United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-10527

Summary Calendar

In the Matter of Ray Douglas Griffith,

Debtor, 

Ray Douglas Griffith, 

Appellant, 

versus

Lone Star FLCA; Crystal Matulich, 

Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:21-CV-825

Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

This appeal arises from a property dispute between Ray Griffith and

Lone Star FLCA (“Lone Star”). Because Griffith waived exclusive use of the 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 30, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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disputed property and Lone Star sent foreclosure notices to Griffith’s last 

known address before the foreclosure sale, we AFFIRM.

I. Background

A. Lone Star’s Foreclosure & Sale of the Property

On December 8, 2005, Griffith borrowed $137,500 from Lone Star to 

purchase a property in Eastland County, Texas. The deed of trust that he 

signed provided: 

Unless otherwise required by law, any notice shall be 

given by delivering it or mailing it by first class mail to 

the appropriate party’s address on page 1 of this 

Security Instrument, or to any other address 

designated in writing. Notice to one grantor will be 

deemed notice to all grantors.

Griffin gave the following address in accordance with this provision: 5112 

Geddes Avenue, Ft. Worth, Texas (“the Geddes address”).

Griffith remarried in 2007 and moved into a house with his new wife 

at 2916 Sanguinet Street in Fort Worth, Texas (“the Sanguinet address”). 

By March 2014, he had officially changed his address in Lone Star’s system 

to reflect his move to the Sanguinet address. He made this request orally and 

Lone Star memorialized his request via an internal memo. In a 2016 letter, he 

communicated his desire to switch to online banking at Lone Star and noted 

that he wanted to continue receiving loan statements by mail; he signed the 

letter with the Sanguinet address.

Beginning in 2017, Griffith made “sporadic and untimely” payments 

to Lone Star, with his final payment coming in November 2018. Shortly 

thereafter, Lone Star labeled his account “chronic[ally] delinquent” and sent 

him four notices of default and acceleration letters to the Sanguinet address.

These notices were all mailed from May 2018 through March 2019. On April 

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3, 2019, Lone Star sent an additional notice of acceleration and informed 

Griffith of its intent to foreclose. 

Griffith ultimately separated from his wife in 2018 and moved back to 

the Geddes address. In 2018, he opened a PO Box in Fort Worth, Texas (“the 

PO Box”). He maintained the PO Box for business and personal affairs, 

including some correspondence with Lone Star. Following Lone Star’s note 

of foreclosure, he sent a text message to Lone Star, explaining that he is no 

longer receiving mail at the Sanguinet address. On the same day of his text 

exchange with Lone Star, he spoke to one of its representatives and 

“specifically requested that his notice address be changed to” the PO Box.

Lone Star memorialized this change of address request through its usual 

business processes.

From May 2019 to December 2019, Lone Star sent all correspondence 

to Griffith through the PO Box as he requested. This correspondence 

included numerous foreclosure notices in June 2019, November 2019, and 

December 2019. To avoid foreclosure on his property, Griffith filed for

bankruptcy under Chapter 13, which cancelled Lone Star’s pending 

foreclosure sale. He subsequently failed to file necessary documents, so the 

bankruptcy court dismissed his case on December 4, 2019. Lone Star 

promptly sent additional notices regarding its efforts to sell the property to 

the PO Box via first class and certified mail. Lone Star sold the property on 

January 7, 2020, to Crystal Matulich.

B. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings

On May 18, 2020, Griffith sued Lone Star and Matulich on multiple 

grounds. Only his wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract claims 

survived summary judgment. Both claims relied on Griffith’s allegation that 

Lone Star’s foreclosure sale was wrongful because “proper notice of the sale 

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was not given to” him. In response, Lone Star asserted that Griffith’s claims 

were “barred in whole or in part by estoppel and/or waiver.”

Ultimately, the bankruptcy court held in Lone Star’s favor. It relied 

on the following as evidence of Griffith’s waiver: (1) he explicitly requested 

a change of address to the PO Box; (2) he never raised any concerns about 

Lone Star sending notices to the incorrect address; and (3) he had actual 

knowledge that Lone Star sent multiple business and legal notices to the PO 

Box.Accordingly, the bankruptcy court concluded that Griffith expressly and 

impliedly waived the initial loan agreement’s requirement that Lone Star 

only send correspondence to the Geddes address. It additionally concluded 

that Lone Star complied with Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code by 

sending the foreclosure notice to Griffith’s last known address. Griffith 

timely appealed to the district court.

C. District Court Proceedings

In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court weighed the 

parties’ arguments and concluded that Griffith did little more than argue that 

“his view of the evidence is correct and that the bankruptcy court’s view is 

incorrect.” Relying on the clearly erroneous standard of review, it explained 

that “because the bankruptcy court’s finding that Mr. Griffith waived his 

contractual right is reasonable and supported by the evidence, the [district 

court] will not overturn the bankruptcy court.”

