Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 1 

### PD-1248-14

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

ROBERT J. CRIDER, II

V.

STATE OF TEXAS

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

FILED BY ROBERT J. CRIDER, II

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO.5, COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS

CASE NO. 005-84506-08.

THE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS AT EL PASO, TEXAS

CASE NO. 08-12-00332-CR

.

Robert Jackson Crider, II 14026 County Road 550 Farmersville, Texas 75442

(972)743-9448 No Fax RJC5004@hotmail.com PETITIONER PD-1248-14 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 3/12/2015 10:36:51 PM Accepted 3/13/2015 10:32:33 AM

ABEL ACOSTA CLERKPetitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 2 

### INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Case Page Busic v. U. S. , 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1753, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980)............... ..... 8

Bynum v. State , 767 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex.Cr.App., 1989).............. 9

Crider v. State , No. PD-1248-14, 2015 WL 925176 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb. 25, 2015)........................................ 5-6

Davis v. State , 61 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex.App.-Amarillo, 2001)............... 9

Engelking v. State , 750 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988)......... 8

Ex parte Williams , 786 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.App.-Hous. [1 st



### Dist.], 1990)..................................... 8

Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds , 255 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex.App.-Austin, 2008)................................................ 7

Getts v. State , 155 S.W.3d 153-158 (Tex.Crim.App., 2005)............... 8

Mahaffey v. State , 316 S.W.3d 633, 635, 639 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010)... 5, 6

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville , 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972)............................. 8

Rewis v. United States , 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971)......................... . 8

Robinson v. State , 377 S.W.3d 712, 722 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)........... 5

State v. Johnson , 198 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2006) .. 9

State v. Johnson , 219 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)............. 9

Thomas v. State

, 919 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)............. 8-9

United States v. Bass , 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971)............................. 8Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 3



### Statutes and Rules Page Sec. 545.104(a), Tex.Transp. Code.......................................... 4

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a).............................. ... 9Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 4



### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

ROBERT JACKSON CRIDER, II § § V. § CASE NO. PD-1248-14 § THE STATE OF TEXAS §

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

NOW COMES ROBERT JACKSON CRIDER, II,

PETITIONER , and moves this court to rehear his Petition for D iscretionary

Review. In support, Petitioner shows:

On rehearing, Petitioner presents the following iss ues restating and

amplifying Issue 1 C set forth in his Petition:

ISSUE 1. Should Mr. Crider’s Motion to Suppress hav e been granted?

ISSUE1 A. When is a turn signal required at a “Y”

intersection?

ISSUE 1 B. Did the movement of Mr. Crider’s vehicle require

a turn signal pursuant to Sec. 545.104(a), Tex.Transp. Code?
ISSUE 1 C. Is Sec. 545.104(a), Tex.Transp. Code

unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Crider’s situation?

SUBSTANTIAL INTERVENING OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT CIRCUMSTANCES: This Court of Criminal Appeals authored and publish ed two (2)

opinions on this appeal (February 25, 2015), in whi ch Mr. Crider’s Petition

for Discretionary Review was refused, and in which four justicesPetitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 5



### participated. There was a dissenting and a concurr ing opinion. See

Appendix. However, both opinions share common conc ern that the statute

at issue is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to “Y”

intersections.

Presiding Judge Keller wrote an opinion in which Ju dge Hervey

joined. That opinion observed that whether a motor ist is required to signal

or not is dependent upon whether the “vehicle devia tes from the direct

course of the roadway”. Citing Mahaffey v. State , 316 S.W.3d 633, 639

(Tex.Crim.App. 2010). That opinion recognized seve ral questions of law

(Robinson v. State , 377 S.W.3d 712, 722 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)) that ar ise

when motorists and police officers are confronted w ith a “Y” intersection.

The questions need to be answered:

Do they all “require a turn signal?”

Must motorists consider “which part of the “Y”” the y are driving on?

Are the angles at the “Y” intersection a factor to be considered?

Does the interruption of the continuous course of t he roadway by a stop sign “make a difference?”

If the roadway changes names between the branches b eing traversed, “[d]oes it matter”?

Justice Newell’s concurring opinion, in which Justi ce Johnson joined

(Crider v. State , No. PD-1248-14, 2015 WL 925176 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb

.Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 6



### 25, 2015)), leaned toward the stop sign interruptin g the “direct flow of the

roadway” at the “Y” requiring that Mr. Crider use a turn signal. However, if

a car stops at a stop sign (or red light) where eac h of the intersecting streets

is at a 90 o 

### angle, there is no requirement that a motorist sig nal to go straight.

Indeed, cars are not equipped with a “straight sign al.” Driving straight is the

default option.

