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S. Hrg. 109–735

CHALLENGES IN A CATASTROPHE:

EVACUATING NEW ORLEANS IN ADVANCE

OF HURRICANE KATRINA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2006

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T.FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

DAVID F. PORTER, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel 

STACEY M. BOSSHARDT, Minority Counsel 

DAVID M. BERICK, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 17

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 19

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 21

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2006

Hon. Johnny B. Bradberry, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development ...................................................................................... 7

Colonel Terry J. Ebbert, Director, Homeland Security and Public Safety for 

the City of New Orleans ...................................................................................... 9

Walter S. Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jefferson Parish Department of Emergency Management .............................................................................................. 11

Jimmy Guidry, M.D., Medical Director and State Health Officer, Louisiana 

Department of Health and Hospitals ................................................................. 28

Kevin U. Stephens, M.D., J.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department ..... 31

Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Association ........................................................................................................................ 33

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bradberry, Hon. Johnny B.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement with supplemental testimony ........................................ 47

Donchess, Joseph A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 104

Ebbert, Colonel Terry J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70

Guidry, Jimmy, M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 28

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 81

Responses to post-hearing questions .............................................................. 98

Maestri, Walter S., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 76

Stephens, Kevin U., M.D., J.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 31

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 99

APPENDIX 

Exhibit 2 titled ‘‘State of Louisiana, Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, April 2005,’’ submitted 

by Senator Lieberman ......................................................................................... 107

Exhibit 8 titled ‘‘Memorandum of Understanding’’ (Draft) submitted by Senator Lieberman ..................................................................................................... 129

Exhibit 13, e-mail referred to by Senator Collins ................................................. 167

(1)

CHALLENGES IN A CATASTROPHE: 

EVACUATING NEW ORLEANS IN ADVANCE 

OF HURRICANE KATRINA 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, 

Lautenberg, and Pryor. 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Good morning. Today, we face a special challenge in conducting 

this hearing because the full Senate is scheduled to vote on Judge 

Alito at 11 o’clock. 

The leaders of the Senate have requested that we all be in our 

seats for the vote, as opposed to the usual way, where we run in 

and run back. So I will recess the hearing temporarily between 

10:55 until 11:25, when we will resume. 

In light of these constraints, I am going to ask our witnesses to 

make their opening statements a bit shorter than they normally 

would be, with the assurance that their full statements will be included in the hearing record. I am also going to give only an abbreviated opening statement, and I, too, will put my full statement in 

the hearing record. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. Today, the Committee continues its investigation into the preparation for and response to Hurricane 

Katrina. The focus of today’s hearing will be on the pre-storm evacuation of the greater New Orleans area in general, as well as on 

the special challenges faced by hospitals, nursing homes, and other 

facilities that care for people with special needs. 

In the days following Katrina’s landfall, the Nation—indeed, the 

world—watched their televisions in horror as tens of thousands of 

people in New Orleans scrambled to the roofs of their homes to escape the rapidly rising water and await rescue. Some residents 

crowded onto the dry asphalt islands of highway off-ramps, where 

they remained for far too long, or suffered in the hot, dirty, and 

undersupplied Superdome and Convention Center. 

2

Confronted with these heartbreaking and infuriating images, we 

all asked, ‘‘How could such a thing happen?’’ Why were so many 

left behind? What was the city’s plan for evacuating those who 

were too frail or too ill or who lacked the means to evacuate themselves? 

We hope today to understand better the answers to those and 

other troubling questions. This is the Committee’s 13th hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina. Of all the lessons to be learned from Katrina, 

effective evacuation to escape a looming catastrophe is among the 

most urgent. 

The initial evacuation from New Orleans in advance of the storm 

went relatively well. Approximately 1 million people left the greater New Orleans area in a much more efficient and orderly manner 

than in hurricane evacuations of years past. 

Then, so to speak, the wheels came off. Those without access to 

transportation out of the region found themselves stranded, high 

and dry, but only in the figurative sense. Among those left behind 

were thousands of elderly, disabled, and disadvantaged residents. 

A central purpose of this hearing is to learn why the responsible 

government agencies failed to make adequate arrangements for 

those who needed help with transportation or who were too ill or 

too frail to leave on their own. Why did so many buses sit idle? 

Why weren’t trains used? Why weren’t those in hospitals and nursing homes made more of a priority? 

Some of the most horrific problems in the immediate aftermath 

of Katrina were at hospitals and nursing homes. Such essentials as 

safe drinking water and fuel for emergency generators were quickly 

depleted. The difficulty inherent in moving patients and nursing 

home residents only became worse as the city flooded. And the loss 

of dozens of lives at nursing homes illustrates the awful consequences of a broken system. 

We must examine the adequacy of the plans for these facilities 

and why they did not evacuate their patients sooner and seemed 

to be so ill-prepared to meet such basic needs. The particular aspect of Hurricane Katrina that we take up today encapsulates all 

that went wrong with our preparation and response. 

Accurate predictions of the consequences of such a storm were in 

hand, and considerable planning had been undertaken to address 

those consequences. Yet that knowledge and effort were overwhelmed by a lack of coordination, by governmental complacency, 

and at times by utter dereliction of duty. The result was incomprehensible and unnecessary suffering, deprivation, and even loss of 

life. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Today, the Committee continues its investigation into the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The focus of today’s hearing will be on the pre-storm 

evacuation of the greater New Orleans area in general, as well as on the special 

challenges faced by hospitals, nursing homes, and other facilities that care for people with special needs. 

In the days following Katrina’s landfall, the nation—indeed, the world—watched 

their televisions in horror as tens of thousands of people in New Orleans scrambled 

to the roofs of their homes to escape the rapidly rising water and await rescue. some 

residents crowded onto the dry asphalt islands of highway on-ramps, where they remained for far too long, or suffered in the hot, dirty, and undersupplied Superdome 

3

and Convention Center. Confronted with these heartbreaking and infuriating images, we all asked: How could such a thing happen? Why were so many left behind? 

What was the City’s plan for evacuating those who were frail or ill or who lacked 

the means to evacuate themselves? 

We hope today to get answers to those and other troubling questions. This is the 

Committee’s thirteenth hearing on Hurricane Katrina. Of all the lessons to be 

learned from Katrina, effective evacuation to escape a looming catastrophe is among 

the most urgent. 

The initial evacuation from New Orleans in advance of the storm went relatively 

well. Approximately one million people left the greater New Orleans area in a much 

more efficient and orderly manner than in hurricane evacuations of years past. It 

appeared that the State of Louisiana’s phased evacuation plan, which was revamped 

in response to a flawed exodus for Hurricane Ivan a year earlier, worked quite well. 

Then, so to speak, the wheels came off. Those without access to transportation out 

of the region found themselves stranded, high and dry, but only in the figurative 

sense. Among those left behind were thousands of elderly, disabled, and disadvantaged residents. A central purpose of this hearing is to learn why the responsible 

government agencies failed to make adequate arrangements for those who needed 

help with transportation or who were too ill or too frail to leave on their own. Why 

did so many buses sit idle? Why weren’t trains used? Why weren’t those in hospitals 

and nursing homes made more of a priority? 

Our witnesses today will provide valuable insight into these issues. The first 

panel will discuss general evacuation procedures and the arrangements made for 

those who could not, or would not, evacuate. the second panel will focus specifically 

on health-care facilities. 

Among the specific questions we will seek answers to are these: 

What factors contributed to the general success of the motor vehicle mass evacuation from the greater New Orleans area? From the pre-positioning of gasoline for 

motorists who might run out to the refinement of the traffic-management technique 

known as contra-flow, this is one of the very few positive stories regarding Katrina 

preparation. 

Why did the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Louisiana 

Department of Transportation and Development fail to make adequate arrangements in advance for the pre-storm, mass transit evacuation of residents without 

access to motor vehicles? Transportation concerns were raised in the Hurricane Pam 

exercise, yet no final or workable arrangements were made to ensure reliable 

sources of buses and drivers for the evacuation. 

The Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that the City of New Orleans would flood 

in a storm of the magnitude and path of Katrina. Given this widely known prediction, why was the only designated shelter for people in the region who did not 

evacuate a refuge of last resort at the Superdome? Given that plan, why was the 

Superdome so ill equipped and poorly supplied to serve as a full-scale shelter? 

Some of the most horrific problems in the immediate aftermath of Katrina were 

at hospitals and nursing homes. Such essentials as safe drinking water and fuel for 

emergency generators were quickly depleted. The difficulty inherent in moving patients and nursing home residents only became worse once the City flooded. And 

the loss of dozens of lives at nursing homes illustrates the awful consequences of 

a broken system. We must examine the adequacy of the plans for these facilities, 

and why they did not evacuate their patients sooner and were so ill prepared to 

meet such basic needs. 

The particular aspect of Hurricane Katrina that we take up today encapsulates 

all that went wrong with our preparation and response. Accurate predictions of the 

consequences of such a storm were in hand, and considerable planning had been undertaken to address those consequences. Yet that knowledge and effort were overwhelmed by a lack of coordination, by governmental complacency, and, at times, by 

utter dereliction of duty. 

The result was incomprehensible and unnecessary suffering, deprivation, and 

death. It produced those appalling televised images that shocked the world. Those 

images are now a part of history, a history that must never be repeated.

Senator COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Good morning 

to you and our witnesses. 

I am going to follow your example, a good one, and ask that my 

full statement be included in the record and just draw from it here. 

4

Today’s hearing on the evacuation of New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina made landfall last August is a story of tragic, maddening, and ultimately fatal consequences of unmet responsibilities 

by all levels of government—city, State, and Federal. 

The warnings of the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise that we 

have focused on in this Committee, that a hundred thousand people at least in New Orleans had no means to evacuate and that 

thousands more would be immobilized by infirmity or age, appear 

to have been received at all levels of government, but at all levels 

of government just about nothing was done about those warnings. 

No one acted to ensure that the pre-landfall evacuation of New 

Orleans would be aggressive, let alone complete. Not the city, 

whose citizens were at risk. Not the State, which was responsible 

under the plan for arranging transportation for evacuees. And not 

the Federal Government, which had the authority to assist in the 

event of a catastrophe but instead stood on the sidelines as the 

hurricane approached. 

Our first panel will describe the efforts that were made and, 

frankly, those that were not at the local and State levels to get the 

citizens of New Orleans and the surrounding areas out of harm’s 

way as Katrina approached. 

Our second panel today will look at the role of State and city 

health officials in preparing for and responding to the unique 

threats faced by the sick and infirm. There was no State program 

to deal with health care facilities other than hospitals. 

Our investigators found, for example, that nursing homes, which 

had severe difficulties evacuating their patients in previous hurricanes, had never been briefed by the State on changes made to 

evacuation procedures for the 2005 hurricane season. Although 

nursing homes are required by the State to have emergency preparedness plans, the State of Louisiana apparently neither reviews 

nor enforces those plans. 

For years, doubts about the effectiveness of the plans have been 

raised, as they were again during the Pam exercise. In fact, one of 

the recommendations of that exercise was to establish a task force 

to assess nursing home emergency plans. I suppose it will surprise 

no one to hear that this was never done. 

Why wasn’t there a comprehensive plan for all patient populations? Why did the city, State, and Federal emergency managers 

simply assume hospitals and nursing homes could cope with a catastrophic hurricane on their own with no need of assistance? Those 

are some very important questions that need answering, hopefully 

today and certainly before the next catastrophe occurs. 

Madam Chairman, the searing pictures of those who were left behind in New Orleans—at the Superdome, the Convention Center, 

on the I–10 overpass, and in flooded medical facilities—are images 

that riveted the Nation, embarrassed and angered us. They remain 

with us. 

Emergency planning that does not make provisions for society’s 

most vulnerable—the aged, the sick, and the poor—is not just operationally unacceptable, it is morally unacceptable. These questions 

form the backdrop for all of our Katrina hearings, but particularly 

for our hearing today about what was done and not done to evacuate people from New Orleans prior to the storm. 

5

Thank you. I look forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Thanks, Madame Chairman. Today’s hearing on the evacuation of New Orleans 

before Hurricane Katrina made landfall last August is a story of the tragic, maddening, and ultimately fatal consequences of unmet responsibilities by all levels of 

government—city, State, and Federal. 

In the days leading up to Katrina’s landfall, 85 percent of the city evacuated successfully—the 85 percent that were ambulatory and had, found, or could afford 

transportation, and had a place to stay. That is the one bright spot in this tale. But 

many of the city’s most vulnerable populations—the poor, the sick, and the aged—

were left behind. 

The city opened the Superdome as a refuge of last resort, but the Superdome was 

ill equipped to accommodate the tens of thousands who would flock there in desperation to escape the rising flood waters. Hospitals and nursing homes—filled with 

the sick and the frail—were left to fend for themselves. The fleet of 600 buses that 

emergency planners thought were needed to evacuate those who had no transportation of their own came too late to avoid unnecessary suffering. And shelter for 

those who were evacuated was woefully inadequate. 

The warnings of the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise that 100,000 people in New 

Orleans had no means to evacuate—and that thousands more would be immobilized 

by infirmity or age—appear to have been received at all levels of government. But 

just about nothing was done about them. 

No one acted to ensure that the pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans would be 

aggressive, let alone complete—not the city, whose citizens were at risk, not the 

State, which was responsible for arranging transportation for evacuees under the 

plan, and not the Federal Government which had the authority to assist in the 

event of a catastrophic event but instead stood on the sidelines as the hurricane approached. Our first panel today will describe the efforts that were made—and those 

that were not—at the local and State levels to get the citizens of New Orleans and 

the surrounding areas out of harm’s way as Katrina approached. 

At the city level, in 2001, officials appealed unsuccessfully to the State for assistance with its evacuation. In 2004 and 2005, a group of enterprising city officials 

began to contract with a variety of transportation companies. But they never signed 

those contracts before Katrina struck. 

At the State level, the Department of Transportation and Development had been 

designated as the lead agency responsible for securing transportation for the 

100,000 without it. But, as State Transportation Secretary Johnny Bradberry told 

our investigators, the department objected to that designation, and the task was 

imply and starkly left undone. 

As for the Federal Government, a U.S. Department of Transportation official who 

attended a Pam workshop worried before all the participants at a Hurricane Pam 

workshop that DOT had completed less than 10 percent of its planning to fully evacuate New Orleans. And on the day before Katrina’s landfall, a FEMA report was 

circulated that noted the 100,000 people with no way out. Still, no meaningful actions to facilitate evacuation were taken by FEMA before the storm. 

