U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

39–118

" ! SENATE 105TH CONGRESS

1st Session

TREATY DOC.

1997

105–28

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AND SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES AT NEW YORK

ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996. TREATY INCLUDES TWO ANNEXES, A

PROTOCOL, AND TWO ANNEXES TO THE PROTOCOL

SEPTEMBER 23, 1997.—Treaty was read the first time, together with the

accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

and ordered to be printed for use of the Senate

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 22, 1997.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to

ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the

‘‘Treaty’’ or ‘‘CTBT’’), opened for signature and signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty includes

two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of

which form integral parts of the Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State on

the Treaty, including an Article-by-Article analysis of the Treaty.

Also included in the Department of State’s report is a document

relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test-Ban Treaty Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to

the Treaty on November 19, 1996. The Text provides the basis for

the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making arrangements for

the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular, by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be responsible for ensuring that the verification regime

established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at such

time as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an analysis of the

verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with section 37 of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. Such legislation as

may be necessary to implement the Treaty also will be submitted

separately to the Senate for appropriate action.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is

a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject of the

Treaty is one that has been under consideration by the international community for nearly 40 years, and the significance of the

conclusion of negotiations and the signature to date of more than

140 states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty creates an absolute

prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions

or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. Specifically, each State

Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any

nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control;

and to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any

other nuclear explosion.
IV

The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based

on the provision of seismic, hydroaucoustic, radionuclide, and

infrasound data by a global network (the ‘‘International Monitoring

System’’) consisting of the facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data provided by the International Monitoring System will be

stored, analyzed, and disseminated, in accordance with Treatymandated operational manuals, by an International Data Center

that will be part of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The verification regime includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for

consultation and clarification, and voluntary confidence-building

measures designed to contribute to the timely resolution of any

compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of

monitoring data related to chemical explosions that a State Party

intends to or has carried out. Equally important to the U.S. ability

to verify the Treaty, the text specifically provides for the right of

States Parties to use information obtained by national technical

means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles

of international law for purposes of verification generally, and in

particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection request. The verification regime provides each State Party the right to protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations not related to the Treaty.

Determinations of compliance with the Treaty rest with each individual State Party to the Treaty.

Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978–1980, negotiations

among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the

Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon states called for testban negotiations, the United States urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ‘‘CD’’) to devote its attention to the difficult aspects

of monitoring compliance with such a ban and developing elements

of an international monitoring regime. After the United States,

joined by other key states, declared its support for comprehensive

test-ban negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a

treaty, negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in

the CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of

a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996 resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in conjunction

with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, of

‘‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’’ that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action.

On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a ‘‘zero

yield’’ CTBT, I stated that:

. . . As part of our national security strategy, the United

States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our

vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the

maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be

a supreme national interest of the United States. ‘‘I am as-
V

sured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our

nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of

maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through

a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without

nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such a

program almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with

the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied

to a new certification procedure. In order for this program

to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress

must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile

stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I

am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this

support.

While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship

program will be successful, as President I cannot dismiss

the possibility, however unlikely, that the program will fall

short of its objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific safeguards

that define the conditions under which the United States

can enter into a CTBT . . .

The safeguards that were established are as follows:

The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship

program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety

and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile,

including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.

The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities

and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology that will attract, retain, and ensure the continued

application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology

depends.

The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the

United States cease to be bound to adhere to this Treaty.

The continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.

The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information

on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

The understanding that if the President of the United

States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the

Secretary of Energy (DOE)—advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command—that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries

consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no
VI

longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the

Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT

under the standard ‘‘supreme national interests’’ clause in

order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

With regard to the last safeguard:

The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety

and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter

affecting the supreme interests of the country and will regard any events calling that confidence into question as

‘‘extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the

treaty.’’ It will exercise its rights under the ‘‘supreme national interests’’ clause if it judges that the safety or

realibility of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of confidence without

nuclear testing.

