NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

MELVIN H. ALEXANDER, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2012-7143 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case no. 10-4045, Judge Robert N. 

Davis. 

Before NEWMAN, PROST and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

O R D E R 

Melvin Alexander appeals from a decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 

Court) upholding the decision of the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals (Board) denying him entitlement to Department of 

Veterans Affairs (DVA) disability compensation benefits for 

a heart condition. We dismiss. 

Case: 12-7143 Document: 11 Page: 1 Filed: 12/26/2012
MELVIN ALEXANDER v. SHINSEKI 2

Mr. Alexander served on active duty in the U.S. Army 

from January 1972 to January 1974. While in service, he 

reported chest pains, but no condition was diagnosed. His 

separation examination in 1973 showed that his heart was 

normal. 

In 2001, Mr. Alexander was treated for a prominent 

heart murmur, and hospitalized with chest pains. He 

subsequently filed a claim seeking DVA disability compensation benefits for a heart condition. On Mr. Alexander’s 

behalf, his private physician submitted a written statement 

indicating that he had treated Mr. Alexander for chest 

pains, which were highly suggestive of angina pectoris and 

likely related to the pains Mr. Alexander reported during 

service. The regional office (RO) of the DVA denied the 

claim, and Mr. Alexander appealed to the Board. 

In a 2007 decision, the Board remanded the case to the 

RO for further development pursuant to the DVA’s statutory duty to assist him in presenting his claim. See 38 

C.F.R. 3.159(a)(1). Along with other measures, the Board 

directed the RO to obtain a “VA medical examination with 

an appropriate physician (e.g., a cardiologist),” who was to 

comment on the incidents of chest pain in service and the 

statement of Mr. Alexander’s private physician. 

On remand, a nurse practitioner reviewed Mr. Alexander’s records, conducted an examination, and issued a 

report that was reviewed and co-signed by a physician. 

That report concluded that a relationship between Mr. 

Alexander’s current condition and his service was unlikely. 

Based on that report and a review of the record, the RO 

again denied service connection. Mr. Alexander then again 

appealed to the Board, which upheld the RO’s determination. The Board noted that while the 2007 remand order 

indicated that Mr. Alexander was to be scheduled for an 

examination with an appropriate physician, the nurse 

practitioner that conducted the examination was compeCase: 12-7143 Document: 11 Page: 2 Filed: 12/26/2012
3 MELVIN ALEXANDER v. SHINSEKI

tent, and thus the exam was in sufficient compliance with 

the remand order and governing regulations. 

Mr. Alexander then appealed to the Veterans Court. 

Like the Board, the Veterans Court rejected Mr. Alexander’s argument that the RO had failed to comply with the 

Board’s 1997 remand instructions. The Court noted that 

while the remand order listed a cardiologist as an example of an appropriate physician, the order did not specify 

that a cardiologist had to conduct the exam or express a 

medical opinion. The court went on to explain that while 

the examination did not strictly comply with the terms of 

the 2007 remand order, the remand proceedings were in 

substantial compliance because the nurse practitioner 

was sufficiently competent and trained to provide a 

medical examination that met the regulatory requirements. The Veterans Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Board, and Mr. Alexander filed a timely appeal 

from that decision with this court. 

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), 

this court has jurisdiction over rules of law or the validity 

of any statute or regulation, or an interpretation thereof 

relied on by the Veterans Court in its decision. This court 

may also entertain challenges to the validity of a statute 

or regulation, and may interpret constitutional and statutory provisions as needed for resolution of the matter. 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(c). In contrast, except where an appeal 

presents a constitutional question, we lack jurisdiction 

over challenges to factual determinations or laws or 

regulations as applied to the particular case. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). 

Mr. Alexander’s informal brief indicates that he does 

not seek to challenge a constitutional issue. Nor does he 

mention a rule of law or a statutory or regulatory interpretation of which he seeks review. Instead, Mr. AlexanCase: 12-7143 Document: 11 Page: 3 Filed: 12/26/2012
MELVIN ALEXANDER v. SHINSEKI 4

der’s brief merely asks the court to look into his case more 

closely than the Veterans Court. In light of Mr. Alexander’s brief, we must reach the conclusion that he has not 

demonstrated that this court has jurisdiction over his 

case, and that we must dismiss. 

We note that even if the court were to liberally read 

Mr. Alexander’s brief as challenging whether the nurse 

practitioner conducted medical examination was in compliance with the Board’s remand instructions, the essence 

of that argument would simply be a disagreement over a 

factual matter, as to which this court does not have 

jurisdiction. See Dyment v. Principi, 287 F.3d 1377, 1381 

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the claimant’s disagreement 

with whether a medical expert substantially complied 

with the Board’s remand order was a factual matter 

outside of this court’s review). 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

(1) The appeal is dismissed. 

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs. 

FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Jan Horbaly 

 Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk 

s19 

Case: 12-7143 Document: 11 Page: 4 Filed: 12/26/2012