OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES AND THE

PRESIDENT’S INDIVIDUAL INCOME 

TAX RATE PROPOSALS

Scheduled for a Public Hearing

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

on March 7, 2001

Prepared by the Staff

of the

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

March 6, 2001

JCX-6-01
2

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 3

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................................................................... 4

II. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS AFFECTING

MARGINAL TAX RATES.......................................................................................... 5

A. Individual Income Tax Rates................................................................................ 5

B. Phaseins and Phaseouts......................................................................................... 9

1. Overview........................................................................................................ 9

2. Overall limitation on itemized deductions (“Pease limitation”)..................... 13

3. Personal exemption phaseout (“PEP”)............................................................ 15

C. Employment Taxes................................................................................................ 19

D. Earned Income Credit........................................................................................... 23

III. THE PRESIDENT’S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE PROPOSALS............ 32

IV. BACKGROUND ECONOMIC DATA....................................................................... 35

V. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX

RATES...................................................................................................................... 40
3

INTRODUCTION

The Senate Committee on Finance has scheduled a public hearing on March 7, 2001, 

relating to marginal tax rates and the President’s individual income tax rate proposals. This 

document,1 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, describes certain elements 

of present law that affect marginal tax rates and also describes the President’s individual income 

tax rate proposals. It further provides a discussion of issues relating to marginal tax rates.

Part I of this pamphlet is an executive summary. Part II of this pamphlet provides a 

description of present law and legislative background relating to the following provisions of the 

Federal tax laws affecting marginal tax rates: individual income tax rates, income phaseins and 

phaseouts, the employment taxes, and the earned income credit. Part III provides a description 

of the President’s individual income tax rate proposals. Part IV provides selected background 

economic data. Part V provides a discussion of issues relating to marginal tax rates.

 

1

 This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of 

Present Law and Economic Analysis Relating to Marginal Tax Rates and the President’s 

Individual Income Tax Rate Proposals (JCX-6-01), March 6, 2001.
4

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Marginal tax rate defined

The term marginal tax rate refers to the additional, or incremental, increase in tax liability 

that a taxpayer incurs under the income tax from a $1.00 increase in his or her income. The term 

statutory marginal tax rate refers to the marginal tax rates for individuals as defined in section 1 

of the Code. The basic rate structure of the Federal individual income tax is defined in terms of 

five marginal tax rates: 15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent, and 39.6 percent. The 

statutory marginal tax rates increase as the taxpayer's taxable income increases. In general, if an 

additional $1.00 of income to the taxpayer resulted in the taxpayer's taxable income increasing 

by $1.00, then there would be no difference between statutory marginal tax rates and effective 

marginal tax rates. Because of the design of certain provisions of the Code, an effective 

marginal tax rate may not always correspond to the statutory marginal tax rate.

The Code includes at least 22 provisions that can result in a taxpayer's effective marginal 

tax rate deviating from the statutory marginal tax rate. In general, these provisions represent 

phaseouts, phase-ins, and floors that limit the ability of certain taxpayers to claim certain 

deductions, credits, or other tax benefits.2 The Joint Committee staff estimates that in 2001, 35.9 

million taxpayers, or approximately one quarter of all taxpayers, will have an effective marginal 

tax rate different from their statutory tax rate. In addition to Federal individual income taxes, 

taxpayers with wage, salary, or self-employment income pay certain payroll taxes. These taxes 

increase the marginal tax rate on earned income.

Efficiency

Economists argue that effective marginal tax rates create incentives, or disincentives, for 

taxpayers to work, save, donate to charity, and the like. These incentives may distort taxpayer 

choice. Distorted choice may promote an inefficient allocation of society's labor and capital 

resources. The magnitude of the inefficiencies potentially created by deviations of effective 

marginal tax rates from statutory marginal tax rates depends upon taxpayer behavioral response 

to tax changes. There is not consensus on the extent to which taxpayers alter their labor supply 

or saving in response to tax changes. Additionally, increased effective marginal tax rates may 

encourage taxpayers to seek compensation in the form of tax-free fringe benefits rather than 

taxable compensation. Such distortions in consumption represent an efficiency loss to the 

economy. Increased effective marginal tax rates also may alter taxpayers' decisions regarding 

when to recognize income or claim expenses. Any such tax-motivated changes in the timing of 

income or expense generally require time and expense by the taxpayer. Such time and expense 

represents an efficiency loss to the economy. 

Equity

Higher marginal tax rates also lead to increased aggregate tax liabilities. A second 

question of tax policy is whether these increased aggregate tax liabilities are equitably distributed 

 

2

 Other provisions of the Code that impose differing marginal tax rates, such as the 

alternative minimum tax and the separate rates imposed on capital gains realizations, are beyond 

the scope of this pamphlet.
5

across taxpayers. The Federal individual income tax is a progressive tax, and the existence of 

phaseouts and other provisions that create effective marginal tax rates that differ from statutory 

marginal tax rates do not make the Federal individual income tax a regressive or proportional 

tax. The phaseouts and other provisions identified in this pamphlet generally operate to increase 

the overall progressivity of the income tax. The majority of the provisions deny tax benefits to 

higher-income taxpayers, while preserving tax benefits to low-income and middle-income 

taxpayers. However, because the phaseouts and other provisions often relate to specific defined 

economic activities, two different taxpayers may have the same income and one can be subject to 

a phaseout provision while another is not. That is, these provisions may create horizontal 

inequities in the Code.

Complexity

The creation of phaseouts adds complexity to the Code. On the other hand, by limiting 

the number of taxpayers eligible to qualify for certain tax benefits, some of the provisions reduce 

computations, possibility of error, and record keeping. These provisions also may confuse 

taxpayers regarding what precisely is the tax base and what sort of preferences exist in the Code. 

Complexity and lack of clarity may promote taxpayer disillusionment and a sense of unfairness 

regarding the Code, and may reduce compliance.

II. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS

AFFECTING MARGINAL TAX RATES

A. Individual Income Tax Rates

Present law

To determine regular income tax liability, a taxpayer generally must apply the tax rate 

schedules (or the tax tables) to his or her taxable income. The rate schedules are broken into 

several ranges of income, known as income brackets, and the marginal tax rate increases as a 

taxpayer's income increases. The income bracket amounts are indexed for inflation. Separate 

rate schedules apply based on an individual's filing status. For 2001, the individual regular 

income tax rate schedules are shown below (bracket breakpoints for married filing separately are 

exactly half of those for married filing jointly).
6

Federal Individual Income Tax Rates for 2001

If taxable income is: Then income tax equals:

Single individuals

$0-27,050............................................. 15 percent of taxable income

$27,050-$65,550................................... $4,057.50, plus 28% of the amount over $27,050

$65,550-$136,750................................. $14,837.50 plus 31% of the amount over $65,550

$136,750-$297,350 ............................... $36,909.50 plus 36% of the amount over $136,750

Over $297,350...................................... $94,725.50 plus 39.6% of the amount over $297,350

Heads of households

$0-$36,250........................................... 15 percent of taxable income

$36,250-$93,650................................... $5,437.50 plus 28% of the amount over $36,250

$93,650-$151,650................................. $21,509.50 plus 31% of the amount over $93,650

$151,650-$297,350 ............................... $39,489.50 plus 36% of the amount over $151,650

Over $297,350...................................... $91,941.50 plus 39.6% of the amount over $297,350

Married individuals filing joint returns

$0-$45,200........................................... 15 percent of taxable income

$45,200-$109,250................................. $6,780.00 plus 28% of the amount over $45,200

$109,250-$166,500 ............................... $24,714.50 plus 31% of the amount over $109,250

$166,500-$297,350 ............................... $42,461.50 plus 36% of the amount over $166,500

Over $297,350...................................... $89,567.50 plus 39.6% of the amount over $297,350

Legislative Background

The 16th amendment to the Constitution was ratified on February 25, 1913. Under the 

16th amendment, Congress has the power to collect taxes “on income from whatever source 

derived” without apportionment among the States. Several months later the Congress enacted 

the individual income tax as part of the Revenue Act of 1913. In its initial form, the income tax 

was designed to affect only a small number of households. For married couples, the tax did not 

apply to taxable incomes less than $3,000. The top marginal rate was 7 percent, and applied to 

taxable income over $500,000. Table 1 shows a description of the history of the bottom and top 

bracket tax rates since Congress enacted the individual income tax in 1913.
7

Table 1- History of Federal Individual Income Bottom and Top Bracket Rates

[In dollar amounts unless otherwise specified]

Tax Rates1

Bottom bracket Top Bracket

Calendar

Year

Rate 

(percent)

Taxable income 

up to

Rate 

(percent)

Taxable 

income over

1913-15 1 20,000 7 500,000

1916 2 20,000 15 2,000,000

1917 2 2,000 67 2,000,000

1918 6 4,000 77 1,000,000

1919-20 4 4,000 73 1,000,000

1921 4 4,000 73 1,000,000

1922 4 4,000 56 200,000

1923 3 4,000 56 200,000

1924 21.5 4,000 46 500,000

1925-28 21? 4,000 25 100,000

1929 24? 4,000 24 100,000

1930-31 21? 4,000 25 100,000

1932-33 4 4,000 63 1,000,000

1934-35 34 4,000 63 1,000,000

1936-39 34 4,000 79 5,000,000

1940 34.4 4,000 81.1 5,000,000

1941 310 2,000 81 5,000,000

1942-433 319 2,000 88 200,000

1944-45 23 2,000 5

94 200,000

1946-47 19 2,000 586.45 200,000

1948-49 16.6 4,000 582.13 400,000

1950 17.4 4,000 5

91 400,000

1951 20.4 4,000 591 400,000

1952-53 22.2 4,000 5

92 400,000

1954-63 20 4,000 591 400,000

1964 16 1,000 77 400,000

1965-67 14 1,000 70 200,000

1968 14 1,000 675.25 200,000

1969 14 1,000 677 200,000

1970 14 1,000 671.75 200,000

1971 14 1,000 7

70 200,000

1972-78 814 1,000 770 200,000

1979-80 814 2,100 770 212,000

1981 8 913.825 2,100 7 969.125 212,000

1982 812 2,100 50 106,000

1983 8

11 2,100 50 106,000

1984 811 2,100 50 159,000

1985 811 2,180 50 165,480

1986 811 2,270 50 171,580

1987 811 3,000 38.5 90,000
8

Tax Rates1

Bottom bracket Top Bracket

Calendar

Year

Rate 

(percent)

Taxable income 

up to

Rate 

(percent)

Taxable 

income over

1988 815 29,750 1028 29,750

1989 815 30,950 1028 30,950

1990 815 32,450 1028 32,450

1991 815 34,000 31 82,150

1992 815 35,800 31 86,500

1993 815 36,900 39.6 250,000

1994 815 38,000 39.6 250,000

1995 815 39,000 39.6 256,500

1996 815 40,100 39.6 263,750

1997 815 41,200 39.6 271,050

1998 815 42,350 39.6 278,450

1999 815 43,050 39.6 283,150

2000 815 43,850 39.6 288,350

1

 Taxable income excludes zero bracket amount from 1977 through 1986. Rates shown apply only to married 

persons filing joint returns beginning in 1948. Does not include either the add on minimum tax on preference items 

(1970-1982) or the alternative minimum tax (1979-present). Also, does not include the effects of the various tax 

benefit phase-outs (e.g. the personal exemption phase-out). From 1922 through 1986 and from 1991 forward, lower 

rates applied to long-term capital gains.

2

 After earned-income deduction equal to 25 percent of earned income.

3

 After earned-income deduction equal to 10 percent of earned income.

4 Exclusive of Victory Tax.

5

 Subject to the following maximum effective rate limitations.

[year and maximum rate (in percent)] 1994-45 - 90; 1946-47 - 85.5; 1948-49 - 77.0; 1950 - 87.0; 1951 - 87.2; 

1952-53 - 88.0; 1954-63 - 87.0.

6

 Includes surcharge of 7.5 percent in 1968, 10 percent in 1969, and 2.6 percent in 1970.

7 Earned income was subject to maximum marginal rates of 60 percent in 1971 and 50 percent from 1972 

through 1981.

8 Beginning in 1975, a refundable earned-income credit is allowed for low-income individuals.

9

 After tax credit is 1.25 percent against regular tax.

10

 The benefit of the first rate bracket is eliminated by an increased rate above certain thresholds. The phase-out 

range of the benefit of the first rate bracket was as follows: Taxable income between $71,900 and $149,250 in 

1988; taxable income between $74,850 and $155,320 in 1989; and t axable income between $78,400 and $162,770 in 

1990. The phase-out of the benefit the first rate bracket was repealed for taxable years beginning after December 

31, 1990. This added 5 percentage points to the marginal rate for those affected by the phaseout, producing a 33 

percent effective rate.
9

B. Phaseins and Phaseouts

1. Overview

The Code includes at least 22 provisions that can result in a taxpayer's effective marginal 

tax rate deviating from the statutory marginal tax rate. In general, these provisions represent 

phaseouts, phase-ins, and floors that limit the ability of certain taxpayers to claim certain 

deductions, credits, or other tax benefits.3 The Joint Committee staff estimates that in 2001, 35.9 

million taxpayers, or approximately one quarter of all taxpayers, would have an effective 

marginal tax rate different from their statutory tax rate. These deviations from the statutory 

marginal tax rate are largely the result of the provisions listed in Table 3 below. The table 

summarizes the provisions of the Code that give rise to deviations between effective marginal tax 

rates and statutory marginal tax rates and summarizes the income range over which the deviation 

will occur. Table 3 also includes a calculation of the effective marginal tax rate that results from 

the provision.4 

The discussion below focuses on three of the provisions listed in the chart: the phaseout 

of personal exemptions, the overall (“Pease”) limitation on itemized deductions, and the EIC.

