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HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM:

THREAT CODES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 16, 2004

Serial No. 108–166

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DAN BURTON, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

——— ———

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Analyst

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on March 16, 2004 ............................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Connor, Charles D., senior vice president, communications & marketing,

American Red Cross; Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst, RAND

Corp.; Dr. James Jay Carafano, senior research fellow, defense and

homeland security, Heritage Foundation; and Kenneth B. Allen, executive director, Partnership for Public Warning ............................................ 67

Hughes, General Patrick, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis,

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randall Yim, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. General Accounting

Office; and Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government,

Congressional Research Service .................................................................. 6

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Allen, Kenneth B., executive director, Partnership for Public Warning,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 112

Carafano, Dr. James Jay, senior research fellow, defense and homeland

security, Heritage Foundation, prepared statement of .............................. 98

Connor, Charles D., senior vice president, communications & marketing,

American Red Cross, prepared statement of .............................................. 70

Hughes, General Patrick, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis,

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of .............. 8

Reese, Shawn, Analyst in American National Government, Congressional

Research Service, prepared statement of .................................................... 42

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Wermuth, Michael, senior policy analyst, RAND Corp., prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 85

Yim, Randall, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team,

U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ............................ 19

(1)

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM:

THREAT CODES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Schrock, Ruppersberger

and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R.

Nicholas Palarino, senior policy analyst; Robert A. Briggs, clerk;

Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Andrew Su, minority professional staff member.

Mr. SHAYS. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging

Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, ‘‘Homeland

Security Advisory System: Threat Codes and Public Responses,’’ is

called to order.

After a series of vague warnings and alarms, the utility of the

Homeland Security Advisory System [HSAS], is being questioned

by State and local officials, first responders and the public. Even

Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge recently

acknowledged the need to refine the code, five-color scheme that

seems to me to be losing both its credibility and its audience.

Seeing no difference between a perpetually elevated state of risk,

code yellow, and a high risk of terrorism at code orange, Americans

risk becoming color blind to the signals that are supposed to

prompt public awareness and action.

Since inception of the alert system 2 years ago, the threat level

has been raised and lowered five times, flashing between yellow

and orange whenever the volume of intelligence on al Qaeda went

up or down, but the lack of specificity as to the time, place or nature of the perceived threats provided no basis upon which to calibrate appropriate public or private responses. As a result, governments and critical industries broadly increased security measures

and incurred substantial costs. At the same time, exhortations to

carry on as usual in the name of economic normalcy dulled any

sense of urgency in the public at large.

The Homeland Security Act charges the Under Secretary for Infrastructure Protection to administer the HSAS and to provide specific warning information and advice about appropriate protective

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measures and countermeasures to the public. The current system

does not yet appear to meet the statutory requirements for specific

information or specific advice. Whether due to an excess of caution

about intelligence sources or a reluctance to ask for changed public

behaviors and sacrifices, the codes and warnings in use today may

be a better barometer of political realities than public safety risks.

When a blizzard or hurricane is forecasted, the public is not advised to be brave for America and stay in the eye of the storm, but

when the threat of terrorism is elevated, citizens are advised to go

about their lives as if no real peril approached. We need to make

terrorism alerts at least as targeted and accurate as storm projections.

This week, the Select Committee on Homeland Security will consider legislation to improve Federal preparedness grants. A subcommittee of that bill directs the DHS Secretary to revise the alert

system to include with each warning more specific designations of

regions or economic sectors at risk. But other refinements could

also add to the immediacy and the utility of any publicly disseminated terrorism threat codes.

So we asked our witnesses—and we’re very grateful to all our

witnesses—to discuss the principles of effective risk communication

that should guide public alerts and warnings and to suggest how

to improve the Homeland Security Advisory System. We appreciate

their being here today, and we look forward to their testimony.

At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished vice

chairman, Mr. Turner.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to thank you for

your continued efforts on reviewing the preparedness of our country and its appropriate response for the continuing terrorist threat

that we have.

I appreciate you holding this hearing on an issue that is very important not just for first responders or those who have responsibility such as at our airports for looking at the issues of security but

also for everyday Americans who look at the system for guidance.

I would characterize that most of the responses that I have received from airport security personnel, first responders or even people just out in the community or businesses that might have responsibility for protecting important infrastructure is that, as they

look at this system, their question continues to remain, now what

do we do, and I think that it is important for us to have the discussion as to how the system can be better correlated given a nexus,

if you will, to specific responses from the community. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time, I would ask unanimous consent that all members

of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in

the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. And without objection, so ordered.

At this time I would recognize our first panel: General Patrick

Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Randall Yim, Managing Director

of Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. General Accounting

Office; and Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government, Congressional Research Service.

What we’ll do is we will start with you, General Hughes, after

I swear you all in, and just say that I’m really looking forward to

this first panel. I particularly appreciate, General Hughes, your

candor when you testified before the Select Committee. I found

your testimony on the issue that we’re discussing very helpful, and

I appreciated that, and I appreciate you being here as well as Mr.

Yim and Mr. Reese.

As we do with all our witnesses, if you would stand, raise your

right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Note for the record all our witnesses have

responded in the affirmative.

The way we’ll proceed, General Hughes, is that we have a 5-

minute clock. We will roll it over to the second 5 minutes and I

would hope that you would stop sometime in between that second

if you haven’t within the first, but technically we allow 10 minutes

for your testimony but hope it will be a little less.

Thank you. General Hughes, you’re recognized.

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STATEMENTS OF GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; RANDALL YIM, MANAGING

DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND SHAWN REESE, ANALYST IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

General HUGHES. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman

Turner. I’d like to thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today. I do think this is an important topic.

On March 11, 2002, President Bush created the Homeland Security Advisory System [HSAS], as a tool to improve coordination and

communication among all levels of government and the private sector and, most importantly, perhaps, with the American public in

the fight against terrorism. The advisory system is binding on the

executive branch and suggested, although voluntary, for State,

local, territorial and tribal governments and the private sector. The

advisory system is the foundation for building a comprehensive,

flexible and effective communications structure for the dissemination of information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks and protective measures to all levels of government, homeland security

professionals and the American people.

The system, created by Homeland Security Presidential Directive

3 and now, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, administered by the Department of Homeland Security, identifies a flexible framework for communicating, addressing and mitigating terrorist threats to the Nation utilizing a threat-based but risk-managed system. During periods of heightened concern, the framework

provides the ability to change the threat condition on a national

level but also affords the opportunity to target communications to

particular geographic locales, industry sectors and other affected

entities.

The latitude provided by HSPD–3 allows the Department to address unforeseen situations and continue to refine the advisory system as the need arises. This flexibility is critical to the success of

the advisory system and essential to its effective implementation.

With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security on

March 1, 2003, the advisory system evolved into a framework that

married the analytic assets of the intelligence community, which

includes the Department of Homeland Security, with the Department’s unique responsibility to assess the Nation’s vulnerabilities

and implement protective measures.

Since its creation on March 11, the HSAS threat condition has

been changed on five separate occasions. In each instance, the condition was raised from yellow to orange, but the circumstances surrounding each decision to elevate the threat condition varied.

We recognize that a decision to change the threat condition has

significant economic, physical and psychological impacts on the Nation. Therefore, decisions made by the Secretary, in consultation

with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to

change the threat condition are made only after careful consideration and close coordination with other Federal agency heads, including other members of the Homeland Security Council.

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In the future, as the Department matures and our implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory System continues to evolve,

we will work diligently to provide information that best suits the

needs of Federal, State and local officials, the private sector and

the public. We look forward to working with the Congress on ideas

to improve the system.

HSAS is simply a tool, one of the many means to an end we’re

all working toward, which is to secure the homeland.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll be pleased to answer any

questions you may have.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, General.

[The prepared statement of General Hughes follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Yim.

Mr. YIM. Chairman Shays, Vice Chairman Turner, members of

the subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity to participate

in this hearing examining the Homeland Security Advisory System.

On February 4, 2004, Admiral Lloyd, the Deputy Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, described the advisory system

as a blunt instrument and a work in progress, pointing out for the

first time this past December that the advisory system specifically

identified economic sectors and geographical regions subject to

heightened alerts. He and members of the House Select Committee

on Homeland Security agreed that such specificity was critical to

maintaining the credibility and usefulness of the system, and these

remarks are consistent with the comments we at GAO have received from State and local governments and the private sector.

We last testified before this committee on February 3rd, describing the key characteristics of effective national strategies for homeland security and comparing and contrasting the extent to which

several national homeland security strategies contain such characteristics. Our purpose was to assist in continual improvement and

refinement of these strategies.

Just as with our previous testimony, we hope that our preliminary observations of the advisory system will identify key characteristics of effective public warning systems, issues and factors to

be considered and balanced when determining what information is

to be disseminated and assist in continued refinement of the system.

As with the national strategies, the true value of the advisory

system will be the extent to which it is useful as guidance for, and

actually used in implementation of prevention, vulnerability reduction, response and recovery measures by the relevant parties, including the general public.

Of course, as General Hughes noted, the Homeland Security Advisory System is not and should not be considered the only means

by which threat and response information is disseminated. It is but

one of many tools, as he said, used to increase our national preparedness. We hope that our testimony will be useful in sharpening

this edge and increasing its effectiveness.

Specific threat and vulnerability information is received by Federal agencies and used by the executive branch in determining

when to raise or lower the threat advisory systems. The key issues

then are to what extent, when and with whom such information

should be shared.

In your request, this committee suggested a link between sharing

information and the ability of the recipients to act upon this information. While each threat advisory reflects a unique fact and circumstance influencing the what, the when and with whom issues,

risk communication strategies that have evolved in numerous contexts have common characteristics that may be useful in assisting

evolution of the advisory system. Effective risk communication can

and should not only assist in prevention, but also in implementing

actions to reduce vulnerabilities, prepare for enhanced response

and recovery should an attack occur.

On the other hand, poor risk communication can lead to complacency, misallocation of valuable limited resources and be disruptive

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and expensive for the affected parties. Preservation of credibility

and public confidence are important considerations in any refinement of the advisory system.

My written statement describes the operations of the system,

but, per your request, my oral remarks will focus on the types of

information that should be conveyed to the general public.

Terrorist threats, as I said, present unique facts and circumstances and are still relatively unfamiliar to the general public.

This uniqueness and unfamiliarity must be acknowledged and recognized in devising refinements to the system. If these terrorist

threats are unique, then unique or specific information should be

provided to the extent that it’s available.

Most would agree that the refinements in the system this past

November were more useful, focusing on specific sectors and geographic areas, but unlike more familiar advisories about weather,

as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, or infectious disease, specific terrorist threat warnings may allow terrorists to alter their tactics or

targets in response or increase general anxiety in the public for

those clearly not at risk. So we must acknowledge and account for

the fact that some information available will not be widely distributed.

Further, due to the nature of terrorist organizations and the

types of threats, threat information may be vague, may be limited

or simply unavailable. Thus, the general public needs to be educated so that they understand that false alarms arise from inherent

uncertainty rather than from poor professional practice, that to a

certain extent false alarms are inevitable, and we must guard

against a cumulative apathy among the public during what I would

term prolonged periods of preparedness.

Finally, we have to acknowledge a fact of life, that, despite everyone’s best intention, the threat of terrorist activities will cause both

rational and not-so-rational responses. So, despite our best efforts,

there will be unintended social, psychological and economic consequences. But, as an important point, when designing effective

risk communication strategies, that we understand and acknowledge that these effects will occur and design our strategies accordingly to convey information to those receptive, and have the ability

to act upon that information, while at the same time understanding that some will receive this information and act or not act upon

it in less than optimal ways.

So what does this mean for refinement of the advisory system?

As this subcommittee and the chairman has acknowledged, we

want to convey information that will increase our national preparedness. That is, we expect some action as a result of our warning. There has to be, then, some connection, some nexus between

the information to be shared and the ability and receptivity to take

positive action, forcing our planners not only to be intelligence and

fact-based providers but, to a certain extent, social and psychological scientists, quite a difficult task.

Risk communication experts generally agree that effective warnings should specify the nature of the threat, when and where it is

likely to occur and over what time period, provide guidance or actions to be taken and perhaps, above all, assure that the information is consistent, accurate, clear and provided frequently.

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This is much easier said than done for terrorist warnings, but if

we focus on the nexus between information and the ability to act

and the receptivity to act upon it, then some patterns emerge, such

as more specific information can and should be provided to those

specially trained to receive and act upon the information such as

firefighters, emergency responders, and we’ve seen that in the hazardous materials area where much more specific information is provided to firefighters in case they must enter a building that contains potentially toxic materials.

For the general public and the private sector, State and local

governments, the same principles can apply. Specific information

that is useful in making risk management decisions should be conveyed so that the resources and intentions are focused on the highest priorities, and the capabilities of these parties to act are enhanced.

For example, there may be vague threat information about a

public sporting event. An individual may still wish to attend, but

take some simple precautions such as notifying others that they

are attending, carrying contact phone numbers or just simply

thinking about the evacuation or escape routes in the event of an

emergency. A private business may wish to review and update its

emergency shutdown procedures or be sure that people are current

on the evacuation routes.

These are all examples of sharing information that is useful for,

linked to the capability of the recipients to receive and act upon

that information, resulting in what Admiral Lloyd calls a tactically

actionable product.

The linkage then between information and capability to act appear to be what other risk communication experts in the second

panel discuss when they talk about the psychology of risk and risk

management perception related to control, to choice, the potential

for personal impact, the risk benefit tradeoffs and trust and a focus

on the link on capabilities between information. I think it really affects the trust issue, trust that the information is accurate and useful, trust that the information is being conveyed to those with expertise and the ability to act upon it, like the law enforcement and

emergency responders, and trust that the false alarms are due to

inherent uncertainty in dealing with terrorist threats rather than

a lack of competence. As I said, the credibility is of utmost importance to maintain.

In closing, let me end with a few suggestions. If we want to foster a closer link between information sharing and capabilities, then

we need to do a better job of capability assessment. We do not have

a good inventory on the types of infrastructure, equipment, people

skills that can be brought to bear in a major homeland security

emergency or for the major missions of prevention, response and

recovery vulnerability assessment, either horizontally across the

Federal Government or vertically between the Federal, State, local

and private sector.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 was not designed to

make changes in the advisory system. However, it mandates that

the Department and other Cabinet agencies inventory, use high

techniques to map and model, again, to get a basic understanding

of the capabilities that the existing infrastructure within the counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94837.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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try can be brought to bear should a crisis arise or we wish to prevent a terrorist attack. That type of modeling inventory should be

combined, again, as one of many tools with refinements of the

Homeland Security Advisory System.

