U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

59–118

" ! SENATE 105TH CONGRESS

2d Session

TREATY DOC.

1998

105–36

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF

1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND

THE CZECH REPUBLIC

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE

ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC.

THESE PROTOCOLS WERE OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 16, 1997, AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER PARTIES TO THE

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

FEBRUARY 11, 1998.—Protocols were read the first time and, together with

the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 11, 1998.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of

1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

These Protocols were opened for signature at Brussels on December

16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and

the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. I request the advice

and consent of the Senate to the ratification of these documents,

and transit for the Senate’s information the report made to me by

the Secretary of State regarding this matter.

The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will improve the ability of the United States to protect and advance our interests in the

transatlantic area. The end of the Cold War changed the nature of

the threats to this region, but not the fact that Europe’s peace, stability, and well-being are vital to our own national security. The

addition of these well-qualified democracies, which have demonstrated their commitment to the values of freedom and the security of the broader region, will help deter potential threats to Europe, deepen the continent’s stability, bolster its democratic advances, erase its artificial division, and strengthen an Alliance that

has proved its effectiveness during and since the Cold War.

NATO is not the only instrument in our efforts to help build a

new and undivided Europe, but it is our most important contributor to peace and security for the region. NATO’s steadfastness during the long years of the Cold War, its performance in the mission

it has led in Bosnia, the strong interest of a dozen new European

democracies in becoming members, and the success of the Alliance’s

Partnership for Peace program all underscore the continuing vitality of the Alliance and the Treaty that brought it into existence.

NATO’s mission in Bosnia is of particular importance. No other

multinational institution possessed the military capabilities and political cohesiveness necessary to bring an end to the fighting in the

former Yugoslavia—Europe’s worst conflict since World War II—

and to give the people of that region a chance to build a lasting

peace. Our work in Bosnia is not yet complete, but we should be

thankful that NATO existed to unite Allies and partners in this determined common effort. Similarly, we should welcome steps such

as the Alliance’s enlargement that can strengthen its ability to

meet future challenges, beginning with NATO’s core mission of collective defense and other missions that we and our Allies may

choose to pursue.
IV

The three states that NATO now proposes to add as full members will make the Alliance stronger while helping to enlarge Europe’s zone of democratic stability. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic have been leaders in Central Europe’s dramatic transformation over the past decade and already are a part of NATO’s

community of values. They each played pivotal roles in the overthrow of communist rule and repression, and they each proved

equal to the challenge of comprehensive democratic and market reform. Together, they have helped to make Central Europe the continent’s most rebust zone of economic growth.

All three of these states will be security producers for the Alliance and not merely security consumers. They have demonstrated

this through the accords they have reached with neighboring

states, the contributions they have made to the mission of Bosnia,

the forces they plan to commit to the Alliance, and the military

modernization programs they have already begun and pledge to

continue in the years to come at their own expense. These three

states will strengthen NATO through the addition of military resources, strategic depth, and the prospect of greater stability in Europe’s central region. American troops have worked alongside soldiers from each of these nations in earlier times, in the case of the

Poles, dating back to our own Revolutionary War. Our cooperation

with the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs has contributed to our security in the past, and our Alliance with them will contribute to

our security in the years to come.

The purpose of NATO’s enlargement extends beyond the security

of these three states, however, and entails a process encompassing

more than their admission to the Alliance Accordingly, these first

new members should not and will not be the last. No qualified European democracy is ruled out as a future member. The Alliance

has agreed to review the process of enlargement at its 1999 summit

in Washington. As we prepare for that summit, I look forward to

discussing this matter with my fellow NATO leaders. The process

of enlargement, combined with the Partnership for Peace program,

the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Founding

Act, and NATO’s new charter with Ukraine, signify NATO’s commitment to avoid any new division of Europe, and to contribute to

its progressive integration.

A democratic Russia is and should be a part of that new Europe.

