United States Government Accountability Office 

GAO	 Report to the Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Projection Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

September 2004 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Challenges Facing 

the DD(X) Destroyer 

Program 

GAO-04-973


a
September 2004 

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer 

Highlights of GAO-04-973, a report to the Program 


Chairman of the Subcommittee on 


Projection Forces, Committee on Armed 


Services, House of Representatives


The DD(X) destroyer—a surface To reduce program risk, the Navy plans to build and test 10 developmental 

ship intended to expand the Navy’s subsystems, or engineering development models, that comprise DD(X)’s 

littoral warfare capabilities— critical technologies. While using these models represents a structured and 

depends on the development of a disciplined approach, the program’s schedule does not provide for the number of new technologies to 

meet its requirements. The Navy engineering development models to generate sufficient knowledge before 

intends to authorize detailed design key decisions are made. None of the technologies in the 10 engineering 

and construction of the first ship in development models was proven to be mature when system design began, as 

March 2005. best practices advocates. Moreover, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate 

DD(X) technology maturity and design stability until after the decision to 

GAO’s past work has shown that authorize construction of the lead ship, creating risk that cost, schedule, and 

developing advanced systems that performance objectives will not be met. With many of the tests to 

rely heavily on new technologies demonstrate technology maturity occurring around the time of critical 

requires a disciplined, knowledge- design review in late fiscal year 2005, there is the risk that additional time 

based approach to ensure cost, and money will be needed to address issues discovered in testing. schedule, and performance targets 

are met. Best practices show, for


example, that a program should not DD(X) Lead Ship Schedule


be launched before critical


technologies are sufficiently


matured—that is, the technology Design/Development Preliminary Lead Ship Critical Design Start Ship Launch

has been demonstrated in its Start Design Review Authorization Review Fabrication June 

intended environment—and that a April 2002 March 2004 March 2005 August 2005 June 2007 2010 

design should be stabilized by the Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information. 

critical design review. 

Some of the technologies are progressing according to the Navy’s plans, 

Given the complexity of the DD(X) while others have experienced challenges. Four of the 10 engineering 

system and the number of new development models—the total ship computing environment, the peripheral 

technologies involved, GAO was vertical launch system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups—are 

asked to describe the Navy’s progressing as planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems. 

acquisition strategy for DD(X) and However, four other models—the integrated power system, the autonomic how it relates to best practices, and fire suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated how efforts to mature critical 

technologies are proceeding. deckhouse—have encountered some problems. At this point, the most 

serious appear to be the schedule delay in the dual band radar resulting from 

the Navy’s decision to change one radar type and the additional weight of the 

integrated power system. The two remaining engineering development 

models—the integrated undersea warfare system and the advanced gun 

GAO is not making system—are progressing as planned, but will not culminate in the 

recommendations in this demonstration of complete subsystems before being installed on the first 

report. Program officials agreed ship. While the Navy has fallback technologies for the hull form and the with our assessment of DD(X) 

program risks, but believe these 

integrated power system, it does not have such plans for the other eight 

risks can be mitigated. engineering development models. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-973. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-2811 or francisp@gao.gov. 

Preliminary Design System Design Detailed Design and Construction 
Contents


Letter 1 

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3 

Program Strategy Has Good Features but Demonstrates 

Technologies after Key Commitments 4 

Some DD(X) Development Models Progressing as Planned by the 

Navy; Others Are Experiencing Challenges 8 

Agency Comments 11 

Appendixes 

Appendix I: DD(X) Engineering Development Models 14 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 24 

Tables	 Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models 5 

Table 2: Engineering Development Model Test Schedule 9 

Figure Figure 1: DD(X) Lead Ship Schedule of Events 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page i GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 

3 
Page 1 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 

A

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

September 3, 2004


The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett


Chairman


Subcommittee on Projection Forces


Committee on Armed Services


House of Representatives


The DD(X) destroyer is a surface ship intended to expand the Navy’s land 


attack and littoral warfare capabilities. The program is currently in the 


system design phase and the Navy plans to authorize detailed design and 


construction of the lead ship in March 2005. A number of technology 


advancements are necessary for the DD(X) to meet its requirements.


The Navy plans to demonstrate the technologies by building and testing 


10 developmental subsystems, referred to as engineering development 


models.


