IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

N O. 2016-CP-00904-COA

MARK A. KING A/K/A MARK KING A/K/A MARK SIEGFRIED KING A/K/A MARK S. KING APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/29/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARK A KING (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LISA L. BLOUNT NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DISMISSED THE APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/30/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Mark King entered a g uilty plea to the charge of possession of counterf eit bank notes

or o ther instrum ents. The Madison County Circuit Court sentenced King to ten y ears in the
custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of C orrections ( MDOC) and ordered him t o pay court

c o s t s , f ees, and assessm ents in the am ount o f $ 498.50. King f iled a m o tion f

or postconviction relief (PCR), arguing that his i ndictm ent was def e ctive f or f ailing to provide

him w ith n otice of the am ount of counterf eit bank notes in h is possession, and as a result, his

sentence was unconstitutional. Af ter reviewing the record and King’s P CR m o t i o n , thecircuit court d enied King’s r e quested relie f a n d d i s mi ssed his PCR m otion. King now

appeals. Finding no error, we af f irm the circuit court’s dism issal of King’s PCR m otion.

FACTS
¶2. On August 14, 2 0 1 4 , a M a d i s on County grand jury indicted King f or possession of

cou n t e r f e i t bank notes or other i nstrum ents in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated

section 97-21-37 (Rev. 2006) (Count I), and conspiracy to possess a counterf e i t instrum ent

in violation of

Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-1-1 (Rev. 2006) (Count II). 1
¶3. On Novem

ber 1 7 , 2 0 1 4 , K i n g e n t e r e d a plea of guilty to C ount I , possession of

counterf eit bank notes, and Count II was nolle prossed. O n D ecem ber 8, 2 014, the circuit

court sentenced King to s erve ten y ears in the custody of the M DOC and to pay court costs,

f ees, and assessm ents in the am ount of $498.50.
¶4. O n A p r i l 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 , King f i led a PCR m o tion, a rguing that h is indict me n t w a s

def ective f or f ailing to p rovide him notice of t he m onetary value o f the counterf eit bank notes

he was c harged with possessing. King f urther subm itt e d that no proof was of f ered in the

indictm ent as to the f

ace am ount of thos e n otes. K ing also c laim e d t hat his sentence

exceeded the m a xim

u m authorized by law, arguing that he should not have been sentenced

to m ore than six m onths i n the c ounty jail pursuant to the am e ndme n t t o t h e s e ntencing

schem e f ound in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-21-33(1) (Rev. 2014).

1 T h e reco rd sh o w s th at o n O cto b e r 3 1 , 2 0 1 4 , th e S tate m o v ed to am en d th e in d ictm en t to ch arg e K in g a s a h ab itu al o f f en d er u n d er M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ) ; h o w ev er, th e S tate f ailed to p resen t th e m o tio n to th e circu it co u rt.

2¶5. Af

ter reviewing both the record and King’s PCR m otion, the circuit court e ntered an

order on April 29, 2 016, deny ing King’s requested relief and dism i ssing his PCR mo t i o n

. The circuit court explained:
[ P]ursuant to t he versions of

. . . [ sections] 97-21-37 and 97-21-33 in ef f ect on the date t he c rim e was com m itted, it w as a f elony to possess such counterf eit checks in any am ount. W hile the S tate could have proceeded against King on
a m isdem eanor charge if the f ace am ount of the checks [ was] below $500, the S t a te was not r equired to d o so and could h ave proceeded against King a s a f elony regardless of

the f ace am ount of

the checks.

The circuit court also held that the f ace of the indictm ent clearly provided K ing with notice

that the State was charging him with a f elony charge o f p ossession of counterf eit bank notes

or other instrum ents.
¶6. King now appeals the circuit court’s dism i ssal of his PCR m otion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. “W hen reviewing a trial c ourt’s denial or dism issal of a m otion f or PCR, we will only

disturb the trial court’s f

actual f indings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we r e v i ew legal conclusions under a d e novo standard of review.” Chapman v

. State , 1 67 So. 3d 1170,
1172 (¶3) (Miss. 2015).

