UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 07-0262
D ARL ENE S. C Y PERT , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. J A M ES B. P EA KE , M.D., S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued Oc tober 8, 2008 Dec ided Dec ember 23, 2008)

Landon E. Overby , ( no n- a tto rn e y pr a c tit ion e r) of

Was hin g ton , D .C. , f

or the a pp e lla nt.
Pau l J. Hutter , w ithwh om R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant Gener al Counsel; Richard May eric k, Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Lesli e C. R og all , Se nio r A

pp e llate Attor

ne y , a ll of Washington, D.C., we re on the brief f or the a ppellee.
Be fore GREENE, Chief Judge , and KASOL D and LANCE, Judges

. KASOL D, Judge : Darle ne S. Cy pert, wife of vete ran Jerry L

. Cy pert, who ha s a 100% total dis a bil ity ratin g , p e rm ane nt i n n a tur e , a pp e a ls f ro m a De c e mbe r 1 3, 20 06 , B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Appea ls (Boa

rd) de cision that denied her entitlement to D epende nts' Educ ation Assistance ( DEA) benef its under Chapter 35 of

Title 38 of the United States Code. F or the re asons set for th below, the B oa rd ' s d e c isi on

wi ll be re ve rs e d and the matte r r e mand e d f or fu rt he r a dju dic a tio n c on sis te nt w ith this decision.

I. BACKG ROUND Veter an Jerry

L . Cy pert ser ved on ac tive duty

from A u gu s t 1 9 6 6 to Dece mber 1969. On Oc tob e r 3 0, 19 90 , th e Se c re tary no tif ie d M r. Cy

pe rt that a s a re su lt o f h is s e rv ic e -c onne c te d p os ttraumatic stre ss disorder (PTSD) he was c onsidered pe rmane ntly and tot al ly

disabled for

VA purposes, e ffe ctive September 25, 1990. At that time, Mr. Cy pert wa s divorced f

rom his first wife.2

He e ntere d into a second marria g e in July 1994 that ended in divorce in June 1999. I n J anuar y 2004, he mar ried the a ppellant. Shortly

there afte r, o n Fe b ru ary

4, 2004, Mrs. Cy

pert a pplied for DE A benef its. Her application was denied by the B oard be cause it determined that the a vailability

of DEA be ne fi ts e nd e d o n Se pte mbe r 2 00 0, 10 y e ars a ft e r t he date Mr . Cy

pe rt re c e ive d h is s tatus a s a perma nently and totally

disabled vete ran. A ccor dingly , the B oard f ound that Mrs. Cy

pert wa s not elig ible for DE A bene fits. Additionally , the B oard de termined that be cause Mrs. Cy pert was not marrie d to Mr. Cy

pert before the elig ibilit y

period for

DEA be nefits had e x pired, she w as not entitled to an extension of the period of e ligibility

. See 38 C.F.R

. § 2 1 .3047 (2008) ( allowing elig ible or surviving spouse s an extension to the period of elig ibilit y under cer tain circ umstances)

. Mrs. Cy pert appea led. On a pp e a l, M rs . Cy

pe rt e sse nti a lly

argues th at th e B oa

rd e rr e d a s a

matte r o f l aw b e c a

us e 38 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)( A) provide s that the 10-y ear delimiting (or elig ibilit y ) per iod for using her hu sb and ' s D EAbe ne fi ts b e g ins to r un fr om the date , as de te rm ine d b y the Se c re tary , th a t sh e be c a me an " elig ible person" as def ined by 38 U.S.C. § 3501 (a)(1) (D)( i). Pursuant to section 35 01 (a )( 1) (D )(i), an " e lig ibl e pe rs on " is the " sp ou se of any pe rs on wh o h a s a

tot a l di sa

bil ity per m an ent i n nature resulting from a se rvice -conne cted disability sustained duringa per iod of qualifying se rvice ." A ccor dingly , beca use her husband wa s permane ntly and totally

disabled on the date she marrie d him, Mrs. Cy pert a rg ues that the 10-y ear

delimiting per iod beg an at that time – when she beca

me Mr. Cy

pert' s spouse. Fur

ther, Mrs. Cy

pert a rg ues that althoug h 38 U.S.C. § 3512 (b )( 1) (B ) p e rm its he r t o c ho os e an a lte rn a te be g inni ng date, if a g re e d to by

