

security at, 2-8.3

waste from, 2-6.7

See also chemical separations plants

purpose of book, 1.1 to 1.3

Q

Q or 3 clearance, 2-8.29

quality assurance and fuel, 2-2.13 lo 2-2.14,2-2.21,2-2.23,2-2.24

Queen Marys. See chemical separations plants

Quigley,) A , 2-10.31

Quonset huts, 2-1.21

R

radar control trailers, 2-9.9

Radiation Areas, 2-3.19 to 2-3.20

radiation protection. See health and safety

Radiation Zones, 2-3.19 to 2-3.20

Radioactive Liquid Waste System, 2-6.16 to 2-6.17

radio-chemistry, applied, 2-4.2 to 2-4.3

Radiochemistry Laboratory (3706 Bldg), 1.24, 1.33,2-1.11,2-1.18

Radiochemistry Laboratory/Cerium Recovery (325 Bldg), 1.5S, 1.64 to

1.65, 2-7.25

Radiological Emergency Staff, 2-8.33

radiological exposure incidents, 2-4.27 to 2-4.29,2-10.16 to 2-10.17,

2-10.37

Radiometallurgy Building 0 2 7 Bldg), 1.55 to 1.56, 2-7.26

radium dial painters, 2-10.8

rail cask car, 2-4.8

railroad cut, 2-4.9

railroads

additions and upgrades to, 1.16 to 1.17, 2-11.5 to 2-11.6

chemical separations plants and, 2-4.8,2-4.9

classification yards and, 2-11.6 to 2-11.7

maps of, 2-11.3/

nuclear materials and, 2-6,17,2-8.23,2-6.24

waste storage In tunnels for, 2-6.19, 2-6.24

reactors for civilian power, 1.70,2-7.3,2-7.4,2-7.23

reactors for plutonium production

airborne effluents and, 1.35,1.60

cooling systems for, 1.29 to 1.30,1.60,1.62 to 1.63, 2-3.16 to

2-3.18

design and construction of, 1.15, \ 2 2 , 1.48,1.70,2-1.9,2-1.10,

2-3.2 to 2-3.4

efficiency in, 2-3.28 to 2-3.29

reactors for plutonium production (cont.)

facilities serving as (cont)

B Reactor (105-B Bldg) (SeeB Reactor)

C Reactor (105-C Bldg) (SeeC Reactor)

D Reactor (105-D Bldg) (See D Reactor)

DR Reactor (105-DR Bldg) (See DR Reactor)

F Reactor (105-F Bldg) (See F Reactor)

H Reactor (105-H Bldg) (SeeH Reactor)

KE Reactor (105-KE Bldg) (See KE Reactor)

KW Reactor (105-KW Bldg) (See KW Reactor)

N Reactor (105-M Bldg) (See N Reactor)

further research on, 2-3.32 to 2-3.33

government oversight of, 2-12.24

historical context of, 1.22,1.44

incidents and accidents at, 2-3.26,2-3.28

Irradiation systems In, 2-3.11 to 2-3.16,2-10.10

lag storage and, 1.30, 2-4.8,2-4.9,4.5

operation of, 1.25 to 1.26,1.74,2-3.4 to 2-3.10,2-3.30,2-11.19,

2- 12.22

outages and, 1.30,2-2.16,2-2.17,2-3.13

photos of, 3.8

power and, 1.59 to 1.60, 2-2.16 to 2-2.17, 2-3.28 to 2-3.29

problems with, 1.26,1.43 to 1.44, 2-1.10,2-3.22 to 2-3.28

research for, 1.60,2-3.31 to 2-3.32, 2-7.20 to 2-7.22

safety in, 1.31,2-3.12, 2-3.18 to 2-3.22

security and, 2-3.22,2-8.3

shielding in, 2-1.16,2-10.23s, 2-10.24

shutdown of, 1.64,2-1.22,2-3.9 to 2-3.10

siting of, 1.16, 2-1.2

urgency regarding, 1.48 to 1.49,1.53 to 1.54,1.59 to 1.60

ventilation systems and, 1.35,1.60

waste from, 2-3.25 to 2-3.26,2-3.27t,2-6.13 to 2-6.14, 2-6.17,

2-6.19,2*6.22 to 2-6.23,2-7.14

water uptake for, 1.29 to 1.30,2-3.3,2-3.16 to 2-3.18, 2-11.12 to

2-11.13, 2-11.14/

reactors for space program, 2-7.20,2-7.24

reactors for testing

facilities serving as

Fast Flux Test Facility (See Fast Flux Test Facility)

