Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2959 | October 4, 2024 Page 1 of 12

I N T H E

Court of Appeals of Indiana

In the Matter of M.H. and Z.M. (Minor Children), Children 

in Need of Services,

and

T.M. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent

v. 

Indiana Department of Child Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner 

October 4, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-JC-2959

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

The Honorable Ryan Gardner, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D10-2306-JC-004609

49D10-2306-JC-004610
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2959 | October 4, 2024 Page 2 of 12

Opinion by Judge Felix

Judge Kenworthy and Senior Judge Riley concur.

Felix, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] T.M. (“Mother”) is the mother of M.H. and Z.W.1(collectively, the 

“Children”). After Mother was involved in a drunk driving accident that 

injured Z.W., a child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition was filed. The 

juvenile court set the factfinding hearing on that petition beyond the statutory 

60-day deadline over Mother’s objection. Mother now appeals, raising two 

issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single 

dispositive issue: Whether the juvenile court erred by sua sponte setting the 

factfinding hearing beyond the 60-day deadline imposed by Indiana Code 

section 31-34-11-1(a).

[2] Because we conclude the juvenile court erred when it set the factfinding hearing 

outside the statutory 60-day deadline, we reverse and remand with instructions 

to dismiss the CHINS petition without prejudice.

1 Z.W. is referred to as both “Z.W.” and “Z.M.” in the record. This opinion uses “Z.W.”
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] M.H. was born on July 1, 2010, and Z.W. was born on December 24, 2013. 

On April 29, 2023, Mother was driving a vehicle, in which Z.W. was a 

passenger, and was involved in a car accident. Z.W. suffered a laceration to the 

face, which required multiple stitches. Mother suffered a broken ankle. M.H. 

was in a different vehicle nearby and witnessed the accident. When Mother 

arrived at the hospital, she was found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.13. 

[4] On May 2, 2023, a family case manager (“FCM”) with the Indiana Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) interviewed Mother and the Children. Mother told 

the FCM that she drove under the influence of alcohol because Z.W.’s father 

did not pick up the Children as planned. Z.W. reported to the FCM that he 

had previously seen Mother drinking and smoking while she was driving and 

that she was drinking while driving before the accident occurred. 

[5] As a result of these events, on June 5, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging the 

Children were CHINS. At a hearing on June 28, 2023, Mother requested the 

juvenile court set a date for the factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition. 

Instead, the juvenile court set a pretrial conference for July 19, 2023. No 

factfinding hearing was set. On July 7, 2023, Mother filed a motion requesting, 

in part, a date for the factfinding hearing. Again, no factfinding hearing was 

set. 

[6] At the pretrial conference on July 19, 2023, DCS informed the juvenile court 

that it had set up DNA testing for both fathers to establish their paternity in the 
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Children, which was set to take place on August 1, 2023. However, DCS had 

not yet located M.H.’s father and stated that “if we can get in touch with him, 

we can ask for a continued initial hearing.” Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 5. After again 

confirming that Mother did not waive her right to have a factfinding hearing on 

the CHINS petition within 60 days of its filing,2the juvenile court stated, 

“Alright, I’ll find good cause to go beyond the sixty[.] I’ll do that over 

[Mother]’s objection. . . . It’s the best interest of judicial economy to address 

all matters at the same time, so I’ll go ahead and find good cause to go beyond 

the sixty.” Id. at 6. Thus, although the 60-day deadline to hold the factfinding 

hearing ended on August 4, 2023, the juvenile court set that hearing for 

September 20, 2023. 

[7] On August 4, 2023, pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(d), Mother 

filed a motion to dismiss the CHINS petition based on the juvenile court’s 

failure to hold a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition within the statutory 

60-day window. The juvenile court denied this motion the same day, 

explaining that it 

found good cause to go beyond the 60-day requirement (not the 

120) as [Z.W.’s father] appeared at the 6/28/23 hearing and 

requested appointed counsel; [Z.W.’s father] is scheduled to have 

a DNA test at DCS; [M.H.’s father] was previously scheduled for 

default; and it is in the best interest of judicial economy to 

2

See Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1(a).
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address all matters together. The Court has authority for good 

cause to go beyond the 60-day requirement. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 186. 

[8] The juvenile court scheduled the factfinding hearing for September 20, 2023, 

but DCS filed a motion to continue because one of its essential witnesses was 

not available on that date. The trial court granted that motion and reset the 

hearing for October 3, 2023. On October 3, the juvenile court held the 

factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition as to Mother and M.H.’s father.3 

M.H.’s father did not appear, so the juvenile court proceeded with the 

factfinding hearing as to Mother only and set a factfinding hearing as to M.H.’s 

father for October 18, 2023. At the October 18 hearing, the juvenile court 

adjudicated the Children to be CHINS and subsequently issued its written order 

to that effect. Mother now appeals.4

Discussion and Decision 

The Juvenile Court Erred by Sua Sponte Setting the Factfinding 

Hearing Beyond the 60-Day Deadline Without Good Cause

[9] Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by setting the factfinding 

hearing beyond the 60-day timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-

11-1(a). Under that subsection, upon the request of a party, a juvenile court 

3

Prior to this hearing, Z.W.’s father admitted that Z.W. was a CHINS.