To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense ad Energy—advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council

or ‘‘NWC’’ (comprising representatives of DOD, JCS, and

DOE), the Directors of DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories

and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command—will

report to the President annually, whether they can certify

that the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical

elements thereof are, to a high degree of confidence, safe

and reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their

opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to assure the safety and reliability of the

stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state

the reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the

NWC, reporting any minority views.

After receiving the Secretaries’ certification and accompanying report, including NWC and minority views, the

President will provide them to the appropriate committees

of the Congress, together with a report on the actions he

has taken in light of them.

If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that

a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a

nuclear weapon type critical to the Nation’s nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear testing, or

that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the adequacy of

corrective measures, the President will be prepared to exercise our ‘‘supreme national interests’’ rights under the

Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.

The procedure for such annual certification by the Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S. Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories

will be embodied in domestic law.

As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became apparent that

one member of the CD, India, would not join in a consensus decision to forward the text to the United Nations for its adoption.

After consultations among countries supporting the text. Australia

requested the President of the U.N. General Assembly to convene

a resumed session of the 50th General Assembly to consider and
VII

take action on the text. The General Assembly was so convened,

and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was adopted. On September

24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first to sign the

Treaty.

The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(the ‘‘Organization’’), to be established in Vienna. The Organization, of which each State Party will be a member, will have three

organs: the Conference of the State Parties, a 51-member Executive

Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat

will supervise the operation of and provide technical support for

the International Monitoring System, operate the International

Data Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site inspections. The Treaty also requires each State Party to establish a

National Authority that will serve as the focal point within the

State Party for liaison with the Organization and with other States

Parties.

The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2

to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being

opened for signature. If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for

signature, the Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the

Treaty, will convene a conference of the states that have deposited

their instruments of ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this conference the participants will consider what measures consistent with international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry

into force of the Treaty. Their decision on such measures must be

taken by consensus.

Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol

and its Annexes so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the Treaty requires

the positive vote of a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty,

voting in a duly convened Amendment Conference at which no

State Party casts a negative vote. Such amendments would enter

into force 30 days after ratification by all States Parties that cast

a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a ‘‘supreme interests’’ clause entitling any State Party that determines that its

supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events

related to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw from the

Treaty upon 6-month’s notice.

Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a Review

Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty’s entry into

force and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more

frequently if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a

two-thirds vote).

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and

strengthen regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the
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achievement of the highest priority item on the international arms

control and nonproliferation agenda. Its effective implementation

will provide a foundation on which further efforts to control and

limit nuclear weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the

call for a CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most

importantly the nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated the

bona fides of their commitment to meaningful arms control measures.

The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the

CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-related

treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will

undergo significant improvement over the next several years to

meet these challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified.

Nonetheless, our National Intelligence Means (NIM), together with

the Treaty’s verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide

the United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively

verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States:

will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of

information available in public and private channels, and

the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing

compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of

noncompliance; and

will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the

Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in

terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage

U.S. security interests and constraining the proliferation of

nuclear weapons, and (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.

My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects

the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by

possible nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect

under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive substantial confidence from other factors—the CTBT’s ‘‘supreme national interests’’ clause, the annual certification procedure

for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program.

I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in

the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the

Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and

its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.
(IX)

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 20, 1997.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Treaty, or CTBT), opened

for signature at New York on September 24, 1996, and signed by

the United States of America and 145 other countries to date.

The Treaty includes as integral parts, two Annexes and a Protocol (on verification) with two Annexes. Accompanying this Report

for the information of the Senate, is an Article-by-Article analysis

of the Treaty.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty represents the culmination of nearly four decades of

efforts, beginning during the Eisenhower Administration, to ban

completely all nuclear weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, wherever they might be carried out. Since 1963,

the carrying out of a nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other

nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, in outer space or underwater

has been prohibited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests

in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the Partial

or Limited Test-Ban Treaty, or LTBT), done at Moscow August 5,

1963. More than 120 states are party to the LTBT, but importantly

two of the formally acknowledged nuclear weapon states, China

and France, are not. During the 1977–1980 time frame, trilateral

negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were carried out by the

United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. These

negotiations reached an impasse over a number of issues, including

seismic monitoring. They continued following the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in early December 1979 and were adjourned in November 1980.