 

3

 For a complete discussion of these provisions and their impact on marginal rates, see 

Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Analysis Relating to Individual Effective 

Marginal Tax Rates (JCS-3-98).

4

 Certain of the provisions phaseout the underlying benefit through a “step function” 

rather than smoothly. Table 3 generally calculates the marginal rate as if the phaseout were 

mathematically smooth, or linear. An example of how the step function phaseouts work can be 

found in a footnote to the analysis section to the discussion of the personal exemption phaseout, 

below.
10

Table 3.--Summary of Provisions Creating Effective

Marginal Tax Rates Different from Statutory

Marginal Tax Rates (2001)

Provision Code section Effective marginal

tax rate

Applicable range

of AGI

Phaseout of exclusion 

of social security 

benefits

Section 86 1.5 times the statutory rate 

for first tier

1.85 times the statutory 

rate for second tier

Single: $25,000-various1

Joint: $32,000-various1

Single: $34,000 various1

Joint: $44,000-various1

"Pease" limitation on 

itemized deductions

Section 68 1.03 times the statutory 

rate

$132,950 various

7.5-percent floor on 

medical deduction

Section 213 1.075 times the statutory 

rate

Any taxpayer itemizing 

medical deductions

2-percent floor on 

miscellaneous 

deductions

Section 67 1.02 times the statutory 

rate

Any taxpayer itemizing 

miscellaneous deductions

10-percent floor on 

casualty loss

Section 

165(h)(2)

1.10 times the statutory Any taxpayer itemizing 

deductions for casualty loss

Phaseout of personal 

exemption

Section 151 The statutory rate 

multiplied by 1.0 plus 

0.232 for each exemption, 

e.g.,

1.0232 times the statutory 

rate for one personal 

exemption

1.0464 times the statutory 

rate for two personal 

exemptions

Single: $132,950

$255,450

H/H: $166,200

$288,700

Joint: $199,450

$321,950

Phase-In of earned 

income credit

Section 32 No children: statutory 

rate minus 7.65 percentage

One child: statutory rate 

minus 34 percentage points

Two children: statutory 

rate minus 40 percentage 

points

$0-$4,760

$0-7,140

$0-$10,020

Phaseout of earned 

income credit

Section 32 No children: statutory 

rate plus 7.65 percentage 

points

One child: statutory rate 

plus 15.98 percentage 

points

Two children: statutory 

 $5,950-$10,7102,3

$13,090-$28,2812,3

$13,090-$32,1212,3
11

Provision Code section Effective marginal

tax rate

Applicable range

of AGI

rate plus 21.06 percentage 

points

Phaseout of child 

credits

Section 24 Statutory rate plus 5

percentage points

Single: $75,000-various3

Joint: $110,0003

Partial phaseout of 

dependent care credit

Section 21 Depends on expenses: at 

maximum expenses: 

Statutory tax rate plus 2.4 

percentage points 

(generally 17.4 percent)

$10,000-$28,001

Phaseout of eligibility 

for deductible IRA

Section 219 Between 1.0 and 1.2 times 

statutory rate4

Single: $33,000-$43,000

Joint: 53,000-$63,000

Phaseout of eligibility 

for Roth IRA

Section 408A Single: between 1.0 and 

1.133 times the statutory 

rate.4

Joint: between 1.0 and 1.2 

times the statutory rate4

Single: $95,000-$110,000

Joint: $150,000-$160,000

Phaseout of eligibility 

for education IRA

Section 530 Greater than statutory rate 

by a percentage determined 

by the 5 percent or 3.3 

percent phaseout rate and 

the interest rate.

Single: $95,000-$110,000

Joint: $150,000-$160,000

Phaseout of HOPE 

credit

Section 25A Single: statutory rate plus 

15 percentage points for 

each $1,500 in credits.

Joint: statutory rate plus 

7.5 percentage points for 

each $1,500 in credits.

Single: $40,000-$50,0003

Joint: $80,000-$100,0003

Phaseout of Lifetime 

learning credit

Section 25A Single: statutory rate plus 

15 percentage points for 

each $1,500 in credits

Joint: statutory rate plus 

7.5 percentage points for 

each $1,500 in credits

Single: $40,000-$50,0003

Joint: $80,000-$100,0003

Phaseout of 

deductibility of interest 

on qualified student 

loans

Section 221 1.167 times statutory rate 

(for maximum deduction 

available in 2001)

Single: $40,000-$55,0003

Joint: $60,000-$75,0003

Phaseout of exclusion 

of interest from 

education savings 

bonds

Section 135 Single: (1+ exclusion/ 

$15,000) x statutory rate

Joint: (1 + exclusion/ 

$30,000) x statutory rate

Single: $55,750-$70,750

H/H: $55,750-$70,750

Joint: $83,650-$113,650
12

Provision Code section Effective marginal

tax rate

Applicable range

of AGI

Phaseout of credit for 

elderly and disabled

Section 22 Statutory rate plus 7.5 

percentage points

Single: $7,500-maximum of 

$17,500

Joint: $10,000-maximum of 

$25,000

Phaseout of adoption 

credit and exclusion

Section 23 Credit: statutory rate plus 

credit amount/$40,000 

Exclusion: (1 + exclusion 

amount/$40,000) x 

statutory rate

$75,000-$115,0003

Phaseout of first-time 

homebuyer credit for 

D.C.

Section 1400C Statutory rate plus 25 

percentage points

Single: $70,000-$90,0003

Joint: $110,000-$130,0003

Phaseout of rental real 

estate losses under 

passive loss rules

Section 469(i) 1.5 times statutory rate5$100,000-$150,000

Phaseout of rehab tax 

credit under passive 

loss rules

Section 469(i) 1.5 times statutory rate $200,000-$250,000

Income phase-in of 

recapture of subsidy of 

qualified mortgage 

bonds

Section 143 Statutory rate plus 

percentage points equal to 

the taxpayer's recapture 

amount divided by 5,000

Defined relative to area 

median income

1

 Applicable range defined by reference to provisional income and modified AGI is used in lieu of AGI. See Joint 

Committee on Taxation, JCS-3-98 for further information.

2 

 Assumes all income is earned income.

3

 Income range measured by reference to modified AGI.

4

 Phaseout affects future year tax liability. Present value of effective marginal tax rate depends on length of time 

the account is maintained and the interest rate.

5 Stated effective rate overstates lifetime effect as provision allows suspended losses in future years.

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation.
13

2. Overall limitation on itemized deductions ("Pease" limitation) 5

Present Law

Individuals who do not elect the standard deduction may claim itemized deductions 

(subject to certain limitations) for certain nonbusiness expenses incurred during the taxable year. 

Among these deductible expenses are unreimbursed medical expenses, casualty and theft losses, 

charitable contributions, qualified residence interest, State and local income and property taxes, 

certain moving expenses, unreimbursed employee business expenses, and certain other 

miscellaneous expenses.

Limitations apply to particular deductions. For example, medical expenses are deductible 

only to the extent they exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income (“AGI”). In addition, 

miscellaneous itemized expenses (including unreimbursed employee business expenses) are 

deductible only to the extent that the total of all such expenses exceeds two percent of AGI.

The total amount of otherwise allowable itemized deductions (other than medical 

expenses, investment interest, and casualty, theft, or wagering losses) is reduced by 3 percent of 

the amount of the taxpayer's AGI in excess of $132,950 in 2001 (indexed for inflation).6 Under 

this provision, otherwise allowable itemized deductions may not be reduced by more than 80 

percent.7 In computing the reduction of total itemized deductions, all other limitations applicable 

to such deductions (such as the separate floors) are first applied and, then, the otherwise 

allowable total amount of itemized deductions is reduced.

Legislative Background

The overall limitation on total itemized deductions was enacted on a temporary basis as 

part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (“OBRA 1990”), effective for taxable 

years beginning after December 31, 1990, but prior to January 1, 1996. The legislative history to 

OBRA 1990 states that the objective of the provision was to better reflect taxpayers’ ability to 

pay taxes. It was believed that the higher an individual’s AGI, the less likely that an otherwise

 

5

 Code section 68. This overall limitation on itemized deductions is commonly referred 

to as the "Pease" limitation after the Congressman who originally proposed the provision.

6

 The threshold of $132,950 is the same for all taxpayers, except that the threshold is 

$66,475 for married taxpayers filing separately.

7

 Thus, for example, if a taxpayer's AGI for 2001 is $232,950 (i.e., the taxpayer has 

$100,000 of excess AGI above the $132,950 threshold), then total otherwise allowable itemized 

deductions are reduced by $3,000 (i.e., 3 percent of the $100,000 excess AGI). However, if total 

otherwise allowable itemized deductions are, for example, $20,000, then, regardless of how 

much AGI the taxpayer has for the taxable year, itemized deductions are reduced by no more 

than $16,000 (i.e., 80 percent of $20,000). For some taxpayers, if the value of the standard 

deduction is greater than 20 percent of the value of the taxpayer's itemized deductions, the value 

of the standard deduction might create a floor beyond which itemized deductions cannot be 

reduced as the taxpayer always has the option of electing the standard deduction.
14

deductible expense would significantly affect the ability of the individual to pay taxes. The 

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (“OBRA 1993”) permanently extended this 

limitation on total itemized deductions. The legislative history states that the permanent 

extension of the overall limitation on itemized deductions would enhance the progressivity of the 

Federal individual income tax system.

Analysis 

The overall limitation on itemized deductions increases the effective marginal tax rate for 

affected taxpayers. This limitation reduces (subject to the 80-percent limitation) the amount of 

certain itemized deductions that may be claimed by an amount equal to 3 percent of each dollar 

of income in excess of the threshold. Thus if a taxpayer who is above the threshold earns an 

additional $1000 of income, the taxpayer's taxable income increases by $1030 because the 

taxpayer's income goes up by $1000 and the itemized deductions must be reduced by $30. The 

statutory tax rates apply to taxable income. Thus, if the taxpayer is in the 36-percent tax bracket, 

the increase in tax liability resulting from the $1000 increase in income will be $370.80 (the 

$1030 in additional taxable income multiplied by 0.36). Generally, the effective marginal tax rate 

for taxpayers subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions is 3 percent higher than the 

statutory tax rate. That is, the taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate equals 103 percent of the 

statutory marginal tax rate. Once the taxpayer's itemized deductions are reduced by 80 percent, 

the taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate again equals his or her statutory marginal tax rate.

Some argue that the overall limitation on itemized deductions diminishes a taxpayer's 

incentive to make charitable contributions. While there may be a psychological effect, there 

generally is little or no difference in the tax-motivated economic incentive to give to charity for a 

taxpayer subject to the limitation compared to a taxpayer not subject to the limitation. This is 

because while the limitation operates effectively to increase the marginal tax rate on the income 

of affected taxpayers, the value of the tax benefit of deductibility of the charitable deduction is 

determined by the statutory tax rate. For taxpayers beyond the threshold, a specified dollar 

amount of itemized deductions are denied. The specified dollar amount is determined by the 

taxpayer's income, not by the amount of itemized deductions the taxpayer claims. Hence, the 

value of an additional dollar contributed to charity increases by exactly one dollar times the total 

amount of itemized deductions that the taxpayer may claim. Because the statutory rates apply to 

taxable income (income after claiming permitted itemized deductions), the value of the 

additional contribution to charity is determined by the statutory tax rate. Economists would say 

that the "tax price" of giving is not altered by the limitation.8

 

8

 This can be seen mathematically as follows. Let Y be the taxpayer's income and X be 

the threshold above which the limitation on itemized deductions applies. Let D be itemized 

deductions and t the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Then the taxpayer's total tax liability, T, is:

T = [Y - {D -(.03)(Y - X)}]t or T = Y[1 + (.03)]t - Dt -(.03)tX.

What this implies is that as the taxpayer's income, Y, increases by $1.00, his or her tax 

liability increases by (1.03)t, as noted in the text. However, if the taxpayer increases his or her 

itemized deductions, D, by $1.00, his or her reduction in tax liability is t dollars. Or, as stated in 
15

The Joint Committee staff estimates that in 2001, 6.1 million taxpayers will be subject to 

the overall limitation on itemized deductions and that this figure will grow to 6.7 million by 

2005. Because the limitation begins for taxpayers with AGI greater than $132,950, only rarely 

might taxpayers in the 15-percent statutory marginal tax rate bracket be subject to the provision. 

Some taxpayers in the 28-percent statutory marginal tax rate bracket, and taxpayers in 31-, 36-, 

and 39.6-percent statutory marginal tax rate brackets will be subject to the provision. For those 

affected taxpayers, their effective marginal tax rates will be 28.84 percent, 31.93 percent, 37.08 

percent, and 40.79 percent.

Table 4.--Distribution of Taxpayers by Income of Those Who Itemize and Those

Who are Subject to Overall Limitation on Itemized Deductions (2001)

Income category (1)

Taxpayers claiming 

itemized deductions 

(millions)

Taxpayers subject to

Pease limitation

(millions)

Less than $10,000 ..............................

10,000 to 20,000................................

20,000 to 30,000................................

30,000 to 40,000................................

40,000 to 50,000................................

50,000 to 75,000................................

75,000 to 100,000..............................

