In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1430

SUSANNE ATANUS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STEPHEN A. PERRY, Administrator, GSA,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 7512—Mark R. Filip, Judge.

____________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2007—DECIDED MARCH 17, 2008

____________

Before RIPPLE, MANION and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Susanne Atanus filed this action in

the district court against her employer, Stephen A. Perry,

Administrator of the General Services Administration

(“GSA”). Ms. Atanus’ complaint alleges that the GSA

discriminated against her on the basis of her race, color,

religion, gender and national origin, all in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq. Her complaint also includes a Title VII retaliation

claim and a claim of age discrimination in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
2 No. 07-1430

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The district court granted the GSA’s

motion for summary judgment on all claims. Ms. Atanus

timely filed a notice of appeal.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

Ms. Atanus has predicated her suit against the GSA on

four alleged adverse employment actions: a ten-day

suspension in December 2002, a letter of instruction issued

on January 13, 2003, verbal harassment that occurred on

February 13, 2003 and her reassignment to the position

of procurement analyst (GS-11) from her previous position of contract specialist (also GS-11).

Ms. Atanus began working as a contract administrator

for the GSA in 1984. According to the GSA, Debra

Wauchop, who supervised Ms. Atanus from 1990 through

early 2002, began noticing problems with Ms. Atanus’ work

conduct in 1999. On February 1, 1999, Wauchop issued

Ms. Atanus a letter of instruction for her obstinate and

quarrelsome behavior toward coworkers and supervisors

during a meeting. On July 20, 2000, Wauchop issued

Ms. Atanus a warning notice for her disrespectful conduct during a lecture given by GSA employees. Less than

a year later, in March 2001, Wauchop issued Ms. Atanus

a third warning notice for two public verbal confrontations that Ms. Atanus had with a senior GSA employee;

the warning notice explained that Ms. Atanus had taken a

harsh and disrespectful tone with the senior employee. The
No. 07-1430 3

1 The GSA defines this assignment as a group of duties and

responsibilities, assembled by management and required to be

performed for a specified period of time, that have not been

officially described and classified into a formal position description.

2 The GSA administers Government contracts using the Federal

Acquisition Regulations. See General Services Administration,

Federal Acquisition Regulations, http://www.acqnet.gov/FAR/

current/pdf/FAR.book.pdf (last visited February 13, 2008).

reprimand also referenced an e-mail in which Ms. Atanus

had given written instructions akin to an order to a

coworker whom she did not supervise. The GSA claims

that Ms. Atanus’ behavior was of concern because, as a

contract specialist, she was required to have extensive

communications with contractor representatives and

other parties outside the Government.

On June 11, 2001, Wauchop assigned Ms. Atanus to an

“unassembled set of duties.”1

 The GSA explains that it

reassigned her to fill a void left by a recently deceased

employee and to maximize Ms. Atanus’ contract capabilities while minimizing her contact with others. Ms. Atanus

neither complains about this transfer nor questions the

GSA’s proffered explanation.

In early 2002, Kim Brown, an African-American woman,

replaced Wauchop as Ms. Atanus’ supervisor. According

to the GSA, Brown observed the same problems with

Ms. Atanus’ conduct as had Wauchop. On July 11, 2002,

Brown issued Ms. Atanus a letter of instruction—her

fourth agency action—citing Ms. Atanus’ failure to follow

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 4.2,2

 which

requires a contract modification to be distributed within

ten working days of execution by all parties. The letter
4 No. 07-1430

3 During this telephone conversation, Ms. Atanus told Smith

that she had done nothing wrong and that she did not need to

meet with him in person. Smith told Ms. Atanus that she

was required to meet with him. The district court noted in its

opinion that Ms. Atanus first had admitted this fact and then

clarified that she had asked only if the meeting would be

necessary.

described two instances when Ms. Atanus had violated

this rule and thereby hindered the GSA’s ability to monitor contractor performance.

The following month, on August 14, 2002, Brown issued

a letter proposing to suspend Ms. Atanus from duty for

five days because of Ms. Atanus’ disorderly conduct at

a meeting on July 16. The suspension letter stated that

Ms. Atanus had handled a FOIA request improperly

and that she had taken a loud, rude and harsh tone

when asked by her team leader to explain her conduct.

According to the letter, Ms. Atanus behaved in this

fashion until her team leader threatened to contact a

federal protective officer for assistance if Ms. Atanus did

not return to her desk.