FEMA officials have denied the agency has any responsibility for pre-storm evacuation and, in fact, played no role in evacuating New Orleans prior to landfall. But 

the Stafford Act, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Plan, 

and the Homeland Security Act all assign FEMA a broad support and coordinating 

role in catastrophic events. If FEMA has no role, why did it lead the evacuation of 

southeast Texas a few weeks later before Hurricane Rita struck? 

Government’s attempts to evacuate special needs patients in hospitals and nursing homes were equally ineffective. All levels of government assumed that medical 

staff would take responsibility for the care and evacuation of their patients in the 

event of a catastrophe. That led to scores of deaths—upwards of 100, according to 

press reports—and left thousands of others without adequate medical care for several days after Katrina landed, despite the best efforts of some of their care givers. 

Our second panel today will look at the role of State and city health officials in 

preparing for and responding to the unique threats faced by the sick and infirm. 

Unfortunately, we have no witness to describe the Federal role [because the Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal agency responsible for health care 

under the National Response Plan, has been frustratingly slow to respond to our 

requests for information and witnesses.] But I want to make it very clear that under 

the National Response Plan, HHS is given explicit responsibility for patient evacuation and for obtaining assistance from the Departments of Defense and TransporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:03 Jan 08, 2007 Jkt 026752 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\26752.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6

tation for that purpose. furthermore, it was FEMA’s responsibility to ensure that 

Federal resources were made available to the State. 

The State emergency plan had for years given the Louisiana State University 

Hospital Sciences Center the lead role in caring for hospital and nursing home patients and had designated the Health Science Center as the lead coordinator for private hospitals and other facilities. But the LSU Health Science Center never fulfilled these functions. 

to compound the situation, there was no State program to deal with health care 

facilities other than hospitals. Our investigators found, for example, that nursing 

homes, which had had severe difficulties evacuating their patients in previous hurricanes, had never been briefed by the State on changes made to evacuation procedures for the 2005 hurricane season. 

Although nursing homes are required by the State to have emergency preparedness plans, the State of Louisiana apparently neither reviews nor enforces these 

plans. For years, doubts about the effectiveness of these plans have been raised, as 

they were during the Pam exercise. One of the recommendations of Pam was to establish a task force to assess nursing home emergency plans. It will surprise no one 

to hear that this was never done. 

Why wasn’t there a comprehensive plan for all patient populations? Why did the 

city, State, and Federal emergency managers simply assume hospitals and nursing 

homes could cope with a catastrophic hurricane on their own, with no need of assistance? These are the questions that need answering before the next catastrophe occurs. The searing pictures of those who were left behind in New Orleans—at the Superdome, the Convention Center, on the I–10 overpass, and in flooded medical facilities—are images that remain with us. Emergency planning that does not make provisions for society’s most vulnerable—the aged, the sick, the poor—is not just operationally unacceptable. It is morally unacceptable. These questions form the backdrop for all of our Katrina hearings, but particularly for our hearing today. Thank 

you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Our first panel consists of officials at the State and local levels 

who played key roles in planning and carrying out the pre-storm 

evacuation. I want to thank each of you for joining us today and 

for your cooperation with the Committee’s investigation. 

Johnny Bradberry was appointed Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development in 2004. He leads a 

staff of approximately 5,000, with an annual budget of more than 

$2 billion. Under Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan, Mr. 

Bradberry’s Department is the lead agency for the management 

and coordination of transportation to facilitate evacuation in emergencies. 

Colonel Terry Ebbert is the Director of the Office of Homeland 

Security and Public Safety for the City of New Orleans, a position 

he has held since 2003. He was also our tour guide on our recent 

trip to New Orleans, and we appreciated his commentary. As Director, he has leadership responsibility for the City’s Police and 

Fire Departments, Emergency Medical Services, and Office of 

Emergency Management. 

Dr. Walter Maestri is the Director of Emergency Management 

and Homeland Security for Jefferson Parish and has served in that 

capacity since 1996. 

I would like to ask not only this panel of witnesses but the next 

panel to stand at this point so that I can swear all of you in for 

this hearing. So if the witnesses from the second panel would also 

stand and raise your right hand? 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

The WITNESSES. I do. 

7

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bradberry with supplemental testimony appears in the Appendix on page 47. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Secretary Bradberry, we are 

going to start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JOHNNY B. BRADBERRY,1 SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

AND DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. BRADBERRY. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and Committee Members. 

I am Johnny Bradberry, secretary of the Louisiana Department 

of Transportation and Development. Thank you for this opportunity 

to discuss Louisiana’s pre-hurricane evacuation preparations. 

I am here to talk about the hurricane evacuation plan that was 

in place for Hurricane Katrina. I also will tell you what actions we 

took before the storm, how my agency could have done a better job, 

and what I am doing to correct those shortcomings. I believe that 

those who fail to reap lessons learned from history are doomed to 

repeat its worst chapters. 

I worked in the oil and gas business in the private sector until 

April 2004, when I accepted Governor Kathleen Blanco’s challenge 

to lead the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. I am a native of Grand Isle, Louisiana’s only inhabited barrier island. 

As a teenager in 1965, my family and I evacuated our home because of Hurricane Betsy. The storm completely destroyed our 

home, and we were forced into exile during my sophomore year in 

high school. It was a defining moment in my life. 

That experience inspired me to do everything I can to help my 

neighbors who are going through that experience 41 years later. It 

also taught me to respect the destructive power of a hurricane, and 

I kept that lesson close to me before, during, and after Katrina. 

In 2004, Hurricane Ivan threatened Louisiana, and the New Orleans area evacuated under a new contraflow plan that utilized 

both sides of the interstate. We were lucky that Ivan spared Louisiana, but the 10- to 12-hour traffic jams to move 90 miles were 

unacceptable. 

DOTD learned a lesson about traffic management and set about 

coming up with a better plan. Specifically, Governor Blanco ordered 

the State police superintendent and me to develop a new evacuation plan that could quickly and safely get citizens out of harm’s 

way. Governor Blanco demanded that the new plan focus on what 

went wrong during the Ivan evacuation and how to solve those 

problems. 

We developed a plan using phased evacuations by zones, extensive traffic management, and an improved contraflow operation executed in partnership with the Mississippi Department of Transportation. In April 2005, local officials unanimously endorsed the 

plan. We began an aggressive and successful marketing campaign 

to educate citizens, and we distributed more than 1 million maps 

that explained the plan. 

Then came Katrina. On Friday morning, August 26, Katrina was 

considered mostly a threat to Florida. The eye was just northwest 

8

of Key West. Although Louisiana was not a projected target, DOTD 

began storm preparations. We put emergency personnel on alert 

status and prepared to immediately clear all evacuation routes. We 

coordinated pre-staging evacuation activities with State police, and 

we alerted Mississippi of our intention to implement contraflow if 

the storm came our way. 

At 11 p.m. on Friday, the National Weather Service first mentioned Louisiana as a possible Katrina target. At 7:30 a.m. Saturday, State and local officials coordinated a phased evacuation per 

the new plan, beginning with residents in the coastal areas. At approximately 3:30 p.m., contraflow began in conjunction with Phase 

III of the plan, and a full-scale evacuation was under way. 

By the time contraflow ended on Sunday evening, August 28, we 

had quickly and safely evacuated more than 1.3 million people 

without significant traffic delays. I am proud of the pre-evacuation 

results that my agency and the State police achieved during 

Katrina, but clearly, more could have been done. 

In the ESF–1 function, adopted just 7 weeks before Katrina 

struck, my agency for the first time was tasked with providing 

transportation assets to facilitate evacuation. Although this new 

ESF protocol was viewed by most in State government as a transitional plan that had not been fully vetted, discussed, or implemented, I should have charged my people with ensuring that officials on the local and/or Federal levels were performing that function if we were not prepared to fully execute that duty. 

Governor Blanco has made it clear to me and to all cabinet secretaries that we will be fully prepared to fulfill primary and support 

responsibilities of the new State plan for the 2006 hurricane season. DOTD will partner with communities in South Louisiana, including the City of New Orleans, to ensure that buses are staged 

in strategic locations to evacuate citizens who have no transportation. 

We also are in discussions with Amtrak about using their services, if needed, for evacuation. Another lesson learned is that it is 

critical for us to more closely coordinate all efforts with local and 

Federal authorities before, during, and after a disaster. To that 

end, I have hired a new full-time emergency coordinator for DOTD, 

and one of her tasks will be to strengthen relationships with relevant local and Federal officials to ensure future coordinated and 

appropriate response. 

And although I do not wish to lay blame at anyone’s doorstep, 

we should all keep in mind that had the levees held up, as we believed they were designed to, you and I would not be here today. 

Katrina still would have been a disastrous storm, but the real catastrophic damage is a direct result of the flood waters that poured 

through the failed levees. 

I also have a simple request today. We need help. We still do not 

have the commitment from the Federal level to make necessary upgrades to our levees to keep our citizens safe and allow them to return to their homes. We are doing as much as we can with the resources we have. However, we need help with legitimate needs for 

infrastructure upgrades to keep tragedies like this from happening 

again. 

9

1The prepared statement of Colonel Ebbert appears in the Appendix on page 70. 

As the horrible stories of misery, suffering, and death unfolded 

on television in the days immediately following Katrina, citizens 

asked how can this happen in America? Today, Louisiana’s citizens 

feel they have been abandoned a second time, and they are the 

ones asking how can this happen in America? 

In closing, it is natural for all of us to believe the fault lies with 

someone else. The real truth is Katrina moved faster than we did. 

All of us on the local, State, and the Federal levels were overwhelmed, undermined, and out-muscled by Mother Nature. The 

lesson learned is that local, State, and Federal entities need to 

work to do more to address evacuation of the 8 percent of the population who stayed. 

In closing, I am proud of my employees’ efforts before, during, 

and after Katrina. But it is incumbent on all of us at every level 

of government to examine our actions, admit our mistakes, and 

move forward with lessons learned. 

Thank you for your time. I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Colonel Ebbert. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL TERRY J. EBBERT,1 DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY FOR THE CITY 

OF NEW ORLEANS 

Colonel EBBERT. As an introduction, I am Colonel Terry Ebbert, 

the Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety for the City 

of New Orleans. 

I spent my adult life serving the citizens of this Nation and the 

City of New Orleans. I want to thank you for the invitation to testify before this Committee. 

Katrina was a natural disaster which overwhelmed operational 

capabilities, resources, and civil infrastructure at the local, State, 

and Federal level. Gone are homes, families, businesses, lives, and 

the unique lifestyle of Southeast Louisiana. 

Left behind to build the foundation for a future New Orleans is 

a city with little money, a crippled criminal justice system, an impaired levee protection system, lack of housing for 50 percent of its 

citizens, and a health care system clinging to life. I have lived with 

the beast Katrina for the last 5 months, but I have also been 

blessed with the opportunity to work with many of the finest first 

responders at every level of government. 

It is clear that this Nation needs to review Katrina planning, response, and recovery at every level to look at organizations with 

the intent to increase capability and compatibility. Katrina was an 

act of nature, and the impact was localized to a small population 

region of the United States. The next act could be a man-made act 

of terrorism. I believe our preparation and integrated joint responses must improve. 

The four parishes of Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and 

Orleans formed the Urban Area Security Initiative Region One for 

joint planning, training, and exercising of homeland security defined events. This includes weapons of mass destruction, all acts of 

terrorism, and natural disasters. 

10

Given the facts of our location on the Gulf Coast and being an 

island completely surrounded by water and limited egress routes 

out of New Orleans, our surrounding partners, along with ourselves, dedicated extensive time and effort in planning for hurricanes. The foundation of our efforts has been to develop effective 

evacuation plans. 

This is a challenge due to the limited time we have after a storm 

enters the Gulf, limited highways, and a large population with an 

anti-evacuation mentality. Driven by predictions of potential deaths 

in excess of 12,000, we worked hard with our regional and State 

partners to develop a plan and educate our citizens on its execution. We worked to refine this plan after storms over the past 2 

years. 

One of the lost success stories is the evacuation in advance of 

Katrina. This highly complex joint plan moved over 1.2 million people and saved over 10,000 lives. This was a two-state, eight-parish 

effort, which included multiple law enforcement agencies, emergency planning offices, local media, and volunteer organizations. 

The continued improvement of this plan will form the foundation 

of our planning for this coming year. We are currently reviewing 

the lessons learned and will update our plans, and we have three 

specific goals. 

Goal No. 1 is to provide greater support to the citizens who need 

special assistance. Goal No. 2 is to create and maintain an environment where the decision to evacuate becomes more desirable than 

remaining behind. And goal No. 3 is implement measures to provide greater enhancement of security resources to the city. 

I have two specific recommendations for Federal action, which 

would improve the national capability for mass evacuation and 

sheltering. One, task Amtrak to develop and maintain the capability to evacuate 5,000 special needs citizens from any metropolitan area in the case of a declared national emergency. Two, identify regional military bases undergoing BRAC closures and convert 

them to national shelters capable of housing at least 200,000 citizens. They could be activated through a joint U.S. NORTHCOM 

and FEMA command. 

Faced with the knowledge that we would be left with citizens 

without the ability to evacuate, we worked hard to develop a ‘‘refuge of last resort’’ for both citizens with special needs, citizens 

without transportation, and for those who recognized too late the 

serious nature of the storm. This plan was designed to begin after 

contraflow evacuation was shut down and a curfew imposed on the 

city. 

Our plan utilized RTA buses moving throughout the city, picking 

up citizens at pre-established checkpoints, and transporting them 

to the Superdome. All citizens were thoroughly searched by the National Guard troops upon entering the dome. Security was provided 

by both the National Guard and the New Orleans Police Department. The command of the Superdome was underneath the command of the Police Department. 

As planners, we recognized that in a major Category 4 or 5 

storm, we would lose power, sewer/water, and further evacuation 

with Federal assets would be required. The planning window for 

this relief response was within 48 hours. For all the difficulties, 

11

1The prepared statement of Mr. Maestri appears in the Appendix on page 76. 

this plan was a success. Many of the citizens in the dome would 

have become the predicted 12,000 deaths in the Hurricane Pam 

model. 

Much has been discussed about our relief response after the 

storm. I can assure you that this was a very difficult 7 days. I witnessed the best of human valor and the worst of human nature, 

but I want to state that I find no fault with any official at any 

level. Rather, the National Response Plan and the FEMA organization were totally overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster. 

