U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

94–257 PDF 2004

COMBATING TERRORISM: CHEMICAL PLANT

SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 23, 2004

Serial No. 108–156

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

——— ———

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DAN BURTON, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

——— ———

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Advisor

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on February 23, 2004 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Liscouski, Robert P., Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Robert Full,

chief, Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services; and Thomas W. Headley, vice chairman, Forward Township Board of Supervisors .............................................................................................................. 8

Stephenson, John, Director of National Resources and Environment for

the U.S. General Accounting Office; Pamela Witmer, president of the

Pennsylvania Chemical Industry Council; Marty Durbin, team leader

for security and opeerations and senior director of Federal relations

for the American Chemistry Council; and Jennifer C. Gibson, vice

president of government and public affairs, National Association of

Chemical Distributors .................................................................................. 50

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Durbin, Marty, team leader for security and opeerations and senior director of Federal relations for the American Chemistry Council, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 84

Full, Robert, chief, Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 18

Gibson, Jennifer C., vice president of government and public affairs,

National Association of Chemical Distributors, prepared statement of ... 105

Headley, Thomas W., vice chairman, Forward Township Board of Supervisors, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 22

Liscouski, Robert P., Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 11

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Stephenson, John, Director of National Resources and Environment for

the U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ..................... 53

Witmer, Pamela, president of the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry Council, prepared statement of ............................................................................ 76

(1)

COMBATING TERRORISM: CHEMICAL PLANT

SECURITY

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., at Moon

Township Municipal Building, Auditorium, 1000 Beaver Grade

Road, Moon Township, PA, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of

the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Murphy, Shays and Turner.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R.

Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor; and Robert A.

Briggs, clerk/policy analyst.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations

hearing entitled, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security,’’

is called to order.

Let me first thank Congressman Tim Murphy for inviting the

subcommittee here today. He is a thoughtful, active participant in

our oversight, and we are happy to have the opportunity to examine the important issue of chemical plant security from this perspective. I will be turning over the chairmanship once we’ve sworn

in our first panel, and he’ll conduct the rest of the hearing.

According to a February bulletin from the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], National Infrastructure Protection Center, industrial chemical plants remain ‘‘viable targets’’ for attacks by al

Queda terrorists. So we meet this morning to ask if the public and

private sectors are pursuing an equally viable strategy to repel or

respond to those attacks.

Many in this area may not think so, and for good reason.

Through last year, a series of media reports pointed to chronically

lax security and obviously avoidable vulnerabilities at chemical facilities here and across the Nation. A porous perimeter of fallen

fences and poorly aimed security cameras that failed to stop intruders armed only with pens and cameras is not likely to deter trained

terrorists seeking access to deadly chemicals.

What is at risk? More than 15,000 U.S. facilities use large

amounts of extremely hazardous substances; 3,000 of those sites

project worst-case hazardous zones in which released chemicals

could reach more than 10,000 people nearby or far downwind. VulVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94257.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
2

nerability zones around 125 chemical plants could each encompass

more than 1 million people.

Securing this widely dispersed network of chemical production,

storage and distribution facilities poses difficult challenges and demands tough choices. Given the undeniable attractiveness of toxic

and flammable compounds terrorists could use as prepositioned

weapons of mass destruction, the need for increased physical security is obvious. But gates, guns and guards are not the only answers. Chemical infrastructure could remain economically critical,

but less vulnerable, if inherently safer substances and processes

were adopted to reduce their toxic utility to terrorists. Increased security and reduced chemical risk need not be mutually exclusive,

but so far sustained progress on either seems much too elusive.

Another challenge posed by increased chemical facility security

pits the need for public information and awareness against the effort to keep facility plans and strategies out of the hands of terrorists. Documents on emergency response plans and chemical plant

preparedness have been removed from the Internet and other public sources. The question remains whether that loss of transparency

enhances security more than it shields poor planning from needed

public security.

As in other areas of terrorism preparedness, the chemical industry and those who regulate it are hard pressed to answer the question, ‘‘Prepared for what?’’ Without threat-based standards against

which to measure security spending, money and time are being

wasted lurching from crisis to crisis, as each code orange alert and

sensational media incursion highlights new vulnerabilities.

The Department of Homeland Security is conducting an inventory of America’s critical infrastructure in formulating preparedness standards to secure key industrial targets from terrorists. The

Assistant Secretary of DHS for Infrastructure Protection, Mr. Robert Liscouski, will testify on the status of those efforts. We obviously appreciate him being here today.

State and local officials, industrial association representatives

and an expert from the U.S. General Accounting Office will also

testify. We appreciate the time, dedication and expertise of all our

witnesses, and we look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

3

4

5

Mr. SHAYS. At this time the Chair would recognize Michael Turner, the vice chairman of the committee.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being at this field

hearing. You have been instrumental in leading this community’s

charge to improve our homeland security and to assist our first responders in being prepared for threats that our country now faces.

I would also like to thank Representative Tim Murphy for

hosting us here today and bringing this important issue of chemical

plant security before this subcommittee. Representative Murphy is

a leading member of the Government Reform Committee and effective legislator and colleague, served as vice president of our freshman class, and has been a strong advocate in the areas of homeland security, education and health care.

The issue of security of chemicals facilities is very important to

our Nation. I’m encouraged to see that the private sector has taken

a lead in preparing security assessments of not only their facilities,

but also for the process of moving chemicals from location to location.

However, the Federal Government should be a partner in that

process and work with companies to develop quality, comprehensive risk management plans. I mentioned there are witnesses from

the private sector today on how the Federal Government can be an

effective partner in addressing these security concerns.

Since September 11 our knowledge of the threat we face of these

facilities has changed, and so must our response. Under our chairman’s direction, this subcommittee has reviewed issues from firstresponder resources, our police and fire, nuclear power plant safety, our Federal nuclear weapons storage programs and the issue of

the safety of our disposal of our Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile.

This issue today is important, of course, to our national security,

but it is also important to our communities and our families who

are in close proximity to these plants and could be affected by our

preparedness. That is why it is so important that Congressman

Murphy has requested that this field hearing be held here today

rather than Washington, an area where the community and the

families are affected most by this issue. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, gentleman.

I recognize Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for

convening this hearing here in Moon Township, in Pittsburgh

where we have many members of the chemical industry with

plants, manufacturing and storage facilities.

We know that securing America’s chemical facilities has long

been a priority for the chemical industry and the thousands of people living in communities near large storage of potential hazardous

materials. I’d like to thank not only Chairman Shays for coming

here to this special field hearing, but also all the staff who has

worked on this issue.

As you probably know, a local newspaper reporter, Carl Prine,

and the TV media in this town have done a series of investigative

reports on the very serious concerns about the levels of security we

have at chemical facilities since the terrorist attacks on September

11, 2001; even CBS picked up the story, and 60 Minutes aired a

show highlighting the impact of this issue across the United States.

6

In the last 2 weeks, the National Security Subcommittee staff

has worked hard to make this hearing possible. I want to thank the

witnesses who are going to testify before this committee today. This

is a complicated issue of tremendous concern to countless citizens

across the country. Ensuring the security of the Nation’s chemicals

demands the attention of several different parties with often-times

competing industries. There are no easy answers, but I appreciate

the willingness of these individuals to participate in an ongoing

conversation.

Now, I have to admit, I am somewhat disappointed the companies themselves declined our invitations to testify this morning.

While I’m looking forward to the testimony to be given by representatives of the chemical industry and expect it to be very informative, the firsthand testimony of the steps various companies

in the Pittsburgh community have taken to improve security since

September 11th would have been invaluable.

I do appreciate the companies’ concerns for revealing security

procedures in a public forum; however, this committee will still

pursue a careful and thorough review of their policies and procedures in the interest of public safety.

I believe chemical facilities are, in fact, concerned with the security of their sites and the safety of the communities in which they

reside. It is, and always has been in the best interest of the companies to be conscious of the possible threats the chemicals they

produce and store pose to both their employees and the families living nearby.

In recent days, the crux of this issue has not been only one of

facilities housing large quantities of dangerous materials should be

required to conduct vulnerability assessments and then take action

to reduce those vulnerabilities. The issue before us today is simply

asking who should be responsible for regulating those assessments

and improvements.

Federal, State and local governments have always played an integral role in ensuring that a certain level of security is maintained

at chemical facilities, and had the companies testified today, we

probably would have heard about all the different regulations they

already are required to adhere to and the various government

agencies that impose them.

Many of the facilities currently meet standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation,

the Coast Guard, State environmental agencies, State emergency

management agencies and local municipalities.

Our immediate response should not be to automatically slap industry with additional security measures without first thoroughly

investigating the issue; however, there are many hard questions

that must be answered. Could more be done? Should more be done?

And who should oversee it and at what cost?

Each of the witnesses that we hear today represent the different

seats at the security table. I’m looking forward to hearing from witnesses at the Federal, State, local industry levels. Not only will we

be hearing testimony from Federal industry representatives on the

appropriate balance that should be struck in determining oversight

and assessment authority, but we will also hear from a local township supervisor testifying to his firsthand experience working to inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94257.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
7

crease security at a local company. We will also hear from the chief

of the Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services on the

relationship that the department has with local businesses with

large chemical stores and emergency response plans in place.

Finally, let me say this: Any decision made by Congress must be

based on sound science and not initial knee-jerk reactions. The

safety of the American people must be our top priority, and I firmly

believe the best way to ensure their safety is to make the most informed and educated decisions possible. That is why this and future hearings on the issue are so important.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you, gentleman, and, again, appreciate this

invitation to have this hearing here rather than in Washington.

To take care of some housekeeping first before calling on our witnesses, I ask unanimous consent of all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and

that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. And without objection, so ordered.

I ask for the unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to submit their written statements in the record. Without objection,

so ordered.

At this time I’ll recognize our three panelists, our three participants in our first panel, the Honorable Robert P. Liscouski, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection,

Department of Homeland Security; Chief Robert Full, chief, Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services; and Mr. Thomas

W. Headley, vice chairman, Forward Township Board of Supervisors.

I think you all know that it’s our custom on this committee to

swear in our witnesses, and at this time we would just ask you if

you would stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses responded in the

affirmative.

I’ve chaired this subcommittee and the previous subcommittee

now for over 8 years, and we’ve sworn in every witness except one,

and you probably could guess that it was I who essentially chickened out. But other than that, everyone has been sworn in, so

thank you very much.

We’re going to start with you, Mr. Liscouski, and then Chief Full

and then Mr. Headley. We’ll go in that order.

At this time I’m turning over the Chair to Mr. Murphy, so you’re

in charge.

Mr. MURPHY [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Actually, before I do that, I should make sure I understand how much time each Member has.

Mr. SHAYS. We’re going to give you 5 minutes. We’re going to roll

it over for another 5 minutes. So you have 10 minutes, but feel free

to be somewhere in that range of 5 to 10, and that’s how we’ll proceed, and then I think what we can do is 10-minute questions for

each Member that we ask.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. And, Mr. Liscouski, you can proceed.

8

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT P. LISCOUSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ROBERT FULL, CHIEF, ALLEGHENY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

EMERGENCY SERVICES; AND THOMAS W. HEADLEY, VICE

CHAIRMAN, FORWARD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to

appear, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am

pleased to be here this morning before your subcommittee to discuss the Department’s efforts to protect and secure our Nation’s

critical infrastructure.

The Department’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate carries out comprehensive assessments of the

vulnerability of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the

United States, including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed by particular types of terrorist attacks

within the United States.

Our overall protection methodology leverages an integrated physical/cyber protection approach to reduce vulnerabilities and to optimize our response when an attack does occur. Because of the disproportionately high physical threat facing U.S. chemical facilities,

however, my remarks for today’s hearing are directed at our physical security efforts toward safeguarding U.S. chemical facilities.

The IAIP Directorate has a dedicated organization committed to

protecting physical assets that includes the Infrastructure Protection Office for which I am responsible. The organization responsible

for protection is the Protective Security Division. Today I am here

to give you a progress report on where we are now and what we

have in store for the coming months to implement the President’s

National Strategy for Homeland Security as it relates to chemical

security.

Since last year the Office for Infrastructure Protection has implemented a consolidated and coordinated team of physical security

professionals. These experts were charged with responsibility for

the following: Identifying critical infrastructure and key assets; assessing their vulnerabilities; assessing the risk to and the consequences of an attack against those infrastructures and assets;

and working with State, local, territorial and private sectors to implement appropriate security measures.

More specifically, the Office of Infrastructure Protection is working to improve the safety and security of the Nation’s chemical

plants and facilities as part of the infrastructure protection directives in the Homeland Security Act and the National Strategy for

Homeland Security. Despite the many organizational and cultural

challenges associated with integrating these elements into one entity, our initial efforts have yielded effective, tangible and measurable results.

Every day at DHS we ask ourselves how are we safer today, and

how do we measure our progress? Today I have some answers to

those questions. Since its inception in 2003, less than a year ago,

DHS, and specifically my office, has placed chemical site security

on the top priority list for physical infrastructure protection.

We have managed Operation Liberty Shield, a domestic protection strategy that includes the deployment of members of State and

9

local police officers, the National Guard to approximately 150 sites

across the United States, over half of which are chemical sites.

We have conducted a national risk analysis of the chemical sector to identify the most hazardous and highest-risk sites. We have

deployed DHS protective security counterterrorism specialists to

top priority chemical sites to identify vulnerabilities to attacks and

develop prevention strategies with site management and local officials, and we have completed vulnerability assessments, developed

specific buffer zone security plans and provided training and assistance to implement those plans.

This approach includes full engagement with the protective security community at the State and the local levels to include the private sector, and this has already resulted in the increased safety

and security of millions of Americans living near the highest-risk

sites.

We have developed a report on chemical facility common

vulnerabilities. We have developed templates for protection plans

for areas adjacent to those chemical facilities and a report on potential indicators of terrorist activities related to chemical sites

which have been shared with State and local authorities. These reports have been published and distributed throughout the country

to law enforcement authorities and to each of the States’ homeland

security advisor.

In addition, we are developing and using a graded approach to

the approximately 66,000 sites. This is based on EPA records in the

United States and identifying the 4,012 sites that should have vulnerability assessments performed. We are reviewing the amount of

toxic materials stored at those sites, developing plume modeling for

146 chemical plants using the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center [NARAC], for more detailed effects prediction.

We’re reviewing the population density in the vicinity of large

amounts of toxic chemicals and evaluating possible impacts of intentional attack as opposed to accidental release models used in

safety programs.

High-risk sites will be visited on a regular basis to assist in the

implementation of security recommendations, and we will also visit

additional sites to provide training, support and recommendations,

and we will do further followup visits on a regular basis. These visits and the protection plans will reduce risk to millions of Americans.

The Office of Infrastructure Protection’s close association with

the industry is exemplified by our close interaction with more than

20 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers [ISACs]. One example of this interaction is the Vulnerability Assessment Methodology

for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, which was published by the American Petroleum Institute and collaboratively

crafted by my office and the API, published in May 2003.

Protecting our critical infrastructure is a Departmentwide responsibility. In 2002, the Maritime Transportation Security Act

was passed. Regulations now in place require some 5,000 sites to

provide security plans to the Coast Guard, including 289 chemical

facilities which were included in that list. Security plans are being

prepared and submitted as we speak.

10

The Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], is another agency

we work closely with. Historically, the EPA has been charged with

identifying chemical and other substances that could affect the

quality of the air we breathe and the water that we drink. Part of

their mission includes regulations requiring chemical facilities that

meet or exceed certain guidelines to develop and update these documents that are called risk management plans. These plans center

on accidental releases of chemicals harmful to humans into the air

or the water. The EPA published that there are about 15,000 chemical plants in the United States.

Before detailing our future programs and initiatives, however, I

would like to address the EPA numbers as they are being used by

the media and others regarding security at chemical plants. While

these facts may adequately address environmental, emergency preparedness, and first responders’ concerns, they do not appropriately

reflect the possible results of terrorist attacks. Our analysis of terrorist scenarios show that of the 15,000 or so chemical sites identified by the EPA, approximately 4,000 if attacked would affect populations of 1,000 or more.

Over the next year the DHS will engage with approximately

4,000 sites, chemical sites, throughout the United States to continue to enhance security of our critical infrastructure sites in the

chemical sector. These additional visits and protection plans will

reduce the risk to tens of millions of Americans in 50 States, the

District of Columbia and the U.S. territories.

The Department is working to ensure that the security of our

Nation’s critical facilities and infrastructure is a focus of our efforts.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today, and I

would be pleased to answer any questions that you have at the appropriate time. Thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Liscouski follows:]

11

12

13

14

15

Mr. MURPHY. We will now turn to Chief Robert Full, who is the

chief of the Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services.

Chief, please proceed.

Chief FULL. Good morning, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Chairman, thank

you very much, and members of the committee, I thank you for this

opportunity to provide testimony before you today. Also, on behalf

of Chief Executive Dan Onorato, our Allegheny County Chief Executive, I would also like to thank you for being here in our fine

county as well, and rest assured your safety is paramount to us,

and we wish your stay here to be very well.

I come before you not only as the Chief of the Department of

Emergency Services, but also the Allegheny County emergency

management coordinator, the chairman of the Allegheny County

Local Emergency Planning Committee and also the Pennsylvania

Region 13 Counterterrorism Task Force.