On September 12, 2002, Richard Smith, Brown’s superior, telephoned Ms. Atanus and scheduled for 2 p.m. an

in-person meeting to discuss the proposed suspension.3

What happened next is the basis for the first of the four

adverse employment actions upon which Ms. Atanus

has predicated her case.

Ms. Atanus walked into Smith’s office two hours prior

to the scheduled start of the meeting. She began discussing

the proposed suspension and told Smith that the suspension was not fair and that she did not understand the
No. 07-1430 5

charge. Ms. Atanus continued to talk about the suspension

for fifteen minutes until Smith told her to leave or he

would call federal protective officers.

At 2 p.m., Smith met with Ms. Atanus; Gregory Flores,

another GSA supervisor, was present as a witness. Smith

gave Ms. Atanus the final decision letter and other paperwork attendant to her suspension. Ms. Atanus began to

discuss the suspension. Smith claims that she was becoming agitated, which Ms. Atanus denies. The parties nevertheless agree that Ms. Atanus told Smith that she did not

believe Christians would act in this manner. At this point,

Smith tried to end the meeting. The parties further agree

that, when Smith stated that the meeting was over,

Ms. Atanus told Smith that he was the one who should

have been suspended because he was not performing

his job properly and that she was going to call Smith’s

superior to reverse his decision.

The following day, at about 10 a.m., Ms. Atanus saw

Smith passing through the office and asked if he would

see her. She entered his office and again began discussing

her suspension. Ms. Atanus told Smith that she was the

smartest person in the building, that she worked very

hard and that it had not been fair to suspend her.

Ms. Atanus continued speaking for fifteen minutes until

Smith dismissed her from his office. According to Smith,

Ms. Atanus grew extremely agitated, loud and aggressive.

At 11:15 that same morning, Ms. Atanus called Smith to

request another meeting; she indicated that she wanted

to smooth things over. In his office, Smith advised

Ms. Atanus of her right to grieve the suspension.

Ms. Atanus admits that she told Smith that she was a

person of God and that he would not suspend her if he too

was a person of God. Smith, who felt that Ms. Atanus had
6 No. 07-1430

become aggressive in approaching his desk, told her that

he was offended by her comment and ended the meeting.

According to Smith, Ms. Atanus continued the discussion,

and she stated that she would not leave the office; he

told her that he would call a federal protective officer if

she did not return to her work station.

At 2:45 p.m. on the same day, Ms. Atanus returned to

Smith’s office for a third time. She said that she never

had paid attention to the previous letters of reprimand

that she had received because nothing had come of them.

He told her to return to her work station. Again, Smith

told her that he would call a federal protective officer if

she did not leave. Smith made a written record of all

these events and provided a copy to Brown.

Based upon the information provided by Smith, Brown

proposed to suspend Ms. Atanus for ten days for her

disorderly conduct toward Smith. On November 19, 2002,

Wauchop reviewed Brown’s proposed suspension and

approved it. The GSA claims that Wauchop relied on the

factors set forth in the GSA’s discipline manual. Of particular concern to Wauchop, according to the discipline

notice, was the fact that Ms. Atanus continued to exhibit

the same behavior for which she had received

prior disciplinary actions, that she showed no sign of

changing and that she had not provided any explanation for her behavior toward Smith.

On December 17, 2002, Ms. Atanus requested that the

GSA conduct a desk audit of her work. A desk audit

consists of a personnel specialist interviewing an employee and supervisor to obtain information about the

difficulty of the employee’s work. After this information

is obtained, the GSA determines whether the position is

classified properly. On January 7, 2003, Brown advised
No. 07-1430 7

Ms. Atanus that the GSA did not perform desk audits

for employees who were assigned an unassembled set

of duties; Ms. Atanus then requested that management

assign her to an official position and perform a desk audit.

On January 17, 2003, Brown began working with

the human resources department to develop a position

specifically for Ms. Atanus.

On January 13, 2003, Brown issued Ms. Atanus another

letter of instruction, her seventh agency action. In her

letter, Brown cited Ms. Atanus’ failure to process contract modifications in a timely manner, the same violation for which she previously had received a letter

of instruction. Brown, Ms. Atanus and Henderson,

Ms. Atanus’ team leader, met on February 13, 2003 to

discuss this letter of instruction. The parties dispute

what took place at this meeting. Ms. Atanus asserts

that Brown and Henderson badgered her in a “loud,

unprofessional tone.” R.37 at 12. She does not expand any

further as to what they said. The GSA denies that this

took place and claims that it was Ms. Atanus who raised

her voice and accused Brown of harassing her.

