2016 UT App 116

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JESSE H. DANSIE FAMILY TRUST,

1

Petitioner,

v.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND HI-COUNTRY ESTATES 

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.

Opinion

No. 20140653-CA

Filed May 26, 2016

Original Proceeding in this Court

John S. Flitton, Attorney for Petitioner

Melanie A. Reif, Attorney for Respondent Public 

Service Commission 

Sean D. Reyes and Brent A. Burnett, Attorneys for

Respondent Division of Public Utilities

J. Craig Smith, Debra K. Caldwell, and Adam S. 

Long, Attorneys for Respondent Hi-Country Estates 

Homeowners Association

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 The Jesse H. Dansie Family Trust (the Trust) seeks review 

of a final order of the Public Service Commission (the PSC), 

 

1. Jesse Rodney Dansie filed this petition for review when he 

was trustee of the Jesse H. Dansie Family Trust. He resigned as 

trustee in January 2015, and the Trust was substituted as the real 

party in interest in this proceeding.
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 2 2016 UT App 116

which approved a rate case for the Hi-Country Estates 

Homeowners Association (the Association). We decline to 

disturb the PSC’s order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The events leading to this case began in 1977, when Jesse 

H. Dansie leased the use of a well on his property to Gerald 

Bagley, the original developer of Hi-Country Estates. The Well 

Lease allowed Bagley to connect Hi-Country’s water system to 

Dansie’s well for ten years. In return, Dansie received an initial 

payment and ‚monthly rental‛ fees, plus water and a number of 

residential hook-ups free of charge. Eight years later, Dansie and 

Bagley amended the Well Lease. Under the amendment, Dansie 

received, in addition to his residential hook-ups, ‚the right to 

receive up to 12 million . . . gallons of water per year from the 

combined water system at no cost for culinary and yard 

irrigation on the Dansie property.‛ The amendment also stated 

that the Well Lease bound Bagley, Dansie, and their successors 

and assigns.

¶3 In 1985, Bagley created Foothills Water Company and, as 

Foothills, applied to the PSC to operate the water system as a 

public utility. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagley 

& Co. (Hi-Country Estates I), 2008 UT App 105, ¶ 4, 182 P.3d 417. 

The PSC granted a certificate of public convenience and 

necessity (CPCN) to Foothills and authorized interim rates. Id.

Later that year, Bagley transferred all interest and stock in 

Foothills to Dansie. Id. That same year, the Association sued, 

contesting Foothills’s and Dansie’s interests in the water system 

and seeking to quiet title in the Association. This case represents 

the most recent episode in the ensuing litigation between the 

Association, Foothills, Bagley, Dansie, and the Trust.

¶4 In March 1986, the PSC held general rate-setting hearings 

for Foothills and issued an order (the 1986 Order). In the course 

of determining ‚just and reasonable rates,‛ the PSC considered 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 3 2016 UT App 116

the Well Lease. The PSC found that the Well Lease was ‚grossly 

unreasonable, requiring not only substantial monthly payments, 

but also showering virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie 

and the members of his immediate family.‛ The PSC further 

determined that ‚it would be unjust and unreasonable to expect 

Foothills’ . . . active customers to support the entire burden of 

the Well Lease Agreement.‛ If Dansie and his family received 

water through the water system, the PSC ordered that they 

would have to pay ‚the actual pro-rata . . . costs for power, 

chlorination and water testing involved in delivering that 

water.‛2

¶5 In 1993, the Association assumed control of the water 

system and the CPCN and developed a new well, discontinuing 

the use of the Dansie well. Id. ¶ 5. A year later, the Association

disconnected the water lines to the Dansie property after the 

Dansies allegedly refused to pay the costs required by the 1986 

Order. Id. In 1996, the PSC decertified the Association as a public 

utility. Id.