4 Neither of the Children’s fathers join in this appeal.
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must dismiss a CHINS petition without prejudice if the juvenile court does not 

“complete a factfinding hearing” within 60 days of the CHINS petition being 

filed. I.C. § 31-34-11-1(a), (d). The juvenile court may extend this 60-day 

deadline “for an additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the 

additional time.” Id. § 31-34-11-1(b) (emphasis added). That is, the 60-day 

deadline “may be waived with the consent of both parties for any reason.” In re 

M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 283 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re J.R., 98 N.E.3d 652, 655 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). Although the parties can waive the deadlines set forth by 

Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, we do not allow these deadlines to be ignored 

because this would allow trial courts to “habitually set these matters outside the 

time frame and there would be no consequence whatsoever.” Id. (quoting In re 

J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655). 

[10] Mother argues that Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, Indiana Trial Rule 53.5, 

and our Supreme Court’s decision in In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279 (Ind. 2020), do

not allow the juvenile court to sua sponte set the factfinding hearing after the 

60-day window passed. Trial Rule 53.5 provides in relevant part: “Upon 

motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and 

shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other 

evidence.” (Emphases added). In M.S., our Supreme Court held that pursuant 

to Trial Rule 53.5, a juvenile court can exceed the 120-day deadline imposed by 

Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b) if a party (1) moves for a continuance and 

(2) shows “good cause” for why a continuance is necessary. 140 N.E.3d at 284 

(citing Ind. Trial Rule 53.5). Thereafter, in In re K.W., this court extended the 
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holding in M.S., concluding that pursuant to that decision and Trial Rule 53.5, 

a trial court has the authority to grant a party’s request for a continuance of a 

CHINS factfinding hearing for good cause. 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1208 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2021).

[11] None of the parties in this case requested the juvenile court set the factfinding 

hearing on the CHINS petition beyond the 60-day deadline. DCS argues that 

the following statement it made during the July 19 pretrial conference should be 

read as a motion to continue: 

We can’t find [M.H.’s father] as far as I know, we have a default 

date set for him in September, so, if he does appear, he has an 

appointment set up or if we can get in touch with him, we can 

ask for a continued initial hearing and he can be potentially 

assigned an attorney if he wants one, but for right now, he’s on 

the DNA list, if he chooses to come.

Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 5. Given the conditional language of this statement, we 

cannot agree that it was a request for the juvenile court to extend the 60-day 

deadline for the factfinding hearing. 

[12] DCS also argues that the juvenile court had the authority to exceed the 60-day 

deadline on its own motion. DCS contends that our decision in K.W., 178 

N.E.3d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), supports this argument because it “held that 

a trial court may order the continuance of a CHINS fact-finding hearing beyond 

the 60-day deadline upon a showing of good cause.” Appellee’s Br. at 10 

(citing K.W., 178 N.E.3d at 1208). In K.W., the juvenile court set the 

factfinding hearing within the statutory 60-day window, but upon DCS’s 
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motion, the juvenile court converted it to a pre-trial conference, and the father 

did not object to that change and did not appear at the hearing. Id. at 1204, 

1207. On appeal, the father did not include the transcript of the hearing at 

which DCS moved for a continuance, but the trial court’s order stated it found 

good cause to do so and it “appear[ed] that [the] trial court granted a 

continuance due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Father’s failure 

to appear for the August hearing, and Father’s request for new counsel.” Id. at 

1208. We ultimately determined that the father failed to show the trial court 

abused its discretion by granting DCS’s motion to continue the factfinding 

hearing beyond the 60-day deadline. Id. 

[13] Notably, the K.W. court was not faced with a sua sponte continuance. Rather, 

in that case, DCS filed a motion to convert the factfinding hearing into a 

pretrial conference and moved for a continuance at that conference. Id. at 1204, 

1207, 1208. Also, in K.W., the father caused at least some of the delay that 

resulted in DCS’s request for a continuance. Id. at 1208. Here, by contrast,

DCS did not request a continuance of the factfinding hearing, and Mother 

made multiple requests for a hearing date and objected to the juvenile court 

setting the factfinding hearing beyond the 60-day deadline. 