In the concurring opinion, Justices Newell and John son observed that

this Court has established the “common meaning” of the word “turn” as used

in Section 545.104(a), Tex.Transp. Code: “...‘turn’ m eans to change

directions-to turn the vehicle from a direct course of the roadway. You

either turn left, or you turn right out of the dire ct course or flow of normal

traffic.” Mahaffey , supra at 635. The concurring opinion acknowledges that

the above questions are “very good”, and “hope[s] t he legislature answers

them.” Because the legislature has not answered th em yet, this Court

should. At this juncture, the legislature has no i mpetus to answer these

questions by clarifying the statute. Here, the con curring and dissenting

opinions find common ground: “I share the desire to provide more guidance

to both police and motorists...” Concurring Opinion a t 3.

Mr. Crider was stopped for allegedly failing to sig nal a turn at a “Y”

intersection. As assumed, the traffic stop was ini tiated by a police officer,Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 7



### who in this case is actually a sergeant (police sup ervisor). Unusually, the

motorist in this case was also a police sergeant. They were both licensed

Texas Peace Officers, sworn to uphold the laws of T exas. Like this Court,

the disagreement between police supervisors indicat es the need for these

issues to be clarified so that common motorists who are not as informed can

know what conduct the criminal statute prohibits.

In this case, the intersection at issue has three ( 3) roadways that

converge at a corporate municipality’s boundary, ea ch with different names.

The Southbound traffic traveling the same two roadw ays has no stop sign

and is considered a continuous course of the road s o that no signal is

required. The only difference is that the Northbou nd traffic on those same

two roadways which Petitioner was traveling has a s top sign. (State’s

exhibit 6, at RR V4). A view of the roadway in que stion clearly shows Mr.

Crider’s movement followed what amounted to little more than a slight

curve. (CR 50).

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION An as-applied challenge to constitutionality requir es a showing that

“the statute is unconstitutional when applied to th at particular person or set

of facts.” Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds , 255 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex.App.-

Austin, 2008).Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 8



### A person of ordinary intelligence must have fair no tice that conduct

contemplated is forbidden by the statute, and the s tatute may not encourage

arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. See Engelking v. State , 750

S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); citing Papach ristou v. City of

Jacksonville , 405 U.S. 156, 162,92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 10 (1972).

A statute must set "a standard sufficiently clear a nd definite so that an

ordinary person knows what constitutes proscribed c onduct." Ex parte

Williams , 786 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.App.-Hous. [1 st 

### Dist.], 1990).

If the Legislature “enacted into law something diff erent from what it

intended, it should amend the statute...”. Getts v. S tate , 155 S.W.3d 153-158

(Tex.Crim.App., 2005).

“ ‘[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal sta tutes should be

resolved in favor of lenity.’ ” Busic v. U. S. , 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S. Ct.

1747, 1753, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980) (superceded on other grounds by

statute); citing United States v. Bass , 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522,

30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), quoting Rewis v. United Stat es , 401 U.S. 808, 812,

91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). This C ourt has said that

another way. “ Any doubt as to whether an offense has been committ ed

should be resolved in favor of the accused .” Thomas v. State

, 919 S.W.2dPetitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 9



### 427, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); State v. Johnson , 198 S.W.3d 795, 797

(Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2006).

"[W]hen challenging the constitutionality of a stat ute, it is incumbent

upon a defendant to show that in its operation the statute is unconstitutional

to him in his situation." Bynum v. State , 767 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex.Cr.App.,

1989) "[C]riminal statutes outside the penal code must be construed strictly,

with any doubt resolved in favor of the accused." S tate v. Johnson , 219

S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)

HARM Petitioner has shown harm by the errors complained of. “[T]he fruits

of the illegal search were admitted into evidence a t trial and constituted the

basis of the Petitioner’s conviction. If the trial court had suppressed the

evidence, as it should have, there would have been no basis upon which the

State could have prosecuted the Petitioner. Consequ ently, this Court cannot

but hold that the trial court's error was harmful u nder Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 44.2(a).” Davis v. State , 61 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex.App.-

Amarillo, 2001).Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 10 

### CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

WHEREFORE , Petitioner requests that this Court of Criminal

Appeals grant his Petition and afterwards reverse a nd render judgment or

remand to the trial court for further proceedings c onsistent with this Court’s

opinion.

DATED: March 12, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert Jackson Crider, II Robert Jackson Crider, II 4026 County Road 550 Farmersville, Texas 75442 (972)743-9448 No Fax RJC5004@hotmail.com PETITIONER

RULE 79.2(c) CERTIFICATE This motion for rehearing the order that refused th e petition for

discretionary review is grounded only on substantia l intervening

circumstances or on other significant circumstances which are specified in

the motion. This motion is so grounded, is made in good faith and not for

purposes of delay.

