Final Cut 8.5 X 11 with Full Blee

Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 

Iraq’s WMD

With Addendums 

30 Septembe

volume III 
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ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072488-6 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072488-0 (Vol. 1) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072489-3 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072489-9 (Vol. 2) 

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Chemical

Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program

By God, spare us your evil. Pick up your goods and leave. We do 

not need an atomic bomb. We have the dual chemical. Let them 

take note of this. We have the dual chemical. It exists in Iraq.1

1

 Saddam speaking about the Israeli, US, and UK intelligence services and Iraq’s development 

of binary CW munitions in a speech on 2 April 1990. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

021329 April 1990).
This page intentionally left blank.
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Contents

Key Findings............................................................................................................................................ 1

Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program........................................................................................... 5

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline .......................................................................................... 5

The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start................................................................................... 5

The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation........................ 5

Full Capability, 1981-1991: Ambition.......................................................................................... 6

Foundation of the Al Muthanna State Establishment.......................................................... 6

Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State Establishment Takes Shape .................. 6

Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions.............................................................................. 8

CW—A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon.............................................................. 9

The Decline, 1991-1996 ............................................................................................................... 9

Destroying Iraqi Weapons ............................................................................................................ 9

Recovery and Transition, 1996-2003.......................................................................................... 12

Miscalculation, 2002-2003......................................................................................................... 13

Command and Control........................................................................................................................... 14

Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War ..................................................................... 14

Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease........................................................ 15

Infrastructure—Research and Development.......................................................................................... 16

Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee ................................................................................ 17

The Power of the IIC .................................................................................................................. 17

The IIC’s Master Plan for Self-Reliance: The List of 1,000 Chemicals .................................... 18

Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1,000 Chemicals................................................................. 18

Thionyl Chloride ............................................................................................................... 19

DCC................................................................................................................................... 19

Thiourea ............................................................................................................................ 22

Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production................................................................... 22

Infrastructure—Production Capability................................................................................................... 23

State of Chemical Industry at OIF—Limited Break-Out Capability ......................................... 24

Weaponization........................................................................................................................................ 29

Suspect Munitions Activities...................................................................................................... 29

Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991 ................................................................................... 29

The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons ................................................................ 31

Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991 ............................................................................ 31

Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, and Precursors ............................................. 31
ii

Chemical Munitions—Searching Military Depots and Caches............................................................. 33

Investigating Ammunition Supply Points .................................................................................. 33

Investigation ............................................................................................................................... 34

Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEA Consolidation Points) ..................... 35

Annexes

A. IIS Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination ................................................. 43

B. Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex ...................................................................................... 61

C. The Iraqi Industrial Committee ......................................................................................................... 85

D. Tariq Company’s Activities............................................................................................................... 89

E. Al-Abud Network .............................................................................................................................. 93

F. Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings ................................................... 97

G. Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad ............................................................................. 107

H. Summary of Key Findings at Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points....................... 113

I. Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points ............................................................................... 123
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Key Findings

Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions 

were judged favorable: 

• Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a 

weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. 

While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq 

unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications 

that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire 

to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.

• The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of 

the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or 

deployment of chemical weapons. 

Iraq’s CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under 

sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military 

and civilian organizations, followed by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to 

reinvigorate its industrial base.

• Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) fi nancially 

unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray. 

• Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime’s organizational and programmatic structures after 

the departure of Husayn Kamil. 

• Iraq’s acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and 

sparked a fl ow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq’s chemical industry. 

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base 

needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from 

the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction 

and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production 

of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CWrelated efforts.

• The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program. 

• Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of 

these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have 

enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.

• Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however 

documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system.
2

Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not 

regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF). 

• ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW 

agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and 

‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.

• ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably 

had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months. 

• A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant 

quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no 

credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its 

existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.

In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dualuse process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime. 

• One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process plants.

Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the 

capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences 

for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have signifi cantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or 

no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization 

activities. 

• ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities.

• Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which 

had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of 

weaponization activities.

Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offi cers and included 

the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever 

included a trigger for CW use.

• Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, information acquired after OIF does not confi rm the inclusion of CW in Iraq’s tactical planning for OIF. We believe 

these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.

Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized 

within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any fi eld elements knew about plans for CW use 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
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• Uday—head of the Fedayeen Saddam—attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according 

to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.

ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a 

set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from 

which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indication that this was 

planned. (See Annex A.)

• ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents 

in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 scientists were planning to produce several CW 

agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin. 

• Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research 

or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities 

in this area. 

• The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN. 

• The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.

ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, 

interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities 

noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related. 

• ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot—the storage site that was 

judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no 

CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
4
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Evolution of the Chemical 

Warfare Program

Over a period of twenty years, beginning with a 

laboratory operated by the intelligence services, 

Iraq was able to begin and successfully undertake 

an offensive CW program which helped ensure 

the Regime’s internal and external security. By 

1984, Iraq was operating a number of CW agent 

production plants, producing hundreds of tons 

of a range of weaponized agents annually, for 

use against external and internal enemies of the 

Regime. The program was supported by a complex 

web of international procurement, R&D, weaponization and indigenous precursor production 

efforts. Iraq fi red or dropped over 100,000 chemical munitions against Iranian forces and its own 

Kurdish population during the Iran-Iraq war and 

then later to help put down the Shi’a rebellion in 

March 1991. 

• Iraq became the fi rst nation to use a nerve agent on 

the battlefi eld when it used Tabun munitions against 

Iran in 1984. 

• During the Iran-Iraq war, CW use helped the Iraqis 

turn back Iranian human-wave attacks when all 

other methods failed, buying time for Iraqi forces to 

regroup and replenish. Iraq again used CW successfully to help crush the popular revolt in 1991.

• By 1991, Iraq had amassed a sizable CW arsenal, comprising thousands of short range rockets, 

artillery shells, and bombs, and hundreds of tons 

of bulk agent. It also had produced 50 nerve agent 

warheads for the 650 km-range al Husayn missile.

• Despite the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, which called 

for Iraq to disarm, Iraq initially chose to retain CW 

weapons, precursors and associated equipment, 

making false declarations to the UN. Even when 

Iraq claimed to have complied with UNSCR 687 

and its successors, Saddam retained components 

vital to restarting a CW program.

Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy 

choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy 

and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate 

foldout and in tabular form at the back of Volume I. 

Covering the period from 1980-2003, the timeline 

shows specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s efforts 

in the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms 

and their chronological relationship with political 

and military developments that had direct bearing on 

the Regime’s policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion 

of each volume of text, we have also included foldout 

summary charts that relate infl ection points—critical 

turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—

to particular events/initiatives/decisions the Regime 

took with respect to specifi c WMD programs. Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the body of 

the text with a gray triangle.

The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start

The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan 

Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation

Iraq’s interest in CW began in the early 1960s and 

escalated in response to a perceived threat from Iran 

and Israel to become a comprehensive CW research 

program by the mid-1970s. The Regime initially 

sent a number of Iraqi offi cers abroad for training 

in nuclear, biological and chemical defense. These 

offi cers later formed the nucleus of the Iraqi Chemical 

Corps, established in 1964.

• According to Iraq’s Currently Accurate Full and 

Complete Declaration (CAFCD), submitted to 

the UN in December 2002, in 1971, a cadre of 

Chemical Corps offi cers sought authorization to 

synthesize small quantities of CW agents (mustard, 

Tabun, and CS) for familiarization and experience. 

The Iraqi General Staff approved the request, and 

laboratories were built for the Chemical Corps at 

al-Rashad near Baghdad.
6

• By 1974, this initial effort had failed, and the IIS 

stepped in and founded the Al Hasan Ibn al-Haytham al-Haithem Research Foundation. The IIS 

funded Al Hasan, whose cover was as part of 

the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c 

Research. Iraq’s various intelligence services 

remained involved, directly and indirectly, in CW 

and related activities for many years.

• Al Hasan personnel were drawn from academia and 

the Chemical Corps. Al Hasan expanded with the 

construction of new laboratories in Baghdad and 

the selection of a new production site 60 kilometers northwest of Baghdad, later to be known as Al 

Muthanna. Al Hasan’s mission was to research the 

synthesis and production of CW agents. It had limited success producing gram quantities of mustard, 

Tabun, CS and organophosphate pesticides like 

Malathion and parathion.

Iraq later declared that the work at Al Hasan was 

suspended in 1978 and the organization liquidated for 

failure to achieve its objectives, as well as for mismanagement and fraud.

• General Amir al-Sa’adi found that Al Hasan had 

made insuffi cient progress toward the goal of 

production and a Presidential Decree dissolved 

Al Hasan. 

That same year, the former head of the Chemical 

Corps, BG Nizar al-Atar, claims he submitted a fi veyear plan to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals 

for a CW program that included the production of 

weapons, and some work continued.

By the end of 1979, a reorganized Chemical Corps 

used the expanded al-Rashad site to produce CW 

agents, ostensibly for the testing of CW defensive 

gear and detection equipment. The Chemical Corps, 

reinforced by many of the former Al Hasan staff, was 

also surveying the technical literature for information on the production of the nerve agents Sarin and 

Tabun. This research laid the groundwork for their 

nerve agent production processes. 

Full Capability, 1981-1991: Ambition

Foundation of the Al Muthanna State 

Establishment

Once committed, Iraq spent large amounts of money 

and resources on its CW program (see Figure 1). 

The outbreak of war with Iran in 1980 and Iraq’s 

failure to attain a speedy victory appear to have been 

the impetus for the Ministry of Defense’s launch of 

its industrial-scale, comprehensive, strategic CW program—code-named Research Center 922 or Project 

922—on June 8, 1981. The objective was to produce 

CW agents—mustard, Tabun, Sarin, and VX, chemical munitions, and white phosphorus (WP) munitions. 

(See Annex B.) 

• Project 922 covered research and development for 

all aspects of CW, production of CW agents and 

precursors, fi lling of CW munitions, storing of 

chemical munitions and agents, and acquiring suffi cient technical expertise to construct and maintain 

production lines. 

• The project also included BW R&D after 1985 and 

pesticide R&D beginning in 1984.

Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State 

Establishment Takes Shape

Project 922 subsumed the Chemical Corps al-Rashad 

CW efforts and their site 60 km northwest of Baghdad. Within months of its inception, Project 922 

began construction at the site on what was to become 

Iraq’s main CW production and research center. West 

German businesses, using East German designs, 

supervised the creation of what was at the time the 

world’s most modern and best-planned CW facility 

under the cover of pesticide production.

• Construction activity between 1982 and 1983 was 

intense. Iraq’s foreign contractors, including Karl 

Kolb with Massar for reinforcement, built fi ve large 

research laboratories, an administrative building, eight 

large underground bunkers for the storage of chemical 

munitions, and the fi rst production buildings. 
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Figure 1. CW facilities as of 1991.
8

Iraq had acquired suffi cient expertise during the 

1970s, despite fraud and failure by Al Hasan, to begin 

agent production immediately on completion of the 

fi rst pilot-scale production line in the early 1980s. For 

example, 85 tons of mustard agent were produced at 

al-Rashad from 1981 to 1982. After Project 922 came 

on line, both facilities produced agent.

• 150 tons of mustard were produced in 1983. 

• About 60 tons of Tabun were produced in 1984. 

• Pilot-scale production of Sarin began in 1984. 

Work at the Project 922 site did not pass unnoticed:

• During the summer of 1985, Iranian F-4 aircraft 

attacked the Samarra’ site;

• This was followed in October 1986 with a SCUD 

attack.

As a result, Iraq moved a signifi cant portion of its 

Roland Air Defense System to the Samarra’ area to 

protect the project.

As production increased, Baghdad recognized that its 

dependence on foreign suppliers for precursors was a 

program weakness and took immediate steps towards 

self-reliance for precursor production. Iraq made 

plans to build three precursor production plants, starting in 1985, near the town of Fallujah, 50 kilometers 

west of Baghdad. 

• Iraq began constructing Fallujah I, II and III 

between 1986 and 1988 to produce precursors.

The decision to construct the precursor production 

plants was the beginning of a signifi cant commitment of resources to a long-term CW program. In 

1987, Husayn Kamil, assisted by Amer al-Sa’adi, created the MIC and renamed the CW complex the 

Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE). 

MSE Redefi nes “Dual-Use”

The term “dual-use” refers to resources that have 

both WMD and legitimate civilian or conventional 

military applications. MSE pursued legitimate industrial projects in addition to CW agent production, 

particularly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Pesticide and pharmaceutical research took place at Al 

Muthanna alongside CW development, often involving 

the same people. 

• The German fi rm Karl Kolb described the production plants it built as “general multi-purpose pilot 

plants,” providing Iraq with plausible deniability 

regarding the plants and distancing Karl Kolb from 

being implicated in contributing to WMD programs.

• Pesticide research and development was a secondary responsibility for MSE. Post-1988, MSE 

unsuccessfully attempted to purchase a pesticide 

production plant from a number of leading companies worldwide, in order to expand its background 

knowledge in organophosphorous production. 

• Between 1989 and 1990, during which time Iraq 

interrupted CW production because there was no 

longer an immediate need for agent, the MSE CW 

infrastructure produced civilian goods, including 

shampoos, disinfectants, and simple pesticides. 

Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions

Against the background of the Iran-Iraq war and the 

pressure to halt the Iranians, Al Muthanna took every 

available shortcut in developing chemical weapons. 

To avoid the delays of developing indigenous delivery 

systems, Iraq purchased conventional bombs from 

Spain that easily could be modifi ed for CW fi ll. Later, 

using reverse-engineering, Al Muthanna built the 

infrastructure to manufacture its own weapons.

• According to Iraq’s declaration to the UN in 1996, 

from 1981 to 1984 Iraq purchased 40,000 artillery 

shells, and 7,500 bomb casings from various countries. These were to be modifi ed for delivery of CW.
9

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• Iraq also declared that by 1989, it had manufactured 10,000 CW bomb casings and 18,500 rocket 

warheads, all reverse engineered from imported 

munitions. 

CW—A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon

The work underway at Al Muthanna State Enterprise by the late 1980s was an indication Saddam 

intended Iraq’s CW effort to be a signifi cant, largescale program. From its inception, MSE’s Research 

and Development (R&D) Directorate investigated 

a broad assortment of agents. Iraqi CW scientists 

understood that they would gain the greatest battlefi eld impact by developing a range of CW agents with 

different characteristics for different situations.

• MSE’s R&D Directorate had individual departments dedicated to the development of mustard 

agents, nerve agents, and psychomimetic compounds according to Iraq’s declaration to the UN 

in 1996. Reporting from various sources indicates 

Iraq investigated more than 40 potential CW compounds.

Saddam believed Iraqi WMD capabilities had played 

a central role in the winning of the Iran-Iraq war 

and were vital to Iraq’s national security strategy. 

• Iraq became the fi rst nation to use nerve agent on 

the battlefi eld when it used Tabun against Iran in 

1984. By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq had 

used over 100,000 chemical munitions against 

Iranian human wave attacks and its own Kurdish 

population. 

• By 1991, Iraq had amassed a sizeable CW arsenal 

and hundreds of tons of bulk agent. Iraq had also 

produced nerve agent warheads for the 650 km 

al-Husayn missile. 

Refl ecting those perceptions, and in a bid to create 

a strategic deterrent, MSE turned immediately after 

the Iran-Iraq war to a strategy for maintaining an 

offensive CW capability in peacetime. With the end 

of the war in August 1988, MSE stopped CW agent 

production, and focused on production of marketable products while continuing research to improve 

production techniques, agent purity, and shelf life. 

Production was restarted in 1990. 

• Al Muthanna’s CW nerve agents contained impurities that affected agent stability and thus limited 

the shelf life of stored fi lled munitions and bulk 

agent. This had not mattered during the Iran-Iraq 

War, when Iraq was using agent as fast as it could 

be produced. However, given Iraq’s intent to use 

chemical weapons as a strategic deterrent, some 

stockpiling was essential. 

A speech by Saddam on 2 April 1990 publicly identifi ed Iraq’s CW research and production efforts in 

anticipation of the next war. Saddam claimed Iraq 

had a binary agent capability, an assertion that caught 

MSE scientists off guard, according to Iraqi declaration corroborated by documents the UN discovered at 

Al Muthanna.

• In less than a month after Saddam’s speech, Iraq 

restarted its CW production lines, tested CW 

warheads for al Husayn missiles, and reverse-engineered special parachute-retarded bombs. [According to the FFCD, Iraq did not import any aerial 

bombs in 1990.]

Al Muthanna fi lled the al-Husayn warheads and 

aerial bombs with a binary nerve agent component. 

These weapons were accompanied by Jerry cans containing the second component, a chemical that, when 

mixed with the weapons’ contents, produced nerve 

agent. This was the mix-before-fl ight Iraqi ‘binary’ 

system. Iraq deployed 1,000 binary bombs and 50 

al-Husayn warheads—binary and unitary—by August 

1990. 

• In the subsequent fi rst Gulf war, it is assessed that 

Saddam believed that the deployment of CW, and 

the delegated authority to use them, contributed to 

the US not driving on to Baghdad. 

The Decline, 1991-1996

Destroying Iraqi Weapons

During the Gulf war in early 1991, Coalition Forces 

destroyed or extensively damaged most of Iraq’s 

CW infrastructure, including many of the agent and 

precursor production facilities at Al Muthanna. Then, 
10

Examples of Known Iraqi Use of CW 

The war with Iran ended in August 1988. By this time, seven UN specialist missions had documented repeated 

use of chemicals in the war. According to Iraq, it consumed almost 19,500 chemical bombs, over 54,000 chemical 

artillery shells and 27,000 short-range chemical rockets between 1983 and 1988. Iraq declared it consumed about 

1,800 tons of mustard gas, 140 tons of Tabun, and over 600 tons of Sarin. Almost two-thirds of the CW weapons 

were used in the last 18 months of the war. Examples of CW use by Iraq:

Use in Iran-Iraq war, 1983-1988

• August 1983 Haij Umran Mustard , fewer than 100 Iranian/Kurdish casualties

• October-November 1983 Panjwin Mustard, 3,000 Iranian/Kurdish casualties

• February-March 1984 Majnoon Island Mustard, 2,500 Iranian casualties 

• March 1984 al-Basrah Tabun, 50-100 Iranian casualties

• March 1985 Hawizah Marsh Mustard & Tabun, 3,000 Iranian casualties

• February 1986 al-Faw Mustard & Tabun, 8,000 to 10,000 Iranian casualties

• December 1986 Um ar-Rasas Mustard, 1,000s Iranian casualties

• April 1987 al-Basrah Mustard & Tabun, 5,000 Iranian casualties

• October 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard & nerve agent, 3,000 Iranian casualties

• March 1988 Halabjah& Kurdish area Mustard & nerve agent, 1,000s Kurdish/Iranian casualties

• April 1988 al-Faw Mustard & nerve agent, 1,000s Iranian casualties

• May 1988 Fish Lake Mustard & nerve agent, 100s or 1,000s Iranian casualties

• June 1988 Majnoon Islands Mustard & nerve agent, 100s or 1,000s Iranian casualties

• July 1988 South-central border Mustard & nerve agent, 100s or 1,000s Iranian casualties

Use in Southern Iraq against the Popular Uprising, 1991

• March 1991, an-Najaf - Karbala area Nerve agent & CS, Shi’a casualties not known.

These are selected uses only. Numerous other smaller scale CW attacks occurred.
11

Chemical

in April 1991, the UN adopted Security Council 

Resolution 687, which established a ceasefi re in the 

Gulf war. Iraq was required to verifi ably disarm as a 

prerequisite to lifting of the oil embargo imposed by 

UNSCR 660 of August 1990. 

Iraq initially chose not to fully declare its CW 

weapons and infrastructure, a decision usually 

attributed to Husayn Kamil and implemented by 

senior personnel including his senior deputy, Amer 

al-Sa’adi. 

• Anticipating that inspections would be an ineffective and short-lived inconvenience, Iraqi leaders 

decided in early April 1991 to hide signifi cant components of the CW program, including weapons, 

precursors, and equipment. 

• Following a particularly invasive IAEA inspection 

in late-June 1991, Saddam ordered Dr. Mahmud 

Faraj Bilal, former deputy of the CW program, to 

destroy all hidden CW and BW materials, according to an interview with Bilal after OIF.

• Available evidence indicates Iraq destroyed its 

hidden CW weapons and precursors, but key documentation and dual-use equipment were retained 

and were later discovered by inspectors. 

For the next fi ve years, Iraq maintained the hidden 

items useful for a CW program restart but did not 

renew its major CW efforts out of fear the UN 

sanctions would not be removed. UN sanctions 

severely limited Iraq’s fi nancial resources. Raw 

materials, precursors, equipment, and expertise 

became increasingly scarce. The crippling of Iraq’s 

CW infrastructure by the war, and the subsequent 

destruction and UN monitoring of much of the 

remaining materials and equipment limited Iraq’s 

ability to rebuild or restart a CW program. 

• The effects of sanctions reverberated throughout 

the scientifi c community and affected all aspects of 

industry within Iraq. Many scientists were underemployed or had access to neither research and 

production materials nor professional development. 

In August 1995, shortly after Iraq revealed its production of bulk BW agent, Saddam’s son-in-law and 

head of Iraq’s WMD programs, Husayn Kamil, fl ed 

the country. Saddam made a decision at that time to 

declare virtually all hidden information and material 

they felt was signifi cant on Iraq’s programs, turning 

over WMD documentation, including 12 trunks of 

CW documents.

• The documentation turned over by Iraq, allegedly 

hidden by Husayn Kamil, included results of Iraqi 

research that indicated more extensive research on 

VX than previously admitted. 

• The documents also included papers related to 

new agent research, mix-in-fl ight binary munitions 

development, and previously undisclosed involvement of other organizations in CW research.

ISG believes that none of these events weakened 

Saddam’s resolve to possess a robust CW capability. 

Baghdad believed its need for chemical weapons was 

justifi ed, based on its fear of hostilities with Iran and 

Israel. The Regime, we judge, was also motivated by 

an unstated desire to elevate its status among Arab 

nations. ISG believes that Saddam deferred but did 

not abandon his CW ambitions. 

• Saddam implied, according to the former Presidential Secretary, that Iraq would resume WMD 

programs after sanctions in order to restore the 

“strategic balance” within the region and, particularly, against Israel.

• Saddam was fascinated by science and by the possibilities it offered for enhancing his military power 

base. He felt that possessing the technological 

capability to develop WMD conferred the intrinsic 

right on the country to do so, according to a former 

senior Iraqi offi cial. 

• In the 1990s, the Regime actively sought to achieve 

scientifi c excellence in Iraq through a series of 

administrative measures, but years of isolation from 

the international academic community and a lack 

of successful domestic research left Iraq’s scientifi c 

infrastructure in decay. 
12

• According to an Iraqi academic scientist, Saddam 

issued an edict in 1993-1994 that all Iraqi universities address problems encountered in the military 

and industrial sectors. This marked a departure 

from past practice where the government denied 

such work to universities.

• Following this order, Iraqi research universities 

were required to become self-funding. MIC projects 

accounted for much of the research funding during 

this time, according to a leading university scientist.

• Saddam encouraged open forums for competition 

among scientists through committees and other 

programs, and he personally awarded top scientists 

for exceptional work in technical fi elds. Saddam 

became personally involved in the direction of 

some of these programs, but many lacked unifi ed 

planning or direction for research, and few were 

successful, according to Sa’adi. 

Following Husayn Kamil’s defection, Saddam took 

steps to better manage Iraqi industry, and with the 

creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee (IIC) 

in September 1995, the stage was set for a renewal 

of Iraq’s chemical industry. The IIC coordinated a 

range of projects aimed at developing an indigenous 

chemical production capability for strategically 

important chemicals that were diffi cult to import 

under UN sanctions, according to reporting. (See 

Annex C.)

Recovery and Transition, 1996-2003

Iraq’s CW program was crippled by the Gulf war 

and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered 

under sanctions, and only began to recover in the 

mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management 

of key military and civilian organizations, followed 

by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq 

with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base.

Iraq’s acceptance of the UN OFF program in 1996 

was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and 

sparked a fl ow of illicitly diverted funds.

Iraq’s chemical industry surged in the late 1990s, 

when more fi nancial resources became available 

to the Regime. Although Iraq still lagged behind 

its pre–Gulf war capabilities, it was able to divert a 

portion of its revenue to purchase new plants and 

renovate existing ones to renew its basic chemical 

industry. 

• Iraq was successful in procuring, constructing, and 

commissioning a complete state-of-the-art chemical facility for ammonium perchlorate through the 

Indian company NEC. Ammonium perchlorate is a 

key chemical for missile propellants.

• Iraq began refurbishing, and in some cases expanding, existing chemical facilities with foreign assistance. For example, the Al Tariq complex renovated 

its chlorine and phenol lines and restarted them in 

March 2000, according to reporting. 

Between 1996 and 2003, the IIC coordinated large 

and important projects for the indigenous production 

of chemicals.

• A written order from Saddam established the 

National Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides 

(NPPP). NPPP focused on the synthesis of drugs 

and pesticides, for which Iraq in the past relied 

heavily on foreign suppliers.

• The IIC examined over 1,000 chemicals for initial 

R&D to determine the feasibility of scaled-up 

production. ISG notes that two chemicals on this 

list were compounds that are consistent with an 

experimental VX pathway. 

• The process for vetting the 1,000 chemicals for 

economic feasibility and large-scale production 

was intensive and formalized. The IIC leadership 

built in several layers of review, research, and 

justifi cation before compounds were selected for 

scale-up, raising further suspicion about the three 

compounds, particularly dicyclocarbodiimide 

(DCC)—a dehydrating agent that can be used as a 

VX stabilizer

• Dr. Ja’far Dhia Ja’far, an IIC member, could not 

recall which projects were accepted for scale-up but 

he knew that some compounds were dual-use and 

declarable to the UN, and that the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) did not declare all of the 

chemicals. 
13

Chemical

Reports of an unexplained discovery of VX traces 

on missile warhead fragments in April 1997 led to 

further tension between UNSCOM and Iraq. The 

uneasy relationship escalated with the discovery of 

the ‘Air Force Document’ (see RSI chapter) in July 

1998, which indicated further Iraqi deception and 

obfuscation over its CW disclosures. Iraq’s anger 

about these two major issues was a contributing 

factor to Saddam’s decisions to suspend cooperation 

with UNSCOM and IAEA. 

• The lack of inspectors allowed further dual-use 

infrastructure to be developed. The lack of effective monitoring emboldened Saddam and his illicit 

procurement activities. 

Concurrently, Iraq continued to upgrade its indigenous manufacturing capability, pursuing glasslining technology and manufacturing its own 

multipurpose controllers. 

• Reporting indicates that research being conducted 

by State Establishment for Heavy Engineering 

Equipment (SEHEE)—Iraq’s primary fabrication plant—beginning in 1999 was geared towards 

developing a process for glass lining steel reactors, making them corrosion resistant. SEHEE was 

focused on making cheaper, longer-lasting vessels, 

and reducing reliance on stainless steel. 

• Documents recovered by ISG indicate that two 

teams, including one from the Al Majid Company 

had developed multipurpose controllers for typical 

chemical production by January 2003. 

As the chemical industry began to recover, former 

CW scientists remained employed, primarily at 

Al Tariq Company (see Annex F), on a range of 

issues of interest to the UN and which Iraq claimed 

were part of its industrial chemical or defensive 

NBC interests. We have not been able to confi rm that 

any of these efforts were connected to chemical agent 

production capability. 

• Scientists from the former CW program formulated 

agent simulants such as concentrated Malathion, 

a pesticide, and locally manufactured a copy of a 

system to disperse the simulant in 2001 and 2002. 

There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial body of evidence suggesting that Saddam 

pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return 

to WMD production after sanctions were lifted by 

preserving assets and expertise. In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent 

to resume WMD production as soon as sanctions 

were lifted. All sources suggest that Saddam encouraged compartmentalization and would have discussed 

something as sensitive as WMD with as few people as 

possible. 

• Huwaysh claimed that in 1999 Saddam asked how 

long it would take to build a production line for CW 

agents. Huwaysh tasked four offi cials to investigate, and they responded that experts could readily 

prepare a production line for mustard within six 

months. VX and Sarin production were more complicated and would take longer. Huwaysh relayed 

this answer to Saddam, who never requested 

follow-up information. An Iraqi CW expert separately estimated Iraq would require only a few days 

to start producing mustard—if it were prepared to 

sacrifi ce the production equipment. 

Miscalculation, 2002-2003

As the reality of the UN’s impending return sank in, 

Iraq rapidly initiated steps to prepare for inspectors. 

Committees and groups were formed to ensure sites 

and key scientists were ready to receive the inspectors. 

• As had often occurred in the past, individual scientists, heads of departments and security offi cials 

examined their plans of work for items or documents that would be subject to inspections. In every 

relevant location in Iraq, to some extent, normal 

work was disrupted in the effort to ensure Iraq was 

not suspected of undertaking proscribed activities.

• According to a senior chemist at the MIC, Huwaysh 

in October 2002, issued an order—the same order 

issued several times in the past—which held 

scientists personally responsible for any materials, 

equipment, or other prohibited items found by the 

UN.
14

• Vice President Taha Ramadan chaired a meeting of 

over 400 scientists before the inspectors returned, 

threatening scientists with dire consequences if the 

inspectors found anything that interfered with Iraq’s 

progress towards the lifting of sanctions. 

• When inspections resumed, foreign experts were 

hidden from the inspection teams. 

In the fi nal days of his Regime, Saddam continued to pursue efforts to enhance Iraq’s industrial 

base, with plans underway for the construction of a 

multipurpose chemical plant, and nine oil refi neries 

in Southern and Northern Iraq. The plans for this 

chemical plant were the result of years of the IIC’s 

efforts to coordinate research into the indigenous 

production of chemicals. 

• The Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) 

owned a plot of land west of Baghdad that it set 

aside for construction of this multipurpose production facility, which was designed to produce 

a year’s supply of 100 chemicals using only 10 

independent pilot-scale production lines. (For more 

information, see Iraq’s Infrastructure: Production 

Capability). 

 • Construction was scheduled to begin in March 

2003, but was halted just prior to OIF. The plant 

would have provided Iraq with an indigenous multipurpose production facility capable of producing 

large quantities of chemicals, in a relatively short 

time. 

Command and Control

Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War

ISG believes that two of Saddam’s primary goals 

after the war were to recover economically from war 

damage and to retain Iraq’s capability to reconstitute its WMD program after sanctions were lifted or 

became ineffectual, inspections were removed, and 

the threat of force abated. During the Gulf war in 

early 1991, Coalition Forces destroyed or extensively 

damaged most of Iraq’s CW infrastructure, including 

the agent and precursor production facilities at 

Al Muthanna. Given the Iraqi government’s possession of CW data and production experience, the 

preservation of intellectual capital would be key to the 

eventual restoration of a post-sanctions CW program, 

and the Regime took explicit steps to ensure the preservation of its body of CW scientists. 

• Many former employees of Al Muthanna were 

deployed to Al Tariq and worked there until OIF. 

• In some cases, CW experts were diverted to companies within the IIC or the MIM, according to 

interviews with multiple sources after OIF. Others 

were assigned to be instructors at chemical schools 

for defensive NBC work. 

Of the approximately 200 former CW scientists—

about 60 of whom are considered key CW experts 

from the Al Muthanna years—ISG attempted to 

contact close to 150 to determine their activities 

since 1991 and any efforts by the Regime to utilize 

their skills for CW-related efforts. ISG was able to 

identify initial location information for approximately 

130 individuals, many of whom ISG was not able to 

contact. 

• Based on locations, employment, and availability, 

ISG experts were able to speak to nearly 30 former 

key-CW scientists, none of whom claimed to have 

been involved in CW-related activities after 1991 or 

to know any individuals suspected of involvement 

in such work.
15

Chemical

ISG Strategy To Evaluate Whether Iraq’s Chemical 

Industry Infrastructure Was CW-Ready

ISG’s strategy for assessing the capabilities of Iraq’s 

chemical infrastructure to support a CW program was 

based on a systematic evaluation of four components 

necessary to maintain such a program: raw materials, equipment, expertise and Regime intent. During 

its investigations, ISG seized documents, conducted 

several site visits and interviewed high-ranking technocrats, former CW scientists, and prominent Iraqi 

academics. This enabled ISG to determine the extent, 

breadth, and coordination of Regime directed dualuse infrastructure development and chemical research 

and production. 

• To determine the availability of expertise required 

to contribute to a large-scale CW effort, ISG 

exploited sites, interviewed former CW scientists 

and analyzed documents on government-sponsored 

research. 

• ISG searched for chemical technology necessary for 

production of key CW precursors, such as processes 

involving phosphorous and chlorine. 

• ISG used various historical intelligence reporting, 

open-source material, interviews with Iraqi 

scientists, and site visits to investigate Iraq’s 

chemical laboratories and industries, and to gain 

information about Iraq’s CW agent production 

experts from 1991 to OIF. 

• Chemical plants that used or produced phosphorus 

compounds were a priority because Iraq’s ability to 

quickly recover a nerve agent production capability 

was dependent on its access to phosphorus-based 

compounds. 

Overall, ISG’s efforts to uncover information on CWgermane research, development and infrastructure 

were complicated by uncooperative detainees, threats 

to some sources and extensive looting and burning of 

documents and facilities. 

• With the exception of one instance, when former 

VX expert Imad Husayn Al-Ani was apporached 

by ‘Uday’s offi cer in 2003 with a request to make 

chemical agent, no other scientists claimed they 

had been contacted by Regime offi cials requesting 

assistance in CW work.

Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence 

With Relative Ease

The issue of retaining scientists in Iraq was a Regime 

policy. However, given the command economy in 

Iraq, which offered limited possibilities for work at 

private chemical companies, it is not surprising that 

most key personnel from the former CW program 

remained employed in the government chemical 

sector. Former CW scientists became heavily involved 

in rebuilding Iraq’s industrial infrastructure, and some 

experts were directed to work projects within various 

military organizations.

• Saddam instructed Directors General of Iraqi 

companies and other state entities to prevent key 

scientists from the pre-1991 WMD program from 

leaving the country, according to Dr. Ja’far Dhia 

Ja’far.

Iraqi scientists and engineers could maintain a 

minimal CW production profi ciency without engaging in CW-related R&D and production because 

they were already experienced in key CW agent production processes. Largely based on data available 

in previously published technical literature, Iraq had 

suffi ciently developed processes to produce nerve, 

blister, and psychological agents. 

• For instance, Iraqi research on VX started in 1985 

with a literature survey on the preparation and 

production methods of VX. Based on their literature 

review, the best and easiest method was chosen for 

the preparation of VX agent, according to Iraq’s 

CW Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) 

to the UN. 

• Iraq’s CW agent purity, formulation, and production 

standards in the 1980s program—although inferior 

to Western standards with the exception of its highgrade mustard—were “good enough” to produce 

harmful agent proven successful during previous use. 
16

Inadequacies in Iraq’s pre-1991 CW program were 

probably caused by limited equipment and inferior 

precursor chemicals. Iraq could procure the materials to address these problems if sanctions were 

lifted, intrusive inspections removed, and threat of 

force abated. 

• In the case of VX, which Iraq claimed it abandoned 

because of lack of success at large-scale production 

according to Iraq’s FCCD, the scientists eventually became well aware of the factors resulting in 

unstable, poor quality (low purity) VX. (see discussion on VX in production section).

• These factors included low purity and instability of 

precursors, reaction temperature control, inadequate 

vacuum systems, and inadequate size of separation 

vessels. 

Infrastructure—Research and 

Development

Refl ecting the importance the Regime attached 

to industrial and scientifi c progress and aiming to 

recover from the war with Iran, Baghdad undertook in 

the mid 1990s a centralized, national effort to coordinate Iraqi industrial activities. By the late 1990s, 

fueled by resources available through the Oil-forFood program, that effort underlay a specifi c initiative 

aimed at boosting the capabilities of Iraqi pesticide 

and pharmaceutical industries, including the capability to manufacture dual-use chemicals. Although ISG 

found no direct evidence linking dual-use chemical production to an active or latent CW program, 

research and development on types of specifi c chemicals linked to Iraq’s CW program raises concerns 

about the legitimacy of Iraq’s chemical plans. 

Prior to 1991, Iraq’s national research and development (R&D) capability was limited in scope, and 

efforts were largely concentrated in state establishments such as the Al Muthanna State Establishment 

(MSE) and at the university level. 

• Iraq’s industrial sector had limited capabilities for 

research, primarily because it had typically purchased turnkey facilities for industrial production 

from abroad.

After the Gulf war, Iraq’s ability to conduct R&D 

stagnated, and the majority of MSE scientists were 

deployed to operate factories or manage critical infrastructure problems caused by the war. The universities 

had no formal national R&D role and continued to 

operate their departments in a self-directed, isolated 

style. 

• The effects of sanctions and the prevailing international situation devastated the research community, 

preventing the intellectual capital of Iraq from 

participating in normal academic interaction. 

In the 1994 timeframe, Saddam issued an edict that 

all Iraqi universities address problems experienced 

in the military and industrial sectors, according to 

an Iraqi academic scientist. Prior to this, universities 

were not obligated to conduct applied research for 

either sector. 
17

Chemical

In subsequent years, and in part triggered by the surge 

of state funding from the OFF program, Iraq was able 

to begin implementing Saddam’s edict and utilizing 

the intellectual capital of Iraq to help solve some of 

the shortages which had plagued Iraq’s industrial and 

military sectors. 

• An upturn in the economy after years of sanctions 

allowed Iraq to reevaluate its research efforts and 

initiate a series of projects to enhance its industrial 

base. 

Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee

Saddam ordered the creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee (IIC) in September 1995 to 

coordinate Iraqi industrial activities after Husayn 

Kamil fl ed the country according to documents. 

After the defection, Saddam assumed the role of 

Prime Minister as well as president of Iraq, and 

began attending the weekly ministers meetings. He 

ordered the establishment of the IIC and a similar Economic Committee to prevent the weekly 

meetings from becoming too detailed, according to 

interviews with Huwasyh. 

• The RCC issued a decree formally setting up the 

Industrial Committee and charged it to deal with all 

scientifi c, technical, and industrial matters affecting the entire Iraqi industrial sector, according to 

interviews with Huwaysh and Ja’far.

• Ja’far indicated that the IIC commissioned a program aimed at developing an indigenous production 

capability for strategically important chemicals for 

domestic consumption that were diffi cult to import 

under UN sanctions 

The IIC’s membership included the heads of Iraq’s 

military and civilian industrial ministries and sectors:

• Members included the Head of MIC, the Minister of Industry and Minerals (MIM), the Minister of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research 

(MHESR), the Minister of Oil, and the Iraqi Atomic 

Energy Commission (IAEC), according to multiple 

reports. 

• Saddam appointed Minister of Oil Amer Rashid 

as the fi rst IIC chairman, and he was followed by 

the Minister of Higher Education and Scientifi c 

Research Abd Al-Khaliq al-Ghafur in 1996 or early 

1997. Abd al-Tuwab Huwaysh later assumed the 

role of chairman of the IIC—as well as being a 

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, according to documents signed by Huwaysh and other reporting. 

• Dr. Ja’far, as the Senior Advisor to the President, 

was appointed as an independent member of the 

IIC. He was neither subordinate to a ministry nor to 

the IIC chairman—instead he reported directly to 

Saddam’s personal Secretary, Abd Hamid Mahmud, 

according to interviews with Dr. Ja’far. Ja’far also 

was made chairman of the Research and Development Committee and the Technology Transfer 

Committee, which was later subordinated to the 

IIC. 

The Power of the IIC

ISG judges that the IIC had signifi cant infl uence 

over Iraq’s chemical infrastructure, industry, and 

research, even though it had not been constituted 

with that aim in mind. In effect, the IIC was the 

driving force behind an extensive, centralized 

national infrastructure improvement effort apparently focused on developing the pesticide and 

pharmaceutical industries and improving self-suffi ciency, based on interviews with IIC offi cials and 

documentation.

• The IIC actively allocated research in Iraq, including work at universities, state companies and 

government research centers. Government ministry 

research resources, including the MIC’s, were distributed by the IIC according to offi cial reporting. 

• The MHESR was the primary channel for recommending industrial research to universities and 

educational research centers in Iraq, according to 

the same reporting. However, the Ministry could 

not dictate to universities what type of research 

to conduct—instead, universities chose their own 

research based on their capabilities, according to 

different offi cial reporting.
18

Source Note: Principal source for IIC

 activity—Dr. Ja’far Dhia Ja’far 

Interviews with Dr. Ja’far Dhia Ja’far provide the 

basis of the majority of information ISG has obtained 

on key IIC projects such as the National Project for 

Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides (NPPP) and the 

National Project for Active Chemical Materials, and 

their execution. Dr. Ja’far was founder of the Iraqi 

nuclear program, Director of the Offi ce of the Presidential Advisor, and Chairman of the IIC’s Research 

and Development and Technology Transfer Committees. A very capable technocrat, Dr. Ja’far served as 

Director and supervisor of the NPPP and Chair of 

IIC’s Research & Development Committee, which 

had oversight responsibilities for chemical research. 

Dr. Ja’far indicated he had near total control over 

the implementation of the NPPP. Much of Dr. Ja’far’s 

information has been corroborated by documents and 

other offi cials including high-ranking employees from 

MIC and MHESR.

The IIC’s Master Plan for Self-Reliance: The List 

of 1,000 Chemicals

IIC placed greater emphasis on the synthesis of 

active chemical compounds than on novel R&D, 

because Iraq was highly dependent on foreign 

supplies of these materials for production of pharmaceuticals and pesticides. Several ad hoc panels 

drawn from the IIC’s Research and Development 

Committee selected the fi nal “List” of approximately 1,000 chemicals for initial R&D to assess the 

feasibility of scaled up production. The feasibility 

research was referred to as “phase 1”. According to an 

Iraqi academic scientist, around 15 items on the List 

of 1,000 chemicals were so-called “fi rst order emergency” or top priority compounds. There were also 

second-order emergency compounds and a third-order 

tier.

The IIC distributed the fi nal list of chemicals to 

Iraq’s industrial Ministries, State companies, research 

centers, and universities, and instructed these organizations to bid on research contracts for the chemical 

research and development projects for which they 

were best equipped to complete. IIC’s Research and 

Development Committee identifi ed the entities best 

suited for each project and awarded the contracts. 

The IIC’s Program for the Indigenous Production of Chemicals appears to have evolved into a 

nation-wide, pan-industry, pan-academia meritbased competition for project ideas and project 

implementation. According to offi cial reporting, 

the work stimulated by the IIC’s Technology Transfer Committee, a committee involved in promoting 

private-sector and university research, was scientifi -

cally credible and was selected on merit. Progress 

on the Program for the Indigenous Production of 

Chemicals was largely limited to economic feasibility studies and small scale laboratory research, until 

approximately early 1999, according to Ja’far. 

• The Presidential Diwan reviewed and approved 

the fi nal list and allocated approximately one million dinars (approximately $US 500) per project 

(note—in 1998, $1 is 2000 dinars). The IIC only 

planned to select a fraction of the 1,000 chemicals 

for scale-up after the review and recommendation 

process was complete.

• Studies included requirements for infrastructure, 

equipment, manpower, and chemical precursors, 

according to different reporting.

Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1,000 Chemicals

Past Iraqi use of three of these chemicals—thionyl 

chloride, thiourea, and DCC—in its former VX 

program raises questions about their legitimacy. 

Thionyl chloride and thiourea were used in a VX 

production route that resulted in a product with 

higher purity and which we assess could have been 

successfully stabilized with DCC. However, we found 

no information linking this program for the indigenous production of chemicals to a CW program.

• Imad Husayn al Ani, Iraq’s former program director 

for VX, stated in an interview in 2003 that plans to 

produce thiourea and DCC, work he was unaware 

of, indicated unequivocally that the Regime 

intended to reconstitute the V-series nerve agent 

program. 
19

Chemical

• ISG has been unable to establish why thiourea 

and DCC were considered strategic chemicals. 

There were no constraints on Iraq’s importation 

of thiourea and no identifi ed industrial products 

or processes in Iraq that require DCC for their 

manufacture. In addition, Mosul University had 

not determined the economic benefi t of producing 

DCC. 

• All three compounds were, however, part of Iraq’s 

former VX program. Two of the compounds are 

directly applicable to an experimental VX synthesis 

route which yielded higher purities for Iraq than the 

two main VX production routes which it declared 

• Thionyl chloride is a chlorinating agent used by 

Iraq in its former CW program. Iraq could have 

selected alternative chlorinating agents for production that are not controlled for importation or 

production for legitimate manufacturing purposes.

Thionyl Chloride

ISG does not believe that the scale-up project 

extended beyond feasibility studies prior to OIF, 

and we are unsure of Iraq’s intended use thionyl 

chloride (SOCl2

) given its many industrial uses and 

potential industrial value. A letter from the Offi ce of 

the Presidential Advisor indicated that as of September 2002, the offi ce had not yet received a report 

on pilot-scale research projects for 14 chemicals, 

including thionyl chloride. Thionyl chloride is a 

controlled CW precursor that Iraq had used as a 

chlorinating agent in its sulfur mustard and nerve 

agent production processes up until 1990. The IIC 

tasked the Jaber Bin Hayan State Company between 

1996 and 1998 to research the small-scale production 

of thionyl chloride, according to reporting. According 

to offi cial reporting, thionyl chloride production was 

reported to Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate.

• After Jaber Bin Hayan in 1998 achieved its objective of reaching 99.99 percent purity on the 50 

milliliter scale, the company was charged in 2001 

with outlining the feasibility of pilot-scale production—approximately 1,000 kilograms—according 

to offi cial reporting and documents recovered from 

a MIC hard drive. 

• The same former CW offi cial believed that Jaber 

Bin Hayan seemed an odd choice for thionyl chloride production because its facilities and equipment 

are ill suited to this process compared to other MIC 

and MIM companies. The offi cial opined that Jaber 

Bin Hayen was tasked because it employed two 

chemists who had worked on thionyl chloride at 

Al Muthanna in the pre-1991 CW program. 

• Reportedly, the thionyl chloride project was meant 

to support pharmaceutical production. 

DCC

DCC was on the UN Good’s Review List, but is not 

restricted under the Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals or the Australia Group 

international export control Regimes, and is available 

on the international commercial market. ISG assessed 

the Iraqi domestic market for DCC was small at the 

time of OIF.

• Mosul University accepted the DCC tasking from 

the IIC in July 1998, according to a Mosul University report to the IIC sent in 2001. Other reporting 

discussed their research results in synthesis and 

purifi cation of DCC. 

• ISG discovered documents at the offi ces of the IIC 

in September 2003—which had been subjected 

to military action, looting, burning and deliberate 

destruction—outlining Iraq’s intent to investigate 

production of DCC. 

• According to a former high-ranking employee of 

the MHESR, the inclusion of DCC among the List 

of 1,000 chemicals for the IIC was common knowledge. He claimed that DCC is used in the synthesis 

of various compounds, and the scientists working 

on it would not be aware of its utility as a VX stabilizer even thought it was described as a potential 

VX stabilizer in the Iraqi Chemical Warfare FFCD.
20

Iraqis themselves differ over the economic rationale for DCC. DCC has several industrial uses as a 

dehydrating agent and acid scavenger and is used in 

the industrial production of peptides. A former Iraqi 

CW scientist familiar with legitimate lab-scale uses 

of DCC in the production of pharmaceuticals was 

not aware of a commercial reason for the use of large 

amounts in Iraq. However, Dr. Bilal, the former head 

of R&D for the CW program, stated that DCC was a 

dehydrating agent and thus would have applications 

in the pharmaceutical industry.

DCC did not move beyond laboratory research 

because Iraq did not have the raw materials to produce it, according to former high ranking employees 

of the MIC and MHESR. However, ISG recovered 

documents from the Technology Transfer Offi ce that 

suggest DCC was planned by Al Majid State Company for later production.

• In late 2002, the IIC asked the MIC if they had any 

companies capable of producing DCC. Al Basel, 

Ibn Sina, al-Qa Qa’a, Al Tariq, Jaber Bin Hayan, 

and Al Kindi all claimed they could not produce 

DCC with the materials they had on hand, according to a senior chemist from the MIC. 

• The Al Majid State Company was ready to transfer University of Mosul, Chemistry Department’s 

“cyclohexanol carbon 2 Aymayid” precursor project 

to formal production even though no economic 

benefi t had been determined, according to fi nal 

research evaluation documents from Dr. Ja’far’s 

offi ce. ISG believes the “cyclohexanol carbon 2 

Aymayid” is an odd notation or translation of N,Ndicylohexylcarbodiimide (DCC).

• These documents also indicate that a precursor 

chemical in the DCC production process investigated by Mosul University and Baghdad University—cyclohexylamine —was researched for 

production.

• Of the three suspect compounds mentioned here, 

DCC was the only one included in the set of Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) provided by the 

Al Majid State Company for potential scale-up in 

the multi-purpose plant. This could be an indication 

of Iraq’s intent to produce DCC at a large scale, 

although we have no detailed information revealing 

the actual intended scale. 
21

Chemical

Iraq’s Declared Work With VX Nerve Agent 

Iraq began research on VX in the 1980s but failed 

to declare any production or attempts to produce 

VX until August 1995. In its 1996 declaration, Iraq 

claimed to have unsuccessfully attempted large-scale 

VX production by two routes, and admitted researching two additional, experimental routes between 1984 

and 1990. 

• Iraq initially declared production of 0.26 tons of 

VX, then modifi ed its declaration several times to 

reach a total of 3.9 tons produced at Al Muthanna 

with available pilot-scale equipment. Iraq denied 

large-scale VX production or weaponization. 

• The two routes it claimed only to have researched, 

but not used in production, Routes C and D, 

provided higher purity and yield than the two main 

routes, A and B. We judge that Iraq would have 

been more likely to continue work on routes 

C and D.

• DCC and other dehydrating agents cannot stabilize 

low purity (<90%) VX for long term storage. 

Comparing routes investigated by Iraq

 Route A Route B Route C Route D

Purity 60-65% 50% 80-90% 90%

Yield 50-55% 30-35% 80% 90%

Starting reactant MPC MPC MPC MPC

Couple with choline choline thiocholine chlorocholine

Source of sulfur P2S5 P2S5 thiourea P2S5

Binary possible? yes yes yes No

Scale of declared production Large-scale Large-scale Research only Research only 

* DCC and other dehydrating agents cannot stabilize low purity (<90%) VX for long term storage. 

Iraq claims not to have pursued routes C and D, primarily because it did not have access to key precursors and did not retain any prior stocks that would 

have been necessary to produce VX. 

• Iraq claimed to the UN that thiourea was unavailable or too expensive, but thiourea is not controlled 

and is available on the open market for relatively 

low prices.

• Iraq claimed to have conducted minimal research 

into route C, but according to UNSCOM reporting, 

Iraq conducted over 100 experiments on route C. 

• Iraq had plans to procure a thiourea and nitrogen 

plant, both of which are necessary for VX production via route C, according to UNSCOM reporting. 

ISG during its investigation of the IIC program for 

strategic large-scale production noted three compounds—thionyl chloride, thiourea, and DCC—with 

direct applications to the Route C VX production 

process. The table below shows that this route, which 

utilizes two of the three chemicals for production, can 

address prior Iraqi defi ciencies in VX purity and stability if yield and purity can be maintained in production scale synthesis.
22

Thiourea

Thiourea is a readily available commodity chemical 

not normally associated with CW agent production. 

It is used in the synthesis of dyes, fl ame retardants, 

pesticides and pharmaceuticals. However, thiourea 

was used by Iraq in successful synthesis of VX prior 

to the Gulf war.

• Methyl thiouracil, a thyroid medicine which 

requires thiourea for its synthesis, was a project 

under the NPPP according to documentary reporting. 

Considering that thionyl chloride and thiourea are 

two of the precursors needed to synthesize VX using 

Iraq’s investigative pathway, route C, and that DCC 

could potentially stabilize the product of this synthetic route, ISG believes Iraq’s interest in these 

chemicals is suspicious. However, we note that these 

three compounds are a small part of the larger, more 

diffi cult organophosphorous synthesis component of 

VX production. 

Chemicals From the List Move Toward 

Production

Although ISG has multiple HUMINT and documentary reports on the Program for the Indigenous 

Production of Chemicals and the NPPP, we have 

found no evidence that any of the programs reached 

a commercial production phase prior to OIF. Dr.

Ja’far Dhia Ja’far could not recall which projects 

were accepted for scale-up or the intended end-users, 

but he also knew some of the compounds were dualuse and declarable to the UN and that the NMD did 

not declare all of the chemicals. 

• The Technology Transfer Committee awarded two 

contracts for the preparation of Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) for the production plant required to 

produce the 100 strategically important chemicals 

to the IAEC and to the Al Majid Chemical Engineering Center in 2002.

Al Maijd and IAEC engineers designed a plant that 

could produce a year’s supply of each of the 100 

chemicals using only 10 independent pilot-scale 

production lines. The engineers supplied Ja’far with 

process fl ow diagrams (PFDs) and piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) for a plant.

• Reportedly, the conceptual designs were given to 

Ja’far in late 2002.

• Each production line was to be designed so that it 

was capable of producing multiple chemicals with 

only minor reconfi guration. 

The multipurpose design is particularly interesting 

in the context of a statement made by General Faiz 

Abdullah Shahine—the last known director of the 

CW program—at a conference in 1989 or 1990 examining the future direction of Al Muthanna that “we 

cannot have a reactor for each unit. Even in the drug 

industry, they tend towards the multipurpose reactors. 

God willing, we will have 6 to 10 units... we must 

work in a manner compatible with our potentials.”
23

Chemical

Infrastructure—Production 

Capability

Improving economic conditions and better management led to a revival in the industry’s fortunes by the 

latter half of the 1990s. Although they still lagged 

behind pre-war capacity, the Regime envisioned 

further expansion in the new century and on the eve 

of OIF, Iraq had some capability to restore chemical 

weapons production. 

Iraq’s CW infrastructure suffered a severe blow 

during Desert Storm, and under subsequent UN 

sanctions and UN inspections. The entire industrial 

sector for years endured shortages of raw materials, infrastructure decay and declining production. 

Iraq’s residual CW infrastructure was under intense 

scrutiny by the UN, which set up additional controls to monitor or destroy remaining materials and 

equipment.

• In 1991, the majority of CW production sites 

suffered extensive bomb damage, but many fi lled 

munitions, bulk agent and precursors remained on 

site under the control of the Regime. 

• Vital materials were unavailable or unaffordable, 

and neglected plants deteriorated while productivity 

declined. Electricity and water remained unreliable, which impacted on the ability to run chemical 

production processes. 

• The UN set up the Chemical Destruction Group, 

which operated in Iraq from 1992-1994, tasked 

with the job of destroying the bulk agent, fi lled 

munitions, and precursors left over from the former 

program. Remaining process equipment was tagged 

and monitored, as was all dual-use process equipment throughout Iraq. 

• By 1994, Iraq’s capability to produce CW at 

Al Muthanna was completely destroyed, along with 

Iraq’s supply of chemical precursors. 

An improving economy in 1997—due in part to the 

OFF Program—and better management at MIC led 

to improvement in the chemical industry, especially 

in production output. MIC and companies within 

other Ministries continued to develop, expand, and 

renovate the chemical infrastructure, and by 2001, 

Iraq believed it had proven its ability to defy sanctions and revive itself, according to an Iraqi economics media report. 

• In 1998, the MIM began rehabilitating Al-Furat 

State Company for Chemical Industries’ chlorine 

plant, employing technical teams and engineers 

from its own companies. According to the Iraqi 

economic media report, key parts for the plant that 

were previously imported now could be produced 

indigenously. 

• Also in 1998, the State Enterprise for Petrochemical Industries set up a chlorine plant for water 

purifi cation, according to Iraqi press reports. 

Iraq continued to upgrade its indigenous manufacturing capability, pursuing glass-lining technology 

and manufacturing its own multipurpose controllers. Beginning in 1999, the Baghdad State Enterprise 

Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE) fabrication 

plant initiated a research effort to develop a process 

for glass lining carbon steel reactors, making them 

corrosion resistant. 

• SEHEE’s research was designed to boost company 

profi ts, make cheaper, longer-lasting vessels, and 

reduce reliance on stainless steel. Al-Qa Qa’a State 

Company, at that time, requested SEHEE fabricate 

a 2.5 meter diameter, 2 meter tall glass-lined reactor (large-scale) for use in nitric acid production, 

according to reporting. 

• SEHEE was successful at lining small-scale vessels, but failed in its efforts to glass-line vessels 

at a larger scale. An inadequate furnace probably 

contributed to the failure at the larger scale, according to reports from two different sources. 

• Two teams from IAEC and Al Majid Company by 

January 2003 had developed multipurpose controllers for typical chemical production, according to 

documents obtained by ISG.

Starting in 2000, production of nitric acid, plastics, 

chlorine, and phenol was increased. 
24

• Iraq’s capacity to produce nitric acid tripled 

between 1998 and 2003.

• Plastics production increased by 125 percent in 

2000, meeting production goals that were set for 

2002. The Al Majid Company was also planning 

a new production line for PVC, according to Iraqi 

press reports.

• In March 2000, Iraq restarted chlorine and phenol 

production at the Al Tariq’s Fallujah plants—also 

known as the Habbaniyah facilities, Iraq’s key pre1991 precursor production sites –based on reporting. (See Annex F—Al Tariq Company’s Activities.)

A steady increase in spending and improvements 

to the industrial sector continued throughout 2001. 

Additional inorganic chemical facilities were constructed and other plants were renovated. 

• Iraq built a sulfuric acid plant equipped with corrosion resistant equipment in a separate and isolated 

building at al-Qa Qa’a. 

• MIM planned to initiate rehabilitation of Al-Furat 

State Company for Chemical Industries’ sulfuric acid plant expecting to double its production, 

according to an Iraqi economics media report.

• Iraq constructed a separate nitric acid production 

facility at Karbala, which was completed shortly 

before OIF. 

Iraq’s revitalization of its chemical industry continued up until OIF, and Saddam had ambitious plans 

for improvements well beyond 2003. With foreign 

assistance, Iraq renovated its nitric acid plant at al-Qa 

Qa’a, which was plagued by corrosion problems, creating a bottleneck for Iraq’s munitions production. 

• In 2002, Iraq made a number of improvements to 

the nitric acid plant at al-Qa Qa’a with equipment, 

materials and expertise obtained from Russia, Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Ukraine, according to 

Dr. Ja’far. For example, corroded compressors were 

replaced with new compressors, which had better, 

corrosion-resistant rotors. 

• According to the same reporting, MIM also supervised the construction of a pilot plant for acetaminophen at the Baghdad Plant for Medical Gases. The 

plant was designed to produce paracetamol from 

nitrobenzene, but it only produced a small quantity 

of low quality material pre-OIF. 

• According to 2003 reporting, there were plans for 

the construction of nine oil refi neries to be built by 

either MIC or MIM in Southern and Northern Iraq 

under the control of MIC. 

State of Chemical Industry at OIF—Limited 

Break-Out Capability 

Defi nition. “Breakout Capability”: ISG considers a CW breakout capability to be the capacity 

of Iraq to de novo produce and fi eld militarily 

signifi cant CW rapidly. ISG considered a range 

of break-out scenarios applicable to Iraq and its 

capabilities existing in 2002. An example of a 

breakout scenario would be wartime or imminent threat-precipitated production of dubious 

quality, low-stability agents for immediate use. 

A breakout capability could be deliberately 

developed during peacetime or improvised in 

response to a threat. 

Though on an upward trend since the late 1990s, 

Iraq’s chemical industry was still not up to pre–Gulf 

war capacity as of OIF. Technical problems and 

poor maintenance of aging equipment throughout the 

1990s resulted in many chemical plants, including 

ethylene and chlorine production plants, operating at 

less than half capacity despite the improvements to 

the chemical industry. 

• A country-wide chlorine shortage, for instance, 

caused a lack of PVC production at the Az Zubayr 

plant, which was detrimental to Iraq’s economy and 

downstream chemical processing. 

• Plants within Iraq that still produced chlorine suffered from corroded condensers, and were only able 

to produce aqueous chlorine. Iraq, prior to OIF, 
25

Chemical

imported anhydrous chlorine gas from China, with 

the permission of the UN, for use within its chemical and sewage treatment industries.

• Formalene and phenol, both ostensibly produced 

indigenously, were imported by the resin facility 

north of Baghdad because of a lack of consistent, 

quality supply from local producers.

ISG judges that the longstanding intent of the 

Regime was to restart WMD production once UN 

sanctions were lifted. Based on an investigation of 

facilities, materials, and production outputs, ISG 

also judges that Iraq had a break-out capability 

to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard CW 

agent, but not nerve agents. 

• Iraq declared to the UN an experimental sulfur 

mustard production route from locally available 

chemicals—sulfur, chlorine, and ethylene, all of 

which Iraq had access to at the time of OIF (see 

Figure 2).

• Iraq retained the necessary basic chemicals to produce sulfur mustard on a large-scale, but probably 

did not have key precursors for nerve agent production. With the importation of key phosphorusbased precursors, Iraq could have produced limited 

quantities of nerve agent as well.

• Mustard production could have started within days 

if the necessary precursor chemicals were colocated in a suitable production facility; otherwise 

production could have started within weeks. Nerve 

agent production would have taken much longer, 

because of the complexity of the process, according 

to Dr. Mahmud Faraj Bilal, a senior Iraqi scientist 

and CBW expert, and the lack of advanced phosphorus precursors in country. Bilal believed a covert 

offensive CW program was unlikely because the 

program would require 400-500 witting personnel. 

Iraq at OIF possessed a large range of corrosion-resistant production equipment, tagged and 

monitored by UNMOVIC, and procured for civilian 

purposes by non-CW associated facilities. However, 

ISG did not encounter any production units specifi -

cally confi gured to produce key precursors or CW 

agents.

Sulfur Mustard process and key chemicals/

associated Iraqi facilities.

Ethylene + Chlorine (aq) = Chloroethanol

Chloroethanol + Na2S = thiodiglycol

Thiodiglycol + HCl = Sulfur Mustard

Figure 2.
26

• Iraq also possessed declarable equipment for 

chemical production, which it had not declared to 

the UN. ISG discovers a complete process hall containing stainless steel reaction vessels of up to 3m3 

for the extraction of essence of plant material, ‘plant 

oils,’ at Samarra’ Drug Industries.

By cannibalizing production equipment from various civilian chemical facilities, it would have been 

possible for Iraq to assemble a CW production plant. 

Alternatively, equipment that was less suitable could 

have been reconfi gured at an existing site and used 

for short-term limited production. Iraq had improvised and jury-rigged equipment in the past.

• According to Dr. Bilal, Iraq’s hypothetical breakout mustard production could be achieved by using 

equipment that could be sacrifi ced, instead of relying on specially lined vessels. 

• In an interview, MIC director Huwaysh said that 

Iraq would have been willing to use systems that 

would be disposed of after a few production runs. 

• Less corrosion resistant equipment could be used 

Phosphorus Chemistry in Iraq 

Because ISG did not fi nd any phosphorus chemistry 

applicable to nerve agents at an industrial scale in 

Iraq, we judge that Iraq could not have produced 

nerve agents without imports of key phosphorus 

compounds.

Why does the indigenous production of nerve agent 

depend on phosphorus precursors? 

The backbone and toxicity of both G and V-series 

nerve agents is based on the phosphorus-carbon 

bond. Creating this bond utilizes trimethyl phosphite 

(CH3

O)3P—used in most phosphorus-based agents. 

Other phosphorus containing compounds, such as 

phosphoric acid and phosphates used in fertilizer 

production, are not suitable for forming the necessary 

P-C bond.

What evidence of phosphorus did ISG fi nd in Iraq?

ISG investigated four production areas suspected of 

conducting phosphorus chemistry:

• The al-Qaim Superphosphate Plant was suspected 

by ISG of possible production of highly reactive 

phosphorus compounds. An ISG site visit revealed 

that by design, the plant could not be used for this 

purpose. At al-Qaim SPP, phosphate rock was 

crushed and converted into phosphoric acid. Superphosphate was then produced from the acid and 

sold on the local market. 

• The Al Tariq Company was suspected of producing 

pesticides, a process that usually consumes similar 

precursors and employs similar chemical reactions as nerve agents. However, an ISG site visit 

and a series of interviews with Al Tariq employees 

revealed that the company imports concentrated 

pesticides (expensive and unsuitable for nerve 

agent production) for dilution, formulation, and resale in Iraq. 

• The Qubaysah White Phosphorus Production 

Facility would have provided Iraq with the capability to convert phosphate rock into a potential nerve 

agent precursor. However, according to reporting the facility was never fully completed, and no 

equipment was installed, according to ISG analysis 

and a military reconnaissance mission.

• Hutin Munitions Production and Storage Facility: 

ISG discovered numerous barrels (over 3,000 gallons) of white phosphorus and munitions assembly 

lines, which we judge were intended for the production of white phosphorus illumination rounds. This 

white phosphorus, probably imported and declared 

by Iraq in 2002, could have been used to produce 

some nerve agent precursors on a laboratory scale. 
27

Chemical

Chemical Process Development and Engineering in 

Iraq

ISG examined a range of documents obtained for 

Iraq’s key engineering design center which show 

that Iraqi chemical manufacturers followed process 

development engineering practices that are very 

similar to international convention. This is not surprising given the legacy of British oil production and 

refi ning in Iraq.

The plant designs and process plans of MIC and 

MIC subcontractors essentially conformed to the 

international norm, based on analysis of seized 

documents. MIC projects for “Triethylamine Process Scale-up”, “Xylidene Production Plans” and a 

fuming sulfuric acid (oleum) plant all demonstrated 

Iraqi engineering capability.

• MIC used AutoCAD software for many of its 

designs. Process modeling and some PFD’s appear 

to have been produced using ChemCAD software. 

• A chart taken from the Sa’ad Center (see Figure 4) 

outlines the planning and building of a proposed 

oleum plant. Although it handwritten, it is the same 

engineering strategy used by most global corporations. 

• The IIC and the MIC often tasked universities to 

prepare these initial technical reports, feasibility 

studies and drawings, steps A-C, as seen with the 

List of 1,000 Chemicals. The work Mosul University 

did in its report “Preparation of N,N-Dicyclohexyl 

Carbodiimide” is an example of a typical early-end 

feasibility study.

Figure 4 illustrates a portion of the total design package (Items A-S) for the oleum plant. These drawings 

and plans are not merely academic steps to optimize 

a given process. In many multi-step chemical manufacturing processes, minimal and safe operational 

performance would require most of these development 

steps, even for small scale facilities that have the 

capability to switch between products rapidly.

for most, if not all, CW agent chemical processes. 

However such equipment would wear out fairly 

quickly when used for some of the chemical processes involved in the agent production, according 

to UNMOVIC. 

Figure 3 shows a two-ton bulk storage cylinder found 

in the underground pilot plant at Al Muthanna. The 

storage container had been modifi ed in the 1980s into 

a reactor vessel probably for mustard production. This 

item escaped UNSCOM-directed destruction. 

What is “corrosion resistant” equipment? “Corrosion resistant” is a term usually applied to equipment 

where all the surfaces that come into direct contact 

with the reagents are made of high nickel alloys, titanium alloys, tantalum alloys, ferrosilicons, ceramic 

or glass—all highly corrosion resistant to specifi c 

materials. Corrosion resistant equipment is commonly used in fl uorinating reactions, such as Sarin 

and soman production, within a CW program, and for 

chemical processes requiring heat and chlorinating 

agents such as the manufacture of mustard and nerve 

agents. Most commercially available materials used 

in the manufacture of chemical production equipment 

have some degree of corrosion resistance. 
28

Figure 3. A two ton bulk storage cylinder found in the 

underground pilot plant at Al Muthanna. The storage 

container had been modifi ed in the 1980s into a reactor vessel probably for mustard production. This item 

escaped UNSCOM-directed destruction.

Figure 4. This chart illustrates a portion of the total 

design package (Items A-S) for the oleum plant. These 

drawings and plans are not merely academic steps to 

optimized a given process. In many multi-step chemical 

manufacturing processes, minimal and safe operational 

performance would require most of these development 

steps, even for small scale facilities that have the capability to switch between products rapidly.
29

Chemical

Weaponization

Iraq’s capability to produce CW munitions on a 

large scale ended with Desert Storm. However, Iraq 

retained the ability to retool existing factories to 

produce new munitions, and would have relied on 

basic fabrication techniques to weaponize agent if it 

had chosen to do so. 

• Most of the Iraqi modifi cations for chemical delivery consisted of simple machining and/or welding 

of aluminum or steel.

• Although much of the Iraqi infrastructure to fi ll CW 

munitions was destroyed, the technology was basic 

and we judged it could be quickly recreated.

