(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1 

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PUGIN v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–23. Argued April 17, 2023—Decided June 22, 2023*

In two immigration proceedings, noncitizens Fernando Cordero-Garcia 

and Jean Francois Pugin were determined removable from the United 

States on the ground that they had convictions for aggravated felonies—namely, offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” See 8 

U. S. C. §§1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Cordero-Garcia’s state conviction for dissuading a 

witness from reporting a crime did not constitute an offense “relating 

to obstruction of justice” because the state offense did not require that 

an investigation or proceeding be pending. By contrast, the Fourth 

Circuit concluded that Pugin’s state conviction for accessory after the 

fact constituted an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” even if 

the state offense did not require that an investigation or proceeding be 

pending. 

Held: An offense may “relat[e] to obstruction of justice” under 

§1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Federal law provides that noncitizens 

convicted of a federal or state crime constituting an “aggravated felony” are removable from the United States. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Congress expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” in 1996 to include 

offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” §1101(a)(43)(S). Dictionary definitions, federal laws, state laws, and the Model Penal Code 

show that federal or state obstruction offenses “relat[e] to obstruction 

of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require 

that an investigation or proceeding be pending. This extensive body of 

—————— 

*Together with No. 22–331, Garland, Attorney General v. CorderoGarcia, aka Cordero, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit.
2 PUGIN v. GARLAND

Syllabus

authority reflects common sense. Individuals can obstruct the process 

of justice even when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. Indeed, obstruction of justice is often “most effective” when it prevents 

“an investigation or proceeding from commencing in the first place.” 

Brief for Attorney General 15. The Court declines to adopt an interpretation of the statute that would exclude many common obstruction 

offenses from the definition of aggravated felony under 

§1101(a)(43)(S). Finally, the phrase “relating to” resolves any doubt 

about the scope of §1101(a)(43)(S), because it ensures that the statute 

covers offenses having a connection with obstruction of justice—which 

surely covers common obstruction offenses that can occur when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. 

 Pugin’s and Cordero-Garcia’s contrary arguments lack merit. First, 

even if a specific prohibition in 18 U. S. C. §1503(a) requires that an 

investigation or proceeding be pending, Congress defined offenses under §1101(a)(43)(S) more broadly. Second, the historical record does 

not support the claim that obstruction of justice requires that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Third, reading §1101(a)(43)(S) 

to cover offenses that do not require a pending investigation or proceeding may create some redundancy, but the better overall reading of 

a statute sometimes contains some redundancy. Fourth, resort to the 

rule of lenity has no place here because the traditional tools of statutory interpretation show that an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. 

Pp. 3–10.

No. 22–23, 19 F. 4th 437, affirmed; No. 22–331, 44 F. 4th 1181, reversed 

and remanded. 

 KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, 

J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 

in which GORSUCH, J., joined, and in which KAGAN, J., joined as to all but 

Part III.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1 

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 22–23 and 22–331

_________________ 

JEAN FRANCOIS PUGIN, PETITIONER

22–23 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

PETITIONER

22–331 v.

FERNANDO CORDERO-GARCIA, AKA FERNANDO 

CORDERO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2023] 

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law provides that noncitizens convicted of an 

“aggravated felony” are removable from the United States. 

The definition of “aggravated felony” includes federal or 

state offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” 8 U. S. C. 

§1101(a)(43)(S). The question here is whether an offense 

“relat[es] to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S)

even if the offense does not require that an investigation or 

proceeding be pending. That question arises because some 

obstruction offenses can occur when an investigation or 

proceeding is not pending, such as threatening a witness to 

prevent the witness from reporting a crime to the police. 
2 PUGIN v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

We conclude that an offense may “relat[e] to obstruction of 

justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not

require that an investigation or proceeding be pending.

I 

This case stems from two immigration proceedings. 

Fernando Cordero-Garcia is a citizen of Mexico. In 2009, 

Cordero-Garcia was convicted of several California 

offenses, including dissuading a witness from reporting a 

crime. Jean Francois Pugin is a citizen of Mauritius. In 

2014, Pugin was convicted of the Virginia offense of being 

an accessory after the fact to a felony. 

As relevant here, the U. S. Department of Homeland 

Security charged both Cordero-Garcia and Pugin as 

removable from the United States on the ground that they 

had convictions for aggravated felonies—namely, offenses 

“relating to obstruction of justice.” See 8 U. S. C. 

§§1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In both cases, an 

Immigration Judge ruled for the Department, as did the 

Board of Immigration Appeals.

Cordero-Garcia and Pugin petitioned for review in the 

relevant Courts of Appeals. In Cordero-Garcia’s case, the 

Ninth Circuit concluded, in pertinent part, that his state 

conviction for dissuading a witness from reporting a crime 

did not constitute an offense “relating to obstruction of 

justice” because the state offense did not require that an 

investigation or proceeding be pending. 44 F. 4th 1181, 

1188–1189 (2022). In Pugin’s case, by contrast, the Fourth 

Circuit concluded that his state conviction for accessory 

after the fact constituted an offense “relating to obstruction 

of justice” even if the state offense did not require that an 

investigation or proceeding be pending. 19 F. 4th 437, 450 

(2021); see also Silva v. Garland, 27 F. 4th 95, 98 (CA1 

2022).

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the 

Courts of Appeals. 598 U. S. ___ (2023).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

Opinion of the Court

II

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, noncitizens 

convicted of an “aggravated felony” are removable from the 

United States. 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act 

defines “aggravated felony” to cover a broad range of federal 

and state crimes. See §1101(a)(43).

In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed 

legislation that expanded the definition of “aggravated 

felony” to include offenses “relating to obstruction of justice, 

perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, 

for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” 

§1101(a)(43)(S); 110 Stat. 1278; id., at 3009–628.

This Court has generally used the “categorical approach” 

to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as an 

“aggravated felony” under §1101(a)(43). EsquivelQuintana v. Sessions, 581 U. S. 385, 389 (2017); Moncrieffe

v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 190 (2013). Under that approach, 

courts look to “the elements of the statute of conviction, not 

to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.” Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U. S. 575, 601 (1990). The Court’s role here is 

not to fashion a separate federal obstruction offense, but

rather to determine which federal or state offenses “relat[e]

to obstruction of justice.” 

The question in this case is whether an offense “relat[es] 

to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) even if the 

offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding 

be pending. Dictionary definitions, federal laws, state laws, 

and the Model Penal Code show that the answer is yes: An 

offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” even if the offense 

does not require that an investigation or proceeding be 

pending. 

To begin, dictionaries from the time of §1101(a)(43)(S)’s 

enactment in 1996 demonstrate that obstruction of justice 

generally does not require a pending investigation or 

proceeding. To take an illustrative formulation, obstruction 

of justice covers “the crime or act of willfully interfering 
4 PUGIN v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

with the process of justice and law,” including “by 

influencing, threatening, harming, or impeding a witness, 

potential witness, juror, or judicial or legal officer or by 

furnishing false information in or otherwise impeding an 

investigation or legal process.” Merriam-Webster’s 

Dictionary of Law 337 (1996). The offense “captures every

willful act of corruption, intimidation, or force that tends 

somehow to impair the machinery of the civil or criminal 

law.” B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 611 

(2d ed. 1995); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1077 (6th ed. 

1990) (“obstructing the administration of justice in any 

way”); cf. Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 391–392 (relying 

on same dictionaries to interpret a different offense in 

§1101(a)(43)).

Notably missing from those dictionary definitions is a 

requirement that an investigation or proceeding be 

pending. The dictionaries demonstrate that obstruction of 

justice includes offenses where an investigation or 

proceeding is pending, but is not limited to offenses where 

an investigation or proceeding is pending.

In accord with the dictionary definitions, Title 18 of the

U. S. Code has long proscribed various obstruction offenses 

that do not require a pending investigation or proceeding. 