On March 5, 2003, Ms. Atanus filed a formal complaint

of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”). On April 6, 2003, the GSA assigned

Ms. Atanus to the position of procurement analyst. The

GSA claims that it was complying with Ms. Atanus’

request to be reassigned to an official position so that

a desk audit could be performed. This position, consistent with Ms. Atanus’ previous positions, was classified at the GS-11 level. Ms. Atanus, however, claims that

the GSA first transferred her to the position of contract

specialist and then, in retaliation for her EEO complaint,

transferred her to the position of procurement analyst.
8 No. 07-1430

B.

The district court granted the GSA’s motion for summary judgment. In setting forth the legal standards for

Title VII and ADEA claims, the district court, relying

on some of our older cases, stated that the two ways of

proving discrimination are through “direct evidence” and

“indirect evidence.” Atanus v. Perry, No. 04 C 07512, 2007

WL 257679, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2006). The court determined that Ms. Atanus offered no “direct evidence” of

discrimination. It noted that the only evidence that

might conceivably be considered direct evidence is her

claim that Wauchop allegedly had asked her during a

1996 lunch, “What’s your nationality,” to which

Ms. Atanus replied, “Assyrian.” Ms. Atanus alleges that

Wauchop had remained silent for the remainder of the

meal. The court ruled that this allegation does not constitute direct evidence of discrimination because “it is not

anything from which one could infer discriminatory

animus without inference or presumption, as precedent

requires.” Id. at *4. It further explained that “Ms. Wauchop

is not alleged to have made any derogatory statement

about Assyrians, or Catholics, or women, nor did she

allegedly express anything that, by implication, could

be understood as a negative appraisal of individuals

who might fit into such groups.” Id. Independently, it

determined that Wauchop’s conduct could not create a

genuine issue of material fact because the conduct had

occurred five years prior to any of the events at issue in

this case.

The district court further determined that Ms. Atanus

had not established a prima facie case of discrimination;

nor had she presented any evidence of pretext. With regard to the ten-day suspension, the court ruled that
No. 07-1430 9

Ms. Atanus had failed to show evidence of similarly

situated employees outside of her protected classes

who reacted similarly to disciplinary actions but were

treated more favorably. It further found that the GSA had

offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for

its decision to suspend Ms. Atanus for ten-days—namely,

her failure properly to handle the FOIA request and her

insubordinate conduct toward Smith—that Ms. Atanus

had not rebutted as pretextual.

With regard to the January 13, 2003 letter of instruction, the district court held that Ms. Atanus had not

established an adverse employment action. In addition,

the court ruled that, even if it were an adverse employment action, Ms. Atanus had failed to identify any similarly situated employees outside her various protected

classes who were treated more favorably in similar circumstances; nor, the court added, had Ms. Atanus established that the reason for issuing the letter—her mishandling of contract modifications—was pretextual.

The court then addressed Ms. Atanus’ claim that Brown

and Henderson had verbally harassed her during the

February 13, 2003 meeting. Although noting that it was

unclear from Ms. Atanus’ complaint how she intended

to frame her claim on this issue, the court explained that

it would consider her claim as one for “hostile work

environment.” It determined that Ms. Atanus’ evidence,

which was limited to her allegations that Brown and

Henderson had “verbally harassed” and “badgered her

in a loud, unprofessional tone,” did not create a triable

question of fact as to whether she had been subjected to

a hostile workplace.

Finally, on Ms. Atanus’ retaliation claim, the court held

that her transfer from the unassembled set of duties to the
10 No. 07-1430

4 The district court concluded that Ms. Atanus had not advanced any failure to promote claim. Ms. Atanus’ complaint

did not include a failure to promote claim under either

Title VII or the ADEA. In her memorandum in opposition to

the GSA’s motion for summary judgment, Ms. Atanus made

passing reference to the fact that she had suffered the adverse

employment action of failure to promote; however, she did not

make any argument in support of this claim. The court ruled

that, if she was making such a claim, it was barred because

she had not amended her complaint to include it; that the

other promotions had occurred long before her EEO complaint, and therefore the claim was time barred; and that she

had failed to show that the individuals who were promoted

instead of her were similarly situated. Ms. Atanus does not

appeal this determination.

position of procurement analyst did not constitute an

adverse employment action. The court noted that both

positions were classified as GS-11, that it was only a

subdepartmental transfer and that, in any event, the

reason for the transfer had been her request that the

GSA move her to an official position so that a desk audit

could be performed.4

II

DISCUSSION

A.

