Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, September 9, 2004 BORDER SECURITY

Joint, Coordinated Actions 

by State and DHS Needed to 

Guide Biometric Visas and 

Related Programs 

Joint Statement of Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, 

Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade, and 

Randolph Hite, Director of Information Technology 

Architecture and Systems Issues 

GAO-04-1080T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1080T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jacquelyn L. 

Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-4128 or 

williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-1080T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representative 

September 9, 2004

BORDER SECURITY

Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and 

DHS Needed to Guide Biometric Visas 

and Related Programs 

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. 

government has made a concerted 

effort to strengthen border security 

by enhancing visa issuance policies 

and procedures, as well as 

expanding screening of the millions 

of foreign visitors who enter the 

United States annually. Consistent 

with the 9/11 Commission report 

that recommends a biometric 

entry-exit screening system for 

travelers, the Department of State’s 

biometric program complements 

the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) United States 

Visitor and Immigrant Status 

Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) 

program—a governmentwide 

program to better control and 

monitor the entry, visa status, and 

exit of visitors. 

GAO was asked to present the 

findings of its report on State’s 

Biometric Visa Program, as well as 

discuss other aspects of visa 

processing and border security that 

require coordinated, joint actions 

by State and DHS. 

GAO has recommended that DHS 

and State develop and provide 

guidance to consular posts on how 

to use information from the 

biometric program to adjudicate 

visas. In other reports, GAO has 

made recommendations to DHS 

and State to improve US-VISIT, as 

well as several aspects of the 

nonimmigrant visa process. The 

agencies generally agreed and are 

taking actions to implement our 

recommendations. 

Our report issued today finds that State is implementing the Biometric Visa 

Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, deadline for 

issuing visas that include biometric indicators, as mandated by Congress. As 

of September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at 

201 visa issuing posts overseas and plans to complete the installation at the 

remaining 6 posts by September 30. Technology installation has progressed 

smoothly, however State and DHS have not provided comprehensive 

guidance to consular posts on when and how information from the DHS 

Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) on visa applicants 

should be considered by adjudicating consular officers. In the absence of 

such guidance, we found that these officers are unclear on how best to use 

the biometric program and IDENT information. 

Since September 11, State and DHS have made many improvements to visa 

issuance and border security policies. Nevertheless, in prior reports, we 

have found additional vulnerabilities that need to be addressed through joint,

coordinated actions. For example, DHS has not adequately defined the 

operational context for US-VISIT, which affects the biometric program. In 

addition, we identified systemic weaknesses in information sharing between 

State and DHS in the visa revocation process. Moreover, we found related 

weaknesses in an interagency security check process aimed to prevent the 

illegal transfer of sensitive technologies. 

Example of Fingerprints and Photograph Capture 
Page 1 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to be here to discuss our report1

 being issued today on the 

Department of State’s Biometric Visa Program, which requires that all 

persons applying for U.S. visas have certain biometrics2

 (in this case, 

fingerprints) and digital photographs collected during the visa3

 application 

process and cleared through the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) before 

receiving a visa. In addition, we will discuss several previous GAO reports 

that highlight the need for joint, coordinated efforts by State and DHS on 

programs to enhance border security and visa processes. 

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a concerted 

effort to strengthen border security by enhancing visa issuance policies 

and procedures, as well as improving the screening of the millions of 

foreign visitors who enter, stay in, and exit the United States annually. 

State’s Biometric Visa Program complements the DHS-run United States 

Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program—a 

governmentwide program that collects, maintains, and shares information 

on foreign nationals to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, 

and exit of visitors. The Biometric Visa Program prescreens visa 

applicants at U.S. consulates overseas to ensure that they are qualified to 

obtain visas, while the US-VISIT program, among other things, verifies that 

the same person who applied for a visa is the one who is entering the 

United States using that visa.4

 The biometric program is consistent with 

 1

See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on 

Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging, GAO-04-1001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2004). 

2

Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to, among other things, verify 

a person’s identity by capturing and analyzing his or her physiological characteristics. In 

this case, and for the purposes of this report, “biometric identifiers” refers to fingerprints. 

See GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

3

In this report, we use the term “visa” to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. The United 

States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. A visa 

allows a foreign visitor to present himself at a port of entry for admission to the United 

States. 