I believe we must recognize that the administrative organization 

of FEMA, built around part-time contractors, has no operational capability to control large-scale emergency response. It needs to concentrate on recovery. 

Find a way to immediately utilize the only organization with the 

leadership, command and control capability, logistics movement 

centers, equipment, and training to accomplish large-scale response—the Department of Defense. A standing joint staff should 

be established as a mission of U.S. NORTHCOM. 

Develop a prepackaged capability for communications, food, 

water, fuel, medical, and other vital supplies. And ensure that 

early relief efforts are ‘‘push’’ rather than ‘‘pull.’’

This is the greatest Nation on Earth, and I know we can do better. I am dedicated to working with all of our State and Federal 

partners to ensure that we do get better. 

I want to give special thanks to Admiral Thad Allen, General 

Russel Honore ́, Admiral Robert Duncan, Captain Tom Atkin, General William Caldwell and his magnificent warriors from the 82nd 

Airborne, along with the FBI and the other law enforcement agencies. The only question any of these officials ever asked me was, 

‘‘Terry, what do you need and want?’’

America is blessed and lucky to have such leadership, and I am 

privileged to have been given the opportunity to have walked beside them. 

I can only reflect on Katrina. My concern is my responsibility to 

the Mayor and the citizens of New Orleans. I must continue, as an 

individual, to learn from my mistakes and hold myself accountable. 

We are currently looking down the gun barrel of the 2006 hurricane season due to begin June 1. We are projected another ‘‘super 

storm’’ season ahead, and we need your support. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and Committee Members. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Dr. Maestri. 

TESTIMONY OF WALTER S. MAESTRI, Ph.D.,1 DIRECTOR, JEFFERSON PARISH DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Mr. MAESTRI. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am Walter 

Maestri, Director of the Department of Emergency Management in 

Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. 

I am honored to have the opportunity to appear before you this 

morning to discuss the problems inherent in evacuating metropolitan New Orleans. It is an issue that all emergency planners and 

12

response personnel—local, State, and Federal—have focused on 

during the past 10 years. Please allow me to provide some historical background on this problem. 

In 1992, when Hurricane Andrew slammed into the Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana coasts, it not only devastated 

those coasts, it also caused all the plans emergency managers had 

developed for the evacuation of those coastal States to be scrapped. 

Andrew demonstrated that ‘‘vertical evacuation,’’ which was the 

major evacuation tool operational in those plans, was not an acceptable solution. 

From that time forward, all of the Gulf Coast States and a significant number of the Atlantic Coast States would be forced to 

physically evacuate their coastal populations. The only remaining 

functional question was the distance from the coastline required to 

move the population to ensure that they would survive. 

Immediately, therefore, new plans were drafted, evacuation studies were commissioned by Federal and State agencies, and strategies were discussed and developed, which would provide for the actual physical movement of the affected population. This effort was 

further complicated by the fact that the American National Red 

Cross began implementing a policy of not sheltering individuals in 

recognized flood inundation zones. 

In Louisiana, these new plans and strategies demanded that the 

majority of the population of the most densely populated region of 

the State be moved, approximately 1.2 million individuals. And furthermore, this population had to be moved a minimum of 35 miles 

to assure that they would leave the flood inundation zone as documented by FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ SLOSH 

model. 

The point I wish to emphasize is that from 1992 forward, all 

agencies of the local, State, and Federal Governments knew that 

actual physical evacuation was necessary to guarantee the safety 

of the New Orleans metropolitan area. Furthermore, beginning in 

1994, the evacuation studies ordered by both the State and the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recognized that a significant portion 

of the population of the area did not have adequate means of transportation, which would allow them to evacuate. 

In addition, these same studies recognized that it would take a 

minimum of 60 hours to have a real chance of evacuating this population. Simply put, everyone involved realized the enormity of the 

task contemplated and that special strategies would be necessary. 

In the decade leading up to the now infamous Hurricane Pam exercise, numerous officials of all government agencies addressed the 

enormity of the task. Following on Hurricane Georges in 1998, a 

near-miss wake-up call for the New Orleans metropolitan area, the 

Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force and the Louisiana State 

Police and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development updated the evacuation plan for Southeast Louisiana and 

included within it for the first time the contraflow strategy in an 

attempt to reduce the clearance time necessary for the area. 

Although all involved with this first contraflow plan believed 

that it would shave a few hours off the clearance times, once again 

the lack of effective transportation for up to 100,000 residents of 

the area raised its head. From 1998 on, in every exercise, presenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:03 Jan 08, 2007 Jkt 026752 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\26752.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13

tation, and meeting where evacuation was discussed, this issue was 

prominent. 

At the Hurricane Pam exercise first sessions in 2004, all participants recognized the evacuation problem and, specifically, the lack 

of effective transportation for a large segment of the population as 

crucial to the planning for metropolitan New Orleans in a major 

hurricane. Ron Castleman, FEMA Region VI Director in 2004, 

identified the Pam exercise as the major planning tool available to 

create a bridge between local, State, and Federal evacuation and 

recovery plans. 

And although during those initial sessions of the exercise evacuation was not directly addressed, it was foremost in the minds of 

all involved. Pam allowed the local and State officials to identify 

the resources necessary to achieve the survival of the metro area 

and its residents and the fact that they were not available in the 

State and local arsenal. 

In fact, during the conference calls that took place between local, 

State, and Federal officials before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, reference was made to the Pam decisions and recommendations regarding pre-positioning of transportation resources for evacuation of the citizens without adequate personal transportation 

abilities. 

We all know the result of the failure to provide those resources. 

And while I understand the necessity of investigation and analysis 

of what occurred and who was responsible for it, I respectfully request that the Committee consider using this catastrophic event as 

a method to identify what can be done to evacuate and shelter the 

citizens of any major metropolitan area in the Nation if a major 

disaster occurs. 

In closing, I want to sincerely thank the Committee for the opportunity to share with it my understanding of these events. I can 

assure the Committee that the elected and appointed officials of 

Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, stand ready to join with them and the 

President of the United States in assuring that such a catastrophe 

never happens again. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your excellent testimony. 

Colonel, as Hurricane Katrina was approaching, for the first time 

in the city’s history, a mandatory evacuation order was issued. The 

Mayor’s staff has told us that the Mayor made the decision to issue 

that order on Saturday morning. Yet it was not actually issued 

until Sunday morning, a loss arguably of 24 critical hours. 

Could you tell us what happened during that day and why there 

was a delay in issuing the mandatory evacuation order once the decision had been made? 

Colonel EBBERT. Throughout the day Saturday, one of the difficulties of dealing with a mandatory evacuation was the definition 

of ‘‘mandatory evacuation’’ and the complexity of issuing orders to 

agencies without the capability of carrying them out. 

And in particular, there was great discussion throughout that 

day, when we looked at the large population we had in our hotels 

and the large population we had in our hospital system, about placing the mandatory evacuation on people without them having the 

capability to evacuate themselves or government having the capability to evacuate them. 

14

We finally reworked that into the night, and the final declaration, which was announced, finally exempted those two particular 

areas from mandatory evacuation. So that took a great deal of the 

time. 

But one of the positive things during that time, we had already 

worked with the State and the local agencies to start our threephased evacuation, which was under control throughout Saturday. 

And as we moved into Sunday, the traffic was already flowing, and 

there was no great increase from the voluntary evacuation phase 

that we had gone through, that the Mayor and the media had 

helped communicate to the public. 

But the delay was basically designed in and occurred because of 

the difficulties with doing something that we had not done before. 

And that is one of the challenges that we face this year is we have 

to, ahead of time: One, decide what mandatory evacuation means. 

Two, what measures, legal measures, are we going to utilize to 

carry it out? Are we going to force people with police out of their 

particular homes? And then, three, ensure that when we issue the 

order that we have the capability to move those people. 

Chairman COLLINS. Yesterday at our hearing, we heard from a 

police officer who was very involved in search and rescue operations. He also helped to compile an after-action report that was 

completed by the command staff of the New Orleans Police Department. 

It specifically noted the lack of a unified command and was quite 

critical, as you are well aware, of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. In fact, the summary section of the report includes an 

entry which reads, ‘‘Total failure of OEP.’’ One the captains on the 

command staff wrote in his report, ‘‘OEP needs to be revamped.’’ 

Another captain wrote, ‘‘Unified command was never established.’’

A third captain wrote, ‘‘The Office of Emergency Preparedness 

needs to be revamped. If their role is to have us prepared to handle 

a disaster such as this, they FAILED. They lacked a plan, did not 

provide the necessary equipment, provided no direction or leadership.’’

This is language directly from three of the city’s first responders, 

and they are those who launched the search and rescue operations 

to save the lives of New Orleans residents. How do you respond to 

the criticisms in that report? 

Colonel EBBERT. I think there are some valid criticisms in that 

report. I think those officers, especially Captain Bayard who testified yesterday, is a wonderful police officer who is dedicated to his 

duty, who carried out his mission with the capabilities that he was 

given. 

Equipment, I agree with. But I think we need to go back and 

then, as the homeland security committee, look at the definition of 

what I am able to purchase and what I am not able to purchase 

with the money that the Federal Government gives me. 

Life-saving boats and motors were turned down by the Department of Homeland Security under our grant program. Twice training that I requested for search and rescue, waterborne training for 

fire and police, was turned down because it did not meet the parameters of the defined grant process. 

15

So I think we need to look hard as a Nation in these dollars to 

provide all-hazards approach. Not just weapons of mass destruction, not just terrorism, but utilize those dollars to the special 

needs of different communities throughout the Nation. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman, and thanks to 

the witnesses. 

Dr. Maestri, I thought that your opening statement was very 

helpful. And in some sense, your painstaking review, from your 

own experience over the years, of the various warnings about what 

happened and the need to do something to evacuate those who 

could not evacuate themselves is painful. 

In that statement, you referred to the ‘‘conference calls that took 

place between local, State, and Federal officials before Hurricane 

Katrina made landfall.’’ I want to ask you a specific question, 

which is, was Dr. Mayfield on those calls? 

Mr. MAESTRI. At times, Dr. Mayfield was on those calls. He certainly had representation on all of those calls. The National Weather Service begins the conference calls by going through and telling 

us the present state of the hurricane. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And therefore, I presume that representatives at the Federal level of FEMA were on the calls? Representatives of the Governor and the Mayor were also on the calls? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And can you tell us in a little more detail 

when those calls began? How soon before Monday, August 29, when 

Katrina hit landfall? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Approximately 3 days before the hurricane made 

landfall. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So it would be Friday? 

Mr. MAESTRI. That is correct. Those conference calls began, in 

fact, late Thursday afternoon and then began in earnest on Friday 

morning. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do I understand correctly from my staff 

that you have had a long-time professional association with Dr. 

Mayfield? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Yes. I have known Max Mayfield for approximately 

10 years. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And did he call you directly, in addition to the conference calls you were on? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Yes, Senator. I received two phone calls from Max 

Mayfield, one earlier in the week. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you remember what day it was? 

Mr. MAESTRI. It was probably Monday or Tuesday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. A full week or a little bit less before the 

hurricane? 

Mr. MAESTRI. That is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MAESTRI. And it was a warning that this was, in his opinion, 

a very serious storm and a storm not to be ignored at all levels. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you—I am sorry. Go right ahead. 

Mr. MAESTRI. Then, again, I received a phone call on Friday, and 

it was a phone call that, truthfully, changed my life and the life 

of the entire metropolitan New Orleans area. Because in that 

16

phone call, he told me that he was now convinced that the storm 

was coming to New Orleans, that it would make landfall, in his 

opinion, as a Category 4 or 5 storm, and that it was, in his words, 

‘‘the big one.’’

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MAESTRI. This is the one that we had been waiting for. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So it is fair to say that there was no 

ambiguity in his warnings? 

Mr. MAESTRI. I saw no ambiguity at all. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And those were calls as of late Thursday, I 

believe you said, on which Federal, State, and local representatives 

were present? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Correct, Senator. In fact, at the conference call 

that followed with the other members of the southeast task force, 

I elaborated to them, because of my personal relationship with 

Max, what he had shared with me. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. In those conference calls, did Dr. 

Mayfield, to the best of your recollection, specifically speak to the 

need for pre-storm evacuation? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Absolutely. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you recall what he said? 

Mr. MAESTRI. He told me personally for Jefferson Parish to make 

sure that the elected officials understood the upcoming events and 

what they could mean, the catastrophe, and to implement and to 

use all authority that I had to implement the evacuation of the 

metropolitan area. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you know whether Dr. Mayfield made 

other calls to individuals in the area that he knew, in addition to 

the conference calls? 

Mr. MAESTRI. I know that he asked me for the telephone numbers and/or means of contacting other elected officials and appointed officials in Southeastern Louisiana because he wished to 

share with them that, in his opinion, this was an extremely serious 

hurricane and one not to be taken lightly. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. He is a real professional, as anybody who 

has met him knows, but also as we watched him on the TV leading 

up to Katrina. Can you describe his mood as you heard it on the 

phone calls? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Senator, I smile because I have known Max for 

many years, as I indicated. And Max Mayfield does not give those 

warnings lightly. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MAESTRI. When he called me and told me what to expect and 

what, in his opinion, was coming, I took it very seriously, and I 

think anyone who spoke to him did. I immediately called the elected local officials together, briefed them on what he had told me, 

and indicated that, therefore, in my opinion, I thought it was necessary for us to take all effective steps then to begin preparations 

for a very serious event. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In some sense, to use the convenient historical metaphor, Dr. Mayfield became the Paul Revere of Hurricane 

Katrina. My impression is not just on television, but he was so personally agitated by what his scientific knowledge told him was 

coming that he just was calling anybody he knew or anybody in auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:03 Jan 08, 2007 Jkt 026752 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\26752.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17

thority in the Gulf Coast to warn people that this was the big one. 

This was the worst. 

How do you explain—and again, we focused on Hurricane Pam, 

the fictional exercise. You have described the specific warnings 

and, in this case, the focus of this hearing, the compelling need for 

pre-storm evacuation for those who couldn’t evacuate themselves, 

particularly. But here now, we have Dr. Mayfield in the days leading up, saying, ‘‘This is it.’’

It seems to me, he couldn’t have done anything more than if he 

had taken a two-by-four and hit people over the head. Why wasn’t 

something more concrete done to provide for the pre-storm evacuation of the poor, of the aged, of the infirm? 