100,000 to 200,000............................

200,000 and over...............................

0.4

0.9

2.1

3.2

3.8

9.5

8.4

10.6

3.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

(2)

0.1

2.6

3.4

Total, all taxpayers.......................... 42.4 6.1

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

(1) The income concept used to place tax returns into income categories is adjusted gross income plus [1] tax 

exempt interest, [2] employer contributions for health plans and life insurance, [3] employer share of FICA tax, [4] 

workers' compensation, [5] nontaxable social security benefits, [6] insurance value of Medicare benefits, [7] 

alternative minimum tax preference items, and [8] excluded income of U.S. citizens living abroad. Categories are 

measured at 2001 levels.

(2) Less than 50,000 taxpayers.

3. Personal exemption phaseout ("PEP")

Present Law

In order to determine taxable income, an individual reduces AGI by any personal 

exemptions and either the applicable standard deduction or itemized deductions. Personal 

exemptions generally are allowed for the taxpayer, his or her spouse, and any dependents (sec. 

151). For 2001, the amount deductible for each personal exemption is $2,900. This amount is 

indexed annually for inflation. The deduction for personal exemptions is phased out ratably for 

 

the text, the statutory tax rate determines the value of the deduction. This algebra assumes the 

taxpayer is not subject to the 80-percent limitation.
16

taxpayers with AGI over certain thresholds. These thresholds of the personal exemption phaseout 

(“PEP”) are indexed annually for inflation. Under PEP, the total amount of exemptions that may 

be claimed by a taxpayer is reduced by 2 percent for each $2,500 (or portion thereof) by which 

the taxpayer's AGI exceeds the applicable threshold.9 Thus, the personal exemptions claimed are 

phased out over a $122,500 range (which is not indexed for inflation), beginning at the 

applicable threshold. Under PEP, the applicable thresholds for 2001 are $132,950 for single 

individuals, $199,450 for married individuals filing a joint return, $166,200 for heads of 

households, and $99,725 for married individuals filing separate returns. For 2001, the point at 

which a taxpayer's personal exemptions are completely phased out is $255,450 for single 

individuals, $321,950 for married individuals filing a joint return, $288,700 for heads of 

households, and $222,225 for married individuals filing separate returns.

Legislative Background

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 phased out the benefit of the 15-percent bracket10 and the 

personal exemptions for an individual, the individual's spouse, and each dependent. This 

phaseout was accomplished by the imposition of an additional 5-percent tax for higher-income 

levels. This created, in effect, a 33-percent marginal tax rate. This 33-percent marginal tax rate 

terminated and the 28-percent bracket resumed after the benefits of the 15-percent bracket and 

the personal exemptions claimed by each taxpayer had been phased out.11

The present-law PEP was initially enacted on a temporary basis by the Omnibus Budget 

Reconciliation Act of 1990 (“OBRA 1990”), which also repealed the additional 5-percent tax 

and imposed an explicit 31-percent marginal tax rate after the 15- and 28-percent marginal tax 

rates. Under OBRA 1990, PEP was effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 

1990, and before January 1, 1996. 

The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 extended PEP through 1996. 

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA 1993") made PEP permanent. 

Legislative history to the PEP provision indicates that, like the overall limitation on itemized 

deductions, PEP was intended to enhance the progressivity of the Federal individual income tax 

system.

Analysis

PEP increases effective marginal tax rates for those affected taxpayers. PEP operates by 

reducing the amount of each personal exemption that the taxpayer may claim by two percent for 

each $2,500 (or portion thereof) by which the taxpayer's income exceeds the designated 

threshold for his or her filing status. Thus, for a taxpayer who is subject to the personal 

exemption phaseout, earning an additional $2,500 will reduce the amount of each personal 

 

9

 The phaseout rate is 2 percent for each $1,250 for married taxpayers filing separate 

returns.

10 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the individual income tax rates were 15 and 28 

percent.

11 This provision was commonly referred to as "the bubble".
17

exemption he or she may claim by two percent, or by $58 in 2001 (0.02 times the $2,900 

personal exemption).12 The taxpayer's additional taxable income is thus equal to the $2,500 plus 

the $58 in denied exemption for each personal exemption. For a taxpayer in the 36-percent 

statutory marginal tax rate bracket, the effective marginal tax rate on the additional $2,500 of 

income equals the statutory 36 percent plus an additional 0.83 percent ($58 times the statutory 

rate of 0.36, divided by the $2,500 in incremental income) for each personal exemption. Thus, if 

this taxpayer claims four personal exemptions, his or her effective marginal tax rate is 39.32 

percent (the statutory 36-percent rate plus four times 0.83 percent). More generally, for 2001 the 

taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate equals the taxpayer's statutory marginal rate multiplied by 

one plus the product of 2.32 percentage points (the $58 in denied personal exemption divided by 

the incremental $2,500 in income) multiplied by the number of personal exemptions claimed by 

the taxpayer.13 Thus, a taxpayer who claims five personal exemptions would have an effective

 

12 It should be noted that since the personal exemption amount is indexed for inflation, 

but the length of the phaseout range is not, the increase in marginal rates implied by PEP 

increases over time.

13 Mathematically, let Y be income, T tax liability, t the taxpayer's statutory marginal tax 

rate, E the number of personal exemptions, and I the income threshold. In the absence of the 

phaseout, the taxpayer's tax liability may be represented as follows.

(1) T = (Y - (2,900E))Ct = Yt - (2,900E)Ct

For a taxpayer with income over the threshold amount, I, the taxpayer's tax liability is

T = (Y - ((2,900E) C (1 - (Y - I)/2,500) C .02))Ct

This simplifies to

(2) T = Y C t C (1 + (.0232)E) - 58Et - (.0232)It

Thus, the effective marginal tax rate for a taxpayer in the phaseout range is one plus 2.32 

percentage points multiplied by the number of personal exemptions claimed, all multiplied by the 

taxpayer's statutory marginal tax rate.

This formula simplifies present law by representing the phaseout as a linear function. 

The phaseout is actually a step function. That is the first dollar of income in the phaseout range 

causes the taxpayer to lose two percent of his or her personal exemptions. The second dollar of 

income in the phaseout range through the 2,500th dollar does not lead to any loss of exemptions. 

The 2,501st dollar, however, causes the taxpayer to lose an additional two percent of his or her 

personal exemptions. That is, the 2,501st dollar causes the taxpayer's taxable income to increase 

by the $1.00 of additional income plus $58 times the number of personal exemptions. The 

2,502nd dollar of income in the phaseout range has no further incremental effect. Thus, the 

effective marginal tax rate on the 2,500th dollar and the 2,502nd dollar is the taxpayer's statutory 

marginal tax rate and the marginal tax rate on the 2,501st dollar generally is 5,900 percent of the 

taxpayer's statutory marginal tax rate for a taxpayer claiming one personal exemption, and 

11,700 percent of the taxpayer's statutory marginal tax rate for a taxpayer claiming two personal 

exemptions. In general, the marginal tax rate on the first dollar is a percentage of statutory 
18

marginal tax rate approximately 111.6 percent of the statutory marginal tax rate.

The Joint Committee staff estimates that in 2001, 2.1 million taxpayers would be subject 

to PEP (See Table 5), and that figure will grow to 2.3 million by 2005. Because the phase-out is 

completed by an AGI of $255,450 for single taxpayers and $321,950 for joint filers, generally no 

taxpayers in the 39.6-percent statutory bracket would be affected. Because the phaseout-range 

begins at an AGI of $132,950 for single taxpayers, $166,200 for heads of households, and 

$199,450 for joint filers, generally few taxpayers in the 15- or 28-percent statutory marginal tax 

rate bracket would be expected to be subject to the phaseout. For single taxpayers (one personal 

exemption) the provisions would increase the 31-percent and 36-percent statutory marginal tax 

rate bracket to effective marginal tax rates of 31.72 percent and 36.84 percent. For heads of 

households and joint filers (assuming only two personal exemptions) the corresponding effective 

marginal tax rates would be 32.34 percent and 37.56 percent.

Table 5.--Distribution By Income of Taxpayers Claiming Personal Exemptions and

Those Subject to the Personal Exemption Phaseout

[Calendar Year 2001]

Income category (1)

Taxpayers claiming 

personal exemptions 

(millions)

Taxpayers subject to

personal exemption 

phaseout

(millions)

Less than $10,000 ..............................

10,000 to 20,000................................

20,000 to 30,000................................

30,000 to 40,000................................

40,000 to 50,000................................

50,000 to 75,000................................

75,000 to 100,000..............................

100,000 to 200,000............................

200,000 and over...............................

19.9

23.3

18.5

15.8

13.1

21.9

12.9

12.8

3.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

1.7

Total, all taxpayers.......................... 142.0 2.1

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

(1) The income concept used to place tax returns into income categories is adjusted gross income plus [1] tax 

exempt, [2] employer contributions for health plans and life insurance, [3] employer share of FICA tax, [4] workers' 

compensation, [5] nontaxable social security benefits, [6] insurance value of Medicare benefits, [7] alternative 

minimum tax preference items, and [8] excluded income of U.S. citizens living abroad. Categories are measured at 

2001 levels. Includes filers and nonfilers.

 

marginal tax rate equal to 100 + 580 times the number of personal exemptions claimed by the 

taxpayer. This same result occurs at each multiple of $2,500.
19

C. Employment Taxes

Present law

FICA taxes

As part of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) a tax is imposed on 

employees and employers up to a maximum amount of employee wages. The tax is composed of 

two parts: old-age, survivor, and disability insurance (“OASDI”) (i.e., Social Security) and 

Medicare hospital insurance (“HI”).

The OASDI tax rate is 6.2 percent on both the employer and employee (for a total rate of 

12.4 percent). The OASDI tax rate applies to wages up to the OASDI wage base, which is 

$80,400 for 2001. “Wages” generally includes all remuneration for employment, but there are 

specific exemptions. The wage base cap is indexed for changes in average compensation.

The second part of the FICA tax imposed on employees and employers is for Medicare 

hospital insurance (“HI”). The HI tax rate is 1.45 percent on both the employee and employer 

(for a total rate of 2.9 percent). There is no limit on the amount of wages subject to the HI 

portion of the FICA tax.

Self-employment taxes

Under the Self-Employment Contributions Act (“SECA”), a tax is imposed on an 

individual’s net earnings from self-employment.14 The SECA tax rate is the same as the total of 

the combined FICA tax rates for employers and employees and is capped at the same levels. 

Thus, the OASDI tax rate applies to the first $80,400 (for 2001) of net earnings and the HI tax 

rate applies to all net earnings from self-employment. A self-employed individual is entitled to 

deduct one-half of his or her self-employment taxes.

Table 6 shows a history of the wage base and rate of tax for certain Social Security taxes.

Unemployment compensation taxes

The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) imposes a minimum, net Federal tax on 

employers of 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 paid annually to each employee. The current gross 

FUTA tax rate is 6.2 percent; employers in States meeting certain requirements and having no 

delinquent Federal loans are eligible for a 5.4 percent credit, making the current minimum, net 

Federal tax rate 0.8 percent. Because most employees earn more than the $7,000 taxable wage 

ceiling, the FUTA tax is $56 per employee ($7,000 x 0.8 percent), or 3 cents per hour for a fulltime worker.

 

14 Net earnings for this purpose are earnings multiplied by 92.35 percent. This 

adjustment is necessary to tax self-employed individuals on the same basis as wage and salary 

employees since self-employment earnings include the “employer” share of the tax whereas 

wage and salary earnings do not.
20

Chart 1 depicts the historical trends in the statutory and effective FUTA tax rates. The 

effective rate equals the FUTA revenue as a percent of covered wages. Although the statutory 

tax rate doubled from 0.4 percent in the late 1960s to 0.8 percent in the late 1970s, the effective 

rate has fluctuated between 0.2 and 0.3 percent in most of those years.
21

Table 6.--History of FICA/SECA Taxes, 1937-2001

Tax rates, employer and

employee, each OASDI

Tax rate,

Calendar self-employed

year

Wage

base OASDI HI Total

Maximum 

employee 

tax HI Total

Maximum 

self-empl. 

tax

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

19933

19923

19913

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1963-65

1962

1960-61

1959

$80,400

76,200

72,600

68,400

65,400

62,700

61,200

60,600

57,600

55,500

53,400

51,300

48,000

45,000

43,800

42,000

39,600

37,800

35,700

32,400

29,700

25,900

22,900

17,700

16,500

15,300

14,100

13,200

10,800

9,000

7,800

7,800

7,800

7,800

6,600

6,600

4,800

4,800

4,800

4,800

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.06

6.06

5.70

5.70

5.70

5.70

5.40

5.40

5.35

5.08

5.08

5.05

4.95

4.95

4.95

4.95

4.85

4.6

4.6

4.2

4.2

3.8

3.9

3.85

3.625

3.125

3.0

2.5

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.45

1.35

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.05

1.05

1.0

.9

.9

.9

.9

1.0

.6

.6

.6

.6

.6

.5

.35

........

..........

..........

..........