4

DHS currently does not have information on individuals apprehended at ports of entry 

when their prints and photographs did not match those captured at the consular posts for 

the visa they were using. On July 19, 2004, DHS implemented a system to assist in 

identifying such cases and indicated that it will be able to develop better information in the 

future. 
Page 2 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

the July 2004 9/11 Commission report,5 which recommends using 

biometric identifiers for border and transportation systems and a 

biometric entry-exit screening system for travelers. 

Our statement today will focus on border security programs requiring 

joint, coordinated efforts by State and DHS. We will first discuss our 

observations of State’s Biometric Visa Program. In addition, based on prior 

GAO reports, we will discuss some of our findings and our 

recommendations that called for coordinated efforts between DHS and 

State to improve other aspects the nonimmigrant visa process (NIV) and 

border security, including US-VISIT. 

We found that State is implementing the Biometric Visa Program on 

schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, deadline for issuing 

visas with biometric identifiers, as mandated by Congress.6

 As of 

September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at 

201 of 207 overseas posts that issue visas, and State plans to complete the 

installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. The biometric 

technology installation has progressed smoothly; however, DHS and State 

have not provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts on when and 

how information from IDENT on visa applicants should be considered by 

adjudicating consular officers.7

 In the absence of such guidance, officers 

may be unclear on how best to use the biometric program and IDENT 

information. Therefore, in our report issued today, we have recommended 

that DHS and State develop and provide comprehensive guidance to 

consular posts on how information on visa applicants available through 

 5

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 

Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2004). 

6

Section 303 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 

No. 107-173) requires that no later than October 26, 2004, the State Department issue visas 

that use biometric identifiers. 

7

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishes DHS’s role in the visa process, and a 

subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of 

State and Homeland Security further outlines the visa issuance authorities. According to 

the memorandum, DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy, reviewing 

implementation of the policy, and providing additional direction, while State is responsible 

for managing the visa process, managing the consular corps and its functions, and carrying 

out U.S. foreign policy. DHS and State share responsibility for policy and implementation 

of the Biometric Visa Program. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

IDENT should be used to help adjudicate visas. DHS concurred with our 

report, and State acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance. 

State and DHS have made many improvements to border security and visa 

issuance policies since September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, in our reviews of 

various aspects of border security and visa issuance, we have found 

weaknesses that both agencies need to address through joint, coordinated 

actions. For example, 

• DHS has deployed an initial US-VISIT operating capability for entry to 115 

airports and 14 seaports. DHS plans to expand the initial operating 

capability to the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 2004, and to 

all remaining land ports of entry by December 2005. It has also deployed 

an exit capability, on a pilot basis, at two airports and one seaport.8

However, the program’s operational context, or homeland security 

enterprise architecture,9

 has not yet been adequately defined.10 DHS 

released an initial version of its enterprise architecture in September 2003; 

however, we found that this architecture was missing important content. 

This content is needed to help clarify and optimize the relationships 

between US-VISIT and other homeland security programs and operations, 

such as State’s Biometric Visa Program. 

• In 2003, we identified systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation 

process,11 many of which were the result of a failure of U.S. agencies to 

share and fully utilize information.12 We reported that information on 

 8

These are the Baltimore/Washington International Airport, Chicago O’Hare International 

Airport, and the Miami Royal Caribbean seaport. 

9

An enterprise architecture provides a clear and comprehensive picture of the structure of 

an entity, whether an organization or a functional or mission area, including depictions of 

the enterprise’s current or “as-is” technical and operational environments, its target or “tobe” technical and operational environments, and a plan for transitioning to the target. A 

properly managed enterprise architecture can clarify and help optimize the 

interdependencies and relationships among business operations, as well as those between 

these operations and the underlying information technology infrastructure and 

applications. 

10See GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts Are Underway to Develop Enterprise 

Architecture, But Much Work Remains, GAO-04-777 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2004). 

11The visa revocation process is a homeland security tool that can prevent potential 

terrorists from entering the United States and can help DHS officials identify and 

investigate potential terrorists that may have already entered the country. 

12See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in 

the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003). 
Page 4 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds was not shared 

between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. 

We made several recommendations to State and DHS, which they agreed 

to implement. A follow-up review in summer 2004, showed that although 

State and DHS had made improvements in the revocation process, some 

weaknesses remained.13 For instance, in some cases State took a week or 

longer to notify DHS that individuals with revoked visas might have been 

in the country. As a result, we made additional recommendations to both 

agencies, which they agreed to implement. 