Mr. MAESTRI. First and foremost, our problem in Jefferson Parish is not as significant as that in the city. But I think——

Senator LIEBERMAN. You mean because of the population? 

Mr. MAESTRI. That is correct. Because of the economic differential. Jefferson Parish is the quintessential bedroom community suburb surrounding a metropolitan area in the United States. 

But I think the issue that you are asking about has to do with 

the available resources. And the problem that we faced and the 

problem that had been identified, and I think the problem that continues, Senator, is that metropolitan areas in the United States do 

not have and/or control the resources necessary to effectively and 

physically evacuate that population without personal transportation assets to move themselves. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up. I would like to come back to 

that. Thanks very much, Mr. Maestri. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

My question to you Colonel Ebbert, first I wish to say how grateful we are as a Nation for your distinguished service to our country 

during the U.S. Marine Corps. 

Colonel EBBERT. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. And I saw that you were commanding officer 

of the Basic School. And one of my teachers in life was Colonel 

Leftwich, who was my EA, as you may recall? 

Colonel EBBERT. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. This is a technical question, but it is one I 

have been pursuing for some time with the Secretary of Defense, 

and they are studying it. And that is the doctrine of posse comitatus. And for those who are not familiar, that doctrine prohibits 

active duty, regular military from participating with local law enforcement in a variety of functions, primarily those of apprehending citizens for alleged infractions of the law. 

Now as we watched the tragic events unfold as a consequence of 

this hurricane, the local National Guards and others came in. The 

active duty forces came in. And you presumably had an opportunity 

to observe them. As a matter of fact, in earlier statements, you 

have praised them for their extraordinary service, and I think it is 

recognized across America that the uniformed individuals performed as best they could to help and with great commendation. 

18

But did the inability of the active forces to participate with the 

Guard in such incidents as may have occurred with regard to law 

enforcement, was that an impediment? And should this country reexamine the doctrine of posse comitatus in the light of this tragedy 

to see whether or not some exceptions should be written into that 

law? 

I have written to the Secretary of Defense on this subject and 

urged that this issue be reviewed. And I am just wondering if you 

had any firsthand observations and any opinion that you would 

like to contribute? 

Colonel EBBERT. I think that there is through this trying time, 

we have already seen a model start to evolve, and I believe that 

you can jointly operate in an environment, which we finally came 

into being about Saturday after the storm. 

And that was with the Office of Homeland Security through the 

Coast Guard and Admiral Thad Allen being the principal Federal 

official. The National Guard and the Title X regular forces both reporting up that chain of command into a joint command, without 

placing the active duty forces in charge of the National Guard. 

I do believe that we need to go back and review all these items. 

We did not have an issue once we got on the ground with General 

Caldwell. We were fully aware of what his authorization in the way 

of law enforcement capability was, and we did not put those 82nd 

Airborne troops in a law enforcement mode. We used the National 

Guard and the NOPD to enter homes when we were searching and 

rescuing, where they had to make forced entry. But we used the 

Guard and the NOPD to do that. 

Where the 82nd came in was just the presence, the arrival of the 

presence of one of our most distinguished divisions in the U.S. 

Army had a calming effect on the population. It had a calming effect on those first responders who were coming from outside areas 

to assist us. And I think that it brought order and discipline to a 

city that was struggling. It also showed hope that the Federal Government was on the scene and providing resources to help us in 

dire need. 

But I do believe that you can do this without putting Title X 

forces in the line of fire in law enforcement, but still put them in 

the line of fire. They are the only organization that has the command and control, radios, people, logistics movement. 

We never had a logistics movement center ever in this operation. 

We never set up the joint command center because we didn’t have 

those capabilities. All those are inherent in the regular forces. 

Senator WARNER. Let me just give you this example. Often they 

operated together, the Guard and the regular forces. And the uniforms, as you well know, are so similar that a citizen cannot, in the 

urgency of the moment, distinguish. And if a citizen needed help 

and he went to a joint patrol, and it required some law enforcement activities, the regular soldiers would have to step back and 

allow the Guard to perform the missions. 

And that could be misunderstood, and it could lead to confusion. 

But so far as you know, that didn’t occur? 

Colonel EBBERT. That didn’t occur, but it is a very distinct possibility that I think it be prudent to look at those special needs when 

19

you place those Title X troops in a situation where, beyond their 

control, they may be faced with that type of an issue. 

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator Lautenberg, I would invite you to go ahead with your 

questions now. I am going to leave for the floor. And if Senator 

Carper wants to stay and do his questions, I would just ask you 

recess the Committee until 11:25, or you will have an opportunity 

afterwards because we will have a second round, whichever your 

preference. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So, do I understand it correctly that you 

are prepared to adjourn now, pick up where we are? 

Chairman COLLINS. Yes. But if you want to——

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I think it would be a good idea because to rush through such an important array of witnesses——

Chairman COLLINS. I think so, too. 

Senator LAUTENBERG [continuing]. That I would like to have a 

chance to talk to them. 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will stand in recess until 

11:25. At that time, we will resume with Senator Lautenberg’s 

questions. 

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m. the Committee was recessed, to reconvene at 11:25 a.m. the same day.] 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Again, I 

thank the witnesses for remaining so that we could resume the 

questioning. 

And we left off with Senator Lautenberg, so I would call upon 

him. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I start by—

as soon as I catch my breath from running down the hall. [Laughter.] 

I start by calling attention to the fact that Amtrak or an alternative method of transportation creeps into so many emergency situations. Notably, the worst catastrophe that we had on our land 

when the trade towers were taken down on September 11. 

And we learned then that Amtrak was the only remaining transportation access that we had. Aviation had shut down. Impossible 

to leave. And we see it again now in Katrina that, Colonel Ebbert, 

your commentary strikes me as being right on, hitting the nail on 

the head. 

And when I think of, Madam Chairman, I would hope that one 

day we would have a hearing on the relative value for our security 

interests in the role that Amtrak would play, and I hope that we 

will be able to do that in the not too distant future. 

Colonel Ebbert, I noted in your testimony that one of the things 

that you called for in a several-point program was to have an Amtrak available that would permit evacuation of 5,000 people. Well, 

I think that is a perfectly obvious, reasonable request whenever 

any kind of a situation calling for evacuation is there. 

But right now, what we face is the determination to have Amtrak abandon its national mission and peel off to segments, depending largely on the States and the States financing. What might it 

20

be like without an Amtrak standing by? Even though at the time 

of Katrina, we had an empty train, Mr. Bradberry, waiting for people to board and get out of there, and we had room for 600 on the 

train, only 100 showed up. There was so much confusion. 

What do you think about the notion, do you think our country’s 

security might be impaired in any way if Amtrak or a national rail 

system were not in place? 

Colonel EBBERT. In answer to your question, Senator, I believe 

that we have a capability that we have not utilized effectively. I 

think that we have basically a federally supported commercial system of Amtrak, which has capability across the Nation to assist in 

this very serious nature of mass evacuation. And I think that we 

need to look at—currently, we try to work that at a local level, and 

we are at the bottom of the barrel working up. 

And we have had——

Senator LAUTENBERG. I heard you—forgive me because time is so 

short. I heard you and your colleagues at the table call for more 

Federal resources, more help. 

Dr. Maestri, simple things like communications equipment? If 

you are an emergency response organization, we had that terrible 

thing at the World Trade Center when fire departments couldn’t 

communicate with police departments or with their own departments. The Federal Government ought to complete its mission in 

protecting our citizens and not just do it overseas, but do it within 

the country. 

So I think we would be far worse off in terms of our ability to 

manage our desperate needs for evacuation. And by the way, there 

is no exclusive on having the kind of things that we have seen, either from terrorists or natural disaster, or how about a nuclear 

plant? We abandoned two nuclear plants in this country at great 

cost after they were built, ready to function, because we found out 

that we couldn’t get people out of there if we had to get them out. 

My God, what do we have to do to make sure that we have a 

facility capable to respond to emergencies like that? Mr. Bradberry, 

and I noticed something that you said in commentary in the past, 

and that was that your Department of Transportation could not be, 

did I understand correctly, a transit agency? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. We are not a transit agency. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, how does that square with your obligation to provide transportation access for the people in your 

State? When you say you are not a transit agency, doesn’t it go beyond simply the definition of transit to say, ‘‘Hey, our mission is 

to carry people, place to place.’’ And particularly when a disaster 

like the one you witnessed takes place? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. Yes, Senator, the pure definition, you are absolutely correct. Historically, however, the State’s approach to transportation has been on infrastructure fundamentally and not mass 

movement of people. That responsibility has historically laid with 

the National Guard. 

The new ESF–1 function identifies the Department of Transportation as playing a lead role in transportation, and we accept that 

responsibility. Although at the time, we had issues with that transfer of authority to the Department of Transportation. We had 

21

issues with that. But in a pure sense of the word, I believe you are 

right. 

I am not sure that any transportation in the country, any transportation department in the country, however, would encompass 

transportation of people in all States, like you might indicate. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, our local rail system is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation, and it seems to me 

it is such a natural fit. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Welcome, Senator Akaka. It is 

nice to welcome you back from Hawaii. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. It is 

good to be back with you and the Ranking Member, Joe Lieberman, 

and to continue talking about Katrina and to try to reach a conclusion about what happened and how we can do it better the next 

time. That is my intent here. 

Colonel, welcome. I want to welcome the panel here. Colonel, in 

response to a question by Senator Collins about the order for mandatory evacuation, you testified that it took from Saturday morning 

to Saturday evening to refine the list of who should be ordered to 

evacuate. And I understand that your office had the responsibility 

to review the evacuation of nursing homes. 

There are several parts to my question. One is did you review 

those nursing home evacuation plans and did you find them workable? Second, in line with Senator Collins’ question, can you give 

us an idea of why you decided not to order hospitals and hotels to 

evacuate? Besides hospitals and hotels, what other questions were 

raised about whom to evacuate that took so long to decide? 

Colonel EBBERT. On the first question, on the review of plans, I 

would like to split that into two different areas. One is planning 

for assisted living homes, and another one is planning for hospitals. 

The homes, as part of their registration and certification by the 

State, have to devise and submit to the State an evacuation plan, 

and it is part of their certification process. At the city agency, we 

are not in that review process. 

On the hospitals, we had never evacuated our hospitals, and we 

have about 2,500 patients that were serious patients in the hospitals. And the intent was never there because of the capability of, 

one, how do you move very seriously ill people multiple times in 

a 4- or 5-month period of time? Two, where do you take them to? 

When we evacuated after the storm this time, we overloaded systems all over the United States by moving these individual patients. 

What we are looking at in this year, obviously, is working with 

the hospitals to probably develop a meeting point of who is a serious ICU type of patient versus an ambulatory patient that could 

be moved over buses or rail. And I think it will probably be a combination of evacuation and taking some of the flood mitigation 

money and strengthening the capability for a limited number of 

hospitals to maintain those very seriously ill people that cannot be 

moved. 

So we are looking at a combination, Senator, to do both of those. 

22

Senator AKAKA. Yes, and part of my question was on your review 

of the evacuation plans for nursing homes and hospitals, the question was did you feel they were workable? 

Colonel EBBERT. The nursing homes or special needs homes had 

plans, and we were very successful at evacuating those people. The 

hospitals, we did not have approved evacuation plans for because 

they were not included as being required to evacuate. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for answering that one. I thought 

maybe that you said you did not have that responsibility about 

evacuation plans for hospitals and homes. 

Mr. Bradberry, I understand that one of your recommendations 

is that a State or city should agree to a memorandum of understanding with transportation companies to retain the use of vehicles for an evacuation. 

In Hurricane Katrina, we found that even though companies had 

contracted to provide vehicles, many of the drivers did not report 

for duty. And there is also a concern that many hospitals and nursing homes contracted with the same companies, making it impossible to meet that demand. 

Do you think the State has a responsibility for reviewing all 

evacuation plans, including the private entities such as nursing 

homes, to ensure that there are adequate plans? And if the plans 

are deemed inadequate, what is the current enforcement mechanism? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. I think that the State does have an obligation 

to be part of a team to evaluate all of the emergency plans that 

are, indeed, in effect. And just like U.S. DOT has the responsibility 

around the national plan, we ought to be in partnership with U.S. 

DOT. We have not been fully in partnership with U.S. DOT, as evidenced by the fact that prior to Katrina, we were working on a new 

plan whereby the Department of Transportation of Louisiana was 

assigned the ESF–1 function. 

It was new for us. It was a plan in transition, and I would venture to say and I would say on record that plan was, indeed, new 

and in transition for not only the State of Louisiana and the Department of Transportation, but for the U.S. Department of Transportation as well. I think we heard Secretary Mineta say that at 

the time of Katrina only 10 percent of that plan was, indeed, done. 

So there is a lot of work to be done, and I think the responsibility 

lies with all of us to assure that adequate plans and contracts and 

relationships and ties are in place. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. My 

time has expired. 

Madam Chairman, I have a statement I would like to have included in the record in the proper place, and I may have questions 

to include in the record. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Lieberman, I want to salute you for the 

excellent and dedicated way in which you have been leading this investigation. 

I regret that I was unable to be here last week when the Committee reconvened 

to continue its extensive set of hearings on Hurricane Katrina. However, I look forward to participating in the hearings over the next few weeks. 

23

In the State of Hawaii, we have experienced many natural disasters from hurricanes and tsunamis to floods and brush fires. Our geographical location in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, makes us extremely aware of the importance of disaster 

preparedness. Evacuating our residents who reside on different islands pose a difficult problem. To address these problems, the Hawaii State Civil Defense leads the 

State in providing rapid assistance during disasters. It collaborates with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Central Pacific Hurricane Center 

and National Weather Service, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Hawaiian Volcano Observatory, and other organizations to assess 

potential dangers and appropriate responses. 

In addition, the State of Hawaii has developed one of the most sophisticated 

warning and evacuation plans in the United States. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has deployed an extensive network of deep sea 

buoys as part of its Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) 

program. These devices provide real time information which is critical for both ordering and avoiding evacuations. 

The Committee’s efforts to address the shortfalls regarding certain decisions that 

were made and others that were not made, will hopefully lead to constructive reform 

of our civil defense systems. In addition, it is important that these systems work 

collaboratively with the Federal agencies. 

