United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2896

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Quennel A. Young

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

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Submitted: April 12, 2023

Filed: May 25, 2023

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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Quennel A. Young was convicted for knowingly possessing with the intent to 

distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 

amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). 
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The district court1 denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. He appeals. Having 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I. 

Quennel A. Young was pulled over while driving a rental car in Jasper 

County, Missouri. He claimed to be traveling from Oklahoma (but provided a 

Kentucky driver’s license). Officers searched the vehicle, finding a rental agreement 

and a backpack with six receipts. Two were for cash advances in Colorado totaling 

$8,500. One was from a retail clothing store in California (“WSS”). Another was 

from a gas station in California. The trunk had WSS bags with new clothing and 

dirty laundry. Searching the trunk, the officers noticed the lid liner was not fastened 

properly. Concealed between the lid liner and the sheet metal, the officers found 

two bundles of meth—one wrapped in a WSS sack. The officers found three more 

bundles of meth in the center console and a second cellphone (in addition to the one 

from Young’s person). The phones had text messages about buying and selling

meth, and photographs of Young with money, of someone holding money, and of 

the backpack with money. 

After a bench trial, Young moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the 

district court denied. He appeals, alleging the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction because he did not know the meth was inside the rental car.

II. 

“This court reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction.” 

United States v. Bailey, 54 F.4th 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 2022). Reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence after a bench trial, this court applies the same standard 

as when reviewing a jury verdict. See United States v. Acosta, 619 F.3d 956, 960 

1

The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri.
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(8th Cir. 2010). “This court may reverse convictions based upon insufficiency of 

the evidence only upon a demonstration that a rational jury would have had no choice 

but reasonably to doubt the existence of an element of a charged crime.” Id. See 

United States v. Ganter, 3 F.4th 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2021) (same). This court 

reviews sufficiency of the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

upholding the verdict if a reasonable factfinder could find the offense proved beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. DNRB, Inc., 895 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 

2018). “A conviction may be based on circumstantial as well as direct evidence. 

The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.” United 

States v. Seals, 915 F.3d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir. 2019). “The government is given the 

benefit of reasonable inferences, so long as they are not conjecture and speculation.” 

United States v. Boesen, 491 F.3d 852, 858 (8th Cir. 2007).

 “To convict an individual of possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government has the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] both knowingly possessed and intended 

to distribute the drugs.” United States v. Morales, 813 F.3d 1058, 1065 (8th Cir. 

2016). “Proof of actual or constructive possession of the contraband is sufficient to 

sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).” United States v. Wright, 739 

F.3d 1160, 1168 (8th Cir. 2014). “[T]o prove constructive possession, the 

government must establish some nexus between a defendant and the contraband; 

mere physical proximity to the contraband is insufficient.” United States v. 

Williams, 39 F.4th 1034, 1045 (8th Cir. 2022). “Constructive possession is defined 

as knowledge of presence of the contraband plus control over the contraband. 

Evidence showing a person has dominion over the premises in which the contraband 

is concealed establishes constructive possession.” Wright, 739 F.3d at 1168. 

“Knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. For instance, a 

defendant’s control and dominion over a vehicle can indicate knowledge of its 

contents.” United States v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 787, 796 (8th Cir. 2010). “[I]ntent to 

distribute may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as a large sum of cash, 

and a quantity of a controlled substance.” United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 457, 

458 (8th Cir. 1992).
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Young argues that he did not knowingly possess the meth because it was 

concealed in the rental car before he rented it. But the evidence, viewed most 

favorably to the verdict, supports the conclusion that Young knowingly, 

constructively possessed the meth. He was the driver and sole occupant of the 

vehicle. See United States v. Valera-Ramirez, 491 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir. 2007) 

(“The fact that [defendant] was the driver and an authorized operator of the vehicle 

in which the methamphetamine was found suffices to establish control over the 

drugs.”); United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1105 (8th Cir. 2007)

(“[Defendant’s] dominion over the vehicle alone could support a finding that he 

knowingly possessed the methamphetamine . . . .”). But cf. United States v. Aponte, 

619 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2010) (“If a defendant did not own the vehicle, however,

and especially where the defendant was in control of the vehicle for only a short 

time, then we have required additional proof showing that the defendant was aware 

of drugs concealed in the vehicle.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Leon, 924 

F.3d 1021, 1024 (8th Cir. 2019) (same). 