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.65

7.51

7.51

7.15

7.15

7.05

7.00

6.70

6.70

6.65

6.13

6.13

6.05

5.85

5.85

5.85

5.85

5.85

5.2

5.2

4.8

4.8

4.4

4.4

4.2

3.625

3.125

3.0

2.5

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

$5,528.70

5,328.90

5,123.30

3,924.45

3,604.80

3,379.50

3,131.70

3,003.00

2,791.80

2,532.60

2,391.90

2,170.80

1,975.05

1,587.67

1,403.77

1,070.85

965.25

895.05

824.85

772.20

631.80

468.00

405.60

374.40

374.40

343.20

290.40

277.20

174.00

150.00

144.00

120.00

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.12

12.12

11.4

11.4

11.4

11.4

8.05

8.05

8.00

7.05

7.05

7.1

7.0

7.0

7.0

7.0

7.0

6.9

6.9

6.3

6.3

5.8

5.9

5.8

5.4

4.7

4.5

3.75

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.7

2.6

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.05

1.05

1.0

.9

.9

.9

.9

1.0

.8

.6

.6

.6

.6

.5

.35

..........

..........

..........

..........

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.02

15.02

14.30

14.30

14.10

14.0

9.35

9.35

9.3

8.1

8.1

8.1

7.9

7.9

7.9

7.9

8.0

7.5

7.5

6.9

6.9

6.4

6.4

6.15

5.4

4.7

4.5

3.75

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

$9,343.50

9,005.84

8,658.38

6,553.83

6,249.60

5,859.00

5,387.40

5,116.00

4,672.80

4,271.40

3,337.95

3,029.40

2,762.10

2,097.90

1,854.90

1,433.70

1,303.50

1,208.70

1,113.90

1,042.00

874.00

675.00

585.00

538.20

538.20

499.20

422.40

405.90

259.20

225.60

216.00

180.00
22

Tax rates, employer and

employee, each OASDI

Tax rate,

Calendar self-employed

year

Wage

base OASDI HI Total

Maximum 

employee 

tax HI Total

Maximum 

self-empl. 

tax

1957-58

1955-56

1954

1951-53

1950

1937-49

4,200

4,200

3,600

3,600

3,000

3,000

2.25

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

..........

..........

..........

..........

..........

..........

2.25

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

94.50

84.00

72.00

54.00

45.00

30.00

3.375

3.0

3.0

2.25

..........

..........

..........

..........

..........

..........

..........

..........

3.375

3.0

3.0

2.25

..........

..........

141.75

126.00

108.00

81.00

..........

..........

1 Sources: Kollman, Geoffrey, CRS Report for Congress, "Summary of Major Changes in the Social 

Security Cash Benefits Program: 1935-1993, 94-36 EPW"; Joint Committee on Taxation. The dollar 

amounts for maximum self-employment tax do not equal two times the maximum employee tax because 

of deductions or credits available to self-employed individuals in some years.

2 After 1993, the cap on wages and self-employment income subject to the HI tax was removed.

3

 For 1991, the cap on wages and self-employment income subject to the HI tax was $125,000. 

For 1992, the cap for HI purposes was $130,200 and for 1993, the cap for HI purposes was 

$135,000.

Chart 1 - History of Federal Unemployment Tax Rate, 

1954-2000

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

195419561958196019621964196619681970197219741976197819801982198419861988199019921994199619982000

Year

Tax Rates in Percent

Statutory

Effective

Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the U.S. Department of Labor.
23

Legislative Background

The Social Security Act of 1935 was signed into law on August 14, 1935. In addition to 

the Federal old-age retirement program (title II), the original Social Security Act also included 

grants-in-aid to States for: old-age pensions based on need (title I); unemployment 

compensation systems (title III); aid to dependent children (title IV); maternal and child welfare 

services, care of crippled children (title V); aid to the blind (title X); and public health work (title 

VI). 

The original act has been amended on numerous occasions since 1935. However, the 

most significant changes to title II were made by the Social Security Amendments of 1939, 1950, 

1954, 1956, 1965, 1972, 1977, and 1983. In addition, the Medicare (title XVIII) program was 

added to the Social Security Act of 1965.

Today the term “Social Security” is seldom used to refer to all of the programs included 

in the Social Security Act. The term is most often used to refer to the old-age and survivor 

insurance program (OASI), the disability insurance program (DI), both under title II, and 

Medicare part A hospital insurance (HI) under title XVIII. Together these are known as the 

OASDHI programs.

In 1976, Congress passed a surtax of 0.2 percent of taxable wages to be added to the 

permanent FUTA tax rate. This surtax has been extended five times, (most recently by the 

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997) through December 31, 2007. Thus the current effective 0.8 

percent FUTA tax rate has two components: a permanent rate of 0.6 percent; and a surtax rate of 

0.2 percent. The wage base was held constant at $3,000 until 1971 and then was increased on a 

number of occasions.

The wage cap on the HI tax was repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 

1993. According to the legislative history, the repeal was intended to increase the progressivity 

of the Federal tax system and provide funding for HI trust fund to enhance its’ long-term 

solvency.

D. Earned Income Credit

Present Law

In general

Eligible low-income workers are able to claim a refundable earned income credit 

(“EIC”). The amount of the credit an eligible taxpayer may claim depends upon whether the 

taxpayer has one, more than one, or no qualifying children. In addition, to claim the credit, the 

taxpayer must have earned income. Earned income consists of wages, salaries, other employee 

compensation, and net earnings from self-employment.

The maximum EIC is phased in as an individual’s earned income increases. The credit 

phases out for individuals with earned income (or if greater, modified AGI) over certain levels.
24

The EIC is not available to married taxpayers filing separate returns.

Qualifying child 

In order to claim the EIC, a taxpayer must either (1) have a qualifying child or (2) meet 

the requirements for childless adults. A qualifying child must meet a relationship test, an age 

test, and a residence test. First, the qualifying child must be the taxpayer’s child, stepchild, 

adopted child, grandchild, or foster child. Second, the child must be under age 19, (or under age 

24 if a full-time student) or permanently and totally disabled regardless of age. Third, the child 

must live with the taxpayer in the United States for more than half the year (a full year for foster 

children). If a child otherwise qualifies with respect to more than one person, the child is treated 

as a qualifying child only of the person with the higher modified AGI.

A valid social security number must be provided with respect to each qualifying child 

with respect to which EIC is claimed. 

Requirements for adults without a qualifying child

In order to claim the EIC without a qualifying child, the taxpayer must be over age 24 

and under age 65. In addition, the taxpayer cannot be the dependent or qualifying child of 

another taxpayer.

Taxpayers with excessive investment income

A taxpayer with an excessive amount of disqualified income for the tax year cannot claim 

the EIC. For the taxable year 2001, that amount is $2,450. Disqualified income is the sum of (1) 

interest and dividends includible in gross income for the taxable year; (2) tax-exempt interest 

received or accrued in the taxable year; (3) net income from rents and royalties not derived in the 

ordinary course of business; (4) capital gain net income; and (5) net passive income.

Calculation of the credit

The credit is determined by multiplying the credit rate by the taxpayer's earned income 

up to an earned income threshold. The maximum amount of the credit is the product of the 

credit rate and the earned income threshold. The maximum credit amount applies to taxpayers 

with (1) earnings at or above the creditable limit and (2) modified AGI15 (or earnings, if greater) 

at or below the phaseout threshold level.

 

15 “Modified AGI” means AGI determined without regard to certain losses and increased 

by certain amounts not includible in gross income. The losses disregarded are: (1) net capital 

losses (up to $3,000); (2) net losses from estates and trusts; (3) net losses from nonbusiness rents 

and royalties; (4) 75 percent of the net losses from businesses, computed separately with respect 

to sole proprietorships (other than farming), farming sole proprietorships and other businesses. 

For purposes of (4), amounts attributable to a business that consists of the performance of 

services by the taxpayer as an employee are not taken into account. The amounts added to 

adjusted gross income to arrive at modified adjusted gross income include: (1) tax-exempt 

interest; and (2) nontaxable distributions from pensions, annuities, and individual retirement 

plans (but not nontaxable rollover distributions or trustee-to-trustee transfers). Sec. 32(c)(5). 
25

For taxpayers with modified AGI (or earned income, if greater) in excess of the phaseout 

threshold, the credit amount is reduced by the phaseout rate multiplied by the amount of earned 

income (or modified AGI, if greater) in excess of the phaseout threshold. In other words, the 

credit amount is reduced, falling to $0 at the “breakeven” income level, the point where a 

specified percentage of “excess” income above the phaseout threshold offsets exactly the 

maximum amount of the credit. The earned income threshold and the phaseout threshold are 

indexed for inflation. The table below shows the earned income credit parameters for the taxable 

year 2001.16

Table 7.--Earned Income Credit Parameters for Taxable Years Beginning in 2001

Two or more 

qualifying 

children

One qualifying

child

No qualifying 

children

Credit rate (percent)....................................

Earned income amount................................

Maximum credit .........................................

40.00%

$10,020

$4,008

34.00%

$7,130

$2,424

7.65%

$4,760

$364

Phase-out begins.........................................

Phase-out rate (percent)...............................

$13,090

21.06%

$13,090

15.98%

$5,950

7.65%

Phase-out ends............................................ $32,121 $28,281 $10,710

For the taxable year 2001, it is estimated that 4.8 million returns will be affected by the 

phasein, and 11.6 million returns will be affected by the phaseout. For the taxable year 2005, 

these numbers are estimated to slightly decrease, with 4.6 million returns affected by the phasein, 

and 11.3 million returns affected by the phaseout.

Advance payment option

Eligible taxpayers may elect to receive an advance payment of the EIC from their 

employer. Employers report the amount of the advance credit that an employee receives during 

the year on the employee’s Form W-2. The amount of the advance payment of the EIC is limited 

to 60 percent of the maximum credit available to an individual with one qualifying child. The 

advance payment option is not available to a taxpayer who does not have a qualifying child.

Taxpayers receiving advance EIC payments must file an income tax return regardless of 

their income level. The advance EIC payments are reported as “other tax” due on the return and 

the taxpayer is allowed the appropriate amount of EIC. By treating the advance EIC payments as 

additional tax, any excess payments over the appropriate amount of EIC are recaptured.

 

16 The table is based on Rev. Proc. 2001-13.
26

Taxpayers previously denied the EIC

Fraudulent and reckless claims

Any taxpayer who has been denied the EIC based on a final determination that the claim 

was fraudulent cannot claim the credit for a period of ten taxable years. The ten-year period 

begins after the most recent taxable year for which there was a final determination of fraud.

Taxpayers for whom there has been a final determination that the taxpayer’s claim was due 

to intentional or reckless disregard of the rules and regulations (but not fraud) are not allowed to 

claim the credit for two taxable years. The two-year period begins after the most recent taxable 

year for which there was a final determination of recklessness or intentional disregard.

Improper claims 

Taxpayers who are denied the credit as a result of deficiency procedures are not allowed 

to claim the credit for any subsequent taxable year unless the taxpayer provides the IRS with 

proof of eligibility for the credit. The form to demonstrate EIC eligibility for this purpose is 

Form 8862, “Information to Claim Earned Income Credit After Disallowance.” Failure to 

provide the information required to prove eligibility is treated as a mathematical or clerical error. 

The IRS may summarily assess the tax due as a result of the disallowance.17

Tax preparer penalties

The Code requires paid preparers who complete EIC returns to comply with due 

diligence requirements imposed by Treasury regulations. A penalty of $100 applies to each 

failure to comply with these requirements. Under the regulations, the preparer must: 

(1) complete the Eligibility Checklist (Form 8867, Paid Preparer's Earned Income 

Credit Checklist, or other permissible form), or otherwise record in its files the 

information necessary to complete it; 

(2) complete the Computation Worksheet (Earned Income Credit Worksheet found in 

the Form 1040 instructions), or otherwise record in its files the computation and 

information necessary to complete the worksheet; 

(3) have no knowledge, and have no reason to know, that any information it used to 

determine eligibility for, and the amount of, the EIC is incorrect; and

(4) retain these items for three years after the June 30th following the date the return 

or claim for refund was presented to the taxpayer for signature. The records may 

be retained on paper or electronically.18

 

17 Sec. 6213(g)(2)(K).

18 Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6695-2(b).
27

Legislative Background

The EIC was enacted in 1975 as a means of targeting tax relief to working low-income 

taxpayers with children. When the EIC was first enacted, its original purposes were to offset the 

impact of Social Security taxes on the available income of working poor families and to serve as 

an incentive for low-income persons to work (a “work bonus”).19 As originally enacted, the 

credit equaled 10 percent of the first $4,000 of earned income (i.e., a maximum credit of $400). 

The credit began to be phased out for taxpayers with earned income (or AGI, if greater) above 

$4,000, and was entirely phased out for taxpayers with income of $8,000. The original EIC did 

not vary by family size. 

The Revenue Act of 1978 increased the maximum credit to $500 (10 percent of the first 

$5,000 of earned income). Also, the income level at which the phaseout began was raised to 

$6,000, with a complete phaseout not occurring until an income level of $10,000. The Deficit 

Reduction Act of 1984 increased the maximum credit to $550 (11 percent of the first $5,000 of 

earned income) and the credit was phased out beginning at $6,500 of income and ending at 

$11,000.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased the maximum credit to $800 (14 percent of the 

first $5,714 of earned income), beginning in 1987. The maximum credit was reduced by 10 

cents for each dollar of earned income (or AGI, if greater) in excess of $9,000 ($6,500 in 1987). 

These $5,714 and $9,000 amounts (stated above in 1985 dollars) were indexed for inflation.

In 1990, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (“OBRA 1990”) increased the 

credit and adjusted the EIC for families with more than one child. 

