2020 WI 50

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2018AP659-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Robert C. Menard, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Robert C. Menard,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MENARD

OPINION FILED: May 29, 2020 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: 

COUNTY: 

JUDGE: 

JUSTICES:

Per Curiam

NOT PARTICIPATING:

 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 

Terry E. Johnson, Ryan P. Fetherston, and von Briesen & Roper, 

S.C., Milwaukee. 

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

John T. Payette and the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison. 
2020 WI 50

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2018AP659-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Robert C. Menard, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Robert C. Menard,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

MAY 29, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

revoked. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Robert C. Menard has appealed a 

referee's recommendation that his license to practice law in 

Wisconsin be revoked; that he be ordered to make restitution to a 

number of clients; and that he be ordered to pay the full costs of 

this proceeding, which are $18,191.42 as of October 25, 2019. 

Attorney Menard stipulated to 30 counts of misconduct and the only 

disputed issue left for the referee to decide was the appropriate 

sanction. Similarly, the only issue raised on appeal is what is 

reasonable and appropriate discipline for the misconduct in this 
No. 2018AP659-D 

2

case. We agree with the referee that revocation is the appropriate 

sanction.

¶2 Attorney Menard was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1991. He has no prior disciplinary history. On March 

20, 2020, the court, on its own motion pursuant to Supreme Court 

Rule (SCR) 22.21(1), determined that Attorney Menard's continued 

practice of law posed a threat to the interests of the public and 

the administration of justice, and it temporarily suspended his 

license.

¶3 On April 9, 2018, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 

filed a complaint against Attorney Menard alleging 23 counts of 

misconduct arising out of 12 client matters. The complaint also 

alleged various counts of misconduct regarding commingling of 

funds, conducting prohibited bank transactions, various trust 

account violations, and making misrepresentations to the OLR. 

Referee James W. Mohr, Jr. was appointed on May 7, 2018. Attorney 

Menard filed an answer to the complaint on May 18, 2018. 

¶4 On December 28, 2018, the OLR filed an amended complaint 

adding eight counts of misconduct. The amended complaint added 

three counts of misconduct involving one of the client matters set 

forth in the original complaint. It also added five counts of 

misconduct involving a client matter that was not part of the 

original complaint. Attorney Menard filed an answer to the amended 

complaint on January 18, 2019. 

¶5 Attorney Menard eventually chose to admit the factual 

basis of counts 1 through 30 in the OLR's amended complaint, and 

the OLR agreed to dismiss count 31 with prejudice. A hearing on 
No. 2018AP659-D 

3

sanction was held before the referee on August 19 and 20, 2019. 

At that time, the parties stipulated that the factual allegations 

in the amended complaint constituted a sufficient factual basis in 

the record for the referee to conclude that the misconduct alleged 

in counts 1 through 30 of the amended complaint had taken place. 

¶6 The referee issued his report on October 10, 2019. He 

found that the OLR's uncontested motion for summary judgment and 

the stipulation put on the record at the evidentiary hearing 

supported the finding that the OLR had proven all 30 counts of 

misconduct by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. The 

following factual recitation is taken from the amended complaint.

¶7 At all times material to the allegations in the amended 

complaint, Attorney Menard was a member of the firm Derzon & 

Menard, S.C. (More recently, he practiced with Menard & Menard.) 

He handled primarily worker's compensation and personal injury 

matters. Between August 2011 and September 2014, the firm 

maintained both a trust account and a business account at Park 

Bank. Between January 2014 and February 2016 the firm maintained 

both a trust account and a business account at U.S. Bank. Attorney 

Menard also maintained two joint savings accounts with his wife at 

U.S. Bank. He was responsible for trust account recordkeeping for 

his clients, and his partner, Alan Derzon, was responsible for 

such functions for his clients. However, Attorney Menard prepared 

most of the deposit slips and signed most of the transactions for 

the firm's trust and business accounts.

¶8 The first three counts set forth in the OLR's amended 

complaint involved Attorney Menard's representation of B.C., a 
No. 2018AP659-D 

4

minor, in a personal injury matter. Attorney Menard was appointed 

guardian ad litem (GAL) for B.C. The circuit court approved a 

$47,500 minor settlement. As GAL, Attorney Menard was ordered to 

make a payment to Dean Health Care and was ordered to place money 

in a federally insured interest bearing account at Park Bank until 

B.C. reached the age of 18 in April 2014. 

¶9 Attorney Menard deposited or directed the deposit of a 

$47,500 check, payable to the Derzon & Menard S.C. trust account, 

to the Park Bank trust account. He then transferred the entire 

settlement from the Park Bank trust account to the Park Bank 

business account. Those transfers were made by telephone. 

Immediately before these transfers, the Park Bank business account 

was overdrawn. The transfers restored the account to a positive 

balance. 

¶10 The amended complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to B.C.'s case:

Count 1: By disbursing and failing to hold in trust 

$29,105.65 that he received as B.C.'s GAL on February 1, 

2013, Attorney Menard violated former 

SCR 20:1.15(j)(1).1

 

1 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 

Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 

Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). 

Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 

2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 

court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.

Former SCR 20:1.15(j)(1) provided:

A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 

lawyer's own funds or property, those funds or that 

property of clients or 3rd parties that are in the 

lawyer's possession when acting in a fiduciary capacity 
No. 2018AP659-D 

5

Count 2: By converting $29,105.65 belonging to B.C. 

between April 24, 2013 and May 16, 2013 to cover 

overdrafts on the Park Bank Business Account, Attorney

Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).2

Count 3: By failing to place B.C.'s $29,105.65 in a 

federally insured interest bearing account until B.C. 

reached the age of 18 on April 2, 2014, Attorney Menard 

knowingly failed to abide by a court order and violated 

SCR 20:3.4(c).3

¶11 The next four counts of misconduct alleged in the amended 

complaint arose out of Attorney Menard's representation of C.M. 

and D.D. Attorney Menard represented C.M. in a personal injury 

action. In December 2013, Attorney Menard deposited or directed 

the deposit of a $76,000 check related to C.M.'s claim to the Park 

Bank trust account. The firm also represented D.D. in a worker's 

compensation claim and a related civil action. Attorney Menard 

deposited or directed the deposit of a $90,000 check related to 

D.D.'s claim to the Park Bank trust account. 

