In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 20-283C

Filed: April 11, 2020

Redacted Version Issued for Publication: April 28, 20201

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Post-Award Bid Protest; Override

STG LLC,

 Protestor,

v.

UNITED STATES,

 Defendant,

v.

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS 

INTERNATIONAL CORP., 

 Defendant-Intervenor.

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Jamie F. Tabb, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Washington, DC, for protestor. With him was 

Tyler Robinson, Elizabeth Krabill McIntyre, and John Satira, Vinson & Elkins LLP, 

Washington, DC.

Amanda L. Tantum, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant. With her were Douglas 

K. Mickle, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., 

Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, and Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, 

Civil Division. Of counsel was Major Abraham Young, Trial Attorney, United States Legal 

Services Agency.

James McCullough, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Washington, 

DC, for intervenor. With him was Michael Anstett, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & 

Jacobson LLP, Washington, DC.

 

1 This Opinion was issued under seal on April 11, 2020. The parties were asked to 

propose redactions prior to public release of the Opinion. This Opinion is issued with 

some of the redactions that the parties proposed in response to the court’s request. Words 

which are redacted are reflected with the notation: “[redacted].”
2

O P I N I O N

HORN, J.

In the above-captioned bid protest, protestor STG LLC (STG), challenges the 

decision of the United States Army Communication Information Systems Activity – Pacific 

(the Army) to override the automatic stay of performance required by the Competition in 

Contracting Act (CICA), 31 U.S.C. § 3553 (2018), upon protestor’s filing of a bid protest 

at the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) challenging the Army’s 

award of a task order to defendant-intervenor Science Applications International Corp.

(SAIC).2

FINDINGS OF FACT

On August 21, 2019, the Army issued a request for proposals (RFP) for a task 

order under the Information Technology Enterprise Solutions-3 Services Indefinite 

Delivery/Indefinite Quality contract. The task order sought mission command network 

operations and maintenance services, including IT support personnel expertise for the 

mission, focused mainly in South Korea, with “additional U.S. and ROK [Republic of 

Korea] military locations as identified by the Government as required and during the 

yearly two major events/[redacted].” As indicated in the contracting officer’s March 3, 

2020 Determination & Findings:

The incumbent Army CHESS ITES-2S Task Order W91 QUZ-06-D-0012-

F406 was awarded to General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) 

on 26 August 2016 under FAR 16.505 Fair Opportunity to Compete 

procedures using a Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) source 

selection methodology. The current contract is comprised of a base year 

inclusive of a one month phase-in, two (2) 12-month option periods, and a 

final 81⁄2 month option period.

(capitalization in original). Per the terms of the contract, the contract for the incumbent 

contractor, GDIT, is scheduled to end on April 12, 2020.

On January 24, 2020, the Army awarded the task order to SAIC,

3 and the same 

day, January 24, 2020, the Army notified STG that SAIC had been awarded the task 

order. STG requested a debriefing, and the Army provided written materials on February 

3, 2020, provided an oral debriefing on February 5, 2020, and on February 13, 2020, the 

Army responded to STG’s additional written questions by letter. During the debriefing

process, the contracting officer provided STG with the following chart regarding the 

evaluation of STG and SAIC’s proposals:

 

2 On April 6, 2020, the court issued an oral decision the parties. The decision, and this 

written Opinion, is limited only to the issue of the Army’s override decision, and not the 

merits of Army’s evaluation and award to SAIC.

3 SAIC is scheduled begin contract performance on April 13, 2020. 
3

Factor Sub-Factor STG LLC SAIC

Factor 1: Technical Approach

Subfactor1.1

C2BaselineEnterpriseServices [redacted] Good

Subfactor1.2

C2Above-BaselineServices [redacted] Acceptable

Factor 1 - Overall [redacted] Good

Factor 2: Management Approach

Subfactor2.1

Management Plan [redacted] Acceptable

Subfactor2.2 

Organizational Chart [redacted] Acceptable

Subfactor2.3

Staffing Plan [redacted] Good

Subfactor2.4 

Adherence toapplicable

regulations and publications

[redacted] Acceptable

Sub-factor 2.5

Phase-in Transition Plan (PITP) [redacted] Good

Sub-factor 2.6

Quality Control (QC) Plan (QCP) [redacted] Good

Factor 2 - Overall [redacted] Good

Factor 3 – Mission Operation Support

Sub-factor 3.1

Operational Plan for C2 Systems 

O&M

[redacted] Good

Sub-factor 3.2

C2 IT O&M Support Experience 

using ITIL

[redacted] Acceptable

Factor 3 - Overall [redacted] Good

Factor 4: Prime Contractor’s Prior Experience [redacted] Good

Factor 6: Past Performance [redacted] Satisfactory 

Confidence

Factor 5: Price

Total Evaluated Price CLINs X001, X002, X003, X004, 

X005, X006, X007, X008, X009, X010, X014, X016,

0017, 4017

[redacted] $70,963,728.92

Total Evaluated Price + 52.217-8

CLINs X001, X002, X003, X004, X005, X006, X007, 

X008, X009, X010, X014, X016, 0017, 4017

[redacted] $80,309,273.97

Grand Total Awarded Price (All Years + Including 

52.217-8 (ALL CLINs) $98,684,273.97

Robert M. Minjack, the contracting officer, also explained to STG that “[t]he award was 

made in strict conformation with the award criteria delineated in the solicitation,” and 

“award was made to SAIC because their proposal was determined to be the Best Value 

in accordance with solicitation evaluation terms and conditions.” 
4

Subsequently, STG filed its protest at the GAO on February 18, 2020.

4 STG’s GAO 

protest argued

[redacted] while SAIC’s total evaluated price was [redacted] higher, than 

STG’s price. Nonetheless, the Army decided to award the Task Order to 

SAIC, depriving taxpayers of the [redacted] savings offered by STG. The 

Army’s award of the Task Order to SAIC was the result of a deeply flawed 

selection decision by the Agency’s Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) that 

deviated from several basic procurement rules, as well as an unreasonable 

and irrational evaluation conducted by the Agency’s Technical Evaluation 

Board (“TEB”). All of these errors were highly prejudicial to STG, and as a 

result, GAO should sustain the protest.

(capitalization in original). On February 21, 2020, Mr. Minjack sent SAIC a letter, 

suspending performance of the awarded task order due to the CICA stay. Mr. Minjack 

contacted GDIT to discuss the possibility of a bridge contract. Although the Army offered 

a bridge contract to GDIT, on February 27, 2020, GDIT indicated to Mr. Minjack that, “after 

careful consideration, GDIT cannot accept an additional 120 days sole source contract 

with the same onerous terms and price.”

Thereafter, on March 3, 2020, the Army issued a Determination & Findings. In the 

Determination & Finding the contracting officer concluded that the “[o]verride of the stay 

and continued performance of the contract is necessary because it is in the best interests 

of the United States based upon mission essential reasons which are urgent and 

compelling, that will not permit waiting for a decision in the protest.” 

The contract performance directly supports the Operations and 

Maintenance of the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange 

System (CENTRIXS) Korea (K) and the Secret Internet Protocol Router 

Network (SIPR). [redacted].