In the decade that followed, efforts to explore the verification

needs for a comprehensive test ban were undertaken by the Group

of Scientific Experts, a group of the Conference on Disarmament

(the CD), while strong calls were made for negotiations on a test

ban by many non-nuclear weapon states. In making their case for

negotiation of a test ban, these non-nuclear weapon states repeatedly referred to the preambular expressions of support for continued negotiations on a test ban contained in the LTBT and the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), done at

Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.

Since December 11, 1990, the United States and the Russian

Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union) have been legally precluded from conducting nuclear explosions with yields greater than
X

150 kilotons in the one environment to which the 1963 LTBT was

not applicable, beneath the surface of the earth, by the Treaty on

the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (TTBT) and

the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on July 3, 1974 and May 28, 1976 respectively. Following signature of these Treaties and pending their

entry into force, the United States and the Soviet Union in 1976

each publicly stated its intention to observe the 150 kiloton limit,

provided that the other did likewise. Following agreement on new

verification Protocols, the two Treaties were ratified and entered

into force on December 11, 1990.

The CTBT will prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions and

any other nuclear explosion, however small, and it does so in each

and every environment, without exception.

The text of the Treaty was negotiated in Geneva, between January 1994 and August 1996, in the CD. Nearly all of the member

states of the CD, initially numbering 38, but subsequently expanded to 61 in June 1996, participated actively in the negotiations. On behalf of the United States, representatives of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence Community,

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Energy all played important roles in the development of the Treaty

through participation in the negotiations in Geneva and the development of policy in Washington. Throughout the negotiating process, the United States consulted and worked closely with its Western Allies in the CD, as well as with Israel and with the non-Western nuclear weapon state members of the CD, Russia and China.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

When the United States made the decision in mid-1993 actively

to pursue conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty it did so

in an environment, both international and domestic, significantly

different from that in which negotiations of a test ban had taken

place from 1977 to 1980. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and

the appreciation of the magnitude of the security threat posed by

the possible proliferation of states having nuclear weapon capabilities fostered a new look at the impact a comprehensive test-ban

could have on constraining such threats. Additional factors included the redress of the major imbalance in conventional forces in

Europe brought about by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe (the CFE Treaty), done at Paris December 19, 1990,

which greatly reduced the levels of tanks, armored combat vehicles,

artillery, attack aircraft, and helicopters, and the major reduction

in the strategic forces of the United States and the former Soviet

Union resulting from the START negotiations. Finally, it was determined that the United States had no current military requirement for new-design nuclear warhead production. Accordingly, the

constraints of a test ban could be accepted. In contrast to earlier

comprehensive test ban negotiations, all the negotiating parties

were willing to accept relatively intrusive verification measures, including extensive in-country sensors and on-site inspections.

In addition, legislation was signed into law by President Bush in

1992 that directed the United States to stop all testing by Septem-
XI

ber 30, 1996, provided no other state tested after that date, and to

engage in negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test-ban by that

date. In the meantime, the legislation (sponsored by Senators Hatfield, Exon, and Mitchell) precluded the expenditure of funds for

more than 15 nuclear weapon tests (including three for the United

Kingdom) and permitted the expenditure of appropriated funds for

such tests only if they were found by the Executive Branch to be

necessary for the sole purpose of maintaining the reliability and

safety of the existing nuclear weapon stockpile.

