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94–170 PDF 2004

AMERICA’S NEW WELCOME MAT: A LOOK AT THE

GOALS AND CHALLENGES OF THE US-VISIT

PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 4, 2004

Serial No. 108–154

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

——— ———

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on March 4, 2004 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Hutchinson, Asa, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security; and Maura Harty, Assistant

Secretary for Consular Affairs, Department of State ................................ 7

Plavin, David Z., president, Airports Council International-North America, representing Airports Council International-North America and

American Association of Airport Executives; Randel K. Johnson, vice

president for Labor, Immigration and Employee Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Jessica Vaughan, senior policy analyst, Center for

Immigration Studies ..................................................................................... 70

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 144

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 148

Davis, Chairman Tom Davis, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Virginia, prepared statement of .................................................... 4

Harty, Maura, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Department of

State, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 49

Hutchinson, Asa, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of .............. 10

Johnson, Randel K., vice president for Labor, Immigration and Employee

Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, prepared statement of .................. 86

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 152

Plavin, David Z., president, Airports Council International-North America, representing Airports Council International-North America and

American Association of Airport Executives, prepared statement of ....... 73

Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Maryland, prepared statement of .................................................. 153

Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 155

Vaughan, Jessica, senior policy analyst, Center for Immigration Studies,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 132

(1)

AMERICA’S NEW WELCOME MAT: A LOOK AT

THE GOALS AND CHALLENGES OF THE USVISIT PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis of Virginia

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis of Virginia, Schrock, Duncan, Turner, Maloney, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Van Hollen,

Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David Marin, deputy staff director and communications director; Drew Crocket, deputy communications director; David Young, counsel; John

Cuaderes, professional staff member; Jason Chung, legislative assistant; Teresa Austin, clerk; Brien Beattie, deputy clerk; Michael

Yeager, minority deputy chief counsel; Denise Wilson, minority professional staff member; Cecelia Morton, minority office manager;

and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good afternoon. A quorum being present,

the Committee on Government Reform will come to order.

We meet today to look into the implementation of the US-VISIT

program by the Department of Homeland Security. US-VISIT

stands for the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. When completed the program will track the entry

and exit of most non-immigrant visa holders who enter the United

States. At the outset it is important to acknowledge the scope of

this undertaking.

In 2003 there were over 427 million inspections at U.S. ports of

entry. Of these inspections, 62 percent involved people from other

countries. There are over 300 land, air, and seaports of entry in the

United States, from Dulles International Airport to the land crossing at Del Rio, TX.

The vast majority of these inspections, 79 percent, take place at

land border crossings. Unfortunately, it is at these crossings where

the constraints of space and time combine to place a potentially

dangerous burden on legitimate travelers to the United States.

Even though only 18 percent of all travelers seek entry at airports,

the interrelated nature of our domestic hub system creates special

problems for airports as well.

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At the same time, the implementation of US-VISIT thus far has

not resulted in significant waiting time increases for the traveling

public. Although these efforts have achieved some success and government agencies are enthusiastically looking for feedback in improving technology and management methods, US-VISIT faces immense challenges as additional consular posts, land border crossing

points, and exit points begin to collect biometric data.

Some would say the risks associated with these challenges suggest that this sort of nationwide integrated reform of our border

control system is too ambitious. But those people underestimate

the damage even one more terrorist event like September 11th

could cause our Nation. People want to do business here because

we provide a safe and stable commercial environment. Providing

and maintaining this environment is one of the most important

things this government can do.

Having said that, there are legitimate questions Congress should

ask about the planning, acquisition, and implementation of USVISIT. First, we would like an update on the effects of the Increment I implementation for entry at airports to date. Second, it

would be helpful to have a brief description of the acquisition strategy you have put in place. It would be helpful to understand how

DHS and the Department of State are working together to create

an integrated visa issuance and border verification system that

leverages all of the information gained at both the consulate and

border.

This committee is also interested in how both DHS and the State

Department are reaching out to domestic and foreign stakeholders.

Is DHS applying the lessons learned from the TSA baggage screening implementation as it plans for the exit function of the USVISIT program? How are DHS and State informing and educating

the foreign business community about US-VISIT?

The multitude of questions surrounding this implementation creates a nexus of issues that the Committee on Government Reform

is uniquely positioned to discuss. The need for the various related

agencies involved to not only cooperate but to allow their internal

data bases to talk to each other on a minute-by-minute basis worldwide marks a new standard for interagency collaboration. The effort to use next generation technologies in a real world environment is both laudable and worthy of study. Can DHS institute a

system that works today and will be flexible to change in the coming years? Is DHS’ acquisition plan and schedule reasonable and

realistic? Can government effect a nationwide integration while

truly exploring and identifying the best solution possible?

As the Nation anticipates the next phases of DHS’ US-VISIT program, we need to recognize that this new system is being implemented in a time when this Nation faces a continuing terrorist

threat. Today’s terrorists have decided to engage in asymmetrical

warfare by attacking our people and institutions instead of our

military. Simply following the old best practices model will not provide an effective defense of our homeland. As a Congress we have

to give our most talented Federal employees the authority to tear

down stovepipes and create a flexible, scaleable solution for tracking activity at our Nation’s borders. This is a monumental task,

and there is no room for error.

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We welcome today the Honorable Asa Hutchinson from the Department of Homeland Security and the Honorable Maura Harty

from the Department of State. We also have a second panel, which

I will introduce later. We believe all of these witnesses will provide

the committee with a diverse set of opinions and viewpoints, and

I very much look forward to today’s hearing.

I now yield to any other Members who wish to make opening

statements. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this hearing. I am

going to try to stay as long as I can, probably not the entire time.

I do want to say that on my way to Guantanamo this past weekend

we stopped in Miami and had the US-VISIT demonstrated to us.

At one level, it is very impressive, putting your finger up and then

a bunch of data is retrieved. We also saw foreign visitors who

seemed to be getting through fairly quickly. We noted, though, that

we were not at the height of the season when these foreign visitors

come. The time it took was more than we were told it would. Nevertheless, when you see all the information come up quickly, it encouraged us.

At the same time, obviously, it is the first time we have done this

kind of intrusive investigation of people as they come in. The first

thing that crossed my mind was that there would be visitors, particularly from Latin America or from Europe, who would find an

easier way to get where they wanted to get. Many of our visitors

come through the United States. I was concerned about that. My

other concern would be whether we are going to make at the ports

what we now have at the airports. We have not found a way to get

around the long lines. We know it is necessary to look closely at

people and at their luggage and everything they are carrying with

them. We know that perhaps technology will get us to the point

where that is done more efficiently and more quickly.

Now that we are doing an analog of that at the ports, I think

we have to be mindful of the concerns that we have had in our domestic airlines, and particularly when foreign visitors, who may be

precisely the kind of visitors we want to come to this country with

revenue from abroad and leaving here, may decide that we make

it so difficult that there are other ways to get where they are going

besides through the United States. At the same time, I am the first

to say that these folks coming from abroad are the ones we want

to look at more closely. So I do not envy those who have to come

up with a system that both keeps us secure and makes sure that

our enviable tourism and commerce proceeds as before. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Any other Members wish to make statements?

[No response.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If not, we will proceed to our first panel.

As you know, it is the rule of the committee that I have to swear

you in. Asa, let me just say welcome back to this committee. I will

tell you I feel a lot better about the reorganization at DHS with

Governor Ridge and having you there. We are very proud of the job

you are doing there. So, welcome back. Ms. Harty, thank you for

being with us as well.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. The record will reflect that both witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Asa, we will start with you.

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STATEMENTS OF ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR

BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND MAURA HARTY, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be

with you and other members of the committee. Thank you for your

leadership and partnership in this important effort. US-VISIT represents the greatest advance in border technology in three decades.

It is a historic achievement in which we, for the first time in history, can use a biometric ability to confirm the identity of those

traveling to our country with visas. The Department of Homeland

Security deployed the first increment of US-VISIT on time, within

budget, and has exceeded the mandate established by Congress.

We also met the challenge that was given to us by Secretary Ridge

to include biometrics ahead of schedule.

US-VISIT also delivers the ability to have security without sacrificing the flow of legitimate travel through our borders. US-VISIT

entry procedures are currently deployed at 115 airports and 14 seaports. As of today, almost 2 million foreign visitors have been processed under the new US-VISIT entry procedures with no measurable increase in wait times. And even more importantly, we have

prevented over 60 criminals from entering the country. Without the

biometric capabilities US-VISIT delivers, we would not have caught

these people.

We are currently meeting the deadline for exit as well. Our exit

procedures are based upon passenger departure information shared

with us by carriers. We match this information with the visa information and this allows us to identify visa overstays. We currently

have, let me emphasize, the biographic data that will allow us to

determine visa overstays. We want to be able to enhance this with

the biometric feature and we are testing this with various pilots,

one of them being at the Baltimore-Washington International Airport.

I think there is a PowerPoint presentation. But I want to explain

how US-VISIT works. The biographic and biometric information is

collected overseas at the visa issuing post and then verified at the

port of entry. And from the standpoint of customs and border protection, the example I am using is a visitor who has had their finger scanned and digital photo taken at an overseas post.