¶6 In 2005, a trial court ruled that the Well Lease was an 

enforceable contract, neither void as against public policy nor 

unconscionable. Id. ¶ 6. We affirmed the trial court’s order in HiCountry Estates I, 2008 UT App 105, ¶ 1. We noted that after the 

PSC ‚revoked the status of the water system as a public utility

. . . the PSC did not have jurisdiction over the water system‛ and 

‚the 1986 PSC order was no longer binding.‛ Id. ¶ 12 n.2. We 

therefore ‚interpret*ed+ the Dansies’ rights and obligations 

under the Well Lease according to its plain language‛ and 

concluded that under the plain language of the Well Lease, the 

Dansies were not required to pay the costs listed in the 1986 

 

2. The PSC determined that, under the Well Lease, Foothills was 

responsible for the monthly lease payments, but Bagley was 

personally responsible for ‚any remaining obligations‛ and that 

the Dansies could seek reimbursement from Bagley for the costs 

of receiving water through the water system.
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 4 2016 UT App 116

Order. Id.; see also Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagley 

& Co. (Hi-Country Estates II), 2011 UT App 252, ¶¶ 10, 13, 262 

P.3d 1188.

¶7 After we issued our decision in Hi-Country I, the Dansies 

filed a motion in the trial court ‚to modify the Final Judgment to 

conform to footnote 2 of our opinion as they understood it.‛ HiCountry Estates II, 2011 UT App 252, ¶ 4. The trial court denied 

the motion and the Dansies once again appealed to this court. Id. 

We affirmed the trial court and explained that ‚the effect of the 

Final Judgment . . . is that the Dansies are, going forward, 

entitled to their contractual rights to free water and free hookups unless the PSC intervenes and determines otherwise.‛ Id. ¶¶ 11, 

14 (emphasis added).

¶8 In the wake of Hi-Country Estates II, the Association

presented evidence that it was providing water service to 

customers outside its boundaries and requested reinstatement of 

the water system’s CPCN. The PSC reinstated the CPCN, 

bringing the water system again within the PSC’s jurisdiction. 

One year later, the Association filed a general rate case 

application with the PSC. The application included a 

transportation fee specific to ‚well lease customers‛—in other 

words, a fee specific to members of the Trust. The Association

asserted that it was under no obligation to serve the Trust 

members, but it included the fee in the proposed rates as a 

contingency to cover the costs it would incur should the PSC 

determine such an obligation existed. Jesse Rodney Dansie, who 

at the time was the trustee, filed a petition to intervene, which 

the PSC granted.

¶9 The PSC scheduled a general rate increase hearing for

March 4, 2014, and a public witness hearing one day later. 

Dansie filed both direct testimony and surrebuttal testimony,

addressing the Well Lease and whether the Association’s service 

area included certain parcels of his property. He asserted that 

Hi-Country Estates I and Hi-Country Estates II prevented 

abrogation of the Well Lease; that he had a right to 12 million 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 5 2016 UT App 116

gallons of water per year from the Association at no cost, 

including transportation fees; and that the proposed ‚well lease 

rate‛ of $3.85 per 1,000 gallons was prohibited under the Well 

Lease. Dansie also stated that he was a customer of the 

Association and that his ‚back 80‛ acres were included in the 

original water system service agreement and should continue to 

be.

¶10 The day before the scheduled rate hearing, the Trust’s 

attorney filed a motion for continuance. The motion stated that 

Dansie had suffered a fall, was hospitalized, and thus would be 

unable to attend the March 4 hearing. On March 4, instead of 

holding the rate hearing, the PSC convened a hearing to discuss 

Dansie’s motion. The Trust’s attorney appeared on behalf of 

Dansie. After a discussion that included consideration of the 

PSC’s statutory deadline of 240 days and the lengthy history of 

litigation over the water system, the parties proposed to hold the 

rate hearing one week later. The Trust’s attorney suggested the 

new date and stated that if Dansie could not attend, his brother 

‚would . . . be willing to testify in his place,‛ and that if Dansie’s 

brother testified, the Trust would not appeal based on Dansie’s 

absence. The Administrative Law Judge stated that she was ‚not 

addressing that issue per se,‛ but she ‚recognize*d+‛ what the 

Trust’s attorney had said. The PSC rescheduled the hearing.

¶11 On March 11, 2014, the parties met again for the rate

hearing. Dansie was still in the hospital, but the Trust’s attorney 

again appeared on his behalf. Dansie’s brother did not attend, 

and the Trust’s attorney moved to continue the hearing until 

Dansie himself could attend, which the Trust’s attorney 

acknowledged could be six weeks or more. After discussing the 

motion with the parties, the PSC denied the motion and 

proceeded with the hearing, but offered the parties, including 

Dansie, the opportunity to file post-hearing briefs and responses 

to any new issues raised in the hearing. The Trust’s attorney 

agreed to proceed with the option to file a post-hearing brief 

and, at the end of the hearing, stated, ‚I think we’ll file a post 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 6 2016 UT App 116

hearing brief probably within the next week or so.‛ However, 

the Trust did not file a post-hearing brief.