• The performance of the modifi ed weapons was 

usually sub-optimal by Western standards, refl ecting the simplicity—or crudeness—of Iraqi design 

approaches. However, the performance was usually 

good enough to meet minimum requirements.

Suspect Munitions Activities

A number of unusual and unexplained items found 

at Taji ammo depot could have been used for either 

conventional or CW weaponization. All Iraqi CW 

weaponization experts who were asked by ISG were 

unfamiliar with these items, and although they could 

have been intended for CW delivery, the items represented crude prototypes and concept components and 

were found at a non–Al Muthanna bunker. 

• In January 2003, UNMOVIC found several 

suspect items at the Taji ammunition depot, including 

six unfi lled CW 122mm rocket warheads and munitions base plates of varying sizes. 

• A number of scientists who were involved with 

Iraq’s CW weaponization projects did not recognize 

the 76mm, 115mm and 183mm base plates, shown 

to them in photographs. They speculated that 

these base plates could have been used for CW 

munitions.

• A former Iraqi CW munitions researcher offered a 

dissenting opinion by claiming the thread type on 

the base plates would not be suffi cient to keep the 

munitions from leaking. Furthermore he claimed 

that the 183mm base plate found could not have 

been for a chemical munition because Iraq did not 

work on munitions this large. 

• No other signifi cant munitions components of these 

sizes have been found to date. ISG therefore is 

unable to satisfactorily conclude the munitions type 

and caliber.

In September 2003, a senior offi cial at the Al 

Nu’man cluster bomb production facility gave ISG 

a 3.5-liter CW submunition he claimed had been 

held by a factory worker in his private residence to 

keep it from being looted. The Al Nu’man facility 

historically had been involved in attempts to develop 

chemical capable submunitions, which had been a 

focus of Iraqi pre–Desert Storm munitions development work.

Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991

ISG expended considerable time and effort investigating longstanding Iraqi assertions about the fate 

of CW munitions known to have been in Baghdad’s 

possession during the Gulf war. We believe the 

vast majority of these munitions were destroyed, 

but questions remain concerning hundreds of CW 

munitions.

Since May 2004, ISG has recovered dozens of 

additional chemical munitions, including artillery 

rounds, rockets and a binary Sarin artillery projectile 

(see Figure 5). In each case, the recovered munitions 

appear to have been part of the pre-1991 Gulf war 

stocks, but we can neither determine if the munitions 

were declared to the UN or if, as required by the 

UN SCR 687, Iraq attempted to destroy them. (See 

Annex F.) 

• The most signifi cant recovered munition was a 

152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile which 

insurgents had attempted to use as an improvised 

explosive device.
30

Figure 5. Chemical weapons fi ndings in Iraq.
31

Chemical

• ISG has also recovered 155mm chemical rounds 

and 122mm artillery rockets which we judge came 

from abandoned Regime stocks.

The 1991 Decision To Destroy 

Undeclared Weapons

An IAEA inspection led by Dr. David Kay in late 

June 1991 triggered Iraq’s decision to unilaterally destroy the undeclared weapons that had been 

concealed from the UN, according to multiple senior 

Iraqi offi cials. Dr. Kay’s inspection team was blocked 

from sites in Abu Ghurayb and Fallujah. The Iraqis 

fi red warning shots over the inspectors’ heads, but 

Dr. Kay and his group brought back video tapes and 

photos that indicated Iraq was hiding undeclared uranium enrichment equipment from the inspectors. 

• Dr. Kay’s inspection and the international uproar 

surrounding it caused consternation and a measure 

of panic in the Regime’s leadership, particularly 

Husayn Kamil. Saddam appointed a high-level 

committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 

‘Aziz to deal with inspection matters, according to 

multiple sources. 

• A senior Iraqi scientist who directed the destruction 

of chemical and biological munitions contends that 

the decision to destroy the hidden materials was 

made at the end of June 1991. David Kay’s inspection and the ensuing controversy prompted Iraqi 

concerns about renewed war with the United States, 

according to Dr. Mahmud Firaj Bilal. Amir Rashid 

contacted Dr. Bilal and ordered that all hidden 

chemical and biological munitions be destroyed 

within 48 hours. When Bilal responded that this 

was impossible, Rashid directed that Bilal use the 

resources of the Iraqi Air Force and the surface-tosurface missile force to accomplish the task. Dr. 

Bilal gathered his colleagues from Al Muthanna 

State Establishment, went to the locations of the 

stored munitions, and began the destruction.

• Iraq declared some of the unilateral destruction–

missiles and chemical munitions–to UNSCOM in 

March 1992 but continued to conceal the destruction of the biological weapons program.

Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991

Iraq completed the destruction of its pre-1991 

stockpile of CW by the end of 1991, with most items 

destroyed in July of that year. ISG judges that Iraq 

destroyed almost all prohibited weapons at that time.

• ISG has obtained no evidence that contradicts our 

assessment that the Iraqis destroyed most of their 

hidden stockpile, although we recovered a small 

number of pre-1991 chemical munitions in early to 

mid 2004.

• These remaining pre-1991 weapons either escaped 

destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. 

More may be found in the months and years ahead. 

Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, 

and Precursors

ISG interviewed Dr. Mahmud Firaj Bilal, the Iraqi 

scientist who supervised the destruction of Iraq’s 

undeclared chemical munitions, along with a number 

of Iraqi higher offi cials who were knowledgeable 

of the weapons destruction. Although other sources 

have corroborated parts of Dr. Bilal’s account, ISG’s 

understanding of Iraq’s chemical and biological warfare agent unilateral destruction is heavily dependent 

Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Tap Chemical 

Resources

A group of insurgents began a nascent CW effort 

without CW scientists or industrial-scale chemical 

supplies. After OIF, a group of insurgents—referred 

to as the al-Abud network—assembled key supplies 

and relevant expertise from community resources to 

develop a program for weaponizing CW agents for 

use against Coalition Forces. The al-Abud network in 

late 2003 recruited a Baghdad chemist—who lacked 

the relevant CW expertise—to develop chemical 

agents. The group sought and easily acquired from 

farmers and local shops chemicals and equipment to 

conduct CW experiments. An investigation of these 

CW attempts suggests that the al-Abud network failed 

to produce desired CW agents, however it remains 

unclear whether these failures derive from a lack of 

available precursors or insuffi cient CW expertise.
32

on Dr. Bilal’s information, which is a weakness in our 

analysis. Nevertheless, as with Iraq’s long range missiles, we obtained a reasonably coherent account of 

the disposition of the CW munitions, though we were 

not able physically to verify the story. The UN has, 

however, verifi ed some of it.

• Iraq likely destroyed all 20 concealed CW Al 

Husayn missile warheads in the summer of 1991, 

according to Dr. Bilal based on UN-sponsored 

excavations. All were “binary” GB/GF nerve agent 

warheads fi lled with a mixture of isopropanol and 

cyclohexanol and MPF.

• Al Muthanna had dispersed approximately 1024 

CW R-400 bombs along various Iraqi airbases. Iraq 

did not declare some of these to the UN and unilaterally destroyed them in situ. The UN holds these 

as accounted for, although they were unaware that a 

small percentage of them were used on the Shia in 

March 1991 according to multiple sources.

• Iraq disposed of 1.5 tons of spoiled bulk VX nerve 

agent at the Al Muthanna State Establishment 

dumpsite.

• Dr. Bilal also stated that Iraq destroyed the following chemical agent precursors:

—157 tons of the VX precursor phosphorus pentasulfi de (P2S5) destroyed by mixing it with soil at 

Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah. UNSCOMsponsored excavations accounted for about this 

amount.

—55 tons of the VX precursor choline destroyed at 

Qasr al-‘ashiq near Samarra’.

—10 tons of the mustard precursor thiodiglycol 

destroyed by burning at Saqlawiyah. This precursor was never declared to the UN and had been 

stored in the city of Samarra’. When the rest of 

the unilateral destruction took place, no one 

remembered this stock until a month after the rest 

of the chemical destruction. This realization triggered its destruction. 

—Al Muthanna State Establishment gave cyclohexanol, isopropanol, and isopropylamine to various 

industries for use as solvents.

• Iraq also destroyed a quantity of empty aerial 

bombs intended for CW use and empty 122-mm 

CW rockets.

• Bilal insisted that Iraq’s CW “Full, Final, and Complete Declaration” is completely accurate regarding 

the unilateral destruction of CW munitions. 

UNSCOM had verifi ed or accepted some of what 

Bilal said about munitions destruction, but other 

parts of the story remain unverifi ed.

• Iraq presented supporting documents on the unilateral destruction of 527 R-400 CW bombs and 

UNSCOM observed remnants of bombs consistent 

with the declared quantity.

• When considered with the number of declared 

BW Al Husayn warheads (25), the total number 

of undeclared “special warheads” was 45. In the 

period from 1992 to 1998, UNSCOM recovered 

and accounted for remnants of 43-45 special 

warheads. In 1997-1998, UNSCOM recovered the 

remnants of three additional training warheads. 

Iraq provided supporting documents on the overall 

accounting for special warheads and on the unilateral destruction of 45 warheads. We cannot be sure, 

however, that there were only 45 “special” warheads in Iraq’s inventory. 

• UNSCOM was not able to verify the quantity of 

VX destroyed, nor were they able to verify the 

destruction of all VX precursor chemicals. 

• UNSCOM was not able to verify the destruction 

of unfi lled 250 gauge aerial bombs, unfi lled R-400 

aerial bombs, and unfi lled 122-mm rockets.

The destruction years ago of the bulk of Iraq’s CW 

munitions not withstanding, ISG remains concerned 

about the status and whereabouts of hundreds of 

CW artillery rounds. Previous assertions that the 

munitions were all destroyed have been undermined 

by reporting that the munitions remain intact in an 

unknown location.

In the 5 January 1999 Compendium, UNSCOM 

assessed that Iraq had not adequately accounted for 

550 mustard-fi lled artillery rounds it claimed to have 

lost. This issue fi rst surfaced in 1996 because of discrepancies in Iraq’s accounting of weapons holdings, 
33

Chemical

and was investigated but not resolved by UNSCOM 

(see the January 1999 UN compendium for details). 

ISG conducted extensive interviews with high- and 

mid-level Iraqi offi cials to determine the fi nal disposition of the 550 mustard-fi lled rounds—which would 

be highly toxic, even now—cited by the UN as an 

unresolved disarmament issue, and found inconsistencies in the story among witting high-level offi cials. 

Most offi cials recounted the story of accidental 

destruction in a fi re in Karbala, reporting provided 

to the UN after Iraq’s investigation of this issue prior 

to 1998, while the former MIC director, Huwaysh, 

claims the rounds were retained for future use.

• In a 7 August 2003 debriefi ng, Huwaysh said that 

as of early 2003, all 550 mustard rounds were kept 

by the SRG at Suwayrah, probably the former location of the II RG Corps Headquarters, just north of 

the Shaykh-Mazar ammunition depot. 

• According to Huwaysh, the matter was discussed 

by the Higher Committee on Monitoring Inspections and a decision was made to declare the shells, 

which was done just prior to OIF. 

• Amir Rashid admitted that the Higher Committee 

discussed the shells in February or March 2003. 

Rashid said the discussion focused on the connection between the burned mustard shells at the Fallujah proving ground and other shells that reportedly 

burned on a trailer near Karbala after the 1991 Gulf 

War. 

• General Hussam Amin did not remember any discussions of Suwayrah and mustard shells. According to Amin, in early 2003, General ‘Amir Al Sa’adi 

explained to him that the mustard shells were 

destroyed on the trailer near Karbala. 

VX Weaponization

Iraq had not adequately addressed VX production 

and weaponization activities—a point on which 

Iraq’s denials were contradicted by UNSCOM fi ndings. ISG investigations into Iraq’s work with VX 

reveals that Iraq did weaponize VX in 1988, and 

dropped 3 aerial bombs fi lled with VX on Iran. The 

bombs, originally declared to be part of a storage 

stability trial, were in fact dropped on an undisclosed Iranian location in 1988.

Chemical Munitions—Searching 

Military Depots and Caches

Refl ecting pre-OIF intelligence assessments that 

Iraq had stockpiled hundreds of tons of chemical weapons, ISG expended considerable time and 

expertise searching for extant CW munitions. ISG 

inspected ammunition supply points identifi ed from 

preliminary analysis of the ‘red-line’ theory–including sites in proximity to units possibly equipped 

with chemical-capable weapons and in proximity to 

suspected decontamination activity. 

• ISG exploited munitions at captured enemy 

ammunition (CEA) depots established by Coalition Forces after OIF to serve as repositories for 

ammunition captured throughout the country. 

• Teams also investigated other suspect locations 

identifi ed prior to OIF as suspect CW locations, 

in particular 11 depots at which possible CW 

movement and storage activity was assessed to 

have taken place in the late 2002-2003 timeframe. 

• Overall, only a modest fraction of rounds were 

identifi ed for exploitation. The sites had been 

subject to looting during and after OIF, bombing 

of military installations during the war, and detonation of large numbers of rounds by Coalition 

Forces.

• Although only a fraction of Iraq’s total munitions 

inventory was identifi ed and exploited for CW 

rounds, a review of high-priority facilities, munitions caches, and locations identifi ed prior to OIF 

as suspect CW storage or transfer sites, did not 

reveal caches of CW weapons.

Investigating Ammunition Supply Points 

ISG’s investigation of Iraq’s ammunition supply 

points—ammunition depots, fi eld ammunition 

supply points (FASPs), tactical FASPs, and other 

dispersed weapons caches—has not uncovered any 
34

CW munitions. ISG investigation, however, was hampered by several factors beyond our control. The scale 

and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, 

and weapons markings, and extensive looting and 

destruction at military facilities during OIF signifi -

cantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was 

able to thoroughly inspect.

• ISG technical experts fully evaluated less than one 

quarter of one percent of the over 10,000 weapons 

caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten 

ammunition depots identifi ed prior to OIF as suspect CW sites.

• The enormous number of munitions dispersed 

throughout the country may include some older, 

CW-fi lled munitions, and ISG cannot discount the 

possibility that a few large caches of munitions 

remain to be discovered within Iraq. 

Investigation

ISG began its search for Iraqi chemical weapons by 

identifying a set of facilities from the nearly 1,000 

sites at which Iraq stockpiled or deployed munitions. ISG obtained from CENTCOM a database of 

104 ASPs identifi ed within the assessed “Red Line” 

surrounding Baghdad (see Annex G, for details on the 

‘Red Line Theory’). This list was narrowed down to 

26 sites using two main criteria (see Figure 6). 

• Reporting of a suspect CW decontamination vehicle, a “Samarra’ ” type water truck in proximity to 

the ASP—at the time the targets were selected, the 

presence of these vehicles was regarded as indicators of CW-related activity. 

• An artillery unit capable of fi ring 122mm multiplerocket launcher (MRL) or 155mm CW rounds, also 

in proximity of the site.

The ASPs of the Republican Guard Al Madinah, Al 

Manawrah, Baghdad, and Hammurabi Divisions were 

of highest priority because of the units’ trusted status 

and location during the combat phase of OIF. Exploitation of the 26 ASPs began with a thorough review of 

all reporting on the facilities to discern the status and 

change in the site during and after OIF , in order to 

narrow the list of sites to be visited. 

• Reporting revealed 16 of the 26 sites were either 

empty, destroyed, or contained unidentifi ed material 

with an imagery signature inconsistent with CW. 

One site was found to be a duplicate location under 

a different name and another was removed for lack 

of evidence. Teams from ISG visited the remaining 

eight sites. 

Types of ASPs

ASPs can be divided into three different classes: (1) 

Ammunition Depot, (2) Field Ammunition Supply 

Point (FASP), and (3) Tactical FASP (TFASP). Sites 

vary depending on permanence of structures and 

proximity to forward deployed units. 

• Ammunition Depots are permanent structures 

located far from the forward lines. They are fenced 

and guarded with hardened bunkers as well as 

revetments for open storage. Depots are designed 

to supply munitions to a large number of different units and as a result contain a wide variety of 

ammunition types. 

• FASPs are usually permanent structures as well. As 

with depots, they are usually fenced and guarded 

and may contain bunkers or revetments. FASPs 

are meant to serve a smaller number of units and 

will maintain a limited mixture of munitions. In 

US Army terminology, they would be equivalent to 

Ammunition Transfer Points, or ATPs.

• TFASPs are semi-permanent structures in close 

proximity to the units that require the munitions. 

They may be fenced or bermed and contain mostly 

open storage in revetments. TFASPs function as 

the immediate supply point for a limited number 

of units and retain only the munitions required 

for those units. In US Army terminology, a TFASP 

would be equivalent to a cache.
35

Chemical

• ISG investigation of eight ASPs turned up a wealth 

of different Iraqi munitions including artillery 

shells, and rockets. However, we did not locate any 

CW fi lled artillery. 

Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points 

(CEA Consolidation Points)

ISG capitalized on efforts by Coalition Forces in 

December 2003 to begin a program to consolidate 

captured Iraqi weapons into seven pre-identifi ed 

Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) Depots (see 

Figure 7). As of mid-September 2004, Coalition 

Forces have reviewed and cleared a total of 10,033 

weapons caches dispersed throughout the country, 

destroying a total of 243,045 tons of munitions. This 

represents only part of Iraq’s pre-OIF munitions 

inventory, and only a fraction of these were checked 

by ISG technical experts for signs of chemical agent 

fi ll. (See Annex H.)

Many of the rounds were destroyed at their original cache locations or at a CEA depot; however, 

ISG technical experts have been working with CEA 

offi cials to evaluate munitions that were returned to 

consolidation points for storage or later destruction.

• ISG reviewed CEA inventory lists for chemicalcapable projectiles, rockets, missiles, or bombs, and 

conducted missions to the consolidation points to 

X-ray, catalogue, and analyze specifi c rounds for 

CW signatures. No CW munitions were found at 

these sites as of September 2004.

• ISG teams also sought unique munitions identifi ed by CEA as new shipments arrived onsite. No 

signifi cant fi ndings were reported. 

ISG estimates that CEA visits allowed us to review at 

most about 10 percent of Iraqi munitions. As of 15 

September 2004, CEA has identifi ed a total of 10,049 

caches (a cache is considered a collection of munitions in any quantity) throughout Iraq. The breakdown 

of their activities follows: 

• To date, 10,033 caches have been cleared with a 

total of 405,944 tons of munitions delivered to the 

CEA points, an average of about 40 tons of munitions per cleared cache. Of that total, 243,045 tons 

of munitions have been destroyed, and 162,899 

tons remain at the CEA points for future destruction.

• 16 caches remain outstanding, containing an estimated total of 6,068 tons, an average of 380 tons 

per cache. 

• ISG conducted CEA visits at about a two-permonth rate in early 2004 and it is estimated that 

ISG experts reviewed about 50,000-75,000 tons 

of munitions—about 12 to 18 percent of the grand 

total of 412,012 existing tons.

• In addition to the CEA process, a large number of 

munitions were destroyed between OIF and late 

2003, when CEA instituted its process. Offi cials 

at CEA have been highly effi cient in destroying as 

much as 25,000 tons of munitions per month. 

• Recent data indicate that the grand total will continue to grow. Over the six-week period from the 

end of July to mid-September, CEA discovered an 

additional 291 caches with a total of 105,028 tons 

of munitions—cache discoveries continued to the 

time of writing. CEA estimates a total of 600,000 

tons of munitions is the total tonnage, including 

munitions destroyed during OIF and scattered about 

the countryside. ISG believes this number is fairly 

uncertain, and could go considerably higher in the 

future as new caches are discovered. We regard 

600,000 as a lower limit on total munitions. Using 

this number, we estimate we visited about 8-12 

percent (in round numbers, 10 percent), or less of 

the total Iraqi munitions stocks.

Although ISG only inspected a small fraction of the 

Iraqi munitions, we remain confi dent that we have 

not destroyed chemical munitions in the process of 

destroying Iraqi weapons.

• The US military has high confi dence that the 

destruction process has thus far proceeded safely, 

with no release of chemicals connected with it.
36

Figure 6. Location of 26 RG ASPs. The “Red Line” is shown for reference purposes.
37

Chemical

• The amount of inspections ISG was able to carry 

out was consistent with the resources available, 

and the safety factors involved in carrying out the 

inspections of munitions facilities.

In addition to the ASPs and CEA sites, ISG undertook a systematic effort to review and investigate a 

series of depots that factored prominently in preOIF assessments of possible CW transshipment 

activity in the 2002-2003 timeframe. Several studies, based primarily on imagery Analysis at that time 

concluded that Iraq probably deployed CW munitions 

from depots to ammunition supply points throughout Iraq as part of ongoing preparations for war. The 

original list of 11 sites at which activity had been 

noted was narrowed to two main depots for intensive 

ISG investigation, including site visits, technical 

assessments, and personal interviews. 

• Imagery analysis observed indication of ammunition movement in Iraq in 2002. Analysis of specifi c 

activity—at the 11 depots—raised increased analytic scrutiny and prompted a review of munitions 

transshipment signatures throughout Iraq.

• The key indicators to identify suspect CW munitions movement and storage included the presence 

of special guards, vehicles assessed to be decontamination trucks, cargo vehicles, and the grading 

of top soil near suspect bunkers.

ISG began an investigation of the 11 major depots 

by reviewing imagery reporting of the sites to 

determine feasibility for site exploitations and by 

subsequent site visits and identifi cation of individuals and military offi cials who had previously worked 

there. ISG analysis revealed that most of the sites 

were destroyed or looted during or shortly after OIF, 

and the military offi cers who worked there proved diffi cult to locate. 

• ISG conducted an in-depth investigation of the AlMusayyib Storage Depot—assessed prior to OIF 

to have the strongest indicators of CW movement—

in an attempt to understand the nature of suspect 

CW transshipment activity there between 1998 and 

2002. (See Annex H for a detailed account).

• Reporting indicated the presence of a suspect CW 

decontamination vehicle at the Miqdadiyah Depot

north of Baghdad and prompted an ISG operation 

to recover two vehicles for exploitation. 

• The remaining sites were not visited because of 

the indicated looting and destruction that prevented 

the discovery of any munitions remaining from 

pre-OIF. 
38

Figure 7. Captured enemy ammunition 

supply points.
39

Chemical

An Najaf Depot

Az Zubayr Depot

Taji Depot

Buckmaster

Jaguar Depot

Arlington Depot

Paladin Depot

Figure 7. Captured enemy ammunition 

supply points (continued).
40

Figure 7. Ammunition depots of interest (continued).

Depot Name Pre-OIF “Indicators” ISG Investigations

1 Al Miqdadiyah 

Ammunition 

Storage Facility

–Presence of Samarra’-type vehicle

–Separately secured area under MEK control

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks and 

Samarra’-type vehicle 1994

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks and 

Samarra’-type vehicle in Jan 2003

–Visited by UNMOVIC after 2003 transshipment 

activity terminated

–Identifi cation and acquisition 

of two ‘Samarra’-type’ vehicles 

from the Miqdadiyah area; 

detailed analysis of vehicles 

included in section (3); no signs 

of decontamination activity. 

2 Al Hadithah 

Site Command/

Ammunition Depot 

West

–Covered stakebed trucks 2002

–Former CW storage (a)

–clean-up efforts 2002

–Imagery indicated site was 

entirely looted and destroyed. 

No ISG exploitation.

3,4 Al Musayyib 

Barracks Brigade 

Headquarters and 

Ammunition 

Ordnance Depotb 

–Presence of Samarra’-type vehicle late 

2001-Aug 2002

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks and 

Samarra’-type vehicle mid-2002

–Separately secured area

–Grading of the area July 2002

–Decon/washdown trenches near entrance 

–Thorough investigation of site, 

to include multiple site visits, 

debriefi ng of former military 

employees, and extensive document review. 

–Detailed fi ndings included in 

section below. 

5 Baghdad 

Ammunition Depot 

Tajib 

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks and tanker 

truck 2002

–Internal security tents with tanker truck Nov 

2002

–Presence of tanker truck

–Multiple site visits, bunkers 

searched. 

–Found 81mm rockets, aluminum 

tubes referred to in Powell’s 

speech

–Air delivery bombs, rockets 

exploited. 

6 An Najaf Storage 

and Ammo Depot 

Areab

–Increased security after Husayn Kamel defection in August 1995

–Presence of Samarra’-type vehicle 1996

–Munitions transshipment June 1998

–Dispersal activity within secured area 1999

–Multiple visits by ISG. 

–Unusual fuel air bomb discovered by onsite contractors.

7 Ar Rutbah Storage 

Facility

–Transshipment with covered stakebed trucks in 

2002 

–Dispersion of munitions within depot Jan 2003 

involving Samarra’-type vehicle, stakebed truck, 

and probable security vehicle

–Presence of Samarra’-type vehicle

–Imagery indicated site was 

looted 

–Remaining munitions cleared by 

82nd ABD and EODT a US EOD 

contractor

–No ISG exploitation.

82nd ABD = 82nd Airborne Division

120th EN = 120th Engineers

EODT = Proper name of a US contractor

EOD = Explosives Ordnance Demolition

UXO = Unexploded Ordnance
41

Chemical

Figure 7. Ammunition depots of interest (continued).

Depot Name Pre-OIF “Indicators” ISG Investigations

8 H-3 Ammo Storage 

Depot West

–CW storage at H-3 NW in 1991

–Stakebed truck transshipment in 2002

–Remaining munitions cleared by 

82nd ABD and EODT a US EOD 

contractor

–No ISG exploitation.

9 Habbaniyah Ammo 

Depot

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks and tanker 

truck 2002

–Few structures remain. 100 

tons of UXO with sub munitions in the mix.

–Being cleared by 120th EN and 

Naval EOD, no WMD reported 

by EOD experts.

–No ISG exploitation.

10 Qabatiyah Ammo 

Storage Depot

–Samarra’-type tanker truck attached to 

engineer platoon 2002 

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks 2003

–Imagery indicated site was 

entirely looted and destroyed. 

–Remaining munitions cleared by 

US forces.

–No ISG exploitation.

11 Qubaysah 

(Muhammidiyat) 

Storage and Ammo 

and Scud Depot

–Transshipment with covered stakebed trucks in 

2002 

–Transshipment with stakebed trucks and tank 

truck 2003

–Bunkers destroyed

–Site reduced by US forces

–No ISG Exploitation

aStored empty 122 mm chemical rockets in 1991, 

AALD-500 bombs late-1980s.

bHighlighted in Secretary of State Powell’s speech 

to the UNSC.
42

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43

Chemical

Annex A

IIS Undeclared Research 

on Poisons and Toxins 

for Assassination

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) M16 Directorate—Iraq’s Undeclared Poisons and Toxins 

Research

The IIS M16 directorate utilized a set of covert 

laboratories to produce, research, and test various chemical compounds, including the BW agent 

ricin. While there is no defi nitive evidence that M16 

scientists produced CW agents in these labs, the 

M16 directorate may have been planning to produce 

several agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen 

mustard, and Sarin.

• Site visits to several M16 labs, safe houses, and 

disposal sites have turned up no evidence of CWrelated production or development, however, many 

of these sites were either sanitized by the regime or 

looted, limiting the obtainable information from site 

exploitations.

• ISG has had to rely heavily on sensitive reporting to 

understand the activity that took place at these sites, 

and there has only been limited, uncorroborated 

reporting that the M16 had produced CW agents. 

Several reports have stated that ricin was produced 

at one of these sites in the early 1990s.

• A former IIS offi cer claimed that the M16 directorate had a plan to produce and weaponize nitrogen 

mustard in rifl e grenades, and a plan to bottle Sarin 

and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers and medicine bottles which they would ship to the United 

States and Europe. The source claimed that they 

could not implement the plan because chemicals to 

produce the CW agents were unavailable.

ISG assesses that the IIS used these labs to develop 

substances that kill or incapacitate targeted individuals. Intentions of senior regime leadership with 

regards to these labs have been diffi cult to determine 

Chemicals Used for Assassinations

ISG has found evidence that the IIS utilized chemical materials to carry out assassination operations 

in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

• A former IIS offi cer said that Muhammad Khudayr 

al-Dulaymi took an auto injecting syringe in the 

shape of a pen that can deliver a lethal amount of 

a toxic substance to Europe in 1988, but ended up 

not using the device. The same source said a similar 

device was taken to the UK in 1987.

• The device was developed by the M9 directorate, 

which would later become the M16 chemical directorate. The former IIS offi cer said that the director of M9, Muhammad Munim al-Azmerli, would 

personally fi ll the device with either snake venom or 

nitrogen mustard before giving it to an M4 offi cer to 

use overseas.

• A former IIS offi cer claims that Muhammad Munim 

al-Azmleri used ricin produced at the M16 Rashdiya site to perform assassinations in 1993.

However, we have not come across information suggesting chemical or biological materials have been 

used for assassinations in recent years.

• ISG has obtained a large body of evidence which 

suggests that the M14 directorate was responsible 

for assassination operations, including the assassination attempts on George Bush and Husayn 

Kamil.

• Little reporting exists on what chemicals, if any, the 

M16 directorate provided other IIS offi cers. However, the director of M16 from 1996 to OIF, Nu’man 

Muhammad al-Tikriti, claims that the only chemical 

M16 provided other directorates was a sleeping 

agent he gave M5 offi cers in 2002.

• In the large body of reporting we have on the M16, 

cooperation with M14 offi cers is rarely mentioned. 

Furthermore, none of the IIS sources with direct 

access we have spoken to have told us they knew of 

chemical substances given to the M14 directorate to 

use in assassinations.
44

due to the compartmented nature of the work. ISG 

judges that these small-scale endeavors were not part 

of a WMD program.

• The M16 chemical preparation division was 

responsible for producing and testing these substances of interest. A recovered document lists the 

chemical preparation division’s tasks which include 

developing substances which kill and paralyze, and 

concealing these chemicals in food and beverages. 

What IIS offi cers have told ISG about the chemical preparation division is consistent with this 

documentary evidence.

• The same document lists less than a dozen individuals as being employed by the chemical preparation 

division in 1999. IIS offi cers in other sections of 

M16 were either unaware of the chemical preparation division’s activities or unwilling to discuss 

them, as several IIS offi cers did not even list it as 

one of M16’s divisions.

Purpose of IIS CBW Research

We assess that the M16 chemical preparation division was not used as the method for maintaining the 

technical expertise required to restart a large scale 

CBW program, because M16’s work was limited to 

laboratory scale production.

• M16 scientists employed in the chemical preparation directorate would have the knowledge to 

produce CW agents on a small scale given their 

scientifi c training, the link the IIS had to Iraq’s 

early CW program, and the availability of covert 

chemical labs and equipment.

• These scientists focused on lab-scale chemical work, which would mean they would be less 

capable to manufacture CW on a large industrial 

scale than the engineers involved in Iraq’s pre-1991 

CW program.

Several scientists in the M16 directorate likely had 

the expertise to produce laboratory scale amounts of 

CW agent, and the directorate had suffi cient laboratory equipment available to engage in CW research 

and development.

• Exploitation of the M16 headquarters building 

revealed that the directorate had large amounts of 

laboratory glassware and analytic equipment, which 

could be used for both legitimate work such as 

food testing and forensic analysis, and illicit CW 

production and development. However, precursor 

chemicals required for CW agent production were 

not found among the various chemicals located at 

the headquarters building or its storage site in Djerf 

al-Naddaf.

• Iraq’s pre-Gulf war CW program had a heavy 

IIS involvement prior to being relocated to the 

Al Muthanna facility. Some of the scientists who 

worked on CW agent production prior to the Gulf 

war still had ties to the M16 directorate at the time 

of OIF.

There are indications that the former regime 

intended to use the M16 to retain the capability to 

produce CW agent on a small scale that would not 

be militarily signifi cant.

• According to a former IIS offi cer with direct access 

to the information, a four man team was created in 

1995 to produce CW agents on a small scale. The 

source believed that the secret IIS lab work was initiated by Saddam Husayn who tasked the director 

of the IIS to set up the program.

• The same source reported that Iraq dismantled its 

capability to mass produce CW agent in favor of 

retaining the ability to produce smaller, batch scales 

of agent at covert labs. The source claimed that the 

IIS possessed the equipment and chemicals necessary to produce CW agents. We believe that this 

source is only speculating on a plan to retain a 

CW production capability, because the source has 

stated several times that the IIS lacked the necessary precursors to produce chemical agent.

Future Plans To Produce CW Agent

ISG is unable to corroborate the sensitive reporting that the IIS was planning to produce nitrogen 

mustard, sulfur mustard, and Sarin, but assesses 

that if plans to produce chemical agent within the 

IIS existed, the M16 chemical preparation division 

would have been the group tasked with carrying 

them out.
45

Chemical

• A former Iraqi intelligence offi cer reported that 

the M16 chemical preparation division planned to 

produce and weaponize nitrogen mustard using CS 

rifl e grenades. The source provided ISG with two 

grenade launchers and cases of CS grenades he 

claimed M16 offi cers were supposed to modify.

• The same source later reported that the IIS had a 

plan to produce Sarin and sulfur mustard, which the 

IIS planned to distribute to the US and Europe. The 

source claimed that the director of M16, Nu’man 

Muhammad al-Tikriti, gave him a perfume-bottling 

machine that was to be used to help carry out this 

plan.

Both of these plans are extremely diffi cult to corroborate because:

• The reporting on this activity states it was never 

carried out.

• According to the source of the above information, only Fadil Abbas al-Husayni, Adnan Abdul 

Razzaq, Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti (the director of M16), and Tahir Jalil Habbush (the director 

of the IIS) knew details about the plans to produce 

chemical agent within M16. (See fi gures 1 and 2.)

Covert Labs and Related Activity

Exploitations of IIS sites have corroborated the 

story that the chemical preparation directorate was 

involved in the research and development of chemical materials, but was not producing CW at the time 

of OIF. Exploitation teams have visited several laboratories, storage areas, and destruction sites, but have 

only recovered materials which indicate the chemical 

preparation directorate was involved in the production 

of chemicals used for assassination or incapacitation 

purposes.

The activity which took place at the various sites 

focused mainly on the production of chemicals and 

the testing of these chemicals on animals and identifying their effects on food and beverages.

• Multiple reports and a recovered lab notebook 

show that the M16 chemical preparation division 

researched a variety of chemicals including: Fluoroacetate, nitrosoamine, strychnine, thallium chloride, 

and various pharmaceutical products.

• According to a recovered document, the chemical 

preparation division was separated into two groups: 

One that produced the chemicals and one that tested 

the intelligence applicability of a chemical.

• Reporting states that persons associated with the 

intelligence application group tested chemicals on 

mice, rats, rabbits, and pigs, and mixed chemicals 

with various foods to see if it changed the appearance or smell of the food (see fi gures 3 and 4). 

The M16 chemical preparation division changed 

locations signifi cantly during the past 12 years, 

which may have been done to avoid UN inspectors.

• From 1991 to 2003 the M16 chemical preparation 

division moved 5 times, from Rashdiyah, to Djerf 

al-Naddaf, to the headquarters building in Karada, 

to a small house in Taji, and fi nally to a residence 

in Mustansariyah where the fi nal operations of the 

division took place.

• Reporting says that a fear of the UN was the driving 

force for some M16 activity, such as concealing 

chemicals or closing down the 

Rashdiyah site.

Rashdiyah (N 33 32 03.0 E 044 20 26.4)

The Rashdiyah site was an active M16 site from 

1991 to some point in the mid-1990s where the 

chemical preparation division researched ricin and 

other, non-CBW-related chemicals.

• Reportedly, ricin, PCP, and hyoscine, a chemical 

extracted from the Datura plant, were researched at 

the Rashdiya site.

• Reports state that the Rashdiyah lab was eventually 

closed in the mid-1990s and moved to the Djerf 

al-Naddaf facility.

• A former IIS offi cer listed the Rashdiyah “Fish 

Research Center” site as being a secret laboratory 

used by the IIS.
46

Figure 1 (left) and Figure 2 (right). Perfume bottles and 

bottling machine reportedly intended to weaponize Sarin 

and sulfur mustard to use against the US and Europe.

Figure 3 (left) and Figure 4 (right). In early May 2003,

a sensitive source gave coalition forces a box of 

chemicals he claimed the IIS M16 preparation division 

was researching. The chemicals were meant for 

assassinations or to assist in kidnapping.
47

Chemical

The absence of laboratory equipment or chemicals 

is more likely the result of the facility not being utilized by the M16 since the 1990s, rather than being 

caused by looting or sanitization efforts prior to OIF.

• An exploitation of this site in April 2003 uncovered 

chemical-resistant countertops and evidence of a 

former air handling system. No other signs were 

evident that this facility had been used as a chemical laboratory.

• Much of the chemicals and equipment present 

at this facility were likely moved when the IIS 

departed this site. A former high-level member 

of the Iraqi government with direct access to the 

information said that the IIS operated the lab from 

1992-1995.

Ricin and other chemicals were probably produced 

and tested on mice and rats at the Rashdiya site in 

the early 1990s. The amount of ricin produced at the 

site was no greater than a few kilograms.

• A high-level IIS source claimed that Adnan Abdul 

Razzaq al-Ubaydi produced as much as 3.5 kg of 

ricin in 1992, which was partially used by Doctor 

Muhammad Abdul Munim al-Azmerli for assassinations in the early 1990s. The source claimed that 

he saw the ricin, and Razzaq personally informed 

him about the amount produced.

• A mid-level IIS lab worker with direct access supported the ricin production claim, and estimated 

that Razzaq produced 2 kg of ricin at the Rashdiya 

site.

We have received confl icting reports about what 

happened to the ricin produced at this site, and have 

been unable to retrieve any of the chemical.

• The IIS source gave two different accounts of what 

happened to the ricin. In June 2003 he said that the 

ricin produced was given to the director of the IIS, 

but in September he claimed that Abdul Munim alAzmerli took possession of the ricin when the IIS 

left the Rashdiyah lab.

• A detainee who was a high-level member in the IIS 

said that the ricin research was halted on the order 

of Husayn Kamil, and the research turned over to 

Dr. Rihab Taha. The source claims that the ricin 

produced at the lab was destroyed.

We believe that a detainee who claims only milligrams of ricin was produced at the site is either 

unaware of the extent of M16’s work on the substance or trying to downplay the quantity of the 

production.

• A detainee who was a high-level member in the IIS 

informed ISG that Adnan Abdul Razzaq al-Obaydi 

produced ricin at a site 35 miles North of Baghdad 

(likely referring to the Rashdiyah lab). Razzaq 

reportedly produced a few milligrams if ricin in 

1992 while researching his thesis on the extraction 

of toxins from natural substances.

• The high level member of the Iraqi government 

who said that 3.5 kg of ricin was produced in 1992 

also said that only a small sample of ricin was 

produced by 1991. The detainee sourced above may 

have only been aware of the scientist’s progress up 

to 1991.

• Reportedly, chemicals produced at the Rashdiyah 

site were tested on mice and rats, which would have 

been unlikely to occur with ricin if only milligram 

amounts were produced (see Figures 5 and 6).

Djerf al-Naddaf (N 33 15 15.1 E 044 33 08.3)

The M16 moved its operations from Rashdiyah to 

Djerf al-Naddaf in the mid-1990s where scientists 

continued the production and testing of chemicals. 

The site appeared to be sanitized when a coalition 

team exploited it, but the IIS may have removed 

laboratory materials several years ago when they left 

the site.

• According to a former BW scientist, an NMD 

offi cial went to the Djerf al-Naddaf site in 1997 or 

1998, and though he was not allowed in the facility, 

he believed it was involved in biological research 

because he saw people he knew from the IIS.
48

A report states that M16 produced small amounts 

of Sarin and Tabun at this site in 1997, which they 

were later ordered to destroy by the director of the 

IIS. While we have strong evidence indicating an IIS 

chemical destruction committee existed at this time, 

we are unable to verify that Sarin and Tabun were 

among the chemicals destroyed.

• The director of the IIS created a committee to 

destroy the chemical agents and any related production equipment, which was later carried out at 

the Djerf al-Naddaf site, according to a senior IIS 

offi cial.

• We have been able to verify that Muhammad alQaisi, who the source claimed was on the committee that destroyed the CW agent, probably worked 

on explosives for M21 during 1997. M21 later 

merged with the M16 directorate around 2000.

• A document recovered discusses a committee that 

destroyed 4 containers of Phosgene, a CW agent 

and precursor, in 1997. On the committee was 

an M21 offi cer named Muhammad Shukr, this is 

probably Muhammad Shukr al-Qaisi, who was later 

employed by M16 according to a separate document.

• The director of M16, Nu’man Muhammad alTikriti, admitted that he ordered the M16 directorate to destroy several mustard and nerve-agent 

precursors in the 1996-97 time frame, but he did 

not say they destroyed Sarin or Tabun. According 

to Nu’man, the chemicals were destroyed because 

they were on a list of prohibited materials given to 

him by the National Monitoring Directorate.

M16 HQ (N 33 17 00.9 E 044 24 32.0)

The M16 headquarters building in Karada housed 

several labs and contained chemicals and chemistry equipment, but the sensitive reports we have 

on activity at this site do not indicate that CBW 

research or development was taking place.

• A former IIS offi cer with direct access claims that 

the M16 Headquarters building was used to produce biological weapons, but the source seems to 

lack knowledge about biological sciences, and a 

device he describes as being used to produce BW is 

probably a device used in analytic research.

 The headquarters building contained several 

chemical and biological laboratories, but apparent 

sanitization efforts of the site make the purpose of 

the laboratories diffi cult to determine from exploitation data alone.

Figure 5 (left) and Figure 6 (right). The Rashdiya site 

was where the IIS produced ricin in the early 1990’s, but 

no evidence of recent illicit activity was uncovered during 

the site visit.
49

Chemical

• The April 2003 exploitation team found a microbiological lab capable of growing small amounts 

of bacteria, analytical equipment, and laboratory chemicals such as solvents. According to the 

exploitation report, items appeared to have been 

removed from the site, and shredded documents 

were present throughout the building.

• A family that moved into the former M16 headquarters building said that after the coalition’s 

primary visit to the facility in April, IIS personnel 

returned to pick up several items including computers and equipment. Sanitization efforts may have 

continued, because the team that returned to the site 

found burnt documents in October 2003.

The equipment, chemicals, and literature found at 

the site are consistent with sensitive reporting on the 

activities of the M16’s chemical forensics division, 

which does not have strong ties to CBW research 

or the development of assassination-related compounds.

• The M16 chemical forensic division was responsible for testing food for the regime. Other reports 

corroborate that there was an M16 division which 

had the ability to analyze chemical substances and 

test food and other items for the presence of poisons and toxins.

• According to a senior IIS offi cial who has reported 

reliably in the past, this building served as the M16 

headquarters, where research on toxins and their 

properties took place. However, the same source 

stated that the work was solely for defensive purposes.

• Laboratory analysis of several samples taken at the 

site revealed that the M16 had samples of potassium cyanide, the pesticides diazinon and Malathion, the herbicide glyphosate, and several other 

innocuous chemicals. It would not be unusual to 

fi nd these chemicals at a laboratory examining 

foodstuffs for poisons or contaminants, because 

such a lab would need standards to which it could 

compare analytic results.

• Documents recovered at the M16 headquarters 

building include scientifi c texts on the extraction of 

toxic compounds, pesticides, detection of toxins in 

food, water contamination, microbial agents, and 

laboratory notebooks.

• A few of the documents recovered indicate that 

M16 was interested in CW-related dual use technology such as organophosphorous chemistry. A thesis 

on the production and physiological effects of ricin 

and Hyoscine was also found on site. The paper 

was prepared by M16 offi cer Adnan Abdul Razzaq 

in the early 1990s (see Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11).

Illicit Activity at M16 Headquarters

The chemical preparation division may have produced chemicals which were used on IIS prisoners 

or unknown Kurdish individuals when it was located 

in the M16 headquarters during the late 1990s.

• An IIS offi cer with said that the director of M16, 

Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti, may have provided 

dimethyl nitrosoamine to the director of the SSO 

in July 2000 for use against 4 unidentifi ed Kurdish 

citizens.

• The same source claims that Adnan Abdul Razzaq 

al-Ubaydi used dimethyl nitrosoamine on prisoners 

under the control of the IIS M7 directorate starting 

in 2000.

• The source informed ISG that when located in the 

Karada district, the IIS M16 chemical preparation 

division worked exclusively on producing dimethyl 

nitrosoamine, a substance which, according to the 

source, can cause lung and liver cancer within three 

months.

Taji Lab (N 33 22 49.3 E 044 18 59.2)

The chemical preparation division’s lab in Taji 

focused on the research of three chemical substances, but the purpose of opening the lab may 

have been to give the division a covert location to 

produce CW agent for the regime.
50

Figure 7 (top left), Figure 8 (top right) and Figure 

9 (bottom right). The M16 headquarters building 

contained several small laboratories that appeared to be 

involved in analytic chemistry work.

Figure 10 (left) and Figure 11 (right). The headquarters 

building contained a large amount of chemical laboratory 

equipment, but the lack of CW precursor chemicals 

makes it appear that the scientists at this site were not 

involved in CW research or production.
51

Chemical

• The IIS M16 laboratory located near Taji was 

opened in 2000 for the purpose of producing nitrogen mustard, according to a former IIS scientist. 

The fi ve individuals assigned to work at the lab 

lacked the necessary chemicals to produce nitrogen 

mustard, so they worked on a plant-based anesthetic 

per the order of M16 director Nu’man Muhammad 

al-Tikriti.

• The source said that while they were waiting for 

Adnan Abdul Razzaq to send back precursor 

chemicals to produce the CW agent, the division 

researched the compounds dimethylnitrosoamine, a 

mixture of fl uoroacetate and thallium chloride, and 

a natural anesthetic extracted from the datura plant.

• An exploitation team that visited this site found 

a non-residential drainage system and signs that 

chemical ventilation had been present, which help 

corroborate the source’s claim that the house was 

used as a laboratory.

• A former IIS scientist who worked at the Taji lab 

said that the lab was shut down and all the equipment removed when the US issued its ultimatum 

to Saddam Husayn to leave Iraq in 48 hours (see 

Figures 12, 13, and 14).

Mustansariyah (N 33 21 17.9 E 44 24 41.0)

The Mustansariyah site was the chemical preparation directorate’s fi nal location, where the burial 

and destruction of chemicals took place. Research 

activity on chemicals was minimal at this site.

• The M16 director, Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti, 

said that when the offi cers in the chemical preparation directorate were based at the Mustansariyah 

house in 2002, they did not do any notable chemical 

work and spent most of their time destroying old 

chemicals and moving other chemicals and equipment to a storage site in Djerf al-Naddaf.

• A house in Mustansariyah received equipment from 

the lab in Taji and CW precursors in late 2002, 

according to a former IIS offi cer with direct access 

to the information. The source believed that nerve 

agent production was being researched at the site, 

experiments occurred on the roof of the house, and 

that chemicals were buried on the property.

• We assess that this source had direct access to the 

movement and burial of chemicals, but we believe 

the source does not have authoritative access on 

information about the identities of chemicals 

involved or the research activities of the Mustansariyah house. The small time frame that the IIS 

was at the site, combined with the time constraints 

of setting up a chemical lab, make it unlikely that 

extensive research took place at this site.

The exploitation of this site found a few items indicating that the Mustansariyah had supported IIS 

chemical-related research, but the site was mostly 

empty.

• In April 2003 an exploitation team visited the Mustansariyah site where it found IIS documents and 

a few laboratory-related items and chemicals, but 

nothing appeared to be CBW related. The site was 

mostly empty, and appeared to be recently cleaned 

and painted.

• A high level member of the Iraqi government with 

direct access to IIS activity accompanied the exploitation team and pointed out several rooms that were 

used for laboratory chemical storage, but the rooms 

were empty leaving the impression that the chemicals had been previously relocated.

• On the roof of the Mustansariyah building, the 

exploitation team found chemical-resistant countertops, chemical fume hood face plates, and spare 

parts for fume hoods.

• On the perimeter of the Mustansariyah site, the 

exploitation team recovered a box of medication 

that was used to cause pain, humiliation, or death 

in Saddam Husayn’s adversaries, according to a 

high level member of the Iraqi Government that 

had direct access to the information (see Figures 15 

and 16).
52

Figure 12 (top left), Figure 13 (top right) and Figure 

14 (bottom right). The M16 site in Taji appeared to 

be sanitized by the time it was inspected by the ISG, 

although some physical evidence corroborated the 

source’s claim that the house formerly housed 

a laboratory.

Figure 15 (top left) and Figure 16 (top right). No 

suspect chemicals were found at the Mustansariyah site, 

but the presence of chemical countertops and Kotterman 

hoods corroborated the story that the M16 planned to 

use this site for chemical laboratory work.
53

Chemical

Site exploitations have verifi ed that material was 

buried at the Mustansariyah site, although ISG has 

been unable to determine the identity of items present at the site.

• The exploitation team that visited the Mustansariyah site was able to excavate various vials and 

broken glassware that was buried in the yard, but 

the contents of these containers could not be verifi ed.

• In September, an ISG exploitation team returned 

to the site to take various soil samples for analysis, 

which came up negative for the presence of BW 

agents or toxins. The samples were not analyzed for 

the presence of suspect chemicals.

• According to a chemical forensic lab report, no suspect chemicals were found in three contact samples 

taken from various locations in the house.

Salmadiyah Warehouses/Burial Site (Djerf 

al-Naddaf, N 33 15 22.0 E 044 33 03.2)

The burial and destruction of chemicals also 

occurred at two M16 warehouses located near the 

former M16 facility in Djerf al-Naddaf.

• IIS offi cers moved chemicals from a warehouse in 

the Karada district of Baghdad to be disposed of at 

a site in Salmadiyah in March 2003, according to 

reporting. The report stated that chemical containers of various sizes were buried in a deep pit and 

that several of the containers were broken either 

during the move or when they were placed in the 

pit.

• A former IIS offi cer with direct access to the 

information reported that chemicals stored at the 

Mustansariyah site were moved to the warehouses 

in Salmadiyah where some were destroyed. A burn 

pit was near the warehouse where IIS offi cers took 

some of the chemicals and poured them directly 

into the ground.

• In a separate report, the same former IIS offi cer 

describes the chemicals as being CW components, 

but the source also describes the chemical components in non-scientifi c terms, such as “impressive 

and beautiful,” which indicates that he probably has 

little training in chemistry and may not have had 

direct knowledge about the identity of the chemicals.

• A former IIS chemist with direct access claims that 

material at the Mustansariyah site was relocated to 

the Salmadiyah warehouses in 2002.

The use of these warehouses for the storage of 

chemicals and equipment was corroborated, but the 

site was thoroughly sanitized after the fi rst coalition 

visit, preventing complete exploitation of the warehouses’ contents.

• An exploitation team visited the site in April 2003 

and found two warehouses which contained laboratory chemicals, lab equipment, and documents. The 

specifi c chemicals were not detailed in the exploitation report, but no CW agents were present in the 

warehouses.

• In April 2003, IIS offi cers destroyed the warehouse 

which contained the material, according to a former 

IIS offi cer with direct access to the information 

(several other warehouses in the area had already 

been destroyed by coalition bombing).

• US military offi cers revisited the site in July 2003, 

but found that the warehouse had been destroyed 

(see Figures 17, 18, and 19).

Karwai Burial Sites (Al Adaim Desert, 

N 34 13 E 044 31)

The IIS buried equipment and chemicals, which 

may have included CW precursors, at a remote site 

North of Baghdad in the mid-1990s. ISG has been 

unable to corroborate that CW-related chemicals 

were hidden at any of the 5 exploited sites.

• An exploitation team originally visited the sites in 

April 2003 where they recovered equipment used 

for animal testing, and burned CS grenades. Buried 

chemicals were also located, but the team determined that sample analysis would be unfeasible, so 

the identity of the chemicals remains unknown.
54

Iraqi Regime Use of Poisons and Toxins 

on Human Subjects

IIS Involvement in Human Testing

In the 1970s, and possibly into the 80s, the IIS 

conducted testing of deadly chemicals on human 

subjects under the leadership of Dr. Muhammad 

Abd al-Munim al-Azmerli, the head of the IIS Al 

Hasan research facility.

• Dr. Munim confessed to administering various 

chemicals to human test subjects from 1975-1980. 

Dr. Munim stated that former IIS director Barzan 

al-Tikriti ordered him to carry out the testing 

program, along with Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti 

(who would later become the head of the M16 

directorate in 1996) and Ali Hassan Jasim (who 

administered the lethal doses).

• According to Dr. Munim, the poisons were being 

developed as assassination tools for use overseas, 

and that the IIS wanted a substance that would not 

kill its victim until 5 hours after it was consumed.

• A high-level member of the Iraqi government with 

direct access claimed Dr. Munim used poisons and 

toxins on approximately 100 prisoners, including 

Kurds, Iranians, and a Saudi Arabian. The prisoners were given lethal doses of various substances 

including Lasix and dimethyl nitrosoamine.

• Dr. Munim gave political prisoners poisoned food 

and gave other individuals injections. The offi -

cer also said that Dr. Munim tested explosives on 

human subjects, and that he was a “sick man.”

• According to sensitive reporting, Dr. Munim tested 

drugs which affected memory and sexual function 

on 15 prisoners between 1980 and 1989. Any subjects that survived the drugs given to them by Dr. 

Munim were later executed.

The testing occurred at the M7 directorate’s Hakamia prison, where the victims were prisoners who 

were sentenced to death.

• Dr. Munim said that subjects for the testing were 

provided by M7, the directorate in charge of the IIS 

prison system where enemies of the regime were 

incarcerated. The M7 directorate was also responsible for interrogations and has been implicated in 

the torturing of inmates.

• Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti denied being personally involved with any of the testing activity, 

but admitted to witnessing Dr. Munim administer 

poisons to prisoners 10 times in 1983 at the M7 

Hakamia prison. Al-Tikriti stated that the poisons 

included cyanide, methyl micro chloride, thallium 

acetate, and sodium fl uoride. “Methyl micro chloride” probably refers to liquid methyl chloride.

• Dr. Munim claimed he tested chemicals on 20 subjects, and used lithium acetate, strychnine, librium, 

digitalis, and cyanide.

The discrepancy between Dr. Munim and Nu’man’s 

stories about the human testing activity may indicate 

that one or both individuals were not being honest, 

or could not recall the details about the extent of the 

activity when discussing it with ISG offi cials.

• The admissions made by Dr. Munim and Nu’man 

both attempt to downplay the human testing activity. Dr. Munim claimed that the numbers of subjects were small, and Nu’man insisted that he only 

witnessed the activity and did not participate.

• Dr. Munim and Nu’man’s stories about the testing 

at Hakamia are signifi cantly different in terms of 

dates and materials tested, even though both individuals admitted to having direct knowledge on the 

activity.

• Neither individual’s story matches information 

provided by other sources who described the testing 

activity.
55

Chemical

Iraqi Regime Use of Poisons and Toxins 

on Human Subjects (continued)

DGS Testing of Chemicals on Humans

Multiple sources have described testing of chemicals 

on political prisoners within the Iraq’s Directorate 

of General Security (DGS) during the 1980s and in 

the early 1990s.

• A former DGS biologist with direct access to the 

information said that until 1991 Department 69 

in DGS imported toxins and tested them on political prisoners sent from DGS headquarters. This 

department’s offi cial duties were for testing the 

food of Saddam’s inner circle for poisons and contaminants.

• According to reporting, individuals were given 

milky liquids at a DGS laboratory run by Department 69 which caused them to die within 3-4 weeks.

• A different report states that DGS offi cers gave 

milky liquids to political prisoners, who died 40 

minutes after consuming them.

Possible IIS Human Test Site in Baghdad’s Karada 

District (N 33 17 14.8 E 044 25 12.6)

ISG has investigated the claim that human testing 

occurred at a residential house in the Karada district 

of Baghdad near the Tigris River. We have identifi ed 

the building that the activity reportedly took place in, 

but have been unable to corroborate that any illicit 

activity took place.

• According to reporting, in July 2001 nine individuals were brought into the house, tied down to beds, 

and had small tubes placed into each of their arms. 

The next day all of the prisoners showed signs of 

bleeding from the mouth. A female doctor gave 

each of the prisoners an injection, and the next day 

six of the prisoners were dead. 

• The same report said that the doctor performed 

autopsies on at least one of the victims, which suggests that she was trying to determine the effects of 

the substances given to him.

• Based on highly detailed information about the 

location and description of the residence taken 

from the same report, ISG managed to identify and 

exploit the suspect facility.

• ISG site exploitation revealed no evidence of human 

testing or other CBW activity, but the site appeared 

to be heavily sanitized or looted. All furniture and 

fi xtures had been stripped from the facility, including fl oor tiles. Based on the site layout of the 

residence, we assess that this is the same facility 

the sensitive report referred to.

We have been unable to identify the exact purpose or 

owner of this house, but limited information indicates that it belonged to the IIS.

• Presidential secretary Abid Hamid Mahmud, who 

was reported to have been at the site in 2001, 

claimed that the building was used as an IIS guest 

house.

• During the site exploitation, IIS business cards and 

partially burned IIS documents were recovered.

Despite the reporting, we do not believe that this 

facility was associated with the IIS M16 (M9G) 

chemical forensics branch.

• Reportedly, this facility was used by the M9G 

branch and was involved in the chemical analysis of 

unknown material.

• This reporting appears to be describing the 

activities of the chemical forensics division of M16 

(formerly known as M9J/M9G). Multiple reports 

indicate that the chemical forensics division was 

based in the M16 headquarters building, which is 

located on the same road but further west.
56

Figure 17 (top left), Figure 18 (top right) and Figure 

19 (bottom right). The M16 directorate stored a large 

supply of laboratory chemicals and equipment at the 

warehouses in Djerf al-Naddaf, but no CW were present 

when the exploitation team arrived.

• A team returned in August and excavated chemical 

containers, but found that several containers had 

been damaged in the burial process. A high level 

member of the Iraqi government with direct access 

claimed that an autoclave and glove boxes were 

buried at the site.

• The same source, which led the team to the site, 

claimed that the IIS buried the CW precursor thionyl chloride, thionyldiglycol (which may be a reference to the CW precursor thiodiglycol), glassware, 

and chemical protective gear at the site in 1994 

and 1998. According to the source, the burial was 

ordered by Abdul Munim al-Azmerli to hide the 

chemicals from UN inspectors.

• We have not been able to corroborate the reason 

material was buried in 1994, but Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti stated that chemicals were buried 

during the 1996-1997 timeframe in this area 

because they were on a list of prohibited materials 

provided by the National Monitoring Directorate 

(see Figures 20 and 21).

M16 Procurement Efforts

The M16 directorate utilized several different avenues to obtain chemicals and equipment, but faced 

diffi culties procuring illicit materials or items that 

would draw attention to the directorate’s work.
57

Chemical

Figure 20. Various buried chemicals 

were located at the burial sites.

Figure 21. A Skinner Box, a device used to test 

small rodents who are under the effects of drugs 

or chemicals, was recovered at one of the sites.

• A high level member of the Iraqi government with 

direct access to the information claimed that IIS 

offi cer Adnan Abdul Razzaq was sent to Russia to 

set up a procurement network to provide the M16 

directorate with CW precursors.

• Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti said that the M16 

directorate never tried to procure CW precursors 

during his tenure as M16 director. He said that 

the M16 had a signifi cant store of chemicals in 

the Djerf warehouses that it used, and M16 scientists got any additional chemicals it needed from 

unspecifi ed Iraqi ministries.

We have no evidence to suggest that M16 used M4, 

the IIS directorate which has been linked to assisting Iraqi procurement efforts, to obtain prohibited 

CW chemicals or equipment.

• Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti claimed that M16 

met with M4 sources on a few occasions to obtain 

equipment for M16, but none of the materials 

Nu’man discussed were prohibited.

• A former IIS offi cer with direct access said that 

Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti, the head of M16, 

attempted to get several chemicals through M4 in 

1998 including the CW precursor thionyl chloride. 

The source claimed that M4 was unable to get the 

requested chemicals.

• A recovered document discusses an M16 request 

for laboratory equipment and chemicals in 2001. 

The document recommends M4 do a feasibility 

study to fi nd out if one of their foreign agents could 

assist in getting M16 the items it needed.

• A former mid-level IIS offi cer said that M4 provided technical papers to the M16 directorate, but 

did not get any chemicals or equipment for the 

directorate. The source said that M16 had its own 

procurement group that made trips out of the country to purchase equipment.
58

Assassination Pen Found al al-Karwai (N 34 14 

34.9 E 044 031 32.0)

The pen-shaped auto injector recovered at al-Karwai 

may have been one of several such devices the IIS 

had to perform assassinations of the former regime’s 

key targets.

• A former IIS scientist with direct access to the 

information stated that the IIS developed penshaped devices meant to be used for assassinations. 

Muhammad Khudayr al-Dulaymi, the director of 

IIS special operations, took one of the devices to 

London in 1988 for an assassination, but did not use 

it.

• The same source claimed that Abdul Munim alAzmerli gave the order to create the devices, which 

were produced from 1981-1985.

• An ISG exploitation team recovered a device that 

matches the description of those requested by 

Azmerli buried at al-Karwai with other IIS materials. The device was tested for the presence of 

chemicals, but none were found.

• The large needle on the device makes it appear 

poorly suited for covert assassinations, and the 

former IIS scientist said that the device’s original 

use was for animals. This may indicate that the 

IIS decided to alter a pre-existing device, rather 

than develop its own specially designed for human 

targets.

Other M16 Burial/Disposal Sites

A source led a coalition exploitation team to a site 

near Musayyib where chemicals may have been 

buried to avoid detection by UN inspectors.

• No CW related materials were recovered, but the 

team found a large amount of chemicals buried at 

the site. The sensitive source claimed that the M16 

buried the chemicals in 2002 because the IIS was 

worried the UN would think the M16’s chemical 

stores were too extensive for legitimate use.

• The head of M16, Nu’man Muhammad al-Tikriti, 

claimed that he directed M16 offi cers to bury 

chemicals in 2002 because they were old and were 

no longer useful to M16 scientists (see Figures 22 

and 23).

According to reporting, the director of the IIS 

research center, Numan al-Nasiri (likely Nu’man 

Muhammad al-Tikriti, the director of M16), was 

seen burying syringes, vials of liquid, cans, and bags 

of chemicals in March 2003. Nu’man buried the 

items with at least one other IIS offi cer at a location 

near the al-Samida depot and gave the specifi c GPS 

coordinates. ISG assessed that this reporting did not 

merit full exploitation due to its inconsistency with 

other M16 burial reporting and the source’s indirect 

access to the information.

Historical IIS Ties to Iraq’s CW program

The IIS likely had the technical knowledge to produce several CW agents, including Sarin and sulfur 

mustard, because the IIS was instrumental in starting Iraq’s CW program in the 1970s.

• One IIS offi cer we spoke with was able to mentally recount the formula for producing Sarin nerve 

agent, despite not having worked on CW production in recent years.

• Iraq’s FFCD states that efforts to produce CW 

agent began at the al-Rashad site, where researchers 

were able to produce lab-scale amounts of mustard, 

Tabun, Sarin, and various pesticides.

• According to a former Iraqi Ministry of Defense 

scientist, the IIS began to research organic phosphates at the al-Rashad facility in 1974. A team 

of approximately 50 scientists worked to produce 

mustard gas at the location, and the effort was led 

by Dr. Muhammad Munim al-Azmerli.
59

Chemical

Figure 22. Tank of triethylamine recovered near 

Musayyib.

Figure 23. Large amounts of buried chemicals 

were located at the Musayyib site.

• A former Iraqi Intelligence offi cer with direct 

access to the information said that Dr. Munim 

obtained the equations for producing chemical 

weapons and established laboratories in Salman Pak 

during the 1980-82 timeframe where he worked on 

Sarin, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and tear 

gas (CS).

• The IIS CW lab in Rashad which was operational 

from 1974-1979 was relocated to Samarra in 1980, 

and then moved to Salman Pak in 1983 according 

to a former IIS chemist. The same source stated that 

CS (tear gas) and Sulfur Mustard were provided 

by the IIS researchers to the Iraqi military to use 

during the Iran-Iraq war.

• Dr. Munim stated that the IIS chemical warfare 

research lab was located in al-Rashad from 1974-

1979, but was move to Samarra in 1980 and then 

later to Salman Pak.
60

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61

Chemical

Annex B

Al Muthanna Chemical

Weapons Complex

Background: Evolution of Iraq’s Chemical 

Weapons Development Facilities

Iraq’s pursuit of chemical and biological warfare 

programs dates back to the early 1960s when members of the armed forces traveled overseas, including 

to the US and UK, in pursuit of CBW training. From 

this training, Iraq formed the Chemical Corps. With 

this foundation and a change in political power from 

the Ba’thist revolution in 1968, Iraq began a campaign of organized research and development into an 

infant CBW program.

• Junior Army offi cers were trained in United States 

and Russia in chemical warfare during the 1960s. 

The Iraqi army then formed the Chemical Corps.

• A division of opinion evolved in the chemical 

corps where the more Senior Offi cers desired only 

a defensive CW program while Junior Offi cers 

favored both an offensive and defensive program. 

This rift in leadership opinion continued into the 

1970s.

• The Ba’thist revolution forged contacts among 

Junior Offi cers of the chemical corps and Senior 

Offi cers of the Army enabling Iraq to embark upon 

an offensive CBW program.

Iraq’s fi rst attempt to produce a chemical weapon 

was a series of failures and limited technological 

advances.

• During the early 1970s the Army developed the 

concept of “Scientifi c Centers for Excellence.” 

The goal of the project was to develop a chemical 

weapon, however after four years of poorly organized research, the project failed to achieve the 

development of a chemical weapon.

The desire to undertake an offensive CW program 

continued, and a more organized approach to produce a chemical weapon began in 1974 under the 

military leadership and Iraqi Intelligence Service 

(IIS) oversight. In 1975 the Al Hasan institute (the 

fi rst laboratory devoted to the development of CBW) 

was formed. Its main laboratory was at Al Rashad in 

suburban Baghdad.

• The Al Hasan Institute was founded as the nucleus 

for chemical research dedicated to CW development.

• Al Hasan was funded by the government through 

the Ministry of Higher Education, not the military.

• The Al Hasan Institute was intimately supported by 

the IIS. The project was not just a Chemical Corps 

project.

Two key military personnel founded the Al Hasan 

Institute, the fi rst laboratory devoted to the development of CBW.

• Ghassan Ibrahim, a captain in the chemical corps, 

formed the Al Hasan Institute.

• Faiz ‘Abdallah Al Shahin, an Intelligence Offi cer, 

was Ghassan’s assistant.

The institute established a mentorship and overseas 

training program to foster better-trained scientists 

and chemical corps offi cers.

• Some of the more prominent Iraq chemical weapons experts received their PhDs from the Chemical 

Warfare Academy in Moscow from 1973 to 1979.

—Dr. ‘Imad Husayn ‘Abdallah Al ‘Ani (Research 

and Development)

—Dr. Salah-al-Din ‘Abdallah (Weapons Design 

Expert and Toxicity Research)

—Dr. Hammad Shakir (Weapons Preparation 

Expert)

Iraq’s second organized attempt at CBW production ended abruptly in a scandal and the Al Hasan 

Institute was abolished in 1978.
62

• The founder of the Al Hasan Institute and a number 

of staff were imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement.

• The program, though it made substantial advancements in CW research and development, never 

succeeded in CBW production. The program ultimately failed to meet expectations.

Project 1/75 evolved from the Al Hasan Institute and 

began to materialize after 1978. Project 1/75 eventually evolved into Iraq’s third and most successful 

attempt in developing a viable and productive CBW 

program. Funding came from a different ministry, 

leadership was changed, and resources became 

more remotely located away from Baghdad.

• Project 1/75 was a remnant of the Al Hasan Institute and started as a small facility 40 km SW of 

Samarra’, Iraq.

• The Ministry of Defense funded the project.

• Lt. Gen. Nizar ‘Abd-al-Salam Al-Attir spearheaded 

what later became the largest campaign in the pursuit of chemical weapons in Iraq’s history.

In 1980, after Saddam took power, Project 1/75 was 

greatly expanded. The project was renamed Project 

922. With the Iran-Iraq war looming, Iraq made the 

CBW program a top priority.

• German fi rms were contracted to build equipment 

and facilities designed for the sole purpose of the 

safe, effi cient, mass production of CBW agents.

• Iraq’s elite scientists were recruited. Research 

groups were coalesced and moved into these facilities near Samarra’.

To maintain anonymity, Project 922 was known 

to the Iraqis as a pesticide production company. 

The State Establishment for Pesticide Production 

(SEPP) became the front company for Iraq’s 100 

square kilometer industrial facility dedicated to 

CBW production.

• Project 922 was referred to as the Samarra’ 

Chemical Weapons Production and Storage Complex. The name was chosen because of its close 

proximity to Samarra’, Iraq.