the Se c re tary , th is statutory section does not permit the Secr etar y to unilaterally

assig n a beg inning date other tha n the one provide d u

n d e r s e c ti o n 3 512(b)( 1)(A) . Mrs. Cy

pert a lso argues that the Sec reta ry ' s interpre tation and application of t he im plementing regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 21.3046(a) (2)( iii)(2008), is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. § 3512. Th e Se c re tary

argue s th a t th e statut or

y langua g e of 38 U. S.C. § 351 2 (a )( 1) (D )( i) a llo ws him to determine the beg inning date of the 10- y ear DEA e ligibility period, a nd the beg inning date is not limit ed to when Mrs. Cy

pert other wise bec ame a

n "e ligible pe rson" under se ction 3501(a) (1)( D)(i)

. The Sec reta

ry finds support for his ar g ument in 38 U.S.C. § 3512 (b)(1)(B ) and his under standing of the leg islative intent and purpose of that s t at u t e. He a lso contends that his implementingC o ngres s recent l y am end ed s ect i o n 35 1 2 t o aut ho ri ze a 2 0

- y ear de l i m i t i ng pe ri o d , be gi nni ng "o n t he d at e t he 1 [vet eran' s] dis ab i l i t y was so d et erm i ned to b e a t o t al d i sabil i t y p erm anent in nat ure, b ut o nl y i f t he el i gi b l e p ers o n remains t h e s pou s e of t h e di s abl ed per s on t h r ou g h ou t t h e per i od. " See V et er an s B en ef i t s Impr ov eme n t A ct of 2008, P u b. L. N o. 1 1 0 -3 8 9 , § 3 2 1 , 1 2 2 S ta t. 4 1 4 5 (2 0 0 8 ). N o thin g in t h e a m e n d m e n t ind ic a te s the c h a n g e s a re to b e a p p lied re tro a c tive ly. Bow en v. G eor

get own U ni v. H os

p. , 4 8 8 U .S. 2 0 4 , 2 0 8 (1 9 8 8 ) (" R etro ac t i vit y i s no t f av o red i n the law

. T hu s, co ngres si o nal e nact m ent s and a d m i ni st rat i ve rul es wil l no t b e co nst rued t o have ret roac t i ve ef f ect unl ess t hei r l anguage re q u ire s this r e su lt. " ).

3 regulation, and his application there of, ar e consistent with his understandingof the statute.

II. AN AL YSI S A. The Statutory

Scheme – 38 U.S.C. § 3500, et seq

. Both pa rties ag ree that availability of DEA benef

its under sec tion 3512 is l imited to a period

o f 1 0 y ea rs
. T h e qu es t i o n i s wh en t h e st at u t o ry 1 0 -y ea r pe ri o d b egi n s
. Ou r r ev i ew o f t h e B o ar d 's

1 int e rp re ta tio n of statut e s is de no vo . 3 8 U .S. C. § 72 61 (a )( 1) ; Ferenc v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 58, 60 (2006). We beg in our revie w by examining the statutory

lang uag e. Ostero-Castro v . Principi , 1 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 7 5 , 3 8 0 (2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Go od Sa ma rit an Ho sp . v . S

ha lal a , 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993)). "Wher e a statute' s lang uag e is plain, and its meaning clea r, no room exis ts f

or construction. There is no t h i n g to con st rue. " Gardner v. D erwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 587 ( 1991), aff' d sub nom. Ga rd ne r v . B ro wn , 5 F.3 d 1 4 5 6 (Fed. Cir. 1993), a ff 'd , 5 1 3 U. S

. 1 1 5 (1 9 9 4 ))

. "D et erm i n i n g a statute' s plain meaningrequire s examini ng the spec if i c l anguag e at issue a

nd the over all structure of the statute." Id . at 58 6; Reno v. Koray , 5 1 5 U. S

