## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
NO. P D-0265-09

VICK IE LAS HUN TOLB ERT, App ellant

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS ON STA TE’ S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE F IF TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

DA LLA S CO UN TY H ERV EY , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t i n whic h K ELLER , P .J., M E YE RS , W OM ACK , K

E AS L E R and C OCH RAN , JJ., jo ine d. K ELLER , P .J., fi led a concurring opin ion. K EASLER , J., fi led a concurring opin ion. J OHN S ON , J., fi led a dis senting opi nion in w hich H O L C O MB , J., joined. H O L C O MB , J. , fil e d a di sse nt ing opi nio n in whic h J OHN S ON , J., joined. P RI CE , J., dissented . O P I N I O N The issue prese nted in this case is whether the trial cour

t was re quired to su a s

po nteinstruct th e ju r y o nth e le s s e r - in c lude d off e n s e o f mu r d e r in a p p e ll an t’ s c a

p it a l- mu r d e r p r o s e c u ti o n . We decide that the trial cour

t was not requir ed to su a s po nteprovide this jury

instruction. Appellant wa s char g ed with ca pital murder ( murder dur ing the course of a ro b bery ). The State prese nted evidenc e that supports a finding that appellant murdere d the victim, whom appellantTolbert-- 2

1 The c ourt of appe als dec ided that there is some evidenc e to support a f inding that a

ppellant is guilty only of murder

beca use this e vidence supports a finding that appellant did not decide to take the victim’s proper

ty until af ter she murder ed him. Se e Tolbe rt v . S tate , N o. 05 -0 7- 00 92 0- CR, sli p op . a t 8- 9 (T e x.Ap p. –D a lla s, July 16 , 2 00 8) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) ; se e als o Hal l v. S tate , 225 S.W .3d 524, 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007) (se tting out two-pa rt test for whe n a def

endant is entitled to h e r r e qu e ste d le sse r- inc lud e d- of fe ns e ins tr uc t i o n )

. W e d i d

n o t e xer c ise our d isc re tio na ry a uth or ity to review this decision. For pur

poses of this case , we will assume that there is some evide nce that would support a findingthat appellant is guilty only of murder

. 2 For ex ample, the State e x plained duringvoir dire that a ppellant would be guilty

only of mur de r if th e j u r

y d i d n o tb e l i e v e b e y o n d

a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b tt h a ta p p e l l an tm u r d e r e d

t h e v i c t im d u r i n g a r o b b e r y o r a t t e mp t e d

r o b b e r y. knew, dur ing the course of robbinghim. The evidenc e could also support a findingthat appellant did not decide to rob t he victim until after she murdere d him, which is not capital murder under Texas la w. See Iba nez v. Sta te , 749 S.W .2d 804, 807 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (a killing followed by unrelated taking of proper ty is not capital murder)

. Even though the parties had discussed seve ral 1 lesser- included off

ense sc enar ios suc h as murder and robber y during voir dire, appellant’ s theory 2 at trial wa s that the jury should a cquit her of the cha rg ed ca pital-murder

offe nse bec ause “ she didn’t do it” and she w as not g uilty of any thing. Appe llant also pointed the fing er at one of a ppellant’s acqua intances a s the one who murde red the victim. And appellant stated t hat she ha d “no objec tion” to the Court char g ing the jury only on capital murde r eve n in the fac e of the State’s re quest for “ a lesser inc luded and pa

rties,” whic h the trial cour t denied. [THE COURT] : The Court is goingto go on the rec ord for asce rtaining whether

there is any objection to the Court’s cha rg e in Ca use F07- 00762, sty led the State of Te x as ve rs us Vi c kie L a shun