Finally, if we focus on capabilities, let us not underestimate the

capabilities of the general public. I, like many others, continue to

be astounded and grateful for the capabilities demonstrated by the

public during September 11th, during the days following, from acts

of heroic rescue to incredible acts of kindness during response and

recovery, to heroism in preventing even greater acts of terrorism.

So I would close by just noting that the capabilities of the general public may be much greater than we think, so let’s not shortchange the public by assuming too little about the types of information that are useful for increasing our collective national preparedness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I’d be pleased to answer any

questions.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you.

First, the substance of your statement, as was the substance of

General Hughes, was quite outstanding, but I have never in my 16

years looked at a statement so well organized and so consumer

friendly the way you have done it. I’m going to take this statement

and give it to my staff as an example of how I would like to see

its work done. It’s really extraordinary.

Mr. YIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Very, very helpful.

Mr. YIM. I give great credit to my staff. I’m just the spokesperson.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I understand, but you all have developed a system of trying to make things clear, and it’s very helpful and an excellent statement as well.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yim follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Reese.

Mr. REESE. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Turner and members

of the subcommittee, I thank you for inviting me to testify before

you today.

The committee asked me to discuss four points concerning the

Homeland Security Advisory System: the process the Department

of Homeland Security uses in determining the threat level; the notification process that the Department uses to disseminate a

change in the threat level; the information provided to the public

when the threat level changes; and the lack of protective measures

for States, localities, the public and the private sector.

As General Hughes said, Secretary Ridge, then Director of the

White House Office of Homeland Security, announced the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System on March 12,

2002. This advisory system has five threat levels. At each threat

level the system prescribes protective measures that are mandatory

for Federal agencies but only recommends them to State and local

governments.

Since the inception to the present, the system has never been

lower than elevated or yellow, and has been raised to orange five

times, with the Nation being at orange for a total of 87 days.

If I correctly understand it from statements by Secretary Ridge,

the process DHS uses in determining the system’s threat level has

three steps: First, DHS receives intelligence reports from a variety

of entities within the U.S. intelligence community.

Second, upon receiving these reports, the Department considers

the following: whether the information is credible, whether the information is corroborated, whether the reported threat is specific

and imminent and the gravity of the potential consequences of the

threat.

Third, in consultation with the Homeland Security Council, the

Department decides whether the threat level needs to be raised or

lowered.

Once the decision is made to raise the threat level, DHS notifies

State and local governments, the public and the private sector

through a variety of communications systems. State and local governments receive notification through such systems as the National

Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and conference calls

to Governors, State homeland security advisers and mayors of selected cities. Selected major industries receive notification through

such systems as the critical emergency operations communications

link; and, finally, the public is notified through a DHS public statement. These public statements provide general reasons for the

change in threat level, but they do not offer specifics.

The Department has said that intelligence reports indicate an increased probability of a terrorist attack. In the written statement

I submitted, there is a table that lists the reasons and dates of the

five changes from yellow to orange. The only time DHS has provided specifics on possible targets was on February 7, 2003, when

the Department stated that intelligence reports suggested possible

al Qaeda attacks on apartment buildings, hotels and soft-skinned

targets, but no geographical location was identified.

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This leads to my final point, which is what some say is a lack

of clear guidance on protective measures for States, localities, the

public and the private sector.

As I noted earlier, the advisory system has mandatory protective

measures for Federal departments. These measures, however, are

only recommended for States and localities, but these measures do

not address the issue of what actions the public should take during

heightened threat level. The only recommended actions the public

received during the five orange alerts was to remain vigilant, report suspicious activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation

and to carry on with their daily lives with a heightened sense of

awareness.

In summary, the advisory system in its present form does not

provide specifics on why the threat level has been changed, nor

does it provide clear guidance on actions States, localities, the public and the private sector need to take during a heightened threat

level.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman and I will welcome any questions you

or the committee might have.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Reese; and we appreciate

the work of the Congressional Research Service.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reese follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. General, I particularly want to thank you for participating with this panel instead of just asking to be separate. That

is very appreciated. I think we’ll be able to understand this issue

better because of it.

We are going to recognize Mr. Turner, Mr. Schrock and then myself for 10 minutes, 5 minutes and then a rollover for 5 additional

minutes. If someone is asked a question and you want to respond

to it as well, even if you were not requested to answer, please feel

free to jump in as well.

OK. Mr. Turner, you have the floor.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Being a former mayor, I talk a lot to individuals who are responsible for local protective functions, police, fire or important infrastructures such as water systems. Also, the security personnel at

the airport. What I hear from them, which is echoed in many of

your statements, is the lack of direction upon the elevation of the

threat level.

In the materials that we have there are obviously some protective measures that are listed, but many times there is a lack of

specificity as to what one should do that has responsibility for important infrastructure. For example, local water authority. The

threat level was raised. They know they need to increase their security. They need to do something, but they don’t really know what

necessarily to do. They don’t know if enough, if it’s not enough.

Also, then they worry when the threat level is lowered that lessened security during a time of lowered threat may not really be in

the best interest of protecting the community or in responding to

the threat.

While one of you acknowledged that the lowest we had gone is

yellow, which is elevated—but even in looking at the protective

measures between yellow and orange, orange says restrict facility

access to essential personnel. Yellow doesn’t necessarily provide

that.

Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese, could you please talk for a moment

about the issue of that lack of nexus, Mr. Yim, that you had mentioned for advice to the local officials and their important infrastructures, if you have knowledge of some of the things that they’re

doing and the lack of direction that they’re receiving on what they

should be doing. Because I know this is very troubling to them.

Then, General Hughes, if you could speak as to, you know, why

don’t we have more specific standardized recommendations to

them, more specific direction that—as this code goes up and down,

where they might feel that, one, they’re rising to the obligation or,

two, that they have, you know, a greater direction as to what it

means. Mr. Yim.

Mr. YIM. Thank you, Mr. Turner.

I think the general perception is that the color-coded system is

too generic; and, as a result, it’s not refined enough to be able to

provide that specific information. So as we evolve the system, we

can conceive of different people with different expertise receiving

different information instead of everyone receiving exactly the

same. That would go a long way toward curing some of the specificity issues.

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So, for example, as we mentioned, if there is to be some link between the types of information you receive and your ability to react

and respond to it, then we can or should be providing more specific

information to the firefighters, to the first protectors, that are

trained to use that information, allocate the resources appropriately and to act upon it.

I’m sure that we can devise some manners when we have security issues surrounding how much information to disclose, if we’re

limiting the recipients, that perhaps the Federal Government

would be a bit—feel a bit more comfortable conveying more specificity to those targeted-type groups.

I think it’s important, however, that one of the reasons that we

tend to default to more general warnings is often we don’t have a

good sense of what exactly are the capabilities of the recipients of

that information to respond. As I said, we have not done a good assessment nationally of the capabilities of the respective State and

local governments to not only respond, but also to prevent terrorist

attacks, to assess their vulnerabilities and reduce their

vulnerabilities.

So I think, to a certain extent, both the assessment and the

warnings will evolve hand in hand as we have a greater sense of

the capabilities that the State and local and private sector and

public can bring to bear in prevention and response. As that capability evolves over time, as people get more sophisticated in what

they need to do, then I think the warnings also need to evolve and

provide greater information to them. We’re clearly not there yet.

We don’t have a good sense, and we default then to, as I said, this

generic warning system, which almost universally people feel is not

that useful.

The only other point I would make on specificity is that let’s not

go too far in specificity in limiting the recipients of that information. We should not presume who would find the information useful. For example, if we want to target geographical areas and limit

the information to just those residents of New York, we may miss

people that are doing business via IT or remotely with New York

or who are planning a trip to New York that may want to make

risk-management decisions based on threats to other geographical

areas.

So there is going to be a difficult balance between providing generic information that raises the country’s general sense of alert,

because we can’t always anticipate who would be affected by that

information, and providing specific information to those trained to

use their resources wisely and to act upon that information.

Mr. REESE. As we’ve all stated, numerous State and local officials

have said that the information that’s been provided to the threat

level change has been generic. Secretary Ridge has also stated that

sometimes the information has seemed generic but there has been

a need to provide information to the general public and to selected

critical infrastructure and the private sector and State and local officials. There is a need to announce a change in the threat level.

I am not privy to any information that the Department sends out

other than what is sent in the public statements to the public, so

I will just kind of focus on that.

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There seems to be a desire to get a one-glove-fits-all situation, or

protective measures that if it works well in New York then it

should work well in Los Angeles. I would say the disadvantage to

DHS giving specific protective measures or information would be

that it doesn’t foster State and local governments possibly to do

their own threat and risk assessments.

So I think, on one hand, we do want more information to be sent

out so people can properly prepare, but on the other—and, as you

know, CRS, we try to do the advantages and disadvantages. We

want to ensure that we don’t hamper State and local officials.

Another issue that State and local officials bring up is when the

threat level goes up there’s an increase in cost that the government

incurs. So if it’s a specified threat that is geographically targeted,

then, naturally, we’ll—and we’ll use New York City as an example.

If New York City is targeted, naturally, we wouldn’t want Los Angeles to incur costs more than they need, but it is universally—

with the State and local officials and individuals that work in

emergency management, there does seem to be a lack of information that causes people to question what they’re supposed to do and

when they’re supposed to do it.

Mr. TURNER. General Hughes.

General HUGHES. Well, first, I found Mr. Yim’s and Mr. Reese’s

comments to be instructive in several ways. I thought they were

very good. But the issue that I’d like to point out to you is the

struggle to try to find balance between greater specificity and

broader information available to the public on the one hand and on

the other hand generating some kind of a reaction in the official

State and local, private sector environment and, by the way, in the

American public that is broad enough to encompass the general

threat; and that’s what we strive for at the Department of Homeland Security.

I will just make the flat statement that, as we now administer

this system, it is specific, and we do communicate specifically with

places that are specifically targeted. We do not do that in the public domain in general for obvious reasons. If we did that in the public domain, we would then give away our knowledge base and we

would probably end up disclosing some of our protective and defensive measures. In my view, that would be a very foolhardy thing

to do, so——

Mr. TURNER. So, General, are you saying that communities that

don’t have a specific directive with respect—should consider themselves lucky in that they are not faced with the imminent threat

that you’re obviously trying to manage?

General HUGHES. Once again, I urge you to have in your minds

somehow a balance. But, generally speaking, I think what you just

said is right, that the nature of the threat that’s communicated to

the country at large versus the nature of the threat that is communicated specifically to places, times, circumstances that we have information about are sometimes very different.

But if I may explain two issues here. The nature of the threat

can be specific and often is and not rise to the level that requires

us to change the broader threat condition. That is, in effect, this

morning there are threats in the United States today about specific

cities, specific places, specific events and specific conditions, but

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this morning they have not risen to a level of concern and to a due

consideration for broader change across the country. When they do,

as they did in December 2003, then after due consideration we

need to make the broader change.

And I have to explain the last piece of this idea, sir. When something is threatened in New York City, the idea seems to be that

you can divorce that from events in Seattle, but you cannot. The

two are inextricably interconnected now electronically, by transportation, by the features of our social order. We are interdependent;

and, indeed, the vector that the threat comes from may not be precisely known.

In some cases, when we have to raise the nature of the threat

to encompass the Nation, the country, we’re doing so because we

may lack specificity, but we have enough general information to

cause us to rise to that level of concern.

I’d like to just close my answer on this issue by stating that the

idea that these colors, the threat conditions that we use here, stand

alone without any interior specific actions is a flawed viewpoint.

We do have many different variations on the theme of specific, direct communication and coordination and specific activities that we

can undertake within any of these general threat conditions here

on this chart.

So I just—I wanted to get that point across, that the basic

premise here and some of our conversation seems to me a little

flawed.

Mr. SHAYS. Can you make that last point again? I’m missing it.

General HUGHES. Yes, sir. We seem to refer to these colors and

the conditions they represent as if they are singular, and they are

not. Each of them has a complex background, some of it based upon

judgment and specificity of the conditions. So if Secretary Ridge, as

an example, in due consultation reaches a decision to raise the

threat level from yellow to orange, there are very specific acts

based on intelligence that cause that to happen.

There may also be a broad general condition that results from

that. The color level is an example, manifestation of the broad general condition, but the specificity interior to that change is very

precise. We talk to people directly. We give them the knowledge

that we have in some form. Often, by the way, right now especially

in this last raised alert condition, we were able to give information

that is very closely held in the Federal Government to State and

some local authorities for the purposes of explaining what was

going on; and they knew in far greater detail than they had in the

past what the threat was about.

Mr. SHAYS. I would just make a point to you that you’re basically

saying to us that this code system is based on substantive determination, and that I can accept. But what I’m going to be wrestling

with when I have a chance to talk to you is what does the public

have a right to know? In other words, you’re saying to us when you

went to code orange, which is elevated, you in essence were saying

something pretty significant and people better listen, because it

wasn’t based on a best guess. Then the question is, what does that

really mean to the public?

Mr. Turner, your time had run out, but do you have any closing

comment you want to make?

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you for asking, actually. I thought the General’s point was very important when he indicated about the vector

of a threat.

For example, we know in the World Trade Center that the threat

to New York did not emanate in New York, and I think that’s very

important. That’s an issue that, in just reading these materials and

looking at specific threats versus general threats, that we might

not all be aware; and it was I think a very important point.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Schrock.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your indulgence,

I’d like to have an opening comment. Then I have a couple of questions.

First, let me thank General Hughes, Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese for

their efforts in enhancing the security of our Nation. Ensuring our

Nation maintains maximum security and vigilance while protecting

our liberties is a challenge and responsibility for which we are all

accountable. This task must be accomplished in a reflective manner

of efficiency, expediency and comprehensiveness; and I recognize

that this is an unprecedented task.

As we proceed, our growing pains will be felt and the learning

curve will be challenging. Progress will come from innovative ideas,

innovative technologies, technological improvements and old-fashioned American ingenuity. However, in our desire to have in place

the very best security advisory system we can, there is a dangerous

risk in waiting for the perfect system. It is incumbent upon us to

provide the resources and material support for the growth and continued improvement of this system.