• Project 922 was known to the Iraqi community as 

The State Establishment for Pesticide Production 

(SEPP).

• Currently the complex is referred to as Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex.

Within three years (1978-1981), Project 922 had 

gone from concept to production for fi rst generation 

Iraqi chemical weapons (mustard agent). By 1984 

Iraq started producing its fi rst nerve agents, Tabun 

and Sarin. In 1986, a fi ve-year plan was drawn up 

that ultimately led to BW production. By 1988 Iraq 

had produced VX. The program reached its zenith 

in the late 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. Between 

1981 and 1991, Iraq produced over 3,857 tons of 

CW agents.

• Initial research under an elite group of chemists 

focused on mustard, but rapidly progressed into 

Tabun and Sarin (G-Agents). Production efforts for 

mustard started at 10 tons of agent production in 

1981 and increased roughly 80-100 tons per year 

until 1985 when the facility annually produced 350 

tons. In 1987 Iraq produced almost 900 tons of 

mustard agents and in 1988 they produced close to 

500 tons of agent.

• Iraq produced between 60-80 tons of Tabun annually between 1984 and 1986.

• Eventually they researched Cyclosarin and VX 

concurrently. In 1984 Iraq produced 5 tons of Sarin. 

Iraq constantly increased Sarin production efforts. 

In 1987 and 1988 Iraq produced 209 and 394 tons 

of Sarin, respectively.

• Cyclosarin was highly desirable to the Iraqis 

because of its low volatility and the commercial 

availability of its precursor compound cyclohexanol. These factors gave Cyclosarin several 

advantages; it was easier to work with in hotter 

environments, had enhanced effi cacy and storage 
63

Chemical

life, and the precursor compound cyclohexanol was 

relatively cheap, commercially available, and diffi cult to control by sanctions.

• Iraq produced 2.5 tons of VX in 1988 before ending 

production due to the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

• Production for Sarin, VX, and Mustard resumed in 

1990.

During the early years, Egyptian scientists provided 

consultation, technology, and oversight allowing 

rapid advances and technological leaps in weaponization. With the Iran-Iraq war well underway, 

Egypt assisted Iraq in CW production:

• In 1983, Egypt made modifi cations to the Grad 

122 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System to enable 

warheads to store chemical agents.

• In 1984, Egypt exported Grad rockets with plastic 

inserts to hold chemical agent.

• In the mid 1980s, Iraq invited Egyptian chemical 

weapons experts to Iraq to assist in producing Sarin 

munitions.

Project 922 Becomes Al Muthanna after 1986

Project 922 underwent a name change in 1986 

when the Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) 

oversaw operations and the facility became known 

as Al Muthanna (see Figure 1). The secrecy of the 

facility began to erode in the mid 1980s precipitating a venue change in Project 922’s production and 

research.

• The BBC Panorama aired the documentary “Secrets 

of Samarra’ “ on 27 October 1986. Security and 

secrecy were compromised for this clandestine 

CBW program.

• The original Director General Lt Gen. Nizar was 

relieved by Fiaz ‘Abdallah Al Shahin in 1987 (IIS 

agent and co-leader of the Al Hasan Institute).

• The Establishment was subordinate to the Ministry 

of Industrial Commission (MIC).

Research and production efforts underwent a strategic change in 1988, after the Iran-Iraq war ended, 

when a commercial product line was introduced. 

Despite the strategic production change, Iraq always 

maintained the philosophy that a CBW program 

would persevere; in times of war facilities would be 

utilized for CBW production and in times of peace 

facilities would be converted to commercial entities 

with the ability to quickly revert.

• Al Muthanna (previously Project 922) halted CW 

production focusing instead on R&D, purifi cation 

and stability of CW agents during August 1988 to 

April 1990.

• The rationale for stopping the chemical weapons 

production was that the CW agents at Al Muthanna 

throughout the previous years were in the crude 

state, containing many impurities which affected 

the stability and consequently the storage ability of 

the agents.

• The need for CBW agent drastically subsided and 

resources begin to stagnate from the reduced production requirement.

• Personnel and facilities were redirected to formulate and produce commercial products such as lice 

shampoo and petroleum jelly.

• Al Muthanna, however, maintained its ability to 

conduct a vibrant CBW research, development and 

production program.

In order to ensure self-reliance, minimize dependence upon foreign resources, and conceal a CBW 

program within a legitimate commercial entity, 

Director General Fa’iz in the mid-late 1980s began 

producing, purchasing, and utilizing off-site facilities. The facilities contained the next generation 

equipment and were research capable.

• Dependence upon foreign suppliers for precursors 

made the CW program vulnerable. Self-reliance for 

precursor production became a priority.
64

Figure 1. Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex.

The BW program trailed the CW program, but gained 

momentum in 1985 by a compelling proposal submitted by Professor Nasser Al Hindawi. A microbiologist, 

Dr Rihab Rashid Taha, was recruited to lead the new 

BW program for Project 922. Research started at Al 

Muthanna but 1987 was transferred to Salman Pak.

• The State Organization for Technical Industrialization recommended Dr Rihab Rashid Taha Al 

‘Azzawi be recruited to pursue the establishment 

of BW program.

• In 1985 a laboratory was utilized at Al Muthanna 

and staffed with scientists to develop Bacillus

anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, and 

botulinum toxin.

• In May 1987 the BW program was transferred to 

Salman Pak. There was a leadership change at Al 

Muthanna and new management under General 

Shahin believed the BW work interfered with CW 

precipitating the location change.
65

Chemical

• Certain CBW projects at Al Muthanna were compartmentalized and relocated to other locations. Al 

Muthanna began acquiring commercial chemical, 

biological and pharmaceutical facilities to conceal 

the CBW program within analogous commercial 

enterprises:

—‘Aqarquf Laboratory

—Fallujah I, II, and III (also known as Habbaniyah 

III, II, and I) to coalition forces.

—The Serum and Vaccine Institute (SVI) at Al 

‘Amiriyah.

—Samarra’ Drug Industries.

As early as April 1990, under fear of hostilities from 

Israel, resources at Al Muthanna were focused to 

operate at full CW production capacity. The Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait in the same year precipitated an 

international reprisal. A US-led bombing campaign 

quickly ensued and disabled Al Muthanna’s production ability. After the bombings, reestablishing late 

Iran-Iraq war production rates proved diffi cult and 

dangerous. Al Muthanna was not able to recreate 

Iran-Iraq war CBW inventories.

• In 1990 Al Muthanna produced 1/3 its maximum 

annual production volume for mustard, 1/3 its 

maximum annual production volume for Sarin and 

2/3 its maximum annual production volume for VX. 

See Table 1 Project 922 Declared Production Volumes of CW Agents in this section for CW agent 

volumes.

• On 02 April 1990 Saddam announced that Iraq possessed binary agents similar to the US and former 

Soviet Union and threatened to use them on Israel if 

the Israelis attacked Iraq with nuclear weapons.

Table 1. Project 922, declared production volumes of CW agents.
66

• Al Muthanna began preparation, in late April 1990, 

for fi lling Al Husayn warheads with Sarin and its 

mixtures and switched to producing the binary by 

August 1990.

• Production efforts intensifi ed after August 1990.

• An order was issued by MIC in late 1990 to evacuate all Al Muthanna State Establishment documents. To implement this requirement, most of 

the documents were transferred to air-raid shelters 

within MSE.

• Al Muthanna essentially ceased production in 

December of 1990 and refocused resources on dispersing CW stockpiles and equipment for protection against the anticipated bombing campaigns, 

which started in January 1991.

Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Production 

Facility Before and After Desert Storm

Al Muthanna’s ability to produce chemical weapons 

ended with the Gulf war, and soon afterwards the 

UN resolution proscribed Iraq’s ability to produce 

chemical weapons. The Fallujah satellite facilities 

(damaged during the Gulf war and not destroyed 

by UNSCOM), were repaired with the exception of 

Fallujah I which was not operational and operated 

as dual-use capable facilities. The majority of the 

Al Muthanna complex was bombed during Desert 

Storm, completely incapacitating Iraq’s chemical weapon production capabilities, however, large 

stockpiles of chemical weapons and bulk agent 

survived.

Laboratories and production areas are shown below 

after the Gulf war bombing. Facilities boxed are 

annotated. The facilities not boxed in the enclosure 

are Iraqi decoys (see Figure 2).

After the bombing during Desert Storm, the roofs 

on the research facilities collapsed incapacitating 

research capabilities at Al Muthanna. The animal 

house was left.

During Desert Storm, the bomb assembly area was 

destroyed. The engineering support area and Chemical and Material Storage area experienced some 

collateral damage. Chemical and Material Storage 

Area where CW precursors were stored at the end of 

February 1991 were not bombed but experienced collateral damage as a result of the bombing.

The precursor and agent production area at 

Al Muthanna was not completely destroyed during 

Desert Storm. Portions of the mustard (blister agent) 

production and storage area survived. The VX and 

Tabun production (nerve agent) facilities were incapacitated. Decoy facilities that had been built on the 

complex remained intact (see Figure 3 for complete 

annotation). 

The pilot plants survived much of the bombing 

during Desert Storm. Several structures remained 

intact, including the Inhalation Chamber, Quality 

Control Lab and two production areas. The Sarin 

production area was struck but not destroyed.

• Pilot Plants included three main production areas; 

Pilot Plant No.1 produced DMMP and D4, Pilot 

Plant No.2 produced DMMP and MPC, Pilot Plant 

No.3 produced DMMP, methyl phosphonyldifl uoride (MPF) and Sarin.

• In the northeast portion of this area of the plant was 

a quality control laboratory. The laboratory was not 

struck during Desert Storm.

• Located in this section of the plant was an Inhalation Chamber. A guard post and barracks—both 

non-production related—were located at the northern section of this area. Neither facility were struck 

during Desert Storm (see Figure 4).

• The weapons assembly area where agent was 

loaded into munitions was located approximately 

3 kilometers southeast of the overall facility. The 

remoteness of the location was chosen by the Iraqis 

to avoid unnecessary casualties in the event of a 

mishap during the uploading process.
67

Chemical

Figure 2. Al Muthanna R&D/Laboratory area after Desert Storm.
68

Figure 3. Al Muthanna precursor and agent production area after Desert Storm.
69

Chemical

Figure 4. Al Muthanna pilot plants and storage area after Desert Storm.
70

• There is also a shampoo fi lling area located on the 

northeast section of this portion of the facility.

The Munitions Filling area suffered serious damage 

during Desert Storm. The entire operation was completely disabled except for two structures that were 

part of the Shampoo Filling Station at the northeast 

end of the complex.

Cruciform bunkers after Desert Storm are shown in 

Figure 5. The overall facility contained more than 

30 bunkers and hardened facilities. The CW bunker 

storage area consisted of eight large, earth-covered 

cruciform bunkers and six dummy cruciform bunkers. 

Gulf war bombing completely destroyed one bunker 

because of secondary explosion and severely damaged two others.

Al Muthanna State Establishment Post-Gulf War

From 1992 to 1994, UNSCOM’s Chemical Destruction Group (CDG) oversaw destruction operations. 

A portion of the facility was transformed into a CW 

agent destruction facility. An incinerator was constructed in the summer of 1992 for the destruction 

of mustard agent at the munitions fi lling location. 

Chemical munitions stored throughout Iraq were to be 

gathered and destroyed at Al Muthanna. See Figure 6 

for the location (note image was taken after incinerator was dismantled). 

• Between 1992 and 1994 the facility was the primary collection and destruction site for all declared 

CW agents, precursor chemicals, and chemical 

production equipment.

• Between 1992 and 1994 and again in 1996, the 

UNSCOM directed the destruction of 30,000 pieces 

of ordnance, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, and 

more than 2 million liters of chemical precursors. 

Eventually, most of the facilities at the complex 

were destroyed and sold for scrap.

• Equipment that survived Desert Storm was tagged 

by UN or destroyed, but the UN was never able to 

verify that all equipment purchased for MSE was 

tagged or destroyed.

• Two Cruciform Bunkers were sealed containing 

munitions too dangerous for destruction.

• Bunkers, damaged by coalition bombing, collapsed, concealing unaccounted CW equipment 

and munitions in the debris. Over the next ten years 

some of the facilities were razed by the Iraqis. 

Precise accountability of equipment and munitions 

is unverifi able, because the National Monitoring 

Directorate and UNSCOM did not always oversee 

excavation.

After 1994, CW production related activities ceased 

at the Primary Al Muthanna site that once was 

Project 922 (Samarra’ Chemical Weapons Production and Storage Complex). A small security detail 

remained. Two sealed cruciform bunkers containing 

the largest declared stockpile of chemical munitions, 

old bulk chemical agent, and hazardous material 

associated with the CW program remained. The surrounding area at the facility became a refuse area 

or junkyard for relics of Iraq’s past CW weapons 

program.

• Two damaged cruciform bunkers were used to seal 

damaged chemical munitions, residual chemical 

agents, and hazardous material.

• The contents of the bunkers were declared to 

the UN but never fully. The munitions inside the 

bunkers were damaged from ODS bombings; fi res, 

leaking munitions and physical damage to munitions made the environment inside the bunker 

extremely dangerous.

• The National Monitoring Directorate and a small 

security detail monitored the bunkers.

Between 1994 and OIF, Iraq requested UN approval 

to remove and relocate some of the equipment and 

facilities. Imagery analysis revealed in early 1997 

that the Iraqis excavated many of the research and 

production buildings. Iraq had razed most of the Al 

Muthanna Complex by early 2000, leaving only the 

southern part of the former chemical and material 

storage area intact (see Figure 7).
71

Chemical

Figure 5. Munitions storage area.
72

Figure 6. Destroyed CW agent fi lling area.
73

Chemical

Figure 7. Al Muthanna chemical and material storage area after OIF.

Removed By Iraqis 

During OIF
74

• Prior to OIF, Iraq removed buildings and their 

contents from the northern section of the Chemical 

Precursor storage area. The facilities at the southern 

section of the facility were removed by unknown 

entities between April and June of 2003.

• Between 2002 and OIF the Iraqis removed some of 

the facilities/warehouses (photo above). This activity was probably not WMD related.

The majority of the facilities—including the laboratory area, pilot plant, production area, bomb product, 

and engineering support weapons fi lling area—had 

been excavated prior to OIF.

Figure 8 shows the Administration Area razed before 

OIF. One structure remained intact after 1994; the 

remaining administration buildings were removed 

after 1994.

Figure 9 is the laboratory area. It had been excavated 

and razed by the Iraqis after 1990 and prior to OIF. 

The only facilities not razed by the Iraqis were the 

animal storage area (not bombed during ODS).

UN Criteria for CW Destruction

During the UNSCOM-supervised destruction processes, a CW facility was technically considered 

destroyed under three different criteria:

• Equipment was permanently disabled by the Iraqis, 

then examined and documented by UN.

• Equipment would be tagged, dismantled, and 

reused by the Iraqis for other legitimate commercial 

use while being documented and monitored by UN.

• Facilities destroyed from coalition strikes were 

deemed unusable for CW development.

Note: UN did not verify reusability of some of the 

equipment concealed within rubble of destroyed 

facilities. The CW process that once occurred within 

a bombed facility was regarded as inoperable, but 

utility of equipment reusability sometimes remained 

unverifi able.

The Iraqis razed and removed all existing structures for the biological/toxicological lab, mustard 

research lab, and Sarin production facility. In addition to complete removal of the facilities, complete 

foundations were excavated and removed. These 

actions were undertaken after the National Monitoring Directorate was displaced in Iraq and completed 

without international scrutiny.

The Tabun Production Facility was razed in a 

similar fashion to the other nerve agent production 

facilities in that all remnants of the existing facility 

were removed to include foundations and surrounding top layers of soil. Portions of the VX Production 

Facility were fi lled with sand. The facility was not 

razed by the Iraqis, however all equipment were 

removed (see Figure 10).

Figure 11 shows the pilot plant area had been sealed 

after ODS. This was a hardened facility area, and 

the QC lab and Inhalation facility were still intact. 

The Sarin Production Facility that was bombed was 

excavated and the non-hardened facilities in the area 

were razed.

Al Muthanna undergoes a series of name changes 

and ultimately becomes the Al Tariq Company. After 

1994 MSE (Samarra’ Chemical Weapons Production 

and Storage Facility as well as its satellite facilities) 

underwent strategic changes in key researchers and 

production. Resources were spent trying to rebuild 

the satellite facilities; however, the site Al Muthanna 

(Samarra’ Chemical Weapons Production and Storage Facility) remained essentially abandoned.

• Key leadership at the facility sought alternative 

employment.

• The bulk of the technicians and certain key scientists were employed within the Al Tariq State 

Establishment.

• Several key fi gures are employed by, or consultants 

to NMD.

• The Director General of Al Muthanna assumed a 

leadership position within Al Tariq.
75

Chemical

Figure 8. Al Muthanna administration support area razed after 1994.
76

Figure 9. Al Muthanna research laboratory area.
77

Chemical

Figure 11. Al Muthanna nerve agent lab (left) and 

quality-control lab (right).

Figure 10. Complete excavation and removal of the 

Tabun production facility (left) and the sand-fi lled sarin 

production facility (right).
78

Exploitations of Al Muthanna

ISG conducted multiple exploitations of the 

Al Muthanna site to determine whether old chemical 

weapons, equipment, or toxic chemicals had been 

looted or tampered with since the last UN visit to 

the site. ISG is unable to unambiguously determine 

the complete fate of old munitions, materials, and 

chemicals produced and stored there. The matter is 

further complicated by the looting and razing done 

by the Iraqis.

An exploitation of the facility reconfi rmed previous 

imagery analysis that the site remained inoperable 

from bombings and UNSCOM compliance, including destruction of equipment and resources, and no 

signifi cant production capabilities existed. Facilities 

and bunkers revealed no evidence of production 

since UNSCOM departed.

• The teams found no new structures or any construction activities except for those declared by Iraq to 

UNSCOM. The facilities appeared to be abandoned 

prior to OIF.

• Several pieces of equipment that were once used 

for CW production were found bearing no UN 

tags, and the ISG was unable to assess whether the 

equipment had been reused since 1994 or intended 

for a future production processes and abandoned.

• The tag system used by the UN was known to not 

be robust, and given the absence of inspectors 

between 1998 and 2002, Iraq would have had little 

incentive to maintain the tags in good condition.

• The extent of the looting and unaccounted for excavations of bombed facilities makes it impossible 

to determine what, if any, equipment was removed 

after 1994, either for legitimate industrial use or a 

renovated CW production process.

• ISG exploitations indicate that the storage area still 

remains a threat despite testing. Chemical storage 

containers fi lled with unknown hazardous chemicals 

are showing signs of rusting-through and leaking.

• Key bunkers and facilities are currently scheduled 

to be sealed or resealed.

Stockpiles of chemical munitions are still stored 

there. The most dangerous ones have been declared 

to the UN and are sealed in bunkers. Although 

declared, the bunkers contents have yet to be confi rmed. These areas of the compound pose a hazard 

to civilians and potential blackmarketers.

• Numerous bunkers, including eleven cruciform 

shaped bunkers were exploited. Some of the bunkers were empty. Some of the bunkers contained 

large quantities of unfi lled chemical munitions, 

conventional munitions, one-ton shipping containers, old disabled production equipment (presumed 

disabled under UNSCOM supervision), and other 

hazardous industrial chemicals. The bunkers were 

dual-use in storing both conventional and chemical munitions. Figure 12 is a typical side-view of a 

cruciform shaped bunker.

• The contents of two of the cruciform bunkers 

bombed during Desert Storm showed severe 

damage. Due to the hazards associated with this 

location, the UN decided to seal the bunkers.

• UNSCOM viewed the contents of the two bunkers; 

however an accurate inventory was not possible due 

to the hazards associated with that environment.

• UNSCOM relied upon Iraqi accountability of the 

bunkers’ contents and assessed the amount of munitions declared to be realistic.

• Military fi eld testing equipment showed positive 

for possible CW agent in the cruciform bunkers 

that contained munitions and a storage bunker that 

contained bulk chemical storage containers. Note: 

this is not unusual given the munitions once stored 

there and the conditions in which they were stored 

post 1994.

An exploitation team observed the old UNSCOM 

CW destruction area that contained large (some 

in excess of 75 meter) sloping trenches once used 

in the CW destruction process. Damaged chemical 

storage drums were visible at the bottom of some of 

the trenches.
79

Chemical

• Drums and debris were visually observed in two 

of the 12 burial trenches. The other 10 trenches 

appeared to be partially fi lled, no drums or debris 

was visually observed and they did not register 

positive for chemical agent. The two that contained 

exposed 55-gallon drums and various metal debris 

did not register positive from CW. These were remnants of the incinerating pits and should have been 

covered.

• Bunkers tested positive for chemical agents and 

confi rmed observations (bunkers contained large 

quantities of unfi lled chemical munitions, conventional munitions, one ton shipping containers, old 

disabled production equipment (presumed disabled 

under UNSCOM supervision), and other hazardous 

industrial chemicals). Also noted were hundreds of 

rusted bulk storage containers that once contained 

bulk mustard agent. Despite the presence of these 

chemical storage drums fi eld testing concluded no 

CW agents were present.

• The hardened laboratories/pilot plant and animal 

compound were sealed prior to OIF and were 

breached, presumably by looters. Sampling of both 

areas showed no evidence or presence of chemical 

agents and the facilities were incapable of producing chemical munitions.

All the facilities (laboratories, pilot plant, bunkers, 

and animal storage area) inspected that were supposed to be sealed as a result of UN resolutions 

had been breached. Exploitation of these facilities 

revealed materials and equipment were removed, 

however the extent of looting makes it diffi cult to 

differentiate whether Iraqi government removed 

equipment after 1998 while still under UN sanction 

or if it was looted after OIF.

• Locks on metal doors were cut or concrete and 

bricks were breached producing apertures large 

enough for human entry.

• Figure 13 shows that bricked entryways were 

breached. The debris in the corridor in the photo 

to the right apparently is from removed material 

inside the bunker. Massive amounts of cylinders 

that once stored chemical agents, primarily bulk 

mustard agent, now are stacked in huge bunkers. 

This practice was consistent with Iraq’s destruction program involving the removal and incineration of agent and equipment.

• Hundreds of bulk storage cylinders were preserved 

from the destruction processes that took place in the 

early 1990s. They once contained chemical agents 

that were supposed to be destroyed. The remaining 

cylinders contained residual material that was to 

be neutralized by adding caustic and water. Some 

residual or leaking caustic, now dried, is apparent 

from the white residue on the side of a cylinder in 

Figure 14 (residue not sampled). This is consistent with Iraq’s destruction program involving the 

removal and incineration of agent and equipment.

• The team located a storage cylinder with the red 

and white plastic siphon (see Figure 14), and found 

it suspect. It was apparent that contents had been 

removed. Follow-on analysis of the drum revealed 

the drum was fi lled with petroleum products (presumably fuel oil). ISG assesses the fuel oil storage 

in the cylinders might be from residual oil once 

used in/for the mustard incinerator. Since the oil 

was associated with mustard destruction, it might 

have been regarded as hazardous material and 

thereby not discarded into the environment. Instead 

it was placed into the contaminated storage cylinders and stored in the bunker with the rest of the 

contaminated cylinders.

ISG also exploited the underground pilot plants, 

which also had been breached by looters, and found a 

reactor unit that was suspect. 

• The reactor should have been destroyed as part of 

UNSCOM inspections. The plant infrastructure 

required to operate the reactor was missing rendering it inoperable.

• The reactor is made from a recycled two-ton bulk 

mustard storage cylinder, similar to the ones viewed 

in the storage bunker above (see Figure 15).

The team found the laboratory, production, and 

animal house area looted and inoperable. Again, 

equipment that should have been destroyed by the 

UN was found here.
80

Figure 12. Typical side view of a cruciform shaped bunker.

Figure 13. Bricked entryways that were breached.

Figure 14. Storage cylinder with the red 

and white plastic siphon.

Figure 15. Reactor made from recycled 

two-ton bulk mustard storage cylinder. 
81

Chemical

• Cages that once housed animals were strewn about 

the site. Some of the cages appear to have held dogs 

used to study the effi cacy of CBW agent, and others 

were designed to hold primates based on the size 

and bar spacing on the cages despite intelligence 

that Iraq never conducted research on primates. 

Scratch marks also were on the wall apparently 

from animals, probably primates.

• An inhalation chamber was located at the site. 

Although it did not appear designed for humans, 

it was large enough to accommodate a human. 

Instead, the chamber apparently held cages which 

were inserted for animal experiments (see Figure 

16). Note: there was no evidence recovered to 

indicate that humans were used in the experiments. 

This equipment should have been destroyed and 

verifi ed by UNSCOM.

The team found multiple glass-lined reaction chambers, remnants from the former CBW programs, 

some which were UN-tagged and others which did 

not bear tags. Inconsistencies in the destruction 

methods among reactors might allow for cannibalization of parts to produce other reactors. The most 

interesting fi nd is the reactor shown in Figure 17, 

which not only was devoid of a UN tag, but the glassliner was still pristine with only minor chips.

• The reactor liner probably was chipped by looters when attempting to move the reactor without 

the proper equipment. More importantly, there is 

no indication of where the reactor originated and 

where it has been since the departure of the UN.

As a general note, there are a number of possible 

reasons for equipment bearing no UN tags:

• Equipment was destroyed in Desert Storm and 

therefore was not tagged;

• Equipment was destroyed by UNSCOM and was 

tagged, but the tag was removed;

• Equipment was tagged, and possibly moved to 

other facilities for use as a dual-use item;

• Equipment survived bombing during Desert Storm, 

but was buried by rubble and subsequently not 

tagged or destroyed by UNSCOM. Over the years, 

it may have been excavated by the Iraqis after 

UNSCOM left, or by looters after OIF.

It was apparent that some of the reactors were delivered to the facility for destruction while others were 

indigenous to the facility and destroyed on site.

A refuse area was exploited containing hundreds of 

empty munitions intended for chemical or biological agent fi lling. Warheads and peripheral hardware 

for brass and recyclable metals are still being looted. 

Old hardware destroyed under the auspice of the 

UN agreement and thousands of pieces of chemical 

weapons hardware that did not meet quality controls 

lay waste in the refuse area (see Figure 18).

• Hundreds of mangled and rusted munition bodies 

and tail sections lay strewn about (see Figure 18, 

upper left photo).

• Chemical bombs destroyed probably early 1990s 

(see Figure 18, upper right).

• Chemical rounds (observed were defective warheads) empty of chemical agents (see Figure 18, 

lower left photo).

• Chemical rounds (without agent) after explosive 

agent had been removed by a scavenger in order 

to recover brass components (see Figure 18, lower 

right photo).

The ISG found hundreds of canisters—both polymer and metal foil inserts—for chemical agents 

used as insert for munitions lying on the ground. 

Two pictures Figure 19 show the difference—on 

the left, the metal SAKR-30 canister, and the right, 

a polymeric canister that fi ts inside the SAKR-30 

canister. There is no picture of the sister canister that 

connects to form the body of the warhead.

The team noted several sloping trenches near the 

site which we believe were once used in the destruction process of CW rockets. Note: some of the 

trenches appear to be arranged for a specifi c process 

while some contained brick structures within the 
82

Figure 16. An inhalation chamber.

Figure 17. Glass-lined reactor.
83

Chemical

Figure 18. Mangled and rusted munition bodies and tail sections (top left), chemical bombs 

destroyed probably early 1990s (top right), chemical rounds empty of chemical agent (lower left), 

and chemical round (without agent) after explosive agent had been removed by a scavenger.

Figure 19. Metal (left) and polymeric (right) chemical

agent canister inserts for SAKR-30 munitions.
84

Figure 20. Sloping trenches with 

exposed drums and debris.

base (see Figure 20). Upon completion of destruction, other trenches were covered. It is uncertain if 

portions of the trenches were unearthed by looters or 

were not originally fi lled.

• Two of the trenches contained some drums that 

were exposed and rusted. Sampling of the damaged 

drums and surrounding standing water showed no 

presence of CW agents.

• The picture above shows one of the deeper sloping 

trenches with exposed drums and debris. A multitude of bird droppings coated the area where birds 

had taken refuge in the sandy walls of the trenches.

The entire Al Muthanna mega-facility was the 

bastion of Iraqi’s chemical weapons development 

program. During its peak in the late 1980s to early 

1990s, it amassed mega-bunkers full of chemical 

munitions, and provided Iraq with a force multiplier 

suffi cient to counteract Iran’s superior military 

numbers. Two wars, sanctions and UNSCOM oversight reduced Iraqi’s premier production facility to a 

stockpile of old damaged and contaminated chemical munitions(sealed in bunkers), a wasteland full of 

destroyed chemical munitions, razed structures, and 

unusable war-ravaged facilities. In 1998 Al Tariq 

State Establishment took over all remaining remnants at Al Muthanna.
85

Chemical

Annex C

The Iraqi Industrial Committee

Saddam personally ordered the creation of the Iraqi 

Industrial Committee (IIC) in September 1995 to 

coordinate activities of the Iraqi industrial sector, 

according to documentary and other reporting. The 

IIC probably never developed formalized procedures 

for coordinating industrial efforts and its overall 

strategy and mechanisms for project implementation 

probably were somewhat nebulous even to its own 

participants. Looting, vandalism and destruction 

of documentation have complicated ISG efforts to 

fully understand the role of the IIC and its subordinate projects. A complex, interdependent web of 

constantly evolving committees, projects and commissions was responsible for national research and 

development for indigenous production of chemicals, 

based on ISG analysis of documents and reporting.

• ISG has been unable to identify the policy direction 

for the IIC’s operations and has obtained confl icting 

data about operational details.

IIC Subcommittees and Their Responsibilities

The Central Evaluation Research Committee/

Evaluation Research Committee

In the fi rst phase of projects, the Evaluation Research 

Committee evaluated the initial work carried out and 

reported to the Central Evaluation Research Committee, which in turn reported to the IIC. After all 

preliminary research had been reviewed, both the 

Evaluation Research Committee and the Central 

Evaluation Research Committee were disbanded and 

the research was passed to the Technology Transfer 

Committee, according to reporting.

The Research and Development Committee/

Technology Transfer Committee and Its 

Subcommittees

Dr. Ja’far chaired both the Research and Development 

Committee and the Technology Transfer Committee. 

The Research and Development Committee provided 

oversight for chemical research for the strategic 

research program, according to documents and reporting, and was responsible for prioritizing projects 

based on economic benefi t and feasibility, according 

to different reporting. Other committee members 

included Drs. Ahmad and Al Jabburi of the Ministry 

of Higher Education, Dr. Karim of Al Razi Center, 

Dr. Al Qurashi of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), Drs. Naji and ‘Atto of the Chemistry 

Department at Saddam University, Dr. Asawa of the 

Ministry of Industry, Dr. Rathman from the Ministry 

of Industry and Minerals (MIM) and Drs. Hashim and 

Hamzah Yasin of the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), according to multiple reports.

The Technology Transfer Committee, established in 

1996, was responsible for researching and acquiring 

strategic technologies from outside Iraq. This committee tracked foreign technological developments by 

targeting students, attending trade shows and sponsoring educational exchanges, according to reporting. 

Different reporting indicated the Technology Transfer 

Committee was responsible for the coordination of 

all medical and agricultural research in Iraq. The 

Technology Transfer Committee appeared to share 

or subsume the responsibilities of the Research and 

Development Committee probably because Dr. Ja’far 

chaired both.

The Follow-Up Committee for Pharmaceutical 

Research

This subcommittee was responsible for reviewing research reports, evaluating scale-up feasibility, 

and evaluating quality control testing of samples. 

It reported directly to Dr. Ja’far at the Offi ce of the 

Presidential Advisor. Once the committee approved 

the research results, the organization received full 

payment for the work, according to Dr. Ja’far.

The Distinguished Industrialists Council

This body formed in February 2001 after 18 prominent Iraqi industrialists met Saddam Husayn. The IIC 

was tasked to carry out several joint activities with 

this group of industrialists, including the setting up 

of a study to provide the correct requirements to the 

industrialists, based on documents recovered by ISG.
86

The Chemical Industries Committee

This was a joint MIC-MIM oversight group under the 

IIC established to implement the National Project for 

Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides, according to reporting.

The National Project for Pharmaceuticals and 

Pesticides (NPPP)

The NPPP was established in early 1999 in response 

to a written order from Saddam, who took personal 

interest in the program’s progress. Three types of 

commercial products were targeted for indigenous 

production under the NPPP.

• Drugs/pharmaceutical/chemicals

• Pesticide chemicals

• Materials for medical diagnostic kits

According to a former high-ranking employee at 

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research 

(MHESR), which was the primary organization 

responsible for the research, the national drug program consisted of six categories of research focus—

medicines, primitive chemicals (reagents), active 

ingredients, kits, pesticides and veterinary medicines. 

Two categories of required chemical research for the 

above products were identifi ed.

• Synthesis of active chemicals required for making 

fi nished (formulated) pharmaceutical products and 

pesticides (“active chemicals” probably refers to 

biologically active substances).

• R&D on formulation technologies required to produce fi nal drug products. Research on such technologies would focus on formulating products for 

which Iraq already had the ingredients.

The National Project for Active Chemical Materials 

probably began in 1999 under the NPPP on the recommendation of the Minister of Higher Education 

and Scientifi c Research, Humam ‘Abd-al-Khaliq 

‘Abd-al-Ghafur. Humam proposed the project to 

Saddam in a letter in which he indicated that he had 

many skilled chemists with little to do, according to 

reporting. Humam reported substances were placed 

on the list based on the need of the Ministry of Health 

(MOH) and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Ministries and companies from across Iraq’s pharmaceutical and pesticide sectors initially nominated chemicals and materials that Iraq needed 

for research and development and eventual pilot 

production under the NPPP. According to a former 

high-ranking employee of MHESR, the chemicals 

were needed because Iraq could not obtain them 

under sanctions after 1996. However, few of the 

hundreds of chemicals identifi ed were restricted by 

sanctions.

The IIC, in consultation with technical experts from 

MIC, MOH, and MIM, evaluated these recommendations. MIM had primary responsibility for identifying priority “active” pharmaceutical chemicals, while 

MOH advised on fi nal pharmaceutical products to 

be included on the list and MIC was responsible for 

evaluating pesticide-related chemicals for the list.

The IIC’s Program for the Indigenous Production 

of Chemicals probably was more of a boon to Iraqi 

science than most regime programs, because the 

program implemented some merit-based competition and methodical science. According to reporting, 

the work stimulated by the IIC’s Technology Transfer Committee was scientifi cally credible and was 

selected on merit.

• The Technology Transfer Committee headed by Dr. 

Ja’far was involved in promoting research by the 

private sector and in Universities. The Committee 

stimulated work which lead to additional areas of 

research activity, according to the same reporting.

In contrast, other regime programs promoting individual scientifi c achievement probably were corrupted 

by special interest groups who stood to gain fi nancially or personally for successfully lobbying chosen 

projects irrespective of scientifi c merit.

• If a knowledgeable person did not step in to put a 

halt to a scientifi cally invalid project, the project 

would proceed. After 1998, if a knowledgeable scientist objected to an unsound project that scientist 

was accused of being entrenched in the system, 

according to ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi.
87

Chemical

• Additionally, the special interest groups found 

ways to bypass the mechanisms intended to prevent unsound projects by suppressing bad results 

and evidence of failed tests, and by concurrently 

highlighting any experiment that was even partially 

successful.

• One example of a project with a poor scientifi c 

basis and no chance of success, according to Al 

Sa’adi, was a project to use lasers to disrupt weapon 

systems and computers of attacking aircraft. 

Although the experiments were conducted with a 

craft not used by any potential enemies, and only 

one of several tests was even partially successful, 

the project was considered a success and the system 

was ordered into unit production.

MIC and MIM: Key Players in Iraq’s Chemical

Infrastructure

The chief military trade organization—the Military 

Industrialization Commission (MIC)—and the principal ministry of civilian commerce—the Ministry of 

Industry and Minerals (MIM)—both had subordinate 

production facilities which made conventional weapons, equipment and materials for the military.

• Although the MIC and the MIM were separate ministries, they cooperated on military issues including equipment, spare parts, projects and vehicles. 

Dr. ‘Imad Husayn ‘Abdallah Al ‘Ani, former VX 

expert, was the Director of the Offi ce of Technical 

Cooperation, and was responsible for the cooperation and coordination between these two ministries 

and the Ministry of Defense as related to matters 

of supplying materials to the military, according to 

reporting.

• The Research and Development Offi ce of MIM 

oversaw the Veterinary Center for the Formulation 

of Drugs for Animals, the Ibn-al-Baytar Center, the 

Chemicals Research and Development Center, the 

Ibn-Sina’ Center and the Al Razi Center. The MIC’s 

subsidiaries included the Al Majid Company, Al 

Basil Center, and the Al Raya Center.

The scientifi c capabilities of the MIC and the MIM 

were comparable and most chemical research could 

be tasked to either, although pharmaceutical work 

was typically assigned to MIM, while pesticides 

research and production was usually delegated by 

MIC, according to reporting.

Prior to OIF, MIM was under less international 

scrutiny than the MIC, the key organization through 

which WMD activities were funneled under Husayn 

Kamil.
88

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89

Chemical

Annex D

Tariq Company’s Activities 

The Tariq Company, also referred to as the Tariq 

Facility and formerly the Tariq State Establishment, 

encompassed several facilities near Fallujah including a headquarters complex; Fallujah I, Fallujah 

II, and Fallujah III (also known as Habbaniyah III, 

II, and I); a research site in Baghdad referred to 

as the “Baghdad site”; and several storage locations. Tariq was subordinate to the former Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) chemical weapons 

(CW) research, production and storage facility near 

Samarra before it was destroyed. It has a long history of ties to Iraq’s CW program, and throughout 

the 1990s continued to house key CW scientists and 

maintain basic capabilities to produce at least some 

CW precursor chemicals. Iraq renovated key processes and reinitiated production of basic chemicals 

in 2000. 

• Tariq chemical facilities were designed to be, and 

in the case of Fallujah II previously used as, CW 

precursor production plants.

• Fallujah II, while under previous state ownership, 

produced nerve agent and sulfur mustard precursors 

for MSE in the late 1980s. 

• Tariq as of 2002 employed some of the more infl uential personalities associated with Iraq’s former 

CW production programs. 

In an effort to determine the nature and extent of 

Tariq’s activities after 1991, ISG conducted a series 

of site visits, interviews with key personnel, and 

document exploitation. Teams focused on evaluating 

activities of the two active Fallujah plants and questioning the former CW scientists, many of whom had 

held important positions in the former CW program, 

about their efforts at Tariq after the Gulf war.

Based on these investigations, ISG assesses that the 

Tariq Company did not provide Iraq with a breakout capability for nerve agent production. 

• Pesticide (Formerly Fallujah III): Instead of 

synthesizing precursors and pesticides on site and 

in Iraq, Tariq imported concentrated commercial 

pesticides for formulation, repackaging, and local 

distribution. 

• Chlorine/Phenol Plant (Formerly Fallujah II): 

Leading up to OIF, this plant was not fully operational, and was unlikely to have provided any basic 

chemicals such as chlorine or phenol to an Iraqi 

CW effort. Because of technical problems, the plant 

could not even supply local markets with its products. 

• One of Tariq’s labs, the Baghdad Research Laboratory, was closed at an unknown date, according to interviews with Huwaysh, and he stated its 

employees did not participate in any CW-related 

research while it was open. Other ISG interviews 

indicate that the lab may have engaged in defensive 

nerve agent detector research. 

As of 2001 or 2002, Tariq scientists were still 

regarded by members of the Regime as CW experts. 

When Saddam asked in 2001 or 2002 for an estimate of how long it would take to build a production 

line for CW, Huwaysh approached a team of Tariq 

scientists to answer the question, according to an ISG 

interview with Huwaysh. 

• Huwaysh’s expert team included a number of Tariq 

employees, such as former directors Ghazi Faisal 

and Zuhair al-Qazzaz, according to the same interview. 

It is possible, that Huwaysh confused the details and 

actually was referring to a similar incident involving him that occurred in 1997. In the latter case, 

Huwaysh—not Saddam—reportedly initiated a query 

about how Iraq’s CW capability would be limited by 

an UNSCOM-ordered destruction of dual-use equipment rather than how quickly production could be 

restarted. 
90

Dual-Use Facilities

Pesticide (Formerly Fallujah III)

Instead of synthesizing precursors and pesticides on 

site and in Iraq, Tariq imported concentrated commercial pesticides for formulation, repackaging, and 

local distribution.

• ISG interviews of a senior scientist revealed that 

around 50 tons per year of the pesticide Nugoz was 

imported, sometimes using false customs declarations.

• A research scientist stated that while Tariq formulated a large list of commercial pesticides, the 

company did not produce pesticides at greater than 

laboratory scale, which he attributed to a lack of 

glass-lined equipment available in Tariq. 

Castor Oil Production (Formerly Fallujah III)

Castor oil was also produced at Tariq from 1992 

until 2002, but ISG investigations did not uncover 

any indication that the ricin-containing mash was 

further processed or transferred off-site for any 

purpose. According to interviews with Tariq offi cials, 

they complied with UNSCOM regulations by burning 

the residual castor bean mash in pits near the Fallujah 

III facility. 

Castor oil production ended in 2002 because of 

rising prices of castor beans and decreasing customer interest. Two companies interested in purchasing Tariq’s castor oil were Ibn Al-Baytar and Samarra 

Drug Industries, but ultimately neither company 

purchased Tariq’s oil because its process used solvent 

extraction and rendered the oil unfi t for pharmaceutical and medical uses, according to the same interviews. 

• An ISG site visit indicated that the castor oil extraction plant appeared to be undamaged, but there was 

no evidence of any current activity. All of the surrounding buildings were empty, possibly because of 

looters.

• Tariq’s castor bean supplier, the Company for 

Industrial Forests, had raised its prices from 60,000 

to 400,000 Iraqi dinars per ton (from US $38 to 

$250) in 2002, and predicted that prices would 

increase to 700,000 dinars ($438) the next year, 

according to the same interviews. 

Chlorine (Formerly Fallujah II) 

Chlorine, a feedstock for some CW precursors, was 

produced at Tariq from 1993 to 1996, and sporadically thereafter; however, ISG has not discovered 

any information that indicates chlorine from the 

plant was diverted to a CW program. During an ISG 

site visit, the director of the phenol plant stated that 

Former CW Personnel Employed by Tariq 

Tariq employed a large number of CW scientists 

and engineers from Muthanna State Establishment, 

especially within upper management of the company, 

throughout the 1990s and up to March 2003:

• Dr. Ghazi Faysal: Worked to build Tariq under the 

OMI after MSE was destroyed in the fi rst Gulf war. 

Served as the director of Tariq until moving to alBasel center. 

• Dr. Iyad Muhammad Rashid Rauf: Deputy General Director for the Tariq facility. Iyad Rashid 

researched nerve agent production in the Salah ad 

Din Research Department of MSE. 

• Husayn Shamki: Tariq research scientist.

• Ihsen Abd al-Amir: Tariq research scientist.

• Issam Daud Faysal: Formerly of the Al Karama 

Facility. Involved in quality control at MSE.

• Brig.Eng. Hayder Hassan Taha: Director of the 

Chlorine factory at Tariq; previously worked as a 

chemical engineer in the Project Directorate in AlMuthana State Co.

• Staff Colonel Ra’d Manhal: Commercial and 

Planning director and NMD point of contact at 

Tariq, former director of the MSE munitions fi lling 

station.
91

Chemical

chlorine production had stopped months before OIF. 

Reporting indicates the facility was unable to obtain 

membranes—the key component of the technology at 

Tariq—to separate the chlorine.

• Members of the site visit team noted that membranes, probably older, used ones, were stacked 

by the roadside close to the northwest entrance. 

The director stated that they had been moved here 

to protect them in the event that the plant was 

bombed.

• Chlorine from the plant was sold to local sanitation 

plants and also consumed onsite to produce other 

commercial water purifi cation compounds such 

as sodium hypochlorite and calcium hypochlorite, 

which were sold for water treatment, according to 

the director. 

Technical diffi culties with the process resulted in 

lower production outputs from 1996 until 2000. 

According to the director, the chlorine cells had been 

broken for several months and control valves, main 

instrumentation control panels and a step down transformer were missing. 

In 1999, the Indian fi rm NEC Engineers Private, 

Ltd., was recruited to begin repairing the chlorine 

production lines, according to multiple sources. 

The plant director during the interview said NEC 

constructed the membrane cell equipment that would 

be use to produce chlorine and caustic soda, but one 

of the membranes was second-hand and perforated 

easily, which caused further problems with the operation.

• Once the project was completed, operational training in India was scheduled for the plant engineers, 

according to documents recovered by ISG. 

• Tariq, along with MIC employees and a representative from Iraqi Intelligence, formed a committee to 

conceal imports from India’s NEC engineers during 

a chlorine plant repair, according to documents 

recovered by ISG. 

By March 2000, with help from the Indian fi rm NEC 

Engineers, the chlor-alkali plant was brought back 

on-line. On 02 July 2003, neither the chlorine nor the 

phenol plants at Fallujah II were in working order. 

With little likelihood of any production in the near 

future, few employees were at the facility. 

Phenol (Formerly Fallujah II)

Since its 1995 commissioning, UNSCOM was 

suspicious of the true nature of Tariq’s phenol plant 

because of its proximity to Tariq’s chlorine plant and 

a lack of details about modifi cations performed at 

the plant. As of OIF, the plant was no longer in operation, according to an ISG site visit and interviews 

with the director of the plant; the temperature control 

equipment was broken, as had been the case for some 

years, and was one of the reasons for the plant’s low 

production levels.

• According to the plant director, the phenol had 

mostly been for al-Ramadi facility, where it was 

converted into a resin, used for making molds. 

• ISG visited a resin facility north of Baghdad in 

March 2004, and observed that this large phenol 

consumer did not use indigenously produced 

phenol from the Tariq facility; rather, they imported 

phenol from South Africa, with UN permission. 

• Additional processes at the phenol plant included 

a small azeotropic ethanol distillation unit, recovered from Al Muthanna. The purifi ed ethanol was 

then sent to SDI and hospitals for pharmaceutical 

purposes, according to the director. 

• In addition to a large list of industrial uses including resin and fi berglass production, phenol could 

also be used as a starting block for cyclohexanol, 

one component of cyclosarin, when reacted catalytically with chlorine. Cylcohexanol can also be 

synthesized from benzene, a much cheaper and 

more abundant chemical in Iraq, but we have no 

information that indicates Iraq used either process 

to produce cyclohexanol. 
92

Research Activities

We assess the bulk of the Tariq’s research throughout the 1990s—formulation and stability of pesticides—was legitimate and not CW related; however, 

a limited amount of defensive work with nerve agent 

simulants, and even gram-scale synthesis of agent 

may have occurred. 

• A research scientist reported that a typical formulation research project included evaluation of the 

following factors: literature research on pesticides; 

availability and ease of import of raw concentrated 

ingredient, emulsifi ers, and stabilizers within Iraq; 

stability testing and physical properties testing 

of formulated product over time and temperature 

ranges; and fi eld testing with 500 kg pilot-scale 

batches. 

• The scientist confi rmed to ISG that malathion, 

dichlorovos and 2,4-D amine, the amine salt of 2,4-

D, had all been synthesized on a laboratory scale.

Because of feared repercussions and the awareness 

of the dual-use nature of Tariq’s products, offi cials 

at Tariq were often reported as hesitant to allow or 

support research that could be considered CW-applicable by the international community.

• Ghazi Faisal had instructed the researchers to avoid 

synthesis of organophosphorus compounds as it 

might cause them diffi culties with the UN, according to ISG interviews with Tariq scientists, and a 

senior scientist claimed he did not know of any 

synthesis of phosphorus based compounds.

• Huwaysh stated that he went out of his way to make 

sure that no CW research was going on, even to 

the point of canceling the Tariq research center in 

Baghdad.

Tariq, in addition to its own research for industrial 

processes, also bid for and won research contracts 

from the IIC list of 1,000 chemicals, none of which 

were phosphorus-related. Tariq’s research and development department routinely reported the progress 

of these projects to Hamza Yassin, chief of chemical 

research and development at the OMI, according to 

reporting. 

• Tariq researchers evaluated scale-up feasibility of 

the following industrial chemicals: benzyl alcohol, acetyl chloride, sodium hydroxide, aluminum 

hydroxide, ortho-chloroanaline, calcine, ferrous 

chloride, and mono-chloro acetic acid.

Tariq scientists have also participated in CW defensive research, including the development of suitable 

nerve agent simulants for military training purposes 

and possible gram-scale production of VX standards 

for testing detectors and studying its degradation 

products. 

• A senior scientist, when asked about military 

equipment at Tariq, immediately mentioned a 

Russian-made detection system brought to the site 

by another senior scientist and used in simulant 

research.

• A research scientist described a larger-scale simulant research project in 2002 that had been directed 

by a presidential order. The research group produced 1,000 liters of Tariq One—Nogoz as a nerve 

agent simulant, and Tariq Two—diethyl amine as 

a nitrogen mustard simulant. The compounds were 

colored with dye, and thickened with a polymer. He 

asserted that any symptoms from the formulated 

pesticides would pass within a half hour, according 

to ISG interviews with him. 
93

Chemical

Annex E

Al-Abud Network

Summary

Triggered by a series of site exploitations and detentions in March 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) began 

investigating a network of Iraqi insurgents—referred 

to as the al-Abud network—who in late 2003 and 

early 2004 actively sought chemical weapons for 

use against Coalition Forces. ISG created a team of 

experts—including operators, analysts, and technical 

ops offi cers—to systematically investigate and disrupt 

the al-Abud network and diffuse the immediate threat 

posed by the insurgents. The team also focused on 

identifying links between al-Abud players and former 

regime CBW experts to determine whether WMD 

intellectual capital was being tapped by insurgent 

elements throughout Iraq. By June 2004, ISG was 

able to identify and neutralize the chemical suppliers and chemists, including former regime members, 

who supported the al-Abud network. A series of raids, 

interrogations, and detentions disrupted key activities 

at al-Abud-related laboratories, safehouses, supply 

stores, and organizational nodes. However, the insurgent leaders and fi nancers within the network remain 

at large and alleged chemical munitions remain unaccounted. 

Organization and Preparation 

Fallujah-based insurgents—belonging mostly to the 

Jaysh Muhammad organization—recruited in late 

2003 an inexperienced Baghdad chemist to lead the 

development of chemical agents including tabun, 

mustard, and other toxic chemicals. The insurgents 

targeted the chemist because of his background in 

chemistry—albeit limited and with no ties to former 

regime CW program—and his access to chemicals 

in Baghdad’s chemical suk district. The insurgents 

appear to have recruited the chemist with fi nancial 

incentives; however, debriefi ngs of detained al-Abud 

network members suggest that the chemist was sympathetic to the insurgent’s anti-Coalition cause.

After identifying their chemist, the al-Abud network 

sought chemicals and equipment needed to conduct 

CW experiments. The al-Abud network had little 

diffi culty in acquiring certain chemicals after OIF, 

including malathion pesticide and nitrogen mustard precursors. However, it remains unclear if their 

inability to acquire necessary nerve agent precursors 

is attributed to a lack of supply or CW inexperience.

• The insurgents acquired most of the chemicals from 

farmers who looted state companies and from shops 

in Baghdad’s chemical suk.

The last component of the CW project involved dissemination of the agents. The al-Abud network relied 

on a political member of Jaysh Muhammad to provide 

the mortar rounds, which the insurgents would fi ll 

with agent for planned use against Coalition Forces. It 

remains unclear how the insurgents intended to utilize 

the rounds, either fi red as mortars or detonated as 

improvised chemical devices. 

Initial CW Experiments

The al-Abud network fi rst attempted to produce 

the nerve agent tabun in late December 2003, and 

the experiment was a self-admitted failure because 

the insurgents lacked the necessary chemicals. The 

product of the fi rst CW experiment was a mixture of 

malathion and other chemicals, which by itself is a 

poisonous compound if disseminated properly.

• The al-Abud network used their malathion mixture 

to “weaponize” nine mortar rounds. The mortars 

likely are an ineffective means of dispersing the 

malathional because the detonation of the mortar 

will consume the poison.

• Malathion and tabun have similar chemical structures, however it is not possible to create tabun 

from malathion. The al-Abud chemist understood 

this limitation, but probably continued with the 

experiments to appease the insurgents.

The al-Abud chemist abandoned his tabun experiments after initial failures, but months later in March 

2004 he considered trying to produce tabun from the 
94

prescribed precursor chemicals, not malathion. Based 

on ISG investigations, the al-Abud network did not 

have the necessary chemicals. A lack of resources and 

insurgent backing probably forced the al-Abud chemist to cease his attempts to produce tabun.

Mustard Experiments and Weaponization

After the initial attempt to produce tabun, the alAbud network in late January and early February 

2004 began acquiring materials for the production of 

nitrogen mustard. The al-Abud network had the necessary materials, but lacked the expertise, to produce 

nitrogen mustard. 

• They failed to produce nitrogen mustard because 

the chemist used incorrect amounts of the precursors and inadequate processes.

• Following the mid-March failure to produce mustard, the al-Abud network sought the assistance of 

a young “chemist-for-hire”—who owned a small 

chemical lab in Baghdad—to refi ne their processes. 

The younger chemist also failed to produce nitrogen mustard.

• The al-Abud network approached the “chemist-forhire” because of his reputation as a capable chemist 

in Baghdad. Although he did not have any prior 

CW experience or previous anti-Coalition tendencies, the young chemist willingly aided the al-Abud 

network as a profi t-seeking mercenary.

With time and experience it is plausible that the 

al-Abud network could have mastered the processes 

necessary to produce nitrogen mustard. However, 

Coalition Forces disrupted the al-Abud network’s 

ability to produce nitrogen mustard when they 

detained the younger and more experienced al-Abud 

chemist and confi scated chemical precursors. Lacking the young chemists’ expertise, the network likely 

shifted its focus to the production of binary mustard.

In renewed efforts to produce mustard, the al-Abud 

network returned to the chemical suk in Baghdad to 

purchase necessary chemicals and began the weaponization of binary mustard rounds. Weaponization of 

binary mustard in mortar shells is relatively simple, 

however the insurgents poorly executed this procedure. 

Ricin and Nontraditional Agent Production

The younger al-Abud chemist—at the urging of the 

other al-Abud chemist and motivated by fi nancial 

gain—successfully produced small quantities of ricin 

extract in March 2004 using widely distributed terrorist literature. ISG exploited the young chemist’s 

laboratory to reveal an operational lab setup designed 

for producing ricin cake—a substance that easily can 

be converted to poisonous toxin ricin. The production 

of ricin likely occurred without the direct knowledge 

of the al-Abud insurgents, but the chemists probably 

intended to sell the toxin for use against Coalition 

Forces.

• The lab setup contained the necessary raw materials 

and equipment to produce small quantities of ricin 

and was not capable of facilitating a mass-casualty 

ricin attack. However, the lab could have produced 

enough ricin to cause a few isolated casualties—if 

disseminated properly.

Within the same timeframe of the tabun and ricin 

experiments, the al-Abud chemists prepared two 

additional agents, napalm and sodium fl uoroacetate, 

for the Jaysh Muhammad insurgents in the al-Abud 

network. ISG assesses their efforts to produce these 

nontraditional compounds capable of causing mass 

casualties as highly unlikely.

Jaysh Muhammad

Jaysh Muhammad (JM) is an anti-Coalition group 

with both politically motivated and religiously motivated elements that ISG began tracking after they 

produced chemical mortars. The politically motivated 

members are Ba’athist, pro-Saddam elements who 

tend to be of the Sufi religious soca. The Sufi enjoyed 

special status during the Regime and hold Izzat 

al-Duri, the ex-vice-president, in exceptionally high 

esteem. They were members of intelligence, security, 

and police forces from the previous regime.

According to detainee accounts, JM members, along 

with Fallujah based insurgents planned to use the CW 

rounds against Coalition Forces. Evidence suggests 

that JM acquired the rounds, although it remains 

unclear if they were used. Until we are able to capture 

the key fi gures of JM involved with al-Abud, it is 

unlikely we will determine what happened to the 

rounds.
95

Chemical

Ties to the Former Regime

ISG has found no evidence that the recent chemical weaponization attempts stem from the former 

regime’s CW program or represent a prescribed plan 

by the former regime to fuel an insurgency. However, 

many of the known al-Abud personalities have ties to 

the former regime through either business relationships or political affi liations. Capitalizing on these 

connections, the al-Abud insurgents—including 

former Ba’athists—utilized a pre-OIF supply infrastructure to access chemicals and mortars. 

• The primary chemical supplier in Baghdad—who 

had business ties to former regime companies as 

well as personal relationships with MIC and Iraqi 

Intelligence Service (IIS) offi cials—served as 

a facilitator for the al-Abud network, supplying 

chemicals and limited fi nancial backing.

• The leadership of Jaysh Muhammad is comprised 

of mostly Ba’athists with ties to the former regime. 

Insurgent knowledge of pre-OIF infrastructure 

enabled the network to source and generate much of 

its chemical-biological warfare capability. Whether 

due to previous positions held or personal contacts 

within the former regime, much of the direct support derived from various former regime means. 

Ties to the Insurgency

ISG has found no evidence to confi rm or deny that 

the al-Abud network is an integrated and coordinated piece of a larger insurgency campaign in Iraq. 

However, the al-Abud network’s efforts are likely 

known to the insurgency because of the proximity 

in Fallujah of the al-Abud leadership and insurgent 

Zarqawi network. Additionally, the majority of fi gures 

in the al-Abud network are at least sympathetic to the 

insurgent cause.

Implications

The most alarming aspect of the al-Abud network is 

how quickly and effectively the group was able to 

mobilize key resources and tap relevant expertise to 

develop a program for weaponizing CW agents. If 

the insurgents had been able to acquire the necessary 

materials, fi ne tune their agent production techniques, 

and better understand the principals behind effectively 

dispersing CW, then the consequences of the al-Abud 

network’s project could have been devastating to 

Coalition Forces. 

• Despite the fl eeting nature of the insurgent’s initial 

attempts, the al-Abud chemists progressively 

gained experience with CW, and continued different 

approaches with the same goal. 

The al-Abud network is not the only group planning 

or attempting to produce or acquire CBW agents for 

use against Coalition Forces. ISG focused on the alAbud network because of the maturity of the group’s 

CW production, as well as, the severity of the threat 

posed by its weaponization efforts. Recent reporting 

from a variety of sources shows insurgent’s attempts 

to acquire and produce CBW agent throughout 

theatre. The availability of chemicals and materials 

dispersed throughout the country, and intellectual 

capital from the former WMD programs increases the 

future threat to Coalition Forces by groups such as the 

al-Abud network. 
96

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97

Chemical

Annex F

Detailed Preliminary Assessment 

of Chemical Weapons Findings

Chemical Munitions—Other Finds

Introduction

Beginning in May 2004, ISG recovered a series of 

chemical weapons from Coalition military units 

and other sources. A total of 53 munitions have been 

recovered, all of which appear to have been part of 

pre-1991 Gulf war stocks based on their physical 

condition and residual components.

The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm 

binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 

percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents 

attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device 

(IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only 

raises questions about the number of viable chemical 

weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility 

that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical 

weapons still exist. 

• ISG has no information to indicate that Iraq produced more binary Sarin rounds than it declared, 

however, former Iraqi scientists involved with the 

program admitted that the program was considered 

extremely successful and shelved for future use. 

According to the source, General Amer al-Saadi 

sought to downplay its fi ndings to the UN to avoid 

heightened attention toward the program. 

Under UN Security Resolution 687, Iraq should 

have destroyed or rendered harmless all CW munitions, but we cannot determine without additional 

information whether the rounds we have recovered 

were declared or if their destruction was attempted. 

• An Iraqi source indicated that when weapons were 

forward-deployed in anticipation of a confl ict, 

the CW weapons often became mixed in with the 

regular munitions, and were never accounted for 

again. Another source stated that several hundred 

munitions moved forward for the Gulf war, and 

never used, were never recovered by retreating Iraqi 

troops. A thorough post-OIF search of forward 

depots turned up nothing—if the weapons were 

indeed left behind, they were looted over the 12 

years between the wars.

• Iraq’s unilateral destruction of weapons in 1991 

was far from perfect—a February 2003 UNMOVIC 

inspection at the Al Azziziyah Firing Range to 

attempt to account for 157 R-400 bombs by inspecting the debris turned up 8 bombs that had survived 

the 1991 explosions. So it is possible that Iraqi—or 

even UN—explosion pits could have been looted of 

a few surviving munitions.

• Because of poor Iraqi inventory accounting, simple 

pilferage before or after the 1991 Gulf war could 

have resulted in some lost munitions. 

May 04: 155mm Chemical Munitions Used as an 

Improvised Explosive Device 

Military units recovered a 155mm artillery round near 

Baghdad International Airport. Analysis of the residue 

at the bottom of the round by ISG fi eld labs returned 

positive indications for sulfur mustard CW agent. 

The lab results, type and condition of the round, and 

the lack of markings indicate it is an Iraqi CW-fi lled 

155mm round left over from the pre-1991 Iraqi program. The lack of a driving band makes it diffi cult to 

determine whether the round was fi red, where it was 

acquired, and suggests the band probably was looted 

(see Figure 1).

Historical context: Iraq purchased thousands 

of empty 155mm artillery rounds designed to 

disseminate smoke chemicals. The original 

markings were generally painted over and the 

munitions fi lled with CW agent mustard. Over 

10,000 of these rounds were destroyed under 

UN supervision, but they have not all been 

accounted for.

One of the key UN unresolved issues involves 

550 mustard-fi lled rounds. An ISG investigation 

into this issue yielded inconsistent information 

about the fi nal disposition of the 550 shells, 

with one offi cial claiming they were retained for 

future use. The ISG has not been able to confi rm 

these claims. 
98

Figure 1. 155mm sulfur mustard chemical round.

Figure 2. Location of binary Sarin round along airport

and road. 
99

Chemical

16 May 2004: 152mm Binary Chemical 

Improvised Explosive Device

A military unit near Baghdad Airport reported a suspect IED along the main road between the airport and 

the Green Zone (see fi gure 2). The munitions were 

remotely detonated and the remaining liquid tested 

positive in ISG fi eld labs for the nerve agent Sarin and 

a key Sarin degradation product. 

The partially detonated IED was an old prototype 

binary nerve agent munition of the type Iraq declared 

it had fi eld tested in the late 1980s. The munitions 

bear no markings, much like the sulfur mustard round 

reported on 2 May (see Figure 3). Insurgents may 

have looted or purchased the rounds believing they 

were conventional high explosive 155mm rounds. The 

use of this type of round as an IED does not allow 

suffi cient time for mixing of the binary compounds 

and release in an effective manner, thus limiting the 

dispersal area of the chemicals.

Historical context: Iraq only declared its work 

on binary munitions after Husayn Kamil fl ed 

Iraq in 1995, and even then only claimed to 

have produced a limited number of binary 

rounds that it used in fi eld trials in 1988. UN 

investigations revealed a number of uncertainties surrounding the nature and extent of Iraq’s 

work with these systems and it remains unclear 

how many rounds it produced, tested, declared, 

or concealed from the UN. 

16 May 2004: 10 155mm Chemical Rounds

A military team interrupted a group of Iraqi individuals attempting to bury multiple projectiles at a 

location near Canal Road in Baghdad (see fi gure 4). 

The individuals fl ed the site when fi red upon, and 

the military team captured multiple artillery rounds 

and other weapons at the site. ISG’s fi eld labs tested 

the recovered 155mm rounds and found some trace 

amounts of sulfur mustard and sulfur mustard degradation products in a few of the rounds. Technical 

experts found that each round contained a ruptured 

burster tube—inconsistent with UN destruction 

practices—suggesting that either Iraq unilaterally 

destroyed the rounds or looters attempted to drain 

residual agent from them (see fi gure 5).

Historical context: Iraq declared in its 1996 

Full, Final, and Complete Declaration (FFCD) 

that it produced 68,000 155mm sulfur mustardfi lled rounds between 1981 and 1990. Of those 

produced, Iraq has not been able to account for 

the location or destruction of 550 shells. The 

bulk of 155mm destruction occurred between 

1993 and 1994 and many of the log entries 

show that the mustard was partly polymerized, 

which is consistent with our fi ndings in the 

recent sulfur mustard rounds. 

16 June 2004: Two 122mm SAKR-18 Artillery 

Rockets

An Iraqi source turned over to Polish Forces two 

122mm rockets obtained at the Khamisiyah Depot—a 

former CW storage site declared by Iraq to have 

housed 122mm fi lled rockets (see Figure 6). Details 

about the provenance of these rounds remain unclear 

but the source believes the missiles were housed in a 

bunker struck during the Gulf war and subsequently 

hidden in canals and lakes in the area. Analysis of the 

liquid residue revealed the nerve agents Sarin (GB) 

and Cyclosarin (GF) as well as a number of impurities and known degradation products of GB and GF. 

Given the age, leakage, decomposition of nerve agent, 

and small quantity of remaining liquid, these rounds 

would have limited, if any, impact if used by insurgents against Coalition Forces (see Figure 7). 

Historical context: Iraq declared having produced the following numbers of 122mm nerve 

agent rockets, but made no distinction in its 

declaration about the type of sarin fi ll: GB, GF, 

or GB/GF mix. We suspect, based on data from 

the declaration and the UNSCOM 239 Report 

that GB/GF-fi lled rockets were included in the 

1988 and 1990 declaration fi gures. Although 

the origin of these rockets has not been clearly 

stated, the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage 

Depot where the rockets were found has a long 

history of CW storage, Coalition bombing, and 

UN investigation. 
100

Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Used on BIAP

The binary chemical round detonated near the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) probably originated 

with a batch that was stored in a Al Muthanna CW 

complex basement during the late 1980s for the purpose of leakage testing. Iraq placed at least 12 fi lled 

binary Sarin munitions, either 152 or 155mm projectiles, in the basement of the Salah al-Din laboratory at the Al Muthanna CW complex, according to a 

report. 

• The same report claims that only 20-30 binary 

152mm rounds were produced, and the program 

switched to 155mm rounds after the 152mm rounds 

were expended in testing. The report stated that all 

of the binary munitions with aluminum canister 

inserts (such as the one used on BIAP) should have 

been used in fi eld testing, but some may have been 

set aside for leak testing at Al Muthanna.

• A different report stated that as of 1988 no binary 

chemical rounds were stored at any other location 

besides the Salah al-Din laboratory, and that the 

rounds were kept in the basement to test for leakage 

and chemical degradation.

• A third report speculated that binary rounds may 

either have been buried or moved to one of two 

bunkers in the mid-1990s when the UN ordered the 

Al Muthanna complex to relocate a large number of 

chemicals and munitions. The same report said that 

Salah al-Din al-Nu’aymi, the manager of the binary 

Sarin munitions project, frequently stored munitions 

he was working on but had not tested in the basement of his laboratory at Al Muthanna.

• A fourth report said that 20-40 binary shells were 

kept in the “special stores” at Al Muthanna as of 

the late 80s, but the source believed that these had 

been destroyed by UNSCOM. ISG has been unable 

to verify from UNSCOM reports that any binary 

shells were destroyed at Al Muthanna. 

The Technical Research Center (TRC) also worked 

on producing 152mm binary Sarin artillery shells, 

but we have no reason to believe that they possessed 

functional chemical munitions.

• According to the Iraqi FFCD, the TRC conducted 

lab experiments with 152mm binary munitions 

using a simulant to test the mixing of the binary 

components. No binary tests using chemical agent 

at the TRC were declared.

• According to one report, the Iraqi Intelligence service offi cer Ali Muklif ran the binary program, and 

the deputy director of the Military Industrialization 

Commission, Amir al-Sa’adi, ordered the work. 

The report claimed that al-Sa’adi provided the TRC 

with chemicals and possibly 152mm rounds, but the 

report did not elaborate on the work performed by 

the TRC.

The disposition of the 152mm and/or the 155mm 

artillery projectiles after the Gulf war is unknown, 

although it is possible that the rounds remained at 

the Al Muthanna complex and were looted after 

OIF.

• Even though Al Muthanna has been extensively 

investigated by UN and ISG teams, the complex 

covers 10 square miles, which makes it diffi cult to 

fully exploit. An ISG team that went to the site in 

January said that looters appeared to have been at 

several parts of the Al Muthanna complex.

• Several parts of the Al Muthanna complex were 

bombed or in poor condition throughout the 1990s. 

These areas pose a health risk to exploitation 

teams, but looters have shown themselves to be less 

risk-averse than ISG personnel. It is possible that 

the round was removed from an area in Al Muthanna that was deemed unsafe to exploit.