To lbe rt

. [S TATE]: The only

thing, Your Honor, we wer e askingfor is a le sser include d and pa rt ie s. [TH E CO UR T]: T he Court wi ll o ve rr

ule the State ’s re qu e st.Tolbert-- 3

3 The re cord doe s not re fl ec t t h at appellant objec ted to the trial cour t’s response to this j ury note o r that appe llant reque sted any additional jury

instructions on the lesser- included off ense of murder. T hus, the rec ord appe ars to re flec t that it was sti ll appellant’ s strateg y to go f or an outrig ht acquittal af

ter the jury

sent out the note. What say s the defe nse? [DEFENSE]: No objection. Duringits deliberations, the jury sent out a note a s k i n g whether it should “consider lesse r included cha

rg es” if it believe d that the robbe ry “wa s an af

terthoug ht” and whe ther it made a differ ence “if the r obbery was an afte rthoug ht to a cr ime of passion.” The trial court r esponded that t h e j ury h ad“a l l t h e l aw an d

t h e e v i d en ce i nt h e c as e” an d t h at i t s h o u l d “r ef er t o t h e C o u rt ’s C h ar ge for the a nswers to y our questions and continue y our deliber ations.” The jury convicted a

ppellant 3 of ca pital murder, a

nd, with the State not having soug ht the death penalty , appellant was sentenc ed to life. On direc t appea l, appellant appa rently rethoug ht her “ all or nothing ” trial strateg y and claimed that the trial court should have su a s po nteins tr

uc te d th e jur

y on the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of murder . Appellant cla imed that “the trial court err ed in not submitting to the jury either be fore

argume nts on

g uil t inno c ence [ si c] began , o r whe n r e qu e ste d b y a no te fr om t

he jur y duri ngthe ir deliberations, an instruction on the lesser included offe nse of murder.” Appellant fur ther c laimed that the t otality of t he circumstance s of t his case require d the trial cour t to su a s po nte instruct the jury on the lesser -included of fense of murder

beca use “the jury

panel wa s voir dired on the le sser included off

ense, te stimony

was pre sented by

two of the witnesse s which supported a potential

ve r d i c to f t h e l e s s e r

i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , t h e S t a t e r e qu e s t e d t h e l e s s e r

i n c l u d e d o f fe ns e char g e, and the jury

in a note to the cour

t also reque sted instructions on the lesser inc luded offe nse.”Tolbert-- 4

4 Se e Bl uit t v. State, 137 S.W .3d 51, 53 (Tex.Cr.App. 2004) (a defe ndant’s stateme nt of “no objection” to er

roneous jury

char g e “sha ll be deeme d equivalent to a fa i l u re t o object” a nd the defe ndant “may

raise such unobjected- to [ jury ] charg e er

ror on a ppeal, but may

not obtain a re versa l for suc h err or unless it resulted in eg reg ious harm”)

.

5 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985) (op. on r eh’g ). The State re sponded that appe llant’s statement that she ha d “no objec tion” to the Court’s char g e estopped her from claiming that the trial court was re quired to su a s po nte instruct the jury

on the lesser -included of

fense of murder . The S t at e al t er natively claimed that no “ eg reg ious error ” resulted from the trial court’s failure to su a s po nteins tr

uc t th e jur

y on thi s le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e beca use appe llant adopted “a

n all or nothing posture by putting the jury to the elec tion of [convicting appellant] of ca

pital murder or an acquittal.” The State f urther a rgued that “the fac t that the jury ’s verdic t coupled with a jury note indicate A

pp el l an t ’s s t rateg y

backf ired is . . . not the trial cour t’s eg reg ious error .” Ba sed on this Court’s decision in Bluit t v . S tate , the court of appea ls decided that appellant stating that she had “ no objection” to the Court’s c harg e did not operate as a n estoppel, but was the

e qu iva le nt o f a fa ilure to ob je c t to the tr ia l c ourt ’s “ e rr or ” in n ot su a s po nteinstructing the jury on the lesser -included of

fense of murder

. Se e Tolbe rt , slip op. at 7-10. The c ourt of appe als reve rsed 4 and re manded f

or fur t h er p ro ce eding s after

finding that this unobjected-to jury char g e “e rror ” eg reg iously

harme d appellant under t his Court’s decision in Almanza v. State. Se e Tolbe rt , slip op. 5
at 7-10. We g rante d revie w of the following g round in the State’s petition for discre tionary revie w: Criminal jury char g es conta in “law a pplicable to the c ase,” and ofte n “def ensive issues.” To obtain re view on appe al, complai n t s i nvolving “ law applica ble to the c a se ” ne e d n ot b e pr e se rv e d at tr ia l but “ de fe ns ive iss ue s” mus t be pr e se rv e d. Di d the Fif th Court of Appea ls wrong ly hold that wher e a defe ndant s tates “no objection” to the proposed char g e and then c omplains on appea l about the omission of a lesser-Tolbert-- 5