In response to your February 26, 2004, request, we assessed the DD(X) 


program’s acquisition strategy and technology maturation efforts, and


briefed your staff on May 18, 2004. As agreed in that meeting, we have


prepared this report, which updates and further explains the information 


briefed. This letter addresses: (1) the program’s strategy for maturing


technologies and how it compares to best practices and (2) how efforts to


mature critical technologies are proceeding.


To assess the program’s strategy for maturing technologies, we reviewed 


the program’s acquisition strategy, test and evaluation master plan, and 


other relevant documents and information. We also drew on our prior work 


on best practices in developing complex systems. To address the progress


of technology development efforts, we analyzed reviews of current test


activities and design assessments, cost performance reports, and other 


program information. We also met with program officials including those 


leading each of the engineering development models. In addition, we met


with officials of companies under contract to design DD(X), including the 


prime contractor, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, and several of its


subcontractors. We compared data obtained from various documents and 


program officials against each other to ensure data reliability. We


conducted our work from April 2004 to July 2004 in accordance with 


generally accepted government auditing standards.


Page 1 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Results in Brief	 The engineering development models used by the program to mature 

technologies and reduce risk represent a structured and disciplined 

approach. The models generally call for designing, developing, and testing 

the DD(X) subsystems that house the key technologies before ship 

construction begins. Formal risk assessments and risk reduction strategies 

are an element of each model. However, the program’s schedule does not 

provide for the models to demonstrate high levels of maturity when 

needed. Best practices call for demonstrating technologies before entering 

system design and stability of system design before proceeding with 

production. None of the 10 engineering development models were 

demonstrated when system design began. DD(X) technology maturity and 

design stability will not be demonstrated before the decision to authorize 

construction of the lead ship, creating risks for establishing and meeting 

realistic cost, schedule, and performance objectives. With many of the tests 

to demonstrate technology maturity occurring around the time of critical 

design review in late fiscal year 2005, there is a risk that additional time and 

money will be necessary to address issues discovered in testing. Program 

officials acknowledge the risks associated with the advanced technologies, 

but believe that taking such risks is warranted to ensure that DD(X) 

technologies are not obsolete and that they have taken adequate steps to 

mitigate the risks before ship construction begins. 

Of the 10 engineering development models, four are progressing as planned 

toward demonstrating complete subsystems, including the total ship 

computing environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull 

form, and the infrared mockups. Four models have encountered some 

problems, including the integrated power system, the autonomic fire 

suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated deckhouse. 

At this point, the most serious appear to be the schedule delay in the radar 

resulting from the Navy’s decision to change one radar type and the 

additional weight of the integrated power system. The two remaining 

engineering development models–the integrated undersea warfare system 

and the advanced gun system–are progressing as planned, but will not 

culminate in the demonstration of complete subsystems before being 

installed on the first ship. The Navy does have backup approaches as a 

contingency for the hull form and the integrated power system, but not for 

the other engineering development models. 

Page 2 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Background	 The DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to provide 

advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and contribute 

to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. Among its planned 

features is the ability to engage land targets from long ranges using its 

155-millimeter guns and Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles. The ship 

will also feature reduced radar, acoustic, and heat signatures to increase 

survivability in the littorals. In November 2001, the Navy restructured the 

program to focus on developing and maturing a number of 

transformational technologies. These technologies will provide a baseline 

to support development of a range of future surface ships such as the 

future cruiser and the Littoral Combat Ship. 

The DD(X) program is managing risk by designing, developing, and testing 

10 engineering development models for the program’s critical technologies. 

Each of the 10 engineering development models represents an 

experimental subsystem of DD(X) and may incorporate more than one 

transformational technology. 

The key events in the DD(X) schedule are shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: DD(X) Lead Ship Schedule of Events 

Preliminary Design System Design Detailed Design and Construction 

Design/Development Preliminary Lead Ship Critical Design Start Ship Launch 

Start Design Review Authorization Review Fabrication June 

April 2002 March 2004 March 2005 August 2005 June 2007 2010 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information. 

Page 3 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
The program completed its system-level preliminary design review 


March 2004 and is currently in system design. The next major event occurs 


in March 2005, when the Navy will seek authority to commit research, 


development, test and evaluation funds for detailed design and


construction of the lead ship. The program’s system-level critical design 


review will be held late in fiscal year 2005 after the lead ship authorization 


and will assess design maturity. The current contract for design and 


development of DD(X) ends in September 2005. Further design and 


development activities, including detailed design and construction, will


take place under a new contract to be awarded in March 2005.