¶12 Two months later, the PSC issued its order. The PSC 

concluded, as it had in the 1986 Order, that the Well Lease was 

‚void and unenforceable as against the public interest‛:

There has been no evidence presented that would 

persuade us to overturn our prior 1986 order 

finding that the Well Lease . . . is unreasonable, 

unjust, and not in the public interest. Therefore, 

based on the [PSC]’s earlier order, the lack of 

contrary evidence, and the Division’s evidence and 

recommendation in this docket, we decline to 

deviate from our prior precedent. We find the Well 

Lease . . . is void and unenforceable as against the 

public interest. Thus, the [Association] has no 

obligation to provide water to Mr. Dansie, and 

therefore, the [Association’s] proposed fee of $3.85 

per 1,000 gallons to deliver water to Mr. Dansie is 

moot and disallowed from the tariff.

The PSC also concluded that Dansie’s western-most 40-acre 

parcel falls within the Association’s service area, but the 

remainder of his ‚back 80‛ acres does not.

¶13 Dansie requested rehearing and reconsideration. The PSC 

denied these requests. The Trust timely petitioned this court for 

judicial review of the PSC’s order.

ISSUES

¶14 The Trust raises three issues for review. First, the Trust 

contends that the PSC exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the 

Well Lease void and unenforceable. Second, the Trust contends 

that the PSC improperly approved the Association’s rate case 

without then-trustee Jesse Rodney Dansie’s presence at the rate 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 7 2016 UT App 116

case hearings. Finally, the Trust contends that the PSC 

improperly excluded certain property from the rate case. The 

Trust argues that the property was owned by Dansie and had 

been covered under the original service area for the water 

system.

ANALYSIS

I. The PSC Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction

¶15 The Trust contends that the PSC exceeded its jurisdiction 

when it concluded that the Well Lease ‚is void and 

unenforceable as against the public interest.‛ The Trust argues 

that in a prior iteration of this dispute, this court determined that 

the Well Lease ‚is valid, binding and enforceable‛ and that the 

PSC’s 1986 Order was no longer in force. The Trust also argues 

that the PSC’s ‚authority to modify contracts is not boundless‛ 

and that the Well Lease falls outside of the PSC’s authority. ‚The 

question of [PSC] jurisdiction turns on statutory interpretation 

and therefore presents a question of law that we review for 

correctness.‛ Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 

2012 UT 18, ¶ 16, 274 P.3d 956 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶16 ‚To [e]nsure efficient use of resources, public utilities . . . 

are[] granted exclusive franchises and regulated to prevent 

exploitation by the producer while encouraging economies of 

scale.‛ Garkane Power Ass’n v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 681 P.2d 1196, 

1200 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). ‚[T]he Legislature may in the 

exercise of its police power fix or determine rates and charges of 

public utilities doing business within the state, or delegate the 

power to do so, and within limitations and restrictions regulate 

and control their service . . . .‛ Logan City v. Public Utils. Comm’n 

of Utah, 271 P. 961, 970 (Utah 1928).

¶17 The legislature delegated to the PSC ‚power and 

jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in this 

state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 8 2016 UT App 116

utility in this state, and to do all things . . . necessary or 

convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.‛ Utah 

Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (LexisNexis 2010); see also Bear Hollow, 2012 

UT 18, ¶ 16. The PSC’s ‚general jurisdiction is ‘broad and 

sweeping in scope.’‛ Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, ¶ 10, 31 

P.3d 1147 (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 

152 P.2d 542, 555 (Utah 1944)). This ‚broad authority over public 

utility operations‛ allows the PSC ‚to protect the public 

interest.‛ Utah Cable Television Operators Ass’n v. Public Serv.

Comm’n, 656 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1982). The PSC protects the 

public interest by ensuring the utilities’ ‚continued ability . . . to 

serve the customers who rely upon them for essential service 

and products‛ and ‚balancing the interest of having financially 

sound utilities that provide essential goods and services against 

the public interest of having goods and services made available 

without discrimination and on the basis of reasonable costs.‛ 

Garkane Power, 681 P.2d at 1207. 