I’ve heard your testimony, read the reports and am becoming

educated as to the difficulties you are encountering. I sympathize

with the regulatory, physical and even the logistical obstacles that

you face.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, we witnessed

American resolve as we had never seen before. On all fronts, Americans were thinking outside the box. Americans know how to make

things happen, and we succeed when we’re challenged. Americans

have an inherent right to be informed of the threats we face and

should be provided sound information and accurate and available

intelligence. With the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3,

the American public is assured of that right, be it through Federal,

State or local authorities. It is our obligation to see that right is

provided.

Secretary Ridge himself has correctly expressed concerns over

the credibility of the system. We are all remiss if day by day efforts

are not made and implemented which enhance the system’s credibility. God forbid this country should sustain another terrorist attack in the future, but the reality is we had better be prepared.

We have had 21⁄2 years since September 11 and have made incredible leaps forward, but we are not there yet. I fear there has

not been sufficient education of the American people regarding our

advisory system. I would encourage a variety of public service announcements to educate Americans.

As a kid, I remember the air raid sirens and the blank TV

screens hissing the tests of the emergency broadcast system. I

think the General and I can relate to that. We knew what that

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meant, and we were informed. Perhaps we need to make a similar

outreach effort in this age of global terrorism. We must not be a

government that cries wolf, but we must be a government of leadership and accountability. I have no doubt that your continued efforts will be successful.

I wish to express my thanks to the witnesses again and the

many dedicated personnel who have kept this country free from

further attack. Their work is to be commended and your continued

efforts to be encouraged.

Question, besides the patent answer of give us more funding,

what is it that Congress can do for you to help improve the Homeland Security Advisory System? If more money is the only answer,

please lay out for us why, and I mean specifically, what that additional money will buy for the taxpayer.

General, Mr. Yim, Mr. Reese.

General HUGHES. Well, thank you very much. I really appreciated the reference to the Civil Defense System and the long-ago

insignia of the triangle on the circle. That’s certainly a very poignant memory for me.

Mr. SCHROCK. We knew what it meant, and we remembered.

General HUGHES. We did remember, and I still do to this day.

I think the nature of the threat then, of course, primarily

couched in terms of the former Soviet Union and the larger national strategic threat, is still a national strategic threat but

couched in a much different way, kind of an ill-defined, fuzzy, nonpolitical entity out there that is striking us now as opposed to potentially striking us. So I see the threat as very imminent in many

ways.

With regard to your direct question, what can you do for us, well,

I think what you’re doing in the course of your work is vital. You

are, by holding these kind of hearings and by engaging with us, assisting to inform and educate the American citizenry, and I think

that’s vital.

I don’t think I am in a position to tell you that we need more

money. We need your support, and we need your understanding of

the difficulty of operating this system, and I appreciated your comments in that regard.

I think that your approach here to try to clarify the system is

the same as the Department of Homeland Security’s. We have

made changes, and that term is kind of interesting. We have not

radically changed the system, but we have made small tune-ups.

We have identified procedural mechanisms that we have changed

or put into use, and other steps have been taken, and, in some

measure, some of those steps may have been informed or motivated

by your work. So I would just like to say I can’t tell you we need

any resources right now. Your understanding and your involvement

are critical, and I appreciate it and thank you for it.

Mr. YIM. Thank you, Mr. Schrock.

I think, with all due respect to all of the difficult tasks the Department faced, one of the things that the Congress can do is really

hold the Department’s feet to the fire in terms of doing vulnerability and capability assessments and making those assessments

complete within a reasonable period of time.

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The new Homeland Security Presidential Directive gave a year

deadline for the Department to do these critical infrastructure assessments and to set national preparedness goals. The Congress

needs to be an integral part of the development of those national

preparedness goals, assessments of the capabilities, not only at the

Federal level but at the State and local and the private sector so

that Federal programs can be designed—they are grant programs

or tax policy or whatever programs—to stimulate enhancement of

those capabilities. As we improve the capabilities of the various

sectors to respond, then I think, as I said before, we will continue

to evolve then the usefulness of the information that can be provided that would link the type of information to the capabilities of

the recipients of that information.

So I think there is a public education component, but there’s also

a tremendous oversight component I think, and that’s GAO’s role

on behalf of the Congress but also in terms of designing Federal

programs to stimulate the desired behavior. Because I think it will

be absolutely clear that the Federal Government cannot own or

fund 100 percent of everything that will need to be done in the Nation for homeland security.

Mr. SCHROCK. I think I’ve heard you say that before.

Mr. Reese.

Mr. REESE. Sir, as you know, CRS doesn’t make policy recommendations, but in my written statement I did provide some options should Congress decide that they would want to refine the

Homeland Security Advisory System, and it’s basically the two

identified in my written statement.

What I’d like to identify now is vagueness of warning and lack

of protective measures. Some options for vagueness of warning

would possibly be have DHS just provide general warnings, not to

use the Homeland Security Advisory System, which they’ve done

twice last year. On September 4, 2003, and November 21, 2003,

DHS released public statements, general warnings. They were via

public statements, and the system’s warning was sent out to State

and local governments. This addresses the concerns that have been

asserted that it causes misunderstanding at the local level, but it

would not address the issue raised by those who say DHS does not

give enough specificity in the terrorist attack warnings, because,

again, it’s just a general warning, not a specific warning.

The second option for that would be increased specificity of warnings when the threat level is raised. This is something that DHS

says is a goal. They want to be able to issue high alerts to designated cities, geographical regions and industries and critical infrastructure.

Next issue would be lack of protective measures. Some cities

have already—some regions and cities, when going to orange, have

already adopted some protective measures on their own. Surveillance cameras are activated. Law enforcement officers are granted—not granted time off, and so on.

There’s two policy options that Congress could look at. One

would be just continue as is, allow the State and local governments

to decide, conduct their own threat and risk assessments and decide what they need to do; and then the other one would be Federal

57

guidance for State and local governments to the public and the private sector.

The American Red Cross has a list of protective measures for the

public schools, businesses, neighborhoods, at the different threat

levels. This could be something that DHS could look at but, again,

may not be as effective. If DHS were to provide specific guidance

to State and local, the public, it may not be as effective if it was

done at the State and local level.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Let me just

make one more comment to our witnesses.

This is a huge, huge issue with me personally. I represent the

port of Hampton Roads, Norfolk, VA, area; and I worry about what

they could do to our massive commercial port and the largest naval

facilities in the world. Then I see what happened in Spain the

other day and what the, ‘‘knee jerk reaction was at the polls.’’ I

really worry about that. Because what that election told me was

the terrorists won, and we simply cannot allow that to happen anywhere. So anything we can do to enhance this not only for this

country but share with other countries as well will be most appreciated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Tierney has agreed that I can go next, and then I’ll recognize

him.

One thing I do know is that the folks in the Department of

Homeland Security want a system that works well. I think they

know it is a work in process.

For me, the testimony that we have from Kenneth Allen, when

he says in his testimony, the most important point that emerged

from the PPW workshop, the workshop they had in 2002, was the

conclusion that the Homeland Security Advisory System is a threat

assessment system and not a complete warning system. The five

colors tell the public that something may happen, but it does not

identify what and where, and it does not warn citizens when an attack is imminent.

Would any of you disagree with that statement?

General HUGHES. In my written testimony I address that issue

and in the verbal testimony I gave you today I addressed that the

Federal Government, the executive branch, especially the Federal

Government, takes the homeland security advisory mechanism as

directive in nature, and it compels us to act, but the State, local

and private sector take it as suggestive, that is, the system that

we currently operate under. So we do not compel the State and

local and private sectors under this system to take specific actions

by law. I think that’s somewhat constructive.

By the way, my experience so far is that we receive very good

cooperation under this system from the State, local and private sector. I certainly know that there are complaints about some of the

issues associated with the system.

Mr. SHAYS. I think you’re speaking, General, more of what I’m

asking. I’m not asking whether the government is compelling anyone to do anything, whether it’s Federal, State or local. What I’m

asking is whether you agree that it’s a threat assessment system

and not a complete warning system.

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General HUGHES. Well, I think that goes to exactly the issue that

I tried to reply to. To me, if it were a complete system, this system

might have some compulsory effect throughout our country in all

of the levels of our social order.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. But even if we went one level down and didn’t

compel action—I realize in a storm warning we can tell people

they’ve got to get off the Outer Banks, but in the system we have,

we don’t even warn people to get off the Outer Banks.

General HUGHES. We do, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Not in this system.

General HUGHES. With regard to the Homeland Security Advisory System?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

General HUGHES. I think—first of all, I think drawing a parallel—direct parallel between the weather warning or alerting system and the homeland security system is a little bit different. I

mean, the nature of the terrorist threat is about a direct attack on

some critical feature of our government, our country, our culture,

versus the kind of indirect and uncertain work of Mother Nature

with regard to a large storm or natural effect.

Mr. SHAYS. See, I feel in a way that the weather threat is more

certain than the terrorist threat.

General HUGHES. Indeed, at times it may be. I guess the issue

is whether or not the Department of Homeland Security should be

in the business of engaging in warning the country about weather

and about devastating storms that are approaching.

Mr. SHAYS. And we do that——

General HUGHES. We do that in general terms.

Mr. SHAYS. No, we do that in very specific terms, I think, General.

We anticipate a storm. We anticipate it is going to be in this

area. We would not only tell the law enforcement folks and the first

responders about it, but you, the general public, should take specific action. You need to leave this area. You need to board up your

house, you need to do the following.

I don’t see any of that in the system that we have as it relates

to terrorism.

General HUGHES. Sir, if I may just say—by the way, I kind of

mixed the message there. I meant, we, the Department of Homeland Security, don’t do that in specific ways about the weather.

Mr. SHAYS. But can I back up a second? FEMA is part of——

General HUGHES. FEMA is part of that. It is a response mechanism. But the National Weather Service——

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. That part you are saying is Commerce.

General HUGHES. In direct answer to your question, though, I

think we do have exact parallels to what you are talking about. We

do change actions, the actions of people, everyday people at airports, at ports of entry, at transit points. We change the condition

in which they act often in connection with threats to the homeland.

To me, it is very similar to asking people to evacuate.

Mr. SHAYS. I am not sure we do it consistently then. When we

went from—and let me say that one of the challenges that I have,

which is—I understand why the colors confuse people. Green is

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low. Blue is guarded or general. Yellow is elevated or significant.

Orange is high. Red is severe.

In other words, you have—under threat risk, you have green, you

say is low, blue is guarded, yellow is elevated, orange is high, red

is severe. We are only going between elevated and high.

General HUGHES. So far.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. But, you know, there are some parts of the country that probably should be guarded or low, frankly. I mean there

are. And you have some—probably places in Montana, you know,

and they intuitively know that. And there are some places in Montana that may be the other way, depending on—but what I wrestle

with is, when I am told as a Member of Congress what the threat

is, I am thinking to myself, whom do I tell? I know what the threat

is. I know we are concerned about a dirty bomb. I know that we

are concerned that it may be exploded in four or five cities. I know

that it may happen at a point in which there is a large gathering

of people.

So I process that information and I say, you know, I don’t know

if I want my daughter going there.

And I also know that we were concerned that there might be a

hijacking of a plane with some pretty horrific results, from Europe.

Now, I know that. So when I had school kids’ parents call me and

up and say, we are thinking our school kids are going to Europe,

I have to wrestle with whether what I know, I warn them; or

whether I just say, no, just do what you normally would do.

Well, I know I am not letting my daughter go there. She can go

to South America, she can go to Asia, she is not going to Europe,

at least with my recommendation, while you are at code orange.

And you know why I am saying that?

And what I also know is that others who had the same warning

told me that they would react the same way, and they told their

friends. So we told our friends what not to do, but we didn’t tell

the public.

Walk me through why the public doesn’t have a right to know

what we are concerned about.

General HUGHES. Well, first, I think the premise that I would

like to begin on is that our issue is to warn the public to the degree

that judgment dictates that we warn the public, but not to incite

the public to unnecessary actions. We try to do that in the system

by carefully characterizing the nature of the threat and carefully

administering it.

I would just like to say that I am from Montana, by the way.

Mr. SHAYS. I saw you smile.

General HUGHES. The nature of the modern environment here is

that some group or person can originate from a place distant from

the point of attack like, perhaps, Montana, and could indeed, if the

vigilance and alertness and warning level were high enough in

Montana, be found out before they get to a point of attack elsewhere, let’s say, Los Angeles as an example.

And so the nature of this is, when the condition seems to rise to

a level of national concern, we apply these gradations that you

talked about here on the chart.

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Mr. SHAYS. But let me just be candid with you. There are no gradations, in my judgment. We just go from one to the other. There

is a yellow and an orange. We aren’t using the others. We aren’t.

General HUGHES. Well, I see it differently. In my view, we are

going from an elevated condition to a high condition. And in the

English language that is a relatively reasonable gradation. Higher

means that you are at greater imminence.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. It seems to me, but what it says to me is—we

are already at elevated and we are going to high; that says something to me in the general public that I am being told by the Department to discontinue doing what you normally do.

General HUGHES. Once again, sir, that is the specificity I was

talking about with the way we administer the system.

In broad, general terms, in the most recent case where we went

from yellow to orange, there was no need for us to give specific

guidance to the broad population of the United States beyond what

we did in raising the threat level condition.

But we did give, sir, much specific guidance to those places, those

sectors, those elements of our culture which were specifically affected with regard to the threat information we had.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this then. What you are really suggesting is that our system is so good that if you tell the authorities,

the public that has no need of concern because it is a foolproof system, that they will catch whoever is going to do it.

I don’t think the Department would want to be in the position

of making that statement.

General HUGHES. I hope I didn’t say that. I am trying to illustrate to you the problem we have, and I do think it is a challenge,

which Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese have talked about, too, finding balance in this presentation to the American public.

What I would like to say is that I think we have done a good job

in the most recent case especially. We are learning as we go along.

I think Mr. Turner and Mr. Schrock both noted the evolution of

this. We are indeed learning as we go along about how to administer this system.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say this—and, Mr. Yim, I am over my

time, and I thank Mr. Tierney. But what I want to say to you is,

if in fact we went to code orange, as we did based on a dirty bomb

and some other things, and if in fact there was a dirty bomb explosion and people had been gathering in a public place, to what extent would the Department have been—not duplicitous—to what

extent should it be held responsible?

If my child had gone to a public place that ultimately had what

we were concerned might happen, who would be at fault?

General HUGHES. Well, I think that we would, if we have information about that specific place. But we did not have that kind of

specific issue in most cases.