. 5 0 , 5 6 -5 7 (1 9 9 5 ) ( co n s t ru i n g s t at u t o ry l an gu age in c on te xt of

statut or y sc he me ); Ki lp a tr ic k

v
. P rincipi , 16 Vet.App. 1, 7 ( 2002) (e x amining e ntire statut or y sc he me in i nte rp re tin g me anin g of statut e ); see also G laxo Operations U.K. Ltd. v. Quigg , 89 4 F .2 d 3 92 , 3 96 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 0) (" [E]ven when the pla in m e anin g of the statut or

y langua g e in question would resolve the issue befor e the c ourt, the leg islative history should usually

be examined at least ' to determi n e whe ther ther e is a c lear ly expressed leg islative intention contrary to the

s t at u t o ry l an gu age
. '" ( qu o t i n g Madison Galleries L td. v. United States , 870 F.2d 627, 629 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998)))

. I n t hi s i ns tan ce, w e fi ndth at t he "s tat ut e's l anguage is pl ain , and it s mea ni ng cle ar." Gardner , 1 Vet.App. at 587. Section 3512(b)(1) (A) states in releva nt part that4 Exc e pt a s p ro vid e d in

su bp ara g ra ph(B ) o r ( C) , a

pe rs on ma de e lig ibl e by su bp ara g ra ph(B ) o r ( D) of

se cti on 35 01 (a )( 1) of

tit le [38 U SCS § 3 50 1( a )( 1) ] . . . may

be a ff or de d e du c a tio na l a ssi sta nc e under thi s chapte r duringthe 10-y ear period beg inning on the date (as dete rmined by the Secre tary

) the person become s an elig ible person wi t h i n t he meaningof sec tion . . . 3501(a)( 1)(D) (i) . . . . Pur su ant to se c tio n 35 12 (b )( 1) (A ), a pe rs on is " ma dee lig ibl e by subpara g raph ( B) or (D) of sec tion 35 01 (a )( 1) of

tit le [ 38 USC S. § 35 01 (a )( 1) ]" (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Se c tio n 3 50 1( a )( 1) , s tate s, in pe rt ine nt p art , th a t an " e lig ibl e pe rs on " is

[t]he sp ou se of

any pe rs on who ha s a

tot a l di sa

bil ity pe rm ane nt i n nature resulting from a ser vice- connec ted disability

sustained during a per iod of qualifying se rvice

. 38 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(1) (D)( i). Thus, by the plain lang uag e of se ction 3501(a) (1) ( D)(i) , a per son who is a sp ou se of

a pe rso n who ha s a

se rv ic e -c onne c te d to ta l and pe rm ane nt d isa

bil ity is a n e lig ibl e p e r s o n , an d

b y th e p la in

la n g u a g e o f

s e c ti o n3 5 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) any one ma de eligibl e by section 35 01 (a )( 1) (D ) m ay

be a ff or de d e du c a tio na l be ne fi ts " duri ng the 10 -ye ar pe ri od be g inn ingon

the date ( a s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e S e c r e t ar

y) the person becom es an eligible person within the meaningof sec tion . . . 3501(a) (1)( D)(i) ." ( emphasis adde d). Altho u gh t h e S ecretar

y corr ectly notes that he is to deter

mine the beg inning of

the 10-y ear delimiting per iod, his discretion is not unfet t er ed. Ag ain, under the ver y terms of sec tion 3 5 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) , t h e b e g i n n i n g d a t e f o r e l i g i b i l i ty f

o r D E A b e n e f

i t s , a s d e t e r

m i n e d b y t h e S e c r e t ar

y, is when the person become s an eligible person wi thi n th e me anin g of se c tio n 3 50 1( a )( 1) (D )( i) . T his section has two c riteria. F irst, a pe rs o n i s n o t eli g ible unless that person is a spouse . Second, that person must be the spouse of a "pe rson who has a total disability perma nent i n nature resulting from

a se rv ic e -c on ne c te d d isa

bil ity su sta ine d d

ur inga pe ri od of qu a lify in g ser

vic e ." 38 U. S.C. § 3501(a) (1)(D)(i). T he Secr etar y cer tainly has the a

uthority to confirm both of these criter ia; ho we ve r, in t

his ins tanc e , c on fi rm a tio n o f t he se c ri te ri a

is n ot c on te sted

. Ac c or din g ly , p ur su ant t o
se c tio n 3 51 2( b) (1 )( A) , M rs . Cy pe rt be c a m e a n " e l i g i b le pe rs on ," thu s tr ig g e ri ngthe 10 -ye ar e lig ibi lity period for DEA be nefits, when she marrie d Mr. Cy pert, since both criteria

wer e satisfied at that time. B . T he Se c re tary ' s Co nte nti on s 1. Section 3512(