As regards the international climate that contributed to the U.S.

decision actively to support negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban, the then forthcoming 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT focused new light on the importance of

a comprehensive test-ban to the member states of the NPT and to

the continued viability of the nonproliferation regime. The United

States was deeply committed to the indefinite and unconditional

extension of the NPT, and it became clear that a comprehensive

test-ban could make a major contribution to achievement of the

NPT’s permanent extension. The decision to support a concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test-ban was thus based on the

careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the

benefits to United States nonproliferation and other security objectives in constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon capabilities. However, the U.S. decision to pursue actively a

comprehensive test-ban was conditioned on having the capability to

ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the

U.S. stockpile and to achieve an effective verification regime for the

Treaty. At the same time, the United States sought to ensure protection of U.S. interests with respect to the scope, membership, and

termination provisions of the Treaty.

The negotiations in the CD continued throughout 1994, 1995,

and most of 1996. The CD was working to meet a target date for

signature of the Treaty in the fall of 1996 set by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution unanimously adopted in

December 1995. The objective was for the CD to forward the

agreed-upon text to a resumed 50th session of the UNGA, which

could then request the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for

signature. As the 1996 CD session drew close to an end it became

clear that one state, India, would block consensus action by the CD

to forward the text to the UNGA. The member states of the CD

that supported the text thereupon began to consider other means

by which the text that had resulted from the deliberations within

the CD’s AD Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test-Ban might be forwarded to the UN. Australia took the lead in its individual capacity, not as a member of the CD, and formally requested that the

UNGA President convene a resumed session of the 50th General

Assembly for the purpose of considering and acting upon the text

of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At its resumed session the General Assembly adopted the text of the Treaty by a vote of 158 to

3 with 5 abstentions. Thereafter the Secretary-General opened the

Treaty for signature on September 24, 1996. At the same time, the

Signatory States held a series of consultations regarding the Text

on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization that had been
XII

developed at the CD. At a meeting of Signatory States of the CTBT

on November 19, 1996, the Signatory States, at that time numbering 130, adopted by acclamation the Text, thereby establishing the

Preparatory Commission for the Organization. This document provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission, which

is the entity responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and for laying the foundation for the operation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(the Organization) that is established by the Treaty and will come

into being once the Treaty enters into force. The Text, which is relevant to but not part of the Treaty, is enclosed for the information

of the Senate. On November 20, 1996, the Preparatory Commission

convened its first meeting (which was reconvened and concluded in

March 1997), and began the process of developing Rules of Procedure, Financial Regulations, and other necessary measures for the

future operation of the Organization in implementing the Treaty.

THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty consists of a Preamble, 17 Articles, and two Annexes, as well as the Protocol to the

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Verification Protocol)

having three Parts and two Annexes. The basic obligations of the

States Parties are set forth in Article I. Specifically, each State

Party undertakes: (a) not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion; (b) to prohibit and prevent

any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or

control; and (c) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way

participating in the carrying out of any such nuclear explosion by

anyone else. The prohibitions and undertakings thus apply to geographic areas (i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or control of a

State Party), as well as to the activities of a State Party (e.g., the

carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion) wherever such activity might take place.

ORGANIZATIONAL BODIES

The Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban

Treaty Organization (the Organization, or CTBTO) located in Vienna, Austria, as the body that is charged with achieving the object

and purpose of the Treaty and overseeing implementation of the

provisions of the Treaty and the international verification system

described in the Protocol to the CTBT. Each State Party to the

Treaty is a member of the Organization, which itself has three organs: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council,

and the Technical Secretariat.

The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) is the body

responsible for overseeing implementation of the Treaty, the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, and the

States Parties’ compliance with the Treaty’s provisions. It is

charged with considering and reviewing scientific and technological

developments that could affect the operation of the Treaty, and

with taking the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the

Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes

the provisions of the Treaty.
XIII

The Executive Council is composed of 51 member states, elected

by the Conference of the States Parties. Annex 1 to the Treaty assigns each potential State Party to one of six geographical regions.