As we continue our oversight responsibility pertaining to the Federal, State, and 

local response to Hurricane Katrina, it is important to remember that accurate and 

timely information could save hundreds of lives. This is an issue that we must not 

neglect as we focus on how to improve our disaster response system. Evacuations 

are costly both in terms of execution and potential economic shutdown. Ensuring reliable and timely information about the impact of a disaster should be a critical 

component in any Federal emergency response planning. 

Hawaii has benefited from Federal assistance, but it has also taken responsibility 

for the quality of the information its emergency planners receive. We have learned 

to be self-reliant in Hawaii because we know that we have no where to retreat to 

in a disaster and that it may be a week or more before we receive assistance from 

the mainland. 

The University of Hawaii, for example, has developed sophisticated models to predict the impact of a tsunami on our islands. They have been built so that real-time 

information from the DART sea buoys can be quickly inputted to make accurate projections of land fall. 

In Hawaii, local communities practice responding to tsunamis on a regular basis. 

There are over 300 warning sirens in communities around the islands, some of 

which have voice capacity. We have Emergency Operations Centers located in every 

jurisdiction with more than 2,500 people. In addition, evacuation plans are printed 

and widely distributed. Every phone book contains a copy of the evacuation plan 

and other emergency advice. Residents of Hawaii are encouraged to have emergency 

supplies to survive for a long period of time on their own. 

We in Hawaii know that our plans are not perfect. Indeed Hurricane Katrina has 

reminded us of some of the ways to improve. Tsunami evacuation plans are being 

updated. Evacuation plans for the sick and elderly are also being reviewed. 

That is why the importance of this hearing surpasses the Gulf Region. We all 

have much to learn from what went wrong in the Gulf Coast as well as what went 

right. There is much to make one proud. First responders did an extraordinary job 

in the Gulf: They responded with bravery and dedication. But we need to do better. 

Thank you Madam Chairman. I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their 

testimony.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, the State of Louisiana’s Emergency Operations 

Plan clearly designates your Department, the Department of 

Transportation and Development, as the primary agency responsible for developing plans and procedures to ‘‘mobilize transportation to support emergency evacuation for at-risk populations.’’

During an interview with the Committee’s investigators, you conceded that the Department had ‘‘done nothing to fulfill this responsibility. We put no plans in place to do any of this.’’

I know you have stated that you disagreed with having the Department tasked with this assignment. But nevertheless, the plan 

is very clear that your Department did have the responsibility. 

24

How is it that the Department did not carry out such a clearly designated and important duty? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. Yes, Madam Chairman. Admittedly, I will state 

that in April 2005, I did, indeed, sign the plan that said that we 

would accept the responsibility for the ESF–1 function. However, 

I signed it under the spirit of continuous improvement, that we 

wanted to keep things moving. 

We went on record to say that there needs some work there. We 

don’t necessarily agree with the idea that the Department of Transportation needs to have this transportation function. Clearly, we 

didn’t have it before. 

And so, to keep things moving, to assure that we did, indeed, at 

the end of the day, have a plan and not to get caught up in the 

bureaucratic channels that normally happen with things like this, 

I signed it, and I will admit to that. At the same time, I want to 

go back to Hurricane Pam and that exercise and sort of build a 

story on relationships, on how this came to be. 

In 2005, the Hurricane Pam exercise, if you didn’t know, did not 

have the transportation function as part of its exercise. That exercise was initially targeted for a 14-day exercise. It got reduced to 

8 days by FEMA because it didn’t have the resources to completely 

do the exercise. 

So at the time that I signed the approval and the acceptance of 

ESF–1, clearly, first and foremost, we didn’t have and didn’t go 

through an ESF function relative to transportation in the Pam exercise. That didn’t take place until July 2005, and then September 

9, 2005, we got a report back from IEM that basically says and 

lined out what we learned about transportation in that Pam exercise of July 2005. 

And I guess, Madam Chairman, the other point I wanted to 

make—so we clearly had a plan in transition. If, indeed, our new 

plan was based on the 15 ESF functions as defined by the National 

Response Plan, and at that time, when I signed the plan, we didn’t 

even have closure on the transportation side of it because we 

haven’t had an exercise in that plan, it reinforced to me that I 

wasn’t ready to really commit to that responsibility, although I 

wanted, again, to keep the plan moving. 

It also needs to be said, and I will take the personal responsibility for my Department, that clearly I had a point man in that 

position that, hindsight is 20/20 but, in my opinion, lacked the 

skills, lacked the sensitivity of the importance of that and didn’t inform me and my staff appropriately along these lines. 

So, again, I take full responsibility for that, but I believe that, 

indeed, it was a plan in transition. And I think we have indications 

to illustrate that. And we placed a lot of our effort on getting people out. We placed a lot of time, which is part of ESF–1, building 

a plan, building a good plan, and we spent a lot of time on it. 

I personally spent a lot of time with State police and putting a 

team together and making sure that we learned from Hurricane 

Ivan, that we built an evacuation plan that was as good as it could 

be and got as many people out as we could. And I think we were 

fairly successful at that in getting almost 1.3 million people out of 

the city. 

25

And we had enough time, in my opinion, to get the remaining 

people out had they wanted to get out, and those that couldn’t, we 

needed to do a better job coordinating responsibilities with other 

agencies. 

Chairman COLLINS. Did you ask the governor to assign the responsibility to another department or agency? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. No, ma’am. We did not. 

Chairman COLLINS. Prior to Katrina making landfall, did you 

have any conversations with the Mayor of New Orleans or with 

anyone from the Orleans Office of Homeland Security concerning 

the large number of people left in the city or that were likely to 

remain in the city who did not have access to transportation? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. No, ma’am. I did not personally, and my staff 

did not. In my previous testimony, I also made a statement that 

I had a fairly high confidence level that a plan was in place to 

move those types of people out of the city. 

And in May of last year, when we advertised and built our evacuation plan for the citizens, we made 1.5 million maps, and we communicated that plan across Southeast Louisiana and beyond. I remember at the press conference and the unfolding of this map and 

this plan, a reporter asking Chief Mathews in New Orleans whether or not the city had a plan for evacuating those types of individuals, that is the homeless and people who couldn’t afford to get out. 

And I recall that the answer to that was we absolutely do, and 

we are continuing to work on it, and we will have it ready for the 

hurricane season. That essentially told me what I had assumed all 

along, which was probably a wrong assumption, that we had plans 

in place to do that. 

Chairman COLLINS. I understand the confusion over the city’s 

role and state of preparedness, but I would note that the City of 

New Orleans’ emergency plan specifically says that local government resources may not be sufficient to provide for the transportation and care for those citizens with extraordinary special needs. 

So the city anticipated and said in writing as part of its plan that 

it would not likely be able to take care of the transportation and 

needs of citizens with special needs. That is why the disconnect 

here is really troubling when you look at who got left behind. 

Dr. Maestri, just one quick final question for you. Did you think 

that the contraflow evacuation of the city should have begun earlier than it did? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Well, in the Katrina exercise, we were onboard 

with the model that the State had presented. However, in previous 

hurricanes and in previous implementations, we had difficulty with 

the staging of the contraflow effort. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Secretary Bradberry, I just want to come back to the exchange. 

First off, I think that your Department and yourself deserve some 

credit for facilitating the evacuation from New Orleans of the people who could get out. 

But I must say I don’t feel that you have acknowledged enough 

responsibility here this morning for the failure to implement those 

parts of the State emergency plan that required you to do more 

than that. I mean, that plan, which is the State of Louisiana EmerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:03 Jan 08, 2007 Jkt 026752 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\26752.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
26

1 Exhibit 2 appears in the Appendix on page 107. 

1 Exhibit 8 appears in the Appendix on page 129. 

gency Operations Plan, it is Exhibit 2,1 and I am going to quote, 

‘‘The Plan requires your Department . . . to develop plans and procedures to mobilize transportation to support emergency evacuation 

for at-risk populations.’’

And I know in your pre-hearing interviews with our staff, you indicated that you felt the Department was not in the bus business, 

as it were, and that with respect to the plan’s requirement to develop procedures to mobilize in an emergency, that you had done 

nothing to fulfill this responsibility. 

Looking back at it, it was more than just in transition. For whatever the reason, the responsibilities that you were given under the 

plan, you just didn’t fulfill. 

Mr. BRADBERRY. Well, I think, with all due respect, Senator, 

clearly we were in transition. I don’t think there was any other 

agency, nor the Federal Government—i.e., DOT—that had a complete plan. There was no plan in our EOC that showed that we 

were operating under that plan. 

We couldn’t come to closure. Hurricane Pam, indeed, was a 

mechanism by which we were to justify that plan. It clearly wasn’t 

to a point where we had tested the transportation function. That 

wasn’t held until July. It all points to me—and the staff that I had 

and the focus we were putting on——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me, because my time is limited. 

Were you working on it? 

Mr. BRADBERRY. We were working on evacuation, contraflow, getting that as perfect as we could. Learning from those lessons. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. But again, that doesn’t deal with the 

at-risk population, the population that got left behind. 

I want to go on because of the time. Colonel Ebbert, as we look 

back, our investigators find different places where you see missed 

opportunities. And one of them, I reference it as Exhibit 8,1 but basically I will describe it to you. The exhibit contains draft memoranda of understanding between the City of New Orleans Regional 

Transit Authority, the school board, and even Amtrak for assistance in evacuation, including, from the way I read it, pre-storm 

evacuation. 

I am reading from one of the drafts. ‘‘We are anticipating that 

evacuation, [in this case] by the buses, will commence immediately 

following this declaration [by the Mayor] for a voluntary evacuation.’’ These were negotiations entered into by Dr. Stephens, who 

we will hear from, I believe, on the second panel, earlier in 2005. 

What happened? Why were those negotiations never completed 

so that those assets were in place, in the days before Katrina 

struck, to get the at-risk population out? 

Colonel EBBERT. Those were ongoing, and they really go back to 

2004, when we started negotiating with those external agencies, 

which are not city agencies, and trying to draft and come to an 

agreement on the MOUs. There were a lot of issues, and we are 

still dealing with the Amtrak issues. You had to deal with the individual liabilities that people were willing to accept, both financially 

and liable. 

27

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me again for interrupting, but just 

because of the time. I know we have another panel. But basically, 

what I am hearing you say is that it got into a lot of legal back 

and forth, even though I am sure looking back on it, you wish that 

you had completed those agreements for those assets? 

Colonel EBBERT. Absolutely. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. And again, in the context of the timeis-of-the-essence Pam warnings and in Hurricane Ivan, I presume 

it is painful for you to look back on it and see that those MOUs 

were not carried forward? 

Colonel EBBERT. Absolutely. I think that the anchoring of those 

MOUs is the future in evacuation planning in the City of New Orleans. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I hope you get them done before June when 

hurricane season starts again. 

Colonel EBBERT. We are working on it, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Dr. Maestri, a final question, which, in 

some ways gets back to where we were when I ended the first 

round of questioning, is about the fact that everyone was on notice, 

both local, State, and Federal. Dr. Mayfield was calling everybody. 

One of the interesting pieces of common wisdom in this field that 

we keep hearing, that I think we have to challenge, is that prestorm evacuation is not the province of the Federal Government for 

a variety of reasons. Although I must say, it does seem to me that 

the various Federal actions here—the Stafford Act, the National 

Response Plan of the Department of Homeland Security—all give 

Federal agencies such broad support that it would include this. 

And so, I wanted to invite you, based on your long experience, 

to comment on that and in some sense to tell us, looking back at 

Katrina, what you made and make today of the Federal Government’s lack of action to assist in pre-storm evacuation? 

Mr. MAESTRI. Senator, I believe that no metropolitan community 

in the United States has the ability to provide the resources necessary to evacuate a population that does not have the ability 

themselves to move from the disaster or the approaching disaster. 

Therefore, it will be always necessary, in my opinion, that we look 

to the Federal Government and to the agencies of the Federal Government to assist in supplying those resources. 

The Pam exercise, although it didn’t address transportation directly, one of the undergirding assumptions throughout was that if 

we were going to avoid that massive death toll that Pam predicted, 

we would have to have those resources. 

If you take the entire bus fleet that is available to a metropolitan 

area for its normal transportation operations, it would not meet the 

need that was faced in New Orleans for 100,000 folks who didn’t 

have adequate transportation and had to leave. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Even the discussion that we have 

heard at one point about the need for 600 buses really wasn’t 

enough, was it? 

Mr. MAESTRI. No, it was not. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. To get 100,000 people out of town in a day 

or two? Well, I appreciate your answer. 

It may be some comfort and, in some sense, an acknowledgment 

by the Federal Government itself that they have the authority to 

28

1The prepared statement of Dr. Guidry with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

81. 

do this. That is, I am sure the three of you know, when Hurricane 

Rita came, the Federal Government mobilized an enormous array 

of resources pre-landfall, including, directly, a massive pre-landfall 

evacuation. And we look back regrettably, painfully, ruefully, that 

it did not happen in Hurricane Katrina. 

Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank this panel for their testimony today. It has been 

extremely helpful, and we appreciate the fact that you are very 

candid in talking about the shortcomings as well as your pledges 

for improvement. 

I would now like to call forward our second panel. This panel will 

discuss the extraordinary challenges of evacuating hospital patients, nursing home residents, people receiving home health care, 

and other individuals with special needs. I want to thank our next 

panel for joining us as well today. 

Dr. Jimmy Guidry is the State Health Officer of Louisiana and 

also serves as the Medical Director for the Louisiana Department 

of Health and Hospitals. His Department is responsible for the special needs population at the State level, and he participated in the 

Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004. 

Dr. Kevin Stephens is Director of the New Orleans Department 

of Health. He is on the faculty of Xavier University, Dillard University, LSU Medical School, and Tulane Medical School. Dr. Stephens—is it Stefans or Stephens? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Stephens. 

Chairman COLLINS. Dr. Stephens’ Department cares for the city’s 

special needs population in the event of a hurricane or other natural disaster. 

And finally, we will hear from Joseph Donchess, who is an attorney who has been the Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing 

Home Association for nearly 20 years. His association represents 

approximately 260 facilities, amounting to 80 percent of the State’s 

nursing homes. 

I welcome you all to the Committee and look forward to your testimony. 

And Dr. Guidry, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF JIMMY GUIDRY, M.D.,1 MEDICAL DIRECTOR 

AND STATE HEALTH OFFICER, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HOSPITALS 

Dr. GUIDRY. Thank you, Madam Chairman and distinguished 

Senators for inviting me here today. I do feel that when it comes 

to the health care of the folks of Louisiana, our story hasn’t been 

told. 