With bipartisan congressional support, my Administration and my

predecessor’s have worked with our Allies to support political and

economic reform in Russia and the other newly independent states

and to increase the bonds between them and the rest of Europe.

NATO’s enlargement and other adaptions are consistent, not at

odds, with that policy. NATO has repeatedly demonstrated that it

does not threaten Russia and that it seeks closer and more cooperative relations. We and our Allies welcomed the participation of Russian forces in the mission in Bosnia.

NATO most clearly signaled its interest in a constructive relationship through the signing in May 1997 of the NATO-Russia

Founding Act. That Act, and the Permanent Joint Council it created, help to ensure that if Russia seeks to build a positive and

peaceful future within Europe, NATO will be a full partner in that

enterprise. I understand it will require time for the Russian people
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to gain a new understanding of NATO. The Russian people, in

turn, must understand that an open door policy with regard to the

addition of new members is an element of a new NATO. In this

way, we will build a new and more stable Europe of which Russian

is an integral part.

I therefore propose the ratification of these Protocols with every

expectation that we can continue to pursue productive cooperation

with the Russian Federation. I am encouraged that President

Yeltsin has pledged his government’s commitment to additional

progress on nuclear and conventional arms control measures. At

our summit in Helsinki, for example, we agreed that once START

II has entered into force we will begin negotiations on a START III

accord that can achieve even deeper cuts in our strategic arsenals.

Similarly, Russian’s ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year demonstrated that cooperation on a range of security

matters will continue.

The Protocols of accession that I transmit to you constitute a decision of great consequence, and they involve solemn security commitments. The addition of new states also will entail financial

costs. While those costs will be manageable and broadly shared

with our current and new Allies, they nonetheless represent a sacrifice by the American people.

Successful ratification of these Protocols demands not only the

Senate’s advice and consent required by our Constitution, but also

the broader, bipartisan support of the American people and their

representatives. For that reason, it is encouraging that congressional leaders in both parties and both chambers have long advocated NATO’s enlargement. I have endeavored to make the Congress an active partner in this process. I was pleased that a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives accompanied the U.S.

delegation at the NATO summit in Madrid last July. Officials at

all levels of my Administration have consulted closely with the relevant committees and with the bipartisan Senate NATO Observer

Group. It is my hope that this pattern of consultation and cooperation will ensure that NATO and our broader European policies continue to have the sustained bipartisan support that was so instrumental to their success throughout the decades of the Cold War.

The American people today are the direct beneficiaries of the extraordinary sacrifices made by our fellow citizens in the many theaters of that ‘‘long twilight struggle,’’ and in the two world wars that

preceded it. Those efforts aimed in large part to create across the

breadth of Europe a lasting, democratic peace. The enlargement of

NATO represents an indispensable part of today’s program to finish building such a peace, and therefore to repay a portion of the

debt we owe to those who went before us in the quest for freedom

and security.

The rise of new challenges in other regions does not in any way

diminish the necessity of consolidating the increased level of security that Europe has attained at such high cost. To the contrary,

our policy in Europe, including the Protocols I transmit herewith,

can help preserve today’s more favorable security environment in

the transatlantic area, thus making is possible to focus attention

and resources elsewhere while providing us with additional Allies

and partners to help share our security burdens.
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The century we are now completing has been the bloodiest in all

of human history. Its lessons should be clear to us: the wisdom of

deterrence, the value of strong Alliances, the potential for overcoming past divisions, and the imperative of America engagement

in Europe. The NATO Alliance is one of the most important embodiments of these truths, and it is in the interest of the United

States to strengthen this proven institution and adapt it to a new

era. The addition of this Alliance of Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic is an essential part of that program. It will help

build a Europe that can be integrated, democratic, free, and at

peace for the first time in its history. It can help ensure that we

and our Allies and our partner will enjoy greater security and freedom in the century that is about to begin.