The district court also considered Griffith’s arguments that Lone Star 

failed to comply with Texas law when it sent foreclosure notices to the PO 

Box because that was not his “last known address.” First, Griffith asserted 

that his April 2019 texts with a Lone Star representative were a written 

request to change his last known address. The district court rejected this 

argument because Griffith “verbally and expressly” directed Lone Star to 

begin using the PO Box after the April 2019 texts. Second, Griffith argued 

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that the bankruptcy notice filed in his bankruptcy petition established the 

Geddes address as his last known address. The district court rejected this 

argument because it reasoned that the bankruptcy notice “could not be 

reasonably construed to be a notice of address change as contemplated by the 

Texas Property Code.” Moreover, it held that even it did qualify as notice, 

Griffith did not inform Lone Star of his desire to change his address “in a 

reasonable manner,” as the parties’ loan agreement and Texas law required.

The district court then affirmed the bankruptcy court in full and issued its 

order in favor of Lone Star. Griffith timely appealed.

On appeal, Griffith argues that the district court erred in: (1) adopting 

the bankruptcy court’s factual findings regarding his waiver; (2) affirming the 

bankruptcy court’s conclusion that he waived his right to receive any notice 

of foreclosure at the Geddes address; (3) adopting the bankruptcy court’s 

findings regarding his last known address; and (4) affirming the bankruptcy 

court’s conclusion regarding his last known address.

II. Standard of Review

“We review the decision of a district court sitting as an appellate court 

in a bankruptcy case by applying the same standards of review to the 

bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as applied by the 

district court.” In re Matter of Lopez, 897 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2018). “We 

review a bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact 

for clear error.” Id. 

“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence 

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm and 

definite conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Missionary 

Baptist Found. of Am., 712 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court 

has recognized that where “the district court’s account of the evidence is 

plausible in light of the record . . . [we] may not reverse it even though 

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convinced that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have 

weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 

564, 574 (1985). The Court has similarly held that “[w]here there are two 

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them 

cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id.

III. Discussion

A. Waiver

Texas law provides that the elements of waiver include: “‘(1) an 

existing right, benefit, or advantage held by a party; (2) the party’s actual 

knowledge of its existence; and (3) the party’s actual intent to relinquish the 

right, or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right.’” Thompson v. Bank 

of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ulico Cas. Co. 

v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008)). Waiver may also be 

evidenced by a party’s conduct if they purposely mislead “the opposite party 

into an honest belief that the waiver was intended or assented to.” Alford, 

Meroney & Co. v. Rower, 619 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1981); 

see also Tenneco Inv. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996) 

(“Silence or inaction, for so long a period as to show an intention to yield the 

known right, is . . . enough to prove waiver.”).

Griffith argues that the bankruptcy court erroneously held that he, 

expressly and/or impliedly, waived his right to receive Lone Star’s 

foreclosure notice at the Geddes address. He asserts that the bankruptcy 

court’s conclusion lacked a sufficient basis in the record, which amounts to 

clear error. He also contends that the district court similarly erred in 

affirming the bankruptcy court’s conclusions for the same reason. We 

disagree.

Here, the district court did not clearly err in adopting the 

bankruptcy’s court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law because they 

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were plausible in light of the record. Ultimately, Griffith makes the same 

request on appeal as he did at the district court: that a reviewing court 

construe the evidence in his favor instead of Lone Star’s. Put another way, 

he requests a third look at the underlying factual findings in search of a 

different result. Indeed, Griffith concedes that he has not appealed any legal 

conclusions reached within the bankruptcy and district court opinions. Our 

task then, is to discern what facts the district court adopted from the 

bankruptcy court and to evaluate whether those facts permit the conclusions 

drawn by the district court.

The bankruptcy court benefitted from observing the proceedings 

during the initial bench trial and weighing the precise facts that Griffith brings 

before this court now. It concluded that Griffith expressly and impliedly

waived usage of the Geddes address for Lone Star’s foreclosure notices. The 

district court adopted the bankruptcy court’s findings, satisfied that the 

record supported them and that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err.

Specifically, the district court noted that Griffith:

(1) “twice made an express change-of-address request 

to Lone Star verbally over the phone”; (2) “verbally 

and expressly asked [Lone Star] to send notices to Mr. 

Griffith’s [PO Box] rather than to the Geddes 

Address”; (3) “received the June 2019 Foreclosure 

Sale Notice at the [PO Box] and never raised any 

concerns to Lone Star that such notices should be sent 

to the Geddes Address instead”; (4) “received the 

November 2019 Foreclosure Sale Notice at the [PO 

Box] and never raised any concerns to Lone Star that 

such notices should be sent to the Geddes Address 

instead”; and (5) “never raised any concerns to Lone 

Star that [his monthly bank statements] should be sent 

to the Geddes Address instead [of his PO Box]).

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The district court also considered and rejected Griffith’s arguments that 

Lone Star proffered no facts to support its contention that he had actual 

knowledge that Lone Star sent foreclosure correspondence to the PO Box. 

On that point, the record indicates that Griffith regularly checked the PO Box 

and that Lone Star sent, by certified and first class mail, correspondence to 

that address both before and after the foreclosure sale was completed.