Mr. Murphy, I’d like to compliment you on your efforts and your

interest in our things that we do here locally, as I know that you’ve

attended our meetings before and provided us a great deal of support in our endeavors with not only terrorism, but also safety in

the community.

Allegheny County, PA, has a population of 1.28 million persons

in a 730-square-mile area, with 130 municipalities including the

city of Pittsburgh. The county is a large center for research and development, retail, manufacturing, specialized medical care centers,

major educational institutions and numerous other industries and

small businesses.

The county is a major transportation hub for North and South,

East and West travel nationally via U.S. interstate highways,

Pennsylvania State highways as well as local roadways; home to

the Pittsburgh International Airport, major railroads, underground

and above-ground pipelines, traffic tunnels, downtown subway,

hundreds of bridges, and the three rivers recognized as being the

busiest inland water port in the United States.

Allegheny County has 235 chemical facilities which the EPA has

classified as having at least one or more of the extremely hazardous substances on their list of 300 with an additional 700 others

requiring EPA 312 reporting.

This hearing is actually being held less than 2 miles away from

one of the focal chemical facilities on the 60 Minutes program. That

particular facility lies here in Allegheny County in an area that sits

upwind from the city of Pittsburgh. With prevailing weather conditions such as today, any major release, accidental or intentional,

would drift into the downtown population center within 10 to 15

minutes; before then even tens of thousands of people would be affected.

We can all sleep at night through the efforts and success of local,

State and Federal Government working together to craft key legislation such as the SARA Title III laws that occurred back in the

1980’s, as well as here in Pennsylvania when the Pennsylvania

Legislature enacted Pennsylvania Act 165. These two pieces of legislation and others are responsible for ensuring that plans, training

and exercises, information, funding, accountability, emergency response and mitigation of programs are in place to ensure the safety

of our community. Chemical safety has been taken very seriously

16

here, and we’ve been recognized as being much ahead of the curve

in prevention and response to chemical releases either from fixed

facilities or a transportation accident.

Security of our chemical facilities from an intentional act from

within their own employees as learned from that tragic event in

Bhopal, India, or an act of domestic or international terrorism has

been an issue with our local emergency planners and local emergency planning for years, long before September 11th. I am and

those particular groups, the LEPC, are in favor of legislation to ensure the security of all facilities that use, store and transport

chemicals.

The facility that was the focus of the 60 Minutes program was

one of our upstanding chemical facilities that sit on our LEPC and

have one of the finest safety records that we have here, and we

enjoy a great working relationship. We, too, at the local emergency

planning committee and I personally was amazed to see the story

and the issue in regards to access into their facility by the reporters.

The American Chemical Council has done an excellent job in

being out front in the security issue, but I know firsthand that

many of the companies that I am most concerned with are not

members of the American Chemistry Council.

There continues to be facilities, many of them in my county here,

that one could walk straight in under the guise of darkness and

cause significant damage and public danger. Some of the facilities

have no more security than maybe perhaps a padlock or a chain,

and we would be lucky in those cases as well.

The first to respond to any emergency is always the affected local

government followed by State and Federal Governments. The sharing of information on security issues pertaining to chemical plant

security and transportation issues needs to be enhanced to include

local law enforcement authorities and the local emergency planning

committees as soon as possible.

Allegheny County, the Pennsylvania Region 13 terror threat assessments have all concluded that targeting one of our many chemical plants and/or the chemical transportation system ranks very

high than the threat of something or somebody running through a

neighborhood street disbursing some sort of military war agent.

The best terrorist event to incur is never to let it happen in the

first place, and this could also be said for fire safety as well. You

can have the best trained and equipped fire department, but when

the fire occurs, people get hurt, may die, and buildings are lost. All

this can be minimized by good fire prevention, but not totally prevented. Strong fire codes and enforcement, smoke detectors, exit

plans and sprinklers contribute greatly to reducing bad outcomes,

so the best fire to have is not to have one in the first place.

We are continuing to improve our ability to respond to a WMD

event locally and nationwide. Congress and the President and all

of you have made available billions of dollars for homeland security

at the local level, and it is finally beginning to be seen at the lowest levels of government and public safety in this county. This is

for planning, training, exercises and equipping responders. I personally don’t want to ever test that system.

17

Chemical security enhancement with the partnership of government as demonstrated with the great successes through SARA

Title III as well as our local ordinances and our State laws through

reasonable legislation and cooperation is a must. We need to do everything to ensure we never experience a terror attack again. We

already know that chemical facilities and their transportation are

a risk. Shame on us if we do not do everything possible to protect

them. They sit in our counties, our cities, and towns and our neighborhoods.

Thank you very much.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chief Full.

[The prepared statement of Chief Full follows:]

18

19

20

Mr. MURPHY. We will now hear from Mr. Headley, who is vice

chairman of the Forward Township Board of Supervisors.

Mr. Headley, please proceed.

Mr. HEADLEY. OK. Before we start here, I’d like to make one correction to my written statement. The facility in question is now

known as Univar, but was previously known as Vopak, and in my

statement I’ve used both names, and the correct current name is

Univar.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the panel this morning

on an issue of local and national importance. My name is Tom

Headley, and I’m vice chairman of the Forward Township Board of

Supervisors, one of three part-time elected officials who form the

governing body of our municipality.

Forward Township has a population of just less than 3,800 people in an area of more than 20 square miles. The area is mostly

rural with a concentration of population around the town of Elizabeth and several small communities along the Monongahela River

including the community of Bunola.

I am here today because Univar, a distributor which receives,

warehouses and ships a wide variety of chemicals, has a large facility located in Forward Township at Bunola. This location is one of

an estimated 123 chemical facilities nationwide with an accidental

toxic release worst-case scenario where more than 1 million people

in the surrounding area could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of

toxic gas. Prior to September 11 people in the area were aware of

this facility, and the various chemicals were present, but were not

overly concerned. After that date, with increased potential for acts

of terror against a facility of this type, the vulnerability and security of this plant became a major concern.

A meeting to discuss these issues with company management

was requested. At this meeting our police chief, our emergency

management coordinator and myself met with Vopak executives to

review site security. It was apparent that a major upgrade was

necessary. Our chief performed a site survey and developed a list

of minimum security upgrades which the municipality would require. Management raised the issue of cost and indicated this expense would place them at a competitive disadvantage relative to

others in their industry. I made it clear these improvements would

be made either on a voluntary basis, or the township would pass

ordinances mandating their completion.

I am pleased to report Vopak made the recommended improvements costing more than $200,000. Perimeter fencing, automatic

gates, security cameras and monitoring devices, improved lighting

and security during off-hours were included. In addition, an emergency plan for the community was developed, a warning siren installed, and emergency information was distributed to all residents

in the immediate area and downwind of the plant.

In spite of these changes, this plant remains vulnerable. The 30-

acre plant site runs from a State highway, Bunola River Road, to

the Monongahela River, and includes six buildings. The main line

of the CSX Railroad bisects the property, and buildings are located

on both sides. Each side is fenced; however, the main track and the

siding where loaded tank cars of chlorine are stored is not secured.

The quantities of chlorine present are the reason for the serious

21

worst-case scenario. In addition, there’s a barge unloading facility

located along the riverfront where chemicals are pumped from

barges into storage tanks. More than 50 loads of various chemicals

are shipped in and out of this location during an average day.

Should there be any type of security problem at the plant or with

a load in transit while in the township, the Forward Police Department would be notified to respond. We have a professional department with five full-time and two part-time officers. Normally one

officer is on duty per shift. Response time to an incident at the

plant will depend on the location of the officer in the township and

could be more than 10 minutes from the time the call was received.

Our officer can request and receive assistance from surrounding

departments and Allegheny County, but, again, time is required for

help to arrive. Our municipal budget is just over $800,000 per year,

and well over half that amount represents police department and

associated costs. The township is not in a position to employ sufficient police to provide adequate security to meet the potential

threats faced by this facility.

After reading the GAO report, GAO–03–439, I would like to

make the following comments as a public official in a host municipality for a chemical facility, and I’ll just hit the major points here.

Those of you who have the written statement can see the specifics

which I’ve added.

Security for chemical plants must be improved. The government

must mandate reasonable minimum security standards at all locations which produce, process, warehouse or distribute chemicals

and other hazardous materials.

Voluntary compliance or self-regulation by the industry is not appropriate in this situation. Substitutes for the most dangerous

chemicals should be encouraged and strict limits placed on maximum allowable quantities of these materials at each location.

One agency of the Federal Government must be given specific

overall authority for chemical industry security. My suggestion

would be the Department of Homeland Security. The present

shared security responsibility is unwise and unable to deal with today’s potential threats.

The scope of any risk management plan must include not only

the plant site, but also the risks inherent in the movement of materials to and from the plant.

Money for staffing, training and equipment for local police departments must be made available immediately, and any new risk

management plan must think outside the box and anticipate nontraditional threats.

I thank you for your attention to this information. Security in

these times is an issue which affects everyone regardless of location. From a huge city like New York with a population of many

millions to the small town of Bunola with fewer than 300 residents,

everyone is concerned about threats to their safety and well-being.

Steps need to be quickly taken to minimize these risks, and the

Federal Government must assume the lead role in this endeavor.

I will be pleased to answer any questions you might have. Thank

you.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Headley.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Headley follows:]

22

23

24

25

26

Mr. MURPHY. I’d like to start off by asking a couple questions of

each of you. I think each Member has 10 minutes to ask questions.

Mr. Liscouski, let me first start off, if you could give us a general

idea, what do you perceive is the greatest threat that chemical facilities face in a terrorist attack?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sir, there’s probably a couple of ways to answer

that question. In the context of the different types of methodology

that various terrorist groups will use to target facilities, they’re always going to look at greatest consequence of loss depending upon

the perspective of the group. So if I interpret your question to say

which group is most interested in chemical facilities or types of

attack——

Mr. MURPHY. Actually, groups and, yes, types of facilities.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I mean, we know al Queda has expressed interest

in the past, based upon bogus reporting, to attack chemical facilities. We’ve had no specific reporting about those types of threats

with locations, but we know generally speaking that’s always been

an area of interest.

We know, based upon their tactics in the past historically that

they’ve not targeted specific chemical facilities overseas, but we

know based upon how they conducted attacks in the past, we extrapolate from those tactics into what we think we need to protect

against here.

Without going into great detail of those tactics, you know, we

look at ways that they’ve attacked facilities in the past; we just extrapolate to those methodologies here in the United States.

Mr. MURPHY. One of the things that Mr. Headley has pointed

out, that Forward Township has voluntarily complied and invested

a great deal of money in some safety features. As I’ve read, one of

the factors of the plant there and at other chemical plants that

they can’t control is they put fences everywhere else, but they cannot block rail traffic that actually goes to their facilities.

Is that my understanding, this rail traffic goes right by the——

Mr. HEADLEY. It bisects the property. It goes right through the

middle. Both sides are fenced, but the center portion and the rail

sidings is not fenced.

Mr. MURPHY. So someone could enter from there, or you could

have a chemical or a train car go through there, too.

Are we doing some things to deal with assessing those

vulnerabilities in the chemical plants and making changes there?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Mr. Chairman, we’re taking a whole list of security concerns across the Nation, and we can talk about specific concerns and specific sites, but I’d like to start off with sort of the

methodology and how we look at the prioritization of where we

need to be putting our efforts.

And I’d like to open up again by stressing in terms of priority,

we share very common concerns with the committee and with our

State and local counterparts about the need to protect the Nation,

particularly from the most dangerous threats that we face and

where those consequences might manifest themselves, and my concern is in the chemical industry specifically. We know that we have

a lot of work to do there.

Again, DHS will be celebrating our first anniversary here next

week, and in the context of that, the focus we’ve had from day 1

27

when we opened the door has been on improving our chemical site

security plans, our strategies, and, most importantly, putting tactics where we need to ensure that we can reduce the greatest

vulnerabilities we have.

By way of context, there are many vulnerabilities across the

United States in many critical areas, in many critical infrastructure areas, and even if we focus every single one of our resources

on improving the chemical sector alone, we still couldn’t do enough

in 1 year to satisfy me. But clearly in terms of reducing the

vulnerabilities, this is going to be a work in progress over a period

of time. So we’re prioritizing our efforts and looking at every available resource and tool we have in our tool kit to reduce those

vulnerabilities.

So in the context of the respective vulnerabilities, job one we

have is assessing those vulnerabilities to ensure that we understand what do we have to focus on first, and it’s everything from

chemicals being stored—if we focus on the chemical sectors for purposes of this hearing, looking at chemicals in storage, looking at

chemicals in transit, identifying those vulnerabilities, the mitigation techniques necessary, what’s effective and sustainable over

time.

And to that end it’s important to note here that a lot of the industry’s concerns when they talk about money—and I’m not here

representing the industry for a moment. I’ll just tell you that from

a practical perspective, sometimes any amount of money isn’t sufficient enough to reduce the vulnerability in some cases without a

long-term strategy about how that money is going to be implemented to reduce vulnerabilities over a long period of time.

So we look at tactics in terms of which we have—what tactics do

we have to apply to reduce vulnerabilities in the immediate sense,

those highest priorities. We look at strategies and tactics that we

employ over time to develop cost-effective, sustainable and very effective programs that reduce the threat, and we can respond to

threats in a very dynamic environment.

So to talk about which specific modality of theft in the context

of chemicals in place or those chemicals in transit, we are looking

at the entire chain of the chemical sector’s vulnerabilities.

One other point and I’ll conclude, and that is it’s important to

note that when we talk about the chemical sector and all sectors

within the critical infrastructure, that we’re not looking at things

in the context of their single vulnerability or their single place in

the critical infrastructure chain. With all these sectors there are

interdependencies, and when we talk about the impact of the chemical sector and what we might be able to do to reduce very specific

vulnerabilities, we may be creating other vulnerabilities by reducing those.

So we’ve got to take a very holistic look at the entire dependency

chain around the companies’ dependencies between the chemical

sector, board of treatment, the production of pharmaceuticals and

the impact of that, and this is something we look at very carefully,

and there is a significant amount of work being done there as well.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Chief Full, let me turn toward you and ask you as someone who

deals with local first responders, and obviously they would be part

28

of what we’re dealing with here, I want you to describe for the

board a scenario that there was some intentional attack on a chemical facility, what that would do to the region. And certainly there

are areas of the Nation where the outcome of the worst-case scenario are looking at in the millions; though tragic here, it would

be tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands or so. But the key

in response to the first responders and medical facilities, do you

conduct training with the chemical industry and fire and police departments and hospital personnel to cover various scenarios and

drills of how one might react in this situation?

Chief FULL. Congressman, we do. We have, again, an aggressive,

again, consequence management program here in Allegheny County which primarily does focus an awful lot on training and preparation and response with 5 Pennsylvania State-certified hazardous

materials response teams, our 26 hospitals.

As you know, with our 130 municipalities, we have 217 separate

fire departments, 119 police departments and 70 EMS agencies in

our county alone, and we have worked hard over the many years

here to bring their level of training up to at least hazardous materials awareness and recognition, and many more of the departments have been operationally trained.

There still needs to be a lot of work to be done. There again,

through the processes of planning for a chemical facility release or

a transportation accident in our county here, there’s a different nature of the beast whenever you have responders that they’re able

to go out and respond to some sort of an accident or something that

was unintentional. But there’s a new dynamic now for first responders that are charged now with possibly responding to events

that have been intentionally created with the full intent not only

to kill and maim a number of the public, but also to kill them, even

through the aspect of secondary issues, a secondary problem be established just to take out the first responders.

But we do do the training, and it has been funded primarily

through the SARA Title III and local emergency management and

planning committee funds that we secure from the chemical plants

themselves. I believe we do have a strong partnership with those

chemical plants, but at the same time we have not addressed and

we have no knowledge really of the things that have been going on

behind the scenes with security with them as well.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask you, too: The EPA is supposed to have

on file, reports of the response management plan that you have for

chemical companies, and that information is not being made public,

but it should be accessible.

Have you been able to access that information?

Chief FULL. Yes, we have. And those reports are made available;

the R&P reports and the Tier 2 reporting and all that reporting is

made available to our office, and we disseminate that out to the

local communities here in Allegheny County. It is also made available to the local fire departments as required under the law.

Mr. MURPHY. And has there been—we only have 2 seconds left

for yourself and Mr. Headley—full cooperation and direct face-toface conversations with the chemical companies to engage the information you need, training for those firefighters, etc., for those

specific chemicals onsite.

29

Chief FULL. We have met with a very positive response in most

cases in that regard. I’ll tell you, Congressman, one of the things

that concerns us the most is most of the folks are under the regulations, the current regulations. They’re not our biggest problems and

our biggest offenders, and many of the other offenders are the

smaller businesses as well that we are concerned about that have

things within their properties that fall just under the thresholds,

but, you know, you can’t make a determination. If you have a

threshold planning limit of 1,000 pounds, can you tell me the difference between 999 pounds of that particular chemical and how

it’s going to react versus 1,000 pounds?

I would argue that there’s not much difference, but there’s many

of the companies that have gone to—and what we want to do is we

want to have them to limit their amount of storage and so forth.

A lot of them have gone to putting their chemical storage in the

transportation networks, and they have brought themselves a couple pounds underneath the reportable limits so they won’t have to

do additional planning, and they won’t have to pay additional fees

to reinforce and support our hazardous materials response program.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Headley, I’ll give you a chance to respond to

that, too.