CENTRIXS-K is the U.S. and Korean classified coalition network that 

enables information sharing through the use of email and web services, 

chat, voice over internet protocol and GCCS-J [Global Command and 

Control System – Joint] systems. GCCS-J is the C41 system that fuses 

command and control capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable 

system by exchanging imagery, intelligence, status of forces, and planning 

information. GCCS-J is the principal foundation for dominant battlespace 

awareness, providing an integrated, near real-time picture of the 

battlespace necessary to conduct joint and multinational operations. It 

offers vital connectivity to the systems the joint warfighter and coalition 

forces use to plan, execute, and manage military operations. This includes 

the systems that provide the vital Common Operational Picture and 

 

4 The case number at GAO for STG’s protest is B-418490.1. As of April 6, 2020, the date 

of the court’s oral decision in the above captioned protest, GAO had not issued a decision 

on STG’s protest.
5

Intelligence sharing databases. Any delay in the execution of the 

procurement would jeopardize the mission and eventually lead to overall 

failure.

(capitalization in original). In the Determination & Findings, the contracting officer 

explained:

Basis for Override of the Stay: Override of the stay and continued 

performance of the contract is necessary because it is in the best interests 

of the United States based upon mission essential reasons which are urgent 

and compelling, that will not permit waiting for a decision in the protest. 

Prior to making the decision to authorize this override, the following were 

considered:

(1) whether significant adverse consequences will necessarily occur if the 

stay is not overridden;

(2) whether reasonable alternatives to the override exist that would

adequately address the circumstances presented;

(3) how the potential cost of proceeding with the override, including the 

costs associated with the potential that the GAO might sustain the protest, 

compare to the benefits associated with the approach being considered for 

addressing the agency's needs; and

(4) the impact of the override on competition and integrity of the 

procurement system.

(emphasis and capitalization in original). 

For the first factor, the Determination & Findings stated:

It is imperative that continued performance for National Security is 

unimpeded. No other reasonable alternatives to the override exist. 

USACISA mission supported by the contract performance directly sustains 

the Operations and Maintenance and Cybersecurity of the Combined 

Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) Korea (K) 

and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR). [redacted]. This is 

an enormous mission capability to take on without any type of transition or 

for a very short period contract. 
6

[redacted] Failure to approve the CICA Stay Override will put National 

Defense, National Security and Allied missions in grave jeopardy of certain 

failure.[

5

]

(capitalization in original). Regarding the second factor, the contracting officer explained 

that no reasonable alternatives exist, first, because the Amy cannot perform the 

operations itself because it does “[redacted] in order to provide the required quality and 

level of support.” Second, the contracting officer explained, the Army’s contract with the 

incumbent contractor GDIT cannot be extended because the contract does not have any 

remaining option periods, and, moreover, GDIT refused an offer of a bridge contract under 

the current terms of its contract. Additionally, the contracting officer explained

there is significant evidence to demonstrate that GDIT is not able to 

satisfactorily perform the required services even though they are the 

incumbent. The documented past performance ratings in CPARS base 

through the option 2 performance periods for the incumbent contractor have 

been marginal and the Government has indicated we would not recommend 

them for this work in the future. (See attached CPARS for Base, Option 1 

and Option 2). Specific critical performance issues include, but are not 

limited to, not maintaining the network readiness at [redacted] which is the 

required minimum level, numerous key personnel vacancies which were not 

filled within the timeframes of the contract terms and conditions and less 

than minimal overall staffing to provide the required quality and level of 

support. The marginal performance has continued into the current option 

period. The incumbent contractor continues to degrade their performance, 

which cannot likely be overcome, to the point where Government 

 

5 The March 3, 2020 Mission Impact Statement included with the Determination &

Findings explained: 

Any delay in the execution of the Cybersecurity, Network Operations & 

Maintenance of Information Technology Support (CNO&MITS) contract with 

SAIC will result in a [redacted] lapse of contractor operations and 

maintenance support for the Combined Enterprise Regional Information 

Exchange System - Korea (CENTRIXS-K) and the Secret Internet Protocol 

Router Network (SIPR) network throughout the Korean Peninsula beyond 

12 April 2020. The Army cannot continue to suspend performance of the 

contract and await the issuance a protest decision because doing so would 

have a severe adverse impact on U.S. Forces and their ability to meet the 

armistice and contingency missions. An override of the current CICA is in 

the best interest of the United States based on the following urgent and 

compelling needs that directly impact the mission critical requirements 

supporting National Defense, National Security and Allied support related 

to the defense of the Korean Peninsula.

(capitalization in original).
7

augmentations had to be made in order to provide the minimum support 

required. There also have been multiple Contract Deficiency Reports 

(CDRs), due to continued understaffing impacting performance for the 

Operations and Maintenance of the networks. The incumbent's staffing 

levels have decreased significantly in the past 9 months and continue on a 

downward trend more rapidly in the past 3 months due to the pending and 

eventual contract award. The incumbent’s staff not hired or pending to be 

hired by awardee are moving or have already moved to other positions or 

jobs. If the incumbent is awarded a sole source bridge contract, there is little 

evidence that they will be able to re-obtain the required qualified personnel 

in short order and therefore a high risk of adverse consequences and of 

imminent failure of all aforementioned missions described above. 

Accordingly, I find that these options are not reasonable alternatives to a 

CICA Stay Override.

(capitalization in original). Regarding the third factor, the contracting officer noted that “[i]f 

GAO were to sustain the protest, the Army might incur costs that are more than de minimis 

depending on the corrective action required and taken. However, this is an acceptable 

risk given the serious consequences of stayed performance for this contract action.” The 

Determination & Findings concluded: “Therefore, I find that the benefits of overriding the 

stay and proceeding with performance greatly outweigh the potential costs of not doing 

so.” For the fourth factor the contracting officer stated in the Determination & Findings:

Although ACC [the Army] recognizes the important role of the GAO protest 

process in the procurement review process and respects the automatic stay 

provisions found in FAR 33.104. However, FAR expressly permits an 

agency to override this stay in limited instances, where, as here, an agency 

has urgent and compelling reasons for an override. ACC-411th CSB 

[Contracting Support Brigade] has explored alternative means to meet the 

requirement but found none that were acceptable. The urgent need will be 

met through the performance of the contract awarded to SAIC. This includes 

the 2 months phase-in period from 13 February 2020 to 12 April 2020 and 

then full performance for up to 9.5 months to 31 January 2021 to meets an 

immediate, critical mission need. In short, overriding the stay is not only 

consistent with the specific rules and regulations of our acquisition system, 

but is also consistent with its overarching principles of competition and 

integrity.

(capitalization in original). The contracting officer concluded in the Determination & 

Findings: 

Based upon a review of the protest, the Mission Impact Statement, the 

Legal Memorandum, the supporting documents, and the above findings, I 

hereby endorse the findings recounted in the above pages, because the 

best interests of the United States based upon mission essential reasons 
8

which are urgent and compelling, will not permit waiting for a decision 

concerning the protest. 