I therefore recommend that the Senate give prompt advice and

consent to ratification of these historic Protocols.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.
(VII)

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, February 9, 1998.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view

to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These protocols

were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and

were signed on behalf of the United States of America and the

other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the NATO

Alliance will contribute materially to the national security of the

United States. It will advance the efforts we have undertaken with

our allies and partners to build an undivided, democratic, and

peaceful Europe, which in turn reduces threats to our own national

interests. It will strengthen the stability of a region that helped

spawn this century’s world wars and the Cold War, which we prosecuted at a cost of trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands

of American lives. It will give us capable new allies willing and

able to defend our common interests. It will demonstrate continuing American engagement and leadership in transatlantic affairs.

The addition of these three states to NATO is a central element

of our transatlantic strategy. This strategy aims to strengthen the

favorable security environment in the region created by the seminal events of the past decade: the end of the Cold War, the collapse

of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, the

rise in its place of a democratic Russia and other newly independent states, the establishment of market democracies throughout

Central Europe, the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the

conclusion of agreements to reduce and stabilize conventional and

nuclear armaments throughout the region.

These transforming events reduce the likelihood of large-scale

aggression in Europe, but also present a host of new challenges

and dangers. Threats stemming from the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction and conflicts fueled by ethnic or religious tensions, such as in Bosnia, loom immediately. Over the longer term,

Europe could face the possibility of renewed aggression or threats

to its interests. Europe’s new democracies must be more fully integrated into the transatlantic region’s security, economic, and political institutions in order to prevent the erosion of recent democratic

gains and the possibility of conflict.
VIII

All these require continuing American engagement in the region’s security affairs and changes in European and transatlantic

security institutions. To this end, we have strengthened the role of

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, opened

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to

new members, pursued the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, worked closely with the European Union

and urged its enlargement, supported democratic and market reforms in Russia, Ukraine, and the other newly independent states,

and pursued initiatives with states in the region, such as the Charter of Partnership signed with the three Baltic states on January

16.

NATO’s unique attributes—an unrivaled military capability, an

integrated command structure, and a primary focus on the collective defense of its members—require that this Alliance remain the

keystone of our involvement in the transatlantic region’s security

affairs. Those attributes made NATO a principal instrument of our

successful effort to defend the territory and values of the North

American and European democracies during the Cold War, and

made NATO history’s most successful Alliance.

Since then, the Alliance has repeatedly demonstrated its continuing utility and competence. NATO’s success in stopping the war in

Bosnia underscores its military effectiveness. NATO’s completion

last December of a thorough reform of its command structure, reducing the number of commands from 65 to 20, testifies to the premium it places on operational coherence. The addition of new members from Central Europe, along with other adaptations in the Alliance’s operations and command structure, will further strengthen

NATO’s effectiveness, protect more of Europe from future threats,

and bolster the development of a Europe whole and free.

Specifically, the addition of these three democracies to the Alliance will increase the security of the United States in four ways.

First, it will reduce the prospect of threats to Europe’s security,

such as those we have seen throughout this century, which could

harm American interests and potentially involve American forces.

Integrating Central European states into NATO will reduce the

chances of conflict by ensuring that such states pursue cooperative

rather than competitive security policies. It also will help deter potential threats to this region from materializing. These include the

dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and the means for their delivery. NATO’s enlargement can also

help address the possibility, although we see it as unlikely, that

Russia’s democratic transition could fail and that Russia could resume the threatening behavior of the Soviet period. By engaging

Russia and enlarging NATO, we will give Russia every incentive to

deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful integration with

the rest of Europe, while foreclosing more destructive alternatives.

Second, adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to

NATO will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address

Europe’s security challenges. These states will add approximately

200,000 troops to the Alliance, a commitment to common values

and political goals, and a willingness to contribute to the security

of the surrounding region, as they have demonstrated through

their contribution of over 1,000 troops to the mission in Bosnia.
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The military and strategic assets of these states will improve

NATO’s ability to carry out what is and will remain its core mission, collective defense, as well as its other missions.

Third, the process of adding new states to NATO bolsters stability and democratic trends in Central Europe. Partly in order to improve their prospects for membership, states in the region have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighboring states, strengthened civilian control of their militaries, and broadened protections

for ethnic and religious minorities. Such actions help to prevent

conflicts in the region that could adversely affect American security

and economic interests.

Fourth, NATO’s enlargement, with other elements of our transatlantic strategy, advances European integration and moves the

continent beyond its forced division of the past half century. The

perpetuation of Europe’s Cold War dividing line would be both destabilizing the morally indefensible. To help erase that line, NATO

launched the Partnership for Peace program with 27 non-NATO

states, opened its doors to new members, inaugurated a constructive relationship with Russia through the NATO-Russian Founding

Act, signed a new charter with Ukraine, and created the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council.

These Protocols propose to add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic to NATO as full members, with all privileges and responsibilities that apply to current allies. The core commitment to these

three states will be embodied in the existing text of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, including the central collective defense provision in Article 5, which has proved its reliability across the decades

of the Treaty’s existence. Article 5 represents our country’s solemn

commitment to the security of the other allies, but the Treaty reserves to each NATO member, including the United States, decisions about what specific actions to take should a NATO member

be attacked, and fully preserves Congress’ Constitutional role in decisions regarding the use of force. During the Fall of 1997, NATO’s

military authorities concluded the Alliance would be able to meet

the Article 5 and other security assurances to the new states from

their first day of NATO membership.

The decision to enlarge NATO’s membership results from intensive analysis of the implications of this initiative and the qualifications of the three states now proposed for admission. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO declared that the Alliance remained open to membership for other European states, and created

the Partnership for Peace program in part to help prepare interested states for possible membership. The Alliance’s September

1995 Study on NATO Enlargement set out the rationale and process for adding new members. At its Madrid summit in July 1997,

the Alliance invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to

begin the process of accession, and declared its determination to

keep the door open for other states interested in joining NATO.

Between September and November of 1997, NATO held four

rounds of accession talks in Brussels with Poland, and five each

with Hungary and the Czech Republic. These discussions examined

in detail the three states’ military capabilities, their willingness to

contribute forces to NATO activities, and their readiness to accept

the political and legal obligations of NATO membership. These dis-
X

cussions were based in part on Defense Planning Questionnaire response completed by each of the three states; these questionnaires

are NATO’s standard instrument for obtaining information on the

military contributions of member states.

During the accession talks, the three states accepted NATO’s

broad approach to security and defense, as outlined in its Strategic

Concept and subsequent Alliance statements. They confirmed their

intention to participate fully in NATO’s military structure and collective defense planning and, for the purpose of taking part in the

full range of Alliance missions, to commit the bulk of their armed

forces to the Alliance. They accepted the need for standardization

and interoperability as part of the foundation for multinationality

and flexibility. They expressed their readiness to accept the nuclear

element of NATO’s strategy and policy and the Alliance’s nuclear

posture. They accepted NATO’s restrictions and procedures for the

handling of sensitive information. They also recognized and accepted that the Alliance rests upon a commonality of views, based on

the principle of consensus in decision making, and expressed a

readiness to contribute to attaining such consensus. Finally, they

agreed to assume shares of NATO’s common-funded budgets that

cumulatively constitute slightly over four percent of the total.

On November 10, 12, and 17, 1997, respectively, the Czech Prime

Minister, Polish Foreign Minister, and Hungarian Foreign Minister

wrote to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to confirm that, on

the basis of the completed accession talks, their states desired to

join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and were willing to accept in full all the obligations and commitments pertaining to their

membership. At NATO’s Ministerial on December 16 in Brussels,

I joined all fifteen other NATO ministers in agreeing to make these

states full members, subject to the ratification of member governments.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the Alliance

may add ‘‘any other European state in a position to further the

principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the

North Atlantic area.’’ It was on that basis that the Alliance added

Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in

1955, and Spain in 1982. The unanimity of NATO leaders in welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance

reflects the qualifications of each of these states and a confidence

that each of them will, in fact, make meaningful contributions to

transatlantic security.

Poland’s size, location, population, and resources have cast this

state in a pivotal role in European security affairs throughout the

past two centuries. Its addition to the Alliance will create an important anchor for regional security. Poland has the most significant military resources in Central Europe, and will bring to the Alliance 23 combat brigades, at least eight squadrons of combat aircraft, and modest naval resources. Poland now spends 2.4 percent

of its Gross Domestic Product on defense, it has adopted a 15-year

plan for military modernization, and the country’s strong economic

performance during this decade suggests that it will have adequate

resources to fund that plan and contribute substantially to Alliance

capabilities.
XI

Poland also has a heritage of strong political values consistent

with those of the Alliance. Poland was home to Europe’s first written constitution, and its officers played important roles in support

of the United States during our Revolutionary War. In the 1980s,

the resistance of the Polish people to authoritarian rule and their

efforts through the Solidarity trade union helped topple Soviet

domination of their own state and others in the region. Since 1989,

Poland has held two presidential and three parliamentary rounds

of elections, the results of which have shown a broad and stable political commitment to tolerant politics, market economics, and an

outward looking foreign policy. Poland has resolved a broad range

of issues with its neighbors, including accords with Germany, Lithuania, and Ukraine, and contributes a force of nearly 500 to the

NATO-led mission in Bosnia, as well as contributing to peacekeeping operations in other regions of the world. Indeed, Poland currently has more soldiers deployed in multinational peacekeeping

operations than any other state.

Hungary, as well, already has proved its commitment to NATO’s

security objectives. Hungary’s willingness to offer its base at

Taszar to American forces enabled our troops to deploy to the

NATO-led mission in Bosnia safely and effectively. This commitment to help bring stability to southeastern Europe has been valuable to the Alliance in this circumstance, and will be in others as

well. Hungary has further demonstrated its commitment to

NATO’s objectives by contributing an engineering battalion to the

Bosnia mission. Hungary will bring eight combat brigades and five

squadrons of combat aircraft to the Alliance, and has committed to

a five year program to increase its defense spending by one-tenth

of one percent of Gross Domestic Product for each of the next five

years.

Hungary also brings values and a political outlook that fit well

with those of the Alliance. The Hungarian people expressed early

and courageous opposition to Soviet domination in their 1956 uprising, and played a key role in the dramatic events of 1989. They

have held two rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections

since then and have pursued constructive policies throughout the

region. Hungary’s recent treaties with Slovakia and Romania have

helped to defuse tensions regarding ethnic Hungarian minorities in

those states. In a national referendum in November, 85 percent of

Hungarians voting favored their country’s membership in the Alliance.

The Czech Republic also will be a strong addition to NATO. A

vibrant democracy during the inter-war years, it is today among

the most western of the former Warsaw Pact states in both geography and outlook. The Czechs contributed forces to Operation

Desert Storm and currently contribute over 600 troops to the

NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Like Poland and Hungary, the Czech

Republic has participated actively in the Partnership for Peace program. The Czechs will contribute 11 combat brigades and six

squadrons of combat aircraft to the Alliance. The Czech government recently approved a budget that fully meets its commitment

to increase defense spending by one-tenth of one percent of GDP

in each of the next three years.
XII

The Czechs have proved their attachment to values shared by

the Alliance’s member states. Their Velvet Revolution of 1989, like

events of the Prague Spring two decades earlier, demonstrated an

abiding commitment to democracy, civil society, and the standards

of human rights espoused by Vaclav Havel and other Czech leaders. Since then the Czechs have held three rounds of parliamentary

elections, separated from Slovakia on peaceful terms, and concluded agreements with Germany settling a range of issues, including those related to treatment of Sudeten Germans during the postWorld War II era.