6 Our de cision in Posey

was intende d “to di scoura g e parties from sandba g g ing or ly ing be hind the log ” and to discour ag e a de fenda nt from re t ry i n g the ca se on appe al under a new defe nsive theory , eff

ectively g iving the de fenda

nt “two bites at the a

pple.” See P osey , 966 S.W .2d at 63. included off

ense instruc tion, the Al

ma nz a sta nd ard a pp lie s? Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls’ op ini on a

pp e ars to a ssu

me that the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in no t su a s po nte i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r

y o nt h e l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r an d t h e na d dr e s s e d

w h e t h e r t h i s j u rychar g e “e rror ” eg reg iously harme d appellant unde r Al ma nz a af t er re j ecting the State’ s estoppel argument based on a

ppellant’s stateme nt that she had “no obje ction” to the jury char g e. This was

erro r. Be fo re ap p l yi n g Almanza’s eg reg ious-harm standa rd for unobjected- to jury

char g e er ror, the court of a ppeals should have first dec ided whethe r it was “err or” for t he trial c ourt not to su a s po nte instruct the jury

on the lesser -included of fense of murder

. Se e Po se yv . S tate , 966 S.W .2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998) (

Al ma nz a does not apply unless the appellate court first finds err or in the jury char g e). This require s a dete rmination of whethe r a jury instruction on the l esser -included of fense of murder was “applicable to the ca se.” See P osey , 96 6 S.W. 2d a t 62 (t ri a l c ourt ha s st a tut or

y duty to

su a s po nte submit a charg e setti ng forth the law “applica ble to the ca se.”) . I n Posey , th is C ourt he ld that a trial c ourt is not s t at u t o ri l y re q u i red to su a s po nteinstruct the jury

on a mistake of f

act “def ensive issu e” b ec ause a “de fensive issue” is not “applicable to the case ” unless the de fenda nt timely reque sts the issue or objects to the omission of the issue in the jury char g e. Se e id

. 6 The State a

rgues on discre tionary

revie w that appe llant should not be pe rmitted to pursue a strateg y , which in hindsight she may now reg ret, of “g oing for broke” in the t rial court hoping that the jur y wo uld a c qu it h e r o f c a

pit a l murd e r a

nd the n, wi th t

hat st rate g y havin g fa ile d, su c c e ssf

ull yTolbert-- 6

purs ue a qu ite dif fe re nt s tr a te g y

on a pp e a l “ wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt

ne ve r h a vin g [ha d] th e op po rt un ity to pass on the latter.” The State a rgues in its brief: I t is evident that Tolbert, af ter she le arne d the jury

had sent out a note indicating an in te r e s t in le s s e r - in c lu d e d o f f e n s e s , s im

p ly r e g r e tt e d h e r tr ia l s tr a te g y in g o ing for broke–in not joining the State in its reque st f or lesser- included offe nses and hoping the jury would not find capital murde r prove d and, ther eby , acquit her

. * * * But the w ay

Tolbert would have the law, a defe ndant could have one strate g y at trial that failed a

nd then springquite a diffe rent strateg y on appea l, wit h the trial cour t never having the opportunity

to pass on the latter, a

nd still preva il. This is the fo rb idd e n “ tw o b ite s at th e a pp le .” S uch an o pp or

tun ity wo uld se rv e on ly

to und er mine the integ rity

of the “ main event” of trial by encour ag ing imprope r g amesmanship– i.e. , s and