You speak there of a period of time and of a place and of a condition or event. In some few cases, we have had that kind of tactical

information. But in most cases we had a broad, general kind of

threat condition, actually coming from different sorts of—we use

the term ‘‘information streams,’’ and they are characterized differently. But collectively, when those streams are brought together,

the broad threat condition here in the United States during DecemVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94837.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ber and January was complex enough and high enough for us to

change the color and issue specific instructions, in some cases, you

may recall.

Mr. SHAYS. But only to the authorities, not to the general public.

To the general public, they were told to do what they normally do?

General HUGHES. Yes. In some cases the general public may

have been the beneficiary of the actions of the official government

without generally knowing if there was a great threat to them.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Yim.

Mr. YIM. Mr. Chairman, I think there are two quick points I

would like to make, because I do generally agree that it is more

the threat advisory, a threat assessment, than a warning system,

for, I think, some subtle reasons.

First, we often consider the color code as a point-in-time warning

system or assessment system when, in fact, an effective warning

system is a process, as I think some of your witnesses following us

will say. It is not just a point-in-time warning.

There are obviously differences between the weather and terrorists. But if you think about how we handle weather advisories, if

a storm is very far off the coast, you are very vague in the information about the landfall and points of impact. As we develop more

information, we can develop more specificity and give greater information to those that are potentially affected without needlessly

warning or needlessly causing anxiety to those that are going to be

outside the path of a storm.

The problem that we have, often, with the terrorist threat advisory is, it is either on or off. It is either yellow or orange, on or

off, rather than considering it as a process. And I think, as it

evolves, more specificity can be given during periods of orange

alert. It is not just we declare orange alert on May 17th, here is

the information; you are not going to hear from us again until we

lower the alert level. I think that process needs to be recognized.

The second point is, we tend to aggregate that. It is clearly a

question of balance, as General Hughes points out. But it is also

the danger of aggregating data. One of the things that the Department uses when it determines whether to go to orange alert is,

they assess both the potential—the risk, the potential of the threat,

the probability of the threat, and the severity of the risk should it

occur. We probably shouldn’t blend that data together. Those are

two bits of information that are important for people to know.

So if you have a low consequence, a low probability event, but

a tremendously high consequence, you may take certain types of

preventive action. If you have a fairly high probability of occurrence, but the consequence is relatively low, it is not a weapon of

mass destruction, you may take different types of preventive or response measures.

The aggregation of those two concepts into the decision to raise

from yellow to orange, I think, exacerbates the problem, making it

worse.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to say, there is no way, Mr. Tierney, you

are going to get the floor right away, just after this statement. I

don’t pretend this is an easy issue.

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For me, I stay up at night thinking what I would do, General

Hughes, if I was in your circumstance and we firmly believed that

there was the potential of a nuclear attack in a city and that there

was a potential cell that we thought had a weapon, material, and

that they were somehow planning in a city.

I mean, if you tell the public, there could be a horrific exodus

that would kill literally tens of thousands of people; and yet, if it

happens and 100,000 people are killed, there would be hell to pay.

And I don’t know the answer. But I do know we’ve got to talk

about it.

And ultimately the public has to have some sense of what these

warnings mean. They can’t just be for the law enforcement folks.

So we have to find a way to have it make sense. And I would also

say, it just seems to me that we should try—and I think the second

panel is going to say this—we should try somehow to have the

warnings in natural disasters as well as the terrorist disasters

somehow have some uniformity in terms of words, in terms of

warnings that—and again, I think you are going to learn from

some of the second panel.

I hope your folks, as well as the first—and your own comments,

and maybe from us, I hope they take the information from this

hearing and process it.

Mr. Tierney.

General HUGHES. May I just make one comment about your

statement there, Mr. Shays? I think that what you had to say was

very important.

I don’t know how to explain this, but I take this very personally,

since I am the intelligence officer who delivers the information to

make this decision. And the thing that keeps me literally awake

and on edge was what you described, a catastrophic strike against

the United States that goes unwarned.

And there are no easy answers to this, but I would just like to

let you know that I appreciate very much your recognizing and verbalizing that point. And that is not procedural so much as it is a

matter of judgment, a matter of the heart, a matter of feeling, a

matter of intellect and analysis, and a matter of condition and circumstance. It is a vital piece of work that has been given to me

to do, and I treat it very, very seriously.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, General.

Mr. Tierney, thank you for your patience.

Mr. TIERNEY. You know, when you talk about all of this—and I

think the comments that the chairman made about what individuals are supposed to take from this are well taken. But if you put

yourself in the position of the local law enforcement or fire fighters

or responders on that, what is the status right now of our system

in terms of a situation where you go from yellow to orange, what

specifically might, say, a police chief in a coastal community like

Newburyport, MA know to do with respect to any given asset if it

just goes from yellow to orange? Is he to protect the seaport and

against a nuclear power plant just north of him, as well as chemical facilities, other things that matter; or is there enough specificity

in there that he knows where to marshal his resources?

General HUGHES. Currently, we would deliver specific information to the police or to first responders or to other officials about

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a given location, a given sector of endeavor, such as a nuclear

power plant’s operation, or other conditions that we have specificity

about, if we have it—if we have it. And we would do that relatively

precisely, and we would not generally do that in public because to

disclose that kind of knowledge in a public environment would,

first, give away the fact that we have the knowledge and, thereby,

potentially put how we got that information at risk; and it would

also contribute to a broad, general feeling that would be unnecessary, in my view.

We would accomplish the work of the authorities or the safety of

the citizenry in the specificity that we treat that information with.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you are saying, if you went from yellow to orange nationwide, that—and you had information that it was something that might relate to a nuclear power plant in the northeast,

that is the information you would give to all interested law enforcement and other first responders across the country, so that others

would not be in the same type of cautionary situation as would

those people in the northeast?

General HUGHES. That is one way to put it.

The other way to put it—which is, I think, a little bit less palatable, but it is the way in which we have to do it—we would give

that information only to the locale that we had specific information

about.

Mr. TIERNEY. So here is the thing that I am talking about. That

you give an alert from yellow to orange nationwide. Then you let

the people in Oregon know that there—you have information specifically for them.

My police department is running around taking care of everything—putting people on overtime, calling the Coast Guard for support over there, calling the National Guard for some other facilities

or whatever. Are they right or wrong to react like that?

General HUGHES. They are right. And this is one of the complex

issues here. And I think I would like to use Madrid as an example

here. We are now under a condition of what I would refer to as simultaneity. We cannot depend upon an attack to come in a single

place at a single time.

Mr. TIERNEY. I was talking about an incident where the only information you had about any attack was with some specificity.

General HUGHES. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is—the answer is still, you don’t communicate

that to responders across, so that the Oregon people are really

heightened, and the other people can take a different, more

nuanced look at that, and they have to go full out?

General HUGHES. Yeah. I understood your question, sir. I guess

the issue for me is that maybe the premise here is a little bit further than I would care to go.

If we had specific information about a problem in Oregon, we

would talk directly to the authorities in Oregon and not raise the

national threat condition, depending upon the nature of the information.

Mr. TIERNEY. If you had information that related to nuclear

power plants, let’s say——

General HUGHES. Then we would talk to the nuclear power plant

sector.

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Mr. TIERNEY. And not the others?

General HUGHES. OK.

Mr. TIERNEY. So when you go from yellow to orange nationally,

then you have less specificity, you are doing that because you have

some information, but you are not certain of the extent.

General HUGHES. Before you came in, I explained in the case of

the December-January timeframe, we had both specific information

about specific issues of threat, and the threat condition generally

rose to the level that we decided we needed to make a national

change in the threat advisory system. And that probably will occur

again in the future.

And I might just say, sir, that in that case, generally it would

not be a single piece of specific information, but several in different

places.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you notify the local officials on that, what

communications system are you using now?

General HUGHES. There are a variety of communications systems

to use. For State and local, we have the JRIES system——

Mr. TIERNEY. I was interested in looking at that. In fact, that

was going to be my next question, what is the functionality of the

JRIES system and how widespread is its use? And how sophisticated are we in that technology?

Because I am aware of similar systems being used in the military, developed out of MIT with General Myers and General Kellogg; and we have looked at those extensively, and they are working quite well in connecting military bases.

Now, I know they are being tried elsewhere. Are you familiar

with that? Is that the type of system that JRIES is going to evolve

into, and where are we in that evolution?

General HUGHES. Indeed, sir, JRIES grows out of the military

system. It was begun by the military, and we have begun to adopt

it. We are proliferating it as rapidly as we can. We intend to encipher some of it, especially to the States and major cities, at the Secret level as rapidly as we can do so, so that they have a greater

body of knowledge available to them.

Mr. TIERNEY. Simultaneously?

General HUGHES. I think the answer that I would like to give

you is, we are not limited by the systems we can use, there are so

many, to include, by the way—and I thank my colleagues for mentioning this—the fact that Secretary Ridge and other officials of

government do make public statements using our national media

to communicate the position of the government.

Mr. TIERNEY. I understand. It was the simultaneity that I was

thinking of, of being very effective and very useful. And the JRIES

system, if we can raise that to the level that I believe that it can

accomplish, to me that is a powerful tool; and you can get on there

to address the people that you want, with the specificity that you

have, and people have a much more detailed idea of what it is that

they have to respond to, just what knowledge that you have, you

can keep it to a secure group.

So if I am allowed, Mr. Chairman, just one last?

What is the status of that now in terms of your use? How long—

how far along the chain is JRIES?

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General HUGHES. I hate to give you a percentage of fielding, but

it is very far along. We are proliferating it very rapidly out to the

States and the major cities especially, and to some local organizational entities. We have a plan to go to the county level in perhaps

not every county in the United States right away, I don’t want to

make you think that this is going to happen overnight, but over the

long term we will evolve to the county level.

We have other alternatives, other communications alternatives

that are in being now, that go especially to the State and some localities and, by the way, to the private sector. An example would

be SIPRNET, the National Guard communications systems, the national telephone system, which we can use. We have provided secure telephones to State and local officials in many cases, especially

in major cities, and often in the private sector those kinds of secure

communications means are available. We can use the Internet, and

we do for general information.

We really are not limited here. We are trying to make a coherent

system that everyone can understand and depend upon. And in my

view, I am the key player in that issue, and I would say that by

the end of this calendar year, we will achieve a very coherent and

very robust, broad system of communications and interaction here

in the United States that will not only go from the government to

our State, local, private sectors, tribal and other territorial responders, but it will come back to us from them, with their views,

their local knowledge, their input. That is, I think, a vital piece of

this.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who is your principal contractor in the JRIES?

General HUGHES. I don’t think we have a principal contractor for

JRIES, because it is a governmental-owned system. But we do have

contractors associated with putting it in place, a number of them.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

We are going to go to our next panel, but I want to say this and

get some kind of response here. I don’t believe, General, that anyone here is questioning whether we should have gone to code orange. I don’t even think—and so I am convinced, trust me, I am

so convinced that I responded differently based on the code orange.

It meant something to me.

What I would like you to do is just comment on what Mr. Yim

talked about in terms of risk communication experts generally

agree that effective warnings should be specific—the nature of the

threat, when and where it is likely to occur, and over what period

of time, provide guidance or actions to be taken, and perhaps,

above all, assure that the information is consistent, accurate, clear

and provided repeatedly.

I guess the issue that I wonder about is, do you disagree with

this recommendation, so it is—you shook your head so you don’t

disagree?

General HUGHES. No, I don’t.

Mr. SHAYS. So the question is how we move forward? Is that the

issue?

General HUGHES. Yes. I think—once again, I hate to use the

word ‘‘evolution’’ or learning and doing all the time, but I think it

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is the right way to characterize this. I think Mr. Yim’s characterization with those words you just voiced are generally right.

I do think—once again, we do find ourselves juxtaposed against

the need to secure some of the information we have and to communicate it so that it can be used by appropriate authorities and not

alarm or unnecessarily excite the general public. This is a matter

of great judgment at times and can be second-guessed and criticized.

As you said, you gave us credit for doing the best that we possibly can, and we are certainly trying to do that. We will learn,

using Mr. Yim’s construct here, more about how to communicate

specificity out to the larger country than we have in the past.

However, the point of protection of the information probably revolves around the degree to which we can be specific and, at the

same time, make sure that we don’t further endanger our public

by giving away to those who would strike us some kind of information that would allow them then to find a seam or a gap and hit

us where we did not expect.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand it is a fine line. But I would suggest

this to you, that it was known from almost day 1 that we were having a problem with flights from Europe. We knew it, the terrorists

knew it, and the general public was hearing about it kind of indirectly.

And I would just suggest to you that some of what we knew,

since the terrorists knew and the government knew, the only thing

you can argue is that we wouldn’t want to disclose sources and

methods. But I don’t think you necessarily have to disclose sources

and methods to disclose information to the public that would then

get them to decide whether or not they want to do something.

I just make this point to you. If, in fact, we thought that large—

we were reading it in the newspaper and the newspapers were correct, but it wasn’t coming from Homeland Security that large public gatherings were a very real target, then unlike the way I responded publicly, which I would do differently, I think the public

would at least need to know that they should make choices, that

we think we protected this large public gathering, that we are confident of what we have in place, but you need to know it is a target,

and so when you go, you go with some risk—if it is to raise the

flag, show you are brave, whatever, but it might tell a parent,

maybe they are not going to send their 14-year-old child. And then

I want to tell you why I think this is important.

If, in fact, something does happen, you have more credibility the

next time. I will tell you, there will be hell to pay if the public isn’t

warned about something that everybody else knew about in government. Then they will never believe you.

I will just illustrate it this way. When we were warning right

after September 11th that we could deal with smallpox, that we

had all of the resources necessary to deal with it, I knew that was

simply a lie. It was not true. When I confronted—and I will say it

more generally, I just simply knew it was not true.

When I spoke to the individual involved, he said we were trying

to make the public feel more comfortable and to lower their anxiety. My comment to him was, though, if there was an outbreak and

there was this lack of ability to deal with it, they will never believe

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you forever, and then—no matter what the government says. So I

guess truth in this process is important too.

And let me just close by saying, first, is there any panelist that

wants to make a comment? Is there anything that you felt we

should have asked that was not asked that you want to put on the

record? Anything based on what you have heard said today that

you want to put on record?

Mr. YIM. Just a 10-second comment, if I could, Mr. Chairman.

I think we should err on the public’s right-to-know side, because

the public has a great appetite for information. I have a great appetite for information. If I am not going to get it from a credible

source, I may get it from a source with much less reliable information. I would rather receive it from the Department of Homeland

Security than receive it from the Internet.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Any other comments?

General, you are great to be here. Thank you for participating in

this panel. It has been very helpful. And we know that you clearly

want to make this system work better. I believe in the system, the

process, I know it has to work better though.