The media was quick to show the things that we failed on, but 

I think when we looked at taking care of large numbers of people 

that were coming at us and trying to figure out how to handle the 

volume of the need, there were a lot of things that we drew upon 

in our planning. But I will admit that it was short of what we 

29

needed to accomplish simply because there was so much to do in 

so little time. 

If you will, I will quickly go through some of the lessons learned 

and some of the things that we achieved to kind of give you a 

breadth and depth of what we dealt with pre-Hurricane Katrina 

and Rita. We opened, with Department of Social Services and DHH 

staff, and supplied seven special needs shelters around the State. 

And we established triage lines, as of noon on Saturday, to assist 

special needs evacuees, to help them make decisions about leaving 

with their families, reporting to where the shelters were available, 

or whether they needed to be in a shelter or care at a hospital. 

We accepted 150 special needs evacuees, and I was told that was 

more like 200 in Baton Rouge from the Superdome prior to the 

storm. This had never been done before in any previous hurricanes. 

We assisted with equipment and staffing to the City of New Orleans to open a section of the Superdome for special needs evacuees. 

We cared for 1,200 special needs evacuees pre-storm, and then 

in Hurricane Rita, we moved special needs shelters. We had one 

side of our State that was hit, and all of the shelters were full. And 

then this other storm was coming at the other area of our State, 

so we started moving special needs shelters in Lake Charles and 

Lafayette to Shreveport and Monroe. 

We increased the capacity at the special needs shelters in Alexandria and Baton Route. Taking care of medically fragile people is 

no small feat, and being able to do that in a setting outside of a 

hospital is certainly no small feat. 

Special needs sheltering expanded on two university campuses. 

This has become a phrase now. This was something that came out 

of Hurricane Pam planning, the TMOSA. It is not a drink. It is a 

temporary medical operations and staging area. LSU’s TMOSA at 

the Pete Maravich Assembly Center, we opened a surge facility for 

emergency rooms with the capacity for 800 beds. And these are 800 

emergency beds never done in the history of this country or anywhere else in the world. We triaged 40,000 evacuees at the facility. 

At Nicholls State and Thibodaux in Lafourche Parish, we opened 

another TMOSA, triaged over 20,000 evacuees. We expanded our 

capacity of special needs shelters around the State to care for over 

2,000. We reopened special needs shelters and operated TMOSA in 

Lafayette to serve returning Rita and Katrina evacuees. We assisted with hospital surge by accepting hospital discharge patients. 

So our special needs shelters, which were our charge, became our 

ability to take care of the sick and those that had nowhere else to 

go, no family to go with. And if they got too sick, they were sent 

to hospitals, and hospitals would take care of them and send them 

back to us. We became the hospital surge, if you will. 

What did we learn? Well, certainly, communication is so critical. 

And even after all the things we have done since September 11 to 

have redundant systems, they still failed. Our ability to get visibility and know what was going on at any time—we would get reports, ‘‘30 buses are coming out your way.’’ People who have been 

on rooftops, in water, they have been picked up by search and rescue. We don’t know their medical condition. 

Medical folks from hospitals had to be evacuated after the storm. 

It wasn’t a result of the storm. It was actually a result of the floodVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:03 Jan 08, 2007 Jkt 026752 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\26752.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30

ing because the levees failed. And in that, being able to communicate on how to get those hospital patients out and helping them 

with their patients, when we have never evacuated those hospitals 

prior to this event in the last 100 years. 

Here we were found with the idea that these very sick people 

who couldn’t make the trip in the first place because hospitals—

medical professionals chose to stay in place because the patients 

they were treating were at risk of traveling. They might lose their 

lives. 

Every day, as a medical professional, we make that decision 

when we treat patients. We put ourselves at risk of contracting an 

infection or a disease that puts our own lives at risk. And in this 

event, our hospitals decided to stay in place knowing the risks, 

very well knowing the risks, to protect the lives of the patients that 

couldn’t make the trip out. 

And certainly, it was a lot more difficult to make the trip out, 

obviously, and we have learned our lessons that the sick and the 

infirm can’t make it out if there is water, and you have to make 

it by boat, by helipad. Find a helipad, get on a helicopter, get them 

to the airport. 

Policy implications and gaps. I will tell you on the health forefront, we did some things that have never been done in this country. We moved 1,800 patients by airplane from the airport to hospitals around the country. 

There were some problems with making sure that their medical 

records were with them. There were problems in maintaining that 

medical home once you got them in the air and getting that information to the caregivers on the other side. There were some 12,000 

total patients and caregivers that came out of hospitals in the affected areas. 

There are implications and gaps, as you heard over and over 

again, that we can improve. But I can tell you this. When we are 

looking at a pandemic possibly hitting this country, we better have 

our plans on how we deal at the regional level, how the State and 

the Federal Government can help us. But every community may be 

on its own if there is a major event where everyone is getting sick 

and dying. 

Building codes, we will come back and look at those. We are 

working with hospitals. We will be working with nursing homes to 

look at building codes. Transportation issues, I am not going to 

dwell on. We were set to take care of patients and save lives. That 

was our mission. Getting them to us was certainly an ordeal. 

Since I am running out of time, I will go to my final recommendations, if I could? Continuing HRSA grants would increase 

the level of funding. The HRSA grants are how we got equipment 

for hospitals and special needs shelters. 

Reform Stafford Act, include health care costs for catastrophic 

events and long-term response. The Stafford Act does not address 

health care. 

Funding for purchase and pre-staging of generators for special 

needs shelters. Mitigation funds for relocation of hospital generators. 

I have been asked, ‘‘Have you asked for these things in the past?’’ 

And the answer is a resounding yes. I did not get that funding or 

31

1The prepared statement of Dr. Stephens appears in the Appendix on page 99. 

that support in the past. We have had a major catastrophe. I have 

yet to have any visibility on any funding available for generators, 

whether it is for special needs shelters or hospitals, and those patients are dependent on electricity and power for their lives. 

So even though we have asked and asked and asked, and we are 

now at a point where we have had the event, the major disaster 

and catastrophe that we all dreaded, we are still in a posture of 

trying to defend why don’t we have these assets? 

And I will go ahead and summarize that as my remarks. Thank 

you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Dr. Stephens. 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN U. STEPHENS, M.D., J.D.,1 DIRECTOR, 

NEW ORLEANS HEALTH DEPARTMENT 

Dr. STEPHENS. Yes, good afternoon. My name is Dr. Kevin Stephens, and I am the Director for the New Orleans Health Department. Thank you for allowing us this opportunity to share our 

story with you. 

There are just two important issues I would like to address 

today. The first question is what was the role of the New Orleans 

Health Department with respect to special needs patients prior to 

Katrina? And two, what was the role of the New Orleans Health 

Department with respect to the special needs patient, hospital patient, nursing home patient after Katrina? 

As a little background information, the sole role for the New Orleans Health Department in the State and local plan was to open 

and operate the special needs shelter at the Superdome as a refuge 

of last resort. Our primary message was for special needs patients 

to evacuate and to evacuate early. And for those who could not, we 

opened the Superdome as a refuge of last resort for them as a safety net. 

To address the first question, we opened the Superdome as a special needs shelter first on Hurricanes Isadore and Ivan. And with 

the lessons learned, we then convened our partners and developed 

the plan we used in Katrina. We met regularly with the nursing 

homes, the hospitals, the other providers in the city to develop 

their own plan in terms of an executable plan for evacuation. 

Now it should be noted, very clearly, that the New Orleans 

Health Department does not have any administrative, we do not 

have any statutory, or we do not have any regulatory authority 

over any of these groups. In fact, we have no funding neither for 

none of these groups, and our role was purely merely advisory. 

Now to address the second question, the New Orleans Health Department role was to maintain the special needs shelter until appropriate relief was obtained at the Superdome. We moved the special needs patients from the Superdome to the sports arena, and 

when the DMAT team came and assumed the care of the special 

needs patients, then at that point, the health department went to 

the recovery process and to where we actually started to open up 

shelters and clinics for people who were remaining for vaccinations 

and so forth. 

32

In conclusion, the New Orleans Health Department role was to 

open the special needs shelters as a shelter of last resort. We 

opened and operated the special needs shelter. We had volunteers 

and partners, mainly the whole number of community partners, including Catholic Charities and so forth, that donated dry goods, 

water, and other food to make this a safe place until outside help 

could come. 

And my final remarks, I think there are couple of things that 

will be very helpful for us. One, I think it would be very helpful 

to adequately fund the health department. We have zero dollars in 

our budget for special needs, for evacuation, for sheltering, or for 

planning. And so, all of our work has been done primarily gratuitously by our providers and with our own network. 

And two, I think it is very important that we, in terms of hospitals and nursing homes and the special needs patient population, 

harden the facilities. It is very difficult to transport out 2,500 patients in threat of a hurricane. And we know from Hurricanes Ivan 

and Isadore that oftentimes the hurricane will not come. And so, 

we have to have funding to evacuate these facilities even in the 

threat. 

And the problem is we were told FEMA would not pay unless the 

hurricane hit. And so, if the hurricane does not hit, like in Isadore 

and Ivan, there is no reimbursement. And one nursing home provider personally told me, he showed me copies of a receipt, it cost 

him $100,000 to evacuate his nursing home. And for him, that was 

very cost prohibitive because if you have to do this two or three 

times in a season, it can be very problematic. 

And three, I think it is very important that we harden the medical facilities. Prior to Katrina, we did know that a lot of the medical facilities had their generators in the basement and on the first 

floor and that if flooding would perhaps happen, they would be out 

of power. 

However, we have made request after request to get them and 

others to help fund moving the generators and the switches to a 

higher level to where they would be operational. And I think at 

this point, it is imperative that we harden the facilities so that 

they can withstand a hurricane to a Category 5 so that they will 

not lose power and they can provide some services not only before 

and during a disaster, but afterwards. It is very important to have 

those facilities open and able to take care of patients. 

And in fact, in the City of New Orleans today, we have two hospitals that are open—namely, Touro and Children’s Hospitals—and 

the other hospitals have not opened, which has created a significant problem in terms of our health care delivery system because 

we just don’t have the capacity without the beds. So I think it is 

very important that we get Federal funding to make sure that we 

can strengthen and harden our medical facilities, not only for the 

special needs, for the hospital patients. 

And four, I think it is very important that we use a regional approach because we just don’t have the resources locally and even 

in the region. 

And one last comment, an example of a system that is great and 

that is operational is the system we have in place currently. Currently, we have a daily dashboard. And if you don’t have a copy, 

33

1The prepared statement of Mr. Donchess appears in the Appendix on page 104. 

I would be happy to forward you one. And on our daily dashboard, 

we have every hospital in our metropolitan area. We look at their 

beds, the ICU beds, the ER beds, and the capacity. 

And I think that in the future, in light of a disaster like this, 

that we could have a regional, even a national database—and this 

is done all electronically. You can go online, even currently as we 

speak, and you can get the status of health care in terms of the 

available beds, available ER beds, the time you have to wait, and 

so forth for every hospital in the metropolitan area. 

So in a disaster like this, we could have a national system to 

when we have to evacuate, we could use the technology to help us 

efficiently determine where we could send patients and what capacity, who has the capacity, how we can get them there, so that we 

can take care of those who can’t take care of themselves. 

Our government has historically taken care of those who couldn’t 

take care of themselves, and we feel this is a very important responsibility, and we are willing to partner with the State and the 

Federal Government to make sure that we ensure the safety and 

well-being especially of those who can’t take care of themselves. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Donchess. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH A. DONCHESS,1 EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, LOUISIANA NURSING HOME ASSOCIATION 

Mr. DONCHESS. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. And Senator Akaka, I am a graduate of Chaminade 

University, and I have very fond memories of my 4 years in Hawaii. 

Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA) is one of two professional associations that has a desk at the Emergency Operations 

Center in Baton Rouge. The association has been an emergency operations participant since after Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992. 

On Saturday, August 27, 2005, at 6:30 a.m., LNHA began maintaining its desk on a 24-hour basis. We maintained that status for 

nearly 3 weeks, and then came Hurricane Rita, and we did it 

again. 

For Hurricane Katrina, 21 nursing homes evacuated pre-storm 

and 36 nursing homes evacuated after the storm. Approximately 

5,500 to 6,000 patients were evacuated from nursing homes pre 

and post storm. LNHA posted 5,300 names of nursing home patients on our Web site. A special Web page was created to list patients’ names and their host facilities. This allowed family members to locate their loved ones and contact them. 

LNHA staff successfully located the list of out-of-state evacuees 

from the Global Patient Movement Resource Center. This list had 

more than 4,000 names on it, and LNHA staff were personally responsible for locating literally hundreds of displaced elderly who 

were flown out of State after Hurricane Katrina. 

There are still 21 nursing homes in Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes that are closed. Many others are 

operating fewer beds because of their inability to find health care 

employees to staff all beds. 

34

Katrina was an unusual, remarkable storm. On Friday, August 

26, the storm’s projected path had it moving toward the panhandle 

of Florida. It was not until late Friday night that a projected path 

change was announced that the hurricane was coming to Louisiana. 

By Saturday morning, health care facilities had less than 48 

hours notice of the impending danger. This short period of time to 

react is rare. Health care facilities typically have at least 72 hours 

notice of an oncoming storm. Was this a reason that not more facilities evacuated by Sunday? Yes, I think so. 

Also, many people remembered the transportation nightmare of 

Hurricane Ivan the year before. The transportation of elderly, fragile patients on buses for 9 to 12 hours to traverse the 80 miles to 

Baton Rouge is an ordeal no one wishes to repeat. 

Issues immediately following Katrina. For the first 2 days, there 

was an inability to communicate with decisionmakers in the Emergency Operations Center. Our E–Team requests were not acknowledged for many hours. 

LNHA staff set up our own rescue missions. Colonial Oaks Nursing Home, which was told on Sunday that its bus transportation 

contractor had already released its drivers to evacuate, had no 

power after the storm, and flood waters were threatening to encompass it. LNHA contacted State Senator Cleo Fields, who volunteered to take leadership buses to help with the evacuation of patients at Colonial Oaks. Late Monday and early Tuesday, patients 

were loaded on the buses and transported to safety. 

St. Margaret’s Nursing Home evacuated on Sunday to Varnado 

High School in a town which is nearer to where the eye of the hurricane passed. The area lost power and communication. 

