SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0351-17T4

YA GLOBAL INVESTMENTS, 

LP,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RAINIER GONZALEZ, PACER 

HEALTH CORPORATION, PACER

ECI, LLC, Ei3 ENERGY, LLC, 

PACER HEALTH STAFFING, INC., 

PACER STAFFING, INC., BRICK 

MOUNTAIN BILLING, INC., BRICK 

MOUNTAIN MEDIA, LLC, 5G 

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS,

INC., CONNECTED MEDIA 

TECHNOLOGIES, INC., EYI

INDUSTRIES, INC., and ICOA, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

______________________________

Submitted January 24, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2090-14.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 19, 2019
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Andrew M. Wolfenson, attorney for appellants.

Sills Cummis & Gross, PC, and Bressler, Amery & 

Ross, PC, attorneys for respondent (Joshua N. Howley 

and William R. Tellado, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this commercial dispute, defendants appeal from an April 21, 2017

amended order, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff YA Global 

Investments, LP (YAGI), and piercing the corporate veil to impose liability on 

defendants Rainier Gonzalez (Gonzalez) and Brick Mountain Billing, Inc.

(Billing) for the sum of $5,100,000 plus interest. Defendants also appeal from 

an August 30, 2017 order denying their motion for reconsideration. 

Defendants raise the following issues on this appeal:

POINT I

THE COURT COULD NOT FIND THAT THE 

DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF MAKING 

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES OR THAT THE 

CORPORATE VEIL COULD BE PIERCED WHERE 

ALL MONIES RECEIVED BY THE CORPORATE 

DEFENDANTS WERE USED FOR PROPER 

BUSINESS PURPOSES.

POINT II

IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY AND A JUDGMENT 

AGAINST BRICK MOUNTAIN BILLING, LLC, 

WAS IMPROPER AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE

PRESENTED THAT BRICK MOUNTAIN BILLING 
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RECEIVED, IMPROPERLY OR OTHERWISE, ANY 

MONIES FROM THE OTHER DEFENDANTS.

POINT III

THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD, AND ITS 

FINDING REGARDING FRAUDULENT 

CONVEYANCES AND PIERCING OF THE 

CORPORATE VEIL WAS INCORRECT AND MUST 

BE REVERSED.

POINT IV

THE SUPPLIED PROOFS CLEARLY SHOW THAT 

THE COURT COULD NOT, UNDER THE 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OR 

OTHERWISE, FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS 

WERE GUILTY OF MAKING FRAUDULENT 

CONVEYANCES OR THAT THE CORPORATE 

VEIL SHOULD BE PIERCED.

POINT V

THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING A JUDGMENT 

AMOUNT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, RAINIER 

GONZALEZ AND BRICK MOUNTAIN BILLING, 

INC., WHICH REFLECTED MONIES RECEIVED 

BY THE OTHER CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AND 

NOT MONIES ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED TO THEM.

POINT VI

THE COURT’S EXCLUSION OF PAYMENTS 

MADE BEFORE EXECUTION OF THE LIMITED 

WAIVER DOCUMENTS MEANS THAT ANY 

MONIES RECEIVED BY THE CORPORATE 

DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO THE DOCUMENTS’ 
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EXECUTION SIMILARLY CANNOT BE 

CONSIDERED, THEREBY REDUCING THE 

POSSIBLE AMOUNT OF ANY JUDG[]MENT 

WHICH COULD BE ENTERED AGAINST 

DEFENDANTS, RAINIER GONZALEZ AND BRICK 

MOUNTAIN BILLING.

After reviewing the record de novo, we find that summary judgment was 

properly granted. See Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35, 41 (2012). We 

also find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying reconsideration. See

Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). We affirm for 

the reasons stated by Judge Robert J. Mega in his comprehensive written 

opinions issued with the orders on appeal. We decline to address appellant's 

point VI, because it was not raised in the trial court. Nieder v. Royal Indem. 

Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234-35 (1973). Defendants' remaining arguments are not 

supported by the record1and are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add these brief comments.

Gonzalez created and controlled a series of corporations, all of which he 

treated as one enterprise, and the assets of which he commingled, disregarding 

any corporate formalities. Gonzalez caused two of the corporations (the Pacer 

 

1 Many of defendants' purported citations to the record either do not support 

their factual assertions or are references to the transcripts of their attorney's 

motion arguments, rather than citations to legally competent evidence. See R.

2:6-2(a)(5). 
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defendants) to borrow tens of millions of dollars from YAGI, and to acquire

from YAGI an assignment of several struggling companies that the Pacer 

defendants committed to turning around financially. At Gonzalez's direction, 

the Pacer defendants blatantly violated their contracts with YAGI by siphoning 

off $5.1 million in earnings from one of the purchased companies and using the 

money for purposes not permitted by the agreements with YAGI. Those 

contracts were fully integrated documents that could not be varied or amended 

by alleged oral agreements. Hence, we find no merit in defendants' arguments 

that someone from YAGI verbally assured them that they could depart from the

terms of those contracts, and that YAGI was somehow bound by the terms of a 

2010 Pacer Health Corporation Executive Summary that YAGI neither signed 

nor agreed to in writing. 

We also find no merit in defendants' argument that the trial court erred by 

rendering judgment against Billing, the only one of Gonzalez's corporations that 

still appeared to be solvent. In response to plaintiff's statement of material facts, 

defendants admitted that Gonzalez treated all of the "corporate Gonzalez 

[d]efendants" (a term that included Billing) as one enterprise and commingled 

their funds; that Billing paid salaries for Gonzalez and his employees; and that 
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Gonzalez and his two colleagues worked for all of his corporations including 

Billing. 

Affirmed.