This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment. Hurst-Rosche Eng’rs, Inc. v. Commercial Union Credit

Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir. 1995). All facts and

reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the

non-moving party. Magin v. Monsanto Co., 420 F.3d 679,
No. 07-1430 11

686 (7th Cir. 2005). We do not evaluate the weight of the

evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses or determine

the ultimate truth of the matter; rather, we determine

whether there exists a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as matter of law.” Magin, 420

F.3d at 686 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)); see also Alexander v.

Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Family Svrs., 263 F.3d 673,

681 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that there is no heightened

summary judgment standard in the employment discrimination context).

B.

Ms. Atanus claims that the GSA discriminated against

her because of her race (Caucasian), color (white), religion

(Christian-Catholic), gender (female), national origin

(Assyrian) and age (born in 1958), in violation of Title VII

and the ADEA.

In a Title VII or age discrimination case, a plaintiff may

show discrimination under either the “direct” or “indirect”

methods of proof, Brown v. Illinois Dep’t Natural Res.,

499 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 2007), nomenclature which

we have explained is “somewhat misleading,” Luks v.

Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2006);

Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-

03 (7th Cir. 2006). The nomenclature is misleading because the phrase “direct method” tends to imply that an
12 No. 07-1430

employee only may proceed under the direct method with

“direct evidence.” See Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902-03. We

recently have explained, however, that this is not the

case. “’[D]irect’ proof of discrimination is not limited to

near-admissions by the employer that its decisions were

based on a proscribed criterion (e.g., ‘You’re too old to

work here.’), but also includes circumstantial evidence

which suggests discrimination through a longer chain of

inferences.” Luks, 467 F.3d at 1053 (emphasis supplied).

The focus of the direct method of proof thus is not

whether the evidence offered is “direct” or “circumstantial” but rather whether the evidence “points directly” to

a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action. Burks

v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Tranp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 n.3 (7th

Cir. 2006) (noting that the “’direct method’ . . . requires

the plaintiff to put forth evidence that demonstrates that

she was a member of a protected class and ‘as a result

suffered the adverse employment action of which [s]he

complains’ ” (quoting Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902)). Thus,

under the direct method of proof,

[c]ircumstantial evidence demonstrating intentional

discrimination includes: “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior toward

or comments directed at other employees in the protected group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously

statistical, that similarly situated employees outside

the protected class received systematically better

treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was

qualified for the job in question but was passed over

in favor of a person outside the protected class and

the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination.”

Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 491 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois,
No. 07-1430 13

5 Ms. Atanus’ allegations about Wauchop’s conduct during the

1996 lunch are insufficient to show discrimination under the

direct methodology. Under the direct method of proof, as we

have explained in the text, an employee may use circumstantial evidence that “suggests discrimination albeit through a

longer chain of inferences.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc.,

476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). Nothing in the record suggests

that Ms. Atanus’ ten-day suspension occurred as a result of her

nationality or that Ms. Atanus’ nationality contributed to the

decision. The lunch occurred over five years prior to any of the

conduct at issue in this case, by which time Wauchop was no

longer Ms. Atanus’ supervisor. Cf. id. at 491 (explaining that a

comment made more than a year before the employee’s termination is too far removed to constitute evidence of discriminatory

animus); Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir.

2000) (two years). Moreover, given Ms. Atanus’ conduct

toward Smith, who was her supervisor’s boss, and given the

GSA’s uncontradicted evidence that Brown relied on Smith’s

report of that conduct in proposing the suspension, Wauchop’s

conduct does not support a reasonable inference that the GSA’s

motivation for suspending Ms. Atanus was bound up with her

nationality or that her nationality contributed to the decision.

Nor can Wauchop’s conduct during the 1996 lunch serve as

circumstantial evidence of discrimination under the direct

methodology with regard to the other acts about which

Ms. Atanus complains because, as we shall explain, none of

those acts constitute adverse employment actions.