High Temperature Lattice Test Reactor (See High Temperature

Lattice Test Reactor)

Physical Constants Test Reactor (See Physical Constants Test

Reactor)

Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (See Plutonium Recycle Test

Reactor)

Thermal Test Reactor (See Thermal Test Reactor)

Infrastructure for, 1.71 to 1.72,2-1.3 to 2-1.4, 2-1.6,2-1.18 to

2-1,19, 2-7,26

location of, 2 -1 3 to 2-1.4

missions of, 1.55,1.64,1.72,2-7.20 to 2-7.21

operation of, 2-1.12, 2-7.7

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t * table

1.13
reactors for testing (cont.)

oversight of, 2*12.24

photos of, 3.8

shutdown of, 1.65

waste and, 2*6.17,2-6.19

record keeping and burial grounds, 2-6.21

Records, Printing, and Mail Office Building (712 Bldg), 2*8.22

recovering, recycling, and reducing efforts

chemical separations and, 1.45, 1.49 to 1.50

cribs and, 2-2.27 to 2-2.28

fuel elements and, 2-2.20 to 2-2.21,2-2.25 to 2-2.27

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.23 to 2*5.27

solid waste and, 2-6.21 to 2-6.22

tanks and, 2-4.24

waste from, 2*6.7

See a/so extraction methods

RECUPLEX Facility, 2-5.19,2-5.24,2-10.37,2-10.38

See also Remote Mechanical A Line

RECURLEX process, 1.54,1.61,2-5.19, 2*10.38

REDOX Plant (S Plant, 202-S Bldg)

design of, 1.54, 2-1.11,2-1.16 to 2-1.17,2-4.6,2-4.18

gravity flow columns in, 2*4.19s, 2-4.20

operation of, 1.45,1.49, 2-4.20 to 2-4.21,2-4.28 to 2-4.29

problems with, 2*4.29 to 2*4.31

waste from, 2-6.7

See also chemical separations plants

Reduction Oxidation Plant. See REDOX Plant

refrigeration buildings (189 Bldg), 1.30

regulations. 2-6.3 to 2-6.5, 2-7.22,2-7.23 to 2-7.24

reinforced concrete, 2-1.14

relocation of area residents, 1.12 to 1.15,1,20

remediation of tank waste, 2-6.13

Remote Mechanical A Line, 2-5.5 to 2-5.6, 2-5.9 to 2*5.10, 2-5.11 to

2-5.14,2-5.17 to 2-5.18,2-5.20tto 2-5.211 

Remote Mechanical B Line, 2-5.4,2*5.10

Remote Mechanical C Line, 2-5.5 to 2-5.6,2-5.14 to 2*5.15, 2-5.16f,

2-5.19,2-5.20 to 2-5.211,2-5.22

remote mechanical lines concept, 2-5.2 to 2-5.3

research and development activities

Battelle Memorial Institute and, 2*7.6 to 2-7.7,2-7.21 and 2-7.22,

2*10.7,2-10.18

chemical separations and, 1.33,2-4.2 to 2-4.4

creation of, 2-12.16 to 2-12.17

diversification of Hanford Site by, 1.71 to 1.73,2*12.23

Du Pont and, 2-7.5

facilities for, 2-1.11,2-7.24 to 2-7.26

fuel manufacturing and, 2*2.15,2-2.23 to 2-2.24

further studies on, 2*7.28

General Electric Company and, 2-7.6

health and safety and, 2-10.17 to 2-10.20

historical context of, 2-7.2 to 2-7.4

research and development activities (cont.)