Each region will present to the Conference designations of States

Parties for seats on the Executive Council. Designations will be

based, inter alia, on a State Party’s nuclear capabilities relevant to

the Treaty as well as the number of monitoring facilities and financial contributions to the Organization. The United States expects

to serve continuously on the Executive Council. The Executive

Council is the executive body of the Organization, responsible for

the supervision of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council

serves as the liaison with the National Authority of each State

Party, and carries out the preparatory and follow-up work for sessions of the Conference. The Executive Council has important functions with respect to verification and compliance: it is directed to

facilitate cooperation among the States Parties through the exchange of information; to facilitate consultations among States Parties; to receive, consider, and act on requests for on-site inspections;

and to take action on the reports of such inspections. It may make

recommendations to the Conference based on the results of on-site

inspections, or, if a case is urgent, take a matter directly to the

United Nations.

The Technical Secretariat is responsible, inter alia and most importantly, for supervising the operation of the International Monitoring System (the IMS), operating the International Data Center

(the IDC), and the conduct of on-site inspections. It is headed by

a Director-General, appointed by the Conference, who will serve a

four-year term and not more than two terms. Data from the monitoring stations in the IMS is provided by States directly or

through their own national data centers, to the IDC, where it is

processed, analyzed and stored, and made available to all States

Parties. The IDC products that will be made available to all States

Parties at no cost include: standard screened event bulletins, executive summaries of data acquired, and integrated lists of all signals

detected by the IMS.

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

In addition to the implementing organs established by the Treaty

itself, the Treaty requires each State Party to establish a National

Authority to serve as a focal point for liaison with the Organization

and with other States Parties. States Parties are also expressly required to take the steps necessary to prohibit natural and legal

persons on their territory and natural and legal persons in any

other place under their jurisdiction or control, from undertaking

any activity that the State Party itself is prohibited from undertaking. In addition, they are required to prohibit their nationals from

undertaking such activities anywhere. These prohibitions complement the basic obligation of each State Party under Article I to

‘‘prohibit and prevent’’ nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

The verification regime established by the Treaty has four separate but interdependent components: an international monitoring
XIV

system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The Protocol to the Treaty

contains the specific objectives, authorities, functions, and requirements for the international monitoring system, on-site inspections,

and confidence-building measures. The Treaty also provides for the

States Parties to take measures necessary to ensure compliance

and to redress a situation that contravenes the Treaty, including

the possibility of the imposition of sanctions. In conjunction with

States Parties’ obligations to provide data and accept on-site inspections, provision is made for the protection of sensitive facilities

and confidential information and data provided by States Parties.

The Treaty also specifically recognizes States Parties’ rights to use

information obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including the respect for the sovereignty of states, for purposes of

verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site

inspection request.

Each State Party is required to maintain and operate, in accordance with agreements or arrangements between it and the Organization, those facilities for seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustical, and infrasound monitoring comprising the IMS, as well

as laboratories and related communication facilities, listed in

Annex 1 to the Protocol, located on its territory or for which it is

otherwise responsible. The Organization is also authorized to enter

into similar agreements or arrangements with states not party to

the Treaty as necessary.

For the purpose of clarifying whether a nuclear explosion has

been carried out in violation of the Treaty, each State Party has

the right to request an on-site inspection. Within specific time

frames an inspection request must be processed and referred to the

Executive Council, which must take action within 96 hours from

the time the request is first received. Approval of the request requires at least 30 affirmative votes of the 51 members of the Executive Council. If the request is approved, the inspection team must

arrive at the point of entry no more than six days following the Executive Council’s receipt of the request. Following the inspection,

an inspection report is provided to all States Parties, and the Executive Council reviews the report and must address any concerns

expressed by a State Party as to whether any non-compliance with

the Treaty has occurred and whether the right to request an onsite inspection has been abused. If the Executive Council determines that further actions may be necessary, it may make recommendations to the Conference on measures to redress the situation.

