NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MARIA ANA JASSO, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

JOSE ANTONIO JASSO, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0385 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2011-006871

The Honorable Pamela Hearn Svoboda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Michael E. Hurley, Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Michael E. Hurley

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Alzate DuComb Law Firm PLLC, Phoenix

By Henry Alzate

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

FILED 6-19-2018
JASSO v. JASSO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Maria Ana Jasso (“Wife”) appeals the superior court’s rulings

enforcing the dissolution decree’s division of property and denying her 

motion for new trial. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Wife and Jose Antonio Jasso (“Husband”) married in 1985. In

October 2011, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, listing a 

home on Cypress Street (“Cypress Home”) and a home on 36th Avenue 

(“Avenue Home”) as community property. Wife requested in her petition 

that she be given the Cypress Home and Husband be given the Avenue 

Home. She then filed an application and affidavit for default, and because 

Husband failed to plead or otherwise defend within 10 days, entry of 

default became effective in January 2012. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 

(“ARFLP”) 44(A)(2)-(4). The following month, Husband signed a quitclaim 

deed in favor of Wife for the Avenue Home. A few days later, the superior 

court issued a default decree of dissolution of marriage, which awarded the 

Cypress Home to Wife and the Avenue Home to Husband. 

¶3 In March 2016, Husband filed a pro per petition to enforce the

decree’s division of property, requesting in part that Wife sign a quitclaim 

deed. He also asked for full control of the Avenue Home, which Wife 

allegedly had been renting out since the divorce, as well as relief from all 

financial obligations related to the Cypress Home. In her response to the

petition to enforce, Wife requested in part that the court “[c]onfirm the 

quitclaim deed Husband executed to Wife” and “[c]onfirm that Wife is the 

sole owner of the [Avenue Home].” 

¶4 The superior court eventually conducted a trial on Husband’s 

petition to enforce. In their amended pretrial statements, Husband

requested complete control of the property he was awarded in the decree,

while Wife contended, based on equitable estoppel and estoppel by deed,

that “Husband should be estopped [from] deny[ing] that he deeded the 
JASSO v. JASSO

Decision of the Court

3

[Avenue Home] to Wife and to assert his ownership thereof.” Shortly after 

the hearing, the court granted Husband’s petition to enforce, ordering that

Husband be awarded the Avenue Home pursuant to the decree and that

the parties execute a “new deed . . . to align with the Court’s ruling.” The 

court also ordered the parties to refinance both homes so that Wife was no 

longer responsible for the mortgage on the Avenue Home and Husband no 

longer responsible for the mortgage on the Cypress Home. 

¶5 Wife moved for a new trial, arguing the superior court did not 

address her estoppel arguments and improperly ordered her to refinance 

the homes. The court denied her motion for new trial in part and Wife 

appealed. We stayed the appeal to allow the superior court to finish ruling 

on the motion for new trial, and when the court did so, it rescinded the 

order that the parties refinance the homes. We then reinstated this appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶6 This appeal relates only to the superior court’s decision to 

enforce the decree’s division of property. In an attempt to show the court 

erred in granting Husband’s petition to enforce and denying her motion for 

new trial, Wife focuses her arguments solely on equitable estoppel and 

estoppel by deed. 

¶7 When it granted Husband’s petition to enforce, the superior 

court reasoned:

Wife failed to file a Motion for New Trial or to Amend the 

Judgment pursuant to [ARFLP 83]. Nor did either party file 

a Motion to Correct Mistake or Relief from Judgment 

pursuant to [ARFLP 85]. The Default Decree indicates it is a 

final, appealable order and neither party filed an appeal. 

Former Wife had many remedies available to her after the 

Default Decree was entered, none of which she pursued. The 

Default Decree is the final order of the Court and controls the 

disposition of property in this case. 

Addressing Wife’s motion for new trial, the court clarified its prior 

reasoning:

As to [Wife’s] argument that equitable estoppel applies in this 

case and the Court failed to address it in its ruling, the Court 

by its silence found equitable estoppel does not apply to the 

facts of this case. Here, although a quit claim deed was signed 

on the [Avenue Home] on February 28, 2012, three days 
JASSO v. JASSO

Decision of the Court

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before the Default Decree, Wife prepared and entered, her 

own Default Decree awarding that same house to Husband. 

She sought no remedies available under [ARFLP] 83 or 85 nor 

did she file an appeal. Equitable estoppel may have applied 

here if despite the Default Decree Husband signed a quit 

claim deed after the Default Decree but that is not what 

occurred. It was signed three days before a final order, the 

Default Decree, was entered. Equitable estoppel nor estoppel 

by deed apply. 

¶8 On appeal, Wife does not address the superior court’s

conclusion that the decree controls the disposition of property in this case, 

or the finding that Wife failed to seek remedies under ARFLP 83 and 85

after submitting the decree ultimately entered by the court. See Ariz. Rev.

Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 25-327(A) (“The provisions as to property disposition may 

not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of 

conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this 

state.”); see also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 158 Ariz. 496, 498 (App. 1988) (explaining 

that the “conditions justifying the reopening of a judgment” under A.R.S. § 

25-327(A) are found in Rule 60 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure); 

ARFLP 85 cmt. (“This rule is based on Rule 60, Arizona Rules of Civil 

Procedure.”). Similarly, Wife makes no attempt to address the impact of

these conclusions or findings on her estoppel theories. Wife’s arguments in 

this regard are therefore deemed waived and abandoned. See Robert 

Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 208 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 17 (App. 

2004) (“Generally, we will consider an issue not raised in an appellant’s 

opening brief as abandoned or conceded.”); Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified 

Sch. Dist. No. 97, 186 Ariz. 161, 167 (App. 1996) (“Issues not clearly raised 

and argued in a party’s appellate brief are waived.”).

¶9 Accordingly, even if the superior court applied the incorrect 

legal standard for equitable estoppel and estoppel by deed, or erred in 

analyzing these two defenses, the court properly granted Husband’s 

petition to enforce and denied Wife’s motion for new trial based on the 

unchallenged grounds addressed above. See Lorenz v. State, 238 Ariz. 556, 

558, ¶ 10 (App. 2015) (“We will affirm the superior court’s ruling if it was 

correct for any reason.”); Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 126 Ariz. 

542, 544 (App. 1980) (“We can consider only those matters which are 

presented to us.”).
JASSO v. JASSO

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

rulings granting Husband’s petition to enforce the decree’s division of 

property and denying Wife’s motion for new trial. Wife and Husband both 

request an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324, which 

allows a court to award a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees “after 

considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness 

of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” In our 

discretion, we deny their requests. As the successful party on appeal, 

Husband is awarded taxable costs upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.