473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007)). Although the district

court, in considering Wauchop’s conduct during the 1996

lunch, relied on earlier cases conflating the direct and

indirect methods of proof with direct and indirect evidence, we are satisfied that the error is of no consequence

to Ms. Atanus’ case.5

 We therefore turn to her claims

under the indirect method of proof.
14 No. 07-1430

The rubric of the indirect method was first set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973).

Under this methodology, Ms. Atanus may create a presumption of discrimination by establishing a prima facie

case of discrimination. Bahl v. Royal Indem. Co., 115 F.3d

1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1997). This presumption shifts the

burden to the GSA to produce a legitimate, noninvidious

reason for its actions. Id. If the GSA satisfies its burden of

production by rebutting her prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts back to Ms. Atanus to

show that the GSA’s reasons “are false and only a

pretext for discrimination.” Id. To establish a prima facie

case of discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA,

Ms. Atanus must proffer evidence that: (1) she belongs to

a protected class; (2) she performed her job according to

the GSA’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated

employees outside the protected class were treated more

favorably by the GSA. Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc.,

361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is

appropriate if the employee fails to establish any of the

foregoing elements of the prima facie case. Kampmier v.

Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 2007).

Ms. Atanus presents four contentions on appeal. She

submits that the district court erred in determining that

she had not established a prima facie case of discrimination on her Title VII and ADEA claims and that she

had not presented any evidence that the GSA’s nondiscriminatory explanations were pretextual with regard

to her ten-day suspension, the January 13, 2003 letter of

instruction, the alleged verbal harassment from the February 13, 2003 meeting and the GSA’s alleged retaliation

for her EEO complaint. We shall examine each.
No. 07-1430 15

1. Ten-Day Suspension

There is no dispute that the ten-day suspension was an

adverse employment action or that Ms. Atanus is a member of various protected classes. We thus shall discuss only

the two remaining aspects of this suspension that are

disputed.

a.

Ms. Atanus, claiming that she was treated differently

than other employees, submits that a material issue of

fact exists regarding the alleged inappropriate conduct

for which the GSA suspended her. According to

Ms. Atanus, Smith “was unreceptive to [her] concerns

and rebuffed her attempt to discuss” her suspension, and

his treatment of her “illustrates the discrimination she

faced by the Agency’s management.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.

She further asserts that the GSA’s rationale for suspending her was pretextual because it was “false, selfserving and one-sided” and because she was not “loud,

rude, or aggressive as Smith alleges.” Id.

Ms. Atanus maintains that she was singled out for

worse treatment than other similarly situated employees

in the GSA. On this fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas

test, a plaintiff must show that members of the comparative group are “directly comparable to her in all material

respects.” Burks, 464 F.3d at 751 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) (noting that relevant factors include

“whether the employees reported to the same supervisor, whether they were subject to the same standards

and whether they had comparable education, experience

and qualification”). Keeping in mind that this prong ought

not be applied in an “unduly rigid” or “narrow[]” manner,
16 No. 07-1430

Ms. Atanus has not put forth any evidence of employees

outside of her various protected classes who acted in a

materially similar manner but were treated more favorably.

Pantoja v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., 495 F.3d 840, 845-46

(7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the plaintiff must show that

“members of the comparison group are sufficiently comparable to her to suggest that she was singled out for

worse treatment”). Indeed, Ms. Atanus has failed to

point the court to any other GSA employee to serve as a

basis for comparison. Rather, Ms. Atanus claims that the

“record is devoid of others in [her] division receiving

similar treatment from Smith” and the GSA. Appellant’s

Br. at 13. This contention, however, ignores that the burden of establishing a prima facie case is on her,

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, and, in any event,

leaves us without any basis for comparing whether other

employees in her division who were insubordinate,

disorderly and rude to their supervisor’s boss received

similar treatment, Henry v. James, 507 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir.

2007) (holding that an employee had not established a

prima facie case because “[h]is conduct was more egregious than that of the non-white officers he highlights”).

b.