The Conference Report to the fiscal year 2005 Defense Appropriations Act 


states that the funds appropriated for DD(X) in the act are limited to design 


and advanced procurement requirements for the first two ships. The 


Conference Report further directs that no funds are available for the 


procurement of materials dependent upon delivery of key DD(X)


technologies unless those technologies have undergone testing. The


Conference Report also states that the Navy should complete land-based 


testing of the advanced gun system and integrated power system prior to


the completion of the critical design review.

1


Program Strategy Has The Navy is developing 12 technologies for DD(X) using 10 engineering 

development models. Engineering development models seek to Good Features but demonstrate key DD(X) subsystems and may involve more than one critical 

Demonstrates technology (see table 1). 

Technologies after Key 

Commitments 

1

 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-622, at 188 and 310 (2004). 

Page 4 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models 

Engineering development models Description 

Advanced Gun System	 Will provide long-range fire support for forces 

ashore through the use of unmanned operations 

and the long-range land attack projectile. 

Autonomic Fire Suppression System	 Intended to reduce crew size by providing a fully 

automated response to fires. 

Dual Band Radar	 Horizon and volume search improved for 

performance in adverse environments. 

Hull Form	 Designed to significantly reduce radar cross 

section. 

Infrared Mockup	 Seeks to reduce ship’s heat signature in multiple 

areas. 

Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures	 A composite structure that integrates apertures 

of radar and communications systems. 

Integrated Power System	 Power system that integrates power generation, 

propulsion, and power distribution and 

management. 

Integrated Undersea Warfare System	 System for mine avoidance and submarine 

warfare with automated software to reduce 

workload. 

Peripheral Vertical Launch System	 Multipurpose missile launch system located on 

the periphery of the ship to reduce damage to a ship systems. 

Total Ship Computing Environment	 Provides single computing environment for all 

ship systems to speed command while reducing 

manning. 

Source: DD(X) program office and contractors. 

a

The Navy refers to both the enclosure for the launcher and the full subsystem as the Peripheral 

Vertical Launch System. 

The engineering development models are the most significant aspect of 

the program’s risk reduction strategy. To demonstrate technologies, each 

DD(X) development model follows a structured approach for design, 

development, and testing. Initially, requirements for each of the 

development models are defined and recorded in a common database. 

The risk of not meeting these requirements is assessed and strategies are 

formulated to reduce these risks. Once designs are formulated, 

components are tested to build knowledge about a subsystem’s viability. In 

testing, the performance of engineering development models is confirmed. 

It is these tests that provide confidence in a technology’s ability to operate 

as intended. Once the technology is demonstrated, the subsystem can be 

integrated into the ship’s system design. 

Page 5 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Our reviews of commercial and Department of Defense acquisition 

programs have identified a number of specific practices that ensure that 

high levels of knowledge are achieved at key junctures in development and 

used to make investment decisions.2

 The most important practice is 

achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 

development. A technology reaches full maturity when its performance is 

successfully demonstrated in its intended environment. Maturing a 

technology to this level before including it into system design and 

development can reduce risk by creating confidence that a technology will 

work as expected and allows the developer to focus on integrating mature 

technologies into the ship design. This improves the ability to establish 

realistic cost, schedule, and performance objectives as well as the ability to 

meet them. Including the technologies in system development before 

reaching maturity raises the risk of discovering problems late that can 

increase the cost and time needed to complete design and fabrication. 

The Navy’s use of engineering development models to mature DD(X) 

technologies represents a disciplined process for generating the 

information needed for development, and corresponds with portions of the 

best practices approach. In using engineering development models, the 

Navy seeks to achieve high levels of technology maturity by first defining 

the requirements and risks of a developmental technology and then 

executing a series of tests to reduce these risks and prove the utility of a 

technology in its intended environment. The progress of technology 

maturity is recorded and communicated clearly through the use of 

established metrics, affording the program manager and others readily 

available information for use in decision making. 