Mr. HEADLEY. Well, I know that Forward Township, as I say, is

home to one major chemical storage facility, and we have had orientations with the fire departments, not only our local fire

departmentm but the other likely fire departments who would

come to assist. To my knowledge, the primary focus of that training

was a fire situation or maybe an accidental release rather than an

intentional problem caused by someone else.

And I’m not aware of all the training that’s going on at the county level or the State level and the Federal level, but I would encourage a very strong emphasis on a coordinated response from the

county because they’re the ones that are best equipped to deal with

a problem like this to get together with local police and emergency

management people and train for a scenario where there is a willful act and an unintentional release as a result of that, and that

would be my major suggestion.

Mr. MURPHY. I thank you.

I will now turn over to Mr. Turner, who, I should also note, as

a former mayor of Dayton, OH, has particular insight of the eastern involved urban areas. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’m fascinated by all that has been accomplished without any

particular legislative authority. If you listen to Mr. Headley and

Chief Full and Mr. Liscouski, you talk about each of your agencies

and communities and what you have done both with the private

sectors and with companies, what the association for the Department of Homeland Security has done, there certainly are some impressive accomplishments.

So I think from your testimony we’re hearing from each of you

that there is a very wide gap in the ability to include everyone in

this committee; but also in the sharing of information from successes, we know that we have some standards that we’re all complying with.

30

Mr. Headley, you had cited the success that you had with Univar

where you first approached the company and you requested access

to the facility. And you were granted access to the facility where

you were able to make recommendations, and through continued

discussions with the company, they ultimately made changes,

modifications as a result of your recommendations. And I wrote

down one sentence from your testimony where you said: I made it

clear these improvements would be made either on a voluntary

basis, or the township would pass ordinances mandating their completion. Certainly after all this has came down to Congress as to

our willingness to take action to provide the authority.

I want to go back to that very first meeting that you had with

Univar when you requested access to the facility. Did you have any

ability to compel or demand access if they had not invited you in?

Mr. HEADLEY. I really can’t answer that question because that

situation did not arise. These people have always been a good

neighbor. They realized that they had a problem, we realized they

had a problem, and we decided we would work together to solve

that problem, and it was done on a very open and amicable basis.

My concern is there are probably—based on what I’m hearing

from the other two gentlemen on this panel, there are numbers of

other plants and facilities throughout the country who maybe don’t

have that cooperative attitude, and that’s why my recommendation

would be that you have to have some Federal legislation with some

teeth in it to mandate that these people comply, because, being a

businessman myself, everything comes down to cost, and you don’t

want to put one company at a competitive disadvantage to another,

and if you do force some and not others, then the people who have

not made the required improvements and made the required investments are going to be more competitive and will be able to sell

at a lower price because they haven’t spent the money. And that’s

not fair, and it doesn’t make common sense.

Mr. TURNER. Your proactive efforts are certainly to be commended, and one thing that I thought of in hearing your description of doing an assessment and providing the company with information as to your recommendations is to what extent are we working to capture that.

Are you working with other agencies on a State or Federal level

so that we can benefit from your experience so that when we look

at the standards of other facilities, that might be able to be replicated?

Mr. HEADLEY. Well, most of the things that we did were common-sense things, and I think obviously somebody with a much

higher degree of sophistication and ability, such as Department of

Homeland Security and maybe the chemical industry, in concert

should develop standards, because all we did, as I say, were common-sense things. I’m sure there are a multitude of other improvements and changes that should be made and could be made, but

we are not aware of that.

Mr. TURNER. In your testimony in calling for Federal oversight

and authority, you specifically identify the Department of Homeland Security as your recommended choice for that authority, and

I wonder if you could give us your insight as to why you didn’t

choose the EPA where some individuals have advocated that.

31

Mr. HEADLEY. Well, in my printed statement I just—and this is

not meant to be all-inclusive, but when you take a look at the entire problem, the storage and the transportation of chemicals, you

have a multitude of various Federal agencies, and getting five or

six different agencies or seven or eight different agencies to work

together to do this is probably—it’s probably not most effectively

done on a cooperative basis.

My recommendation would be that somebody have the ultimate

authority to require everyone else to go along, because there are

too many people who have a piece of the regulatory or enforcement

pie for any of them to do an effective job individually.

Mr. TURNER. Chief Full, in your testimony you also indicated

that there was a need for Federal authority or for an agency to

have oversight, but you did not identify a preference as to EPA or

Department of Homeland Security. I wondered if you had one.

Chief FULL. I didn’t do it intentionally. My recommendation

would be the Department of Homeland Security.

I believe with all the efforts that have been done to date with

channeling various levels of government into the Department as it

would pertain to terrorism prevention and also security issues,

even consequence management, I believe that has been very, very

positive compared to the way it used to be with everybody having

to go out and you would go on the Internet, or you would open up

the White Pages, and you would go into that blue section and look

what level of government, what agency covers this. But clearly I

believe that this is something that the expertise lies in the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. TURNER. Chief Full, have you experienced instances where

there might be a company or facility where they have not been

helpful in providing access? You don’t have to name them, but I’d

like you just to describe if that has happened and what your attempts might be to resolve that.

Chief FULL. Yes, we have. And literally we’ve been on the doorstep of chemical facilities that have had obvious leaks, even in

progress, over the course of my experience and so forth where we

had to stand there with law enforcement and threaten the arrest

of the occupants of the building so we could gain access to see what

was actually leaking in the chemical facility itself.

I come with 32 years of emergency response experience, and I’ve

documented over 1,000 chemical spill responses in my career, and

in my career in those chemical responses I’ve had the opportunity

to experience a few of those situations. The vast majority of companies are compliant.

We probably have a greater threat—I know we’re focused in on

the facilities themselves. There’s a lot of expertise that lies in the

facilities, but I think that there is a tremendous void on the transportation networks and the quality of training of the drivers of the

trucks that are carrying chemicals, and the railroads and the ready

information that would be readily at hand.

If I had to pick my choice or the thing that would most disturb

me or have the greatest consequence in our community would be

an event regarding a chemical transportation incident. Obviously

they would be moving the chemicals in and out of one of our faciliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94257.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
32

ties, but there are great limitations in quick access to information

and so forth in dealing with those from the first responder’s aspect.

Here in our county, being a major transportation network, we

fear even out here on the local interstate when a truck driver carrying some very serious chemicals—and they’re all very serious,

some of them are as serious as the Bhopal chemical that was released in Bhopal—that if the driver decides at a rest stop to go in

and take a rest for a few minutes and leaves that truck running

here, they can drive—pick up that truck and drive it into the downtown business district or through one of our communities.

We have the inland barge traffic here in our community here.

Those barges carry 770,000 gallons of various chemicals. We have

the second, I understand, largest chemical loading in our community of any inland port. All it would take is somebody with a—some

sort of a small device to throw it off one of our bridges onto one

of those tank barges, and we would have a significant problem.

A lot of other folks take a look at these extremely hazardous substances as well. We believe that the bulk storage chemicals, your

fuels and even something as mundane as diesel fuel, can wreak

havoc in a community.

We are known here as being one of the inland oil spill capitals

of the world, and back in 1988 we had a significant release of over

a million gallons of diesel fuel that went into our rivers that impacted our community for over a week with people not being able

to draw water.

In 1987, we had a train derailment involving a major release of

chemical and fire, which necessitated an evacuation of 16,000 people in the city of Pittsburgh for 2 days.

We know firsthand what it would take in the event that if we

would have an act which would occur with these facilities in our

neighborhoods and so forth, that we can’t quickly enough protect

the population, and there would be so many of them affected, and

that’s very hard to deal with.

Mr. TURNER. I thank you, sir.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

Following this panel we will have GAO address us, and I just

would like to put in some perspective what we’re going to hear and

have all of you respond; Mr. Liscouski, you put into perspective the

so-called worst-case scenario of 127—123 chemical facilities

throughout the United States that could potentially expose 1 million people, 700 facilities that could potentially threaten 100,000

people, and 3,000 facilities that could potentially threaten 10,000

people. What does that mean?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I think this is drawn from the R&P data base,

sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Could you bring your microphone closer?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I think the GAO data you’re referring to is drawn

off of the R&P data base by EPA.

33

Mr. SHAYS. What does that mean, though? I don’t know how to

translate it. I mean, I want to give you an opportunity to tell me

what it means.

If you’re saying there are 123 chemical sites that could negatively impact a million people, I need to know as a legislator what

that means. I don’t know what that means. I want to know what

it means to you; I think I know what it means to me.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. First off, I think we have to level-set the numbers. The numbers that we’re dealing with from that lineup to the

R&P data base of 15,000 sites in that data base are drawn off of

data based upon absolute worst-case safety-based scenarios. Those

don’t correspond to what we look at from a tourism perspective and

realistic plume models that would ultimately have to be projected

and then a determination made upon how large of a population. So

the numbers we’re dealing with are somewhat different than the

numbers off of the R&P data base.

When we went through the prioritization of the chemical sites

around the United States, we had to apply more realistic and more

deterministic models to understand what the impact of a terrorist

attack would be, and then subsequently what the effect would be

on the population. So our numbers are different than what’s been

purported in the R&P data base to allow us to really focus on realities based upon the plume modeling. So we’re drawing off of two

sets of data, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. This committee began to undertake the terrorist

threat in 1999. We rewrote our rules so that we would look at terrorists at home and abroad. We had 20 hearings before September

11th, in which we discussed various scenarios. We had the three

primary commissions come before us: Hart-Rudman, Gilmore and

the Bremer Commission. They all agreed there’s a terrorist threat,

they all agreed that we needed a new strategy, and they all agreed

we needed to reorganize the government, but Hart-Rudman ultimately was the most radical.

When we and this committee talked to Americans before September 11th about the need to reorganize and create a Department of

Homeland Security, the basic response was, what are we, Great

Britain? There was just no willingness to come to grips with the

terrorist threat. We had September 11th, we basically took the

Hart-Rudman model, we created a department that you now work

for.

Is it your sense that it was a wise thing in creating the Department of Homeland Security?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Without question. I mean, without question, because I think the opportunities that have been presented to DHS

for coordination for preparedness response, protection response

without question have added value to America’s security.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we probably should have done it sooner, no

doubt about that. The reason we didn’t do it sooner in part was

those in government didn’t fully comprehend the threat, and clearly the public didn’t.

And so I’d love to get a sense from you how much do you think

the public has a right to know about the threat? I mean, in this

community, for instance, what are they allowed to know, and

where do we draw the line?

34

Mr. LISCOUSKI. If I can just take the liberty of engaging with you

just to describe it further, because my sense when we say was

there a right to know the threat, the public has a good understanding of the threat, we have a duty to inform the public about the

threat, so we clearly communicate threat information fairly

robustly and, in some folks’ consternation, probably too much information at times. And we don’t have perfect information, but that’s

just the nature of the intelligence that we have access to. But there

are many other components to managing the threat, and I believe,

sir, that’s what you’re referencing when you ask the public’s right

to know.

Mr. SHAYS. Not just the threat. I don’t mean threat in a generic

way, code orange and so on. I mean does the public have a right

to know about vulnerabilities?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Vulnerability, that’s what I was about to get to.

There’s a whole chain of events that goes into protecting the public,

some of which, as we discussed, should not be within the public’s

purview for knowledge related to protection responsibilities and

protection methodologies.

Mr. SHAYS. Can you give me a hypothetical what they should

never have a right to know?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, I can just talk holistically about what the

program is, and maybe I can add some more clarity to the approach, and I would be happy to get down to the details.

As we heard Chief Full describe and Mr. Headley describe about

their abilities to understand what they need to know about the—

at the local level, there is no question, and DHS is actively engaged

in this process, and I speak of DHS and the Federal Government

at large in sharing that information with those State and local authorities who have to prepare, have to respond to, have to understand what the first-responder requirements are. In the context of

working with State and local authorities, we share information

with the local police through the Homeland Security Advisory and

through other mechanisms about protective methodologies and

vulnerabilities.

So we regularly share with the public in the context of the authorities that ultimately have responsibility at the local level to

interact with the public. The constituencies here are many and varied, and I wouldn’t want to speak for either gentleman on each side

of me about how they view their respective constituencies, but

clearly we all strive to share as much information as we can, and

I think we do a pretty good job at it, but clearly we need to do a

better job at it, there’s no doubt about that.

We have a number of information-sharing mechanisms to go out

to the public, to the private sector, to the State and local governments. Since DHS has been established, the Information Sharing

Analysis Centers, the information bulletins we regularly and routinely put out not just about the threat information to raise the

alert level, but on preparedness and prevention and protective

measures, which we routinely share with all government.

So I think we’re in agreement, sir, about the public needing to

know. We clearly share the information, so I appreciate your perspective.

35

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I’m not sure if we’re connecting because I find

tremendous reluctance on the part of the government to inform the

public, and, for instance, I find it beyond my comprehension to

know why—what code are we at right now?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Yellow, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Yellow means there’s a likelihood for an attack.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. It’s elevated risk, right.

Mr. SHAYS. Elevated, in other words, it’s not general, but we’re

acting like it’s general, and to the general public it’s general; you

know, we’re under a threat, but we’re on one level above. But yet

we went to code orange, which meant, you know, there was a serious likelihood of attack. We knew we had concerns about planes,

and we had concerns about dirty weapons in public places. We told

the public that basically they should continue to do what they normally do.

So, I mean, I have a pretty big dispute that you and I will have

to resolve with the Department on going to code orange and yet

telling people do what you normally would do.

But let me just ask you in terms here, if we have 123 sites that

could impact a million people, as you pointed out and I agree with,

the plume isn’t going to go in 360 degrees. If it did, it probably

would not have the concentration to be as deadly, at least as to the

distances, as you got into more distance. But you have two sites

here; you have the Neville Chemical and Univar, which is in your

area. Don’t we have a sense that the plumes will more likely go in

a certain direction? Don’t we have historic data that would tell us

that would be the case?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Yes, sir, we do. In fact, that’s how we were able

to further refine the R&P list from 15,000 to the list that we have

of about 4,012.

Mr. SHAYS. No. That’s different; 15,000 are the number of chemical plants.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, 15,000 are the R&P data base, which I believe were reflective of an impact of 1,000 people or more.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. But, see, 1,000 people or more to me doesn’t tell

me anything. That implies there’s 1,000. Those 1,000 could be

100,000. I mean, the 1,000 or more—you get my gist?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, sir, actually, I don’t. The R&P data base considered the worst-case scenario from an EPA perspective.

Mr. SHAYS. 4,000 sites.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, sir, 15,000. The R&P data base, which was

drawn by EPA, considered the worst-case scenario as related to the

plume modeling perspective, which is virtually a 360-degree plume

model——

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. LISCOUSKI [continuing]. Because of the safety concerns and

what the EPA mandated from a safety perspective.

The plume modeling we applied from NARAC was a more realistic plume model based upon historical environmental conditions

and the understanding of where the plume models would impact on

the populations, and we adjusted that within the context of the

plume model to, again, be a worst-case scenario, further refine the

numbers.

Let me just respond to one thing you mentioned earlier.

36

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not quite sure—you can go on to your agenda, but

I’m not quite sure you responded to what I’m just trying to understand.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sure. And I apologize. I’m not trying to obfuscate

you, I’m trying to understand your question.

Mr. SHAYS. You have a lot of knowledge, and I want to make

sure I know it, but allow me to understand. We’re not talking

about 4,000 sites; 1,000 more——

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Yes, sir, 4,000 sites.

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s just deal with 4,000 sites, 1,000 or more. What

I was trying to convey to you is when you—let me just tell you why

I have this bias——

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. And concern.

I voted for the Patriot Act. A majority of my constituents aren’t

sure they like the Patriot Act, I’m making that assumption. Congress repealed the power of us to go into a library, take the hard

disk, understand who a terrorist may be talking to, being able to

not have to tell the terrorist that we think they’re a terrorist so

that they go back and continue to communicate so that we can improve our intelligence.

I happen to believe strongly in the Patriot Act. I’ve come to the

conclusion that the public doesn’t believe the Patriot Act because

they don’t think there’s a terrorist threat out there. And I have certainly come to the conclusion they don’t think there’s a terrorist

threat because I think we haven’t conveyed a terrorist threat because we don’t want people to be needlessly concerned.

And so in the process of trying to not scare people, we are, in my

judgment, endangering the public and weakening our ability to get

information, because some of the powers that we need in order to

get information may disappear because we may not renew the Patriot Act.

I’m just trying to put context to my question—I have this basic

view that we need to tell people a threat, and then they get some

power to deal with it, and then we both have a good sense of why

that’s happening.

When you say 4,000 sites, 1,000 or more, there are how many

sites with 100,000 or more of that 4,000, and that’s what concerns

me.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. And as we’ve gone through the refinement process, sir, that’s precisely how we’ve begun to prioritize our efforts.

So I think we’re very much in alignment and understand our priorities as you’ve just articulated them.

One thing, as Chairman Murphy understands well, that we don’t

want to create a situation with the public where we create panic

around the situation by not providing information. And by the

same token, sir, you’re a psychologist, so, therefore, you’ve got a

much deeper background in this than I, but I know from the concerns that we have in terms of getting the public to do the right

thing and providing enough information, I agree with you, not

enough information can create the same condition as too much information which might be shared irresponsibly.