b) ( 1) ( B) Th e S ec re t ar y

contends that the be g inning date, as de termined by him, is l imited by5

se c tio n 3 51 2( b) (1 )( B ), wh ic h s tate s in pe rt ine nt p art : (B ) N otw ith sta

nd ingsu bp ara g ra ph (A ), an eli g ibl e pe rs on re fe rr e d to in t hat su bp ara g ra ph may , s ub

je c t to the Se c re tary ' s a

pp ro va l, e le c t a late r d a te fo r t

he 10 -y e ar p e ri od

that w ou ld o the rw ise be a pp lic a ble to the per son under that subpa rag raph. The beg inning date so elec ted may be any date betwee n the beg inning date deter mined for the pe rson un de r sub pa

ra g ra ph (A ) an d whi c he ve r of the fo llo wi ngdate s a pp lie s: (i) The date on wh i ch the Sec reta ry notifies the veter an fr om whom eligibility is d er i ved that the ve te ra n h a s a se rv ic e -c o nn e c t e d

d i s a bil ity pe rm ane nt i n nature

. I t is no t c le ar w hy

the Se c retary

be lie ve s th is s e c tio n a

uth or ize s h im t o d e te rm ine a be g inn ingdate ot her t han th e on e est abl is hedby sect io n 3 51 2(b )(1 )(A) . By it s v e r y t e rm s, sect io n 3 51 2(b )(1 )(B) permits an elig ible person to sele ct an alternate date, if the S ecr etar y permits; absent such an elec tion or lac k of permission, the beginning date is the one established by section 3512(b)(1)(A ). Assum ing arguendo that the Secre tary would authorize an alternate date in this case , Mrs. Cy pert ha s not electe d

one. Moreove r, the phrase "f or the 10-y ear period that would otherwise be applicable to the person under subpa

rag raph ( A)," reinfor ces the fac t that se ction 3512(b)( 1)(A) , by and of itself, e stablishes a beg inning pe riod. Se e Da v is v . M ic h. De p't o f Tre as ur y , 4 89 U. S. 803 , 8 09 (1 98 9) (" I t is a f u n d a me n ta l c an o n o f s tatuto r y c o n s tr u c ti o nth a t t

h e w o r d s o f

a s tatute mu s t b e r e a d

in th e ir c o n te xt

and wi th a vie w to t

he ir pla c e in t he ov e ra ll s tatut or

y sc he me ." ); see also Re no and Kilpat rick, b oth

su pra . A nd , a s n ote d a

bo ve , th a t 10 -y e ar e ligibilit y pe ri od be g ins wh e n a

pe rs on is " ma de e lig ibl e by su bp ara g ra ph(B ) o r ( D) of

se cti on 35 01 (a)(1) o f t itl e [38 U SCS § 35 01 (a )( 1) ]." 38 U. S.C. § 3 51 2( b) (1 )( A) . Su c c inc tly , s tate d, the Se c re tary ' s r e lia nc e on se c tio n 351 2( b) (1 )( B ) fo r a uth or ity to u nil a te ra lly

se t th e be g inn ing of th e 10 -ye ar D EAe lig ibi lity pe ri od on the date the ve te ra

n is

no tif ie d th a t he is t ota lly

and pe rm ane ntl y

dis a ble d, or any oth e r date , is m isp la c e d a nd wi tho ut m e ri t. 2. ThePu rp os e Be hin d D EA Be ne fit s The Sec reta

ry also argues that DEA benef its we re intended to assist spouses only during the ini tia l pe ri od

of a dju stm e nt, and that this sup po rt s his inte rp re tatio n that the 10 -ye ar DE A e lig ibi lity period in this case beg an whe n Mr. Cy pert re ceive d his status as a per manently and totally

disabled veter an, and expired befor e he marrie d the curr ent Mrs. Cy pert. Howeve r, 38 U.S.C. § 3500 states6

the purp os e be hin d D EAbe ne fi ts, and it d oe s n ot s up po rt

the Se c re tary ' s a

rgume nt. As state d in pertinent pa

rt, DEA benef

its a re intended to assist spouses of vetera ns "in pre paring[t hem] to support th e ms e lv e s an d th e ir f

a mi li e s a t a s ta

n d ar d o f li v in g le v e l w h ic h th e v e te r an , b u t f o r th e v e te r an ' s []

se rv ic e -c onne c te d d isa

bil ity , c ou ld h a ve e xpe c te d to pr ov ide for the v e te ra n' s f a mil y ." 38 U. S.C. § 3 50 0; see also Gardne r , Reno , and Kirkpatrick , a ll su pra (e xami nin g a

statut e ' s mea

nin g wi thi n
c on te xt of statut or y sc he me ); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson , 4 56 U. S. 6 3, 68 (1 98 2) (" ' [W]e a ssume