Even if she had established a prima facie case of discrimination, Ms. Atanus has not shown that the GSA’s

reasons for her ten-day suspension are pretextual. A

plaintiff may show pretext with “evidence that the employer’s explanation is not credible.” Sarsha v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 1993). In this

regard, an employee may show that the employer’s

reason had “no[] basis in fact,” that the explanation was

not the real reason for its action or that the reason stated
No. 07-1430 17

6 We note that Ms. Atanus also does not proffer any evidence

of pretext regarding the GSA’s reason for suspending her for

five days (which was the reason that Ms. Atanus was required

(continued...)

was insufficient to warrant the adverse job action. Bahl,

115 F.3d at 1291 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The main inquiry in determining pretext is

whether the employer “honestly acted” on the stated

reason rather than “whether the reason for the [adverse

employment action] was a correct business judgment.” Id.

(noting that this court will not “take on the mantle of a

super-personnel department reviewing the business

decisions of [the] employer”); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp.,

464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (“An employer’s mistaken

belief that the plaintiff’s conduct merited termination

is not unlawful, so long as the belief was honestly held.”).

The GSA’s stated reason for suspending Ms. Atanus

was her insubordinate, disorderly and rude conduct

toward her supervisor’s boss, her similar past conduct

and her failure to explain herself. Ms. Atanus admits

that she told Smith that “she did not believe Christians

would act in this manner,” that he would not suspend

her “if he was a person of [G]od,” that he was the one

who should be suspended because he was doing his

job improperly and that she would have his superior

overturn his decision. R.37 ¶ 39, at 6 (responding to R.34

¶ 39, at 6). Ms. Atanus does not contest that Brown’s

decision to suspend her was based upon Smith’s report

of Ms. Atanus’ conduct. Ms. Atanus, in short, offers

nothing more than her belief that her conduct toward

Smith did not warrant a ten-day suspension to show that

the GSA did not act honestly and in good faith.6 Cowan v.
18 No. 07-1430

6 (...continued)

to meet with Smith) for her improper handling of a FOIA

request.

Glenbrook Sec. Srvs., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 444 (7th Cir. 1997)

(perpetually tardy employee could not defeat a motion

for summary judgment with mere speculative inference

that termination was due to racial animus rather than

record of tardiness). Indeed, she flatly asserts that a trial

is warranted because this issue hinges on credibility

and intent. Given the facts that Ms. Atanus has admitted, however, and given that she has no evidence of

pretext, no reasonable jury could find that the GSA’s stated

reasons have no basis in fact, are not the real reasons for

her suspension or that her conduct was insufficient to

warrant the suspension. Fane v. Locke Reynolds, 480 F.3d

534, 541 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming a grant of summary

judgment where an employee was terminated for “rude

behavior, insubordination, and not recognizing her own

inappropriate behavior” and where the employer believed that such conduct warranted termination and

honestly acted pursuant to that belief); Gadsby v. Norwalk

Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1337-38 (7th Cir. 1995) (Flaum,

J., concurring).

2. Letter of Instruction

Next, Ms. Atanus submits that she presented a prima

facie case of discrimination regarding the letter of instruction that she received on January 13, 2003. The letter

stated that she had not been following GSA guidelines

for the modification and extension of contracts. According to Ms. Atanus, a comparison of the letter that
No. 07-1430 19

she received with letters received by employees outside

of her protected classes reveals that the letters received

by other employees were boilerplate, much less severe

in tone and did not threaten termination.

Ms. Atanus has not shown that the January 13, 2003

letter of instruction was an adverse employment action.

In Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1998),

we declined to consider “two counseling statements,”

which admonished the employee to improve, as adverse

employment actions or as having tangible job consequences because the employee had not pointed to any

immediate consequences of the reprimands, such as an

eligibility for promotion, transfer to a favorable location,

an advantageous increase in responsibilities or similar

benefits. See Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d

892, 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that, although the

“definition of an adverse employment action is generous,” an employee “must show some quantitative or

qualitative change in the terms or conditions of his employment” or some sort of “real harm”); Oest v. Illinois

Dep’t of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2001); cf. Coolidge

v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 505 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir.