On March 12, 2020, protestor filed the override protest in this court. Protestor 

argues “[t]he Army’s decision to override the stay of performance of the task order is 

arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law,” claiming that “the Army’s D&F 

[Determination & Findings] appears to pay lip service to each of the Court’s identified

factors, but provides no evidence that the Army reasonably applied those factors in 

reaching its decision to override the stay of performance.” Protestor complaint continued: 

“Instead, the Army’s override decision appears to be based only on generic, unsupported 

statements that the factors were considered and that the Army’s decision was consistent 

with those questions.” Therefore, protestor claims, “the Army’s decision to allow 

performance of the awarded task order to proceed is arbitrary and capricious, 

unreasonable, and contrary to law.” The next day, March 13, 2020, the court held an initial 

hearing with the parties, and the parties and the court agreed to proceed on an expedited 

schedule for the above captioned protest with the parties filing cross-motions for judgment 

on the Administrative Record. On April 6, 2020, the court issued an oral decision at a 

hearing with the parties indicating to the parties the override would be sustained, thus 

granting defendant and intervenor’s motions for judgment on the Administrative Record 

and denying protestor’s motion for judgment on the Administrative Record. This Opinion 

incorporates and memorializes the April 6, 2020 oral decision issued to the parties.

DISCUSSION

Initially, defendant argues “STG cannot establish that it is an interested party with 

standing to assert a challenge to the override.” Protestor responds that “STG has standing 

to bring this CICA override challenge. Given the development of CICA override case law 

at the Court, this should go without saying.” 

The Tucker Act grants the United States Court of Federal Claims 

jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting 

to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed 

contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged 

violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a 

proposed procurement.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018). In order to have standing to sue as an “interested party” 

under this provision, a disappointed bidder must show that it suffered competitive injury 

or was “prejudiced” by the alleged error in the procurement process. See Todd Constr., 

L.P. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (To prevail, a bid protester 

must first “‘show that it was prejudiced by a significant error’ (i.e., ‘that but for the error, it 

would have had a substantial chance of securing the contract).’” (quoting Labatt Food 

Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009))); see also Blue 

& Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sci. 

Applications Int’l Corp. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 235, 281 (2012); Linc Gov’t Servs., 
9

LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 672, 693 (2010) (“In order to establish standing to sue, 

the plaintiff in a bid protest has always needed to demonstrate that it suffered competitive 

injury, or ‘prejudice,’ as a result of the allegedly unlawful agency decisions.” (citing Rex 

Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Statistica, Inc. v. 

Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. United States,

16 Cl. Ct. 84, 88 (1988); and Morgan Bus. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 325, 

332 (1980))). In order to establish what one Judge on this court has called “allegational 

prejudice” for the purposes of standing, the bidder must show that there was a “substantial 

chance” it would have received the contract award, but for the alleged procurement error. 

See Linc Gov’t Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. at 675; Hyperion, Inc. v. United 

States, 115 Fed. Cl. 541, 550 (2014) (“The government acknowledges that proving 

prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires ‘allegational prejudice,’ as contrasted 

to prejudice on the merits . . . .”); Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 148, 153 

(2014); see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 

Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied

(Fed. Cir. 2004); Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 

(Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2003); Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher,

102 F.3d at 1581; Archura LLC v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 487, 497 (2013); Lab. Corp. 

of Am. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 549, 557 (2012). Because standing is a jurisdictional 

issue, this showing of prejudice is a threshold issue. See Corus Grp. PLC. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. 

v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

In a post-award bid protest, such as the above-captioned bid protest, the “protestor 

must ‘establish that it (1) is an actual or prospective bidder, and (2) possesses the 

requisite direct economic interest.’” Mgmt. & Training Corp. v. United States, 137 Fed. Cl. 

780, 783-84 (2018) (quoting Rex Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1307 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006)); see also Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362, 365 

(Fed. Cir. 1989)); Timberline Helicopters, Inc. v. United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 117, 120 

(2018); Contract Servs., Inc. v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 261, 269 (2012).

Although “standing is not often discussed at length in CICA stay override cases,” 

see PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 330, 348 (2010), several Judges on the 

United States Court of Federal Claims have found that, by bidding on a procurement 

which was stayed pending a protest at the GAO, a protestor has enough of a direct 

economic interest in the stayed procurement and has standing to challenge an override 

of the CICA stay in this court. See Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 

Fed. Cl. 369, 381 (2013) (evaluating the standing of a protestor challenging an override 

of the CICA stay and stating that, “[a]s an actual offeror challenging the award of a 

contract before the GAO, there is no question that Supreme [the protestor] is an interested 

party for purposes of our court’s jurisdiction”); URS Fed. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 102 

Fed. Cl. 664, 670 (2011) (determining that a protestor had standing to challenge an 

override of a CICA stay implemented in connection with a bid protest at the GAO when 

the protestor had bid on the solicitation at issue at the GAO, notwithstanding that the 

protestor was not the incumbent contractor), recons. denied, 102 Fed. Cl. 674 (2012); 
10

PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. at 348; Sierra Military Health Servs., Inc. v. 

United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 573, 579 (2003). 

In the above-captioned bid protest, STG submitted a proposal in response to the 

RFP at issue in STG’s post-award bid protest at the GAO. Pursuant to CICA, performance 

of the contract awarded to SAIC following the Army’s evaluation of proposals received in 

response to the RFP was stayed until the Agency decided to override the CICA stay. 

Therefore, STG, as an actual offeror, has a direct economic interest in the resultant 

contract issued under the Army’s RFP and has standing in the above-captioned bid 

protest to challenge the Army’s override of the CICA stay implemented when STG filed 

its protest at the GAO. See Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 

at 381; URS Fed. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. at 670. 

In the above-captioned bid protest, STG challenges the Army’s decision to override 

the CICA stay that was implemented in connection with STG’s bid protest at the GAO. In 

protestor’s motion for judgment on the Administrative Record, protestor argues that the 

Army “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law in overriding the mandatory 

stay of performance.” In response, intervenor argues that “[t]he administrative record 

demonstrates the reasonableness of the Army’s decision to override the stay of contract 

performance, notwithstanding STG’s timely-filed GAO protest,” and defendant argues 

that the Army “rationally determined that an override was in the best interests of the United 

States based upon mission essential reasons which are urgent and compelling, that 

would not permit waiting for a decision in the GAO protest.”

6

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA), Pub. L. No. 104-320, 

§§ 12(a), 12(b), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1)–(4)), 

amended the Tucker Act to establish a statutory basis for bid protests in the United States 

Court of Federal Claims. See Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United 

States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1330-32 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Sys. Application & Techs., Inc. 

v. United States, 691 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Tucker Act 

expressly waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States in bid protests). 

The statute provides that protests of agency procurement decisions are to be reviewed 

under APA standards, making applicable the standards outlined in Scanwell Labs., Inc. 

v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and the line of cases following that decision. 

 

6 Defendant, in its motion for judgment on the Administrative Record, also argues that 

“STG repeatedly insinuates that the Army acted in bad faith in deciding to override the 

D&F and that the D&F contains falsehoods,” but “STG makes no attempt to provide the 

required proof for such claims, demonstrating their complete lack of foundation.” Protestor 

responds that “[c]ontrary to the Defendant’s assertions, STG has not argued and does 

not here argue that any Government official has acted in bad faith,” and argues that when 

a protestor “challenges the decisions made by agency officials, points out that their 

findings are unsupported by the record, and argues that their decisions do not meet the 

requirements of reasonable decision-making under the Administrative Procedure Act, it 

does not mean a plaintiff has alleged that the agency acted in bad faith.” Therefore, 

protestor argues that “the Court need not consider this tangential argument further.” The 

court agrees with protestor. 
11

See, e.g., Per Aarsleff A/S v. United States, 829 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(“Protests of agency procurement decisions are reviewed under the standards set forth 

in the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’), see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (citing 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706), ‘by which an agency’s decision is to be set aside only if it is arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]’” (quoting NVT Techs., 

Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (citing PAI Corp. v. United 

States, 614 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010))); Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico 

Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1332; Res. Conservation Grp., LLC v. United States, 

597 F.3d 1238, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Following passage of the APA in 1946, the District 

of Columbia Circuit in Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), held 

that challenges to awards of government contracts were reviewable in federal district 

courts pursuant to the judicial review provisions of the APA.”); Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. 

v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. 