• Timely information sharing among State, DHS, and other agencies also 

affects the time it takes to adjudicate a visa for a science student or 

scholar. In some cases, consular officers determine that some of these 

applicants must undergo a security check, known as Visas Mantis, to 

protect against sensitive technology transfers.14 In February 2004, we 

found that it was difficult to resolve some Visas Mantis cases expeditiously 

given the way in which information was disseminated among State, DHS, 

and other agencies. 15 Again, we addressed recommendations to both State 

and DHS, and they are currently implementing them. 

Overall, our work has demonstrated that joint, coordinated actions by 

State and DHS are critical for homeland and border security. 

State’s $162 million Biometric Visa Program is designed to work hand-inhand with the DHS multibillion-dollar US-VISIT program. Both programs 

aim to improve U.S. border security by verifying the identity of persons 

entering the United States. Both programs rely on the DHS Automated 

Biographic Identification System, known as IDENT, which is a repository 

of fingerprints and digital photographs of persons who either have applied 

for U.S. visas since the inception of the program in September 2003, have 

entered the United States at one of 115 air or 14 sea ports of entry since 

 13See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in 

the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-04-795 (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004). 

14The Visas Mantis process allows all participating agencies, including DHS, to provide 

information and raise any particular concerns that they may have regarding the applicant 

and/or the applicant’s proposed activities in the United States. According to State, the key 

role of the Visas Mantis process is to protect U.S. national security, particularly in 

combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and 

conventional weapons. 

15See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to 

Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars, GAO-04-371 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

25, 2004).

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

January 2004, or are on a watch list—whether for previous immigration 

violations or as part of the FBI’s database of terrorists and individuals with 

felony convictions.16

The process for determining who will be issued a visa consists of several 

steps. When a person applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate, a fingerprint 

scan is taken of his right and left index fingers. These prints are then 

transmitted from the overseas post through servers17 at State to DHS’s 

IDENT system, which searches its records and sends a response back 

through State to the post.18 A “hit” response—meaning that a match to 

someone previously entered in the system was found—prevents the post’s 

computer system from printing a visa for the applicant until the 

information is reviewed and cleared by a consular officer. According to 

State data, the entire process generally takes about 30 minutes. If the 

computer cannot determine if two sets of prints match, IDENT refers the 

case to DHS fingerprint experts, who have up to 24 hours to return a 

response to State (see fig. 1). 

 16IDENT data includes FBI information on all known and suspected terrorists, selected 

wanted persons (foreign-born, unknown place of birth, previously arrested by DHS), and 

previous criminal histories for high risk countries; DHS Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement information on deported felons and sexual registrants; and DHS information 

on previous criminal histories. Information from the bureau includes fingerprints from the 

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. 

17A server is a computer on a network that manages network resources, such as storing 

files, managing printers, managing network traffic, or processing database queries 

18In a hit record, information is included on the person’s previous entry in the system, 

either at a port of entry or U.S. consulate, or through the watch list. 

Biometric Process at U.S. 

Consulates Overseas 
Page 6 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

Figure 1: Biometric Fingerprint Analysis Process 

US-VISIT aims to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and 

travel, contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and 

adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by 

• collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign 

nationals who enter and exit the United States; 

• identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms 

of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or 

(3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; 

• detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and 

determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and 

• facilitating information sharing and coordination among appropriate 

agencies. 

United States Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology Program 
Page 7 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

The process by which a foreign national is screened for entry is as follows: 

When a foreign national arrives at a port of entry to the United States, a 

DHS inspector scans the machine-readable travel documents. Existing 

records on the foreign national, including biographic lookout hits are 

returned. The computer presents available biographic information and a 

photograph and determines whether IDENT contains existing fingerprints 

for the foreign national. The inspector then scans the foreign national’s 

fingerprints (left and right index fingers) and takes a photograph. This 

information is checked against stored fingerprints in IDENT. If no 

matching prints are in IDENT, the foreign national is enrolled in US-VISIT 

(i.e., biographic and biometric data are entered). If the foreign national’s 

fingerprints are already in IDENT, the system performs a comparison of 

the fingerprint taken at the port of entry to the one on file to confirm that 

the person submitting the fingerprints is the person on file. If the system 

finds a mismatch of fingerprints or a watch list hit, the foreign national is 

held for further screening or processing. 

State’s implementation of the technology aspects of the biometric visa 

program is currently on schedule to meet the October 26, 2004, deadline. 