/s/ Robert Jackson Crider, II Robert Jackson Crider, IIPetitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 11 

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true and correct copy of the foregoing and attac hed documents were

electronically served to the following recipients, if that option was available

through the electronic filing manager, and if not, it was mailed to Appellee’s

counsel on Thursday, March 12, 2015:

Greg Willis, Criminal District Attorney Collin County, Texas John Rolater

Andrea L. Westerfeld Appellate Section Collin County District Attorney's Office 2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 100 McKinney, Texas 75071

and in accordance with Rules 68.11 and 79.7, Tex.R. App.P., in the same

manner it was provided to:

Lisa C. McMinn State Prosecuting Attorney P. O. Box 13046 Austin, Texas 78711-3046 Telephone: (512) 463-1660 Fax: (512) 463-5724 information@spa.texas.gov

and 10 paper copies will be delivered to the Clerk of this Court of Criminal

Appeals within three (3) business days as required by the Rules.

/s/ Robert Jackson Crider, II Robert Jackson Crider, IIPetitioner’s Motion for Rehearing: page 12 

### APPENDIX 1. Dissenting Opinion of this Court ................................. Pass Im

2. Concurring Opinion of this Court ................................P ass Im

### PD-1248-14

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

ROBERT J. CRIDER, II

V.

STATE OF TEXAS

TAB 1

FILED BY ROBERT J. CRIDER, II

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO.5, COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS

CASE NO. 005-84506-08.

THE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS AT EL PASO, TEXAS

CASE NO. 08-12-00332-CR

.

Robert Jackson Crider, II 14026 County Road 550 Farmersville, Texas 75442

(972)743-9448 No Fax RJC5004@hotmail.com PETITIONER

## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL A PPE ALS OF TEXAS

N O

. P D

- 1 2 4 8

- 1 4

R O B E R T J A C K S O N C R I D E R , I I , A p p e l l a n t

v .

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

D I S S E N T T O R E F U S A L T O G R A N T A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E E I G H T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

C O L L I N C O U N T Y

K E L L E R , P

. J

. , f

i l e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i n w h i c h H E R V E Y , J

. , j o i n e d

.

This case involves a traff ic s top for failure to signa l a turn at a “Y” intersec tion. The two

branc hes of the “Y” are Vinson Road and County L ine Road; th e b as e of the “Y” is FM544.

Appellant, trave ling on Vinson, failed to signa l a turn when he rea ched and continued onto FM544.

We h av e h el d t h at a t urn signa l is require d only when a vehicle deviates from the dire ct

course of the roadw ay

. Under this definition, at the place whe re Vi n s o n m eets FM544, a driver 1

Mahaffey v . State , 316 S.W .3d 633, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 1CRIDER DISSENT — 2

coming from either direc tion would seem to be following the normal course of the roadw ay , while

one traveling from Vinson to County L in e wo u l d appea r t o be deviating from the di rec t course of

the roadw ay , i.e., turning

. Fa ced with littl e g uidance from this Court, the court of appea ls held that

appellant executed a turn when he continued onto the base of the “Y” intersec tion beca use “the direc t

flow of tra ffic te rminated” at the interse ction. 2

There are a number of issues that might—or might not—bear on the answe r to whether a turn

signa l is require d at a “Y” intersec tion. Do all “Y” inte rsec tions require a turn signa l? Does it

matter which part of the “Y” intersec tion the driver is travel i n g fr o m? Do the ang les of the “Y”

intersec tion matter? I n this case , Appellant had a stop sign. Does the prese nce of one or more stop

signs make a differ ence ? Does it matter whether the name of one branc h of the “Y” and the base are

the same? These are questions of law, but there are no definitive answe rs to any of these questions. 3

I would g rant revie w to answe r these questions, so that motorists and police office rs will know what

the law r equire s. Be cause the Court does not, Irespe ctfully dissent.

Filed: F ebrua

ry 25, 2015 Publis h

Crider v. State
, No. 08-12-00332- CR, slip op. at 6 (Tex. App.–El Paso J une 30, 2014) (not

2 desig nated f

or publication).

Robinson v. State
, 377 S.W .3d 712, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The only disag ree ment 3 in th i s ca s e wa s n o t about the char acte r of the roadw ay , but about the leg al signific ance of the char acte r of the roadw ay

. The question whether the appellant was require d to use his turn signa l was there fore a question of law .”).

### PD-1248-14

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

ROBERT J. CRIDER, II

V.