' that the leg islative purpose is expressed by the ordi n ar y m eaningof the wor ds used." ' (quoting Richards v. United States , 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))) . Noting in sect i o n 3500, or elsewhere in the statutory scheme , is th er e an ex presse d intention to li mit DEA benef its to t he initial period of adjustment, as ar g ued by

the Secr etar

y
. Moreove r, the Court ca nnot rea d into a statute an a lternative purpose pr emised on cong ressional intent. Cf

. Al lie d Stor es o

f O hio , I nc . v . B owe rs , 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (whe n examining an Ohio statute, stating that "[h]aving themse lves specif ically decla red their purpose , the Ohio statutes left no room to conc eive of any other purpose for their

exis tence ")

. There fore, the Secr etar

y ' s relianc e on a June 2001 statement made by the Deputy

Secre tary

of Veter ans Aff

airs to Cong ress, in which he contende d that section 3512 should be re ad to sug g est that the educ ational bene fits provided t o a spouse should be li mited to an ini tial period of a djustment for the ve te ra n a s a re su lt o f h is tota l and pe rm ane nt dis a bil ity , is mispl a c e d to the e xten t th a t Co ng re ss did not articulate that command in cra fting the ver sion of the statute at issue he re. 3. TheOz e r Ca se The Sec reta

ry corr ectly notes that the cur

rent a nd applicable version of sec tion 3512

au t h o ri z i n g D E A b en ef

i t s fo r s p o u s es wa s p ro m u l gat edb y C o n gre s s i nre s p o n s e t o t h e C o u rt 's decision in Ozer v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 257 ( 2001). The Court in Oz e r i n v al i d at edt h e S ec re t ary 's then-implementing regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 21.3046 (2001), because it lim ited DEA be nefits to a 10- y ear period be g innin g af

t er t h e date on which the Sec reta ry deter mined that the veter an had a total disability perma nent in nature . The Sec reta ry argued that the re g ulation was base d upon the statutory langua g e in 3 8 U .S. C. § 35 12 (b )( 1) (A )- (C ) (2 00 0) , how e ve r, the Court he ld t hat a lth ou g h th e statut e provided a

10-y ear period in which be nefits wer e ava ilable, that per iod did not begin to run until afte r the veter an died. The re is no dispute t hat C ong ress ther eaf ter c hang ed the statute to c lear ly provide

a 10 -ye ar p e ri od

of be ne fi ts t ie d to a date oth e r tha n the de a th of the ve te ra

n. Ho we ve r, Con g re ss d idT h e pl ai n l an g u ag e of t h e Se cr et ar y ' s i mpl eme n t i n g r eg u l at i on i s s u bj ec t t o an i n t er pr et at i on a n d a ppl i ca t i on 2
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u t e ; i

. e
. , t h a t t h e w o r d " r a t i n g " r e f e r s t o t h e r a t i n g d e c i s i o n i s s u e d b y a VA r e g i o n a l o f f i c e ( R O) t h at de t er mi n es t h e el i g i bi l i t y of t h e s pou s e u n der 38 U

. S. C. § 3501, a s ar g u ed by M r s
. Cy per t

. B ec au s e t h e r eg u l at i on p e rm its an inte rp re ta tio n c o n siste n t w ith the re g u la tio n , w e ne e d no t i n v a lid a te the re g u la tio n a t t h is ti m e . R a the r, it is t he Se cret ary ' s i nt erp ret at i o n and ap p l i cat i o n of t he regul at i o n t hat we f i nd co nt rary t o s t at ut e, and t heref o re im p e rm issib le

. See, e. g. , D ol es e v
. O f f i ce D epot , I

nc. , 2 3 1 F .3 d 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 0 ) (inv a lid a ting re g u la tio n o n ly to e x te n t i t wa s c o n tra ry to sta tute ); Foxgl enn I nve s t or s Lt d. Par t ners hi p v
. Ci s ner os , 35 F.3d 94 7 , 95 2 (4t h C i r. 19 9 4 ).