According to State officials, a well-planned rollout of equipment and 

software and fewer technical problems than anticipated led to smooth 

implementation of the technological aspects of the program at the 201 

posts that had the program operating as of September 1, 2004. But amid 

the fast pace of rolling out the program to meet the deadline, DHS and 

State have not provided comprehensive guidance for consular posts on 

how the information about visa applicants made available through the 

Biometric Visa Program should best be used to help adjudicate visas. 

Indeed, we found several significant differences in the implementation of 

the biometric program during our visits to San Salvador, El Salvador, and 

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. State acknowledged that posts may 

be implementing the program in various ways across the 207 consular 

posts that issue nonimmigrant visas. 

According to State officials, the implementation process for the biometric 

program led to far fewer technical problems than expected. Early on, State 

had a few difficulties in transmitting data between the posts and DHS’s 

IDENT, primarily related to server and firewall (computer security) issues. 

According to State, most issues were resolved within a few days. In fact, 

201 nonimmigrant visa (NIV)-issuing posts out of 207 had the software and 

hardware installed and were transmitting prints to IDENT for analysis as 

Biometric Visa 

Implementation 

Nearing Completion, 

but Some Guidance 

Still Needed 

State Expects to Meet 

Implementation Deadline 
Page 8 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

of September 1, 2004. State anticipates the completion of the installation 

by the October 2004 deadline. 

According to State’s data, from February to August 2004, the total 

biometric visa process averaged about 30 minutes for an applicant’s prints 

to be sent from an overseas post to the State server, and on to DHS for 

IDENT analysis and then for the response to be returned through State’s 

server to the posts. IDENT response time could affect visa issuance times 

because a visa cannot be issued until the post has received and reviewed 

the IDENT response. Our observations at posts in San Salvador and Santo 

Domingo demonstrated the importance of the length of time required to 

receive an IDENT response. We observed that most interviews average 

only a few minutes, but the IDENT response time currently is 30 minutes. 

Thus, if interviewing officers collect prints during the interview, the 

interview would be completed before the IDENT response would be 

available to consular officers. Since the visa cannot be issued until the 

IDENT information is considered by the consulate, potential delays in the 

IDENT response times could have a major effect on the visa issuance 

process and inconvenience visa applicants. State has encouraged consular 

officials to issue visas the day after interviews since part of the visa 

process now relies on another agency’s system. This will require 

significant changes for posts such as Santo Domingo, which still issues 

same-day visas. 

State has focused on implementing the Biometric Visa Program by the 

mandated deadline; however, our report identifies certain lags in guidance 

on how the program should be implemented at consular posts. State and 

DHS have not yet provided to posts details of how all aspects of the 

program will be implemented, including who should scan fingerprints, 

where and who should review information about applicants returned from 

IDENT, and response times for the IDENT system. In addition, DHS and 

State have not provided comprehensive guidance for consular posts on 

how the information about visa applicants made available through the 

Biometric Visa Program should be used to help adjudicate visas. 

We believe that it is important for State and DHS to articulate how the 

program could best be implemented, providing a roadmap for posts to 

develop implementation plans that incorporate the guidance. We 

recognize, however, that the workload, personnel and facility resources 

vary considerably from post to post. As a result, each post may not be able 

to easily implement the Biometric Visa Program according to a precise set 

Fingerprinting Raising 

Issues in Visa Process 

Guidance Lagging for 

Program Implementation 
Page 9 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

of guidelines. However, posts could develop procedures to implement the 

guidance, identify resource and facility constraints, and implement 

mitigating actions to address their own unique circumstances. Therefore, 

we have recommended that DHS and State provide comprehensive 

guidance to consular posts on how information about visa applicants that 

is now available from IDENT should be used to help adjudicate visas. In 

responding to our recommendation, DHS generally concurred and State 

acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance. 

Our work at two posts shows that, because they lack specific guidance on 

the system’s use, consular officers at these overseas posts are uncertain 

how they should implement the Biometric Visa Program and are currently 

using the returned IDENT responses in a variety of ways. For example, we 

found that, in cases in which the IDENT response information is available 

to the overseas post by the time of the visa applicant interview, some 

consular officers who conduct interviews review information before the 

interview, some review it during the interview, and some rely instead on a 

designated officer or the line chief to review the information after the 

interview is completed and before affected visas are printed. 

