NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JOHN D., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.D., A.D., C.D., H.D., B.D., A.D., 

H.D., A.D., Appellees.

Nos. 1 CA-JV 16-0137

1 CA-JV 16-0138

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. JD30200, JD30201

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant
JOHN D. v. DCS, et al.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 John D. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father is the biological or adoptive father of eight children 

born to two mothers, neither of whom is a party to this appeal. On March 

26, 2015, Father allegedly engaged in an argument with his wife, the mother 

of five of the children, when she became upset over his physical abuse of 

one of the children. During the argument, Father became enraged and 

allegedly stabbed his wife twenty times with a kitchen knife while seven of 

the children were present in the home; wife died from her wounds. Father 

is currently incarcerated and awaiting trial for first-degree murder and 

other charges associated with the attack. 

¶3 During the police and Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)

investigations following the murder, the children reported Father had 

repeatedly physically abused them. The children stated that Father would 

slap and hit them, both with his hand and with a belt, to the point of leaving 

red marks, and that the abuse occurred on a weekly basis. As a result, DCS 

filed dependency petitions as to all eight children. DCS subsequently filed 

motions to terminate Father’s rights to the children on the ground of willful 

abuse. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(2). The juvenile court 

scheduled a severance hearing for March 2-4, 2016. 

¶4 On March 2, the first day set for the severance hearing, Father 

was ill and was not transported by the jail to court. As a result, the juvenile 

court vacated the hearing scheduled for that day and March 3, but affirmed 

the hearing date of March 4. However, the juvenile court advised Father’s 

counsel that if Father did not appear for the March 4 hearing, she would 

find him in default and the hearing would proceed in his absence. 

¶5 On March 4, Father again failed to appear and the jail notified 

the juvenile court he had “refused to be transported.” Father’s attorney told 
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the court he had visited Father on March 3 and, based on that visit, he 

avowed to the court Father was too sick to attend the hearing. Father’s 

counsel did not, however, present any medical records documenting 

Father’s condition. The juvenile court ruled it would proceed with the 

hearing and make findings, but would not enter its final termination order 

“for a period of 20 days” to provide Father time to file a motion and produce 

medical evidence showing good cause for his failure to appear. 

¶6 Father filed a “motion to set aside entry of default” on March 

23, 2016. In his motion, Father asserted that based on his illness, there was 

good cause for his failure to appear at the termination hearing. Attached to 

the motion were medical records from the jail purporting to show that 

Father was too ill to appear at the hearing. On April 1, the State filed a 

motion opposing Father’s motion to set aside the termination order. 

¶7 On March 25, 2016, the juvenile court entered an order 

terminating Father’s rights on the grounds of willful abuse pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). The court concluded that, based on the testimony and 

evidence presented at the March 4 termination hearing, Father had 

physically abused the children and caused them to suffer emotional harm 

based on the March 26, 2015 stabbing/murder. The record is unclear as to 

whether the juvenile court had received Father’s motion to set aside prior 

to entering its termination order. 

¶8 In response to the termination order, Father filed a “motion 

for reconsideration to set aside entry of default,” asserting the court had 

prematurely entered its termination order and had “inadvertently 

miscalculated the time that Father was permitted to file his written 

Motion.” The court denied Father’s motion for reconsideration, and Father 

timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Good Cause

¶9 Father admits he “was aware of the hearing date and time and 

knew that the court could proceed in his absence if he failed to attend the 

hearing without good cause.” See Ariz. R. of Juv. Proc. 65(C)(6)(c) (stating 

that when a parent fails to appear at a severance hearing without good 

cause, the juvenile court may proceed if the court finds the parent “had 

notice of the hearing, was properly served pursuant to Rule 64 and had 

been previously admonished regarding the consequences of failure to 

appear . . .”). Rather, Father contends the juvenile court erred because,
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based on his illness, he established good cause for his failure to appear at 

the hearing. 

¶10 To show good cause for failing to appear at a severance 

proceeding, “the moving party must show that (1) mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise or excusable neglect exists and (2) a meritorious defense to the 

claims exists.” See Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304 & 

n.11, ¶¶ 15-16 (App. 2007).

1 We review the juvenile court’s determination 

regarding good cause and the denial of a motion to set aside a termination 

order for an abuse of discretion. Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 

Ariz. 96, 101, ¶ 15 (App. 2007).

¶11 The juvenile court acted within its discretion in determining 

Father’s illness did not constitute good cause. Although Father showed that 

he was sick, apart from the avowals of his counsel, there is no medical 

record or report showing that he was too ill to appear at the severance 

hearing. Additionally, Father did not allege or attempt to show he had a 

meritorious defense to the allegations in the severance petition. To the 

contrary, Father’s counsel advised the court at the severance hearing he was 

“95 percent sure” Father would not be contesting the severance. 

¶12 Accordingly, Father failed to establish good cause to set aside 

the termination order. 

II. Due Process 

¶13 Father argues the juvenile court denied him his due process 

by “prematurely making findings of fact without allowing [him] to present 

evidence” of his illness within the 20-day “timeframe . . . ordered by the 

court.” Father asserts the “judge miscounted the allowable days for 

response and drafted a final order” before he was able to “timely respond.” 

 

1 Father argues this standard is inappropriate because, “unlike a 

typical civil case covered in Rule 55, a termination proceeding involves a

fundamental right and the court should not use the standard for ‘civil 

default’ when a fundamental right is at stake.” However, Father cites no 

authority to support his position; we therefore decline to address it. See

ARCAP 13(a)(7)(b) (stating argument shall contain citation to authority); 

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 106(A) (stating Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to 

juvenile appeals); see also Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 14 n.5

(noting appellate courts generally “will not consider argument posited 

without authority”).
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¶14 The juvenile court entered its termination order on March 25, 

two days after it received Father’s motion and one day after the 20-day 

deadline, i.e, 20 days after the March 4 severance hearing. Although it does 

appear the juvenile court mistakenly noted the deadline for Father’s motion 

as “March 20, 2015” in its termination order, this apparent typographical 

error was harmless, as the court did not deny Father’s motion as untimely. 

Instead, the court considered Father’s motion on the merits and ruled that 

he had “failed to show good cause” for his failure to appear at the hearing. 

See Salas v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 182 Ariz. 141, 143 (App. 1995) (stating 

that a party is provided procedural due process when it has been given 

notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner). We find no error. 

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Father’s parental rights to the children.