DISCUSSION
¶8. Kin g a r g u e s t h a t h i s indictm e nt charging him with possession of counterf eit bank

notes or other i nstrum ents was def ective. King adm its that his indictm e n t notif ied him that

he was b eing charged w ith t he o f f ense of possession of counterf e it b ank n o t e s pursuant to

section 97-21-37. However, K ing argues that t he indictm ent f ailed to s pecif

y the am ount of

3f

orged notes f

ound in his possession f or se n t e n c i n g purposes. King subm its that the
sentencing statute, section 9 7 -21-33, applies dif f erent penalties depending on the am ount of

f orged notes in possession of t he def endant. As a result, King asserts tha t im posing a

sentence without properly i ncluding the a m ount of f orged n otes in h is indictm e nt v iolates the
Eighth Am endm e nt of

the United States Constitution.
¶9. Unif

orm Rule of Circuit and County Court 7.06 states that an indictm e nt “shall be a
plain, concise[ ,] and d ef

inite written statem ent of the essential f acts constituting the of

f ense charged and shall f

ully notif y the def endant of the nature and cause of t he accusation.” In

Davis v. State , 171 S o

. 3 d 5 3 7 , 5 4 0 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), this C ourt explained that
“[ t]he c h i e f o b

j e ctive of an indictm ent is to provide a def endant f air n otice of the crim e charged.” Furtherm o re, “[ a]n indic t m e nt m ust contain (1) the e ssential elem ents of the

of f ense charged, (2) suf

f icient f acts to f airly inf orm the d ef

endant o f the charge against

which he m

ust def end, and (3) suf

f icient f acts t o enable h im to plead double jeopardy in the

event of a f

uture prosecution f

o r the sam e of

f e n se.” I d

. (quoting Gilmer v. S

tate , 955 So. 2d
829, 836-37 (¶24) (Miss. 2007)).
¶10. T h e record r ef

lects that King’s indictm ent f or possession of counterf eit bank no t e s charged:
[ O]n or about t he 11th d ay of June, 2014,

. . . [ King] did u nlawf ully , w illf ully , and f eloniously have in [ his] possession m ultiple f orged, altered[ ,] or counterf eited negotiable n o tes, nam ely : m ultiple b u s i n e s s checks drawn on the

acc o u n t o f HRL Contractors, LLC,

. . . when

. . . [ King] knew sam e to be f orged, altered[ ,] or counterf eited, with intention to u tter the sa m e as true or
as f alse, or to c ause the sam e to b e u ttered, with intent to injure or def raud, in

4violation of . . . [ section] 97-21-37[

. ]

¶11. At the tim e King com m itted the crim e ch a r g e d i n h is indictm ent, Mississippi Code

Annotated section 9 7-21-33 (Rev. 2006) provided the f ol l o w i n g p enalty f

or a violation of

section 97-21-37: a term of i m prisonm ent between two and ten y ears, a f ine of not m ore than
$10,000, or both. As stated, the circuit court herein “reviewed the c om plete f ile in this

m atter, including all the p leadings in this c ause, the underly i n g c r i m inal f ile, [ and] the
transcript of the guilty p lea and sentencing hearings” and u ltim ately e ntered an order deny ing

r e l i e f a n d dism issing King’s P CR m o tion. In its order o f dism issal, the circuit cour t

exp l a ined that, “pursuant to the versions of

. . . [ sections] 97-21-37 and 97-21-33 in ef f ect

on the date the crim e was com m itted, it was a f elony to possess such counterf eit checks in

any am ount.” The circuit court held:

It is clear f

r om the f a ce of the indictm ent that t he State was proceeding against King on a f

e lony charge, regardle s s o f t h e a m o unt of the checks, which the Court f inds to have been within the dis c r e t i o n o f the S tate. Count I o f the indictm ent clearly shows that King was c alled into Court t o f a c e a f e lony charge f or the possession of counterf e it business checks drawn on the a ccount of H R L C o n tractors, LLC, which King possessed in Madison County , Mississippi, knowing the sam e to be f o rged, altered[ ,] o r counterf eit, and t hat he had the intent to utter and published such checks with the f urther intent to injur[ e] and def

raud.
¶12. Our review of King’s i ndictm ent ref lect s t h a t h e was charged with com m itting the

of f ense on June 11, 2 01 4

. T h e Mississippi S uprem e Court has held that, unless a statute
specially provides otherwise, a trial court m ust sentence an o f

f e nder under the s e ntencing

statute in ef

f ect a t the tim e of the of

f ense. W i lson v. State , 194 So. 3d 8 55, 874 (¶61) (Miss.