The addition of these three states to the Alliance is part of a

strategy to improve not only their security and that of current

NATO members, but also all other states of Europe, including the

Russian Federation. It is the intent of the United States, and of

NATO, to avoid any destabilizing redivision of the European continent, and instead to promote its progressive integration. The Alliance declared at its Madrid summit that it will leave the door open

for the addition of other new members in the future, and that it

will review this process at its next summit, which will be held in

Washington in April 1999. It is encouraging that states that aspire

to NATO membership, but have not yet been invited to join the Alliance, nonetheless welcomed the series of enlargement decisions at

Madrid, the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and

similar steps as beneficial to their own security.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May of 1997, has special importance in this regard. The Founding Act opened the way

to a new and constructive relationship between the Alliance and

Russia. It therefore complements the efforts of individual allies to

see a democratic, peaceful Russia integrated into the community of

European nations and security structures. To that end, the Founding Act created a new forum, the Permanent Joint Council, which

allows NATO and Russia to pursue security issues of mutual interest. The Council first convened at the Ministerial level on September 26 in New York, met among Defense Ministers in Brussels on

December 2, and again among Foreign Ministers on December 17.

The Founding Act, the Permanent Joint Council, the integration of

Russian forces in the mission in Bosnia, and other actions by

NATO stand as evidence to the Russian people that the Alliance’s

enlargement in no way will threaten Russia’s security, but rather

will enhance it by deepening democratic stability in Europe.

The Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council advance Russia’s

cooperation with NATO and integration in European affairs, but

they also safeguard NATO’s freedom of action and the integrity of

its decisionmaking. The Founding Act places no restrictions on

NATO’s ability to respond to the security environment as its own

members see fit. Similarly, the Permanent Joint Council has no

power to direct or veto actions by the North Atlantic Council, which

remains NATO’s supreme decisionmaking body. Moreover, all actions within the Permanent Joint Council must proceed by consensus, which provides the United States and each other NATO member with an effective veto over proposed points of discussion or action. The Ministerial meetings of the Permanent Joint Council to

date demonstrates that it can be a useful forum for advancing rela-
XIII

tions with Russia, and that it will not adversely affect NATO’s

progress on internal issues such as the Alliance’s enlargement.

NATO’s enlargement and related adaptations, which will enhance the security of its members and partners, also will entail financial costs to the United States and our allies over the coming

years. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO’s leaders commissioned a study of the military requirements of the Alliance’s enlargement, and of the resource implications of meeting those requirements. The declaration from that summit expressed the confidence of NATO’s leaders that ‘‘Alliance costs associated with the

integration of new members will be manageable and . . . the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.’’

The studies completed by the Alliance this past Fall confirm this

view. They estimate that the addition of these three members will

require approximately $1.5 billion in expenditures from NATO’s

common-funded military budgets over the next 10 years. The

United States currently provides about one quarter of these common-funded budgets and will continue to do so after the addition

of the new states. Thus the additional costs to the United States

of adding these three states to the Alliance is estimated to be about

$400 million over the next ten years. Adding other states to NATO

in the future likely will entail costs as well, although it is not possible to estimate these without knowing which states might be invited and when.

There are other costs to the United States less directly related

to NATO’s enlargement. Under the Warsaw Initiative, the United

States has provided bilateral foreign military financing assistance

to Central European states totaling approximately $185 million between fiscal years 1996 and 1998, of which $37.3 million in the current fiscal year is allocated to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In addition, we provide funding to assist partner participation in the Partnership for Peace program and ‘‘in the Spirit of

Partnership for Peace’’ exercises and events, which totaled about

$80 million from fiscal years 1996 to 1997. The three invited states

took full advantage of this assistance to play a major role in the

Partnership for Peace program. While all these programs are consistent with the aims of NATO enlargement, they constitute neither direct nor automatic costs of enlargement, and their continuation will relay on future decisions by Congress to provide funds.