¶12 Between December 18, 2013 and February 3, 2014, Attorney 

Menard transferred $163,500 of the C.M. and D.D. settlements from 

the Park Bank trust account to the Park Bank business account. 

Most of the transfers occurred by telephone or internet. On 

 

that directly arises in the course of, or as a result 

of, a lawyer-client relationship or by appointment of a 

court. 

2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 

a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 

or misrepresentation."

3 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly 

disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an 

open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 

exists."
No. 2018AP659-D 

6

December 20, 2013, the Park Bank business account was overdrawn by 

more than $15,000. A transfer from the Park Bank trust account 

briefly restored the business account to a positive balance but 

soon thereafter the Park Bank business account was again overdrawn. 

The business account was restored to a positive balance with 

another transfer from the trust account. This pattern of the 

business account being overdrawn and then restored to a positive 

balance by more transfers from the trust account was repeated 

multiple times. 

¶13 The amended complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to the C.M. and D.D. cases:

Count 4: By disbursing and failing to hold in trust 

$46,919.15 of C.M.'s personal injury settlement between 

December 18, 2013 and February 3, 2014, Attorney Menard 

violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).4

Count 5: By converting $46,919.15 of C.M.'s settlement 

between December 18, 2013 and February 3, 2014 to cover 

overdrafts on the firm's business account, Attorney 

Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

Count 6: By disbursing and failing to hold in trust as 

much as $57,500 of D.D.'s settlement between December 

23, 2013 and February 3, 2014, Attorney Menard violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).

 

4 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 

A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 

lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 3rd 

parties that is in the lawyer's possession in connection 

with a representation. All funds of clients and 3rd 

parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in connection with 

a representation shall be deposited in one or more 

identifiable trust accounts.
No. 2018AP659-D 

7

Count 7: By converting as much as $57,500 of D.D.'s 

settlement between December 23, 2013 and February 3, 

2014 to cover overdrafts on the firm's business account, 

Attorney Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶14 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's firm's representation of D.S. in a 

personal injury matter. On November 26, 2012, Attorney Menard 

deposited or directed the deposit of a $190,000 check relating to

the D.S. matter to the Park Bank business account. Between 

November 26, 2012 and November 30, 2012, Attorney Menard used the 

D.S. settlement proceeds to cover numerous transactions, including 

pre-authorized debits to AT&T, Target, CITI Card, and Austin Ford. 

¶15 The amended complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to D.S.'s settlement:

Count 8: By converting as much as $117,300.02 of D.S.'s 

settlement between November 26, 2012 and December 18, 

2012 to pay business and personal expenses and to make 

disbursements to himself of $13,500, Attorney Menard 

violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶16 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of B.H. in a personal 

injury matter. On December 3, 2012, Attorney Menard deposited or 

directed the deposit of a $93,893.53 check to the firm's Park Bank 

business account. By December 18, 2012, the Park Bank business 

account was overdrawn; none of the settlement proceeds had been 

paid to B.H.; and Attorney Menard had converted as much as 

$67,072.82 of the settlement. Attorney Menard eventually 

disbursed a total of $52,950 to B.H. despite the fact that the 

settlement breakdown specified that she was owed $62,950.32. 
No. 2018AP659-D 

8

Attorney Menard has provided no evidence that B.H. received the 

remaining $10,000 of her settlement funds.

¶17 The OLR's amended complaint alleged the following count 

of misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's handling of the 

B.H. settlement:

Count 9: By converting as much as $67,072.82 of B.H.'s 

settlement between December 3, 2012 and December 18, 

2012 in order to cover disbursements unrelated to his 

representation of B.H., Attorney Menard violated SCR 

20:8.4(c).

¶18 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of M.B. in a worker's 

compensation claim. On December 19, 2012, Attorney Menard 

deposited or directed the deposit of a $63,491.97 check to the 

Park Bank business account. Another check payable to an attorney 

at Derzon & Menard was deposited the same day. Prior to those 

deposits, the Park Bank business account was overdrawn. The 

deposited funds were used to cover checks to Attorney Menard and 

wire transfers to other individuals. In addition, Attorney Menard 

disbursed four checks payable to "cash" totaling $16,000 from the 

funds. The amended complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to the M.B. matter:

Count 10: By converting as much as $63,491.97 of M.B.'s 

settlement between December 19, 2012 and January 4, 2013 

in order to repay $42,259.46 that was owed to D.S. and 

make $11,000 in disbursements and wire transfers to 

Attorney Menard and others, as well as $16,000 in cash 

disbursements, Attorney Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶19 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of J.B. regarding an 
No. 2018AP659-D 

9

auto accident. On April 15, 2013, Attorney Menard deposited or 

directed the deposit of a $92,330 check to the Park Bank business 

account along with two other checks. Prior to this deposit, the 

business account was overdrawn. The deposit restored the account 

to a positive balance. Between April 15 and April 22, 2013, 

Attorney Menard made numerous disbursements from the Park Bank 

business account, including a $28,300 cashier's check to his wife. 

¶20 At the close of business on April 22, 2013, the business 

account was overdrawn by $244.19; none of the funds had been 

disbursed to J.B. and Attorney Menard had converted as much as 

$55,648.44 relating to the J.B. matter. Attorney Menard continues 

to owe J.B., or her subrogated care providers, $12,648.44.

¶21 The amended complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's representation of 

J.B.: 

Count 11: By converting as much as $55,648.44 of J.B.'s 

settlement between April 15, 2013 and April 22, 2013 in 

order to repay $27,500 to D.S., provide a $28,300 

cashier's check to his wife, and cover numerous business 

or personal expenses, Attorney Menard violated SCR 

20:8.4(c).

¶22 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of J.L.-M. in a personal 

injury action and a related third-party worker's compensation 

claim. The settlement in the matter was paid via two checks issued 

to the Derzon & Menard trust account: a $108,000 check dated May 

13, 2013, and a $12,000 check dated June 3, 2013. On June 3, 2013, 

Attorney Menard deposited or directed the deposit of the $108,000 

check to the Park Bank business account. Prior to this deposit 
No. 2018AP659-D 

10

the account was overdrawn by over $12,000. Between June 3 and 

June 17, 2013, Attorney Menard made numerous disbursements from 

the business account for business and personal expenses. By June 

17, 2013, the business account was overdrawn by $2,757.59 and no 

disbursements had been made to J.L.-M. Attorney Menard told J.L.-

M. he had made disbursements in accordance with the settlement 

breakdown. 