52016); Miss. C ode Ann. § 99-19-1 (Rev. 2015). A t the tim e of King’s of f e n se, section 97-
21-27 (Rev. 2006) provided:
Every person who shall have in his posse s sion any f orged, a ltered[ ,] or counterf eited n egotiable note, bill, draf t, or other evidence of debt issued or purported to have been issued by any c orporation or com p any duly authorized f or that purpose by the laws of the United States o r of this state, or of any other state, g overnm ent, or country , or any other f o r g e d, a ltered, or c o unterf eit, instrum ent the f

orgery of which is declared by t he p rovision s o f t h i s chapter to be punishable, knowing the same t o b e f orged, altered, or c ounterf e ited, with intention to utter t he sam e as true or as f alse, or to cause the sam e to be uttered, with intent to injure or def raud, shall be guilty

of f orgery

. (Em phasis added). A reading of the plain language of the statute ref lects no r equirem ent f

or

a specif i c value o r am ount of f

orged or counterf

eit notes in order t o b e gu i l t y o f f o rgery ;
rather, the statute sim

ply requires that a person “have in his p ossession any f o rged, altered[ ,]

or counterf

eited negotiable note[ .]” Id

. (Em phasis added). Accordingly , we f i nd that King’s

indictm ent properly

tracks the language of

the statute and, in so doing, provides King with

proper notice of the charge against him

. See Harrison v

. S t a t e , 7 22 So. 2 d 6 81, 687 (¶22)
(Miss. 1998) ( “So long as f rom a f air reading of the indictm ent taken a s a whole the nature

and cause of t he c harge a gainst the accused are clear, the i ndictm ent is legally suf f icient.”).
¶13. The corresponding sentencing statute in place at the t im e King com m itted the charged

of f ense of possession of

counterf e it bank notes, section 97-21-33 (Rev. 2006), provided:

Persons convicted of f

orgery shall b e punished by im prisonm ent in the P e n i t entiary f

or a term of not less than t wo ( 2) y ears nor m ore than ten (10) y e a r s , or by a f

ine of not m ore t han Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00 ) , o r both; provided, h owever, that w hen the am ount of value involved is l ess t han Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in lieu of t he punishm ent above provided f or, the person convicted m ay b e punished by im prisonm e nt in the c ounty jail f or

6a term o f not m ore than six (6) m onths, o r by a f i ne of not m ore than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both, within the discretion of the court.
¶14. In h is appellate b rief , King cites t o the am ended version of section 9 7-21-33, ef f ective
July 1, 2014, which provides vary i ng penalties d epending on “the am ount of value involved”

in the f orgery

. 2 However, this am ended v ersion b ecam e ef f e c tive shortly af

ter King

2 T h e recen tly am en d ed v ersio n o f sectio n 9 7 -2 1 -3 3 (R ev . 2 0 1 4 ) p ro v i d es: (1 ) A n y p erso n co n v icted o f f o rg ery w h en th e am o u n t o f v alu e in v o lv ed is

u n d er O n e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) m ay b e p u n ish ed b y im p r iso n m en t in th e c o u n ty j ail f

o r a t erm o f n o t m o r e th an six (6 ) m o n th s, o r b y a f in e o f n o t
m o re t h a n O n e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ), o r b o th if th e co u rt f i n d s
su b stan tial an d co m

p ellin g reas o n s w h y th e o f f e n d er can n o t b e saf

ely a n d ef f ectiv ely su p erv ised in th e co m m u n ity , is n o t am en ab le to co m m u n ity