DHS, as you pointed out, I think, has been fairly good, and our

track record has been very good over the past several months and

37

has gotten better. Sharing information with State and local authorities and sharing information with our industry partners and

sharing information with the public, we’ve tried to give as much

context around the threat to allow people to plan, to allow people

to understand what the threat means to them.

The one thing we don’t control, frankly, is the information that

the Intelligence Community can ultimately generate and acquire,

and the information, you know, that can provide the appropriate

level of context to the general population.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask our two other participants—do you

mind if I have an additional 5 minutes?

Mr. MURPHY. Not at all.

Mr. SHAYS. Have you both been told about plume modeling at either site, and do you have a sense of where these plumes go?

Chief FULL. I have not been told of those. I know in our own

planning we do for accidental releases, we deal with the fact that

we have prevailing weather issues, but we also have experienced

events here that with that type of release that we’ve had instantaneous wind changes and things along those lines, and my experience lends itself to that even though that we know it’s going to go

probably in one direction, that through a course of a major event,

it could go and turn around. And we have had past history in that

regard. We have no knowledge of that. Usually when we’re asked,

it’s emergency planners, plant people that have said, what do you

think the worst case is? But there’s very little or no science behind

it.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Headley, are you pleased with the security

model?

Mr. HEADLEY. Pleased is a relative term. We’re certainly far better off than we were 2 years ago, but I think there’s some room for

improvement.

If I might want—I’d like to add one other thing, and in Mr.

Liscouski’s favor I think what we have here is EPA—information

that was developed that the EPA modeled for one purpose, and we

are trying to use it possibly for another purpose. And I think it’s

important that Homeland Security or whoever it is that’s charged

with the responsibility to do an accurate assessment given a terrorist scenario rather than an accidental release scenario, which is

what was used to develop the EPA model.

And one thing, not to alarm anyone, but the EPA model is based,

I believe—I’m not an expert on this—on the largest uncontrolled

release from one particular vessel, whether it be a tank or a tank

car or a truck or whatever; it did not anticipate the possibility for

multiple releases from multiple trucks or tanks or railroad cars,

and we have those scenarios in a terrorist situation that weren’t

present in an accidental release scenario, and I think those need

to be examined.

Mr. SHAYS. Coincidentally, Mr. Murphy and I are participating

in an exercise called Dark Porthole, which will address the potential impact of a combination of different types of attacks.

I feel like I’m just starting to edge into something that I would

like to get into in more depth, but I guess what I’d like to ask all

three of you is EPA is not here, and I have my own sense of why

they’re not here, they refused to come, and yet EPA has the experVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94257.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
38

tise, it seems to me, at least in the past, and they have—it seems

to me that a terrorist attack would create a greater challenge than

one that would be national—first of all, let me back up and say the

chemical industry has an unbelievably good record of safety. It is

just astounding in one sense how successful it has been, but that’s

based on everybody doing their job and people of goodwill working

in the plant; it’s not based on someone infiltrating the plant. It’s

not based on a plane attack, so on and so on.

So I guess what I’d like to ask as my last question for this round

is should I believe that a terrorist attack would be less deadly or

more deadly than what EPA has used as their scenario?

Maybe I’ll start with you.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Yeah, and I appreciate the opportunity to respond to that because I guess from my perspective as responsible

for infrastructure protection, there isn’t a single death that we

want to live with. I think we have to level-set that.

We’re getting kind of caught up in a numbers discussion here.

We’re going to be candid with you, it’s not realistic to think we can

prevent anything or every event. But I think our goal is to actually

try to prevent every event that we possibly can.

Mr. SHAYS. See, the difference is that chemical plants we allow

to be near the public because we thought people of goodwill would

be in charge, and now the scenario is different. Just as before

World War II, we moved chemical plants inland because we were

concerned of their vulnerability on the shoreline. You know, that

was World War II. Then we had a Communist threat, and now we

have the terrorist threat, and the terrorist threat seems to me to

change all the assumptions.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, it does change all the assumptions, and the

discussion we’re having today is predicated on our thinking around

the September 11 environment. And on that level we have to think

about the DHS prospective and my colleagues here is that we have

to think in a dynamic threat environment which does evolve.

So I think, you know, I’m glad to see the support for this because, quite candidly, the recognition of how challenging this problem is, is something which we need a lot of public education on. We

are not standing still and remediating vulnerabilities in the highest

priority sites that we have, and I wish I had a magic wand or a

crystal ball——

Mr. SHAYS. My question I asked—and my time has run out—the

question I asked was the EPA came out with their worst-case scenario, which we knew as a 360-degree plume and so on, but that

notwithstanding, it seems to me, and correct me if I’m wrong, I can

ask the next industry, but I’d like to know—I know what I’m going

to ask them, and I don’t know what they’re going to say, but I want

to know what you are going to say to the same question.

Do you believe that a terrorist attack in a chemical plant would

be more serious, more likely to be more serious than one that

would be accidental?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, the potential is there. I mean, there’s clearly no question when we talk about the potential, the potential for

a terrorist attack to exceed an accidental release depending upon

where we are on the scale, you know, that’s just a reality.

Mr. SHAYS. So the question——

39

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I think in the various scenarios you have, I could

come up with scenarios that would be less catastrophic than an accidental release. I can come up with scenarios that would be more

catastrophic.

Mr. SHAYS. So what do you finally conclude?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I’m concluding, sir, we’re planning based on the

priorities that we have of catastrophic loss. We’re not stopping at

a specific end line for total continuous improvement for the chemical sector.

I guess I don’t want to be put into a box to say could a terrorist

attack be worse than a worst-case scenario of an EPA release. I

think if I look at the way the EPA data——

Mr. SHAYS. The answer would be yes.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. The answer would be yes.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. The answer would be no, then, I think, because

the EPA worst-case scenario considers a 360-degree plume.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, other than the 360-degree plume.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I can’t qualify it.

Mr. SHAYS. You have to make assumptions.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I am.

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s just say the plume goes in one direction. I’m

talking about the accident in a facility. Isn’t it true that if you have

an accident, you can focus on it; whereas, if it’s terrorist, you might

have more than one event in a chemical site and under that circumstance wouldn’t it be worse?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, sir. I think there’s a lot of education, I think,

that has to go on here, and I regret that EPA isn’t here. They could

probably respond to their EPA modeling and what the worst-case

scenarios are better than I because I don’t pretend to be an EPA

expert.

Mr. SHAYS. This is one of the things that this hearing has pointed out is that clearly the administration doesn’t want EPA to be

involved in this.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I can’t speak to why they’re not here.

Mr. SHAYS. I am. I have the floor right now; I can speak to it.

We’ve asked them—we know why they don’t want to be here. We

know there’s a significant challenge. And one of the things before

we let this panel go, I want to understand your relationship with

the EPA.

I thank you for the time, and I’ll come back.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

I have a list of what EPA requires reports on, some 350 different

chemicals that they’re considered extremely hazardous substances

of various levels.

As I look over this list, I mean, I obviously have to be a Ph.D.

in chemistry to understand all the effects of all this, but, Chief

Full, it brings to mind a comment you made earlier which particularly concerned me, and you said that companies may have some

storage of some chemicals onsite, and that they may have to report

or take certain actions if they are above a certain threshold, and

they intentionally lower the amount of chemical onsite so that they

do not have to take the same security steps. I want to make sure

I understand that correctly. That’s quite concerning to me.

40

Chief FULL. I don’t believe that I can justify that they may do

it for security purposes, but we do know that they do it on the process of minimizing their exposure to pay for chemical fees and so

forth that have been allowed under the particular law.

And so, you know, if they’re doing it for security purposes, then

that certainly would be very, very tragic and just very disturbing

to me. But I know for a fact, and it’s been just a—it’s been an ongoing effort over the last several years that the chemical industry has

reduced the amount of chemicals that are typically stored on their

facilities, and much more of those chemicals are being placed into

the transportation network versus being stored at plants.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Another question I have relates to first responders, and I know

Congress has appropriated a significant amount of money over the

last several years to deal with this. I mean, with the Clinton administration there was 100 million put into the budget in fiscal

year 2001, and the Bush I budget was $360 million, and then $750

for 2003, $750 million for 2004 and continue on with that.

And I know looking at the kind of grants the local fire departments receive around my area, and my colleagues can attest to

that, too, are they getting the right kind of equipment needed in

areas where there might be chemical vulnerabilities?

Chief FULL. Congressman, right now I can say that the money

is beginning to get to the right level, but, you know, the first appropriations took place several years ago. It’s taken way too long to

be able to get some of the moneys and the purchasing done to the

local level. And what’s occurred here, I know in my county I can

say that we have now put equipment out in the law enforcement

community, the fire service, the EMS community, and enhanced

our hazardous materials teams, but we are just scratching the surface on their needs.

And what we have found now, that now that the money has

down to the local levels, the vendors now are being inundated with

the request for equipment, they can’t fill the orders fast enough. So

I believe the logjam here in even Pennsylvania has been corrected,

but the vendors, again, can’t fill the orders fast enough, but we’re

satisfied right now with the way that the money is coming. There

is concerns the way that—whether or not that they will be shut off

anytime sooner, and as well we would like more discretionary control over how some of the moneys are being spent in regards to how

they can be used for exercises and some particular training.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. Liscouski, I have a question for you. Without revealing

things that were given to us in security briefings, repeatedly we

hear patterns of terrorists that they go back and repeat their goals

and their tactics until they achieve some results. And we’ve heard

repeatedly comments from Bin Laden and from other terrorist networks that they’re looking at something on the level of spectacular

or massive in terms of casualties or injuries in the United States.

In a chemical area—and actually a big chemical attack we had

was not done by external terrorists at all, it was actually done in

the Oklahoma City bombing. It was done with fertilizer and using

other chemical components there in a way that the chemicals can

be controlled, and someone can use chemicals for a weapon.

41

It comes down to when dealing with terrorists, they’re looking for

something that also shows the vulnerabilities. I mean, that’s the

terrorists; they want to frighten people to hurt the economy, to

shut down industries and to really harm many people whether it’s

personally, healthwise, politically or whatever that is.

Are we in an area of intentional access where someone may take

chemicals, purchase them legally or whatever, and use them in

some way as weapons of mass destruction? Are we also making

some headway on any sort of regulatory efforts in controlling that

aspect?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sir, I can’t speak to the regulatory aspects of

that, that’s an EPA issue; however, working closely with the FBI

and other partners in the law enforcement community, the FBI has

very strong authority on following up reports of incidents that

might include sabotage or forging of documents for obtaining those

materials for elicit purposes. That’s not within my area of responsibility and expertise. I can add value to it, but I’m afraid I

wouldn’t do it justice with respect to the Federal Bureau in that

regard.

We’re concerned about it. We look at all those vulnerabilities. I

haven’t seen specific reporting or evidence that al Queda is using

those tactics to apply chemicals. I have seen reporting historically

of other U.S.-based groups, frankly, that you are particularly referring to as well of using that type of——

Mr. MURPHY. More domestic terrorists.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. More domestic terrorists.

We’re looking at all aspects. I don’t want to minimize that as a

threat. We look at all aspects of that, but I have to then relate to

my stronger partnership with the FBI, other Federal and State and

local agencies that have to remain investigative in the law enforcement field.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. Turner, 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. I would like to go back to an issue that Chairman

Murphy raised in the initial questions; that is, the availability of

public information not on the issue of terrorist threats, but through

the EPA processes and where we’ve allowed information to be out

in the public and that might aid someone that has a threat potential for a facility.

I want to tell you that I’m a big fan of the community

participatory process that the EPA laws, regulations have permitted. They give both environmental groups and community

groups an opportunity to bolster the responses of government by

actively participating, and then that way they can have a stake on

the effect or outcome being positive in the regulatory process of responses at these facilities.

But we’ve already recognized that those very same processes that

enhance the community’s local participation also provide information to bad actors to recognize the testimony that, for example, the

information concerning these facilities can be taken off the Internet.

I’d like, if you will, for each of you to talk for a moment about

your concerns you might have about the availability of some of this

information to the public and also then your concerns, and specifiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94257.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
42

cally Mr. Headley and Chief Full, of your desire—obviously the

communities benefit from some of this information being public so

the community can participate, but at the same time our terrorist

threat has—might change our evaluation of that. I’d like you to

comment.

First, Mr. Headley.

Mr. HEADLEY. Well, Chief Full is the one who could most adequately describe what the progression of information is from Homeland Security through our police department; and then whether

that information is disseminated directly to the chemical industry

and then through their chain, I really don’t know.

I know that from time to time information is passed along, I believe, from the FBI to the police department that there is some concern about something specific, and our police department takes additional steps to try to recognize that threat. Beyond that I’m not—

I don’t have expertise to speak to that issue.

Mr. TURNER. Just to reiterate, the question is about—and I appreciate your comments, Mr. Headley, about terrorist threats, but

my question is about the availability of information with respect to

the regulatory process pertainable to planning for emergency responses, permitting processes for these facilities. So much of our information, including what is stored at a facility, how the facility

might respond and what its vulnerabilities might be have been

made public through the EPA process of allowing communities to

understand what’s going on in their backyard. I was just wondering

about contrasting that with given the fact that this information is

made available to the public, but it’s also available to people who

we would not want to have it.

Chief FULL. I wish I could give you a solid answer, Congressman.

I have mixed emotions about it. I was one who was—very much

like yourself, I was very supportive of being in the public arena.

We pride ourselves even with our local emergency planning committee here with 60 members, with a vast array of public and private participation and all the various groups and so forth, but since

September 11th it’s very hard to take out of the mind-set that

somebody could realize that one of the products inside one of those

facilities would be ideal to wreak havoc.

With that said, though, I believe that here at the local level there

are ways to get around that, that government, as long as we’ve established a procedure that when people want information, and

rightfully so—I mean, a resident living next door to a community

chemical plant should still have the right to be able to see what’s

in that plant, and we’ve established procedures for that through

our local emergency planning committee that they can come in and

see all that. But to have it out in the open arena, we’ve sort of gone

away from the thoughts that we don’t want people to be able to

search around there for the best case or where they can maximize

the most damage on the Internet, but we have still established

ways that people can find that information out by visiting us or

calling us, and we’ll work with them on a one-on-one basis.

But for somebody to call up right now, what would concern me

is you get a general call from somebody that says, I’d like a list of

all your chemical plants and all your chemical plants that have

these following chemicals. That kind of a request would be very

43

suspicious to us right now, and we wouldn’t honor that request, but

a legitimate request from a resident or a particular government official or something along those lines, we would make any and all

of our information still available to them.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Mr. Turner, thank you.

And I probably have the easiest answer in this space than anyone does, but I do that out of compassion for my colleagues, because from a pure protective standpoint I prefer we share no information with the general public. If we could prevent people in the

open-source world from gaining access to information which could

be used to exploit vulnerabilities, I’m all over that, and if I was at

the one end of the spectrum to suggest that’s what we ought to do,

I’m here to tell you that I’m mandated, I’m charged with trying to

protect the critical infrastructure of the United States, and that’s

a tool in the tool kit.

Now, I say that, but by the same token I know that my colleagues at the local level have to live in that space, and not having

information really hampers their ability to do that. We’re not going

to prescribe how we share information or what the local officials

share with their constituency and the population. As Chief Full

pointed out, they can do that, they live with that, they live in the

local area, they know the locals, they can talk with folks, they can

share information responsibly.

It’s a national problem, but there’s no Federal answer for this at

the local level to respond to it. But I can tell you that it’s my concern that we do protect information that can be exploited by terrorist groups and others that are looking to do us harm.

Mr. HEADLEY. If I might just add one thing, if you’re talking

about availability of information, on February 13th I downloaded

the TRI data on this facility from the Internet, which tells you all

the quantities—the reporting here was 2001, it’s not the most recent information, but if someone is interested in what chemicals

are at that facility, it’s widely available.

Mr. MURPHY. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Maybe the best way to spend my time is

to understand EPA’s role and DHS’s role. I don’t really quite understand it. I don’t understand whether the EPA has any role over

the terrorist threat, and if not I need to know why, so maybe you

can start me out.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sure. Let me start by describing what DHS’s role

here is vis-a-vis the Homeland Security Act and then how that’s

evolved or how we got to the Homeland Security Act and what that

means to DHS and then how that’s evolving in the context of providing security in cooperation with EPA.

Homeland Security Act 2002 established DHS——

Mr. SHAYS. Can you move the mic closer.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Excuse me, sir. I’m sorry.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS as the lead

agency for chemical security in the chemical sector and in partnership with the EPA we’re pursuing that. And that was a balance between safety and security. We did not assume the responsibilities

for safety for which DHS—EPA—has the clear mandate, and the

legislative and regulatory authority for safety programs are crucial,

44

as we’re discussing here, to providing good foundation for security.

You cannot separate those two things. But the responsibility for security for DHS, it was never intended to be a separate or mutually

exclusive responsibility that moved to DHS without the cooperation

of the EPA. We can’t do that. I would never support it.

If the law provided for that I would quickly develop the relationships that I needed within the EPA to draw upon their expertise

in this area because they have that domain expertise. Good government doesn’t mean we should replicate responsibilities; good government means that we leverage responsibilities and capabilities

across our government and that’s precisely what we’re doing with

the EPA.

