IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-53

No. 291A20

Filed 23 April 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: N.B., N.M.B., M.R.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 9 March 

2020 by Judge Joseph Moody Buckner in District Court, Orange County. This matter 

was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but was

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Stephenson & Fleming, LLP, by Angenette Stephenson, for petitioner-appellee 

Orange County Department of Social Services.

Olabisi A. Ofunniyin and Matthew W. Wolfe for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Dorothy Hairston Mitchell for respondent-appellant mother.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant father. 

ERVIN, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-mother Stacey W. appeals from the trial court’s orders 

terminating her parental rights in N.B., N.M.B., and M.R., while respondent-father

Jerald B. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights in N.B.1 

 

1 N.B., N.M.B., and M.R., respectively, will be referred to throughout the remainder 

of this opinion as Natasha, Nylah, and Merise, which are pseudonyms used for ease of reading 

and to protect the juveniles’ privacy.
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After careful review of the record in light of the applicable law, we affirm the trial 

court’s orders.

I. Factual Background

¶ 2 On 25 July 2017, a child protective services agency in Hagerstown, Maryland,

received a referral expressing concern that Natasha and Nylah had been neglected 

by a woman with whom they had lived in Maryland during a time in which

respondent-mother had been incarcerated. At the time of the making of this referral, 

Natasha, Nylah, and Merise were residing in Chapel Hill with the sister of a woman 

that respondent-mother described as her “foster mother” and that the children 

referred to as their “great-aunt” despite the absence of any biological relationship

between this individual and either respondent-mother or the children. The children

had begun living with this individual in January 2017, when this individual had

traveled to Maryland and retrieved the children in light of respondent-mother’s

incarceration and the inability of the persons with whom the children had initially 

been left to provide adequate care for them.

¶ 3 Upon learning that the children had been living in Chapel Hill for the last six 

months, the Maryland child protective services agency contacted the Orange County 

Department of Social Services, which undertook responsibility for investigating the 

report. At the time that DSS became involved with the children, respondent-mother, 
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who had been released on parole, had been unable to establish consistent employment 

or housing while respondent-father was incarcerated.

¶ 4 In the course of the investigation, Natasha and Nylah reported that 

respondent-mother had frequently been incarcerated and that they had been 

subjected to inappropriate discipline by caretakers, had been exposed to illegal drugs, 

and had endured inappropriate touching. In light of these allegations of abuse, a 

child medical evaluation was conducted upon Natasha and Nylah on 14 September 

2017. At the conclusion of the examination, the examiner expressed concern that 

both Natasha and Nylah had been physically and sexually abused.

¶ 5 On 3 November 2017, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that Natasha, 

Nylah, and Merise were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. In its petitions, 

DSS asserted that respondent-mother had a history of incarceration, during which 

the children had lived with multiple caretakers who subjected the children to 

excessive discipline, failed to provide the children with adequate food, and failed to 

provide the children with an adequate level of care. In addition, DSS alleged that the 

children had been physically and sexually abused while in respondent-mother’s care

and that respondent-mother had been released from incarceration and was 

threatening to remove the children from the home of their current caretaker. In order 

to prevent respondent-mother from taking the children into her care, DSS sought and 

obtained the entry of an order placing the children into nonsecure custody and 
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allowing them to continue living with their current caretaker. Eventually, the 

children’s caretaker became unable to care for them, so that the children entered 

foster care.

¶ 6 After an adjudicatory hearing held on 15 February 2018, the trial court entered 

an order on 26 March 2018 finding that the children were neglected and dependent

juveniles. The trial court ordered that the custody of the children remain with DSS,

required respondent-mother to comply with a family services agreement, and

authorized respondent-mother to engage in supervised visitation with the children. 

In view of the fact that respondent-father continued to be incarcerated, the trial court 

ordered him to provide DSS with a specific release date.

¶ 7 On 19 July 2018, the trial court held an initial permanency planning hearing. 

On 31 August 2018, the trial court entered a permanency planning order in which it

found that, while DSS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their

parents, neither respondent-mother nor respondent-father had been actively 

attempting to successfully reunify with the children or making themselves available 

to DSS. As a result, the trial court adopted a primary permanent plan of adoption,

with a secondary permanent plan of reunification, and authorized DSS to seek the 

termination of the parents’ parental rights in the children.

¶ 8 On 21 October 2019, DSS filed separate motions seeking to have respondentmother’s parental rights in all three children terminated based upon neglect, 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and willful failure to make reasonable progress toward 

correcting the conditions that had led to the children’s placement in DSS custody,

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In addition, DSS alleged that respondent-mother’s 

parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination based upon abandonment, 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Similarly, DSS filed a motion seeking to have respondentfather’s parental rights in Natasha terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1); willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 

conditions that had led to Natasha’s placement in DSS custody, N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(2); and dependency. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).

¶ 9 On 28 November 2018, after a hearing held on 1 November 2018, Judge 

Beverly Scarlett entered a permanency planning order in which she found that DSS 

continued to have difficulty in communicating with respondent-mother, that 

respondent-mother had sent clothing to the children on three occasions, and that 

respondent-father continued to be incarcerated. In addition, Judge Scarlett

reiterated the trial court’s earlier conclusion that neither parent was making 

adequate progress toward reunification with the children. As a result, Judge Scarlett 

retained the existing primary permanent plan of adoption and secondary permanent 

plan of reunification.