OBRA 1990 also created two additional credits as part of the EIC: the supplemental 

young child credit and the supplemental health insurance credit. Both of these supplemental 

credits used the same income base as the basic EIC. The health insurance credit and phaseout 

rates were set at 6 percent and 4.285 percent, respectively. For the young child credit, eligible 

families with children under 1 year of age had an extra 5 percentage points added to their credit 

rate in computing the basic EIC amount. The young child credit was phased out by adding an 

extra 3.57 percentage points to the family’s phaseout rate. 

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (“OBRA 1993”) expanded the EIC in 

several ways, while repealing the supplemental young child credit and supplemental health 

insurance credit. For taxpayers with one qualifying child, the EIC was increased to 26.3 percent 

of the first $7,750 of earned income in 1994. For 1995 and thereafter, the credit rate was 

increased to 34 percent. In 1995, the maximum amount of earned income on which the credit 

could be claimed is $6,160 (this is a $6,000 base in 1994, adjusted for inflation). The phaseout 

rate for 1994 and thereafter is 15.98 percent.

For taxpayers with two or more qualifying children, the EIC was increased to 30 percent 

of the first $8,425 of earned income in 1994. The maximum credit for 1994 was $2,527 and was 

reduced by 17.68 percent of earned income (or AGI, if greater) in excess of $11,000. The credit 

 

19 S. Rep. No. 94-36 at 11 (1975).
28

rate increases over time and equals 36 percent for 1995 and 40 percent for 1996 and thereafter. 

The phaseout rate is 20.22 percent for 1995 and 21.06 percent for 1996 and thereafter.

OBRA 1993 also extended the EIC to taxpayers with no qualifying children. The 

rationale for this extension was to offset partly the effect of an OBRA 1993 gasoline tax increase 

on low-income persons, as well as to reduce the impact of income and payroll taxes on those 

with a lower ability to pay those taxes.20 This credit for taxpayers with no qualifying children is 

available to taxpayers over age 24 and below age 65. 

The implementing legislation for the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, enacted 

in 1994, made a number of modifications to the EIC. First, it denied the EIC to inmates for any 

amount received for services provided by the inmate in a penal institution. Second, it generally 

made nonresident aliens ineligible to claim the EIC. Third, it deemed that a member of the 

Armed Forces stationed outside the United States while serving on extended active duty would 

satisfy the test that the principal place of abode be within the United States. Fourth, it required 

that members of the Armed Forces receive annual reports from the Department of Defense of 

earned income (which includes nontaxable earned income such as amounts received as basic 

allowances for housing and subsistence). Fifth, it required a TIN for each qualifying child 

regardless of the dependent's age. Prior to the legislation, taxpayers had to provide a TIN only 

for qualifying children who attained the age of one before the close of the taxpayer's taxable 

year.

The Self-Employed Person's Health Care Reduction Extension Act of 1995 introduced 

the concept of disqualified income, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 

1995. A taxpayer is not eligible for the EIC if the aggregate amount of disqualified income (i.e., 

taxable and tax-exempt interest, dividends, and (if greater than zero) net rent and royalty income) 

of the taxpayer for the taxable year exceeds $2,350 (“the disqualified income test”).

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 included 

several changes to the EIC. First, it modified the disqualified income test by adding capital gain 

net income and net passive income (if greater than zero) that is not self-employment income to 

the definition of disqualified income, and by reducing the threshold above which an individual is 

not eligible for the EIC from $2,350 to $2,200 (indexed for inflation). Second, it modified the 

definition of AGI used for phasing out the earned income credit by disregarding certain losses. 

The losses disregarded are: (1) net capital losses (up to $3,000); (2) net loses from trusts and 

estates; (3) net losses from nonbusiness rents and royalties; and (4) 50 percent of the net losses 

from businesses, computed separately with respect to sole proprietorships (other than in 

farming), sole proprietorships in farming, and other businesses. Third, it applied mathematical 

and clerical error treatment to the failure to provide a correct Social Security Number (“SSN”) or 

to pay the proper amount of self-employment tax on net self-employment earnings on which an 

EIC is claimed. Finally, it denied the EIC to individuals whose SSNs were issued solely for 

purposes of the individual applying for or receiving Federally funded benefits.

 

20 H.R. Rep. No. 103-111 at 4, 609 (1993).
29

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (“TRA 1997”) included provisions to improve 

compliance as a result of concern over the error rates associated with EIC claims. The 

provisions: (1) deny the EIC for 10 years to taxpayers who fraudulently claimed the EIC (2 years 

for EIC claims which are a result of reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations); (2) 

require EIC recertification for a taxpayer who is denied the EIC; (3) impose due diligence 

requirements on paid preparers of returns involving the EIC; (4) provide the Treasury 

Department with access to the Federal Case Registry of Child Support orders; and (5) allow 

expanded use of Social Security Administration records to enforce the tax laws including the 

EIC. TRA 1997 also (1) added two items of nontaxable income to the definition of modified 

AGI (tax-exempt interest and nontaxable distributions from pension, annuities, and IRAs (other 

than rollover distributions)) and (2) increased the disregarded amount of net business losses from 

50 percent to 75 percent.

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 increased the IRS authorization to improve 

enforcement of the EIC. Congress authorized the IRS to spend a total of $716 million over a 5-

year period for the improved administration of the EIC.

Below are tables showing the historical earned income parameters, the number of 

recipients, and amount of credit. 
30

Table 8.--Earned Income Credit Parameters, 1975-2000

[Dollar amounts unadjusted for inflation]

Phaseout range

Calendar year

Credit 

rate 

(percent)

Income for 

maximum 

credit

Maximum 

credit

Phaseout 

rate 

(percent)

Beginning 

income

Ending 

income

1975-78

1979-84

1985-86

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991:

One child

Two children

1992:

One child

Two children

1993:

One child

Two children

1994:

No children

One child

Two children

1995:

No children

One child

Two children

1996:

No children

One child

Two children

1997:

No children

One child

Two children

1998:

No children

One child

Two children

1999:

No children

One child

Two children

10.00

10.00

14.00

14.00

14.00

14.00

14.00

16.70

17.30

17.60

18.40

18.50

19.50

7.65

26.30

30.00

7.65

34.00

36.00

7.65

34.00

40.00

7.65

34.00

40.00

7.65

34.00

40.00

7.65

34.00

40.00

$4,000

5,000

5,000

6,080

6,240

6,500

6,810

7,140

7,140

7,520

7,520

7,750

7,750

4,000

7,750

8,425

4,100

6,160

8,640

4,220

6,330

8,890

4,340

6,500

9,140

4,460

6,680

9,390

4,530

6,800

9,540

$400

500

550

851

874

910

953

1,192

1,235

1,324

1,384

1,434

1,511

306

2,038

2,528

314

2,094

3,110

323

2,152

3,556

332

2,210

3,656

341

2,271

3,756

347

2,312

3,816

10.00

12.50

12.22

10.00

10.00

10.00

10.00

11.93

12.36

12.57

13.14

13.21

13.93

7.65

15.98

17.68

7.65

15.98

20.22

7.65

15.98

21.06

7.65

15.98

21.06

7.65

15.98

21.06

7.65

15.98

21.06

$4,000

6,000

6,500

6,920

9,840

10,240

10,730

11,250

11,250

11,840

11,840

12,200

11,200

5,000

11,000

11,000

5,130

11,290

11,290

5,280

11,610

11,610

5,430

11,930

11,930

5,570

12,260

12,260

5,670

12,460

12,460

$8,000

10,000

11,000

15,432

18,576

19,340

20,264

21,250

21,250

22,370

22,370

23,050

23,050

9,000

23,755

25,296

9,230

24,396

26,673

9,500

25,078

28,495

9,770

25,750

29,290

10,030

26,473

30,095

10,200

26,928

30,580

2000:

No children

One child

Two children

7.65

34.00

40.00

4,610

6,920

9,720

353

2,353

3,888

7.65

15.98

21.06

15,700

12,690

12,690

10,380

27,413

31,152

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation
31

Table 9.--Earned Income Credit: Number of Recipients

and Amount of Credit, 1975-2000

Year

Number of 

recipient 

families 

(thousands)

Total amount

of credit 

(millions)

Refunded 

portions

of credit

(millions)

Average

credit

per family

1975...................................

1976...................................

1977...................................

1978...................................

1979...................................

1980...................................

1981...................................

1982...................................

1983...................................

1984...................................

1985...................................

1986...................................

1987...................................

1988...................................

1989...................................

1990...................................

1991...................................

1992...................................

1993...................................

1994...................................

1995...................................

1996...................................

1997...................................

19981..................................

19992..................................

20002..................................

20012..................................

20022..................................

6,215

6,473

5,627

5,192

7,135

6,954

6,717

6,395

7,368

6,376

7,432

7,156

8,738

11,148

11,696

12,542

13,665

14,097

15,117

19,017

19,334

19,464

19,391

19,766

20,453

19,838

19,492

19,054

$1,250

1,295

1,127

1,048

2,052

1,986

1,912

1,775

1,795

1,638

2,088

2,009

3,391

5,896

6,595

7,542

11,105

13,028

15,537

21,105

25,956

28,825

30,389

31,777

32,269

33,384

33,604

33,973

$900

890

880

801

1,395

1,370

1,278

1,222

1,289

1,162

1,499

1,479

2,930

4,237

4,636

5,266

8,183

9,959

12,028

16,598

20,829

23,157

24,396

27,175

27,602

28,555

26,666

28,881

$201

200

200

202

288

286

285

278

224

257

281

281

450

529

564

601

813

924

1,028

1,110

1,342

1,481

1,567

1,608

1,578

1,682

1,723

1,783

1

 Preliminary.

2

 Projected.

Source: For 1975-98, Internal Revenue Service; for 1999-2002, Joint Committee on Taxation.
32

III. THE PRESIDENT’S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE PROPOSALS

In general

The proposal would create a new low-rate regular income tax bracket for a portion of 

taxable income that is currently taxed at 15 percent. The proposal would reduce other regular 

income tax rates and consolidate rate brackets. By 2006, the present-law structure of five regular 

income tax rates (15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent and 39.6 percent) would be 

reduced to four rates of 10 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, and 33 percent. The proposal would 

repeal the present-law provisions that offset the refundable child credit and the earned income 

credit by the amount of the alternative minimum tax. 

New low-rate bracket

The proposal would establish a new regular income tax rate bracket for a portion of 

taxable income that is currently taxed at 15 percent, as shown in Table 10, below. The taxable 

income levels for the new low-rate bracket would be adjusted annually for inflation for taxable 

years beginning after December 31, 2006. 

Table 10.--Proposed New Low-Rate Bracket

Taxable Income

Calendar Year

Single 

Individuals

Heads of 

Household

Married Filing 

Joint Returns Proposed New Rate

2002 0-$6,000 0-$10,000 0-$12,000 14%

2003 0-$6,000 0-$10,000 0-$12,000 13%

2004 0-$6,000 0-$10,000 0-$12,000 12%

2005 0-$6,000 0-$10,000 0-$12,000 11%

2006 0-$6,000 0-$10,000 0-$12,000 10%

2007 and later Adjust annually for inflation 10%

Modification of 15-percent bracket

The 15-percent regular income tax bracket would be modified to begin at the end of the 

new low-rate regular income tax bracket. The 15-percent regular income tax bracket would end 

at the same level as under present law.

Reduction of other rates and consolidation of rate brackets

The present-law regular income tax rates of 28 percent and 31 percent would be phased 

down to 25 percent over five years, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 

2001. The taxable income level for the new 25-percent rate bracket would begin at the level at 

which the 28-percent rate bracket begins under present law and end at the level at which the 31-

percent rate bracket ends under present law.
33

The present-law regular income tax rates of 36 percent and 39.6 percent would be phased 

down to 33 percent over five years, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 

2001. The taxable income level for the new 33 percent-rate bracket would begin at the level at 

which the 36-percent rate bracket begins under present law.

Table 11, below, shows the schedule of proposed regular income tax rate reductions. 

Table 11.--Proposed Regular Income Tax Rate Reductions

Calendar Year

28% rate

reduced to:

31% rate

reduced to:

36% rate

reduced to:

39.6% rate 

reduced to:

2002 27% 30% 35% 38%

2003 27% 29% 35% 37%

2004 26% 28% 34% 36%

2005 26% 27% 34% 35%

2006 and later 25% 25% 33% 33%

Projected regular income tax rate schedules under the proposal

Table 12, below, shows the projected individual regular income tax rate schedules when 

the rate reductions are fully phased in (i.e., for 2006). As under present law, the rate brackets for 

married taxpayers filing separate returns would be one half the rate brackets for married 

individuals filing joint returns. In addition, appropriate adjustments would be made to the 

separate, compressed rate schedule for estate and trusts.
34

Table 12.--Individual Regular Income Tax Rates for 2006 (Projected)

If taxable income is: Then regular income tax equals:

Single individuals

$0-6,000............................................... 10 percent of taxable income

$6,000-30,950 ...................................... $600, plus 15 percent of the amount over $6,000

$30,950-$156,300................................. $4,342.50, plus 25% of the amount over $30,950

Over $156,300...................................... $35,680, plus 33% of the amount over $156,300

Heads of households

$0-$10,000........................................... 10 percent of taxable income

$10,000-$41,450................................... $1,000, plus 15% of the amount over $10,000

$41,450-$173,300................................. $5,717.50, plus 25% of the amount over $41,450

Over $173,300...................................... $38,680, plus 33% of the amount over $173,300

Married individuals filing joint returns

$0-$12,000........................................... 10 percent of taxable income

$12,000-$51,700................................... $1,200, plus 15% of the amount over $12,000

$51,700-$190,300................................. $7155, plus 25% of the amount over $51,700

$190,300.............................................. $41,805, plus 33% of the amount over $190,300

Effective Date

The proposals generally would apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 

2001.
35

IV. BACKGROUND ECONOMIC DATA

Table 13 shows some background aggregate economic data for recent years that is potentially 

relevant to a discussion of marginal rate issues. Table 13 shows data since 1990 for nominal 

Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) and nominal individual income tax revenues. The table shows 

that individual income tax revenues have grown faster than GDP and that as a percentage of 

GDP individual income tax revenues have grown from 8.0 percent to 10.1 percent. Numerous 

factors play a role in the relationship of GDP growth to individual income tax growth; among 

them are major tax law changes such as those enacted in 1990, 1993, and 1997, increases in 

wages above increases in inflation that cause the so-called “real” bracket creep (because features 

of the tax Code that are indexed are only indexed to capture the effects of inflation rather than 

real growth), changes in the distribution of economic growth (because of our progressive tax 

system, tax revenues will rise faster if income growth is skewed towards the top of the income 

distribution), and capital gains realizations, which influence tax revenues but have no direct 

relation to GDP.