In this case, there is sufficient additional proof. See Valera-Ramirez, 491 

F.3d at 777 (“Moreover, the events in this case were consonant with the drug courier 

modus operandi . . . .”). Young rented a car, traveled across the country, took $8,500 

in cash advances, had two cell phones and text messages about buying and selling 

meth, and transported five bundles of meth—about five pounds—in concealed 

compartments in a rental car (with one bundle wrapped in a sack from WSS where 

Young had recently shopped). The evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, 

sufficiently establishes that Young knowingly possessed and intended to distribute 

the meth.

Young speculates that the drugs were left in the vehicle by a previous renter. 

But this court has encountered and dismissed this argument before. See id. at n.2 

(“In light of the aforementioned evidence and considering the low probability that 

an individual would rent a car, load it with valuable contraband, and then return it to 

the rental company, the jury could reasonably have rejected this hypothesis.”).
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As evidence of innocence, Young stresses his cooperation with the officers 

and his reaction of surprise when the meth was discovered. See HernandezMendoza, 600 F.3d at 978. But this is unpersuasive because Young’s conduct does

not nullify evidence sufficient to support his conviction. See United States v. 

Maurstad, 35 F.4th 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[Defendant’s] cooperation with the 

officer has no bearing on whether he knew there was meth in the car—it’s entirely 

possible that he was cooperative to avoid raising suspicion and being charged with 

the more serious meth offense. And, even if it did indicate honesty, there was other 

evidence sufficient to establish knowledge.”). 

Young relies on three cases, which are distinguishable. See Aponte, 619 F.3d 

799; United States v. Mendoza-Larios, 416 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2005); United States 

v. Pace, 922 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1990). In Aponte, both the vehicle and the cooler 

with the drugs were owned by a third party, and “there was no evidence linking [the 

defendants] to previous drug use or to the hidden compartment containing drugs.” 

Aponte, 619 F.3d at 806. In Pace, the drugs were hidden in the luggage of a 

passenger, who testified that “he didn’t tell [defendant] what was in his luggage.” 

Pace, 922 F.2d at 453. The defendant in Mendoza-Larios rode as a passenger in a 

vehicle owned by a third party, and no other evidence linked him to the drugs in a 

hidden compartment welded within the passenger airbag space. See MendozaLarios, 416 F.3d at 873, 876 (“Pace . . . ha[d] more evidence than this case.”). 

Unlike these cases, the government presented sufficient evidence linking 

Young to the concealed drugs. Compare Aponte, 619 F.3d at 806 (no evidence 

linking defendants to the drugs), with United States v. Bustos-Flores, 362 F.3d 

1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient evidence where the “drugs were 

packaged with black electrical tape and silicone” and “[b]oth materials were found 

either in the passenger compartment of the car or in the trunk next to the defendant’s 

luggage”). See United States v. Hernandez-Mendoza, 600 F.3d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 

2010) (sufficient evidence, in part, where four cell phones were located in the vehicle 

because “the government presented testimony that drug traffickers typically carry 

multiple cell phones”); United States v. Corrales-Portillo, 779 F.3d 823, 833 (8th 
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Cir. 2015) (“Unlike Pace, this is not a case in which the government could not prove, 

even by inference, that the defendant was anything more than present in the vehicle 

or physically proximate to the contraband.”). Cf. United States v. RodriguezCisneros, 814 Fed. Appx. 186, 188 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding sufficient evidence to 

support a 21 U.S.C. § 841 conviction by relying, in part, on text messages discussing 

buying and selling drugs); United States v. Santiago, 62 F.4th 639, 644 (1st Cir. 

2023) (same); United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2021) (same). 

The evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes

that Young knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. The district 

court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.

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The judgment is affirmed. 

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