[14] The K.W. court also confronted the issue of whether the trial court could sua 

sponte extend the deadline to conduct a dispositional hearing pursuant to 

Indiana Code section 31-34-19-1. 178 N.E.3d at 1208–10. The father argued 

that the trial court did not have the authority to extend the dispositional 

deadline because M.S. only dealt with factfinding hearings, not dispositional 
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hearings. Id. at 1209. The K.W. court had no difficulty finding that T.R. 53.5 is

as applicable to dispositional hearings as it is to factfinding hearings. Id. at 

1209–10. 

[15] Additionally, similar to Mother’s argument here, the father in K.W. argued that 

the trial court could not sua sponte extend the dispositional hearing deadline. 

178 N.E.3d at 1209 n.2. In a footnote, the K.W. court found that the father’s 

argument failed because this court has previously held that a trial court may sua 

sponte grant a continuance for good cause, id. (quoting Farley v. Farley, 172 Ind. 

App. 120, 123, 359 N.E.2d 583, 585 (1977)), and because one of the three 

situations in which a continuance usually arises is when a trial court sua sponte 

orders one, id. (citing 22B Ind. Prac., Civil Trial Rule Handbook § 53.5:1). 

[16] Based on the holdings in K.W. and M.S., especially as they relate to Trial Rule

53.5, it is reasonable to conclude that a juvenile court may sua sponte extend 

the 60-day factfinding hearing deadline set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-

11-1(a). Importantly, the requirement still remains that such a sua sponte 

continuance must be supported by good cause, see M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 284 

(citing Ind. Trial Rule 53.5); K.W., 178 N.E.3d at 1210 (citing M.S., 140 N.E.3d 

at 284; T.R. 53.5). 

[17] We now must determine whether the juvenile court had good cause to sua 

sponte continue the factfinding hearing beyond the 60-day deadline. We review 

for an abuse of discretion a juvenile court’s determination of whether good 

cause existed for a continuance. See M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 285 (citing F.M. v. 
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N.B., 979 N.E.2d 1036, 1039–40 (Ind. Ct. App 2012)). “An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted 

the law.” Bruder v. Seneca Mortgage Servs., LLC, 188 N.E.3d 469, 471 (Ind. 2022)

(citing Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021)). Good cause for a 

continuance may exist where a party is ill, see Farley, 172 Ind. App. at 123, 359 

N.E.2d at 585; a party’s mental capacity needs to be assessed, see In re R.A.M.O., 

190 N.E.3d 385, 391–92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022); a party’s attorney has a medical 

emergency such that the party is without counsel, see id.; a witness is 

unavailable to testify, see id.; or the parties represent to the court that a 

settlement is likely, see In re K.T., 188 N.E.3d 479, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). 

[18] Here, the juvenile court’s good cause finding was based mainly on its desire for 

judicial economy.5 While it may be preferable to have one factfinding hearing 

for all parents involved in a CHINS proceeding, sometimes multiple hearings 

are unavoidable. See In re E.T., 152 N.E.3d 634, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)

(quoting In re S.A., 27 N.E.3d 287, 292–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)) (recognizing 

that multiple factfinding hearings may be necessary when a CHINS 

adjudication involves both parents), trans. denied. Additionally, “the purpose of 

a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” M.S., 140 

5 The juvenile court also found good cause because a public defender was appointed to Z.W.’s father and a 

DNA test was scheduled. In this situation, the trial court took it upon itself to determine what Z.W.’s 

father’s counsel would request, instead of waiting for Z.W.’s father’s counsel to request a continuance. 

Making a sua sponte decision for Z.W.’s father was an abuse of the court’s discretion.
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N.E.3d at 284–85 (quoting In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019)). 

Indiana law “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, 

reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for 

their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s 

needs.’” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 

1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Our General Assembly has clearly determined that in 

order to protect children and guard against unnecessary State interference into 

family life, juvenile courts must hold factfinding hearings within 60 days after a 

CHINS petition is filed, unless the parties consent to an extension of or waive 

that deadline. See I.C. § 31-34-11-1(a)–(b); M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 283 (citing J.R., 

98 N.E.3d at 655). The juvenile court’s desire for judicial economy, without 

more, does not outweigh these important interests, especially when the desired 

judicial economy is based upon less than concrete or known savings (e.g.,

anticipation that a parent will be served, or anticipating that a recently 

appointed attorney will request a continuance). Therefore, the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in continuing the factfinding hearing over Mother’s 

objection. 

[19] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court erred by setting the 

factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition after the statutory 60-day period 

ended and also erred by denying Mother’s motion to dismiss the CHINS 

petition. Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address Mother’s 

argument that this error violated her constitutional rights. We thus reverse the 
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juvenile court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss DCS’s 

CHINS petition without prejudice.

[20] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Kenworthy, J., and Riley, Sr. J., concur. 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Talisha R. Griffin 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Casey Farrington 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita 

Indiana Attorney General 

John R. Oosterhoff 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Katherine Grace Meger Kelsey 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2959 | October 4, 2024