¶23 Specifically, Attorney Menard told J.L.-M. he had 

disbursed $12,491.77 to Athletic & Therapeutic Institute and 

$7,623.75 to Blount Orthopedic Clinic. Park Bank records show 

that neither check was ever presented for payment or cleared the 

business account.

¶24 In January 2014, against Attorney Menard's advice, J.L.-

M. and her husband claimed all of her medical expenses as 

deductions on their 2013 joint income tax return. An IRS audit 

ensued in 2016. 

¶25 J.L.-M. and her husband hired the law firm of Robinson 

& Henry, P.C., to represent them in the tax audit. Thereafter, 

both J.L.-M. and her new attorneys repeatedly requested medical 

billing information and documentation from Attorney Menard. While 

Attorney Menard was initially helpful in providing documents, he 

later became difficult to reach and never sent them all of the 

correct documents showing proof of medical payments he had made on 

J.L.-M.'s behalf. 

¶26 Ultimately, the IRS did not allow the payments to Blount 

Orthopedic Clinic and Athletic & Therapeutic Institute to be 

included in its calculations because there was no proof those 
No. 2018AP659-D 

11

medical expenses had been paid out of J.L.-M.'s settlement. J.L.-

M. and her husband eventually settled with the IRS for an 

additional tax burden of $3,973, plus interest on their 2013 tax 

return.

¶27 On November 26, 2013, Attorney Menard issued a check 

from his Park Bank business account payable to Blount Orthopedic 

Clinic in the amount of $3,000, which was presented and paid in 

December 2013. Attorney Menard acknowledged to the OLR that this 

check was paid on behalf of J.L.-M. to settle the debt she owed to 

Blount Orthopedic Clinic. 

¶28 On July 24, 2014, Attorney Menard issued a check from 

his U.S. Bank business account payable to Athletic & Therapeutic 

Institute in the amount of $8,000, which was presented and paid on 

August 20, 2014. Attorney Menard acknowledged to the OLR that 

this check was paid on behalf of J.L.-M. to settle the debt owed 

to Athletic & Therapeutic Institute.

¶29 Attorney Menard never advised either J.L.-M. or Robinson 

& Henry of these reduced payments, despite their repeated requests 

during the IRS audit for evidence of all medical payments made. 

Until July 2018, Attorney Menard had led J.L.-M. to believe that 

the full bills of both of those creditors had been paid. To date, 

Attorney Menard has not made any refund to J.L.-M., either the 

$4,623.75 balance of any funds after the $3,000 payment to Blunt 

Orthopedic Clinic or the $4,491.77 balance of funds after the 

$8,000 payment to Athletic & Therapeutic Institute.
No. 2018AP659-D 

12

¶30 The amended complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's handling of the J.L.-

M. case:

Count 12: By converting as much as $78,727.28 of J.L.-

M.'s settlement between June 3, 2013 and June 17, 2013 

to cover numerous business or personal expenses, 

including $384 in overdraft fees; a $10,000 check to his 

mother; a $5,000 check to Entercom for advertising; 

checks to other clients and checks to "Cash," Attorney 

Menard, or Derzon & Menard totaling $10,400, Attorney 

Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

Count 13: By falsely informing J.L.-M. that he had paid 

Athletic & Therapeutic Institute $12,491.77 and Blunt 

Orthopedic Clinic $7,623.75 on her behalf from the 

settlement proceeds in her case, Attorney Menard 

violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

Count 14: By failing to promptly deliver $12,491.77 to 

Athletic & Therapeutic Institute and $7,623.75 to Blount 

Orthopedic Clinic pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, 

or to promptly disburse the balance ($9,115.52) of any 

remaining funds to J.L.-M. after settling the claims of 

Athletic & Therapeutic Institute and Blount Orthopedic 

Clinic for lesser amounts, Attorney Menard violated SCR 

20:1.15(e)(1).5

Count 15: By failing to fully and accurately respond to 

J.L.-M.'s request for information regarding the 

disbursement of her settlement funds to her creditors, 

including his failure to inform J.L.-M. that he had paid 

 

5 SCR 20:1.15(e)(1) provides:

Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 

client has an interest, or in which a lawyer has received 

notice that a 3rd party has an interest identified by a 

lien, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer 

shall promptly notify the client or 3rd party in writing. 

Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by 

law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer shall 

promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any funds or 

other property that the client or 3rd party is entitled 

to receive.
No. 2018AP659-D 

13

only $8,000 to Athletic & Therapeutic Institute and 

$3,000 to Blount Orthopedic Clinic and that she was 

entitled to a refund totaling $9,115.52, Attorney Menard 

violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).6

¶31 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of P.D. in a personal 

injury case. Attorney Menard's records include a copy of a $50,000 

check payable to the firm's client trust account in the P.D. 

matter, but Attorney Menard has not identified the account into 

which the $50,000 was deposited and has not identified any 

disbursements made to P.D. from those funds.

¶32 On March 13, 2014, Attorney Menard deposited or directed 

the deposit of a $75,000 check relating to the P.D. matter to the 

firm's U.S. Bank business account.

¶33 Between March 13 and March 26, 2014, Attorney Menard 

made numerous disbursements from the U.S. Bank business account, 

including over $40,000 for advertising and payments to Attorney 

Menard, his law firm, or cash. Attorney Menard also disbursed two 

checks totaling $23,000 to another client whose personal injury 

case had been settled in December of 2013. No funds belonging to 

that client were ever deposited to the U.S. Bank business account.

¶34 The amended complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's representation of 

P.D.:

Count 16: By converting as much as $74,313.81 of P.D.'s 

two settlements between approximately July 31, 2012 and 

May 22, 2014, at least some of which was used to cover 

 

6 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides: "A lawyer shall promptly comply 

with reasonable requests by the client for information."
No. 2018AP659-D 

14

business expenses, including advertising and payments to 

Attorney Menard, the firm, and "Cash," Attorney Menard 

violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶35 The next client matter detailed in the amended client 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of T.R. in a worker's 

compensation matter. On February 4, 2015, Attorney Menard 

deposited or directed the deposit of two checks to the U.S. Bank 

business account in the T.R. case: a $55,289.57 check payable to 

T.R., which was not endorsed, and a $14,710.43 check payable to 

Attorney Menard. Prior to that deposit, the balance in the U.S. 