Mr. Reese, thank you as well. Mr. Yim, thank you.

We are going to announce our second panel: Mr. Charles D. Connor, senior vice president, communication and marketing, American Red Cross; Mr. Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst,

RAND Corp.; Dr. James J. Carafano, senior research fellow, defense and homeland security, Heritage Foundation; and Mr. Kenneth B. Allen, executive director, Partnership for Public Warning.

All four of you, if you would, stay standing.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record, our four witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

You have all been here for the questions and responses and

statements of the first panel. Feel free to incorporate that in your

statement; feel free to depart from your statement. That will be

part of the permanent record. And I want to let you know that we

really thank you. We think this is a very significant issue, and we

appreciate your participation in our trying to understand it better.

We will start, as you are sitting, with you, Mr. Connor, first.

STATEMENTS OF CHARLES D. CONNOR, SENIOR VICE RESIDENT, COMMUNICATIONS & MARKETING, AMERICAN RED

CROSS; MICHAEL WERMUTH, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST,

RAND CORP.; DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH

FELLOW, DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, HERITAGE

FOUNDATION; AND KENNETH B. ALLEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC WARNING

Mr. CONNOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for your gracious invitation to testify this morning. My

name is Chuck Connor, and I serve as senior vice president of communication and marketing at the American Red Cross national

headquarters here in Washington.

The American Red Cross is a nationwide network of nearly 900

chapters and 36 blood services regions dedicated to saving lives

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and helping people prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies.

With 1.2 million volunteers and 32,000 employees, the Red Cross

annually mobilizes relief to families affected by nearly 70,000 disasters. We also train almost 12 million people each year in life-saving skills. The Red Cross is the largest supplier of blood and blood

products to more than 3,000 hospitals across the Nation. We also

assist victims of international disasters and conflicts at locations

worldwide.

One of our most important partnerships is government at every

level—Federal, State and local. Government relies on the American

Red Cross to address the huge challenges of public preparedness,

particularly in the all-hazards environment we spoke of today. We

believe that everything the Red Cross can do in this important area

relieves some of the burden on government agencies and first responders.

As the Department of Homeland Security has assumed the huge

responsibility for domestic security, it has correctly focused on

operational procedures. Conversely, it is our responsibility at the

Red Cross to prepare the American public.

In January, Red Cross president and CEO, Marty Evans, issued

a strong wake-up call to the American public to get prepared. Despite growing concerns about terrorism and man-made disasters,

Americans have generally failed to take the most basic steps to ensure their own safety.

According to a study the American Red Cross commissioned last

year, close to 60 percent of Americans, fully 175 million of our fellow citizens, are entirely unprepared for a disaster of any description. In February 2003, the Red Cross launched the Together We

Prepare Campaign. This program challenges individuals and communities to take responsibility for their safety and that of their

families at home, in school, and in businesses and neighborhoods.

By following five basic steps we can all move toward greater safety. Those five steps are: make a plan, build a kit, get trained, volunteer, and give blood. Mr. Chairman, please mark your calendars,

our next blood drive in the House is scheduled for April 15th.

We believe that the more empowered and self-sufficient you and

I feel, the more immediately effective we can be in a crisis situation. The bottom line, regardless of the responsibilities of government, in the end, all of us must take charge of our own destinies.

The strategic direction of the Red Cross is to be America’s partner and a leader in mobilizing communities to help people prevent,

prepare for and respond to disasters and other life-threatening

emergencies. A critical part of this effort includes public education

regarding the meaning of each alert level within the Homeland Security Advisory System, and the immediate actions required to ensure safety and security.

As you know, the White House issued Homeland Security Directive 3 in March 2002, which established the five threat conditions

for a possible terrorist attack. General explanations were given for

preparedness activities for each level, but these were intended

mainly for government agencies.

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However, across the country, there arose questions of, what does

a condition yellow mean to me or my family? What does this mean

for my business or my children’s school?

Working with the Office of Homeland Security at the time, the

Red Cross developed and released specific disaster readiness guidelines for individuals, families, neighborhoods, schools, and businesses. Each color-coded threat category was further expanded to

provide recommendations for each of these different audiences.

These Red Cross-developed guidelines have been incorporated into

the Department’s own public communications.

As part of our expanding preparedness and response role, we are

continuing to keep America informed of the Department’s terrorist

threat level recommendation and the appropriate actions to take if

the level is raised or lowered. And I believe you will see the chart

on the wall there, which is germane to what we are talking about

here.

Once notified of a status level change, the Red Cross implements

procedures and protocols to ensure that the organization can provide a swift, efficient and supportive response in case of an incident.

Similarly, the public looks to the Red Cross as a primary source

of emergency preparedness information. When a change in status

takes place, the Red Cross communicates practical emergency preparedness information to the public through national news releases

and the communication resources of our Nationwide Disaster Services Network.

Preparedness information empowers all of us who use it to be

more responsible for our own security and that of our family. This

vital education effort befits our stature as America’s premier disaster response organization.

In a world where the forces of nature and man too often collide,

the Red Cross is truly a beacon, showing Americans the way to

safety. We owe it to ourselves, our families, our communities to

prepare for the unexpected.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear

before your panel. I would be pleased to answer questions later.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Connor.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Connor follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Wermuth.

Mr. WERMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members,

for the opportunity to be here today to address this important

issue.

Mr. Chairman, according to my count, this is the fourth time I

have had the pleasure of being before this committee in that many

years. I would also say that before September 11th, I could have

counted on both hands the number of people who were providing

national leadership on this issue, and of course, the chairman

ranks among those people before September 11th.

My remarks today are going to be focused on relevant research

and related activities in connection with the congressionally mandated advisory panel to assess domestic response capability for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, also known as the

Gilmore Commission.

In accordance with its statutory mandates, the advisory panel delivered its fifth and final report to the President and the Congress

on December 15th of last year. The strategic visions, themes and

recommendations in that report were motivated by the unanimous

view of the panel, that its final report should attempt to define a

future state of security against terrorism, one that the panel chose

to call America’s New Normalcy.

In developing that report, panel members all agreed at the outset

that it could not postulate as part of its vision a return to a preSeptember 11th normal. It was the panel members’ intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects terrorism to a logical

place in the array of threats from other sources that the American

people face every day, from natural diseases and other illnesses to

crime to traffic and other accidents, to mention just a few.

That report focuses on conceptualizing a strategic vision for the

Nation that in the future has achieved in both appearance and reality an acceptable level of capabilities to cope with the uncertain

and ambiguous threat of terrorism as part of dealing with all hazards. In developing that strategic vision, the advisory panel was

guided by the recognition that the threat of terrorism can never be

completely eliminated and that no level of resources can prevent

the United States from being attacked in the future.

The panel believes that the Nation is achieving a critical understanding of the risk posed to America by terrorism, an understanding that derives from America’s inherent strengths, the strength in

our Constitutional form of government and, in particular, the

strength of our people.

As a group of American citizens with broad experience in government at all levels and in the private sector, the panel members can

see from those national strengths an ability to respond to the

threat of terrorism with firm resolve and through concrete actions

across the full spectrum of awareness, prevention, preparedness,

response and recovery.

Its goal was to articulate a strategy to achieve a steady state 5

years into the future, a vision shaped by a broad and well-grounded

American perspective on the threat of terrorism and focused particularly, because of this panel’s mandate, on State and local response entities.

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As part of that vision, the panel depicts a desirable state 5 years

in the future in a number of specific areas, including, among them,

State, local and private sector empowerment; intelligence, information sharing; and enhanced critical infrastructure protection.

Of course, a true national alert system will have an impact certainly in those four areas; and potentially in what the panel addressed. But as you have heard from other witnesses, the Homeland Security Advisory System, any true alert system or warning

system, however you would like to couch it, is only one piece of a

much more involved and complex process of intelligence collection,

analysis and dissemination, and information sharing. As was mentioned by the previous panel of witnesses, the actual status of response capabilities, the assessment of vulnerabilities, which are

part and parcel of what the Department of Homeland Security is

doing, as well as those at the State and local level and the private

sector, and the responsibility and the authority to act.

After the panel described a future vision that included the words,

‘‘The national warning system has been refined to provide more

geographically and sector-specific information, based on the actual

or potential threats, as its vision of the future.’’ It went on, in a

following section that it called a Roadmap for the Future, to articulate a specific recommendation based on the following conclusions.

The panel said, ‘‘The Homeland Security Advisory System has

become largely ’marganilized,’’’ was the term that they used. ‘‘This

may be attributed to a lack of understanding of its intended use

as well as the absence of a well orchestrated plan to guide its implementations at all levels of government and within the public.

The Governor of Hawaii chose to maintain a blue level in February

when the Federal Government raised its level to orange. And the

Governor of Arizona announced that his State would likely do the

same thing based on particular threats.’’

Organizations surveyed by RAND for the panel had a number of

suggestions for improving the Homeland Security Advisory System.

Between 60 and 70 percent of State and local organizations suggested providing additional information about the threat type of incident likely to occur, where the threat is likely to occur, and during what time period, to help guide them in responding to the

change in threat.

And I have included, for the committee’s information, an actual

extract of that survey of some 1,200 State and local response organizations, as well as the tabular information on how they responded based on their own disciplines.

The panel specifically said, ‘‘We recommend that DHS revise the

Homeland Security Advisory System to include using, one, a National Alert System to notify emergency responders about threats

specific to their jurisdiction; two, providing training to emergency

responders about what preventive actions are necessary; and three,

creating a process for providing specific guidance to potentially affected regions or sectors when threats are changed.’’ All of that just

affirms what you have heard from other witnesses this morning.

But several points are really worthy of consideration here. First,

an alert process of this type is neither a total solution nor a single

point of failure. Second, it is, by its own title, advisory. It does not

require anything. Most importantly, most importantly, any alert

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system will only be as effective as the intelligence upon which it

is based, making that function especially critical. And without delving into continuing deficiencies in the whole intelligence and information collection, analysis and dissemination, I respectfully call

the panel’s attention to the extensive discussion of that subject contained in the advisory panel’s fifth report.

Mr. Chairman, State and local governments, as you well know,

and as other members of the subcommittee know, have a threshold

responsibility for public safety and health. And they must do things

that they determine are best for their own jurisdictions within

their own existing resource constraints.

With better assessments, with better alerts, based in large measures on more comprehensive and focused threat information, they

will be able to make more well informed decisions.

As the committee has already heard this morning, there have

been changes in recent days. Over the end of the year holiday period, the flights from Europe that the chairman talked about earlier, all of those, in our opinion, are steps in the right direction. I

would even venture to say that perhaps the advisory panel might

not have been as specific in its recommendation now as it was in

the fall of last year, because there are improvements that are headed in the right direction.

But the Federal Government still needs to do a better job. It

needs to do better about engaging States and localities and the private sector in part of that process. The Terrorist Threat Integration

Center [TTIC], may—and I stress ‘‘may’’—prove to be a valuable

tool in that direction, but only time will tell.

Some States and even some major cities have taken more upon

themselves to be able to make valid risk assessments based on information that they derive from a lot of sources, and the private

sector is becoming more involved as well.

So, in conclusion, I would say that progress is being made. DHS

has indicated a new amount of flexibility and innovation in the way

that they are now handling the advisory system. There are probably some other fairly significant things that could be done. I did

not include any specific recommendations beyond the panel’s recommendation in my testimony, but I do have an opinion or two

about maybe some specific things that could be done if anyone

would like to ask for that during the question-and-answer period.

Mr. Chairman and members, again, thanks for the opportunity

to participate. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Wermuth, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wermuth follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. And, Dr. Carafano, thank you.

Dr. CARAFANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting

me to speak on this important topic.

I have a lengthy statement for the record which I will submit.

I would like to briefly summarize the high points of that, which are

why I think this is an important subject; the good things I think

which are going on, which I don’t think have been touched on

enough; some concerns about the current system; and then, I think,

a look to the future of what we really need to think about for the

long term.

I think it’s worth just reviewing and why this is important is

four reasons: First and foremost is, I think the HSAS could be a

key tool for welding the disparate national, Federal, State and local

systems we have into a national system, which I truly think is the

Federal role, is getting the resources where they need to be, when

they need to be, for what they think needs to be done to protect

American citizens.

The second is, I do think that a properly run system can have

an effect in terms of preventing, deterring and mitigating terrorist

acts. I think that is an important fact.

The third one, which has already been touched on, is there are

enormous physical implications for this. It is widely reported it

costs the Federal Government $1 billion a week to let the system—

the Conference of Mayors says it costs about $7 million dollars for

local jurisdictions to do this. So every time we change the level, the

physical implications are really large, and those need to be taken

into account.

And, fourth, I think we really need to look at the long-term psychological impact that this system will have on the Nation. I

strongly encourage further research in that area to determine how

Americans are really going to react to this system over the long

term.

Just very quickly in terms of the good things that are going on,

that I think deserves to be mentioned. The Homeland Security

Council is playing an increasingly important role. They meet each

time the level is changed. I think there is good coordination, at

least from the outside, across Federal agencies in terms of coordinating Federal efforts to respond to the changing alerts. I think

that is important.

I think at the deputies level behind the scene, there is an improving increase in coordination. I think that is good.

I think the Homeland Security Operations Center that the Department of Homeland Security has established, is an important

asset. It plays an important role in managing the implementation

of the system. It is a credit to the Department that they have stood

it up, and the role that it plays. And I do think the announcement

that Secretary Ridge made of the Homeland Security Information

Network, which was mentioned in the last panel, is important and

most important because I think it will provide a collaborative tool

at a classified level that allows key people at Federal, State and

local levels to communicate with each other, which in the end is

really important to making the advisory part of this system important.

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I do have several concerns. On the Federal level, my primary

concern is with the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,

and that I think in the future the TTIC should play an increasingly

important role in implementing HSAS, in determining when it

should be implemented and how it should be implemented. As I

talked about before, I am concerned that TTIC is not under the Department of Homeland Security, I don’t think that is what the intent of the Homeland Security Act of 2002—I don’t think it allows

the Secretary to actually fulfill his role.

I mentioned a number of recommendations in the report. I think

in the end the IA portion of IAPA in TTIC need to be fully integrated. I think they need to be under DHS. I think the Secretary

of DHS needs the legislative authority over the TTIC similar to the

kinds of things that the JCS has over who can participate in the

joint staff, that were implemented in the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.