2007) (explaining that two reprimands followed by termination constitute an adverse employment action). The

same is true here. The letter itself does not state that

Ms. Atanus is being disciplined for her second failure

to follow FAR 4.2; rather, it warns that disciplinary

action may be taken if she fails to comply with the directive of the letter. Ms. Atanus was not terminated or

demoted, and she does not allege that her job responsibilities were changed because of the letter. Indeed, after

Ms. Atanus requested that the GSA conduct a desk audit,

the agency developed an official position, specifically
20 No. 07-1430

7 Ms. Atanus, as she did before the district court, intersperses

throughout her brief allegations that she was refused promotion while other GS-11 contract administrators were promoted

to GS-12. Ms. Atanus, however, does not contend, nor could

she on this record, that the GSA’s failure to promote her

was related to this letter of instruction. Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of

Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2001); cf. Spiegla v. Hull,

371 F.3d 928, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2004).

for her and at the same GS-11 grade, to comply with her

request.7

Ms. Atanus, moreover, has not established that the

employees who received letters of instruction were similarly situated. The letter that Ms. Atanus received

was not written by the manager who issued letters to the

other employees. Additionally, this letter was Ms. Atanus’

second letter of instruction for failing to follow the

same GSA regulation. The letter references the prior

letter of instruction that Ms. Atanus had received, in

which Ms. Atanus had been warned that further violations of FAR 4.2 “could lead to disciplinary action, up

to and including removal.” R.37, Ex. 5 at 2. Because employers are justified in reprimanding employees more

severely for repeated errors and because Ms. Atanus has

not submitted any evidence indicating that the two other

employees who received less severe letters had been

reprimanded in the past, she has failed to show that

these employees were similarly situated. Accordingly,

Ms. Atanus has not established a prima facie case of

discrimination with regard to the January 13, 2003 letter

of instruction.
No. 07-1430 21

3. Verbal Harassment

Ms. Atanus contends that her Title VII rights were

violated when Brown and Henderson verbally harassed

her during the February 13, 2003 meeting. Ms. Atanus

claims that Brown “badgered her in a loud, unprofessional

tone” and that she perceived Brown’s comments as

“discriminatory and harassing.” Appellant’s Br. at 19.

An employee may bring a Title VII discrimination

claim alleging that the employer is responsible for a

hostile work environment. The employee must demonstrate that: (1) “he was subject to unwelcome harassment”;

(2) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic;

(3) “the harassment was severe and pervasive so as to

alter the conditions of the employee’s environment

and create a hostile or abusive working environment”;

and (4) “there is a basis for employer liability.” Mason v.

So. Illinois Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th

Cir. 2000). Whether an employer’s conduct creates a

hostile work environment is not subject to “a mathematically precise test” and “can be determined only by

looking at all the circumstances.” Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993). Relevant circumstances

include “the frequency and severity of the conduct;

whether it was threatening and/or humiliating or

merely an offensive utterance; and whether the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work.” McPherson

v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 2004).

Ms. Atanus has not provided any specifics as to the

content of Henderson’s and Brown’s statements during

the meeting or whether their remarks referenced her

race, color, national origin, gender, religion or age. She

also does not establish that their conduct affected her

work performance. Under our case law, being addressed
22 No. 07-1430

8 We cannot accept Ms. Atanus’ claim that the district court

erred by not considering the harassment in conjunction with the

other acts that form the basis for her case. See, e.g., Silk v. City of

Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 807 (7th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging “that,

in discrimination cases, the ‘whole can be greater than the

sum of the parts,’ and that it is quite appropriate for a plaintiff

to ‘ask the trier of fact to draw an inference of discrimination

from a pattern of behavior when each individual act might have

an innocent explanation.’ ” (quoting Vande Zande v. State of

Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995))). It is

unclear whether Ms. Atanus is claiming that the alleged verbal

harassment incident helps her establish her prima facie discrimination claim or whether the other incidents of alleged

discrimination assist her in establishing the hostile work

environment claim; either way, her contention is unpersuasive.

As we have discussed above, Ms. Atanus has admitted facts

showing that she was insubordinate, disorderly and rude to

her superior, and she has failed to put forth any evidence

showing that she correctly performed the tasks for which the

GSA issued her the letters of instruction. The GSA has provided

(continued...)

in a loud, unprofessional tone during one meeting does

not satisfy the requirement that the offensive conduct be

severe and pervasive. Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr.,

406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel.

Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that

“relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct

will not support a hostile environment claim” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate

and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive

that it created a hostile work environment within the

meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (remarking that Title VII

is not a code of “general civility”).8
No. 07-1430 23

8 (...continued)

solid, non-discriminatory reasons for suspending her and for

issuing the letters of instruction. Ms. Atanus has not proffered

any evidence showing those reasons to be pretextual, and,

therefore, she cannot say that the alleged verbal harassment

strengthened her other claims.