¶18 ‚In addition to broad powers, the legislature specifically 

outlined rate making as a delegated function to the [PSC]‛ in 

Utah Code section 54-4-4. Beaver, 2001 UT 81, ¶ 11. If, in 

performing that function, the PSC ‚finds after a hearing that . . . 

contracts affecting the rates . . . are: (A) unjust; (B) unreasonable; 

(C) discriminatory; (D) preferential; or (E) otherwise in violation 

of any laws,‛ the PSC ‚shall . . . determine the just, reasonable, 

or sufficient rates . . . or contracts to be thereafter observed and 

in force.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1)(b)(i). ‚*I+n the fixing of 

rates for public utility service . . . the [PSC] is not limited or 

controlled by the provisions of antecedent contracts, but is at 

liberty to disregard such contracts altogether if they come in 

conflict with what the [PSC] finds to be a reasonable rate under 

the conditions existing at the time of making the investigation.‛ 

Utah Hotel Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Utah, 204 P. 511, 515 

(Utah 1922). ‚*I+f it is the policy of the state to regulate the rates 

for the services rendered by public utilities through the exercise 

of the police power, then contracts respecting rates will not 

prevent the state from subsequently authorizing a change in the 

rates stated in the contract so as to prevent them from being 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 9 2016 UT App 116

unfair or discriminatory on the one hand or from being unjust or 

confiscatory upon the other.‛ City of St. George v. Public Utils.

Comm’n, 220 P. 720, 722 (Utah 1923).

¶19 In 1996, the PSC ‚revoked the water system’s status as a 

public utility.‛ Hi-Country Estates I, 2008 UT App 105, ¶ 5, 182 

P.3d 417. Over the next 16 years, the Association operated the 

water system as a private nonprofit corporation. Because it was 

no longer a public utility, neither statutes regulating public 

utilities nor the PSC’s order applied to the Association. Id. ¶ 12. 

But in 2012, the PSC reinstated the Association’s CPCN, making 

the water system once again a public utility and placing the 

Association under the PSC’s jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 54-4-1. The PSC ordered the Association to file a rate case, 

which in turn required the PSC to review the Well Lease. The 

PSC cited its 1986 Order,

3 ‚the lack of contrary evidence, and the 

Division *of Public Utilities’+ evidence and recommendation‛ in 

concluding that the Well Lease ‚is void and unenforceable as 

against the public interest.‛ 

¶20 Before the PSC reinstated the CPCN and re-established its 

jurisdiction, this court reviewed the validity of the Well Lease. 

See Hi-Country Estates II, 2011 UT App 252, 262 P.3d 1188; HiCountry Estates I, 2008 UT App 105. Interpreting the Well Lease 

 

3. The Trust argues that the PSC’s decision ‚relies heavily‛ on 

the 1986 Order. Although the PSC quoted the 1986 Order, the 

record shows that it primarily relied on evidence and testimony 

from the Division of Public Utilities. ‚The Division is charged 

with, inter alia, representing the public interest before the [PSC], 

investigating rate cases, making policy recommendations to the 

[PSC], and investigating compliance with [PSC] orders.‛ 

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 861 P.2d 

414, 418 n.3 (Utah 1993); see also Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-1 

(LexisNexis 2010). The PSC was ‚persuaded by the Division’s 

evidence that no costs associated with the Well Lease Agreement 

should be recovered through rates.‛
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 10 2016 UT App 116

as an ‚agreement*+ between private parties contracting for water 

service,‛ Hi-Country Estates I, 2008 UT App 105, ¶ 12, we 

concluded that the Well Lease ‚was not void as against public 

policy‛ and that it ‚was not unconscionable,‛ Hi-Country Estates 

II, 2011 UT App 252, ¶ 3 (citing Hi-Country Estates I, 2008 UT 

App 105, ¶¶ 13, 15). The Trust argues that our holding in those 

cases ‚reaffirm*ed+ that the *Association] system is burdened 

with the obligation of the *Well Lease+ Agreement.‛ But ‚our 

opinion [in Hi-Country Estates I] wisely hazarded no guess as to 

whether the PSC could or would exert jurisdiction in the future, 

and thus made no effort to adjudicate the rights of the parties or 

the enforceability of the Well Lease going forward.‛ Id. ¶ 10.

