### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 42 -C V

______________________________ I NSURANCE COMPANY OF TH E STATE OF PENNSYL VANIA, Appellant V. EDWARD L EJ EUNE, Appe llee

On Appea l from the 102nd Judi cial District Court

Red River County , Texas Trial Court No. CV01389

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Op ini on by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr iss2 O P I N I O N I n this restricted a

ppeal, Insuranc e Company of the State of Pennsylvania (Company ) see ks t o o v e rtu r na d e f a u l tj u d g m e n taw ar d e d

t o E dw ar d

Le j e u n e o na

w o r k e r s ' c o mp e n s a t i o n c l a i m . In

a re stricted appe al prope rly befor e us, we look to see if any prese rved err or is a ppare nt on the fac e of the re c or d. F ind ing no su c h er ro r o n th e fa c e of

thi s r e c or d, we a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt. Af te r e xha us ting his a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s, L e je un e br ou g ht s uit

a g a ins t Co mpa

ny to determ i n e whether ce rtain injuries we re c ompensable w orker s' compensation claims. W hen Company f

a il e d to f il e anan s w e r

a f te r b e in g s e r v e d , th e tr ia l c o u rt r e n d e r e d a d e f a u lt ju dg ment ag ainst Company . I n this restricted a ppeal, Company claims the default judgme nt violates Sections 410.252, 410.253, and 410.258 of the Texas L abor Code. I n addition, Company

alleg es the ser

vice of proc ess was inva lid and the attorne y s' fee awa rd is not supported by

the re cord. L ejeune raises

a c o u n t e r - i s s u e a l l e g i n g C o mp an y' s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l i s u n t i m e l y. Thoug h (1) notice of appe al was timely , we h o l d that (2) no ve nue er ror wa s prese rved, ( 3) no attorne y s' fee s were awa rded, ( 4) fa ilure to note the hour the cler k rec eived c itation was not fatal, (5) the c lerk ne ed not ver ify the re turn of ser

vice, ( 6) the rec ord reve als no violation of Se c tio n 4 10 .2 53 , ( 7) the re c or d r e ve a ls n o v iol a tio n o f S e c tio n 41 0. 25 8, and (8 ) t he re c or d r e ve a ls

no e rr on e ou s a dd

re ss f or se rv ic e of

pr oc e ss. To pr e va il o n a

dir e c t a tta c k o n a

jud g me nt b y

a re str ic te d a

pp e a l, a n a pp e lla nt

mus t e sta bli shthat: ( 1) [ he or sh e ] fi le d n oti c e of the re str ic te d a

pp e a l w ith in s ix months after the judgme nt was sig ned; (2) [he or she] was a pa

rty to the underlying3

lawsuit; (3) [he or she] did not participate in the he aringthat resulted in the judg ment complained of

and did not timely

file any postjudgme n t m o t i o n s or re quests for finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law; and ( 4) er ror is appa

rent on the fac e of the rec ord. Alexande r v. Lynda's Boutique , 13 4 S.W. 3d 84 5, 84 8 ( Te x. 20 04 ); see also T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1(c) , 30. Her e, only

require ments (1) a

nd (4) a re que stioned. Review by

a re stricted appe al af

fords a n appellant e ssentially

the same sc ope o f re view as

an ordinary appea l, that is, a revie w of the e ntire ca se. See G unn v. Cavanaugh , 391 S.W .2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965). The only restric tion on the sc ope of r eview in a restric ted appe al is that the err or must appear

on the fa ce of

the re cord. See Gen. Elec. Co. v

. Falcon Ridge Ap a r t me n t s , Jo int Ve ntu re , 8 11 S.W. 2d

94 2, 94 3 ( Te x. 19 91 ); cf. Flores v. H.E. B utt Grocery Co. , 802 S.W .2d 53, 55 (Tex. App

. — C o rp u s C h ri sti 1990, no writ). "[E]vidence not bef ore the trial court pr ior to final judgme nt may

not be consider ed" in a re stricted appe al. Gen. Ele c. Co. , 811 S.W .2d at 944. The fa c e of the re c or d, fo r p ur

po se s o f a re str ic te d a

pp e a l, c on sis ts of a ll the pa pe rs on fi le in t he a pp e a l, including the repor

ter' s rec ord. DS C Fi n. Cor p. v. Mo ff itt , 8 15 S.W. 2d

55 1 ( Te x. 19 91 ); Laas v. W illiamson , 1 56 S.W. 3d 85 4, 85 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —B e a umo nt 2 00 5, no pe t.) ; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Century Bank, N.A. , No. 06-03-00140- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 4998 (Tex. Ap p . — T ex arka na J une 4, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.).4

( 1) Not ic e of A

pp e al W as Tim e ly L ejeune argues Company ' s notice of a ppeal wa s not tim ely

filed. I n a re stricted appe al, the notice of ap p ea l m u s t b e filed within si x months after the judgme nt was sig ned. T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1(c) . The trial court orig inally g rante d L ejeune ' s motion for a defa ult judgment Apr il 11, 2007. Howeve r, the trial court g rante d L ejeune ' s motion to vacate t he April 11, 2007, defa ult judgme nt and g rante d a re formed de fault judg ment May 9, 2007. L ejeune then fil ed an amende d motion to reform the de fa ult jud g me nt w hic h s ta te d th e Te xas D e pa rtme nt o f I

ns ur anc e , D ivi sion of Work e rs ' Compensation, did not rece ive a c opy of the proposed defa

ult judg ment until Apr il 19, 2007. The trial court g rante d a re formed de fault judg ment J une 4, 2007. L ejeune claims the notice of appea l must have bee n filed within six months of the April 11, 2007, judg ment. A trial cour

t may vacate, m odify , corr ect, or ref orm its own judgment within thirty day s after the judgme nt was sig ned. T EX . R. C IV . P. 32 9b (d ); Fi rst Al ie f B an k v . W hit e , 682 S.W .2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984). The f

irst reformed de fault judg ment was sig ned within thirty day s of the orig inal def a u lt ju d g me n t. T h u s , th e f ir s t r e f o r me d d e f a u lt ju d g me n t ( s ig n e d M a y 9 , 2 0 0 7 ) v aca ted the orig inal defa

ult judgment sig ned Apr il 11, 2007. The second r efor med def ault j u d gm ent (sig ned J une 4, 2007) w as sig ned within thirty day s of the first re formed de fault judg ment. Thus, the trial court ha d authority

to vacate, modify , corr ect, or ref orm the first re formed defa ult judg ment with the second refor

med default judgme nt. There can only be one f inal judgme nt. T EX . R. C IV . P. 301. TheUnless ot h erw ise specif ied in the re mainder of

this opini on, we will re fer to the second 1 re fo rm e d d e fa

ult jud g me nt s ig ne d Jun e 4, 20 07 , a s th e de fa ult jud g me nt. 5 J une 4, 2 0 0 7 , r e f

o r me d d e f a u lt ju d g me n t is th e o n ly f in a l a p p e a la b le o r d e r in th is c a s e . I f a 1 judgme nt is modified, corr ecte d, or re formed, the time for appe al runs fr om the date the judg ment was modified, c orre cted, or ref ormed. T EX . R. C IV . P. 329b(h). The time period for filing the notice of appe al beg an to run June 4, 2007. There fore , Company ' s notice o f a re stricted appe al filed N o v e mb e r

2 9 , 2 0 0 7 , w a s t i m e l y. ( 2) No Venue Error W as Preserv ed Company complains the trial cour t's de fault judg ment violates the mandatory venue provisio n s o f

Se c ti o n4 1 0

. 2 5 2 o f

th e T e xa s L a

b o r Co d e . Se c ti o n4 1 0

. 2 5 2 ( b ) r e qu ir e s th e ju dicial revie w of a

worke rs' com p en s at i o n admi nistrative dec ision to be filed in "the c ounty wher e the emp lo y ee res id ed at th e ti me of th e in ju ry . . . " T EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . § 410.252(b) ( Ver non 2006). I n his petition, L ejeune alleg ed he w as a r esident of Ellis County at the time of

the injury . I n a noanswe r def

ault judgme nt, the nonanswe ring party has " admitted" the fac ts pled in the petition. See, e.g., Stoner v . Thompson , 578 S.W .2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979). Be cause there is no evidence of L ejeune ' s county

of re sidence in the rec ord other tha n the petition , C o m p an y

claims the District Court of Red River County was wi t h o u t j urisdiction, making the defa ult judgment void. L ejeune argue s t h e al leg ation was a draf ting e rror , Section 410.252(b) is not jurisdictional, and Company failed to ra ise the plea ding de fec t by a spec ial exception.Com pa ny fa ile d to no te in i ts b ri e f t hat Mingus had bee n overr uled. The Te x as Disciplinary 2 Rules of Pr o fe s s i o n al Conduct impose on counsel the duty of ca ndor towar d the Court. See T EX . D I S C I PL I NAR Y R. P R OF ' L C ON DU C T 3. 03 (a )( 1) . Co mp any shou ld h a ve dis c ov e re d th e a dv e rs e subsequent history

during its resea

rch a nd mentioned the fa ct in its brief. 6 Ac c or din g to L e

je un e , th e all egati on in t he pe tit ion

that L e je un e wa s a

re sid e nt o f E lli s County is merely a draf

ting err or. L ejeune claims the re cord de monstrates the a lleg ation is a draf ting

err or bec ause the petition contains an address for L ejeune , which is within Red River County , and the conteste d

c a s e h e ar in g s tate s th e s a me a d dr e s s . We a g r e e w it h Co mp an y

th a t t h e f a c t t h at L ejeune resided in Red River County at the time he f

iled suit and at t he ti me of the a dminist rative decision does not esta

blish residence at the time of the injury

. A void judgme nt is not sus ceptible to ratification or conf irmation, and its nullit y

cannot be

wa i v ed. Easterline v. Be an , 1 21 Te x. 32 7, 49 S.W. 2d 42 7, 42 9 ( 19 32 ); I

n r e G u a rdia n s h ip of Erickson , 2 08 S.W. 3d 73 7, 74 0 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 06 , no pe t.)

. A j ud g me nt, tho ug h, is v oid only when the c ourt rende ring judgme nt "ha d no jurisdiction o f t h e p ar ties or prope rty , no jur isd ic tio n o f t

he su bje c t matte r, no jur isd ic tio n to e nte r the pa rt ic ula r j ud g me nt, or

no c a pa c ity to act ." Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W .3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). Com pa ny c ite s Mingus v. W

adley , 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W . 1084 (1926), overruled by Dubai Pe tro le um Co. v . Ka

zi , 12 S.W .3d 71 (Tex. 2000); Ga mb i l l v. Town of Ponder , 494 S.W .2d 808 2 (T e x. 19 73 ); Sc hu ma nn v . Ci ty of S c he rtz , 100 S.W .3d 361, 365 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); and Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. W alker , 6 4 S. W.3 d 6 54 , 6 57 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , p e t. denied)

. Mi ngus w a s o v e r r u le d b y th e T e xa s Su

p r e me Co u rt in Du ba i P e tro le um Co. v . Ka zi , 127

S.W .3d 71 (Tex. 2 0 0 0 ). The c ourt stated " [w] e ther efor e over rule Mingus to t

he e xten t th a t it char act eri z ed the pl ain ti ff's fail ure to est abl is h a s tat ut ory prer equ is it e as j uri sd ict io nal ." Id . Neither Ga mb ill nor Schumann conce rn Section 410.252 of the T exas L abor Code. See Ga mbill , 494 S .W .2 d at 80 9; Schumann , 100 S.W .3d at 365. Ar go na ut c o n c e r

n e d th e f o rty
- d ay f il in g d e a d li ne under Sec tion 410.252(a) r ather than the venue provision of Section 410.252(b). Ar go na ut S w. I ns . Co. , 64 S.W .3d at 657 (holding Section 410.252(a) was mandatory and jurisdictional). Th e Tyle r, B e a

umo nt, and

Au sti n Co ur

ts o f A pp e a ls h a ve he ld S e c tio n 4 10 .2 52 (b ), wh ile mandatory , is not jurisdictional. See Ins. Co. of the St ate of Pa. v. King , No. 12-04-00117- CV, 2005 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 43 59 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r June 8, 20 05 , n o p e t.) ; Maybe rry v. Am. HomeAssur. Co. , 12 2 S. W.3 d 4 55, 4 58 (T e x. Ap p. —B e a umo nt 2 00 3, no pe t.) ; Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Hafley , 96 S.W .3d 469 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see also Dubai , 12 S.W

. 3 d at 76 (conc luding statutory

prer equisites no longe r p r e s u me d ju r is d ic ti o n a l)

. We a g ree with the conclusion of our sister c ourts that S ec t i o n 4 1 0

. 2 5 2(b) is not jurisdictional. The sec tion affe cts only venue, without making any substantive chang e in the cour t's inhe rent powe r. Se e Ha rtf or d , 96 S.W .3d at 473. Be cause Section 410.252(b) is not jurisdictional, vi o l at i n g t he sec tion does not render the judgme nt void. O r d in ar il y , v e n u e e r

r o r s c an b e w a iv e d

. S

ee , e. g ., Corona v. Pilgrim' s Pride Corp. , 245 S.W. 3d 75 , 85 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 08 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Clif

f Jones, Inc . v. Ledbetter , 896 S.W .2d 41 7 , 4 18–19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1995, no writ). Company did not challeng e the8

pleadingdefe ct with a spec ial exception, file a motion to transfe r venue under Sec tion 410.252(c) of the Te x as L abor Code, or otherwise challeng e the pleading defe ct in the trial court. Be cause the

rec ord does not re flec t that any issue conce rning Section 410.252(b) was raised in the t rial cour t, any

err or has be en wa ived. We overr ule this issue. ( 3) No Attorneys' Fees W ere Awarded Company complains that the re cord doe s not suppor t the awa rd of attorney s' fee s. Company argues that the lac k of a r eporte r' s rec ord is reve rsible er ror a nd that the evidenc e of attorne y s' fee s is insufficient to justify

the awa rd. B oth Company

and L ejeune claim t he judg ment contains an

awa rd of attorney s' fee s in the amount of $15,000.00 to L ejeune . We disag ree . The de fault judg ment' s only ref ere nces to attorney s' fee s are found in a sing le sentenc e: I f De fenda

nt succe ssfully

appea ls to the court of appe als, Def endant sha ll be entitled to a re mitti tur of $15,000 ag ainst the judgme nt f or attorney s' fee s; and if Def endant d o e s n o t a

p p e a l f r o m t h e c o u rt o f a

p p e a l s t o t h e S u

p r e m e C o u rt o f T e xa s a ndtim e fo r t hat a pp e a l ha s e xpir e d, or

if the De fe nd ant su c c e ssf

ull y a pp e a ls t o th e Sup re me Court of Texas, Defe ndant s h al l b e enti tled to a re mitti tur of $15,000 ag ainst the judgme nt for attorne y s' fee s . . . . There is no other re fer ence to attorney s' fee s. The first refor med def ault judgme nt contains identical lang uag e conc erningattorney s' fee s and make s no awa rd. The orig inal defa

ult judgment does not contain any

awa rd of attorney s' fee s and wa s expl icitly vacated. A re mitti tur is an " order

awa rding a new

trial, or a da

mag es amount lower

than that awa

rded" and requiring the party to choose be tween the se alter natives. B LACK ' S L AW D I C TI ONAR Y 13 21 (8 th

e d. 20 04 ); see T EX . R. C IV . P. 315. A re mitti tur m er el y re duces a prior dama g es aw ard ( or9

a lte rn a tiv e ly

or de rs a ne w tri a l) . I f t

he re is n o a

wa rd to r e du c e , a

re du c tio n of th e awa

rd is s til l nothing. As suc h, no attorney s' fee s are awa rded in the defa

ult judg ment. Be cause there is no awar d of attorne y s' fee s, Company ' s arguments—that the lack of a re porter' s rec ord is reve rsible er ror a nd that the evidenc e is insufficient to support the a war d—are moot. Co mp any als o argue s th a t it did no t r e c e ive no tic e of

the he ari nga t w hic h th e de fa ult jud g me nt a

wa rd inga tto rn e y s' fe e s w a s ent ered. Co mpa ny c ite s Lopez v. Lopez , 757 S.W .2d 721 (Tex. 1988), as author ity

for the pr oposition t h at i t was e ntitled to noti ce of the hea ring

. Lopez

is distinguishable f

rom this case. In Lopez , the appe llant had filed a n answe r. Id . I n addition, Lopez states " the re cord he re e stablishes that Guada lupe had no a ctual or c onstructive not i ce o f t he trial set ti ng." Id . at 723. I n this case, Company failed to file a

n answe r, and the reco rd i s silent

conce rning whether

Company

rec eived notice o f t h e t ri al setting . I n the abse nce of a duty for the court c lerk to file the notice , notice nee d not affirmatively appea r on the fa ce of

the re cord. Gen. Elec. Co. , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d

at 9 4 3 (d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Lopez ). Company has fa iled t o p ro v ide us with any

a uth or ity that th e face of th e re c or d mu st a ff ir ma tiv e ly de mon str a te no tic e . We wi ll n ot p re su me
err or base d on a silent rec ord. This issue is overruled.10

( 4) Failure to Note the Hour the Clerk Re ceiv ed Citation W as Not Fatal Acc ording to Company , the citation violates R u l e 105 beca use the district cle rk did not endorse the hour at which the reque st was re ceive d. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 105. "Adefa ult judgment

c ann ot w ith sta

nd a dir e c t a tta c k b y

a de fe nd ant w ho sh ow s th a t su c h d e fe nd ant w a s n ot s e rv e d in st ri ct c om pl ian ce wi th th e law." Frazier v. Dikov itsky , 144 S.W .3d 146, 148 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 20 04 , n o p e t.) . Stri c t c omp lia nc e do e s n ot, ho we ve r, re qu ir e " a bs olut e ob e isa

nc e to t he min ute st det ail ." He rb e rt v . Gr e ate r Gu lf Coas t E nte rs ., 915 S.W .2d 866, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.). The fa ilure to note t he hour the citation was re ceive d is not fatal. Aguilar v. Livingston , 154 S.W .3d 832, 835 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.); 3 R OY W. M C D ONAL D & E L AI NE A. G R AF TON C AR L S ON , T EX A S C I V I L P RACTI CE § 1 1:6 6 ( 2d e d. 20 00 ); see Clark v . W ilson , 3 1 T e x. 32 2, 32 7 ( 18 68 ); cf. T

AC America's, Inc. v . Boothe , 94 S.W .3d 315, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,

no pet.) (que stioning whe ther Cla rk, 3 1 T ex . at 3 2 7 , wa s b i n d i n g p re ce d en tan d co n cl u d i n g Cla rk was distinguisha

ble). We over

rule this issue. ( 5) The Clerk Need Not Verify the R eturn of Service Be cause the re turn is not verified, Company argues the c itation fails to compl y with Rule 107. Ru le 1 07 pro vi des "[ t] he re tu rn o f cit ati on by an aut ho ri z ed p ers on sh all be v eri fi ed. " T EX . R. C IV . P. 10 7. Te xas l aw i s c le ar th at a pr ivate pr oc e ss s e rv e r i s an " a uth or ize d p e rs on " and

thu s mu st11

verify the re turn. S

e e, e . g . , F

razier , 1 4 4 S

. W

. 3d at 149. The que stion in t his case is whe ther a district clerk is included w ithin the definition of "a n authorized person." Rule 107 rec og nizes two classes of proce ss se rver s, "of fice rs" or " authorized persons." The

ru le ' s v e ri fi c a tio n r e qu ir e me nt a pp lies on ly to a

n " a uth or ize d p e rs on ," no t an " of fi c e r. " Th is omission l og ically

means that off

icer s are not require d to verify the re turn. I n an unpublished opinion, the Corpus Christi Court of Appea ls ha s conclude d a sher iff nee d not verify returns. DRC Distribs. v. Joiner , N o. 13 -0 4- 03 8- CV , 2 00 6 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 11 68 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i F e b. 9, 20 06 , no pe t.)

. I n 19 88 , the Te xas Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure we re a me nd e d to pe rm it c ourt s "to aut ho ri z e per so ns o t h e r t h a n S heri ffs or C on st abl es t o s ervi ce C it ati on ." T EX . R. C IV . P. 103, cmt. 1988. Prior to 1988, the Rules merely require d the re turn t o b e "s i g ned by the offic er off ici all y ." T EX . R. C IV . P. 107, 599–600 S.W .2d (Tex. Cases) p. xx x ix (1981, ame nded 1988). The Rules did not previously

require verific ation. The 1988 amendments adde d the re quirement that "[ t] he ret urn of cit ati on by an aut ho ri z ed pers on sh all be veri fi ed. " See T EX . R. C IV . P. 107, 733–34 S.W. 2d (T e x. Ca se s) p. x lv (19 88 , ame nd e d 1 99 0) . We c on c lud e that th e int e nt o f t he ru le is t o include distri ct cl erks, with sher iffs and c onstables, within the meaningof the ter m

" of fi c e rs " —p e rs on s w ho , b y vir tue of the ir of

fi c e s, are no t re qu ir e d to ve ri fy re tur ns . We ov e rr

ule this iss ue.We h e ld a bo ve that ve nu e re qu ir e me nts of Se c tio n 4 10 .2 52 (b ) a re no t juri sd ic tio na l. 3 Serrano conce rned the forty -day filing r equire ment contained in Sec tion 410.252(a). See Se rrano , 936 S.W .2d at 37. This Court has similarly held Section 410.252(a ) wa s jur i s d i ct ional. See Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. , 64 S.W .3d at 657. 12 ( 6) The Rec ord Reve als No Viol ation of Section 410.253 Company also claims t h ere is error on the fa ce of

the re cord be cause the re cord doe s not contain evide nce that Section 410.253 was satisfied. Sec tion 410.253 requires a party seeking judicial revie w to simult aneou sly "f ile a copy of the pa rty ' s petition with t he cour t" a nd "pr ovide wri tt en n ot ice of t he s ui t o r no ti ce of app eal to th e di vi si on ." T EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . § 410.253 (Ve rnon 2006). Com pa ny c ite s Planet Insurance Company v. Se rrano , 936 S.W .2d 35, 37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ), as support for its arg ument. Serrano , t h o u gh , d o es n o ts u p p o rt C o mp an y 's argument. I n that case , the San Antonio Court of Appea ls held that, "w hile the re quirement for filing with the Commi ssi on within 40 day s is mandatory and jurisdictional, the re quirement for si mu lt aneo us fi li ng wi th th e C om mi ss io n i s d ir ect ory ." Id. a t 37

. Th e fo rt y -d ay fi lin g re qu ir e me nt, whi c h th e Sa

n A n to n io c o u rt h e ld w a s ma n d a to r y an d ju r is d ic ti o n a l, is c o n ta in e d in Section 410.252(a) , not Section 410.253. Compare T EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . § 410.252(a) with T EX . L AB .

3 C ODE ANN . § 410.253(a)

. Serrano he ld the simult ane ou s fili ng re qu ir e me nt, wh ic h is c on ta ine d in Section 410. 2 53, was not jurisdictional. Serrano , 936 S.W .2d at 37. Thus, we disc ount the Company ' s relianc e on Serrano for its a rg ument that Section 410.253 is jurisdictional. The Texas Supreme Court has he ld Section 410.253, although ma ndatory , is not jurisdi ctional. Nat'l Liab. &Com pa ny c ite s Go ld

for holding "the Court should not i nfer that notice wa s sent." As noted, 4 Go ld actua lly held the contr ary . 13 Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 5 2 5 , 5 2 7 ( T e x. 2 0 00 ); Al ber ts on 's, I nc . v . S inc lai r , 984 S.W .2d 958, 961 (Tex. 1999). Th e re is n o e vid e nc e that Se c tio n 4 10 .2 53 wa s v iol a te d. Th e Te xas S up re me Court ha s h e ld

a sil e nt r e c or d w ill no t sh owe rr or if the re is no duty to ma ke sure the re c or d af fi rm a tiv e ly sh ow s a particula r fa ct. See G en. Elec . Co. , 811 S.W .2d at 942. Company has not dir ecte d this Court to any authority that the re cord must af

fi rm atively

show compliance with Section 410.253. We will not presume, ba sed on a silent rec ord, t hat S ection 410.253 was viol ated. The Tex as S upreme Court has held the abse n ce i n t h e record of any proof of notice is " '

just that - an abse nce of

proof of err or.' Acc ording ly , it is no t err or appa rent on the f

ace of the re cord, a

nd could not support a re stricted app eal ." Go ld v . G old , 1 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 2 , 2 1 3 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Alexande r , 134 S.W .3d at 848). 4 Be cause there is no evidenc e in the rec ord that Section 410.253 was violated, this Company point of er ror is over

ruled. ( 7) The Rec ord Reve als No Viol ation of Section 410.258 Com pa ny c la ims the re is e rr or

on the fa c e of

the re c or d b e c a

us e the re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in evidenc e that Section 410.258 wa s satisfied. We disag ree . Se c tio n 4 10 .2 58 re qu ir e s " any pr op os e d judg me nt .
. . , in c lud inga pr op os e d d e fa

ult judgme n t " t o b e filed " with the Ex ecutive D irec tor of the Commission not later tha n the 30th day befo re t he d ate on whi ch t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s ched ul ed t o en ter th e ju dgmen t .
. . " T EX . L AB . C ODE14