We work closely with the EPA to understand what the threats

are, understand the priorities and, most importantly, the solutions

and the remedies to the vulnerabilities.

To extend the Homeland Security Act 2002 which was effectively

a strategy for what good nationwide homeland security is, the

Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7, just recently

signed by President Bush in December, is how we have to do those

responsibilities collectively.

We’re in the process of developing those, the tactics behind that

strategy and the partnerships between the respective agencies that

have responsibilities for all critical infrastructure; we’re in dialog

and constant negotiation with these agencies, and specifically with

EPA, determining how we broker the respective responsibilities for

ensuring we have protection for chemical, as well as the Department of Transportation who has authority in this area, as well as

TSA and the Coast Guard who have authority in this area.

So we’re taking a very holistic look at an end-to-end sort of perspective for chemical security effective at the ports, in transit, and

ultimately in place at the sites themselves. So that has a responsibility broad spectrum across, as I pointed out, EPA, Coast Guard,

DFT, TSA, DHS at a greater role, and probably a couple others

that are not coming to mind.

So this is intended to be a very well-coordinated effort. DHS has

responsibility in the context of actually doing the tactical things as

well as the strategic responsibility of coordinating our efforts nationwide.

Mr. SHAYS. There’s no Federal law evidently that explicitly requires all chemical facilities to take security actions to safeguard

their facilities against terrorist attack.

Do you think this is wise and, if so, why?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, MTSA is responsible for the act enabling

the Coast Guard with their oversight role in this area for the ports

by virtue gives the Coast Guard that authority in part.

And working with the Coast Guard and, as I pointed out, with

DOT, we believe that, you know, we can always make improvements; but we believe we can exploit the current regulatory authorities within those respective agencies to achieve a national

level of security as it relates to chemical security.

Mr. SHAYS. How does the Coast Guard impact us here.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, with the two citations here, both of these

sites, both in Neville Island and in Forward Township, are TSA,

sir.

45

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe you gentlemen can explain it to me.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I can amplify it if you like.

Mr. SHAYS. I must be out of my territory. I want to know, we

don’t have Federal laws that require the chemical plants to do security and I’m trying to ask if this made sense, and you’re telling

me that, you know, the Coast Guard—through the Coast Guard we

somehow are getting chemical plants to do this.

So are you saying that they have requirements or they don’t have

requirements?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, I’m saying they do have requirements. The

MTSA, the Maritime——

Mr. SHAYS. So you disagree with the statement. You think our

laws now require chemical plants to secure their facilities.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Within certain parameters, sir. The Coast Guard

has mandated vulnerability assessments based upon standards to

be provided to them by December 2003. We’re in the process of collecting those standards currently. So under the MTSA——

Mr. SHAYS. That’s for all chemical plants.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, those that fall within the purview of the

MTSA, sir. That’s what I was saying. This is a holistic approach,

some of which are covered by regulations, some of which are covered by oversight by DHS.

You’re asking for one—I think you’re asking, do we need one single Federal law for security risk to chemical plants.

Mr. SHAYS. [Nods affirmatively.]

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Then I would say at this point in time, I think,

working with the administration, I would say all things are on the

table, but I’m not in a position to worry about that.

What I’m in a position to worry about is what’s the security currently and what are we doing to improve that, and I’m telling you

right now we’re taking a very active approach to it.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not trying to get you in a position where you’re

telling me what the administration has to do for policy, but I basically conclude you’re the person in charge. The EPA has basically

decided, fairly late, not to participate.

I’m trying to understand, you know, who’s in charge if anyone in

terms of what kind of absolute mandates we can make on chemical

plants and whether we should, and I’ve seen two folks locally and

I’m just trying to think, you know, what information is being

shared with them. And I know there’s a reluctance on the part of

you to overstate or even understate the challenge. I’d like to get

something out of this hearing that I can go home with and say,

well, we need to move in this direction or that direction.

You’re not giving me the opportunity to draw on your expertise

to know whether you think that more Federal law is necessary, or

some Federal law. You’re telling me how you’re coping and, you

know, I mean, maybe that’s the way we end this hearing, but it’s

not a very satisfying one from my standpoint in trying to learn

something.

I’m trying to understand—I mean, for instance, I’m near a nuclear power plant. They have to have an evacuation plan, they have

to determine where the plume goes and the probability of the

plume, they have to have requirements for safety, and maybe it’s

46

a bad comparison, maybe we just don’t need it, but I think if we

have it for nuclear plants why not for chemical?

So I thought maybe in this hearing I’d learn that, but maybe I’ve

got to ask someone else. I don’t know, it’s getting to be a bit frustrating because I feel like I’m in a game. I just want to know some

answers.

Gentlemen, tell me, do you have evacuation plans for neighborhoods around the chemical plants?

Mr. HEADLEY. As part of the improvements that we made at

Vopak we came up with an evacuation plan for an accidental release, which obviously would apply for an intentional release as

well, which essentially was to put in a warning siren, to send information to the people in the neighborhood and downstream to warn

them that there was a problem. It’s one of those things where you

stay in place and put plastic over your windows and do that kind

of thing until the threat dissipates.

Beyond that, I can’t comment about the regulatory or who has

ultimate authority on these matters because I just don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. Chief.

Chief FULL. My experience—and, again, the chemical facility and

the Forward Township being in my county I can tell you that they

are more the exception than the rule.

Mr. SHAYS. What’s more the exception than the rule.

Chief FULL. What they have accomplished, both at the company

level and with the municipality through their efforts, have been

nothing less than extraordinary and outstanding in the spirit of cooperation. However, they are only 1 of 230 facilities I have in my

county right now, and I am concerned about the fact that we don’t

have something. And, quite frankly, at this point in time at the

local level, I don’t care where it comes from, but there has to be

something to improve the accountability for security of the facilities.

As I take a look at what we’ve discussed here this morning, I’m

in the business of responding to those things when they have occurred; and with that, we’ve got to ensure that it doesn’t occur and

we can’t be shopping around with who’s going to do it under one

regulation, I mean, we already are mandated under a number of

different regulations that either come out of EPA or FEMA or

something along those lines.

We, too, have a power plant 10 miles from here and I’m very familiar with what you’ve experienced with your power plant, and we

have evacuation plans for our chemical facilities, as is required

under our EPA reporting and so forth. But they have nothing to

do—there’s not one thing in there about security; it really doesn’t

even ask, do you have a site security plan? We have everything for

consequence purposes, responding to if there’s an emergency, but

there is nothing to do with security at all, there’s—and——

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Liscouski, why wouldn’t we just give the EPA

that same responsibility and I’ll just give you the analogy that I

have. I mean, under FEMA they have natural disasters and they

have man-made disasters and they respond to both and they deal

with both.

47

Why would we separate that? Why wouldn’t we just keep the

EPA involved with the same—I mean, logically what is the argument for not doing it?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I can only speak to what is, sir; I can’t talk about

the retrospective reasons as to why people made decisions.

I’ll just tell you that when we talk about the responsibility for

coordinating across the national picture for infrastructure protection and security, it makes sense that DHS has the responsibility

to do that, working with our Federal partners.

Now, we talk about legislation and we talk about regulation, I

think it’s important to note, and we talk about things that have to

be done at a minimum. As it relates to security, one of the things

I’m always fearful of when people talk about legislation that deals

with regulation is that it goes up to the fence line and typically

deals with minimum standards.

When we talk about minimums here we’re often talking about

those things which don’t meet a dynamic threat environment. The

world that we come from and the world that we all currently live

in with respect to the September 11th—the post-September 11th

world is one in which we have a great dynamic threat.

My fear is legislation can only move at a certain pace and if we

require chemical companies to achieve a minimum, the minimums,

then they will go to the minimum; and if the threat exceeds that

minimum, are we going to wait to enact legislation which is going

to then take them to the next level of a minimum standard which

might respond to an evolutionary threat?

My job is to ensure that we have robust capabilities and thinking

going on. So to that end, irrespective of legislation sitting in the

hopper or not, regardless of what requirements there are to meet

regulatory requirements, we regularly work with the chemical sctor

across the industry, associations, individual companies, to assess

their vulnerabilities, to get them to work and make the investments they need to do the things that they need to do, and we

check up with them.

That’s not requiring a legislative mandate to do that. We’re moving out on that now, we’re making improvements, and I can tell

you right now we’re exceeding anything that I’ve seen on the table

yet with respect to legislation. Now, are we making progress to my

satisfaction in terms of getting all 4,000 sites done to the level that

we need to? No. Is there enough money to do that right off the bat?

I’m not so sure it’s a question of money. It’s a question of time. And

this is an evolutionary problem. We have to attack it as much as

we can.

But if you want to leave this hearing satisfied, I can only tell you

right now that we are not sitting waiting for legislation, good

thought, to be passed by the Congress or anyone else before we

take action. We’re very aggressive about it. We’re moving out and

we’re reducing vulnerabilities.

I’d like to say we’re touching all the points that we need to be.

We can be doing a better job, but the public should not be thinking

that DHS is waiting for guidance from anybody before we move out

there.

We’re working hard with the industry, we’re pushing them hard.

I suspect you’re going to hear on the next panel from the American

48

Chemistry Council how hard we’re pushing them, how hard we’re

working them, and I’m upsetting some people by doing that. Do I

care if I upset them? No. Do I care about making sure we’ve got

the right security for the United States? Yes. That’s what I’ve got

to answer to, sir, not about making sure I’ve got some regulation,

but making sure we understand the vulnerabilities and that we’ve

got the right protection programs.

Mr. SHAYS. Our job is oversight of DHS under the law. We have

oversight of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, FEMA and all the parts there.

Our job is to look at programs to see if they’re working well, and

then part of it is to determine whether we have to rewrite laws.

Our committee has come up with tremendous amounts of recommendations, some to the Department of Homeland Security, and

in the process of hearings we learn things that we can then recommend. It’s not your job to write the law, it’s our job. I understand that.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. I agree.

Mr. SHAYS. But it’s our job to understand if we’re doing it the

right way and the best way. Is this the best way? We bring people

before us to learn that.

And so I am just wrestling right now—and I think you can think

it’s pretty logical, we have EPA, they have it for accidental, and yet

we have testimony from two people locally that they have nothing

now for security. And I’m wondering why it’s better to have DHS

do it than not just to have EPA just revise what they do to have

it also under security.

And that’s what I’m wrestling with, and I’m not trying to play

a game with you or anybody else, I’m asking a logical question and

I’m hearing your answer saying, well, we’re doing the best we’re

doing, we’re not waiting.

What I wanted to know is what is the logic of not having EPA

do it. Tell me that, please. Is there logic or is it just a value judgment?

Mr. LISCOUSKI. No, I believe there’s logic for this for the same

reason the Transportation Security Administration was formed

from the likes of FAA and where there was a security component

beforehand.

I think there is some recognition that there is a difference between safety and security, that safety provides a good foundation

for security programs, but security has to be within the responsibility of an organization whose mandate and primary focus is security

for the United States. That’s DHS.

Mr. SHAYS. So your point about transportation—and then I’m

done—is what? I’m missing your point. You’re speaking too quickly

for me.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Sorry.

Mr. SHAYS. What’s your point about Department of Transportation? The analogy to what to what.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Well, prior to September 11th, the Department of

Transportation did have airline security within its mandate. And

then subsequent to September 11 the Transportation Security Administration was formed to ensure that we had an even greater

focus, and that focus was then transferred to——

49

Mr. SHAYS. We took Coast Guard from Transportation and we

moved it to DHS, I understand that. I’m not suggesting we take

EPA and give it to you. But the question is, are we now doing two

separate things? They’re both dealing with security, that one is

dealing with national and you dealing with man-made causes, and

I am just wondering why. That’s what I’m wrestling with.

We didn’t do it in other areas. We haven’t brought FEMA in, and

FEMA does both. And I don’t understand why we’re separating it.

That’s what I’m trying to understand. If you don’t know the answer

to it then that’s fine.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Perhaps I’m not being clear. I think I do know

that answer. The FEMA responsibility, which is now Emergency

Preparedness and Response, is not a security responsibility but a

preparedness and response capability.

The security responsibilities we have in the DHS are across a

number of different elements. The safety responsibility for EP&A

remains at EP&A. EP&A really never had a very robust security

capability. We’re trying new security programs based upon solely

safety forces.

The industry—the government would obviously serve in terms of

what the Homeland Security Act provided for—felt that DHS was

the appropriate place for a nexus for security as it relates to all of

our critical infrastructure and specifically to the chemical sector.

So I think the answer is there, perhaps I’m just not articulating

it correctly and I apologize for that, but I’d be happy to spend more

time with you trying to get clarity on it.

Mr. SHAYS. The Department of Homeland Security legislation

emanated from this committee. We had the very first hearing on

it and I understand the genesis of the legislation. I still for the life

of me don’t understand why EPA is not more involved in the security side and that’s what I don’t understand.

I don’t understand why these gentlemen know that they have

emergency plans when it relates to natural causes, but somehow

they don’t have it for man-made problems. I don’t for the life of me

understand that and I know you’re trying to answer, but I don’t

understand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Shays.

We will move on to the next panel now. I thank you for your testimony, I appreciate it very much.

Mr. LISCOUSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Recess.]

Mr. MURPHY. All right. We’ll continue now with our hearing and

ask that the people about to give testimony please rise and be

sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MURPHY. I note for the record that the witnesses responded

in the affirmative.

I’d like to introduce our panel, the second panel, for witnesses.

These include Mr. John Stephenson, Director of National Resources

and Environment for the U.S. General Accounting Office; Ms. Pamela Witmer, president of the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry

Council; Mr. Marty Durbin, team leader for security and operations

and senior director of Federal relations for the American Chemistry

50

Council; and we have Ms. Jennifer C. Gibson, vice president of government & public affairs, National Association of Chemical Distributors.

I welcome all the witnesses today to this hearing and I guess

we’ll begin with Mr. Stephenson, your testimony. Each person will

get——

Mr. SHAYS. Five minutes.

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. Five minutes and we’ll roll over if we

need to do that.

Mr. Stephenson.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN STEPHENSON, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT FOR THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; PAMELA WITMER, PRESIDENT

OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COUNCIL;

MARTY DURBIN, TEAM LEADER FOR SECURITY AND

OPEERATIONS AND SENIOR DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL RELATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL; AND JENNIFER C. GIBSON, VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT AND

PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMICAL

DISTRIBUTORS

Mr. STEPHENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the

opportunity to discuss our work on the security of the Nation’s

chemical facilities and the recommendations that we made to address this issue over a year ago in our March 2003 report.

As the events of September 11, 2001 showed, terrorists can cause

enormous damage to our country by attacking infrastructure essential to our economy and jeopardizing public health and safety. Following these events, the President, in the National Strategy for

Homeland Security, identified the chemical industry as 1 of 13 sectors critical to the Nation’s infrastructure. Across the Nation, literally thousands of industrial facilities manufacture, use, or store

hazardous chemicals in quantities that could potentially put large

numbers of Americans at risk in the event of a chemical release.

The Federal Government’s role in protecting chemical facilities

from terrorist attacks has been much debated since September 11.

Initially EPA had the lead responsibility for chemical security, but

it has now been shifted to the new Department of Homeland Security, as you just heard. Public debate has centered on whether the

Federal Government should impose security requirements on chemical facilities or whether voluntary industry actions alone are sufficient.

Let me briefly summarize the findings in our report. First, most

experts agree that the Nation’s chemical facilities are indeed attractive targets for terrorists intent on causing massive damage.

The risk of an attack varies among facilities and upon several factors including the types of chemicals they use and their proximity

to populated areas.

According to EPA data on accidental toxic release worst-case scenarios, as you heard, 123 chemical facilities located throughout the

Nation could each potentially expose more than 1 million people in

the surrounding area if a toxic release occurred, and another 700

facilities could each threaten at least 100,000 people.

51

Now, there’s a chart in the back of our testimony that kind of

in part explains the difference between those numbers and the

4,000 that DHS was talking about.

Numerous studies and media accounts of reporters gaining access to facilities indicates that the vulnerabilities are very real.

Just a few months ago, as was already mentioned once here, the

Pittsburgh Tribune Review did an expose on the vulnerability of

such facilities in this area that CBS later used in a broader 60

Minutes piece on chemical plant security.

Despite the obvious risk, no Federal laws as yet explicitly require

that all chemical facilities assess vulnerabilities or take security action to safeguard them from an attack. While some facilities must

take action under recent legislation covering water treatment

plants, part of those 15,000, or plants near ports, which is about

300 of those 15,000, no Federal regulation right now requires that

all of them be assessed.

Furthermore, well over 2 years after the events of September 11

the Federal Government is still not comprehensive—has still not

comprehensively assessed the chemical industry’s vulnerability to

terrorist attacks. EPA, the Department of Homeland Security, and

the Department of Justice have each taken preliminary steps to assist the industry in its preparedness efforts, but no agency monitors or documents the extent to which chemical facilities have implemented security measures. Consequently, Federal, State and

local entities in general lack information on preparedness.

To their credit chemical manufacturing industry associations

have taken a number of voluntary initiatives to address security at

their member facilities. For example, the American Chemistry

Council, represented on this panel, requires its members to follow

its responsible care approach and preparedness. ACC’s efforts are

commendable, but its members, while some of the Nation’s biggest

chemical companies, include less than 1,000 of the approximately

15,000 facilities the EPA estimates manufacture or store dangerous

chemicals.