ba g g ingthe pr os e c uti on

and the tr ia l c ourt

–s o a s to ob ta in a wi nd fa ll o n a

pp e a l. (F ootnote and citation to re cord omitted). Th es e c o n s i d er at i o n s u n d er s co re o u r c as e- l aw s t at ing tha t lesser-inc luded instructions are like defe nsive iss u es an d t h at a tria l court is not statutorily require d to su a s

po nteinstruct the jury

on less e r - in c lude d offe nses bec ause the se issues “f reque ntly depend upon tr ial strateg y and tac tics.” See De lga do v . S

tate , 235 S.W .3d 244, 249-50 (Tex .Cr.App. 2007) (“ The trial judg e has a n absolute sua sp on te du ty

to p re pa re a jur y c ha rg e that a c c ur a te ly

se ts o ut t he law a pp lic a ble to t he sp e c if ic of fe ns e char g ed. But it doe s not ine vitably follow that he has a simil ar su a s

po nteduty

to instruct the jury

on all potential defe nsive issues, lesser included offe nses, or evidentiar y issues. These a

re issues that fr e qu e ntl y

de pe nd up on tr ia l strat egy and

ta c tic s. ” ) ( fo otn ote omi tte d) ; Posey , 966 S.W .2d at 62 (“de fensive issue” is not “applica ble to the case ” unless the def endant “ timely

reque sts the issue or ob je c ts to the omi ssi on

of the iss ue in t

he jur y c ha rg e ” ); Drue ry

v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 491, 512-13 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007) (Ke ller, P.J ., concur ri n g) (“ a lesser-included of fense instruction is a kind of d ef en s i v e i s s u e” ci t i n g Bu

fk in v . S tate , 207 S.W .3d 779, 782 n.10 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006), which c itedTolbert-- 7

7 Th is c a se pr e se nts the qu e sti on wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

wa s required

to su a s po nteinstruct the jury on the l esser -included offense of m urder

. This case does not prese nt the question and does not require us to decide whether the t rial cour t in its discretion may

have pr ovided this instruction. See ge ne ra lly Gr e yv . S tate , 29 8 S.W. 3d 64 4, 65 2 (T e x.Cr .App . 20 09 ) (H e rv e y , J., c on c ur ri ng ); Grey , 29 8 S. W.3 d at 65 2- 58 (C oc hr an, J., c on c ur ri ng ) ( dis c us sin g “ wh e n a tr ia l c ourt mu st

g ra nt a re qu e st by e ith e r the defe ns e or

State fo r a

le sse r- inc lud e d in str

uc tio n a nd wh e n it may

include such a

n instruction, with or without a reque st”) (e mphasis in origina l).

8 See 43 G EO R GE E. D IX & R O BERT O. D AW S ON , C R I MI NAL P RACT I CE AND P ROCE D U RE § 36.50 at 202 (Supp. 2006).

9 We believe that, unde r these c ircumstance s, appellant c annot rely on the State’s reque st for

“ a le sse r inc lud e d” to make an ins tr uc tio n o n th e le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e of mur de r “ a

pp lic a ble to the ca se.” Com

pa re W oe rn e r v . S

tate , 576 S.W .2d 85, 86 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) (de fenda nt preser ved err or in State’s jury argument by , in effe ct, expressly adopting the co- defe ndant’s objec tion to the argument). On this rec ord, t he S tate’s request for “a lesser included” does not remove this case f rom Cam pb e ll v . S tate , 614 S.W .2d 443, 445-46 (Te x .Cr.App. 1981)). I n Delgado , w e qu ote d w ith 7 approva l the following excerpt fr om the Dix and Da wson treatise on Criminal P rac tice and Procedur e: B e c a us e of the str a te g ic natur e of

the de c isi on , it is a

pp ro pr iate fo r t

he tr ia l c ourt

to defe r to the implied strateg ic dec isions of the parties by ref rainingfrom submitting lesser of fense instructions w ithout a party ’s reque st. I t is clea r that the def

ense ma y not claim err or succ essfully on appea l due to the omission of a lesser included offe nse if the de fense ref raine d from re q u est ing one . L ikewise, a ny err or in the imp ro pe r s ub mis sio n o f a le sse r inc lud e d ins tr