I do think that the problem with the system is at the State and

local and public level. I understand what DHS has said, but the

perception is that the HSAS is the key risk management communication tool to the Nation. And the general consensus is that it

lacks useful guidance to actually be that. I mean, you can say what

you want, but the research shows that if a warning is credible, specific, understandable and actionable, it is not a warning.

I would recommend delinking the color code from the warnings

that we give to State and local and the public. I think, as mentioned before, the State and local warnings need to be regional and

functional in nature.

As I mentioned, I think DHS has been moving in that direction.

After we changed back from code orange at Christmas, they kept

a specific alert on for the airline industry and certain airports. I

think that is a sign that they are moving in the right direction.

I think the other key piece to this is, we really need national performance standards, because State and local governments are

never going to be able to act appropriately unless they know what

is expected of them. And I am very supportive of the Cox-Turner

Bill. I think that would be a step in the right direction, in putting

in a requirement for these standards to be in place, because I think

they are a key part of what we need to do to have a good system.

The public system, I think we need to move to a simple, twotiered system, a watch-and-warning system similar to what we do

for weather alerts. People are already conditioned to that. I mean,

we need a simple standard. We need to tell people what we can

when we can. We need to provide specific directions and specific actions; otherwise, these warnings are simply not meaningful.

I also think we need to have realistic expectations about what we

can expect. The research shows that, by and large, unless people

are conditioned to a disaster, if they have had experience in a forest fire or earthquake or something, that they tend not to prepare.

And so we can put out all the warnings that we want, but unless

we have a really serious education system in this country, it is unlikely that people are going to do much with these warnings.

And even if we do have an extensive education system, it is really questionable what kind of large impact it is going to have in

terms of raising public preparedness. And I just—I—as we look to

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the future, one of the most important things you need to think

about is the back end of the system. We don’t spend near enough

time on that. We are talking about getting alerts to people, but

what we need to do is start training the next generation of leaders

at the State and local level and private industry, who know how

to react to these alerts.

One of the things I did in preparing for this testimony is, I

screened about 100 Web sites from State and local governments

and various industries, and the results are uniformly disappointing. Most people take the Federal color code system, and they just

put that page up on their Web site. They say, here is what to do.

So we are not training the next generation of leaders who can really react to nuanced warnings officially. And I have a series of recommendations in my testimony which I will be happy to go into.

With that, I will conclude my statement. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. My name is Kenneth Allen. I am the executive director of the

Partnership for Public Warning. I appreciate this opportunity to

appear before the subcommittee to talk about the Homeland Security Advisory System, but most of all, I want to talk about the public.

The objective of a public warning system is to provide people at

risk with timely and accurate information so that they can take

protective action. Effective public warnings can save lives, reduce

property losses and speed economic recovery.

Public warning empowers citizens by providing them with the information they need during times of emergency to make informed

decisions and take protective actions. Four years ago, the President’s National Science and Technology Council issued a report

concluding that many in our society are at risk because we do not

have an effective national public warning system. That message

was confirmed on September 11, 2001.

On that terrible day, not a single national public warning system

was ever activated. The Partnership for Public Warning was established in January 2002 by concerned emergency management officials from around the country. Because public warning is an issue

that encompasses all levels of government and relies upon a private-sector infrastructure, PPW was created as a nonprofit, publicprivate partnership.

We are the only national organization addressing the issue of

public warning. And let me emphasize that many of our members

and many of the proponents of the creation of PPW were the local

and State officials and emergency managers involved in this issue.

In fact, the chairman of our board is the director of the Florida

Management Agency, so we are truly a public-private partnership.

Less than 3 months after our creation, the government proposed

the Homeland Security Advisory System. We provided comments

on the initial proposal and have continued to monitor it and evaluate the system.

In June 2000, we hosted a 4-day workshop with experts from

government, industry and academia to look at the proposed system.

The most significant finding was the one that the chairman noted

earlier, this is not a complete warning system. It is merely a threat

advisory system. It tells us that something may happen, but it

doesn’t tell us what, where or when.

The best description I have heard of the HSAS is that it is America’s ‘‘mood ring,’’ and even a mood ring probably comes with more

specific actions such that if it is black, you need to get help. We

need to address that issue.

As a result of the workshop, we provided recommendations in

2002 to the Office of Homeland Security. Last November, as people

began to look at the HSAS and Secretary Ridge talked about making changes, we decided that someone ought to ask the public and

local and State government what they thought about it; and we initiated our own request for public comment.

The comments we received included the following points: The

current system is too vague. It is inconsistent with existing alert

and warning scales. It would be more effective if it used standard

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terminology and message formats. When there is a change in the

threat level, State and local officials should be notified before the

public is notified. One color does not fit all. Advisories should be

tailored to specific geographic regions, industry sectors and other

potential targets.

A terrorist warning system should be developed to complement

the advisory system. It should be linked to existing alert and systems such as the emergency alert system, and NOAA weather

radio. And most of all, we should employ a multitude of technologies to reach people when there is a risk.

After almost 2 years of operation under the HSAS, I think it is

clear from the record and this hearing that changes are needed. A

more useful system, an effective system, can and should be developed.

We are not here today to criticize those who developed the HSAS.

This is a complex and difficult challenge; and we believe that the

system in place has been a good first step, and the Department of

Homeland Security is to be commended on its efforts. It is time for

us to work together, however, on a more effective solution.

In my testimony, I have some of the elements of an effective public warning system. Applying those elements to the HSAS, we have

the following recommendations: one, make the threat advisory

scale consistent with other existing threat scales; two, refine the

system to provide information on a local, regional and industry-specific basis; three, provide more guidance regarding the protective

actions that citizens should take; four, develop a public warning

system for terrorist threats to complement the threat advisory

scale; five, integrate the HSAS with existing public alert and warning systems and move toward the national public warning capability; and six, collaborate with State and local government, the private sector and the public on the development of a more effective

terrorist alerting system.

The last two recommendations are the most important. Americans do not expect their government to preserve and protect them

from all risk. The public, however, does expect the government will

at least provide timely and effective information on imminent risk.

Many, if not most, Americans believe that an effective national

warning capability exists. It does not.

Existing national alert and warning systems are fragmented and

uncoordinated. Individuals at risk often fail to get timely information, fail to understand or act on the information, and often do not

know where to go for additional information.

Those not at risk who receive warnings of little relevance may

come to view the system with skepticism if not distrust. The HSAS

is an example of this fragmentation. Instead of building upon existing alert and warning capabilities, we have created another system

and layered it on top of what we already have.

The solution is a national integrated public warning capability

that can be used to alert the public during all types of the emergencies, from terrorism to national disasters to accidents. We have

done some work in that area, and I would be glad to talk to the

committee if you wish to pursue that.

But our final and most important recommendation is the need

for cooperation and partnerships. Protecting our Nation’s security

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must be a collaborative effort in which government, industry and

the public work together. This is especially true if we were to develop an effective Homeland Security Advisory System.

The Federal Government cannot develop an effective system on

its own; no organization or individual has all the answers. Moreover, local and State governments, private industry and the public

must understand and implement a terrorism warning system. To

do so effectively, those stakeholders should be part of the process

to design and operate the system.

We urge the Department of Homeland Security to participate in

a collaborative forum with all of the stakeholders.

September 11th taught us that the unthinkable can happen. Future tragedies, whether natural or manmade, are not a matter of

if but when. Lives can be saved and losses reduced through effective public warning. Americans expect their government to protect

them and believe an effective warning capability exists. It doesn’t

exist today, but we can put it in place quickly if we work together.

There is no excuse for further delay. This is an important issue. We

commend the committee on its leadership in this area and look forward to working with you. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

One of my staff in hearing the issue of, you know, we are taking

steps in the right direction, said it is hard to be satisfied with steps

in the right direction. As former Senator Nunn points out, a gazelle

being chased by a hungry cougar is taking steps in the right direction. Survival is a matter of velocity, speed, not vector direction.

And I guess it is a combination of a lot of things, but interesting.

Mr. SCHROCK. How do I top that? Thank you all for being here.

I want to start with Colonel Carafano. You mentioned that the

TTIC, you thought it should fall under the Department of Homeland Security, but as a DOD function. Its product and analysis is

integrated with the DHS Homeland Security Advisory System. If

Secretary Ridge consults with his council before raising or lowering

color codes, why yank it out of DOD?

Dr. CARAFANO. TTIC, now as I understand it, is statutorily run

by the Director of Central Intelligence, and it is actually—it is an

interagency group, obviously. It has DHS members. It’s mostly CIA

members. I think they’re going to potentially go to about 250, and

over half of those will be CIA. I think the intent of the Homeland

Security Act of 2002 is that the Secretary of Homeland Security is

responsible for the integration and dissemination of terrorist threat

information.

It just seems to me that unless we have somebody that we can

put a finger in the chest and say, ‘‘You are responsible for this,’’

unless he is in charge of the resources of the organization and the

membership of the organization, what the organization does, that

we haven’t truly met the intent of the law. And I know Mike has

a different interpretation on who ought to have the rose pinned on

him for this. I will let him chime in.

Mr. SCHROCK. Colonel Wermuth.

Mr. WERMUTH. Jim and I have had this discussion before.

Mr. SCHROCK. Obviously.

Mr. WERMUTH. I think the TTIC is appropriately placed somewhere other than within a single department. In the first place, the

Department of Homeland Security doesn’t own everything, even at

the Federal level. More importantly, it’s our experience in studying

issues like this that when an entity becomes part of a single department, that’s how it’s viewed. It’s part of that department. It

doesn’t tend to be viewed as something that can provide services

outside the department, and clearly, the Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, DOD itself and other

Federal entities, much less States and localities, need some of the

product that is generated from an organization like a TTIC.

So I would suggest that a TTIC-like entity does need to be placed

not directly under a particular department of the Federal Government but more freestanding to do the broader strategic approach

to fusing intelligence information, if you will, fusing it and analyzing it and disseminating it.

At the same time, Jim is absolutely right that the Department

of Homeland Security needs more capability to take that information, maybe to take information from a lot of other sources, and

process it, analyze it and disseminate it and make it actionable

within DHS’s own mission, which is of course to provide better

alerts, better warnings, better advisories across this entire specVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 02, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\94837.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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trum to States, localities, the private sector and perhaps the public

at large. It’s the level that, from my perspective, it’s the level

you’re talking about. We need a broader, strategic, accountable organization like the TTIC; DHS needs an operational organization

to do the same kinds of stuff for the execution of its own mission,

both.

Dr. CARAFANO. If I could just add one point, one point on which

we both agree is—I think it’s a great recommendation in the commission report—there should be strong State and local representation in the TTIC so when we implement these alerts, we have people who understand what State and local people do and we can

translate that quickly into language that State and local people can

act on. I think that’s a good recommendation.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Allen, Colonel Wermuth talked about

marginalization in the Gilmore Commission report, that the Advisory Panel states, ‘‘The Homeland Security Advisory System has

become largely marginalized.’’ Do you all believe that, and what actions should DHS take to make this system more credible?

Mr. WERMUTH. Well, for the reasons that the panel stated in

much more detail than I did in the testimony, it has become

marginalized because people now are not necessarily taking it seriously or taking different kinds of action that you might anticipate

that they would take, for whatever reason, whether it’s resource

considerations or just local politics. I mean, there are reasons why

States and localities might decide to choose to do something or not

to do something just based on political realities.

I said in my remarks I didn’t have any specific recommendations

beyond what the panelists said, but now I’ll offer one in response

to Congressman Schrock’s question.

I think we need two systems or maybe two components of a system, and it has been talked about here already, but we need a system that is a warning system for the people who have, as I referred

to it in my remarks, the authority and the responsibility to take

action. We need a system that is directed to States and localities

and those elements of the private sector that are involved in critical infrastructure protection that really provides a more targeted,

more focused, more specific level of threat information for those entities to take specific action.

Then it would seem we need a more general system—and Jim

talked about this as well—that is directed to the public, that says

to the public—he said two tiers; I might suggest three, a lower and

a medium and a high one—that would say, at the low end, ‘‘You,

the general public, are not expected to do anything.’’ We have governments and the private sector that are taking actions in connection with certain things, one that is a little bit higher than that,

that says, ‘‘You need to be more aware of your surroundings and,

perhaps, take some specific actions,’’ and a third level that says,

‘‘Gee, at this level, you really need to consider not traveling, doing

things, you know, to be more observant, more vigilant of your surroundings.’’

But it seems like this broad five-tiered system that applies to everybody—all of the witnesses this morning have agreed—that’s

probably not a good idea, that there has to be more specific things

focused on the segments of our society that have both the authority

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and the responsibility to act, governments and those elements of

the private sector that we’ve identified, the public at large, and I’m

not sure you can devise a single system that would apply across

that spectrum.

Now, having said that, we ought to tell the public if we have different processes, and we probably will eventually have different

processes. As some different processes have already started being

applied, let’s tell the public about those, so it doesn’t look like we’re

telling governments and selected people one thing and telling the

public something else. Let’s describe all of the processes to our public and let them take that information on board and do what they

will with it, but it doesn’t seem to be helpful to expect the public

always to react to a change in threat levels when it really doesn’t

affect the entire public.

Mr. ALLEN. If I could just add to that, I would agree. One of the

lessons of the risk communication is that different audiences respond differently to different warnings, and we are not—this is not

one audience. State and local officials are one. Private industry officials are another. The public is another. Even the media is an important audience we should be dealing with, and we need to recognize and develop a system that can communicate with each of those

effectively.

Second of all, and again, I will reiterate this again, we need to

integrate this with other systems. We have between 10 and 20 different threat scales in this country for different hazards. Even in

terrorism, the FBI has a four-tiered level, and we had DOD

Threatcon. It’s very confusing for folks to know which system applies.

Third, collaboration. Let’s let State and local governments work

with DHS and the private sector to develop a system that works

for all of us.

And fourth and finally and a point that you made earlier is, we

need public education. When we grew up in the 1950’s and we had

all of those civil defense programs and we practiced getting under

the desk, we knew what to do in the event of an emergency.

When the Iron Curtain came down, somehow we lost sight of all

of that, and it’s time, perhaps, to spend a little bit of effort teaching

the public simple things such as what does a siren mean if you

hear one go off. In different parts of the country, it means different

things. So public education is a key part of what we need to do.

Mr. SCHROCK. Let’s follow on to HSAS for a minute. Since the

creation of the HSAS, a number of issues have arisen and two, I

think, that stand out: the vagueness of the warnings and the system’s lack of protective measures. And various recommendations

have been to refine the system, adding specificity to the alerts, and

developing protective measures for the public.