We were fortunate to get intermittent contact with them through 

the Washington Parish Sheriff’s Office. With the help of State Senator Sherri Cheek in Shreveport, we located private bus companies 

which sent buses to Varnado late Tuesday night and transported 

the patients to host nursing homes in North Louisiana. 

Bethany Nursing Home in New Orleans was surrounded by flood 

waters, but the patients were safely housed on the second floor. On 

Tuesday, LNHA arranged for two buses to be positioned a few 

blocks away on high ground. Two high-water vehicles had been requested to drive through the flood waters and extract the patients. 

As the buses were in place waiting, the two high-water vehicles 

were diverted from our mission by the National Guard, we were 

told. Shortly thereafter, the two buses were commandeered by 

FEMA, we were told. The surviving patients at Bethany did not get 

out until Friday, 3 days later. 

Gunfire by marauding criminals made rescue missions dangerous, and some attempts to rescue elderly in nursing homes were 

aborted because of the gunfire. Such was the case with Maison 

Hospitaliere. These are but four illustrations. 

Lack of communications with certain parishes was a critical 

issue. Washington, St. Tammany, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Orleans, and, to some extent, Jefferson are parishes that had very little 

communication capabilities. Cell towers were down. Land lines 

were not operating. Ham radios were the only reliable sources of 

communication. 

35

Nursing homes and hospitals were not a priority during the rescue process. For the first 2 days, LNHA was on its own to improvise and find ways to rescue the elderly in nursing homes. We 

helped members and nonmembers alike. At first, LNHA could submit E–Team missions, but by the fourth day our E–Team missions 

were denied because we were not a governmental agency. Our 

hands became tied. 

Now, months later, our manpower is scattered to the winds. 

Many are out of State, and some may never return. Others have 

been hired by FEMA or clean-up crews or other businesses at higher wages. Today, nursing homes state-wide can hire 4,200 people, 

including 2,300 certified nursing assistants. 

Our Medicaid payment is not adequate. Our Medicaid agency, 

the Department of Health and Hospitals, refuses to pay nursing facilities in accordance with its State plan, approved by the Federal 

Government. Facilities are underpaid approximately $3 per patient 

day, which amounts to $23 million for our program. 

And cuts by DHH of 10 percent will further hurt nursing homes’ 

abilities to provide adequate care. This cut will take effect in a few 

days. 

Overtime and transportation costs incurred from the storm have 

not been reimbursed by FEMA for private, for-profit facilities. 

LNHA is currently working with Louisiana’s congressional delegation to change the Stafford Act to allow payment for Medicare and 

Medicaid patients in for-profit nursing homes who were affected by 

disasters. 

Solutions. Passage of the Reconciliation Bill by the House of Representatives in the next few days is a helpful start to getting 

health care in the Gulf Coast region back on its feet. It provides 

100 percent Federal funding of Medicaid for most of this fiscal 

year. 

Nursing facilities need staff flexibility. The use of uncertified 

aides for 1 year should be allowed until people can be attracted to 

South Louisiana in this work area. We need an expansion of visas 

for more foreign nurses, registered nurses and licensed practical 

nurses. While Congress can and should get tough on illegal immigration, it should recognize the need of health care providers in 

Louisiana and elsewhere and expand visas for trained individuals 

who can offer a valuable needed service to the many fragile elderly 

living in nursing homes. 

LNHA has proposed State legislation that would empower and 

direct the State Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to order the evacuation of health care facilities and provide wherewithal for providers to do it. 

The State of Texas learned from the experiences and reacted 

quickly to an oncoming Hurricane Rita. And Louisiana reacted in 

a timely fashion for Hurricane Rita. Nursing home patients were 

moved to host sites, including many uncomfortable gymnasiums because all nursing homes were filled with Katrina evacuees. 

The State agency, under our proposal, would provide the means 

of transportation, the host sites, and the manpower to effectuate a 

timely and safe evacuation. If a facility fails to comply with a timely called and arranged evacuation order, it would be subject to regulatory sanction. Facilities would be given immunity from lawsuits 

36

for acting responsibly in accordance with the evacuation order, and 

costs incurred by a facility would be reimbursed in a timely fashion 

by the State Medicaid agency. 

Finally, the vast majority of our nursing facilities weathered 

Hurricane Katrina. At 10 a.m. on Monday, August 29, after the 

storm passed, patients were safely sheltered. Shortly thereafter, 

the breaks in the levee system created an unprecedented disaster 

with 80 percent of the city inundated with flood waters. 

The floods and an unexpected lawless segment of those trapped 

created an untenable situation. Disaster plans became meaningless 

at that time. 

In closing, let me say our nursing home population is a fragile 

one, and their safety must be a priority. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Donchess. 

I am going to start my questioning with your last statement, 

where you said that nursing home populations are fragile ones, and 

they must be a priority. You said earlier that they were not a priority. To me, that is just inconceivable. Why weren’t nursing home 

populations and patients in hospitals more of a priority? 

Mr. DONCHESS. I don’t have a clear answer for you, Madam 

Chairman. I will say this, that we worked with people in the operations center. They all seemed concerned. But when it came time 

to act, the action wasn’t there. 

As I said earlier, we actually had to do our own missions, create 

our own missions, contact outside sources to put these together. 

And I am hoping that with a proposal of State legislation, that the 

State legislature will see the need to make nursing homes and hospitals a greater priority and do something legislatively about it. 

Chairman COLLINS. Now you personally sat at the Louisiana 

Emergency Operations Center during Katrina. Is that correct? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. So you are familiar with the State’s E–Team 

process, whereby missions, including rescue missions, are assigned. 

Correct? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS. And it is my understanding that while you 

were at the EOC, you tried to submit E–Team requests on behalf 

of specific nursing homes that were encountering difficulties. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Yes, ma’am. In fact, on the software program, the 

Louisiana Nursing Home Association is listed as one of the participants. For the first 2 days, we were allowed to submit missions, 

even though it took a long time to get word as to whether they 

were missions in activity or whether they were still not a go yet. 

By the fourth day, we were told that we are not a State or city 

agency and, therefore, we can’t submit the E–Team requests at all. 

We would have to take our requests to Dr. Guidry and get him to 

initial them, and then it was a go after that. 

But this was, many times, Dr. Guidry had 100 different things 

to do at one time. And oftentimes, it was difficult finding him and 

getting these things approved. So what we need to do, if we are 

going to be a participant at the Emergency Operations Center—and 

I might add that State legislation says that the Office of Emergency Preparedness can act with public and private agencies. That 

37

1 Exhibit 13 appears in the Appendix on page 167. 

is right in the law. And therefore, I don’t see why, if we are going 

to be called upon to assist, why we can’t be given the authority to 

offer these E–Team missions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Could you give us some examples of the 

kinds of mission requests that you submitted that were not carried 

out? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Well, in the beginning, for instance, with Maison 

Hospitaliere, we asked for buses, and we didn’t get any word back 

right away as to whether the buses were rolling or not. 

I know the first night also, Colonial Oaks said, ‘‘We need to move 

out.’’ I think we put in an E–Team request for them, heard nothing 

back until the next day. By that time, Senator Fields had his buses 

down at the nursing home and were extracting those patients. 

They actually left, I believe, by early Tuesday morning. 

There were a number of situations that it became very evident 

that—I will give you another example. At one point in time, we 

were told the buses were rolling to Maison Hospitaliere. I went 

back about an hour later, and I asked where the buses were at this 

point in time, and I was told, ‘‘Well, the buses haven’t left yet.’’

So it is just a breakdown in communications. One of the things 

I didn’t add in my testimony that I have in my formal documents, 

and I am certainly not an expert at this, but I think if you create 

small special operations teams that could be given an assignment. 

And they then go in and take care of that assignment until it is 

done, that this might be a way to help nursing homes and other 

special needs types of people to get out. 

The Bethany home was a very good example, where we had 

buses there 3 days earlier. But because of some SNAFU along the 

way, they were there for 3 more days, and I think 6 or 7 more patients died during that point in time because they didn’t have the 

air conditioning and other needed equipment to keep those patients 

alive. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is just so tragic and so unacceptable. 

Here you are, sitting at the Emergency Operations Center, a recognized participant in the process, funneling requests from nursing 

homes. Some of them pretty desperate requests for evacuation help, 

for fuel, for generators, I am told, other urgent needs. And you 

can’t mobilize the resources, even though you are part of the process. Is that an accurate picture of what happened? 

Mr. DONCHESS. That is an accurate picture. And when days go 

by, and you hear people on the other end of a phone during those 

few times we could get through, and you hear their voices cracking 

and knowing that they are at their very wit’s end after 2 days go 

by, then 3 days go by. I wanted to do whatever I could to help, and 

I knew that we had to get these missions going in order to rescue 

those people. 

Chairman COLLINS. Dr. Guidry, it is very troubling to hear what 

was just described. I am also very troubled by an e-mail that is Exhibit 13 1 in the book, the exhibit book before you. This is an e-mail 

from a Federal official from the regional emergency coordination 

program office at the Federal Department of Health and Human 

Services, and what she reports is as follows. 

38

‘‘I spoke with Dr. Roseanne Pratts, who is the Louisiana Department of Health Emergency Preparedness Director, at 2 p.m.’’ This 

is on Saturday, August 27. ‘‘And inquired if Federal HHS assistance was needed for patient movement or evacuation or anything 

else. She responded, no, that they do not require anything at this 

time, and they would be in touch if and when they needed assistance.’’

Can you explain to me why the State turned down an offer of 

Federal assistance? 

Dr. GUIDRY. Yes. If you look at the time of this e-mail, we were 

opening up special needs shelters. We had triage phones. We had 

requests coming in. So we were aware of what the needs were. 

HHS’s offer—HHS is not in the transportation business and, to 

this day, 5 months later, has not helped us with the things that 

they offered. So when they asked us if we needed these things, 

there were no requests at that time for these things, and as it 

states, we did not need these things at that point in time. 

So, at that point in time, the offer was for something that wasn’t 

being asked for. 

Chairman COLLINS. As the situation deteriorated in the days to 

come—this is 2 days before landfall—did you go back to HHS and 

request assistance? 

Dr. GUIDRY. HHS showed up early in this event. They were there 

on that Sunday before the storm hit, and they were actually the 

ones helping us fill out request forms, what are called action request forms. And so, they were telling us what is available to us, 

what we can order. So they were on the ground with us. 

HHS brought the Public Health Service and helped us provide 

health care. Everyone said in this event there would be a second 

wave of infections because of people being out in the water and the 

weather, and that did not occur because we were able to give vaccinations and take care of people once they got to where we could 

take care of them. So we did use their resources, and their resources did not include transportation. 

Chairman COLLINS. Well, Dr. Guidry, I have to say to you that 

in light of the predictions for this storm, in view of the findings 

from Hurricane Pam, I find it inconceivable that an offer of assistance from the Federal Department of Health and Human Services 

2 days before landfall—really 11⁄2 days before landfall—specifically 

for patient movement, evacuation, or anything else, was turned 

down. 

And I must say that I wonder if the dire straits that we heard 

described this morning would have been as bad as they were if this 

offer had been accepted? 

Dr. GUIDRY. I can say equivocally that I would have made the 

same decision. That what they had to offer I was quite aware of 

because I have been doing this for 10 days. And when HHS offered 

to help, I knew when I needed their help, and I knew what they 

could offer, and I knew how to get that. 

I spoke to several people, Stu Simonson, at HHS. I spoke to a 

number of people at HHS, boots on the ground. And this call, at 

that point in time, was from somebody in Washington that did not 

know what we were going through there, offering something that 

they couldn’t deliver. 

39

I was told, when I asked for NDMS to move patients out, and 

this was once the flooding occurred, that had never been done in 

this country and that, good luck, maybe I could get them there and 

maybe I could get patients moved. But we still asked. We put in 

requests before things occurred. We saved as many lives as we 

could. 

The offer that was made on that day and put in this e-mail 

shows someone offering something that they weren’t going to deliver because I am aware of the system to the Nth degree because 

I have lived this with this fear for a long time. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. I must say that I noticed the e-mail 

exhibit that Senator Collins referred to, and I must say that I was 

pleased that somebody at the Federal Government level had, on 

their own, exercised that kind of initiative. 

HHS has, under the National Response Plan, the responsibility 

for patient evacuation. The National Response Plan was not activated by that time. So Erin Fowler, I presume it is ‘‘she’’—on her 

own took some initiative, and I admire it. I regret that, for some 

reason, you thought that she wasn’t able to carry through. But I 

am going to come back with another question in a minute. 

Dr. Stephens, I want to go back to the line of questioning I had 

with Colonel Ebbert because in so many ways, as you look back, 

there are points when you wished that something had happened 

that could have prevented the suffering of the people who couldn’t 

leave New Orleans on their own. 

Now, looking back, here you are, trying to negotiate these memoranda of understanding with Amtrak, with the regional transit authority, and with the school authorities for ways to get people out. 

Just briefly, tell me what got you started to do that in 2004? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Well, quite candidly, our previous chief of Office 

of Emergency Preparedness had retired, and so we knew that this 

hurricane season was coming up, and the Mayor had to name his 

successor. And so, in that critical time, nothing was going on. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. STEPHENS. And so, I took the initiative myself. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You just did it on your own? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Knowing that there was no preparedness for 

that kind of evacuation? 

Dr. STEPHENS. And so, what I did, candidly, is I called the riverboats. I met with the Delta Queen, and we actually went on the 

boat. And my staff actually rode up the river on the ride, on a little 

excursion, to see how the water would be and if it is safe for patients and people. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. This was back in 2004? 

Dr. STEPHENS. At the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And then how about the memoranda that 

you were negotiating with those other people for transportation 

evacuation assistance? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Well, again, in fact, most of the MOUs were typed 

by me personally. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, amazing. 

Dr. STEPHENS. Because I didn’t have the staff. 

40

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. STEPHENS. And I called Amtrak and said, ‘‘Look, what can 

you do?’’ And so, I met with Larry Baird, and Josie came down, and 

a train came down. We actually went on the train to look at the 

trains to see——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sometime earlier in 2005? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did other city officials, either in the Department or the Mayor, know that you were doing this? 

Dr. STEPHENS. We were working and negotiating with the Office 

of Emergency Preparedness. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. STEPHENS. Because it is a very complex problem because you 

have to look at egress, where do you go, how do you get out? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. STEPHENS. You have to look at the trains, how many cars. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you involved the city emergency preparedness office as this went along? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Yes, we did. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So just, because time is running short, in a 

couple of words, why didn’t these memoranda come to completion? 