uc tio n is wa ive d if the de fe ns e fa ils to object to the instruction. 8 We, theref

ore, de cide that the tr ial court ha d no duty to su a s po nte i nstruct the jury

on the lesser- included off

ense of murder and that a jury instruction on this lesse r-include d offe nse was not “applica ble to the ca se” absent a reque st by the defense for i ts inclusion in the j ury char g e. That the State in t his c a se un su c c e ssf

ull y re qu e ste d “ a

le sse r i nc lud e d” did

no t make a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e instruction on murder “ applicable to th e ca s e. ” T he trial c ourt denied the State’s re quest, and appellant f

ailed to also make her desire for such an instruction known to the trial court. This was 9Tolbert-- 8

the g e ne ra l r

ule that a pp e lla nt w a s r e qu ir e d to re qu e st a n in str uc tio n o n mu

rd e r or ob

jec t to its omission i n the jury

char g e in orde r to make a jury instruction on t h at o ff

en s e “applicable to the case ,” re quiring the trial c o u rt to provide this instruction. See D elgado , 235 S.W .3d at 249-50; Posey , 966 S.W .2d at 62. We believe that the rec ord cle arly ref lects that appe llant had no desire for a jury instruction on the lesser- included offense of murder. This was her call to make as a matter of trial strateg y

and tac tics. S

e e D e lgado , 235 S.W .3d at 249 (whe ther to re quest lesser- includedof fe ns e ins tr

uc tio ns “ fr e qu e ntl y de pe nd on tr ia l str a te g y and tac tics ” ); Posey , 966 S.W .2d at 63 (strate g ic dec isions and decisions as to the def ensive theor

y of a c ase a

re g ener ally left to the lawy er and the c lient).

10 I n Grey , 298 S.W .3d at 654-55, Judge Coc hran wrote in her concur ring opinion: But sometimes neither

the State nor the de fense reque st an inst ru ct ion on a lesser

included off

ense e ven though the law a nd the evidenc e would cle arly support one. E ac h p ar t y

m ay i n v o k e a n“a l l o r n o t h i n g” s t ra t egy t h at p erm i t s i tt o fo re go instructions on a lesser- included offense, in eff ect forcing the jury

to choose be tween c on vic tio n o f t

he g re a te r o ff

e ns e or outr ig ht a c qu itt a l. Under this “ g ambling” or “par ty autonomy ” rationale , the par ticipants may

g amble, but they do so at their own pe ril. I f t h e d ef ense a nd prosec ution do not request an instruction on a lesser -included of fense , they

have w aived their

rig ht to complain on ap p ea l t h at t h e j u d ge w as re qu i re d t o gi v e o n e. An d , b ec au s e t h i s “a l l o r n o t h i n g” mod e l is a

va lid tr ia l strate g y , d e fe ns e c ouns e l is no t in e ff e c tiv e fo r d e c lin ingto reque st a lesser- included-of fense instruction. Id . (footnotes omitted). c on sis te nt w itha

pp e lla nt’ s “ a ll o r n oth ing ” st rat egy of go ingfo r a n o utr ig ht a c qu itt a l. T hat th is strateg y proved unsuc cessf

ul does not make a

lesser- included-o ff

ense instruc tion on murder “applica ble t o the case” requiring a decision that the t rial court was required to sua sponte provide thi s in str uc tio n th a t th e re c or d cle arl y re fl e c ts a pp e lla nt d id n ot w ant. Se e Ha y ne s v . S tate , 273 10 S.W .3d 183, 191 (Tex.Cr.App. 2008) (Johns on, J ., concur ring ) (“ Reg ardle ss of which side c hooses to ‘g o for br oke,’ it may

be a va lid strateg ic choic e fr om which neither side should be re scued.” ). There fore, t h ere was no jury -cha rg e “e rror ” to which Almanza’s e g re g iou s h arm ana ly sis wo uld apply

. See P osey , 966 S.W .2d at 61 ( Al ma nz a does not apply

unless the appe llate cour t first findsTolbert-- 9

11 We further

note that, ha d the trial cour t submit ted a lesse r-include d-off ense instruc tion on murder a nd had the jury

convicted a

ppellant of that off

ense, a ppellant could complain on a ppeal that the trial cour

t should not have submitted this jury instruction g iven appellant’s “all or nothing” trial strateg y . I t, the ref

ore, appea rs that appe llant could complain on appe al no matter w hat the trial c ourt did unless, of course , appellant’ s “all or nothing” strateg y resulted in the jury

acquitting her of

the g reater off

ense. O ur dec ision in Posey was mea nt to discourage t h i s t y

p e of ga mesmanship by requiringa par

ty to r equest inclusion of defe nsive-ty pe issues in the jury

char g e bef

ore that party

may complain on appe al abo u t t h ei r abse nce in the c harg e. See P osey , 966 S.W .2d at 63 (de cision inten d ed “t o d i s courag e par ties from sandba g g ing a

nd ly ing be hind the log” and to discoura g e a defe ndant from r etrying the case on appea l under a new de fe n sive theory , eff ectively g iving the defe ndant “two bites at the apple” ). err or in the jury

char g e). I t h as b ee n s u gges t ed t h at we s h o u l d re s cu e ap p el l an t fr o m h er u n s u cc es s fu l “a l l o r n o t h i n g”
tr ia l st rate g y by de c idi ngtha

t a jur y ins tr uc tio n o n the les se r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e of mur de r b e c a me

“ a pp lic a ble to t he c a se ” wh e n the State un su c c e ssf ull y re qu e ste d “a le sse r i nc lud e d. ” Ac c or din g to this arg ument, and with the assumption we have ma de that ther e is some evidenc e that would support

a f in d in g th a t a

p p e ll an t i s g u il ty

o n ly o f mu r d e r , th e tr ia l c o u rt w a s o b li g a te d to g r an t t h e St a te ’s reque st for “a

lesser inc luded” thus makinga jury instruction on the lesser-i n cl uded off ense of murder “ applicable to the case .” This ar g ument essentially is that a ppellant may rely

on the State’s

uns u cc es s fu l reque st for “a lesser inc luded” to make the lesser -included of fense of murder “applica ble to the case ” for

all purposes e ven thoug h the re cord c lear ly ref lects that appe llant did not want this instruction (at least until the jury convicted he r of c apital murder ). 11 We rejec t this arg ument. The issue in t h i s ca se is not whether the trial cour

t should have g rante d the State’s re quest for “ a lesser included.” T he issue in t his case is whe ther the tria l court had a duty

to su a s po nteinc lud e thi s ins tr

uc tio n in the jur

y c ha rg e . T he State ’s un su c c e ssf ul r e qu e st for “ a lesser

included” ha s no bear ing on this question.Tolbert-- 10

12 We note that our dec ision in Hayne s left open the question whether an appe llate cour

t may ref orm a judgme nt to ref

lect a convic tion for a lesse r-include d offe nse whe n “one of the par ties asked for but wa s denied” this lesser-includ ed -o ff en s e ins truction. We further note that ac ceptingthe argument that appellant c an re ly on the State’s unsucc essful re quest for “a le sser include d” to make it “applicable to [ this] cas e” woul d support a dec ision that the St ate c ould rely on a def endant’ s un su c c e ssf

ul r e qu e st f

or a le sse r- inc lud e d- of

fe ns e ins tr

uc tio n to pe rm it re fo rm a tio n wh e n the State
“ g oe s f or br ok e ” and

an a pp e llate c ourt

de c ide s th a t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a c o n v i c t i o nf

o r t h e g r e a t e r o f

f e n s e . T h i s ar g u a

b l y w o u l d b e i n c o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e o v e r r e a c h i n g - b ythe-State rationale in Hayne s and Colli er . See H

aynes , 273 S.W .3d at 185-86 (“ J udg e Mansf ield’s lead opinion in Colli er

wa s base d in lar ge par

t on the ratio na le that in

c a se s li ke thi s th e State
‘ o v e r r e a c h e s ’ o r

‘ g o e s f o r b r o ke’ b y

p u r s u in g a

tr ia l s tr a te g y

o f n o t r e qu e s ti n g a

le s s e r - in c lu d e d [- ]offense instruction to make it more likely it will obt ain a c onviction for the gr eate r offense that the evidenc e mig ht only