• An alternate explanation is that rounds were moved 

out of Al Muthanna and stored at a different location in the early 1990s, from where it was later 

looted after OIF, although we have no reporting to 

substantiate this possibility.

The actual number of fi lled binary artillery shells 

produced by the Iraqi CW program during the 1980s 

is unknown, but we assess that only a handful of fi lled 

binary rounds would have existed after the Gulf war.
101

Chemical

Historical context: Prior to the Gulf war, the 

Iraqis had stored SAKR munitions in bunkers at 

the Khamisiyah Depot and moved some of them 

to a nearby depression near a canal prior to the 

confl ict to avoid bombing. During the Gulf Confl ict US ground forces captured the Khamisiyah 

Depot and blew some of the storage bunkers 

without knowledge of CW munitions there. 

UN inspectors have since visited the site and 

UNSCOM’s fi gures for these 122mm munitions indicate that between 350 and 400 are not 

accounted for—almost certainly the rounds that 

remained in Building 71 after its demolition. 

Between 1991-1998 Iraqi’s looted the structure, 

and in doing so disposed of the contents, including weapons. The likelihood is that the rounds 

were chucked into nearby piles of earth, which 

were in turn covered by more debris. 

Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Used on BIAP 

• According to a report, the National Monitoring 

Directorate only asked for the number of binary 

CW rounds Al Muthanna tested, not the number it 

actually produced. The Iraqi FFCD from June 1996 

states that 10-12 152mm and 160 155mm binary 

Sarin artillery shells were fi eld-tested.

• If the number of 152mm artillery shells produced 

by Al Muthanna was a few dozen, as was stated in 

the aforementioned sensitive report, then the shells 

which remained in the basement of the Salah al-Din 

25 June 2004: 17 Additional 122mm SAKR-18 

Artillery Rockets. July 2004: 22 Additional 122mm 

SAKR-18 Artillery Rockets 

An additional 17 rockets from the same cache 

described above (d) were identifi ed at the Khamisiyah Depot by the same source. (See fi gure 8). Sixteen were returned to ISG for analysis and one was 

exploded onsite because it retained an intact rocket 

motor that posed safety concerns. Most of the rounds 

had been severed, exposed to heat, or were partially 

destroyed. Four intact rounds were separated for 

testing and returned a preliminary positive result for 

G-series nerve agent. None of these rounds retained a 

liquid fi ll line, suggesting the agent had degraded over 

time. 22 more rockets were discovered at Khamisiyah. 21 were in deteriorated condition with the only 

intact rocket having residual riot control agent present. (See fi gure 9).

Historical context: These 122mm SAKR-18 

rockets were discovered at the Khamisiyah 

Depot. Please refer to the box above for relevant historical context.

Laboratory in the late 1980s may have been the 

only fi lled binary sarin rounds which existed at the 

time of the Gulf war.

• Reporting states that the only 152mm binary Sarin 

rounds produced by Al Muthanna that were not 

destroyed in fi eld tests were in the basement of the 

Salah al-Din laboratory. The report stated that 

at least 12 binary munitions were placed there, 

although they may have been 152mm, 155mm, or a 

mixture of both.

(continued)
102

Figure 4. Location of chemical rounds along canal road.

Figure 3. 152mm binary Sarin round used as IED.
103

Chemical

Figure 5. Examples of the 10 155mm chemical rounds

and x-rays of ruptured burster tubes.

Figure 6. Location of SAKR-18 rockets at Khamisiyah depot. 
104

Figure 8. Additional SAKR-18 rockets turned in from 

Khamisiyah depot.

Figure 7. Photos and x-ray of SAKR-18 rockets.
105

Chemical

Figure 9. Additional SAKR-18 rockets turned in from 

Khamisiyah depot.
106

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107

Chemical

Annex G

Chemical Warfare and the 

Defense of Baghdad

ISG investigated reporting that Iraq used a defensive 

doctrine during OIF that included the employment 

of a “red line,” beyond which the Iraqis would have 

used available WMD against Coalition forces. Since 

OIF, we have conducted numerous interviews of 

senior regime offi cials and military offi cers in an 

effort to confi rm whether Iraq had weaponized CW 

ready to use or whether there was a “red line” concept that would have triggered a CW attack.

We believe that there was indeed a “red line” 

defense for Baghdad, but it was a simple multi-ring 

conventional defense that quickly broke down under 

Coalition assault, and not the coordinated, prepared 

plan depicted in prewar intelligence reporting.

• Evidence of strategic planning at the Diwan and 

fl ag-offi cer levels is lacking in any mention of CW.

• Many Iraqi Generals believed there was a secret 

plan to use CW, but we have found no evidence that 

the SSO—which was involved in past CW uses—

was part of any planning for CW use.

Prior to OIF, historical reports describe Iraqi plans for 

defensive use of CW to disrupt or halt the advance 

of enemy troops and to disrupt enemy staging areas 

before their attack.

• As early as 1991, prior to Desert Storm, Saddam 

decided to use CW if Coalition forces crossed a 

parallel extending west from Al Amarah or if Iranian troops crossed the border into Iraq, according 

to reporting.

During the run-up to OIF, the Intelligence Community received additional information pointing to a 

“red line” around Baghdad that, if crossed by Coalition forces, would trigger an Iraqi CW attack.

• According to a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 

member, Saddam in October 2002 authorized the 

use of prohibited weapons at the discretion of four 

fi eld commanders if US forces closed on Baghdad. One of the four fi eld commanders was Kamal 

Mustafa, the Republican Guard Secretary. The 

“red line” was described as a box around Baghdad 

encompassing the cities of Tuz Khurmatu, Bayji, 

Ar-Ramadi, Karbala, Al-Hillah, Al-Hillah, Al-Kut, 

and Al-Miqdadiyah (see Figure 1).

• According to a senior Iraqi Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs offi cial, in early February 2003, Saddam 

had decided to use CW against Coalition troops in 

the event of war.

• Reportedly in a mid-February 2003 meeting, senior 

members of the Iraqi armed forces and Ba’ath 

party members discussed plans to release unknown 

chemical agents by remote detonation in six populated areas near the Saudi-Jordanian frontier and in 

western Iraq.

• According to a foreign government service, as of 

16 March 2003, the 108th artillery battalion of the 

Baghdad Republican Guard Division in Al-Kut was 

under orders to use CW on Coalition forces if they 

approached Al-Kut. The battalion was reportedly 

equipped with CW shells, including mustard and 

unidentifi ed binary agents, and was commanded by 

Col. Muhammad Ibrahim Sulayman.

Figure 1. Red line for triggering CW use, 

October 2002.
108

Late 2002–Early 2003: Struggling To Generate a 

High-Level Defense Strategy

Available evidence indicates that the Iraqi Pre-OIF 

defense strategy evolved over a rather short time, 

from mid-2002 through the end of that year, and 

transitioned to the level of detailed tactical planning only shortly before OIF (see Chapter 1, Regime 

Strategic Intent).

• Even as Coalition forces built up around Iraq, 

Saddam continued to believe that they would not 

invade or attack Iraq; this belief was dispelled only 

by the beginning of OIF itself;

• Saddam perceived his armed forces to be stronger 

than they were and thought a Coalition invasion, if 

it did occur, would never penetrate as far as Baghdad;

Origin of the Red Line—The Sandhurst Approach

Information acquired from various military sources 

and documents indicates that Iraq developed a 

defense doctrine that included a directive to defend 

to the last by all means necessary once Coalition 

forces approached a red line. Sources report that 

Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan was based upon 

a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi Offi cers, but 

we have not found evidence that the plan explicitly 

included a trigger for CW use.

• The defensive tactical doctrine was originally 

taught to Iraqi Offi cers at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, United Kingdom, in the 1950s, and 

later similar doctrines were taught to Iraqi offi cers 

at British-style training courses in Pakistan. The 

fundamental principles are based upon concentric 

defensive perimeters or layered defensive lines.

• The defenses usually consisted of four lines:

—4th line (yellow)—line along which reconnaissance units usually deploy;

—3rd line (green) —fi rst line of defense against 

advancing units;

—2nd line (blue)—fi rst major fallback positions for 

the units stationed at the blue line—additional 

troops, supplies, and ammo stationed here;

—1st line (red)—innermost defense line or last line 

of defense and fi nal fallback position for troops. 

Advancing forces would meet the heaviest resistance here, and it was the fi nal staging area.

Reporting indicates that the multiline defense was 

attempted by some Iraqi forces defending against 

Coalition advances during OIF, with poor results:

• The 34th Infantry Division used the method in 

defending the Khanaquin Border Crossing—however, Coalition forces moved so rapidly and so 

many Iraqi soldiers deserted that the situation 

quickly became chaotic, and the notion of falling 

back to a stabilized line or lines was impossible.

• In addition, the 5th Mechanized Division used this 

doctrine in its defense of Kirkuk, but its lines successively collapsed under Coalition air assault.

• In fact, Saddam believed that a popular uprising 

would occur as the Coalition invasion progressed;

• Saddam’s inner circle reinforced his faulty perceptions out of fear of Saddam’s reaction.

High-Level Discussions Began in Earnest Only in 

Mid-2002 on a Regime Defense Plan. Starting in 

mid-2002 through OIF, the Intelligence Community 

received reporting that the Iraqi regime intended to 

use CW if Coalition forces invaded Iraq or threatened Baghdad. Iraq’s layered defense plan reportedly 

included the use of chemical weapons once Coalition forces crossed the defensive “red line.” Discussions about the deployment of WMD reportedly took 

place at various military levels, according to multiple 

reports.
109

Chemical

• In August 2002, reporting indicated Saddam 

Husayn had selected a pool of approximately 100 

experts and scientists to “solve Iraq’s problems” 

pertaining to the advancement, protection, and 

concealment of WMD programs. Rewards were 

reportedly provided to those scientists who came up 

with ideas for using WMD to thwart any potential 

US attack on Iraq.

• Reporting at various levels indicates WMD use 

was discussed; however, no source has been able to 

provide detailed plans of how Iraq was going to use 

WMD against a Coalition invasion.

Reportedly both before and after OIF, planning of 

an Iraqi defense strategy against Coalition forces 

underwent several stages. An initial plan appears 

to have been delivered by December 2002 and most 

likely underwent revisions until OIF.

• A senior Iraqi offi cer with direct knowledge of Iraqi 

war planning stated during OIF that at a meeting 

in December 2002, high-level Republican Guard 

Commanders and staff offi cers received the fi nal 

orders on how Baghdad was to be defended from 

LTG Al-Rawi.

• Reporting prior to OIF from a senior active-duty 

Iraqi military offi cer indicated in early February 

2003 the RG leadership was preoccupied with 

tactical defense planning against a possible Coalition attack. Defense plans were posited on three 

defensive lines, with the third and fi nal line including Baghdad and its suburbs. Conventional training 

had been intensifi ed by senior command, but there 

had been no increase in CBW training programs. 

Typical defensive chemical protection clothing and 

related materiel were provided, as were defensive 

chemical-warfare-related procedures.

Interrogations with several Iraqi division-level 

offi cers after OIF confi rm that Saddam’s Defense 

Plan was based upon a layered defense doctrine. 

The innermost circle of defense was referred to as 

the “red line.” Once Iraqi troops retreated to the red 

line position, they were to “hold to the last” without further retreat, presumably ready to employ all 

available weaponry (see Figure 2).

• Interrogation of a senior Iraqi offi cer with direct 

knowledge of Iraqi war planning during OIF 

revealed that on 18 December 2002 the former RG 

High Level Commanders and Staff Offi cers met 

with former RG Chief of Staff LTG Sayf Al-Din 

Al- Rawi, Qusay Husayn, Former RG Commander, 

and Saddam Husayn to receive orders for the fi nal 

Defense of Baghdad.

• According to the same source, Baghdad’s defenses 

would be based upon three defensive lines—units 

would fall back from one line to the next on orders 

from Saddam Husayn. The last line of this defensive plan was considered the red line, but, according to the offi cer, CW was not part of the defensive 

strategy because Saddam had indicated in a meeting that he had none. LTG Al-Rawi has eluded 

capture, and we have not been able to corroborate 

this information or confi rm this meeting.

• Interrogations with Former Staff Maj. Gen. Salih 

Ibrahim Hammadi Al-Salmani—head of the 

Baghdad division of the Republican Guard during 

OIF—indicated that all Iraqi forces were given a 

preestablished red line to defend. Consistent with 

Sandhurst teachings, the red lines were established 

by HQ and were the fi nal defensive fallback position where troops were to fi ght with the strongest 

resistance.

Figure 2. Schematic representation of “red 

line” and defense posture based on a senior 

Iraqi offi cer involved in pre-OIF war planning.
110

By April, the regime was nearing its end, and the 

discussions it had were no longer useful:

• Latif Nusayyif Al-Jasim Al-Duri—former member 

of the RCC and Deputy Secretary of the Ba’ath 

Military Bureau—indicated that at the last meeting 

he attended with Saddam and leading military and 

political fi gures in April 2003, Saddam was still 

asking “what kind of weapons preparations were 

accomplished and if any more were needed.”

• Al-Duri claimed that preparations for missiles and 

CW were not discussed but noted that the meetings 

were brief, which was unusual for revision and fi netuning of a last-ditch defense plan. Other attendees 

regarded this as the farewell meetings rather than a 

planning meeting. Tariq Aziz also substantiated the 

fact that the last meeting with Saddam still did not 

include in-depth tactical discussion or presentation. 

This lends credence to the fact that the defense plan 

never came together at the tactical level (see Figure 

3).

Figure 3 denotes Former Staff General Salih alSalmani’s impression of the red-line doctrine for the 

defense of Baghdad (the graphic provides an approximation of the layered defense structure). This graphic 

is a similar to Figure 2 on the previous page in denoting the layered defense and red line.

Flag-Level Opinion—No Knowledge of CW Plans, 

but Conventional Wisdom Expects It

At the same time as policymakers at the Presidential level were trying to generate a plan for defense 

against the Coalition, generals and high-level defense 

offi cials believed that a plan for CW use existed, 

even though they themselves knew nothing about the 

details.

Several high-ranking Iraqi military offi cials claimed 

CW was not part of an organized Iraqi Defense Plan 

but kept open the possibility that discussions took 

place in closed venues at higher levels. This suggests 

that Iraqi conventional wisdom agreed that CW was 

part of a secret plan, even in the absence of direct 

evidence:

• A major contributor to the Iraqi Defense Plan, 

former Defense Minister Sultan Hashem Ahmad 

Al-Tai, was captured by Coalition forces in September 2003. The Minister asserts that at no time was 

WMD discussed in strategy meetings to lay out an 

Iraq Defense Plan but does not rule out the possibility that discussions ensued at higher levels.

• Sultan Hashem was never directly asked if the 

red-line doctrine included the use of CW; however 

he fi rmly asserts that WMD use was not a topic of 

the defense plan and would have been a topic for 

a different, compartmentalized forum. Hashem 

also noted the large number of people who were 

shocked when Saddam announced in December 

2002 in an open forum that Iraq did not possess 

WMD.

• After OIF, the commander of the Iraqi military’s 

chemical corps, Gen. Amar Husayn al-Samarrai 

informed the US that Iraqi leaders had intended to 

concentrate their forces around the critical cities of 

Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Tikrit, with each city 

surrounded by several defensive layers. Samarrai 

was not aware of any offensive strategy to use CW 

against Coalition forces but indicated his job was to 

make sure the Iraqi military was fully equipped to 

handle a coalition chemical attack.

Figure 3. Former Staff General Salih al-Salmani’s 

impression of the red-line doctrine.
111

Chemical

• At the onset of OIF (late March), according to a 

foreign government service, an Iraqi security offi -

cial indicated that Iraq’s chemical weapons munitions had been removed from Baghdad as a result of 

the coalition air attack. He contends the bombing in 

late March 2003 resulted in the inability to prepare 

chemical weapons immediately against Coalition 

forces.

• Preliminary searches of the recovered documentation do not reveal written or recorded offi cial 

documents regarding an Iraqi defense doctrine and 

execution orders for CW.

Investigation Into Nontraditional CW Use—The 

Fedayeen Saddam

Traditional tactics in the deployment of CW would 

have been under the control of Saddam and Qusay 

Husayn with the SSO and RG delivering and deploying the munitions either by missile (with heavy MIC 

assistance), mortar, or artillery. However, ISG also 

investigated whether there was any evidence of 

CW use planned by the two most skilled groups in 

unconventional/nontraditional tactics and methods, 

the Saddam Fedayeen and the IIS, specifi cally the 

special operations elements of M14 cooperating with 

M16 technical experts.

There are no indications from the limited intelligence 

available that Fedayeen doctrine included the use of 

CW if a red line was breached. There is some evidence to indicate that ‘Uday wanted to deploy CW, 

but was unable to obtain them.

• According to reporting prior to OIF, in mid-March 

2003, ‘Uday Saddam Husayn sought CW agents 

from OMI and tasked Muhammad Khudayr Al-Halbusi Al-Dulaymi—then director of IIS M-14—who 

asked Imad Hussayn ‘Abdallah ‘Al-‘Ani (the father 

of Iraq’s VX program), to provide an unspecifi ed 

CW agent. Dulaymi dispatched a courier who communicated the message to Al-Ani. Al-Ani asked for 

two weeks to study feasibility as a delaying tactic 

and replied after two weeks that OMI facilities 

were not capable of producing CW agents and the 

required chemical precursors were not available in 

Iraq. However, after OIF Muhammad Al-Dulaymi 

was interrogated on 17 July 2004, he asserted that 

‘Uday Husayn never contacted him requesting 

chemical weapons.

Post-OIF Reporting on Red Line

Interrogations, interviews, and documents obtained 

after OIF have confi rmed that the “red line” was 

indeed part of regime planning, but they have not 

revealed a plan by Iraq to use CW at a pre-positioned red line. Information from numerous military 

offi cials indicates that Iraq was not able to use chemical weapons at the time of OIF, although ISG has 

not been able to locate and debrief some of the key 

Iraqi military commanders. Exploitation of military 

sites within the identifi ed “red line” revealed no large 

cache of chemical weapons or indications that large 

amounts of chemical weapons were present (for further information, see Annex C).

• Reporting prior to OIF that Saddam in early 

October 2002 authorized the use of prohibited 

weapons at the discretion of four fi eld commanders 

was contradicted by one of the fi eld commanders 

who surrendered to Coalition Forces in May 2003. 

Former Staff Gen. Kamal Mustafa claims he did not 

have WMD at the time of war and indicates that the 

‘red line’ plan did, in fact, exist but was simplistic 

in nature.

• According to the reporting, “special weapons” 

could have been employed dependent on certain 

conditions, such as climate and troop disposition, 

once Coalition forces breached this red-line perimeter. There were no indications of chemical weapon 

use when Coalition forces breached this zone, 

although sand storms and high winds, or dispersed 

troop formations, might have prevented the use of 

CW.

• During OIF, reporting from a former senior Iraqi 

Special Security Organization Offi cer with direct 

access indicated in early March 2003 the Iraqi 

Regime planned to defend Baghdad by establishing seven rings of defense. The source believed that 

“extreme defense measures” would be employed, 

and these measures would include WMD under the 

control of Qusay Husayn. The former offi cer also 

believed the defense plan was impenetrable and 

never executed because of a breakdown of the Iraqi 

military.
112

No Evidence of Red Line Defense Plan 

With CW Use at the Unit or SSO Level

Traditionally, the RG Deployed Chemical Weapons 

Under Ad Hoc Control of the SSO. Past doctrine 

would have the SSO deliver unmarked chemical 

weapons to the RG, who would fi re the weapon at a 

location dictated by an SSO offi cer. We assess RG 

Commanders were not aware of SSO intentions prior 

to the chemical weapons use. This notion supports a 

CW use concept that would have been compartmentalized and therefore not discussed at most defense 

planning meetings.

Available evidence is not consistent, however, with 

a compartmented CW use program involving SSO 

assets:

• Pre-OIF reporting from the Kuwait government service from a source with good access indicates that, 

as of 16 March 2003, the 108th artillery battalion 

of the Baghdad Republican Guard (RG) division 

in Al-Kut was under orders to use CW on coalition 

forces if they approached Al-Kut. The battalion, 

commanded by Col. Muhammad Ibrahim Sulayman, was reportedly equipped with CW shells, 

including mustard and unidentifi ed binary agents. 

However, this source was contradicted during OIF 

by a senior RG artillery offi cer with direct and 

indirect knowledge and information on the 108th 

artillery battalion. They asserted that the 108th did 

not receive any chemical weapons.

• Another source claimed that, unlike the Iran-Iraq 

war, SSO personnel did not deliver ammunition 

during OIF, and the SSO offi cer attached to the 

108th, CPT Jamal Al-Tikriti, did not bring chemical 

weapons with him.

Post-1991 to OIF, a senior scientifi c advisor to 

Saddam through interviews conducted after OIF 

shed light on the launch procedures for modern 

Iraqi missiles. He asserted that, because of the 

complexity and prototype nature of the new systems, 

technicians from the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) would be heavily involved in missile 

preparations, aiming, and launching. RG and SSO 

involvement would be unlike pre-1991 doctrine. The 

military would only provide the target by direction 

from “a single location.”

• A senior scientifi c advisor to Saddam through interviews conducted after OIF provided insight into 

the missile launching procedures. MIC technicians 

reportedly launched all available Al Samoud and 

Al Fat’h missiles. However, missiles experienced 

enough faults, due to their prototype status, that 

they required technicians to be on hand continuously to fi x problems as they were detected. The 

MIC technicians then aligned-aimed the missiles 

and conducted the launch operations. The Iraqi 

military was responsible only for relaying the targets to the MIC-OMI technicians.

• All targeting information came from one location 

and fi eld commanders had no say in the matter. 

Regarding WMD warheads and who would have 

control of the warheads (MIC, SSO or RG) the 

source states there were no WMD warheads.
113

Chemical

Annex H

Summary of Key Findings at 

Captured Enemy Ammunition 

Consolidation Points

Exploitation of Captured Enemy Ammunition 

Supply Points

As of 27 July 2004, 9,758 Iraqi munitions caches had 

been found and scheduled for destruction. Coalition forces are almost fi nished with the process of 

consolidating the known caches into one of seven 

Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) Depots. In 

order to examine the maximum amount of munitions 

possible, ISG teams visited these CEA depots to 

exploit a broad spectrum of Iraqi munitions, possibly 

including WMD-capable projectiles, rocket, missiles, 

or bombs. In addition to the assessment and exploitation of munitions, the teams also provided the on site 

contractors with handouts explaining which munitions 

are of interest to ISG and how to contact ISG should 

any suspected munitions be found. The seven CEA 

depots are listed in Table 1.

A variety of munitions were exploited by ISG 

teams. Highlights include the Al Fat’h missile 

and the 81mm aluminum rockets, which fi gured 

prominently in the “aluminum tubes issue,” as 

well as many other types of munitions including 

cluster bombs, rockets, and artillery projectiles 

(see Figures 1 and 2).

An Najaf CEA Depot

An Najaf is located in central Iraq (approximately 120 

km south of Baghdad). The An Najaf Depot contains 

87 intact earth-covered bunkers; 42 destroyed warehouses, and approximately 99 revetments. An Najaf 

Depot covers an area of 5 km by 6 km and is secured 

by a 7ft barbed wire fence. The bunkers, located at 

the northen end of the depot, are in four major groups, 

each group consisting of fi ve pentagon shaped subgroups containing fi ve bunkers each. The warehouses 

are located to the south in rows of seven warehouses 

by six rows for a total of 42 warehouses. All of the 

warehouses were destroyed by unknown explosions. 

Figure 1. Al Fat’h missile.

Figure 2. 81mm rockets.

An Najif ACP is currently under the operational control of Foster Wheeler Tetra Tech.

• An item of interest found at this site was determined to be an Iraqi copy of the Spanish Fuel 

Air Bomb, and Surface-to-Air missiles. Bunkers, 

destroyed warehouses, and the revetments were 

exploited with no WMD weapons found (see 

Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6).
114

Table 1

Captured Enemy Munitions (CEA)

CEA Depot Contractor in Charge 

of Site Location MGRS Location GEO

An Najaf Foster Wheeler Tetra Tech 38S MA 14975 58003 N32.09.190 E044.05.540

Arlington US Environmental 38S LD 53499 73957 N 34.59.858 E043.23.679

Az Zubayr Foster Wheeler Tetra Tech 38R QU 58237 50953 N30.15.530 E047.40.210

Buckmaster EODT 38S LD 63444 10878 N34.25.490 E043.30.490

Jaguar US Environmental 38S LE 03320 51830 N35.41.447 E042.49.583

Paladin EODT 38S LB 77958 77610 N33.13.829 E043.41.401

Taji EODT 38S MC 31780 13636 N33.33.360 E044.15.540

Figure 4. Al Fat’h missile in shipping container.

Figure 5. Iraqi fuel air bomb.

Figure 3. Destroyed warehouses.
115

Chemical

Arlington CEA Depot

Arlington CEA Depot is located north of Tikrit and 

about 200 km north of Baghdad and receives ammunition from the northern sector of Iraq. The Arlington 

Depot contains 100 intact earth covered bunkers, 79 

intact and two destroyed warehouses, roughly 1,000 

revetments, approximately 100 mud huts, and open 

storage. Arlington comprises an area roughly 2 km by 

8 km surrounded by a 6-foot fence and guard towers. 

Arlington CEA Depot is currently under the operational control of US Environmental, Inc.

• The bunkers are located at the north end of the 

depot, the warehouses are to the south. Revetments 

are scattered though out the depot. Two of the 

warehouses were destroyed by unknown explosions 

presumably prior to OIF.

• All bunkers and revetments were neat, orderly, and 

easily exploited. Multiple types of munitions were 

found including airdrop bombs, cluster bombs, 

rockets, surface-to-surface missiles, and air-to-air 

missiles. Large quantities of ammunition were 

found including many types of rockets, RPGs, 

artillery projectiles of various caliber, and small 

arms. The majority of the munitions in the bunkers 

are stored in their original shipping containers. The 

warehouses contained large quantities of artillery 

projectiles, tank munitions, and limited quantities 

of antitank and antipersonnel mines. The revetments housed primarily 57mm munitions. All of the 

bunkers and warehouses were exploited.

Figure 6. Bunker with 152mm artillery projectiles.

• The 142-inch long, 122mm crates are indicative 

of the Sakr-18 rocket. The team counted 120 long 

crates and inspected 29 of them. The other 92 

crates were not checked due to safety concerns. 

That is, the 142-inch long crates were at the rear 

of a full bunker, with a 1-foot wide center walk 

space between munitions stacked 6 to 7 foot high. 

A random sample of the long crates was conducted 

by going four crates deep near the center of the 

120 crates, stacked 9 crates high. After sampling 

the crates, the pile started to shift. With no room to 

escape if the crate piles collapsed, the team broke 

off the exploitation.

• No WMD Munitions were found, (see Figures 7, 8, 

9, 10, 11, and 12).

Az Zubayr CEA Depot

The Az Zubayr CEA Depot (alternate spelling Ash 

Shuaybah) vicinity south of Basra. Az Zubayr 

contains 31 intact and 17 destroyed earth-covered 

bunkers, 29 open storage pads, and an open receiving 

area for captured enemy ammunition being received 

at this location. Ammunition is shipped from southern 

Iraqi cache sites. Az Zubayr encompasses an area 

roughly 2 km by 3 1/4 km surrounded by a 6ft fence 

and guard towers. Az Zubayr Depot is currently 

under the operational control of Foster Wheeler Tetra 

Tech.

Figure 7. Piles of 122-mm HE rockets.
116

• The 17 destroyed bunkers were completely leveled, 

with little of the foundations remaining. The west 

building is called the missile building and is largely 

intact, with unexploded ordnance buried under the 

fl oor. Large multi-roomed buildings were located 

near the bunkers to the east. Onsite contractors 

stated this area was originally the Naval Munitions 

School for the Iraqi navy. The longest bunker is 330 

ft long, with both the entrance and the road network 

constructed below grade.

• Multiple types of munitions were found, including 

airdrop bombs, naval mines, torpedoes, and missiles. The destroyed bunkers were exploited, yielding evidence of two Silkworm missiles (both were 

tagged by a UN inspection team, however the label 

Figure 11. Example of a full bunker.

Figure 12. Cluster bombs.

Figure 8. Ammunition crates in bunker.

Figure 9. 155-mm smoke projectile.

Figure 10. 3,450 155mm HE artillery projectiles.
117

Chemical

Figure 13. Iraqi munitions.

Figure 14. Destroyed bunker.

Figure 15. 155mm smoke projectiles.

number was unreadable. One of the open revetments contained over a 100 special 81mm green 

aluminum rockets. Presumably, these are missiles 

associated with so-called “aluminum tubes issue” 

(see the Nuclear Section of this report for more 

information).

• No WMD munitions were found (see Figures 13, 

14, 15, and 16).

Buckmaster CEA Depot

Buckmaster CEA Depot is located in central Iraq 149 

Km north of Baghdad. This depot is an extension of 

the Taji Depot and ammunition is shipped here from 

caches in central Iraq. Buckmaster comprises an area 

of nearly 5.5 km by 3 km surrounded by a 6-foot 

fence and guard towers. The bunkers are primarily 

located on the east side of the depot. Revetments 

and open storage are scattered throughout the depot, 

primarily from the center to the east edge boundary 

fence.

• Buckmaster Depot contains 100 earth-covered 

bunkers, 96 of which are intact. Four bunkers 

were destroyed by US ground forces during OIF. 

Hundreds of revetments, in addition to mud huts 

and open storage areas, are scattered randomly 

throughout the depot. Larger missiles, including 32 

FROGs, are stored in the open, along with French 

Exocets and surface-to-air missiles.

• All bunkers were orderly and easily exploited, as 

were the revetments. This is in contrast to the other 

CEA Depots exploited. Multiple types of munitions 

were exploited, including air drop bombs, cluster 

bombs, Al Qa’ Qa’a 500 bombs, Al Fat’h missiles, 

tank munitions, rockets, surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, RPGs, artillery projectiles 

of various caliber, and small arms. The majority of 

the munitions in the bunkers were stored in their 

original shipping containers.

• Munitions of interest were Iraqi Fuel Air Bombs 

and numerous Al Qa’ Qa’a 500 bombs along with 

several Al Fat’h Missiles.
118

• No WMD munitions were found (see Figures 17, 

18, 19, and 20).

Jaguar CEA Depot

Jaguar CEA Depot is located 300km NNW of Baghdad and 80km SSW of Mosul. The Jaguar North 

Depot contains 80 intact and 20 destroyed earth-covered bunkers, several revetments, and large quantities 

of open storage for munitions being received from 

northern Iraqi cache sites. Jaguar North comprises 

an area roughly 2.5 km by 5.5 km surrounded by 

a 6-foot fence and guard towers. Jaguar Depot is 

currently under the control of US Environmental, 

Inc. To the southwest roughly 5 km are two areas 

called Jaguar South and Jaguar Middle with a total 

of over 1,400 earthen revetments and 40 destroyed 

warehouses comprising an area of roughly 5 km by 

6 km, surrounded by an earthen berm and concertina 

wire. More wire was in the process of being installed 

at Jaguar South. The warehouses at Jaguar South 

are severely damaged due to explosions from either 

Desert Storm or OIF.

• Multiple types of munitions were exploited by the 

team, including air drop bombs, cluster bombs, 

rockets, and air-to-air missiles. Large quantities 

of diverse munitions types were identifi ed, including rockets, RPGs, artillery projectiles of various 

caliber, and small arms. The majority of the munitions in the bunkers were not stored in their original shipping containers. Most of the bunkers were 

unorganized, with propellant, powder bags, fuses, 

Figure 16. Destroyed bunker. Figure 17. 122-mm rockets.

Figure 18. Fuel air 500 bombs.

Figure 19. Examining Al Fath.
119

Chemical

Figure 20. Assorted bombs.

and projectiles being intermixed with broken white 

plastic shipping containers and discarded wooden 

shipping crates piled on the fl oor. In contrast, some 

bunkers were well-organized, with munitions 

neatly stacked. All bunkers contained a large mix of 

conventional munitions that appeared to have been 

stored for an extended time, due to the amount of 

dust accumulated on the crates and munitions.

• At Jaguar South and Jaguar Middle the warehouses 

were all destroyed, causing Unexploded Ordnance 

(UXOs) to be scattered around the area by the 

explosions. Several of the warehouses had indications that looters burned material around the base 

of 155mm artillery projectiles in order to remove 

the brass rotating band. Presumably several of the 

explosions resulted from the looters’ activities. 

Artillery projectiles with red and blue bands were 

found in an open area between revetments in the 

northwest corner of the ASP. Munitions were also 

found in a water-fi lled wadi on the north side of 

Jaguar South, outside the perimeter.

• Munitions of interest were 122mm rockets, CG-250 

Cluster Bombs, and Spanish BRI-400 Bombs.

• No WMD munitions were found (see Figures 21, 

22, 23, and 24).

Paladin CEA Depot

Paladin CEA Depot is located 60km west of Baghdad. 

Munitions are shipped from central Iraqi cache sites. 

The Paladin Depot contains 51 intact earth covered 

bunkers, seven bunkers being described as large, two 

destroyed bunkers, hundreds of revetments, and open 

storage for captured enemy munitions received at this 

location. Paladin comprises an area roughly 4 km by 

4 km surrounded by a 6ft fence and guard towers. The 

bunkers are located at the north corner, with the revetments scattered throughout the depot. Paladin Depot 

is currently under the operational control of EODT.

• The smaller bunkers were disorganized and the 

munitions were covered with dust and sand. Several 

types of munitions were exploited, including air 

drop bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, and surface-tosurface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and air-to-air 

missiles. Large quantities of artillery projectiles 

were found, of many types and various calibers: 

20mm, 23mm, 30mm, 57mm, and 76mm projectiles 

were dispersed throughout the bunkers. One item 

of interest was a previously unseen 120mm smoke 

mortar projectile, later identifi ed after searching 

DOD publications.

• The large bunkers were protected by a berm 

approximately 40 to 50 feet high. The front 

entrances had a drive through, and the bunkers 

featured an internal crane. An air handling system 

was incorporated into the side of the bunkers, 

Figure 21. 122-mm rockets.
120

Figure 22. CG 250 cluster bomb with submunitions.

Figure 23. Spanish BRI 400 forefront.

Figure 24. Artillery projectiles.

suggesting that they once contained weapons that 

contain sensitive electronics and guidance systems. 

No indications were seen to indicate an air fi ltration system. These bunkers also had a central power 

junction shed (approximately 10-feet long, 6-feet 

wide, and 8-feet high). Some of the large bunkers 

held 122mm rockets, while others were empty.

• SA-2 missile containers were opened and the UN 

tag data was recorded for all SA-2s on site, with the 

exception of four that were physically inaccessible. 

The majority of these missiles were stored in their 

original shipping containers. One SA-2 was damaged and appeared to have been ejected from an 

exploded bunker.

• No al Samud or Al Fat’h missiles were identifi ed, 

and no WMD munitions were found (see Figures 

25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30).

Taji CEA Depot

Taji CEA Depot is located north of Baghdad and 

currently no longer accepts incoming munitions as a 

CEA Depot. This depot contains earth-berm warehouses, roughly 100 of which are intact and roughly 

20 damaged or destroyed. Munitions were shipped 

to this depot from caches within the Baghdad area of 

Iraq. Taji Depot comprises an area of approximately 

5 km by 3 km surrounded by a 6-foot fence topped 

with several strands of barbed wire and guard towers. 

Some of the perimeter around the bomb and missile 

yard also has a 6- to 8-foot high berm, 10 to 20 meters 

from the fence line. The warehouses comprise most of 

the area of the depot, with the bomb and missile yard 

in the southeast corner. Taji Depot is currently under 

the operational control of EODT.

• Numerous revetments are located throughout the 

depot, most of which were fi lled with small arms 

munitions up to 57mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery. 

The open storage area south of the warehouses is 

referred to as the bomb and missile yard.

• Air deliverable bombs up to 500 kg, larger missiles 

up to and including FROGs, and surface-to-air missiles are stored in the open.
121

Chemical

Figure 25. 3,000-kg bomb. Figure 26. 120-mm mortar smoke munition.

Figure 27. Air to air missiles. Figure 28. Hastily stacked SA-2 missiles.

Figure 29. Small bunker with lightening protection. Figure 30. SA-2 and Roland missiles.
122

• The team exploited all missiles, rockets, and bombs 

in the open storage area and revetments within the 

bomb and missile yard. Surface-to-air missiles, 

rockets, and FROG missiles were neatly stacked. 

Multiple types of munitions were checked including airdrop bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, surfaceto-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and 

air-to-air missiles. The majority of SA-6 surfaceto-air missiles were stored in their original shipping 

containers. The FROG missiles were stored in the 

open. A team also inspected eight Al Qa’ Qa’a 250 

bombs with the twisting weld—none of the Al Qa’ 

Qa’a bombs were found with fi ll plugs.

Figure 31. 262-mm rockets. Figure 32. FROGs.

Figure 33. Incendiary bomb.

Figure 34. Fuel air bombs.

• Taji will eventually contain only small arms ammunition (82mm and less).

• Munitions of interest were FROG missiles, 262mm 

rockets, Iraqi Fuel Air Bombs, cluster bombs, and 

Qa’ Qa’a 250 Incendiary Bombs.

• No WMD munitions were found (see Figures 31, 

32, 33, and 34).
123

Chemical

Annex I

Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition 

Supply Points 

Assessment of 24 Ammunition Sites Identifi ed 

Within the Predetermined “Red Line” 

ISG inspected Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) and 

Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEAs) to determine whether caches of CW (chemical weapons) had 

been destroyed or were in storage. Iraq stockpiled or 

stored munitions at more than 10,000 sites. ISG chose 

to make use of the limited time available for inspection, focusing efforts on storage sites with the most 

potential for containing CW. In 2003, ISG formulated 

a methodology, beginning with sites near the so-called 

“Red Line” around Baghdad. (For information about 

the Red Line and its use in the defense of Baghdad, 

see Annex G). Of the 104 ASPs within the Red Line 

around Baghdad, ISG used indicators of CW—such 

as possible decontamination vehicles—to narrow the 

search to 24 sites. The results of that search—a single 

visit to each site that visually reviewed a majority 

Location of 26 RG ASPs near units capable of fi ring 

155mm CW artillery shell or 122mm CW rockets and 

a suspect decontamination vehicle. The “red line” is 

shown for reference purposes.

Priority Name Coords

1 Kirkuk Bks FASP/Decon 352853N 0442124E

2 Margiabah FASP Taji South 332922N 0441355E

3 Shaykh Mazhar Barracks DIV and BDE HQ 325124N 0444432E

4 Margiabah Tactical FASP Southwest 332834N 0441209E

5 Al Musayyib BDE HQ A Ammo ORD Depot 324922N 0441559E

6 Iskandariyah Tactical FASP 325228N 0441941E

7 Ash Shuaybah (Zubayr) Ammo Stor Dpo East 302457N 0474151E

8 Shaykh Mazhar Tactical FASP 325316N 0444238E

9 Aradi Al Haswah Tactical FASP 332038N 0435227E

10 Abu Gharaib Revetment Field 1 SA-8 FASP 331313N 0441607E

11 Sabiat Tactical SAM FASP 332320N 0441613E

12 As Suwayrah Tactical FASP West 325610N 0444413E

13 Al Kut FASP Northwest 323325N 0454401E

14 Havy al Tayaran POL Depot and Storage Area 331828N 0441654E

15 Muhammed al Amir Tactical FASP 323126N 0453450E

16 Jurf al-Sakr FASP 325104N 0440954E

17 Ahmad al Husayn Tactical FASP 333125N 0440909E

18 Al Asriyah Tactical FASP South 325102N 0442300E

19 Muhammed al Amir Tactical FASP Southwest 323106N 0453417E

20 Saribadi Barracks Military Exchange 330126N 0444432E

21 Al Kut Barracks Northwest 323228N 0454629E

22 Al Haswah Tactical FASP South 324935N 0442318E

23 Al Miqdadiyah Ammo Depot 340550N 0443649E

24 Habbiniyah Ammo Depot 332221N 0433116E

of the munitions on-site—were no caches of CW 

munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions. 

Although only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands 

of tons of Iraqi munitions were inspected, ISG has 

high confi dence that there are no CW present in the 

Iraqi inventory.
Biological Regime Strategic

 Intent

Biological Warfare

I need these germs to be fi xed on the missiles, and tell him to 

hit, because starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the 

action to happen at anytime....

Saddam Husyan, January 1991
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i

Biological

Contents

Key Findings............................................................................................................................................ 1

Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program.......................................................................................... 5

The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline ................................................................................... 5

Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program .............................................................................. 5

Ambition: The Early Years, 1960-1985........................................................................................ 5

Renewed Ambition and Near-Realization: 1985-1991................................................................. 8

The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and the 

 End of the Game (1991-1996)................................................................................................ 11

Recovery and Transition 1996-2003........................................................................................... 15

Research and Development.................................................................................................................... 18

Building Human Capital............................................................................................................. 19

Research Facilities...................................................................................................................... 20

Iraqi BW Agent Research........................................................................................................... 20

Bacillus anthracis (‘Agent B’) .......................................................................................... 20

Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin, ‘Agent A’) ....................................................... 21

Clostridium perfringens (‘Agent G’)................................................................................. 22

Afl atoxin (‘Agent C’) ........................................................................................................ 22

Brucella ............................................................................................................................. 22

Ricin .................................................................................................................................. 23

Wheat Cover Smut (‘Agent D’)......................................................................................... 25

Viruses............................................................................................................................... 25

Camel Pox ......................................................................................................................... 27

Smallpox............................................................................................................................ 28

Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever ................................................................................. 32

Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70) ........................................................ 32

Rotavirus ........................................................................................................................... 32

Other R&D Related to BW Development .................................................................................. 32

Biopesticides ..................................................................................................................... 32

Single Cell Protein R&D................................................................................................... 34

Growth Media R&D.......................................................................................................... 34

Drying Process/Carrier/Particle size........................................................................................... 37

Production Capability................................................................................................................. 38

Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF................................................................................. 42

Mobile Assets ............................................................................................................................. 42
ii

Weaponization........................................................................................................................................ 45

Attempts at BW Weaponization ................................................................................................. 47

The Gulf War .............................................................................................................................. 48

Concealment And Destruction of Biological Weapons.......................................................................... 49

Iraq’s Initial WMD Concealment Effort..................................................................................... 49

The Destruction of Iraq’s BW .................................................................................................... 50

What Remained Hidden and Undeclared 1995-1998? ............................................................... 53

Weaponization Related Activities in the Years Following Desert Storm.................................... 53

Unresolved Issues....................................................................................................................... 56

Program Direction ...................................................................................................................... 56

Research and Development ........................................................................................................ 56

IIS Laboratories.......................................................................................................................... 57

Seedstocks .................................................................................................................................. 57

Disposition of Iraq’s BW Program Culture Collection ..................................................... 57

Agent Production........................................................................................................................ 57

Drying of BW Agents................................................................................................................. 58

Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage ............................................................................. 58

Weaponization ............................................................................................................................ 59

Annexes

A. Bulk BW Agents ............................................................................................................................... 61

B. BW Research and Development Facilities........................................................................................ 63

C. ISG Investigation of Iraq’s Reported Mobile Biological 

 Warfare Agent Production Capability ............................................................................................... 73

D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobil BW Agent Production Units ..................................................... 79
1

Biological

Key Findings

The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and this service 

retained its connections with the program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence.

• The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own 

purposes, from the beginning of Iraq’s BW effort in the early 1970s until the fi nal days of Saddam Husayn’s 

Regime.

In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would 

have used it if the need arose.

• At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Husayn personally 

authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of 

the circumstances that would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear to be a threat to the leadership itself or the US resorting to “unconventional harmful types of weapons.”

• Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his 

disposal were to be used. Saddam specifi ed that the “many years” agents, presumably anthrax spores, were 

to be employed against his foes.

ISG judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its 

BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the 

opportunity arose.

• ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with the strategic 

intention of achieving the ability to project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. Biological weapons were part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to preserve some measure of its 

BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert Storm sought to save what it could of its BW 

infrastructure and covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts, and dispose of its 

existing weapons stocks.

• From 1992 to 1994, Iraq greatly expanded the capability of its Al Hakam facility. Indigenously produced 5 

cubic meter fermentors were installed, electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive new construction to house its desired 50 cubic meter fermentors were completed.

• With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program 

in the belief that it constituted a potential embarrassment, whose discovery would undercut Baghdad’s ability 

to reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions.

In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain 

advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW 

program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite 

evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of 

discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level.

Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW 

if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW 

asset, the scientifi c know-how of its BW cadre.

• Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have encountered a range of major hurdles. 

The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady degradation of Iraq’s industrial base: new equipment 

and spare parts for existing machinery became diffi cult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance 
2

declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to 

get. Additionally, Iraq’s infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly 

if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international attention. UN monitoring of dual-use facilities up to the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk 

laden.

Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a 

few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a 

course.

• In spite of the diffi culties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although 

equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW knowhow through the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identifi ed civilian facilities 

and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent.

ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons 

and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document 

complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF).

• After the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, Iraqi leaders decided not 

to declare the offensive BW program and in consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq 

declared that BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and their contents.

• Iraq declared the possession of 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads containing BW agent. ISG 

assesses that the evidence for the original number of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges that Iraq clandestinely 

destroyed at least 132 bombs and 25 missiles. ISG continued the efforts of the UN at the destruction site but 

found no remnants of further weapons. This leaves the possibility that the fragments of up to 25 bombs may 

remain undiscovered. Of these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded 

agent.

• ISG does not have a clear account of bulk agent destruction. Offi cial Iraqi sources and BW personnel, state 

that Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk agent in mid 1991. However, the same personnel admit concealing details of the movement and destruction of bulk BW agent in the fi rst half of 1991. Iraq continued to 

present information known to be untrue to the UN up to OIF. Those involved did not reveal this until several 

months after the confl ict.

• Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until 

early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were 

retained by another Iraqi offi cial until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG.

ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with 

a BW program.

• ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents by universities or

research organizations.

• The work conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) at Al Hakam until 1995 would serve to maintain the basic skills required by scientists to produce and dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) but ISG has 

not discovered evidence suggesting this was the Regime’s intention. However in 1991, research and production on biopesticide and single cell protein (SCP) was selected by Iraq to provide cover for Al Hakam’s role 

in Iraq’s BW program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center 

(TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills that were applicable to BW, but again, ISG found no evidence to 

suggest that this was the intention.
3

Biological

• Similarly, ISG found no information to indicate that the work carried out by TABRC into Single Cell Protein 

(SCP) was a cover story for continuing research into the production of BW agents, such as C. botulinum and 

B. anthracis, after the destruction of Al Hakam through to OIF.

• TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous manufacture of bacterial growth media. Although these media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents, ISG has found 

no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifi cally for this purpose.

• Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox), ISG found no evidence that it 

retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions.

The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for 

assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the 

work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW 

agent.

• The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad area. Iraq should have declared these 

facilities and their equipment to the UN, but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) 

nor the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were aware of their existence 

or inspected them.

• Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agents for military 

purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories 

were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which 

was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including forensic work.

• Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using 

poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret 

experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons, 

including ricin and afl atoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears that testing on 

humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW 

agents for military use.

In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent 

production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.

• Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned and built a breakout BW capability, in the 

form of a set of mobile production units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in suffi cient quantities to weaponize. Although ISG has conducted a thorough investigation of every aspect of this information, 

it has not found any equipment suitable for such a program, nor has ISG positively identifi ed any sites. No 

documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all proved 

negative.

• ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to the breakout program.

• ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production 

units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed 

and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment 

for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW 

program.
4

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5

Biological

Evolution of the Biological 

Warfare Program

The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy 

choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy 

and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separate 

foldout and in tabular form at the back of Volume I. 

Covering the period from 1980-2003, the timeline 

shows specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s efforts 

in the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms 

and their chronological relationship with political 

and military developments that had direct bearing on 

the Regime’s policy choices. 

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion 

of each volume of text, ISG has included a foldout 

summary chart that relate, infl ection points—critical turning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—to particular events, initiatives, or decisions the 

Regime took with respect to specifi c WMD programs. 

Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the text 

with a gray triangle.

Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program

For more than 20 years Iraq pursued a program of 

secret research, development and production in a 

bid to acquire a BW capability with which to defend 

its interests and project its infl uence beyond Iraq’s 

borders. A well-kept secret known to only a handful of leaders, Iraq’s BW program—approved by 

Saddam Husayn, overseen by Husayn Kamil Hasan 

Al Majid, guided by Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al 

Sa’adi, and closely linked to the IIS—culminated in 

the fi rst Gulf war in January 1991, by which point 

Iraq had developed a small but impressive arsenal of 

BW weapons comprising over 100 bombs, at least 

25 Al Husayn warheads fi lled with anthrax spores, 

botulinum toxin and afl atoxin, as well as many thousands of liters of these agents stored in bulk, for use 

in Iraq’s unsophisticated delivery systems. Iraq’s BW 

infrastructure emerged from that confl ict damaged, 

but not destroyed, and the in the wake of the war 

the Regime tried to preserve what it could of its BW 

program. Aiming to leave open the option of restarting BW activities once UN inspections were over and 

sanctions were lifted, Baghdad attempted to remove 

all possible signatures of its past offensive activities. 

Simultaneously, Iraq undertook a signifi cant denial 

and deception effort intended to conceal from the 

UN the true nature, scope, and ultimate objectives of 

the program. By 1995, these efforts had failed, and 

Iraq admitted its offensive program, leading in 1996 

to the destruction, at Saddam’s orders and under UN 

supervision, of most of the Iraq’s BW physical infrastructure.

The destruction of the BW infrastructure in the mid1990s halted Iraq’s BW activities, with the exception of its efforts to preserve intellectual know-how, 

the Regime’s most valuable asset. BW programs are 

primarily the product of trained innovative scientifi c 

minds. Extensive scientifi c laboratories and vast 

industrial complexes are unnecessary. A handful of 

dedicated, bright scientists, supported by dexterous, 

intelligent, and experienced technicians working 

with simple but effective equipment, materials, and 

animals in a secure environment can accomplish 

most of what is required to lay the foundations of a 

BW program. In comparison to nuclear and chemical weapons (CW) programs, individuals’ intellectual 

capabilities play a far greater role in determining 

the success or failure of a program than the physical 

resources to which they may have access. Thus, any 

account of Iraq’s BW program is largely a story of the 

key experts who are involved, and only secondarily a 

history of facilities and equipment (see Figure 1).

Ambition: The Early Years, 1960-1985.

Iraq’s fi rst foray into chemical and biological warfare (CBW) was rooted in the nationalist wave that 

swept the Middle East in the 1960s under Egypt’s 

president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, when Arab military 

leaders concluded the time had come to increase 

their understanding of the technology of modern 

warfare. Select junior offi cers in Iraq’s armed forces 

traveled overseas for CBW training, among them Lt. 
6

Nizar Al Attar, who attended the CBW courses at Fort 

McClellan in the US and was later to head Iraq’s CW 

program and introduce BW to Al Muthanna State 

Establishment (MSE). In 1964, the Iraqi Army established a Chemical Corps, thus taking the fi rst step that 

led to the acquisition of CBW. Following the Ba’thist 

revolution of 17 July 1968 that brought Ahmad Hasan 

Al Bakr to power, senior army offi cers, encouraged 

by their technologically aware subordinates, decided 

to embark on a CW program. It was an amateur affair 

consisting of small groups trying to develop agent. By 

the early 1970s, the attempt had failed.

In 1974, a charismatic offi cer, Ghassan Ibrahim 

founded a laboratory, nominally a respectable academic body run by the Ministry of Higher Education 

and Scientifi c Research carrying out legitimate scientifi c research, named the Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham 

[Al Hazen Ibn-al-Haithem] Research Institute (see 

Figure 2). In reality, the institute was a front for clandestine activity in CW, BW, electronics, and optics 

under the patronage of the IIS. Ibrahim’s assistant 

was an intelligence offi cer, Fa’iz ‘Abdallah Al Shahin, 

who would later oversee Iraq’s production of CW 

agents during the Iran-Iraq war and play a key role in 

the development of other nonconventional weapons, 

such as radiological bombs. He would also briefl y 

supervise part of the BW program. Later still, Fa’iz 

would become Deputy Minister of Oil.

Al Hasan was a large, coordinated effort to master 

the technologies associated with several aspects of 

modern warfare. Quickly Al Hasan established chemical laboratories at Al Rashad, NE of Baghdad, posing 

as ‘The Center for Medical Diagnostics’ and a temporary biological center in the Al ‘Amiriyah suburb 

of Baghdad. A purpose built closed-institute soon 

followed: the Ibn-Sina Center at Al Salman occupying 

a peninsula formed by the River Tigris 30km south of 

Baghdad. The Ibn-Sina Center masqueraded as ‘The 

Center for Medical Agriculture’. After occupying a 

temporary headquarters in Sadun Street in the center 

of Baghdad, Al Hasan built a new headquarters and 

physics laboratory at Masbah nearby and later added 

an electronics laboratory at Tajiyat, north of Baghdad.

The generation of scientists trained and employed at 

Al Hasan, many of whom devoted more than 20 years 

of their careers to the pursuit of WMD, formed the 

backbone of Iraq’s later CW and BW programs. Initially, a group of nine scientists drawn from the Ministries of Higher Education, Defense and Health led 

the original offensive BW effort, conducting research 

into bacteria, toxins, and viruses, emphasizing production, pathogenicity, dissemination and storage 

of agents, such as Clostridium botulinum, spores of 

Bacillus anthracis, cholera, polio, and infl uenza virus. 

Later, in both chemical and biological disciplines, the 

Al Hasan Institute engaged prominent scientists to 

train and guide more junior staff and chemical corps 

offi cers. Dr. Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Mun’im Al Azmirli, 

an Egyptian, mentored the chemists and Dr. Muzhir 

[Mudher, Modher] Al Falluji led the biologists. The 

Institute sponsored its staff to study abroad for PhDs 

in subjects appropriate for the CW or BW effort. The 

Iraqi Regime rewarded success with promotion, high 

status, money, and material goods.

The second attempt to develop BW also faltered 

despite considerable effort. The Minister of Defense 

and Dr. ‘Amir Al Sa’adi concluded in a 1978 investigation that Al Hasan had failed to deliver what 

it promised and that there had been academic and 

fi nancial fraud. Arrests and imprisonment of several 

researchers followed for fraud and embezzlement 

surrounding the purported development of infl uenza 

as a BW agent. Al Sa’adi decided that project was 

a failure, not having made enough progress toward 

industrial scale BW production and should be shut 

down, which the Iraqi government did on 16 January 1979, exactly 6 months before President Ahmad 

Hasan Al Bakr resigned in favor of his Vice President, 

Saddam Husayn. The facilities and staff were parceled out to various government establishments such 

as State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI). 

The best personnel went to the IIS. Between 1979 and 

1985, Iraq rebuilt and expanded the dual-use infrastructure for BW research, but undertook little work 

of signifi cance.

• In 1979, a presidential decree created the Scientifi c and Technical Research Directorate (STRD) 

which later became the Technical Research Center 

(TRC), as a technical support agency for the IIS 

and to replace the Al Hasan as a cover mechanism 

for continued work on the development of chemical 

and biological agents.
7

Biological

Figure 1. Some major sites associated with Iraq’s

BW Program.

Figure 2. Al Hazen emblem.
8

• The IIS continued small-scale CBW activities, 

recruiting chemists and scientists from universities 

and private laboratories and assigning them to Al 

Salman to conduct research.

• In 1983, a militarily relevant BW program restarted 

at the CW facility at Al Muthanna. UN inspectors 

were told that the initiative for this came from the 

Director General (DG) of Al Muthanna, Lt. Gen. 

Nizar Al Attar, who then received endorsement 

from the Minister of Defense. ISG has been unable 

to establish the veracity of this story, although it is 

apparent that a BW program started there in 1984 

under the auspices of the MOD, funded by the 

State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI), 

and headed at the research level by a new recruit, 

Dr. Rihab. Her direction, at least at the working 

level, was at this time given by Lt. Gen. Nizar who 

instructed her that he “did not want research to put 

on a shelf. He wanted applied research to put in a 

bomb.”

Renewed Ambition and Near-Realization: 

1985-1991

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 altered 

Baghdad’s perception of the value of WMD and led 

to a reinvigoration of the BW program. In the view 

of Iraqi leaders, Iraq’s CW halted Iranian ground 

offensives and ballistic missile attacks on Tehran 

broke its political will.

• According to Brig. Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al 

Samarra’i, Iraq’s war with Iran was the catalyst to 

reactivate Iraq’s BW efforts. Iraq’s success with 

CW during its war with Iran only reaffi rmed the 

potential value of unconventional capabilities like 

BW. He opined that, “if the Iran war lasted beyond 

1988, Saddam would have used BW.” Further, 

Iraq’s concerns about Israel and their WMD 

capabilities provided additional impetus to seek a 

strategic counterbalance to deter foreign threats.

• Dr. Bilal added additional perspectives on the 

strategic intent of Iraqi’s BW program, which 

he described as a strategic capability that would 

compliment Iraq’s CW efforts with great potential 

for achieving surprise. Bilal also commented that 

Iraq considered BW a potential counterbalance to 

the Israeli threat, but acknowledged that Iraq lacked 

an effective delivery system to mount a BW attack 

against Israel.

• After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, one of the 

country’s most eminent microbiologists and one of 

its few experts in fermentation, Professor Nassir 

Al Hindawi of Mustansiriyah University, submitted a proposal for BW research to the Presidential 

Diwan. The leadership directed his proposal to Lt. 

Gen. Nizar, the DG of Al Muthanna. Al Hindawi 

convinced Saddam to utilize disease-causing agents 

to aid the war effort against Iran. The focus of his 

interest was developing botulinum toxin as tactical 

nerve-like BW agent and anthrax as a strategic and 

tactical weapon.

In the early 1980s Baghdad stepped up the pace of 

it BW program signifi cantly. In 1983, the remnants 

of the fi rst BW effort became formally part of Al 

Muthanna under the direction of Lt. Gen. Nizar Al 

Attar. According to UNSCOM reporting, a formal 

research plan was drafted that year committing to BW 

research. Meanwhile, close by at the old facilities of 

the Al Hasan Institute, Al Salman was conducting a 

parallel BW research program under the authority of 

the intelligence services that included research into an 

anti-crop fungal agent, Tilletia, and the development 

of a bacterial spray device (known as the Zubaydi 

device, after its inventor). Al Salman tested the spray 

device, mounted on a helicopter, with reportedly 

inconclusive results, at Khan Bani Sa’ad in August 

1988.

In late 1984, on returning from completing her PhD 

in the UK, Dr. Rihab was contacted by Lt. Gen. Nizar 

and directed to report to Al Muthanna, where she 

took over technical leadership of the BW program 

and led it to a series of achievements. According to 

Dr. Rihab, in 1983, there was an informal decision 

made to revitalize the BW program. Three years 

later, a 5-year plan was drawn up that would lead 

to BW weaponization, a course Dr. Rihab and her 

group implemented with urgency, authority, and great 

secrecy demonstrating considerable planning. Dr. 
9

Biological

Rihab formed a team and commenced extensive literature surveys, based initially on the citation indices 

of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

publications of the 1960 and 1970s. The team also 

started conducting toxicological investigations. Under 

her leadership of the technical elements, the program 

moved steadily through a series of discrete phases.

• In 1985, Dr. Rihab ordered reference strains of several pathogenic organisms from a variety of foreign 

sources and began basic research on candidate BW 

agents. Al Hindawi became an advisor to her in 

1986.

• In 1986, under the guise of work at Baghdad University, she successfully ordered multiple isolates of 

pathogens from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), such as B. anthracis for use in the 

early BW agent research effort.

• In 1987, the program moved from Al Muthanna 

to Al Salman. The group now under the control of 

Ahmad Murtada, DG of the TRC, recruited new 

staff and broadened its range of agents. Murtada 

was an acolyte of Husayn Kamil and relied on 

the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) 

and its Senior Deputy, Dr. ‘Amir Al Sa’adi, for the 

weapons aspects of the program. Equipment from 

the At Taji SCP Plant was transferred to Al Salman 

in August that year.

• Also in 1987, Dr. Rihab and Dr. ‘Amir Al Sa’adi 

discussed the possibility of developing a transportable system for the production of BW agents. She 

claims that the idea was largely ‘Amir Al Sa’adi’s 

and that she rejected the proposal in favor of a fi xed 

production site at Al Hakam.

• In 1988, they opened the facility at Al Hakam. 

Production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and Clostridium perfringens started. Weapon development 

and testing followed.

• In May 1988, TRC broadened the base of the BW 

program by adding a mycologist, Dr. ‘Imad Dhiyab, 

with a team that researched fungal toxins, including trichothecene mycotoxins and later afl atoxin. 

The connection, if any, of this work with the earlier 

fungal work at Al Salman, is unknown.

• When Iraq tried to expand the production capacity 

of Al Hakam by importing three 5 cubic meter fermentation vessels from the Swiss company Chemap 

in 1988, the export license was denied; this, despite 

implementing an elaborate deception plan involving 

a fake production building at Al Qa’qa’a. However, 

fermentors and other equipment were requisitioned 

from an Iraqi veterinary vaccine plant at Al Kindi 

and transferred to Al Hakam in November 1988.

• In 1989, Dr. Rihab sought to have a spray dryer 

manufactured in Iraq for work at Al Hakam. Iraqi 

companies were able to fabricate the body of a 

dryer but not the other components. In fact, there 

was already a dryer at Al Hakam that would, with 

some safety modifi cations, have been suitable for 

drying BW agent. This dryer had been transferred 

from the At Taji SCP Plant to Al Hakam in 1988. 

Nevertheless, she sought from overseas a commercial dryer that could, without modifi cation, safely 

dry anthrax. In 1989, Iraq approached a foreign 

manufacturer of dryers with a sample of Bacillus 

thuringiensis (Bt) to be dried for biopesticide purposes as a cover for the true purpose. The company 

did not supply Iraq with the special dryer.

By early 1990, Iraq was methodically advancing 

toward the acquisition of a BW component to its 

arsenal of WMD. Iraq had conducted laboratory and 

environmental static and dynamic explosive fi eld tests 

of wheat cover smut, afl atoxin, anthrax simulants 

(Bacillus subtilis and thuringiensis), botulinum toxin, 

Clostridium perfringens and ricin. Following Saddam 

Husayn’s speech on 2 April 1990 that identifi ed Israel 

as a threat, Husayn Kamil ordered the BW program 

to go all out for weaponization. The program took on 

a sudden urgency and its direction changed dramatically; frenetic and convulsive efforts to adapt new 

weapons and acquire and expand BW agent production replaced the years of orderly progress.

By the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 

1990, the BW program had moved into high gear 

with the aim of fi elding fi lled weapons as quickly as 

possible. Also in August 1990, Al Hakam commenced 

production of Clostridium perfringens, the causative 

agent of gas gangrene. There is no evidence of the 

weaponization of this material and details of its disposal remain uncertain.
10

• Botulinum toxin and anthrax were the backbone 

of the Iraqi pre-1991 BW program. In addition to 

the production activities at Al Hakam, the Foot 

and Mouth Disease Vaccine plant (FMDV) at Al 

Dawrah was adapted for the production of botulinum toxin and continued to produce the agent until 

they evacuated the site on 15 January 1991, two 

days before the start of Desert Storm. While senior 

Iraqi offi cials deny production of anthrax at FMDV, 

the UN found traces of anthrax on two fermentors 

and a mobile storage tank in the facility. One source 

has informed ISG that the site did produce anthrax. 

ISG concludes that FMDV produced anthrax. ISG 

does not know whether the fate of this anthrax was 

the same as that produced at Al Hakam.

• Dr. Hazim ‘Ali, recruited in July 1990 to lead the 

development of viral agents, took over the FMDV 

Plant at Al Dawrah in September of that year, 

renaming it ‘Al Manal’. He commenced work on 

viruses including hemorrhagic conjunctivis, human 

rotavirus, and camel pox with a view to weaponization. Hazim’s viral work was still in its infancy by 

the time of Desert Storm and very little had actually 

been achieved.

In parallel with the production of BW agents, other 

facilities were manufacturing R-400 aerial bombs 

and warheads for the Al Husayn missile. Husayn 

Kamil had the fi nal say over which agents to weaponize. Although in November 1990, Al Muthanna 

started adapting an aircraft auxiliary fuel tank as a 

means of dispersing BW agent, a few days after the 

invasion of Kuwait, Husayn Kamil chose to use the 

R-400 aerial bomb and the Al Husayn missile warhead because they were already in use for CW agents. 

There was no discussion of how to weaponize BW 

agents because of lack of time and the pressing need 

to make decisions quickly. Additional weapons testing 

of R-400 bombs using an anthrax simulant, B. subtilis, occurred leading up to the war. In addition, there 

is an unconfi rmed report that Bt was used in explosive 

testing of an unidentifi ed BW munition at Al Hakam 

between September 1990 and January 1991.

• In November 1990, Al Muthanna started adapting 

an aircraft auxiliary fuel tank as a means of dispersing BW agents. Iraq had previously attempted a 

similar development in the CW fi eld and in a letter, 

dated 10 December 1990, to Husayn Kamil, Gen. 

Fa’iz Shahin, DG of Al Muthanna, had referred to 

“successful tests of spraying mustard gas by planes 

which proved to be very effective.” It appears that 

the BW spray device was a continuation of this 

earlier effort. Sometime in early January 1991, at a 

meeting of the Iraqi leadership, Husayn Kamil told 

Saddam: “Sir, the best way to transport this weapon 

(BW) and achieve the most harmful effects would 

come by using planes, like a crop duster, to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful.” 

Saddam responded that he wanted all options of 

delivering BW agent to the targets. The Iraqi Air 

Force fl ew the tanks with anthrax simulants to optimize the dispersion characteristics. The Air Force 

also experimented with a remotely piloted MiG-21 

aircraft as a possible delivery platform for a similar 

tank system. These trials only ceased when Desert 

Storm started.

By January 1991, refl ecting the huge exertion of the 

previous months, Iraq had produced large quantities 

of anthrax, botulinum toxin, Clostridium perfringens, afl atoxin, and small quantities of ricin, and 

had more than 180 BW weapons deployed to fi ve 

hide sites. In addition, Al Hakam protected caches 

of bulk BW agent containers by moving them from 

site to site during the hostilities. The weapons and 

agent were guarded and ready for use. The Iraqi 

leadership decided policy for their use and targeting. Iraq states that the opening bombardment of 17 

January 1991 destroyed the only aircraft and spray 

tank ready for use. Despite this, work continued to 

complete another three tanks, with plans for a further eight in preparation.

• Iraq had fi lled ballistic missiles and aerial bombs, 

and was modifying aircraft fuel tanks to spray BW 

agents.

• The weapons were not well designed technically 

and the result of an immature development program. In ISG’s view, the weapons were suboptimal 

but could have been effective in certain circumstances.
11

Biological

• The Iraqis were well aware of the shortcomings 

of the Al Husayn missile and the R-400. Lt. Gen. 

Hazim, commander of the Surface-to-Surface Missile Forces openly admitted that the Al Husayn, 

with a BW agent fi lled warhead, would fulfi ll its 

purpose if after impact in an enemy country suffi cient material survived to enable its detection as 

a BW agent. It was a weapon of terror. They were 

for use in extremis and only if an enemy directly 

threatened the existence of the Regime in its heartland in and around Baghdad. Except for those in 

the know, Iraqi armed forces treated BW weapons 

as ‘special chemical’, a more toxic type of CW 

weapon.

Saddam himself exercised control over Iraq’s BW 

arsenal, and he was prepared to use it against US 

and allied forces in the event of war. At a meeting in early January 1991, he identifi ed the targets 

for the BW weapons. Israel was to be fi rst and all 

Israeli cities were targets, but he ordered that strikes 

concentrate on Tel Aviv. US forces were to be targets 

if they attacked with unconventional forces. He 

also identifi ed Riyadh and Jeddah as targets. In a 

transcript of discussions held at the time Saddam 

ordered the use of the more persistent (presumably 

anthrax) BW agents: “we want the long term, the 

many years kind.”

• Saddam envisaged all out use of the weapons. He 

said “we don’t want to depend on one option” and 

that Iraqi forces must use all means, bombs, missiles and spray aircraft, to deliver the BW agent. He 

pointed out that this was “a life and death issue and 

all the orders about targets are sealed in writing 

and authenticated” in case something happened to 

him.

• The stockpiles of weapons and bulk agents 

remained in their hide sites unused and undamaged. 

Two offi cials shared the day-to-day responsibility; 

Dr. Bilal for the bombs and missiles and Dr. Rihab 

for the bulk BW agent.