- b ased treatm en t , o r p o ses a sig n if ican t risk to p u b lic saf

ety

. I f su ch a f

in d in g is n o t
m ad e, th e co u rt sh all su sp en d t h e sen ten c e o f i mp riso n m en t an d i m p o se a p erio d o f p ro b atio n n o t ex c eed i n g o n e (1 ) y ear o r a f in e o f n o t m o re th an O n e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ), o r b o th

. T h e to tal v alu e o f th e f o rg ery b y th e p erso n f r o m a sin g le v ictim sh all b e ag g reg ated i n d e term in in g th e g rav ity o f th e o f f en se. A n y p erso n co n v icted o f a t h ird o r s u b seq u en t o f f en se u n d e r th is

su b sectio n w h ere th e v alu e o f th e p ro p e rty is n o t l e s s th a n F iv e H u n d red D o llars ($ 5 0 0

. 0 0 ), s h all b e p u n ish ed b y im p riso n m en t in th e P en iten tiary f o r
a term n o t ex ceed in g th ree (3 ) y ears o r b y a f in e n o t ex ceed i n g O n e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ), o r b o t h

. (2 ) A n y p erso n co n v icted o f f o rg ery w h en th e am o u n t o f v alu e in v o lv ed is O n e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) o r m o re b u t less th a n F i v e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) sh all b e p u n ish ed b y i m p riso n m en t in th e P e n iten tiary f o r
a t erm n o t m o re th an f

i v e (5 ) y ears, o r a f

in e o f n o t m o re th an T en T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) , o r b o th

. (3 ) A n y p erso n co n v icted o f f o rg ery w h en th e am o u n t o f v alu e in v o lv ed is F iv e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) o r m o re, b u t less th an T w en ty -f iv e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 2 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) sh all b e im p r iso n ed in th e P en iten tiary f o r a term n o t ex ceed in g ten ( 1 0 ) y ears, o r b e f in ed n o t m o re th an T en T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) , o r b o th

. 7com m itted the of f ense of possession of counterf eit bank notes. See W

ilson , 194 So. 3d at 874
(¶61) ( “Section 99-19-1 c learly requires the trial court to sen tence an o f f ender under a sentencing statute in place at the tim e of the crim e.”).
¶15. The transcript f

rom the plea hearing ref

lects t hat t he sentencing judge advised King

that section 97-21-33 was am ended shortly af ter K ing com m itted the of f e nse of p ossession

of counterf

eit bank n otes. The sentencing judge then explained that both section 99-19-1 and

caselaw m andate t hat the sentencing judge apply the version of section 97-21-33 in ef f ect at

the t im e King com m itted t he of f ense. The transcript f

u rther ref lects that the sentencing judge

advised King of t he m inim um and ma x im

um sentences h e c ould receive, pursuant to his

g u i l t y p l e a , f

or possession of counterf eit bank notes. King a f

f irm ed under oath that h e

understood t he possible sentences he could receive and that h e still wished to enter a plea of
guilty

. ¶16. A f t e r o u r r e view, we f

ind that King’s sentence of ten y ears in the custody of the

MDOC and pay

m ent of court costs, f

ees, a n d assessm ents in t he a m ount of $ 498.50 f alls

within the sentencing purview authorized by the version of section 9 7-21-33 in ef f ect at the

tim e King com m itted the of f ense o f possession of counterf eit bank notes. As a result, King’s

(4 ) A n y p erso n co n v icted o f f o rg ery w h en th e am o u n t o f v alu e in v o lv ed is T w en ty -f iv e T h o u san d D o llars ($ 2 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ) o r m o re, sh all b e im p riso n ed in th e P en iten tiary f

o r a term n o t e x ceed in g tw en ty (2 0 ) y e ars, o r b e f i n ed n o t
m o re th an T en T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ), o r b o t h

. T h e to tal v alu e o f th e f o rg ery b y th e p erso n f

r o m a sin g l e v ictim s h all b e ag g reg ated i n d eterm in in g th e g rav ity o f th e o f

f en se.
8sentence is valid. W e theref ore f ind no error in the circuit court’s determ i nation that King

was entitled to no relief

. ¶17. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E M A D I S O N C O U N T Y C I R C U I T C O U R T DISMISSING THE M OTION FOR P OSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., I RVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

9