International interactions for, 2-7.26 to 2-7.27

organizational setting for, 2-7.4 to 2-7.7

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.22 to 2-5.23

reactors and, 1.60,1.71 to 1.72, 2-3.31 to2-3.32, 2-7.20 to 2*7.22

studies conducted as, 1.73,2*7.7 to 2-7.24,2*7.29tto 2-7.401

types of, 2*7.1

waste from, 1.56, 2-6.5 to 2-6.6,2-6.19 to 2-6.20

reservoirs, 1.29 to 1.30, 2-3.17,2-11.12,2*11.13f

resources for further study, 3.1 to 3.12

restricted classification, 2-8.21

Retention and Neutralization Building G 40 Bldg), 1.56

retention basins, 1.30,2-6.13,2-6.17

retrievably stored transuranic waste, 2*6.20 to 2-6.21

reusing historic facilities, 4.9 to 4.10

reverse wells, 2-6.15 to 2-6.16

Richland

growth of, 2-1.2, 2-12.6

housing in, 2*12.6

living conditions at, 1.20 to 1.21,2-8.18 to 2-8.19,2*12.19 to

2- 12.21

resident ownership achieved in, 2-12.25

services In, 2-10.31 to 2-10.32,2-11.9

sewer systems for, 2-6.29

temporary facilities in, 2-1.20

Richland Airport, 2-11.10

Richland Barricade, 2-8.25 to 2-8.26

Richland Classification Yard, 2-11.6 to 2-11.7

Richland Crash Alarm System, 2-8.33

Richland Landfill, 2-6.30 to 2-6.31

Richland Village. See Richland

Richland Villager, 3.5

Rickard, William H., 2-7.18

River Patrol, 2-8.15

Riverland Classification Yard, 2-11.6

roads, 1.16 to 1.17,2-11.3 to 2*11.5

Rockwell Hanford Operations, 2-1.25,2-5.18

Rubber Glove Line, 2-5.5 to 2-5.6,2-5.6 to 2-5.9,2-5.14,4.6 to 4.7

rumors about Hanford Site, 2-8.4 to 2-8.5,2-8.16

run book, 2-4.11

rupture monitor, 2-3.15

Russia. See Soviet Union

ruthenium releases, 2 ^ .2 9 to 2-4.31,2-6.27

s

S Department, 2-4.13s, 2-7.5,2-7.11

S Plant. See REDOX Plant

Safeguards Active Response Inventory system (SARIS), 2-8.32

Safeguards and Security Program. See security

f ■ figure,» ■ sidebar box, t ■ table
safety and health. See health and safety

safety control rod ax man (SCRAM), 2-3.12s

safety engineers, 2-10.5,2-10.7,2-10.12

Sage Senf/ne/, 2-8.18

salaries and workforce, 1.17,2-12.3

salting out, 2-4.20

sample galleries, 2-4.28 to 2-4.29

sampling, 1.32, 1.49,2-4.27 to 2-4.29

sand filters, 2-4.14,2-6.28

sanitary landfill sites, 2-6.30 to 2-6.31

sanitary liquid waste, 2-6.28 to 2-6.31

Sanitary Sewer Disposal Plant, 2-11.21

sanitary solid waste, 2-6.30 to 2-6.32

Sanitary Waste Landfill, 2-6.30

sanitary water, 2-11.14 to 2-11.15

schedule for Manhattan Project

management of, 1.20

problems with, 1.21

safety concerns and, 1.11 to 1.12

urgency in, 2-1.1,2-3.4, 2-4.4,2-12.7

scientists, 1.7,1.10,1.11,1.64,2-3.3

scope of book, 1.3 to 1.4

SCRAM the reactor, 2-3.12

Seaborg, Clenn, 2-4.2 to 2-4.3

searches and prohibited items, 2-8.40

secondary zone, 1.73/

secrecy

construction and, 1.22 to 1.23,2-4.4

legislation and, 2-6.3

material acquisition and, 1.18,2-8.17

problems with, 2-8.6 to 2-8.7

public and, 1.40

safety impacts of, 2-10.7,2-10.30

start of, 1.7

workforce and, 1.18, 2-8.4 to 2-8.6,2-12.6 to 2-12.7,2-12.11