It would be difficult if not impossible to accurately sort out the influences of these various 

factors even with an exhaustive study of the issue. With respect to the issue of real bracket 

creep, Table 14 shows data on nominal average weekly earnings and on the level of the 

Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). Between 1990 and 2000, nominal average weekly earnings grew 

37 percent while the CPI grew 32 percent. This modestly stronger growth in earnings would 

gradually push taxpayers into higher marginal rate brackets in a tax system that is indexed only 

for inflation and is not otherwise altered through changes in law. Growth in GDP in excess of 

the CPI or other price indices is not directly relevant to the issue of bracket creep, as real GDP 

growth is strongly influenced by population growth, and real growth that merely reflects 

population growth will not push taxpayers into higher tax brackets. Thus, for example, if GDP 

doubles but the number of tax filers also doubles, income reported per tax return will not change 

and thus taxpayers will not experience bracket creep.21

Table 15 below shows Internal Revenue Service data for the number of taxpayers per 

marginal rate bracket for 1983 (the earliest year data are available), 1990, and 1997 (the latest 

year of data availability). The table also shows the average marginal tax rate for each year. The 

average marginal tax rate is equal to the sum of the number of taxpayers per bracket times the 

marginal rate, divided by the total number of taxpayers. Thus for example if there were 20 

taxpayers in the 15-percent bracket and 10 in the 28-percent bracket, the average marginal rate 

would equal (20x15 +10x28)/(20+10) = 19.33 percent. The Joint Committee on Taxation 

estimates that in 2001 there will be 62.8 million taxpayers in the 15-percent rate bracket and 38 

million in the 28-percent brackets and above. By 2005, 65.1 million taxpayers are estimated to 

be in 15-percent rate bracket for a 3.7 percent increase, while 42.7 million taxpayers are 

estimated to be in the 28-percent brackets or higher, for an increase of 12.4 percent. 

 

21 As discussed above, GDP growth does not directly relate to income reported on tax 

returns, though the two are highly correlated over long periods of time. The statement assumes a 

direct relationship for ease of exposition. 
36

Finally, tables 16 and 17 show the distribution of tax liability by income class for 2001, for, 

respectively, the individual income tax and the combined individual income taxes, employment taxes, 

and excise taxes.

Table 14. Nominal average weekly earnings vs. Consumer Price Index

Nominal average Consumer

weekly Price Index

Year earnings

1990 $ 345.35 130.7

1991 353.98 136.2

1992 363.61 140.3

1993 373.64 144.5

1994 385.86 148.2

1995 394.34 152.4

1996 406.61 156.9

1997 424.89 160.5

1998 442.19 163.0

1999 456.78 166.6

2000 474.03 172.2

Percentage Change 1990-2000: 37% 32%

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; employment data is for

 production or non-supervisory workers in private non-agricultural industries.

Table 13. Individual Income tax revenues as a share of Gross Domestic Product

Nominal Individual income Individual income

GDP (1) tax revenues (1) tax as share of 

GDP (2)

Year

1990 $ 5,803.20 $ 466.90 8.1%

1991 5,986.20 467.80 7.9%

1992 6,318.90 476.00 7.7%

1993 6,642.30 509.70 7.8%

1994 7,054.30 543.10 7.8%

1995 7,400.50 590.20 8.1%

1996 7,813.20 656.40 8.5%

1997 8,318.40 737.50 9.0%

1998 8,790.20 828.60 9.6%

1999 9,299.20 879.50 9.6%

2000 9,965.70 1,004.50 10.2%

Percentage Change 1990-2000: 72% 115% 26%

Notes:

(1) GDP data is on a calendar year basis, while tax revenues are on a fiscal year basis

(2) Congressional Budget Office calculations adjusting for calendar year/fiscal year discrepancy

Source: Congressional Budget Office, Department of the Treasury and Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
37

Marginal Percent Percent Percent

tax Number of total Number of total Number of total 

rate returns returns returns returns returns returns

10 -- -- -- -- 506,115 1%

11 6,673,952 8% -- -- -- --

13 5,785,666 7% -- -- -- --

15 14,132,745 18% 65,767,284 71% 68,703,363 70%

17 8,330,386 10% -- -- -- --

18 1,187,845 1% -- -- -- --

19 9,101,399 11% -- -- -- --

20 -- -- -- -- 897,974 1%

21 2,882,329 4% -- -- -- --

23 5,625,610 7% -- -- -- --

24 2,679,437 3% -- -- -- --

25 717,738 1% -- -- 37,749 0%

26 5,624,855 7% -- -- -- --

28 2,862,298 4% 23,877,696 26% 23,821,494 24%

29 298,858 0% -- -- -- --

30 4,197,801 5% -- -- -- --

31 -- -- -- -- 2,868,200 3%

32 1,580,014 2% -- -- -- --

33 -- -- 3,050,051 3% -- --

34 122,785 0% -- -- -- --

35 4,049,996 5% -- -- -- --

36 672,438 1% -- -- 1,169,742 1%

37 80,667 0% -- -- -- --

39.6 -- -- -- -- 691,359 1%

40 2,068,920 3% -- -- -- --

44 842,641 1% -- -- -- --

45 236,934 0% -- -- -- --

48 261,970 0% -- -- -- --

50 557,809 1% -- -- -- --

Total returns 80,575,093 92,695,031 98,695,996

Average marginal tax rate 21.0% 18.9% 19.0%

Notes: Source: Internal Revenue Service, Individual Income tax returns, 1983, 1990,1997.

Data not available prior to 1983 or later than 1997.

Table 15. Tax returns by the highest marginal rate at which tax was computed,

1983, 1990, 1997

1983 1990 1997
38

Table 16. DISTRIBUTION OF 

FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX LIABILITY (1)

 Calendar Year 2001

NUMBER OF RETURNS

INCOME NUMBER OF INCOME INDIVIDUAL WITH ZERO OR 

CATEGORY (2) RETURNS (3) INCOME TAX NEGATIVE LIABILITY

Millions Percent Billions Percent Billions Percent Millions Percent

Less than $10,000............. 19.9 14.0% $83 1.0% -$6 -0.6% 18.8 38.7%

 10,000 to 20,000...............23.3 16.4% 347 4.2% -10 -1.0% 16.2 33.3%

 20,000 to 30,000...............18.5 13.0% 460 5.6% 9 0.9% 8.1 16.6%

 30,000 to 40,000...............15.8 11.1% 549 6.7% 28 2.8% 3.2 6.6%

 40,000 to 50,000...............13.1 9.2% 589 7.2% 39 3.9% 1.4 3.0%

 50,000 to 75,000...............21.9 15.4% 1,337 16.4% 112 11.1% 0.8 1.6%

 75,000 to 100,000...............12.9 9.1% 1,121 13.7% 119 11.8% 0.1 0.1%

100,000 to 200,000...............12.8 9.0% 1,683 20.6% 237 23.6% (4) 0.1%

200,000 and over............... 3.8 2.7% 1,999 24.5% 478 47.5% (4) (5)

Total, All Taxpayers..........142.0 100.0% $8,168 100.0% $1,006 100.0% 48.6 100.0%

 Highest 10%........................... 14.2 10.0% 3,431 42.0% 686 68.2% (4) 0.1%

 Highest 5%............................. 7.1 5.0% 2,556 31.3% 570 56.6% (4) (5)

 Highest 1%............................. 1.4 1.0% 1,402 17.2% 361 35.9% (4) (5)

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

-----------------------------------------------------

(1) Includes the outlay portion of the EIC.

(2) The income concept used to place tax returns into income categories is adjusted gross income (AGI) plus: [1] tax-exempt 

 interest, [2] employer contributions for health plans and life insurance, [3] employer share of FICA tax, [4] worker's compensation, 

 [5] nontaxable social security benefits, [6] insurance value of Medicare benefits, [7] alternative minimum tax preference items, and

 [8] excluded income of U.S. citizens living abroad. Categories are measured at 2001 levels.

 The highest 10% begins at $107,455, the highest 5% at $145,199 and the highest 1% at $340,306.

(3) Includes filing and nonfiling units. Individuals who are dependents of other taxpayers and taxpayers with negative income are excluded.

(4) Less than 50,000.

(5) Less than 0.005%.
39

Table 17. DISTRIBUTION OF 

FEDERAL TAX LIABILITY (1)

 Calendar Year 2001

INCOME NUMBER OF INCOME FEDERAL

CATEGORY (2) RETURNS (3) TAX LIABILITY

Millions Percent Billions Percent Billions Percent

Less than $10,000............. 19.9 14.0% $83 1.0% $7 0.4%

 10,000 to 20,000............... 23.3 16.4% 347 4.2% 26 1.5%

 20,000 to 30,000............... 18.5 13.0% 460 5.6% 62 3.5%

 30,000 to 40,000............... 15.8 11.1% 549 6.7% 89 5.1%

 40,000 to 50,000............... 13.1 9.2% 589 7.2% 102 5.9%

 50,000 to 75,000............... 21.9 15.4% 1,337 16.4% 256 14.6%

 75,000 to 100,000............... 12.9 9.1% 1,121 13.7% 244 13.9%

100,000 to 200,000............... 12.8 9.0% 1,683 20.6% 408 23.3%

200,000 and over............... 3.8 2.7% 1,999 24.5% 555 31.7%

Total, All Taxpayers.......... 142.0 100.0% $8,168 100.0% $1,748 100.0%

 Highest 10%...........................14.2 10.0% 3,431 42.0% 907 51.9%

 Highest 5%.............................7.1 5.0% 2,556 31.3% 696 39.8%

 Highest 1%.............................1.4 1.0% 1,402 17.2% 396 22.6%

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

-----------------------------------------------------

(1) Federal taxes are equal to individual income tax (including the outlay portion of the EIC), employment tax (attributed to employees), 

 and excise taxes (attributed to consumers). Corporate income tax and estate and gift taxes are not included due to uncertainty

 concerning the incidence of these taxes.

(2) The income concept used to place tax returns into income categories is adjusted gross income (AGI) plus: [1] tax-exempt 

 interest, [2] employer contributions for health plans and life insurance, [3] employer share of FICA tax, [4] worker's compensation, 

 [5] nontaxable social security benefits, [6] insurance value of Medicare benefits, [7] alternative minimum tax preference items, and

 [8] excluded income of U.S. citizens living abroad. Categories are measured at 2001 levels.

 The highest 10% begins at $107,455, the highest 5% at $145,199 and the highest 1% at $340,306.

(3) Includes filing and nonfiling units. Individuals who are dependents of other taxpayers and taxpayers with negative income are excluded.
40

V. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES

In general

The issue of the appropriate marginal tax rate structure raises numerous policy issues. 

First, economists argue that effective marginal tax rates create incentives, or disincentives, for 

taxpayers to work, save, donate to charity, and engage in other types of activities. These 

incentives may distort taxpayer choice. Distorted choice may promote an inefficient allocation of 

society's labor and capital resources. 

Higher marginal tax rates typically lead to increased aggregate tax liabilities. A second 

question of tax policy is whether these increased aggregate tax liabilities are equitably distributed 

across taxpayers. 

A third issue relates to the complexity and lack of clarity created by multiple rates and 

various phaseout provisions that affect marginal tax rates. The creation of phaseouts adds 

complexity to the Code. Additional instructions are required and additional computations must 

be made. These provisions also may confuse taxpayers regarding what precisely is the tax base 

and what sort of preferences exist in the Code. Complexity and lack of clarity may promote 

taxpayer disillusionment, a sense of unfairness regarding the Code, and reduce compliance. 

The discussion below addresses each of these issues. It also discusses certain issues that 

further affect effective marginal tax rates: the extent to which taxpayers may be subject to 

multiple phaseout provisions; the determination of effective marginal tax rates when one 

considers that many taxpayers also may be subject to the payroll tax; the determination of 

effective marginal tax rates when one considers interaction between the regular tax and the 

alternative minimum tax; and the determination of effective marginal tax rates when one 

considers interaction with State income taxes.

