CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIESHONOLULU, HAWAII   FEBRUARY 2000

**SLOCSecurity in the Asia Pacific**ProfessorJi Guoxing**********Introduction
******T**heeconomic development of Asian Pacific countries in the passing two to threedecades has been closely related to seaborne trade, and the importance of sealines of communication (SLOC) to regional countries would be much increased inthe twenty-first century.  SLOCsecurity is now one of the priorities in regional countries' strategic thinkingand policy making.
Theoceans occupy 70 percent of the earth's surface, and the Pacific Ocean occupies50 percent of the world’s ocean surface. World countries have depended on the free passage of goods across theseas, and the majority of Asian Pacific countries, with their export-orientedeconomic structure, have even more depended on maritime transportation. An uninterrupted flow of shipping is critical to regional countries'survival and prosperity.**However, SLOC insecurities do exist, and the problems therein do notwarrant optimistic views.  Factorsaffect SLOC security include: the unstable political relationship among regionalcountries; different interpretation over the freedom of the seas principle;islands' sovereignty disputes and overlapping maritime jurisdictional claims;the emerging naval build-up; and non-traditional threats such as pollution,piracy, drug-trafficking, etc.
Being not the possession of anyone country or power, sea lines have to beused and defended jointly by countries.  Regionalcountries need to promote closer cooperation in guaranteeing SLOC security formutual interests.
China attaches much importance to SLOC security, and would play apositive role in the safeguarding of SLOC together with other regionalcountries.  However, China needs tomake sustained efforts to let the world community believe its sincerity inmaintaining SLOC security and to clarify the misunderstanding prevalent in someworld circles that ''China does not support the freedom of the seas principle''and ''China is one of the sources threatening regional SLOC security''.
**Major Sea Lines in Regional Seas
**T**he sea occupies an important position in the Asia Pacific, and is thecentral component of the region. Southeast Asia has a vast span of water withthe South China Sea, extending over 1800 miles from Sumatra to Taiwan, as theprincipal maritime component linking the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The shores of Northeast Asian countries are washed by the East China Sea,the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, and in abroad sense by the Pacific Ocean.
Sea lines of communication connect world countries with one another. In peace-time, these ocean routes serve as commercial trade routes; inwar-time, they become strategic lines of communication. The Asia Pacific roughly has two significant sea lines of communication,one passing through the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East,the other passing through the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan to the PacificOcean and the Pacific coast of the US and Canada. Actually, among the world seven major sea lines, apart from the NorthAtlantic Line, the South Atlantic Line, and the North American-South AmericanLine, the other four lines (the Eurasia Line, the North Pacific Line, the SouthPacific Line, and the Cape of Good Hope Line) all relate to the Asia Pacific. In terms of ship movement, the seas in the Asia Pacific are among thebusiest in the world.  For example,a significant volume of commercial and military traffic is involved in the Seaof Japan.  According to a study bythe Washington-based Stimson Center, there are more incidents in the Sea ofJapan than any other theater worldwide.**[1]**
The South China Sea provides shipping routes connecting Northeast Asiawith Southeast Asia and the Middle East.  TheSpratly Islands are located in the southeast quadrant of the sea, an area knownto seafarers as 'dangerous ground' due to the shallowness of the waterssurrounding the islands and numerous submerged reefs around. Thus most merchant ships steer clear of the Spratlys, and major routespass well west of the Spratlys.  ''Throughthe South China Sea pass more than 41,000 ships a year, more than double thenumber that pass through the Suez Canal and nearly treble the total for thePanama Canal.''**[2]**
There are several straits of strategic importance in the region, such asthe Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar in Southeast Asia, and theStraits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, Osumi, and Soya (La Perouse) in Northeast Asia.  Major shipping routes in the Asia Pacific are through thesekey straits.  Due to their potentialfor closure, these straits are known as chokepoints.
The Strait of Malacca, 600 miles long, is relatively shallow (only 21.8meters) at some points.  The maximumdraught recommended by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for passingships is 19.8 meters.  The navigablechannel at its narrowest point in the Singapore Strait at its eastern end isonly 1.5 miles wide.  This creates anatural bottleneck, with the potential for collision, grounding, or oil spill. 
The Strait of Malacca, being the main corridor between the Indian Oceanand the South China Sea, has as many as 220 ship movements in both directionsper day at present, and would have 275 ship movements by the year 2000. ''About 26 tankers, including three fully loaded supertankers heading forAsian ports, pass through the strait daily.''**[3]** Tankers using the waterway by 2010 will be two to three times morenumerous than today.  ''If thestrait were closed, nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sailfurther, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vesselcapacity.''**[4]
The Lombok Strait is wider and deeper than the Strait of Malacca, andpassing through it is only 150 miles longer. As its depths are greater than 150 meters, it is not draught-limited, andits minimum passage width is 11.5 miles.  Itis thus used by largest ships over 100,000 DWT (dead weight tonnage). Most ships transiting the Lombok Strait also pass through the MakassarStrait, which has an available width of 11 miles and a length of 600 miles. Its depth is 930-3392 meters, mostly suitable for submarines and largeships.
The Sunda Strait is 50 miles long and is another alternative to theMalacca Strait.  Its northeastern entrance is 15 miles wide. But because its northern part is relatively shallow with dangerouscurrents, it is not heavily used, and deep-draught ships of over 100,000 DWT donot transit the Strait.
The Strait of Tsushima, being part of the Korea Strait, is the major linkbetween the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. It is 137.9 miles long.  Itsnarrowest point is 25 miles wide, and its deepest point is 129 meters. It is heavily used by vessels traveling to and from the east coast ofSouth Korea, western Japan, and Vladivostok of Russia.
The Strait of Tsugaru, located between Japan's Hokkaido and HonshuIslands, connects the Sea of Japan with the North Pacific Ocean. It is 71.5 miles long.  Itsnarrowest point is 10.1 miles wide, and the deepest point of the navigablechannel is 521 meters.
The Osumi Strait is a major connection from the Yellow Sea and the EastChina Sea to the Pacific.
The Strait of Soya (La Perouse) connects the Sea of Japan with the Sea ofOkhotsk.  Its narrowest point is 20 miles wide, and its depth is 30-60meters. 
Forstraits used for international navigation, some regional countries have modifiedthe width of their territorial sea.  Inspite of their declaration of 12 nautical miles (nm) territorial seas, bothJapan and South Korea have modified their territorial seas to 3 nm in the KoreaStrait, thus providing a high seas ''corridor'', through which ships may transitwithout entering the territorial seas of Japan and South Korea. Japan has also declared territorial seas of 3 nm wide in the Tsugaru,Osumi, and Soya (La Perouse) straits.
**SLOCs as Lifelines to RegionalCountries
**T**he Asian Pacific countries rely heavily on intra-regional andinter-regional trade for their economic development, and seaborne trade is themost efficient and economical means of transporting large volume and heavyweight cargoes.  Shipping routes are thus described as the arteries of theregional economy. 
The volume of major sea-trade commodities in the Asia Pacific hassurpassed 1.5 billion tons, comprising over one-third of the world's maritimetrade volume.  About 15 % of the total volume of world trade transit theSoutheast Asian SLOCs.  Regionalcountries using the major East Asian SLOCs for international trade amounted toUS$ 949.5 billion in 1994, with 54.5% being Northeast Asian trade and 45.4 %being Southeast Asian trade.  Amongthem, Japan's and China's total trade via Southeast Asian lines was US$ 260.4billion and US$ 65.6 billion respectively, 39 % and 27 % respectively of theirtotal trade.  For South Korea, ''Theshipping routes connecting the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca-Singapore straits andSoutheast Asian waters form the most important ocean routes used to importstrategic commodities.''**[5]**
The major commodities brought on northbound East Asian SLOCs includecrude oil from the Middle East as well as grain, coal and iron ore to fuelNortheast Asian industry. Southbound shipping on the East Asian SLOCs consistsprimarily of manufactured products bound for Southeast Asia and Europe. ''The overall pattern of shipping is that large tonnages of low-valuecommodities are shipped to industrial economies (Japan and the four NIEs), whichthen 'add value' via manufacturing process. The industrial economies then ship out relatively smaller tonnages ofhigh-value goods.''**[6]**
With the rapid economic growth of Asian Pacific economies in the passingdecades, the center of international navigation is moving east to the AsiaPacific.  Asian countries are nowincreasingly participating in ownership of the world shipping fleet. Over the last two decades, South Korea, China, Singapore, and China'sTaiwan have joined Japan and Hong Kong as major ship owners. These six economies now own 201,645 DWT, 30.05 % of the total worldshipping tonnage.  Of the 20 largestcontainer shipping lines in the world, half are owned and based in Asia, andamong the world top 20 container ports, 18 are in the Asia Pacific. The Asian financial crisis since July 1997 has affected the regionaldemand for maritime navigation, but in the medium-term and long-termperspectives, the Asian Pacific economic growth will be resumed and regionaldemand for navigation would continue to increase at a high rate. The quick recovery of some regional countries such as South Korea is anexample.
Maritime transport is divided into three major categories: dry bulk(dominated by iron ore, grain, and coal); liquid bulk (dominated by crude oiland petroleum products); and general cargo (dominated by containers). ''Tonnage via Malacca and the Spratly Islands is dominated by liquid bulksuch as crude oil and liquid natural gas, with dry bulk (mostly coal and ironore) in second place.  Nearlytwo-thirds of the tonnage passing through the Strait of Malacca, and half of thevolume passing the Spratly Islands, is crude oil from the Persian Gulf.''**[7]**
Oil is the dominant source of energy for Asian Pacific countries. As Asian Pacific oil consumption is much greater than production, thesecountries will become increasingly dependent on imported oil from the MiddleEast.  At present oil importsaccount for almost 60 % of Asian oil consumption, and by 2010 import dependenceis projected to increase to at least 75 %. The rapid growth in regional seaborne energy trade has resulted inincreased numbers of tankers and LNG/LPG carriers plying regional shippingroutes.  In Northeast Asia, there isvery heavy oil tanker traffic mainly to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. About 4 billion barrels of crude oil a day are imported by them,representing 23 % of the global total.  LNGshipments through the South China Sea constitute two-thirds of the world'soverall LNG trade.  The supply ofenergy and its unimpeded transportation become major security concerns in theregion.
Keeping the sea lines of communication secure and unencumbered is animportant  economic and security interest for the US. The US reaffirms that, ''Promoting stability in the Arabian Gulf,maintaining freedom of the seas, protecting sea lines of communication,particularly in the Strait of Malacca, and other efforts to safeguard energysupplies will become a challenge of increasing mutual interest.''**[8]**
In respect to dry bulk trade, the quantity of dry bulk cargo imported byAsia is 56 % of the world total (coal 50 %, iron ore 60 %, grain 60 %).
Australia is the principal supplier of coal to most Asian markets,providing 100 million tons in 1996.  USand Canada are also important suppliers, shipping 16 and 25 million tonsrespectively in 1996.  China is estimated to supply between 15 % and 20 % of Asia'scoal import need by 2001, and Indonesia is emerging as a second major coalexporter.    
Because iron mines are found in only a few countries, most of the ironore trade is carried out by sea.  Accordingto UNCTAD Trust Fund statistics, trade in iron ore was 430.6 million tons in1995; Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan accounted for 47.8 % of the world'siron ore imports.  Japan imported120.4 million tons of iron ore from Australia, Brazil, and India; South Koreaimported 35 million tons from Australia, Brazil, India and Canada; Chinaimported 41.3 million tons from Australia, Brazil, South Africa and India.**[9]**  Australia exports now provide nearly 60 % of Asian demand for iron ore. 
As East Asia is becoming a grain-importing region, the increasing demandfor grain is having a big impact on the maritime transport trade. Northeast Asian countries are heavily dependent on the US, Canada, andAustralia for grain import. '' At the present time grain imports to Asia standat around 75 million tons per year, of which Japan accounts for a little under40 percent.  Approximately 30percent is accounted for by the East Asian NIEs, while China's imports accountfor more than 20 percent.''**[10]**Canada has approximately 12 % of the total Asian grain market.
In respect to container trade, the total volume of containers in EastAsia's ports increased by 270 % from 15.92 million TEU (20-foot equivalentunits) in 1985 to 60.1 million TEU in 1995. It is anticipated that East Asian ports will probably handle around 50 %of total world container throughput by 2005. The intra-Asian container trade has consistently registered growth, andis now recognized as the second largest container trade in the world--secondonly to the trans-Pacific trade.
**UNCLOS and Freedom of the SeasPrinciple
**T**he principle of the freedom of the seas was first enunciated by a Dutchlawyer Hugo Grotius in the early 17th century. He set out the legal principle that ''Navigation was free to all and noone country could lay claim to the seas on the basis that their navigators werethe first to sail on it.''**[11]** His intention was to contest the right which Portugal took upon itself toprohibit all others from engaging in seaborne commerce with the East Indies. In fact, during the history of maritime affairs, the Portuguese practiceis no exception; maritime powers usually sought freedom for their own commerceand trade and a restriction on others.  ''Eventhose who espouse freedom in shipping today, often really mean freedom forthemselves on the back of restrictions on others.''**[12]** Nowadays, in theory, every country has the freedom of the seas; inpractice, those developed economies and maritime powers are enjoying mostly thefreedom of the seas.
The freedom of the seas principle today is set out in UNCLOS (UNConvention on the Law of the Sea) in 1982, which came into force in November1994.  UNCLOS codifies the legalregime governing virtually every aspect in, over or under the seas, contributesto the building of a stable maritime regime, including navigation regime, andmakes a significant development in the law of navigation. ''Counterbalancing the adoption of distended national jurisdiction towardthe seas, the UNCLOS established three important regimes in securing the freedomof navigation, namely, 'innocent passage' through territorial waters, 'transitpassage' through international straits, and 'archipelagic sea-lanes passage'through archipelagoes,''**[13]**in addition to freedom of navigation in the contiguous zone, in the exclusiveeconomic zone, and on the high seas.
However, UNCLOS does not resolve all issues and many problems exist. As UNCLOS ''marked a fundamental compromise between the preservation offreedom of navigation in return for a preferential share of high seas mineralresources for the developing world,''**[14]**and is designed ''to balance the rights of users or maritime states to areasonable degree of freedom of the seas, with the interests of coastal statesto protect and safeguard their sovereignty, marine resources and environment.''**[15]**,it is ambiguous on many issues, and only offers general rules and principles. Difference in understanding and interpretation is prevalent in the worldcommunity.  General State practiceremains conflicting as well. 
The unresolved issues regarding navigation which might be potentialsources of conflicts include:    
Firstly,regarding the innocent passage through the territorial waters, it has been amuch debated issue for long in the international community as to whether theright of innocent passage applies to warships. Coastal states have been reluctant to permit passage to warships withoutprior authorization or notification.  ''Thehistory of foreign invasion and traditionally sensitive security concern in theAsia Pacific caused many littoral states in the region to have strongreservations on the right of foreign warships to innocent passage through theircoastal waters.''**[16]** Regional countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, India, Indonesia,South Korea, North Korea, and Pakistan require authorization or notification forthe innocent passage of foreign warships.
Theinterpretation of the innocent passage norms becomes an issue in respect of theJava Sea.  For years, Indonesiawants to impose some rules to regulate the movements of foreign warships usingthe Java Sea.  They say warshipssailing outside designated sea-lanes should abide by the norms that govern therights of innocent passage.  “Underthe Indonesian interpretation of these norms, submarines must sail on thesurface, weapons and surveillance radars must be switched off andaircraft-carriers must keep their planes deck-bound.”**[17]** But Indonesia’s dictates are unacceptable to the US. The Americans have pointed out that, “Under the proposed rules, US navyships sailing out of Singapore would have to wait until they neared the SundaStrait before they could go into operational mode. The prospect of its ships sailing more than 300 kilometers in less thanbattle-readiness doesn’t appeal to the US navy.”**[18]**
For the avoidance of misunderstanding regarding this controversial issue,the US and the former Soviet Union signed in 1989 a joint statement on innocentpassage of warships in each other's territorial seas and set forth in moredetails their interpretation of the Convention governing innocent passage in theterritorial seas.  Other countriesprobably need to follow suit.
Secondly, regarding the transit passage through international straits, itis defined as the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight solelyfor the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit in the normal modes ofoperation utilized by ships and aircrafts for such passage. But it has been controversial as to whether submarines are free totransit international straits submerged.  Besides,controversy lies in the rights of a strait state to interfere with transitpassage due to suspected pollution incidents, and the scope of regulatoryresponsive measures to accidents and pollution taken by a strait state.  Moreover, there are various proposals by regional straitstates ''to go beyond the IMO safety regulations and traffic-lane demarcationsand to impose additional restrictions on passing ships, including even tolls forthe use of these recognized straits''**[19]**,which have been resisted by other countries.
Thirdly, regarding archipelagic sea-lanes passage, ''Under the LOSConvention an archipelagic state may designate sea lanes and air routes suitablefor the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraftsthrough or above its archipelagic waters.  Sucharchipelagic sea lanes must include all normal passage routes and all normalnavigational channels.  On the otherhand, innocent passage applies in other archipelagic waters seaward of theinternal waters of the islands of the archipelago.''**[20]** Different interpretations of these stipulations exist between maritimepowers and archipelagic states. 
The Convention assigns archipelagic states for designating sea lanes incoordination with the IMO (International Maritime Organization). But uncertainty exists regarding it. Indonesia believes it alone has the right to decide on such matters.  Indonesia recognizes the authority of the IMO only on mattersrelating to navigational aids and the safety of shipping--not on the delineationof sea lanes.  Indonesia, indeclaring her new archipelagic sea-lanes, proposed to limit passage to onlythree north-south sea-lanes.**[21]** This attempt to restrict avenues and methods of routine naval passagethrough the Indonesian archipelago has even been resisted by the US Pentagon.Washington opposes proposed sea-lane rules by Indonesia, ''Establishing sealanes without concurrence would set a dangerous precedent.''**[22]** To utilize its geostrategic leverage, Indonesia did try in 1978 and 1988''to close the Lombok and Sunda Straits as a way of asserting its sovereigntyover two of the world's most important maritime choke points.''**[23]**
Fourthly, regarding naval activities in EEZ, the EEZ regime in UNCLOSattempts to accommodate the competing interests of coastal states for greatercontrol over offshore resources, and those of maritime powers for maintainingtraditional freedom of action in waters beyond territorial seas. But the restrictive regime of the EEZ might pose a threat to the mobilityof navies and the ongoing controversy over the EEZ regime includes the freedomof action of foreign navies within EEZ.  Theissues are whether foreign navy is free to conduct military maneuvers withinEEZ without requiring prior notification or authorization from the coastalstate; and whether a state is free to place non-economic installations, such assubmarine detection devices in the EEZ of foreign state, which do not interferewith coastal enjoyment of its EEZ rights.
The restrictions over freedom of the seas raised by the wording of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treatysigned by the ASEAN countries at the Bangkok Summit in December 1995 have causedconcerns in the US and some major powers.  Thetreaty includes a protocal open to signature by the five declared nuclear weaponstates.  The US issued a statementon 15 December 1995, saying, ''One of the most significant issues preventing usfrom supporting the treaty at this point is the inclusion of exclusive economiczones (EEZs) and continental shelves in the zone, which we believe isinconsistent with internationally recognized high seas freedoms of navigationand overflight.  We feel that, tothe extent that the SEANWFZ Treaty imposes security obligations on non-treatyparties without their consent in areas where high seas freedom exist, the treatyis inconsistent with the UN Law of the Sea Convention and sets an unfortunateprecedent.''**[24]**
Fifthly,the legal issues relating to the shipment of nuclear wastes through certainocean areas such as EEZs, territorial seas and straits.  Thosenations supporting the shipments assert that the shipments are free to navigatethrough any part of the ocean under the traditional doctrines of innocentpassage, transit passage, and freedom of the high seas. Many of those nations concerned about the shipments argue instead thatthe environmental provisions in the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1989 Basel Convention onthe Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal''require nations shipping these wastes to prepare environmental assessments andthen to provide notification to and seek authorization of affected nationsbefore passing through their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.''**[25]** The issue of restricting the passage of vessels carrying nuclear or otherhazardous cargoes through the Malacca Strait has often been raised by stateslittoral to the Strait.
**Present SLOC Insecurities
**A**ssea lines in the region are proximate to the Asian land mass, and pass throughnarrow chokepoints, they are highly vulnerable.  “In these straits, any attempt to hinder or block passageof ships by coastal states, if the experience of the Suez Canal and the Gulf isany guide, could pose a threat to SLOC security in the region.”**[26]**
Firstly,The unstable political relationship among regional countries, especially amongUS, Japan, and China constitutes a major threat to regional SLOC security. Without an amicable and cooperative political atmosphere among regionalcountries, one cannot expect to have a secure and stable maritime transportationin the seas.
Theattempt by some circles in the US to sow discord between US and China and todisrupt the ongoing bilateral relationship of strategic partnership woulddestabilize the region and threaten SLOC security.  The suspicions and mistrust between China and Japan wouldalso affect regional peace and development as well as regional SLOC security.
Takethe revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines for example, China strongly opposes theenlargement of Japan’s military role in the Asia Pacific. As said in the new Guidelines, Japan has set forth a more definitive rolein responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have animportant influence on Japan’s peace and security. It is said, “The concept ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’embodied in the revised Guidelines is not geographical but situational.”**[27]** But it is clear that the guidelines “allow Japanese troops to serveindependently outside Japan for the first time since World War Two. Previously they could only serve overseas as part of UN peace-keepingoperations.”**[28]** The Guidelines were approved in the Japanese Parliament in May 1999, andhave become the law.  Such an enhancement of a bilateral military alliance runsagainst the historic trend and aggravate regional tension and SLOC insecurity. Keeping alive of the memories of the Japanese invasion, China and otherEast Asian countries are gravely concerned over it. 
What’smore, it is widely reported in Japan’s mass media that Taiwan is included in“areas surrounding Japan”.  EvidentlyJapan wants to intervene in China’s domestic affairs.  China is firm that the “areas surrounding Japan” shouldnot incorporate Taiwan.
Besides,Japan’s self-imposed role since 1981 in safeguarding the SLOCs up to 1,000miles from its territory for its oil life-lines has already aroused concern inthe region.  In line with thecommitment, Japan is able to conduct regular maritime surveillance of itsneighboring seas and its sea lanes by utilizing maritime patrol aircraft andnaval vessels.  If all regionalcountries are set to defend 1,000 miles as Japan does, all the seas in theregion would be full of potential conflicts. With the expanded role by the Guidelines, Japan could more convenientlystretch out its muscles in the Asia Pacific.
Secondly,islands’ sovereignty disputes and overlapping maritime claims constituteanother major threat to regional SLOC security.  Disputes over sovereignty of some islets located along sealines in the South and East China Seas have the potential to spark openconflict.  “An interruption to theSLOC security could arise as a side effect of armed clashes between coastalstates engaged in pressing claims to maritime jurisdiction, particularly thoseto mid-sea islands.”**[29]** In March 1999, two unknown ships entered into Japan’s territorial seas,and fled into international waters after Japan’s warnings. In June 1999, North Korea and South Korea clashed in the fishing areas inthe Yellow Sea which both claim.  ”Theregional states have fears for the vulnerability of the SLOCs in the South ChinaSea.  Also, there is a fear among Japanese that the same atmosphereof tension and insecurity will be seen in the East China Sea before long.”**[30]****Thirdly,the ongoing naval build-up by regional countries would be another threat to SLOCsecurity.  In order to assuresea-lane security many countries in the region, including a number of medium andsmall states, are engaging in defense buildups, and maritime capabilities are atthe forefront of these defense acquisition programs. Japan, South Korea and China are enhancing their sea-lane defensecapacity, and countries astride the sea-lanes are also expanding their own navalforce.  “On the naval front,around 200-250 new major surface vessels were originally planned for procurementby the new century.  Furthermore,analysts have expected that more than 36 new modern submarines will be acquiredby Asian states in the next decade—primarily by Japan, South Korea, Malaysiaand Indonesia.”**[31]** The financial crisis since 1997 has either slowed down the pace of theirmodernization programs or in some cases suspended their major arms buys. But on the whole, the region will remain one of the most lucrativemarkets in the world for defense manufacturers. The dangers of a naval arms race and the risk of naval confrontationalong the sea-lanes are emerging.
Fourthly,the transport of radioactive wastes from Europe to Japan through the AsianPacific region is another threat to SLOC security.  Three shipments of radioactive wastes have taken place todate since 1992, with an expectation of continued shipments for 10 years or morewith a frequency of one or two shipments per year.  “Many coastal states along the routes taken by theshipments have expressed concern, with some states banning the shipments fromtheir exclusive economic zones and territorial waters.”**[32]** Malaysia has condemned the shipments and has demanded that the vesselsnot enter Malaysia’s territorial waters. Indonesia has declared that as itcannot close international sea lanes, it has called on Japan, even pressedJapan, not to use Indonesian waters. 
Thereis also concern that the Japanese shipments may open the door to worldwidecommercial traffic in one of the most toxic substances known. For example, South Korea and Taiwan may eventually want to start shippingspent nuclear fuel from their reactors for reprocessing into plutonium and haveit returned by sea.**[33]
Finally,non-conventional actions such as piracy, maritime hijacking, drug trafficking,pollution, natural disasters also threaten SLOC security.
Piracyposes a real danger to SLOC security.  Piracyand armed robbery in Southeast Asia is known to account for about 60 % of thetotal reported piracy in the world.  Piracy “hot spots” in the region are: the Straits ofMalacca and Sunda, offshore Vietnam and Cambodia, the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainantriangle, the area north of Taiwan, and the Yellow Sea areas.  According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), overtwo-thirds of the world’s piracy incidents in 1992 and 1993 occurred in theAsian Pacific region.  In 1994 andonwards, there was a significant increase in piracy incidents in Indonesianwaters.  According to IMBstatistics, in 1995 and 1996, more than 50 % of the world’s piracy incidentsoccurred in East Asia, with 101 of 170 global pirate attacks in 1995, and 100 of175 global pirate attacks in 1996.  EastAsia’s financial crisis has led to an increase in piracy and the piracyincidents in the South China Sea in 1997.

Pollutionis another big problem.  The majorconcern is the possibility of a catastrophic oil spill. The first major oil pollution incident in the Sea of Japan was the 6,400tons spilled from the wrecked tanker Juliana. Then a South Korean spill of 80 tons of bunker-C in 1987 when a tankerwas wrecked 40 miles off Inchon Habor.  Inthe heavily trafficked straits such as the Malacca Strait, there are frequentworries about the danger of a major oil spill seriously disrupting, or evenclosing the strait.
Anothersource of tanker-related oil pollution is the discharge of tank washings. Approximately 1,000 tons, or 300,000 gallons one single voyage of a200,000 ton tanker may be discharged into the sea with tank washings.
Maritimenatural hazards, such as floods, tropical storms, severe oceanic conditions andtsunamis, also greatly affect maritime transportation. The seriousness of regional natural disasters is clear at a glance of thewords that “The Asia Pacific area includes 52 % of the earth’s surface area,59 % of the world’s population, and over 70 % of the world’s naturaldisasters.”**[34]******China versus SLOC Security
**C**hina’seconomic reform and economic interests decide that China pays great importanceto the guarantee of SLOC security.
China’srapid economic growth and industrialization in the passing two decades have ledto a dramatic increase in the demand for maritime transportation. Its import and export volume was US$ 135.63 billion in 1991, and US$325.06 billion in 1997, an average annual growth rate of 15.9;**[35]**and 90% of its foreign trade is by sea-transportation. As there exists a big imbalance between supply and demand in oil forChina, it has to import oil by sea. Currently around half of China’s oilimports are from the Middle East.  Asthe gap is being widened at a rate of 7 million tons per year, China’s net oilimport is projected to reach 55 million tons yearly (mt/y) in 2000, and 116-150mt/y in 2010.
Significant achievements have been made by China in ocean-goingtransportation and container transportation capacity. “By the end of 1997, merchant ships had increased to 320,000 with atotal dead-weight tonnage of close to 50 million, of which more than 23 millionwere of the fleets in foreign trade transportation.”**[36]** At present, China has 15 harbors each with an annual handling capacity ofmore than 10 million tons.  Theharbors with annual handling capacity above 10,000 tons number 200. In 1997, the volume of freight handled by the country’s major coastalharbors totaled 905 million tons.  Inrecent years, China’s coastal shipbuilding industry has shown a trend of rapiddevelopment, and in 1997 China’s shipbuilding tonnage ranked third in theworld.
Thevolume of containers handled by Chinese ports has surged, increasing four-foldbetween 1990 and 1995.  Shanghai,which accounts for about one-third of the total containers handled by China,increased by 26.4 % in 1996.  By theend of the decade, the ports of China will handle more than 10 % of the Asiantotal. 
Withthe rapid growth in Chinese cargoes, and improved handling capacities atmainland ports, major lines begin to experiment with direct calls at mainlandports, collecting cargoes previously transshipped through Hong Kong or Japaneseports. 
Proceedingfrom its economic interests, China is fully aware of the importance of the searoutes. “ As a member of the IMO China has signed bilateral maritimetransportation agreements with 51 countries, making positive efforts to promoteinternational cooperation and exchanges in maritime transportation.  At the 16th to 20th sessions of theIMO, China was successively elected as an A-level council member state. China has also acceded to 30-some conventions formulated by the IMO.”**[37]** To date, the Chinese government has accepted all the major internationalconventions related to maritime safety and pollution prevention, includingSafety of Life at Sea Convention of 1974, Regulations for Preventing Collisionsat Sea Convention of 1972, Search and Rescue Convention of 1979, Convention forthe Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/78, etc.
Chinasupports the principle of the freedom of the seas.  In view of the concerns in the world community over thedisruption of SLOCs in the South China Sea after the Mischief Reef incident,China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement in May 1995, saying “Whilesafeguarding its sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and its maritimerights and interests, China will fulfill its duty of guaranteeing freedom ofnavigation for foreign ships and air routes through and over the internationalpassage of the South China Sea according to international law.”**[38]** It is clear from the statement that China respects innocent passagethrough territorial waters of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, andrespects freedom of navigation in the EEZ of those big islands entitled to have these claims, as well as freedom of navigation on theremaining high seas in the South China Sea. Thus China’s statement implies that freedom of navigation applies toboth the sea areas under its jurisdiction and the high seas. Worries in some circles that China’s stated freedom of navigation onlyapplies to the high seas are uncalled-for.
Currentlythere are two security zones proclaimed by China in the Yellow and East ChinaSeas.  One is a military alert zoneextending west of a line from the North Korean-China border at the mouth of theYalu River to a point off the Shadong Peninsula.  Another is a military exclusive zone in the vicinity ofShanghai. Entry into the two zones is forbidden even on innocent passage withoutspecific permission.  China’sestablishment of the zones is for self-protection. With the improvement of relations among regional countries, it isexpected that China might reconsider these zones in line with the concept offreedom of navigation.
Chinastrongly opposes piracy in SLOCs, and has taken measures to exercise morecontrol on local ‘rogue’ officials.  Historically,China has suffered greatly from piracy and drug smuggling, and therefore hasstriven to crack down on crimes at sea.  Somepiracy incidents in the South China Sea and East China Sea in early 1990s mighthave come from some Chinese individuals and institutions, but they were not ‘adeliberate PRC exercise of extra-territorial sovereignty and an unofficialexertion of expansive PRC maritime claims’ as thought by some Asians. Beijing stated that “Rogue elements of the Chinese Customs and PublicSecurity Bureau (not military units) were responsible.”**[39]**** **After an attempt in May 1994 by some Chinese to seize a vessel insideHong Kong’s territorial waters, China formally made an apology and promised toavoid such incidents in the future.  WhenJapan proposed to China in 1993 that officials from the two countries’coastguard authorities meet to discuss East China Sea shipping problems, Chinaagreed to the meeting, and both sides arranged the establishment of a hotlinebetween their coastguard authorities.  
China’sability in defending SLOCs is limited, and stands for cooperative actions withregional countries in the safeguard of regional SLOC security. In terms of the number of craft, the Chinese navy is big; but it is stillan obsolescent force, limited in size, scope, endurance and sophistication. China has no military forces to protect its seaborne trade.  China lacks air and naval forces for controlling sea routes. Sharing common interests with other regional countries, China supportscooperation in defending SLOCs. 
Thereexist in the world community the apprehensions of “China threat by itsocean-going navy”.  If themisunderstandings are not cleared up, they would affect regional cooperation onSLOC security.
China’songoing defense buildup, including naval buildup, is a purely defensive one. The Chinese Navy’s strategic mission, as stated by its commanderAdmiral Shi Yunsheng, is “to contain and resist foreign aggression from thesea, to defend our territorial sovereignty, and to safeguard the unity of themotherland and maritime rights and interests.”**[40]**China will try to protect its maritime rights and interests of the 200 milesexclusive economic zones, and at some other locations the rights of continentalshelves when they are more than 200 miles away from the shores. 
Sincethe mid-1980s, the Chinese navy’s strategy has changed its emphasis fromcoastal defense to offshore defense.  Offshoredefense means the defense of China’s maritime rights and interests in itsmaritime jurisdictional zones.  The then naval commander-in-chief Liu Huaqing made known in1987 the navy’s modernization plan, which included “the transformation ofthe Chinese navy from a coastal defense force into a force capable of limitedoceangoing operation.”**[41]** According to Liu’s plan, “The outmost defense approaches of theChinese navy will be spanned around the China seas: to the Korean Strait in the north, to Liuqiu islands in the east, and toNansha islands in the south.”**[42]** These outermost defense approaches are what “limited oceangoingoperations” and “the operations in offshore seas” refer to. China will not build a global offensive navy. The Chinese navy will only operate in offshore seas within therequirements of China’s security and defense, and is not embarking on ‘atransition to a blue-water power’.
China’srise would not constitute a threat to others. Whether a nation poses a threat to world peace is not determined by itspower but by the nature of its domestic and foreign policies. China’s domestic policy is one of wholehearted commitment to reform andeconomic development and its foreign policy is one of independence and peace. China will not threaten the others’ security.  Actually, it is China who feels that it is being threatenedby other big powers, especially after the Nato’s eastward expansion and thenew US-Japanese security Guidelines.  Chinais faced in the back with the Nato’s expanded influences in Central Asia, andin the front with Japan’s expanded roles in areas surrounding Japan.
**Regional SLOC Security Cooperation
**A**ssea lines are crucial to the survival and prosperity of the Asian Pacificcountries, the safeguard of SLOC security is in the interests of all regionalcountries.  Since the world’soceans are an integral whole, no country can defend the wide radius of the sealines by itself.  In many ways, SLOCis the classical multilateral maritime security interest, and provides the mostbasic demonstration of how a nation’s maritime security interests extendbeyond its own waters.
Therehave been already successful precedents in this respect. The joint Maritime Operation Planning Team between Singapore andIndonesia in the Malacca Strait is a good example. The Regional Piracy Centre established by the International MaritimeBureau in Kuala Lumpur in 1992 covering all the countries east of Sri Lanka toSoutheast Asia and the Far East for serving as an information and reportingcenter, is another example. 
Butsuch limited cooperation is far from enough. Further cooperative approaches to the maintenance and protection of sealines are much needed to develop.
Firstof all, the common understanding and interpretation of UNCLOS stipulationsrelated to the SLOC security is much needed to ensure the security at sea. To secure a common interpretation of UNCLOS stipulations could promotethe uniform practice and acceptance of essential rules of the regime and help tobuild a stable maritime regime.  Havingconsensus on the interpretation, countries could together clarify the outerlimits of coastal states’ claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction over adjacentmaritime areas.  Regional countriescould as well give publicity to the charts or lists of geographical coordinatesrelated to their baselines and maritime jurisdictional zones.
Besides,countries could reach agreements regarding cooperation in the law enforcement onthe high seas for guaranteeing the norms for international navigation on thehigh seas.  Potential conflicts suchas the one happened in October 1994 in the Yellow Sea with the USS Kitty Hawkchasing and threatening a Chinese submarine should be avoided.
Secondly,proper settlement of islands’ sovereignty disputes and overlapping maritimeclaims should be put on the agenda of regional leaders. As an expedient measure, the establishment of joint patrol area and jointdevelopment zone could be initiated. 
Thirdly,the ways of guaranteeing oil and gas import transportation security should begiven special attention.
Fourthly, naval cooperation is ofparticular importance to SLOC security. Bilateral and multilateral navalcooperation for CBM would reduce uncertainty in maritime security environment. Concrete cooperative approaches should be worked out for the protectionof SLOC, especially the ways to deal with those non-conventional threats. They might include humanitarian assistance, search and rescue (SAR),avoidance of incident at sea (INCSEA) agreements, anti-piracy cooperation,cooperative maritime surveillance, and mine-countermeasures. 
Therehave been two regional organizations engaged in maritime security issues. APEC has been active in recent years in furthering regional cooperationin shipping and maritime safety.  TheTransportation Working Group under APEC has taken a number of initiatives tofacilitate the maritime commerce. ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) has started to moveinto the area of maritime cooperation.  Itinvited US and Thailand to co-chair an ARF Maritime Specialist Officials meetingin Honolulu in November 1998 in conjunction with a meeting of the IntersessionalSupport Group on CBMs. Regional SLOC security cooperation might fall within theframework of one of the present two existing regional organizations.
CSCAP(Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) which is supposed to bethe premier institution of track-two process to support the ARF, seems to berather active on security issues these years. However, facts have shown that there have been actually no track-twoactivities in some member countries of CSCAP regarding the participation ofdelegates and the presentation of their perspectives.  Thus the further development of CSCAP is in question. The institutionalization of track-two process as CSCAP has done is infact not helpful.  It is better to let track-two process be more open and in aloose form, and inclusive of all academic, non-governmental activities. 
Since1995 there has been a Maritime Cooperative Working Group affiliated to CSCAP. The working group has convened several meetings and has been veryproductive in making suggestions for regional maritime cooperation. It is suggested that a regional SLOC cooperative organization might beset up based on the Maritime Cooperative Working Group. The Group could be restructured and put under ARF or APEC. The new organization would coordinate all the bilateral and sub-regionalactivities in the region, apart from liaison among regional law enforcementauthorities.  
 **[1]    Barry M. Blechman, et. al.,''The US Stake in Naval Arms Control'', Henry L.    Stimson Center, Washington DC, 1990.

[2]    International Herald Tribune, 3 May 1999.

[3]    Sumihiko Kawamura, ''Shipping and Regional Trade: Regional Security    Interests'', in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates ed., *Shipping and Regional Security*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and    Defence No.129, Australian National University, 1998, p.16.

[4]    World Oil Transit Chokepoint, May 1998 on the world-wide web at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html>.

[5]    Seo-Hang Lee, ''SLOC Security in Northeast Asia: Korean Navy's Role'', in    Dalchoong Kim and Doug-Woon Cho ed., *Korean Sea Power and the Pacific Era,* Institute of East and West    Studies, Yonsei University, 1990, p. 86.

[6]    Sumihiko Kawamura, op. cit., p. 15. Cited from the US Pacific Command's *Asia    Pacific Economic Update*.

[7]    ''South China Sea Region'', United States Energy Information Administration,    August 1998, on the world-wide web at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html>.

[8]*The United States Security Strategy    for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, released by the US Secretary of    Defense, November 1998, p. 56.

[9]    Joonson Jon, ''Critical Non-Energy Import Dependencies in Northeast Asia'',    in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates ed., op. cit., pp. 82-83.

[10]    Stephen J. Meyrick, ''Developments in Asian MaritimeTrade'', in *Maritime    Shipping in Northeast Asia: Law of the Sea, Sea Lanes, and Security,*    IGCC Policy Paper 33, February 1998, Institute on Global Conflict and    Cooperation, University of California, p.16.

[11]    Bruce Farthing,*Farthing on    International Shipping,* Business of Shipping Series, LLP, London Hong    Kong, 1997, p. 7.

[12]    Ibid, p. 2.

[13]    Sang-Seek Park, ''New Maritime Order in the Asia Pacific toward the 21st    Century'', paper for the 12th International Conference on SLOC Studies,    Seoul, 6-7 April 1999.

[14]    Mark J. Valencia, ''Northeast Asia: Transnational Navigational Issues and    Possible Cooperative Responses'', in IGCC Policy Paper 33, op. cit., p. 26.

[15]    Jin-Hyun Paik, ''Law of the Sea and Stable Maritime Regime'', paper for the    12th International Conference on SLOC Studies, Seoul, 6-7 April 1999.

[16]    Ibid.

[17]    Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 February 1996.

[18]    Ibid.

[19]    Stanley B. Weeks, ''Sea Lines of Communication Security and Access'', in Sam    Bateman and Stephen Bates ed., op. cit., p. 50.

[20]    Jin-Hyun Paik, op. cit.

[21]    Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 February 1996.

[22]    Ibid.

[23]    Ibid.

[24]    Stanley B. Weeks, “Sea Lines of Communication Security and Access”, op.    Cit., p. 52.

[25]    Grant Hewison, “Return Shipments of Radioactive Wastes from Europe to    Japan”, in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates ed., op. cit., p. 101.

[26]    Seo-Hang Lee, “Security of SLOCs in East Asia”, in IGCC Policy Paper, #    33, op. cit., p. 74.

[27]*The US Security Strategy for the East    Asia-Pacific Region,*op. cit., p. 20.

[28]*South China Morning Post*, 5 May    1999.

[29]    Seo-Hang Lee, “Security of SLOCs in East Asia”, op. cit., p. 74.

[30]    Sumihiko Kawamura, “Maritime Transport and Communications-Including Marine    Safety and SLOC Security” in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates ed., *Calming    the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation,*Canberra    Papers on Strategy and Defense, No. 114, Australian National Univesity,    1996, p. 93.

[31]    Frank Umbach, “Financial Crisis Slows but Fails to Halt East Asian Arms    Race”, *Jane’s Intelligence Review,*August 1998, p. 23.

[32]    Grant Hewison, op. cit., p. 93.

[33]    Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 32.

[34]    APEC Emergency Preparedness website:  http://www.dfat.gov.au/apec/emprep/

[35]*China Statistical Yearbook 1998*,    compiled by PRC State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Publishing    House, September 1998, p. 620.

[36]    “The Development of China’s Marine Programs”, Information Office of    PRC State Council, May 1998,*Beijing    Review*, 15-21 June 1998, p. 16.

[37]    Ibid, p. 22.

[38]*Beijing Review*, 8-14 May 1995, P.    22.

[39]    Far Eastern Economic Review, *Asia    Handbook, 1995,* pp. 62-63.

[40]*Outlook Weekly*, Beijing, 21 March    1997.

[41]    Shi Rongsheng ed., “The Structure and Modernization of the Chinese    Navy”, *Military History,* China,    No. 2, 1991, p. 25.

[42]    Ibid., p. 26.******************************