Mr. Allen kind of touched on this, but how can we add more

specificity about the nature of the threat when alert levels rise, and

why don’t we have recommended, standardized protective measures

for State and local governments, private businesses and the public?

As Mr. Allen said, a siren going off in my hometown means

there’s a fire. In Kansas, it could mean a hurricane—I mean, a tornado. So how can we put that all together? Because there are so

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many things out there, nobody knows what to believe. Consequently, everybody ignores everything.

Mr. ALLEN. You’re absolutely right. And of course, in some

places, a siren means gather all of the volunteer firemen.

Mr. SCHROCK. True.

Mr. ALLEN. Clearly you don’t want to reveal sources of intelligence, and I don’t think anybody is asking for that, but there are

a couple of ways to deal with the issue. One is to create a codified

process that the public understands. In other words, that we understand and the State and local officials understand how decisions

are being made about raising or lowering the threat levels, what

are the protocols and criteria used in that process, what are the

protocols for communicating with people.

Right now the raising and lowering of the threat level is a black

box to most in the public. We don’t know what goes on inside that

black box. We don’t know what goes into that decision, and then

we aren’t sure what’s going to be communicated and when. So you

can deal with a lot of the problem by providing more information

right up front about how decisions are made, how and when they

are going to be communicated.

And then as you get down the road, you do need to put a process

in place to share information with the public. We know from history that people generally do not panic, that they would prefer to

have more information than less information. And most of all, as

somebody said, let’s not underestimate the intelligence of the

American public, and let’s share with them as much as we can.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I’d like to get more into the TTIC issue and

where the information goes. Are you familiar with the analysis and

coordination centers that certain States have developed? It just so

happened last week I visited the Maryland analysis and coordination center, and I think, from my observations, it’s working very

well, because what you have there, it’s more like a strike force concept. You don’t have to worry about the bureaucracy and who is in

charge, but you have FBI. You have CIA. You have NSA. You have

State and local. You have Customs. You have Immigration. You

have all of these groups. And what has been effective, I think, is

that it’s up and down. Information is flowing up and down.

Now, how would you analyze that—and that was really put together, I believe, out of necessity, because there was a lot of frustration, especially on the local level, that information was not coming from the hierarchy of the Federal level. How would you analyze

that operation? And I understand Maryland’s operation, I think,

was one of the first, but it’s being looked at and being implemented

in other States. How would you analyze that as it relates to TTIC?

Mr. WERMUTH. I would say that certainly Maryland’s effort is

great. California, of course, has one that they call their California

Terrorist Integration Center. The city of New York, of course, is another example of how a major municipality is handling the issue.

I would just say that all of those are important pieces of this entire process. A lot of them have been developed, as you said, Congressman, as a matter of necessity, because States and localities

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felt like they were not getting enough information, and they had

to do a better job at either the State or local level for coordinating

it. But it goes back to the recommendation that the advisory panel

made about the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. That’s why

it’s important from the panel’s perspective, why, in our view, the

Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the Federal-level entity that

looks at this strategically, has to have representation from organizations like the Maryland analysis center, like the California center, like New York, embedded into their staff on a day-to-day basis

so that you have this complete perspective, not only from the Federal level but also from the State and local level.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But do you see a duplication of effort occurring between that and this group?

Mr. WERMUTH. Not at all, because when you divide this, if you

will, in military terms—strategic, operational and tactical—you

need all of the elements. And the New York operation is tactical.

The Maryland operation tends to be both operational and tactical,

because it’s working with the Maryland community. Same thing in

California.

So all of these are complementary efforts. It’s my same opinion

about the TTIC being separate and independent so that it serves

all of the customers, but other entities needing their other capability at the operational level inside departments. The Department of

Treasury just formed a new intelligence and analysis center for

money operations, for financial transactions by terrorists. I think

all of those things are important, not duplicative but complementary depending on what the level of activity that you’re talking

about, tactical, operational or strategic.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let’s get—yes?

Dr. CARAFANO. If I could follow on that. I really think the State

and local analysis centers are essential, and they’re really the missing piece of the puzzle and the piece that will allow us to get away

from the blunt instrument we now have. Because what you need

is—if you have these analysis centers that can really take the information and interpret it to understand what should be done in

that local situation, then DHS can move away from the blunt instrument, and they can pass more focused analysis to the regional

and the functional areas, and then they can do their analysis to interpret if it’s applicable for them.

So I think these are complementary with TTIC, and I think

something like HSIN, the Homeland Security Information Network, which could provide a bridge between TTIC and DHS and

these other organizations so they can talk collaboratively, will really allow us to have a much, much more nuanced system.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You said that you think those systems like

the one that I visited in Maryland are very good, but there are

some concerns about TTIC. What would your recommendation be?

Is it because you don’t have one boss, because you have a combination of FBI, CIA? And yet, in the analysis center, you have the

whole group together. What would your recommendation be to

make it more effective so that Secretary Ridge could be in a position to make the proper recommendations and get the right intelligence?

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Dr. CARAFANO. First of all, I think TTIC will always have to be

an interagency organization. It should never be anything but an

interagency organization.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes. I agree.

Dr. CARAFANO. And second, I think you have to have one guy in

charge, you have to have one guy responsible, and I really think

that should be the Secretary of Homeland Security.

My third recommendation would be to then give him the tools to

ensure that the other pieces of the Federal system cooperate appropriately, and the model I would use is what we use for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. When we passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act and

said the Joint—the chairman gets to decide who is on his staff, and

you have certain education requirements. You have certain experience requirements. You have certain accreditation requirements,

and then he has certain budgeting authority.

So if he has all the tools to make the other Federal agencies,

then I think you’ve built a system for the long term and, most importantly, you have a chest that you can put your finger in and

say, ‘‘This is the guy that’s responsible for bringing it all together,

connecting the dots and telling everybody what they need to know

and when they need to know it.’’

Mr. WERMUTH. The only point of disagreement there is in the

placement of the TTIC, as I mentioned earlier. The Advisory Panel

believes the TTIC ought to be separate and independent from my

Department. And in fact, if you want to pin the rose on a single

person, this panel recommended that what it calls the National

Counterterrorism Center, that we think probably will help serve as

a model for the TTIC, really ought to report not to the Director of

Central Intelligence but directly to the White House. So clearly you

can pin a rose directly on an individual there, the guy in charge

of all of the Federal——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Where is the funding going to come from,

the White House? You’re going to have to have the resources.

Where are the resources going to come from?

Mr. WERMUTH. You might very well have to have a separate appropriation for an organization like this. You could do it as part of

intelligence authorizations. Because it’s an interagency organization, it could also be part and parcel—as it is right now, with the

TTIC—it could be part and parcel of other agency appropriations

that help to fund an entity like that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let’s get to the—is the light still green?

Mr. SHAYS. We did another one.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The issue as far as—is it information coming in and not properly analyzed? Is it information that’s there and

not getting to the right people? Let’s focus on what the real issue

is with TTIC.

Mr. WERMUTH. It’s all of the above. Before the TTIC, before other

perhaps similar types of interagency entities, various agencies were

collecting information, analyzing information in some cases, disseminating information without either having a willingness to

share or having an understanding of what needed to be shared

with other entities.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me get back to my original question because of the time.

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Why is the coordination centers—why do they seem to be working very well while there are still issues with TTIC? Would you

analyze the two and why you feel one is working better than the

other right now?

Dr. CARAFANO. I think, quite honestly, if you talk to most State

and local governments, they will say that there’s more information

going into the system than coming out. And there are lots of reasons for that, connectivity, security clearances. How do we share

information? It’s a learning process. I’d be reticent to say there’s

one reason why we’re not communicating down as well as I think

we’re communicating up, and I think that all of these things are

really going to have to be addressed before you see a marked improvement.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me get to another area. I was a former

county executive, during September 11, and went through sending

our police officers into overtime to synagogues and FBI buildings,

Social Security buildings, those type of things. I see the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported last year that it cost U.S. cities approximately $70 million per week in extra overtime, security, personnel

costs, and I think the Heritage Foundation estimates that it costs

the Federal Government $1 billion per week.

Do we need—what would you recommend as far as a procedure,

as it related to geography and specificity? Now, again, I know that

there is a lot of different intelligence, there is a lot of chatter, but

in the end, our intelligence is pretty strong in a lot of areas. The

issue of specificity and locale, for instance transportation versus an

issue involving an airplane issue or whatever it is, that we need

to continually—when we hear the chatter, when things go up—to

throw it out to the whole country. And that is No. 1.

And second, then what would the recommendation be, if we could

get to a geographical issue or specificity, how would you implement

that? Through code colors or what?

Mr. ALLEN. I don’t have the specific answer for you, because I

think it’s going to depend on the region and the sector. Industry

sectors might——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. My question is for the whole country, is

it—do you think it would work to declare a certain area in the East

Coast and not declare California? Because then all of a sudden——

Mr. ALLEN. I think it would work the same way the State Department can advise you that certain nations of the world are unsafe to travel in or travel to them at your own risk. I think if we

develop a specific system targeted at specific geographic and industrial sectors and we educate the public as to what it means—I

mean, I think a lot of this comes from the confusion on the part

of the public as was discussed here. What does it mean when the

threat level goes up? Does it mean everyone is affected the same?

I think we can develop a much more effective system that’s targeted at the specific threats because——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Automatically, all local jurisdictions and

most States, they are spending millions of dollars that maybe we

don’t have to spend.

Mr. ALLEN. Well, one of the things we heard today, for example,

is that DHS does try to communicate with State and local governments, and where they have specific information, as I understood,

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what they were saying was, ‘‘After we send out the general notice,

we will call those where we have specific information.’’ So maybe

it’s a matter of putting a protocol in place that if you’re a local community and you don’t get a call within the hour, you know that

there is no specific threat targeted at your jurisdiction.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But most people will cover themselves by

doubling up and pulling the people in overtime. It happens. Believe

me, that’s reality. The numbers are there.

Mr. ALLEN. It is reality, but remember, no system is going to be

mandatory, but each community and each citizen, all we can do is

provide them with as much information as possible to make informed decisions.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You can keep talking. I can’t. But the specificity—I’m just asking—well, fine if we can. It depends on who the

chairman is. He’s a good chairman.

What I’m getting to, is it realistic to think that we could come

up with a plan that would deal with the issue of specificity, geography so that if in fact we know—and we can have, our intelligence

is a lot more specific in certain arenas—that California, as an example, doesn’t have to spend overtime when in fact you might need

to do that on the East Coast, that’s kind of what I’m—is there—

do you all feel that there’s a possibility to come up with a system

like that? Would that be confusing? Would that—because once it

goes, believe me, all—you know how elected officials always want

to be re-elected. They are going to make sure they cover their

bases.

Mr. WERMUTH. It will never be perfect but better than it is now.

Because of the ambiguity of terrorist threats, you’ll never be able

to devise a 100 percent system, but we can do it better and less

costly at the State and local level, absolutely.

Dr. CARAFANO. I would just like to say, I think it’s important to

de-link in the minds of the public and the State and local governments the HHS color-coded system from what they do every day.

I think it works fine at the Federal level because you’re coordinating centralized agencies, but I think we need to get people to think

we’re organizing the Federal Government effort; and for State and

local governments and the public, we need to provide them watches

and warnings that are applicable to them, and I do think that is

an achievable system.

Mr. ALLEN. I agree, it is achievable. Collaboration and education

are the two key components, but we can do that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you, gentlemen. I’m going to ask all of you

this question, including you, Mr. Connor, but I’m going to also have

a specific question for you, Mr. Connor. I want to know how you

transform from a threat assessment to a real warning system. I

mean, I know we’ve been talking about it and it’s in your testimony, but I want you to give me the first and second, say, the third

most important steps DHS can do. I want you to think about that,

and first ask you, Mr. Connor, you had mentioned in your testimony the work of the Red Cross in preparedness lessens the burden on Government agencies and first responders and yet the organization relies primarily on charitable donations to perform this

important work in support of Government at all levels.

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I want to know, what additional resources do you need to continue to be successful in your effort to prepare the American public

and to respond to the 70,000 disasters in any given year?

Mr. CONNOR. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Red Cross, through its

nearly 900 community based chapters nationwide, is on the scene

with first responders immediately following disasters, both natural

and manmade, and as part of the first-response community, we

provide direct support to fire, police, EMS, and we are integrated

into State and local disaster preparations and training. Yet we are

unable currently to apply directly for first-responder funding to

meet these requirements we discussed. We must rely currently on

local municipalities to include us in their grant applications.

Mr. SHAYS. And why is that?

Mr. CONNOR. Pardon me, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. Why is that?

Mr. CONNOR. I am advised that this is currently, if I’m not mistaken, the DHS interpretation of the statute. They’ve had—they

have a narrow interpretation of first responder, and it is, as I understand it, fire, police and EMS, if I’m correct in that. And so they

are the entities that have the eligibility to apply directly for grants

and not Red Cross, currently.

Mr. SHAYS. How do you describe your relationship with the Federal Government?

Mr. CONNOR. We are a Federal instrumentality. The President

appoints our chairman. We have several Cabinet members who are

ex officio members of our board of Governors but we are not a Federal agency. We rely, almost to the 100 percent extent, on donations of that nature.

Mr. SHAYS. Yet you have an actual specific role to play when

disasters——

Mr. CONNOR. We do. We are listed, if I may—we are in the National Response Plan, and we have the role for mass care, which

is spelled out in the Federal——

Mr. SHAYS. And of course, you wouldn’t want to change that, but

the issue is, should you be allowed to——

Mr. CONNOR. Correct. Our point is, we have a lot of work to do.

We are committed to be partners with DHS at the national level

and the local level. We really want to do this. It takes resources.

And to the extent we could be eligible for grants directly, that

would be helpful——

Mr. SHAYS. So the issue is not that you would get a grant but

at least that you would be eligible——

Mr. CONNOR. That’s correct. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. No. That makes sense.

Mr. CONNOR. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me have all of you, including Mr. Connor, let’s

start with you, Mr. Allen—I mean, first off, we basically all agree

here that we have a threat assessment, but we don’t really have

a warning system yet, and that’s the nodding of heads—can’t be recorded, is all yes. OK.

Now, so how do we move from threat assessment to a real warning system? Tell me the first few steps. Give me two. You can give

me one. You can give me four.