7 no t, a s th e Se c re tary

argue s, sta

rt that 10- y e ar el ig ibi lity pe ri od on the date the ve te ra n b e c a me tot a lly and per manently disabled. Rather, as we discuss above, Congr ess established the be g inning date of the elig ibilit y period as the date the spouse beca me an " elig ible person" within the meaning of sec tion 3501(a) (1)( D)(i) , with optional beg inning dates permitted under section 3512(b) (1)( B) at t he ele ction of the spouse a

nd with permission of the Secr etar y
. See 38 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)( A). C. The Implementing Re g ulation, 38 C.F.R. § 21.3046 The re g ulation promulgated by the Secr etar

y to implement section 3512 states in pertinent pa rt : (iii) F o r s p o u s e s f o r w h o m V A ma d e a f in a l d e te r

mi n a ti o n of elig ibilit y afte r Oc tober 27, 1986, shall be – (A) T he ef

fec tive date of

the rating, or (B ) The date of notification, or (C) Any date be tween the dates spec ified in para g raphs ( a)( 2)(iii) (A) and (B ) of this section as c hosen by the elig ible spouse. 38 C.F.R. § 21.3046. The Sec reta ry may not, by regulation, establish a beg inning date inconsistent with the express lang uag e of the statute. Ch e v r o n U

. S

. A

. , I n c
. v
. Na tu r a l R es
. D e

f. Co u n c il, Inc ., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9 (1984) (" The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory

construction andmu st rej ectadm in is tr ati ve co ns tr uct io ns whi ch ar e con tr ary to cle ar c o n gress io nal in ten t. ") Acc ording ly , to the extent that the reg ulation interprets a nd implemen ts section 3512 to limi t the be g i n n i n g d a t e o f t h e 1 0

- y e ar D E A d e l i m i t i n g p e r i o d t o t h e d a t e t h e S e c r e t ar y d e t e r m i n e s th a t a

ve te ra n' s tot a l ratin g is pe rm ane nt i n n a tur e or the date tha

t th e Se c re tary

no tif ie s th e ve te ra

n o f t his deter mination , it is contrary

to the plain meaningof sec tion 3512 and its legislative pur pose. 2 Although ag ency regulations may be entitled to def

ere nce, see Chev ron U.S.A., Inc ., 467 U.S. at 843- 45 (Court g ives defe renc e to executive depa rtment' s regulation making r easona ble interpre tation of statutory scheme ), def

ere nce is not wa

rra nted whe n the Secr etar

y ' s interpre tation is contrary to the8

plain meaningof the statutory lang uag e. See also Paralyze d Veterans of A m. v. Ellerbe B eck et A r c h i t e c t s a n d En gs ., P. C. , 95 0 F . Su pp . 3 89 , 3 92 (D .D .C. 19 96 ) ( " An a g e nc y is e mpo we re d to interpre t its own reg ulations so long as suc h interpre tation is r ea s o nable in lig ht of the text and purpose of

the statute and c onsistent with the statute and regulation." ( citing Thomas Jefferson Un iv . v . S ha lal a , 512 U.S. 504, 514-15, (1994)) ). Ther efor e, bec ause the Secre tary ' s interpre tation and application of 38 C.F.R. § 21.3046 in this i nstance are contra ry to the authorizing statute, the Boa rd' s Dec ember

13, 2006, decision, which r ests on t hat interpre tation and application, will be

reve rsed.

III . C ON CL USI ON After consideration of the appe llant's a nd the Secr etar

y ' s bri ef s , t he ora l argument, and a

re vie w o f t

he re c or d, the B oa

rd ' s D e c e mbe r 1 3, 20 06 , decision de nyingMr s. Cy

pe rt DE A b e ne fi ts b e c a u s e s h e w a s n o t an e l i g i b l e p e r s o n b e f o r e h e r h u s b an d ' s p e r i o d o f e l i g i b i l i t y f o r DE A b e ne fi ts

e xpir e d is REV ERS ED , a nd the matte r i s RE MA

ND ED fo r fu

rt he r a dju dic a tio n c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.