ANN . § 4 10 .2 58 (V e rn on 20 06 ). Th e de fa

ult jud g me nt i n th is c a se state s, " No tif ic a tio n o f t

his proposed judg ment was sent to the Division of Workers' Compensation in acc ordanc e with Texas L a bo r C od e § 4 10 .2 58 and has b e e n o n f ile fo r n ot l e ss t

ha n 3 0 d ay s at th e tim e of

sig nin g of

thi s Def ault J udg ment." O ther than the above r ecital, the judg ment contains no re fer ence to satisfaction or violation of Section 410.258. Com pa ny c la ims the re c or d mu st a ff ir ma tiv e ly sh ow , o n it s f

a c e , str ict complia

nc e wi th Se c tio n 41 0. 25 8. I n s up po rt of thi s argume nt, Com

pa ny c ite s Ne wso m v . B all inge r I nd e p. Sc h. Di st. , 21 3 S.W.3 d 375 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 06 , n o p e t.) ; Verlander Enters. v . Graham , 932 S.W .2d 259, 262 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ); and C.W . B ollin ger Ins . Co. v . F

ish , 699 S.W .2d 645, 64 7–48 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 85 , n o w ri t) . N on e of

the se c a se s a

re on po int

. Fi sh conce rned substituted service under the I nsuranc e Code, not Section 410.258. Fi sh , 699 S.W .2d at 647. Graham conce rned se rvice of citation, not Section 410.258. Graham , 932 S.W .2d

a t 26 2. Th e re are no pr e su mpt ion s c on c e rn ing se rv ic e of c itatio n in a re vie w of a no -a ns we r d e fa

ult judgme nt. Uvalde Country Cl ub v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 6 9 0 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 4 , 8 8 5 ( T e x . 1 9 8 5 )

. In Newsom , the par

ties ag ree d the first summary judgme nt was void under Sec tion 410.258. Newsom , 213 S.W .3d at 377. The issue in that c ase conce rned whether a trial court' s plenary

power depende d on the validity

of the fir st summary

judgme nt. Id

. at 378. Company has not provided us with any authority that strict compliance with Section 410.258 must be shown on the fac e of the rec ord.15

A r e c ita l in

a jud g me nt that Sec tio n 4 10 .2 58 ha s b e e n s a tis fi e d is pr e su me d to be c or re c t in t h e ab s en ce of

evidenc e to the contr ary . S. Ins. Co. v. Brewster , 2 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d 6 , 1 4 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) . I n Brewster , the appe llant presente d a ce rtification to the appellate court that S ection 410.258 had not been complied with, but the cer tification was not contained in the rec ord. Id

. I n this case , there is no evidenc e, in or out side the record, that Sec tion 41 0. 25 8 h a s b e e n vio la te d. We a g re e that, un le ss the re c or d c on tr ov e rt s the re c ita l, we mus t pr e su me the re cital in the judg ment is corre ct. This issue is overrule d. ( 8) TheRe c or

d R e v e als No E

rro ne ou s A dd

re ss f or Se rv ic e of Pro c ess Company also argues that, if the pe tition wa s d el i v er ed to t he addr ess indicated on the citation, service was made on Corporation Service Company rathe r than Insuranc e Company of the State of Pennsylvania. C o m p any has not direc ted us to where the re cord c ontains evidenc e supporting this alleg ation. We have not bee n direc ted to any evidenc e that the pe tition was not

serve d on Company

or its authorized ag ent. I n a re stricted appea l, the err or must a ppear on the fa ce of the re cord. See Gen. Elec. Co. , 811 S.W .2d at 943. " Our sy stem is founded upon a be lief that trial

cou rt s s h o u l d f

i r s t be giv en t he o pp ort un it y to con si der a ndwei gh fact ual evi den ce." Id. at 944. Since there is no evidence that the addr ess was inva lid, we over rule this issue.16

F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J o s h R

. M o r

r i s s , III Chief J ustice Date Submitted: April 21, 2008 Date D ecide d: Aug ust 20, 2008