Bank business account was $8,259.25. That same day, there were 

two electronic withdrawals from the U.S. Bank business account by 

YP Advertising. On February 6, 2015, a check for over $28,000 

payable to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue cleared the U.S. 

Bank business account. By February 9, 2015, the business account 

was overdrawn by $16.30, and none of T.R.'s funds remained in the 

account.

¶36 The amended complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's representation of 

T.R.:

Count 17: By converting T.R.'s $55,289.57 worker's 

compensation settlement between February 4, 2015 and 

February 9, 2015 to cover business expenses, including 

advertising and a payment to the Wisconsin Department of 

Revenue, Attorney Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶37 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

arose out of Attorney Menard's representation of J.S. in a worker's 

compensation matter. On December 21, 2015, Attorney Menard 

deposited or directed the deposit of a $31,326.31 check to the 
No. 2018AP659-D 

15

U.S. Bank business account. That amount represented Attorney 

Menard's fees and costs in the matter. On December 31, 2015, 

Attorney Menard deposited or directed the deposit of a $95,637.56 

check payable to J.S. to the business account. Prior to this 

deposit, there was $9,119.39 in the business account.

¶38 Between December 31, 2015 and January 6, 2016, over 

$140,000 in transactions cleared the U.S. Bank business account, 

including payments to the Milwaukee Athletic Club, Bank of America, 

Chase, and GM Financial.

¶39 On January 6, 2016, Attorney Menard transferred $15,000 

of J.S.'s funds from the U.S. Bank trust account to the U.S. Bank 

business account. By the close of business that day, the business 

account was overdrawn and none of J.S.'s funds had been disbursed 

to her.

¶40 Between January 7 and February 9, 2016, Attorney Menard 

transferred $73,000 belonging in part to J.S. from the U.S. Bank 

trust account to the U.S. Bank business account. None of those 

transfers were used to pay J.S. The funds were all used for 

business and personal purposes. 

¶41 The amended complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's representation of 

J.S.:

Count 18: By converting J.S.'s $95,637.56 worker's 

compensation settlement to cover business expenses, 

including advertising, a $35,843.08 payment to ADP 

relating to a 401k plan and a $25,500 check to his new 

law firm, Attorney Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
No. 2018AP659-D 

16

¶42 The next client matter detailed in the amended complaint 

involved Attorney Menard's representation of P.M., who is Attorney 

Menard's uncle. P.M. has a winter home in Florida. In February 

of 2014, he was struck by a car while he was mowing his lawn at 

his home in Florida and suffered severe injuries requiring medical 

and surgical treatment.

¶43 On April 10, 2014, P.M. hired Attorney Menard to 

represent him in a personal injury action against the driver who 

hit him. The parties entered into a contingent fee agreement which 

provided that P.M. agreed to pay Derzon & Menard 33 1/3 percent of 

whatever total sum was collected, plus costs and disbursements. 

¶44 The driver had $1,000,000 in liability coverage through 

State Farm. P.M. denies that Attorney Menard informed him about 

the policy limit. Attorney Menard said he was concerned about 

potential contributory negligence since there were reports that 

P.M. had stepped into the road in front of the car while mowing 

his lawn. P.M. had no recollection of the accident and would not 

be able to testify to rebut those reports.

¶45 In June 2014, State Farm offered to settle the case for 

$325,000. P.M. agreed Attorney Menard should attempt to negotiate 

a higher settlement and, if there was not a higher offer, the 

initial offer would be accepted. Attorney Menard negotiated a 

higher settlement figure of $500,000. P.M. accepted that 

settlement amount.

¶46 On July 3, 2014, State Farm issued a $500,000 check 

payable to Derzon & Menard Attorneys at Law Trust Account and 

mailed it to Attorney Menard. The check was deposited in Derzon 
No. 2018AP659-D 

17

& Menard's business account at U.S. Bank on July 8, 2014. Attorney 

Menard did not inform P.M. of the receipt of the funds. He did 

not disburse any portion of the settlement payment to P.M. or to 

any third party on P.M.'s behalf. 

¶47 On July 9, 2014, P.M. signed a release agreeing to the 

$500,000 settlement. Between July 8 and July 28, 2014, Attorney 

Menard made numerous disbursements from the U.S. Bank business 

account for business and personal expenses unrelated to his 

representation of P.M. By October 17, 2014, following numerous 

deposits and disbursements unrelated to P.M.'s case, the balance 

in the U.S. Bank business account was $131.93. By November 24, 

2014, the balance of the business account was $16.96. Thus, by 

November 24, 2014, Attorney Menard had converted $333,333.33 of 

P.M.'s settlement funds.

¶48 From April 2015 through early 2018, P.M. repeatedly 

contacted Attorney Menard by telephone and email inquiring about 

the status of his settlement proceeds. Attorney Menard gave 

excuses to P.M. as to why he was not able to disburse the funds. 

¶49 P.M.'s own insurance agreed to cover his medical 

expenses. P.M.'s insurance carrier paid out $648,478.14 to medical 

care providers on P.M.'s behalf, discharging most of the medical 

bills for less than the original amount billed, which was 

$1,993,103.10.

¶50 Attorney Menard did not disburse any portion of the 

$500,000 settlement as payment for any of P.M.'s medical bills.

¶51 In early 2018, P.M. hired Attorneys Lenz and Meadows as 

successor counsel. In July 2018, P.M. sued Attorney Menard, his 
No. 2018AP659-D 

18

former firm, his current firm, and others to recover the settlement 

proceeds to which he was entitled. The case settled following 

meditation. The settlement is confidential.

¶52 The amended complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's representation of 

P.M.:

Count 19: By depositing or directing the July 8, 2014 

deposit of a check in the amount of $500,000 in personal 

injury settlement proceeds for P.M. to his firm's U.S. 

Bank Business Account, rather than into the firm's trust 

account, Attorney Menard violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).

Count 20: By failing to disburse settlement funds to 

P.M., Attorney Menard violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1)7

and current SCR 20:1.15(e)(1).

Count 21: By converting funds from P.M.'s State Farm 

settlement between July 8, 2014 and November 24, 2014, 

Attorney Menard violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

Count 22: By failing to fully and accurately respond to 

P.M.'s request for reports on the status of his 

settlement funds, Attorney Menard violated 

SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).

Count 23: By failing to provide P.M. with a full 

accounting of his settlement funds upon their final 

 

7 Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provided:

Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 

client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 

received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 

identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 

contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client or 

3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this rule or 

otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 

client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 

or 3rd party any funds or other property that the client 

or 3rd party is entitled to receive.
No. 2018AP659-D 

19

distribution, Attorney Menard violated former 

SCR 20:1.15(d)(2), and current SCR 20:1.15(e)2.8

¶53 The amended complaint alleges two counts of misconduct 

for commingling funds. It alleges that between December 2012 and 

February 2014, Attorney Menard deposited or directed the deposit 

of at least 72 checks to the Park Bank business account that were 

payable to the firm's trust account, to a specific client, to the 

firm and a specific client or a third party. Those deposits 

totaled $1,801,858.13. 

¶54 Between March 2014 and September 2016, Attorney Menard 

deposited or directed the deposit of at least 102 checks to the 

U.S. Bank business account that were payable to the firm's trust 

account, to a specific client, to the firm and a specific client 

or a third party. Those 103 deposits total $2,806,497.51.

¶55 Attorney Menard admitted under oath in an interview 

conducted by the OLR that the checks deposited to the Park Bank 

business account were more likely than not all attorney fee checks 

from worker's compensation cases. He also admitted under oath he 

did not keep track of whose funds were deposited to the business 

account and that he would use funds in that account for his own 

purposes.

¶56 The amended complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Menard's commingling of funds:

 

8 SCR 20:1.15(d)(2) was renumbered as SCR 20:1.15(e)(2). The 

text of the rule was not changed and provides: "Upon final 

distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client 

or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, the 

lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding 

the property."
No. 2018AP659-D 

20

Count 24: By depositing or directing the deposit of as 

many as 72 checks totaling $1,801,858.13 to the Park 

Bank Business Account between December 2012 and February 

2014, which checks were payable to the firm's trust 

account, specific clients, the firm and a specific 

client, or a third party, Attorney Menard violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).

Count 25: By depositing or directing the deposit of as 

many as 103 checks totaling $2,806,497.51 to the U.S. 

Bank Business Account between March 2014 and September 

2016, which checks were payable to the firm's trust 

account, to specific clients, the firm and a specific 

client, a third party, or which otherwise constituted 

trust property, Attorney Menard violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). 

Count 26: By conducting 46 telephone and internet 

transactions in his trust accounts at Park Bank and U.S. 

Bank between January 1, 2013 and February 16, 2016, 

Attorney Menard violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b. and 

c.9

¶57 Finally, the amended complaint alleged additional trust 

account violations as follows: 

Count 27: By failing to preserve transaction registers 

and client ledgers for at least six years after the 

 

9 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b. and c. provided:

b. No deposits or disbursements shall be made to or 

from a pooled trust account by a telephone transfer of 

funds. This section does not prohibit any of the 

following:

1. wire transfers.

2. telephone transfers between non-pooled draft and 

non-pooled non-draft trust accounts that a lawyer 

maintains for a particular client.

c. A lawyer shall not make deposits to or 

disbursements from a trust account by way of an Internet 

transaction.
No. 2018AP659-D 

21

termination of representation, Attorney Menard violated 

former SCR 20:1.15(e)(6).10

Count 28: By failing to produce transaction registers 

and client ledgers for funds received in trust, despite 

requests by the OLR on July 5, 2017, July 26, 2017, and 

July 31, 2017, Attorney Menard violated 

SCR 20:1.15(g)(2).11

Count 29: By maintaining trust account records by 

computer between at least December 1, 2012 and December 

31, 2015, and failing to regularly back up those records, 

Attorney Menard violated former SCR 20:1.15(f)(4)a.12

Count 30: By failing to print a copy of the transaction 

register and client ledgers for the Derzon & Menard Trust 

 

10 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(6) provided: "A lawyer shall 

maintain complete records of trust account funds and other trust 

property and shall preserve those records for at least 6 years 

after the date of termination of the representation."

11 SCR 20:1.15(g)(2) provides: 

All trust account records have public aspects 

related to a lawyer's fitness to practice. Upon request 

of the office of lawyer regulation, or upon direction of 

the supreme court, the records shall be submitted to the 

office of lawyer regulation for its inspection, audit, 

use, and evidence under any conditions to protect the 

privilege of clients that the court may provide. The 

records, or an audit of the records, shall be produced 

at any disciplinary proceeding involving the lawyer, 

whenever material.

12 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(4)a. provided: "A lawyer who 

maintains trust account records by computer shall maintain the 

transaction register, client ledgers, and reconciliation reports 

in a form that can be reproduced to printed hard copy. Electronic 

records must be regularly backed up by an appropriate storage 

device."
No. 2018AP659-D 

22

Account every 30 days, Attorney Menard violated former 

SCR 20:1.15(f)(4)b.13

¶58 In his report, the referee noted that a number of 

witnesses testified at the hearing and, in the referee's opinion, 

the most convincing witness was Mary Hoeft Smith, the former Trust 

Account Program Administrator for the OLR, who is now retired. 

Ms. Smith testified that Attorney Menard was unable to produce the 

required trust account records, but he did produce voluminous 

business account records. She testified it was a common practice 

for him to move client trust funds into his business account and 

then use those funds to pay "very hefty expenses for things like 

advertising, radio, and billboards." She described this as a 

practice of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" and using funds belonging 

to one client in order to pay back a client who was previously the 

victim of a conversion by Attorney Menard. She testified that the 

matters that were charged in this case were only the largest of 

many, many conversions and in her opinion "virtually every client 

whose funds went into the business account were converted."

¶59 The referee noted that J.L.-M. testified by telephone 

from Colorado and the referee found her to be intelligent, honest, 

and straightforward. J.L.-M. testified she felt a lot of betrayal 

from Attorney Menard and that it had been a very harrowing 

experience. 

 

13 Former SCR 20:1.15(f)(4)b. provided: "In additional to the 

requirements of sub. (f)(4)a., the transaction register, the 

subsidiary ledger, and the reconciliation report shall be printed 

every 30 days for the IOLTA account. The printed copy shall be 

retained for at least 6 years, as required under sub. (e)(6)."
No. 2018AP659-D 

23

¶60 The referee noted that P.M., Attorney Menard's 71-yearold uncle, also testified and although the matter has been resolved 

and P.M. has no further claim for restitution, the entire 

experience has left a bad taste in P.M.'s mouth. 

¶61 The referee found that Attorney Menard "gave the 

impression of not being entirely trustworthy." The referee said 

Attorney Menard felt he was entitled to the full $500,000 

settlement proceeds from his uncle's settlement and that his uncle 

was entitled to nothing. The referee said "this assertion lacked 

a rational basis and was a rather cold-hearted way to treat a 

family member. It showed a distinct lack of remorse on 

Respondent's part in depriving his uncle of his settlement 

proceeds." 

¶62 The referee also noted that Attorney Menard claimed that 

each of his clients gave him a power of attorney to do whatever he 

wanted with their money and that included depositing the money 

into the business account and using it for whatever purposes 

Attorney Menard wanted. The referee said:

Frankly, I found it astonishing that an attorney would 

ask clients to sign a power of attorney allowing him to 

use their settlement money for the attorney's business 

purposes, and also apparently thought this practice 

would absolve him of the Supreme Court's trust account 

requirements. Interestingly, Respondent never produced 

any of those powers of attorney as exhibits at the 

hearing. (Emphasis added.)

¶63 The referee said Attorney Menard acknowledged that he 

was sloppy and "crappy" in regards to his accounting practices but 
No. 2018AP659-D 

24

said "a revocation would ruin me and would ruin everything that 

I've worked for 30 years."

¶64 The referee said that the evidence revealed that over at 

least a six-year period, Attorney Menard converted over $1,000,000 

in client funds. The referee said additionally, between December 

2012 and September 2016, Attorney Menard deposited as many as 175 

checks made out to clients, to his trust account, or to third 

parties, all of which should have gone into the trust account, 

into his business accounts and these out-of-trust deposits at two 

different banks totaled over $4,000,000.

¶65 After considering a variety of cases cited by both 

parties, the referee said this case was similar to In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 2012 WI 124, 345 

Wis. 2d 7, 823 N.W.2d 798. Attorney Weigel was charged with ten 

counts of misconduct involving failure to maintain proper trust 

account records and converting funds belonging to clients. He 

claimed the trust account violations already existed when the 

former founding member of his law firm was bought out by Attorney 

Weigel and others. At times, the trust account may have been out 

of balance as much as $1,000,000, but by the time Attorney Weigel 

was charged the out of balance amount was down to $100,000. 

¶66 The referee noted that Attorney Weigel claimed, as 

Attorney Menard does here, that the OLR did not present testimony 

from a client or third party demonstrating an actual monetary loss. 

Therefore, he argued that the OLR had failed to prove conversion. 

The referee noted that this court disagreed, noting that an 

attorney must hold the property of others with the care required 
No. 2018AP659-D 

25

of a professional fiduciary. This court described Attorney 

Weigel's conduct, just as Mary Hoeft Smith did here, as "robbing 

Peter to pay Paul," and this court revoked Attorney Weigel's 

license to practice law.

¶67 The referee said that the conduct in Weigel is almost on 

all fours with the conduct involved here and in both cases, over 

an extended period of time, client trust funds were used as slush

funds to pay off other clients, firm expenses, or whatever was 

most pressing at the moment. The referee said that Attorney 

Menard's trust accounts, as the Weigel trust account, were 

continuously overdrawn or out of trust. The referee said the 

amount converted here, well over $1,000,000, is in the same order 

of magnitude as in Weigel, and likely represents just the tip of 

the iceberg. In addition, the referee noted that over $4,600,000 

was out of trust over a span of four years. The referee agreed 

with the OLR that revocation was the appropriate remedy. He said:

The scope of Respondent's conduct in playing fast and 

loose with client money is simply breathtaking. Proper 

trust account records were never kept; money belonging 

to clients was commingled with that of other clients and 

used to pay vast sums in law firm and personal expenses; 

clients were not paid in a timely basis and often did 

not get paid until they complained; one client 

(ironically Respondent's uncle) was never paid at all –

under some misguided theory that the attorney was 

entitled to the full proceeds of the settlement – and 

had to sue his own nephew for the nonpayment.

This is far-reaching, deplorable and disreputable 

conduct. It reflects poorly on the practice of law in 

general and has jaded those clients that Respondent was 

to have served. This is clearly not the way lawyers 

should conduct themselves. Jeopardizing over $1,000,000 

of client money on an extended 'rob Peter to pay Paul' 
No. 2018AP659-D 

26

scheme is totally unacceptable. So is failing to keep 

over $4,600,000 in trust.

¶68 In addition to recommending revocation of Attorney 

Menard's license, the referee recommended that Attorney Menard be 

ordered to make restitution as follows:

 To C.M. the sum of $459.58

 To B.H. the sum of $5,000.32

 To J.B. the sum of $12,648.44

 To J.L.-M. the sum of $4,346.57

 To P.D. the sum of $1,100

 To J.S. the sum of $74,137.58 (less any or all of the 

$5,395.72 amount which Attorney Menard can demonstrate 

was paid on behalf of J.S. for legitimately due and owing 

medical expenses).

¶69 Finally, the referee recommended that Attorney Menard 

pay the full costs of the proceeding. 

¶70 Attorney Menard has appealed the referee's 

recommendation of revocation as the appropriate sanction. He 

asserts that appropriate discipline should be a suspension between 

18 and 24 months.

¶71 Attorney Menard notes that he testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that there were several reasons why he 

developed the practice of obtaining client consent to commingle 

funds in his business account rather than depositing them in trust, 

and for obtaining durable power of attorney forms from all clients 

in order to do so in the first place. He says he testified that 

some of his clients did not have bank accounts and they asked him 
No. 2018AP659-D 

27

to cash checks and pay portions of the proceeds on demand, while 

other clients were afraid that depositing a large settlement check 

into their own accounts might upset their SSDI or Medicare status. 