STATE OF TEXAS

TAB 2

FILED BY ROBERT J. CRIDER, II

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO.5, COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS

CASE NO. 005-84506-08.

THE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS AT EL PASO, TEXAS

CASE NO. 08-12-00332-CR

.

Robert Jackson Crider, II 14026 County Road 550 Farmersville, Texas 75442

(972)743-9448 No Fax RJC5004@hotmail.com PETITIONER

## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL A PPE ALS OF TEXAS

N O

. P D

- 1 2 4 8

- 1 4

R O B E R T J A C K S O N C R I D E R , I I , A p p e l l a n t

v .

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

C O N C U R R I N G W I T H R E F U S A L T O G R A N T A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E E I G H T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

C O L L I N C O U N T Y

N E W E L L , J

. , f

i l e d a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n i n w h i c h J O H N S O N , J

. , j o i n e d

.

I a g r e e w i t h t h i s C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n n o t t o g r a n t d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w o f t h e u n p u b l i s h e d

o p i n i o n i n t h i s c a s e

. I w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y b e c a u s e I b e l i e v e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s p r o p e r l y

a n s w e r e d t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e i t a n d b e c a u s e I d o n o t b e l i e v e t h i s i s t h e c a s e t o d e t e r m i n e

w h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e o f r o a d w a y r e q u i r e s a “ t u r n ” o r a “ m e r g e ” o r w h e n a s i g n a l i s

r e q u i r e d a t a “ Y ” i n t e r s e c t i o n

.

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s d e s c r i b e d t h e “ Y ” i n t e r s e c t i o n a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e a s f o l l o w s :

T h e r e c o r d h e r e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e d i r e c t f l o w o f t r a f

f i c o nCrider Concur ring Opinion - Pag e 2

V i n s o n R o a d a p p e a r s t o t e r m i n a t e a t t h e s t o p s i g n , w h e n t h e

r o a d e s s e n t i a l l y s p l i t s i n t o F M 5 4 4 a n d C o u n t y L i n e R o a d

. A l t h o u g h t h e r i g h t t u r n f r o m V i n s o n R o a d o n t o C o u n t y L i n e R o a d i s a t a s t e e p e r a n g l e t h a n t h e t u r n f r o m t h e s a m e r o a d o n t o F M 5 4 4
, a l l t h r e e r o a d s a r e “ e q u a l l y t r a v e l l e d r o a d s , ” a n d b e c a u s e a d i t c h l i e s o p p o s i t e t h e s t o p s i g n , a d r i v e r o n V i n s o n R o a d s t o p p e d a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n s t o p s i g n m u s t c l e a r l y m a k e a

c h o i c e : t u r n l e f

t o r t u r n r i g h t

.

C r i d e r v

. S t a t e , N o

. 0 8

- 1 2

- 0 0 3 3 2
, 2 0 1 4 W L 2 9 9 3 7 9 2
, a t * 3 ( T e x

. A p p

. – E l P a s o J u n e 3 0
,

2 0 1 4 ) ( n o t d e s i g n a t e d f

o r p u b l i c a t i o n )

. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , t h e r e w a s n o m o r e

d i r e c t f l o w o f t h e r o a d w a y a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s a s t o p s i g n t h a t f o r c e d t h e

d r i v e r t o c h o o s e a p a t h

. I d

.

T h i s i s u n l i k e t h e r o a d i n Ma h a f f e y w h e r e a r o a d w i t h t w o s o u t h b o u n d l a n e s d r o p p e d

d o w n t o o n e s o u t h b o u n d l a n e

. Ma h a f f e y v

. S t a t e , 3 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 3 3
, 6 3 5 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

.

2 0 1 0 )

. A n d i t ’ s u n l i k e t h e r o a d a t i s s u e i n R o b i n s o n w h e r e t h e r e w e r e n o t r a f f i c s i g n s

i n d i c a t i n g a n i n t e r s e c t i o n t h a t r e q u i r e d a s i g n a l

. R o b i n s o n v

. S t a t e , 3 7 7 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 2
, 7 1 5

- 1 6

( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 1 2 )

. I s e e n o r e a s o n u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e t o d i s t u r b e i t h e r t h e t r i a l 1

c o u r t ’ s a p p l i c a t i o n o f l a w t o t h e f a c t s o r t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ e v a l u a t i o n o f t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n

.