The visitor arrives at the inspection booth and provides their

travel documents, passport and visa to the officer. The officer

swipes the machine-readable part of the visa. The system immediately selects the correct files from the State Department’s data

base to display and this information is seen on the officer’s monitor. The officer asks the visitor to place first their left index finger

and then their right index finger on the finger scanner device that

captures their finger scans. The officer then takes a digital photograph of the visitor. While the officer continues the entry questioning, the finger scans are compared against a criminal and terrorist

watch list and the biographic and biometric data are matched

against the data captured by the State Department. This ensures

that the person entering the country is the same person who received a visa. In addition, the digital picture that was taken of the

8

visitor at the visa issuing post is displayed on the inspector’s

screen for visual comparison.

Of course, the biometric checking is only a tool that the officer

uses to determine admissibility, not the entire process. And this biometric check through the select watch list takes a matter of seconds.

When the system has completed its check, the officer sees a response that says either ‘‘No Hit’’ or ‘‘Hit.’’ If a ‘‘No Hit’’ is received,

the officer completes the interview, updates the screen with the duration of the visitor’s stay and, unless other questions arise, welcomes the visitor into the United States. The addition of biometrics

collected abroad and verified at the port of entry is one of the many

tools that Customs Border Protection Officers use to make their decision to admit a visitor into the country.

Mr. Chairman, since the US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, we have caught a fugitive who escaped from prison 20

years ago. We have caught and extradited a felon who was wanted

for manslaughter. We stopped a drug dealer who had entered our

country more than 60 times in the past 4 years using different

names and dates of birth. And just this Monday a woman attempted to enter through Puerto Rico and though there was a lookout for her in the Interagency Border Inspection System [IBIS], because she had a fairly common surname her biographic information

did not give us a match, but the US-VISIT biometric check allowed

officers to confirm that she was the same person wanted in New

Jersey for possession of stolen property. The US-VISIT biometric

match also tied her to an additional 17 aliases and 7 different

dates of birth. Her criminal history dates back to 1994 and includes

multiple arrests in New York for larceny, in Maryland for theft, an

arrest in New Jersey, I do not think I have covered all the States

yet, but it was a very significant arrest record. She, of course, has

been deported from the United States in 1998 and now is waiting

extradition. It is important to note that this serves as a deterrent

as the word goes out that we have this capability.

Another huge accomplishment is that we have published a privacy policy and Privacy Impact Statement. And we have, in response to the question, worked very closely with the State Department. I want to compliment my partner, Maura Harty, Assistant

Secretary at State, who has done such an outstanding job in developing this program in partnership with us. We also have worked

with the airlines and airports and those in the private sector.

But our job is not finished. We have submitted the 2004 spending plan. And as has been expressed, one of the concerns is what

are we going to do for the land borders. US-VISIT will apply to

visitors with visas crossing our land borders just like our air and

seaports. What is different from our air and seaports is that on the

land borders the US-VISIT process of finger scanning and digital

photo will be taken at the secondary inspection area and not primary. This is where visitors with visas go today so this is not a

change. What is new is that our visitors will have their identity

verified using US-VISIT procedures and this process will add up to

less than 15 seconds to the overall secondary inspection. Again, the

current process is for visitors with visas to go immediately to secVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:22 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94170.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ondary inspection, so US-VISIT is not adding any time to the primary process.

Our remaining issue is the 104 million Mexican citizens who are

holders of border crossing cards. Mr. Chairman, on the chart that

is over here you can see the breakdown by volume of those that are

crossing our land borders: U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents,

visa exempt, visa waiver, regular visa, and the Mexican border

crossing card of 104 million, totaling 440 million that come across

our land borders. We have not made any final decisions in this regard on the border crossing cards, but obviously this presents a

unique challenge to us that we will have to address.

We also intend to look at radio frequency [RF] technology to aid

in the processing of visitors across the land borders at the 50 busiest ports of entry and exit. We are optimistic that we can develop

a procedure at our land borders that is just as accommodating and

facilitating as what we have done at our air and seaports as well.

I want to thank again this committee for its partnership in this

endeavor. I look forward to answering questions. We are committed

to building this system that adds to our security and ultimately

will help us to facilitate those legitimate travelers into our country.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Harty.

Ms. HARTY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank

you very much for inviting me to testify before you today on the

role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs in implementing biometric

programs and U.S. visas and new passports. The inclusion of biometrics in international travel documents is an important step in

enhancing the security of our Nation’s borders.

The Department of State’s visa work abroad constitutes a vital

element in providing for our national border security. The consular

officers of the Foreign Service who adjudicate visas at our embassies and consulates abroad are truly our first line of defense.

Through them, our goal is to push the very borders of the United

States out as far from our shores as possible to stop a problematic

or a questionable traveler well before they reach our country.

The Border Security Act requires that no later than October 26

of this year the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas that

use biometric identifiers. To comply with this requirement, the

State Department began deployment of the Biometric Visa Program last September. I am pleased to report that more than 80

posts are currently enrolling fingerprints, and the program will be

in effect at all 212 visa-adjudicating posts by the October 26 deadline.

Under State’s Biometric Visa Program, our consular officers by

October 2004 will enroll applicants’ fingerprints with electronic

scanners as part of the visa application process. The scanner looks

like this. I would like to call to your attention several slides that

I have as well which demonstrate how we work in concert with our

colleagues at DHS in seven pilot posts and how it will work in the

future all around the world.

As we see in slide 1, the officer reviews biographic, address, and

contact information for the applicant along with other specific application data. I should note that this is only a small part of the

information that is available to an officer during the process.

The second slide demonstrates, and I realize it is much harder

to see than the copy I have in front of me, but the second slide

demonstrates how the officer marries up the applicant’s photo with

the finger biometric identifier he or she just in fact collected. I

think we are a little bit out of order here. But the second slide in

my presentation has both the photo and the fingerprints side-byside so one is matched against the other. That is the second slide.

In the third slide, which we just saw, the officer reviews the

IDENT check conducted on the applicant. In the case of this applicant, at this time there is no response from the IDENT record.

That means there is no print at all available through the IDENT

data base.

The fourth slide is what the consular officer sees upon receipt of

the results of the class name check for the applicant. In this example, there is a previous refusal under the same name. The officer

will now need to further examine this case to determine if the refusal actually pertains to the applicant in front of them or if it is

in fact simply someone with a similar or the same name. At this

point in the process there are naturally two ways to go. If the offiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:22 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94170.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cer decides to issue a visa, our non-immigrant visa system sends

the issued visa data including the applicant’s photo to DHS.

The fifth and final slide is the data at ports of entry, as currently

seen. It looks quite a bit like the first slide that Under Secretary

Hutchinson showed you. In the future, when a visa applicant arrives at a port of entry the US-VISIT system will use the fingerprint identification number to match the visa with the file in

IDENT and compare the visa holder’s fingerprints with those on

file. This one-to-one photo and fingerprint comparison will ensure

that the person presenting the visa at the port of entry is the same

person to whom the visa was issued abroad. If the applicant’s fingerprints do not match fingerprints provided by the FBI and the

IDENT data base we will not issue a visa until a consular officer

reviews the information regarding that individual. The point I

would really like to underscore here is that an IDENT hit overseas

will freeze the visa process until that hit is resolved. We are currently piloting the IDENT match program at seven overseas posts

and we will continue to add new posts as quickly as possible to

meet that October deadline.

The Border Security Act also established October 26, 2004, as the

date by which Visa Waiver Program countries must issue to their

nationals only machine-readable passports incorporating biometric

identifiers that comply with the standards established by ICAO.

ICAO’s decision to make facial recognition technology the standard

passport biometric was made in May 2003, leaving VWP countries

approximately 17 months to bring a biometric passport from design

to production, a process that normally takes several years. Although VWP country governments share a commitment to making

this change, and all are to varying degrees making progress toward

complying with the requirement, virtually all visa waiver countries

have indicated they will be unable to meet the deadline.

The legislative requirements of the Border Security Act which I

just described apply only to passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries, not the U.S. passport, which I firmly believe is the

most valuable travel document on the planet. Although our law

does not require of us what it requires of the VWP, we nevertheless

have a program that will produce the first biometric U.S. passports

using the ICAO standard of facial recognition by October of this

year. We hope to complete the transition to biometric passports by

the end of 2005.

The Department of State is working hand in hand with our colleagues and friends at the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that we together have a system that facilitates legitimate

international travelers and properly identifies those who pose a

threat to prevent them from entering the country. Our continued

commitment to ensuring the sanctity and security of our borders

and our Nation is our No. 1 priority. I would like to thank Under

Secretary Hutchinson and his team for the very collaborative effort

we have. And I am happy to answer any questions that you might

have this afternoon.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harty follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Ms. Harty, let me

start with you. Many delays in obtaining visas have a profound effect, obviously, on business and educational institutions here in the

United States. Members of the committee staff recently visited

China and learned about the Beijing embassy’s proposal for a 1-

year multi-entry visa for Chinese visitors. Can you tell me about

the status of this proposal. Any estimate when the decision might

be made?

Ms. HARTY. Sure. Absolutely. I thank you for the question, sir.