The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity 

Through Ambiguity and the End of the Game 

(1991-1996)

ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with strategic 

intent that would enable the projection of its power 

over much of the Middle East and beyond. BW 

was part of that plan. With an eye to the future and 

aiming to preserve some measure of its BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert 

Storm sought to save what it could of its BW infrastructure, hide evidence of the program, and dispose 

of its existing weapons stocks. Following Baghdad’s 

formal acceptance of UNSCR 687 of 3 April 1991, 

Iraq had 15 days to declare its stocks of WMD. It did 

not do so, and in a letter dated 18 April 1991, to the 

Secretary General of the UN, Foreign Minister Tariq 

‘Aziz even denied that Iraq had any BW program.

Baghdad’s action in the following months and years 

indicate that it intended to preserve its BW capability 

and return to the steady, methodical progress toward 

a mature BW capability when inspections ended and 

sanctions were lifted. The biopesticide program that 

was established after the 1991 Gulf war, temporarily 

preserved Iraq’s research, development and production base at Al Hakam and, whether intentionally 

or otherwise, achieved several objectives set out in 

the original Iraqi BW strategic plan drafted in 1985. 

These included industrial-scale production of biological agents, albeit nonpathogenic ones, and perfecting 

development of dry agent formulation.

Baghdad took early steps to protect what remained 

of the BW physical plant and 

equipment. During the fi rst Gulf war, the only facilities directly relevant to Iraq’s BW program that were 

destroyed were the research laboratories at Al Salman 

and the munitions fi lling station at Al Muthanna. Neither was critical to the BW program that was centered 

on Al Hakam. Al Hakam at that time was unknown to 

the Coalition and therefore was not attacked during 

the war, unlike the Abu Ghurayb Infant Formula Plant 

(the Baby Milk Factory) that the Coalition destroyed 

by bombing in the mistaken belief that it was a key 

BW facility. Following approval of UNSCR 687 in 

early April 1991, Saddam Husayn endorsed Husayn 

Kamil’s decision not to declare Al Hakam as part 
12

of the BW program and decided to convert the plant 

to commercial use prior to the arrival of the second 

UNSCOM BW team in September 1991. Husayn 

Kamil pressured Dr. Rihab to complete this transition 

quickly to save equipment and the jobs of the scientists and technicians.

• Saddam wanted to keep scientists employed, 

according to ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi. 

Moreover, he initially expected the sanctions would 

last no more than three years, and many Iraqis 

doubted the sanctions would be so comprehensive, 

according to several interviews with former offi -

cials. These perceptions probably persuaded senior 

Regime leaders that they could weather a shortlived sanctions regime by making limited concessions, hiding much of their pre-existing weapons 

and documentation, and even expanding BW potential by enhancing dual-use facilities.

The advent of postwar UN inspections posed serious 

problems for Iraq, and in a bid to hide the true uses 

of the remaining plant and equipment the Regime 

ordered a large scale deception effort, involving 

cleaning existing plants to remove traces of BW 

activity, hiding relevant documents, destroying existing stocks of agent, and concocting a cover story 

for ongoing BW-related work at Al Hakam. Immediately Iraq scoured the principal facilities to remove 

evidence of an offensive BW program. The production plant was vigorously decontaminated, research 

papers altered, evidence hidden or destroyed and the 

BW cadre agreed to provide false accounts of past 

events and future intent. In the summer of 1991, on 

the orders of Husayn Kamil relayed through Ahmad 

Murtada, Dr. Rihab ordered that all documents associated with the BW program be destroyed and all production activities at Al Hakam be stopped. She claims 

to have collected all documents, kept a few, and 

destroyed or buried the rest. She ordered all BW scientists from Al Salman and Al Hakam to sign a legal 

document stipulating, under the threat of execution, 

a prohibition on speaking to UN inspectors about the 

production of, or progress on, any BW agent.

• After that order, the person in charge of physical 

security at Al Hakam witnessed Dr. Rihab remove 

about 20 to 25 electronic media disks (fl oppy disks) 

from her offi ce.

• In late 1991, Saddam Husayn’s Secretary, ‘Abd 

Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Tikriti, asked 

Husayn Kamil if Iraq would declare the BW 

program to the UN. Husayn Kamil indicated that 

it would not be necessary and the he would order 

the scientists to hide all evidence of the program in 

their homes. Husayn Kamil arranged the collection 

of all documents relating to WMD and directed the 

Special Security Organization (SSO) to conceal 

them. This was to facilitate the reconstitution of 

WMD programs after the UN departed. There is 

some uncertainty whether these documents are 

the same as those handed to the UN in 1995 from 

Husayn Kamil’s chicken farm.

Saddam also authorized Husayn Kamil to destroy, 

unilaterally, Iraq’s stocks of BW agents. There were 

three distinct phases of destruction, including clean 

up and sterilization of facilities including Al Salman, 

Al Hakam, Al Manal and Al Safa’ah; destruction 

of munitions by TRC and Al Muthanna personnel; 

and neutralization and dumping of bulk BW agent. 

According to some accounts given by former Iraqi 

offi cials, the clean up of the Al Hakam site began in 

May 1991. Other accounts give the order as sometime 

in the summer of 1991. In any case, Dr. Rihab ordered 

MIC to sanitize Al Hakam to destroy any traces of 

botulinum toxin and anthrax. The Al Hakam site was 

sanitized, which entailed the sanitization of all surfaces, drains, equipment and sewers using formalin, 

alcohol and potassium permanganate.

ISG, however, continues to harbor doubts regarding Iraq’s destruction of bacterial reference strains 

and isolates. According to Dr. Rihab, she destroyed 

these materials in early 1992, but ISG can verify 

neither that the materials were destroyed nor the 

other details of Dr. Rihab’s account. She maintains 

that she gave a small box containing no more than 

25 vials of lyophilized bacterial pathogens, including those obtained from the American Type Culture 

Collection to the IIS in mid-1991 for safekeeping. 

Allegedly, Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, who 

would eventually become the director of the National 

Monitoring Directorate (NMD), returned the box to 

her in early 1992. She also claimed that she asked 

former TRC head Ahmad Murtada what to do with 

the vials. Murtada took the matter to Husayn Kamil, 
13

Biological

who ordered the vials destroyed. Dr. Rihab claims 

she did this by injecting the vials with DettolTM and 

then autoclaving the vials. According to UNSCOM 

data, all ATCC ampules were accounted for and there 

should have been no remaining unopened vials from 

ATCC after the fi rst UNSCOM BW inspection.

ISG judges the Regime took these steps with the aim 

of restarting the BW program in the future. In 1993, 

Husayn Kamil reportedly announced in a speech to 

WMD scientists that Iraq’s WMD programs would 

resume and expand when UN inspectors left. Al 

Hindawi recounted to ISG a conversation he had with 

‘Amir Al Sa’adi about the future of the BW program 

following the fi rst Gulf war. Al Sa’adi referred to 

Husayn Kamil’s intent as “His Highness had a broad 

vision of the future.” Al Hindawi interpreted this to 

mean that Husayn Kamil intended to reactivate the 

program later.

Even as Baghdad took steps to hide its remaining BW infrastructure and cover the traces of its 

previous program, the Regime sought to continue 

a covert BW development effort under the cover of 

civilian research. In April 1991, Dr. Rihab personally briefed Saddam Husayn on the plan to convert 

Al Hakam for the production of biopesticide. In that 

same month, MIC and Saddam Husayn decided to 

develop programs for SCP and biopesticide, using Bt 

as the cover.

• Dr. Bilal told ISG, “Al Hakam was kept as potential 

for the BW program in the future.” He described 

that they decided they must do everything to preserve it and stated that the entire bio-insecticide and 

SCP effort at Al Hakam was a “100% cover story” 

created by ‘Amir Rashid. Dr. Rihab also stated that 

the intent to produce the SCP and bioinsecticide Bt 

at Al Hakam was “to cover the equipment.”

ISG judges that in the wake of Desert Storm and 

destruction of much of the BW effort, Iraq’s strategic objective was to give the appearance of cooperating with UNSCOM while preserving the intellectual 

capital amassed in prior years on BW. The Bt and 

SCP programs offered an effective justifi cation that 

allowed Iraq to keep the Al Hakam site with its extensive equipment and skilled scientists in one place. Dr. 

Bilal related that after they created the cover story for 

Al Hakam, an economic study of Single Cell Protein 

(SCP) was conducted highlighting that Al Hakam’s 

production capacity was only kilograms while Iraq’s 

calculated “legitimate” SCP need was 70 tonnes per 

year.

• Nasr Al Hindawi advocated the development of 

SCP at Al Hakam. The idea was endorsed because 

of his reputation in SCP production that was 

expected to provide credibility for the program 

to outside observers. Using SCP as an alternative 

feedstock, however, required very large rates of 

annual production (hundreds of tonnes) as well as 

large quantities of scarce methanol and ethanol for 

growth media.

• Dr. Rihab was not interested in SCP. The production of Bt pesticides was a convenient cover. 

The assertion that Al Hakam had been involved 

in biopesticide production before 1991 provided 

what they hoped to be a plausible explanation 

that enabled Iraq to avoid declaring production 

of anthrax. She enlisted the support of Dr. Jabbar 

Farhan ‘Abd-al-Razzaq Al Ma’dhihi from the 

TABRC who had conducted research on Bt to assist 

in the development of biopesticide production.

Ostensible biopesticide production at Al Hakam 

required both an expansion of the facilities and collaboration with the IAEC’s TABRC. The cover story 

did not fi t the limited capabilities that resided at Al 

Hakam: the production capacity of the plant was far 

too little to be convincing that it really was for commercial SCP purposes. Realizing this, Baghdad began 

to expand production capacity in 1993. Simultaneously, collaboration on biopesticide production with 

experts from TABRC generated processes and capabilities that would be directly relevant to any future 

Iraqi BW effort.

• Iraq expanded Al Hakam’s water and electricity 

utilities; a move ISG assesses would have signifi cantly expanded the site’s potential to support 

planned biopesticide and SCP production, and also 

sought to transfer to Al Hakam any and all usable 

equipment to support the proposed biopesticide and 

SCP activity. For example, after UNSCOM’s fi rst 

visit to Al Hakam in September 1991, Al Hakam 

acquired a 1,500-liter fermentor and a dryer from 
14

Al Muthanna in order to strengthen the cover story. 

Additionally, Baghdad sought to acquire necessary 

equipment to pursue BW-related work at Al Hakam. 

In 1995, for example, Iraq attempted to purchase 

two turnkey 50 cubic meter fermentor plants from 

a Russian Company that purportedly had expertise 

in botulinum toxin production. Iraq negotiated a 

deal with that Russian Company for equipment and 

assistance. A team of Iraqi scientists and technicians traveled to Russia. The deal fell through 

because the company did not receive an export 

license.

Collaboration with TABRC brought together groups 

of experts and organizations whose work had direct 

bearing on future BW work. Jabbar Al Ma’dhihi, 

Head of TABRC, for example was instrumental in 

designing the process that resulted in reconfi guring Al 

Hakam to produce Bt bioinsecticide. Dr. Al Ma’dhihi 

also developed a novel solution to Iraq’s need for BW 

growth media. Unlike traditional bacterial growth 

media, Al Ma’dhihi’s creation was cheap and of 

domestic origin—made from waste products from 

food and agricultural processes. He noted that his 

media induced near 100% sporulation rates in Bt with 

little or no additional additives or intensive monitoring of the fermentation process. In ISG’s view, this 

media would probably be a suitable media for anthrax 

spore production. Rihab, herself, has conceded that 

this media may support growth and sporulation of 

anthrax and admitted that the use of this media would 

make monitoring diffi cult.

• Separately, Dr. Rihab described the purpose of her 

group’s research into alternative media, which was 

to circumvent the effects of sanctions imposed on 

Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Nasir Al 

Hindawi worked on alternative media for Brucella. 

Mosul University, worked on plants as a source 

of peptone media for anaerobic organisms. Some 

of the plant media was purportedly suitable for 

growing pathogens such as Clostridium botulinum. 

Rihab was angry that Mosul’s research might attract 

UNSCOM attention.

A strategic objective from the earliest days of the 

BW program was to produce dry agent. Dr. Rihab 

was aware that liquid agent had a relatively short 

shelf life and this was demonstrated to her when in 

1991, she found that liquid BW agent recovered from 

bombs and bulk storage containers “was ruined.” She 

therefore found the work at TABRC on drying Bt by 

Dr. Al Ma’dhihi of great interest. Al Ma’dhihi was 

able to dry Bt at bench-scale and was working toward 

pilot-scale levels. This technology was directly applicable to drying anthrax although safety precautions 

would have been necessary.

• Dr. Al Ma’dhihi used bentonite provided by Al 

Hakam. The particle size was of 1 to 10 micrometers and Al Ma’dhihi realized that this was too fi ne 

for agricultural work. However, such technology is 

applicable to BW.

Dr. Rihab was pleased with the biopesticide formulation Al Hakam produced. Al Hakam produced 

approximately 40 tons of dry formulated product each 

year from 1992 to 1996. In about 1994, Al Hakam 

slowed down the production of Al Nasr in order to 

improve the formulation for the farmers. However, 

there was disagreement among the developer, producers, and end-users on the utility and use of the 

Al Hakam’s dry Bt product called Al Nasr (or “Victory”). Farmers found it cumbersome to use, having 

to apply it by hand one plant at a time; spraying the 

product as a liquid slurry by mixing it with water was 

not successful. Al Hindawi stated, “The Bt produced 

there was not very popular with the farmers and was 

not a profi table endeavor.” The former minister of 

agriculture corroborated this view.

• Dr. Al Ma’dhihi, the developer of this product, 

explained that it was intended to be used by sprinkling the dry material directly on to plants. He 

commented that farmers did not like the product 

because the powder was too fi ne; it aerosolized into 

a cloud when applied and did not form an adequate 

residue on the plants.

• Those who produced Al Nasr, Dr. Rihab and Mr. 

Thamir ‘Abd-al-Rahman thought otherwise on the 

use and value of the product. They both described 

mixing the dry powder with water to form a slurry 

and spraying the product using hand sprayers. They 

thought the product was well received.

ISG’s assessment is that whatever the intention of 

Iraq’s Bt drying technology it was more applicable 
15

Biological

to BW than biopesticides. ISG has learned more 

about the potential use of Iraq’s biopesticide program 

for prohibited purposes from other sources.

• It was reported, but not confi rmed, that researchers from the BW program at Al Hakam used other 

organisms to model work with anthrax after 1991.

• The former chief anthrax technician stated to ISG 

that the Al Hakam Bt fermentation line would fully 

support anthrax production. If virulent anthrax isolates were available, it would take by his estimate, 

one week to redirect the line to begin production of 

anthrax. He noted however that attempting to dry 

anthrax using the Al Hakam equipment was highly 

hazardous without respiratory protection or containment around the spray dryer.

In early 1995, UN inspectors confronted Iraq with 

evidence of imports of bacterial growth media in 

quantities that had no civilian utility within Iraq’s 

limited biotechnology industry, a step that ultimately 

led to the unraveling of Iraq’s cover story regarding continuing BW-related activity. On 1 July 1995, 

Iraq acknowledged that it used this growth media to 

produce two BW agents in bulk, botulinum toxin, and 

Bacillus anthracis spores, between 1988 and 1991. 

This precipitated Iraq into preparing a Full Final and 

Complete Disclosure (FFCD). Iraq presented the draft 

version in July 1995. A fi nal version followed on 4 

August 1995, only to be declared void less than two 

weeks later after Husayn Kamil fl ed to Jordan.

Most of what ISG knows about Iraq’s BW endeavors 

dates from the period August 1995 to early 1996. 

After his departure offi cials denounced “the traitor” 

Husayn Kamil and blamed him for Iraq’s failure to 

disclose the BW program earlier. Tariq ‘Aziz claims 

he persuaded Saddam Husayn to make a full disclosure of Iraq’s BW efforts to the UN. For a short while 

information fl owed freely and Iraq released a considerable quantity of documents on its WMD programs 

in anticipation that this would lead to the lifting of 

sanctions. (However, in the biological fi eld there were 

only around 200 items, including notebooks, papers, 

receipts, photographs, videotapes and journal reprints. 

For a program that had already lasted more than 20 

years this was a modest collection.) As a consequence 

of the disclosures, the UN supervised the destruction 

of Al Hakam and disablement of FMDV in June 1996.

Iraq’s disclosures on its covert BW program almost 

certainly were tied to the disintegration of the 

economy, which had hit rock-bottom by late 1995 as 

a result of UN-mandated economic sanctions. ISG 

judges that Saddam was willing to risk an element of 

Iraq’s WMD program in a bid to gain economic and 

sanctions relief. Getting out from under sanctions, by 

this time, was an overarching Regime objective. BW 

research at the time offered no real capability but nevertheless posed the risk of a potential embarrassment 

that could only get in the way of sanctions relief.

• After a series of drafts, Iraq submitted a new “Full, 

Final and Complete Declaration” (FFCD) on 22 

June 1996. This initiated a series of UN inspections 

to verify the details and resulted in another FFCD, 

submitted in September 1996, and a further FFCD 

in September 1997. Despite these revisions, the 

new FFCDs did not supply any substantially new 

information and therefore did not meet UN requirements. The UN was unable to verify the contents of 

the documents in spite of two Technical Evaluation 

Meetings between Iraq and the UN in March and 

April 1998, and July 1998.

Recovery and Transition 1996-2003

With the bulk of Iraq’s BW program in ruins, Iraq 

after 1996 continued small-scale BW-related efforts 

with the only remaining asset at Baghdad’s disposal— the know-how of the small band of BW scientists and technicians who carried out further work 

under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

By 1996, the combination of the destruction wrought 

during Desert Storm and the deliberate destruction 

of key BW facilities and equipment under UNSCOM 

supervision left Iraq with few physical remnants of 

its BW program. Numerous other dual-use biological 

facilities were subject to routine UN monitoring.

• Many of the key scientists went to work for the 

NMD. Others pursued advanced degrees in Iraq’s 

universities or went into the private sector; or work 

at other government agencies, e.g., TABRC; while 

at least some continued to conduct small-scale 

biological research and development in disperse 

locations under the control of the IIS.
16

• ISG is uncertain what the function of the multiple 

IIS laboratories was, and who the scientists were 

(see also CW section, Annex I). Some of the work 

conducted there was probably a continuation of 

the work at the Al Salman laboratories after their 

destruction in the Gulf war in 1991 and that would 

include forensic related work. Other objectives 

were probably to develop poisons for assassination or debilitation. Whether any of the research 

was directly related to military development of 

BW agents is uncertain; the nature of some of the 

reported work would have had direct application to 

dissemination of ricin.

Dr. Rihab hypothesized to ISG that if a BW program 

had existed in Iraq prior to OIF, it would probably 

have been conducted in secret within the intelligence 

community. However, ISG’s inspection of assorted 

equipment and sites has not uncovered evidence of 

either the true nature of IIS laboratories or conclusive links between these laboratories and Iraq’s BW 

effort. ISG notes, in any case, that the tactic of using 

IIS and covert laboratories has historical precedence 

dating back to the program’s origins in the 1970s, 

when the IIS provided the BW program with security 

and participated in BW-related research. Reverting 

to this practice would minimize the evidence available to inspectors. It would also leave the known and 

acknowledged BW workers free to deal with the UN 

inspection regime. However, it would require another 

cadre of scientists other than ones known to the UN 

to conduct this kind of research. The discovery of 

multiple IIS clandestine laboratories after OIF lends 

some credence to this assessment.

• There is information that suggests that up to 5 IIS 

laboratories operated in the greater Baghdad area at 

various times up until OIF.

• ISG found a possible DGS laboratory in Baghdad 

that contained a variety of chemicals but no laboratory equipment. Residents in the building alleged 

that the laboratory was a biological one. The investigating team found several DGS administrative 

documents, some of which were from employees 

requesting approval for danger pay for their hazardous work with biological and radioactive materials.

• Information collected at the time of OIF led to the 

discovery of assorted laboratory equipment purportedly used by a suspect BW scientist at a Mosque in 

Baghdad.

• A clandestine laboratory was identifi ed by an ISG 

team at the Baghdad Central Public Health Laboratory in the summer of 2003. According to an 

employee of the laboratory, the IIS operated a laboratory at that location for several years. In advance 

of a 1998 UNSCOM inspection, secret documents 

were removed and stored at the Director’s house. In 

December of 2002, the laboratory was emptied of 

all equipment and documents.

• A former IIS chemist indicates this fi ve-story building and adjacent warehouse complex comprises 

the M16 training center at Djerf-al-Nadaf, SE of 

Baghdad. A former member of the NMD reported 

this site as one of the three IIS locations with equipment and activities intentionally not declared to the 

UN. Neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC were aware 

of their existence and had not visited these facilities. He believes the building contained a biological 

laboratory for unspecifi ed work. Site exploitation 

revealed a modern building that probably housed 

both offi ces and at least one laboratory on the fi rst 

fl oor. The building was completely looted, with 

very few remnants of equipment, materials, or documents. Neighbors indicated that the IIS removed 

everything from the site just before the war.

• According to a former mid-level BW scientist, 

Iraq conducted tests on prisoners using afl atoxin in 

1994 at an undeclared clandestine facility. A former 

member of the NMD indicated he visited the facility in 1997 or 1998 to survey the equipment for 

possible declaration to the UN; he was told on-site 

that none of the equipment or activities there would 

be declared.

• ISG also has evidence that, possibly as recently as 

1994, an IIS chemist who immigrated to Iraq from 

Egypt, Dr. Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Mun’im Al Azmirli 

(now deceased), experimented on prisoners with 

ricin resulting in their deaths.
17

Biological

• In the chemical fi eld, ISG learned that, in the 1970s, 

the former IIS Directorate of Science and Technology, M9 (which later transformed into M16) used 

this approach for research into lethal agents. The 

IIS used a succession of four clandestine laboratories in At Taji and Baghdad between 1996 and 2003 

to research and develop chemicals. It also included 

testing of chemicals on small animals like mice, 

rabbits and rats.

• Additional reporting, though unconfi rmed, indicates 

that M16 also conducted BW related research at 

two covert laboratories. In the early 1990s, Saddam 

tasked the IIS to do small-scale BW work in covert 

laboratories concealed within legitimate facilities. 

Further unconfi rmed reports indicated the IIS conducted BW and CW experiments and stored WMD 

precursor materials in residences and warehouses 

around Baghdad until at least April 2003.
18

Research and Development

ISG judges that Iraq maintained the expertise and 

equipment necessary for R&D of bacteria, fungi, 

viruses, and toxins that could be used as BW agents 

up until Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in March 

2003

• ISG assesses that Iraq’s bacterial and toxin BW 

agents were adequately researched and developed 

at the advent of the fi rst Gulf war in 1991, and that 

Iraq had an extensive BW R&D program in the 

years prior to that. By the time of Desert Storm, 

Iraq had weaponized Clostridium botulinum

(‘Agent A’), Bacillus anthracis (‘Agent B’) and 

Afl atoxin (‘Agent C’) by fi lling liquid forms of 

these agents into munitions, although these munitions were not the most effective or effi cient for 

BW dispersal.

Despite evidence of Iraq’s intent to develop more 

dangerous biological agents after Desert Storm, ISG 

uncovered no indications that biological agents were 

researched for BW purposes post-1991, even though 

Iraq maintained—and in some cases improved—

research capabilities that could have easily been 

applied to BW agents. ISG’s investigations found 

no direct evidence that the expertise or equipment 

were being used specifi cally for BW work. That said, 

ISG judges that further R&D on the agents weaponized pre-1991 was probably not required. Additional 

agents would have required extensive R&D, in ISG’s 

judgement, but despite concerns that surrounded the 

possible addition of other, more pathogenic, agents 

into the viral BW program, no evidence has been 

found by ISG.

• ISG conducted site visits and multiple interviews 

investigating Iraq’s possible possession of smallpox and collected fragmentary and circumstantial 

information. A defi nitive conclusion is impossible, 

but, based on the available evidence, ISG concludes 

that Iraq intended to develop smallpox and possibly 

other viral pathogens like CCHF as potential BW 

weapons. In December 1990, Dr. Rihab informed 

Dr. Hazim ‘Ali that Husayn Kamil wanted him to 

work on “more dangerous” viruses. According to 

a source, Dr. Hazim ‘Ali was willing to work on 

other viral agents if Dr. Rihab provided him with 

the materials. No additional materials were provided. Iraq had the basic capability to work with 

variola major (smallpox) and may have conducted 

some preliminary basic research. However, ISG 

has found no conclusive evidence that Iraq retained 

or acquired any stocks of smallpox or conducted 

advance R&D of pathogenic viruses.

ISG uncovered troubling information about post-1991 

BW-related endeavours that raise concerns about the 

legitimacy of Iraq’s activities and that suggest to ISG 

Baghdad aimed at some future time to resume its BW 

program.

• In the1990s Iraq decided indigenously to research 

and produce nutrient growth media that could be 

used to produce multiple strains of bacteria to 

include B. anthracis, but no direct evidence has yet 

been uncovered that this media was used to produce 

B. anthracis post-1991. Dr. Rihab described to ISG 

her BW group’s research in developing indigenously produced media to circumvent the effects 

sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1990 invasion. 

Research into alternative media for the growth of 

Brucella was conducted following the introduction 

of the 1990 UN sanctions.

• Multiple sources have told ISG that the B. thuringiensis research and production at Al Hakam from 

1991 to 1996 was done to provide cover for the 

equipment and capability at this facility. ISG has 

not been provided with a good explanation as 

to why an advanced capability to dry agent in a 

particle size too small for effi cient biopesticide use 

was established as well. ISG judges that this work 

advanced Iraq’s expertise and knowledge in largescale drying of B. anthracis even if the agent itself 

was not produced and dried.

• ISG has found that up to fi ve IIS laboratories 

operated in the greater Baghdad area up until OIF. 

Additional reporting, though unconfi rmed, indicates that the M16 Division also conducted BW 

related research in two covert laboratories. In the 

early 1990s, Saddam tasked the IIS to do smallscale BW work in covert laboratories concealed 

within legitimate facilities. Further unconfi rmed 

reports indicated the IIS conducted BW and CW 
19

Biological

experiments and stored WMD precursor materials in residences and warehouse around Baghdad 

through April 2003. Information collected at the 

time of OIF led to the discovery of assorted laboratory equipment purportedly used by a suspect BW 

scientist on the Black List at a Mosque in Baghdad. A clandestine laboratory was identifi ed by an 

ISG team at the Baghdad Central Public Health 

laboratory in the summer of 2003. According to an 

employee of the laboratory, the IIS operated a laboratory at that location for several years. In advance 

of a 1998 UNSCOM inspection, secret documents 

were removed and stored at the Director’s house. In 

December 2002, the laboratory was emptied of all 

equipment and documents.

Building Human Capital

Over the course of many years Iraq undertook concerted efforts to create the cornerstone of a national 

BW program: a body of trained scientists with the 

professional skill and experience needed to develop 

and produce BW. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons programs, which require vast physical infrastructure, expensive equipment and substantial fi nancial 

resources, human capital is the essential element of a 

national BW effort, for scientifi c research underpins 

all aspects of a developing BW program. Iraq made 

the most of a limited pool of qualifi ed personnel to 

identify and develop the requisite cadre of skilled 

scientists and technical personnel.

• Trying to develop such a cadre for the BW as well 

as CW programs was an integral part of the overall 

Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Institute’s goals. UN 

inspectors discovered that during the 1970s the Al 

Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Institute recruited the best 

and the brightest graduating students—from the 

Universities of Baghdad, Colleges of Medicine, 

Science, and Veterinary Medicine, and the University of Mustansiriyah, College of Medicine. The 

Institute offered these students employment with 

incentives including opportunities for travel abroad 

and further education. Students selected for biology 

then attended a two-month training program at the 

University of Baghdad, College of Veterinary Medicine, in “laboratory techniques and procedures.” 

Some were selected for graduate studies abroad 

and some for graduate studies at the University of 

Baghdad or the University of Mustansiriyah, while 

others were given technician positions at the IbnSina Center.

ISG assesses that at some point after the revitalization of Iraq’s BW program in the mid-1980s, a shift 

in priorities occurred in which Iraqi BW personnel 

were selected for participation in the program more 

for their loyalty and dependability than for their 

technical skills, an approach that distorted the entire 

higher educational process and frequently ensured 

that the “best and the brightest” were replaced by 

the loyal and reliable.

• A senior Iraqi scientist described to ISG a practice 

that began in the early 1990s and continued until 

2002 as a possible Husayn Kamil initiative. This 

initiative reportedly named Al Mumtazin, or “the 

distinguished,” involved nominating candidates for 

post-graduate education based on their loyalty to 

the Regime, institution or superior rather than their 

technical competence. These “distinguished” candidates reportedly had lesser grades and were generally older than published requirements, according to 

an ISG interview with a senior Iraqi scientist.

• In a possible bid to counter the corrosive effect of 

selecting personnel for political and professional 

reasons, in the mid 1980s, Iraq established a mentoring process through which to conduct investigations into possible BW related bacteria and toxins. 

This system, used throughout the BW program, 

utilized compartmented small clusters headed by a 

senior scientist who had extensive research experience or a senior technician with extensive experience with either the agent or a class of bacteria of 

interest according to multiple sources who participated in the former program.
20

Research Facilities

Iraq’s R&D to develop BW started in 1974 at the Al 

Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Institute. Initially the BW 

effort was located in a house in the Al ‘Amiriyah 

suburb of Baghdad, and then moved to Al Hasan site 

number 2, also known as the Ibn-Sina Center, at Al 

Salman. The biological part of the Al Hasan program was “research on microorganism for military 

purposes.” It included antibiotic and environmental 

resistance, means of production, and agent preservation. Agents included Staphylococcus aureus, Bacillus 

species, Vibrio cholerae, botulinum toxin, infl uenza 

and polio viruses, and others. Although the militarily relevant piece of the Al Hasan biological program 

seems to have entered a hiatus with the closure of the 

Institute, biological activities, not specifi cally directed 

toward BW weapons continued unabated at the Al 

Salman site.

In the formative phases of the BW program, the IbnSina Center was the primary center for BW R&D. 

Some BW R&D continued unabated at Ibn-Sina 

Center, which began to broaden in 1984. When Iraq 

revitalized the militarily relevant BW program in the 

mid-1980s, Al Muthanna was the primary site until 

1987 when the program again moved to the IbnSina Center. However, Al Muthanna continued with 

specifi c R&D participation such as that with ricin and 

afl atoxin on behalf of Al Salman. R&D continued at 

the Ibn-Sina Center until mid to late 1990 even after 

much of the BW program moved to the newly established Al Hakam facility in 1988.

In 1990, with the compulsory acquisition of the Al 

Dawrah FMDV Plant and the Agriculture Water 

Resource Center (AWRC) facility and R&D and 

production of afl atoxin moved to the AWRC. In addition, BW-applicable R&D was conducted during the 

1980s at TABRC. Al Hakam continued to be a key 

BW-related R&D facility until 1996, when it was 

destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Additionally, 

Al Hamath, TABRC, and the Tariq Facility 

(Fallujah III) were also key sites during this period 

(for more complete information on Iraq’s R&D 

facilities and ISG’s exploitations, see Annex B on BW 

Research and Development).

Iraqi BW Agent Research

Iraq’s efforts to develop BW agents were extensive, 

and in the years leading up to the fi rst Gulf war 

Baghdad investigated a wide range of biological 

agents with potential military applications. ISG 

investigated the extent of Iraq’s research prior to 

the war, and assessed the degree to which Baghdad 

pursued development of these agents in the aftermath 

of Desert Storm.

Bacillus anthracis (‘Agent B’)

Baghdad invested considerable time and effort prior 

to 1991 in the development of anthrax as a biological weapon. ISG assesses that the effort ended with 

Desert Storm. However, studies of simulants aided the 

quality of any future anthrax products.

R&D on growing the anthrax organism and inducing sporulation was initiated at Al Hasan site number 

2, but the work was terminated at the end of 1978. 

The R&D was reinitiated in 1985 at Al Muthanna. 

Although denied by Dr. Rihab, the studies may have 

picked up where the Al Hasan studies left off, and 

work progressed rapidly and included laboratory 

production, characterization and storage.

• After the transfer of the BW effort from Al Muthanna to Al Salman, scale up production and aerosol 

studies (dry and liquid) were conducted. A continued interest in obtaining a suitable dry product and 

the efforts expended to acquire a suitable drying 

capability continued at Al Salman and later at Al 

Hakam.

• Iraq obtained two capable dryers that were airfreighted into Baghdad in 1989. One of these dryers 

was located at Al Hakam in 1991. Iraq also tried 

to obtain an “aseptic” spray dryer (identical to 

those air-freighted to Baghdad, but with additional 

biological containment capabilities) in 1990. This 

dryer was not delivered by the supplier.

• Static tests (using simulants for B anthracis spores) 

were conducted in March 1988 in LD250 aerial 

bombs. Dynamic and static trials using 122 mm 

rocket warheads fi lled with simulant were conducted in 1989 and 1990. Trials were then conducted in August 1990 using R-400 aerial bombs, 

again fi lled with anthrax simulant.
21

Biological

fi rm the veracity of the claim of continued research 

into B. anthracis at Al Hakam following the 1991 

Gulf war.

• ISG found information that indicated that research 

into anthrax vaccines was conducted at the Abu 

Ghurayb Veterinary College (Baghdad University, 

College of Veterinary Medicine). Unfortunately, 

ISG was not able to obtain further information as to 

what this research involved or what vaccine strain 

was utilized.

Clostridium botulinum 

(Botulinum toxin, ‘Agent A’)

ISG has uncovered no further information to suggest 

that Iraq actively continued to research and produce 

C. botulinum for use as a BW weapon following the 

1991 Gulf war.

R&D on botulinum toxin was an integral part of 

the Al Hasan site number 2. Efforts appeared to be 

modest but were focused on growth conditions for 

maximizing toxin yield. This effort was terminated at 

the end of 1978 when Al Hasan was dissolved.

Tests then were re-established when the militarily 

relevant BW program was revitalized in 1985 at Al 

Muthanna. Seemingly, building on the knowledge 

gained by the Al Hasan effort, rapid progress was 

made. By early 1987, before the program was moved 

to Al Salman, inhalation studies on botulinum toxin 

were conducted in the 5m3

 inhalation chamber at Al 

Muthanna.

At Al Salman, studies progressed to where fi eld trials 

on the dispersal of liquid botulinum toxin using LD250 aerial bombs were conducted in March 1988. 

After the move to Al Hakam in 1988, with its larger 

agent production capability, static (November 1989) 

and dynamic (May 1990) trials were conducted using 

122 mm rocket warheads at the Al Muhammadiyat 

test range. R-400 aerial bombs were also tested in 

August 1990 as were the effects of metals (simulating 

the interior of munitions) on the agent.

ISG continued to gain more insight into B. anthracis work done before 1991, which reinforced the 

fi ndings of UNSCOM detailed below. However, no 

new information has been obtained on B. anthracisspecifi c R&D conducted after the 1996 destruction 

of Al Hakam.

• Thamir ‘Abd-al-Rahman, a key fi gure in Iraq’s 

anthrax work pre-1991, told ISG that he attempted 

to obtain the Ames strain of B. anthracis which he 

considered “very virulent” while attending a scientifi c workshop in 1989, but he was unsuccessful in 

that endeavor. Iraq declared researching different 

strains of B. anthracis, but settled on the American 

Type Culture Collection (ATCC) strain 14578 as 

the exclusive strain for use as a BW.

• Prior to work on the pathogenic strains of B. 

anthracis, Dr. Rihab directed the scientists to use 

surrogates in their early and more advanced stages 

of R&D and production. Accordingly, experiments 

were done with surrogates, B. thuringiensis, Bacillus subtilis and Bacillus megaterium, in order to 

determine appropriate growth conditions. Her logic 

was in part for safety. She wanted to permit the 

researcher to familiarize and learn procedures with 

a nonpathogenic organism before attempting to use 

pathogenic ones. These bacillus strains were used 

to simulate work on B. anthracis by researchers at 

Al Hakam after 1991. A similar practice apparently 

was followed 1985-1990. Laboratory-scale work 

was done with the B. thuringiensis Israeliensis

strain at Al Hakam to determine optimized growth 

conditions. The main work, and ultimate production, of B. thuringiensis was conducted utilizing the 

Kurstakii strain. B. megaterium was researched at 

Al Salman in 1987-1988 as a model for B. anthracis using a 150l fermentor.

• One large fi eld experiment was also planned and, 

according to the source, the experiment involved 

spreading of the bacteria by an airplane. ISG found 

no further information on this experiment. The 

information provided by the source confi rms existing knowledge about Iraq’s use of B. thuringiensis, 

B. subtilis and B. megaterium as simulants for B. 

anthracis. However, as this is information that 

comes from a single source, ISG is unable to con-
22

Clostridium perfringens (‘Agent G’)

No information was discovered to suggest that BWrelated research into C. perfringens continued after 

the 1991 Gulf war. Following the end of OIF, ISG 

obtained information relating to C. perfringens that 

essentially confi rmed previous UNSCOM fi ndings 

regarding Iraq’s work on this bacteriium as a BW 

agent.

• In late April 1988, Dr. Rihab initiated research on 

C. perfringens, known as ‘Agent G’, to facilitate its 

use as a BW agent. The development of ‘Agent G’ 

occurred at the Technical Research Center (TRC), 

Al Salman, and was directed by ‘Ali Shihab during 

the late 1980s. Dr. Rihab instructed the researchers 

to investigate the various strains and identify the 

most effective for use as a large-scale BW agent. 

According to a source, the intent of the research 

was to disseminate C. perfringens as spores.

• The initial stage of the C. perfringens project 

focused on identifying a medium in which to 

optimize growth. Researchers procured Duncan 

and Strong growth media and modifi ed the salt and 

nutrient levels. This initial research on media and 

isolates occurred in the beginning of 1990. The 

second phase of the research focused on bench 

scale production of ‘Agent G spores’, with the fi rst 

successful production of C. perfringens spores in 

March 1990.

• As part of the second phase of research, the 

research protocol called for animal testing to be 

conducted quarterly and the results forwarded 

via an offi cial report to Dr. Rihab. ISG has two 

accounts for the testing that occurred. One source 

describes research conducted in a small aerosol 

chamber on rabbits and mice attempting to inoculate abraded skin in these experimental animals. 

The results obtained through these experiments left 

the test animals with lesions typical of C. perfringens infection. The second account also involves 

the use of an inhalation chamber to aerosolize 

spores and infect the laboratory animals but after 

autopsies were performed, researchers concluded 

that aerosolized spores may not be effective as a 

BW agent. They then began injecting ‘Agent G’ via 

syringe and this resulted in successful tests using 

guinea pigs and mice. The animals developed Gas 

Gangrene infections at the wound sites and eventually died. Results from the successful tests were 

reported to Dr. Rihab in April 1990, who instructed 

the researchers to move the production of ‘Agent G’ 

to a larger scale.

Afl atoxin (‘Agent C’)

R&D on afl atoxin began in May 1988 based on previous nonmilitary work on afl atoxin by Dr. Imad. Good 

progress was made which led to an initial weapons 

test in November 1989, consisting of static trials with 

122 mm rocket warheads. Additional testing involved 

combining afl atoxin with CS and CN incapacitating 

agents as well as mustard CW agent. Studies included 

potency retention under conditions and temperature of 

deployment as well as effect of metals on the agent. 

This was followed by dynamic testing trials in May 

1990. However, R-400 aerial bombs and Al Husayn 

missile warheads were munitions selected for BW 

weaponization in late 1990.

In 1992, an individual at the Central Public Health 

Laboratory—who worked for the SSO and was 

responsible for checking Saddam’s food for contamination—denied having an afl atoxin standard, according to a source with direct access but of unknown 

reliability. According to the same source, the former 

director of CPHL had been involved in offensive afl atoxin research until at least 1991.

Debriefi ngs since April 2003 of sources formerly 

involved with BW efforts indicate that Iraq at least 

continued research on afl atoxin throughout the 1990s. 

In 1994, a DGS forensics laboratory produced 150 

ml of afl atoxin for testing on humans, according to a 

mid-level scientist who formerly worked in the BW 

program and visited the site.

Brucella

Dr. Rihab supported inclusion of brucella in Iraq’s 

BW program and actively supported pre-Desert Storm 

research to that end. That initiative, however, appears 

to have ended in the wake of the fi rst Gulf war.

According to a source, Dr. Rihab wanted to add Brucella to the list of BW agents. According to a former 
23

Biological

mid-level scientist who worked at several Iraqi BW 

program locations, he conducted research on Brucella at Al Hakam prior to Desert Storm and later at 

Baghdad University until 1992 using imported strains 

and patient isolates, respectively, according to the 

scientist. The research included isolating bacterium, 

growing it in culture, extracting and purifying its 

toxins, and testing the toxin on mice. Although this 

research was not declared to UNSCOM, the scientist 

stated that his thesis was open.

• Rihab and Ahmad Murtada, the Director General 

of the former TRC, recommended that the scientist 

conduct the research as part of graduate degree on 

Brucella at Baghdad University under the direction of Alice Krikor Agap Melkonian. Before the 

war, the researcher conducted laboratory work at 

Al Hakam and course work at the university. Rihab 

provided the Brucella abortus isolate the researcher 

used at Hakam but it was not from the B. abortus

isolates obtained by Rihab from American Type 

Culture Collection: none of these had been opened. 

The scientist stopped research on Brucella during 

the war but resumed his work after that at the university, working on isolates from a hospital patient. 

According to the mid-level scientist, the Brucella

work was not secret and his thesis about the work 

was not classifi ed.

• In 1991, after the war, work on Brucella restarted 

at the College of Science with an isolate from 

a patient at the Ibn-al-Khatib Hospital and was 

coordinated through the Ministry of Health. During 

the project, Brucella was isolated and grown. The 

researcher extracted and purifi ed the endotoxin, 

tested it on mice and determined the toxin was 

not as effective as Shiga toxin, ricin or botulinum. 

Rihab received a copy of the researcher’s report 

and work on Brucella was supposed to start on 

the person’s return to Al Hakam but it was put on 

hold by Dr. Rihab in 1992 to focus on research and 

production of B. thuringiensis.

• Research on Brucella was also conducted at the 

Abu Ghurayb Veterinary College, but ISG has no 

information on the extent of this work.

• Research into alternative media for the growth of 

Brucella was conducted following the introduction 

of the 1990 UN sanctions. This research was carried out by ‘Ali Shihab. ISG found no information 

to indicate the timescale of research, the results or 

whether the research was successful.

• After the establishment of the Al Razi Center in 

1992, the Microbiology department, directed by Dr. 

Antoine Al Bana, carried out research into diagnostic kits for Brucella. The facility was visited by 

the ISG BW team who discovered Brucella bacterial isolates obtained from Al ‘Amiriyah Serum 

and Vaccine Institute (ASVI) (see Figure 3). The 

strains found were B. abortus and B. melitensis. 

Although, pre-OIF, the facility had maintained the 

capability to conduct successful BW-related R&D 

on Brucella, there were no indications that this had 

occurred.

Ricin

The evidence surrounding Iraq’s investigation of 

ricin for BW purposes is unclear, and thus ISG 

can offer no defi nitive conclusion. It is clear that 

Baghdad had weaponized ricin in at least a limited 

fashion prior to the fi rst Gulf war. There is at least 

some evidence of post-war IIS involvement in ricin 

research and possible human testing, but ISG developed no defi nitive information with which to confi rm 

reports of post-war production.

Iraq’s R&D on ricin had its origin in the mid 1980s 

at the Scientifi c Research Center (SRC). In 1988/89 

active collaboration was sought from personnel at Al 

Salman. The research proceeded apace with initial 

fi eld trials using 155 mm shells in Nov 1990. The 

work at the SRC was initiated at the behest of an offi -

cial with the Internal Security Service who followed 

the efforts through the fi eld trial (see Figure 4).

ISG conducted a focused investigation into Iraqi work 

with ricin—a toxin derived from castor beans (Ricinus communis) of the indigenous Iraqi R. communis

plants. The search to date has yielded confl icting 

information about the use of castor beans and continued ricin work after 1998.
24

ISG is aware from UNSCOM reporting that Iraq conducted limited weaponization of ricin prior to Desert 

Storm and that it conducted partially successful fi eld 

trials with ricin. Based on this, ISG focused on two 

main themes: (1) part of the Al Tariq Facility—also 

known as Fallujah II—for castor oil production, and 

(2) the reported IIS work with the toxin. While ISG 

has not been able to fi nd direct evidence of recent 

ricin production, several sources have provided information that suggest that work on ricin toxin continued 

well past 1992, possibly until the beginning of OIF.

The ISG team examined in detail the Al Tariq Facility 

and a site that supplied Al Tariq with castor beans—

the Al ‘Aziziyah farms. The team debriefed a number 

of scientists and engineers employed at Al Tariq and 

a group of farmers from Al ‘Aziziyah, obtaining from 

each group a very different picture about work at Al 

Tariq and the intended use of the castor beans. Al 

Tariq staff employees maintained that castor beans 

were used exclusively for the processing of castor 

oil for the brake fl uid and tire production industries. 

They also admitted contemplating the use of castor 

oil as an anti-foaming agent in the yeast industry. 

When prompted with a few more specifi cs, one Al 

Tariq employee explained away the activity as being 

pharmaceutical-related. Another shipment of castor 

beans, for a university, remains to be explained. For 

more information on this facility, see Annex 2.

ISG has investigated claims by former IIS offi cials—

a former IIS chemist and his former supervisor, the 

late Dr. Al Azmirli—that the IIS produced ricin until 

at least 1995 and possibly until 2003, although ISG 

has not yet obtained direct evidence of ricin work.

• Interviews with Dr. Al Azmirli—a former IIS offi -

cial and scientifi c advisor to Saddam—revealed that 

the IIS researched ricin as a BW agent until 2003. 

He himself was directly involved with ricin work 

until 1992, when Husayn Kamil demanded the program be turned over to Dr. Rihab and a doctor from 

the Ministry of Agriculture.

• Dr. Al Azmirli claimed that between 1992 and 

1996, ricin was being produced at Al Shameir 

Hospital in Al Rashad until it was transferred to Al 

Hakam. A separate former IIS offi cial confi rmed 

that Al Azmirli produced approximately two kilograms of ricin at the Ar Rashidiyah plant in 1991 

and 1992. An exploitation of the Ar Rashidiyah 

plant corroborated the location and presence of a 

facility, but ISG could not confi rm that ricin work 

had occurred there because of extensive looting.

• Mun’im Mustafa Fatahi, a close friend of Dr. Al 

Azmirli, reportedly told Al Azmirli that a group of 

people was actively pursuing ricin for weaponization. As of March 2003, ricin was being developed 

into stable liquid to deliver as an aerosol in small 

rockets, cluster bombs, and smoke generators, 

according to Al Azmirli.

• Documents obtained from Dr. Al Azmirli’s residence included an MSc thesis on the topic of ricin 

written by ‘Adnan Jasim from Baghdad University.

ISG has investigated claims from several sources 

that work on ricin toxin continued well past 1992, 

possibly until the beginning of OIF. The information that ISG obtained on the potential role of ricin 

in Iraq’s BW program post 1991 has primarily been 

based on single source reporting of unclear veracity.

• The IIS was involved in the research and limited 

production of ricin for the development of a BW 

weapon. A source stated that ‘Adnan Abd-al-Rasa’il 

Al ‘Ubaydi was responsible for all research related 

to ricin conducted by the IIS. In 1992, ‘Adnan 

produced a few milligrams of ricin. The IIS was 

then ordered not to continue with the ricin project 

because Husayn Kamil wanted the project. The 

source stated that all research and production processes were turned over to Dr. Rihab and a doctor 

from the Ministry of Agriculture. A group in Al 

Hakam was then involved in ricin production after 

1992.

• According to a single source, the MIC maintained 

fi elds of castor plants in the Al ‘Aziziyah area 

for sale to the Al Tariq Company. According to 

a source, the castor beans harvested from these 

crops were allegedly used to make brake fl uid and 

“chemical weapons.” When asked if the “chemical 

weapons” were possibly insecticides or pesticides, 

the source stated that the “chemical weapons” were 

used against humans. As the product of a single 

source, this information is hard to verify.
25

Biological

• During the approximate period of 1994 or 1995, 

Husayn Kamil, then Head of MIC, gave an order to 

confi scate farmland that belonged to the source in 

the area of Al ‘Aziziyah. By Husayn Kamil’s order, 

castor plants were to be planted on the acquired 

land and the MIC remained responsible for delivering the beans for each year’s planting. The source 

also reported that a castor crop was planted every 

year within different farming areas in the vicinity of the Al ‘Aziziyah. To hide the fact that MIC 

possessed dedicated castor fi elds, a cover story 

was developed between MIC and the Ministry of 

Agriculture or Ministry for Industrial Crops. Wheat, 

corn and cotton were subsequently planted in the 

vicinity of the castor crops, as a “cover crop.” The 

Ministry of Agriculture maintained a cover for the 

MIC in the area of Al ‘Aziziyah with offi ces for 

project managers. The same source indicated that 

the cover story was used to deceive UN inspectors.

• All the castor beans grown at this location were 

delivered to the Al Tariq facility. According to the 

source no payment was ever made for the castor 

beans. The only payment that occurred for the 

overall transaction was to the farmers who worked 

in the fi elds. There were various project managers 

who handled paying the farmers, who were on the 

payroll of the Tariq facility and ultimately MIC. 

The castor crops were planted in approximately 

February and March, and harvested annually in 

September. Each harvest yielded approximately 

250 to 300kg of castor beans. The Al Tariq facility 

would normally send four or fi ve trucks to the Al 

‘Aziziyah warehouse to take delivery of the castor 

beans.

• During an exploitation of the TABRC facility, the 

team discovered a piece of equipment they determined was associated with de-hulling of castor 

beans (see Figure 5). The exploitation team also 

discovered a 100-ton press containing an oily 

residue and took a sample of this material. This 

material returned a positive test for ricin. Although 

a positive result was obtained this discovery does 

not indicate on its own any illicit activity on behalf 

of the facility, as any step in the production of 

castor oil will return a positive test for ricin. The 

scale of the equipment was small and no reason was 

provided as to the purpose of the machinery.

ISG investigated a laboratory at the Al ‘Abud Trading 

Complex, Baghdad. Evidence of ricin was found in 

samples collected, both by fi eld analysis and at ISG 

laboratory assays.

• Based on the materials, equipment, and manual 

found at the site, ISG judged the complex did not 

appear to be related to the Regime’s chemical, or 

biological weapons programs. Rather, it appears to 

be an extremist-run laboratory with equipment and 

reagents that at a minimum could be used to produce ricin. Biological growth mediums and chemical precursors (triethanolamine) were also found in 

the laboratory.

Wheat Cover Smut (‘Agent D’)

R&D on wheat cover smut (bunt of wheat) was 

initiated in 1984 at the Al Salman site. After the BW 

militarily relevant program was moved from Al Muthanna to Al Salman, the wheat cover smut project was 

merged into a fungi and fungal toxin group within Dr. 

Rihab’s group. Smut spores were tested in static fi eld 

trials in late 1989. Tests to evaluate smut spores as a 

carrier for afl atoxin were also part of the program. No 

additional information has been found by ISG related 

to Iraq’s interest in and work on smut spores.

Viruses

Prior to the fi rst Gulf war Iraq pursued a range of 

viral agents as part of its BW program. ISG has 

uncovered no direct evidence to indicate a renewed 

interest or organized program to re-establish an 

Iraqi viral BW program and judges that Baghdad’s 

viral BW effort ended in 1991.

Researchers involved in Iraq’s 1970s BW research at 

the Al Hasan Institute reportedly attempted to develop 

infl uenza virus as a BW agent and were also conducting R&D on polioviruses. There were two virologists 

in the original group; one was a US trained veterinarian Dr. Muzhir Al Falluji, who had training and experience in animal orthopox (smallpox like) viruses; the 

other was Dr. Muslih Al Muslih (the 3rd Director of 

Ibn-Sina Center) who worked on poliovirus. Dr. Al 

Falluji taught several classes at the College of Veterinary Medicine. The Al Hasan Institute was closed in 

1979 and along with it, the viral programs.
26

Figure 4. Castor Beans, found at the al-Abud 

laboratory by the ISG.

Figure 5. Thresher used to mash castor beans 

found at TABRC.

Figure 3. Entrance to al-Razi facility.
27

Biological

Iraq’s viral BW program began its research and development (R& D) phases in July 1990 under the direction of Dr. Hazim ‘Ali. This was the second known 

attempt by Iraq to conduct BW viral research. From 

1973 until 1978, The Ibn-Sina Center of the Al Hasan 

Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation conducted 

research at its Al Salman site.

Iraq subsequently revived its BW programme in the 

mid 1980s. The revival of the Iraqi viral BW program 

began in early to mid 1990 when Dr. Hazim ‘Ali was 

chosen to lead the effort. Iraq’s pursuit of viral BW 

began over 4 years after the initiation of its research 

for bacterial and fungal agent development.

According to Hazim ‘Ali, the viral BW program 

ended on 17 January 1991. This information is 

consistent with an English-language document titled 

“Viral Agents Program” obtained through the investigations of ISG, which states that work on the viral 

program began on 1 December 1990 and was cancelled on 17 January 1991, when all specimens were 

destroyed. This is in contrast to information provided 

to UNSCOM that included laboratory notebooks and 

ISG information stating that Dr. Hazim ‘Ali isolated 

and began growing camelpox in October 1990.

Because of pre-OIF intelligence assessments about 

Iraq’s possible possession of smallpox, ISG conducted extensive investigations that included site 

visits and multiple interviews to determine the validity of this assessment. ISG has collected fragmentary and circumstantial information that provides no 

defi nitive conclusions, either way on this issue.

• ISG has collected information from credible 

sources from the pre-1991 program demonstrating 

Iraq’s interest and intent in developing pathogenic 

viruses specifi cally smallpox.

• Further, ISG assesses that Iraq maintained the 

capability in its personnel and basic equipment to 

conduct R&D into viral agents including smallpox.

• Finally coinciding with the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq 

intended to develop a production base to support 

pathogenic viral production.

Camel Pox

Iraq’s interest in camel pox and its inclusion in the 

viral BW program have led ISG to assess that camel 

pox R&D was a surrogate for smallpox research, 

analogous to the use of nonpathogenic Bacillus species and Bacillus anthracis.

According to Hazim ‘Ali, researchers in Iraq’s BW 

program followed the practice of working with 

particularly pathogenic micro-organisms surrogates 

to facilitate transition to the actual pathogens. This 

approach permitted the researcher to familiarize and 

learn techniques, procedures and processes to increase 

the safety margin for the researcher and technicians.

• In Dr. Rihab’s own words, Hazim’s decision to 

work with camel pox was because “it was near to 

smallpox.” When directly questioned about the 

possibility of smallpox in Iraq, she misspoke on 3 

occasions saying “there is no camel pox in Iraq.”

• Camel pox was one of the three viruses chosen for 

the viral BW program by Hazim ‘Ali. According to 

Hazim, no experiments were conducted to determine the effectiveness of camel pox on humans. 

His decision to develop camel pox was based on his 

research of citations from standard microbiology 

and microbial infection textbooks. His recollection was that camel pox causes rare cases of human 

infection but these were not severe. Dr. Hazim’s 

rationale for the utility of camel pox as a possible 

BW pathogen remains inconsistent with current and 

historical published scientifi c and medical knowledge.

ISG has no information to contradict his statements 

that his research only succeeded in initial isolation 

of camel pox from a clinical specimen obtained from 

the Veterinary Diagnostic Research Center in Abu 

Ghurayb.

The camel pox sample (scab) was not available immediately but by the end of October 1990, Hazim ‘Ali 

obtained a sample and successfully isolated the virus 

in chicken eggs. Chicken eggs were inoculated with 

the camel pox and the results were promising with 

some characteristic lesions (white pox marks) appearing on the chorioallontoic membrane of the chicken 

egg. These lesions on the chorioallontoic membrane 

of a ten-day old chicken embryo were characteristic 

of infections described in textbooks.
28

Hazim claims he cannot remember if animal testing 

occurred. The source stated that a pilot experiment 

should have been conducted with the isolate to assess 

for activity in an animal; rabbits are particularly 

susceptible to camel pox. However, he could not 

remember an actual test of the viral isolate on rabbits 

due to the critical time in which the test would have 

occurred; the 1991 Gulf war. Hazim does not believe 

that anyone else could have carried out this experiment in his absence or without his knowledge.

Hazim investigated existing facilities in Iraq for scaling-up the production of camel pox if and when that 

was possible or necessary. He decided on using the 

chorioallontoic membrane method of viral egg production. Although denying a plan for large-scale production, he inspected the Veterinary Service Center in 

Irbil. It was used in the production of animal vaccines 

for Newcastle disease and fowlpox. The Irbil facility 

had a moderate scale egg production capability but 

according to Hazim an untrained staff. The large size 

of the facility required was explained due to the fact 

that the amount of virus obtained through this method 

would only average 5 mg of tissue.

This facility was autonomous to the Iraqi Government 

and an order to commandeer the plant for Hazim’s 

activity was signed by the Minister of Agriculture. 

However, the order was never implemented.

Dr. Hazim ‘Ali’s performance in leading and conducting Iraq’s fl edgling viral BW research, based on comments by his colleagues, was underwhelming. Rihab 

described him as “not a man to work by himself.” Dr. 

Nasir Al Hindawi commented that Hazim ‘Ali did not 

produce a single virus.

Smallpox

ISG concludes that Iraq had a pre-1991 intent to 

develop smallpox as a strategic viral BW agent and 

had the basic capability to work with variola major 

(smallpox). However, ISG has collected no direct 

evidence that Iraq either retained or acquired smallpox virus isolates or proceeded with any follow up 

smallpox related research. ISG assesses, however, 

that Iraq did have the capability to conduct research 

into smallpox, if not in a manner up to Western 

BL-4 containment standards. Iraq possessed facilities such as the Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease 

Vaccine Plant and Al Razi Center had equipment 

that could potentially be used to work on high-risk 

agents such as smallpox.

Prior to OIF, the US intelligence community assessed 

that Iraq probably retained samples of the smallpox virus and may have been researching it for BW 

purposes. It was also stated that it had no information 

indicating whether such work was ongoing. Despite 

the limited information gained by the UN and a claim 

by a senior player in the CBW program that the intent 

of the viral BW program was to weaponize smallpox, 

the additional information uncovered by ISG has not 

provided evidence of an R&D effort to weaponize 

smallpox.

• According to Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Sammarai, a senior offi cial involved in the weaponization 

and testing of CBW agents, the aim of the viral 

BW program was intended for the weaponization 

of smallpox. He states that Dr. Hazim ‘Ali started 

with Camel pox since it was easier to work with 

for development, but ultimately the program was 

intended to progress to smallpox. Dr. Bilal did not 

know for a fact that samples of smallpox existed 

within Iraq but stated that ‘Ali might obtain them 

from the Baghdad Central Public Health Laboratory 

or collections at the Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute (ASVI). Dr. ‘Ali Mukhlif, Dr. Hazim 

‘Ali’s sponsor to work with the TRC, told Bilal the 

intention of the program and Hazim’s activities 

during a meeting at Al Muthanna in 1990.

• During investigations conducted by ISG and earlier 

by UNSCOM, Dr. Hazim ‘Ali occasionally referred 

to “smallpox” when questioned about their research 

and quickly retracted the statement to say “camel 

pox.” The source was unable to provide an explanation as to why he repeatedly made this mistake. 

This type of mistake added to the confusion surrounding Iraq’s possible R&D efforts on smallpox. 

Hazim stated that he would not be surprised if 

smallpox isolates were found in Iraq and identifi ed two culture repositories where viral cultures 

could be maintained over extended periods of time: 

Al Dawrah FMDV Plant and the Baghdad CPHL. 

None were found by ISG. However, the CPHL seed 

stock repository was reported to have been systemi-
29

Biological

cally looted post-OIF (see below, under “Feasibility 

of Maintaining Smallpox Cultures from 1972) and 

the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant was effectively shut 

down and electricity turned off after it was rendered 

unusable in 1996.

Contrary to comments made by Dr. Al Hindawi that 

there were no virologists in Iraq, ISG identifi ed and 

interviewed close to a dozen, mostly US and UK 

trained, highly capable PhD virologists. Several 

had experience with orthopox (smallpox like) viral 

research experience mostly with animal related pox 

viruses. One actually performed genetic engineering 

research on animal pox viruses attempting to develop 

a recombinant animal vaccine. A couple had experience working with the smallpox vaccine strain (vaccinia). However, none of Iraq’s “best and brightest” 

virologists were assessed directly involved in Iraq’s 

BW efforts. After extensive interviews, none could 

provide direct information concerning the existence 

of historical or recent smallpox isolates or research. 

(See the accompanying textbox on reported Iraqi 

retention of smallpox isolates.)
30

Iraqi Retention of Smallpox Cultures

ISG cannot be certain whether or not Iraq had 

smallpox seed stock to OIF. ISG investigated Iraq’s 

technical and practical capabilities to maintain viral 

or clinical smallpox isolates from the early 1970s in 

Iraq. Interviewing a number of senior Iraqi scientists and virologists ISG could make no defi nitive 

conclusions. ISG notes the stated intent of Husayn 

Kamil in 1990 to develop more virulent viruses as 

part of the BW program. While Hazim did not accomplish this objective, ISG cannot rule out the possibility that other, yet unidentifi ed, researchers were given 

the responsibility to attempt to do so.

In 1978, Ministry of Health (MoH) reported to the 

World Health Organization that no smallpox cases 

had occurred in Iraq since an outbreak in 1972, and 

attested in writing that all remaining smallpox cultures and clinical specimens were destroyed in 1978. 

There was, however, no independent verifi cation of 

the destruction of smallpox isolates or clinical specimens that may have been retained by either clinical 

or research institutes, and subsequent reporting on 

the subject is contradictory:

• One source ISG interviewed was an advisor to the 

Iraqi Minister of Health between 1980 and 1982. 

He stated that he was “90% certain” that Saddam 

did not destroy the last smallpox samples.

• Contrarily, Rihab stated categorically that no 

isolates of any kind were inherited by her from the 

original 1970s BW effort.

• According to a senior Iraq scientist at Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, he was ordered 

by MoH urgently to produce 3.5 million doses of 

smallpox vaccine in 1980. This source was the principal responsible scientist involved in this effort. By 

his accounts, the Iraqi MoH attempted to procure 

smallpox vaccine seed stocks from the World Health 

Organization (WHO) in 1980 for this effort. The 

WHO refused Iraq’s request citing the recent success in the eradication program.

• Intelligence reports dating back to 1994 suggest 

that Iraq may have obtained smallpox cultures from 

the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1992. A biologist 

who had indirect access to this information stated 

that Iraq acquired isolates of smallpox from Russia 

in 1992. He went on to describe an effort to develop 

smallpox for the BW program from 1992 to 1994. 

He described efforts to grow the virus in both eggs 

and tissue culture. This effort reportedly failed and 

the viral cultures were maintained at the CPHL. 

The subject biologist is no longer in Iraq.

ISG has collected no information with which to conclusively refute or confi rm the existence of smallpox 

isolates retained by Iraq from the period when the 

disease was still endemic, but if they were retained 

they would have been a potentially serious threat in 

the context of a renewed BW program.

• ISG assesses such viral cultures could remain 

viable for extended periods of time depending on 

the nature of the isolate, facility conditions and the 

overseeing scientist. Clinical smallpox specimens 

would be less likely to survive long-term storage 

unless they were held in liquid nitrogen. Frozen 

lyophilized smallpox isolates could, on the other 

hand, have an extended shelf life and probably 

remain viable for decades. Several institutes in Iraq 

had nitrogen freezer storage capabilities.

• ISG did learn that as late as 1992, Iraq was assessing the viability of smallpox vaccine it produced 

in the 1980s. A scientist who was involved in the 

production of the smallpox vaccine in the 1980s 

was asked to test samples presumably from that 

stockpile. The vaccine was found nonviable. At that 

time, he recommended that all remaining vials of 

that vaccine be destroyed. He does not know if that 

recommendation was followed. Separately, ISG 

learned from Dr. Hazim ‘Ali that a researcher at the 

Baghdad University Medical College was actually 

producing smallpox vaccine in 1996, for whom and 

for what purpose are unknown.

Baghdad College of Science was identifi ed as one 

possible location for smallpox work prior to OIF. An 

ISG subject matter expert team visited the University 

of Baghdad, College of Sciences on three separate 
31

Biological

occasions and toured the facilities in late May and 

early June 2003. The visit observed generally old, 

poor condition, and sparse laboratory equipment. The 

team inspected a room (room 179) marked “Graduate Studies” which had locks on both doors. The 

room contained a large autoclave. The room had 

two large overhead fume hoods of the type used in 

restaurants to fi lter the air within the room. There 

was one small plastic class I safety cabinet, several 

shaker incubators, a glove box, old bottles of culture 

media. No freezers or liquid nitrogen containers were 

identifi ed.During the course of its investigations, ISG 

inspected the Al Kindi veterinary vaccine facility. This 

facility was similar in function to the one Hazim ‘Ali 

investigated in Irbil in autumn 1990 that produced 

Newcastle and animal pox vaccines.

• ISG inspected the production buildings and 

observed that the equipment appeared to be for the 

expressed purpose of producing Newcastle virus 

vaccine in chicken eggs; however, this dual-use 

equipment was assessed to be easily diverted to produce Variola (smallpox) or other pathogenic viruses 

(see Figure 6).

• ISG also visited the building where animal pox vaccines are produced in tissue culture. Their assessment was that as with the Newcastle vaccine unit, 

the equipment in this building could also be used to 

produce large amounts of smallpox virus in tissue 

culture although all equipment present is consistent 

with the expressed purpose of making animal vaccines.

ISG learned of a television news report that was 

broadcasted on Western television in mid-April 2003 

that reported the CPHL had been looted of highly 

infectious virus such as smallpox, polio and infl uenza. 

ISG visited the latter and interviewed senior researchers who described the incident. Several visits to the 

CPHL and interviews with scientists and researchers 

have not shed further light into the existence of smallpox cultures being stored there. ISG did identify a 

“secret lab” that was operated there, which had beem 

vacated in December 2002. The nature of the research 

in that laboratory was not determined.

Iraqi Retention of Smallpox Cultures (continued)

Figure 6. 1,480-liter double-jacketed steel vessel 

(left) and egg incubator (right).
32

Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever

While Iraqi explanations for why CCHF was not 

considered for the BW program remains unsatisfactory, there is little substantial information to contradict the explanation.

Hazim ‘Ali argued against CCHF being considered 

endemic to Iraq but did not deny that a sample could 

be obtained during the cyclical infection season. 

According to Antoine Sabri Al Bana, Iraq’s leading 

CCHF expert, the virus circulated widely in herd 

animals such as donkeys, sheep and goats.

• Some cases of CCHF occurred in Iraq during 

the time Hazim ‘Ali was studying overseas and 

described an incident involving physicians, who 

unaware of the virus and its symptoms, were 

unprotected whilst treating infected patients. As a 

result, some of the physicians acquired CCHF and 

died. Hazim ‘Ali used this example to illustrate the 

introduction of the virus into Iraq and that it was 

not actually endemic to the country.

• According to Hazim ‘Ali, two researchers from the 

Veterinary Medical College worked together on 

diagnosing and isolating CCHF in the 1970/1980s. 

The duration of the experiment and the extent 

to which testing was conducted using animals, 

remains unknown. Hazim ‘Ali claims not to know 

where exactly the practical isolation of the virus 

occurred because of a lack of suffi cient containment 

to work with the virus and no vaccine was available 

at the time. The work of the two researchers was 

published. Isolation of the fi rst case of CCHF in 

Iraq occurred in 1979.

• In 1996, a CCHF outbreak occurred that resulted 

in over a 100 cases. Most cases were seen at the Al 

Khatib hospital, near Tuwaitha, south of Baghdad. 

The mortality rate even in treated cases approaches 

50 percent.

Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis

(Enterovirus 70)

ISG has investigated, but has found no information to suggest that BW-related research into the 

contagious agent acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis 

(AHCV) occurred after the alleged cessation of the 

Iraqi viral BW program in early 1991. The Enterovirus 70 strain that causes AHCV was introduced to 

Iraq in the 1970s.

• The documented work conducted on isolating 

AHCV was unsuccessful according to Dr. Hazim 

‘Ali. A senior virologist involved in the Iraqi BW 

program attempted to isolate Rotavirus and AHCV 

from clinical isolates. When the source isolated 

AHCV and had evidently obtained cytopathic 

results, the isolate was infected into Hep2 viro cells. 

The results of the test were unsuccessful.