Shaffer, 424 F.2d at 864, 868, for its “reasoning that suits challenging the award process 

are in the public interest and disappointed bidders are the parties with an incentive to 

enforce the law”); Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Under the APA standard as applied in the Scanwell line of cases, and 

now in ADRA cases, ‘a bid award may be set aside if either (1) the procurement official’s 

decision lacked a rational basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of 

regulation or procedure.’” (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. 

United States, 238 F.3d at 1332)); Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 

F.3d at 1319.

When discussing the appropriate standard of review for bid protest cases, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed subsections (2)(A) and 

(2)(D) of 5 U.S.C. § 706, see Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United 

States, 238 F.3d at 1332 n.5, but focused its attention primarily on subsection (2)(A). See

Croman Corp. v. United States, 724 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir.) (“‘[T]he proper standard 

to be applied [to the merits of] bid protest cases is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 

[(2006)]: a reviewing court shall set aside the agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”’” (alterations in original) 

(quoting Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 365 F.3d at 1350-51 (citing Advanced 

Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1057-58 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied

(Fed. Cir. 2000)))), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2013). The statute says that 

agency procurement actions should be set aside when they are “arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or “without observance of 

procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (2018);7 see also Tinton Falls 

 

7 The language of 5 U.S.C. § 706 provides in full:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing 

court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 

statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms 

of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 

and
12

Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States, 800 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Orion Tech., 

Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013); COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United 

States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“We evaluate agency actions according to 

the standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act; namely, for whether they are 

‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” 

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); and Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d at 1351)); 

Savantage Fin. Servs. Inc., v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 

Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Axiom Res. 

Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting arbitrary and 

capricious standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and reaffirming the analysis of 

Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1332); Blue 

& Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“‘[T]he inquiry 

is whether the [government]’s procurement decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”’” (quoting Bannum, Inc. v. United 

States, 404 F.3d at 1351 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)))); NVT Techs., Inc. v. 

United States, 370 F.3d at 1159 (“Bid protest actions are subject to the standard of review 

established under section 706 of title 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’), 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (2000), by which an agency’s decision is to be set aside only if it is 

‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,’ 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).” (internal citations omitted)); Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. 

 

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 

found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C)in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short 

of statutory right;

(D)without observance of procedure required by law;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 

556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of 

an agency hearing provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject 

to trial de novo by the reviewing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole 

record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken 

of the rule of prejudicial error.

5 U.S.C. § 706.
13

v. United States, 316 F.3d at 1319 (“Consequently, our inquiry is whether the Air Force’s 

procurement decision was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law.’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).”); Synergy Sols., Inc. v. United 

States, 133 Fed. Cl. 716, 734 (2017) (citing Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 365 

F.3d at 1350); Eco Tour Adventures, Inc. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. at 22; Contracting, 

Consulting, Eng’g LLC v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 334, 340 (2012). “In a bid protest 

case, the agency’s award must be upheld unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 

645 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir.) (quoting PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d at 1351), 

reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United 

States, 800 F.3d at 1358 (“In applying this [arbitrary and capricious] standard to bid 

protests, our task is to determine whether the procurement official’s decision lacked a 

rational basis or the procurement procedure involved a violation of a regulation or 

procedure.” (citing Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 595 F.3d at 1285–86)); 

Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g

en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2013); McVey Co., Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 387, 402 

(2013) (“The first step is to demonstrate error, that is, to show that the agency acted in an 

arbitrary and capricious manner, without a rational basis or contrary to law.”); 

PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 520, 531-32 (“Stated another way, a 

plaintiff must show that the agency’s decision either lacked a rational basis or was 

contrary to law.” (citing Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d at 1358)), 

subsequent determination, 96 Fed. Cl. 119 (2010). 

The United States Supreme Court has identified sample grounds which can 

constitute arbitrary or capricious agency action:

[W]e will not vacate an agency’s decision unless it “has relied on factors 

which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 

an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision 

that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 

that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 

expertise.”

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting 

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see

also Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States, 800 F.3d at 1358; F.C.C. v. Fox 

Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 552 (2009); Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham 

v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied

(Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he agency 

tribunal must present a full and reasoned explanation of its decision. . . . The reviewing 

court is thus enabled to perform meaningful review . . . .”); Textron, Inc. v. United States, 

74 Fed. Cl. 277, 285-86 (2006), appeal dismissed sub nom. Textron, Inc. v. Ocean 

Technical Servs., Inc., 223 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme 

Court also has cautioned, however, that “courts are not free to impose upon agencies 

specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the APA.” Pension Benefit Guar. 

Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990).
14

Under an arbitrary or capricious standard, the reviewing court should not substitute 

its judgment for that of the agency, but should review the basis for the agency decision to 

determine if it was legally permissible, reasonable, and supported by the facts. See Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43 (“The scope of 

review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to 

substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also Turner Constr. Co., Inc. v. United 

States, 645 F.3d at 1383; R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 

U.S. 916 (1995)); Synergy Sols., Inc. v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. at 735 (citing Impresa 

Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1332-33). “‘“If the 

court finds a reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even 

though it might, as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to the 

proper administration and application of the procurement regulations.”’” Weeks Marine, 

Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 

F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 

1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); Limco Airepair, Inc. v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 544, 550 (2017) 

(citation omitted); Jordan Pond Co., LLC v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 623, 631 (2014); 

Davis Boat Works, Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 342, 349 (2013); Norsat Int’l 

[America], Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 483, 493 (2013); HP Enter. Servs., LLC v. 

United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 230, 238 (2012); Vanguard Recovery Assistance v. United 

States, 101 Fed. Cl. 765, 780 (2011).

Stated otherwise by the United States Supreme Court:

Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.” To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision 

was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has 

been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be 

searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The 

court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (internal citations 

omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see

also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2001); Bowman Transp., Inc. v. 

Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974), reh’g denied, 420 U.S. 956 

(1975); Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The 

rational basis test asks ‘whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and 

reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.’”); Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 357 F.3d 1294, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (In discussing the “arbitrary, capricious, 

and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” standard, the 

Federal Circuit stated: “the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not 

empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); In re Sang Su Lee, 277 

F.3d at 1342; Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d at 1058 (“The 
15

arbitrary and capricious standard applicable here is highly deferential. This standard 

requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and 

consideration of relevant factors.” (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight 

Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285)); Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d 955, 959 

(Fed. Cir. 1993); By Light Prof’l IT Servs., Inc. v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 358, 366 

(2017); BCPeabody Constr. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 502, 508 (2013) 

(“The court ‘is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,’ and it 

must uphold an agency’s decision against a challenge if the ‘contracting agency provided 

a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.’” (internal citations 

omitted) (quoting Keeton Corrs., Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 753, 755, recons.

denied, 60 Fed. Cl. 251 (2004); and Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d at 

1381)), appeal withdrawn, 559 F. App’x 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Supreme Foodservice 

GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. at 382; Alamo Travel Grp., LP v. United States, 108 

Fed. Cl. 224, 231 (2012); ManTech Telecomms. & Info. Sys. Corp. v. United States, 49 

Fed. Cl. 57, 63 (2001), aff’d, 30 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ellsworth Assocs., Inc. v. 