The program’s schedule, however, does not allow most engineering 

development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions 

are made. None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10 engineering 

development models were mature at the start of system design and none 

are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize detailed 

design and construction of the lead ship. Under the current schedule, 7 of 

the 10 subsystems will not be demonstrated until the end of program’s 

critical design review in August 2005 or beyond. The decision to authorize 

2 For more information see GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology 

Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 

(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999) and Best Practices: Capturing Design Manufacturing 

Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2002). 

Page 6 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
award of the contract for detail design and construction of the lead ship 

will thus be made before the technologies are proven and the design is 

stable. By the end of the critical design review, only three subsystems are 

expected to have completed testing: the autonomic fire suppression 

system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups. The integrated power 

system, peripheral vertical launch system, and total ship computing 

environment complete testing just after the critical design review. The 

remaining four subsystems complete testing well after critical design 

review or are not tested as fully integrated systems until after installation 

on the first ship. The Navy is aware of the risks presented by its schedule 

but stated that exit criteria have been established for milestone decisions 

which ensure requirements will be met. Program officials further stated 

that, according to the Department of Defense acquisition policy, 

technologies for ships do not have to be mature until shipboard 

installation. 

Our reviews of commercial best practices identified a second critical 

practice that increases a program’s chances of success: achieving design 

stability by the system-level critical design review. For a stable design, 

subsystems are integrated into a product that meets the requirements of 

the user. Design stability requires detailed knowledge of the form, fit, and 

function of all technologies as well as the integration of individual, fully 

matured subsystems. Stability of design allows for testing to prove system 

reliability and leads into production planning. 

Most of the testing of the engineering development models will take place 

in the months immediately before and after critical design review and 

beyond. Even if the models proceed with complete success, they will not be 

done in time to achieve design stability at the critical design review. If 

problems are found in testing–as has been the case with other programs– 

they could result in changes in the design, delays in product delivery, and 

increases in product cost.

3

 Detailed knowledge about subsystems and their 

component technologies is necessary for developing the system design. If 

this information is not available and assumptions about operating 

characteristics have to be made, redesign may be necessary when reliable 

information becomes available. This can increase the schedule and the 

costs of system design. Unstable system design could also affect 

3

 See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, 

and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2004). 

Page 7 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
construction. Higher construction costs are likely to be incurred if work is 

done inefficiently or if changes result in rework. 

One example of the consequences of technology and design immaturity 

already apparent in the DD(X) program is the development of the dual band 

radar and its impact on the integrated deckhouse. The dual band radar 

consists of two separate radar technologies and will not complete testing 

until fiscal year 2008. Due to this lengthy period of testing, the dual band 

radar may not be installed until the first ship is afloat. Contractors have 

stated that this schedule has led to the need for increased funding. Because 

the dual band radar will not be fully tested by critical design review, 

program officials have had to make some assumptions about where in the 

deckhouse it will be placed. If the weight of the radar increases or if other 

technical factors cause it to be relocated, a redesign effort may be needed 

to assure that requirements are met. As the deckhouse forms a significant 

portion of the DD(X), redesign could have an impact on the ship as a 

whole. 

Other shipbuilding programs have developed strategies that call for 

maturing critical technologies while still providing decision makers with 

relatively high levels of knowledge at key decision points. For example, the 

CVN-21 future aircraft carrier program has a risk reduction strategy that 

defines a timeline for making decisions about a technology’s maturity. The 

majority of these decisions are made early in the system design phase prior 

to the system critical design review. This should allow the system design to 

proceed in integrating technologies with the assurance that they will work 

in their intended environment. Lead ship authorization occurs after critical 

design review so that the maturity of the design can be demonstrated 

before a decision is made. 

Some DD(X) 

Development Models 

Progressing as Planned 

by the Navy; Others 

Are Experiencing 

Challenges 

The DD(X) program entered its system design phase without the majority 

of its technologies completing their design or component testing stage. 

These activities include events like design reviews for the integrated power 

system and damage testing on components of the peripheral vertical launch 

system. The only development model beyond these initial stages is the hull 

form, which has completed its initial tests and simulations and is now 

entering a second design and test phase. 