Nor does Smith’s conduct toward Ms. Atanus during her

repeated attempts to discuss her suspension or his threats to

call a federal protective services officer if she did not calm

down and return to her work station rise to the level of a hostile

work environment, even when considered “collectively and

cumulatively” with her meeting with Henderson and Brown. Id.

at 804, 807 (explaining that a plaintiff, to defeat summary

judgment in a hostile work environment claim, must “demonstrate that a rational trier of fact could find that his workplace

is permeated with discriminatory conduct—intimidation,

ridicule, insult—that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of his employment”).

4. Retaliation

Lastly, we turn to Ms. Atanus’ contention that the

GSA retaliated against her when it transferred her to a

different position within the same GS-11 level after

she filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the

EEOC. Title VII proscribes an employer from retaliating

against an employee who has engaged in statutorily

protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be

an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by this subchapter, or . . . has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
24 No. 07-1430

subchapter.”). Ms. Atanus proceeds under the indirect

method of proof.

Under the indirect methodology, an employee must

present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation. The employee must show that

“(1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity;

(2) she performed her job according to her employer’s

legitimate expectations; (3) despite meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations, she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (4) she was

treated less favorably than similarly situated employees

who did not engage in statutorily protected activity.” HiltDyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002);

see also Hudson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552,

560 (7th Cir. 2004). “Under the indirect method of proof,

failure to satisfy any one element of the prima facie case

is fatal to an employee’s retaliation claim.” Hudson, 375

F.3d at 560. Once the employee establishes a prima

facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465. The burden

then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the

employer’s reason is pretextual. Id. (noting that, at this

point, summary judgment is proper if the employee fails

to establish pretext).

We focus on whether Ms. Atanus has suffered a materially adverse employment action—the third prong of

her prima facie case. Adverse employment action “has

been defined quite broadly in this circuit.” Smart v. Ball

State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996); Oest, 240 F.3d at

612. We have recognized that “creating a precise list

of activities that constitute adverse employment actions would be impossible because of the unique circum-
No. 07-1430 25

9 Ms. Atanus has taken inconsistent positions with regard to

this claim. In the materials submitted in opposition to the GSA’s

summary judgment motion, she admitted that the GSA trans-

(continued...)

stances of individual cases,” but we have noted some

examples of adverse employment actions: “’termination

of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in

wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss

of benefits, [and] significantly diminished material responsibilities.’ ” Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465-66 (quoting

Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir.

1999)). Given this flexible, practical approach, “we have

emphasized that an adverse employment action need not

be quantifiable in terms of pay or benefits.” Id. at 466. An

adverse employment action, nevertheless, “is one that

is materially adverse, ‘meaning more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.’ ” Id. at

465 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,

993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, “not

everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Smart, 89 F.3d at 441. For example,

we have held that a transfer and job title change from

assistant vice-president and manager of one bank branch

to a loan officer position at a different branch is not necessarily, by itself, a materially adverse employment action.

Crady, 993 F.2d at 136; see also Grayson v. City of Chicago,

317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially

adverse); Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 457

(7th Cir. 1994).

Construing the record broadly,9

 Ms. Atanus asserts that
26 No. 07-1430

9 (...continued)

ferred her to the position of procurement analyst in an effort

to comply with her request, which was made before she filed

her complaint with the EEOC, that the GSA perform a desk

audit on the work that she was performing. See R.37 ¶¶ 70-74,

at 8 (responding to R.34 ¶¶ 70-74, at 10). In the same statement

of facts, however, she asserted that the GSA transferred her

to the position of contract specialist first and then, after her

EEO complaint, transferred her to the position of procurement

analyst. R.37 ¶¶ 34-36, at 13. Because the timing of the events

makes no difference to our decision, it is unnecessary for us

to determine whether Ms. Atanus is bound by her prior stipulation to the GSA’s version of the facts.

USCA-02-C-0072—3-17-08

the GSA retaliated against her by transferring her from a

contract specialist (GS-11) position to the position of

procurement analyst (GS-11) after she filed her complaint with the EEOC. Ms. Atanus has not explained

whether the change in title entailed any change in the

work that she was performing, whether there was a

change in geographic location or whether the position

restricted her opportunities to advance within the GSA.

Without more factual development, Ms. Atanus’ claim

that she suffered an adverse employment action is deficient.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment

of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED