Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House Committee 

on Government Reform

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST 

Monday, August 23, 2004 U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

State Department and 

Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Expand Post9/11 Efforts but Challenges 

Remain 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-04-1061T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1061T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-1061T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations; Committee on 

Government Reform; House of 

Representatives 

August 23, 2004

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 

State Department and Broadcasting 

Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 

Efforts but Challenges Remain 

Polls taken in Islamic countries 

after 9/11 suggested that many or 

most people had a favorable view 

of the United States and its fight 

against terrorism. By 2003, opinion 

research indicated that foreign 

publics, especially in countries 

with large Muslim populations, 

viewed the United States 

unfavorably. GAO issued two 

studies in 2003 that examined (1) 

changes in U.S. public diplomacy 

resources and programs since 

September 11, 2001, within the 

State Department (State) and the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors 

(BBG); (2) the U.S. government’s 

strategies for its public diplomacy 

programs and measures of 

effectiveness; and (3) the 

challenges that remain in executing 

U.S. public diplomacy efforts. 

GAO made several 

recommendations to State and the 

BBG to address planning and 

performance issues. Both agencies 

agreed with these 

recommendations and have made 

some progress in implementing 

them. 

On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 

Commission released its report and 

recommendations. Two of the 

Commission’s recommendations 

relate to the management of U.S. 

public diplomacy. For this 

testimony, GAO was asked to 

discuss its prior work as it relates 

to these recommendations. 

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy 

efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic 

importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources 

in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting 

broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim 

countries. These initiatives are consistent with the 9/11 Commission’s 

recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, library, 

and exchange programs overseas. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated 

several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority 

markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the 

Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. 

The 9/11 Commission report highlights these broadcast efforts and 

recommends that funding for such efforts be expanded. 

While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on 

terrorism, we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State’s, 

BBG’s, and other federal agencies’ communication efforts. The absence 

of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages 

to overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission recommended 

that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy 

message. In addition, we found that State does not have a strategy that 

integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State, 

noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of 

strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic 

plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program 

objective to gauge the Board’s success in increasing audience size, the 

key focus of its plan. We also found that State and the BBG were not 

systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the 

goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics’ 

understanding about the United States. The BBG subsequently made 

audience size a key performance goal and added broadcaster credibility 

and plans to add other performance measures that GAO recommended. 

In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying 

out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public 

diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language 

proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through 

increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market, 

organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to 

generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number 

of solutions to address these challenges. 
Page 1 GAO-04-1061T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s issued work on U.S. public 

diplomacy efforts and to focus specifically on the Middle East and related 

recommendations by the 9/11 Commission report. The terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of 

cultivating a favorable public opinion of the United States abroad. Recent 

opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries 

with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. Last 

September, we reported to the House International Relations Committee 

on the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts.1

 In July 2003, we 

issued a report for that committee on the progress that the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors (BBG)—the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S. 

international broadcasting—has made in developing a new strategic 

approach to reverse declining audience trends and support U.S. strategic 

objectives such as the war on terrorism.2 The Department of State and the 

BBG share an annual budget of more than $1 billion for public diplomacy 

activities. While neither of our reports focused exclusively on the Middle 

East, each identified systemic problems that would apply to public 

diplomacy activities there. 

Mr. Chairman, on February 10, 2004, I testified before you and this 

Subcommittee on public diplomacy.3

 Today, I will present a similar 

statement updated in light of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on 

public diplomacy. I will address (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy 

resources and programs since September 11, 2001; (2) the government’s 

strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of 

effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public 

diplomacy efforts. My testimony will highlight our findings that are 

relevant to specific 9/11 Commission recommendations to (1) rebuild our 

scholarship, exchange, and library programs overseas, and increase 

 1

GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant 

Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2003). 

2

GAO, U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching 

Large Audience but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives, GAO-03-772 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 2003). 

3

GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges, GAO-04-

435T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004). 
Page 2 GAO-04-1061T 

support for broadcasting to Arabs and Muslims; and (2) better define the 

U.S.’s public diplomacy message. 

As part of our past work underpinning our issued reports, we surveyed top 

officials of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide on such 

issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of 

budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure 

performance.4

 We met with relevant State officials, members of the BBG, 

and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss management 

issues. We also met with academics specializing in public diplomacy and 

international affairs issues, and private sector officials from U.S. public 

relations and opinion research firms with international operations. While 

several government entities conduct public diplomacy activities, my 

comments will focus on State’s and BBG’s efforts since they were the 

subject of our work. We conducted our work from May 2002 to May 2003 

and in August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Since September 11, 2001, both State and the BBG have expanded their 

public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of 

strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the 2 fiscal years since the 

terrorist attacks, State has increased its public diplomacy funding and 

staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with significant Muslim 

populations—South Asia and the Near East. Among other efforts, State is 

emphasizing exchange programs targeting young and diverse audiences, 

including high school students. State is also expanding its American 

Corners program, which provides information about the United States to 

foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. embassies and local 

institutions. These efforts are consistent with the 9/11 Commission report 

recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, exchange, 

and library programs for young people. In addition, since September 11, 

2001, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has initiated several new 

programs focusing on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, 

including Radio Sawa in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, 

and Radio Farda in Iran. Estimated start-up and recurring costs for these 

three projects through fiscal year 2003 totaled about $116 million. The 

Board also launched an Arabic language television network (Alhurra) in 

 4

GAO surveyed 156 public affairs officers from March through May 2003; of these, 118 

responded for a 76-percent response rate. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-1061T 

mid-February 2004. The 9/11 Commission report endorses Board requests 

for additional resources to expand its broadcast efforts targeted at Arabs 

and Muslims. However, although Board research indicates that these 

initiatives have garnered sizeable audiences, it is unclear whether program 

content is changing audience attitudes or increasing knowledge and 

awareness of issues of strategic interest to the United States. 

In September 2003, GAO reported that that the U.S. government lacks an 

interagency public diplomacy strategy that defines the messages and 

means for governmentwide communication efforts targeted at overseas 

audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission report recommended that the 

United States do a better job of defining its public diplomacy message. 

Because of their differing roles and missions, the State Department, 

Department of Defense, USAID, and others often focus on different 

audiences and use varying means to communicate with them. An 

interagency strategy would provide a framework for considering the 

foreign publics in key countries and regions, the relevant U.S. national 

security interests there, the U.S. government communication channels 

available, and optimal ways to convey the desired communication themes 

and messages. We also reported that State does not have a strategy that 

integrates its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward 

common objectives, and that neither State nor the BBG has focused on 

measuring progress toward long-term goals. The absence of an integrated 

strategy may hinder State’s ability to channel its multifaceted programs 

toward concrete and measurable progress. Finally, State is not 

systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public 

diplomacy goals and thus has a limited ability to correct its course of 

action or direct resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood 

of success. In comparison, the Broadcasting Board of Governors in July 

2001 initiated a 5-year strategic approach to international broadcasting 

known as “Marrying the Mission to the Market,” which emphasizes the 

need to reach large audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques 

and strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast 

markets, such as the Middle East. However, we found that this plan lacked 

a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the 

Board’s success in increasing audience size. Further, there were no 

measurable program objectives to support the plan’s strategic goals or to 

provide a basis for assessing the Board’s performance with regard to 

changing audience views toward the United States. 

In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out 

their programs. According to public affairs officers at the State 

Department, these challenges include insufficient resources to effectively 
Page 4 GAO-04-1061T 

conduct public diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with 

foreign language proficiency. More than 40 percent of the public affairs 

officers we surveyed said that the time available to devote exclusively to 

public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and more than 50 percent 

reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform 

such tasks was inadequate. Further, about 21 percent of the officers 

posted overseas in language designated positions have not attained the 

level of language speaking proficiency required for their positions, 

hampering their ability to engage with foreign publics. In addition, about 

58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that 

Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills 

required to effectively conduct public diplomacy. The Broadcasting Board 

of Governors also faces resource issues, as well as a number of media 

market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its 

efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. These challenges 

include outmoded programs and poor signal quality; the disparate 

structure of the agency, which consists of seven separate broadcast 

entities and a mix of federal and grantee organizations collectively 

managed by a part-time Board; and the resource-intensive job of 

broadcasting 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets 

worldwide. The Board has developed a number of solutions to address 

these challenges. 

GAO made several recommendations addressing planning and 

performance issues that the Secretary of State and the BBG have agreed to 

implement. GAO recommended that State develop a strategy that 

considers the use of private sector public relations techniques to integrate 

its public diplomacy efforts, improve performance measurement, and 

strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages 

and public diplomacy. Among GAO’s recommendations to the BBG were 

that the Board revise its strategic plan to include audience size and other 

key measurable program objectives, implementation strategies, resource 

requirements, and project time frames, as well as a clear vision of the 

Board’s intended scope of operations, particularly plans to reduce 

overlap.5

 In response to our recommendation that State develop a strategy 

that considers private sector techniques, State agreed, but no such strategy 

has been developed to date. However, State has begun the process of 

establishing a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. 

 5

We reported overlap in 55 percent of the BBG’s language services, meaning more than one 

service was reaching the same target audience in the same language. 
Page 5 GAO-04-1061T 

Regarding our recommendation to strengthen performance measurement 

efforts, State officials said that they are exploring ways to do so and 

State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has, among other 

things, begun conducting limited pre- and post-testing of its program 

participants’ understanding of the United States. State acknowledged the 

need to strengthen training of Foreign Service officers and told us that the 

primary obstacle to doing so is insufficient staffing to allow time for 

training. Officials said they have already begun to address staffing gaps by 

stepping up recruitment efforts as part of the Diplomatic Readiness 

Initiative. In response to our recommendations to the BBG, the Board has 

revised its strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of maximizing 

impact in priority areas of interest and has made audience size a key 

performance measure. The Board has added broadcast credibility and 

audience awareness to its array of performance measures and plans to add 

a measure to determine whether its broadcasting entities are achieving 

their mission. Finally, the Board recently completed a review of language 

service overlap that identified about $9.7 million in potential savings. 

However, the Board has yet to revise its strategic plan to include details on 

implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project time frames 

for the various initiatives supporting its strategic goal of maximizing 

program impact. 

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and 

influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a 

wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, 

broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S. 

public diplomacy focused on foreign elites—current and future overseas 

opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However, the 

dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have 

forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider 

techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG, 

as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports U.S. 

public diplomacy’s key objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate 

information about the United States, while maintaining its journalistic 

independence as a news organization. The BBG manages and oversees the 

Voice of America (VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Farda, the Middle East Television Network 

(which consists of Radio Sawa and Alhurra, the Board’s new Arabic 

language television station), the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio 

Free Asia. Radio Sawa, Alhurra, and Radio Farda (Iran), provide regional 

and local news to countries in the Middle East. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-04-1061T 

Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of $1 billion on public 

diplomacy programs each year. State’s public diplomacy budget totaled an 

estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or $320 

million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and cultural 

exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and expenses 

incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information 

dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs, 

publications, and other activities. BBG’s budget for fiscal year 2004 is $546 

million. This includes more than $42 million for radio and television 

broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the language service 

review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the scope of operations of 

more than 25 language services and reallocated about $19.7 million in 

funds, with the majority redirected toward Central Asia and the Middle 

East, including $8 million for Radio Farda service to Iran. 

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State 

Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2003 Estimates 

a

Estimate includes $11 million for Radio Sawa. 

b

Estimate includes $3 million for Radio Farda. 
Page 7 GAO-04-1061T 

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its efforts in Muslimmajority countries that are considered strategically important in the war 

on terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and 

number of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near 

Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives 

targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly 

Muslim countries—that include expanding exchange programs targeting 

citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies 

in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims 

share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to 

support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the 

Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. In 

addition, the Board expanded its presence in the Middle East through the 

launch of the Alhurra satellite television network in mid-February 2004. 

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States rely on such 

programs and activities to vigorously defend our ideals abroad, just as the 

United States did during the Cold War. 

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its 

resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim 

countries. For example, while State’s bureau of Europe and Eurasia still 

receives the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, 

the largest percentage increases in such resources since September 11 

occurred in State’s bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, 

where many countries have significant Muslim populations.6

 Public 

diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 million 

and in the Near East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58 

percent, respectively, from fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same 

period, authorized American Foreign Service officers in South Asia 

increased from 27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 

percent and 27 percent, respectively. 

Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources 

to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement 

with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize 

exchanges with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning 

 6

These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 

Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 

Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 

More Public 

Diplomacy Resources 

Shifting to MuslimMajority Countries 

State Has Increased 

Resources and Programs 

in the Middle East 
Page 8 GAO-04-1061T 

Program—designed to target young and diverse audiences through 

academic and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International 

Visitor, and Citizen Exchange programs. According to State, under this 

program, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries 

have already arrived and are living with American families and studying at 

local high schools. State has also carried out increased exchanges through 

its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer and 

English language training for women newly employed by the Afghan 

government and a program to assist women from Arab countries and 

elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S. electoral process. In 

addition, State is expanding its American Corners program, as 

recommended by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in October 

2003.7

 This program uses space in public libraries and other public 

buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In fiscal 

year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in the East 

and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to open 10 in Afghanistan 

and 15 in Iraq. 

State’s Office of International Information Programs has also developed 

new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and 

electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism, distributed in 36 

languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which 

documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al 

Qaeda; and a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform 

foreign audiences of the administration’s policies toward Iraq. 

Several of the BBG’s new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences in 

priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of these 

programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March 2002 

using modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such 

as the extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the poorly 

performing VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at around 2 

percent of the population. According to BBG survey research, Radio Sawa 

is reaching 51 percent of its target audience and is ranked highest for news 

and news trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite such results, it 

remains unclear how many people Radio Sawa reaches throughout the 

entire Middle East because audience research has been performed only in 

 7

Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds 

Winning Peace (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003). 

New BBG Initiatives Target 

Large Audiences in Priority 

Markets 
Page 9 GAO-04-1061T 

selected markets. Further, the State Inspector General and the Advisory 

Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have raised 

questions about whether Radio Sawa has focused more on audience size 

and composition than on potential impact on attitudes in the region. The 

BBG has also launched the Afghanistan Radio Network and a language 

service to Iran called Radio Farda. Estimated costs for these three 

initiatives through fiscal year 2003 are about $116 million. In addition, the 

Board started Alhurra, an Arabic language television network in the 

Middle East, in mid-February 2004. 

While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks the recognition 

of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, there still is 

no interagency strategy to guide State’s and all federal agencies’ 

communication efforts and ensure consistent messages to overseas 

audiences. In addition, as of June 2004, State still lacked a comprehensive 

and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide its 

programs. We agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the 

U.S. government must define its message. State also is not systematically 

or comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. 

In addition, we found that , although BBG has a strategic plan, the plan 

lacks a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the 

Board’s success in increasing audience size. Further, the BBG’s plan 

contains no measurable program objectives to support the plan’s strategic 

goals or to provide a basis for assessing the Board’s performance. Since 

our report, however, the Board revised its strategic plan and has improved 

its ability to gauge its program effectiveness measures by adding broadcast 

credibility and audience awareness measures. The Board also plans to add 

additional performance measures, such as whether broadcast entities are 

achieving their mandated missions. 

No interagency public diplomacy strategy has been implemented that lays 

out the messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts 

to overseas audiences. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates 

the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually 

reinforcing benefits. State officials told us that, without such a strategy, 

the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. 

public diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy 

diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public 

diplomacy efforts. 

Planning Deficiencies, 

Inability to Gauge 

Progress Toward 

Goals Hinder U.S. 

Public Diplomacy 

Efforts 

Interagency Public 

Diplomacy Strategy Has 

Not Been Established 
Page 10 GAO-04-1061T 

Our fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance of 

interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very 

small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S. 

assistance provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest 

recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more 

than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more 

than $13 million in 2003. 

Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in 

recent years. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the White House, 

State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated 

various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White 

House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One 

such mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information 

Centers in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early 

stages of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were 

designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate 

news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate 

negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable 

to U.S. efforts. 

In January 2003, the President established a more permanent coordination 

mechanism, the White House Office of Global Communications, which is 

intended to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S. 

government to overseas audiences. The President also established the 

Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by 

the State Department and the National Security Council and to work 

closely with the Office of Global Communications, to ensure interagency 

coordination in disseminating the U.S. message across the globe. Although 

it is the committee’s long-term objective to develop a National 

Communications Strategy, according to recent conversations with U.S. 

officials, the committee has not met since March 2003.8

 8

In July 2004, the State Department established the Policy Coordinating Committee on 

Muslim World Outreach, according to State officials. This Committee has taken on much of 

the role of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee. 
Page 11 GAO-04-1061T 

After September 11, State acknowledged the need for a strategy that 

integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them 

toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the 

development stage. State officials told us that such a strategy is 

particularly important because State’s public diplomacy operation is 

fragmented among the various organizational entities within the agency. 

Public affairs officers who responded to our survey indicated that the lack 

of a strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute public 

diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs officers 

in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance from the 

Office of the Undersecretary at the time of our review (10/01-3/03) was 

generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in another 

region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints during our 

overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former public affairs 

officer stated that so little information had been provided from 

Washington on State’s post-September 11 public diplomacy strategy that 

he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to formulate his incountry public diplomacy plans. 

During our audit work, we learned that private sector public relations 

efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated strategies to integrate 

complex communication efforts involving multiple players. Although 

State’s public diplomacy efforts extend beyond the activities of public 

relations firms, many of the strategic tools that such firms employ are 

relevant to State’s situation. While it is difficult to establish direct links 

between public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government 

agencies and the private sector have best practices for assessing 

information disseminating campaigns, including the need to define success 

and how it should be measured. Executives from some of the largest 

public relations firms in the United States told us that initial strategic 

decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the problem, 

identifying the target audience, determining the core messages, and 

defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting 

research to validate the initial decisions, testing the core messages, 

carrying out pre-launch activities, and developing information materials. 

Each of these elements contains numerous other steps that must be 

completed before implementing a tactical program. Further, progress must 

be measured continuously and tactics adjusted accordingly. 

State Does Not Have an 

Integrated Strategy to 

Guide Public Diplomacy 

Operations 
Page 12 GAO-04-1061T 

We also found that State is not systematically and comprehensively 

measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas 

performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and 

program outputs, rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign 

publics’ understanding and attitudes about the United States. Some posts 

judge the effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts by simply 

counting the number of public diplomacy activities that occur in their host 

country—for example, the number of speeches given by the ambassador 

or the number of news articles placed in the host-country media. While 

such measures shed light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they 

reveal little in the way of overall program effectiveness. 

State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine 

whether posts’ performance targets are actually met. At one overseas post 

we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only 22 

percent of the host country’s citizens had a favorable view of the United 

States—a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly percentage 

increases set as targets. However, a former public affairs officer at the 

post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the 

post had actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement 

to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited the 

lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether they 

met their annual performance targets. An official in State’s Office of 

Strategic and Performance Planning said that they have now begun to 

require posts to report on whether they have met performance targets. 

Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not 

conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the 

respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was 

insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations. Many officers also 

reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry out the long-range 

monitoring required to adequately measure program effectiveness. Even if 

sufficient staffing were available, State would still have difficulty 

conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants because it lacks a 

database with comprehensive information on its various exchange 

program alumni. State had planned to begin building a new worldwide 

alumni database with comprehensive data linking all of its various 

exchange programs. However, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 

officials told us they had received insufficient funds to do so, and thus are 

seeking to improve existing information systems for individual exchange 

programs. 

State Lacks Measures of 

Progress Toward Public 

Diplomacy Goals 
Page 13 GAO-04-1061T 

In contrast to State’s lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-based 

approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate large 

listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes it must 

reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of this strategy 

has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism, in particular the 

Middle East. The Board’s vision is to create a flexible, multimedia, 

research-driven U.S. international broadcasting system that addresses the 

many challenges we noted in our report, including an organizational 

structure that consists of several broadcast entities with differing 

missions, broadcast approaches, and constituencies. 

In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan 

did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to 

gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy 

focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. We also 

found that the plan lacked measurable program objectives to support its 

strategic goals, including a broadcaster credibility measure. The Board has 

taken several steps to address the recommendations we made in our 

report. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the key 

objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United 

States and made audience size a key performance measure. Second, the 

Board has added broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional 

performance measures we recommended, including audience awareness 

and whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions. 

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy 

resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the 

need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with 

measurable indicators of progress. There are other challenges our 

government faces in executing successful public diplomacy activities. 

According to public affairs officers, these challenges include insufficient 

time and staffing resources to conduct public diplomacy tasks. In addition, 

many public affairs officers reported that the time available to attend 

public diplomacy training is inadequate. Furthermore, a significant 

number of Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts 

overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. The Board’s key challenge 

in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing 

with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues. 

More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed reported 

that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to executing public 

BBG Has Strategy for 

International Broadcasting 

and Has Made Progress in 

Measuring Performance 

A Number of Internal 

Challenges Hamper 

U.S. Public Diplomacy 

Activities 

Insufficient Time and Staff 
Page 14 GAO-04-1061T 

diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers 

told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy 

receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was 

particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to interact 

with ordinary citizens. More than 50 percent of those responding to our 

survey reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to 

perform public diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although State increased 

the actual number of Americans in public diplomacy positions overseas 

from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a 

shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected needs 

identified in State’s 2002 overseas staffing model. In 2002, State’s overseas 

staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in these positions; however, 

64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were not filled.9

 In addition, about 58 

percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that 

Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills 

required to effectively conduct public diplomacy. 

We reported in 200210 that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, 

State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the 

department’s total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158 

new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002 

through 2004, and according to State officials, the department has met its 

hiring goals under this initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, it 

does not have numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as 

language proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials are 

optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address the 

overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the recruiting efforts 

will result in the right people with the right skills needed to meet specific 

critical shortfalls. 

Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many 

officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service 

officers filling “language-designated” public diplomacy positions overseas 

did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their 

 9

State’s overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal year 2002 was the latest 

year for which data were available on the numbers of positions filled. 

10GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System 

Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 18, 2002). 

Shortfalls in Foreign 

Language Skills 
Page 15 GAO-04-1061T 

positions.11 The highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in 

the Near East, where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the 

requirement. Although State had no language-designated positions for 

South Asia, it had eight language-preferred12 positions, none of which was 

filled by officers who had reading or speaking capability in those 

languages. It is important to note that most of the foreign languages 

required in these two regions, such as Arabic and Urdu, are considered 

difficult to master. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French 

language-designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish 

language-designated ones met the requirements. Officers’ opinions on the 

quality of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by 

region. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy noted this challenge and 

recommended an increase in public diplomacy staff dedicated to issues of 

the Arab and Muslim world, with specific emphasis on enhancing fluency 

in local languages. 

Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and 

other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country’s 

language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The 

foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and 

the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where 

English is widely understood, speaking the host country’s language 

demonstrates respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in 

the public affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because 

their ability to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy 

business in French. French is widely used in that country, especially in 

business and government. However, embassy officers told us that 

speaking Arabic would provide superior entrée to the Moroccan public. 

The ability to speak country-specific forms of Arabic and other more 

obscure dialects would generate even more goodwill, especially outside 

the major cities. 

According to the department, the largest and most significant factor 

limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-standing 

staffing shortfall, which State’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is designed 

 11Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and reading proficiency. 

Most officers who do not meet one requirement do not meet the other one either, so the 

percentages are similar. For purposes of clarity, our figures refer only to the requirements 

for speaking proficiency. 

12These are positions for which language capability is preferred but not required. 
Page 16 GAO-04-1061T 

to fill. Other planned actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job 

candidates with target language skills, sending language training 

supervisors to posts to determine ways to improve training offerings, and 

developing a new “language continuum” plan to guide efforts to meet the 

need for higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those 

critical to national security concerns. 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy 

challenges, key among them is how to gain large audiences in priority 

markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and 

noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure 

consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency 

and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of 

Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language 

services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. Although its 

strategic plan identifies a number of solutions to the competitive 

challenges the Board faces and provides a new organizational model for 

U.S. international broadcasting,13 we found that the Board’s plan did not 

include specifics on implementation strategies, resource requirements, 

project time frames, or a clear vision of the Board’s intended scope of 

operations. The Board recently completed a review of the overlap issue 

and identified six approaches to addressing the problem while still 

meeting the discrete missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast 

entities. All of the Board’s overlapping services were assessed against this 

analytical framework, and more than $9.7 million in potential savings for 

priority initiatives were identified. However, the Board has yet to revise its 

strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies, resource 

requirements, and project timeframes for the various initiatives supporting 

its overarching strategic goal of increasing program impact. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may 

have at this time. 

 13The Board views the separate entities as part of a “single system” under the Board’s direct 

control and authority. 

Outdated Broadcast 

Services and Structure 

Pose Challenges to 

Expanding in Priority 

Markets 
Page 17 GAO-04-1061T 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or 

Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Robert Ball, Lynn Cothern, and Michael ten Kate. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320310) 
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