I think it is a good suggestion. One of the many changes in the

September 11th world is that we have a much more collaborative

interagency process on just such decisions. We received a cable

from the post spelling out what they would like to do. We applaud

it, and we are running it through the interagency process right now

and I think it is fair to say that we will have an answer fairly

quickly. I agree with you completely that facilitating legitimate

travel is important to all of us and we would like to see that done.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Also Ms. Harty, I understand October 26,

2004, is the implementation date for biometric-enabled travel documents for Visa Waiver countries as well as a U.S. intelligent passport system. It is going to be difficult to meet it. Any idea at this

point as to whether that deadline will need to be extended?

Ms. HARTY. Sir, what I can say about that is that it is a frightening prospect. If the visa waiver countries are held to the deadline

as the law currently requires, several things will happen. My job

is to implement the law, and so I will do that. However, one of the

consequences of so doing is that we will have an awful lot more

visa applicants to converse with than we have had in the recent

past. We estimate that there may be upwards of 51⁄2 to 8 million

additional visa applications that we would have to handle. Of

course, sir, it is a relatively short term problem as the visa waiver

countries begin to come on board with their biometrically enabled

passports. But in the short term, we would see a serious impact on

business travel, on academic institutions, on travel and tourism to

this country. We will do our very best to facilitate the travel of

those who are in emergency situation, those who have time-sensitive travel. But there will be a serious impact on the visa waiver

countries and on our abilities to provide services to them in the

short term.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thanks. Asa, last year GAO issued a report that characterized the US-VISIT program as a high risk endeavor. But the report was issued at a time when the US-VISIT

office was still in the process of staffing and setting up the office.

I know you are aware of the report. In the 5-months since that report was issued, can you give us an update on how the concerns

that were laid out have been addressed.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Absolutely. And the GAO report was really understandable because it is a risky endeavor when you are talking

about $330 million of the taxpayers’ money and a complicated system. But a couple of specific issues that they raised. One was the

very beginning stage of the program office that was not fully developed that would provide oversight. Jim Williams, who is with me,

who is the director of the program office, brings an extraordinary

amount of expertise. He has set up a team, established an office.

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They are very robust and are moving forward very aggressively. So

I think that concern has been met.

The second one was that there was not any broad-based oversight in terms of the different agencies that might be impacted.

That has been addressed. I am chairman of an advisory board and

we have met, and so that interagency oversight has been met as

well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you think the deadlines for US-VISIT

allow for enough time for implementation, or do you think you will

be asking for extensions, or is it just too early to say?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I believe that is something that we need to

continue our discussions with Congress on. Some of it is how robust

the interpretations of the requirements are and the expectations of

Congress. The 2004 spend plan that we presented, we can meet the

2004 deadline of integrating the data bases at the 50 busiest ports.

And then if you look at the 2005 solutions, some of it will be the

funding, how quickly we can move toward our solution. So I am optimistic that we can meet those deadlines that Congress has given

to us. But we would certainly welcome a continued discussion with

you and a partnership with you to make sure that we are going in

the same direction.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you made a passing

comment about the Mexican border crossing card. So let me followup on that if I could. What was the original intention of the administration with respect to the Mexican border crossing card?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, our intent was to fully satisfy the requirements of the congressional mandate for an entry/exit system

and to build a strong, robust system there. So it is a matter of designing it. There has not been any change in position, it is a matter

of developing the right process to handle those border crossing

cards.

Mr. TIERNEY. Maybe I need to phrase it differently. What is it

you expect the card to do, exactly?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you. The card, of course, there are 104

million of them already issued out there. They are used for frequent border crossers, they have fingerprints, they have a background check to a certain extent before those cards are issued. The

question is whether we are going to take their biometrics when

they come in. Obviously, that is difficult time-wise when you talk

about 104 million of them. So we are looking at the right way to

be able to track that, looking at radio frequency technology. One

consideration is, but no decision has been made, but one consideration is that they should simply be processed through but not entered into US-VISIT. Obviously, that is a logical thing to consider

because of the volume and the time it would take and potential for

clogging our borders if you did try to enroll biometrically all of the

border crossing cards. So we are still looking at that, the possibility

of exempting them from the US-VISIT enrollment requirement

when it is used as a crossing card. Now if it is used as a regular

long term visa, like a B–1 visa, then they would go into secondary

inspection and they would be enrolled in US-VISIT. So that is what

we are looking at. But, again, no final decision has been made.

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Mr. TIERNEY. And where are you in that? Are you slowing down

your process on that or delaying it a little bit?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. No, absolutely not. We are on schedule in this

regard and we expect the final decision to be made very quickly because we know it is of great concern to the border communities,

particularly. Looking at what is ahead, they need to know. So we

anticipate a decision very shortly.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you have no change in this process or no new

news that you want to give us with respect to this border crossing

card?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Not other than we are working very hard on

that and hope to be able to make a final decision very soon.

Mr. TIERNEY. So in a day or two we do not expect any news on

that issue from the administration?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would not necessarily count on that. Obviously, whenever you are making a very substantial policy change,

not change necessarily, but determining the direction as to how to

handle this that impacts so many communities, you have to check

with a lot in the interagency community, work with Congress on

that. And that is the process that we are going through right now.

Mr. TIERNEY. And what is your current recommendation with regard to it?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. My current recommendation? My recommendation would be that the border crossing cards when they are used

as the 72-hour permit, then they should be exempt from the enrollment in US-VISIT. That would be my current opinion. And then

whenever they are used as a regular visa, they should be referred

to secondary inspection for enrollment in US-VISIT.

Mr. TIERNEY. And what risks do we run in our security with respect to exempting on that short a period of time?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, if you continue to handle the border

crossing cards as they do now, you are not running any additional

risk, you are simply not adding the significant security capabilities

by having a biometric confirmation. Now, as we proceed and develop the US-VISIT more broadly and comprehensively, we want to

bring the border crossing cards completely into US-VISIT in the

right way. But it might be, again, radio frequency technology where

you would have an imbedded chip in the card that would be waived

just like an EZPass to a reader and that would come up for the inspector and that way you could travel almost up to 40 miles per

hour. I would not suggest that going through our ports of entry,

but the technology is capable of reading those type of cards through

radio frequency technology even at that speed.

Mr. TIERNEY. So, if you are going to exempt a class of people

there, you are going to exempt a good number of countries that are

listed, everything from Angola to Switzerland. Is that to say there

is no potential that anybody is going to have anybody from any one

of those countries be involved with terrorism, they do not need to

be checked, but every other country needs to be checked? I do not

get how that enhances our security or how it does not leave gaping

holes.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, first of all, this is a system that is not

a perfect system on day 1; you have phase I, phase II, phase III.

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Those are the directions that Congress gave us. And so it is not

going to be a perfect security on day 1; we build on it.

Second, the border crossing cards, you already have their fingerprint, you already have their check. They are not issued that card

unless we are satisfied they are not a terrorist. And so these frequent crossers are coming across for economic interests. So we are

not creating any security vulnerability if we make the decision to

exempt those.

In reference to other countries such as visa waiver, that is obviously something, again, that we continue to look at. But on day 1

of our system we are adding 36 million travelers into our airports

and seaports. That is a pretty big first mouthful. And then we see

how this needs to be expanded to cover other security gaps.

Mr. TIERNEY. I have more questions but I will wait, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized

for 5 minutes, Mr. Schrock.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me

thank both of you for testifying. Let me make a brief statement

and then I have a couple of questions. And I am sorry I was late.

Clearly, today’s testimony is going to be very beneficial to Congress and those of us charged with oversight of this incredibly important issue. The task set before all of us to protect our borders,

a national interest, while preventing unnecessary delays to our

flow of commence, trade, and tourism, is clearly a daunting task.

The efforts to date by all of those involved in the guidance and direction of the DHS is clearly to be commended.

I realize the US-VISIT program is in its infancy and expect we

will see it change and perform in due time as we realize future

benefits from the lessons we have learned through its implementation. I am convinced that the American people and the tourist population will remain security-minded and we will be tolerant and

patient as we experience growing pains as long as we maintain a

focus on efficiency and effectiveness and never become complacent

with this program. I say tolerant because I have gone through several airports in the last week and I really was and I really surprised myself.

I have a very deep concern and a personal stake in these efforts

because the district I represent in Hampton Roads, Virginia Beach,

and Norfolk has one of the largest commercial seaports, incredible

military facilities, and major tourist attractions, and international

airports. So I tell you, I pledge my support to whatever is necessary

to provide maximum security for our ports and borders, ports being

my No. 1 issue right now, while minimizing the obstacles to the

reasonable flow of tourists and trade at our ports, and I thank you

for what you are doing.

We understand that the statutory requirements have placed

DHS officers in Riyadh and Jeddah, where I have spent a lot of

time, to review visa adjudications and that more officers are coming. What value are these officers going to have to the visa adjudication process?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Those visa security officers were deployed to

Saudi Arabia in accordance with the mandate that Congress gave

us in the Homeland Security Act. The value that they add, and

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Congressman, I was there as well to see the kind of work that they

do, they review every visa application in Saudi Arabia. They check

directly with the law enforcement data bases, add a security perspective. And I think that is the specific value that the Homeland

Security visa security officers would add is a security perspective

to that issuance process. They are also engaged in training, coordination there on the ground, making recommendations on any policy

changes that need to be made.