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Mr. ALLEN. Can I give you an example, Mr. Chairman? Let’s say

that there is a threat that there’s going to be an anthrax attack

or a dirty bomb here in the Washington, DC area, and the government has elevated the level to severe, and then they get more information that it is a real likelihood that something is going to

happen. In a warning system, some of the steps you would go

through in the decisionmaking process, the first might be to notch

it up by notifying the local officials to keep an eye out for this sort

of behavior or to watch this sort of activity and provide them specific information to the extent you can.

But let’s say, again, that, at some level, you’re going to go and

say you have to notify the public. Currently, there is no capability

within the HSAS or within the DHS threat system to provide an

actual public warning to the public. In other words, if they were

going to notify us, there’s not even a linkage between the HSAS

and the NOAA weather radio or the Emergency Alert System, our

two national warning systems to get information out. There should,

at a minimum, be a linkage—if there’s going to be a public warning, that we have a process and a procedure to notify citizens over

television and radio via EAS and NOAA weather radio. We do not

have that.

Second of all, we need to have decided in advance what are we

going to tell citizens to do. It’s no good warning them if you don’t

tell them what you’re going to do. Do you want them to shelter in

place? Do you want them to evacuate? So we need a plan prior to

any of this happening.

But the first step would be to develop that linkage between the

threat assessment and the threat warning and the systems that we

already have in place to communicate with the public in times of

emergency. That would be the first step. And there’s a lot more we

could do, but let’s keep it simple.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. We intend, as this committee, to write a

report on what we’re going to recommend to DHS because—and we

are going to use a good deal of what we’ve learned from the first

and second panel. You’ve provided some rich information. I do want

to encourage you to feel free to continue to dialog with the committee, all of you, in terms of recommendations. That would be helpful.

Doctor.

Dr. CARAFANO. I would establish a public system, a two-tiered

system of watches and warnings. In order to issue a watch or a

warning, you would have——

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s start again. You’re talking too quickly.

Dr. CARAFANO. I would establish a public system that would consist of a two-tiered system of watches and warnings, and in order

to issue a watch or a warning, you would have to provide information that was credible, specific, understandable and actionable. If

you couldn’t meet those four criteria, then issue a press release or

something else.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to come back to your comment. I’m going

to give you a specific example, and tell me what you would want

the public to know.

Mr. WERMUTH. There needs to be some distinctions made between threat assessments and warnings. Unfortunately, the lexicon, even within the Federal Government, about what really is a

137

true threat assessment is different depending on which agency you

talk to; so in the first place, we need better definitions. But I would

offer that we need various types of threat assessments to start

with, strategic threat assessments, who are our enemies, what are

their motivations, what are their capabilities. And then with that

information, you can make some more strategic decisions about the

application of resources.

Warnings, on the other hand—and I think Jim and I agree here.

In fact, I think from what I’ve heard, all of us would agree warnings have to do with actionable intelligence, something that causes

you to say not only is there this threat but it is this specific and

here is what you ought to be doing, perhaps within a range of various activities depending on who your sector is.

So to me, a threat assessment is something at a higher level. A

true warning system has to be based on something more current,

more actionable, more tactical, if you will, than broader threat assessments about who our enemies are and what they intend to do

and what they have the capabilities to do, so that then you can

overlay that with your vulnerabilities in performing a good risk

analysis for the application of resources and other kinds of activities.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to come back, Mr. Wermuth, and want to

know how specific they would have to be in an example I’ll give

you.

Mr. Connor.

Mr. CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, the Red Cross’s emphasis is on preparing the public for all hazards, kinds of affairs, and we understand this debate, and we think it’s properly left in the Federal

arena. Whatever the outcome is, we want to be helpful to DHS in

whatever system is——

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me ask you this, though, do you think the

public needs to be warned about potential terrorist threats, or do

you think it should just be threat assessment?

Mr. CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think that is a question for

the Red Cross.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. I’m comfortable. So now, let me give you

a specific example. Let’s just suppose that we believe that the Europeans aren’t doing a good enough job of making sure terrorists

are able to get onto airplanes. Let’s assume that they may use a

biological agent on the plane and that we think that is a very real

possibility. Let’s also assume that we’re concerned about a dirty

bomb being detonated when a large group of people are gathering

and that we surmise that it may be in 5 to 12 cities.

And we have decided to respond by warning all the officials

about this concern. We are asking the Europeans to put marshals

on airplanes. We are asking them to do a better job of checking.

Let’s assume that we are going into our cities to try to determine

whether there is in fact any hint of radioactive material and that

we are particularly guarding those larger events.

Let’s also assume that we have such a concern that there might

be an outbreak, that we even have sharpshooters at large public

gatherings.

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Now, tell me, if I’m being told that and that’s what I know as

well as a Member of Congress, what do you think the public has

the right to know?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, well, you didn’t pick an easy example.

Mr. SHAYS. I thought I picked a damn realistic one.

Mr. ALLEN. But a very realistic one. From the point of view of

the partnership, we would err on the side of telling the public more

information than less, enough to let them make informed decisions

about whether or not they want to go to a large crowd gathering.

Mr. SHAYS. Or travel at your own risk.

Mr. ALLEN. Or travel at your own risk.

We would also hope that the decision on releasing that information or not is made collaboratively in a process in which State and

local government officials also have a right to play a role and that

it’s just not DHS and the Federal Government making that decision.

But we think that—we believe that it’s the basic precept of our

society. The public has a right to know, and unless there’s a reason

from an intelligence perspective not to, we would err in sharing it

with the citizens and letting them make their own decisions.

Dr. CARAFANO. I think everything you just stated would be the

perfect basis for a usable warning to the general public, certainly

much, much more useful than going from one color to another. Everything that you describe, there are things where individuals can

take actionable things on their own behalf to protect themselves,

and I think that would be a foundation for a perfectly valid announcement.

And I would add, I think DHS’s press announcement where they

talked about concerns about airlines in late February and stuff, I

think that came closer to the kind of thing that we would be looking for, but I don’t think there’s anything that you just said that

wouldn’t be perfectly appropriate in an announcement.

Mr. WERMUTH. Let me use your examples to explain what I

think is the difference between threat announcements or threat

analysis and warnings. In the airline example, I think we could

and should tell the American people, on a regular basis if necessary, that we know that terrorists are still interested in commercial airliners and that we think some of our European allies are not

providing enough security measures at airports to prevent them

from getting onto airplanes. That’s kind of a threat advisory.

Right? People can process that information and make decisions

about whether to travel or not.

It rises to a warning level when, as we did around the holiday

season and again around the first of February, say we have specific

information that terrorists may be trying to board flights out of

Heathrow and out of Paris coming in this direction. That rises, to

me, to the level of a warning that says, ‘‘You may really want to

consider not flying on some of those routes, because we have specific actionable intelligence.’’ That’s the distinction between the

two.

But I would agree with my colleagues here on the panel, that I

think the public has a right to know. In the dirty bomb instance,

you don’t have to tell the people exactly how many people you have

as sharpshooters, for example, what kinds of weapons that they

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have, but perhaps you ought to say we’re concerned enough that

we’re providing additional security forces that have the authority

to interdict potential terrorists, including the possible use of force

at arms.

I just think that information is important enough to disseminate

to the public and then let them make a decision. They may still decide to go to that sporting event or that public gathering, whatever

it happens to be, but tell them enough where they can make an informed decision without necessarily talking about either intelligence sources or methods or for that matter enforcement methods,

on the other hand.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m just struck by the fact that you’re basically saying what seems to logical to me and so respectful of the public, and

yet that was really a real life example. That wasn’t a made-up example. That was a real-life example that occurred in the last few

months.

Mr. Ruppersberger, I’m going to have a few more questions, so

if you want to join in?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I want to get back to TTIC, because I know

it’s important, and it’s just not working as well as it should. Is

there anything that you would recommend to us as far as legislation is concerned on how we might be able to fix TTIC?

Mr. WERMUTH. That it be a mandate: full-time representation in

the TTIC from State and local entities of the Maryland type, of the

California type, of the New York type. Whether you allow States

and localities to pay for that or whether you provide direct Federal

funding through grants or otherwise, that would allow some of

these entities to provide their full-time representation, I don’t think

that entity is ever going to have the full picture, is ever going to

be as effective as it could be, unless it has that kind of representation; and it can’t be a quarterly meeting with a few State and local

representatives coming to the TTIC and sitting around the table.

It has to be full-time, every day.

As one person described it, you’ll learn more when you’re talking

to your colleagues around the coffee pot than you will in exchanging pieces of paper or having advisory meetings.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. From a legislation point of view, do you

think there’s a need for legislation to reform it or to dictate something?

Mr. WERMUTH. It may very well be that it would require very

specific legislation or at least broader authority for Federal grants

to be used by States and localities, if they choose to do so, to send

representation to the TTIC, particularly those States in major metropolitan areas that perhaps are at higher risk, from everybody’s

viewpoint at higher risk, and we could sit here and name some of

those.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Dr. Carafano.

Dr. CARAFANO. I would legislate the requirement for State and

local participation in TTIC. I would legislate something similar to

the Goldwater-Nichols requirements for JCS for participation in

TTIC. I would do all of the funding for TTIC through the DHS so

that DHS got basically a go/no-go on how the funds and other agencies participating in TTIC will be spent.

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And then finally, I would do a technical amendment to the

Homeland Security Act of 2002. I would take TTIC, and I would

take the IA portion of IAIP, merge them into one organization and

put them under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Mr. SHAYS. Thanks, gentlemen. I’m not going to keep you here

much longer, but I need to—this doesn’t seem as difficult for me

as I think it probably is, because I just start with the basic premise

that the public has a right to know. But what I do wrestle with

is, then, when don’t they have a right to know or when would I

cause more harm than good.

Tell me, if you were in the position of having to do not only an

assessment, a risk assessment, but a warning, what would become

the most difficult tradeoffs for you that would maybe suggest that

the public would not have a right to know? And you all have had

to have thought about it. I mean, it just—you’re in this line of

work.

Mr. WERMUTH. That one, of course, is difficult, but all I can do

is to say, without having a specific example, there are not many

scenarios that I can think of where you wouldn’t want to tell the

public something. I know the situation you’re talking about right

after September 11th when the question was asked, ‘‘are we prepared for biological attacks,’’ and what the answer was to that

question on national television—I think the rationale behind not

telling the public in that case is absolutely the wrong rationale. We

have to trust the American people to take this information on

board and process it. Whether it’s natural disasters or emerging

natural infectious diseases or a deliberate attack, I think we can

tell them what you would, as a citizen, want to know without necessarily disclosing intelligence sources and methods or perhaps all

of the steps that governments at all levels are taking to help protect them, because that might disclose things to the bad guys. You

have to tell them what the threats are and what that means to

them in terms of risk. I think it’s wrong to take any other approach.

Mr. ALLEN. General Hughes said that making those decisions

about what to share is a balance, and I would agree with him to

an extent, but I think the balance needs to be shifted a little bit.

Hopefully, we will never be—have the difficult decisions that I

guess they had during World War II in the bombing of Coventry

when they decided not to share that information in order not to divulge the source of the intelligence.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s a great example, isn’t it?

Mr. ALLEN. It is a great example. And the only example I could

think of when you wouldn’t share it is when the potential loss to

the Nation is greater from sharing it than not sharing it, and I

truthfully can’t conceive in 99 times out of 100 where that would

be the case.

So I think that the balance, again, needs to be shifted to the side

of informing the public, letting them make their own decisions

about their lives and their families.

The President said we’re at war on terrorism, but unlike other

wars, where we had an ocean between us and the battlefield, it’s

here, and I think we’re all combatants in that war. And I think,

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as combatants, we all have a right to know whatever we can to protect ourselves and our communities. So I would err on informing

people.

Dr. CARAFANO. I agree. I think that the two concerns are, one,

compromising sources or methods and, two, doing something that

might facilitate a terrorist attack and might make it easier. I think

those would be my two primary concerns.

Mr. SHAYS. You all, again, are such experts, I want to ask you

this. Could what happened in Spain happen in the United States?

Mr. WERMUTH. Certainly. It’s part and parcel of this entire public information, education process. I think governments at all levels

have an obligation to tell people we cannot protect you against everything all of the time. You will never be 100 percent secure in

any number of contexts within our society, whether it’s within your

freedom of travel, whether it’s within your ability to communicate

with each other through increasingly sophisticated communication

systems. We ought to be explaining that to the American people.

It really is the basis of what the Advisory Panel described as its

new normalcy. Be straightforward with the American people. We

can’t protect you against everything. Yes, there are risks with train

travel in the United States, but just because we’re vulnerable, as

this panel would say, doesn’t necessarily mean that there is a

threat out there that exists to exploit that vulnerability.

Could it happen here? Yes. But that’s what makes intelligence

collection, analysis and dissemination so critically important. It’s

not just because we’re vulnerable or the things that scare us to

death. It’s understanding who the enemy is, what their motivations

are, what their capabilities are and being able to take action on

that depending on what the threatened attack is at any point in

time. But to me, the answer to the question is, sure.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Carafano.

Dr. CARAFANO. I agree.

Mr. SHAYS. And the answer is, yes, again?

Dr. CARAFANO. Yes. I would agree.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Allen, as well, is saying he would agree.

I would also put into perspective we lose about 120 people every

day in automobile accidents. It blows me away every time I think

about it. You know, the number last year was 440,000, and so we

do know there are a lot of things we do at risk. It’s just nice to

know it, and, I mean, nice—I just think it’s important to know it.

Let me ask you, is there anything that we should have asked

that we didn’t? Is there anything that you would have liked to have

responded to that we didn’t ask? Anything you want to put on the

record?

Mr. CONNOR. Mr. Chairman we would love to put in the record

our thanks to Mr. Ruppersberger for his great support of the Red

Cross and his statement on the floor of the House last week for

March as Red Cross month. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s probably the most important thing that happened all day today, that you thanked him.

Dr. CARAFANO. I’d just like to reiterate a call that I think we

need to pay much more attention to educating the next generation

of State and local and Federal leaders on how to do preparedness

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better, how to do response better, and it’s a serious education challenge that I don’t think we’ve fully taken on.

Mr. ALLEN. I just want to commend the chairman and this committee for addressing this issue, the whole issue of public warning.

I think it’s because so many people are involved, and nobody has

been in charge of it. And somebody needs to pay attention to it, and

we commend you for doing so.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. We’re not going to let up on it, and we

do know we have people of good will, but we do think politics is

kind of interfering, in some cases, with good judgment, regretfully,

and I just think that we just need to keep plugging away at it, and

I thank you all for providing us tremendous data and information

and opinion. Thank you.

This hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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