Testing subsystems to demonstrate whether they will work in their 

intended environment is scheduled to begin for most development models 

Page 8 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
in fiscal year 2005 and will continue, in some cases, beyond fiscal year 

2006, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Engineering Development Model Test Schedule 

Engineering development model Begin testing End testing 

Advanced Gun System 

Advanced Gun System June 2005 August 2005 

Long Range Land Attack Projectile September 2004 September 2005 

Integrated Systema — — 

Autonomic Fire Suppression System January 2005 August 2005 

Dual Band Radar 

Multi-Function Radar October 2004 April 2006 

Volume Search Radar September 2006 June 2007 

Integrated System August 2007 January 2008 

Hull Form August 2003 July 2004 

Infrared Mockup March 2005 July 2005 

Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures February 2005 June 2005b 

Integrated Power System July 2005 September 2005 

Integrated Undersea Warfare System c c 

Peripheral Vertical Launch System 

Advanced Vertical Launch System (Launcher) May 2005 September 2005 

Peripheral Vertical Launch System (Enclosure) March 2005 May 2005 

Integrated System May 2005 May 2005 

Total Ship Computing Environment August 2005 September 2005 

Source: DD(X) program office and contractors. 

a

Tests using both the gun system and projectile are not performed until after ship installation. 

b

Tests with volume search portion of dual band radar are not performed under the current contract. 

c

Tests of the undersea warfare system to demonstrate components will occur between May 2004 and 

December 2005 the full system will not be demonstrated until after ship installation. 

Four of the 10 engineering development models—the total ship computing 

environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and the 

infrared mockups—are progressing as planned toward demonstrating 

complete subsystems. However, challenges have arisen with other 

development models. The impact of some of these challenges has been 

mitigated with minimal change to the program, but others remain 

unresolved or have resulted in rescheduling and cost growth. Only two of 

the engineering development models, the hullform and the integrated 

Page 9 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
power system, have fallback technologies that could be used if current 

technologies do not meet requirements. All other engineering development 

models could necessitate system level redesign if they fail to mature 

technologies to meet requirements. We have already noted the challenges 

with the dual band radar and its impact on the integrated deckhouse. Other 

challenges are highlighted below. Program officials agreed with our 

assessment of DD(X) program risks, but believe these risks can be 

mitigated through use of fallback technologies and design budgeting. 

Design budgeting refers to the practice of building in extra margins, such as 

weight and space, to accommodate growth as the design matures. 

Appendix I provides details on the status of all 10 engineering development 

models. 

The integrated power system is currently exceeding its weight allowances 

by a significant amount and has used up its entire additional design margin 

for weight. This means that any further increases in weight could affect 

other systems or result in an unplanned and unbudgeted weight reduction 

program. The power system has also experienced some software 

compliance issues with the total ship computing environment. Program 

officials have defined the software issue and are working toward a 

solution. In addition, the testing schedule for the power system has been 

altered due to changes to the dual band radar. Program officials had 

planned to test the two subsystems together in at-sea tests on a surrogate 

vessel. When the delays in testing for dual band radar occurred, at-sea tests 

for the power system were cancelled. To compensate for the loss of 

knowledge that was to be gained by this testing, the program office plans 

for increased fidelity in land based testing. Plans for the integrated power 

system do include the use of a fallback technology. Use of the technology 

would require some trade-offs in performance, weight, and noise 

requirements. In their comments on this report, the Department of Defense 

stated that the Navy has allocated additional margin from the total ship 

design to account for weight growth in the integrated power system. While 

this adjustment in overall ship margin does not directly impact the overall 

ship design, it may leave less space for future growth in other systems. 

While the early tests of the autonomic fire suppression system exceeded 

expectations, by sustaining significant damage and still controlling the fire, 

some challenges have arisen that delayed later testing. Like the power 

system, the fire suppression system experienced compatibility issues with 

the total ship computing environment. These issues have been recognized 

and the program office has identified solutions to resolve them. These 

Page 10 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
software compatibility issues caused a delay in the system tests that 

pushed their completion beyond the system-level critical design review. 

The current testing plans for the integrated undersea warfare system 

include testing of the dual frequency sonar array for internal interference, 

the ability of the high frequency portion of this array to detect mines, and 

the software necessary to integrate all functions and reduce the sailor’s 

workload. Though these tests may prove the functionality of components 

and technologies within the undersea warfare system, they do not 

demonstrate the system as a whole. As a result, when the current series of 

testing concludes in May 2005, the undersea warfare system will not have 

demonstrated operations in the intended environment. 