As time goes on I think their role will change somewhat. Maura

and I have talked that eventually the consular offices should have

access to all the data bases that we check so they can do all the

checks there and then our visa security officers can look to having

more liaison with the law enforcement community there, adding intelligence value on the ground.

Mr. SCHROCK. Do you have enough of them there?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. We have enough there at the present time.

The problem is that a number of them are there TDY and we are

going to have to get permanent deployment there. But we do have

at the present time a sufficient number.

Mr. SCHROCK. Secretary Harty.

Ms. HARTY. Thank you, sir. I agree with Under Secretary Hutchinson completely in what he just said. I would like to add that I

also have been there and our colleagues at both State and DHS are

working very well together. We do look forward to the time, and

we are working very, very carefully and assiduously on data share

issues so that we can free up people from doing repetitive tasks.

If our systems talked to each other completely, they would be freed

up on the homeland security side to do a little bit more liaison, a

little bit more intelligence work, and that will greatly enhance the

level of play for one team and for both sets of things that need to

be done.

Mr. SCHROCK. Great. I fear that we could be setting ourselves up

for failure if the basics, such as the baseline data base, are not

among our first priorities. I know the law enforcement information

exchange program that is being piloted both in the district I represent and in the northwest is one such effort. Are we seeing some

nationally implemented efforts like this to share criminal information and build greater data bases? The concern I had right after

September 11 was that we had 47 Federal agencies doing intelligence and you would not talk to me, and you would not talk to

him, and I would not talk to anybody because we were giving up

power. I am just wondering if that is all coming together?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It is. That is probably as high a priority as we

have in the department is just to address the problem that you outlined. Both US-VISIT and our visa security officers are I think emblematic of some success in this area, particularly US-VISIT where

we have brought together the data bases so that our inspectors at

the entry points will have the same information that our consular

officers will have and that it will be almost instantaneous transfer.

We continue to buildupon that.

I will add that what we will bring in with the private sector contractor, the integrator of US-VISIT, what they will do is they will

help us to modernize and to integrate all of the different data

bases. That contract will go out this year. Last year the President

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asked for $400 million and our US-VISIT I think was funded at

$330 million. That difference makes a substantial impact on what

we can do in that area.

Mr. SCHROCK. Secretary Harty?

Ms. HARTY. Sir, I agree completely again with Under Secretary

Hutchinson. He mentioned Jim Williams’ name already. We have

a great partner and a great friend at State in Jim Williams. We

have done a lot together already. Just a little bit earlier during my

opening remarks I showed several slides that already show that

when a consular officer issued a visa this morning in, say, Buenos

Aires, within 5 minutes time the Consular Consolidated Data base

refreshes itself and shares that information with inspectors at

ports of entry. So that when that Argentine citizen travels to the

United States even later the same day the inspector at the port of

entry already has the photo and access to the same biographic information that we saw at the consular post overseas. That is a tremendous ability to spot and make sure that we do not see people

engaged in photo substitution of passports. It is a tremendous ability for the inspector at a port of entry to know what we knew and

to ask the appropriate questions to make sure there is not a gap

there.

Mr. SCHROCK. And that has happened since September 11, that

ability?

Ms. HARTY. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. SCHROCK. That ability to do that has happened since September 11?

Ms. HARTY. We introduced the data base ourselves in 1999 and

we began rolling it out very, very slowly, regrettably, to legacy INS.

Post-September 11 that deployment speed increased very rapidly.

Mr. SCHROCK. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. The gentleman

from Maryland, Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding the hearing on this important issue.

Secretary Harty, I had a couple of questions. As you stated in

your testimony, I think our consulates are the front line in this effort of screening people for visa purposes. I think it is essential

that we have the right technology and information systems in place

so that we can compare visa applicants against data bases that we

have to determine whether they have a criminal background record

or any kind of profile that would lead us to be concerned of a potential terrorist activity. I think it is essential that the data bases be

coordinated so that we have common information and the most

comprehensive information.

I represent an area right next to the Nation’s Capital, a very diverse community. Once someone passes that test, in other words,

they have passed the computer check at the consular office, all the

information has gone through and they have confirmed that there

is no match with the data base, then the consular officer still has

to make a decision as to whether or not this person should be

granted a nonimmigrant visa. My concern is that in many cases

there are people who have legitimate reasons to come to the United

States, whether it is for education purposes, whether it is to visit

a sick family member, dying family members in many cases, who

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are being denied visas without being provided really any additional

information as to why they do not meet the test.

Right now, as I understand the test, the consular officer has to

determine whether or not they have sufficient ties to their country

that they live in, which is a very wide open test, and we want our

consular officers to have discretion. On the other hand, it seems to

me incumbent that we provide some of these people reasons that

they are being denied. Again, these are people who have met the

security check, OK, we have confirmed that there is no match. Because we have had literally hundreds of cases, in many cases people who want to visit dying relatives, who do have ties to their

country of origin, have no reason to want to stay in this country,

but they are being denied on a routine basis. And they have to pay

$100 every time, at least, something thereabouts. And many times

they pay $100 more than once and they are not really given in

many cases reasons by the consular officer as to why they are

being denied, so it makes it much more difficult for us to help them

provide the information.

My question is, how can we address that issue? I have lots of

cases here which I think anybody who is looking at the facts would

conclude that this person wanted to come to the United States for

legitimate reasons and yet they were denied a visa. So that is one

question. Then I have questions on the other end. It seems to me

we need to do more for people who are actually overstaying their

visas. But if you could address that one first.

Ms. HARTY. Sure. Thank you very much for the question. It goes

to the very heart of what we do. I agree with you completely and

with Secretary Powell who talks very regularly about the importance of balancing secure borders and open doors, and the importance on the open door side of that equation of recognizing that this

country prospers in countless numbers of ways when we in fact

allow legitimate travelers to come here, be they coming for tourism,

business travel, academic pursuits, or any other personal reason.

We need to bear in mind the travel and tourism industry, an $88

billion industry. One out of every seven civilian adults employed in

this country is employed by some facet of the travel and tourism

industry. We are not unaware of those things.

What we are aware of as we do our jobs as consular officers overseas, as I have done for many years myself, is the great privilege

of representing our country overseas and of being able to delve into

the society to which we have been assigned, so that we speak the

language, we read the newspapers, we understand the economics,

we understand very well from our friends in the Department of

Homeland Security the overstay rate of people from the country

that we are assigned to. We do a balance that allows us to take

into account everything we know about that country and then ask

very specific individual questions to the person in front of us.

It is awfully sad sometimes, sir, you are absolutely right, if someone comes up and says that they have a dying relative. The last

thing in the world we want to do is impose an additional hardship

on them. Having said that, though, sometimes it is not always exactly what it seems to be, both on the side of what the applicant

might tell us about why they are coming as well as when the applicant says they were not necessarily told what the reason for their

65

denial was. In a country, say, with a 47 percent unemployment

rate, a young applicant who wants to go to the United States who

does not have a job in his own country does not necessarily look

to us like somebody who would come home again when they might

in fact seek employment in the United States.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I do not mean to interrupt you but my time

will expire soon. Clearly, the individual that you were just describing is somebody who you can understand why someone would make

a judgment that maybe they would be a risk to stay in the United

States. I am not going to go over all the cases, maybe we can go

over them some individually.

Ms. HARTY. Sure.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. But we are talking about someone from India,

a woman who is a member of all Indian University badminton

champion, in 1991 she was admitted to George Washington University School of Business and Public Management, she was admitted

to the special program, her father has agreed to pay for her entire

stay in the United States, the family has lots of assets in India,

and there is no clear reason why this woman was denied. Maybe

in some cases you are saying they do not provide the individual

with the reason. But sometimes our office asks for a reason and we

do not get an explanation.

So, clearly, there are many cases where their judgment is absolutely right. But it seems to me there has to be a process where

in those cases where the facts suggests there are good reasons to

come here, a dying family member or something—when I talk to

somebody who works at NIH who has a family member who is

dying and lives in the neighborhood and I know and they just want

their brother who is 75 years old to come visit them before they die

and they are denied a visa, it seems to me there has to be a mechanism for dealing with this at the staff-to-staff level rather than it

having to get elevated up to a Member of Congress intervening.

My concern is we are not focusing enough of our efforts on people

who are overstaying their visas. Part of this VISIT program has

this exit provision, which right now is a voluntary program I believe at two airports, including BWI. Really, we should be going

after those people who are abusing the visas by overstaying. We

are giving a lot less attention to that while at the same time it

seems to me a lot of people who want to come here legitimately are

being left out.

I guess my time has expired; maybe there will be another round.

But I really would like to pursue this because we really get lots of

cases, Mr. Chairman. We do not pursue every one but we want to

pursue those that the facts suggest that the individual has not

really been given full information as to why they have been denied

entry.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We get a lot of the same.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I know you do.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you. First, Under Secretary Hutchinson, former Congressmember, I have heard nothing but complimentary feedback from Baltimore-Washington International Airport. I represent Maryland’s Second Congressional District and

BWI is in that district. In the beginning with the TSA we had comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:22 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94170.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
66

plaints that our office had to deal with involving long lines. I think

one of the reasons for that is that TSA had a good program, they

cut the personnel and then all of a sudden the lines increased. But

we changed that.