‘we akly ’ support. Ac cordingto this opi nion, if the jury then co n v i ct s the defe ndant of the g reater off ense, but a

n appellate court late r dec ides that the evide nce is insuffic ient to s up po rt

on e of its e le me nts , perm it ti ng the a pp e llate c ourt

to r e fo rm

the jud g me nt t o r e fl e c t a conviction for a supported-by -the-e vidence lesser- included offe nse would ‘re scue [the State] from a trial strateg y

that went awry .’”) (footnote a nd citation to authority

omitted). We further

note that a State’s unsucce ssful reque st f or a lesser -included- offe nse instruction g ener ally could not become “applica ble to the ca se” unle ss an appe llate cour t decide s t h at the

e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio n o n th e g re a te r of fe ns e (whic h h a s n ot o c c ur re d in thi s c a s e )

. T h e nt h e S t a t e ’ s u n s u c c e s s f u l r e qu e s tf

o r a l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

- o f

f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o nc ou ld become “applica

ble to the case ,” not f

or deter mining whether the trial court should have su a s po nte submitt ed this instruction, but for deter mining whe ther the tria l court’s judg ment can be re formed
to r e f le c t a c o n v ic ti o n f

o r an y r e qu e s te d le s s e r - in c lu d e d o f f e n s e s th a t th e e v id e n c e s u p ports. See Hayne s , 273 S.W .3d at 187 (a

ppellate c ourt ca

nnot refor m trial cour

t’ s ju d g me nt to reflec t conviction fo r unre qu e ste d le sse r- inc lud e d of fe ns e that wa s no t su

bmi tte d in

jur y c ha rg e ); Col lie r v . S

tate , 999 S.W .2d 779, 782-83 (Te x .Cr.App. 1999) (sa me). 12 We f urther note that our dec ision in Ste ph e ns v . S

tate , a l s o r e l yi n g o nt h e o v e r r e a c h i n g - b ythe-State rationale, did not permit the State to rely on a def endant’ s unsucce ssful reque st for a le sser-Tolbert-- 11

included-of

fense instruction on murder in r ejec ting the State’ s claim that double-jeopa rdy principles did not preve nt it from prosec uting the def endant f or murder afte r an a ppellate c ourt had de cided that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support the ag g ravating element of the def endant’ s conviction for capital murde r. Se e Ste

ph e ns v . S tate , 806 S.W .2d 81 2 , 8 1 7

- 18 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990) (r ejec ting State’ s claim that “since it did not oppose [t he defe ndant’s] r equest for a lesser included off

ense instruc tion,
t h at i ts h o u l d n o t b e p en al i z ed fo r t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fa i l u re t o i n cl u d e t h e l es s er o ff en s e i nt h e c h ar ge to t he jur y ” ); se e als o G ra nge r v . S

tate , 850 S.W .2d 513, 519-20 (Te x .Cr.App. 1993) (disting uishing Stephens on basis that this Court i n Stephens was “ca ref ul to point out repe atedly

. . . that at the orig inal trial, the State had chosen not to reque st a n instruction on the lesser inc luded offe nse of r ape. In other words, the State had, at the first t rial, fai led to pursue the lesser inc luded offense c harge afte r je op ar

dy ha d a tta ched to i t an d wa s, the re for e, fo re v e r b arre d from pr os e c uti ng it a ga in .”) (emphasis in original). In Stephens , th e St a te w a s n o t p e r mi tt e d to r e ly o nth e d e f

endant’ s

un su c c e ssf

ul r e qu e st for

a le sse r- inc lud e d- of

fe ns e ins tr

uc tio n to make thi s in str

uc tio n “ a pp lic a ble to the case .” The judgment of the court of appeals i s reve rsed, and the case i s remande d there for f urther proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion.

H e r v e y , J.

Deliver ed: Marc h 17, 2010 Pub lis h