There are also costs related to enlargement that will be borne by

our new and current allies. With regard to NATO’s direct expenditures through its common-funded budgets, our Canadian and European allies will continue to bear about 75 percent of the cost In addition, as noted, the three new states plan on making substantial

investments in military modernization and reorganization over the

coming years, and have committed to achieve defense spending levels on a par with other NATO members. Several leaders from the

region have noted that their countries likely would need to spend

more on military modernization if they were left outside the Alliance.

Current allies will also continue to make investments through

their national military budgets to help ensure that an enlarged

NATO can carry out its missions. In particular, NATO’s military

authorities have stressed the need for improved lift, logistics, and
XIV

other power projection capabilities, and many current allies are undertaking modernization efforts in these areas. For example,

France is restructuring its armed forces to be more mobile and easily deployable, and is establishing a Rapid Action Force designed

for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies.

Already, Britain provides NATO’s only rapidly-deployable corps

headquarters committed to NATO, and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps. Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000 fullyequipped troops from its Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition,

NATO’s recent decisions to develop Combined Joint Task Force capabilities and a European Security and Defense Identity within the

Alliance will enable European allies to play a larger role and to

bear additional burdens.

The decision to pursue the enlargement of NATO has reflected,

in our country, a unique process of bipartisan cooperation across

the two political branches of government. Both the Senate and

House have considered the question of adding new members to the

Alliance in some depth over the past three years. In July 1996, the

House approved the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act by a bipartisan majority of 353 to 65, and the Senate adopted a similar

resolution by a margin of 81 to 16. During the course of 1997, four

Senate committees held ten hearings on the strategic, military, diplomatic, and budgetary implications of this initiative.

In addition, on April 22, 1997, the Majority Leader and Minority

Leader of the Senate created the Senate NATO Observer Group,

comprised of 28 Senators from both political parties, to work with

the Administration of the process of NATO enlargement. During

the past year, senior administration officials met with the members

and staff of this Group in classified sessions over a dozen times,

briefed them on military and political issues related to NATO’s enlargement, provided a range of classified documents and periodic

issue summaries, and consulted them in advance on key questions,

such as which states to support for admission to the Alliance. Four

members of this Group, along with four members of the House of

Representatives, attended the NATO summit in Madrid last July

as members of the United States delegation, and participated directly in its proceedings.

This unprecedented process of consultation has helped ensure a

thorough and bipartisan examination of the full range of issues at

stake in NATO’s enlargement. It has helped to inform decisionmaking within the executive branch. It also has helped to ensure

that the voice of the American public plays a role in this set of decisions that will so vitally affect their own lives and those of their

children.

The Protocols to the Treaty of 1949 for each of the three states

are identical in structure and composed of three Articles. Article I

provides that once the Protocol has entered into force, the Secretary General of NATO shall extend an invitation to the named

state to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, and that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the state shall become a party

to the Treaty on the date it deposits its instrument of accession

with the Government of the United States of America. Article II

provides that the Protocol shall enter into force when each of the
XV

parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government

of the United States of America of its acceptance of the Protocol.

Article III provides for the equal authenticity of the English and

French texts, and for deposit of the Protocol in the archives of the

Government of the United States of America, the depository state

for North Atlantic Treaty purposes.

The addition of these three states to the Alliance, along with the

other elements of our transatlantic strategy, will enable NATO to

help accomplish for Europe’s east what it has accomplished for Europe’s west over the past half century. It will safeguard our own

country’s vital interests in Europe’s well-being, and help ensure

that aggression, conflict, and repression do not once again visit that

continent as they have too often, and at terrible cost, throughout

our lifetimes. I therefore convey these protocols to you with high

expectations that their ratification will further strengthen the

peace and security of the transatlantic region well into the approaching century.

Respectfully submitted,

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT.
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