We found several differences in the visa operations at two posts—San 

Salvador, El Salvador, and Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic—that 

handle a large volume of visa applications. For example, 

• San Salvador, one of the first posts to begin implementing the program in 

September 2003, has a large new embassy complex that allowed the post 

great flexibility in implementing the collection of biometrics. Applicants 

are led through outdoor security screening before entering the interview 

waiting room. Once in the waiting room, they immediately proceed to a 

fingerprint scanning window where an American officer verifies their 

names and photographs and scans their fingerprints. By the time they 

arrive at their interview windows, usually the interviewing officer has 

received their IDENT responses. However, the post has designated one 

officer to review all of the IDENT responses, so some interviewing officers 

do not take the time to review IDENT information on those they interview 

even if the information is available at the time of the interview. 

• Santo Domingo’s consular section is hampered by significant facility 

constraints. The NIV applicant waiting area is very cramped and has been 

even more restricted over recent months due to construction efforts. Some 

of the NIV applicants are forced to share space in the immigrant visa 

waiting area. Santo Domingo has fewer interviewing windows than San 

Salvador and cannot easily spare one to designate for fulltime fingerprint 

Program Implementation 

Varies at Consular Posts 
Page 10 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

scanning due to high interview volume. Some interviewing officers scan 

applicants’ fingerprints at the time of the interview, so the interview ends 

before the IDENT response has been returned from DHS. One consular 

officer is designated to review the IDENT responses for all of the 

applicants, and interviewing officers may not see IDENT information on 

the applicants they interview. In some cases, the designated officer 

determines if the applicant should receive a visa, and in others he brings 

the IDENT information back to the original interviewing officer for the 

case for further review. 

Since September 11, 2001, we have issued reports recommending that 

State and DHS work together to improve several aspects of border 

security and the visa process, as described below. These reports show the 

importance of joint, coordinated actions by State and DHS to maximize 

program effectiveness. 

The US-VISIT program supports a multifaceted, critical mission: to help 

protect approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable waterways 

through inspections of foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry. DHS has 

deployed an initial operating capability for entry to 115 airports and 14 

seaports. It has also deployed an exit capability, as a pilot, at two airports 

and one seaport. Since becoming operational, DHS reports that more than 

eight million foreign nationals have been processed by US-VISIT at ports 

of entry, resulting in hundreds being denied entry. Its scope is large and 

complex, connecting 16 existing information technology systems in a 

governmentwide process involving multiple departments and agencies.19 In 

addition to these and other challenges, the program’s operational context, 

or homeland security enterprise architecture, is not yet adequately 

defined. 

DHS released an initial version of its enterprise architecture in September 

2003; however, we found that this architecture was missing, either 

 19GAO has identified US-VISIT as a high-risk endeavor. See GAO, Homeland Security: 

Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, 

GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.; Sept. 19, 2003). 

Joint, Coordinated 

Actions by State and 

DHS Required on 

Many Aspects of Visa 

Processing and 

Border Security 

US-VISIT Operating at 

Selected Points of Entry, 

but DHS Further Defining 

its Operational Context 
Page 11 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

partially or completely, all the key elements expected in a well-defined 

architecture, such as descriptions of business processes, information 

flows among these processes, and security rules associated with these 

information flows.20 DHS could benefit from such key elements to help 

clarify and optimize the relationships between US-VISIT and other 

homeland security programs operations, such as State’s Biometric Visa 

Program, both in terms of processes and the underlying information 

technology infrastructure and applications. Although the biometrics 

program is administered by State, it falls under the overall visa policy area 

of the DHS Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, and is part 

of our national homeland security mission. State officials indicated that 

they are waiting for DHS to further define US-VISIT, which would help 

guide State’s actions on the Biometric Visa Program. 

Since September 11, 2001, our work has demonstrated the need for State 

and DHS to work together to better address potential vulnerabilities in the 

visa process. In June 2003, we identified systemic weaknesses in the visa 

revocation process, many of which were the result of a failure to share and 

fully utilize information. We reported that the visa revocation process was 

not used aggressively to share information among agencies on individuals 

with visas revoked on terrorism grounds.21 It also broke down when these 

individuals had already entered the United States prior to revocation. 

Immigration officials and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were 

not then routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases 

of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were 

revoked. Therefore, we recommended that DHS, in conjunction with the 

Departments of State and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures 

to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on 

terrorism grounds and take proper actions. 

In July 2004, we followed up on our findings and recommendations 

regarding interagency coordination in the visa revocation process and 

found that State and DHS had taken some actions in the summer of 2003 to 

address these weaknesses.22 However, our review showed that some 

weaknesses remained. For instance, in some cases State took a week or 

 20DHS plans to release an updated version of its enterprise architecture in September 2004. 