And we took care to express no opinion as to whether, in the 

future, the PSC would re-assert jurisdiction and again prevent 

the Dansies from enjoying ‚free hook-ups and free water under 

the Well Lease.‛ Id. ¶ 13.

¶21 The PSC has now re-asserted jurisdiction. Accordingly, it 

‚is not limited or controlled by the provisions of antecedent 

contracts, but is at liberty to disregard such contracts altogether 

if they come in conflict with what the [PSC] finds to be a 

reasonable rate under the conditions existing at the time of 

making the investigation.‛ Utah Hotel Co., 204 P. at 515. Nothing 

in Hi-Country Estates II prevents this result; as explained above, 

its holding applied only so long as the PSC did not assert 

jurisdiction. We therefore conclude that the PSC did not exceed 

its jurisdiction, and we decline to disturb the PSC’s decision that 

‚the Well Lease Agreement is unreasonable, unjust, and not in 

the public interest.‛

II. The PSC Adequately Addressed the Trustee’s Inability to 

Attend the Rate Case Hearing

¶22 The Trust contends that ‚because of unforeseeable health 

reasons,‛ then-trustee Jesse Rodney Dansie (the Trustee) could 

not attend the March 11, 2014 rate case hearing before the PSC. 

The Trust argues that without the Trustee’s attendance, 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 11 2016 UT App 116

‚valuable and important rebuttal and cross-examination were 

not conducted or factored into the [PSC]’s findings.‛ 

¶23 We reject this claim as inadequately briefed. The Trust 

provides no ‚citations to the authorities‛ as required by rule 24 

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. ‚Briefs must contain 

reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. An issue 

is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is 

so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 

reviewing court.‛ State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ¶ 13, 72 P.3d 

138 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚Utah courts 

routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments.‛ 

State v. Davie, 2011 UT App 380, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶24 Although we decline to consider this argument on the 

merits, we note that the PSC treated the Trustee fairly. It

originally scheduled the hearing for March 4, 2014. When the 

Trustee was unable to attend due to his hospitalization, the PSC 

continued the hearing one week. It did so with the agreement of 

all parties, including the Trust’s attorney, who stated that March 

11 was ‚acceptable‛ and that if the Trustee was still not available 

on that date, another member of the Trust would be able to 

testify. When the Trustee could not attend the March 11 hearing 

and no other member of the Trust appeared, the Trust’s attorney 

asked the PSC to continue the hearing a second time, but the 

attorney did not know when the Trustee would be available. The 

Trust’s attorney acknowledged at both hearings that the PSC ‚is 

statutorily required to issue a decision within 240 days‛ and was 

facing that deadline. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(3)

(LexisNexis 2010). Additionally, prior to the March 4 hearing, 

the Trustee had submitted direct and surrebuttal written 

testimony. When he was unable to attend the March 11 hearing,

the PSC gave the Trust the opportunity to file a post-hearing 

brief, which it did not do. Finally, the Trustee’s absence did not

disadvantage the Trust alone, but also other parties, because it 

gave the Trust the right to submit the Trustee’s testimony in 

written form without cross-examination. 
Dansie v. Public Service Commission

20140653-CA 12 2016 UT App 116

III. The PSC Properly Excluded Dansie Property from the 

Service Area

¶25 The Trust next contends that the PSC’s order ‚excludes 

portions of the Dansie property from the proposed service area 

despite the fact that those lands were included in the [original] 

service area and specifically covered under the [Well Lease] 

Agreement.‛ This argument is inadequately briefed. An 

adequately briefed argument ‚contain*s+ the contentions and 

reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . 

with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 

relied on.‛ Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Further, ‚a party 

challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 

that supports the challenged finding.‛ Id. ‚A reviewing court ‘is 

not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump 

the burden of argument and research.’‛ Hampton v. Professional 

Title Servs., 2010 UT App 294, ¶ 2, 242 P.3d 796 (quoting State v. 

Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). 

¶26 The Trust identifies no provision of the Well Lease or any 

other evidence that would obligate the Association to provide 

water service to the excluded portions of the Dansie property.

The PSC noted that the Trust ‚presented no basis in law or fact 

for altering‛ the Association service area and we conclude the 

same on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We decline to disturb the order of the PSC.