As it relates to the US-VISIT program, I am going to ask you

some questions because you will probably be gone but the next

panel has a member of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on it, so

I want to give you the opportunity to respond to what your experiences are at least at BWI, which is what I know about. But I think

the Department of Homeland Security and the BWI have been

working very, very closely on the exit program and it has worked

very well. It is a pilot program and I think BWI is the only airport

right now that has the exit procedures and kiosks. Our office nor

BWI have received any complaints at all about the program. That

is incredible because you usually hear complaints about something

somewhere. I think one of the main reasons for this is that there

is a program developed called U.S. Helpers and these are individuals who are working in the international terminals to work with

these individuals. Because what they are really saying to the people when they are exiting is if you do not give us the information

when you are leaving you will not be able to come back again or

whatever, and that is working.

I have heard complaints, though, about long lines interfering

with business. International business is extremely important to us.

However, I would think that after September 11 and based on what

occurred, and our threat against terrorism, our national security,

that anyone coming into this country, as long as there are not an

inordinate amount of delays, would not have a problem of giving

a fingerprint and information off of their passport. It is so important for national security. I mean, we have Social Security Numbers and we have to have pictures on our drivers licenses. And

there are also a lot of waiver countries that are not affected. And

you are saying, was that fair? Well, bottom line, we have to rely

on our intelligence and our intelligence shows that we cannot take

care of everybody, everything, that we have to take care of our priorities.

So I am asking you to answer the question, which I anticipate

that the Chamber might be concerned about, of interfering with

business. That has not been the case at BWI airport, for whatever

reason. So if it works, I think do it someplace else or use that as

a model when we implement this program on a national basis.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Congressman. I want to compliment BWI, they have been a tremendous partner in assisting us

in testing the exit solution. We are very grateful. And you are

right, we made sure that we had personnel that was present to

help the foreign visitor to make sure they knew how to do it, to

assist them in that exit solution. We will be piloting that in other

places.

I know that the Chamber and others have expressed some concern about whether we are moving too quickly, how this is going

to impact business, particularly the land borders. I appreciate and

understand their concerns. In fact, we look forward to meeting with

them regularly on this. But, first of all, the history should help a

little bit. Those fears were there in reference to the airport solution

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and they did not materialize because we were committed to make

sure we did not clog business and we added that security value. We

have that same commitment for the land borders. We are going to

work with those communities and continue to work with the Chamber, who have been a very, very good partner.

What is very, very important is that, whether it is BWI airport,

that we have a communication with them, all the airports and the

airlines that are impacted, and now it is the communities and our

land borders that we need to listen to. Jim Williams will be going

down there next week and listening to them. We are going to have

that same kind of dialog and partnership as we go to phase II of

US-VISIT as we did at the airports.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are we going to use helpers at other airports, the same system?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Whenever there is a similar solution we will.

And we hope it will be a temporary thing until all of our travelers

get used to the requirements. But initially, yes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. My time is getting close and we have a

strict chairman here today, so I want to ask one question because

this is where I have received a lot of complaints and I am asking

your opinion on this.

I know that with respect to terrorists and Al-Qaeda that we have

to always give different looks as far as security and because AlQaeda is very patient and they do do surveillance. No question, we

know that and we have established that. At BWI Airport there was

a program, at least when we went to Code Orange, to 1 day just

stop all cars that are coming to the airport. Now I guarantee you

that many people will miss their flights because of that issue.

I am wondering whether, in your opinion, that type of tactic is

worth the result to really delay and to stop everybody coming into

BWI Airport without notice. I know we need to give different looks.

But that seems to be rather drastic from a commerce and a business point of view to just do that without warning and when there

is no intelligence information that there could be a problem there.

What is your opinion with respect to that?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Whenever we go to Orange, it is not designed

to stop business traffic and traffic at the airport, it is just designed

to add a security measure. So we want to have——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But I am asking you specifically with regard to that tactic, do you feel that is justified?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It is justified with local airport influence on it.

I do not believe it is designed to be comprehensive where everybody

is stopped, but it is a rotating check, different checkpoints as they

go in. Some airports have it more comprehensive than others. So

there is a specific mandate that we give, but there is some local

flexibility on it based upon their own security and the makeup of

their airport. I would be happy to look at that and get you a more

specific response.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes. I would like you to look at that and

get back, because we do get a lot of complaints about that procedure when it occurred on those occasions. Could you get back to me

on that?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I will be happy to.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Ms. Watson.

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Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary

Hutchinson. I for many years represented LAX and I understand

on September 11 LAX was a designation as a target, too. So we

have been very concerned about security. As I was reading through

the tons of information that has been prepared for us, do I understand that the US-VISIT program exempts the Canadian border?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Anybody who comes across the Canadian border with a visa will be treated the same as if they come across the

Mexican border with a visa or into our airports. But the fact is that

Canadian citizens do not require a visa to come into the United

States, so they will not be impacted the same way because they are

not visa travelers.

Ms. WATSON. What concerns me as you follow the dots, it appears that there has been a lot of activity and a lot of crossing coming from the Northwestern part of the United States. And if somebody were a part of a conspiracy to do us harm, that would be the

route they would want to come. I just want to mention that.

Historically, our country’s information system for tracking visitors has really I would say been quite a failure. We have heard

again and again in hearings in this committee and in GAO reports

how our data bases for tracking visitors are full of data that is either outdated or just wrong. You are planning to add a lot of new

information into the existing data base. So how, I might have

missed it because I did come in late, how are we correcting and

how are we gathering data that is more updated, more accurate,

and, considering the requirements of the Privacy Act, what are we

doing differently so we will do a more effective job of tracing people

who come across our borders and who live among us and who also

could do us harm?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. First of all, of course, we are consolidating

data bases, making sure that we share information. But in reference to people who come across on a visa and overstay their visa,

we are doing a great deal to handle that information and not just

let it sit there. For example, in US-VISIT there is an exit capability

now that gives us information on people who do not abide by their

visas and leave on time. That information is referred over from USVISIT to our ICE Office of Compliance that will followup on those

leads. We are beefing up the staffing of that to handle that information. That is a voluminous task.

When you are looking at foreign students under the SEVIS program, there are thousands of referrals that come from the universities of students who are not showing up for class, who dropped

out, or some other anomaly, so we have to followup on that. USVISIT, if someone does not leave within the 30 days through the

airport, we can check that and that information is referred to us.

But we have had an average of 2,500 potential overstays each week

since US-VISIT has been implemented. Now, of those, it might

have been someone who left a week later. So it is not a viable lead,

they just left maybe 4 or 5 days after their 30 days expired. But

that is a referral we have to sort through. And so of the 2,500 per

week, only about 20 percent of those might actually be actionable

for leads that would be sent to the field. But an enormous amount

of work is involved in handling the information that is created. It

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is a challenge to us, but thank you for raising it because we are

working hard on it.

Ms. WATSON. Let me just comment by saying that when the

original bill came through the committee establishing this program,

I argued to leave the visas and the requests for passports and so

on to the State Department because the consulars are well trained,

I mean, they are tough. Out at my embassy, my consular, I mean,

even people that I thought would be safe bets, said no, because of

the training they receive. We do not necessarily have that training

and discernment. And I was concerned about where we placed

these particular procedures. And so I was not clear in listening, is

there a two-step process? When we start looking at the data, does

it go through the US-VISIT program and then to the State Department, the consular section in the State Department, or does it go

to the consular section and then back to US-VISIT? Can you explain that process to me.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I think there are two possibilities here. One,

of course, if a consular office issues a visa, then that happens first

and that information is transferred to Homeland Security so that

when they come in through the checkpoint we will have that same

information to confirm their identity. So is that an answer to your

question?

Ms. WATSON. And then it goes back to the consular section of

State?

Ms. HARTY. Well, the second half of that, of course, is if the Department of Homeland Security learns that somebody has overstayed a visa, that information is available to the State Department. So should the person apply for another visa later on, we

would be aware of that information, and that would have taken

place here. It is really mutual; whoever sees them first puts it in

the system, and this is a system that everyday is sharing more and

more information to the other. The most important thing we think

is that both consular officers overseas and Homeland Security officers at ports of entry have as much information as is available by

either of our agencies to make the best decisions possible.

Ms. WATSON. If someone answers my question, I am still a little

confused. I think the culprit in all of this is that we just did not

have adequate personnel, enough personnel to stay on these cases.

All of us are so reminded of the aftermath of September 11 and

those hijackers who received their clearance months and months

after September 11 occurred. So somebody dropped the ball.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am sorry to interrupt you.

Ms. WATSON. Go ahead.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. But I thought your first question, and maybe

you were going at that, is that in the State Department consular

offices when the visa is issued, do our visa security officers duplicate that work? We are trying to avoid that, obviously, and to compliment and give a security perspective. But that might have been

the direction of your question. But in every area the information

needs to be interchangeable in real time, and that is our objective.