While development of the advanced gun system is proceeding as planned 

and has even overcome early challenges in design and development, the 

current plans do not include fully demonstrating the maturity of the 

subsystem. Land based testing of the gun system, including the automated 

mount and magazine, is planned for the summer of 2005 and flight tests for 

the munition are set to complete in September of 2005. However, the two 

technologies will not be tested together until after ship installation. 

Program officials cited lack of adequate test facilities as the reason for the 

separate tests. 

Agency Comments	 In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it is appropriate to 

undertake a reasonable amount of risk in the DD(X) lead ship, given the 

long production lead time in shipbuilding. It noted that the DD(X) risk 

mitigation approach represents the management of finite resources to 

achieve innovation and to implement a cost effective test plan designed to 

address those risks. DOD stated that the DD(X) schedule supports 

readiness of all the engineering development models in time for ship 

installation, which for shipbuilding programs, is the most relevant point of 

reference for technology maturity as DOD policy indicates technologies for 

ships do not have to be mature until that time. DOD concluded that the 

DD(X) engineering development models are on track to support a 

milestone B decision in March 2005 to authorize the lead ship and to 

achieve maturity prior to installation. DOD pointed out that it had selected 

exit criteria for that decision to provide for assessments of critical 

technologies and that results of all required tests will be available for the 

decision. DOD made specific comments on individual engineering 

development models, which we address elsewhere in the report. 

Page 11 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
As noted in the draft report, we believe the approach the Navy has taken 

to demonstrate DD(X) technologies through the engineering development 

models is both structured and disciplined. However, the short amount 

of time between lead ship authorization and ship launch (5 years and 

3 months), together with the fact that virtually every major subsystem 

on the ship depends on a new technology or novel use of existing 

technologies, frame a challenge that involves significant risk. While tests on 

some key subsystems are scheduled to be conducted by the milestone B 

decision, these tests are to demonstrate the functionality of components 

but not the subsystems. Thus, the full demonstration of technology 

maturity and the resolution of unknowns will continue beyond the 

milestone decision. Our past work on best practices has shown that 

technological unknowns discovered later in product development lead to 

cost increases and schedule delays. Two key factors that can mitigate the 

effect of such risks—time in the schedule to address problems and the 

availability of backup technologies—are largely unavailable for the DD(X) 

program. While DOD policy allows for technologies to mature up to the 

point of ship installation, it does not necessarily follow that this is a best 

practice. In fact, DD(X) will proceed from the start of development to 

initial capability in about the same time as other non-shipbuilding systems 

for which DOD does call for demonstration of technology maturity before 

development start.4 

We plan to provide copies of this report to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee; the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 

Defense; and the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 

Defense. We also will provide copies to the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Navy. We 

will make copies available to others upon request. 

4

 Examples include the F/A-22 Raptor (14.5 years), the Joint Strike Fighter (10 years 5 

months to 11 years 5 months), and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (7 years 9 months). 

DD(X) will take 8 years and 2 months. 

Page 12 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me on (202) 512-4841; or Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director, on 

(202) 512-6785. Major contributors to this report are J. Kristopher Keener, 

Angela D. Thomas, and Karen Sloan. 

Sincerely yours, 

Paul L. Francis 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 13 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Appendix I 

DD(X) Engineering Development Models


Advanced Gun System 

FY03 FY05 FY07

• Gun system to fulfill requirements for long-range land attack and precision volume fire for forces ashore, development models 

includes technologies for both the unmanned magazine and the long-range land attack munition 

• Gun system requires automated magazine for unmanned operations, including loading and launch of long-range munitions 

• Modifications to ship size led to change in gun system design 

• Understanding of gun design gained through 3-D modeling—manufacturing of physical components began April 2004 

• Early “fly-off” competition for projectile provided proof of concepts 

• Lead ship authorization supported by: 

• Component testing for gun—land based tests planned for June 2005 

• 5 of 15 flight tests for projectile—flight tests set to end September 2005 

• Gun and projectile will not be demonstrated together before installation on first ship 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead hip authorization; CDR—Critical design review 

FY04 FY06

PDR CDR 

DD(X) 

Lead ship 

Land-based 

tests CDR Fabrication/component tests PDR

Gun 

Projectile Requirements definition and design Flight tests PDR 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s s

Page 14 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Autonomic Fire Suppression System 