United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 388, 392 (1999) (“Courts must give great deference to agency 

procurement decisions and will not lightly overturn them.” (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. 

v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985))), appeal dismissed, 6 F. App’x 867 (Fed. Cir. 

2001), and superseded by regulation as recognized in MVS USA, Inc. v. United States, 

111 Fed. Cl. 639 (2013).

According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:

Effective contracting demands broad discretion. Burroughs Corp. v. United 

States, 223 Ct. Cl. 53, 617 F.2d 590, 598 (1980); Sperry Flight Sys. Div. v. 

United States, 548 F.2d 915, 921, 212 Ct. Cl. 329 (1977); see NKF Eng’g, 

Inc. v. United States, 805 F.2d 372, 377 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Tidewater 

Management Servs., Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 65, 73, 216 Ct. Cl. 69 

(1978); RADVA Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 812, 819 (1989), aff’d, 914 

F.2d 271 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, agencies “are entrusted with a good 

deal of discretion in determining which bid is the most advantageous to the 

Government.” Tidewater Management Servs., 573 F.2d at 73, 216 Ct. Cl. 

69.

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d at 958-59; see also Res-Care, Inc. v. 

United States, 735 F.3d 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir.) (“DOL [Department of Labor], as a federal 

procurement entity, has ‘broad discretion to determine what particular method of 

procurement will be in the best interests of the United States in a particular situation.’” 

(quoting Tyler Constr. Grp. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009))), reh’g

en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2014); Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 995 

(Fed. Cir. 1996); Geo-Med, LLC v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 440, 449 (2016); Cybertech 

Grp., Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 638, 646 (2001) (“The court recognizes that the 

agency possesses wide discretion in the application of procurement regulations.”); 

Furthermore, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
16

Contracting officers “are entitled to exercise discretion upon a broad range 

of issues confronting them in the procurement process.” Impresa 

Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 

1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 

procurement decisions are subject to a “highly deferential rational basis 

review.” CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d at 1351; see also AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. 

United States, 880 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Where, as here, a bid protester 

challenges the procurement official’s decision as lacking a rational basis, we must 

determine whether ‘the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable 

explanation of its exercise of discretion,’ recognizing that ‘contracting officers are entitled 

to exercise discretion upon a broad range of issues confronting them in the procurement 

process.’” (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 

F.3d at 1332-33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))); Weeks Marine, Inc. v. 

United States, 575 F.3d at 1368-69 (“We have stated that procurement decisions ‘invoke 

[ ] “highly deferential” rational basis review.’ Under that standard, we sustain an agency 

action ‘evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.’” (alteration in 

original) (quoting CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 

Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d at 1058))).

A disappointed bidder has the burden of demonstrating the arbitrary and capricious 

nature of the agency decision by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tinton Fall 

Lodging Realty, LLC v. United Sates, 800 F.3d at 1364; see also Grumman Data Sys. 

Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d at 995-96; Enhanced Veterans Sols., Inc. v. United States, 131 

Fed. Cl. 565, 578 (2017); Davis Boat Works, Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. at 349; 

Contracting, Consulting, Eng’g LLC v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. at 340. The Federal 

Circuit has indicated that “[t]his court will not overturn a contracting officer’s determination 

unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. To demonstrate that such a 

determination is arbitrary or capricious, a protester must identify ‘hard facts’; a mere 

inference or suspicion . . . is not enough.” PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d at 1352 

(citing John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see

also Turner Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 645 F.3d at 1387; Sierra Nevada Corp. v. 

United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 735, 759 (2012); Filtration Dev. Co., LLC v. United States, 60 

Fed. Cl. 371, 380 (2004).

A bid protest proceeds in two steps. First . . . the trial court determines 

whether the government acted without rational basis or contrary to law when 

evaluating the bids and awarding the contract. Second . . . if the trial court 

finds that the government’s conduct fails the APA review under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), then it proceeds to determine, as a factual matter, if the bid 

protester was prejudiced by that conduct.

Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d at 1351; T Square Logistics Servs. Corp. v. 

United States, Fed. Cl. 550, 555 (2017); FirstLine Transp. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 119 
17

Fed. Cl. 116, 126 (2014), appeal dismissed (Fed. Cir. 2015); Eco Tour Adventures, Inc. 

v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. at 22; Archura LLC v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. at 496. 

To prevail in a bid protest case, the protestor not only must show that the government’s 

actions were arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, but the 

protestor also must show that it was prejudiced by the government’s actions. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”); see also Glenn Def. 

Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d at 907 (“In a bid protest case, the 

inquiry is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law and, if so, whether the error is prejudicial.”); IT 

Enter. Sols. JV, LLC v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 158, 173 (2017) (citing Bannum v. 

United States, 404 F.3d at 1357-58); Linc Gov’t Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 

672, 694-96 (2010).

Under CICA’s automatic stay, agencies, upon receiving notice that the award is 

being protested, are to “direct the contractor to cease performance under the contract 

and to suspend any related activities that may result in additional obligations being 

incurred by the United States under that contract.” See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3)(A)(ii)(2). 

CICA gives the Agency certain options to override a CICA stay, and, in the abovecaptioned bid protest, the Agency did so. CICA provides:

(C) The head of the procuring activity may authorize the performance of the 

contract (notwithstanding a protest of which the Federal agency has notice 

under this section)--

(i) upon a written finding that--

(I) performance of the contract is in the best 

interests of the United States; or

(II) urgent and compelling circumstances that 

significantly affect interests of the United States 

will not permit waiting for the decision of the 

Comptroller General concerning the protest; 

and

(ii) after the Comptroller General is notified of that finding.

31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3)(C).

Regarding override decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit has determined that “28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) grants the trial court jurisdiction over 

an objection to a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).” RAMCOR Servs. Grp., Inc. v. United 

States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Dyncorp Int’l LLC v. United States, 

113 Fed. Cl. at 302 (“We have jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) 

(2006), to review an agency decision to override a CICA stay.” (citing RAMCOR Servs. 

Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d at 1289-90)); Beechcraft Def. Co., LLC v. United 
18

States, 111 Fed. Cl. 24, 31 (2013); Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 

Fed. Cl. at 381 (“Challenges to alleged violations of the CICA automatic stay provision 

are within this jurisdiction.” (citing RAMCOR Servs. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 

at 1290)).

Although not binding on this court, a template for evaluating an override 

determination was offered by a Judge of this court in Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United 

States, 73 Fed. Cl. 705 (2006).8 See Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 

Fed. Cl. at 384 (“In Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 705 (2006), 

one judge of our court surveyed the field of prior decisions and was able ‘to distill from 

the relevant cases a variety of factors that an agency must consider in making an override 

decision.’” (quoting Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711)); but

see PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. at 343 (“The court in Reilly’s Wholesale

has provided excellent guidance to this court, and to the procurement community, in 

identifying factors that may be relevant to most CICA stay override decisions. As to the 

precedential weight to be accorded the Reilly’s Wholesale factors, however, the court in 

this decision must express some reservations.”). Override protests, however, are very 

fact specific inquiries. See PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. at 344 (quoting 

Automation Techs., Inc. v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. at 727); Automation Techs., Inc. v. 