Ms. WATSON. Yes. That is what I understood. But I think the

consular function should stay with State because they do have experienced workers. And if I could end by saying I know 175,000

persons would be involved would be created when we created the

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Department of Homeland Security. I hope that we have designated

enough people to track this information and keep it updated. That

is my concern. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. And I want to thank this

panel. We may have some additional questions in writing to followup on, if that would be OK with you. But I will dismiss this panel.

We will take a 2-minute recess as we set up the next panel. Let

me just note for the record that Representative Burton wanted to

be here today. He could not make it but I just want to note that

he has testimony for the record.

We will take about a 2-minute recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We are now ready for our second panel.

I want to thank you all for staying with us and for taking the time

from your busy schedules to appear. Our panel consists of Dr.

David Plavin, who is the president of Airports Council International-North America, who is here on behalf of the Airports

Council-North America and the American Association of Airport

Executives; Randel Johnson, vice president for Labor, Immigration

and Employee Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and Jessica

Vaughan, senior policy analyst for the Center for Immigration

Studies. It is our policy that we swear in our witnesses.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have some lights in front of you, when

it turns orange that means 4 minutes are up and you have 1

minute remaining. Your entire testimony is in the record, so it is

already part of the record. We have some questions we have already gleaned off that. But if you can try to keep it to 5 minutes,

the committee would appreciate that and then we can move on to

questions. Thank you again for being with us and for staying with

us.

Mr. Plavin, we will start with you and move right on down.

STATEMENTS OF DAVID Z. PLAVIN, PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS

COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL-NORTH AMERICA, REPRESENTING AIRPORTS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL-NORTH AMERICA

AND AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES;

RANDEL K. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT FOR LABOR, IMMIGRATION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, U.S. CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE; JESSICA VAUGHAN, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST,

CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES

Mr. PLAVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Thank you for holding this hearing. Today I am testifying

on behalf of ACI-North America, ACI-Worldwide, and the American

Association of Airport Executives.

We want to start by saying we fully support the goals of the program. We think it is long overdue. Airports have been arguing for

a long time that this is a program that clearly needs to be implemented. Second, I want to say that we really thank the Department of Homeland Security, Under Secretary Hutchinson, the USVISIT program, Jim Williams and his folks. The individual program has been implemented smoothly and without a lot of disruption.

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Now having said all of that, I think the other part of the issue

is that we need to take great care with the way in which we implement the program, expand the program, and look at it on an ongoing basis because its potential for damage to the economy is very

serious.

Let me start with the entry part of the program. Underlying patterns historically have had the immigration function inadequately

staffed at airports. Most airports report that, especially during the

peak seasons, lines are very long and people are waiting a long

time and sometimes still waiting on planes in order to get into the

arrivals hall. We think US-VISIT made the right decision in implementing their program in what is traditionally the very slowest

part of the travel season. We think that was a great, intelligent decision.

But if you put the two together, you can see why we have a concern about the problems that the existing clearance procedures will

exacerbate. New York, for example, reports that there are fully a

third more travelers during the summer season than during the

current season. Dulles Airport notes that today they might process

800 to 1,000 US-VISIT passengers per day but that during the

summer months that probably will exceed 2,000 people per day. If

we in fact extend this program to people who are now covered by

the Visa Waiver Program, we are talking about a multiplication of

that number that is very, very serious and we think will overwhelm the CBP and the airport resources.

In that context, I think it is very important that we have published standards as to how long we think it ought to take to process people. We do not have that now. In fact, we have moved away

from that over the years. And it is not possible for the Department

to fulfill the cost effectiveness requirement that you have included

in the authorization without having some form of performance

standard. There is no acceptance of the fact that there is a reasonable amount of time within which people ought to be cleared coming into the country.

There are a series of financial issues. We think that Congress

and DHS need to fully fund the US-VISIT program before the exit

portion of that is implemented. Our experience with TSA, for example, demonstrates the peril of forging ahead with inadequately conceived and funded solutions. The US-VISIT funding should cover

space and services used by the program at the airport.

Let me turn then to the exit elements of the VISIT program, especially the biometric dimension of it. It is a much more complicated program to implement than the entry program. Most important, the success of the exit process, that is to say, to do what

Congress intended it to do, will depend on the proper placement of

each process. Especially, the needs need to be based on the unique

physical and traffic characteristics at each airport, and they are

very different. That ought to require real and regular consultation

with each airport and its airline community. That is crucial to a

successful rollout. That was excellent at the beginning of the rollout process. We think it needs to be resumed. Test pilot programs

would make it even more effective. It would be critical to test a variety of technologies—kiosks, hand-held devices, and placements at

airports with different physical and traffic characteristics.

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The US-VISIT exit phase, unlike the entry phase, will insert an

entirely new process, equipment, and staff into airports where previously none existed. Unlike airports in the rest of the world, U.S.

airports have not been designed or built to accommodate passenger

controls on departures. Passenger flows and passenger mixes are

different at each airport. Space is already at a premium at these

airports.

Having said all of this, we think it is really important in almost

every case that US-VISIT focus on implementing their program at

the departure gates, not in the middle of the concourses where the

current experiments have them. We think that is the only way to

really be sure that passengers actually go through the process and

depart on the flight. It will also reduce the congestion. And because

of the confusion about exit procedures which will probably continue

for a period of time, the conversation we already heard today about

the border crossings, we would really hope that as we look at penalties for failure to comply we take into account the fact that there

are lots of holes in this system that are going to remain that way

for a while.

Finally, there have been a series of cumulative changes, all of

which I think individually have been for the better. But currently

what we have is a hodgepodge layering of security and clearance

procedures at airports that undermine efficiency, economic viability, customer service, and security itself in some cases. We hope

that we can develop a comprehensive approach to all of the DHS

programs, including some new facility guidelines on how to put together an airport and how to flow people through it.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. ACI

and AAAE and our member airports look forward to working closely with you and with DHS to enhance security and travel for the

public. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Plavin follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my primary

role here today is, frankly, to see that the interests of the border

communities in this country are represented as the big decisions

get made here in Washington. In this regard, let me just mention,

and in response to some of the questioning earlier, the lessons we

have at airports are interesting and they are important, and we

certainly share many of the concerns of the prior speaker, but the

land ports are an entirely different kettle of fish. It is like comparing a cruise liner on top of the ocean to the difficulties of exploring

the depths of the ocean.

I was on the Data Management Information Task Force. I was

privileged to visit many border communities and airports. You saw

those from Asa Hutchinson where 80 percent of crossings occur, almost 400 million a year, at the land borders. It is not just a question of statistics and numbers, however, it is a question of environment. The land borders are entirely different than airports. It is an

antiseptic environment versus one where it is dusty, harsh, a lot

of stress on border guards. We cannot extrapolate the lessons from

one and say that because it is working well at airports that we can

take those lessons and apply them to the land ports.

Mr. Chairman, my testimony is quite lengthy. I would just like

to ask that the members of the committee spend some time if they

have not already going through the input from all the various local

Chambers we have had. I can say that in my experience I have

never had such an overwhelming response for information when we

did a survey of the Chamber so quickly, ranging from Laredo to

Nogales, to Ote Mesa, to San Diego. I think just that response

shows the depth of the concern with US-VISIT and what may happen come December out there in the real world.

I want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that while, yes, the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce is concerned about profits and cents, but

when one visits these border communities it is not just a question

of keeping businesses alive, it is a question of keeping a way of life

alive, it is a question of keeping Americans employed. Because

when you have slowdowns at the borders and they last more than

a few days, Americans lose their jobs, and when Americans lose

their jobs, the economy goes downhill. I remember one occasion up

in Buffalo where people were close to having tears in their eyes

when they were talking about concerns about delays at the borders

and the fact that their children would have to move, schools would

close down because there would be no jobs. So it is not just dollars

and cents here, it is environment, it is the social weaving of a community.

Let me also mention that there is a natural skepticism among

Chambers at the borders. These people have dealt with the government for a long time. There is a sense that while we are hearing

some of these great things and, yes, it is working well at the airports so let’s roughly apply that to the land ports and see what

happens, we do not think there will be much of a slowdown, maybe

10 seconds here or there, people just do not believe that is the way

it is going to work out. They do not believe Washington is listening

to their concerns, and that is one reason that I am here. But they

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are asking that Congress closely follow this process, that DHS, before they implement anything in a massive way, do a series of pilot

projects to test these concepts so in fact there are not any delays

at the borders.

Now, we are going to be criticized I know for not being sensitive

to national security. But do not use that argument. I can say that

people who live at the borders, who consider themselves U.S. patriots as strong as anybody, just want to have a feeling that the government is listening to them, that there is a conscious sense of

what is at stake here, and that what the government is implementing will in fact promote national security. If they have that, I think

everyone is willing to pull the wagon. But they have to have a

sense of what is the purpose, what is the cost, and is it worthwhile.

And DHS needs to do a better job of selling the program.

Last, just as a technical matter, I should note that the statute

that created the Department of Homeland Security recognizes that

economic security—in fact, it is in the mission of the Secretary—

economic security is also important to this country and that we

have to keep speedy, efficient commerce moving at our borders.

That is also part of the Department’s mandate as decided by Congress.