Relying on voluntary efforts alone without Federal oversight or

third-party verification may not be sufficient to address the considerable threat. Indeed, relying on voluntary efforts alone raises serious concerns, and the extent the facilities are participating in such

efforts is at this point unclear.

In light of the gravity of a potential threat and the obvious challenges facing the industry in addressing it, we recommended a year

ago that the Department of Homeland Security and EPA jointly develop a comprehensive national strategy that, one, identifies highrisk facilities and collects information on preparedness—that

sounds like that’s partially being done according to the DHS witness; two, further specify the roles and responsibilities for addressing the threat; three, establish appropriate information sharing

mechanisms; and, four, develop legislative proposals to require

chemical facilities to expeditiously assess their vulnerability and,

when necessary, make corrective actions.

Legislation is now working its way through the Congress that, if

enacted, and I haven’t seen the latest draft of this legislation, but

would direct DHS and EPA to in part adopt most of these recommendations.

52

Mr. Chairman, that concludes the summary to my statement and

I’ll be happy to respond to questions at any time.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Stephenson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephenson follows:]

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

Mr. MURPHY. Ms. Witmer.

Ms. WITMER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the

House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and

International Relations. As Congressman Murphy indicated, my

name is Pam Witmer and I am president of the Pennsylvania

Chemical Industry Council. PCIC represents over 70 companies involved in the manufacture, distribution, and use of chemicals along

with those companies that support our industry.

Pennsylvania’s business of chemistry is an approximately $27

billion a year industry employing almost 62,000 Pennsylvanians.

These jobs represent over 8 percent of the Commonwealth’s entire

manufacturing work force, a work force that takes home on average

over $68,000 a year.

I’m pleased to appear before you today to discuss the efforts that

have been undertaken post September 11 by those involved in

Pennsylvania’s chemical industry. We are committed to work in

partnership with Federal, State and local governments to further

ensure the security of materials that are used to make everyday

products like Kevlar for bulletproof vests for our military and law

enforcement, water purification systems, bicycle helmets for our

children, siding and insulation for our homes and lifesaving medicines. Hazardous materials are used to make the products that

drive our economy and contribute to our well-being. It is equally

important to understand that of the hazardous materials manufactured and transported, only a small portion of them would be considered attractive to a would-be terrorist.

The chemical industry has long taken security seriously. In this

‘‘just in time’’ culture it’s imperative that materials are moved from

manufacturer to customer in a timely, efficient, cost-effective and

secure manner. As well, the industry has made it a priority to establish a good working relationship with members of the local firstresponse community.

I think the key word used to describe the industry’s security efforts to date is ‘‘proactive.’’ Efforts to further enhance security

through formal industrywide guidelines were undertaken immediately following the tragic events of September 11th. Shortly following 9/11, industry had developed, distributed and began training on the use of the Site Security Guidelines for the Chemical Industry. These guidelines were followed by the more comprehensive

American Chemistry Council Responsible Care Security Code.

These documents were developed jointly by the American Chemistry Council, CHEMTREC, the Chlorine Institute, the Synthetic

Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, and subsequently

supported by many other chemical industry associations including

the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry Council.

PCIC supports efforts to pass Federal legislation that would

place authority for establishing national standards for chemical site

security and overseeing their implementation with the Department

of Homeland Security. PCIC also suggests that such Federal legislation recognize the ACC Responsible Care Security Code as an acceptable security standard. PCIC does not support individual

States acting on their own in absence of Federal legislation.

73

From PCIC’s perspective there are three themes essential to the

successful development and implementation of a security plan: use

of sound science and actual risk posed, outreach and training.

Sound science and actual risk. The Site Security Guidelines and

the more recent Security Code represent a risk-based approach to

identify, assess and address vulnerabilities, prevent or mitigate incidents, enhance training and response capabilities and maintain

and improve relationships with key stakeholders. The Guidelines

and Security Code were written specifically for those who have responsibility for the safe and secure management and distribution

of their products and raw materials. The Responsible Care Security

Code outlines a tiered risk-based approach to identifying

vulnerabilities and implementing security programs and practices

that managers can consider and tailor to a company’s specific situation as identified in vulnerability assessment. The two documents

offer flexibility to design a program according to the chemical being

used and the actual risk posed.

Some of the more obvious strategies being employed include

changing the direction trucks enter a facility, use of employee identification cards, background checks for employees and contractors,

additional surveillance in the forms of obvious cameras as well as

placement of more covert cameras, additional fencing, more security guards, etc.

As I mentioned, these are some of the obvious methods employed

to better secure the sites that manufacture, store, use and distribute hazardous materials. Actual security plans are, of course, confidential and, on the advice of law enforcement, not discussed.

The second element of a successful security plan is outreach and

information sharing. Hazardous materials security is a shared responsibility. It is not just the job of government agencies, law enforcement or a particular industry sector. It is all of these groups

working together that would provide the best opportunity to prevent or respond appropriately to an act of terrorism, international

or domestic.

Information sharing is a critical element for effective security.

Along with understanding the real risk posed by a particular chemical, being provided with accurate information can trigger heightened or tightened security.

This shared responsibility extends to those involved in the manufacture and distribution of chemicals. A number of initiatives have

been established that do enable government agencies, law enforcement, and various industry sectors to interact on information sharing. Some of these efforts include the Chemical Sector Sharing and

Analysis Center. In April 2002, ACC and the National Infrastructure Protection Center, which was then part of the FBI, signed a

formal agreement establishing a communications network that operates 24 hours a day to provide an exchange of security and threat

information between the Federal Government, the chemical manufacturers, carriers and distributors. PCIC is also a subscriber of the

Chemical Sector ISAC to ensure that chemical manufacturers and

distributors not affiliated with ACC are provided with the latest security and threat information.

Some of the other advances in information sharing include the

Railroad Alert Network, the Surface Transportation Information

74

Sharing and Analysis Center, the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center and the Association of American Railroads and the

American Chemistry Council Security Task Force.

As you can see, much has been done in the way of providing better access to information. However, there still exists a reluctance

to pass along critical intelligence because of the sensitive nature of

the intelligence or its source. Consideration should be given by the

Federal Department of Homeland Security to developing a process

that would provide top security clearance for certain chief security

executives within companies, as many of these individuals come

from the intelligence or law enforcement community.

The third theme of all hazardous materials security efforts, training, is essential. PCIC member companies participate in drills to

determine whether or not the plan is effective, sharpen skills and

responses and to determine what needs to be done better.

An example of a cooperative training effort that took place this

past November was the national level terrorism-related preparedness drill involving the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI, PCIC member

company ConocoPhillips and State and local law enforcement agencies for Pennsylvania and New Jersey. This particular training exercise utilized a scenario involving a simulated terrorism-induced

oil spill in the Delaware River to test the Unified Command’s capability to respond to a breach in port security while at the same

time containing and responding to a major oil spill.

PCIC and many of our member companies also voluntarily participate in and support a national organization called TransCAER,

which stands for Transportation Community Awareness Emergency

Response. Pennsylvania TransCAER is a unique organization that

counts among its members the Federal Environmental Protection

Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the Keystone Emergency Management

Association, in addition to chemical manufacturers, distributors

and hazardous materials cleanup companies. Pennsylvania

TransCAER, an award-winning affiliate of the national

TransCAER organization, has as its mission, outreach and training

to communities in which our facilities are located and through

which our materials are transported.

Pennsylvania TransCAER has just completed its second consecutive year of providing free hazardous materials incident response

training to county and local first responders. This unique training

utilizes actual scenes from within the county in which the training

is being held, allows first responders to role play all elements of a

hazardous materials transportation incident, from the initial call

reporting the incident, to managing the incident, to cleanup, to reporting relevant information to medical and hospital personnel, to

working with the media.

I am pleased to announce this voluntary effort will be offered

free to an additional seven Pennsylvania counties in 2004. Allegheny County was one of the first counties to be offered this free

training in 2002 and neighboring Beaver County participated in

the Pennsylvania TransCAER training event in 2003.

On a more local level, many employees of PCIC member companies are active participants in their county’s Terrorism Task Force.

75

They are volunteer firefighters or emergency medical technicians.

As well, some of our member companies have agreements with

their local emergency planning coordinator that allow the company’s hazardous materials response team to go offsite and assist in

a hazardous materials emergency.

This unprecedented information sharing, outreach and training

is taking place not just between law enforcement and industry, but

also with other Federal and State agencies. An example of this cooperation on a national level is the industry’s participation in a

Federal Department of Transportation study that is currently underway to field test various new technologies that may be beneficial

for tracking shipments of hazardous materials under a variety of

scenarios. PCIC is a member of the security discussion group created by Pennsylvania’s Homeland Security Director, Keith Martin.

As you can see, the manufacturer and distribution of hazardous

materials is more secure today than it was last year and certainly

more secure than it was 5 or 10 years ago.

This does not mean that we are done nor does it mean that there

will never be a successful terrorist attack. It does mean that we

recognize our responsibility to try and secure our employees and

communities through which our materials are transported and

manufactured.

A number of positive and proactive voluntary initiatives have already been taken to develop more secure movement of hazardous

materials. Research will continue looking for better ways to improve approaches to security that are based on sound science and

developed on the basis of actual risk. But society as a whole faces

the problem that in response to all types of threats, terrorism, natural disasters, etc., in general there is no such thing as zero risk.

Whether it’s airports, water treatment plants, high-rise buildings

or hazardous materials, we must all realize there are real costs to

every person for each effort made to reduce the likelihood of risks

negatively impacting us.

I realize I went way over my time, but thank you and whenever

it’s appropriate I’ll answer questions.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Witmer follows:]

76

77

78

79

80

81

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Durbin.

Mr. DURBIN. Good morning. Again, my name is Marty Durbin

and on behalf of the members of the American Chemistry Council

I certainly appreciate the opportunity to address security in the

business of chemistry, a critical sector of America’s infrastructure.

ACC represents 140 of the leading companies in the U.S. Chemical manufacturing industry. It’s an industry with the largest exporting sector in our economy directly employing a million people

and is the largest private industry investor in research and development. Products we manufacture are essential to our modern

lives, from plastics to pharmaceuticals, from cars to clothing, and

they keep our drinking water safe, support agriculture and spur

medical invasions that prevent and treat disease.

Now, you’ve asked that we address voluntary actions the chemical industry has taken to address security and assess the Federal

Government’s roles and programs in this area. I welcome the opportunity to highlight three specific areas. One is the leadership

role that I believe ACC members have taken with regard to security to further ensure the security and safety of their products facilities and the communities in which they operate; and, second,

the strides the Federal Government has made in the last year in

this area; and, third, the remaining challenges and where we need

to go from here.

As has been mentioned several times, safety and security have

been primary concerns of this industry since long before September

11th; however, those attacks forced every part of America’s critical

infrastructure to reevaluate security preparedness. Our members

didn’t wait for government direction. Building on the ethic of stewardship embodied in our trademark Responsible Care Program now

in it’s 16th year, our members acted swiftly, adopting an aggressive

plan to further enhance security, and that is the ACC Responsible

Care Security Code.

Through the code, ACC members are making serious commitments and significant investments. Implementation of the code,

which addresses site, cyber and transportation security is mandatory for all members. Regarding facilities specifically, the code requires that for every facility in all four categories, a rigorous security vulnerability assessment be conducted, security enhancements

are implemented, and that a third party verify that those enhancements have indeed taken place.

The code emphasizes that security is a shared responsibility requiring actions by others in order to be effective. That includes suppliers and customers as well as government agencies, first responders law enforcement and everyone else we’ve been speaking about

this morning.

The ACC Security Code has been called a model program by Secretary Ridge, and, as Mr. Stephenson mentioned, in the GAO report last year it was commended. More recently the Code was recognized by the U.S. Coast Guard, by the State of New Jersey, and

by the city of Baltimore as essentially a best practice for chemical

security. I’d be happy to go into more detail on that during the

question period.

ACC’s efforts, of course, extend far beyond the boundaries of just

our facilities. We understand that effective response systems are

82

key to safety and security and, as such, we have longstanding public service programs such as CHEMTREC, which we mentioned

earlier, a 24-hour emergency response center that has now been a

public service of the American Chemistry Council for over 30 years,

and the TransCAER program, again, as Ms. Witmer discussed.

The GAO report last year said that ACC’s efforts were commendable, but we have not been content to rest on our laurels. Our

members have continued to push themselves to strengthen our

partnerships with law enforcement, first responders as well as

local, State and Federal Government, and to meet the ambitious

timetable of our security code. I’m pleased to report that our members are meeting their timetable. Every member facility has completed a vulnerability assessment and with many enhancements already in place we’re on a path to full implementation of security

enhancements by the end of this year.

Now, second, regarding the Federal Government and its role,

We’ve been working very closely with the Department of Homeland

Security during its first year of existence. We concurred with

GAO’s recommendations last year that the Federal Government

should develop a comprehensive national chemical security strategy

that’s both practical and cost effective and that would focus in the

following four areas.

First, identifying high-risk facilities. Now, I can tell you that

starting in March of last year DHS partnered with ACC and Mr.

Liscouski mentioned much of that in his testimony. Today DHS

and the Coast Guard are actively visiting chemical facilities and

working in conjunction with local law enforcement and responders

to protect facilities and their communities.

In addition it’s worth noting that U.S. Customs has developed

the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program

[CTPAT], to help identify potentially vulnerable or suspect shipments and works with manufacturers and shippers through the

value chain, both foreign and domestic, to secure global trade.

Second, GAO identified the need to specify the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies. Since their report was published, and

as has already been mentioned, the President signed a Presidential

Directive in December that more clearly defines security roles of

various Federal agencies and specifically names DHS as the lead

agency for the chemical sector.

Third was the need to develop appropriate information sharing

mechanisms. As has been mentioned, the FBI through the National

Infrastructure Protection Center contacted ACC shortly after September 11th and asked that we sponsor and host the chemical sector ISAC and through our CHEMTREC program we provide that

24/7 capability for a direct two-way communication between DHS

and our sector to hundreds of participants representing not only

our members but other segments of the chemical sector as well.

I would also note that while the national terrorist threat level

was at orange during December and January, DHS established

daily contact with ACC and its member companies to maintain a

clear understanding of threats and countermeasures that were

taken.

Finally, GAO recommended developing a legislative proposal,

and here I want to be very clear that the members of ACC fully

83

recognize that strengthening safety and security and having Federal oversight at our facilities is in the best interest of our plant

communities, our companies and our Nation.

As such, ACC supports chemical security legislation that will establish national guidelines for security at chemical facilities, require facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and implement

security plans, provide oversight and inspection authority to the

Department of Homeland Security and create strong enforcement

authority.

Now, we’ve been very pleased with the constructive relationships

we’re developing with our Federal partners to address the security

in the chemical sector, and frankly Assistant Secretary Liscouski is

to be commended for the focus that he personally has brought to

this effort; however, I will confirm what he’s telling you, that he

is certainly going to great lengths to push our members in our industry to do even more than they are to help develop and establish

what this higher level of sustainable security is at our member

companies. But we look forward to working with our government

partners to continuously enhance security of our products, our facilities, our employees and our communities.

Although much has been done there are areas in which we must

continue to focus our attention, and they include improved public/

private intelligence sharing regarding threats and vulnerabilities,

coordinated training activities, improved coordination of chemical

security initiatives within DHS and all of its various agencies, and

agreement on other security needs of the chemical sector. And I’m

pleased to say the dialog in all of these areas is underway.

In conclusion, I want to say that security is a responsibility

shared by industry and government. ACC members will continue to

step up to their security responsibilities; however, we know we

can’t do this alone.

Our members have already invested hundreds of millions of dollars to further enhance security, but unilateral security investment

by the private sector is not enough.

ACC members will continue to work with law enforcement, first

responders and government partners to ensure the security of our

essential products and contributions this industry provides to our

country. We demonstrated our commitment and willingness to step

up to this challenge, but we cannot shoulder the burden alone. We

need to embrace a more comprehensive and more integrated partnership with our public sector colleagues. Frankly, security is just

not an option for the members of the American Chemistry Council.

Thank you, again. I’m happy to answer your questions at the appropriate time.

Thank you, Mr. Durbin.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Durbin follows:]

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

Mr. MURPHY. Ms. Gibson.

Ms. GIBSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. My name is Jennifer Gibson and I am the vice president of government and public affairs at the National Association

of Chemical Distributors.

NACD’s 300 member companies represent between 80 and 90

percent of the chemical distribution facilities in the United States.

NACD members process, repackage, warehouse, transport and

market chemical products for an industrial customer base of

750,000. Approximately 18 billion of U.S. chemical industry sales

are through distributors.

To become and remain a member of NACD chemical distribution,

companies must take title to product and adhere to management

practices related to health, safety, security and the environment as

outlined in the association’s Responsible Distribution Process

[RDP].

Since well before September 11, 2001 NACD members have adhered to the policies and procedures outlined by the Responsible

Distribution Process. These requirements have always called for security and risk management considerations within and outside

each facility. Members are also required to complete two stages of

independent third-party verification of their RDP policies and procedures including an onsite independent verification once every 3

years. Companies who are found to be out of compliance by the

third-party verifier are terminated from NACD membership; therefore, security is not a new issue for chemical distributors.