See also security

secret classification, 2-8.21

security

development of, 2-8.7 to 2-8.8

further research on, 2-8.34 to 2-8.35

historical context of, 2-8.2 to 2-8.4,2-12.25

incidents and, 2-8.6 to 2-8.7,2-8.9 to 2-8.10,2-8.14.2-12.6 to

2-12.7,2-12.11

measures for, 2-3.22,2-8.14 to 2-8.34

missile sites and, 2-9.12

organizations involved in, 1.37 to 1.38, 2-8.7 to 2-8.14

purpose of, 2-8.1

threats to, 2-8.2,2-8.12,2-12.15 to 2-12.16,2-12.25

uranium and, 2-2.6

See also secrecy

Security Areas, 2-8.25

Security Bulletins, 2-8.20

segregating workers, 1.17,1.20,2-12.6,2-12.8

selecting Hanford Site, 1.12 to 1.15

seminars, 2-7.27

Separation Building/Cold Chemical Semi-Works (321 Complex), 1.24,

1.33

septic tanks, 2-6.28,2-6.29, 2-6.30

service tracks, 2-11.7

sewage, 2-6.28 to 2-6.30, 2-6.31

Sewage Lagoon (100-N lagoon), 2-6.30

sewage treatment plants, 2-6.28 to 2-6.29

sewer systems, 2-11.20 to 2-11.21

shielding, 2-3.3,2-10.23,2-10.24,2-12.10$

Shippingport Reactor, 1.70,2-7.23

Siemens, 2-3.10

silver reactor fillers, 2-4.14, 2-6.28

Simon, Walter O ., 2-3.23, 2-12.4, 2-12.11,2-12.12

site selection, 1.12 to 1.15

site visitation, 4.7 to 4.8

siting criteria for Hanford Site, 1.16, 2-1.1,2-1.2,2-11.1 to 2-11.2

skimmer, 2-4.17

slugs. See fuel elements, unirradiated

sluicing uranium from tanks, 2-4.24

sodium dichromate, 2-3.23

Sodium Test Facilities, 2-7.26

Soldat, Joe, 2-4.28,2-4.30 to 2-4.31,2-10.13

solid waste, 1.34, 2-6.18 to 2-6.26,2-6.30 to 2-6.32

Solid Waste Information Tracking System, 2-6.21

Solid Waste Landfill, 2-6.30 to 2-6.31

solvent extraction, 2-4.18 to 2-4.23,2-4.23 to 2-4.25,2-4.26

solvent recovery and REDOX process, 2-4.20

Southern Connection, 2-11.6 to 2-11.7

Soviet Union

Cold War and, 1.45 to 1.48,1.56 to 1.57,2-12.15

espionage by, 2-8.6 to 2-8.7,2-8.14

waste management In, 1.50 to 1.51

space reactors, 2-7.20, 2-7.24

Special Hazards Bulletin, 2-10.28

Special Response Team, 2-8.12

Special Work Permit, 2-10.29

Special Work Permit clothing, 2-10.29/

specific gravity, 2-4.12$

speck hunts, 2-4.29 to 2-4.31

See also airborne releases and mitigation

standards for radiation protection, 2-10.20 to 2-10.22

steam production, 2-11.19 to 2-11.20

storing irradiated fuel, 2-4.8 to 2-4.9,2-7.22 to 2-7.23

storing plutonium, 1.31 to 1.32

straightening fuel rods, 2-2.11

strain gauge, 2-4.24$

strikes by labor unions, 2-5.25,2-10.34 to 2-10.35,2-12.7$, 2-12.18

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t - table
stripping, 2-4.19

See also solvent extraction

strontium removal from waste, 2-4.26

submarine reactors, 2-6.20

substations, 2-11.16,2-11.18

suicide squad, 2-3.12

Sullivan, Louis, 2-1.14

support buildings, 1J 2 to 1.33

support services center, 2-11.9

Swensson, Earl, 2-12.11

SWITS. See Solid Waste Information Tracking System

SWP. See Special Work Permit

SWP clothing, 2-10.29/

symposia, 2-7.27

Szilard, Leo, 1.6,1.7,2-8.6

T

T Department, 2-7.5

T Plant (221-T Bldg)