United States, 72 Fed. Cl. at 727, 730. As explained in Beechcraft Defense Co., LLC, the 

Reilly’s Wholesale court identified four factors to consider:

(1) “whether significant adverse consequences will necessarily occur if the 

stay is not overridden”; (2) “whether reasonable alternatives to the override 

exist that would adequately address the circumstances presented”; (3) “how 

the potential cost of proceeding with the override, including the costs 

associated with the potential that the GAO might sustain the protest, 

compare to the benefits associated with the approach being considered for 

addressing the agency’s needs”; and (4) “the impact of the override on 

competition and integrity of the procurement system.”

Beechcraft Def. Co., LLC v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. at 31 (quoting Reilly’s Wholesale 

Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711); see also Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. 

United States, 109 Fed. Cl. at 384. The court in Reilly’s Wholesale Produce further stated 

that the “decisional law also indicates that certain factors are irrelevant to this analysis, 

among them: (i) that the new contract would be better than the old one . . . or (ii) the 

override and continuation of the contract is otherwise simply preferable to the agency . . 

. .” Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711.

 

8 As indicated by the same Judge who issued the Reilly’s Wholesale decision, “‘the 

decisions of this court are not binding precedent for judges of this court.’” Park Props. 

Assocs., L.P. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 787, 790 (2015) (quoting Sotera Def. 

Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 237, 258 (2014)), aff’d, 677 F. App’x 676 

(Fed. Cir. 2017).
19

In discussing Reilly’s Wholesale, although a Judge of this court argued that “[t]he 

court’s focus should be on whether the CICA stay override decision was rational and 

whether the agency considered relevant factors, not on whether the agency conformed 

its analysis to a specific framework elaborated by this court,” the Judge, nonetheless 

acknowledged “the court recognizes the utility of the analytical framework provided by 

Reilly’s Wholesale, but does not consider that the Reilly’s Wholesale factors govern the 

outcome of this case.” PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. at 345. Likewise, the 

undersigned is not bound by the Reilly’s Wholesale factors, but believes the factors are 

a useful tool to help analyze the Agency’s decision to override the automatic stay based 

on urgent and compelling circumstances in the context of APA review. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A).

The court in Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States set forth an analytical 

framework that was based on “a variety of factors that an agency must consider in making 

an override decision based upon urgent and compelling circumstances.”9 Reilly’s 

Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711. The factors articulated in Reilly’s 

Wholesale Produce v. United States “have been applied when the stay override is based 

upon urgent and compelling circumstances, or based upon the best interests of the United 

States.”10 Charles F. Day & Assocs., LLC v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 767, 771 (2015); 

see also Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. at 384 (noting that 

the factors articulated in Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States “have been 

employed in cases reviewing overrides based on either justification”); E-Mgmt. 

Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2008) (applying the Reilly’s Wholesale 

Produce v. United States factors to an agency’s decision to override the CICA stay, in 

which the agency justified the override decision as being in the “best interests of the 

 

9

In a footnote, the court in Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States stated:

Admittedly, some of the cases cited for the factors that are legally relevant 

and irrelevant in this context are ones in which the agency override decision 

was based upon the “best interests” of the United States. However, in the 

court’s view, the rationale employed in those cases has, where indicated, 

application to the review of an override decision based upon urgent and 

compelling circumstances.

Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711 n.10.

10 In Dyncorp International LLC v. United States, a Judge of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims declined to apply the factors set forth in Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. 

United States to an agency’s override of the CICA stay “in the context of a ‘best interest’ 

justification.” See Dyncorp Int’l LLC v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. at 303 n.4. The Dyncorp 

International court stated that the Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States test 

“overstates what is required by the arbitrary and capricious standard particularly in the 

context of a ‘best interest’ justification.” See id. The Dyncorp International court stated 

that the “test for evaluating the merits of an agency's override decision is whether the 

agency's determination was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law.” Id. at 302 (footnote omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)).
20

United States”). The undersigned is not bound by the Reilly’s Wholesale factors when 

evaluating the Agency’s best interests justification for overriding the CICA stay, but 

believes that the Reilly’s Wholesale factors are a useful analytical tool for evaluating 

whether the Agency’s best interests justification was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Protestor argues that the “application of the Reilly’s Wholesale factors is entirely 

appropriate because the Army itself structured its D&F to correspond to these four factors. 

As a result, if the Army’s D&F justifications are insufficient or unreasonable under the four 

Reilly’s Wholesale factors, then its overall Override Decision itself must also be arbitrary 

and capricious.” (citations omitted). In its motion for judgment on the Administrative 

Record, defendant states, “whether Reilly’s accurately states the law or not, the Army has 

adopted the Reilly’s factors when making its override decision. Thus, even though Reilly’s 

does not apply, when an agency applies the Reilly’s factors in its analysis, the Court can 

consider them in favor of the APA standard of review.” (citations omitted). As indicated 

above, this court is not restricted by the Reilly’s Wholesale factors, but the factors are a 

useful tool to help analyze the Army’s decision to override the automatic stay based on 

urgent and compelling circumstances in the context of APA review. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A). Additionally, as noted by protestor, and the defendant itself, the contracting 

officer used the framework of the Reilly’s Wholesale factors, and so this court includes in 

its analysis of the contracting officer’s Determination & Findings consideration of the

Reilly’s Wholesale factors.

Regarding the first factor, “‘whether significant adverse consequences will 

necessarily occur if the stay is not overridden,’” Beechcraft Def. Co., LLC v. United States, 

111 Fed. Cl. at 31 (quoting Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 

711), protestor argues that “[t]he Army’s D&F fails to reasonably explain why its cited 

adverse consequences only now necessarily require drastic action to prevent alleged 

harm to American interests.” Intervenor argues “the national security concerns set forth 

in the D&F weigh heavily in favor of the Army’s override decision and deserve deference.” 

Defendant contends that “[t]he Army rationally determined that significant adverse 

consequences to national security, through a lack of security and continued operation of 

the CENTRIXS-K and SIPR communication networks, would occur absent an override.” 

As noted above, for the first factor, the Determination & Findings stated:

It is imperative that continued performance for National Security is 

unimpeded. No other reasonable alternatives to the override exist. 

USACISA mission supported by the contract performance directly sustains 

the Operations and Maintenance and Cybersecurity of the Combined 

Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) Korea (K) 

and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR). [redacted]. This is 

an enormous mission capability to take on without any type of transition or 

for a very short period contract.
21

[redacted] Failure to approve the CICA Stay Override will put National 

Defense, National Security and Allied missions in grave jeopardy of certain 

failure.

(capitalization in original). Protestor concedes “that the IT services at issue here are 

important and contribute to the success of operations in Korea,” but argues “the Army has 

still failed to justify why the cited concerns necessarily will occur absent only the drastic 

action of overriding the CICA Stay.” (capitalization in original). The contracting officer in 

the Determination & Findings explained that “[redacted].” The lack of services would have 

far-reaching and [redacted] consequences. The Determination & Findings rationally 

support a finding that significant adverse consequences will occur if the stay was not 

overridden in the above captioned protest.11

The second Reilly’s Warehouse factor, asks whether reasonable alternatives to 

the override exist that would adequately address the circumstances presented. See

Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711. The Determination & 

Findings stated that no reasonable alternative existed, first, because the Amy cannot 

perform the operations itself because it does “[redacted] in order to provide the required 

quality and level of support.” The contracting officer in the Determination & Findings also 

noted:

The second possibility would be to exercise an option under the incumbent 

contract or issue a sole source bridge contract to the incumbent, General 

Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT), for the duration of the protest. 