NACD as the leading association of chemical distributors was the

first industry association to adopt new additional practices addressing security following September 11. In April 2002 NACD added security requirements to RDP within key distribution operations, specifically in the handling and storage of chemical products at facilities, in carrier selection for distributing chemical products and in

customer qualifications for chemical products of concern to various

Federal agencies. NACD’s RDP verification is now underway to

confirm implementation of these new security requirements at sites

and we expect all of these verifications to be complete by the end

of next year.

Regarding the current Federal programs addressing security at

chemical facilities, we think the Federal Government has gotten off

to a very good start. NACD also supports Federal legislation that

would mandate vulnerability assessments for chemical facilities

and recognize the management practices already in place that provide for enhanced security of chemical manufacturing and distribution.

We would also like to see DHS develop a vulnerability assessment model for chemical distribution facilities, as it did for the

chemical manufacturing sector. We have five programs underway

to close potential loopholes that could allow commercial HAZMAT

transport drivers with felony records to obtain positions at chemical distribution facilities unbeknownst to their employers. The plan

is to fingerprint all commercial driver’s license holders with

HAZMAT endorsements is a positive step. We strongly encourage

the subcommittee to urge TSA and DHS to utilize the successful

fingerprinting program already in place for airport and aviation

104

personnel. The hazardous materials truck driver population is more

than double the size of the aviation personnel that require

fingerprinting. We urge the subcommittee to insist that Congress

and the executive branch consult with the American Association of

Airport Executives that designed, implemented and operated the

aviation clearinghouse to ensure that there will be no interruptions

to the interstate transportation of chemicals because of the inability to process HAZMAT driver fingerprints. This program was

originally scheduled to go into effect late last year and now the effective date will be April 1st of this year.

In the event of a catastrophic occurrence at a chemical distribution facility, Federal agencies should work collaboratively with first

responders, industry and incident response agencies. It is important that Federal agencies work side by side with as many stakeholders as necessary to respond to any catastrophic event should

it occur. Existing emergency response networks that are well-established and widely used by industry, namely CHEMTREC, play a

vital role in crisis and incident management.

Third, the only shortcoming we perceived in the area of Federal

support of local and State emergency response activities is a lack

of regular communication in some cases and, therefore, the possibility of uncoordinated activities. The Federal Government should

continue to take a leadership position in directing more formalized

and regular communication among federally supported local and

State emergency response personnel as well as individuals with

similar responsibilities at chemical facilities. We greatly applaud

the government’s development of the Information Sharing and

Analysis Centers that includes the chemical sector as one of several

with which it collaborates and shares information on related security issues.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee

today. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gibson follows:]

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

Mr. MURPHY. I want to thank all the witnesses.

Mr. Stephenson, I’d like to start off with a question for you. In

your report you write on page 6 of it, it says, ‘‘In testimony on February 6, 2002 the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

warned of the potential for an attack by al Queda on chemical facilities.’’

Without getting too much into intelligence on that, what actions

have been taken, voluntary actions from the chemical industry? In

your analysis are we at the same risk, elevated risk, or low risk

based upon some of the actions we have heard today?

Mr. STEPHENSON. Unfortunately, we haven’t done any updates to

our work in the last year, but voluntary actions by industry have

gone a long way toward reducing the risk, I would say.

Unfortunately, organizations like ACC only represent a small

portion of the facilities that store or use hazardous chemicals. In

addition, we at GAO are satisfied that there is still no Federal requirements that mandates vulnerability assessments across the

board to all facilities who use hazardous chemicals.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me followup with that so that I understand the

association. The American Chemistry Council did an assessment of

15,000 facilities.

Mr. Durbin. That’s correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I list some of the other associations, the National Association of Chemical Distributors, and then there are

manufacturing associations, but according to the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, American Petroleum Institute, State

association, etc., when you add all these associations together, two

things: one, how close are we to having all 15,000 plants and distributors involved in this; and, two, do all these associations adhere

to the same security guidelines identified by the ACC?

Mr. DURBIN. I will try to answer that. If you look at the population of the 15,000 communities, you know, again, ACC or chemical manufacturing is only about 7 percent, you add the others that

you mentioned, you certainly do start to add up—add to that number. However, if you look at the vast numbers, the larger numbers,

you’re looking at water treatment and drinking water facilities, agriculture retailer facilities, refrigeration warehouses that use ammonia for their refrigeration.

So, again, you’re still not—even if you mention all the—take all

the ones you mentioned, you’re not coming close to getting to the

majority of facilities that would fall under that 15,000.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, how much has been—in terms of the compliance issues, do we know how much money has been invested so far

and what will it take for all the plants to be in compliance with

just the standards that you have said? Any idea what we’re talking

about?

Mr. DURBIN. Again, just speaking for the ACC members, we don’t

have a definite number yet, we’re actually doing some economic

surveys with the membership. And I will just qualify that over the

last year the investments are now being made.

What I can tell you and what we do know is that the number at this point is literally over $100 million and into the hundreds

of millions of dollars that have been invested. Again, on average

right now it appears that there has been at least $2 million per

113

company that has been spent. You know, membership of 140 companies, you’re ranging in size from very large to very small; but,

again, we are talking literally over hundreds of millions of dollars

that have been spent already.

Mr. MURPHY. And, Ms. Gibson, I think in your testimony regarding the National Association of Chemical Distributors, I think you

mentioned that plants or distributors have been given a couple

chances to comply.

Ms. GIBSON. Right.

Mr. MURPHY. By the third time, third strike they’re out.

What enforcement abilities do you have on a national level or

State level with regard to if plants and distributors do not reach

their security guidelines that you have set on a voluntary basis,

what can you do besides kick them out of the association?

Ms. GIBSON. That’s our measure that we can take to get them

to comply, and if they don’t, well, they’re out. And that’s why we

support Federal measures to require these measures.

Mr. MURPHY. Are there such things as the association working,

for example, that those who may purchase products made by these

plants or distributed by the distributors that—to discourage people

from purchasing from plants that are not in compliance? That’s a

big financial aspect added to it.

Ms. GIBSON. Right. Exactly. Yeah, to be a member of NACD everyone has their NACD logo, Responsible Submission Process logo,

and purchasers know that these products have gone through Responsible Submission Process, so that is a good economic incentive.

Mr. MURPHY. So, for example, if your company is distributing

chemicals manufactured by other associations going through the

States, does word go out that XYZ Co. is not in compliance, and

therefore other plants and distributors are given some sort of warning not to purchase from them? Does it go that far?

Mr. DURBIN. If I may, I’m not an attorney, but I believe you start

to get into problems of antitrust concerns if you have members of

an association starting to single out a particular company for any

reason to say do or do not purchase from that company.

Mr. MURPHY. So then this just goes——

Ms. Witmer, do you want to add something to that?

Ms. WITMER. I was just going to follow that up that we, in fact,

follow very strict antitrust rules and that whenever there’s a gathering of association members, our legal counsel reminds them, you

know, that they are not, in fact, to talk about those kinds of activities for, you know, fear that we would be in violation of the antitrust.

And that is why, as Ms. Gibson pointed out, we are so strongly

in favor of Federal legislation, so that there is one national standard and then perhaps maybe a reporting mechanism as well.

Mr. MURPHY. So the bottom line, in absence of Federal standards

requiring this, there’s no enforcement capability that any of your

associations can foster, even within your association, other than

kicking them out?

Ms. WITMER. Not from a legal perspective.

Ms. GIBSON. Right.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask you another thing, too. How long before

the highest-risk facilities are brought up to a standard that your

114

agencies have set? Are we at that level yet, the highest-risk facilities?

Mr. DURBIN. Again, speaking for the ACC facilities, they were

broken into four tiers; the tier I facilities completed their vulnerability assessments at the end of 2002, by the end of 2003 they

would have had to implement all their security enhancements.

Now, they have until March of this year to have those verified,

but those tier 1 facilities are, again, essentially done; tier 2 facilities will be done by June of this year and all of our facilities are,

again, as I mentioned in my testimony, are scheduled to be through

by the end of this calendar year.

Mr. MURPHY. One of the recommendations I had for security

here, is it possible within the plants and distributors, large or

small, that some external source could hack into the computer and

cause problems with regard to release of chemicals or locking security measures, or is it all done internal with no connection to the

outside?

Ms. GIBSON. I’ll let Mr. Durbin speak to this as well, but I know

that’s been—specifically in the past several months now that we’ve

kind of addressed the facility perimeter security, we’ve really started to look more at the cyber security aspect of it, really evaluating

what information those companies have on their computers and

how can that information be protected, because that is just as important as the physical security.

So we’re starting to get into that more and more and there’s a

joint industry group looking at those in collaboration with the government.

Mr. DURBIN. And, in fact, I would say what’s interesting about

the cyber security piece of this is that more than the physical security side, they almost have a leg up, because many of our member

companies have already been working very closely on cyber-related

issues because of simple E business, business-to-business issues,

Y2k issues.

So there were already groups of our member companies very

much focused on securing not only their IT systems and information, but, again, many of our facilities and our processes are controlled by computer, so making sure that they cannot be hacked

into from outside, outside the facility, to be able to cause a release.

Mr. MURPHY. And then one area, too, I want to ask about because the plants that we specifically have heard about today, a couple of those were investigated by the media, and we know there’s

many more throughout the country they covered; for example, in

the 60 Minutes story, Baltimore, California, New York, other

places, too.

Despite what we heard earlier today on Univar, despite efforts

taken on those sites, they still cannot block access through the rail

lines that bisect their plants and I saw mention in here that the

rail industry and chemical industry are working cooperatively.

What else do we have to do on those sites other than—I don’t

know, what else can be done on those sites, because that still

seems to be a critical aspect, materials transported by rail, by

truck; where do we go from there?

Mr. DURBIN. No question; and I think, as Ms. Witmer mentioned

in her testimony, we did establish a task force between AAR, the

115

Rail Trade Association, and ACC to address three specific issues.

One was communication to our customers, and I can discuss that

more in a moment, but the two other areas were storage in transit

and access to the plants.

Traditionally, you know, the railroads and transportation of our

chemicals, obviously a very important part of your business, intended to have fairly free access to the facility, you know, 24 hours

a day drop-off materials and what have you.

A lot more has gone into now determining, kind of putting together rules of the road for access to the facility, gates over the rail

access, and in some cases where there aren’t gates you’ve still got

electronic surveillance and alarms and other things that are now

instituted. But, again, this is an evolving process and one where

we’re continuing to find the existing vulnerabilities and working

very hard, very fast, to try to address those vulnerabilities.

Mr. MURPHY. Also, I know that I have little doubt that some reporters, all they have to do is walk on those plant sites and look

at those aspects and, as was already testified to, there are reporters sent by the media to see what is actually happening there. And

I don’t want to see these kind of breaches take place without a

quick response. I really need you to know that, and I appreciate

that you will continue to work with Congress in order to draft

these high-standard initiatives to make sure we protect these areas

for the public.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, when we talked with our first panel

about the issue of EPA and the Department of Homeland Security

being the lead agency with respect to having authority in this terrorist threat arena, we all voted for the Department of Homeland

Security.

I want to give each of you an opportunity to tell us your preference: the Department of Homeland Security or EPA and your rationale.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Well, I don’t want to give you my preference.

I will say that EPA has a great deal of knowledge on this subject

stemming from its Clean Air Act responsibilities and the 1990

amendment which established this risk management plan approach, so they have an incredible amount of knowledge on those

15,000 facilities with hazardous chemicals.

On the other hand, Department of Homeland Security brings to

it the threat-based analysis. Both of those things have to be considered when you’re assessing vulnerabilities at an individual facility.

So I would hope that they’re working very closely together. I

think both of them have a contributing role in this. DHS, since it

is a security issue, may be more appropriate. But I would hope that

all this experience that EPA has developed over the last decade

won’t go to waste.

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Witmer.

Ms. WITMER. The Pennsylvania Chemistry Industry Council supports DHS as the oversight agency for security, presumably because they have the expertise in developing and assessing security

plans.

116

There is potentially a role for EPA to play, certainly from a response perspective. Their mission is to protect the environment, not

to—they don’t have the expertise to assess the security plans.

Mr. DURBIN. ACC has also been on record that DHS would be the

appropriate primary agency to have a lead over the chemical sector

security, but, again, that is not to say that there isn’t a need to be

able to pull in the expertise of other agencies.

No. 1, I would point out that while we have worked and will continue to work very closely with EPA on all of their programs what

is needed now is an agency that not only has the charter mission

to protect all the critical infrastructures, but they can appropriately

look across all of the interdependencies of the various critical infrastructures. If you look at any one facility you’ve got, you know, the

power grid coming in, water grid, transportation grid, and you need

to be able to coordinate all of those.

Additionally, if I can add a little bit more context as well, you’re

talking about an industry that already has a long history of working with various Federal agencies not just on physical hardening

of our facilities but on the potential misuse of our products, whether they’re stolen or have chemical weapons conventions, dual-use

chemicals, drug precursors, and even the fertilizer industry was

mentioned earlier that works with ATF. And there’s a coordination

that needs to go on here that involves EPA, Department of Commerce, Department of State, ATF, the FBI, and I think that the

way DHS has been created it’s only appropriate that they have to

play that primary coordinating role.

Ms. GIBSON. I would concur with Mr. Durbin’s comments about

I think the most important aspect is to have one clear agency coordinating all these security efforts. And given the focus of DHS—

threat, security analysis assessment, vulnerability assessment, site

security approval—I think they are the most appropriate agency to

take on that role.

Mr. TURNER. My next question goes to the association of representatives. I already indicated in panel one that I’m a fan of the

EPA processes that require disclosure of information because of

how it has assisted the community in empowering them to be able

to be at the table and have an impact, I think even to the benefit

of affecting the facilities by giving them additional security consulting information, even though at times I think it has been an augmentation of the government’s ability to advise and to plan for potential incidences at these facilities.

For your members, though, what are their thoughts with respect

to the extent of the public information that is available? Are they

concerned as it relates to a terrorist impact that so much information is currently available about them?

Ms. WITMER. Members of the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry

Council are urged to work with their communities, including their

residents in the area in which the facility is located, as well as the

first responders and government officials to reach out and let them

know what is happening at the facility.

As far as an actual security plan, no, we don’t think that individuals in the neighborhood, so to speak, should, in fact, be able to

look at those. The emergency management plans are available to

the local first responders. They have them, they know what’s there

117

at the facility, so that if there is an incident, when they respond

they know what they’re dealing with.

So there’s a balancing act that we think we are successfully negotiating. We don’t think there needs to be that information placed

on the Internet for anyone to look at, but there does need to be a

lot of communication with the community in which the facility is

located.

Mr. DURBIN. I would concur with Ms. Witmer’s comments. There

is information that has to be shared with the community and then

there’s talking about the security vulnerability assessments and

the plans we’ve implemented to address those vulnerabilities and

making them publicly available.

Ms. GIBSON. Part of NACD’s Responsible Distribution Practice

for companies is to become involved with the local agencies and invite them for tours and go through the training and emergency response exercises, so we clearly support as much communication as

possible with the local officials.

As far as having information on the Internet, that’s—everybody

knows the obvious dangers of that—that could easily fall into the

wrong hands. So, as Ms. Witmer said, it is a balancing act.

Mr. TURNER. My next issue relates to as individual plants in several communities begin to take efforts to secure their facilities,

they are learning more than they did before in the capture of this

information, the sharing of this information, so that our collective

learning curve can be diminished, and then we can adopt best practices as it occurs.

From the association’s perspective, you talk about your efforts to

capture that expertise and disseminate it among your members

and also from GAO’s perspective the lost opportunities.

And I’ll go to Ms. Gibson.

Ms. GIBSON. I’m sorry, I don’t quite understand the question.

Mr. TURNER. Your members are undertaking security enhancements.

Ms. GIBSON. Yes.

Mr. TURNER. And they may be undertaking very different types

of security enhancements that they might benefit from sharing that

information among each other.

Ms. GIBSON. Right.

Mr. TURNER. Can you tell us what among your association you’re

doing to help capture that information and share it among the various members so that we can all have a greater enhancement of

that?

Ms. GIBSON. Kind of within the association it’s always—security

is a funny topic, as you know; companies are sometimes reluctant

to actually publicize the specific measures they’re taking. But we

do have guidelines under the Responsible Distribution Process for

companies to follow and they have done that.

We’re also probably going to start this year outlining some best

practices along the RDP process to go over at our annual meetings

so those companies know all the different areas and programs to

share information and what works.

Mr. TURNER. Obviously the reason why I’m asking the question

is I don’t believe we’re doing very well. I know you’ve indicated

some effort to do that, but still this is, you know, a critical area

118

where we really need to be finding our best and brightest and best

solutions and sharing them.

Mr. GIBSON. Even among—just among all the different chemical

trade associations, there is a lot of communication among all the

different trades; even though distribution may differ from manufacturing, we work very closely together on these issues through the

ISACs and different initiatives.

Mr. DURBIN. Just to follow that, many of the guidelines we put

together were in conjunction with NACD and others so we try to

reach out there. As far as—I think you put your finger on a very

important role and something that we do need to be able to capture, the best practice, and make sure that we share this appropriately.