Entitled “Obstruction of Justice,” Chapter 73 of Title 18 

houses many such offenses. For example, the federal 

witness tampering statute covers various offenses, such as 

killing or threatening a witness with an intent to prevent 

the person from testifying at an official proceeding. See 18 

U. S. C. §§1512(a)(1)(A), (b)(1). That statute provides that 

“an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 

instituted at the time of the offense.” §1512(f )(1). Likewise, 

§1519 forbids assorted means of destroying, altering, or 

falsifying records with an intent to obstruct certain 

investigations or proceedings. That provision covers acts 

intended to impede a federal investigation or proceeding, 

“including one not even on the verge of commencement.” 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 5 

Opinion of the Court

Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 547 (2015) (plurality 

opinion); see also 18 U. S. C. §1518 (proscribing acts to 

obstruct the communication of certain information to 

criminal investigators).1

 The Solicitor General explains that many state 

obstruction offenses as of 1996 similarly did not require 

that an investigation or proceeding be pending. See, e.g., 

Fla. Stat. §914.22(3)(a) (1997); N. D. Cent. Code Ann.

§12.1–09–01(3)(c) (1997); State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 682 

A. 2d 943 (1996); Brief for Attorney General 36–43 

(collecting statutes); see also Commonwealth v. Berry, 141 

Ky. 477, 481, 133 S. W. 212, 213 (1911); cf. EsquivelQuintana, 581 U. S., at 395–397 (looking to state statutes). 

Some States did not label the relevant offenses as 

“obstruction of justice,” but instead labeled the offenses 

with a more precise term for the particular category of 

obstruction at issue, such as witness tampering. But 

Congress accounted for the variations in labels by crafting

the relevant definition in §1101(a)(43)(S) to cover offenses 

“relating to obstruction of justice,” not just offenses labeled 

as “obstruction of justice.” In any event, the terminology 

that States use to categorize criminal offenses is not 

dispositive because our inquiry here does not turn on 

“technical definitions and labels under state law.” Taylor, 

495 U. S., at 590.

For obstruction offenses, the Model Penal Code also

generally does not require that an investigation or 

—————— 1To be sure, one of those offenses—18 U. S. C. §1519—was enacted 

after the passage of §1101(a)(43)(S) in its current form in 1996. But 

§1519, too, reflects the longstanding ordinary understanding of 

obstruction of justice—and no one here suggests that the ordinary 

understanding in the years after 1996 somehow differed from the 

ordinary understanding in 1996. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 

281 (2003) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“the most rudimentary rule of 

statutory construction” is “that courts do not interpret statutes in 

isolation, but in the context of the corpus juris of which they are a part, 

including later-enacted statutes”). 
6 PUGIN v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

proceeding be pending. See generally ALI, Model Penal 

Code §240.0(4), p. 3 (1980) (“‘official proceeding[s]’” include 

those which “may be heard”). For witness tampering, for 

example, the Model Penal Code focuses on an actor’s intent 

to tamper with a witness, not whether an investigation or 

proceeding is pending. See id., §241.6, Comment 2, at 166–

167 (“What is important is not that the actor believe that 

an official proceeding or investigation will begin within a 

certain span of time but rather that he recognize that his 

conduct threatens obstruction of justice”). 

That extensive body of authority—dictionaries, federal 

laws, state laws, and the Model Penal Code—reflects 

common sense. Individuals can obstruct the process of 

justice even when an investigation or proceeding is not 

pending. For example, a murderer may threaten to kill a 

witness if the witness reports information to the police. 

Such an act is no less obstructive merely because the 

government has yet to catch on and begin an investigation. 

As the Solicitor General persuasively states, one can 

obstruct the wheels of justice even before the wheels have 

begun to move; indeed, obstruction of justice is often “most 

effective” when it prevents “an investigation or proceeding 

from commencing in the first place.” Brief for Attorney 

General 15.

Importantly, if an offense “relating to obstruction of 

justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) required that an

investigation or proceeding be pending, then many common 

obstruction offenses would not qualify as aggravated 

felonies under that provision. We decline to interpret

§1101(a)(43)(S) to exclude numerous heartland obstruction 

offenses. “We should not lightly conclude that Congress 

enacted a self-defeating statute.” Quarles v. United States, 

587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 8); see also, e.g., 

Stokeling v. United States, 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) 

(slip op., at 7–8); Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 395; 

Voisine v. United States, 579 U. S. 686, 695–696 (2016).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7 

Opinion of the Court

One final point bears emphasis: To the extent any doubt 

remains about whether §1101(a)(43)(S) requires that an

investigation or proceeding be pending, the phrase “relating 

to obstruction of justice” resolves the doubt. Cf. Mellouli v. 

Lynch, 575 U. S. 798, 811–812, n. 11 (2015). The phrase 

“relating to” ensures that this statute covers offenses that 

have “a connection with” obstruction of justice—which 

surely covers common obstruction offenses that can occur 

when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. 

Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U. S. 87, 96

(2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, in 

defining certain other aggravated felonies in this statute, 

Congress did not employ the broad phrase “relating to.” 

See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(A) (“murder, rape, or 

sexual abuse of a minor”). 

For all of those reasons, an offense “relating to 

obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) does not 

require that an investigation or proceeding be pending.2

—————— 2As interpreted by this Court, a few obstruction statutes require that 

an investigation or proceeding be reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., 

Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11). 

Those decisions interpreted specific statutory language and did not rule

that obstruction offenses in general have a foreseeability requirement

(which would have been incorrect, in any event). Moreover, the Solicitor 

General explains that offenses “relating to obstruction of justice” require 

an intent to interfere with the legal process. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8, 18, 

116–117; Brief for Attorney General 23. That mens rea requirement 

targets the same basic overbreadth concern as a foreseeability 

requirement and ensures that §1101(a)(43)(S) will not sweep in offenses 

that are not properly understood as offenses “relating to obstruction of 

justice.” For example, the Solicitor General concedes that federal 

misprision of felony is not an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” 

because, in the Government’s view, the crime does not require an intent 

to interfere with the legal process. See 18 U. S. C. §4; Reply Brief for 

Attorney General 26–27. In short, we see no justification for engrafting

a separate foreseeability requirement onto the broad and general 

language of §1101(a)(43)(S).
8 PUGIN v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

III

Pugin and Cordero-Garcia offer four main arguments in 

response. None is persuasive.

First, Pugin and Cordero-Garcia point to 18 U. S. C. 

§1503(a), which among other things prohibits persons from 

endeavoring “to influence, obstruct, or impede” the “due 

administration of justice.” According to Pugin and CorderoGarcia, that specific prohibition requires that an

investigation or proceeding be pending. Cf. Pettibone v. 

United States, 148 U. S. 197, 207 (1893). But even if they 

are correct about that point, §1503(a) is only one 

obstruction offense among the many obstruction offenses in 

Title 18. And many federal obstruction offenses—like many 

state obstruction offenses—proscribe obstruction when an 

investigation or proceeding is not pending. Moreover, if 

Congress wanted to define offenses “relating to obstruction 

of justice” to have the same coverage as §1503(a), Congress 

knew how to do so: Congress could have cross-referenced 

§1503(a) in §1101(a)(43)(S) in the same way that Congress 

cross-referenced numerous other statutes in §1101(a)(43). 

See, e.g., §§1101(a)(43)(B)–(F). But Congress included no 

such cross-reference to §1503(a) in §1101(a)(43)(S).

Second, Pugin and Cordero-Garcia cite a few authorities 

from the 1700s and 1800s and assert that obstruction of 

justice historically required that an investigation or 

proceeding be pending. But the historical record cited by 

Pugin and Cordero-Garcia does not back up their broad 

claim. See, e.g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the 

Laws of England 126 (1769) (explaining without 

qualification that endeavoring “to dissuade a witness from 

giving evidence” was an “impedimen[t] of justice”). More to 

the point, as we have explained at length, the widespread 

and contemporary understanding of obstruction of justice 

at the time Congress enacted §1101(a)(43)(S) in 1996 did 

not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. 

Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 593 (1990). 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9 

Opinion of the Court

Third, Pugin and Cordero-Garcia argue that offenses 

“relating to obstruction of justice” require a pending 

investigation or proceeding; otherwise, they maintain that 

those offenses would be redundant with other offenses 

covered by §1101(a)(43)(S)—in particular, offenses

“relating to . . . perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery 

of a witness.” But Pugin and Cordero-Garcia fail to explain 

how requiring a pending investigation or proceeding for 

obstruction offenses would resolve the claimed 

redundancies with perjury or bribery offenses. After all, 

perjury and bribery offenses often “relat[e] to obstruction of 

justice.” In any event, “redundancies are common in 

statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to 

be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional 

inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply 

because of the shortcomings of human communication.” 

Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 16). As 

a result, “the better overall reading of the statute” 

sometimes “contains some redundancy.” Ibid.; Atlantic 

Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U. S. ___, ___, n. 5 (2020) 

(slip op., at 10, n. 5); Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 

586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11). Section 

1101(a)(43) illustrates the point: Congress listed a large 

number of offenses that would qualify as aggravated 

felonies, likely to avoid unintended gaps. So it is not 

surprising to find some overlap. To take one example, the 

definition of “aggravated felony” covers “murder, rape, or 

sexual abuse of a minor” and separately covers “crime[s] of 

violence.” §§1101(a)(43)(A), (F).3

—————— 3The same point applies to §1101(a)(15)(U)(iii), which lists both 

“obstruction of justice” and “witness tampering.” Neither Pugin nor 

Cordero-Garcia cites that provision—presumably because the provision 

appears in a different part of the statute and contains different language. 

Moreover, Congress took the same belt-and-suspenders approach in 

§1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) that it did in §1101(a)(43). See §1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) 

(covering among other things “being held hostage; peonage; involuntary 
10 PUGIN v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

Fourth, Pugin and Cordero-Garcia invoke the rule of 

lenity. But even assuming that the rule of lenity can be 

invoked in this particular civil immigration context, the 

rule applies only if “after seizing everything from which aid 

can be derived,” there remains “grievous ambiguity.” 

Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, applying the 

traditional tools of statutory interpretation, we have 

concluded that an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” 

does not require that an investigation or proceeding be 

pending. So we have no basis for resorting to the rule of 

lenity. See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 580 U. S. 63, 71 

(2016); Salman v. United States, 580 U. S. 39, 51 (2016); 

Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 188, n. 10 (2014); 

cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U. S. 478, 489 (2012). 

* * * 

In sum, we conclude that an offense “relating to 

obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) does not 

require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. We 

therefore disagree with the argument raised by Pugin and 

Cordero-Garcia for excluding their obstruction offenses 

from the broad coverage of §1101(a)(43)(S). We affirm the 

judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 

Circuit. We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

—————— 

servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal 

restraint; false imprisonment” as well as “any similar activity in 

violation of Federal, State, or local criminal law”).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1 

JACKSON, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 22–23 and 22–331

_________________ 

JEAN FRANCOIS PUGIN, PETITIONER

22–23 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

PETITIONER

22–331 v.

FERNANDO CORDERO-GARCIA, AKA FERNANDO 

CORDERO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2023] 

 JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.

I agree with the Court that the Ninth Circuit wrongly embraced a pending-proceeding requirement when it assessed 

what types of prior offenses qualify as “offense[s] relating 

to obstruction of justice” under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S), 

for purposes of determining the “aggravated felon[ies]” that 

render noncitizens deportable, §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This 

means, of course, that I also agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Fourth Circuit rightly rejected any such pending-proceeding requirement.

I write separately to highlight one (possibly sufficient) 

reason why a predicate offense need not have a nexus to a 

pending or ongoing investigation or judicial proceeding in 

order to qualify as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” within the meaning of this immigration statute. The 
2 PUGIN v. GARLAND

JACKSON, J., concurring

reason is that, when Congress inserted the phrase “offense 

relating to obstruction of justice” into §1101(a)(43)(S), it 

might well have been referencing a specific and previously 

designated category of offenses—the offenses that are 

grouped together in Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the U. S. Code, 

under the heading “Obstruction of Justice.” 62 Stat. 769, 

codified at 18 U. S. C. §1501 et seq. And not all of the offenses that are addressed in Chapter 73 contain a pendingproceeding requirement.

* * * 

What counts as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” within the meaning of §1101(a)(43)(S) is nothing more, 

or less, than what Congress intended that phrase to mean 

when it enacted that statute. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “does not expressly define” the phrase, so we 

apply the “normal tools of statutory interpretation” to “‘see 

what Congress probably meant’” by it. Esquivel-Quintana

v. Sessions, 581 U. S. 385, 391 (2017) (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U. S. 47, 53 (2006)). In my view, our job in this 

regard is a limited one: We are called upon to understand 

and implement whatever Congress meant by that unadorned phrase.

When Congress selected the words “offense relating to obstruction of justice” and inserted them into the INA in 1996, 

110 Stat. 1277–1278, Congress’s longest standing and most 

significant use of the phrase “obstruction of justice” in the 

Statutes at Large was its description of Chapter 73 of Title 

18 as concerning “obstruction of justice.” 62 Stat. 769; see 

also 104 Stat. 4861 (describing Chapter 73 as “relating to 

obstruction of justice” when adding an offense to that Chapter in 1990). To me, this is a powerful contextual clue that 

Congress may have simply—and solely—been drawing on 

its own existing understanding of which particular offenses 

are properly characterized as such. Accord, Flores v. Attorney General, 856 F. 3d 280, 287–289 (CA3 2017) (refusing 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

JACKSON, J., concurring

to “look beyond Chapter 73” to “determine whether an alien’s prior offense ‘relat[es] to obstruction of justice’” because §1101(a)(43)(S)’s “text . . . indicates Congress’s intention to reference Chapter 73”). In deciding the cases before 

us, I would not want to rule out (even inadvertently) the 

possibility that Chapter 73 is Congress’s actual benchmark 

with respect to what qualifies as an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” for §1101(a)(43)(S) purposes, rather 

than just a mere clue to some platonic, judicially divined 

meaning of Congress’s chosen words.

I believe that hewing closely to Congress’s will in this regard is especially important where (as here) making the determination of which offenses qualify implicates the “drastic” deportation sanction. Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 

223, 231 (1951). In our constitutional system, the Legislature makes legal policy judgments regarding the particular 

circumstances that trigger the consequences that are associated with criminal convictions. Accord, United States v. 

Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 265, and n. 5 (1997). And it seems at 

least plausible that Congress’s description of certain “aggravated felon[ies],” §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as “offense[s] relating to obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), may embody 

its judgment to peg that subset of aggravated felonies to 

Chapter 73, not an intent to leave the category without form 

for future judicial refinement. Of course, if Congress has 

already thus decided which obstruction-related convictions 

so trigger the INA’s aggravated-felony provision, this Court 

need not, and indeed should not, cobble together a “generic” 

offense definition from nonstatutory sources (which risks 

sweeping in offenses that Congress did not mean to capture).

Here, the Court correctly emphasizes Chapter 73’s importance in the course of analyzing whether a possible predicate offense must have a nexus to a pending proceeding in 

order to qualify as an aggravated felony. Ante, at 4. But 

these parties have not fully ventilated the arguments for 
4 PUGIN v. GARLAND

JACKSON, J., concurring

and against the possibility that Chapter 73 might define (in 

substance) the universe of offenses that “relat[e] to obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), as Congress meant that 

phrase to be interpreted. Nor would running that issue to 

ground here change the outcome.* As the Court notes, multiple Chapter 73 offenses require no pending proceeding. 

§1512(f ); see also 102 Stat. 4397–4398 (1988 Congress describing an amendment to §1512 as an “obstruction of justice amendmen[t]” (boldface deleted)). That suffices to resolve the question before us even under a Chapter 73-

focused approach. The issue of whether such an approach 

best tracks Congress’s intent can be reserved for future consideration in a case where the parties joust in earnest on 

the question.

—————— 

*Before this Court, Pugin did not root his arguments in the Chapter 

73-focused paradigm that I sketch here. I agree with the Court that the 

arguments he did make do not require reversing the Fourth Circuit.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

Nos. 22–23 and 22–331

_________________ 

JEAN FRANCOIS PUGIN, PETITIONER

22–23 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

PETITIONER

22–331 v.

FERNANDO CORDERO-GARCIA, AKA FERNANDO 

CORDERO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2023] 

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH

joins, and with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins as to all but 

Part III, dissenting. 

From early American laws, to dictionaries, to modern federal and state obstruction statutes, interference with an ongoing investigation or proceeding is at the core of what it 

means to be “an offense relating to obstruction of justice,” 8 

U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S). The Court circumvents this ample 

evidence only by casting a wide net and then throwing back 

all but the bycatch. That approach “turns the categorical 

approach on its head,” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 

U. S. 385, 393 (2017), and subverts the commonly understood meaning of “obstruction of justice” when Congress enacted §1101(a)(43)(S) in 1996. I respectfully dissent.
2 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

I 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines “aggravated felony” by enumerating a long list of offenses. 

§1101(a)(43). Some are federal criminal offenses, but others are undefined generic offenses, such as “burglary,” 

§1101(a)(43)(G), and “obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)

(43)(S), which is relevant here. 

To assess whether someone’s conviction is covered by a 

generic offense, our precedents dictate that courts use the 

“categorical approach.” Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 

389. That approach disregards facts about the conviction

and instead “compare[s] the elements of the statute forming 

the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of 

the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U. S. 254, 257 

(2013). If the elements of the underlying crime of conviction 

are narrower than or the same as the elements of the generic offense, then there is a “categorical match,” Moncrieffe

v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 190 (2013), and the underlying offense is an aggravated felony. If there is no categorical 

match, then the conviction is not an aggravated felony, no 

matter the underlying facts.

Before a court can engage in this categorical comparison, 

however, it must discern the “basic elements” of the relevant “generic” offense. Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 

575, 599 (1990). Courts accomplish this task by looking for 

“evidence about the generic meaning” of the offense at the 

time of the statute’s enactment. Esquivel-Quintana, 581 

U. S., at 395. This means looking for the “generally accepted contemporary meaning” of the generic offense, while 

setting aside more unusual “nongeneric” variants that are 

“defin[ed] . . . more broadly.” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 596, 599. 

In Taylor, for example, this Court concluded, after surveying various sources of meaning, that for purposes of 18 

U. S. C. §924(e), “generic burglary” encompasses any crime 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

“having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” 495 U. S., at 599. In reaching that 

conclusion, the Court purposefully excluded burglary convictions in a handful of States that “defin[ed] burglary more 

broadly” by “eliminating the requirement that the entry be 

unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles and 

vending machines, other than buildings.” Ibid. Expanding 

the definition to include those statutes would have strayed 

too far from “the generic definition of bribery . . . intended 

by Congress.” Id., at 595 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The question presented in these cases—whether “an offense relating to obstruction of justice,” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)

(43)(S), necessarily involves a pending investigation or proceeding—is a question about the “basic elements” of “generic” obstruction of justice. Taylor, 495 U. S., at 599. That 

is, it is a question about how obstruction of justice was 

“commonly understood,” Descamps, 570 U. S., at 257, in 

1996 when Congress enacted §1101(a)(43)(S). Answering 

that question requires focusing on the core, “generally accepted contemporary meaning,” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 596, of 

obstruction of justice, rather than on more unusual “nongeneric” variants that are “define[d] . . . more broadly,” id., at 

599.

The Court loses sight of this fundamental point. Instead 

of focusing on whether a pending investigation or proceeding is part of the heartland of obstruction of justice, it wanders off into an array of obstruction-adjacent federal and 

state laws that do not require a pending investigation or 

proceeding. The Court then announces that those offenses 

are core obstruction of justice, even though the evidence it 

relies on, taken as a whole, reveals they are not. The result 

is predictable. By defining offenses that do not require a 

pending investigation or proceeding as core obstruction of 

justice, the majority forces through the conclusion that a 
4 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

pending investigation or proceeding is not required to qualify as generic obstruction of justice.

A reexamination of the sources relied upon by the majority, with the appropriate focus on discerning the trunk of 

obstruction of justice, rather than its various branches or 

offshoots, leads to the opposite result: To qualify as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)

(43)(S), a predicate offense must require a pending investigation or proceeding.

A 

As an initial matter, the majority glosses over the critical 

fact that “obstruction of justice” was an established term of 

art at the time of §1101(a)(43)(S)’s enactment in 1996. This 

is a major first misstep because “[w]here Congress employs 

a term of art obviously transplanted from another legal 

source, it brings the old soil with it.” George v. McDonough, 

596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

From the “old soil” until today, “obstruction of justice” has 

required a pending investigation or proceeding. In 1831, 

Congress forbade efforts “to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United 

States, in the discharge of his duty” or “to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein.” Act of Mar. 

2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 488 (emphasis added). This provision, which became §5399 of the Revised Statutes, see Rev. 

Stat., Title 70, ch. 4, §5399 (1875), laid “the foundation for 

the modern statutory incarnation of the offense of obstruction of justice.” E. Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, 

Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 Geo. L. J. 1435, 1473 

(2009).

In Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893), this 

Court confirmed that §5399 required a pending proceeding. 

After describing the law as criminalizing “obstruction of the 

due administration of justice in any court of the United 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

States,” the Court explained that “such obstruction can only 

arise when justice is being administered.” Id., at 207. “Unless that fact exists, the statutory offense cannot be committed.” Ibid. The Court thus tied obstruction of justice 

under §5399 to “the pendency of proceedings in the United 

States court, or the progress of the administration of justice 

therein.” Id., at 205.

Section 5399 is the predecessor of the modern omnibus or 

catchall obstruction of justice clause, which is codified at 18 

U. S. C. §1503, and which prohibits endeavoring “to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” In recognition of this through line, this Court held, 

just a year before the enactment of §1101(a)(43)(S), that “a 

person lacking knowledge of a pending proceeding” cannot 

be convicted under §1503. United States v. Aguilar, 515 

U. S. 593, 599 (1995) (citing Pettibone, 148 U. S., at 207). 

Underscoring this point in his partial concurrence, Justice 

Scalia explained that “an endeavor to obstruct proceedings 

that did not exist would not violate the statute” because “obstruction can only arise when justice is being administered.” 515 U. S., at 610, n. 1 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

Congress was aware of this settled interpretation of 

§1503 when it added “obstruction of justice” to the INA’s list 

of aggravated felonies. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 

U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 10) (“We normally assume 

that Congress is aware of relevant judicial precedent when 

it enacts a new statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In fact, by 1996 Congress had already demonstrated 

that “relating to obstruction of justice” was understood to 

capture §1503. Enacted in 1970, the Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) specifically lists as 

a predicate offense “section 1503 (relating to obstruction of 

justice).” 18 U. S. C. §1961(1). Moreover, this language, 

just like the language at §1101(a)(43)(S), serves the purpose

of identifying one of a long list of underlying offenses to 
6 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

which an overarching statute applies. Thus, by 1996, Congress had used the same phrase for the same purpose to refer to §1503. In fact, the INA’s list of aggravated felonies

explicitly cross-references RICO, suggesting Congress was 

well aware of the parallel. See §1101(a)(43)(J) (INA listing 

RICO violation as an aggravated felony).1

In short, in searching for the heartland of obstruction of 

justice, the omnibus clause of §1503 and the history from 

which it is derived are invaluable touchstones. Neither 

countenances an obstruction of justice offense separate 

from a pending investigation or proceeding.2

B 

Even setting this crucial historical evidence aside, and 

—————— 1The majority argues that if Congress had wanted offenses “relating 

to obstruction of justice” to “have the same coverage as §1503(a),” then 

Congress could have just “cross-referenced §1503(a) in §1101(a)(43)(S).” 

Ante., at 8. This argument misses the point entirely. If Congress had 

done that, then only persons convicted under §1503 would qualify. Congress’s use of the generic “obstruction of justice,” however, clearly signals 

that Congress wanted other state and federal offenses sharing the same 

basic elements to be included as well. Section 1503 is a strong indicator 

of the generic meaning of “obstruction of justice” in §1101(a)(43)(S), not 

its equivalent. 2Although the Court quotes Blackstone’s statement that “‘dissuad[ing] a witness from giving evidence’” was an “‘impedimen[t] of justice’” in support of its position, ante, at 8, Blackstone actually supports 

this dissent. The Court ignores that in historical usage “giving evidence” 

meant “testifying” at a proceeding. See, e.g., 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 305 (1768) (“[E]very defence, which cannot 

be thus specially pleaded, may be given in evidence, upon the general 

issue at the trial”); 2 M. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 280 

(1736) (“If a reward be promised to a person for giving his evidence before 

he gives it, this, if proved, disables his testimony”). The majority also 

ignores that the Blackstone passage is discussing “[c]ontempts against 

the king’s . . . courts of justice.” 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 124

(1769). This context confirms Blackstone is referring to impeding a witness from testifying at a proceeding, because otherwise it would not be a 

contempt against the king’s courts.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

proceeding as the Court does, by looking to dictionary definitions, chapter 73 of the Federal Criminal Code, state statutes, and the Model Penal Code, the same result emerges: 

Core obstruction of justice requires a pending investigation 

or proceeding.

1 

Begin with the central dictionary definition upon which 

the Court relies. It defines obstruction of justice as “the 

crime or act of willfully interfering with the process of justice 

and law esp. by influencing, threatening, harming, or impeding a witness, potential witness, juror, or judicial or legal officer or by furnishing false information in or otherwise 

impeding an investigation or legal process.” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 337 (1996) (emphasis added).

While the Court claims that this definition omits any requirement of a pending investigation or proceeding, ante, at 

4, the two italicized phrases say otherwise. “[I]nterference” 

means the “act of meddling in or hampering an activity or 

process,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1178 (1993), while “impede” means “to interfere with or get 

in the way of the progress of” something or someone, id., at 

1132. The definition is clear that the process that is meddled in, or interfered with, is the “process of justice and law” 

or “an investigation or legal process.”3

For the same reason, the majority is too hasty when it 

asserts that the definition encompasses acts separate from 

a pending investigation or proceeding. That definition ends 

with the phrase “in . . . an investigation or legal process.” 

—————— 3While it is possible to talk about interfering with or impeding a process before it has even begun, those phrases more naturally connote an 

effect on a process that is ongoing. For example, talk of interfering in a 

hiring process strongly suggests that hiring-related activities are already 

underway. Certainly where an upcoming hiring is not even foreseeable, 

it would be unusual to talk of such inference. Yet, the majority does not 

require even a foreseeable investigation or proceeding in order for there 

to be obstruction of justice. See ante, at 7, n. 2.
8 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Under the series-qualifier canon, that phrase is best read 

to modify all listed verbs, especially because the definition 

lists each action as an example of “the crime or act of willfully interfering with the process of justice and law.” See 

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., 

at 5) (“[W]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a modifier 

at the end of the list normally applies to the entire series” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, far from favoring the majority’s view, the definition most naturally supports the conclusion that interference with a pending investigation or proceeding is an element of generic obstruction 

of justice.

The other dictionary definitions upon which the Court relies similarly indicate the need for a pending investigation 

or proceeding. The majority notes that Black’s Law Dictionary defines obstruction of justice to cover “‘obstructing the 

administration of justice in any way,’” ante, at 4, but overlooks the fact that “administration of justice,” both historically and currently, refers to court proceedings. See, e.g., 1 

J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *290 (“[T]he judiciary power is intrusted with the administration of justice”); 

Black’s Law Dictionary 53 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “due 

administration of justice” as “[t]he proper functioning and 

integrity of a court or other tribunal and the proceedings 

before it”). Similarly, the full definition from A Dictionary 

of Modern Legal Usage mentions “interference with the orderly administration of law.” B. Garner, p. 611 (2d ed. 

1995). The cited definitions thus all weigh against the majority’s sweeping view, and in favor of the view that obstruction of justice “can only arise when justice is being administered.” Pettibone, 148 U. S., at 207.

2 

The federal offenses listed in chapter 73 of Title 18, which

is entitled “Obstruction of Justice,” provide further support 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

for the conclusion that core obstruction of justice requires 

the administration of justice.

When Congress codified chapter 73 in 1948, the chapter 

contained six provisions, each of which requires a connection to a pending proceeding or investigation. See Act of 

June 25, 1948, §§1501–1506, 62 Stat. 769–770. The central 

provision is §1503, with its omnibus or catchall prohibition 

against endeavoring “to influence, obstruct, or impede, the 

due administration of justice.” As already explained, supra, 

at 5, it is undisputed that §1503’s omnibus clause requires 

a pending proceeding. The same is true for the other five 

provisions, all of which either refer to ongoing legal processes or cover conduct that can arise only during legal proceedings.4

By the time Congress passed 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S) in 

1996, Congress had added nine narrower, more specific offenses to the six original offenses (§§1501–1506) in chapter 

73. See 18 U. S. C. §§1507–1513, 1516–1517.5 While it is 

less clear that those specialized provisions fall within the 

heartland of obstruction of justice, even the vast majority of 

them require a connection to a proceeding or investigation.6 

—————— 4The five other original chapter 73 offenses are §1501 (“Assault on process server”); §1502 (“Resistance to extradition agent”); §1504 (“Influencing juror by writing”); §1505 (“Influencing or injuring witness before 

agencies and committees”); and §1506 (“Theft or alteration of record or 

process; false bail”). These provisions remain in chapter 73 to this day, 

with only modest revisions that do not change the need for a pending 

investigation or proceeding. 5 §31(a), 64 Stat. 1018 (adding §1507 in 1950); §1, 70 Stat. 935 (adding 

§1508 in 1956); §101, 74 Stat. 86 (adding §1509 in 1960); Pub. L. 90–123, 

§1(a), 81 Stat. 362 (adding §1510 in 1967); §802(a), 84 Stat. 936 (adding 

§1511 in 1970); §4(a), 96 Stat. 1249 (adding §1512 in 1982); id., at 1250

(adding §1513 in 1982); §7078(a), 102 Stat. 4406 (adding §1516 in 1988); 

§2503(a), 104 Stat. 4861 (adding §1517 in 1990). 6The two exceptions are §§1511 and 1512. Section 1511 is a specialized provision, enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 

1970, §802, 84 Stat. 936, which prohibits “conspir[ing] to obstruct the 
10 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

See §1507 (“picket[ing] or parad[ing]” with the intent to interfere with “the administration of justice”); §1508 (listening to or recording jury “deliberat[ions] or voting”); §1510 

(interference with reports of information “to a criminal investigator”); §1516 (interfering with a “Federal auditor in 

the performance of official duties”); §1509 (interfering with 

“due exercise of rights” under a court order); §1513 (retaliating against a witness for participating in “an official proceeding”). 

The primary outlier amongst the more recent additions 

to chapter 73 is §1512, which criminalizes tampering with 

a witness, victim, or informant. As the majority notes, that 

provision provides that “[f]or purposes of this section . . . an 

official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” §1512(f )(1). Instead of 

favoring the majority’s conclusion, however, §1512 is the exception that proves the rule. There would be no need to 

clarify that the provision applies absent a pending proceeding unless there were an established background understanding that obstruction of justice requires such a proceeding.7 Because the question at hand concerns the meaning 

of heartland obstruction of justice, excluding “nongeneric” 

variants “defin[ed] . . . more broadly,” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 

599, what matters here is the general rule, not a singular 

exception to it. To use a lighthearted example, it is clear 

that the “generic” meaning of “mammal” includes giving 

—————— 

enforcement of the criminal laws of a State . . . with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business.” 18 U. S. C. §1511(a). Given that 

§1511 is a specialized conspiracy provision intended to “discourage organized crime’s corruption of state and local officials for the purpose of facilitating gambling enterprises,” Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 

788 (1975), it has no bearing on core obstruction of justice. Section 1512 

is discussed infra, at 10–11. 7 In a testament to the gravitational force of the weighty background 

rule that a pending proceeding is generally required, this Court has interpreted §1512 to at least require a foreseeable proceeding. See Arthur 

Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 707–708 (2005). 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

birth to live young, even though the platypus is an exception to that rule. Section 1512 thus proves the opposite of 

what the majority takes it to prove.8

The Court instead reasons that because §1512 does not 

require a pending investigation or proceeding, the answer 

to the question “Does generic obstruction of justice require 

a pending investigation or proceeding?” must be “No.” That 

line of thinking, however, simply assumes that §1512 falls 

within generic obstruction (it assumes the platypus is 

heartland mammalia). In so assuming, the Court loses 

sight of the task at hand, which is, again, to answer a question about the trunk of obstruction of justice, not more 

broadly defined offshoots. See Descamps, 570 U. S., at 257. 

All signs point toward treating §1512 as just such an offshoot, at least insofar as it explicitly chooses to dispose with 

the requirement that a proceeding “be pending or about to 

be instituted at the time of the offense.” §1512(f )(1).

3 

The text of the INA itself confirms that Congress did not 

understand obstruction of justice to encompass all witness 

—————— 8The majority also mentions §1518 (Obstruction of criminal investigations of health care offenses) and §1519 (Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy), which were 

enacted after Congress passed §1101(a)(43)(S). See §245(a), 110 Stat. 

2017 (adding §1518 in 1996); §802(a), 116 Stat. 800 (adding §1519 in 

2002). Both are highly “specialized” provisions concerned with “corporate fraud and financial audits.” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 

541 (2015) (plurality opinion). Given that these later enacted offenses 

are specialized extensions of obstruction of justice, they are irrelevant to 

determining what Congress in 1996 understood as the generic meaning 

of “obstruction of justice” in §1101(a)(43)(S). While the concurrence suggests that “obstruction of justice” is coextensive with chapter 73, ante, at 

2–3 (opinion of JACKSON, J.), the concurrence (like the majority) does not 

engage with these issues regarding §§1518 and 1519, nor with the problems noted above about §§1511 and 1512, see supra, at 9–11, even though 

all of these issues have been thoroughly ventilated in these cases. See 

Brief for Petitioner in No. 22–23, pp. 23–29; Brief for Respondent in No. 

22–331, pp. 15–21; Brief for Attorney General 24–31.
12 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

tampering. In the very same subsection of the INA at issue 

here, Congress expressly used the term “witness tampering” separately from “obstruction of justice.” 8 U. S. C. 

§1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). Specifically, in a set of provisions defining “U” nonimmigrant status,9 Congress again enumerated a list of offenses, many of which overlap with the aggravated felonies in §1101(a)(43). See §1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); 

cf. §§1101(a)(43). Just as it did for aggravated felonies, 

Congress included “obstruction of justice” in the list. This 

time, however, Congress added witness tampering in addition to obstruction of justice by listing “witness tampering; 

obstruction of justice; [or] perjury” as distinct offenses. 

§1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); cf. §1101(a)(43)(S) (“obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness”).

The Court’s broad interpretation of “obstruction of justice,” which swallows up all witness tampering, cannot be 

reconciled with this statutory text. If, on the one hand, the 

Court applies the same broad meaning to “obstruction of 

justice” in §1101(a)(15)(U)(iii), then “witness tampering” 

becomes redundant, in violation of the canon that statutes 

should be read “so as to avoid rendering superfluous any 

parts thereof.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 

501 U. S. 104, 112 (1991). If, on the other hand, the Court 

attempts to avoid this problem by interpreting “obstruction 

of justice” differently across the two provisions, then it violates “the established canon of construction that similar 

language contained within the same section of a statute 

must be accorded a consistent meaning.” National Credit 

Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 

501 (1998). Either way, the Court’s interpretation fails.

Although §1101(a)(43)(S) refers to “an offense relating to 

—————— 9Persons eligible for “U” nonimmigrant status are victims of certain 

qualifying criminal activity who are helpful to officials investigating or 

prosecuting such activity. See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(15)(U)(i). 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

obstruction of justice,” while §1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) refers to 

“criminal activity . . . involving . . . obstruction of justice” 

“or any similar activity,” these textual differences only reinforce that Congress understood “obstruction of justice” 

and “witness tampering” to have quite different ordinary 

meanings. Given that §1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) covers not just 

“obstruction of justice” but “any similar activity,” one must 

infer that Congress took witness tampering to be not only 

distinct from obstruction of justice, but distinct enough to 

need separate mention from “obstruction of justice” “or any 

similar activity.”

Nor does it matter that §1101(a)(15)(U) was added to the 

INA in 2000 as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. 114 Stat. 1534. On the contrary, the 

fact that Congress understood “obstruction of justice” to be 

distinct from “witness tampering” just four years after enacting §1101(a)(43)(S) is good evidence Congress understood the same to be true in 1996, when it deemed “obstruction of justice” an aggravated felony under the INA. After 

all, “no one here suggests that the ordinary understanding 

in the years after 1996 somehow differed from the ordinary 

understanding in 1996.” Ante, at 5, n. 1.

4 

State law points to the same result as the other indicia of 

meaning examined thus far. State law is relevant because, 

in discerning the generic meaning of terms with commonlaw roots, the Court will often survey state statutes in effect 

at the time the federal statute in question was enacted. See 

Taylor, 495 U. S., at 598–599 (considering how “burglary” 

was understood “in the criminal codes of most States”). 

Here, when §1101(a)(43)(S) was enacted in 1996, 13 States 

and the District of Columbia had a crime deemed “obstruction of” or “obstructing” “justice.” The majority of those 

state statutes (eight in total) required a connection to an 

investigation or proceeding that was pending, or at least 
14 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

reasonably foreseeable, while the remainder were ambiguous on the matter.10 Thus, when §1101(a)(43)(S) was added 

to the INA in 1996, obstruction of justice “‘generally’” or 

“‘typically’” required such a connection. Id., at 598.

The majority avoids this conclusion only by, once again, 

adopting a circular approach. In analyzing state law, the 

majority looks exclusively to state witness tampering statutes, which it simply assumes are “state obstruction offenses.” Ante, at 5. It then concludes that because many of 

those statutes do not require a pending investigation or proceeding, neither does obstruction of justice under the INA. 

Ibid. As should be clear by now, that method gets the categorical approach backward; if the overarching federal category is assumed to include the state offenses in question, 

there will always be a categorical match. One cannot prove 

that all state witness tampering laws fall within the INA’s 

“relating to obstruction of justice” simply by assuming that 

they do.11

—————— 10See Haw. Rev. Stat. §710–1072.5 (1996) (connection required); La. 

Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:130.1 (West 1996) (same); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, 

§26 (1996) (same); Miss. Code Ann. §97–9–55 (1996) (same); Va. Code 

Ann. §18.2–460 (1996) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §3015 (1996) 

(same); W. Va. Code Ann. §61–5–27 (1996) (same); Wis. Stat. §946.65 

(1996) (same); Ind. Code Ann. §35–44–3–4 (ambiguous); Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. §2921.32 (1996) (same); Utah Code Ann. §76–8–306 (1996) (same); 

D. C. Code §22–722 (1996) (same); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/31–4 

(1996) (same); Mont. Code Ann. §45–7–303 (1996) (same). 11Moreover, even assuming state witness tampering statutes are relevant, it is noteworthy that in 1996 the vast majority of States (39 in total) 

categorized their witness tampering statutes as something other than 

“obstruction of justice.” See, e.g., Ala. Code §13A–10–124 (1996) (categorized under “Offenses Against Public Administration”); Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§18–8–707 (1996) (categorized under “Offenses—Governmental Operations”); Idaho Code Ann. §18–2604 (1996) (categorized under “Evidence 

Falsified or Concealed and Witnesses Intimidated or Bribed”); see also 

Brief for Respondent in No. 22–331, pp. 26–28 (collecting statutes). Of

the remaining 11 States that located their witness tampering statutes in 

the part of the Criminal Code prohibiting “obstructing” or “obstruction” 

of “justice,” at least 7 required a connection to a pending investigation or 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

The majority also relies on the Model Penal Code (MPC). 

Ante, at 5–6. Although the MPC sometimes can provide 

supplemental evidence of generic meaning, see Taylor, 495 

U. S., at 598, n. 8, it is critical to bear in mind that the MPC 

is fundamentally a “reform movemen[t].” United States v. 

Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 403 (1980). Where that reform involves a definitive break from the state of the law at the 

time in question, the MPC is of limited value in discerning 

generic meaning. Such is the case here. The MPC eschews 

any talk of “obstruction of justice,” and instead sets out a 

series of articles under the heading “Offenses Against Public Administration.” ALI, MPC §§240–243 (1980). Those 

articles cover many offenses, such as escape from prison 

(§242.6), perjury (§241.1), and bribery (§240.1) that are 

clearly not generic obstruction of justice (indeed, perjury 

and bribery are listed separately from obstruction of justice 

in §1101(a)(43)(S)). Even in the article that most closely 

parallels traditional obstruction of justice (§242.1 “Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental 

Function”), the MPC gave the word “‘obstructs’” an “expansive meaning,” §242.1, Comment 2, at 203, and “intended” 

for the offense described to “reach all legitimate activities 

of government,” not just “the administration of justice,” id., 

at 203–204. Because of these departures, which have not 

been widely adopted, the MPC carries little weight for purposes of discerning the core that forms generic obstruction 

of justice.

Despite these issues, the majority focuses, again without 

justification, on the MPC’s description of witness tampering 

—————— 

proceeding. See Ind. Code Ann. §35–44–3–4(a)(1); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 

27, §26; Miss. Code Ann. §97–9–55; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §199.230 (1996); 

N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–266 (1996); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §3015; W. 

Va. Code Ann. §61–5–27. State law on the whole thus favors a pending 

investigation or proceeding requirement for generic obstruction of justice.
16 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

(§241.6). See ante, at 6. Even setting aside the now-familiar circularity of this reasoning, this definition does not help 

the majority either. In describing witness tampering, the 

MPC reformers chose to depart from “laws requiring that a 

proceeding or investigation actually be pending,” §241.6, 

Comment 2, at 166, by requiring only a “belie[f] that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 

instituted,” §241.6(1) (emphasis added). That intentional 

departure is reason alone to treat this MPC description 

with caution when articulating generic obstruction of justice. Yet, the majority goes much further than the MPC 

reformers by dismissing the notion that at least a foreseeable investigation or proceeding should be required. See 

ante, at 7, n. 2. That statement by the Court reflects just 

how far afield it has wandered from the heartland of obstruction of justice.

Perhaps sensing the weakness of its evidence, the Court

falls back on the Government’s “commonsense point,” Reply 

Brief 4, that “one can obstruct the wheels of justice even 

before the wheels have begun to move,” ante, at 6. Yet the 

intuitive idea that “obstruction can only arise when justice 

is being administered,” Pettibone, 148 U. S., at 207, finds 

support in common sense to at least the same degree. But 

while both formulations find some support in common 

sense, the same cannot be said regarding other clues about 

generic meaning. Considered together, the relevant history, dictionaries, and federal and state laws provide powerful evidence that obstruction of justice “as commonly understood,” Descamps, 570 U. S., at 257, when Congress 

enacted 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S) in 1996, requires a pending investigation or proceeding.

II

In a feeble attempt to shore up its argument, the Court 

resorts to a seemingly limitless construction of “relating to 

obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), according to which 
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the phrase “relating to” covers all offenses “that have ‘a connection with’ obstruction of justice,” ante, at 7. That reading is a direct result of the Court’s failure to consider statutory text and context when interpreting “relating to.” 

After all, “in isolation” that phrase is endlessly expansive 

because, absent a statute-specific “limiting principle,” relations “stop nowhere.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 48, 59–

60 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, one 

look at statutory text and context confirms that “relating 

to” must have a narrower meaning.

The text of the INA “makes [non-U. S. citizens] removable based on the nature of their convictions, not based on 

their actual conduct.” Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 389. 

This explains why, when applying §1101(a)(43)(S), courts 

use the categorical approach, which compares the elements 

of the statute of conviction to the generic offense. Without 

a delineated generic offense, however, this comparison falters. The Court’s nebulous reading of “relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery 

of a witness,” §1101(a)(43)(S) (emphasis added), fails to 

grapple with this reality. Rather than ask whether a conviction is a categorical match for, say, generic “perjury,” the 

majority seems to suggest courts should ask if the conviction has “a connection with” generic perjury. If that is what 

the majority intends, it is not clear what that question 

means or how courts should go about answering it.

In contrast, no such problem arises if “an offense relating 

to . . . perjury” or “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” is understood narrowly to mean simply “an offense 

qualifying as generic perjury” or “an offense qualifying as 

generic obstruction of justice.” The broader statutory context confirms this reading. Again and again, §1101(a)(43) 

uses the phrase “relating to” in descriptive parentheticals 

to introduce an ordinary language description of other aggravated felonies. For example, to identify the money laundering offenses in 18 U. S. C. §1956, the INA refers to “an 
18 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of money instruments).” §1101(a)(43)(D) (emphasis 

added). This structure, which the INA repeats well over a 

dozen times, see §§1101(a)(43)(D)–(E),(H)–(N), confirms 

that the phrase “relating to” is used in the INA simply to 

introduce (not expand upon) a general description of the intended crime category.

The Court’s seemingly expansive reading of “in relation 

to” is also refuted by its consequences for the statutory text. 

If all that is required is a “connection with” something that 

“obstruct[s] the wheels of justice,” ante, at 6–7, then the 

Government has open season to argue that all sorts of 

crimes that hinder law enforcement (e.g., failing to report a 

crime) or make detection of a crime more difficult (e.g., 

money laundering) qualify as offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” On this approach, certain other aggravated 

felonies listed in the INA (e.g., §1101(a)(43)(D) (money 

laundering)) will collapse into “obstruction of justice,” leading to substantial superfluity in the statute. Indeed, the 

separate categories of perjury and bribery of a witness 

listed in the very same subparagraph, §1101(a)(43)(S), will 

themselves be part of that collapse.