Because if they had, a lot of the horrible scenes we saw from New 

Orleans after the storm would have been avoided because people 

would have been evacuated. 

Dr. STEPHENS. Well, I think there are two components to that. 

The first one is it was just a matter of timing. I mean, obviously, 

if we knew that this was the big one, then we all would have 

speeded up our deliberations. 

And two, though, it is very complicated. When we looked at Amtrak, for instance, Amtrak could not go to Baton Rouge. Amtrak 

could only go to Hammond because they didn’t own the tracks. 

Union Carbide owned the tracks to Baton Rouge. 

And so, when you look at the levees and the locks, Amtrak 

couldn’t get out if the locks were opened. The train couldn’t go because of the—and so, you have a plethora of complications. And 

even when you got to Hammond, where do people go? How do they 

get—Hammond does not have a public transit system. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. All right. I get the picture, unfortunately. 

Obviously, again, based on the Pam exercise and all the warnings, 

you look back, I am sure, and you wished that had been completed. 

And I admire you for starting the process really on your own. 

Dr. Guidry, let me ask this question. The Department that you 

are with, Health and Hospitals, licenses hospitals in the State of 

Louisiana. The regulations, as we have looked at them, require the 

preparation of emergency preparedness plans that must include 

identification of hazards and natural disaster and emergency procedures for evacuation of the hospitals, including the designation of 

facilities to receive the evacuated patients. 

From what we can see as we look back, notwithstanding all of 

that and the warnings of Hurricane Pam and those regulations, 

hospitals in Southeast Louisiana seem not to have been prepared 

or not to have followed what the regulations required. And most 

particularly, I know somebody mentioned this before, generators 

41

and fuel supplies were not above flood level. And there were not 

adequate supplies or, in a lot of cases, an overall evacuation plan. 

Simple question. Why not? 

Dr. GUIDRY. I asked the same questions. I went back and looked 

at how did we get to this point in time? It is not a requirement 

for licensure to have generators at a certain level, at a certain 

place. It is not a requirement for licensure that you show proof that 

your plan is operational. 

We are at this point, we passed legislation this past special session to say we are going to go back and look at building codes and 

plans. But it was not a requirement prior to this event that they 

would turn in plans defining what their evacuation plans were. 

When I had discussions with a number of these hospitals in this 

area over the many years, the question was, ‘‘How are you going 

to evacuate?’’ And their response was always, ‘‘We do not plan to 

evacuate. Our evacuation plan will be to get those people out that 

can travel, elective surgeries. But we will remain here with the 

people that are not able to get out and the people that are going 

to need our care so that we can be here after the event.’’

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did that make sense, do you think? And 

now, in the aftermath of Katrina, does it make sense? 

Dr. GUIDRY. I can tell you that next hurricane season, there are 

going to be a lot more people leaving and the plan is going to 

change drastically. Those that do stay will be the hospitals that 

have the capability of hardening their structures and putting their 

generators higher because it does not make sense to stay in a bowl, 

if you will. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And I gather from the reference you 

made to the State legislative action this year that it is—well, you 

tell me whether it is your intention that these plans, evacuation 

plans that have to be submitted as part of the licensure for the hospitals, are going to be reviewed as to adequacy? 

Dr. GUIDRY. It is our plan to review that with all of the participants and people sitting around the table, saying, ‘‘How can we 

make this work?’’ It is also our plan to hire a contractor that has 

expertise in this to help us develop this plan, such as the RAND 

Corporation, to help us with that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Madam Chairman, if I can quickly ask 

Mr. Donchess this last question? 

As you said in your opening statement, during Katrina, 21 nursing homes evacuated before the storm and 36 evacuated after the 

storm. It looks to us like many of the homes did not follow their 

own emergency plans, which require evacuation in a catastrophic 

situation. 

And surely, by that time, there were Category 4, Category 5 hurricane warnings to everybody, as we have heard again today. Why 

weren’t those emergency evacuation plans followed? In other words, 

what is the point of requiring the nursing homes to evacuate in 

case of an oncoming catastrophe if they don’t do it? 

Mr. DONCHESS. I think there are a number of items. First, I 

think the professional staff used their professional judgment to determine what would be more harmful to the patients because these 

are very fragile. As we saw in Hurricane Ivan, there were deaths 

42

of patients on buses because it took so long to evacuate and to get 

to their host sites. 

Also the fact that the notice this time around was so short. Many 

of our nursing homes were not advised until Saturday morning 

that this was a serious storm, that it was heading for the New Orleans area. Prior to that, I think everybody went to bed on Friday 

night thinking that it was still heading for the Florida panhandle. 

It is a very long process in loading buses with nursing home patients. You literally have to put them in sheets and carry them up 

steps of the bus and then get them really situated in seats on the 

buses, and then you do it all over again with the next patient. So 

it is a very long process. 

And I think many of the nursing homes, those that may have already been told that their transportation was not available, either 

because the buses weren’t there or the drivers had left, thought 

long and hard about whether it was going to be safer to keep the 

patients sheltered in place or to move them. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I don’t minimize the difficulty of the decision about moving the frail elderly. But obviously, on the other side 

of it—and I am not capable of reaching a judgment as to guilt—

a number of patients in nursing homes died. So that the risk associated with the movement of a frail elderly from a nursing home 

obviously has to be balanced against the very risk to their lives, 

which were taken in some cases. 

And I know that there is a State Attorney General’s investigation 

of possible criminal violations in that regard. Do you want to offer 

any response to that? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Well, hindsight is a beauty, and I am hopeful 

that next time around nursing homes will heed the warnings and 

that we will have 100 percent evacuation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, that is the point, particularly when it 

is up to Category 4 or Category 5. Then you know something really 

big is coming. 

Mr. DONCHESS. Yes, sir. And I could tell you that as time went 

on and I contacted nursing homes prior to the storm hitting and 

was conveying to them what I had just heard from National 

Weather Service people like this is the making of the perfect storm, 

I could tell that they were getting very concerned. But by then, it 

was Sunday, and the opportunity to move had been lost. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. A lot of lost opportunities. That is the tragedy. And hopefully, at all levels, as the hurricane season begins 

again in June, not only the State and local governments and private sector, but the Federal Government are going to be a lot more 

ready to respond before landfall rather than weeping and being 

upset afterward. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Donchess, welcome to the Committee. Let me just tell you 

that I am trying to understand who is responsible for taking care 

of those people in society that are least able to take care of themselves, which includes nursing home patients. And I would like to 

clarify an issue that was raised with Colonel Ebbert. 

43

Is it true that the State and city required nursing homes to develop evacuation plans and that the State and city officials reviewed those plans? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Yes, sir. That is correct. It was right after Hurricane Andrew that our Emergency Preparedness Committee at 

LNHA met and actually developed a model emergency preparedness plan. That plan, with a few changes, was adopted by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. 

And the very front page calls for each of those plans to be reviewed by the local office of emergency preparedness. And so, our 

member facilities, I know, have been doing that since 1993. 

Senator AKAKA. I assume that there were only a limited number 

of transportation companies that nursing homes could contract 

with in an event of an evacuation. Who is responsible for ensuring 

that companies that have contracts with nursing homes are capable 

of meeting transportation requirements in the event of an emergency? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Well, initially, I would say the nursing facility 

that contracts with the company should get some assurances from 

the company that it is capable of providing the buses that are required to get people out. 

One of the things I was told after the fact is that some of these 

companies had multiple contracts with different nursing homes and 

may not have had enough buses. I don’t know if that is true or not, 

but that is something that I had heard. 

Senator AKAKA. You said that disaster plans became meaningless 

once the city flooded. Everyone knew New Orleans could flood if a 

Category 3 hurricane hit. Shouldn’t disaster plans for the worst expected disaster have been made? 

Mr. DONCHESS. Yes, sir. And hopefully, they will be made for the 

next time around. I know our committee is going to be meeting on 

February 23 and be going over some critical issues, such as having 

wrist or arm bands for patients with some vital information on 

them. 

I had never fathomed that an elderly nursing home patient 

would some way be moved away from the rest of the staff or other 

patients of nursing homes, but yet we saw on many occasions 

where patients were, actually. Because in one occasion, a bus was 

actually taken over by a marauding band of criminals in New Orleans, and some of those patients got removed from where they were 

supposed to be going. Some of those patients ended up on C–130s, 

flying to points unknown that we then had to find after the fact. 

But absolutely, we are going to be looking at many different 

issues such as arm bands, wrist bands, notifying the local OEP at 

the host sites so if they have capability of assisting with offloading 

of patients, that they will be ready for that as well. So there are 

a number of issues that we have outlined that we want to discuss 

at that meeting. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Guidry, I understand that the Louisiana 

State University system is supposed to function as the State agency responsible for acute care for all hospitals and nursing homes 

in an emergency situation under Emergency Support Function No. 

8 of the State Emergency Operations Plan, but that LSU does not 

assume this role in practice. 

44

Why is it that LSU and the Department of Health and Hospitals 

signed off on an Emergency Operations Plan when they knew it 

was not operational? 

Dr. GUIDRY. I am going to answer this, since I am under oath, 

as honest as I can, and that is we just signed off on what DHH 

was responsible for, and that is what we tried to deliver. LSU 

signed off. 

And that part which they signed off on was taking care of the 

indigent and the uninsured and taking care of those patients that 

would normally go in the private sector. We have, since that was 

signed—and we will now have to go back and revisit this—worked 

through the HRSA grant to build networks between hospitals so 

that in each region of the State, there is a designated regional hospital. And in some regions, that is a LSU hospital, and in some regions, it is a private hospital. 

The LSU system has been losing its funding, if you will, and its 

ability to provide the care for all the indigent, and the private hospitals have been absorbing that. So the Department of Health and 

Hospitals, myself in the role, has worked with all the hospitals to 

make sure we can take care of patients. So LSU has worked to 

take care of the LSU system as much as they can, and I have 

worked with the private hospitals and the hospital association to 

take care of the other hospitals, all working together in a system 

we have set up through HRSA grant. 

Senator AKAKA. Madam Chairman, may I do one more question? 

Chairman COLLINS. Certainly. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Stephens, in the Hurricane Pam exercise, 

the city assumed that all major hospitals would cease to function 

if a Category 3 hurricane hit New Orleans. However, according to 

individuals interviewed by the Committee, it is New Orleans policy 

to direct patients who need constant care to go to hospitals. Isn’t 

it shortsighted to have patients being directed to hospitals, which 

you anticipate would not be functioning during such a disaster? 

Dr. STEPHENS. Well, I think there are a couple of issues with 

that. The first thing is the level of category of a hurricane and 

whether or not the hospital will be open and operational. And as 

you know, from Category 1 to 5, in the Category 4 or 5, like in 

Katrina, obviously the hospitals are not the place of diversion because they themselves should be evacuated. 

But in the Category 1 or 2, it is certainly feasible to evacuate 

people from wherever they need to go to a hospital for some type 

of sheltering. And indeed, with the State plan, they have two components, hospital sheltering and special needs sheltering, and they 

have specific criteria for each. In that event, I think it is appropriate to do that. 

And one of the things I mentioned earlier, I think it is certainly 

wise for us all to look at the hardening of our hospitals’ infrastructure. We can build structures to withstand Category 4 and 5 hurricanes, and I think we need to invest the resources to harden the 

hospitals, not only pre and during the hurricane, but even more importantly, after the hurricane hit. 

Because then, when you have injuries, then you have no place to 

bring people to get emergent and imminent care. But if the hospitals were hardened, that would be a first line of defense that we 

45

could get to them, and we could start to take care of people who 

may have been injured throughout the process. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I thank the panel. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Dr. Stephens, before I dismiss this panel, I want to apologize for 

not having time to question you. Maybe you are happy about that. 

[Laughter.] 

But had I been able to, the line of questioning was going to be 

identical to that pursued by my colleague Senator Lieberman about 

the memoranda of understanding. 

And I just want to commend you for stepping into the vacuum 

and trying to put together agreements that would have improved 

the response. And I think you deserve some public credit for that, 

and I hope you will continue to work on that and make sure that 

they get finalized before hurricane season strikes this year. 

I do want to thank all of our witnesses today for your cooperation 

and your testimony. The hearing record will remain open for 15 

days for additional information. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

I don’t really have anything substantial to add. I just wanted to 

say that Dr. Stephens’ admirable work must be explained by the 

fact that not only is he a medical doctor, but he is a doctor of jurisprudence. 

Chairman COLLINS. I thought it was despite that. [Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And then, finally, Dr. Guidry, are you related to Ron Guidry? 

Dr. GUIDRY. I must be, but I don’t know. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Don’t try to curry favor with the Committee. 

[Laughter.] 

Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your testimony. This hearing 

is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(47)

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POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

SUBMITTED TO DR. JIMMY GUIDRY FROM SENATOR 

DANIEL K. AKAKA 

1. The Public Health Service teams are controlled by HHS and the 

DMATs are part of FEMA, yet they had virtually identical jobs 

in the immediate response to Hurricane Katrina. Was there sufficient coordination of these public health assets or was the response impaired because the resources were divided between 

two Federal agencies? 

The problem to be addressed is that the entity with the responsibility for coordinating a response did not ‘‘own’’ the asset. Specifically, HHS as the lead ESF 8 for health and medical activities has 

the responsibility to assist the State ESF 8 with placing, monitoring, and coordinating a response activity. The assets—i.e., 

DMAT team—are not under their direct control. The additional layers to obtain approval, placement, and payment/reimbursement impaired effective coordination. Dividing responsibility from asset 

ownership impairs the fabric of accountability. 

2. Some public health officials who the Committee interviewed said 

that outside resources were not helpful unless the personnel 

could be self-sustained—in other words—they came with their 

own security, housing, and food. Did you encounter this problem with the medical personnel sent to Louisiana, and if so, do 

you believe that in the future only self-sustained teams should 

be sent to a disaster site? 

We found that self-sustained teams of volunteers were more effective in response coordination efforts than ‘‘plug and place’’ of 

self-deployed volunteers. To address the needs (security, housing, 

and food) of the self-deployed volunteers added significantly to an 

already overwhelming workload. Teams that had trained together 

and understood NIMS were more apt to complete a shift and thereby relieve the workload. Volunteers—while well-intentioned—became more demanding than the patients that we were trying to 

help. In many cases, the volunteers would not complete a shift as 

they would often prefer to respond to the ‘‘hot zone’’ rather than 

the coordinated areas of care.

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