The incumbent contract is comprised of a base year, two (2) 12-month 

option periods, and a final 81⁄2 month option period which ends on 12 April 

2020. The contract did not include the FAR 52.217-8 Option to Extend 

Service because the last date for performance under Army CHESSITES-2S 

task orders is 12 April 2020. A re-compete for a bridge contract is not 

possible because of insufficient time to solicit, evaluate, award and then 

mobilize and phase-in a new contractor as less than two months is left on 

the incumbent contract. Therefore, a sole source bridge contract is the only 

possible alternative to continue services with the incumbent in the absence 

of an override.

(capitalization in original). Additionally, the contracting officer in the Determination & 

Findings explained:

there is significant evidence to demonstrate that GDIT is not able to 

satisfactorily perform the required services even though they are the 

 

11 Defendant argues that “[t]he Court in Reilly’s opined that ‘some of the problems 

encountered here are, at least in part, of defendant’s own making’ not as part of its 

analysis of factor 1, [Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States,] 73 Fed. Cl. at 711-14, 

but rather as part of its weighing of harms. Id. at 716.” As defendant repeatedly pointed 

out Reilly’s is not binding on this court, and this court use the guidance in Reilly’s as the 

court deems appropriate. 
22

incumbent. The documented past performance ratings in CPARS base 

through the option 2 performance periods for the incumbent contractor have 

been marginal and the Government has indicated we would not recommend 

them for this work in the future. (See attached CPARS for Base, Option 1 

and Option 2). Specific critical performance issues include, but are not 

limited to, not maintaining the network readiness at [redacted] which is the 

required minimum level, numerous key personnel vacancies which were not 

filled within the timeframes of the contract terms and conditions and less 

than minimal overall staffing to provide the required quality and level of 

support. The marginal performance has continued into the current option 

period. The incumbent contractor continues to degrade their performance, 

which cannot likely be overcome, to the point where Government 

augmentations had to be made in order to provide the minimum support 

required. There also have been multiple Contract Deficiency Reports 

(CDRs), due to continued understaffing impacting performance for the 

Operations and Maintenance of the networks. The incumbent's staffing 

levels have decreased significantly in the past 9 months and continue on a 

downward trend more rapidly in the past 3 months due to the pending and 

eventual contract award. The incumbent's staff not hired or pending to be 

hired by awardee are moving or have already moved to other positions or 

jobs. If the incumbent is awarded a sole source bridge contract, there is little 

evidence that they will be able to re-obtain the required qualified personnel 

in short order and therefore a high risk of adverse consequences and of 

imminent failure of all aforementioned missions described above. 

Accordingly, I find that these options are not reasonable alternatives to a 

CICA Stay Override.

(capitalization in original). Defendant argues that the “Army rationally concluded that none 

of the alternatives would allow for continuous service or for adequate performance.” 

Protestor first states “STG does not take issue with the Army’s conclusion that performing 

the work in-house was unreasonable.” Protestor, however, continues

the Army’s conclusion as to GDIT was arbitrary and capricious and not in 

accordance with law for several reasons. As explained below, the Army 

made no attempt to negotiate with GDIT and did not even learn GDIT’s 

potential price in order to make an informed assessment of a bridge contract 

as an alternative, despite having enough time to do so. Moreover, the Army 

improperly invoked GDIT’s performance record on the incumbent task order 

as a rationale for concluding that a bridge contract was not a reasonable 

alternative. In addition, the D&F reveals that the Army failed to consider 

other possible alternatives to the override, such as temporarily acquiring the 

services using other contract vehicles. The Court should find that the Army 

did not properly consider Factor 2 and has therefore not satisfied its burden 

to justify its Override Decision under Factor 2.
23

(capitalization in original). Protestor states that “GDIT’s initial response was that it was 

‘open to exploring contractual options in support of continued performance for an 

additional 120 days’ and ‘willing to negotiate in good faith’ as to the terms and conditions,’” 

and, therefore, STG blames the Army for the failure to negotiate a bridge contract. The 

protestor also claims the Army had time to pursue a bridge contract with GDIT. The 

Administrative Record, however, reflects that ultimately Mr. Minjack, the contracting 

officer, offered a bridge contract to GDIT, but GDIT indicated that it could not “accept an 

additional 120 days sole source contract with the same onerous terms and price.”12 In 

addition, the contracting officer expressed concerns that GDIT may not have been able 

to successfully perform a bridge contract. As noted above, the contracting officer 

indicated in the Determination & Finding that GDIT’s “staffing levels have decreased 

significantly in the past 9 months and continue on a downward trend more rapidly in the 

past 3 months due to the pending and eventual contract award,” and “[i]f the incumbent 

is awarded a sole source bridge contract, there is little evidence that they will be able to 

re-obtain the required qualified personnel in short order and therefore a high risk of 

adverse consequences and of imminent failure of all aforementioned missions described 

above.” The contracting officer’s concerns appear reasonable, and the court will not 

second guess the contracting officer’s actions. See Ellsworth Assocs., Inc. v. United 

States, 45 Fed. Cl. 388, 392 (1999) (“Courts must give great deference to agency 

procurement decisions and will not lightly overturn them.”). The court finds it rational that 

the Army determined it could not continue contract performance with incumbent, despite 

protestor’s claims, and that it further could not perform the necessary contract functions 

in-house, necessitating the override so SAIC could begin contract performance.

The third Reilly’s Wholesale factor asks “‘how the potential cost of proceeding with 

the override, including the costs associated with the potential that the GAO might sustain 

the protest, compare to the benefits associated with the approach being considered for 

addressing the agency’s needs.’” Beechcraft Defense Co., LLC v. United States, 111 Fed. 

Cl. at 31 (quoting Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. at 711). The 

Determination & Findings stated if “the override is authorized and the protestor prevails 

in its protest, the Army will have expended the costs of performance of up to 6 months 

(including 2 months phase-in) under the awarded contract,” and “[i]f GAO were to sustain 

the protest, the Army might incur costs that are more than de minimis depending on the 

corrective action required and taken.” The contracting officer determined: “However, this 

is an acceptable risk given the serious consequences of stayed performance for this 

contract action. Therefore, I find that the benefits of overriding the stay and proceeding 

with performance greatly outweigh the potential costs of not doing so.” The protestor 

argues “[t]he Army’s attempt to address this factor consists of two short paragraphs that 

are bereft of any actual cost data, and include no evidence that the Army made any 

serious attempt to even consider all of the potential costs implicated by its Override 

Decision,” and “[t]he Army’s analysis is cursory, speculative and unsupported, leaving 

only a naked assertion that the benefits of the Override Decision outweigh the potential 

 

12 The contracting officer indicated in the Determination & Findings that he believed that 

GDIT would have proposed “a significant price increase in an attempt to recoup asserted 

losses on this contract.”
24

costs.” Defendant, by contrast, argues “[t]he Army’s evaluation took into account the 

factors described in the D&F and was rational,” and the 

Army rationally weighed, against these costs of proceeding with the 

override, the benefits of overriding the stay – avoiding “the serious 

consequences of stayed performance,” described earlier in the D&F, such 

as “the severe adverse impact on U.S. Forces and their ability to meet the 

armistice and contingency missions” and potentially having to receive poor 

service from the incumbent contractor.