FY03 FY07

• Fire Suppression System utilizes new technologies such as smart valves, flexible hosing, nozzles, 

sensors, and autonomic operations to reduce crew and time needed for damage control 

• Proof of concept tests exceeded expectations 

• Tested smart valves, flexible hosing, nozzles, and some autonomic operations 

• Software compatibility issues with computing environment acknowledged and solutions identified 

• Possible system integration issues include: 

• Effect of water mist on power system 

• Fire suppression capabilities needed in deckhouse under discussion 

• Completion of system tests delayed beyond lead ship authorization due to software issues – expected 

to complete tests in August 2005 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead hip authorization; CDR—Critical design review 

FY04 FY05 FY06

PDR Lead ship CDR DD(X) 

Fire 

Suppression 

Preliminary and component tests System tests

PDR CDR 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s s

Page 15 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Dual Band Radar 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10

• Dual Band Radar consists of an X-Band multi-function radar and an S-Band volume search radar 

• Multi-function radar provides information for land attack and defense against threats from aircraft, surface vessels, and 

submarines: prototype is currently in testing 

• Volume search radar cues the multi-function radar, provides information on long-range aerial targets, and assists with air 

control, currently in design 

• In July 2003 the Navy revisited the frequency of the volume search radar and changed path (L-Band to S-Band) 

• Change required modification to contract 

• Volume search radar testing delayed until detailed design and construction phase 

• New schedule has impact on ship design and construction 

• Contractor indicated that installation may occur with ship in the water 

• Design of deckhouse is tied to dual band radar 

• Lead ship authorization supported by critical design review and land based tests of multi-function radar—dual band radar testing 

not complete until mid-FY08 

• PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead hip authorization; CDR—Critical design review 

MFR—Multi-function radar; VSR—Volume earch radar; DBR—Dual band radar 

PDR CDR Fabrication start Ship launch 

DD(X) 

Lead ship 

Radar PDR CDR MFR 

tested 

VSR 

tested 

DBR 

tested 

DBR 

in yard 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s s

s

Page 16 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Hull Form 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

PDR Lead ship CDR DD(X) 

• DD(X) will introduce radically new hull design that widens as it approaches the waterline 

• June 2003 modifications to ship size led to changes in hull form design 

• Hull form had fallback design—decision made at preliminary design review that fallback 

no longer necessary 

• Program is assessing the applicability of models and simulations for traditional hull 

forms for use with new hull form 

• Propeller currently in design—original 7 bladed design changed to 6 or 5 bladed design 

• System tests to demonstrate new propeller design and refine hull form design will not be 

complete before lead ship authorization—test set to end in July 2005 • PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Requirements definition Preliminary tests Optimization tests 

Hull form PDR CDR

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 17 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Infrared Mockup 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

PDR Lead ship CDR DD(X) 

• Infrared suppression seeks to reduce heat signature of the ship using sheeting water 

system on hull, material treatments to deckhouse, and passive air cooling for exhaust 

• Preliminary tests include at-sea testing of materials as well as land-based testing of exhaust suppression with surrogate components 

• Final tests include further materials testing for signature and environmental factors, hull 

water system mock ups, as well as scale model and full scale testing of exhaust 

suppression 

• Two of three comprehensive environmental tests, hull water system mockups, and scale 

model exhaust tests support lead ship authorization—third comprehensive 

environmental test set for April 2005, full scale exhaust suppression tests set for 3rd 

quarter FY05 

Preliminary tests Final tests Infrared 

mockup PDR CDR 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 18 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 

DD(X) PDR Lead ship CDR

• Deckhouse makes up a large portion of the ship and is formed of composite 

components to reduce weight, also integrates apertures of radars and 

communications systems 

• Weight and design affected by July 2003 change to volume search radar 

• Test schedule affected—deckhouse effort being rebaselined 

• Impact of volume search radar on deckhouse not tested in this phase of 

development—may cause changes to deckhouse 

• Lead ship authorization supported by testing for corrosion, shock, and 

damage—testing of full scale sections for shock, fire, radar cross signature 

and aperture integration planned for 3rd quarter 2005 

PDR CDR 

Land-based 

Testing 

Materials testing 

Deckhouse 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 19 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Integrated Power System 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 