design of, 2-4.5 to 2-4.6

exhaust stack, 4.6

heritage facility and, 4.6

mission changes in, 1.62

operation of, 1.26,1.54,2-4.27,2-4.28 to 2-4.29

photos of, 2-1.16/*, 3.8

waste from, 2-4.31, 2-6.7,2-7.11

See also chemical separations plants; Green Run

Tactical Response Team, 2-8.2,2-8.12

tail-end Charlies, 2-10.18

tanks, radioactive waste storage

characterizing waste in, 2-6.6 to 2-6.7

design and construction of, 1.23,2*6.8 to 2-6.9

historical context of, 1.45, 1.50,1.54,1.61 to 1.62,1.75

incidents in, 2-6.11 to 2-6.13

mining uranium in, 2-4.23 to 2-4.25

monitoring of, 2-6.12

waste reduction for, 1.50, 2-6.9 to 2-6.11

tanks, water storage, 2-11.14/

Technical Security Building (3762 Bldg), 2-1.18/

telephone systems, 2-11.22 to 2-11.23

temperature monitoring instalments, 2-3.15

temporary construction facilities, 2-1.20

Temporary Tag Pass, 2-8.27

temporary wood frame structure, 2-1.18/

termination winds, 2-12.6

Test Pile/Hot Cell Verification Building 0 0 5 Bldg), 1 .2 4,1.28,2-1.3,2-

2.5 to 2-2.6, 2-7.25,4.4

test reactors. See reactors for testing

testing fuel rods, 1.24,1.28, 2-1.3, 2-2.5 to 2-2.6, 2-7.25

themoluminescent dosimeters, 2-10.25, 2-10.26f

Thermal Test Reactor (305-8 Bldg), 1.55,2-1.3 to 2-1.4

See also reactors for testing

thermonuclear weapons, 1.47 to 1.48,1.52

thyroid surveys, 2-10.18

time and radiation protection, 2-10.23, 2-10.24

tolerance dose, 2-10.17

tool sheds, 2 -9.6,2-9.7/

top secret classification, 2-8.21

Towne, Cordon, 2-10.11,2-10.12

Tracks Radioactive Components (TRAC), 2-6.9

training workforce, 2-8.11 to 2-8.12,2-10.30 to 2-10.31,2-12.9 to

2-12.10

transfer line leaks, 2-6.12

transite shingle cladding, 2-1.18/

transmission lines, 2-11.16 to 2-11.18

transportation

airplanes for, 2-8.24, 2-11.10

equipment for, 2-11.8 to 2-11.10

fuel elements and, 2-4.8 to 2-4.9

historic sites visitation and, 4.7 to 4.8

incidents during, 2-6.26, 2-10.38

infrastructure for, 2-1.6

plan for, 2-11.1,2-11.3

plutonium and, 1.26,1.27,2-8.24

railroads for, 1.16 to 1.17,2-11.5 to 2-11.8 >

roads for, 1.16 to 1.17,2-11.3 to 2-11.5

security and, 2-8.23 to 2-8.24

waste and, 2-6.16 to 2-6.17,2-6.25,2-7.23

transuranic waste, 2-6.18$, 2-6.20 to 2-6.21

trash, 2-6.30 to 2-6.32

trenches, 2-2.27,2-3.26, 2-6.14,2-6.15,2-6.16, 2-6.17

trespassing on Hanford Site, 2-8.3

Tri-City Herald, 3.6

Tri-City Industrial Development Council, 2-3.9

Tri-City Nuclear Industrial Council, 2-3.9

triple dip baths, 2-2.11 to 2-2.12

tritium, 1.49,2-2.24 to 2-2.25,2-3.30,2-7.11

See also weapons

trombone sampler, 2-4.28/

tunnels, railroad, 2-4.9, 2-6.19,2-6.24

u

U Plant (221-U Bldg)

design of, 2-4.5 to 2-4.6

operation of, 2-4.27,2-4.28 to 2-4.29

problems at, 2-6.17

use of, 1.49 to 1.50, 2-4.5, 2-4.23 to 2-4.25

f ■ figure, s ■ sidebar box, t ■ table
I n d e x

U Plant (221-U Bldg) (cont.)