Issues of efficiency and growth

Economists often emphasize the importance of effective marginal tax rates because, they 

argue, it is effective marginal tax rates that create incentives, or disincentives, for taxpayers to 

work, to save, or to take advantage of various tax preferences. These incentives may distort 

taxpayer choice. Distorted choice may promote an inefficient allocation of society's labor and 

capital resources. A more efficient allocation of labor and capital resources would leave society 

with the same output of goods and services as it has today, plus additional resources that could 

be used to increase output. For this reason, economists believe that increasing efficiency in an 

economy will result in increased growth in the economy. Some analysts have suggested that 

high effective marginal tax rates may alter taxpayers' decisions to work. For example, assume a 

married couple with two dependent children currently in the 31-percent tax bracket has an AGI 

of $199,450. This AGI would place the couple at the bottom of the phaseout range of the 

personal exemption phaseout for 2001. Further assume that one of the couple has an opportunity 

to take on an additional project at work that will increase the couple's net income by $2,500. As 

was established in Part II above, the additional $2,500 in income to this couple will increase the 
41

couple's tax liability by $847, leaving the couple an after tax net addition to income of $1,653.22 

The taxpayer may feel net remuneration of $1,653 is insufficient to offset the loss of leisure time 

and the effort that would be expended to complete the project. If the taxpayer chooses not to 

work, society loses the benefit of his or her labor.

There is disagreement among economists on the extent to which labor supply decisions 

are affected by the effective marginal tax rate. Empirical evidence indicates that taxpayer 

response is likely to vary depending upon a number of taxpayer specific factors. In general, 

findings indicate that the labor supply of so-called "primary earners" tends to be less responsive 

to changes in effective marginal tax rates than is the labor supply of "secondary earners."23 

Some have suggested that the labor supply decision of the lower earner or "secondary earner" in 

married households may be quite sensitive to the household's effective marginal tax rate.24 Other 

evidence suggests the decision to work additional hours may be less sensitive to changes in the 

effective marginal tax rate than the decision to enter the labor force.25 That is, there may be 

more effect on an individual currently not in the labor force than on an individual already in the 

labor force.

However, the importance of the personal exemption phaseout to the labor supply decision 

in the example above is not in the total effective marginal tax rate, but only in the incremental 

effect of the personal exemption phaseout provision. Because the couple is otherwise in the 31-

percent statutory marginal tax bracket, in the absence of the personal exemption phaseout, an 

additional $2,500 of income would provide a net increase in after-tax income of $1,725 ($2,500 

in gross income less $775 in income taxes that would result from the 31-percent statutory 

 

22 As explained in Part II, an additional $2,500 in income of this couple results in an 

effective marginal tax rate that is equal to the couple's statutory tax rate (31 percent) multiplied 

by one plus 0.0232 times the number of personal exemptions the couple many claim (four), or 31 

percent multiplied by 1.0928, resulting in an effective marginal tax rate of 33.88 percent.

23 The phrase "primary earner" refers to the individual in the household who is 

responsible for providing the largest portion of household income. "Secondary earners" are 

earners other then the primary earner.

24 See, Charles L. Ballard, John B. Shoven, and John Whalley, "General Equilibrium 

Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic 

Review, 75, March 1985, for a review of econometric studies on labor supply of so-called 

primary and secondary earners. United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, For Better 

or For Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax, June 1997, pp. 10-12, also reviews this 

literature.

25 Robert K. Triest, "The Effect of Income Taxation on Labor Supply in the United 

States," Journal of Human Resources, 25, 1990. More recently, Nada Eissa, "Tax Reforms and 

Labor Supply," in James M. Poterba, editor, Tax Policy and the Economy, 10, (Cambridge: The 

MIT press), 1996, reviews this literature with particular emphasis on the labor supply of women. 

Her evidence suggests that marginal tax rates may be an important determinant of labor force 

participation.
42

marginal tax rate). The personal exemption phaseout reduces the net after-tax income by an 

additional $72. One might conclude from this comparison that whatever marginal disincentive 

effect there might be is largely due to the statutory rate and that the incremental efficiency loss 

from the provisions by which the effective marginal tax rate deviates from the statutory marginal 

tax rate may be relatively small. That conclusion may not be correct in all circumstances. The 

efficiency loss increases as the effective marginal tax rate increases. That is, an increase in an 

effective marginal tax rate from 30 percent to 31 percent creates a greater efficiency loss per 

dollar of additional tax revenue than an increase in an effective marginal tax rate from 20 percent 

to 21 percent.26 Without specific information regarding taxpayer behavioral response, it is not 

possible to quantify the magnitude of the efficiency loss that might be created.

Economists have undertaken special study of the effect of effective marginal tax rates 

that are created by the EIC.27 Because, as Table 8 in Part II, above, shows, the EIC creates

varying effective marginal tax rates, the aggregate effect on the economy from the EIC's 

structure is difficult to determine. In theory, for a taxpayer in the phase-in range, the EIC may 

either increase or decrease his or her labor supply. While the higher net return to additional work 

made possible by the phase-in makes more work attractive, the taxpayer's greater total income as 

a result of the subsidy makes leisure time attractive as well. A taxpayer in the flat range has no 

marginal inducement to increase work and, by having increased the taxpayer's net income, the 

EIC may make leisure time more appealing. In the phaseout range, the higher effective marginal 

tax rate combined with the increase in net income provided by the EIC makes additional work 

less appealing than additional leisure time. With more taxpayers in the phaseout and flat ranges, 

one might expect the EIC has a negative aggregate effect on labor supply. The aggregate effect 

depends on the strength of the offsetting incentives. Using empirical data, analysts disagree 

regarding the aggregate effects.28

 

26 In fact, the magnitude of the efficiency loss from taxation depends upon a measure of 

the taxpayer's behavioral response, or the elasticity, and the square of the total effective marginal 

tax rate. Hence, a small change in an effective tax rate can create an efficiency loss that is large 

in relation to the change in revenue. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Joint Committee 

on Taxation, Methodology and Issues in Measuring Changes in the Distribution of Tax Burdens 

(JCS-7-93) June 14, 1993, pp. 20-31 and Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance, second edition, 

(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin), 1988, pp. 291-314.

27 For a review of this literature, see Stacy Dickert, Scott Houser, and John Karl Scholz, 

"The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs: A Study of Labor Market and Program 

Participation," in James M. Poterba, editor, Tax Policy and the Economy, 9, Cambridge: The 

MIT Press), 1995. Eissa, "Tax Reforms and Labor Supply," also reviews the effects of the EIC 

on female labor supply.

28 Dickert, Houser, and Scholz, "The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs," 

estimated that the 1993 expansion of the EIC would have the effect of reducing hours worked by 

families already in the labor force, but that loss would be more than offset by increased labor 

force participation by low-income individuals not previously in the labor force.
43

An economy’s total output capacity depends heavily on the amount of labor available to 

contribute to production. To the extent that portions of the potential labor force are sensitive to 

the effects of marginal tax rates on their after-tax wages, a reduction in the high rates generated 

by certain portions of the Code can contribute to increased growth in the economy. 

The distorted choices that may result from increased effective marginal tax rates are not 

limited to decisions to work. By reducing the after-tax return to saving, increased effective 

marginal tax rates may distort taxpayers' decisions to save. Substantial disagreement exists 

among economists as to the effect on saving of changes in the net return to saving. Empirical 

investigation of the responsiveness of personal saving to after-tax returns provides no conclusive 

results. If saving is reduced, capital available for investment is reduced. Investment in 

technology, equipment, and structures is the engine for future productivity increases and growth 

in an economy. Increases in productivity increase wage rates, which provide incentives for 

increased labor supply. For this reason, tax policy affecting marginal tax rates on asset income

can also have a significant effect on the economy’s capacity for future growth.

Additionally, increased effective marginal tax rates may encourage taxpayers to seek 

compensation in the form of tax-free fringe benefits rather than taxable compensation. Such 

distortions in consumption represent an efficiency loss to the economy. Increased effective 

marginal tax rates also may alter taxpayers' decisions regarding when to recognize income or 

claim expenses. Any such tax-motivated changes in the timing of income or expense generally 

require time and expense by the taxpayer. Such time and expense represents an efficiency loss to 

the economy.29 As noted above in the context of labor supply, it is difficult to determine the 

magnitude of potential efficiency loss that may arise from provisions that create an effective 

marginal tax rate that deviates from the statutory marginal tax rate without information regarding 

the taxpayers' responses to changes in tax rates.

With respect to increased marginal tax rates resulting from phaseout provisions, the onetime or temporary nature of a provision may limit taxpayer behavioral response to the deviation 

in the effective marginal tax rate from the statutory marginal tax rate. If taxpayer behavioral 

response is limited, efficiency loss is limited. For example, itemized deductions for unusually 

large medical expenses, itemized deductions for unreimbursed casualty losses, the adoption 

credit or exclusion, the recapture of interest from a qualified mortgage bond, and the first-time 

purchase of a home in the District of Columbia tend to be events that happen once or 

infrequently. If a taxpayer is subject to the effective marginal tax rate created by these provisions 

for only one year, the taxpayer is less likely to reduce labor supply, change the type of 

compensation they receive, or reduce saving. On the other hand, if the taxpayer has the 

opportunity to plan in advance, the one-time nature of these events may induce the taxpayer to 

shift the timing of income or expense. Similarly, expenditures on college tuition and repayment 

of student loans are of limited duration. In such circumstances, the increase in effective marginal 

tax rates above the statutory tax rates may not lead to a reduction in the labor supply of the 

 

29 For a recent review of some of the economic literature relating to taxes and labor 

supply, consumption distortions, and the timing of income recognition see, John F. Navratil, 

Essays on the Impact of Marginal Tax Rate Reductions on the Reporting of Taxable Income on 

Individual Income Tax Returns, unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. Thesis, 1995.
44

taxpayer. Other provisions such as the EIC, the phaseout of personal exemptions and the overall 

limitation on itemized deductions might be expected to affect the same taxpayers year after year. 

These provisions may be more likely to create efficiency loss.

Issues of equity

Analysts generally apply two concepts when assessing the equity, or fairness, of a tax 

system: vertical equity and horizontal equity. The concept of vertical equity compares the tax 

burdens of taxpayers at different levels of income and asks how the tax burdens of lower-income 

taxpayers compare to the tax burdens of higher-income taxpayers. There is no agreed upon 

standard as to what is the fairest distribution of tax burdens in comparison to the taxpayer's 

income. Vertical equity is usually discussed in terms of the progressivity or regressivity of the 

tax system. The concept of horizontal equity asks whether taxpayers who otherwise are similarly 

situated bear the same tax burden. A taxpayer's income usually is used as the measure to assess 

equality of economic circumstances.

Overall, the Federal individual income tax is a progressive tax. That is, the average tax 

rate increases as taxpayers' incomes increase. The existence of phaseouts and other provisions 

that create effective marginal tax rates that differ from statutory marginal tax rates do not make 

the Federal individual income tax a regressive or proportional tax. Phaseouts and similar 

provisions (e.g., the 2 percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions) generally operate to 

increase the overall progressivity of the income tax. The majority of the provisions deny tax 

benefits to higher-income taxpayers, while preserving tax benefits to low-income and middleincome taxpayers. Indeed, the legislative rationale underlying some of the phase-out provisions 

was to deny tax benefits to taxpayers with incomes above some specified level. For example, the 

earned income credit reduces the income tax liabilities of certain low-income taxpayers, and its 

phaseout denies the same benefits to middle-income and higher-income taxpayers. As a result, 

the tax burden as a proportion of income rises as taxpayers' incomes increase. Similarly, the 

phaseout of the personal exemptions maintains the tax benefit of the personal exemptions for all 

taxpayers with incomes below the phaseout range, denies the tax benefit to all taxpayers with 

income above the phase-out range, and partially denies the tax benefit within the phase-out 

range. In this way, the phaseout increases the overall progressivity of the income tax.

If the rate structure is altered, the progressivity of the income tax system will change 

unless taxes are cut or raised in direct proportion to current liabilities. Proportional cuts or 

increases will maintain the same level of progressivity (that is, the share of total income taxes 

paid will remain the same for a given share of taxpayers). As a result of the progressivity of the 

current tax system, a proportional cut in taxes necessarily means that the dollar amount of the tax 

cut will be skewed towards upper income taxpayers in direct proportion to the manner in which 

tax liabilities are skewed towards upper income taxpayers. Similarly, a proportional increase in 

taxes would necessarily mean that the dollar amount of the tax increase would be skewed 

towards upper income taxpayers for the same reasons.
45

Complexity and clarity

It is not generally believed that the number of marginal rates in the basic statutory rate 

structure has a significant impact on complexity.30 In terms of calculating tax liabilities, the 

basic tables provided by the IRS enable the taxpayer to quickly determine liability once taxable 

income is known, as the tables themselves have factored in the effect of the various rates. Some 

observers however have argued that multiple rates create complexities in tax planning since the 

timing of income can become more important in order to minimize tax liability. For example, if 

the realization of a $10,000 capital gain would push a taxpayer into a higher tax bracket (or push 

them into the phaseout range of a tax benefit) but a $5,000 realization would not, it would pay 

for that taxpayer to realize the $10,000 gain in two separate years to minimize liability. With 

broader tax brackets (and hence fewer rates), such timing issues will be less of a concern because 

broader rate brackets mean that more income is taxed at a given rate and it is then less likely that 

variability in income over time would alter a taxpayer’s cumulative tax liability over that time.