21GAO-03-798. 

22GAO-04-795. 

Aspects of NIV Process 

Require State and DHS 

Cooperation 
Page 12 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

longer to notify DHS that individuals with revoked visas might be in the 

country. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate 

those individuals. Given outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the 

removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation, we 

recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly 

(1) develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles and 

responsibilities and sets performance standards and (2) address 

outstanding legal and policy issues in this area or provide Congress with 

specific actions it could take to resolve them. State agreed to work 

together with DHS to address these recommendations. 

In February 2004, we reported that the time it takes to adjudicate a visa for 

a science student or scholar depends largely on whether an applicant must 

undergo a security check known as Visas Mantis, which is designed to 

protect against sensitive technology transfers.23 Based on a random sample 

of Visas Mantis cases for science students and scholars, we found it took 

an average of 67 days for the interagency security check to be processed 

and for State to notify the post. We also found that the way in which Visas 

Mantis information was disseminated at headquarters made it difficult to 

resolve some cases expeditiously. Finally, consular staff at posts we 

visited stated that they lacked clear guidance on the Visas Mantis program. 

While State and FBI officials acknowledged there had been lengthy waits, 

they reported having measures under way to improve the process and to 

identify and resolve outstanding Visas Mantis cases. We recommended 

that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of the FBI 

and the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop and implement a plan to 

improve the Visas Mantis process. We are currently reviewing the 

measures these agencies have taken to improve the Visas Mantis program 

made since our February report and will report on our findings at the 

beginning of next year. 

Overall, we have reported on a number of areas in which joint, 

coordinated actions by DHS and State are needed to improve border 

security and visa processing. In commenting in our report of State’s 

biometric program, both DHS and State have pledged their commitment to 

continued cooperation and joint actions. Indeed, these agencies are 

currently working together as part of the US-VISIT program. For example, 

State participates in two DHS-led groups designed to oversee and manage 

the US-VISIT program. First, State participates on the US-VISIT Federal 

 23GAO-04-371.
Page 13 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

Stakeholders Advisory Board, which provides guidance and direction to 

the US-VISIT program. State also participates as part of the US-VISIT 

Integrated Project Team, which meets weekly to discuss, among other 

things, operational issues concerning the deployment of US-VISIT. 

Mr. Chairman, overall, our work has demonstrated that coordinated, joint 

actions by State and DHS are critical for homeland and border security. 

State and DHS have worked together to roll out the biometric technology 

to consular posts worldwide on schedule. Moreover, their cooperation on 

US-VISIT will be critical to ensure that information is available to 

consulates to adjudicate visa applications and prevent persons from 

unlawfully entering the United States. However, they have not yet 

provided comprehensive guidance to the posts on how the program and 

biometric information should be used to adjudicate visas. We recognize 

that it may not be feasible for each post to implement biometric visas in 

the same way, given the variances among posts in workload, security 

concerns with the applicant pool, facilities, and personnel. However, 

guidance to posts on how to best implement the program, including best 

practices, would enable posts to develop operating procedures, identify 

resource needs, and implement mitigating actions to address the unique 

circumstances at each post. 

Therefore we have recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland 

Security and State develop and provide comprehensive guidance to 

consular posts on how best to implement the Biometric Visa Program. The 

guidance should address the planned uses for the information generated 

by the Biometric Visa Program at consular posts including directions to 

consular officers on when and how information from the IDENT database 

on visa applicants should be considered. Further, we have recommended 

that the Secretary of State direct consular posts to develop an 

implementation plan based on this guidance. DHS generally concurred 

with our recommendations, stating that GAO’s identification of areas 

where improvements are needed in the Biometric Visa Program will 

contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen the visa process. State 

acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance. Regarding US-VISIT, 

we made an earlier recommendation that the Secretary for Homeland 

Security clarify the operational context in which US-VISIT is to operate. 

DHS agreed with our recommendation and plans to issue the next version 

of their enterprise architecture in September of 2004. This is an essential 

component in establishing biometric policy and creating consistency 

between the DHS-run US-VISIT program and State’s Biometric Visa 

program. 

Conclusion 
Page 14 GAO-04-1080T Border Security: Biometric Visas 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to answer any questions you or other members of the committee may 

have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202) 512-

4128. Other key contributors to this statement include John Brummet, 

Sharron Candon, Deborah Davis, Kathryn Hartsburg, David Hinchman, and 

David Noone. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320313) 
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