F o r b e t t e r o r w o r s e , w e h a v e h e l d t h a t t h e w o r d “ t u r n ” i n S e c t i o n 5 4 5

. 1 0 4 ( a ) o f t h e

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n C o d e

– t h e s t a t u t e a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e

– i s u n a m b i g u o u s , a n d w e h a v e s e t o u t

i t s c o m m o n m e a n i n g

. Ma h a f f e y , 3 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6 3 5

. A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s C o u r t :

Notably , this Court di d not need to dec ide in Robinson whether a turn sig nal was 1 require d beca

use the only

issue was whe ther a

n article 38.23 instruction was wa rra nted. Robinson , 377 S.W .3d at 718. And we left undisturbed the lowe r cour t’s deter mination that a signa l was re quired. Robinson v. State , No. 06-09-00225- CR, 2011 W L 192752, at *5 (Te x

. App.–Texarkana

J an. 13, 2011) ( not desig nated f or publication).Crider Concur ring Opinion - Pag e 3

T h e w o r d ‘ t u r n ’ i s n o t a l e g a l t e r m o f a r t

– i t h a s n o ‘ a c q u i r e d

t e c h n i c a l m e a n i n g

. ’ ‘ T u r n ’ h a s m a n y d i c t i o n a r y m e a n i n g s , b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f d r i v i n g , ‘ t u r n ’ m e a n s t o c h a n g e d i r e c t i o n s

– t o t u r n t h e v e h i c l e f

r o m a d i r e c t c o u r s e o f t h e r o a d w a y

. Y o u e i t h e r t u r n l e f t , o r y o u t u r n r i g h t o u t o f t h e d i r e c t c o u r s e o r f l o w o f

n o r m a l t r a f

f i c

.

I d

. G i v e n o u r r e c e n t f

o r a y i n t o d e f

i n i n g t h e w o r d “ s a f

e , ” I t h i n k t h i s d e f

i n i t i o n p r o v i d e s

a b o u t a s m u c h g u i d a n c e a s c o u l d b e e x p e c t e d r e g a r d i n g t h e w o r d “ t u r n

. ” S e e B u t c h e r v

.

S t a t e ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ , 2 0 1 5 W L 3 5 9 0 8 7
, a t * 5 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. J a n

. 2 8
, 2 0 1 5 ) ( s e t t i n g o u t

t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e r e l o c a t i o n i s “ s a f e ” f o r t h e v o l u n t a r y r e l e a s e m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s s u e

i n § 2 0

. 0 4 o f t h e T e x a s P e n a l C o d e )

. A n d d r i l l i n g d o w n t o f i n d a m b i g u i t y i n t h e w o r d s u s e d

t o d e f i n e a n u n a m b i g u o u s w o r d i n a s t a t u t e

– w o r d s s u c h a s “ d i r e c t , ” “ c o u r s e , ” a n d

“ f l o w ”

– i n v i t e s m o r e c o n f u s i o n t h a n c l a r i t y

.

A s a n e w l y m i n t e d A u s t i n m o t o r i s t , I a p p r e c i a t e t h e d i s s e n t ’ s i n t e l l e c t u a l d e s i r e t o

g a m e o u t e v e r y p o s s i b l e t r a f f i c s c e n a r i o a t t e n d a n t t o n a v i g a t i n g a “ Y ” i n t e r s e c t i o n

. B u t i f

t h a t ’ s r e q u i r e d i n e v e r y m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s b a s e d u p o n a t r a f f i c s t o p , I c a n ’ t w a i t t o g e t t o

r o u n d a b o u t s

. T h e d i s s e n t a s k s s o m e v e r y g o o d
, t h o u g h t

- p r o v o k i n g q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h i s

2

t r a f f i c o f f e n s e , a n d I h o p e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a n s w e r s t h e m

. I s h a r e t h e d e s i r e t o p r o v i d e m o r e

g u i d a n c e t o b o t h p o l i c e a n d m o t o r i s t s , b u t w e ’ r e n o t G o o g l e m a p s

. I b e l i e v e M a h a f f e y a n d

t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t a n d t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s w i t h s u f f i c i e n t g u i d a n c e t o r e s o l v e

a n d r e v i e w a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s

. I d o n ’ t b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s c a s e i s a s u i t a b l e v e h i c l e

T E X

. T R A N S P

. C O D E AN N

. §545.059(c) (West 2013) (“A n opera tor moving a round a 2 rotary traff ic island shall drive only

to the rig ht of the island.”) ; see also N A T I O N A L L A M P O O N ’ S E U R O P E A N V A C A T I O N (Warner Br os. 1985) (“ Big Be n, Parliament”)

.Crider Concur ring Opinion - Pag e 4

t o r e v i s i t M

a h a f f e y , a n d t h a t i s w h y I b e l i e v e d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w i s u n n e c e s s a r y

.

F i l e d : F e b r u a r y 2 5
, 2 0 1 5 P u b l i s h