(footnote omitted). Although court agrees with protestor that the Determination & Findings 

did not include any actual cost data, save the potential cost of performance, the court also 

agrees with the defendant, that “the benefits at issue here – the Army’s readiness and the 

safety of the military, the American public, and the South Korean public – cannot be 

quantified. They are nonetheless fully worthy of consideration.” Additionally, although 

protestor argues in order to “conduct a sufficient cost-benefit analysis, the Army must 

consider, and not ignore, any potentially applicable costs,” as defendant notes, the Army 

was “not required to consider every single possible cost.” As noted above, the rational 

basis test of APA review asks “‘whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and 

reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.’” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 

906 F.3d at 992 (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d at 1351). 

The contracting officer acknowledged the possibility that if STG’s protest at the GAO was 

ultimately successful the Army could incur costs, and would have “expended the costs of 

performance of up to 6 months (including 2 months phase-in) under the awarded 

contract,” but determined that for the Army, it was “an acceptable risk given the serious 

consequences of stayed performance for this contract action. Therefore, I find that the 

benefits of overriding the stay and proceeding with performance greatly outweigh the 

potential costs of not doing so.” The court defers to the Army’s conclusion about the 

acceptable risk to the Army if STG’s protest is successful. See BCPeabody Constr. 

Servs., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. at 508 (“The court is not empowered to 

substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and it must uphold an agency’s decision 

against a challenge if the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable 

explanation of its exercise of discretion.” (quotations omitted)). Therefore, the court finds

the Determination & Findings’ conclusions regarding this factor were not unreasonable.

As to the fourth factor identified by the United States Court of Federal Claims in 

Reilly’s Wholesale, “the impact of the override on competition and integrity of the 

procurement system,” the contracting officer stated in the Determination & Findings:

Although ACC [the Army] recognizes the important role of the GAO protest 

process in the procurement review process and respects the automatic stay 

provisions found in FAR 33.104. However, FAR expressly permits an 

agency to override this stay in limited instances, where, as here, an agency 

has urgent and compelling reasons for an override. ACC-411th CSB 

[Contracting Support Brigade] has explored alternative means to meet the 

requirement but found none that were acceptable. The urgent need will be 
25

met through the performance of the contract awarded to SAIC. This includes 

the 2 months phase-in period from 13 February 2020 to 12 April 2020 and 

then full performance for up to 9.5 months to 31 January 2021 to meets an 

immediate, critical mission need. In short, overriding the stay is not only 

consistent with the specific rules and regulations of our acquisition system, 

but is also consistent with its overarching principles of competition and 

integrity.

(capitalization in original). Protestor argues that, despite the foregoing, “the D&F includes 

no evidence that the Army even considered these serious impacts to competition and the 

procurement system.” The defendant argues that the above statement by the contracting 

officer demonstrates that the Determination & Findings did show the Army considered the 

impact on the procurement system. Defendant also points to the Determination & 

Findings’ consideration of the arguments raised by protestor on the merits of the GAO 

protest. The Determination & Findings stated:

Below is a summary of STG’s arguments as well as the Army’s initial 

summary of the response to its protest:

1. Protestor’s Argument #1: The Government applied unstated evaluation 

criteria.

Response Summary: The award to SAIC on 24 Jan 2020 under the Army 

CHESS ITES-3S Contract W52P1J-18-D-A075, Task Order W91QVN-20-

F-0157 was based upon the evaluation of proposals in accordance with the 

solicitation terms and conditions. As documented in the Price Negotiation 

Memorandum/Source Selection Document (PNM/SSDD), Technical 

Evaluation Board (TEB) Report and Comparative Analysis 

Recommendation Report the evaluation was in strict conformance with the 

stated evaluation criteria in the Task Order RFP and any amendments. The 

Protester is merely substituting its own judgment for that of the SSA’s 

comparative analysis and tradeoff analysis and final best value award 

determination.

2. Protestor’s Argument #2: The TEB’s evaluation of the offerors under 

the RFP’s non-price factors was unreasonable.

Response Summary: The evaluation of proposals was in accordance with 

the solicitation terms and conditions. The Final TEB Report and evaluation 

was in strict conformance with the stated evaluation criteria in the Task 

Order RFP and any amendments. The Protestor is merely substituting its 

own judgment for the judgment of the Government evaluators.

(emphasis and capitalization in original). In addition to considering the merits of the 

protestor’s arguments to determine whether the Army believed the arguments had merit 

before proceeding with the override, as noted above, the contracting officer also reached 
26

out to the incumbent contractor GDIT to gauge if a bridge contract was feasible. Although 

GDIT concluded it would not consider a bridge contract on the same terms as the earlier 

contract, the contracting officer’s actions demonstrate that the Army did not rush to 

override the CICA stay, but instead tried to find an alternative to allow the GAO process 

to continue. On balance, the Determination & Findings demonstrate that the Army 

considered the impact that overriding the CICA stay would have on the integrity of the 

procurement system. 

Based on the record before the court, the Army identified significant adverse 

consequences that would occur if the Army did not have a contractor providing mission 

command network operations and maintenance services. The Army rationally determined 

that there were no reasonable alternatives to overriding the CICA stay, considered the 

costs and benefits associated with overriding the CICA stay, and considered the effects 

of the Agency’s actions on the integrity of the procurement system. The Army decision to 

override the CICA stay “based upon mission essential reasons which are urgent and 

compelling, that will not permit waiting for a decision in the protest,” therefore, was not 

arbitrary and capricious. See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3)(C).13

CONCLUSION

As determined above, the Army’s decision to override the CICA stay is sustained. 

The defendant’s and intervenor’s motions for judgment on the Administrative Record are 

GRANTED. Protestor’s motion for judgment on the Administrative Record is DENIED. 

Protestor’s protest is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT

consistent with this Opinion.

As indicated above, this Opinion is limited to the sole issue of the decision of the 

Army to override the CICA stay. This Opinion did not consider the merits of the evaluation 

of the proposals or the Army’s decision to award the task order to SAIC. If protestor files 

a subsequent bid protest in this court related to the Army’s evaluation of the proposals 

 

13 The court notes that the parties disagree as to the standard to apply if the court were 

find the override decision was irrational, as protestor argues that “the effect of a 

declaratory judgment in an override case is to reinsert the previously applicable stay of 

performance,” and argues that it would be “unnecessary to evaluate the additional 

injunction factors in order to afford the plaintiff relief from the agency’s arbitrary and 

capricious conduct.” Defendant argues that because a declaratory judgment in this 

protest would have the effect of an injunction, “the traditional equitable factors for 

injunctive relief should be applied to a request for declaratory judgment,” and “the Court 

should reject STG’s argument that, when considering the appropriateness of a 

declaratory judgment, the Court need not consider the injunction factors.” As the court 

has concluded that the override decision was not arbitrary or capricious, the court does 

not need to reach the issue of what standard to apply.
27

and award to SAIC, the protestor shall indicate it is related to the above captioned protest, 

and the Clerk’s Office shall assign the newly filed bid protest to the undersigned.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

 s/Marian Blank Horn 

 MARIAN BLANK HORN

 Judge