He says still others felt overwhelmed with the prospect of having 

to resolve unpaid medical expenses and liens on their own out of 

the settlement proceeds and Attorney Menard agreed to handle those 

tasks on his clients' behalf. He says during the pertinent 

timeframe, his law business was generally good and he never 

perceived his accounting practices as "robbing Peter to pay Paul."

¶72 Attorney Menard says the evidence showed that none of 

his clients or former clients were harmed by his conceded trust 

account violations, with the exception of J.S., who he acknowledges 

is still owed $60,000 and who recently filed a claim with the 

Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection. However, he says 

he "was willing to pay whenever she requested" and she had stopped 

making requests. 

¶73 Attorney Menard argues that "his business practices were 

uniquely set up in such a way to create financial flexibility for 

the benefit of his clients, and were set up as such with the 

expressed consent of his clients." He says the referee fails to 

discuss or simply overlooked the following:

 Attorney Menard has never previously been the subject of 

a disciplinary proceeding.

 Attorney Menard's bookkeeping practices were previously 

reviewed by the OLR in the context of a client complaint 

and were found to be satisfactory.
No. 2018AP659-D 

28

 Mary Hoeft Smith admitted her investigation was both 

rushed and incomplete.

 Each and every client identified had signed a durable 

power of attorney and consent form for their funds to be 

commingled.

 With the exception of P.M., which the matter has been 

resolved, not a single client at issue has made a claim 

for restitution to date.

¶74 Attorney Menard argues that the OLR fell short of proving 

that the alleged amounts that the referee recommends be paid as 

restitution were in fact owed. He complains that the OLR presented 

evidence inferring that, if Attorney Menard could not produce 

documentation proving full payment of settlement proceeds, when it 

was abundantly clear that his recordkeeping practice was sloppy at 

best, then he must owe restitution in the presumed, unproven 

deficit amount, irrespective of the fact that no one, except P.M., 

whose case has been settled, had made a claim against Attorney 

Menard for restitution owed. Attorney Menard again acknowledges 

that he is a poor record keeper, but he says poor recordkeeping 

and the absence of documentation available to confirm full 

satisfaction of settlement proceeds owed to clients is not the 

same as clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of 

nonpayment.

¶75 Attorney Menard complains that the referee unfairly 

compared his case to Weigel, in which the attorney's license was 

revoked. He says:
No. 2018AP659-D 

29

[H]is case is uniquely situated in that the evidence 

showed that his clients were made fully aware of the 

commingling at issue. In most, if not all cases, the 

evidence showed that his clients provided consent and/or 

signed waivers permitting Menard to hold on to their 

settlement proceeds, satisfy outstanding medical/thirdparty liens, and pay out client's shares in lump sum 

allocations on an 'as needed' basis.

He also says unlike Weigel, he did keep records and settlement 

statements "providing a detailed picture of each and every client 

settlement and accounting of funds commingled, albeit, sloppy, 

unorganized records." Id.

¶76 Attorney Menard argues the fact he kept all of his 

clients and former clients informed about his accounting practices 

and the commingling of funds for purposes of resolving medical 

bills, negotiating subrogation liens, and paying clients 

structured settlement proceeds should have been a factor taken 

into consideration by the referee but it was not.

¶77 Rather than revocation, as was ordered in Weigel, 

Attorney Menard argues that his case is more similar to In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss, 2014 WI 75, 356 

Wis. 2d 382, 850 N.W.2d 190. The complaint in Voss alleged 11 

counts of misconduct arising from Attorney Voss' work as a courtappointed guardian. Rather than setting up a guardianship account 

to handle his clients' income and expenses, Attorney Voss used a 

personal checking account not subject to interest accrual as a 

standard IOLTA account would have been, and he did not establish 

a separate fiduciary account for his clients' assets. In 

suspending Attorney Voss' license for 18 months, this court held 

that in spite of the fact it was Attorney Voss' third instance of 
No. 2018AP659-D 

30

discipline, that the conduct went on for a significant period of 

time and that the client at issue was vulnerable, revocation was 

reserved for the most egregious cases and Attorney Voss' conduct, 

although serious, did not rise to that level. 

¶78 The OLR argues that revocation is indeed appropriate for 

Attorney Menard's admitted 30 counts of misconduct. The OLR points 

out that although Attorney Menard claims he obtained powers of 

attorney or some other agreement from his clients purporting to 

authorize him to use their money as he saw fit, no such documents 

were ever introduced into evidence. In addition, the OLR says 

even if Attorney Menard had induced his clients to sign such 

documents, this would amount to nothing more than an attempt to 

circumvent this court's clear cut ethical rules, and even Attorney 

Menard confirmed that his scheme did not change his underlying 

ethical obligations or excuse the underlying misconduct. 

¶79 As for Attorney Menard's claim that one reason he 

deposited client money into his business account was to shield 

clients from negative consequences in relation to their government 

benefits, the OLR says even if Attorney Menard was holding client 

funds to shield them from government discovery, he fails to explain 

why he could not have held that money in his trust account rather 

than his business account. In addition, the OLR says Attorney 

Menard does not explain why this alleged motivation required or 

allowed him to convert client funds to his own use. It says "under 

his theory the clients needed their money hidden, not spent by 

their attorney." In addition, the OLR says this claimed motivation 

smacks of fraud. The OLR asks whether Attorney Menard was hiding 
No. 2018AP659-D 

31

client funds in his bank account so that government entities would 

not factor those sums into his clients' benefit eligibility 

determination. If so, it says it was not his place to assist 

clients in circumventing government benefit eligibility standards. 

¶80 The OLR says another justification used by Attorney 

Menard is the fact that an alleged former client named Jessup, who 

he claims filed a grievance against him, resulted in an OLR 

investigation that ultimately resulted in no discipline. The OLR 

says this purported "evidence" provides no defense whatsoever 

since there is no evidence in the record as to the existence or 

facts of any Jessup grievance; what investigation, if any, the OLR 

did; or what the OLR advised or did not advise Attorney Menard 

regarding the matter. The OLR says it is barred by this court's 

rules from even confirming or denying that any client named Jessup 

ever filed a grievance. It notes that upon its objection at the 

evidentiary hearing, the referee confirmed he would not factor the 

alleged Jessup grievance into his decision. 

¶81 The OLR says Attorney Menard's conduct is not analogous 

to that in the Voss case because Attorney Menard repeatedly 

conceded he did use client funds for his own personal or business 

needs and, unlike Voss, the conversions here involved at least 12 

clients over the course of many years. In addition, the OLR notes 

Attorney Menard's conversions total over $1,000,000 and his out of 

trust deposits exceeded $4,000,000. 

¶82 The OLR says the referee appropriately concluded that 

this case was analogous to Weigel. The OLR notes that Attorney 

Weigel's license was revoked despite no finding that his 
No. 2018AP659-D 

32

conversions were to pad his own pocket, whereby in this case 

Attorney Menard repeatedly converted funds not only to pay clients 

and others in client matters, he also converted funds to his own 

use.

¶83 The OLR also argues that the referee appropriately 

ordered restitution in the amounts set forth above. While Attorney 

Menard complains that the OLR's restitution request shifts the 

burden of proof on restitution to him, the OLR says it repeatedly 

asked Attorney Menard for documents to support any payments he 

made to or on behalf of clients. It says Mary Hoeft Smith conducted 

her analysis based on what Attorney Menard produced and what she 

received from his banks. The OLR says while Attorney Menard is 

correct that SCR 22.38 requires the OLR to prove misconduct by 

evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing, he fails to 

note the impact of SCR 22.39, which shifts the burden of proof to 

a respondent who fails to produce trust account records to the 

OLR, or provide an accounting or fiduciary property to the OLR by 

creating a presumption of trust account misconduct. See SCR 

22.39(2). The OLR says Attorney Menard did not provide it with 

trust account records or accountings, and Mary Hoeft Smith had to 

recreate those records. The OLR says, "Menard did not provide a 

scintilla of documentary evidence, much less evidence that is 

clear, satisfactory or convincing to rebut OLR's restitution proof 

or any presumption permitted under SCR 22.39." 

¶84 The OLR says Attorney Menard mischaracterizes Mary Hoeft 

Smith's testimony about her investigation by calling it "rushed 

and incomplete." The OLR says she never said any such thing and 
No. 2018AP659-D 

33

to the contrary she testified that the OLR prioritized promptly 

presenting the case to the Preliminary Review Committee with some 

clients rather than waiting to conduct an exhaustive audit of each 

and every one of Attorney Menard's clients.

¶85 The OLR concludes by saying that the testimony at the 

hearing was clear, unequivocal, and compelling that Attorney 

Menard used his clients' funds as his own personal slush fund or 

piggy bank rather than holding them in trust as required by Supreme 

Court Rules. It says his scheme displayed an utter disregard for 

the most fundamental of an attorney's fiduciary obligations: the 

duty to hold his clients' funds in trust. It says his "rob Peter 

to pay Paul" pyramid scheme violates a most basic and important 

part of the Supreme Court Rules.

¶86 In his reply brief, Attorney Menard continues to argue 

that he tried to create a flexible and transparent accounting 

system for the benefit of his clients and with their expressed 

consent. He also argues that the previous Jessup investigation 

had an effect on his perception that his accounting practices were 

acceptable and creates at least an explanation for why those 

practices continued to be used. He says he has learned a painful 

lesson from this experience and is not at risk of repeating it. 

He asks the court to impose a suspension between 18 and 24 months. 

¶87 A referee's findings of fact will not be set aside unless 

clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 

269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. This court is free to impose 

whatever discipline it deems appropriate, regardless of the 
No. 2018AP659-D 

34

referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 

¶88 Attorney Menard stipulated to 30 counts of misconduct. 

The record clearly supports the referee's findings of fact, based 

on that stipulation, that the OLR met its burden of proof on all 

of those counts.

¶89 Turning to the appropriate sanction, upon careful review 

of the matter, we agree with the referee that revocation of 

Attorney Menard's license is appropriate. Although no two 

disciplinary cases are identical, we agree with the referee's 

assessment that this case is very similar to Weigel. Here, as in 

Weigel, monies belonging to one client were routinely used to pay 

off other clients as well as firm and personal expenses. As in 

Weigel, in virtually every client matter he handled, Attorney 

Menard "robbed Peter to pay Paul." As we said in Weigel:

[I]t would be difficult to imagine a more aggravated 

pattern of misconduct than the one presented here. We 

agree with the OLR that any sanction less than revocation 

would undermine the public's confidence in the honesty 

and integrity of the bar. Revocation . . . is the only 

sanction proportionate to the seriousness of the 

misconduct, and revocation will also protect the public, 

the courts, and the legal system, and it will deter other 

lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct. Weigel, 

345 Wis. 2d at 39.

¶90 We also agree with the referee's recommendations that 

Attorney Menard should be assessed the full costs of the proceeding 

and that he should be ordered to make restitution to the clients 

mentioned above.
No. 2018AP659-D 

35

¶91 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Robert C. Menard to 

practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this 

order.

¶92 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 

this order, Robert C. Menard shall make restitution to the 

following clients:

 To C.M. the sum of $459.58

 To B.H. the sum of $5,000.32

 To J.B. the sum of $12,648.44

 To J.L.-M. the sum of $4,346.57

 To P.D. the sum of $1,100

 To J.S. the sum of $74,137.58 (less any or all of the 

$5,395.72 amount which Attorney Menard can demonstrate 

was paid on behalf of J.S. for legitimately due and owing 

medical expenses).

¶93 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 

this order, Robert C. Menard shall pay to the Office of Law 

Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $18,191.42 as 

of October 25, 2019.

¶94 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 

above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 

Lawyer Regulation.

¶95 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not 

already done so, Robert C. Menard shall comply with the provisions 

of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an attorney whose license to 

practice law has been revoked.
No. 2018AP659-D 

36

¶96 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary suspension of 

Robert C. Menard's license to practice law, which was issued on 

March 20, 2020, is hereby lifted.

¶97 Rebecca Frank Dallet, J., did not participate.
No. 2018AP659-D 

1