Rotavirus

According to the senior level viral researcher, 

Rotavirus, which causes an acute gastroenteritis, 

was chosen because of a theory at the time that as 

Americans were “more hygienic”, they might be 

more susceptible to infection with rotavirus. Little 

new information has been uncovered by ISG surrounding Rotavirus, the third virus chosen for the 

Iraqi viral BW program.

• Work was done to isolate the virus from clinical 

samples but ISG has no additional information to 

indicate the success of these attempts.

Other R&D Related to BW Development

Biopesticides

ISG judges that, following Desert Storm, in mid1991, Al Hakam shifted its focus from Bacillus 

anthracis production to Bacillus thuringiensis, a 

biopesticide and a simulant for B. anthracis, as a 

mechanism to preserve a key segment of Iraq’s BW 

production base. This shift in focus allowed Iraq the 

opportunity to continue the pursuit of relevant technologies and processes—such as the development of 

an entirely indigenous growth media and the drying 

of biopesticide—that could further achieve its desire 

for self-suffi ciency in BW.

• Multiple sources told ISG that in order for Rihab’s 

former anthrax group to produce Bt, they required 

the assistance of scientists at TABRC who had 
33

Biological

Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)

Bt is a biopesticide that is widely available on the 

international market and therefore, trade restrictions 

aside, it is not immediately apparent why Iraq should 

choose to develop its own production process from 

scratch. ISG assesses that there are many companies that would be willing to supply Iraq with Bt 

and/or sell it a license to produce the material. ISG is 

unable to fi nd any indication that preproject planning work—market considerations, least cost / most 

effective method for Iraq to enter the bio-insecticides 

business—was ever conducted in relation to Bt.

been researching alternatives to chemical pesticides 

like B. thuringiensis since the early 1980s. ISG 

learned from several sources with direct access that 

Al Hakam developed B. thuringiensis production 

to cover past anthrax production and to preserve 

production infrastructure for the future.

• An Iraqi scientist and former head of the anthrax 

program told ISG that from 1992-1995 TABRC 

provided the seed inoculums to Al Hakam for 

industrial-scale production of Bt. However, ISG 

has no information to suggest that TABRC was 

involved in production of B. thuringiensis in quantities larger than the bench-scale amounts required 

for experimental purposes.

ISG judges that the TABRC became the primary 

facility continuing B. thuringiensis research after Al 

Hakam’s destruction in 1996, but ISG lacks evidence that this research was intended as a simulation for B. anthracis research. However, undeclared 

pieces of equipment including fermentors were found 

at TABRC by ISG and an important former B. anthracis production expert was reported to have worked 

routinely at the facility from 2000 to 2003, which 

makes ISG suspicious of the true nature of the work 

done there.

• An ISG exploitation team found undeclared 

fermentation vessels and an underground storage 

area with other dual-use biological production and 

processing equipment at TABRC in October 2003 

(see Figure 7).

• Thamir ‘Abd-al-Rahman, who was declared to the 

UN as involved in Iraq’s B. anthracis BW project, 

worked at the TABRC one day a week beginning 

in 2000 on a SCP project, according to an Iraqi 

microbiologist with direct access, but unknown reliability. Thamir also was reported to have possibly 

helped a B. thuringiensis researcher at the TABRC, 

Jabbar Al Ma’dhihi, with some viability tests on B. 

thuringiensis.

Multiple sources told us the primary mission of the 

TABRC was agricultural science R&D. The majority of TABRC’s activities involved crop improvement and integrated pest management. As part of the 

Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) within the 

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Complex, the facility had 

a mature scientifi c staff with expertise in recombinant 

DNA technology, microbiology, entomology, and 

access to agricultural pathogens, according to an Iraqi 

microbiologist of unknown reliability.

• Dr. Al Ma’dhihi—former TABRC Director— oversaw research into the biopesticide B. thuringiensis

and considered it as a replacement for chemical 

pesticides in Iraq, according to an Iraqi scientist 

and former head of the anthrax program. Under Al 

Ma’dhihi’s direction, TABRC reportedly conducted 

successful research into effi cient small-scale production and drying of B. thuringiensis that could 

potentially be applied to the BW agent, B. anthracis. ISG is uncertain whether informal or formal 

collaboration between TABRC and the Al Hakam 

factory occurred before 1991.

• Some of the research into the genetic modifi cation 

of B. thuringiensis done at TABRC in conjunction 

with the Department of Biotechnology at Saddam 

University (now known as Al Nahrayn University) 

from 1999-2003 used polyethylene glycol protoplast fusion methods, followed by screening, to 

produce a new strain of B. thuringiensis that would 

display high levels of biomass production as well 

as infectivity, according to an Iraqi microbiologist. ISG judges—based on this research—that the 

TABRC had genetic engineering capabilities that 

could be applied to BW agents like anthrax, but have 

found no evidence to date that such work was done.
34

Simulants

Generally, ‘simulants’ are closely related to the BW 

agent that they are substituting for, but lack the pathogenicity of the BW agent in humans. The rationale 

for the use of a simulant is that it can be safely used 

for a variety of purposes such as to accurately assess 

production methods, storage conditions, weaponization parameters, and dispersal techniques. Many 

simulants can also be used for a variety of legitimate 

civilian activities and therefore provide cover stories 

for BW programs.

Single Cell Protein R&D

ISG has found no direct evidence that the post-1995 

work carried out by TABRC into SCP was used to 

cover continuing research into the production of 

BW agents, like what was done at Al Hakam. Testing 

of samples taken during site exploitations at TABRC 

and its SCP production subordinate, Al Hamath, by 

a US coalition BW exploitation team were negative 

for B. anthracis and C. botulinum (see Figure 8). ISG 

assessed that a thorough decontamination procedure 

or, more likely, that no large-scale R&D or production 

of known BW agents occurred at these facilities.

• An Iraqi microbiologist told ISG that the TABRC’s 

SCP academic research began in the early 1990s 

and involved research, experimental testing, and 

pilot plant production. The work also involved 

the development of a process for upgrading the 

nutritional quality of the agricultural residues and 

wastes.

• The Al Hamath facility worked on a project for 

the pilot plant scale production of citric acid using 

Aspergillus niger. The process was abandoned 

when it was discovered that the strain of A. niger

used was unsuitable for use in submerged culture as 

the mycelium suffered damage under the continual 

agitation required for submerged culture. Two 

750l bioreactors from the abandoned citric acid 

production project were set aside for SCP work 

at Al Hamath but only one of the bioreactors was 

functional.

Single Cell Protein

SCP is cell or protein extracts from micro-organisms, 

grown in large quantities for use as protein supplements, for example in animal feeds. SCP production is 

used to alleviate problems of protein scarcity and can 

be used to replace costly conventional sources such 

as soy meal and fi shmeal. The use of agricultural and 

industrial wastes for bioconversion to protein rich 

food and fodder stocks has the additional advantage 

of making the fi nal product cheaper.

Growth Media R&D

ISG judges that beginning in the 1990s Iraq decided 

indigenously to research and produce nutrient 

growth media that could be used to produce multiple strains of bacteria to include B. anthracis, but 

no direct evidence has yet been uncovered that this 

media was used to produce B. anthracis post-1991.

Dr. Rihab described to ISG her BW group’s research 

in developing indigenously produced media to circumvent the effects sanctions imposed on Iraq after 

the 1990 invasion.

• Dr. Al Ma’dhihi was responsible for the development of an indigenously produced media with 

ingredients that did not come under UN scrutiny as 

a result of the sanctions against Iraq. Importantly, 

laboratory notebooks suggest the media was very 

effective in inducing nearly one hundred percent 

sporulation of the B. thuringiensis, a known simulant for the BW agent B. anthracis, with few or no 

additives or intensive monitoring of the fermentation process.

• During January 2004, ISG obtained a laboratory 

notebook dating back to 1989 detailing experiments conducted using Dr. Al Ma’dhihi’s locally 

produced milk byproduct/corn byproduct media and 

the B. thuringiensis variant Kenyae with impressive 

sporulation results. The notebook outlined experiments concerning the effect of different concentrations of the media and additives on sporulation of 

B. thuringiensis. These results were consistent with 

the claims made for the effectiveness of the media. 

One experiment detailed in the notebook showed 

that per 24-48 hours growth of B. thuringiensis

in this locally produced media, there was 100 per 

cent spore growth with a resulting viable count of 

1.2x108

 to 5.6x108 per milliliter.
35

Biological

Figure 7. Example of dual-use biological processing equipment found at TABRC (spray dryer).

Figure 8. Al Hamath facility.
36

• Dr. Al Ma’dhihi’s media was essential to a possible 

Iraqi BW program as the media was made up of the 

simple local ingredients, which are both by-products of other food production processes. The milk 

byproduct, in particular, is a waste product. At Al 

Hakam, the corn byproduct was made from cornstarch produced at the Al Hashimiyah State Factory 

in Al Hillah near Babylon. The milk byproduct was 

obtained from an unnamed dairy at Abu Ghurayb. 

Besides being indigenous and cheap it was impossible to monitor or account as part of a UN verifi cation process.

• This locally produced media were utilized in the B. 

thuringiensis production process at Al Hakam and 

with growth requirements of B. thuringiensis being 

very close to B. anthracis, the whey/CSL media 

could potentially have been used at Al Hakam to 

produce B. anthracis. Dr. Rihab and Thamir ‘Abdal-Rahman, the director of the B. anthracis project 

at Al Hakam, have both stated in interviews to ISG 

that they are unaware of any tests on growing B. 

anthracis in the milk and corn byproduct media. 

This is an odd statement because both individuals co-authored a document that evaluated various 

growth media for growing Bacillus species including B. anthracis on such a commercially available 

media.

• Thamir goes further to state that there was no 

reason to replace the modifi ed G medium declared 

as used in the anthrax programs as it was reliable, 

produced high sporulation rates and was made from 

simple salts commercially available within Iraq, and 

therefore there was no need to hide procurement 

signatures. However, Modifi ed G medium (MGM) 

cannot be used alone to grow B. anthracis spores. 

MGM requires that the anthrax organism be grown 

in a very enriched medium fi rst and that relative 

large inoculums be used in the last step of fermentation that uses modifi ed G medium. Thus using 

an alternative to the enriched medium and MGM 

would have a material advantage to minimize sanctions scrutiny. Furthermore, at the time of production of B. thuringiensis at Al Hakam, Iraq was 

under increasing scrutiny on the material balance of 

growth media from UNSCOM.

Dr. Rihab admitted to ISG that use of such a locally 

developed milk and corn byproduct B. thuringiensis

media would permit evading monitoring of media to 

track fermentation activity.

• An anthrax expert’s assessment was that it was 

highly probable that this media would achieve similar rates of sporulation in anthrax production.

Dr. Rihab described to ISG her BW group’s research 

in developing indigenously produced media to circumvent the effects sanctions imposed on Iraq after 

the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

• Dr. ‘Ali Shihab did media work for an unspecifi ed 

microbe. Shihab was the lead scientist for Clostridium perfringens development. ISG assesses that 

he was probably working on an alternative growth 

media for that organism.

• Nasr Al Hindawi worked on alternative media for 

Brucella that was a candidate BW agent undergoing 

basic research in the period coinciding with Desert 

Storm.

• After 1992, Baghdad University worked on plants 

as a source of bacteria growth media; the plant 

media was apparently suitable for pathogen growth, 

and Dr. Rihab had expressed her concern that it 

might attract the attention of UNSCOM.

• Around June 2002, Dr. Al Ma’dhihi produced 

about fi ve vials of B. thuringiensis formulated with 

bentonite and asked Thamir, who was working with 

Dr. Al Ma’dhihi twice a week at TABRC, for an 

assessment of their viability by re-growing them 

in a small volume shake fl ask culture. One of Dr. 

Al Ma’dhihi’s MSc students was working on this 

organism, although no other specifi c reason for 

this work was given. Thamir successfully cultured 

approximately two of the samples.
37

Biological

Drying Process/Carrier/Particle Size

Multiple sources have told ISG that the B. thuringiensis research and production at Al Hakam from 

1991 to 1996 was done to provide cover for the 

equipment and capability at this facility, yet ISG 

has not been provided with a good explanation as 

to why an advanced capability to dry agents in a 

particle size too small for effi cient biopesticide use 

was established. An UNMOVIC document from 

March 2003 on Iraq’s Unresolved Disarmament 

Issues says that the particle size would have had little 

use in agriculture and that UNSCOM determined the 

B. thuringiensis strain used did not produce biopesticidal proteins, so it would not have had any utility 

as a biopesticide. ISG judges that this work advanced 

Iraq’s expertise and knowledge in large-scale drying 

of B. anthracis even if the agent itself was not produced and dried.

• Iraq successfully dried B. thuringiensis utilizing 

bentonite as a carrier and drying agent. According 

to a source, only one grade of bentonite was available in Iraq and particle size was dictated by this. 

The bentonite was supplied through the Ministry 

of Industry and Minerals (MIM) mining company. 

Talc was also successfully tested as a carrying agent 

but was determined to be too expensive for production. Acetone was experimented with at Al Hakam 

as a drying agent, but was found to be too expensive for large-scale production.

• According to a source, at Al Hakam the dried 

B. thuringiensis was crushed into 1-10μm sized 

particles but ISG has found no information on 

who decided on this particle size. The same source 

claimed that the farmers using the B. thuringiensis 

from Al Hakam did not like the size of the particles 

since it made direct dusting onto plants diffi cult. Al 

Hakam had plans to enlarge the particles to granular 

size but they had not completed this work when the 

facility was destroyed in 1996.

Information surrounding the intended application 

of B. thuringiensis remains contradictory with no 

consensus on whether it was to be applied wet or dry. 

A senior researcher involved in the BW program has 

indicated that the B. thuringiensis was intended for 

use against corn borers as a wet or dry application 

by farmers. Sources are generally consistent in their 

assertion that the B. thuringiensis was never intended 

or tested for aerial application. Although the information available suggests Iraq successfully dried B. 

thuringiensis and produced the 1-10μm particle size 

applicable for effi cient BW agent dissemination, 

ISG has found no information that Iraq actually used 

the same process to produce weaponizable dried B. 

anthracis.
38

Production Capability

ISG judges that between 1991 and 1996 Iraq possessed an expanding BW agent production capability. From 1996 to OIF, Iraq still possessed small but 

signifi cant dual-use facilities capable of conversion 

to small-scale BW agent production. ISG has found 

no evidence that Iraq used this capability for BW 

production.

• Iraq maintained—and tried to improve where possible—a smaller, but capable, “legitimate” fermentation capability at agricultural and educational 

sites that could have been used to produce small but 

signifi cant quantities of BW agent. ISG, however, 

uncovered no information that Baghdad did so.

• Samarra Drug Industries, which primarily formulated drugs, had numerous jacketed process tanks, 

ranging in capacity from 100 to 10,000 liters, 

together with ancillary equipment such as fi lter 

presses, autoclaves, and bio-saftey cabinets.

• ISG cannot disprove the existence of Iraqi transportable fermentations systems that could have 

been used for BW. That said, no evidence has 

been found to date that there were such systems. 

ISG judges that the two mobile trailers found near 

Mosul and Irbil were not for BW production (see 

the accompanying annexes on mobile production 

facilities for further information).

Iraq relied heavily on imported equipment and 

supplies to conduct its BW program, was dependent upon dual-use civilian facilities to produce 

BW agent, and took steps to mitigate the impact of 

sanctions on its ability to pursue potential BW agent 

production.

Iraq relied on equipment that had been imported for 

civilian purposes for the production of BW agent 

prior to the fi rst Gulf war, and demonstrated the 

ability to quickly adapt civilian facilities to BW 

agent production. This equipment was relocated to 

a purpose-built BW facility, Al Hakam, where the 

production of botulinum toxin was started in 1988. 

The production of anthrax spores and C. perfringens 

(the causative agent of gas gangrene) followed later. 

Civilian facilities were requisitioned in 1990 for the 

production of afl atoxin (the Agriculture and Water 

Resources Center, Al Fudaliyah) and for the production of additional quantities of botulinum toxin and 

possibly anthrax (the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant, Al Dawrah). After the war these facilities 

reverted back to their former use, and Al Hakam was 

disguised as a SCP (yeast) and a Bacillus thuringiensis (biopesticide) production plant.

• Prior to the construction of Al Hakam, alternative 

locations and options were considered by the Iraqi 

authorities. This included the possibility of having 

mobile production facilities. Pre-OIF intelligence 

reports indicated that Iraq had such facilities.

Baghdad’s BW production centered on a number of 

important fi xed facilities. The facility at Al Hakam 

was perhaps the most important, but Iraq pursued 

BW in a range of locations.

Iraq initiated production of BW agents (for fi eld tests) 

at Al Salman in 1987 using seven laboratory fermentors (7- and 14-liter vessels) and two small production fermentors. Regarding the two small production 

fermentors, one was acquired in 1987 from the At 

Taji single cell protein (SCP) project (300 liter) and 

the other was a 150-liter fermentor purchased while 

the program was at Al Muthanna. A medium capacity 

spray dryer also was transferred from the At Taji SCP 

Plant to the BW program in 1987.

After the Al Hakam facility (northern production 

area) became functional in 1988, the 300 liter and 150 

liter fermentors were transferred to the new facility. 

Additionally, a larger scale production capability was 

acquired by moving the Clostridial vaccine production line from Al Kindi Veterinary Research Facility 

(later named the Veterinary Vaccine and Drug Production Facility [VVDP]) to Al Hakam. This collection 

of fermentors and tanks—reported by the supplier to 

be fermentors—consisted of two 1,850-liter fermentors, one 1850-liter tank, and six 1480-liter “tanks” 

and eight 800-liter mobile “tanks.” The 1,850-liter 

fermentors and six 1,480-liter “tanks” were all used 

in production of BW agents. Iraq asserted the mobile 
39

Biological

tank was used only for storage and transport of bulk 

agent. A second spray dryer that could produce small 

particles—one of two air-freighted from a supplier to 

Baghdad in 1989—was located at Al Hakam at the 

time of its fi rst UN inspection in September 1991.

In 1990, additional production capability was 

acquired for the BW program with the addition of Al 

Safa’ah (Agriculture and Water Resources Center at 

Fudaliyah) and Al Manal (Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth 

Disease Virus (FMDV)) facilities to the BW program. 

Al Safa’ah possessed a sizeable fermentation line 

consisting of several 400-liter fermentors and associated other tanks. Additionally, the facility had several 

incubators including one walk-in incubator, which 

allowed for some creative stacking of glass fl asks said 

to be used for afl atoxin production. Al Manal had 

valuable high containment capacity for R&D and contained: one 125-liter mobile tank; one 141-liter and 

one 236-liter seed fermentors one 1,425-liter and two 

2,100-liter fermentors; two 2,550-liter mobile tanks; 

two 2,600-liter, two 2950-liter, and two 3,500-liter 

fermentors. Of these, assortments of 2,600-liter and 

3,500-liter fermentors were used to provide a capacity 

for 1,200 liters (10X concentrated) of agent per batch 

(not all of the available capacities were said by Iraq to 

be used in this production process) (see Figure 9).

Additionally, other sites had production capability of a more limited scale, e.g. Al Kindi Veterinary 

Research Laboratories (Al Kindi VVDP facility) and 

Al ‘Amiriyah Serum Vaccine Institute (ASVI), or 

capability that would require modifi cation on a limited scale, e.g. Samarra Drug Industries. The Al Kindi 

VVDP facility retained one 1,850-liter tank—damaged during Desert Storm, when the other tanks and 

fermentors were transferred to Al Hakam. Production 

for viruses and bacteria employing glass fl asks and 

embryonated eggs were less effi cient but ample.

• Iraq declared work on larger-scale fermentation 

systems for SCP, and on a capability to produce 

large-scale quantities of a commercial biopesticide in the fi rst UNSCOM inspections in the years 

immediately following the 1991 Gulf war. Many 

former offi cials told ISG that Iraq aggressively 

worked from 1992 to 1995 at Al Hakam to improve 

the production and processing of SCP and the 

biopesticide B. thuringiensis in an attempt to save 

the facility from being destroyed by UNSCOM.

From 1991 to 1996, Iraq continued to expand its 

dual-use production capability at Al Hakam—until 

the facility and equipment were destroyed under 

UNSCOM supervision in May-June 1996. Fermentors and associated equipment were transferred from 

Al Safa’ah to Al Hakam. Indigenously produced 

fermentors, 2.5 cubic meters and 5 cubic meters, were 

installed in the southern production area. These were 

assessed by international experts as “not fancy but 

functional” although Iraq has stated to ISG that the 

5 cubic meter fermentors were not functional due to 

propeller shaft problems. Large physical plants were 

constructed in anticipation of acquiring two 50 cubic 

meter turnkey fermentation systems. These were not 

delivered.

To avoid sanctions imposed after Iraq’s invasion 

of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a program to develop the 

in-house manufacture of media and media components suitable for the growth of bacterial BW 

agents, see Section on R&D. ISG site exploitations 

have revealed sites with the potential to undertake 

growth media production.

• The large-scale production of bacterial BW agents 

is a multi-stage process that requires a growth 

medium suitable for the selected organism together 

with a ‘train’ of specialty, and fermentation 

equipment. Because of sanctions and UNSCOM 

inspections, beginning in 1990 Iraq had diffi culty 

obtaining an external supply of growth media for 

large-scale production of BW agent. By 1992, 

UN inspections, mandatory declarations and UN 

monitoring of growth media importation and use 

created further impediments for any Iraqi biological production effort. Rihab apparently began an 

effort in 1990 fi rst with some of her BW researchers, and then later with at least one scientist at the 

IAEC TABRC, to develop bacterial growth media 

from indigenous sources. Rihab stated that when 

the effort was initiated in 1990, the intent was to 

circumvent sanctions placed on Iraq. ISG does 

not have evidence that this effort was originally 

intended to enable clandestine production of BW 

agents, but nevertheless provided some capability in 

this regard.
40

The production capabilities at Tuwaitha continued 

to expand during this period. The FMDV Plant at Al 

Dawrah remained functional until it was partially disabled under UN supervision in 1996; selected fermentors and tanks—identifi ed as used in botulinum toxin 

production in 1990—were removed from the facility 

and destroyed at Al Hakam in 1996.

Other facilities at Al Kindi VVDP Facility and ASVI 

recovered and made modest improvement in production capability as did Samarra Drug Industries (SDI). 

During this time frame two new organizations—Al 

Razi Institute and Ibn-al-Baytar—were established 

in converted facilities. These organizations obtained 

highly qualifi ed expertise, some of which were 

associated with the Iraqi BW program including Dr. 

Hazim ‘Ali, who headed Iraq’s viral BW effort and 

was named Director of Al Razi Institute.

Beyond its important fi xed facilities, Iraq also possessed important relocatable assets associated with 

its BW production efforts. The destruction in MayJune 1996 of the facilities and equipment involved 

in Iraq’s BW program, including the equipment that 

had been moved or installed at Al Hakam post 1991, 

signifi cantly altered Iraq’s dual-use capability, but 

did not eliminate all such capability.

At the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant, one 2,600-liter, two 

3,500-liter, and one 236-liter fermentor as well as 

one 2,550-liter mobile tank were not destroyed under 

UN supervision in June 1996. These fermentors and 

tanks were not identifi ed in 1995/96 by UNSCOM 

as involved in Iraq’s BW program. However, DNA 

evidence of B. anthracis was found in both 2,550-liter 

tanks and a 141-liter fermentor in 1996. All of these 

fermentors and tanks could be transferred from the 

FMDV facility to another site or sites within a few 

weeks after the decision to do so. ISG assesses these 

as relocatable production assets.

In 1990, Iraq produced at least 39—possibly as many 

as 70—1,000-liter mobile tanks that could be readily converted into fermentors. Additionally, 8 mobile 

800-liter tanks/fermentors were transferred from Al 

Kindi Vet Vaccine Facility to Al Hakam in 1987/88. 

Of the combined 1,000-liter and 800-liter mobile 

tanks, only 24 were cited as destroyed by Iraq. Evidence of such destruction of 24 units was provided 

to UNSCOM and stored at the UN Headquarters in 

the Canal Hotel. Thus, 23 remained after the alleged 

unilateral destruction of BW weapons and agents by 

Iraq in 1991. ISG has determined that two more tanks 

were destroyed at Al ‘Aziziyah. Of those remaining, 

four are 800-liter imported tanks/fermentors.

• Rihab stated that Iraq was able to produce one 

cubic meter model fermentors “with bad wheels”. 

Documentary evidence dated September 2000 

recovered by ISG indicates that Iraq converted one 

cubic meter storage tanks into fermentors that are 

assessed to have been indigenously fabricated for 

Al Hakam under Rihab’s supervision. These storage 

tanks have been an unresolved issue for the UN. 

Rihab denied receiving mobile tanks/fermentors 

while at Al Hakam in 1994.

• ISG obtained a document that indicated 10 one 

cubic meter tanks were connected prior to 2000 to 

form a 10 cubic meter fermentation plant (location 

unknown). Another document indicates the delivery 

of an additional 13-14 such tanks in 1993.

A spray dryer—the second of two air freighted into 

Baghdad in 1989, model number 0142 was located in 

1997 by UNSCOM in a warehouse in northern Iraq, 

the fi rst model 0141 was at Al Hakam in 1991 and 

was destroyed in 1996. Before the two weeks it took 

to assemble a sampling team, Iraq again relocated the 

dryer, completely disassembled it to cleanse and sterilize it and then reassembled it. This dryer was under 

monitoring until 15 December 1998 by UNSCOM. Its 

present whereabouts is unknown.

ISG judges that after 1996, Iraq maintained—and 

tried to improve where possible—a smaller, but 

capable, “legitimate” fermentation capability at 

agricultural and educational sites that could have 

been used to produce smaller, yet signifi cant quantities of BW agent, but ISG has found no direct 

evidence to substantiate this possibility.
41

Biological

Figure 9. Sign at the entrance to FMDV “Almanai” 

(top left), vial of vaccine dating from 19 October 1983 

(top center), and a main production fermentor (top right).

Top plate of 3,500-liter bio-reactor (bottom left), and

236-liter bio-reactor (bottom right).
42

Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF

ISG judges that a break-out production capability existed at one site, the State Company for 

Drug Industries and Medical Appliances, SDI, at 

Samarra. Since Iraq could relocate production 

assets such as fermentors, other sites with basic 

utilities could also be converted for break-out. A full 

program to include R&D and production or even 

just large scale production would require months 

rather than weeks to re-initiate in a break-out context.

A break-out of large-scale proportion would require 

all three key production elements; fermentor capacity, 

media capacity, and technical expertise. A break-out 

capability must also take into consideration the scale 

and scope of the program being considered. Modest 

or small-scale break-outs would be easier and require 

less time after a decision to do so was made. For a 

larger scale and scope such as Iraq possessed in 1990 

would require more equipment, larger supply source, 

more personnel and a longer time period for effective start-up. Iraq, having had achieved a maturing 

program, had a core group of experienced personnel; 

a better start than existed in 1985. Personnel are movable assets as is growth media. While sanctions and 

inspections may be a hindrance to an ample supply 

of media, it would not have been a show stopper. Iraq 

developed a milk and corn byproduct media that is 

judged to be adequate for the production of anthrax 

spores, albeit of a reduced production effi ciency. 

Thus, the equipment for the scale and scope of a program becomes the critical factor to evaluate a breakout capability.

ISG assesses the SDI to have the fi xed equipment 

that could be altered for producing certian BW agents 

within four to fi ve weeks after the decision to do so, 

including utilities and equipment, not all of which had 

been declared to the UN. However, such conversion 

would not be trivial (see Figure 10).

ISG judges the movable assets at the Al Dawrah 

FMDV Plant could provide the core of an alternative 

break-out capability at any other suitable site in Iraq, 

perhaps within 2 to 3 weeks after the decision to do 

so. The 1 cubic meter tanks or fermentors presently 

unaccounted for are other important assets that, if 

indeed still exist, could, when combined with the Al 

Dawrah FMDV assets, exceed the capacity Iraq possessed in 1990. In this case media and personnel are 

also movable assets.

• Iraq had shown the ability to move fermentor 

assets pre-1990 era. Iraq had also shown its ability 

to utilize small cadres of skilled personnel to lead 

clusters of less skilled personnel in the production 

process.

• Iraq gained additional production and development 

know-how during the post-1991 era.

• Iraq has developed the capacity to produce indigenously, substitute media for the production of some 

agents, such as corn and milk byproduct media for 

anthrax spores.

ISG judges that Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) would 

likely be the agent of choice for breakout production.

• It represented the single strategic BW agent that 

Iraq had in its historical arsenal.

• Iraq has a previous track record in large-scale 

growth, processing, testing and weaponization of 

anthrax spores.

• Corn byproduct medium, indigenously manufactured for Bt production, would also be suitable for 

the growth of B. anthracis.

Mobile Assets

Prior to OIF, a key source reported that Iraq had 

developed a mobile BW capability designed to evade 

UN inspectors and to provide Baghdad the ability to 

produce BW agents for offensive purposes 

(see Figure 11). According to the US Intelligence 

Community, this reporting was augmented by reports 

from at least three additional sources who indicated 

a mobile BW or fermentation capability existed in 

Iraq. The reported development of a mobile BW agent 

production capability was a central element in the 

pre-war assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs and, as 

a result, has been one of the key issues addressed by 

ISG.
43

Biological

Two 1,000-liter, stirred, jacketed vessels suitable 

for use as fermentors for the growth of bacterial 

BW agents.

Plate fi lter press.

Autoclave with control panel.

Production hall with tiered vessels of Soviet origin 

not declared to the UN.

Figure 10. Examples of equipment found at SDI

that could be diverted to BW purposes.

 High grade water production plant.
44

Figure 11. Truck-mounted BW production unitbased on source reporting.

Regarding the mobile capability, ISG’s BW team has 

focused primarily on following leads from the key 

source and the others with indirect or direct access to 

Iraq’s BW activities to bring us closer to an assessment as to whether Iraq did indeed pursue an undeclared mobile BW agent production capability. The 

ISG effort consisted of debriefi ng over sixty individuals and exploiting numerous sites identifi ed as related 

to a transportable BW production effort. However, 

ISG acknowledges that much of the site exploitation effort was hampered by Iraqi post-OIF activities 

such as turnover of employees and looting. Based 

on information collected by ISG, the key source was 

determined to be unreliable.

• Debriefi ngs and site visits have uncovered information that differs with pre-OIF reporting, including 

denials of the existence of the program from personnel allegedly involved. ISG has exhausted many 

leads and exploited many sites reportedly pertaining 

to Iraq’s alleged mobile BW agent production capability and have obtained no additional evidence to 

corroborate the claim of the existence of a mobile 

BW program. As for other individuals that alleged 

the existence of a mobile BW capability, ISG has 

not been able to corroborate this reporting and 

believe that these individuals are outside of Iraq.

ISG cannot disprove the existence of Iraqi transportable fermentation systems that could have been used 

for BW, but ISG uncovered no evidence that there 

were such systems. A report covering the detailed 

investigations of ISG is attached as Annex 3.

As part of its investigation into a possible Iraqi 

mobile BW agent production program, two mobile 

trailers that were recovered near Irbil and Mosul in 

2003 have been examined by ISG. These trailers had 

tanks or suspected fermentors on board and were 

initially suspected to be part of a mobile BW agent 

production program. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers 

almost certainly designed and built the equipment 

exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. ISG 

judges that it is impractical to use the equipment for 

the production and weaponization of BW agent, and 

cannot therefore be part of any BW program. A report 

covering the detailed investigation of the trailers by 

ISG, is attached as Annex 4.

• ISG has found no evidence to support the view that 

the trailers were used, or intended to be used, for 

the production of BW agents, or the fi lling of BW 

weapons.

• The design of the equipment makes it unsuitable for 

the production of BW agent and impractical as part 

of a BW weapons production system.

• The information gathered, and the assessment of the 

equipment on the trailers, are consistent with the 

theory that Iraq developed the trailers for hydrogen 

gas production.

These fi ndings refl ect the assessment solely of the two 

specifi c mobile units that were located, and do not 

necessarily mean that such a capability or intent did 

not exist.
45

Biological

Weaponization

Between the late 1980s and the start of Desert Storm 

in 1991, Iraq attempted to develop a range of systems for the dispersion of BW agent. In the dash to 

fi eld viable BW weapons the workers in the program 

adapted robust bombs capable of mounting on many 

types of aircraft and warheads, including the Al 

Husayn missile. They also worked furiously to ready 

an aircraft spray system.

• The scientists and engineers conducted weapons 

trials over some three years with both simulants and 

BW agents, on occasion using living animals as 

targets. Delivery systems tested included a 

helicopter-borne spray system, aerial bombs, 

artillery shells, multi-barrel rocket launchers, longrange missile warheads and an aircraft mounting of 

an adapted auxiliary fuel tank.

• In the haste to prepare for the 1991 confl ict, 

systems tried and tested with CW agents were 

preferred; the R-400 aerial bomb and the Al Husayn 

warhead, charged with anthrax, botulinum toxin 

and afl atoxin. Additionally, engineers at 

Al Muthanna rushed the auxiliary fuel tank, 

modifi ed into a spray system, of the Mirage F1 

aircraft into service (see Figure 12).

• Prior to Desert Storm, Iraq had dedicated 

complimentary programs to develop spray technology that could effectively disseminate either 

CW or BW agents. These spray dispersal systems 

were intended for use in conjunction with various 

developmental unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 

programs. Initial testing was quickly beginning to 

show progress by the time of Desert Storm. Since 

that time however, while their desire for these 

systems remained, their developmental work shifted 

focus. Due to the attention of the UNSCOM 

inspectors, the developmental effort shifted away 

from the more controversial spray technologies 

toward completing the longer range UAV goals.

ISG judges—with important reservations—that the 

former Regime clandestinely destroyed almost all of 

Iraq’s biological WMD and long-range missiles in 

1991. Numerous interviews with high-ranking Iraqi 

political fi gures, WMD scientists, and military and 

security offi cers indicate that after a brief period of 

concealment in 1991, Iraqi leaders decided to destroy 

Iraq’s undeclared weapons stockpile in secret.

• Shortly after the passage of Security Council 

Resolution 687 in early April 1991, Iraqi leaders 

also decided to erase all traces of the offensive BW 

program.

• By the autumn of 1991, Iraq probably accomplished 

both the destruction of the weapons stockpile and 

surviving evidence of the BW program.

• Interviews conducted by ISG have produced a 

reasonably coherent picture of this unilateral 

destruction, with few confl icting details, although 

important questions about the disposition of bulk 

BW agent and bacterial reference strains remain.

• ISG judges that the former Regime destroyed most 

of its hidden stockpile of BW weapons. A few 

pre-1991 weapons probably either escaped destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. It is 

thus possible that a few more will be found in the 

months and years ahead.

ISG bases its reservations on the following factors:

• The security situation in Iraq has limited the 

physical verifi cation of Iraq’s unilateral destruction 

claims—by excavating and counting weapon fragments, for example.

• Many of the offi cials interviewed by ISG had 

previously lied–or told half-truths–to UNSCOM, 

and they may have lied to ISG as well, though ISG 

assesses that most were being open and truthful.

• The continuing exploitation of Iraqi documents may 

produce evidence that contradicts the assertions of 

the Iraqi offi cials.

• The efforts of the Iraqi Interim Government and 

Coalition forces may yet result in the discovery 

of unacknowledged WMD stockpiles left by the 

former Regime, though ISG judges this to be very 

unlikely.

ISG has not discovered any evidence that Iraq has 

conducted research or trials dedicated to the dispersion of BW agents since declaring its offensive program in 1995. Iraq pursued some delivery systems 

projects until OIF that could have provided some 

BW utility and whose origins lay in the development 

of BW and CW dispersion systems.
46

Al-Aziziyah: R-400 bomb fragments.

Al-Asad: drop tanks (Russian).

Al-Asad: new Mirage FI drop tank (France).

Figure 12. Examples of possible BW delivery systems.

• Iraq continued to develop delivery platforms 

for small payload weapons up to OIF. ISG has 

not identifi ed any specifi c payloads for these 

systems. By their nature, these platforms were 

expensive and limited in number. They would 

have far greater utility for special weapons, such 

as BW or CW agent or radiological material, 

rather than conventional warheads. The Delivery 

Systems Team has reported on UAVs that operate 

autonomously and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) 

that were operated from a ground station. The L29 RPV was the latest development of a concept 

that commenced in the Technical Research Center 

(TRC), the home of Iraq’s BW program in the late 

1980s. After the L-29, Iraq continued to work on 

the development of UAVs and RPVs, the Al Quds 

being one example.

• Although the Iraqis made signifi cant initial progress 

in their spray dissemination programs, disregarding 

the defi nite adverse impact in their research from 

Desert Storm, they were still signifi cantly short of 

the target goal. Perfecting just the sprayer technology—such as optimizing tank pressures, nozzle 

designs for droplet size and concentrations, together 

with determining operational fl ight envelopes—for 
47

Biological

use with either a chemical or a BW mission in mind 

was still years from fruition. The aircraft or UAV 

carrier platforms also were far from being completed. However, the “know-how” and the same 

“experts” still existed and the technology necessary 

is largely duplicative with agricultural uses. Therefore, it was potentially just a matter of iterative 

analysis and experimentation to achieve a capable 

CBW spray dissemination system.

Attempts at BW Weaponization

In common with much else in Iraq’s BW program, 

progress was steady and planned, except when the 

exigencies of impending war forced a convulsive 

change of pace and direction. Thus, having toxicological and production aspects in hand, some scientists 

and engineers turned their attention to weaponization. 

Starting with small-scale animal tests using small 

quantities of agent dispersed using a detonator in a 

confi ned space they progressed, step by step, toward 

full-scale weapons trials using viable BW agent. Dr. 

Rihab and her team, assisted by MIC consultants, 

evaluated many types of weapon. The initial trials 

were modest and used a BW agent simulant. Next, 

individual weapons charged with viable BW agent 

were fi red statically. Eventually, trials used salvoes of 

rockets at their operating range. The rationale for the 

choice of weapon types and agents is a matter that, 

even now, Iraqis are reluctant to talk about. Al Muthanna organized the trials and advised on the weapons 

technology. As a result, the thinking appears to have 

followed CW lines. Until the imposed requirement to 

weaponize at full speed in 1990, the latter fi eld trials 

aimed at amassing data for the delivery of anthrax. 

This may have been an attempt to provide a means of 

denying ground in front of an invading enemy, and 

would parallel the use of CW agents such as mustard. 

Following the instruction from Husayn Kamil these 

trials stopped and efforts switched to longer range 

delivery systems such as aircraft bombs and sprayers 

and ballistic missiles.

Aerial Bombs. Dr. Al Hindawi and Dr. Rihab state 

that their fi rst weapons-related fi eld trial consisted of 

the explosive detonation of two cylinders representing 

munitions containing a simulant. A trial using an Iraqi 

manufactured LD-250 aerial bomb charged with botulinum toxin followed in March 1988, using animals 

on a grid as a target. They reported repeating this trial 

later the same month.

‘Zubaydi’ Helicopter Spray Device. As early as 1987 

under the auspices of the residual Al Hasan BW program at Al Salman, Iraq started efforts to develop BW 

aerosol dissemination systems. Dr. Tariq Zubaydi, a 

university professor interested in “detecting bacterial 

organisms in the air,” coordinated these tests. He had 

proposed reverse engineering a nebulizer system. In 

time, his work led to developing better spray systems 

in support of his research. TRC was keen to exploit 

his research for BW purposes. The fi rst known fi eld 

test occurred in July 1988 at Khan Bani Sa’ad. These 

early tests involved rotary sprayers mounted on a 

helicopter.

Artillery Shells. According to one of the scientists 

involved in TRC’s Ricin program, Dr. Lu’ay Qasim, 

Al Muthanna technicians detonated four 155 mm 

artillery shells fi lled with the agent in a ground test at 

Jurf as Sakhr. 

122 mm Multi-barrel Rockets. In the following year, 

1989, the TRC team, assisted by Al Muthanna, was 

investigating the dispersion achieved by individual 

rounds and salvoes from 122 mm multi-barrel rocket 

launcher systems. Weapons were fi lled with Botulinum toxin, afl atoxin, wheat cover smut spores, and 

simulants.

Fixed-Wing Aircraft Spray Systems. The “Thual-Fiqar” project started in November 1990, soon 

after the publication of an Israeli newspaper article 

described how an aircraft with a biological weapon 

could kill the majority of a target population under 

favorable conditions. Husayn Kamil ordered Al Muthanna to develop a capability to disseminate a BW 

agent from an aircraft. As a result, two independent 

working groups were established; one group consisted 

of experts from Al Muthanna, the Technical Research 

Center (TRC) and the Iraqi Air Force, while the 

other group was restricted to the Military Research 

and Development Center (MRDC) at Baghdad’s Al 

Rashid Airfi eld. These projects may have their origins 

in CW rather than BW. In a letter dated 10 December 

1990, Gen. Fa’iz Shahin, DG of Al Muthanna, writing 

to Husayn Kamil, referred to “successful tests of spraying mustard gas by planes which proved to be very 

effective.” This may account for the speed with which 

Al Muthanna was able to advance with this task.
48

• Mirage F1 Auxiliary Fuel Tank Spray System. The 

Al Muthanna group worked on modifying Mirage 

F1 auxiliary fuel tanks to disperse the BW agent. 

The fi rst tank modifi ed contained an electric fuel 

valve adapted to feed agent through a crude venturi outlet. This tank was installed on a Mirage F1 

and one fi eld test was performed at Abu ‘Ubaydi 

Airfi eld near Al Kut. This unsuccessful test led to 

more tanks being modifi ed for testing by adding 

two more valves and outlets and strengthening the 

structure of the tank. Various combinations of water 

with other additives were tested with differing 

degrees of success. It eventually was determined 

that under proper circumstances (correct combinations of additives and fl ight conditions), acceptable 

results were achieved (i.e., the liquid dispensed 

was deposited on the ground in the testing areas 

as planned). However, when simulated BW agents 

were then tested, the results were unsatisfactory.

• MiG-21 RPV. A senior NMD offi cial recently 

reported on his pre-OIF research of the 1990-91 

MiG-21 RPV development project and the associated Mirage F-1 CBW spray tank project, as well 

as the later L-29 RPV project. The purpose of the 

research was to prepare the NMD to respond to 

urgent requirements from UNMOVIC. The NMD 

offi cial said his investigation confi rmed that the 

MiG-21 RPV had been intended for a mission to 

deliver CBW agents and that the Mirage F-1 project 

was a related effort to develop an aircraft-mounted 

CBW spray tank. While the MiG-21 RPV effort 

failed, the Mirage F-1 spray tank development, on 

the other hand, was considered successful. While 

varying in some minor details concerning the 

timing of some test events, this NMD offi cial essentially corroborates the UNSCOM report.

The Gulf War

By the start of the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq had produced 

signifi cant quantities of BW agents. The weaponization of these agents demonstrated a rudimentary 

understanding of BW weapons and agent dissemination. Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Samarra’i, the Al 

Muthanna offi cial who headed the effort to weaponize 

CBW agents, described this aspect of the BW program as ‘immature’. Iraq had no operational experience with these agents or BW weapons, had limited 

delivery systems to employ them, and had no practiced employment doctrine. Dr. Bilal’s philosophy 

was to adapt chemical weapons for BW agent use. 

Though Iraq had made initial efforts toward the development of more advanced aerosolization technologies, senior BW managers dismissed this approach in 

favor of tried and tested CW systems.

Based on an apparent press article, Husayn Kamil 

and his Deputy ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi 

directed a compartmented program to develop aircraft 

spray tanks and modify a MiG-21 jet aircraft into a 

remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). Iraq conducted several successful fi eld trials using a modifi ed 1,100-liter 

fuel tank mounted on aircraft. The UAV effort failed 

to reach an operational developmental prototype prior 

to 1991.

ISG recovered documents that provided insight 

into Iraq’s perceived success in BW weaponization. 

According to ‘Amir Al Sa’adi, who coincidentally 

evaluated Dr. Rihab’s professional work, he annotated 

her award nomination package in 2000 and cited the 

conventional explosive dissemination munitions, 

aerial bomb, artillery, and rockets as inactive. He 

judged efforts for spray system as not reaching weaponization with the research as incomplete.
49

Biological

Concealment And Destruction of 

Biological Weapons

Iraq’s Initial WMD Concealment Effort

UNSCR 687, approved on 3 April 1991, required 

Iraq to disclose fully its weapons’ programs and 

stockpiles, yet the former Regime decided later that 

month only to declare partially their programs and 

weapons.

• In the week following the passage of UNSCR 687, 

MIC Senior Deputy Dr. ‘Amir Al Sa’adi convened 

a meeting of all the senior managers from the missile, chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons 

programs. These program heads brought with them 

inventories of weapons, missiles, launchers, accessory equipment, bulk agents, raw materials, and 

production machinery, along with recommendations 

of what to declare and what to hide.

Al Sa’adi and the program heads wrote a paper 

detailing a series of options for Iraq’s response to the 

resolution. These options, according to Al Sa’adi, 

included:

• Declaring everything and actively cooperating with 

inspectors.

• Declaring all sites and weapons, saying nothing 

about activities under development such as the 

nuclear program, and not volunteering information.

• Hiding everything. They based this option on 

the Coalition’s claim that it destroyed everything 

during the war.

• A fourth option may have called for Iraq to make a 

simple declaration of a few lines and to let the UN 

respond with clarifi cation of what was required.

• One or two of the options contained a provision 

that Iraq should unilaterally destroy the biological 

program. Another option called for Iraq to declare 

only BW research and development work.

Al Sa’adi submitted the options to Husayn Kamil, 

not directly to Saddam. Husayn Kamil later gathered 

Al Sa’adi and several of the program heads and gave 

them instructions regarding the declarations. He did 

not base his instructions on a single recommended 

option but contained elements from several options. 

After the initial declaration in April, Iraq also submitted a more detailed declaration in May 1991.

• Whether Saddam was involved in the decision is 

not clear, though ISG judges that he was probably 

involved. Once Husayn Kamil made the overall 

policy for the declarations, Al Sa’adi, in consultation with the program heads, decided which weapons and programs to declare.

Senior Iraqi offi cials have stated several reasons for 

Iraq’s retention of weapons and its failure fully to 

declare its programs.

• Husayn Kamil decided that a full declaration–to 

include the nuclear and BW programs– would be 

embarrassing to Iraq and would bring undesired 

international scrutiny, according to one participant 

in the April 1991 meeting.

• Former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz stated 

that Husayn Kamil originally wanted to keep the 

concealed, undeclared weapons for use in the 

future, and he speculated that Kamil probably 

wanted to use them against the United States, Israel, 

or Kuwait.

• Former Oil Minister and MIC Deputy, ‘Amir 

Muhammad Rashid Al ‘Ubaydi, speculated to ISG 

that Iraq did not declare all of its weapons in order 

to maintain a deterrent against the United States, 

which continued to menace Iraq from Kuwait and 

southern Iraq at the time of the initial declaration.

• Another offi cial believed that Iraq’s decision not to 

declare all of Iraq’s weapons came from Saddam 

who was afraid of Iran, Israel, and perhaps other 

neighbors. Post-war Iraq was unstable, and Iraq 

found itself in a helpless and defenseless position.

• Another offi cial believed Iraq retained missiles and 

launchers because Iraq was experiencing serious 

Iranian-instigated security problems–the 1991 Shia 

uprising– and Iraq wanted to keep the missiles in 

case war developed with Iran.
50

• In the period shortly after the passage of UNSCR 

687, most Iraqi offi cials did not think that the 

resolution would be vigorously applied, and they 

expected that inspectors would only operate in Iraq 

for a couple of months.

Because of Husayn Kamil’s decision in April 1991, 

Iraq only partially declared its holdings of chemical weapons and missiles, while it did not declare 

its biological and nuclear weapons program at all.

Iraq concealed the undeclared weapons to varying 

degrees.

• Iraq concealed between 128-157 R-400 bombs 

containing BW agent at Airfi eld 37 in western Iraq 

and at Al ‘Aziziyah to the southeast of Baghdad.

• Iraq also concealed 25 biological agent-fi lled Al 

Husayn missile warheads; 15 in the embankment 

of the Tigris Canal northwest of Baghdad, and 10 

warheads in the Al Mansuriyah former railway 

tunnel to the northeast of Baghdad. These warheads 

contained botulinum toxin, Bacillus anthracis

spores, and afl atoxin, though the number fi lled with 

each agent is still uncertain.

• Iraq also concealed an undetermined amount of 

bulk BW agent at a succession of locations around 

the periphery of Baghdad.

The Destruction of Iraq’s BW

An IAEA inspection in late June 1991 triggered 

Iraq’s decision unilaterally to destroy the undeclared weapons that had been concealed from the 

UN, according to multiple senior Iraqi offi cials.

The IAEA’s inspection team was blocked from sites 

in Abu Ghurayb and Fallujah. The Iraqis fi red warning shots over the inspectors’ heads, but the inspectors brought back photos indicating Iraq was hiding 

undeclared uranium enrichment equipment from the 

inspectors.

• The IAEA inspection and the international uproar 

surrounding it caused consternation and a measure 

of panic in the Regime’s leadership, particularly 

Husayn Kamil, and Saddam appointed a high-level 

committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 

‘Aziz to deal with inspection matters, according to 

multiple sources.

• A senior Iraqi scientist who directed the destruction 

of chemical and biological munitions contends that 

the decision to destroy the hidden materials was 

made at the end of June 1991. The IAEA inspection and the ensuing controversy prompted Iraqi 

concerns about renewed war with the US, according to Dr. Bilal. ‘Amir Rashid telephoned Dr. Bilal 

and ordered that all hidden chemical and biological munitions be destroyed within 48 hours. When 

Bilal responded that this was impossible, ‘Amir 

Rashid directed that Bilal use the resources of the 

Iraqi Air Force and the surface-to-surface missile 

force to accomplish the task. Dr. Bilal gathered his 

colleagues from Al Muthanna, went to the locations 

of the stored munitions, and began the destruction.

Interviews with high-ranking political fi gures, managers of military industries, WMD scientists, and 

disarmament offi cials indicate that Iraq decided in 

the spring of 1991 to eliminate evidence of the BW 

program. All the interview subjects agree that Iraq 

accomplished this elimination by the autumn of 1991, 

though there are still important questions about the 

timing of the effort, the amounts and origins of material destroyed, and whether Iraq initially planned to 

retain a stock of BW.

The Iraqi leadership regarded the BW program as 

politically dangerous for Iraq and made the decision 

to destroy the BW program, according to Tariq ‘Aziz.

• Husayn Kamil actually made the decision to 

destroy weapons and evidence of the BW program 

in April at the same time that he decided not to 

declare the program, according to NMD head, 

Husam Amin.

• In early May 1991, Husayn Kamil verbally ordered 

Technical Research Center (TRC) head Ahmad 

Murtada to destroy all biological agents, along with 

all documentation for their research, development, 

and production, according to Dr. Rihab.
51

Biological

• Former MIC director ‘Amir Rashid also indicated 

that the destruction decision came from Husayn 

Kamil, who then relayed the decision through 

Al Sa’adi and himself, to TRC head Murtada for 

execution.

The BW program’s destruction occurred in three 

distinct phases:

• The cleanup and sterilization of research and production facilities, including Al Salman, Al Hakam, 

Al Manal (Al Dawrah, FMDV Plant), and Al 

Safa’ah (Al Fudaliyah)

• The destruction of munitions by the TRC Biological Group and Al Muthanna personnel

• The deactivation and dumping of bulk BW agent.

Concealment of the production aspects of the BW 

program required the thorough cleanup of Iraq’s 

BW research and production facilities, which reportedly began shortly after the destruction decision. 

Cleanup was completed prior to the arrival of the fi rst 

UNSCOM BW inspection in August 1991, according 

to TRC head Dr. Ahmad Murtada.

• The TRC T-3 BW research and development facility at Al Salman, located three kilometers south 

of Salman Pak, which Coalition bombing had 

badly damaged during the 1991 war, was further 

destroyed with explosives, and the site graded and 

landscaped. A review of reporting from the summer 

of 1991 indicates this activity began in early July 

1991 and was complete by the end of that month.

• Before the fi rst UNSCOM inspection in May 1991, 

according to Dr. Rihab, the Al Manal production 

facility was cleaned up. The Al Manal production 

equipment not originally part of the facility was 

taken to Al Hakam, and the site returned to its original owner. MIC did not formally relinquish control 

until July 1991.

• Al Hakam, one of Iraq’s major BW agent production plant, was not damaged during the 1991 war, 

and Husayn Kamil sought to maintain the facility–

with its specialized equipment and work force– by 

creating a civilian cover story to explain the presence of the large-scale production equipment. The 

plant was converted for production of biopesticide 

and single cell protein.

Iraq destroyed its BW weapons in the summer of 

1991, according to multiple sources.

• Dr. Bilal of Al Muthanna was responsible for 

destroying the BW–R-400 aerial bombs and Al 

Husayn missile warheads–because no one within 

the TRC T-3 Directorate had any experience with 

weapons, while Al Muthanna personnel were very 

familiar with them. Bilal was assisted by Sinan 

‘Abd-al-Hasan Muhi Mustafa Al ‘Ubaydi and 

Isma’il Ahmad Salih Bashir Al Bashir of TRC.

• There were two sites within the ‘Aziziyah bombing range for the destruction of the R-400 BW 

bombs–possibly 133 or 134 of them, according 

to Dr. Bilal. Deactivation of the agent within the 

bombs with formalin and potassium permanganate 

(for botulinum toxin and anthrax bombs) or bleach 

(for bombs containing afl atoxin) was followed by 

destruction of the bomb casings with explosives.

• The Al Husayn BW warheads were chemically 

deactivated by Al Hakam personnel at their storage sites (the Tigris Canal embankment and the Al 

Mansuriyah former railway tunnel), then taken to 

An Nibai and destroyed with explosives, according 

to Bilal and Rihab.

• Iraq’s BW declaration indicated Iraq had 157 R400 BW bombs (100 botulinum toxin, 50 anthrax, 

and 7 afl atoxin) and 25 Al Husayn BW warheads 

(5 anthrax, 16 botulinum toxin, and 4 afl atoxin). 

UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and the Iraqis themselves 

regarded these numbers as soft estimates because of 

the lack of documentation.

• UNMOVIC-monitored excavations at the Al 

‘Aziziyah destruction site in February and March 

2003 unearthed evidence of 104 R-400s, in addition to the 24 R-400s excavated under UNSCOM 

supervision. As a result, UNMOVIC considered the 

128 R-400s accounted for at Al ‘Aziziyah.

It also appears that Iraq destroyed its stocks of bulk 

agent in the summer or autumn of 1991, but Iraqi 

accounts of this destruction vary in timing, amounts, 

and location. As a result, ISG still does not have a 

clear picture of bulk agent destruction. There remain 

a number of inconsistencies in the accounts of the 

offi cials involved.
52

• A 2,200-liter storage tank of anthrax in underground storage at Al Hakam remained there during 

the 1991 war, along with two one cubic meter tanks 

on trailers. The trailers had fl at tires and the large 

tank was not transportable. The disposition of this 

material is unknown, according to a former BW 

program offi cial.

• In the summer of 1991, Al Hakam personnel deactivated anthrax stored in an unknown number of 

one-cubic meter stainless steel tanks using formalin 

and potassium permanganate. They dumped the 

anthrax into a septic tank for an unspecifi ed period, 

then trucked the deactivated anthrax to an area near 

the production bunkers at Al Hakam and dumped it 

on the ground.

• In April 1991, Al Hakam personnel removed some 

of the Clostridium botulinum and Bacillus anthracis produced at Al Hakam and stored it in a bungalow in Ar Radwaniyah until May 1991, according 

to Dr. Rihab. This agent was supposed to return to 

Al Hakam for disposal but was not. Later, Rihab’s 

staff destroyed and disposed of the BW agent in arRadwaniyah. This concealment and destruction was 

never declared to the UN.

• An Iraqi BW program offi cial inadvertently told 

UN inspectors about the dumping of an unknown 

number of one-cubic meter stainless steel tanks of 

anthrax in the desert northwest of Baghdad near 

An Nibai in July 1991, according to a former BW 

offi cial.

• Al Hakam personnel reportedly transported several 

one cubic meter tanks of botulinum toxin and 340 

liters of Clostridium perfringens to Airfi eld 37 in 

western Iraq in January 1991 as the war was about 

to begin. At some point, unidentifi ed personnel 

loaded these tanks onto a truck and drove them 

around Baghdad until September or October 1991. 

Iraq had told the UN it destroyed the material in 

July 1991. This was not so. The tanks probably 

returned to Al Hakam where, following deactivation, disposal occurred, though the Iraqi NMD 

could not confi rm this, according to a BW program 

offi cial.

• One source indicated that the 340 liters of Clostridium perfringens at Al Hakam remained there until 

the destruction of Al Hakam (in 1996), but this contention is not supported by other sources. Another 

source maintains that researchers tested this agent 

in May 1991, found severe fungal contamination, 

and assessed that the agent was no longer pathogenic.

The Iraqis also apparently destroyed tanks of anthrax 

at the ‘Aziziyah fi ring range, the site of the R-400 

bomb destruction. The number of containers and the 

amount of agent destroyed is unclear.

• Three one cubic meter tanks of anthrax stored at the 

‘Aziziyah fi ring range were ordered destroyed in 

June 1991, according to a participant in the destruction. After gathering debris from the destruction, 

he reported to his supervisor, Dr. Bilal, that the 

tanks had been destroyed. However, an entry in the 

log book of the offi cer in charge of the ‘Aziziyah 

range only lists the destruction of two of the tanks, 

and therefore the source believed that one of the 

containers still exists at Al ‘Aziziyah.

• Two destroyed one cubic meter bulk storage and 

transport containers –along with parts of a third 

container–were found at Al ‘Aziziyah during Iraqi 

excavations of the site just prior to OIF, according 

Dr. Bilal. If true, it would account for the missing 

third anthrax tank. Other participants in the 2003 

excavations have not confi rmed the fi nding of this 

third container.

Iraq declared that all bulk agent, including anthrax 

that remained after the fi lling of weapons, had been 

stored at Al Hakam and was unilaterally destroyed 

there in July and August 1991, according to 

UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC also noted that UNSCOM 

found evidence of anthrax disposal at Al Hakam but 

considered the evidence insuffi cient to support Iraq’s 

statements about the quantity of anthrax destroyed 

and the circumstances surrounding that destruction.

The problem of accounting for the destruction of 

bulk agent is part of the larger issue of Iraqi BW 

agent material balance. ISG cannot arrive at an agent 

material balance because it still does not know with 

confi dence:
53

Biological

• The amount of each agent produced at each production facility

• The amount of each agent used in weapons fi lling

• The number of weapons fi lled with each agent

• The amount of bulk agent of each type destroyed.

It is not clear whether the original decision to eliminate the BW program called for the destruction of 

bulk agent and BW munitions, or if Iraq initially 

planned to conceal and retain the bulk agent and 

fi lled munitions. Kamil’s original plan may have 

only encompassed the cleanup and conversion of the 

research and production facilities.

• The BW munitions were all destroyed in the 

summer of 1991, according to multiple sources, but 

Iraq was also engaged in a much wider campaign 

of unilateral destruction during this period that also 

encompassed the chemical and missile programs.

• Iraq apparently destroyed much of the bulk BW 

agent in July 1991, but some reportedly remained 

hidden until September or October 1991, according 

to one BW program insider.

A letter written by Husam Amin to Qusay Saddam 

Husayn, as head of the Iraqi SSO, supports the 

judgment that Iraq unilaterally destroyed most of 

its pre-1991 CW and BW weapons and long-range 

missiles. The letter, written in August 1995 shortly 

after Husayn Kamil fl ed to Jordan, listed undeclared 

capabilities that Kamil might reveal to the UN.

• The letter points out that “the destruction of the 

biological weapons occurred in the summer of 1991 

(after the ceasefi re) and not in the fall of 1990 as in 

the Iraqi declaration” to the UN.

• The letter mentions a number of undeclared 

capabilities e.g. weaponization of BW agents, BW 

production at the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant, the 

Badr-2000 program, and other matters, but contains 

no mention of any existing undeclared CBW weapons or missiles.

Husam Amin acknowledged writing the letter, and 

ISG judges that the letter is authentic.

What Remained Hidden and Undeclared 

1995-1998?

ISG’s investigation found no evidence that Iraq 

continued to hide BW weapons after the unilateral 

destruction of 1991 was complete, and ISG judges 

that most of the documents and materials hidden by 

the Special Republican Guard from 1991 until 1995 

were indeed surrendered to the UN. However, Iraq 

continued to conceal documents from 1998 until 

2003.

• For several years, Special Republican Guard offi -

cers concealed the “know-how” documents, which 

Husayn Kamil ordered collected in 1991. These 

offi cers used safehouses in the Ghaziliyah and Hay 

at Tashri neighborhoods of Baghdad and a farm in 

Abu Ghurayb to hide the documents.

• In late 2002, weeks before the arrival of the 

UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq, NMD employees 

reportedly were ordered to collect all documents 

indicating discrepancies between the number of 

chemical and biological munitions destroyed or 

used and the total number produced. These documents, which fi lled 16 boxes, were being turned in 

to the IIS to be hidden or disposed of.

ISG investigations also determined that Iraq failed to 

declare to the UN a number of signifi cant capabilities 

and activities. Examples of such omissions include:

• Storage and disposal of bulk BW agent, including 

anthrax, at Ar Radwaniyah in 1991.

Weaponization Related Activities in the Years 

Following Desert Storm

Various reporting indicates an interest in acquiring 

systems for the dissemination of CBW. Acquisition 

related efforts were usually couched in generic terms, 

such as “aerosol systems” or “aerosol generators,” 

and typically associated by the Iraqis with agricultural 

use. It would also appear that there may have been 

plans to keep the spray technology remnants of the 

CBW programs hidden from UN inspectors.
54

Detailed Accounting of Iraq’s Al Husayn Missile 

“Special” Warheads

According to Iraqi declarations and Dr. Mahmud 

Farraj Bilal, Iraq had produced 75 “special” Al 

Husayn warheads, including 50 chemical warheads, 

and 25 biological warheads.

In April 1991, Iraqi initially declared to the UN only 

30 warheads–all of them chemical. Iraq destroyed 

these under UNSCOM supervision. Of the 30 CW 

warheads:

• 16 contained unitary Sarin (GB) nerve agent

• 14 contained the cyclohexanol/isopropanol mixture 

that was the basis for Iraq’s “binary” GB/GF nerve 

agent. The methylphosphonic difl uoride (DF) component for these warheads was also destroyed.

In addition to these 30 declared chemical warheads, 

Iraq initially concealed 20 undeclared chemical 

warheads from UNSCOM, which it destroyed in the 

summer of 1991. All were “binary” warheads fi lled 

with a mixture of cyclohexanol and isopropanol.

After Husayn Kamil fl ed Iraq in August 1995, Iraq 

clarifi ed that the 75 Al Husayn warheads actually 

consisted of 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads. 

Of the 25 biological warheads, Iraq declared and Dr. 

Bilal believes that:

• 5 contained “Agent B”—anthrax spores

• 16 contained “Agent A”—botulinum toxin

• 4 contained “Agent C”—afl atoxin

75 Total “special” warheads produced by Iraq

30 Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision

20 “Binary” CW warheads unilaterally 

destroyed at An Nibai

25 Deactivated BW warheads unilaterally 

destroyed at An Nibai

45 Toatl warheads unilaterally destroyed

45

75 Total “special”warheads destroyed

To verify Iraq’s claims, UNSCOM sampled remnants 

of warheads destroyed at An Nibai and found traces 

of anthrax in containers of seven distinct missile 

warheads. In response, Iraq changed its account of 

BW warheads. Dr. Bilal clarifi ed that no one knew for 

certain the number of warheads fi lled with a given 

agent because the Iraqis kept no records of the fi lling 

operation.

Of the 45 “special” warheads that were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq, UNSCOM recovered and 

accounted for remnants of 43-45.

The Al Husayn warhead “material balance” is thus:

• In 1994, a Hughes 500 helicopter was equipped 

with two L-29 drop tanks at At Taji Airfi eld by Dr. 

Imad ‘Abd-al-Latif ‘Abd-al-Rida’Ali Shihab. He 

reportedly did this to satisfy a requirement from the 

Minister of Agriculture to replace its aging agricultural helicopters. No other helicopters were converted. UNSCOM tagged the helicopter and while 

inspectors agreed it was only for agricultural use, it 

was kept under close scrutiny. ISG recovered these 

tanks in February 2004 and have conducted extensive sampling and forensic analysis to determine 

what materials were disseminated from these tanks, 

but have not discovered any materials relating either 

directly or indirectly to BW.

• The L-39 RPV, UAVs and ballistic missile developments are addressed in the Delivery Systems Section of this Report.
55

Biological

The R-400 BW aerial bomb “material balance”

is thus:

200 casing manufactured for BW use

128-134 Filled R-400s unilaterally destroyed at 

`Aziziyah (with 8-9 intact bombs), with 

UNMOVIC accounting for 128 and Dr. 

Bilal stating 134.

60 or 61 Empty R-400 casings deestroyed at Al 

Muthanna under UNSCOM supervision

6

Defetive casings discarded inteh Tigris 

River by Al Hakam personnel

194-201 Total R-400 casings manufactured for 

biological use accounted for.

Dr. Bilal’s recent thinking on the R-400 destruction at 

‘Aziziyah and Al Muthanna is at variance with what 

Iraq told UNSCOM during the late 1990s. At that 

time, Iraq asserted that 157 R-400s were destroyed 

at ‘Aziziyah and that 37 were destroyed at Al Muthanna. When these are added to the six disposed of in 

the Tigris, the number equals the 200 R-400 cases 

originally manufactured for BW use. Dr. Bilal now 

contends that Iraq’s prior claim of 157 destroyed at 

‘Aziziyah was based on the diary of an offi cer at the 

range and was inaccurate. Bilal’s assertion that 60 or 

61 empty cases were destroyed at Al Muthanna is at 

variance with UNSCOM data that indicates that 58 

R-400s were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision 

at Al Muthanna.

Detailed Accounting of Iraq’s R-400 BW Aerial 

Bombs

Iraq declared and Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal contends 

that Iraq originally manufactured 200 R-400 bomb 

casings for use as BW. Some of these were coated 

internally with epoxy for fi lling with “Agent A” 

(botulinum toxin) and “Agent B” (Bacillus anthracis 

spores). Dr. Bilal maintains that Iraq unilaterally 

destroyed 133 or 134 R-400 BW aerial bombs in 

1991. In the two months prior to the outbreak of war 

in 2003, Iraq excavated two R-400 destruction sites in 

‘Aziziyah and recovered the remnants of 133 or 134 

R-400 bombs, including eight or nine intact bombs. 

UNMOVIC, however, accepted that 128 R-400 were 

accounted for at ‘Aziziyah.

Six more bombs were found to be defective prior to 

fi lling. Al Hakam personnel discarded these six bombs 

in the Euphrates River. Later, UNSCOM retrieved 

these from the river.

Dr. Bilal claims that the Iraqis reviewed a videotape 

of the UNSCOM-supervised destruction of 60 or 61 

empty R-400 bombs at Al Muthanna in 1991. They 

noted that 30 of the bombs destroyed had black-stripe 

markings, indicating they were epoxy-coated and 

intended for BW use. Bilal believes that the remainder of the 60-61 bombs destroyed on the tape showed 

those manufactured for BW use.
56

Unresolved Issues

In March 2003, when UN inspectors departed Iraq, 

many contentious issues remained unresolved. 

Additional issues have emerged from ISG investigations. ISG investigated these matters with interviews, 

site visits, documents searches and material 

sampling. ISG made progress understanding most of 

the unresolved issues, but a few vital areas remain 

outstanding. With the degradation of the Iraqi 

infrastructure and dispersal of personnel, it is 

increasingly unlikely that these questions will be 

resolved. Of those that remain, the following are of 

particular concern, as they relate to the possibility of 

a retained BW capability or the ability to initiate a 

new one.

• ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of 

bulk BW agents remaining after Desert Storm and 

subsequent unilateral destruction. There is a very 

limited chance that continuing investigation may 

provide evidence to resolve this issue.

• The fate of the missing bulk agent storage tanks.

• The fate of a portion of Iraq’s BW agent 

seed-stocks.

• The nature, purpose and who was involved in the 

secret biological work in the small IIS laboratories 

discovered by ISG.

Through an investigation of the history of Iraq’s bulk 

BW agent stocks, it has become evident to ISG that 

offi cials were involved in concealment and deception 

activities.

• ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs 

up to OIF by failing to disclose accurate production totals for B. anthracis and probably other BW 

agents and for not providing the true details of its 

alleged 1991 disposal of stocks of bulk BW agent.