waste from, 2-6.7

See also chemical separations plants

unclassified classification, 2-8.21

unreinforced concrete, 2-1.14

U O , Plant (224-U Bldg), 1.49,2-4.5f, 2-4.25

See also chemical separations plants

uranium

contamination by, 2-6.17

plutonium quantities produced from, 2-2.4

recovering and recycling of, 1.45,1.49 to 1.50,2-2.20 to 2-2.21, '

2-2.25 to 2-2.27

scarcity of, 1.45,2-3.5

See also fuel elements, unirradiated

uranium billets

quantity required of, 2-2.14

security of, 2-2.5 to 2-2.6, 2-8.23,2-8.24

storage of, 1.28, 1.34,4.3

Uranium Trioxide Facility. See U O , Plant

uranium trioxide powder, 1.50, 2-4.25

uranyl nitrate hexahydrate, 2-4.25

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Atomic Energy Commission and, 2-9.1

Manhattan Project and, 1.10,2-3.3

Richland and, 1.20, 1.21,2-12.20 to2-12.21

site ownership and, 2-1.24

U.S. Department of Energy, 2-1.25,3.9,3.11 to 3.12

U.S. Transuranium Registry, 2-7.11,2-10.18

V

vadose zone, 2-6.6

Vault Safety and Inventory System, 2-8.32

vehicles on Hanford Site, 2-11.8 to 2-11.9

vendors and secrecy, 2-8.17

ventilation systems

chemical separations plants and, 1.35, 1.50,2-4.13 to 2-4.14,

2-6.28,4.6

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.4,2-5.19,4.7

reactors and, 1.35,1.60

research and development on, 1.35

vernacular architecture, 2-1.14

videotapes and audiotapes, 3.9 to 3.10

Village Medical Division, 2-10.31

Village Police. See Hanford Patrol

visitation of historic facilities, 4.7 to 4.8

visual inspection of fuel elements, 2-2.14

Vitro Engineering, 2-1.24

w

Walker, Lou, 2-4.10f

Washington Public Power Supply System, 2-3.10

Washington State Patrol, 2-8.11

waste, transuranic, 2-6.18,2-6.20 to 2-6.21

Waste Acid Treatment Facility, 2-6.17

Waste Acid Treatment System, 2-2.27

waste definitions, 2-6.1 to 2-6.2

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (225-8 Bldg), 1.71,2-4.26

waste from plutonium production

burial grounds for, 2-2.27,2-6.18 to 2-6.26

chemical separations plants and, 2-4.1,2-4.13 to 2-4.14, 2-4.20,

2-4.29 to 2-4.31,2-6.5,2-6.26 to 2-6.28

fuel manufacturing and, 2-2.2,2-2.27,2-6.5

further research in, 2-6.32

heritage facilities and, 4 .5 ,4 .6 ,4 .7

historical context of, 1.33 to 1.35

incidents and, 2-6.11 to 2-6.13,2-6.16,2-6.26,2-6.30

legislation on, 2-6.3 to 2-6.5

off site sources of, 2-6.6, 2-6.20

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.4,2-5.19, 2-5.27 to 2-5.28, 2-6.5,4.7