Again, just within our association and among the association,

issues around process safety or just safety has always been an area

where we’ve kept very robust networks of sharing, sharing best

practices.

We are now doing the same thing on the security level. We have

a security network. In fact, just last week in Washington we had

a 2-day meeting, which we had about 40 security directors from facilities around the country, and it is structured in such a way just

to put the issues on the table that they are having issues with, concerns, or, again, best practices, what are you guys doing about this.

And so in that regard we’re seeing a very robust communication

with our members.

I think we do need to look at how do we capture that and make

sure we get it out, you know, more broadly. All of the guidelines

that we’ve put together, even our Responsible Care Security Code,

is not something we keep insulated just to ourselves; it’s public, it’s

published, available to anyone out there who wants to use those

guidelines.

Ms. WITMER. Would you like me to address that or do you want

to go on? It’s really just an agreement statement with, you know,

the other two responders.

One thing that we do differently perhaps at PCIC, we have an

Internet-based ability for folks in the security network to talk to

each other if they have a particular issue that they’re dealing with.

Rather than having to come in physically to a meeting to talk

about it, we have set up two-way communication on the Internet

where they can discuss those sorts of issues as well.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Stephenson.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Just quickly, the Information Sharing and Coordination Centers [ISACs], that were set up for each of the 13 infrastructure elements are designed for this purpose, to share best

practices. These are public/private partnerships consisting of the

lead trade association and these Federal agencies responsible for a

given infrastructure.

So maybe there’s a little bit of confusion since DHS is new to this

responsibility, and coordination that isn’t working as well as it

should. DHS is taking charge of vulnerability assessments, but has

not fully addressed the information sharing aspects of the ISAC

function. So I think hopefully the Federal Government can encourage better sharing of information as well; it’s a role we need to fulfill.

119

Mr. MURPHY. Anything else? Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. I’m finished.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I’d like to have a sense of who handled

security before there was a terrorist threat. Who had the responsibility.

Mr. DURBIN. I’m sorry. Within the government? Within industry.

Mr. SHAYS. Walk me through it.

Mr. DURBIN. Well, again, security I think before September 11th

was certainly—it was dealt with at the company level, certainly

from a different paradigm, at least here in the United States.

I can tell you some of our larger corporations that are, you know,

multinational depending on where they’re located, certainly have

had to deal with the issue of terrorism, whether it’s in Ireland or

different parts of Africa or Indonesia or what have you. But I think

prior to September 11th, our security directors at our companies

were dealing more with the traditional break-ins, misuse of chemicals, and even just employee issues within the facilities.

Mr. SHAYS. So the EPA—was EPA the——

Mr. DURBIN. No, there was no specific government role over security of chemicals.

Mr. SHAYS. So they dealt with safety, they didn’t deal in any way

of maybe having a fence up or something like that? EPA wouldn’t

require that.

Mr. DURBIN. Not that it would have been required. It would have

been part of the risk management plans that the EPA program encouraged and helped develop to get the communication going from

the facility, the plant community and the local responders. I mean,

that discussion was then able to say what is necessary——

Mr. SHAYS. But it happened under the context of the EPA.

Ms. WITMER. It was more of safety, you know—as you know, a

lot of these facilities are on rail lines or in a community where

there are kids walking and so, you know, it was a safety issue.

Mr. SHAYS. So it was a security issue, but not from the standpoint of people intending bad things, but still security was handled

by EPA in that sense; correct.

Ms. WITMER. I would disagree that it was security, but that it

was more of safety.

Mr. STEPHENSON. The risk management plan was premised on

accidental releases, not intentional releases, but, again, they did

worst-case scenarios on an accidental release and that’s where the

information on putting millions at risk in certain situations came

from. Chemical facilities themselves came up with those worst-case

scenarios, it wasn’t EPA.

Mr. SHAYS. So basically it was silent to security—basically the

EPA and security was—and the consequence of a release was

whose responsibility? OSHA’s.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Well, OSHA set safety standards. Consequences of a release is part of what the risk management plans

were supposed to address. Again, that’s where the risk numbers

came from.

And let me correct something on the earlier panel, it wasn’t—the

chemical companies—and ACC can correct me if I’m wrong—did

look at things like wind direction, types of chemicals used, and

120

proximity to populated areas. This notion of a 360-degree pattern

isn’t exactly right from my understanding of what the risk management plans did and what the worst-case scenario estimates involved.

And also the one gentleman was right. The worst-case scenario

was from a single vat, whatever the largest toxic chemical that was

stored onsite. So your question about could a terrorist act be worse;

yes, if for example it targeted two vats, it would be worse than one.

Mr. SHAYS. I felt that it was such a simple question, that it

wasn’t a trick question. All he had to do was say yes, it would obviously be worse if there would be more.

But the bottom line is the worst-case scenario under the EPA

makes certain assumptions.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. And one of those assumptions was that it was going

to be, as you said, one vat.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. You could have a whole host of them, correct, under

a terrorist attack.

Mr. STEPHENSON. You could. You could. And the difference between the 4,000 number that the Department of Homeland Security quoted and the 7,000 from the risk management plans isn’t exactly clear.

Mr. SHAYS. Currently what.

Mr. STEPHENSON. DHS mentioned 4,000 high-risk facilities and

if you look at the risk management plans it has about 7,000 facilities affecting over 1,000 people, so I’m not sure what the 3,000 difference is.

You can get part way from the 15,000 facilities by eliminating

the ones that affect under 1,000 population. That’s a good share of

the 11,000 number. But then DHS said there were 4,000 facilities

that affect 1,000 or more; the risk management plans say there are

7,000 facilities that affect 1,000 or more. So I’m not clear what that

3,000 difference is.

Have I thoroughly confused you?

Mr. SHAYS. No. I mean, I was confused by the comments earlier.

I find that we try to understate the concern to not get people anxious, and in the process there’s not—I don’t have a constituent

right now who really believes there is a terrorist threat. Well, I am

overstating. We’ve minimized it to such an extent.

I mean, I wrote down while you were testifying, I wrote down

that basically I don’t feel people really believe there’s a threat. And

if they did believe there was a threat, they think the odds are so

low that it will impact them that they’re not concerned.

And I don’t feel any, you know, what’s said in rooms in Washington are the chemicals are the greatest vulnerability, they represent

the potential greatest harm, that they are the most tempting target, that their security is not all that great yet, and we know that

and from those who would intend to do harm, you know. But it’s

kind of like someone who swims in shark-infested waters. They get

out and say, listen, I did it, there’s no big problem here. But there

were still sharks there and you were fortunate you didn’t get

caught up in it.

121

I guess my point to all of you is that I’m just fascinated to know

when there is an attack on a chemical plant, what the industry is

going to say. I just don’t know what they’re going to say, because

we all know right now we’re very vulnerable. That’s the reality. We

are extraordinarily vulnerable.

Mr. DURBIN. If I could, Mr. Shays, that’s exactly why an organization like the American Chemistry Council said we think we’ve

gone out and we’re doing the right thing. Our members have set

very vigorous guidelines for themselves and they’re meeting their

own deadlines. But we know it’s not enough. We know we don’t

represent the entire community of concerned facilities, facilities

that would be of concern, and why we think that there does need

to be Federal legislation that would establish guidelines for everyone. We have been actively trying to get legislation enacted and

would be happy to work with you.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this: Do you do plume studies for

these various plants? Do you recommend that they do that? Was

it being done under EPA?

Let me back up a second. I still don’t know who deals with consequence. That’s what I don’t understand. Before there was the

concern of terrorism, who dealt with consequence?

Mr. DURBIN. Meaning if an incident were to occur?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, an accident.

Mr. DURBIN. Well, that’s something that the risk management

plans help to coordinate what would be the response at the local

level. I mean, I think what’s clear to say no matter where——

Mr. SHAYS. I guess I don’t have a sense of the sophistication of

the consequence management. Does it vary from State to State,

community to community.

Ms. WITMER. If there’s an incident in Pennsylvania, if there is an

accidental release in a facility or if there’s a distribution——

Mr. SHAYS. This talks to pre-September 11th.

Ms. WITMER. Right. Exactly.

If there was an incident involving hazardous material the primary State agency would be the Department of Environmental Protection because they’re responding to the incident from a cleanup—

a consequence—a cleanup perspective, as well as, you know, the

local first responders being the first ones on—I think that’s what

you’re getting at as the consequence.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s part of it. Were there pre-September 11th

automatic procedures that so many homes within a certain area

have to be evacuated and so on.

Ms. WITMER. It depends, you know, if it was a transportation-related incident or if it was at a facility, as well as, you know, what

the material was that was involved. And that was part of the risk

management plan that was developed by the facility.

Mr. SHAYS. So if it was a certain material there were just instantly guidelines that would—and were local communities apprised of those.

Ms. WITMER. Absolutely. A material safety data sheet for each of

the chemicals is provided to the local communities.

Mr. STEPHENSON. That’s one of the primary purposes of the risk

management plan is so that the first responders know what’s going

122

on in that chemical plant and know what could potentially happen

if there was an accidental release.

Mr. SHAYS. And that was under the auspices of the EPA.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Right. It existed for over a decade.

Mr. SHAYS. So what happens now if there is a terrorist attack?

Is EPA in the ball game.

Ms. WITMER. From—I think we’re talking about——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m talking consequence now.

Ms. WITMER. Right. Exactly. So we’re talking after the incident.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Ms. WITMER. And, of course, the EPA would have a role. And I

think what each of us said is that EPA does have a role and that

it’s from a consequence perspective but not from before the incident, from determining what the vulnerability is and from setting

guidelines and standards on what is appropriate from a security

standpoint. EPA, from my perspective with the Pennsylvania

Chemical Industry Council, would come in from a consequence

management role.

Mr. SHAYS. Wouldn’t their role be far more important than DHS

to deal with the consequences? What does DHS know and why

would we reinvent the wheel? I mean, who cares.

I mean, you know, if a building is on fire the fire department

comes out and puts the dang thing out. And whether or not it was,

you know, an arson or a natural cause, we deal with it the same

way. That’s kind of what I’m wrestling with right now.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Well, EPA does have an emergency response

capability to handle such things as the hazardous spill in the Baltimore Tunnel that happened less than a year ago, or anthrax in the

Capitol Complex, as you know.

However, I think the ACC witness said it best. There’s some

cross-agency issues here that all need to be coordinated. Transportation used to be Department of Transportation, now it’s Homeland

Security. So there’s a coordination function.

Mr. SHAYS. They moved that section over; correct.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. We’re not talking about that. They didn’t move EPA

into, you know, DHS.

Mr. STEPHENSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s still EPA.

Ms. WITMER. That’s why I think we need an agency to be the

oversight and coordinating agency because you have that many different agencies that have a role, but you need someone to be able

to be the director.

Mr. SHAYS. And who should that be.

Ms. WITMER. Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. SHAYS. Why, if it’s consequence.

Ms. WITMER. But there’s more than consequence involved in first

hopefully preventing and then mitigating an incident.

Ms. GIBSON. So much of this has been done at the local level in

the past, and that will continue. And you get into a terrorist attack, you have all these other issues coming in, law enforcement

will be there, it’s just a different scenario.

I think DHS, their role is at the prevention of all this to try to

assess the threats and figure out how to prevent them from hapVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:58 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94257.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
123

pening. And then as far as consequences I don’t think there’s a

whole lot of change from how it would have been anyway.

Mr. SHAYS. See, what I suspect is—and we’ve been along this,

but what I suspect is that there is a part of the chemical industry

that doesn’t want people to be alarmed by the various scenarios because some of the scenarios are quite frightening and so it doesn’t

want to push that.

What I am fearing is that we aren’t leveling with ourselves as

to what the consequence could be and so—and because we’re not

doing that, we’re leaving our constituency very vulnerable. That’s

what I feel.

Mr. DURBIN. But I think you raise that and that’s a separate

issue. I would agree with you there’s a lot of improvement that has

to take place in the way of information sharing, even at the level

of DHS trying to tell just the private sector and the different critical infrastructure sectors about what we should be prepared for.

I mean, this is an evolving role here that we don’t have it perfect

yet, and DHS gets certain intelligence information and they’re running through their own processes figuring out how much they can

tell us, how much they can’t, protecting sources and methods. And

then they find themselves getting into a situation where they say,

well, now we’ve cleansed so much information out of it, if we do

provide it to anybody it’s not of any use.

So, I mean, there’s no question there’s real challenges as far as

providing the right types of information out both to the public and

to the sectors themselves.

Mr. STEPHENSON. You know, there’s not a standard model here.

When you look at the other 13 infrastructure elements DHS does

not have the lead for all 13 of those. EPA still has the water

and——

Mr. SHAYS. Slow down. They don’t have the role for what.

Mr. STEPHENSON. DHS does not have the lead role, the lead Federal agency role for all 13 infrastructure elements. There’s not a

single model that applies. For example, EPA is still the lead for the

water infrastructure, Agriculture is still the lead for food security

and the likes. If you look at all those 13 infrastructure elements

that are set out in the administration’s Homeland Security Plan,

DHS doesn’t control them all.

So there are different models that work in different infrastructure segments. So, who the lead agency should be is maybe not a

simple answer, maybe it’s one that needs to be studied.

Mr. SHAYS. And there are 13 infrastructure areas.

Mr. STEPHENSON. There are, yeah, 13 stated in the President’s

Homeland Security Strategy.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEPHENSON. For example, power companies are a key.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, is there anything that the four of

you would like to respond to based on any question of the first

panel, just any information you need to correct or get out on the

table or you need to just agree with or disagree with.

Mr. STEPHENSON. The main thing I would reiterate is need for

Federal legislation requiring vulnerability assessments of the

chemical sector. There is a Federal requirement for most sectors,

124

but at this point such a requirement is curiously absent from this

sector.

Mr. SHAYS. And there is that consensus, then, agreed, which is

helpful. Thank you.

Mr. STEPHENSON. That’s our point of view.

Mr. MURPHY. Anybody else who wishes to add any comments for

the panel?

Ms. WITMER. Just one thing, and it’s sort of a minor point. I don’t

remember which of you had asked whether or not there were emergency evacuation plans in place, and, in fact, there are as part of

the risk management plans that companies have had to develop.

And those, as you had mentioned, regardless of whether it’s an accidental release or a terrorism-related incident, that emergency

management plan would kick in and, you know, people would be

evacuated.

Mr. SHAYS. See, the difference is before—can I go, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MURPHY. [Nods affirmatively.]

Mr. SHAYS. We did a review of Y–12 and their evacuation plan

and this is a nuclear—is it a processing site.

Mr. HALLORAN. Manufacturing.

Mr. SHAYS. Pardon me.

Mr. HALLORAN. Manufacturing.

Mr. SHAYS. Manufacturing.

But what was interesting is when they thought of it only in

terms of safety—when they thought of it in terms of terrorism,

those willing to go up in flames with it, it always was you had to

come in and you had to get out, and so the scenario was such that

they didn’t need as many people because even if someone got inside, they still had to get out and so they wouldn’t be able to take

the material and get away.

Well, you know, now with terrorism they don’t have to come in

and take away, they just have to come in, and they could come in

under sight; in other words, the assumption has totally changed

and we realized all these sites were vulnerable around the country.

In other words, someone willing to be a suicide bomber becomes

a whole different scenario. And so what I wonder about these plans

is if you have a circumstance now where you are basically saying

that you could have someone on the inside, you could have three

vats instead of one, you could have someone blow up a road. Then

your scenario is totally different, and I’m not struck by the fact

that we’re even coming close to dealing with evacuation plans

based on that.

I realize that, you know, we would want to put focus on the

plants that are most likely to be attacked, I mean, there’s some in

the countryside, there’s some—and I realize we’re going to be getting half of what we need to get done today to start paperwork and

things like that. I just wonder who’s dealing with it, and I don’t

feel anyone is really right now.

Mr. MURPHY. I’d like to thank all the witnesses from both panels

today for being here. You’ve helped us a great deal and we will attempt to report an understanding of the Federal Government’s role

in this.

125

I would think that if there’s any fear I have of what comes out

of these—well, two fears. One is overreaction and one is underreaction. Looking around the room I can’t put my eyes on anything in

this room that did not have some level of manufacturing impact by

the chemical industry, everything that is involved in our lives, and

we are dependent upon it. This is not an attack of the chemical industry, this is what we know and are responsible with the chemical

industries to be involved with changes.

My fear of other reaction is, and particularly in an election year,

that there will be so much politicization of these issues that some

people will say the threat is exaggerated.

I pulled up an article from the Internet regarding risk of chemical plants. This was published in 2000, and basically it was poohpoohing the whole idea that there have been terrorist attacks on

this country and we didn’t have to worry about that. What a naive

concept that was and I think we’re still involved with that.

I appreciate your candor and we don’t have any further questions

for this panel, but we have to get answers to these issues and continue to protect the American public.

Mr. SHAYS. And if I could also thank you for hosting this hearing. It was important, I think, for us to be out in the field, and I

do appreciate our panel very much. Thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Shays, Mr. Turner, for coming out

here to visit us.

Mr. SHAYS. And, Transcriber, you did it with a smile the whole

time.

Mr. MURPHY. This hearing is adjourned.

NOTE.—The General Accounting Office report entitled, ‘‘Homeland Security, Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical

Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown,’’

may be found in subcommittee files.]

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

126

127

128

129

130

Æ