More importantly, an expansive reading of “in relation to” 

opens the door for the Government to argue that many lowlevel offenses that fall outside of core obstruction of justice 

are “aggravated” felonies, even though the INA reserves 

that label for “especially egregious felonies.” EsquivelQuintana, 581 U. S., at 394. For example, misdemeanor 

convictions for failing to report a crime, presenting false 

identification to an officer, refusing to aid a police officer, 

leaving the scene of a crime, or purchasing a fake ID could 

be taken to count as “relating to obstruction of justice.” See 

Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 19

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Curiae 10–25 (collecting offenses).12

This significant potential for “redundancy,” “unfairness,” 

and “arbitrary” enforcement should have led the Court to 

“exercise interpretive restraint,” Marinello v. United 

States, 584 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 7, 9) (internal quotation marks omitted), when construing “relating 

to.” Indeed, the many problems with an expansive reading 

of “relating to” raise the question whether the Court even 

really intends to adopt such a reading, especially because

the relevant discussion occupies a single paragraph. Perhaps instead the Court simply offers up “connection with” 

as a synonym for “relating to,” leaving it for lower courts to 

settle what that phrase actually means.

III

While the evidence assembled here is far stronger than 

any offered by the majority, the sheer complexity of the task 

at hand leaves lingering ambiguity, even if the Court claims 

it does not see it. Cf. ante, at 10. To the extent doubts remain, however, they are resolved in favor of a narrower understanding of §1101(a)(43)(S) by the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation 

statutes in favor of the [non-U. S. citizen].” INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 449 (1987).

This Court resolves doubts in favor of the non-U. S. citizen in keeping with the general rule that ambiguities in penal statutes should be construed against the government. 

—————— 12Of course, many of the convictions the Government seeks to shoehorn into “obstruction of justice” are serious offenses, even if they are not 

a categorical match for obstruction of justice. Such convictions, however, 

may render non-U. S. citizens removable for other reasons (e.g., if they

qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude). Moreover, when noncitizens are removable, any discretionary immigration relief for which they 

may be eligible will “depen[d] upon the discretion of the Attorney General.” Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U. S. 563, 581 (2010). Thus, 

any difference between the majority and the dissent in terms of “practical 

effect on policing our Nation’s borders . . . is a limited one.” Ibid. 
20 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

After all, deportation is not only a kind of “penalty,” but a 

“drastic measure” often “the equivalent of banishment [or] 

exile.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10 (1948). Nowhere is that truer than here. Aggravated felonies under 

the INA are “a category of crimes singled out for the harshest deportation consequences.” Carachuri-Rosendo v. 

Holder, 560 U. S. 563, 566 (2010). If a non-U. S. citizen is 

convicted of an aggravated felony, even if she has a green 

card and has lived in this country for years, she is subject 

to removal and is also ineligible for readmission and many 

forms of immigration relief. See 8 U. S. C. §§1158(b)(2), 

1182(a)(9)(A), 1182(h), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3), 

1229c(a)(1). “Accordingly, removal is a virtually certainty

for [a non-U. S. citizen] found to have an aggravated felony 

conviction, no matter how long he has previously resided 

here.” Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) 

(slip op., at 1–2). Moreover, a person convicted of an “aggravated felony” faces heighted criminal sanctions for disobeying orders of removal, §1253(a)(1), or reentering the 

United States without permission, §1326(b)(2). For example, the penalty for illegal reentry skyrockets from 2 years 

to 20. See §§1326(a), (b)(2). 

This Court has been clear that, in the face of such stakes, 

it “will not assume that Congress meant to trench on [a nonU. S. citizen’s] freedom beyond that which is required by 

the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words 

used.” Fong Haw Tan, 333 U. S., at 10. While it may be 

true that certain broader readings of “obstruction of justice” 

are “at least plausible,” ante, at 3 (JACKSON, J., concurring), 

that is not good enough because it is, at the very minimum, 

at least equally plausible that “obstruction of justice” requires a pending investigation or proceeding. The Court 

should have “err[ed] on the side of underinclusiveness” 

when interpreting §1101(a)(43). Moncrieffe, 569 U. S., at 

205.
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 21

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

IV

By rejecting a central feature of core obstruction of justice 

and adopting a seemingly expansive reading of “relating 

to,” the Court leaves generic obstruction of justice without 

any discernible shape. The Court thus injects further chaos 

into the already fraught question of how to understand 

§1101(a)(43)(S) and opens the door for the Government to 

try to use that provision as a catchall for all sorts of criminal 

activity, whether aggravated or not.

The Court could perhaps have reined in some of that 

chaos by giving “obstruction of justice” affirmative shape 

and boundaries in other ways, but it makes no effort to do 

so. Instead, the Court simply rejects the legal proposition 

that a pending investigation or proceeding is required for a 

predicate offense to qualify under §1101(a)(43)(S). At bottom, its reasoning in support of that conclusion boils down 

to a simple syllogism, which it clothes in various guises: (1) 

Dissuading a witness from reporting a crime to the police 

qualifies as obstruction of justice; (2) the offense of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime does not require a 

pending investigation or proceeding; thus (3) some offense 

qualifying as obstruction of justice does not require a pending investigation or proceeding.

The flaw in this syllogism is, of course, premise (1). By 

assuming, up front and without reason, that dissuading a 

witness from reporting a crime qualifies as obstruction of 

justice, the Court oversteps. Congress could, if it wanted, 

add witness tampering to the INA’s lengthy list of aggravated felonies, just as it did with the list of offenses at 

§1101(a)(15)(U)(iii), but it has not done so. The Court’s decision today makes that judgment call for Congress. “Our 

license to interpret statutes does not include the power to 

engage in such freewheeling judicial policymaking.” 

Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 

16).
22 PUGIN v. GARLAND

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

The syllogism’s conclusion is also noteworthy for its narrowness. In the end, all the Court really holds is that generic obstruction of justice includes one offense (dissuading 

a witness from reporting a crime) that does not require a 

pending investigation or proceeding. Lower courts faced 

with difficult questions about what offenses qualify as categorical matches for §1101(a)(43)(S) would do well to bear 

in mind the limited nature of that holding. Many open 

questions remain regarding whether offenses other than 

dissuading a witness from reporting a crime are categorical 

matches for §1101(a)(43)(S), what affirmative understanding of §1101(a)(43)(S) should guide that categorical analysis, and whether other offenses that also lack a connection 

to a pending investigation or proceeding can qualify under 

that analysis.13 I do not take the majority to be addressing 

any of these questions, and great care is warranted in answering them in the future.

* * * 

By eliminating a central constraint on what qualifies as 

“an offense relating to obstruction of justice” under 

§1101(a)(43)(S), while providing zero affirmative guidance 

as to what sorts of offenses are a match for that category, 

the majority leaves lower courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals without direction and invites the Government 

to advance far-ranging constructions of §1101(a)(43)(S) that 

bear little resemblance to core obstruction of justice. I 

—————— 13On this list of open questions is whether state accessory-after-thefact convictions like petitioner Pugin’s are a categorical match for 

§1101(a)(43)(S). The majority affirms the Fourth Circuit’s legal holding 

that a pending investigation or proceeding is unnecessary for an offense 

to qualify under §1101(a)(43)(S). The majority is conspicuously silent, 

however, regarding the underlying offense itself and whether it is obstruction of justice under §1101(a)(43)(S). And for good reason, because 

accessory offenses have their own distinct pedigree and purpose with historical roots far afield from that of obstruction of justice. Cf. R Perkins, 

Parties to Crime, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581, 581–582, 605–607 (1941).
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 23

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

would leave it to Congress, not the Judiciary, to decide 

which additional crimes should be listed as aggravated felonies under the INA. I respectfully dissent.