Let me just close by saying I think we all know that in a political

year there are going to be attacks on this administration based on

it is too weak on security, perhaps too strong on security, I do not

know, it depends on what is the flavor of the day. But there is a

concern I think at the border communities and generally that the

Department will move too quickly because it will be afraid of these

kinds of attacks. We would just ask and hope that this debate, because the stakes are so high, can be accomplished in a nonpartisan

way.

Just in closing, we would just hope that the Congress carefully

follow what the Department does, and if in fact deadlines need to

be extended, that Congress will seriously consider doing so. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Vaughan, thanks for being here.

Ms. VAUGHAN. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and for

holding this hearing.

The US-VISIT program is one of the most important and ambitious immigration program enhancements ever undertaken. The attacks of September 11 were made possible in part due to failures

in our immigration system, specifically our temporary visitor program. Those terrorists, like others before them, obtained visas they

were not entitled to, successfully used altered documents, and they

overstayed their visas. The fact that US-VISIT will help prevent

the entry of terrorists is not the only reason it is worth doing.

When it is fully implemented, US-VISIT will also help ensure the

integrity of the nonimmigrant visa system as a whole by helping

us know that travelers are who we think they are and help ensure

that they leave when they are supposed to. It is also important to

remember that it can provide a service to legitimate travelers by

helping to ensure the safety of international travel and help us understand which visitors pose little risk so that their travel can be

facilitated.

At the moment we are operating a massive temporary entry system, admitting more than 190 million temporary visitors a year

with almost no information on the accuracy of our visa issuance

and admissions decisions—virtually no quality control. We do know

that today there are at least 10 million illegal immigrants living

in the United States, of whom DHS estimates that at least 30 percent of them, probably more, are visa overstayers. So, we have already made 3 to 4 million visa mistakes.

Not only do we not know exactly how many overstayers there

are, we have little idea where they came from, how long they have

been here, or what kind of visa they entered on. This dearth of information significantly handicaps our visa processing and inspections system. By collecting and analyzing information on departures under US-VISIT, immigration and consular officers will have

a much better sense of what kinds of applicants are more likely to

overstay and which kinds of applicants will be more likely to abide

by the terms of their visa. Then we can focus our resources on

screening the kinds of applicants who present the most risk and facilitate the processing for the others.

In addition to improving our screening of these applicants, the

US-VISIT program will also enhance enforcement efforts beyond

the port of entry. Interior enforcement is currently the weakest

link in our immigration system. A recent GAO report noted that

the current risk of an overstayer being identified and removed is

less than 2 percent. The data presented by US-VISIT will provide

information on both the problem groups and categories and also

generate leads on specific individuals. For the program to have a

meaningful impact on enforcement, however, it is necessary that it

generate real enforcement activity; in other words, some people

need to actually be sent home so that word gets around that overstayers will no longer escape the attention of authorities.

As we proceed with implementation of the program, it is important that decisions on the order in which different groups are to be

phased into enrollment reflect both feasibility and potential beneVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:22 Jul 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94170.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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fits to be gained from including them. US-VISIT will turn out to

be a huge waste of time and resources if we keep it limited in

scope. Right now, by enrolling only regular nonimmigrant visa

holders, the program covers only a small fraction of the number of

admissions, less than half the number who were covered under the

I–94 system which also included certain visitors from Mexico and

Canada. Unless US-VISIT begins enrolling more visitors, we actually will be worse off in terms of tracking than we were before. The

three main groups missing are Visa Waiver Program visitors, Mexican laser visa holders or the border crossing card people, and Canadians. All of these categories present their own risks for security

and compliance and therefore all must be included in US-VISIT

eventually.

I believe the strongest case can be made for enrolling Mexican

laser visa holders next. The southern land ports of entry system is

a notoriously loose sieve that is exploited by all kinds of illegal

aliens, including terrorists and criminals. Mexicans represent the

largest number of illegal aliens in the country, about 70 percent,

and probably about one-third of all of the overstays. Today the border crossing cards are being abused with near impunity. They are

one of the most frequently counterfeited U.S. documents and even

the genuine documents are used fraudulently. In fact, they are

openly available for rent in the street markets of Juarez and other

cities. We cannot expect this laxity toward fraud and deceit will be

overlooked by terrorists any more than it is overlooked by other

prospective illegal immigrants.

At somewhere between 5 and 8 million people, the population of

laser visa holders is more manageable than either the regular NIV

or visa waiver cohorts. And the documents are already biometric

and machine-readable. This is something that we initiated years

ago at considerable effort and expense but have yet to begin to utilize. Currently, the cards are being swiped very inconsistently, perhaps only half of the time. A large share of pedestrians are

checked, but hardly any traveling by car are asked to even show

their cards.

Of course, we need to implement an exit system as well. But in

relation to other programs of this kind, again, the scale of the task

is manageable. If the State of New Jersey can figure out how to

collect money from 30 million people a month without them having

to get out of their car, we should be able to figure out how to swipe

out 5 to 8 million people a year without too much imposition.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Vaughan follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Schrock, do

you want to start the questioning.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being

here today. It is a fascinating subject, and as you may have heard

me say earlier, port security is a huge issue with me with the port

of Hampton Roads, a major commercial port, and the largest naval

facilities in the world. I go across that Hampton Roads bridge tunnel every week and think who is under there and what are they

getting ready to do. Call me paranoid, but if we are not careful,

something could happen.

Mr. Plavin, in your written statement you discussed the need for

DHS to involve airports early and intensively in designing the

basic building blocks of the existing process because this will be a

much greater challenge to the entry process. In your opinion, is

DHS making a reasonable effort to discover and incorporate this

information into its planning for the exit function?

Mr. PLAVIN. I think DHS has indicated very good faith in working with us over an extended period time. My suspicion is that they

have discovered that the exit process is much more difficult than

anybody had anticipated, particularly the question of implementing

the biometric capture as they actually check the departure pieces.

And part of the problem—what I think a lot of newcomers to the

airport business find out—is that each airport is different; they are

laid out differently, their traffic patterns, some people are originating at the airport, some are connecting through the airport, some

are English speakers, some are not English speakers. That makes

the process of automating the process of capturing the exit data

very much more difficult.

So I credit DHS with recognizing that this is a complex issue. I

think the next step in the process is to spend more time from the

bottom up, working at each airport, to try to design that process

which makes the most sense for that particular kind of facility.

Mr. SCHROCK. I was in four or five airports on Monday and I

looked at each one and there were no two that resemble each other.

I am sure that has to be part of the problem.

Mr. PLAVIN. Right.

Mr. SCHROCK. I went into one and it was like an outdoor garden—Augusta—nice little airport. But, my Lord, anything could be

lobed into the air or pushed into there or sent through a fence. I

think, boy oh boy, that is a disaster waiting to happen.

Mr. Johnson, in your testimony you implied that the US-VISIT

program should not be implemented at any land border before it

is fully tested in a real world environment. Has the Chamber articulated what kind of testing would satisfy this requirement?

Mr. JOHNSON. No. That is a fair question, Congressman. We can

certainly offer that to DHS and work with our local Chambers,

whether it is Nogales or whatever, and construct a pilot project like

that. I will say that in this regard, because I have seen some recent

announcements from DHS concerning testing of their program,

which on its face seemed like good news, the implication was that

the testing would be done in existing lanes at some of these borders; i.e., these existing lanes of crossing the border will be taken

off-line and therefore tested. Well, at the 50 largest land ports at

least, that would be a disaster. It has to be tested, and I know this

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is not an easy thing to do, but it has to be tested off-line under a

realistic environment, and we could certainly help DHS set that up.

Mr. SCHROCK. How could it be realistic, though, if it was off-line?

I am not being cynical, I am just trying to understand in my mind

how it would work.

Mr. JOHNSON. You would have to replicate the same kinds of

numbers of people at various times of the day and then see how

quickly the information can be processed, the fingerprints taken,

etc. I am not saying it would be cheap. This is an expensive process

and there is a lot at stake and there is really no room for error.

Mr. SCHROCK. September 11 was not cheap either.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, it certainly was not. Right.

Mr. SCHROCK. Ms. Vaughan, is it your opinion that the VISIT

program can have a positive impact on U.S. commercial and travel

sectors? And what benefits will be gained from a fully functioning

VISIT system? I am guessing there is not a problem now, but I am

wondering what your thoughts are on that.

Ms. VAUGHAN. I do think that business interests have something

to gain when we have safe, secure travel that makes an effort to

meet the needs of businesses through programs like pre-clearance,

trusted traveler, and so on, as long as we do not compromise security. I think industry, especially the travel industry, for example,

has the most to lose if another attack were ever to occur and if people begin to perceive that travel is unsafe.