As the district court recognized, the record is replete with facts 

supporting that Griffith explicitly and impliedly waived exclusive use of the 

Geddes address. At best, he creates another plausible take on the evidence—

that, however, is not enough to demonstrate that the bankruptcy or district 

courts clearly erred. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Because these courts did 

not clearly err in finding or adopting the facts and conclusions of law that

support Griffith’s express or implicit waiver of the Geddes address, we 

affirm. In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., 712 F.2d at 209.

B. Griffith’s Last Known Address

Texas Property Code § 51.0021 covers debtors’ changes of address. It 

provides that “a debtor shall inform the mortgage servicer of the debt in a 

reasonable manner of any change of address of the debtor for purposes of 

providing notice to the debtor under [§] 51.002.” Section 51.0001 defines 

“last known address” and explains that:

the debtor’s last known address means . . . the 

debtor’s last known address as shown by the records 

of the mortgage servicer of the security instrument 

unless the debtor provided the current mortgage 

servicer a written change of address before the date the 

mortgage servicer mailed a notice required by [§]

51.002.

In its dealings with Griffith, Lone Star had to “give notice of 

sale . . . as required by the applicable law in effect at the time of the proposed 

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sale.” In giving notice of the foreclosure sale, Texas law required that Lone 

Star direct its notice to Griffith’s “last known address.” Tex. Prop. 

Code § 51.002(e). The bankruptcy court determined that Lone Star 

complied with Texas law in delivering Griffith’s notice to the PO Box 

because the record demonstrated that it was his last known address. The 

district court considered and adopted these facts and reached the same 

conclusion. Griffith contends that the district court erred in adopting the 

bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding his last 

known address. We disagree.

In support of his contentions, Griffith maintains the same theories as 

he did at the district court: (1) that Bauder v. Alegria, 480 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 

App.—Houston 2015) supports his position that his April 23, 2019 text 

message exchange with a Lone Star representative sufficed as notice of a 

change to the Geddes address under § 51.0021; and (2) that the bankruptcy 

notice in his bankruptcy petition establishes the Geddes address as his last 

known address. On the latter point, he argues that even if his April 2019 

phone call overrides his text messages from earlier that day, his bankruptcy 

notice came long after both events and established the Geddes address as his 

last known address. 

Here, Griffith’s arguments fail because he misapplies Bauder and the 

bankruptcy petition is not a notice of address change under § 51.0021. First, 

Griffith relies on a footnote in Bauderto argue that he followed Texas changeof-address law when he changed to the Geddes address during his April 2019

text with a Lone Star representative.1 However, as the district court 

1 See 480 S.W.3d at 97 n.7 (providing that “if [the debtor] had provided [the lender] a 

written change of address before the notices were sent, then the notices should have been 

sent to the address provided in writing, even if it differed from [the debtor’s] last known 

address as shown by [the lender’s] records”).

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explained, this “footnote supports the proposition that a debtor’s written 

instruction overrides any competing information in the mortgage servicer’s 

record at the time the written instruction was made. It does not, however, 

support the proposition that a written instruction also overrides a subsequent

change of address.” On April 23, 2019, Griffith texted Lone Star at 5:04 a.m. 

and requested to use the Geddes address for all correspondence moving 

forward. A few hours later, however, he called Lone Star and requested all 

correspondence be directed to the PO Box. Lone Star then circulated an 

internal memorandum reflecting Griffith’s second request and mailed 

relevant documents thereafter accordingly.

Second, Griffith argues that Lone Star had a “duty” to inspect his

2019 bankruptcy notice and update its records to reflect the address on the 

notice as his last known address. However, Griffith cites to no authority that 

supports his argument. Texas law explains that a debtor’slast known address 

comes from two sources: (1) “the debtor’s last known address as shown by 

the records of the mortgage servicer,” or (2) the debtor’s subsequent written 

request for the mortgage servicer to change the original address. Tex. 

Prop. Code § 51.0001. As previously discussed, Lone Star had the PO Box 

in its records, so the first option is foreclosed. So, that means that Griffith 

argues that the bankruptcy notice qualifies as a written request for Lone Star 

to change the original address. That position is untenable. As Texas law 

explains, change of address requests must be reasonably communicated and 

express in nature. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 51.0021, 51.0001. The 

bankruptcy notice was not sufficient to reasonably communicate his request 

for a change of address; nor did it evince Griffith’s intent for Lone Star to 

view the document in that light. As the record demonstrates, Griffith 

provided the bankruptcy notice to prevent Lone Star from selling the 

property. Nothing suggests that he used the bankruptcy notice to alert Lone 

Star about a new address. He argues that Lone Star should have made some 

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inference regarding his address from the bankruptcy petition, but that 

situation is precisely what the Texas Property Code seeks to prevent in 

requiring debtors to submit change of address requests in writing. See id.

Because the bankruptcy notice does not qualify as a written change of address 

request, we affirm. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court.

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