Phaseouts increase complexity in several ways. For those taxpayers in the phaseout 

range, separate worksheet calculations must be made to determine the amount of the tax benefit 

that is disallowed. In order to determine eligibility, such calculations are also often required of 

the taxpayer who is ultimately fully eligible, or fully ineligible, for the tax benefit. Phaseouts 

may also complicate tax planning and create unintended inequities. For example, the head of 

household taxpayer with a $40,000 income and a child in the first year of college would be 

eligible for a HOPE credit of up to $1,500. However, if such taxpayer realized a $10,000 capital 

gain in order to pay tuition, the taxpayer would no longer be eligible for the credit. The welladvised taxpayer who needed the funds to pay tuition would realize such gains in a tax year prior 

to the expenses that give rise to the credit.

Layering of provisions

It is possible for taxpayers to be subject to more than one of the phase-outs or phase-ins 

in the Code simultaneously. Certain of the phaseouts are mutually exclusive--for example, one 

could not simultaneously be subject to the personal exemptions phase-out and the phaseout for 

the deductibility of interest on qualified student loans, as the income ranges of the separate 

phaseouts do not overlap. However, other phaseouts can overlap. Taxpayers who are 

simultaneously subject to multiple phaseouts will face higher effective marginal tax rates than if 

subject to one or no phaseouts. For example, if a taxpayer with two qualifying children receives 

 

30 The numerous rates on capital gain income that differ from ordinary income tax rates 

are a significant source of complexity. Separate, and different, capital gains rates create 

complexity in several ways. First the lower capital gains rates cause planning complexities 

because taxpayers have an incentive to convert ordinary income into capital gain income. The 

separate rates on capital gains also require a separate and complicated 36-line computation on 

Schedule D of form 1040. For taxable years beginning after 2000, additional lines will be 

needed to take into account the additional lower rate for gains on certain assets held for five or 

more years.
46

an EIC on $25,000 in wage income, that taxpayer will be subject to the phase-out of the EIC 

(phaseout range is $13,090-$32,121 in 2001). If the taxpayer also claims the dependent care 

credit, he or she will also be in the phase-down range for that credit ($20,000-$30,000). As a 

result, on an additional $1,000 of income, this taxpayer would lose $210.60 in EIC benefits and 

$24 in the dependent care credit. Additionally, the taxpayer would owe $150 in Federal income 

taxes. The additional $1,000 would result in additional tax of $384.60, for a combined effective 

marginal rate of 38.5 percent.

Another example of overlapping credits could occur at higher income levels. For 

example, a married couple with an AGI in 2001 of $133,000 and three children would be in the 

phase-out range of the child credit, which begins at $110,000. They would also be subject to the 

limitation on itemized deductions, which begins at $132,950. As previously discussed, the 

limitation on itemized deductions increases the effective marginal rate to 103 percent of the 

statutory rate, and the child credit adds 5 percentage points to the effective marginal tax rate. 

Because the couple will likely be in the 28-percent statutory tax rate bracket, their effective 

marginal tax rate from the itemized deduction limitation will be 28.84 percent (28 percent times 

1.03). With the addition of the effect of the child credit phaseout, their true effective marginal 

tax rate will be 33.84 (28.84 plus 5) percent. However, it should be pointed out that this couple 

would be completely phased out of their child credits when their AGI exceeded $139,000, and 

then they would only be affected by the itemized deduction limitation, implying their effective 

marginal tax rate would fall back to 28.84 percent.

It is possible for the interactions of the phaseouts to create marginal tax rates that many 

would think of as excessive. For example, consider the following conceivable scenario: A 62-

year-old head of household retiree with two children in college who both would qualify for a 

HOPE credit, $10,000 in Social Security benefits, $10,000 in labor income, and $23,000 in 

taxable pensions, dividends, etc., could face an effective marginal tax rate as high as 90 percent. 

If this taxpayer were to earn an additional $100 in wage income, he would owe $7.65 in 

additional social security taxes.31 Additionally, this taxpayer would have income and social 

security benefits that would place him in the situation of having an additional 85 cents of social 

security benefits included in taxable income for each dollar of additional non-social security 

income. Hence, the taxpayer would see his taxable income rise by $185 as a result of the 

additional $100 in wage income. This taxpayer would be in the 15 percent statutory bracket 

assuming they claimed the standard deduction. Hence, the additional income would imply 

additional federal income taxes of $27.75 (185 percent times 15 percent times $100). If the two 

children each qualified for the full $1,500 HOPE credit, the taxpayer would have $3,000 in 

potential credits. However, under the above income circumstances, the taxpayer would be in the 

phase-out range for the HOPE credit (AGI of $40,000-$50,000 for head of household filers). 

Because the length of the phase-out range is only $10,000, the $3,000 credit is phased out at a 

rate of 30 percent for each dollar increase in AGI in the phaseout range. Ordinarily, then, this 

taxpayer would experience an additional 30 percentage point increase in his statutory marginal 

tax rate--the additional $100 in wage income would cause a loss of $30 in credits. However, the 

phaseout of HOPE credit is based on AGI, not the wage income itself, and because of the social 

security provision that also affects this taxpayer, AGI rises by $185 for each dollar of wage 

 

31 The employer share of social security taxes is ignored for this example.
47

income. Hence, rather than lose $30 in HOPE credits, the taxpayer would lose $55.50 (30 

percent of $185) in credits. In the end, this taxpayer would owe $90.90 in additional federal 

taxes for the additional $100 in wage income. It is possible that State and local income taxes 

could push this taxpayer into a situation where the taxes owed as a result of the additional 

income could exceed the full amount of the income. 

In general, the phase-out provisions that affect the greatest numbers of taxpayers do not 

have phaseouts that overlap. For example, a married couple in the phase-out range for the HOPE 

credit ($80,000-$100,000) could not be eligible for the EIC (phased out by $32,121 in 2001), 

will have already have had any dependent care credit phased down (phase down is complete by 

$30,000), and would not yet be in the phase-out range for the child credit (phaseout starts at 

$110,000), the limitation on itemized deductions (limitation starts at $132,950), or the personal 

exemption phaseout (phaseout starts at $199,450).

Effective marginal tax rates, the Federal individual income tax and Federal payroll taxes

The majority of taxpayers also are subject to the payroll tax either at a rate of 7.65 

percent (OASDI and HI combined), at a rate of 1.45 percent (HI component only), or at a rate of 

15.30 percent (self-employment tax32). Indeed, many taxpayers have payroll tax liabilities but 

have no Federal individual income tax liabilities. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates 

that, in 2001, of 110 million taxfiling units with payroll tax liabilities, 27 million faced no 

individual income tax liability after credits.33 These taxpayers will have a marginal federal 

income tax rate of zero, but would face the marginal rates of the payroll tax.

An additional $1.00 of wage income generally will increase the taxpayer's income tax 

liability by the taxpayer's effective marginal income tax rate and, in addition, will increase the 

taxpayer's combined (income and payroll) tax liability by the sum of the taxpayer's effective 

marginal income tax rate and the taxpayer's applicable marginal payroll tax rate. For example, 

for the taxpayer with wage earnings less than $80,400 in 2001, an additional $1.00 of wages will 

increase his or her combined tax liability by his or her effective marginal income tax rate plus 

7.65 percent.34 Moreover, most analysts conclude that both the employee's and employer's share 

 

32 The 15.3-percent self-employment tax rate equals the sum of the employee's and 

employer's share of the payroll tax. One-half of a self-employed individual's self-employment tax 

for the taxable year is allowed as an above-the-line deduction for the individual's Federal 

individual income tax. A self-employed taxpayer with self-employment income in excess of 

$80,400 in 2001 would be subject to a 2.9-percent HI tax rate only.

33 The CBO estimates that, for 1999, 45 percent of all individuals and families who pay 

some payroll taxes have greater payroll tax liability than federal income tax liability. See CBO, 

Estimates of Federal Tax Liabilities for Individuals and Families by Income Category and 

Family Type for 1995 and 1999, May 1998. Taxpayers with greater payroll taxes than income 

taxes do not necessarily face higher marginal rates under the payroll tax than the income tax.

34 For employees with wages above $80,400 in 2001, only the HI component of the 

payroll tax applies. The HI component is imposed at a rate of 1.45 percent on the employee's 

wages plus 1.45 percent on the employer. Analysis of effective marginal tax rates comparable to 
48

of the payroll tax is borne by the employee and that therefore the marginal payroll tax rate would 

include both the employee's and employer's share. However, such a computation is subtler than 

merely adding the employer's share of 7.65 percent to the employee rate of 7.65 percent. If the 

employer's share is to be added, that amount also should be accounted as wage compensation to 

the employee, as it represents additional compensation paid that is taxed away at the employer 

level. Accordingly, an additional $1.00 of wage income paid to the employee actually represents 

gross compensation of $1.0765 when the employer's payroll tax share is taken into consideration. 

Thus, the effective marginal payroll tax rate would be 14.21 percent (the sum of the employee's 

7.65 cents plus the employer's 7.65 cents divided by the employee's additional total wage 

compensation of $1.0765).35

The alternative minimum tax and effective marginal tax rates

The AMT presents several issues in trying to determine the marginal effective tax rate 

applicable to an individual. First, if an individual is subject to the AMT, the statutory tax rates 

that one should focus on in determining the effective marginal tax rate generally are the AMT 

rates. However, if a taxpayer who otherwise would be subject to the AMT generates sufficient 

additional income, the taxpayer may become subject to the regular tax. In such a case, the 

regular tax rates would determine the taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate. For example, 

assume that a married couple filing a joint return have a large number of dependents and a large 

amount of State and local property and income taxes so that their taxable income for regular tax 

purposes is $42,520 (resulting in a regular tax liability of $6,400), but their AMTI (before their 

$45,000 exemption amount) is $70,000 (resulting in a tentative minimum tax of $6,500). Their 

marginal tax rates are 28 percent for regular tax purposes and 26 percent for AMT purposes. In 

this case, the taxpayers are subject to AMT ($6,500 being greater than $6,400). If the taxpayers 

generate an additional $6,000 of income, their regular tax liability becomes $8,080 and their 

tentative minimum tax becomes $8,060, and the taxpayers are no longer subject to the AMT. 

Their effective marginal tax rate for the additional $6,000 in taxable income is 26.33 percent 

($1,580/$6,000), which is a blended rate comprised of both the 28-percent regular tax rate and 

the 26-percent AMT rate. Any additional marginal income in excess of this $6,000 will be 

subject to the 28-percent marginal rate.

In addition, to the extent that an individual's AMT liability gives rise to the AMT credit 

that may be used by the taxpayer in the future to reduce his or her regular tax liability, the effect 

of marginal income on the present value of such credit also must be taken into account. Finally, 

because the AMT exemption amount is phased out as the taxpayer's AMTI increases, the 

marginal effective AMT rate for a taxpayer within the phaseout range is higher than the 

 

that of the subsequent text would apply to those taxpayers for whom additional wages are subject 

only to the HI component of the payroll tax.

35 In calculating an effective combined marginal tax rate applicable to an additional 

$1.00 of wage income for a taxpayer subject to the payroll tax, not only should the effective 

marginal payroll tax rate be adjusted for the additional amount of compensation that is taxed 

away at the employer level, but the effective marginal income tax rate also should be adjusted for 

the additional amount of compensation that is taxed away at the employer level.
49

applicable statutory AMT rate. The effective marginal AMT rates are 32.5 percent at the 

beginning of the phaseout range and 35 percent at the end of the phaseout range.

Effective marginal tax rates and other taxes or programs

In addition to payroll taxes and the AMT, other taxes that the taxpayer may be obligated 

to pay increase the overall effective marginal tax rate. For some taxpayers an additional 

consideration might be the Federal estate tax. If the taxpayer were contemplating working in part 

to leave a bequest, then the individual would consider the estate tax to increase the effective 

marginal tax rate applicable to additional dollars of income. Likewise, if a taxpayer sought to 

earn additional income to purchase a good that is taxable under a State sales tax or a Federal 

excise tax, the taxpayer might have an effective marginal tax rate on the additional earnings 

greater than that calculated here.

Most State individual income taxes adopt Federal individual income tax definitions of 

AGI and taxable income. As a result, the provisions analyzed above that change the taxpayer's 

effective marginal tax rate by increasing the taxpayer's taxable income subject to tax at the 

Federal statutory marginal tax rates generally will increase the taxpayer's taxable income subject 

to State statutory marginal income tax rates. This would create an effective State marginal tax 

rate in excess of State statutory marginal tax rates.36 Considering State income taxes would 

imply that this pamphlet's analysis of effective marginal income tax rates would understate the 

magnitude of effective marginal tax rates. However, some of the provisions analyzed above, 

such as the earned income credit, the dependent care credit, and the child tax credit do not alter 

the taxpayer's Federal taxable income, only the taxpayer's Federal tax liability. Consideration of 

State income taxes generally would not alter this pamphlet's analysis of effective marginal 

income tax rates created by those provisions.

Overall effective marginal tax rates should also consider the effects of certain 

government programs that also implicitly create effective marginal tax rates that deviate from the 

statutory marginal tax rates in the Code. For example, beneficiaries of food stamp benefits, 

Medicaid benefits, low-income housing subsidies, and subsidized student loans generally are 

subject to income or asset tests. The benefits of these programs generally are phased out as the 

individual crosses certain income or asset thresholds. These phaseouts create an implicit 

marginal tax on additional income earned by the individual.37 These implicit taxes are in 

addition to those imposed by the Code.

 

36 It is important to recognize that State income taxes are deductible for Federal income 

tax purposes for those that itemize their deductions, and thus consideration of the effect on 

marginal rates of State taxes needs to account for that deductibility.

37 For a brief discussion of the implicit taxes created by the food stamp program and 

AFDC see, Dickert, Houser, and Scholz, “The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer 

Programs.”