DD(X) PDR Lead ship CDR

• Power system includes development of an integrated shipwide power generation and distribution system as 

well as development of a permanent magnet motor for propulsion 

• A backup technology for the magnet motor exists but has higher weight, more noise, and reduced efficiency – final decision on which technology to include will be made no later than critical design review 

• Power system is currently exceeding weight allowance by significant margin which includes the system’s 

entire design budget for weight, any further increases in weight could impact other systems or result in an 

unplanned weight reduction program 

• Software compliance issues with computing environment acknowledged and mitigation solutions identified 

• At-sea testing will no longer take place 

• Fidelity of land-based tests increased 

• Lead ship authorization supported by component testing of magnet motor and power generation—landbased testing of prototype planned for 4th quarter 2005 

Fabrication Land-based Tests 

Power System PDR CDR 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 20 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Integrated Undersea Warfare 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

DD(X) PDR Lead ship CDR

• Undersea warfare system designed to detect mines and submarines in the 

littorals and is composed of medium and high frequency arrays, towed arrays, 

and decision-making software to reduce the workload of the sailor 

• All arrays based on existing technologies, but the integration of two different 

frequencies in one array is a challenge 

• Tests performed only prove functionality of components and not system as a 

whole 

• Component testing completes after lead ship authorization—software testing 

scheduled to end in May 2005 

Undersea Warfare 

Requirements definition and design 

PDR CDR 

Software 

tests 

Integration 

tests 

Mine 

tests 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 21 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Peripheral Vertical Launch System 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

PDR Lead ship CDR 

• Peripheral vertical launch system consists of the missile launcher and the enclosure for 

the launcher—system will be placed on the perimeter of the ship, not centrally 

• Launcher development based on existing systems 

• Includes design margins and open architecture electronics that will allow for future munitions 

• Multiple damage tests completed on enclosure before lead ship authorization 

• Tests for system will not be completed by lead ship authorization: 

• Only component testing complete on launcher—system testing set to end third quarter 2005 

• Testing on enclosure set to end in third quarter 2005 

Launcher 

Enclosure 

PDR CDR 

Design Certification Build/component tests System tests

System Prel tests Design iminary tests

PDR CDR 

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 22 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix I

DD(X) Engineering Development Models

Total Ship Computing Environment 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

DD(X) PDR Lead ship CDR

Software 

release 3 

Software 

release 1 

Software 

release 2 

• Provides single computing environment for all ship systems to speed command while reducing manning 

• Computing environment consists of seven software releases ending in 3rd quarter FY09 

• Computing environment development plans include many of the GAO software best practices (GAO-04-393) 

• Developing software in an evolutionary environment 

• Following disciplined development process 

• Using meaningful metrics to measure progress 

• Engineering development model includes three of seven software releases and tests with data from other 

engineering development models 

• Lead ship authorization supported by two of three software releases—land-based system testing of 

functionality scheduled to occur fourth quarter 2005 

Requirements definition 

PDR CDR Land-based Computing Environment tests

PDR—Preliminary design review; Lead hip—Lead ization; CDR—Critical design review 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy information. 

s ship author

Page 23 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix II 

Comments from the Department of Defense


Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix. 

Page 24 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Appendix II


Comments from the Department of Defense


See comment 1. 

Now on p. 9. 

See comment 2. 

Now on p. 2. 

Now on p. 6. 

Page 25 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Appendix II


Comments from the Department of Defense


Now on p. 10. 

See comment 3. 

Now on p. 11. 

Now on p. 8. 

See comment 4. 

Now on p. 8. 

Page 26 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Appendix II


Comments from the Department of Defense


Now on p. 10. 

Now on p. 11. 

Page 27 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
Appendix II


Comments from the Department of Defense


GAO Comments	 The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter 

dated August 20, 2004. 

1. Change to the ship schedule incorporated into the body of the report. 

2.	 The period from February to July includes only testing of the 

permanent magnet motor, one component of the integrated power 

system. The date in the report was changed to July 2005 to reflect the 

beginning of full system testing of the integrated power system. 

3.	 This is not a GAO conclusion. The statement is based on statements 

provided by the Navy as well as industry contractors. 

4.	 Our discussion of the technology and design maturity of the dual band 

radar and the integrated deckhouse deals with the impact of the Navy’s 

decision to change radar frequency, not the reason for the decision. 

(120365) Page 28 GAO-04-973 DD(X) Destroyer 
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