Recognizing that signals from non-nuclear explosions might create ambiguities, the Treaty calls upon each State Party, on a voluntary basis, to participate in a number of confidence-building

measures, including the provision of information relating to any

chemical explosions using over 300 metric tons of TNT-equivalent

blasting material that it intends to carry out.

ENTRY INTO FORCE, DURATION, AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY

Annex 2 to the Treaty names the 44 states that are members of

the Conference on Disarmament and that are also listed in Table
XV

1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s April 1996 edition

of ‘‘Nuclear Power Reactors in the World’’ or listed in Table I of the

IAEA’s December 1995 edition of ‘‘Nuclear Research Reactors in

the World.’’ Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the Treaty,

these 44 states are those whose ratification is required for the

Treaty to enter into force. Once those states have ratified, the

Treaty will enter into force 180 days following the deposit of the

last instrument of ratification by the 44, or two years after September 24, 1996 (the date on which the Treaty was opened for signature), whichever is later.

By virtue of this Article XIV provision, each of the 44 named

states could effectively block the entry into force of the Treaty. The

Treaty therefore provides that three years after the opening of the

Treaty for signature, if it has not yet entered into force, a majority

of the states that have deposited their instruments of ratification

can request the Secretary-General of the United Nations (the designated Depositary for the Treaty) to convene a conference to consider what measures, consistent with international law, might be

undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty’s entry into force. This conference would not, however, have the authority to waive the requirement for ratification

by the 44 designated states.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty contains a ‘‘supreme interests’’ clause, in accordance with which a State Party

may withdraw from the Treaty upon six month’s notice to all the

other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary, and

the United Nations Security Council, if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A State Party exercising this right

is required to provide, along with its notice of withdrawal, a statement of the extraordinary event or events that it regards as having

jeopardized its supreme interests.

RESERVATIONS AND AMENDMENTS

Reservations may not be taken to the Articles of the Treaty or

the Annexes to the Treaty. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and the Annexes thereto so long as they are not incompatible

with the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The procedures for amendment of the Treaty, the Protocol or the

Annexes to the Protocol provide that any State party may propose

an amendment, which, if considered and adopted at an Amendment

Conference by a majority of States Parties and without a negative

vote by any State Party, shall enter into force for all States Parties

30 days after deposit of an instrument of ratification or acceptance

by all those States Parties that voted for the amendment at the

Amendment Conference.

In addition, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of ensuring

the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the Parties may make

changes of an administrative or technical nature to Part I (dealing

with the International Monitoring System and the International

Data Center) and Part III (Confidence-Building Measures) of the

Protocol, as well as the Annexes to the Protocol, in accordance with

a separate procedure and without going through the formal amendment process.
XVI

COSTS

The expenses of the Organization are to be borne by the States

Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization. It is anticipated

that the United States share will be approximately 25 percent. The

Treaty provides that each State Party establishing or upgrading

International Monitoring Facilities (IMS) may reduce its annual assessed contribution by up to 50 percent pursuant to agreement

with the Organization and, if applicable, the state(s) on whose territory the facility is based. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission are to be divided in the same manner as the expenses of

the Organization, and provision is made for giving credit to States

Parties for their contribution to the Preparatory Commission as offsets against their assessed contributions for the regular budget of

the Organization.

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

As noted above, the Treaty requires that each State Party establish a National Authority that will function as its liaison with the

Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party is required to inform the Organization of its National Authority upon

entry into force of the treaty for it.

In order for the United States to ensure full compliance with its

obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation will be required. Such legislation will be submitted separately to the Congress. In addition, any environmental documentation that may be

deemed appropriate will be forwarded separately to the Senate for

its information.

CONCLUSION

I believe that this Treaty, by banning all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as described above, and

by establishing a comprehensive verification system to monitor

compliance and assist States Parties in making compliance decisions, will significantly strengthen the national security of the

United States and its Allies and will contribute to global and regional security as well. I therefore recommend that the Treaty be

transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification

at the earliest possible time.

Respectfully submitted,

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT.

Enclosures: As stated.
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