reactors and, 1.35,1.60,2-3.25 to 2-3.26, 2-3 J 7 t 2-7.14

recordkeeping for, 2-6.9,2-6.21,2-6.30

research and production of, 1.56,2-6.5 to 2-6.6,2-6.19 to 2-6.20

research for management of, 1.65,2-7.4,2-7.22 to 2-7.23

sewer systems and, 2-11.21

See also airborne releases and mitigation

Waste Incinerator Facility (232-Z Bldg), 1.61,2-5.24 to 2-5.25,2-6.22,

4.7

Waste Information Data System, 2-6.30,3.12

Waste Treatment Facility (242-Z Bldg), 1.61,2-5.25 to 2-5.26,2-10.27,

2-10.34 to 2-10.35,2-10.37

waste types and forms

hazardous, 2-6.21

high-level waste as, 2-6.6 to 2-6.13

liquid waste as, 1.34 to 1.35, 2-6.6 to 2-6.17,2*6.28 to 2-6.30,

2-6.31

low-level radioactive waste as, 2-6.13 to 2-6.20

off site waste as, 2-6.20

post-1970 transuranic waste as, 2-6.20 to 2*6.21

sanitary, 2-6.28 to 2-6.31

solid waste as, 1.34,2-6.18 to 2-6.26,2-6.30 to 2-6.32

transuranic, 2-6.18s, 2-6.20,2-6.21

water systems, 2-3.16,2-11.11 to 2-11.15

weapons

arms race and, 1.40 to 1.42,1.52 to 1.53

design of, 1.25

manufacturing process for, 1.27 to 1.28,1.29f

plutonium pits for, 2-5.10

f ■ figure, l ■ sidebar box, t ■ table

1.17

\
weapons (cont.)

testing of, 1.38, 1.42, 1.46 to 1.47, 1.52, 2-3.7

thermonuclear type of, 1.47 to 1.48,1.52

use of, 1.39 to 1.40,2-3.5

See a/so arms race

websites, 3.11 to 3.12

Wechsler, |acob, 2-3.5

' Westinghouse Corporation, 2*7.7,2-7.21

Westinghouse Hanford Company, 2-1.2S

Wheeler, John A., 2-3.23,2-4.3

White Bluffs townsite, 2-1.22

whole body counters, 2-10.19, 2-10.25 to 2-10.26

Wigner effect. See graphite

wildlife and contamination spread, 2-6.17

wind and sandstorms, 2-12.6

women as radium dial painters, 2-10.8

women during Manhattan Project, 1.17,1.18 to 1.19, 2-8.20, 2-12.6,

2-12.8 to 2-12.9, 2-12.12 /

Women's Army Corps, 2-12.9

wood frames, 2-1.18/, 2-1.20

work week during Manhattan Project, 2-12.4

workforce

autopsies on, 2-10.18

construction workers in, 1.45,2-12.3/

decision process and, 2-12.1 to 2-12.3

discouragement of, 2-5.7

dosimeters and, 2-10.24 to 2-10.25

epidemiological research and, 2-10.19 to 2-10.20

further research on, 2-12.28 to 2-12.30

labor unions In, 1.18,2-5.25,2-10.34 to 2-10.35, 2-12.5,2-12.7$,

2-12.17to2-12.18

medical examinations and, 2-10.16,2-10.25,2-10.28,2-12.18

numbers of, 1.45, 2-12.12 to 2-12.13, 2-12.14 to 2-12.15/, 2-12.21

to 2-12.22

oversight and, 2-12.23 to 2-12.24

plutonium finishing and, 2-5.6,2-5.17

recruiting of, 1.17 to 1.18,2-8.6,2-12.3 to 2-12.4,2-12.8

research and, 2-7.6/

retention of, 2-12.4, 2-12.6

security and, 2-8.9

security clearances for, 2-8.27 to 2-8.28

security staff in, 1.37 to 1.38,2-8.8 to 2-8.11,2-8.11 to 2-8.12,

2-8.15, 2-8.22

segregating of, 1.17,1.20, 2-12.6,2-12.8

start of monitoring of, 1.35 to 1.37,2-12.16

training of, 2-8.11 to 2-8.12,2-10.30 to 2-10.31,2-12.9 to 2-12.10

U.S. and Soviet views on, 1.51

whole body counters and, 2-10.19, 2-10.25 to 2-10.26

women in, 1.17,1.18 to 1.19, 2-8.20, 2-12.6, 2-12.8 to 2-12.9,

2-12.12/

See a/so health and safety

wound counter, 2-10.26

Wright, Wakefield, 2-10.16

Wye Barricade, 2-8.25 to 2-8.26

X

xenon poisoning, 1.26,2-3.23

Y

Yakima Barricade, 2-8.25

Yakima Firing Center, 2-9.12

Yakima River railroad bridge, 2-11.7

yeltowcake, 2-2.5

z

Z clearance, 2-8.29

Z Plant. See Plutonium Finishing Plant

Zircoloy cladding, 2-2.18,2-2.20/, 2-3.23

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"" - v:*w:

M a n h a tta n Project 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 6