Mr. SCHROCK. Yes. That was a huge problem after September 11.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is almost up so I will yield.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Just on the issue that I raised before, I will

give you the opportunity from the Chamber point of view, our experience at BWI Airport. It works very well. I think one of the reasons is the cooperation between the Homeland Security and the

airport and having the right personnel there. The personnel are

there to help and to assist individuals and individuals who do not

speak the language. So far, there have been no complaints from the

airlines or any of the people involved. I would think that is a good

program. I am wondering whether the position of the Chamber

would be to use that as a model to move forward.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well Congressman, we have not heard of complaints either. In fact, putting exit aside in which there are serious

concerns about when you exit and you do not receive a slip of paper

that says you exited properly, and then what happens when you

come back into the country and you are met by a border guard who

says, well, our records show you never exited the country and so

you are denied entry, putting that aside, you are right. But my

point earlier was that the airports are the airports and the land

borders are the land borders and they are apples and oranges. I

think it is dangerous to extrapolate too much from the success we

have had thus far in a low-traffic environment, as Congresswoman

Norton pointed out, and say it seems to be working well at BWI

and so let’s do it at Nogales, or Douglas, AZ, or Ote Mesa. They

are worlds apart. And I think to the extent that, Mr. Chairman,

this committee could hold a field hearing at some of the border

towns and visit with some of these people who deal with these realities, it would be very, very helpful.

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Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. They are not denying on reentry, just dealing with the issue as far as reentry is concerned. But I would think

even the people coming to the United States of America for business or for whatever reason would want to have a safe environment. That is an extremely important issue to what we are dealing

with. If, in fact, we have another terrorist attack using airplanes,

I do not know what it would do to the airline industry.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree, Congressman, let me clarify. The U.S.

Chamber of Commerce supported the creation of the Department of

Homeland Security. We key-voted the legislation in the House and

the Senate. But there is a need to also keep commerce moving in

this country and we need to try and seek a balance. And it is a

mandate in the Department of Homeland Security’s mission statement that it protect the national security of this country and the

economic security. So the Department is charged with looking at all

these factors and, in its wisdom, balancing them.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Like most programs in management, it

starts at the top. If you are holding people accountable for their

performance, you evaluate the issue and you provide the proper resources, which includes personnel, the program usually works.

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. Resources is a huge question here.

Mr. PLAVIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You may. Go ahead.

Mr. PLAVIN. I think I would like to add something as well. The

issue about the success of the program at BWI should, I think, be

understood in context. The program has been implemented on the

entry side at about 115 airports and seaports. But is the only place

where we have actually begun an experiment with how to capture

data biometrically on the exit process. Unfortunately, part of the

process is we really have no way of knowing how much of the exit

process we are capturing because of where that capture is being

placed. We do not know how many people are missing it. We do not

know how many people are departing without checking in with it.

So our point is, it may not be interfering with the process, it may

not be interfering with how people move through the system, but

we really do not have any way of knowing whether in fact it is

being effective in doing what it is designed to do.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are you familiar with the helper program

that is being used there?

Mr. PLAVIN. Yes, I am.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What is your opinion of that program?

Mr. PLAVIN. I think it is an excellent program. I think it has

worked well to help people who are baffled by it. But, again, what

we do not know is how many people are not really taking advantage of that process and in fact registering that they have left the

country. A concern that we have is that if we do not know the answer to that, then we will not know when people try to reenter

whether they are legitimate reentries or whether they have actually violated their visa in a prior stay.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Right. OK.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Plavin, let me start with

you. In your testimony, you note that DHS should plan to add significant numbers of staff at airports during peak travel periods in

order to avoid long lines and overcrowding facilities for all arriving

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travelers. Can you expand on this, and do you have any statistics

that would back this up at this point? You heard the testimony previously to this in terms of their expectation. Obviously, this is of

concern to the committee.

Mr. PLAVIN. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The history of this

goes back a long way and it goes back way before September 11

and way before the creation of the Department. For many, many

years, large airport ports of entry have experienced many times

during the peak season when their arrival halls are so overflowing

that you have had to keep all passengers on arriving aircraft because there was no room for them in the arrivals hall. We have

now added by the US-VISIT estimate, something like 10 or 15 seconds to each transaction on an arriving passenger in order to capture their fingerprint and their facial recognition profile. You add

that to the fact that we are talking about big arrivals halls processing maybe 4,000 or 5,000 passengers an hour today, sometimes

with success, sometimes without success.

So our concern is over two issues. One is to be sure that the

entry process is properly staffed, and also that we are not making

it worse by the addition of the biometric capture. We need the additional people to be sure that we are not making the wait so long

that we are discouraging people from coming to the country.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Johnson, in your written testimony,

you focus a great deal on the potential damage that can result from

improper implementation of the US-VISIT program. It is clear that

the U.S. border as it functions today is neither effective to secure

the Nation nor to promote free movement. People sit in their car

and they wait in line for a long time. Further, visitors overstay

their visas with little or no concern that the government will ever

take notice of their violation. This is why DHS was created in the

first place. Do you think DHS even in its first year has been an

improvement over the mix of agencies that had jurisdiction over

the borders in the past? Do you have any opinion on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Obviously, there is that syndrome of trying

to create a new system while reorganizing the old one. But as you

well know, there were many, many complaints about INS prior to

the creation of DHS. It is hard to quantify it. I would say there

have been some improvements in that area. Considering the panoply of agencies that were absorbed, we have, I think, a more definite number of people we know who to go talk to to try and make

our views known. And there are some startup issues. But overall,

I think it has been an improvement but there is a long ways to go.

I would say that DHS has ramped up its outreach efforts to the

business community and I am sure others, which has been very

helpful to us of course.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Ms. Vaughan, in your written testimony you note that at the current time we are operating a massive

temporary entry system, admitting almost 190 million temporary

visitors every year, with almost no information as to the soundness

of our visa issuance and admission decisions. Do you see DHS moving in the right direction in their attempt to balance the needs of

security and commerce?

Ms. VAUGHAN. I do. I was actually thrilled to hear that DHS has

started to implement the arrival/departure information system, for

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example, which is a way of capturing the exit information for a lot

of the travelers without having to go biometric yet or having to figure out how to install a scanner for travelers leaving at every airport at every departure situation. So that we are at least capturing

some information and can start to learn which kinds of travelers

are the problems and, indeed, what the scale of the problem truly

is.

We have not had any kind of report on overstays other than a

guess at the total number of overstays in more than 10 years. So

now at least we can start to work with real information to try to

impose some quality control on our decisions. I think that not only

helps us get a grip on the overstay problem and enforcement, but

also benefits legitimate travelers because then we are not wasting

time scrutinizing people who may not need to be scrutinized so

closely.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You also state in your written testimony

that at this time the US-VISIT program does not intend to include

Mexican laser visa holders, and that since 2001, all border crossing

cards have included biometric features. In your opinion, could these

cards be adopted to serve the identification and authentication

functions of US-VISIT at the southern border?

Ms. VAUGHAN. Yes. It is hard for me understand why they have

not been yet. Part of the problem is that not every port of entry

has a scanner to read the cards. But as I said, we know that there

is a serious problem in misuse of the cards and even a small-scale

program to try to begin to get a handle on how the cards are being

used indicates that there is a problem. We are not sure exactly how

many cards exist, but it is somewhere between 4 and 8 million, we

think. And yet from the information provided today by DHS, there

is something like 104 million crossings with those cards, which, if

you do the math, tells you that every person is crossing every couple of days on one of these cards, which leads you to believe there

may be some misuse of them or every single person who has one

is coming up a lot, either doing quite a lot of business or perhaps

working or perhaps lending it to someone else.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Schrock.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was not going to ask

any questions, but based on the direction some of your questions

were going and Dutch Ruppersberger’s comment on BWI, in your

written statement, Mr. Plavin, you say that you ‘‘strongly urge USVISIT to design its exit procedures to be conducted at the airport

departure gates.’’ In the preliminary test at BWI, the exit kiosks

I think were placed at the TSA screening sites. Why would that not

be appropriate for other airports as well?

Mr. PLAVIN. My understanding of the BWI process is it is actually a little bit beyond the security gate, actually in the middle of

the concourse. I think there are two reasons. No. 1, if it is actually

integrated into the passenger screening process, it adds a significant amount of time to the line for everyone on the line. So that

is one of the reasons why I think the CB people decided to push

it back away from the security piece. But in doing so, either one

of those alternatives does not allow you to capture people who are

actually arriving at the airport on a connecting flight.

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Mr. SCHROCK. What kind of grief is it causing the TSA people at

BWI?

Mr. PLAVIN. In the way it was implemented at BWI, my understanding is that it has not really caused TSA very much grief because it is sufficiently far enough away from the security checkpoint that it does not represent an interference and US-VISIT has

added some people to assist people in the use of the kiosk.

Mr. SCHROCK. When you say placed near the TSA screening site,

it could be 50, 60, 100 feet away?

Mr. PLAVIN. Yes. Somewhere within 50, 60 feet. Right.

Mr. SCHROCK. OK. So it is not right there with that complex. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I want to thank

our panel. Let me just note, this will be the largest procurement

this new Department has put together. There is a very high expectation for it. We have stayed away from the intricacies of the procurement itself, but I want to make it clear we are going to continue to look very carefully at this as it moves through the process.

Your comments have been very helpful to that end. We appreciate

all of you taking the time to appear with us today.

I am going to keep the record open for a week to allow the witnesses to include any other information that may occur to them in

the record. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Dan Burton, Hon. Elijah E.

Cummings, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. C.A. Dutch

Ruppersberger, and Hon. Edolphus Towns and additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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