• Offi cials within the BW program knowingly continued this deception right up to OIF and beyond, only 

revealing some details well after the confl ict.

• Those concerned put two motives for the continued denial and deception in relation to undeclared 

dumping of BW agent at a site in Ar Radwaniyah:

—The members of the program were too scared to 

tell the Regime that they had dumped deactivated 

anthrax within sight of one of the principal presidential palaces.

—Changing the account would only complicate matters with the UN and would have no affect on the 

material balance.

More detail on these subjects, where it exists, is 

included in the appropriate section of the report.

Program Direction

Decision Making, Command and Control and 

rationale of Iraq’s BW Program. Despite access to 

many of Iraq’s senior political and military fi gures, 

including Saddam, many aspects of the BW program 

remain opaque to ISG. Specifi cally ISG learned very 

few new details of the following:

• The role of the military and intelligence services in 

defi ning the requirements for the BW program.

• The rationale behind key decisions such as the 

reasons for starting the program, the selection of 

agents and weapons.

• The military response to meet the requirements of a 

BW program.

• The doctrine for the use of BW weapons.

• The procedures for the release of BW weapons and 

who was to make the decisions.

Research and Development

Genetic Engineering and Viral Research. From 

1998-2003, Iraq devoted increased resources and 

effort to its biotechnology and genetic engineering 

activities, a concern that the UN continued to investigate until its departure. ISG has talked to scientists and workers in the biotechnology and genetic 

engineering fi elds, and viral researchers specifi cally. 

Despite an extensive interview program and numer-
57

Biological

ous site visits that have included sampling, ISG found 

no evidence of activity likely to contribute directly to 

BW.

BW Agent Simulants. The UN deemed Iraq’s 

accounting of its production and use of BW agent 

simulants—specifi cally Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus 

thuringiensis to be inadequate . ISG remains interested in simulant work because these items may 

be used not only to simulate the dispersion of BW 

agents, develop production techniques, and optimize 

storage conditions, but also the equipment used for 

their manufacture can also be quickly converted to 

make BW agent. It permits maintenance of techniques 

and provides continuing familiarity with the process 

to preserve skill levels. Iraq continued its work on 

Bacillus thuringiensis as a bio-pesticide carried on 

bentonite, at Tuwaitha after the destruction of Al 

Hakam. As a result of interviews with the former staff 

of Al Hakam and principal researchers at IAEC, ISG 

has discovered that this research also included investigations of bentonite not only as a carrier but also as 

means of enabling the speedy production of slurry 

from the stored dried biopesticide.

IIS Laboratories

ISG has found a number of small IIS laboratories, 

some containing biological equipment. There are 

reports that afl atoxin and ricin work has been conducted by the IIS into the 1990s and that human 

experimentation occurred. Given the historical connections of the IIS with Iraq’s BW program, it is a 

concern that the nature, purpose and those involved 

at these small IIS laboratories have not been identifi ed by ISG. This is an unresolved issue that will be 

further investigated.

Seedstocks

Disposition of Iraq’s BW Program 

Culture Collection

Doubts persist regarding Iraq’s destruction of bacterial reference strains and isolates. According to Dr. 

Rihab, she destroyed these materials in early 1992. 

Dr. Rihab gave a small box containing no more than 

25 vials of lyophilized bacterial pathogens, including those obtained from the American Type Culture 

Collection to the IIS in mid-1991 for safekeeping. 

Husam Amin returned the box to Dr. Rihab in early 

1992. Dr. Rihab ostensibly asked former TRC head 

Ahmad Murtada what to do with the vials. Murtada 

took the matter to Husayn Kamil, who ordered the 

vials destroyed. This was accomplished by injecting 

the vials with DettolTM and then autoclaving the vials. 

ISG cannot verify that these materials were destroyed 

or the other details of Dr. Rihab’s account. Given correct storage conditions, ISG assesses that these seed 

stocks would still be viable.

Agent Production

Anthrax. The UN could not confi rm, and in fact 

its evidence contradicted, the quantities of anthrax 

declared by Iraq as having been produced, used for 

trials, fi lled into weapons, and destroyed. The UN 

assessed that Iraq probably had greater stocks of the 

agent on hand in 1991 than it declared, probably 

for use in the Mirage F1 drop-tanks, and questioned 

Iraq’s account of destruction of the agent. ISG has 

interviewed most of the key Iraqis who admitted 

working with the agent, and has obtained contradictory explanations of the events. The details are in 

Annex A.

Botulinum Toxin. Iraq’s declaration of the amount of 

botulinum toxin it produced, used in experiments and 

trials, fi lled in weapons, wasted during handling, and 

unilaterally destroyed is derived from calculations, or 

contrived from the numbers of weapons stated to have 

been fi lled—none of these fi gures is verifi able. ISG 

teams have interviewed principal engineers and scientists involved with botulinum toxin; there has been no 

new information.

Mycotoxins: Afl atoxin. The resources that Iraq 

devoted to the manufacture, testing and fi lling of 

weapons with afl atoxin has puzzled investigators 

since Iraq fi rst declared the agent. There is little 

doubt that Iraq conducted such a program, but the UN 

assesses it almost certainly overstated the production, raising the possibility that some of the weapons declared to have contained afl atoxin may have 

contained other BW agents. There is no evidence to 

support Iraq’s claim about the numbers of weapons 

fi lled with the agent, and most of the limited number 

of staff involved in aspect of the effort have not been 

located. ISG has not determined the rationale behind 

Iraq’s choice of afl atoxin for its offensive BW program.
58

Wheat Cover Smut. The UN was not able to verify 

the amount of wheat cover smut produced, used or 

consumed owing to a lack of suffi cient documentation 

from Iraq. Iraq had stated it produced smut coated 

with afl atoxin, but neither this statement, nor the 

destruction of the wheat cover smut could be verifi ed. 

ISG has not discovered any new information on this 

agent.

Clostridium perfringens. (C. perfringens)–the causative agent of gas gangrene—was one of the fi rst 

agents Iraq examined. Despite its interest and various 

fragments of research—including interest in cluster 

munitions and an awareness of the use of C. perfringens in anti-personnel weapons—the UN found no 

evidence to indicate that such a course was pursued. 

An ISG team obtained two vials of C. perfringens as 

well as one vial of C.botulinum type B, from a midlevel scientist who formerly worked in the BW program. This matter is addresses in Section D—R&D.

Ricin. Unlike other BW agent programs, work on 

ricin emanated from the IIS, and almost certainly was 

based on its limited developed use as an assassination 

weapon. Iraq conducted a limited weapons development program until Desert Storm that included a test 

using artillery shells charged with ricin. Later Iraq 

expanded into the manufacture of castor oil, which 

yields the material from which ricin is extracted. 

Although this manufacture was later abandoned, 

Iraq retained the ability to restart such production in 

volume. ISG has pursued the Tariq castor oil facility 

and its possible role in ricin production as well as the 

security services’ interest in and use of ricin.

Undeclared BW agents—In addition to the BW 

agents listed above, Iraq may have investigated 

variola major (smallpox). Additionally the amount of 

peptone or tryptone soya broth (TSB) growth media 

imported by Iraq and not accounted for give rise to 

concern about the possible production of Yersinia 

pestis (plague), Francisella tularensis (tularaemia) 

and Brucella species (brucellosis). ISG has examined 

smallpox and Brucella, but has not uncovered any 

information on plague or tularaemia.

Drying of BW Agents

Iraq actively pursued the goal of drying its BW agent 

for improved storage and optimal dispersion and inhalation. The UN was unable to determine whether Iraq 

dried any of the bulk agents it produced, although it 

possessed the expertise and equipment to do so. ISG 

has found a successful program for drying the anthrax 

simulant, Bt; safety of the drying process would affect 

its application to anthrax. ISG found no evidence of 

dried agent.

Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage

Production Equipment. There are a number of 

critical items of equipment and materials normally 

required for the production of bacterial BW agents. 

Iraq was able to manufacture fermentors, separators, 

settling tanks and growth media, often of a lower 

quality than those it formerly imported, and all of 

which have commercial purposes. This manufacturing aspect is a vital prerequisite for resuming a BW 

program and could lead to the possibility of making 

mobile BW facilities. ISG investigated the industrial infrastructure needed for such activity and the 

particular possibility of a mobile BW program. ISG 

discovered no evidence to indicate a renewed interest 

in manufacturing equipment for BW purposes.

1m3

 Stainless Steel Mobile Tanks. In 1990, Iraq 

produced 39 1m3

 stainless steel mobile tanks. The 

tanks are signifi cant because they were used to store 

and transport bulk agent, and with modifi cation 

the imported tanks could be used for fermentation 

purposes to produce BW agent. Al Hakam already 

possessed eight 800-liter stainless steel mobile fermentors. Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed 

19 of the 1m3

 and 4 of the 800-liter fermentors in 

1991. UNSCOM verifi ed these fi gures from remnants 

presented to inspectors in the mid-1990s. ISG has 

identifi ed the remains of 2 additional 1m3 tanks. Thus 

out of an original 47 items, 18 1m3 and four 800-liter 

fermentors are still to be found. There are 22 items 

unaccounted for. Additionally, ISG has learned of 

additional production after 1990 (see Figure 13).
59

Biological

Weaponization

Al Husayn Biological Warheads. Iraq declared that 

it manufactured a total of 25 Al Husayn warheads 

for BW, claiming to have fi lled 16 with botulinum 

toxin, 5 with Bacillus anthracis spores, and 4 with 

afl atoxin. There is evidence only to confi rm that suffi cient stainless-steel agent containers were unilaterally destroyed to account for the declared quantities 

of BW warheads. It is not possible to conclude that all 

of the BW warheads were destroyed or that only three 

agents were used.

R-400 and R-400A Bombs—Iraq declared that it 

ordered the manufacture of 200 R-400A bombs 

for BW, but reportedly did not fulfi l that quota and 

instead used some R-400 bombs. Iraq claimed that 

157 bombs were fi lled with BW; 100 with botulinum 

toxin, 50 with Bacillus anthracis spores, and 7 with 

afl atoxin. Investigations by ISG at the Al ‘Aziziyah 

site confi rmed that by the beginning of OIF approximately 132 out of 157 bombs had been accounted for, 

indicating that at least 25 bombs remain unaccounted 

for. Because all the known physical evidence has now 

been investigated, it is unlikely that this matter can be 

resolved without the discovery of documents or new 

testimony from those involved.

Spray devices and RPVs. Iraq showed a continuing interest in the use of spray devices as a means 

of dispersing BW agent. The program started with 

the adaptation of helicopter-borne agricultural spray 

equipment and progressed through experiments with 

MiG-21 and Mirage F1 aircraft. In the 1990s L-29 

aircraft were adapted for remote operation, but there 

is no evidence of spray tanks being fi tted to them. The 

Mirage F1 used an auxiliary fuel tank as a trial spray 

system. Iraq claims that only 4 of these tanks were 

modifi ed and that the original tank and aircraft were 

destroyed in opening bombardment of the Gulf war 

in 1991. No evidence exists to support the destruction 

of the aircraft and tank, although the remains of the 

other tanks have been verifi ed in the past. Recent ISG 

investigations have discovered very large numbers 

of drop tanks, but none that had been modifi ed for 

trials or use as a BW weapon. The L-29 development 

program continued up to OIF and Iraq possessed 

approximately 30 L-29 aircraft that could be adapted 

for remote operation. Drop tanks existed for this aircraft, some in use at the same site that had been used 

for helicopter spray trials.

Figure 13. 1m3 Stainless steel mobile tanks.
60

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61

Biological

Annex A

Bulk BW Agents

Background

Under UNSCR 687 Iraq was required to disclose all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. However, four years 

passed before Iraq admitted it had an offensive 

BW program. Even after this, despite warnings about the consequences of not disclosing 

everything completely and truthfully from the 

UN, Iraq chose defi ance. Iraq never disclosed 

the true amount of B. anthracis and probably 

other BW agents it had produced before 1992 as 

well as several locations where bulk BW agent 

was stored, and in one case, destroyed, according to multiple sources. UN inspectors on many 

occasions asked members of Iraq’s BW program 

about additional storage sites, suggesting that 

they suspected, or knew of such a site or sites, 

but Iraqi offi cials persisted with their deceit until 

OIF and beyond.

ISG Investigation

Disparities in Declarations Concerning Pre1992 B. anthracis Production

Information obtained by ISG from several 

sources with access to Iraq’s former BW program 

and other related historical information show that 

Saddam’s Regime probably did not declare the 

production of thousands of liters of B. anthracis. 

This information appears to support pre-OIF 

judgments made by the Intelligence Community 

and UN inspectors that Iraq did not disclose the 

total amount of BW agent it had produced, and 

therefore continued to be in violation of UNSC 

resolutions. Although ISG assesses there to be 

only a very small chance that Iraq kept some of 

this undeclared B. anthracis until OIF, ISG has 

been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate 

preservation or complete destruction of the agent.

• Iraq produced much more B. anthracis between 1989 

and early 1991 than it declared to the UN, according to 

an individual who worked in Iraq’s former BW program. 

This individual told ISG that approximately 550 kilograms (kg) of the peptone growth media Iraq declared as 

“lost” actually was used to produce the B. anthracis that 

was not declared. Enriched mediums, such as peptone 

were used by Iraq to produce seed B. anthracis for the 

bulk production process.

• BW agent production continued at Al Hakam until the 

day before the start of the fi rst Gulf war in January 

1991—contrary to Iraqi declarations, which stated that 

production ceased at the end of 1990—and the FMDV 

Plant was used to produce B. anthracis, according to an 

Iraqi formerly involved in biological agent research.

• UNSCOM found B. anthracis in two fermentors and 

a mobile storage tank at the FMDV Plant that was 

“consistent with the strain used in Iraq’s BW program,” according to an UNMOVIC document on Iraq’s 

unresolved disarmament issues (UDIs) as of 6 March 

2003. Two pieces of the equipment that tested positive 

were destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996, and subsequent 

sampling of the FMDV Plant in November 1996 did not 

detect B. anthracis on any remaining equipment.

• Iraq’s Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) 

sequestered a portion of the production facility at the 

FMDV Plant from July 1990 until July 1991 for secretive work that emitted a smell of peptone two to three 

times a week, according to a current assistant manager 

of the FMDV Plant who has worked there since the 

early 1980s. ISG judges some of this secretive MIC 

work was the botulinum toxin production Iraq declared 

it produced at the FMDV Plant in November and 

December 1990. However, the continuous peptone smell 

outside of these dates fi ts with information from the 

individual that worked in Iraq’s former BW program, 

who told us that the peptone declared as “lost” was 

actually used to produce more B. anthracis than was 

declared at both the FMDV and Al Hakam.

• UNSCOM and UNMOVIC could not verify the amount 

of BW agent Iraq declared producing because of discrepancies in its reporting of the amount of media and 

fermentor time available to produce the agent, according 

to the UNMOVIC document on Iraq’s UDIs.
62

• Despite repeated attempts by ISG to confi rm this 

information with interviews with key personalities 

who would be knowledgeable, no further 

information or physical evidence has been collected 

up to this point.

Undeclared Movement and Destruction of Bulk 

BW Agent

ISG has conducted a series of interviews and site 

visits to uncover more information on the movement 

and destruction of at least some bulk BW agent in 

1991. When Iraq disclosed its offensive BW program 

in 1995, those involved decided not to disclose the 

movements and destruction areas associated with bulk 

BW agents.

• A scientist who worked for the former Iraqi Regime 

told ISG that Iraq destroyed three tons of B. anthracis at Al ‘Aziziyah. ISG assesses that this three tons 

of B. anthracis is only a portion of that not declared 

to the UN.

• An assistant of Dr. Rihab told UN inspectors in 

early 1997 that he had taken an unspecifi ed number 

of one-cubic meter tanks fi lled with B. anthracis

into the desert north of Baghdad near An Nibai and 

dumped the agent there in July 1991.

• The chief reason offered for not declaring agent 

disposal at Ar Radwaniyah was fear of informing 

Regime offi cials that Dr. Rihab’s BW staff had 

deposited deactivated B. anthracis and probably 

at least one other agent in an area surrounded by 

Special Republican Guard (SRG) barracks and 

within site of the Ar Radwaniyah Presidential 

Palace.

• How high up the chain of command this knowledge 

of undeclared movement and destruction went is 

yet to be determined. Evidence suggests that the 

Head of the Technical Research Center (TRC), 

Ahmad Murtada, the offi cial responsible to Husayn 

Kamil for BW, knew, but he denies it. It has yet to 

be determined if ‘Amir Al Sa’adi, Husam Amin, or 

the Vice President and the Higher Committee also 

knew.

This deception, in effect, prevented any possibility 

of the UN accepting the Iraqi account of its BW 

program. Whether those involved understood the 

signifi cance and disastrous consequences of their 

actions is unclear. These efforts demonstrate the 

problems that existed on both sides in establishing the 

truth.
63

Biological

Annex B

BW Research and Development 

Facilities

Iraq’s BW program was initiated in early 1974 in 

a house in Al ‘Amiriyah. After completion of basic 

buildings on a new site, Al Hasan’s Ibn-Sina Center, 

or site number 2 (or later Al Salman) the program was 

transferred to Ibn-Sina Center mid 1974. The fi rst 

phase of construction consisted of a clinic, telephone 

exchange, and a bacteriology labratory building, 

which appeared to have a functional high containment 

capability. Onto the back of the bacteriology building an animal house was attached. Later a building 

for viral research was built that was compartmented 

into 6 laboratories. This site was heavily bombed in 

1991 and was not functional after that time. Even 

before the transfer of the new BW program from Al 

‘Amiriyah, plans were already established for another 

facility (the green cube) “Phase 2” which became 

available about the same time as the dissolution of the 

original Al Hasan Institute. The remaining biology 

program along with elements of the CW program was 

then emplaced in this building as was the newly created Research and Technical Center (later to become 

the TRC). In the early 1980s Phase 3 was completed 

in the form of the Toxicology Laboratory to which the 

militarily relevant program was transferred in 1987.

Revitalization of Iraq’s militarily relevant BW 

program was located at Al Muthanna from 1983 to 

1987 when it was relocated to Al Salman. However, 

Al Muthanna continued to provide signifi cant R&D 

assistance through 1990 particularly studies on afl atoxin and ricin as well as weapons fi eld trials.

For many years, both before and following Desert 

Storm, the IIS conducted research and development of 

biological agents, such as ricin and afl atoxin, at several facilities discovered by ISG. Brief descriptions of 

these laboratories are presented below. The Al Safa’ah 

(AGRC), Al Salman and Al Muthanna sites were no 

longer functional after 1991 and thus further descriptions are not provided. Al Hakam, Al Manal, TABRC, 

Al Hamath, and the Al Tariq Company are deemed 

to have a signifi cant post 1991 BW related capability and the descriptions follow. Baghdad University, 

College of Veterinary Medicine, al Razi Research 

Institute, al Kindi Veterinary Vaccines and Drug Company, Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vacccine Institute have 

the facilities and expertise to play an important role in 

a resurgent R&D program.

Al Hakam

The Al Hakam facility was destroyed by the Iraqis 

under UNSCOM supervision in 1996 because of the 

discovery of the key role it played in the Iraqi BW 

program. Historically, Al Hakam was Iraq’s primary 

BW agent production facility, producing Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium botulinum, Clostridium 

perfringens and simulant, Bacillus subtilis, for testing 

and ultimately, weaponization purposes. Following 

the fi rst Gulf war, the Al Hakam plant was directed by 

Iraq to change its focus to civilian projects, which had 

been selected as a cover for its former BW program.

• The civil projects chosen to replace the production 

of BW agents and use the same equipment at Al 

Hakam were the production of biopesticides (B. 

thuringiensis), SCP and biofertilizers. The equipment at the facility was considered dual-use and the 

production of materials such as B. thuringiensis (a 

known stimulant for the BW agent B. anthracis) 

and SCP (whose equipment could be used to produce C. botulinum), led to the fear that Al Hakam 

could potentially be producing BW agent or at the 

very least, be maintaining the infrastructure and 

production expertise necessary to quickly reactivate 

Iraq’s BW agent production capability.

Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant

The FMDV plant was declared to UNSCOM as a 

facility that was used to produce botulinum toxin 

for offensive BW purposes from September 1990 

until January 1991. After Iraq acknowledged its role 

in its BW program, UNSCOM disabled the FMDV 

plant’s high containment air handling system in 

1996 by pouring a mixture of concrete and foam 

into its ducting. No laboratory or production work is 

currently conducted at the FMDV plant. The plant is 
64

currently being used as a central storage and distribution depot by the State Company for Veterinary 

Medicine. ISG has no information to suggest that 

the FMDV facility was involved in any BW-related 

research after the end of the fi rst Gulf war in January 

1991.

• ISG discovered freezers containing hundreds of 

perished isolates of foot and mouth virus. The 

facility was also storing laboratory equipment from 

other facilities and archives from other veterinary 

institutes. No research or scientifi c activity was 

occurring at the facility.

• According to a source, the FMDV plant only produced vaccine up until 1990/91. The main vaccine 

it produced was for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 

Type 0 (for sheep). It also produced types A20 

and Asia (for cows). The plant exported its FMD 

vaccine to 13 other countries in the region. From 

1990-1991, MIC took over the FMDV plant. While 

the MIC was operating the facility, they gave the 

FMDV employees a small area in which to conduct 

work that was separate from MIC activities. None 

of the workers from the FMDV plant were said to 

have been brought in to help MIC. However, this is 

contrary to what was communicated to UNSCOM.

• Surveillance cameras were installed at the facility 

by UNSCOM in 1994/5 to monitor the activities 

at the facility until and following the removal and 

destruction of some key equipment. Cameras were 

also mounted in the plant’s production department. 

Until some time prior to OIF, tapes were retrieved 

every two weeks by a local security company on 

behalf of the UN. The purpose of the cameras, after 

the building was rendered harmless in 1996, was to 

assure the equipment was not removed and installed 

at another location without proper notifi cation to 

the UN.

Tuwaitha Agricultural and 

Biological Research Center

ISG investigated work into Bacillus thuringiensis 

and Single Cell Protein carried out at the TABRC. 

ISG exploited TABRC in 2003. During the exploitation, signifi cant documentary evidence of ongoing 

research relative to Bt at TABRC and a number 

of equipment items which were capable of being 

used for production of small-to-pilot scale quantities of biological material were found. Numerous 

fermentors and bio-reactors were found, some of 

which should have been reported to UNSCOM or 

UNMOVIC but were not. The underground storage of 

laboratory equipment was likely to protect that equipment from coalition bombing. 

• TABRC was part of the IAEC within the Tuwaitha 

Nuclear Research Complex. Its mission was 

primarily agricultural science research and development, and the majority of its activities was 

directed toward crop improvement and integrated 

pest management. This facility possessed a mature 

scientifi c staff with expertise in recombinant DNA 

technology, microbiology, entomology, and access 

to agricultural pathogens. The center had research 

and development arrangements with other Iraqi biotechnology entities and possessed numerous pieces 

of equipment that could be used for either peaceful 

purposes or for development and production of BW 

agents (i.e., dual-use equipment). The facility was 

located within a high-security complex associated 

with other facilities of interest.

• ISG assesses that TABRC was not involved in 

any signifi cant BW-specifi c activity. Work with Bt 

appears to have been laboratory scale only and 

primarily directed toward expanding the insect 

host range of Bt isolates. There was no evidence to 

support earlier ISG contentions that attempts were 

underway at TABRC to engineer B. thuringiensis to 

be pathogenic for humans.

• ISG conducted detailed site exploitations of 

TABRC over a period of several days. The determination was made that the site contained numerous 

pieces of UNSCOM-tagged equipment, as well 

as multiple pieces of undeclared equipment, that 

would be useful for BW agent production. The 

equipment ranged from a declared 750-liter doublejacketed stainless steel fermentor to an undeclared 

5-liter fermentor. ISG found no information indicating any of this equipment was either intended or 

used for BW purposes.
65

Biological

Al Hamath

The Al Hamath facility was exploited on 19 April 

2003. ISG determined that the area was used for 

agricultural purposes and the activities assessed to 

have occurred at the site were determined not to be 

BW-related. The facility was heavily looted before 

it was exploited in April 2003. A local national at 

the site reported that the facility had been under 

military control and prior to UNMOVIC inspections 

the military had removed all the equipment from the 

site. Field laboratory analysis of samples taken from 

the barren facility also indicated no evidence of CW 

or BW related materials in the submitted samples. In 

2000, TABRC began the conversion of a pilot plant 

for citric acid production to a pilot Single Cell Protein 

(SCP) plant at Al Hamath, located at the same site as 

the Offi cial Rest House.

• The production method chosen for citric acid was 

growth in submerged culture rather than in solidstate. Process equipment (e.g. mixing vessels, 

tanks, fermentation vessels) was commissioned 

and fabricated accordingly. The strain of Aspergillus niger used in this process proved unsuitable for 

use in submerged culture as the mycelium suffered 

damage under the continual stirring/agitation necessary in submerged culture. In short, the project 

could not be made to work. Having a collection of 

process equipment already in place at Al Hamath, 

it was seen as convenient to co-opt and reconfi gure 

the equipment for SCP production.

• A source indicated that the SCP process was set up 

in the northeastern corner of the larger of the two 

main buildings at Al Hamath. The remainder of the 

space in the larger hall was devoted to the production of fungal biopesticides (e.g. Paecilomyces, 

Trichoderma) grown in solid-state culture on milled 

corncobs. The fermentations were conducted in the 

rooms (offi ces) pre-existing in that building.

Al Tariq Company’s

Habbaniyah I/Fallujah III Site

The Al Tariq Company produced castor oil by extraction from 1992 until 2002, using an Iraqi-designed 

and produced crushing mill purchased locally. Al 

Tariq offi cials complied with UNSCOM on the 

requirement that they burn the bean mash left over 

from production while UN inspectors remained in 

Iraq. This open pit burning of mash was no longer 

observed after the plant was reconstructed, post-Operation Desert Fox bombing, and went operational. The 

mash, which took days to burn and created signifi cant 

smoke, was burned in pits near the Fallujah III facility. At one point, Al Tariq offi cials considered using 

the bean mash in animal feed, but this idea was never 

implemented.

• Farmers at Al ‘Aziziyah claim their land was taken 

by Husayn Kamil in 1994 or 1995 to be utilized 

as dedicated lands for the growth of caster plants, 

the end user of which was exclusively the Al Tariq 

facility. The MIC reportedly worked in collaboration with both the State Company for Industrial 

Crops and the Ministry of Agriculture to plant 

“cover crops” –other crops such as wheat-in order 

to mask the growth of the castor plants. In 2001, an 

employee of the Al Tariq Facility named “Husayn” 

told an individual at the farm that the castor beans 

were being used by the Al Tariq Facility in order to 

“produce poisons that would kill humans.”

• Historically this site has been of concern because 

the castor oil plant could have potentially been used 

in the fi rst step, mainly the castor bean mash, in the 

production of the BW agent ricin. Iraq stated several different ways in which the ricin in the mash 

was being inactivated; yet UNSCOM showed that 

active ricin could readily be isolated from the mash 

after the castor oil was removed.

• During this time period, offi cials from Ibn-alBaytar expressed an interest in purchasing castor 

oil from Al Tariq for use in pharmaceuticals. The 

Al Tariq facility’s oil was not competitively priced, 

however, and because it was extracted by solvents 

instead of cold pressing, Al Tariq’s oil was not 

considered to be “food grade”, or appropriate for 
66

medical/pharmaceutical uses. At one point, SDI 

purchased fi ve tons of Al Tariq oil for pharmaceutical purposes, but upon sampling the oil, immediately deemed it as inappropriate for medical 

use and sent all of the castor oil back to Al Tariq. 

Because of these issues, Ibn-al-Baytar decided to 

procure castor beans directly from the same source 

as Al Tariq, the Company for Industrial Forests 

(CIF). After production ended in 2002, Al Tariq was 

left with unwanted castor oil, but no customers. The 

leftover castor oil was kept in barrels at Fallujah III.

During the work of the UN and ISG, a number of 

facilities have been identifi ed as having carried 

out or have been assessed as capable of carrying 

out R&D on viruses. These facilities include the 

Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vaccines and 

Drugs, the Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, the Al Razi Research Center, the Al Dawrah 

Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine plant (before 1996 

when UNSCOM disabled the air handling system), 

Baghdad University College of Veterinary Medicine 

at Abu Ghurayb and Al Hakam before its destruction (also in 1996). Al Hakam and Al Dawrah FMDV 

facilities are described above.

Al Razi Center

ISG determined that the Al Razi Center is no longer 

suitable for research or production of any biological activity because of extensive looting.ISG has 

no information to suggest that Al Razi was actively 

involved in R&D of viral BW agents for the Iraqi BW 

program. An ISG visit to Al Razi found numerous 

vials of lyophilized bacteria and yeasts that were littering the site including: Vibrio cholerae, Salmonella 

typhi, Salmonella paratyphi, Clostridium diffi cile, 

Clostridium welchii, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, Brucella melitensis, and Brucella abortus. In addition, 

numerous vials of lyophilized avian infl uenza were 

also noted.

Several burn piles consisting of burned documents, 

vials, chemicals, electronic media and small pieces 

of equipment where located around the building. The 

piles seemed to be an organized destruction effort 

given stir rods located with some of the piles.

An inventory of UNSCOM tagged equipment was 

conducted. Four pieces of dual-use laboratory equipment were noted missing.

ISG assesses that the research expertise available at 

the Al Razi center could potentially have been used to 

research viral BW agents.

• Al Razi was established in 1992 under the direction of Saddam Husayn. Dr. Hazim ‘Ali, a senior 

personality related to the Iraqi viral BW program, 

and Athir Al Duri were responsible for setting up 

the facility with Dr. Hazim ‘Ali in charge of the 

virology department and Al Duri director of the 

bacteriology department.

• The virology department at Al Razi was involved in 

work on Hepatitis and mumps diagnostic kits, using 

positive sera obtained from the Ministry of Health. 

The facility also had an animal house where they 

kept sheep, goats, rabbits and mice. No primates 

were seen by the source but monkey cages were 

seen in 1996 after a delivery from Al Muthanna.

Baghdad University, College of 

Veterinary Medicine, Abu Ghurayb

ISG found no information to suggest that the College of Veterinary Medicine, Baghdad University, 

played a role in the R&D phase of the viral BW 

program. ISG has uncovered no substantial connection between the BW program and the College of 

Veterinary Medicine.

• The College of Veterinary Medicine was capable of 

viral research. The faculty at the College of Veterinary Medicine possess the requisite knowledge and 

skill to grow and genetically manipulate potential 

BW agents. Based on the faculty’s description of 

the equipment that was looted, the College had 

adequate resources to grow agents such as high-risk 

virus. However, the remaining equipment found 

in 2003 by the assessment team at the facility is 

inadequate to conduct any signifi cant research or 

production of BW agents.
67

Biological

Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vaccines

and Drugs

All known UNSCOM tagged equipment at the 

Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vaccines and 

Drugs was present at the site. The site is operating normally, although at a reduced level. A senior 

employee explained that they were still in the process 

of trying to reinstate the quality of their vaccines and 

had not yet developed elaborate plans for the future.

• Prior to Desert Storm, the facility was believed 

to be involved in Iraq’s BW program. A foreign 

company supplied a complete vaccine production 

line in 1984 for the facility to produce “Co-Baghdad vaccine,” a mixture of veterinary important 

Clostridial species. It was most of this vaccine line 

that was acquired by Al Hakam and used at that 

facility prior to 1991. Presently the company is 

able to produce viral disease vaccines for poultry 

to include: Newcastle, fowl pox, and gumboro; and 

viral vaccines for livestock to include rinderpest, 

sheep pox and goat pox. Bacterial disease vaccines 

include: enterotoxaemia (sheep), hemorrhagic septicemia, blackleg (C. perfringens, cattle), anthrax 

(sheep). Al Kindi Company did not sustain any 

damage during OIF, and no looting had taken place, 

since the employees stayed in the buildings and 

guarded them. No seed cultures were lost, since the 

company has generators that supplied power to the 

refrigerators and freezers without interruption.

• In April 1994, an UNSCOM Team found that the 

facility was the sole Iraqi producer of veterinary 

vaccines required to protect against animal viral, 

bacterial, and parasitic agents (including anthrax). 

However, a 1997 UNSCOM report indicated Al 

Kindi personnel had the expertise to run a BW 

production facility as well as apparent access to 

military signifi cant microorganisms, and would 

have been able to easily convert veterinary vaccine 

production to production of human vaccines.

The Newcastle vaccine product lines at Al Kindi 

demonstrate an ability to scale up large quantity viral 

production. Al Kindi Company had the facilities that 

would enable mass production of smallpox virus in 

either cell culture or fertilized eggs, and in either 

liquid slurry or lyophilized form, however, no indication of intent to do so was found by ISG.

Role of Al ‘Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute 

(ASVI) in Smallpox R&D

ISG has uncovered no evidence to support smallpox 

R&D at ASVI for possible use as an offensive BW 

agent. The ASVI is the only facility in Iraq acknowledged to be associated with smallpox, albeit with the 

smallpox vaccine. The Institute continued to manufacture a smallpox vaccine through to the early 1980s.

ISG discovered no indications of BW activity at 

the facility. All equipment and material observed 

appeared related to serum and vaccine storage, quality 

control and very limited organic production capability. An ISG assessment on the facility states that it is 

unlikely that ASVI was involved in suspicious BWrelated activities other than possible temperature control storage. Laboratory results from samples taken 

from the site were negative for BW agent signatures.

• ASVI produced limited quantities of bacterial and 

viral vaccines and diagnostic reagents and kits for 

human use. According to Hazim ‘Ali, head of the 

Iraqi viral BW program, any smallpox isolates 

would have been stored at either the ASVI or the 

Central Public Health Laboratory. The director 

of ASVI stated, in a recent interview, that ASVI 

produced three and half million doses of smallpox 

vaccine in 1980, a month after the start of the IranIraq war, eight years after the last smallpox case in 

Iraq and the year it was declared eradicated in the 

world. The director stated that vaccine might have 

been for defense against an Iranian BW attack, but 

it is also possible that the vaccine could have been 

a defensive measure for anticipated Iraqi smallpox 

use against Iran.

• From its inception, ASVI has not had the biosafety 

equipment, procedures or technical expertise to 

work with dangerous pathogens. Economic sanctions and import restrictions further impeded their 

ability to perform even basic research. In March 

2003, the facility was extensively looted with 

reconstruction efforts at the facility focusing on 

replacing air conditioning units, doors, windows 

and providing a consistent source of electricity. 

As of late August 2004, through its affi liation 

with a humanitarian organization, Kimadia State 

company for Marketing and Medical Appliances, 
68

and the Iraqi Ministry of Health, the facility was 

able to import small amounts of vaccine and other 

reagents. These were to be stored and later distributed by the facility.

• From 1975 to 1982, ASVI produced smallpox 

vaccine, utilizing vaccinia; samples of the vaccine 

were cultured and collected from bovine calf skin. 

Production of smallpox vaccine was conducted 

under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO) from 1975 to 1977. The WHO vaccine was produced and stored in liquid form but 

between 1977 and 1980, ASVI also produced a 

powdered/lyophilized vaccinia product. In October 

1980, ASVI requested vaccinia seed stock from the 

WHO to produce more vaccine. The request was 

denied due to the disease having been eradicated, 

and the WHO ordered ASVI not to proceed with 

its vaccinia work but the Iraq Ministry of Health 

ordered it to produce the vaccine. By 1982, the viral 

research branch responsible for the smallpox vaccine, produced and subsequently stored, 3.5 million 

doses of the vaccine in liquid form. These samples 

were assessed to have a shelf life of three years. 

The remaining 750 grams of bulk smallpox vaccine 

preparation was stored in a powdered/lyophilized 

form. This preparation had a shelf life of 10 years.

• The vaccine produced as by ASVI in response to 

the request from the Iraqi Ministry of Health was 

manufactured by strengthening some vaccine it had 

previously produced and stored. The strain identifi ed as having been used was Lister. The material 

was strengthened by three times inoculating rabbit 

skin and then infecting calf bellies. Each calf belly 

yielded about 200,000 doses of the vaccine. The 

scientist responsible for conducting the work left 

ASVI in 1982 and there were no tests of vaccine 

effi cacy, such as neutralizing antibodies, in humans 

in Iraq. The 750 grams of material were tested in 

1986 and found to be nonviable. In 1992, the 3.5 

million doses of vaccine were tested and determined to be nonviable also. It was recommended 

that the vaccine be destroyed but ISG has been 

unable to confi rm or deny this claim.

• In 1994, Iraq completed a WHO questionnaire 

regarding the reporting of smallpox vaccine production activities, vaccine stocks and seed virus strains. 

ASVI’s response indicated that it maintained two 

smallpox vaccine seed vials that Iraq had obtained 

from the Netherlands before 1977 and 19 vials of 

Brucella antisera that had been produced in rabbits and mislabeled as vaccinia. In addition, a 1994 

inventory submitted to the NMD listed the facility 

as possessing two vials of “smallpox seed No. Q1”. 

During meetings with UNMOVIC in December 

2002 regarding the 19 antisera vials and the two 

seed stock vials, Antoine Al Bana took one of the 

19 vials for analysis and an UNMOVIC inspector 

also took one. Al Bana determined that there was 

nothing viable in the vial that he analyzed.

• Two vials of smallpox vaccine seed stock labeled 

“Rijks Instituut V.D. Volksgezondheid—10 ml 

seedvirus—L1 K2—Strain Elstree—Utrecht” were 

discovered at ASVI. These two large vials may 

be the seed vials referred to in the 1994 report to 

the NMD, however, SMEs note that the vials were 

markedly different in content and appearance. No 

locally produced vials labeled “Elstree” were discovered at ASVI. ISG is awaiting confi rmation on 

the contents of these vials.

• According to a DGS intelligence offi cer who provided security at Rihab’s laboratory at Al Salman 

and Al Hakam, an individual connected with ASVI 

in 1989 to 1990 had IIS connections and supported 

Rihab’s BW efforts at Al Hakam. The individual 

had frequent contact with Dr. Rihab beginning in 

1990. Rihab made frequent visits to Al ‘Amiriyah 

Sera Vaccine Institute where she and the individual 

conducted unidentifi ed BW related research. At 

ASVI, the individual source had access to special 

laboratories and conducted unspecifi ed genetic 

research. The DGS offi cer stated that the source 

helped Rihab in her work. The DGS intelligence 

offi cer also stated that the source was an IIS offi cer 

and that his work was related to the IIS. When 

asked how he knew this he stated that Rihab was 

under constant surveillance by the IIS and that he 

learned the source’s affi liation from other IIS offi -

cers. The individual left ASVI in 1991 to work at 

Baghdad University.
69

Biological

• All buildings, which were found to be heavily 

looted during April and May 2003, are now generally restored with equipment replenishment in 

progress. The UN tagged and untagged dual-use 

equipment found and the site were consistent with 

the declared purpose of the site.

State Company for Drug Industries and Medical 

Appliances

ISG exploitation of Samarra Drug Insustries’ 

(SDI) location revealed industrial scale utilities 

and numerous, dual-use jacketed vessels, some of 

which had not been declared to the UN. ISG found 

no evidence that equipment at Samarra had been 

modifi ed to serve as fermentors for BW production. ISG assesses, however, that the staff possessed 

the required expertise for bulk BW agent production and that Samarra potentially would have been 

capable of limited breakout production of BW agent 

within one month prior to OIF.

SDI belongs to the State Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances, which, in turn, is part 

of the Ministry of Industry and Materials (MIM) and 

under its direction and control. The main activities of 

the site are R&D and production and formulation of 

pharmaceutical products. A technical group within 

MIM provides guidance and direction for pharmaceutical compounds to be researched at SDI. Staff 

protected the plant post OIF and hence minimal looting took place.

• The facility appears to be producing its full product 

line except for antibiotics.

• Site buildings contain numerous jacketed process 

tanks ranging in capacity from 100–10,000 liters 

together with ancillary equipment such as fi lter 

presses, autoclaves and bio-safety cabinets. (Figures 

4, 5, and 6)

• All equipment was assessed to be in good working 

condition.

• ISG judges that the 10,000-liter industrial scale 

tanks at Samarra are compatible with their declared 

use--the manufacture of pharmaceuticals—and that 

they would require considerable modifi cation to 

function as fermentors for BW production. However, ISG also judges the 3,000-liter and possibly 

some or all of the 1,000-liter stirred, jacketed vessels could be pressed into service for BW production within one month.

• An ISG team was reluctantly admitted to a production hall containing tiers of linked, jacketed, 

stainless steel vessels, of Soviet origin, which were 

piped to receive steam. Some of these vessels were 

fi tted with aeration rings and glass viewing ports 

but no stirrers/agitators were evident. (Figure 7) 

None of these vessels had been declared to the UN.

• The plant general manager asserted that these vessels were for solvent extraction of natural oils from 

plants, and that they were last used in 1975-76. ISG 

judges the vessels have a potential dual-use capability and that they could be adapted to function as 

fermentors for production of BW agents.

• High quality industrial scale steam and water utilities were available on site. (Figure 8) 

Laboratories of the Iraqi Intelligence Service

ISG interviewed several sources and identifi ed several 

suspect clandestine laboratories that reportedly supported biologically related research. ISG has not been 

able to determine whether these laboratories were part 

of a clandestine BW effort.

The tactic of using IIS and covert laboratories has 

historical precedence dating back to the programs 

origins in the 1970s. Reverting to this practice would 

minimize the evidence available to inspectors. It 

would also leave the known and acknowledged BW 

workers free to deal with the UN inspection regime. 

However, it would require another cadre of scientists 

other than ones known to the UN to conduct this kind 

of research. The discovery of multiple clandestine 

laboratories after OIF lends some credence to this 

assessment.
70

ISG found a possible DGS laboratory in Baghdad that 

contained a variety of chemicals but no laboratory 

equipment. Residents in the building alleged that the 

laboratory was a biological one. The investigating 

team found several DGS administrative documents, 

some of which were from employees requesting 

approval for danger pay for their hazardous work with 

biological and radioactive materials. This warehouse 

complex, adjacent to the 5-story IIS laboratory (site 

5), was reported by a former mid-level IIS chemist 

to be a storage facility for IIS chemicals and equipment. A separate former IIS offi cer indicated this was 

a former IIS training facility and hide site; materials 

were reportedly moved from the IIS safe house (site 

2) to this warehouse in the beginning of 2003 to avoid 

discovery by UN inspectors.

• During the fi rst exploitation in April 2003, the 

exploitation team found large quantities of liquid 

and dry chemicals, equipment, documents, and 

other materials—some of which were partially 

destroyed. A visit to the site in July revealed a 

completely looted warehouse complex with no 

remaining evidence of chemicals, equipment, or 

documentation. A former IIS offi cer indicated that 

other IIS offi cers returned to the site in late April to 

destroy the remaining materials.

• Though not BW, ISG learned that the Chemical 

Preparation Division of IIS’s M16 Directorate of 

Criminology used this approach for lethal chemical 

research. The IIS used a succession of four clandestine laboratories in At Taji and Baghdad between 

1996 and 2003 to research and develop chemicals. 

It also included testing of chemicals on small animals like mice, rabbits and rats.

• There is information that suggests that up to 5 IIS 

laboratories operated in the greater Baghdad area at 

various times up until OIF.

• Additional reporting, though unconfi rmed, indicates 

that the M16 Division also conducted BW related 

research in two covert laboratories as well. In the 

early 1990s, Saddam tasked the IIS to do smallscale BW work in covert laboratories concealed 

within legitimate facilities. Further unconfi rmed 

reports indicated the IIS conducted BW and CW 

experiments and stored WMD precursor materials in residences and warehouse around Baghdad 

through April 2003.

• Information collected at the time of OIF led to the 

discovery of assorted laboratory equipment 

purportedly used by a suspect BW scientist on the 

Black List at a Mosque in Baghdad.

An ISG team at the Baghdad Central Public Health 

laboratory identifi ed a clandestine laboratory in 

the summer of 2003. According to an employee 

of the laboratory, the IIS operated a laboratory 

at that location for several years. In advance of a 

1998 UNSCOM inspection, secret documents were 

removed and stored at the Director’s house. In 

December of 2002, the laboratory was emptied of all 

equipment and documents.
71

Biological

Figure 4. Two 1,000-liter, stirred, jacketed vessels 

suitable for use as fermentors for the growth of 

bacterial BW agents.

Figure 5. Plate fi lter press.

Figure 6. Autoclave with control panel.

Figure 7. Production hall with tiered vessels of 

Soviet origin not declared to the UN.

Figure 8. High grade water production plant.
72

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73

Biological

Annex C

ISG Investigation of Iraq’s 

Reported Mobile Biological 

Warfare Agent Production 

Capability

Summary of Pre-OIF Intelligence on Iraq’s Mobile 

BW Program

According to a chemical engineer whose reliability 

ISG now believes is highly questionable, Iraq developed a mobile BW capability designed to evade UN 

inspections and to provide Baghdad the ability to 

produce biological agents for offensive purposes. 

The chemical engineer stated that seven production 

units had been built, three of which had begun agent 

production runs. He identifi ed six locations of the 

seven plants, as well as key engineers and personnel 

involved in the design, construction, and operation of 

the units (see Figure 1). Additional sources reported 

before OIF on the existence of a mobile biological 

capability in Iraq:

• An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the 

details of the program reported the existence of 

transportable facilities moving on trailers.

• An additional source reported that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on 

road-trailer units and on rail cars.

Objectives of Investigation

Because Iraq’s reported mobile BW agent production 

capability was a key element of the prewar assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs, it was an important 

issue addressed by ISG, and the BW team tasked a 

variety of collectors and analysts against this intelligence issue with the intent to do the following:

• Locate and debrief Iraqis identifi ed as being 

directly involved in the planning, design, manufacture, and operation of the BW agent production 

plants.

• Exploit the sites named as having an involvement in 

the program, as well as ancillary sites and 

companies connected to the cover story.

In the wake of ISG’s investigation, ISG is unable to 

confi rm the existence of a mobile BW agent production capability in Iraq. Key personnel in the mobile 

program were said to have been involved in both BW 

activities at Al Hakam and the design and construction of legitimate seed purifi cation plants. Key fi ndings include:

• All individuals that ISG questioned denied the existence of a mobile BW agent production capability.

• Individuals linked to sites that were part of the 

investigation deny that the sites were used by the 

military or intelligence services, or used to conceal 

specialized equipment, trucks, or railcars.

• Two key sites that reportedly housed production 

units bear physical features that ISG assesses 

prohibit their use in the manner described by the 

source.

• ISG has not been able to determine the involvement 

of other sites reported by the chemical engineer to 

have been linked to the mobile program largely due 

to post-OIF events at the sites, such as turnover of 

personnel and looting.

• While ISG established that the chemical engineer 

had access to both Iraq’s seed purifi cation project 

and BW program, there are concerns regarding his 

employment and whereabouts after 1995, which is 

the period that he claimed to have been involved in 

the mobile BW program.

Origins of Iraq’s Mobile BW Program

Many of the key personnel that ISG investigated were 

employed at the Chemical Engineering and Design 

Center (CEDC), which later became part of the Sa’ad 

Center. By the very nature of their employment, 

these individuals were involved in both the design 

and construction of the single cell protein lines at Al 
74

Hakam—which could have been used for BW agent 

production—and the design and construction of legitimate seed purifi cation plants. Background on these 

two programs:

• BW Program. Prior to the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq 

possessed a BW program that had researched, 

developed, produced, and weaponized agents. After 

the war, Baghdad effectively hid its offensive BW 

program from UNSCOM inspectors for nearly 5 

years. Iraq claimed to have destroyed its BW agents 

and weapons completely in 1991, but UNSCOM 

was unable to verify this claim. By the departure of 

UNSCOM inspectors in 1998, Iraq’s declared BW 

production capability in known fi xed facilities had 

been dismantled.

• Seed Purifi cation Project. Iraq’s mobile BW 

program reportedly began amid the UN inspection 

process and operated under the cover of the seed 

purifi cation project facilities. ISG investigations 

show that the seed project began in 1994 on orders 

of Husayn Kamil as part of Iraq’s effort to improve 

and modernize its agricultural sector. It involved 

the creation of a total of ten legitimate, although 

ineffi cient and low quality, agricultural seed sorting and fungicide treatment systems. There systems were designed to have a greater capacity and 

less of a health risk than seed purifi cation plants 

available to Iraq at the time. The seed purifi cation 

units were designed, fabricated, and installed by 

the CEDC. The designers considered producing a 

mobile system but decided on fi xed plants installed 

in buildings. The fi nal plant design was based on 

the reverse engineering of a German-manufactured 

seed purifi cation plant in Tikrit. The seed purifi cation project occurred in two phases, concluding in 

1997 when all ten plants were transferred to the 

Mesopotamia State Company for Seeds, also known 

as the Al Nahrayn Company.

Denials of the Existence of Mobile BW

ISG identifi ed nearly ninety individuals that could 

have been involved or were linked to sites or the 

source that became part of the investigation. Of these 

individuals, ISG located and debriefed over sixty. 

While many have corroborated some of the reporting on personnel and of the Sa’d Center and some 

legitimate activities the source claimed were cover 

activities, none have provided evidence to substantiFigure 1. Reported 

production sites.

1 02 Dec
75

Biological

ate the claim of a mobile BW program. The levels 

of cooperation from these individuals vary considerably, ranging from active cooperation to denials and 

evasiveness:

• Most of the individuals identifi ed as being involved 

in the mobile BW program were associated with the 

CEDC and responsible for both the seed purifi cation project and the single cell protein project that 

was the cover for the Al Hakam BW facility. ISG 

spoke to nearly all of these individuals and, while 

they have acknowledged their involvement in both 

of the projects, they have consistently denied the 

existence of a mobile BW program.

• Several key Iraqi engineers were debriefed. Each 

engineer denied both the creation of a mobile fermentation project and that the seed purifi cation sites 

were used as legitimate cover for mobile BW agent 

production units. ISG offi cers found some of those 

interviewed to be less than forthcoming, but were 

unable to judge if the interviewees were withholding information on the alleged mobile BW project 

or some other project they did not want to reveal. 

Debriefi ngs of High Value Detainees (HVDs) have 

not yielded any new insights into the existence of 

mobile BW agent production capabilities in Iraq.

• Personnel from Al Nasr Al Azim State Establishment, a company that produced fermentors, heat 

exchangers, and vessels for Al Hakam, have denied 

that they produced components for any mobile BW 

systems during the 1990s.

• Personnel from the Al Nahrayn Company denied 

that three of its sites housed mobile BW agent production units. ISG offi cers assess that the Al Nahrayn Company has usually been forthcoming and 

accommodating to requests for information and site 

visits.The current occupants of the As Suwayrah 

Store, Tikrit Industrial Facility, and Mosul Rail 

Station also deny that the facilities were utilized for 

transportable activities, as reported by the source. 

However, in the case of Tikrit, although the construction company that runs the site occupied the 

facility when the production units were allegedly 

present, current site personnel were hired after OIF 

and do not have historical knowledge of the facility.

Exploitation of Mobile BW Agent Production Sites

Since stand-up, ISG has exploited many sites in Iraq 

identifi ed to have a connection to the mobile BW 

program, including the fi ve reported production sites 

that remained intact after the war (Figure 2). Discrepancies remain between past descriptions of sites 

and physical features at the sites as found by ISG. 

Investigations of six additional sites have not uncovered links to the mobile BW program, which may be 

partially due to post-OIF activities, such as turnover 

of employees and looting of facilities.

Djerf-al-Nadaf Seed Purifi cation Facility, Reported 

Mobile Site. ISG teams visited this site six times to 

examine its physical features and debrief site personnel. The teams determined that the facility is in 

fact operated by the Al Nahrayn Company and it’s 

involved in seed purifi cation. A high-bay building 

adjoining the primary warehouse of interest was built 

in 1994 and contains a legitimate two-story high 

seed purifi cation unit. However, ISG also discovered 

differences between physical features present at the 

facility and those reported pre-OIF.

• ISG offi cers were unable to locate any evidence 

of reported vehicle entrances on the ends of the 

building that was said to have housed the BW 

production unit. In the course of inspections, ISG 

found that the building is constructed of continuous sheet metal; there were no indications that the 

metal on the ends of the building was altered to 

accommodate and then conceal the past existence 

of doors. The current site manager, who is a longtime employee at the site, and an engineer involved 

in the seed purifi cation project, denied the past 

existence of the doors on the ends of the building.

• Two two-meter-high block walls around three 

sides of the building prevent vehicle access into the 

building through these reported vehicle entrances 

(Figure 3). ISG determined that the walls were constructed by 1997, which is when the BW production 

unit was reportedly on site.

• Reportedly a small building on-site was the location of the power supply for the mobile production 

units. An ISG examination of the reported power 

supply building revealed that the building consists 
76

of two small rooms, which site personnel explained 

were constructed for security personnel and technicians. These individuals said that the power supply 

for the site came from the local power grid. However, an external generator for electricity to certain 

places at the site cannot be ruled out.

ISG has determined that the primary warehouse 

has undergone some modifi cations since the date of 

information concerning a transportable BW connection to the facility. This indicates that the building was 

altered, thereby raising the possibility that other less 

detectable modifi cations have occurred:

• A one-meter high concrete wall was discovered 

around the internal perimeter of the building. Site 

personnel report that the wall was built in 1999 to 

prevent seeds from pressing against the sheet metal 

walls.

A tile fl oor was found in one corner of the building, 

indicating that a room had been present and removed. 

Site personnel indicate that an offi ce was present in 

this location, but was removed in 1999 to accommodate the need for greater space required for the seed 

purifi cation activities. 

Al Ahrar Seed Purifi cation Facility, Reported 

Mobile Site. ISG exploited the Al Ahrar seed purifi -

cation facility, the primary candidate for the site in the 

An Numaniyah area that reportedly housed a mobile 

BW agent production unit. Exploitation revealed that, 

although it is operated by the Al Nahrayn Company 

and is part of the seed purifi cation project, it most 

likely did not house mobile production units.

• The facility contains four adjoining warehouses, 

each large enough to accommodate semi trailers; 

however, it was determined that the doorways of 

the warehouses, assessed to have housed production 

units, are too short to accommodate tractor-trailers 

the size of the described mobile fermentation units 

(Figure 4). There were no signs that the doorways 

had been altered. In addition, site personnel deny 

the past presence of trailers with fermentation-like 

equipment. They stated that CEDC employees, 

including individuals allegedly involved in the 

mobile BW program had been to the site as part of 

the seed purifi cation project. A high-bay building 

adjacent to the warehouses contains two legitimate 

seed processing units that are similar to the one unit 

located at the Djerf-al-Nadaf facility.

Investigations of the four remaining reported 

production sites have yielded no evidence of their 

involvement in the mobile BW program:

• Tikrit Industrial Facility Northwest, Reported 

Mobile Site. This site was a reported location 

of two transportable BW plants using the cover 

of seed purifi cation. ISG exploitation of the site 

revealed that the warehouse, which is currently 

used as a storehouse for a construction company, 

was large enough to accommodate tractor trailers 

(Figure 5). However, ISG found no evidence to 

suggest that the building is or was equipped with 

false walls for concealment of any such units. In 

addition, the site personnel explained that the facility had been a plastics factory from the 1980s until 

the construction company took over the grounds. 

Although they had no fi rst-hand historical knowledge of the site, the site personnel stated that the 

facility had no connection to seed purifi cation and 

had not been used as a hide site for tractor trailers.

• Plant Protection Division As Suwayrah Stores, 

Reported Mobile Site. The As Suwayrah Stores was 

identifi ed as the most probable candidate for the 

site in the Al ‘Aziziyah-Sarabadi area. ISG exploitation of the site determined that the facility is a pesticide storage site with no association with the seed 

purifi cation project. Measurements of the suspect 

warehouses indicate that the facility is large enough 

to conceal a mobile BW agent production unit; 

however, ISG has not been able to confi rm if such 

a unit had been present in the past. Site personnel, 

who had been hired after OIF, had no historical 

knowledge of the activities at the facility; however 

Plant Protection Division Management with historical knowledge of the site deny that the facility was 

used to hide vehicles or production equipment.

• Mosul Rail Yards, Reported Mobile Site. The locomotive repair station at the Mosul rail yards reportedly was the location of the single rail-mounted 

BW agent production unit. While this site is not 

directly involved in the seed purifi cation project, the 

current Director General of the Al Nahrayn Seed 

Company stated that the company was ordered to 

conceal seed purifi cation equipment in the rail station during the 1998 Desert Fox campaign. An ISG 

inspection of the facility revealed that it is capable 
77

Biological

of accommodating rail cars. However, long-time 

employees at the rail yard stated that the repair station had never been used to conceal unusual equipment, railcars, or trucks.

• Huwayjah Agricultural Facility, Reported Mobile 

Site. This site, which reportedly housed a BW 

production unit in the late 1990s, was completely 

destroyed by looters between 10 May and 26 

November 2003. Al Nahrayn offi cials confi rmed 

that their site in Huwayjah had been destroyed 

by looters and deny the past presence of mobile 

platforms for BW agent production. They stated 

that, while this site was an agricultural processing 

facility, it had no connection to the seed purifi cation 

project.

ISG exploited three additional sites, but were unable 

to ascertain their link to the mobile BW program due 

to post-OIF activities, such as turnover of site personnel and looting:

• Al Mishraq Sulfur Facility, Possible Reported Dispersal Site. ISG assesses that the Al Mishraq Sulfur 

Facility could have been a dispersal site for the rail 

mounted BW production unit housed in Mosul. ISG 

exploitation of this site revealed no evidence of the 

unit, and site personnel claimed that they had never 

seen rail cars with fermentation-like equipment in 

them.

• Habbaniyah Barracks, Reported Dispersal Site.

Reportedly, containers of BW material from the 

mobile units were concealed from UN inspectors by 

burial at the Habbaniyah Barracks. ISG exploited 

the site to fi nd evidence to support this claim; however, looters had removed, among other things, a 

fence that reportedly would have provided a marking to assist in locating the burial site.

• Baghdad Unidentifi ed Facility ‘Ali Ad Dayyan. 

This site, also known as Buetha, is along the Tigris 

just south of Baghdad and was reported to have 

been associated with the BW program personnel. ISG exploited the site and determined that it 

had been an orange grove and chicken farm at one 

time but could not confi rm an association with the 

mobile BW program. However, locals stated that it 

had belonged to the Iraqi Government until 1998.

Other Leads

In addition to information now judged unreliable from 

a key source, ISG also has sought to vet the reporting by other sources who indicated before OIF that 

Iraq had a mobile capability. ISG has not been able to 

corroborate this reporting, and these individuals are 

believed to be now outside of Iraq. Since it began its 

investigation, ISG also received information on a possible BW mobile capability from two other sources 

separate from those mentioned by the pre-OIF 

sources, but neither lead has confi rmed the existence 

of a mobile BW agent production capability:

• Nu’man ‘Ali Muhammad Al Tikriti, director of 

the M16 section of the IIS, made a reference to 

the MIC in 2000 having at least one transportable 

facility for work on either biological or chemical 

warfare agents, according to a former IIS offi cer. 

Nu’man denies knowledge of any attempts by Iraq 

to manufacture or use mobile facilities for a BW or 

CW program.

• A former senior offi cer in the Iraqi Army told us 

that he heard from his nephew, who was involved 

in making weapons, that Iraq had “portable biological factories or laboratories” making BW agents in 

1998. Debriefi ngs of the nephew have determined 

that he had hearsay information regarding movement of prohibited BW-related equipment to evade 

UNSCOM inspections. He claimed to have had no 

knowledge of a mobile BW agent production capability. 

Individuals Debriefed

ISG has debriefed key individuals and visited key 

sites regarding the planning, design, manufacture, 

and operation of the reported transportable BW agent 

production plants.

Some of these individuals were key players directly 

involved with running the BW program, whereas 

others were either heads or associated with specifi c areas of the BW program. ISG interviewed 
78

key fi gures, such as the suspected head of the BW 

program, the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture, 

the National Monitoring Directorate representative 

to the Ministry of Industrialization and Minerals, the 

director of the MIC, the former Minister of Industrialization and Minerals, the Minister of Transportation 

and Communication that had involvement in the BW 

program, and other important individuals that had 

suspected involvement with Iraq’s BW program.

In the area of mobile production equipment and 

facilities, there were a number of key individuals 

interviewed. Some of these individuals included the 

Director of IIS Directorate of Criminology M16 that 

reportedly discussed mobile platforms in 2000, the 

director of a possible dispersal site for rail mobile 

units, managers of a reported mobile BW agent production site, and a former military offi cer who allegedly knew that Iraq had “portable biological factories 

or laboratories” making BW agents in 1998.
79

Biological

Annex D

Trailers Suspected of Being 

Mobile BW Agent Production 

Units

ISG assesses the capability of two mobile trailers 

with tanks or suspected fermentors on board that 

were recovered near Irbil and Mosul in 2003 as 

impractical for biological agent production and 

almost certainly designed and built for the generation of hydrogen.

Background

Iraq’s Consideration of Mobile BW Agent Production Systems. Several events underpin the continuing 

suspicion that Iraq possessed mobile facilities and 

laboratories.

• In the 1980s, the Technical Research Center (TRC) 

at Al Salman purchased a mobile laboratory for 

forensic purposes in support of a proposed meeting 

of the Arab League or Arab Games in Baghdad. The 

meeting did not take place in Iraq, but Al Salman 

retained the laboratory.

• Later, in 1987 Dr. Rihab, head of the BW bacteriological group, and Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al 

Sa’adi, MIC First Deputy and right hand man of 

Husayn Kamil, discussed the possibility of developing a transportable system for the production of 

BW agents. The idea was largely Al Sa’adi’s; Rihab 

rejected the proposal in favor of the more pedestrian route that, in time, led to the construction of 

Al Hakam, Iraq’s major BW research, development, 

testing, production, and storage facility 

(see Figure 1).

Discovery and Initial Exploitation of Suspect 

Trailer-Borne Equipment

It was against this background that Coalition Forces 

discovered two trailers in Northern Iraq in April and 

May 2003. In April 2003, a trailer (trailer 1) was 

recovered after its discovery in Irbil. This trailer 

appeared to be complete with all equipment fi tted. A 

second, similar trailer (trailer 2) was later identifi ed 

and recovered in May 2003 from a site adjacent to the 

Al Kindi research facility at Mosul. Some items of 

equipment were missing from this trailer bed.

Initial Assessments and Sample Analysis. A team of 

military experts conducted a preliminary technical 

fi eld investigation of trailer 1 soon after its capture. 

They assessed the trailer to be part of a possible 

Iraqi mobile BW weapon production system, with 

its equipment being capable of supporting a limited 

biological batch production process. A second examination was undertaken by a team of scientifi c experts, 

after Al Kindi personnel suggested the trailers were 

for hydrogen production. Their report concluded, 

“The trailers have equipment and components possibly compatible with biological agent production 

and/or chemical processes that might include hydrogen production.”

ISG Assessment of the Trailers

In response to questions raised by these earlier 

reports, a team, comprised of specialists in fermentation technology and bio-manufacturing, conducted a 

comparative assessment of the trailers with respect to 

the two major uses postulated:

• A clandestine mobile BW agent production 

platform.

• Field units for hydrogen production.

This assessment focuses on Trailer 1 because it 

appeared to have a complete set of equipment. The 

‘reactor vessel’ was considered to be the key component of the system for evaluation because its purpose 

as either a bio-fermentor or a chemical reaction vessel 

for hydrogen generation, would resolve the debate 

over the function of the whole assembly of equipment 

mounted on Trailer 1.

The Trailers as a Clandestine BW Agent 

Production Platform

The crucial item of equipment for the production of 

BW agents is the fermentor. This provides and maintains an aseptic and controlled, optimal environment 

for growth of the selected microorganism. A fermentor, regardless of the particular microorganism being 

produced, be it BW agent or not, must possess certain 
80

essential design features in order to achieve these criteria. The most critical of these is the ‘sterile integrity’ 

of the fermentor and its associated pipework, in order 

to maintain a monoculture and prevent the ingress 

of ‘foreign’ microorganisms that might outgrow and 

displace the required agent.

ISG has found no evidence to support the view that 

the equipment had a clandestine role in the production of BW agents. ISG judges the equipment’s confi guration makes its use as a fermentor impractical 

for the following reasons:

• There is a critical absence of instrumentation for 

process monitoring and control of the process.

• The positioning of the inlets and outlets on the reactor make even the most basic functions (such as 

fi lling completely, emptying completely, and purging completely) either impractical or impossible to 

perform.

Figure 1. Recovered trailers allegedly for

hydrogen production.

• The lack of the ports required to introduce reagents 

exacerbates this problem. These aspects of the 

design alone would render fermentation almost 

impossible to control.

• The low-pressure air storage system capacity is 

inadequate to provide the volume of compressed air 

required to operate the fermentation process over a 

complete aerobic production cycle. In addition, it is 

not practical to charge and use the existing compressed gas storage with nitrogen or carbon dioxide 

for anaerobic fermentation. Similarly, the collection 

system for effl uent gas would be wholly inadequate 

to deal with the volume of effl uent gas produced 

during a complete production cycle.

• Harvesting any product would be diffi cult

and dangerous.
81

Biological

Fermentor 

Design

Feature

Critical 

Requirement

Yes/No

Present 

on Trailer 

Vessel

Yes/No

Required 

Reconfi guration

Major/Minor

System 

sterilization Yes No Major

Media/water 

sterilization Yes No Major

Aseptic 

growth

conditions

Yes No Major

Agitator/stirrer Yes No Major

Aeration 

sparger Yes No Minor

Process

control

instrumentation & sensors

Yes No Major

Addition and 

sampling ports Yes No Major

Sight glasses Yes No Major

Provision of 

sterile air Yes No Major

Sterile 

fi ltration of 

off-gas

Yes No Major

Provision 

of steam for 

sterilization 

purposes

Yes No Major

Table 1 illustrates the assessment of the ‘reactor vessel’ and associated equipment system 

on trailer 1 against the essential features of an 

effective fermentor. (Note: there are additional, 

minor design inconsistencies, which are not 

included in this table.)

• A working reactor of the size of that on the trailers could produce only around 100 liters of x10 

concentrated BW agent per week, not enough to fi ll 

a single missile warhead.

• In May 2003, analysis was carried out on seven 

samples taken from key equipment locations on the 

trailer, including powder and slurry taken from the 

‘reactor vessel’. No evidence of BW organisms was 

detected. The complete absence of proteins and the 

minute amounts of phosphorus and sulfur present 

were deemed inconsistent with normal 

bio-production.

The Trailers as Field Units for Hydrogen Gas 

Production

After re-examining the equipment found on trailers 

in northern Iraq and reviewing previous reporting, 

documents, and results of chemical and biological analysis, ISG judges that the Al Kindi General 

Establishment at Mosul designed and built the two 

trailer-borne equipment systems as hydrogen generators for Republican Guard artillery units for use 

with radio-sonde balloons. Although the equipment is 

poorly constructed, it is consistent with the hydrogen 

generation process detailed in documents from the Al 

Kindi Company.

The equipment on Trailer 1, although poorly 

constructed, is consistent with the hydrogen 

generation process because:

• The reactor design and sizing, large entry port to 

“load” the reactor, the scoop to “load” the reactor and aluminum hydroxide found in the bottom 

of the reactor are all consistent with production of 

hydrogen. Hydrogen may be produced by reacting sodium hydroxide with aluminum powder and 

water. The rate of reaction, and the temperature and 

pressure in the reactor is controlled by the rate at 

which water is added. The by-product is aluminum 

hydroxide.

• A peristaltic pump to compress the effl uent gas is 

necessary for handling fl ammable products.

• A high-capacity cooling system for the reactor is 

consistent with the duty associated with a strongly 

exothermic process, such as that used for the production of hydrogen.

• A pressure-relief valve with a vent extending above 

the vehicle, spark resistant lighting, and a telescopic 

lightning arrestor found on the completed trailer 

indicate precautions taken with the handling of a 

fl ammable, lighter than air gas, such as hydrogen.

Moreover, reports and other documents provided 

by high-ranking offi cials from Al Kindi, detailing 

milestones in the manufacture and testing of the 

trailers, are consistent with the reporting on their 

stage of construction. For example, the date of the 
82

Iraqi letter requesting an extension of the contract due 

to late delivery of a ‘reactor vessel’ corresponds with 

the observed lack of construction work on Trailer 2.

• The two trailers were located in late May 2002 at 

the Al Kindi facility in Mosul. Reporting indicated 

that at least one of the trailers had arrived on the 

site as a bare chassis fi tted with a fl oor/bed. Over a 

period of 10 months between May 2002 and March 

2003, both trailers had had suffi cient equipment 

added to be described as two ‘possible transportable BW production related trailers’.

• The location of the trailers, together with the 

addition and removal of structural features and 

equipment during their construction and testing, 

is consistent with information in Iraqi reports and 

documents.

Iraqis have stated the trailers were constructed to 

provide a mobile capability for hydrogen gas production. Several documents give credence to this claim.

• Al Kindi in its submission for the December 2002 

semi-annual declaration to UNMOVIC stated a 

“production station for H2

 gas (see Figure 2).”

• A letter from the Al Kindi General Company to 

the ‘American Authority’ in Mosul, explains that 

the trailers were manufactured as ‘hydrogen fi eld 

production systems’ for the Republican Guard.

• Copies of the original contract and associated documents that describe the requirements, specifi cations 

and testing were provided by sources that had fi rst 

hand knowledge of the manufacture and use of the 

trailers.

• The Al Kindi Material describes the process 

employed on the trailers as an attempt to improve 

upon one originally developed in Russia for the 

production of hydrogen for use in meteorological 

balloons.

• It is interesting to note that the Al Kindi material 

also includes comments (some of which are not particularly favorable) received from the Iraqi Republican Guard Artillery in relation to the suitability 

of the process for the job it would be required to 

Figure 2. Document denoting alleged “hydrogen 

production” function.
83

Biological

do. In summary, their conclusion is that the process 

plant/trailer combination is too bulky and that the 

trailer is not rugged enough for the process to be 

considered a truly mobile “fi eld” system. A smaller 

capacity plant might be more compatible with the 

needs of meteorological units requiring self-suffi -

ciency in terms of hydrogen availability.

• The level of detail provided in the Al Kindi Material makes a highly credible case for hydrogen 

generation. It would have been extremely diffi cult 

to fabricate data to this level of detail.

Detailed Assessment Of The Suspect Trailers 

Recovered From Irbil and Mosul 2003

Evaluation of the Possible Use of the Trailers as a 

clandestine BW Agent Production platform

Air Supply

Air is used in the process to provide aeration for the 

reactor, for transferring liquids as required throughout 

the process, and after the production cycle for purging vessels and pipework that have had contact with 

the inoculum, the culture broth, and/or contaminated 

gases. Air is drawn into a low pressure (0-40 bar) 

compressor set via a simple activated carbon fi lter 

F-2, compressed and fed to the integral storage reservoir (S-11) of the compressor set. Compressed air 

from the compressor reservoir is fed either directly to 

the reactor via vessel T-3 or to a bank of fi ve 40l “K” 

bottles (S-1 to S-5). The air stored in this cylinder 

bank is available as an emergency reserve for use to 

shunt liquids around the process as required without 

having to rely on the compressor set. The air supply 

system may be vented via Valve V-3.

Major Components of the Trailers

The Trailers. Both trailers had been used previously, 

probably as transporters for heavy construction 

equipment and the like. They show signs of damage 

and wear, such as a heavily dented and uneven truck 

bed. They are of different lengths. There is a tube 

frame with horizontal welded steel straps to support a 

canvas cover. The frame also supports light fi ttings.

The Equipment. The principal items of equipment 

mounted on the Irbil trailer are:

• Chiller. The forward portion of the trailer is almost 

entirely occupied by a large chiller unit, capable 

of pumping copious volumes of cold water through 

a pipe circuit to other items on the trailers. The 

chiller is powered by electricity.

• Electrical Switch Panel. On the side of the trailer, 

there is an electrical control box.

• Low Pressure Air Compressor. An electrical air 

compressor fed from the atmosphere through a 

small fi lter is attached to a reservoir.

• Bank of 5 Air Storage Cylinders. The pipe work 

from the air compressor connects with 5 fi xed air 

bottles.

• Large Water Tank. Near the center of the trailer 

is a large stainless steel water tank that connects 

to the water pumping system. The tank is provided 

with a loose fi tting lid. It is not sealed.

• 2 Feed Tanks. After passing through a very small 

fi lter, water can be metered and pumped into two 

tanks.

• Reactor Vessel. To one side toward the rear of the 

trailer there is a reactor fabricated in stainless steel 

by the State Establishment for Heavy Equipments 

Engineering (SEHEE), Baghdad 

(see Figure 3 (a) and (b)).

• High-Pressure Compressor. After cooling, the gas 

produced by the reactor is compressed in a highpressure compressor housed in a strong steel box.

• Bank of 5 Product Storage Cylinders. The 

compressed gas is fed into 5 storage bottles, held in 

a box that can be rotated to ground level to assist 

with handling of the product (see Figure 4).
84

Comment and assessment

• The simple fi lter F-2 is not of a design that will 

provide sterile compressed air to the process. A 

HEPA fi lter could be fi tted to address this problem, 

although this would not be a minor modifi cation.

• Large amounts of compressed air are required for 

each production cycle (see 2.6) and the risk of contamination (failure) of any given batch is increased 

if process air is not sterilized.

Figure 3 (b). Trailer 1 data plate on reactor vessel.

• The low pressure compressor set is of standard 

reciprocating design and will not provide “oil-free” 

air. Oil-free air compressors are often specifi ed in 

fermentation installations though in this particular 

concept (i.e. the production of “fi re-and-forget” BW 

agents), it is unlikely to be a critical factor.

• These trailers were not designed with anaerobic fermentations in mind. Although it would be possible 

(but extremely inconvenient) to connect nitrogen 

cylinders to the sparge system, it is noteworthy that 

no provision has been made on the trailers for the 

Figure 3 (a). Trailer 1 reactor vessel. Figure 4. Trailer 1 box for holding product ‘K’ bottles.
85

Biological

storage of gas cylinders other than the fi ve designated for air storage. These cylinders are permanent 

fi xtures and cannot easily be removed/substituted 

with other gas cylinders containing N2

 or CO2. ISG 

concludes that anaerobic fermentations (e.g. Cl. 

botulinum and Cl. perfringens) would not normally 

be conducted on the trailer.

Water Supply

Water tank T-1 provides water for dilution of medium 

concentrate, for wash-down, for charging the chilled 

water system, and for chiller system make-up. Dilution and/or wash-down water can be introduced to the 

process by 2 routes:

• Indirectly, via pump P-1 and valve V-8 into vessel 

T-2. This route could be used for providing process 

water for medium concentrate dilution (see 2.4) to 

the reactor. When full, vessel T-2 is isolated from 

the system (at V-8), vented (at V-9), and its contents 

delivered via fl owmeter FM-1, cartridge fi lter F-1, 

and positive displacement pump P-2 into the reactor 

(T-4). [N.B. The reactor must also be vented during 

this process via the overpressure relief assembly 

bypass valve (V-15)].

• Directly (and quickly): into vessel T-3 via valve V-7 

and pump P-1. This route would be used for providing water for wash-down or cleaning, and possibly 

as part of the postproduction purging cycle.

Comment and assessment

• The simple cartridge fi lter (F-1) is not of a design 

that will provide sterile water to the process. This 

fi lter assembly is located at very low level. The 

whole fi lter assembly would need to be repositioned 

and repiped if a sterile water fi lter is to be fi tted. 

This is not a minor modifi cation.

• Vessels T-2 and T3 lack any form of liquid level 

indication and will be diffi cult to use when fed by 

pump P-1.

Chilled Water System

The chiller system provides cooling water to the reactor, the gas-drying condenser, and the high-pressure 

gas compressor.

Prior to fi rst operation, the chiller circuit must be 

fi lled with water from the water storage vessel T-1. 

When this has been done the system should require 

little by way of make-up water because it is a sealed 

system and little evaporation can occur. Cooled water 

is circulated around the system by pump P-3

Comment and assessment

• Notwithstanding the other loads on this process 

(H.P. compressor and effl uent gas cooling), ISG 

believes that the cooling load presented by a relatively small fermentation operation at perhaps 30o

C 

- 40o

C (a typical temperature range for B. anthracis) does not justify a cooling plant of the size 

specifi ed for the process as found.

• However, it would be fair to say that the output of 

this unit can be modulated and the fabrication shop 

may not have had the luxury of choice and was 

obliged to use equipment available at the time.

Metered Water Supply System (Vessel T-2)

The metered water supply system comprises a vented 

supply vessel (T-2), a fl owmeter, an in-line cartridge 

fi lter (F-1), and a dosing pump (P-2) (see Figure 5).

Note that vessel T-2 can only receive water from the 

main water tank. It may receive other liquids through 

the vent valve V-9 so long as the vessel is aspirated 

via vessel T-3 and the air supply line vent valve V-3. 

The valve arrangement does not allow liquids to be 

received from tank T-3.

Comment and assessment

• Vessel T-2 is not equipped with any form of liquid 

level indication and will be diffi cult to operate 

because of this.
86

• The glass fi ber cartridge fi lter F-1 will not remove 

all microbial contaminants from the water supply 

and therefore the process water treated by this 

means will not be sterile. In ISG’s view, neither 

the medium concentrate nor the inoculum should 

be introduced to the process via valve V-9. The 

medium concentrate is a complex medium and may 

contain aggregates that will collect on and bind the 

in-line cartridge fi lter F-1. The inoculum will have 

been prepared under sterile conditions and it makes 

no sense to fi lter things that are already sterile.

• A large amount of process water is required for 

each production cycle (as dilution water and for 

system purge). The risk of contamination (failure) 

of any given batch is increased if the process water 

is not sterile. In this regard, it is important to ensure 

that the initial seed culture contains suffi cient viable 

organisms in log phase to ensure that potential contaminant microorganisms cannot compete.

• Vessel T-2 would be ineffective if used for dilution 

water either. Running the water through a fi lter that 

is incapable of removing any solids smaller than 

fi ne sand particles will make little difference to the 

fermentation performance. Some 360-390 liters of 

dilution water is required for each production run. 

Given that the capacity of vessel T-2 is 166 liters, 

this vessel would need to be recharged twice during 

the operation. The maximum fl ow rate for the 

metering pump is only 30 liters/minute. This makes 

charging the reactor an unnecessarily lengthy 

operation.

Figure 5. Trailer 1 water fi lter.

Inoculum and concentrated culture medium vessel 

(T-3)

Vessel T-3 is piped up to receive process water (see 

2.2). It may also act as a transfer vessel for the inoculum and the growth medium (possibly as a concentrate) via valve V-12. If used in this way, vessel T-3 

must fi rst be aspirated through valve V-3 on the air 

line. The inoculum and the growth medium would be 

transported to the trailer in pressurizable containers 

with suitable fi ttings such that the contents could be 

“blown” into T-3 by using either a foot pump or from 

the onboard air storage via a fl exible hose.

During the production cycle, vessel T-3 needs to be 

empty because all process air required by the reactor 

has to be passed through it.

Comment and assessment

• The purpose of vessel T-3 is not entirely clear. It 

is a totally closed, unlagged tank having neither a 

dedicated vent nor a liquid level indicator. A diffi cult vessel to use.

• The only ways to vent this vessel are via valve V-3 

on the air supply line or through the reactor and out 

via the over-pressure bypass valve V-15. Neither 

method would be available during the production 

cycle because the air supply system will already be 

in use.

• As piped up, liquid contained in vessel T-3 cannot 

be passed to vessel T-2. This means that neither 

the medium concentrate nor the inoculum can be 

metered into the reactor. Also, it means that the 

only entry point by which concentrated medium 

and/or inoculum can gain access to the process is 

via vessel T-3.

• Steam and/or hot water required (provided from a 

stand-alone utilities vehicle) would be admitted to 

the process via valve V-12.

• There is no convenient coupling present at valve V3 for attaching temporary hoses for passing steam, 

inoculum, or concentrated growth medium into 

vessel T-3.
87

Biological

• During the production cycle, vessel T-3 must be 

empty because process aeration is required.

• It is assumed that the air feed pipe does not extend 

into vessel T-3 because, if it did, the vessel would 

be impossible to fi ll.

Reactor

The reactor (vessel T-4) is a vessel fabricated in 

30mm 316 stainless steel and is of an unusual design 

for the cultivation of microorganisms in that its 

principle features are:

• A fl at base and a hemispherical top

• With the exception of what would be the air sparge 

inlet and the drain point, all other connections and 

the access way are side mounted

• The vessel jacket (3mm 316 stainless steel) completely covers the top of the reactor within but the 

base of the vessel is not cooled.

• There is no means of assessing liquid level in the 

vessel.

The vessel is provided with an air supply, an overpressure safety relief valve plus manual bypass, a 

drain point, an effl uent gas outlet, a temperature 

gauge, 2 pressure gauges, and a spare unused instrument stub. The vessel jacket is provided with two 

chilled water inputs, one cooling water return port, a 

temperature gauge, and a pressure gauge.

If the process were to be used as a mobile BW agent 

production unit, vessel T-4 would be used for the 

production of the BW agent. The inoculum (prepared 

elsewhere and delivered to the Trailer), the growth 

medium (prepared elsewhere and delivered to the 

Trailer probably would be supplied as a concentrate) 

and dilution water are fed into the vessel. Stirring and 

aeration of the culture is achieved by injecting low 

pressure compressed air into the reactor (presumably 

through a sparge ring). Used air could escape from 

the reactor through the effl uent gas outlet connection.

Comment and assessment

• Reactor capacity. The dimensions of both reactors (the Mosul Trailer and the Irbil Trailer) were 

taken, and these measurements are represented on 

a diagram in the appendix. The reactors are, for 

all intents and purposes, of the same capacity. The 

internal height of the reactor is 1873mm and its 

nominal capacity is 864.5l. Bearing in mind that 

the placement of the reactor connections limits the 

extent to which the reactor can be fi lled in practice, 

the total usable capacity of the vessel (i.e. to the 

level of the effl uent gas outlet) as 633l. All fermentations are prone to foaming. A sight-glass permits 

operators to monitor the foaming and hence control 

it by adding reagent or adjusting other parameters. 

This design has no sight-glass. Under no circumstances should any liquid be allowed to enter the 

gas recovery system as this would, after a short 

time cause the catastrophic failure of the high pressure compressor. This imposes a limitation of the 

maximum volume at which the reactor can be operated. ISG would expect the working volume of this 

vessel to be in the region of 450l (approximately 

70% of the total usable volume of the reactor)

(see Figure 6).

• Aeration & stirring. The air supply pipe penetrates 

the vessel only to a depth of approximately 973mm 

leaving a distance of 900mm between the end of 

the air supply pipe and the base of the reactor. The 

sparge tube must extend to the base of the reactor 

if any aeration and stirring is to be achieved, but no 

sparge assembly or even a fl exible hose of suitable 

diameter has been found. In one Trailer (Mosul 

- the less complete of the two), the air supply pipe 

is threaded presumably to receive an air sparge ring 

attachment whereas in the other Irbil Trailer the air 

supply pipe has no thread or other fi tting. That there 

should be a difference between the sparge tubes 

is somewhat puzzling. The most effi cient way to 

achieve maximum oxygen transfer rate is to use an 

impeller (mechanical stirrer) under turbulent fl ow 

conditions. Direct air injection alone will provide 

some mixing of the reactor contents but is not an 

effi cient method of transferring oxygen into the 

culture medium. The consequence of this is that this 

reactor will require much more air than would be 

necessary under the impeller option (see Effl uent 

Gas Collection).
88

• Vessel venting. The vent valve of the reactor is not 

fi tted at the top of the vessel as would normally be 

expected but rather at the side 1,260 mm above the 

base of the reactor. This distance corresponds to the 

highest venting points of the reactor (the emergency 

pressure relief outlet and the effl uent gas offtake). 

This means that the reactor cannot be fi lled to 

capacity (e.g. for cleaning). As noted in above, the 

total useable volume of the reactor is 633 liters and 

the useable working volume will be 450 liters.

• Antifoam addition. There is no antifoam addition 

point on the reactor and no sight-glass by which to 

gauge whether or not antifoam addition is required. 

Although antifoam may be incorporated in the 

culture medium as a standard component medium 

prior to its introduction to the reactor, it is unusual 

to fi nd that the production cycle can be completed 

without the addition of further amounts of antifoam. The construction of the reactor indicates that 

this process will be conducted at pressures up to 10 

bar gauge; under such conditions the culture would 

be particularly prone to foaming at certain times 

during a normal production cycle (e.g. at start-up 

of the effl uent gas collection compressor and at 

sample collection).

Figure 6. The inside of the reactor vessel on trailer 2.

• Process monitoring and control. The reactor vessel 

is not provided with any probe port(s), or a sampling port. An assessment in a previous report postulates that the operators of the plant would run the 

process according to a standard operating procedure 

and would require no knowledge of the agent being 

produced. pH change is normally monitored during 

the production cycle. Culture mediums are usually 

buffered to cushion the effect of microbial activity 

as the production cycle progresses but, more often 

than not, the addition of acid or alkali is usually 

required at some point during the cycle. An addition port would be required on the reactor for this 

purpose. Dissolved oxygen concentration is also an 

important parameter (particularly in cases where 

the aeration system is not effi cient. A probe location 

point is required for this. ISG maintains that without these monitoring and control items, any fermentation would be almost impossible to control.

• The level of instrumentation provided is insuffi cient 

for the purpose of producing BW agents on a routine basis. Without sight glasses or level indicators 

it is impossible to assess liquid levels in any of the 

vessels. Furthermore, the process would need to be 

pressurized (layout and disposition of vessels will 

not permit gravity fl ow from one place to another) 

and as such would be very hazardous to operate 

when producing highly toxic BW agents. Technical 

operators would have to be aware of the nature of 

the work they were conducting.

• Reactor harvest and cleaning. Reactor discharge 

takes place via drain valve V-14 into a length of 

1⁄2” (inner diameter) pipe extending over the edge 

of the trailer (see Figure 7). It would be normal to 

see some form of coupling or fl ange on the discharge pipe but the end is not even threaded. As it 

stands, the only way to transfer the reactor contents 

would be to push a fl exible hose over the discharge 

pipe outlet. The reactor contents would have to 

be “blown” by compressed air to a container or 

equipment of some kind, either on the ground or on 

another vehicle—making it an unnecessarily risky 

operation. There are no suitable receptacles on the 

trailer. The drain valve is sited some 2cm above the 

fl oor of the vessel. This means that the reactor can 
89

Biological

Figure 8. Solids in the bottom of the 

reactor vessel on trailer 1.

Figure 7. Outlet valve and pipe on 

the reactor vessel of trailer 1.

never be completely emptied. To carry over some 

of the culture to the next production cycle will 

not cause any problem (apart from a reduction in 

productivity) so long as the culture remains sterile. 

Where it is critical is in the event of a contaminated 

or failed batch. Removing by hand the highly toxic 

remnants of the failed batch from the reactor would 

be no easy task. At Al Hakam, Iraq’s principal BW 

facility, the production run failure rate was reported 

as running at 10 to 20 per cent. The production conditions were far better than they would be on these 

trailers, so ISG would anticipate high failure rates 

using this process as a mobile BW agent production 

platform.

• Sampling. No dedicated sample port is provided. 

The only means of sampling mid-cycle would 

be from the drain valve located at the base of the 

reactor. The dispositions of the drain valve and 

the outfl ow of the discharge pipe are such that two 

operatives would be required to perform the sampling operation (see Figure 8).

Productivity Issues

With a working volume of only some 450l, this reactor could hardly be described as a production scale 

unit. Each cycle will be approximately 48 hours in 

duration (a culture time of 36 hours plus 12 hours 

turnaround) and would be expected to yield only 

some 45 liters of 10x concentrated BW agent. On this 

basis, 2 production cycles (at least 4 days’ production) 

would be required to produce suffi cient BW agent to 

charge a single R-400 bomb (Fill capacity of 90l).

Effl uent Gas Handling

Effl uent gases from the reactor exit the vessel and 

are cooled by passage through the condenser/cooler 

X-2. Condensate is collected in the knock-out pot 

T-5 and the dried gases are passed to a high pressure 

compressor via a particulates fi lter F-3. The gases are 
90

compressed to approximately 100 bar and passed to a 

storage bank comprising fi ve 40l “K” bottles (S-6—S10) such that the process as a whole presents a zero 

effl uent signature (i.e. all air input during complete 

cycle, less an amount of oxygen removed for respiration, but plus, the carbon dioxide respiration product). 

Some personnel who have exploited the equipment 

maintain that if this system was to produce BW agent 

then the effl uent gases would be collected in order to 

reduce the risk of detection.

Comment and assessment

The notion of collecting and storing effl uent gases 

from this process is a completely impractical and 

unnecessary proposition and is discounted. ISG found 

no testimony or evidence, physical, documentary or 

circumstantial, to support any such procedure.

• Air requirements. Conducted at ambient pressure, 

a mechanically stirred reactor will normally require 

an air fl ow of 0.5 x the reactor working volume per 

minute at the start of the process cycle. The air rate 

will increase to around 1.0 volume per minute as 

the cell density increases. In this case, the reactor working volume is 450 liters and if a 36-hour 

fermentation run is assumed at an average air fl ow 

rate of 0.75 reactor working volume per minute, the 

total air consumed for the complete cycle will be 

450 x 0.75 x 36 x 60l = 729,000l (36m3

/hr). Note 

that this estimate is conservative because it assumes 

air rates characteristic of mechanically stirred vessels. The reactor on the trailer has no stirrer.

• Storage capacity. In contrast to this, the 5 x 40l 

“K” Bottles, each pressurized to 100 Bar, would 

hold the equivalent of a combined storage ability 

of (5 x 40) x 100 = 20,000l of air from the reactor 

if at atmospheric pressure. When set against the 

729,000l of effl uent gases produced during a single 

production cycle, the effl uent gas storage system 

capacity falls far short of the duty required.

• It is unknown what would happen to “K” bottles 

once pressurized. The operators would still have to 

take them away for discharge.

Evaluation of Other Possible Uses of the Trailers

Although a number of uses have been proposed for 

the trailers, ISG found no evidence to support those 

uses. It is the view of the ISG that none is feasible.

• A number of potential uses have been suggested for 

the trailers:

 —Possible Reverse Osmosis Water Purifi cation Unit 

(ROWPU)

 —Possible Chlorinization [sic] Plant

 —Possible Chiller Plant

 —Possible Desalinization [sic] Plant

 —Possible CW Production (least likely)

Although the chiller unit could obviously be used on 

a stand-alone basis, there is no evidence to support 

any of the remainder, thus they are discounted.

Evaluation of the Technical Detail in Documents 

Pertaining to the Trailers Recovered From the Al 

Kindi General Establishment

Process Outline

The process is a hydrogen generator. For the production of 1m3

 of hydrogen, the Russian equipment 

required 1Kg Al powder, 100g of NaOH (solid 

crushed), and 6l of water. The reactor size was 60l. 

Rudimentary means of cooling of reactor contents 

and product H2

 was provided. The Iraqis identifi ed the 

following problems with the Russian system:

• Thermal runaway of the reactor (lack of effective 

cooling and temperature readouts).

• Lack of control of gas fl ow during hydrogen generation because of the use of fl exible hoses and lack 

of pressure regulation systems (operator hazard 

judged “high”).
91

Biological

• Process was skid mounted and was heavy and diffi cult to handle.

• Russian version of the process was suitable only for 

fi lling balloons directly, there being no gas storage 

capability.

• There was no pressure relief valve (PRV) on the 

reactor.

The Iraqis set about designing and building an 

improved version of the Russian equipment in order 

to overcome the above limitations. Specifi cations of 

the major equipment items are listed.

Major Equipment Items

Main Reactor

Produced by Al Nasr Al Azim Company in stainless steel 316; pressure tested to 16 Bar gauge; wall 

thickness 30mm; reactor internal diameter 800mm; 

height 1,150mm; manway access diameter 400mm; 2 

x pressure gauges; 1 x temp gauge; 1 x safety valve; 

gas draw-off pipe diameter 1⁄2 “ stainless steel; reactor 

jacket fabricated in stainless steel 304 thickness 3mm; 

annular depth 100mm; height 1250mm; cooling water 

inlet/outlet diameter 2”; 1 x temp gauge; 1 x pressure 

gauge; reactor gas draw-off pipe contained within 

cooled water jacket extension; complete assembly 

mounted on 1,500 x 1,500 s/s316 baseplate with 

height of 30 mm.

High Pressure Air Compressor

Diaphragm type with capacity of 4-10 ft3

/min at 400 

Bar. Fed by gas from the reactor after having passed 

through a condenser stage to remove water vapor and 

a particle fi lter. After compression, the gas is fed to 

fi lling pipes via a pressure regulator valve.

Water addition system (to reactor)

High pressure pump at 30 Bar is used for this purpose. Water can be drawn from either the main tank 

(working volume 2,500 liters) or from the secondary 

tank (working volume 100 liters). All water passing 

to the main reactor is measured by an in-line water 

meter.

Air Bottle Storage System (20 Bar)

5 x K Bottles provided to supply air. This system is 

connected to the secondary tank (working capacity 

100 liters).

Chilled Water System

Twin cooler/4 x Fan assembly. Output 35 cooling tons 

with an outlet temperature of 5o

C-10oC. Motor rated 

at 35 HP DWM Kaplan. Circulation pump capacity is 

40m3

/hr.

Motor Control Center

Contains all switches, starters, relays, and ancillary 

equipment necessary for the operation, monitoring, 

and control of the process.

Trailer

The entire plant is mounted on a trailer (12m x 3m) 

and 4m high (see Figures 9 and 10).

Process Description

This is a batch process designed to produce suffi cient 

H2

 to fi ll 5 x 40l “K” Bottles to a pressure of between 

45-50 Bar. This requires 10-12kg of Aluminum 

powder (200-300 micron), 1-1.5kg fl aked/granulated 

NaOH, and 25-30 liters of water.

Aluminum powder is distributed in an even layer over 

the base of the reactor and the NaOH layered over it. 

The reactor is sealed and water is added according to 

the following schedule:

• 5 liters (monitoring increase in pressure to between 

1-2 Bar).

• 5 liters (monitoring pressure rise to between 

3-3.5 Bar).

• 5 liters (monitor pressure to 4 Bar). Start draw-off 

and compress the gas to the storage cylinders 

for 3 hours.

• Add the fi nal 10 liters of water and continue drawing off the gas evolved until a cylinder pressure of 

45-50 Bar is reached. Reactor temperature should 

not be allowed to exceed 50o

C during the above 

procedure—cooling water is normally only used in 

the summer months because it slows down

the reaction.
92

The high-pressure compressor is set to provide 

compressed hydrogen at 45 Bar to the 5 “K” Bottles. 

On completion of fi lling, the fi ller regulator valve is 

closed and the compressor switched off. The reactor and process pipework are depressurized and the 

whole system vented to air.

After every 2 or 3 runs, the residue (a mixture of 

NaOH/Al(OH)3

/Al) remaining at the bottom of the 

reactor is removed and discarded.

Process Trials

On 29 December 2002, the process was trialed at the 

Al Kindi Company in the presence of representative from the Republican Guard Artillery Trials and 

Acceptance Section. 5 cylinders were fi lled to a pressure of 50 Bar. The hydrogen was used to infl ate and 

deploy a meteorological balloon (volume 2.5-3.3m3

) 

loaded with radio and radar defl ection equipment. The 

process was signed off and handed over on 11/3/2003.

Cost

250 million Iraqi Dinars for each trailer.

Notes on the Process

[Several points were noted by the Republican Guard 

in connection with the suitability of the process for its 

stated use.]

• The process is not considered a true “fi eld” system 

because it is not rugged enough and is both large 

and heavy.

• The gauges require external protection (operator 

safety).

• All pressure and temperature gauge connector stubs 

need to be shortened, protected, and insulated.

• A smaller capacity plant might be more compatible 

with the needs of the Met Sections of those forces 

that need to be self-suffi cient in hydrogen.

• The target purity for the hydrogen product is 99.9% 

if the performance characteristics of the balloons 

are to be achieved. This purity cannot be guaranteed 

and therefore balloon performance is compromised,

The Opinions of the High-Value Detainees (HVD)

Shortly after the discovery of the trailers, fi ve HVDs 

and one senior Iraqi scientist were shown the equipment and their opinions were noted. The six individuals all had intimate involvement with Iraq’s BW 

program, or its concealment. All denied having seen 

the trailers previously or knowing anything about 

them. They were puzzled and offered a wide range of 

opinions. Those who were asked dismissed the suggestion that they were for the production of hydrogen.

• Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al Azzawi, head of the bacteriological BW program, was quite sure it was not 

a BW laboratory because of the absence of a steam 

generator, appropriate fi lters, essential instrumentation, and ports for adding reagents.

• Prof. Nasr Husayn Al Hindawi, who was an advisor to Dr. Rihab and not a detainee, was “95%, or 

maybe a little less” sure that they were for biological use. Prof Hindawi had also been shown photographs of the equipment. 

• Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Samarra’i, responsible 

for weaponization aspects of the BW program, said 

they were not for CW agents; he was “85% sure” 

they were for BW, later he dropped this to 80%.

• Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan al Sa’adi, a chemical 

engineer and Senior Deputy at MIC to Husayn 

Kamil, explained “Anyone who told you this is bio 

should be fi red.” He pointed out that it was also 

unsuitable for CW agent production. Later he put 

forward a theory that they were designed to produce enhanced fuel for SA-2 missiles as part of the 

Iraqi Air Defence effort. He claimed the energetic 

fuel would increase the range of the weapon system.

• Minister ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah 

Huwaysh, former Minister of Military Industrialization and head of MIC, was sure that it was not 

biological; he thought it was a chemical process, 

but not military, although it might be for producing 

a payload for a UAV. 

• Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, Head of the 

National Monitoring Directorate and a missile 

expert, did not express an opinion about use, but 

stated that the vessels should have been declared to 

the UN, and if this had not been done it was a clear 

violation.
93

Biological

Republican Guard urging them to collect the completed equipment. They did not do so. Al Kindi was 

still assembling the second trailer when OIF started. 

Both trailers remained at Al Kindi at the start of OIF.

On 19 April 2003 the fi rst trailer, with its equipment largely intact, was recovered from looters and 

exploited by Coalition personnel. On 11 May 2003, 

the second trailer was recovered from Al Kindi. It 

appeared to have suffered some looting. It too was 

exploited by Coalition personnel.

The exploitation effort included visiting Al Kindi. 

Managers, engineers, and scientists who had been 

involved in the project were debriefed. They provided 

copies of supporting documents. The equipment was 

measured, photographed, and samples taken of material within the fi rst system.

Documents

Al Kindi provided a dozen documents and working 

notes. This material was translated and analyzed. For 

ease of understanding this material is presented as a 

chronology:

23 June 2001. Contract No. 73/MD/RG/2001 for the 

fabrication of 2 hydrogen generation units is issued at 

a total cost of 500,000,000 Iraqi Dinars. The specifi -

cations are listed.

July 2001. Start date of Al Kindi contract for the 

production of the trailers.

5 February 2002. Al Kindi letter to Republican Guard 

discussing use of small towing vehicle to pull trailers.

15 October 2002. Al Kindi letter to Republican Guard 

informing them of late running of contract.

After 15 October 2002. Undated chart labeled Technical Progress.

1 November 2002. Theoretical end date of contract—

6-month extension requested.

15 December 2002. Al Kindi mentions the station for 

generating hydrogen gas for a semi-annual declaration to UNMOVIC.

• Clear operating instructions to be displayed on the 

trailer,

• Trailer needs to be lightly armored (shrapnel proof),

• 2 x powder fi re extinguishers are required 

(6kg total),

• It would be possible to make a smaller version 

(enhanced mobility)—if the various pieces of 

equipment needed could be procured.SERgsT 

Evaluation of the Documents Pertaining to the 

Trailers Recovered from the Al Kindi General 

Establishment

Summary

Al Kindi and the Republican Guard Command 

signed a contract on 23 June 2001 under which Al 

Kindi would produce two hydrogen generating units 

for what was described as weather air stations for 

50,000,000 Iraqi Dinars. Work was scheduled to last 

16 months from 1 July 2001 to 1 November 2002. 

Work went more slowly than planned. Al Kindi 

blamed the State Enterprise for Heavy Equipments 

Engineering (SEHEE) in Baghdad, the sub-contractor that fabricated the reactor vessels. There were 

discussions concerning the provision of towing 

vehicles, an item missing from the original contract. 

Al Kindi failed to achieve the contract completion 

date in November 2002, and informed the Republican Guard of a six-month delay. In December 2002, 

in its semi-annual declaration to the UN, Al Kindi 

listed the ‘production station for H2 gas’ along with 

many other projects then on hand. The fi rst of the 

two trailer-borne units was completed in early 2003. 

A joint Al Kindi and Republican Guard group tested 

the system on 11 March 2003. They concluded that, 

although the equipment produced hydrogen according to the specifi cations, there were many unsatisfactory features. Despite this, in late March 2003, the 

Military Industrial Commission (MIC) wrote to the 
94

29 December 2002. Report issued by the Command of the Republican Guard Artillery, the Branch 

of Examination and Acceptance of the Republican 

Guard and the Working Group from Al Kindi. The 

report reviews what has been achieved against the 

provisions of the contract. All the items listed conformed to the required specifi cation. A test produced 

hydrogen in the capacity required. A lightning rod 

was in place for safety. The observations include 

statements that the system is not fi eld-worthy because 

it is heavy and requires a towing vehicle, and it needs 

for protection. Al Kindi is recommended to address 

the necessary changes.

8 January 2003. Unspecifi ed RG correspondence 

referred to in 23 January 2003 letter.

22 January 2003. Top Secret letter from MIC to Al 

Kindi requesting action on observations on contract.

23 January 2003. Letter from Republican Guard to 

Al Kindi with observations on the trailers.

5 February 2003. MIC letter to RG Artillery Commander dated 5 February 2003. The letter discusses 

the procurement of a towing vehicle.

26 February 2003. Letter from Republican Guard 

CoS to Republican Guard Artillery Commander 

discussing TS correspondence of 8 January 2003 

requesting an opinion on an unspecifi ed matter in 

connection with the contract.

11 March 2003. The day that the equipment was 

tested. Shortly after a signed log of the results was 

produced.

23 March 2003. MIC letter to the Artillery Command 

of the Republican Guard, discussing the 11 March 

2003 test results for contract 73/MD/RG/2001 and 

requesting that the vehicle be picked up as quickly as 

possible.

25 April 2003. On 19 April 2003, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) elements confi scated a tractor and 

trailer near a checkpoint at Tall Kayf in northern Iraq. 

The trailer was stolen by a looter from a truck park 

in northwest Mosul near an ammunition plant. Upon 

investigation, it was apparent that the trailer may be 

part of the Iraqi transportable CBW system. US forces 

then moved the trailer to Irbil air base for further 

investigation. The gooseneck trailer has two rear axles 

and accommodation in the frame for a third also at 

the rear. A telescoping rod, which could raise roughly 

nine meters, was located at the rear left corner of the 

trailer. Roughly three to four inches of a solid light 

brown material beneath a one half-inch liquid layer 

was inside. Despite wearing protective mask, an 

ammonia odor was noted. The pH of the material was 

fourteen. A rusted hand shovel was located at the base 

of the reaction vessel. Color coded valves had been 

taped to prevent overspray during painting; masking 

tape had not been removed from one valve indicating 

that the valve had not been used since the trailer was 

painted.

30 April 2003. Information from a technical evaluation and intrusive examination by coalition personnel of the equipment and piping system resulted in 

a fl ow schematic consistent with batch production 

of biological (likely bacterial only) agents. This unit 

does not appear to perform any function beyond the 

production of biological agents.

11 May 2003. US forces found a second ‘suspected 

mobile BW agent production’ trailer outside Al Kindi 

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation 

Center in Mosul. The trailer was partially assembled, 

lacking many components. Design and components 

were nearly identical to previously exploited ‘suspect 

BW production’ trailer. US forces located the trailer 

outside the main gate of Al Kindi (36°24’09.5”N 

043°08’04.9”E) in a parking lot approximately 100m 

west of the center main gate and within 75m of the 

administration offi ces. The trailer was a dual axle fl at 

bed with welded steel caging for walls and roof. The 

top caging (roof) of the trailer had been displaced in 

two areas. The cage above the water reservoir had 

been unbolted on one side and bent down to eye level. 

The cage above the compressor housing had been 

unbolted on both sides and placed on the decking of 

the trailer. Various components were installed or present on the trailer. From front to back, there are a water 

chiller with four fan housings, a motor, a large stainless steel water reservoir, a small stainless steel tank 

on three legs, the main stainless steel reactor, a compressor housing with compressor, and the compressor 

motor. Some of connections (piping) were in place 
95

Biological

Figure 9. Process fl ow diagram of trailer process.

Figure 10. Diagram of reactor.
96

between components and others ended abruptly. No 

wiring or other electrical components were present. 

A number of attachment brackets were located on the 

decking of the trailer. The trailer appears to be a previously used armor or heavy equipment transporter. 

Overall layout of this trailer was very similar to the 

mobile trailer previously reported. The underside 

of the trailer had been recently painted and showed 

neither signs of wear nor any dirt or road debris. The 

trailer was found without tires and had been placed on 

concrete blocks.

12 May 2003. Between October 2001 and February 

2003, the State Establishment for Heavy Equipments 

Engineering (SEHEE) fabricated two reactors, under 

requirements generated by the MIC. The fi rst reactor was delivered in July 2002 to the Al Kindi State 

Establishment in Mosul. A modifi ed second reactor 

was delivered to the same customer in January 2003. 

On 25 October 2001, SEHEE (Al Nasr Al Azim State 

Company) received a letter from MIC’s Al Kindi 

State Establishment to fabricate two stainless steel 

jacketed reactors. According to the letter of request, 

SEHEE would receive unspecifi ed materials from 

Al Kindi in Mosul. SEHEE’s Ri’ad factory, building 

number six, received the work-order number ‘4/40/

2001’, after being processed through the company’s 

design, technology, and planning departments. The 

head engineer for building number six is engineer 

Najm. Al Kindi dedicated engineer Mahmud Saleh as 

the primary coordinator on the project in an effort to 

emphasize the importance of the project and ensure 

any design or fabrication problems were quickly 

rectifi ed. Mahmud Saleh visited SEHEE routinely 

to monitor progress and provide guidance. Reactors one and two were built using stainless steel 316 

in the fabrication of both the inner and outer shells. 

When source asked how the fi rst reactor performed, 

the Al Kindi representative indicated the reactor was 

‘successful.’ According to the source, the fi rst reactor was only hydrostatically tested, because reactor 

one’s manhole diameter was too narrow for radiography equipment. During the initial hydrostatic 

test, reactor one was designed to withstand 100 bar. 

Because the source could not verify welds of reactor 

one with radiography, the Ri’ad factory was limited 

to hydrostatically testing the reactor one to 10 bar. 

When this was explained, Mahmud Saleh stated a 10 

bar test would be suffi cient, because the vessel would 

only contain ‘hydrogen’. Subsequently, reactor two’s 

manhole was widened to the diameter of 14 inches to 

allow for radiography of interior welds.

12 May 2003. Preliminary analysis of samples from 

the suspect transportable biological production trailer 

reveals negative results for chemical and biological 

agent signatures. An analysis with hand held assays 

and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was conducted 

on 7 May 2003 to determine the presence of the following BW agents: anthrax, plague, Ricin, botulinum 

toxin, SEB, tularaemia, Brucella, and smallpox. No 

positive results for any BW pathogens or toxins were 

noted. Chemical analysis of three samples from this 

exploitation was conducted by the CBIST chemical 

laboratory using gas chromatography, mass spectrophotometry (GCMS). All samples were negative for 

chemical warfare agents within the detection limits of 

the analytical instrument (1 nanogram per microlitre).

17 May 2003. The designer of the trailers explained 

that the equipment was for hydrogen generation. 

4 June 2003. Cover letter from DG Al Kindi to American Authority in Mosul, dated 4 June 2003, entitled 

‘Mobile Hydrogen Field Production System.’ The 

letter mentions the customer as the Republican Guard, 

Artillery Corps (Contract No. 73/Art/RG/2001), who 

required two trailers to produce hydrogen gas for 

meteorological station purposes. The letter also mentions the declaration to UNMOVIC of the equipment 

on 15 December 2002. Al Kindi offers to demonstrate 

the use of the equipment to generate hydrogen. The 

documents attached are:

—List of 10 personnel who worked on the project (5 

engineers, 1 chemist and 3 technical observers).

—Technical report of 15pp on the hydrogen generators, produced in week 1 June 2003.MIC TS letter 

to Al Kindi dated 22 January 2003.

—Letter from Republican Guard HQ to Al Kindi 23 

January 2003.

—Undated chart labeled Technical Progress.

—Project report given to UNMOVIC, dated 15 

December 2002.
97

Biological

—Undated Republican Guard Report to Al Kindi 

about the tests.

—Copy of contract no. 73/MD/RG/2001 dated 23 June 

2001.

—Al Kindi letter to Republican Guard discussing use 

of small towing vehicle, dated 5 February 2002.

—Letter from Republican Guard COS to Republican 

Guard Artillery Commander discussing TS correspondence of 8 January 2003 requesting an opinion 

on an unspecifi ed matter in connection with the 

contract. Letter dated 26 February 2003.

—MIC letter to the Artillery Command of Republic 

Guard discussing the 11 March 2003 test results, 

dated March 2003 .

—Information letter, handwritten in Arabic, log of test 

results on 11 March 2003 with recommendations .

15 June 2003. Three sources from Al Kindi provide 

details of reactants and miscellaneous technical 

points.

Models and Military Use. The hydrogen trailer 

production system was modeled after the previouslyused version of a mobile hydrogen gas generator, 

that produced hydrogen gas that was fed directly in 

to weather balloons without being condensed into 

cylinders. The model was the older hydrogen production unit that originated from Russian technology. The 

mobile hydrogen generation system was used instead 

of transporting gas cylinders into the fi eld because it 

was practical and economical to produce hydrogen 

on site for the military. The use of the mobile unit 

alleviated the logistical concerns of transporting the 

hydrogen to the fi eld. The system was large and heavy 

because it was developed and used by the Iraqi military. That is, it was designed to be durable and easily 

operated. No other methods of producing hydrogen 

gas were investigated. The trailers were modeled on 

a simpler version that directly produced hydrogen 

without condensation of the gas into cylinders. The 

sources did not request any outside assistance from 

either foreign or other Iraqi facilities for the design 

or manufacture of the mobile hydrogen production 

system.

Chemical Reaction. The production of hydrogen 

from aluminum, sodium hydroxide, and water was 

a reliable method that was previously used by the 

militaries in Iraq, Russia, and other countries. There 

were two methods in which water could enter the 

reactor. The fi rst was via an air pressure system and 

the second was a direct feed method. Thus, the air 

was used only to push the water into the reactor, and 

it would not enter it. The water was not purifi ed or 

fi ltered prior to use in the system.

Design. The reactor was designed specifi cally for the 

hydrogen production system. Specifi cally, the reactor was designed by the senior engineer and technical 

assistant to the director in late 2001. The reactor was 

constructed of stainless steel to prevent corrosion. 

Inlets and outlets for the various gases and liquids in 

the reactor were placed in accordance with the most 

practical locations. The reactor jacket was designed 

to operate in an even cooling layer to uniformly 

reduce the temperature within the reactor. The equipment was arrayed on the trailer in the most practical 

manner to ensure its effectiveness.

Products. The hydrogen was transferred from the 

reactor via the pipe in the top of the vessel. The two 

at the top are supply pipes, the one on the upper back 

goes to the compressor. The hydrogen it entered a 

fi lter to remove residual water and particulates, and 

then was compressed into the cylinders.

Safety. Safety precautions were developed during 

the production and handling of hydrogen. An oil-free 

compressor was placed on the trailer to compress 

the hydrogen as it was produced. The system was 

grounded to prevent any accidental ignition of the 

gas. In addition to a metal ground stake, a metal pole 

was attached to the trailer to act as a lightning rod to 

prevent sparks.

Financial Aspects. The equipment was purchased 

under normal purchase protocol. The reactor and lowloader were the most expensive pieces of equipment. 

Components were selected and purchased based on 

their availability in the open Iraqi market. Improvised 

equipment, such as the use of oxygen or nitrogen 

cylinders, was used instead of more diffi cult-to-obtain 

parts.
98

Materials. The reactant materials, including the aluminum powder and sodium hydroxide were obtained 

from the Iraqi market and were stored at Al Kindi. 

The trailers were designed to operate for several 

runs before cleaning, and the by-products were to 

be removed by scooping out the residual solids and 

running water through the reactor for cleaning. The 

hardest piece of equipment to acquire was the reactor. 

The delay in delivery from the production company 

caused the contract to be delayed for six months.

Operation. The equipment was operated based on the 

logical design developed by the sources. The system 

was to be powered by one of two methods. The fi rst 

method involved the direct use of an electric source 

and the second method was to use a generator. The 

generator could be towed or located nearby the trailer, 

in a location that would not cause potential ignition of 

the hydrogen.

Transportation of the Trailers. The chassis (low 

loader) was used to support the weight of the equipment, and because it was readily available in the 

market. The system was to be pulled with a standard 

cab. The trailers were never moved to the test site. 

The cylinders containing the hydrogen produced on 

the trailers were the only item(s) taken to the test site. 

The hydrogen was used to fi ll meteorological weather 

balloons at the test site. The sources last saw both 

trailers at Al Kindi. The fi rst trailer was complete 

and ready for delivery, and the second trailer was 

incomplete. The source alerted the Republican Guard 

to quickly come and get the complete trailer from Al 

Kindi, but they were never taken from Al Kindi prior 

to or during the war. Thus, no one used the trailers 

during the war.

Figure 11. Scoop for solids.
1

Glossary

Glossary and Acronyms

Term or Acronym Meaning or Defi nition

28th April Group A research group paralleling the work of the 404 Group.

404 Group A four-man air defense missile system research group.

AAM Air-to-Air Missile.

ABD Airborne Division (US).

ABS The Scientifi c Bureau for Drug Information and Medical Appliances.

ADDP Accelerated Device Development Program. 

ADN Ammonium Dinitrate.

ADN Ammonium Dinitramide (a solid-propellant oxidizer).

AEST Albostangy Equipment Services and Trade.

Agent “A” Botulinum toxin.

Agent “B” Anthrax.

Agent “C” Afl atoxin.

Agent “D” Wheat cover smut.

Agent “G” Gas gangrene.

AHCV Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis.

AHF Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride.

AK-20 A liquid-propellant oxidizer (IRFNA containing 20% N2O4 by weight) used 

in SA-2.

AK-27 A liquid-propellant oxidizer (IRFNA containing 27% N2O4 by weight) used 

in SCUD.

Al Husayn Project Project under Husayn Kamil to identify the steps required to develop a 

nuclear weapon. 

AlNiCo Aluminum-Nickel-Cobalt.

Anthrax A disease caused by the bacterium Bacillus Anthracis.

AP Ammonium Perchlorate (a solid-propellant oxidizer).

ARADET Arab Company for Detergent Chemicals.

ASB Arab Scientifi c Bureau.

ASP Ammunition Supply Point.

ASVI Ameriyah Sera and Vaccine Institute.

ATAP Anti-Tank Anti-Personnel submunitions.

ATCC American Type Culture Collection.
2

ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile.

AVLIS Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation.

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System.

AWRC Agriculture Water Resource Center.

AYC Akashat Yellowcake.

AZ-11 A liquid rocket fuel, composed of 2 components (89% DETA plus 11% 

UDMH). 

Bacillus Anthracis Causative agent of the disease anthrax.

Bacillus subtilis Simulant for BW spore agents.

Bacillus thuringiensis Natural bacterial insecticide and simulant for anthrax.

Bbl/d; bpd Barrels per day.

BCP Border Control Checkpoint.

BIAP Baghdad International Airport.

BME Belmetalenergo.

BOP Balance of Payments.

Botulinum toxin A toxin used as a BW agent.

Breakout capability Knowledge, infrastructure, and materiel, which usually lie beneath the 

threshold of suspicion, but which can be rapidly adapted or reorganized to 

allow for weaponization processes to be undertaken. Such capabilities require 

pre-disposed resources and often employ dual-use technology, equipment, or 

knowledge.

Bt Bacillus thuringiensis.

BW Biological Weapon—an item of materiel that disperses or 

disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors; Biological Warfare.

CA Commercial Attache.

CAD Computer-Aided Design.

CAEC Abrasive Import and Export Corporation.

CAFCD Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration. The declaration presented to the UN by Iraq, as required by UN Resolution 1441. The 12,000-

page document was presented to the UN on 7 December 2002.

CAM Computer-Aided Manufacturing.

CBI Central Bank of Iraq.

CBJ Central Bank of Jordan.

CBS Central Bank of Syria.

CBW Chemical and Biological Weapons.

CCD Charge Coupled Device.
3

Glossary

CCHF Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever.

CDB Cast Double Base (a solid-propellant, cast and then cured).

CDG Chemical Destruction Group, a UN body operating in Iraq from 1992 to 

1994.

CEAP Captured Enemy Ammunition Point.

CEDC Chemical Engineering and Design Center.

CENTCOM Central Command, (US).

CEP Circular Error Probable.

CERC Central Evaluation Research Committee.

CGMS Control and Guidance Missile System.

CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US).

CIC Chemical Industries Committee.

CIF Company for Industrial Forests.

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force 7.

Cl Chlorine.

Clostridium botulinum Causative agent of the disease botulism.

Clostridium perfringens Causative agent of gas gangrene.

CMPC-B Combined Media-Processing Center, Baghdad.

CNC Computer Numeric Controlled devices or machines.

CNEC Commisao Nacional de Energia Nuclear, (Brazil).

CO2 Laser Carbon Dioxide; common laser medium useful for LIS.

CoM Council of Ministers.

CoS Chief of Staff.

CoSm Cobalt-Samarium.

CP Command Post.

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority.

CPHL Central Public Health Laboratory, Baghdad.

CPMIEC China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation.

CPU Central Processing Unit.

CS Tear gas (not a nerve agent).

CSL Corn Steep Liquor.

CVL Copper Vapor Laser; useful for LIS.

CW Chemical Weapon—an item of materiel that disperses or disseminates a 

chemical agent; Chemical Warfare.

D4 N-Dimethylphosphoramidic Dichloride.

DB Double Base, a solid propellant comprising nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine.

DCC Dicylohexl carbodimide. 
4

Delivery System The means of delivering or transporting conventional or unconventional 

weapons in the form of weapons platforms, such as rockets, missiles, spray 

devices, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other types of vehicle. Delivery 

is defi ned as the positioning of the weapon to a point from which it was 

designed to operate independently.

DETA Diethylenetriamine—one of the two components of AZ-11 liquid rocket fuel. 

DF Deutrium Floride.

DG Director General.

DGMI Directorate of General Military Intelligence.

DGS Directorate of General Security.

Dhafi r Project High-explosives development program to support nuclear 

weapons development.

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency (US).

DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation (AUS).

DIS Defence Intelligence Staff (UK).

Diwan The Presidential Offi ce.

DMA Di Methyl Amine (a precursor for UDMH).

DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence.

DMMP Dimethyl methyl phosphonate. 

DOCEX Document Exploitation.

DOZ Dioctyl Azelate.

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Dual Use Technology, materials, equipment, or knowledge capable of use for both 

legitimate and proscribed purposes. The object per se is not one or the 

other—it is dependent on intentions.

ECCM Electronic Counter-Countermeasure.

ECM Electro-Chemical Machining.

ECM Electronic Countermeasures.

EDB Extruded Double Base.

EDC Engineering Design Center—MIC organization (Formerly Offi ce 3000 Group 

1, and later EDD). 

EDD Engineering Design Directorate—a MIC organization renamed the Engineering Design Center in 1988. 

EEDDC Electrical Engineering Design Center.

EGC Electri-Gaz-Com.

EMIS Electromagnetic Isotope Separation.
5

Glossary

End User The identity that is declared to be the fi nal consumer of an exported technology, item, service, material, training, or apparatus. The entity is not necessarily the purchaser.

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

EP Entry Points.

ETGC External Technology General Corporation.

EU European Union.

EUC End-User Certifi cate. An end-user certifi cate is an internationally recognized, but not internationally standardized, documentary method of declaring 

the end user of any of the above. The end-user certifi cate is not a foolproof 

system and has been frequently abused. Due to corrupt practices and outright 

fraud, end-user certifi cates can be completely false or deliberately deceptive 

in their declarations of the end user.

EW Electronic Warfare.

FAE Fuel Air Explosive.

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization.

FASP Field Ammunition Supply Points.

FCDC Foreign Currency Disbursement Committee.

FEAL Food Examination and Analysis Lab.

FFCD Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure. The series of Declarations Iraq presented to the UN, detailing its WMD programs. Separate documents were 

submitted for CW, BW, nuclear, and ballistic missiles.

Fissile material Material (e.g., uranium) capable of undergoing nuclear fi ssion.

FMD Foot and Mouth Disease.

FMDV Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine.

FOG Fiber-Optic Gyroscope.

FRJE Factory for Repair of Jet Engines.

FROG-7 Free Rocket Over Ground (Mk 7). A battlefi eld artillery Rocket (also known 

as LUNA).

Front Company A fi rm or commercial enterprise purposefully established and owned by 

Iraqi procurement authorities to purchase or otherwise illicitly acquire items 

prohibited by UN sanctions. The front company would operate in a covert 

and clandestine fashion with the intention of avoiding international scrutiny 

and deceiving any monitoring authorities concerning the nature of goods 

procured, the source of goods, the transport routes used for importation, the 

fi nancial aspects of illicit trade, and the eventual Iraqi end use and end user.

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

FS Fedayeen Saddam.
6

FSU Former Soviet Union.

G&C Guidance and Control.

GA Tabuna—chemical agent.

GB Sarina—chemical agent.

GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK).

GDP Gross Domestic Product.

GE General Establishment.

GEBRC Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Research Council/Center.

GEET General Establishment for Engineering Technologies.

GF Cyclosarin—a chemical agent.

GID General Intelligence Directorate (Jordan).

GPS Global Positioning System.

GRL Goods Review List.

Group 1 Offi ce 3000 group whose focus was gaseous diffusion and later gas centrifuge; later separated from Offi ce 3000 and renamed EDD, and then EDC 

under MIC and MIMI.

Group 2 Offi ce 3000/PC3 group whose focus was EMIS; later part of PC3 under 

MIMI.

Group 3 Offi ce 3000/PC3 group whose focus was support activities, to include planning, purchasing, administration, technical and fabrication; later part of PC3 

under MIMI.

Group 4 Originally al Husayn project; renamed Group 4 when transferred to Offi ce 

3000; later part of PC3 under MIMI.

GSE Ground Support Equipment.

GSSE Geological Survey State Enterprise.

HC Higher Committee.

HDI Human Development Index.

HE High Explosive.

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium—a term indicating a high percentage (>80%) of 

U235 isotope; generally weapons-grade material.

HF High Frequency; Hydrogen Fluoride.

HIC Higher Inspection Committee.

High-Value Detainee A detainee who, due to his or her senior position in the military, security, 

scientifi c/technical, or governmental structures of Saddam Husayn’s Regime, 

may have knowledge or insights of relevance to ISG’s mission. 

HP Al Husayn Project.

HSBS Hong Kong Shanghi Banking Corporation.
7

Glossary

HTPB Hydroxyl Terminated Polybutadiene (a polymeric solid-propellant binder).

HUMINT Human Intelligence.

HVD High-Value Detainee. 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency—the UN’s nuclear watchdog organization. 

IAEC Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

IAF Iraqi Armed Forces.

IAH Ibn al Haytham-Haitham (Khadimiyah).

IAH-AHI Ibn al-Haitham—Al-Hazen Institute (located at 

Salman Pak).

IC Industrial Committee.

ICC Iraqi Chemical Corps.

ID Iraqi Dinar.

IED Improvised Explosive Device.

IID International Industrial Development.

IIP Ion Implementation Project.

IIS Iraqi Intelligence Service.

IIS Section one IIS internal section responsible for creating front companies in Iraq and 

facilitating trade with these companies.

ILTC Iraqi Land Transportation Company.

IMF International Monetary Fund.

IMU Inertial Measurement Unit.

INOC Iraq National Oil Company.

INP Iraqi Nuclear Program.

INS Inertial Navigation System.

Intellectual capital A cadre with engineering and scientifi c knowledge.

INVO Iraq Nuclear Verifi cation Offi ce.

IRFNA Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (a liquid rocket 

oxidizer comprising nitric acid plus N2O4).

ISG Iraq Survey Group. The organization stood up by the Coalition in June 2003 

to conduct a survey of Iraq’s WMD programs and to locate Captain Speicher. 

It is a multiagency intelligence collection and analysis organization, formed 

of military and civilian personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, 

and Australia. Its mission is to organize, direct, and apply capabilities and 

expertise in Iraq to discover, take custody of, and exploit information and 

material of intelligence value on individuals, records, WMD samples, weapons systems materials, facilities, networks, and operations. 

JARIC Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (UK).
8

JD Joint Delegation.

JIICA Jordan International for Industrial and Commercial Agencies.

KDP Kurdish Democratic Party.

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.

KIMADIA State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing. 

KOMID North Korea’s Korea Mining Development Corporation.

LACM Land Attack Cruise Missile.

LAMA Active Metallurgy Testing Laboratory, Tuwaitha.

L/D Length/Diameter ratio (of missiles).

LDM Large Diameter Missile.

LEU Low Enriched Uranium—a term designating uranium with a low (<5%) percentage of U235 isotope.

LIS Laser Isotope Separation—a uranium enrichment technique using lasers for 

isotopic separation.

LRBM Long-Range Ballistic Missile. 

LSM Land-to-Sea Missile. 

LU Launcher Units.

M1 Offi ce of the Director, IIS.

M2 Directorate of Administration and Accounting, IIS.

M3 Directorate of Data Processing and Information Security, IIS.

M4 Directorate of Foreign Clandestine Operations, IIS.

M4/8 Formerly M19 of the IIS, formed of three sections: the internal, foreign, and 

trading sections.

M5 Directorate of Counterintelligence, IIS.

M6 Directorate of Internal Security, IIS.

M7 Directorate of Investigation and Prosecution, IIS.

M8 Directorate of Liberation Movements, IIS.

M9 Directorate of Communications, IIS.

M10 Directorate of Studies and Research, IIS.

M11 Training and Preparation Institute, IIS.

M12 Directorate of Accounting, IIS.

M13 Directorate of Clandestine Operations, IIS.

M14 Directorate of Special Operations, IIS.

M15 Directorate of Legal Affairs, IIS.

M16 Chemical Preparations Division, IIS.

M17 Directorate of Signals Intelligence, IIS.
9

Glossary

M18 Directorate of Residency, IIS.

M19 The primary IIS body handling procurement of specialized items. Redesignated as M4/8 also known as the Technical Consultation Company or the 

Trade Offi ce.

M20 Directorate of Surveillance, IIS.

M21 The Al Ghafi qi Project, responsible for explosives in IIS.

M22 Directorate of Protective Services, IIS.

M23 Directorate of MIC Security, IIS.

M40 Directorate of Opposition group activities, IIS.

MABOT Mina al Bakr Offshore Terminal.

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense Systems.

MAPO Tris-1-(2-Methyl) Aziridinyl Phosphine Oxide.

MEASI Middle East Advanced Semi-Conductors ,Inc.

MEK Mujahiddin e Khaliq.

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MGRS Mercator Grid Reference System.

MHESR Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research.

MIC Military Industrialization Commission. 

MIM Ministry of Industry and Minerals.

MIMI Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization.

MIO Military Industrial Organization—also known as MIC.

MGM Modifi ed G Medium.

MLIS Molecular Laser Isotope Separation.

MoA Ministry of Agriculture.

MoD Ministry of Defense.

MoF Ministry of Finance.

MoH Ministry of Health.

MoO Ministry of Oil.

MoT Ministry of Trade.

MoTC Ministry of Transport and Communication.

MOU Memorandum of Understanding.

MOST Ministry of Science and Technology.

MPC Methylphosphonyl Chloride. 

MPF Methylphosphonyl Difl uoride.

MPS Methylphosphonthioic Dichloride.

MRDC Military Research and Development Center.
10

MRL Multiple Rocket Launcher.

MS Main Survey.

MSE Muthanna State Establishment—an organization within the MIC.

MTC Military Technical College.

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime. 

N2O4 Nitrogen Tetroxide.

Nd-YAG Neodymium doped yttrium aluminum garnet—a laser

 medium.

Nd-Glass Neodymium doped glass—a laser medium.

NFI No Further Information.

NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Center (US), formerly NIMA.

NMC National Mobilization Committee.

NMD National Monitoring Directorate.

NMG Nuclear Monitoring Group (IAEA).

NORINCO North Industries Corporation.

NP Nitronium Perchlorate (a solid-propellant oxidizer).

NPPP National Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides.

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty.

NSC National Security Council.

Nuclear Weapon A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear 

type) in its intended ultimate confi guration which, upon completion of the 

prescribed arming, fuzing, and fi ring sequence, is capable of producing the 

intended nuclear reaction and release of energy. 

NVD Night-Vision Device.

NVG Night-Vision Goggles.

ODF Operation Desert Fox. 

ODS Operation Desert Storm.

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom.

OIP Offi ce of the Iraq Program.

OFF Oil for Food program. 

Offi ce 3000 Project to research uranium enrichment, known as the Offi ce of Studies and 

Development until late 1982; renamed PC3 in Jan 1989 after transfer to 

MIMI.
11

Glossary

Oil for Food Program The program established by UNSCR 986 in December 1996. The scheme 

allowed the UN to authorize sales of Iraqi oil, with the intention of allowing 

the Iraqis to buy food supplies with the revenues gained. In practice, trade 

under the OFF process opened the door for Iraq to develop numerous kickback and illicit money-earning schemes. A percentage of OFF money was 

used to fi nance UNMOVIC.

OMI Organization of Military Industrialization, synonymous with the MIC, the 

preferred usage.

OMV Ongoing Monitoring and Verifi cation.

ONAREM Offi ce National Des Resources Minieres (Niger).

OSD Offi ce of Studies and Development.

PC3 Petrochemical Project 3—codename for Iraq’s clandestine nuclear research 

and development project under MIMI.

PC13 Phosphorus Trichloride.

POC13 Phosphorus Oxychloride.

PFD Process Flow Diagram.

PFP Process Flow Plan.

PID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram.

PPD Plant Protection Division—part of Ministry of Agriculture

PPE Personal Protective Equipment.

PPRC Pulse Power Research Center—renamed the al Tahadi State Establishment in 

1995.

Project 144 Project for the reverse-engineering of SA-2 (later SCUD)

Protocol Offi cial set of rules and guidelines established by state parties to regulate 

activity. In this instance, it refers to a systematic code of behavior for organizing trade between Iraq and its protocol partners: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and 

Turkey.

QC Quality Control.

R50 EMIS separator with central orbit radius of 500 mm.

R60 EMIS separator with central orbit radius of 600 mm.

R100 EMIS separator with central orbit radius of 1,000 mm.

R120 EMIS separator with central orbit radius of 1,200 mm. 

R&D Research and Development.

RCC Revolutionary Command Council.

RDC Research and Development Committee.

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.

RDX Tetra methylene tetranitramine (an explosive).
12

Reconstituted Program A term describing the restart or renewal of a program based upon and using 

technology, materials, equipment, and knowledge from a dormant, hidden, or 

previously interrupted program.

RG Republican Guard.

RGFC Republican Guard Forces Command.

Rhoda mine 6G A medium for dye lasers.

Ricin A toxin used as a BW agent, derived from the castor bean.

RLG Ring Laser Gyro (part of an INS).

RNA Research and News Analyzing.

RO Reverse Osmosis.

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade.

RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle.

RSI Regime Strategic Intent. 

SA-2 Surface-to-Air missile Mk 2 (also known as Volga).

SAFF Safe, Arm, Fuze, and Fire—a term used in weaponry including nuclear weapons.

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile. 

SAP Security Apparatus for the Protection of military industrialization establishments.

SCP Single Cell Protein. 

SCR Security Council Resolution (of the United Nations).

SCVM State Company for Veterinary Medicine.

SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy.

SDI Samarra Drug Industry.

SE State Establishment.

SEEMO State Establishment for Extraction and Mining Operations.

SEHEE State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipments.

SEPI State Enterprise for Petrochemical Industries.

SEPP State Establishment for Pesticide Production.

SF Special Forces.

SFOR Stabilization Forces.

SIEI Specialized Institute for Engineering Industries.

SIGINT Signals Intelligence.

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

SISMI Italian Intelligence and Military Security Service.

SLV Space Launch Vehicle.
13

Glossary

SME Subject Matter Expert.

SOE State Owned Enterprises.

SOMO State Oil Marketing Organization.

SOTI State Organization for Technical Industries.

SPO Special Projects Offi ce—subordinate offi ce in MIC; also known as the 

Master Subjects Offi ce.

SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile.

SRC Scientifi c Research Center.

SRG Special Republican Guard.

SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile.

SSO Special Security Organization.

STADI Staff Training and Development Institute, Tuwaitha, (IAEC).

STRD Scientifi c and Technical Research Directorate, which later became the Technical Research Center.

SVI Sera and Vaccine Institute.

SWB Summary of World Broadcasts.

TABRC Tuwaitha Agriculture and Biological Research Center.

TAGCO Trading and Agriculture General Company.

TCC Technical Consulting Company.

TDI Toluene DiIsocyanate (a cross-linking agent in polymers).

TEA TriEthylAmine.

TECO Technical Corps for Special Projects.

TEA Triethylamine—a chemical agent precursor.

TEL Transporter Erector Launcher.

TEMPS SS-12 Missile—destroyed under Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.

TFASP Tactical Field Ammunition Supply Point.

TG-02 A liquid rocket fuel (a mixture of 50% TEA plus 50%

xylidene).

TIS Thermal Imagery Sight.

TNRC Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center—the principal center of research and 

development in Iraq’s nuclear program.

TNT Tri Nitro Toluene (an explosive).

TOSSCO Technical Oilfi eld Services and Supply Company.

TPAO Turkish Petroleum Company.

TPIC Turkish Petroleum International Company, a TPAO Subsidiary.
14

Trade Intermediary An independent commercial entity that links the consumer of products and 

services to other manufactures, vendors, transporters, fi nanciers, and/or 

consultants or other service providers. Trade intermediaries were used by the 

Iraqi Regime. Some were cognizant of the illicit nature of trade and deliberately colluded with Iraq, while others were deceived by the Iraqi Regime and 

were innocent tools of illicit Iraqi procurement activities.

TRC Technical Research Center.

TSMID Technical and Scientifi c Materials Import Division.

TTC Thermal Tracking Camera.

TVC Thrust Vector Control (of rocket engines).

U Uranium.

U# UNSCOM inspection number.

UAE United Arab Emirates.

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

UCl4 Uranium Tetrachloride. 

UDMH Unsymmetrical DiMethyUnsymetrical Di-Methyl. Hydrazine-one. One of the 

two components of AZ-11, a liquid rocket fuel.

UEIE Ur Engineering and Industrial Establishment.

UF4 Uranium Tetrafl uoride.

UF6 Uranium Hexafl uoride.

UGF Underground Facility.

UHF Ultra High Frequency.

UN United Nations.

UNCC United Nations Compensation Commission.

UNDP United Nations Development Program.

UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientifi c and Cultural Organization.

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund.

UNGA United Nations General Assembly.

Unilateral Destruction Destruction of weapons, equipment, or documents by one party only.

UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission. Set up 

by UNSCR 1284 on 17 December 1999 as a replacement for UNSCOM. Its 

fi rst Executive Chairman was Dr. Hans Blix.

UNOPS United Nations Operations.

UNSC United Nations Security Council.

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission. Set up by UNSCR 687 on 3 April 1991 

“. . . to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical, 

and missile capabilities.” Inspections of nuclear capabilities were carried out 

by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the two sometimes worked alongside each other. 
15

Glossary

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution.

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution.

UNSYG United Nations Secretary General.

UO2 Uranium Dioxide.

UO4 Uranium Tetroxide.

UoB University of Baghdad.

URENCO European Enrichment. 

USD US Dollars.

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

UTL United Telecommunications, Limited.

UXO Unexploded Ordnance.

VHF Very High Frequency.

VP Vice President.

VR Video Reconnaissance.

VVDP Veterinary Vaccine and Drug Production facility.

VX A highly toxic CW nerve agent.

Weaponization The application of technology, materials, equipment, and knowledge to harness the effects or physical principles that have been proven in laboratory or 

otherwise controlled conditions to create a weapon.

WFP World Food Program.

WHO World Health Organization.

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of 

destruction and/or being used in such a manner as to kill large numbers of 

people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons but 

excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapons where such 

means are a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Chemical Weapons 

and Biological Weapons need to be of a certain size to count as WMD—

single chemical or biological artillery rounds would not be considered to be 

WMD, due to the limited damage they could produce.

Yellowcake A form of uranium ore concentrate.
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