¶ 10 After a hearing held on 6 February 2020, the trial court entered orders on 9 

March 2020 in which it determined that respondent-mother’s parental rights in all 
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three children and respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha were subject to 

termination based upon neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and willful failure to make 

reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to the children’s

placement in DSS custody, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); that respondent-mother’s 

parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination based upon abandonment, 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7); and that respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha 

were subject to termination for dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). In addition, 

the trial court concluded that the children’s bests interests would be served by the 

termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in all three children and that 

Natasha’s best interests would be served by the termination of respondent-father’s 

parental rights.2 Respondent-mother and respondent-father noted appeals to this 

Court from the trial court’s termination orders.

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

A. Respondent-Mother’s Appeal

¶ 11 In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination orders before this Court,

respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred by concluding that her 

parental rights in the children were subject to termination. A termination of parental 

 

2 At the time of the termination hearing, paternity for Nylah had not been established. 

As a result, a proceeding to terminate the unknown father’s parental rights in Nylah had 

been initiated and service of the unknown father by publication was in process. Although

paternity for Merise had not yet been established either, a putative father had been identified

and DSS was making efforts to determine whether that individual was actually Merise’s 

father.
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rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. 

N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110 (1984). At 

the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, 

and convincing evidence” the existence of one or more of the grounds for termination

delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019). This Court

reviews a trial court’s adjudicatory decision “to determine whether the findings are 

supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 

conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253 (citing In 

re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982)). In the event that the petitioner was able to prove 

the existence of one or more grounds for termination, “the court proceeds to the 

dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it is in the best 

interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 

842 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110). “[A]n 

adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a 

termination of parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019).

¶ 12 A trial court may terminate parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1111(a)(1) in the event that it concludes that the parent has neglected the 

juvenile as that term is defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 

(2019). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose parent, 

guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or 
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discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare . . . .” 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). Although the trial court is authorized to terminate a 

parent’s parental rights in a juvenile based upon neglect that is occurring at the time 

of the termination hearing, see, e.g., In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020) 

(stating that “this Court has recognized that the neglect ground can support 

termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their child by abandonment”), the 

fact that “a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of 

time prior to the termination hearing” would make “requiring the petitioner in such 

circumstances to show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . . 

impossible.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 80 (2019) (cleaned up). In such a situation, 

“evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child — including an 

adjudication of such neglect — is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate 

parental rights[,]” but “[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed 

conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition 

of neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984). As a result, the trial court is also

entitled to find that the parent’s parental rights are subject to termination on the 

basis of neglect if it concludes that the evidence demonstrates “a likelihood of future 

neglect by the parent.” In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020). As a result, even if 

the record is devoid of any evidence tending to show the existence of current neglect, 

the trial court may find that a parent’s parental rights are subject to termination
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based upon a determination of past neglect and a showing that a repetition of neglect

is likely if the child is returned to the parent’s care, id., at 841, n.3, with the trial 

court being required to evaluate the likelihood of future neglect on the basis of an 

analysis of any “evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of 

past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 

212, 835 S.E.2d 425, 430 (2019) (citing Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715).

¶ 13 The record reflects that the trial court found that the children were neglected 

in an adjudication order that was entered on 26 March 2018. In addition, the trial 

court found that, prior to the children’s placement in DSS custody, there was a 

“pattern of neglect due to housing instability; substance abuse, specifically cocaine; 

leaving the juvenile[s] with inappropriate caretakers . . . ; and domestic violence 

between Respondent parents.” In addition, the trial court found that, prior to the 

time at which DSS obtained custody of the children and while she was pregnant with 

Merise, respondent-mother and the children had resided at a Salvation Army shelter;

that, after respondent-mother’s incarceration for drug violations, she had failed to

make proper arrangements for the children’s care; that Merise, when she was an 

infant, had been “found alone in a car outside a courthouse”; that, following

respondent-mother’s release from incarceration, she had failed to visit with the 

children or provide financial assistance for their care; that respondent-mother lived 

in a half-way house while on parole and had failed to establish safe, stable, and 
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suitable housing for the juveniles; that a child medical examination had resulted in 

a determination that Natasha and Nylah had been physically and sexually abused 

and that they had suffered trauma because of respondent-mother’s failure to protect 

them; and that respondent-mother had exposed Natasha and Nylah to “multiple 

unsafe situations involving but not limited to inappropriate discipline, inappropriate 

supervision resulting in abuse, and inadequate food.” Based upon these findings of 

fact, the trial court determined in all three termination orders that: 

Much of the neglect experienced by the juvenile[s] is 

directly related to Respondent mother’s instability, drug 

use, incarcerations, and placement with multiple 

caretakers to whom Respondent mother entrusted that 

subjected the juvenile[s] to physical and sexual abuse as 

well as neglect.

¶ 14 According to respondent-mother, the quoted finding demonstrates that the 

trial court relied upon a showing of past neglect rather than upon an analysis of the

circumstances that existed at the time of the termination hearing in determining that 

her parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect. 

Instead of evidencing a determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in 

the children should be terminated based solely upon evidence of past neglect,

however, we interpret the quoted language as nothing more than a summary of the 

prior neglect to which the children had been subjected. In reaching this conclusion, 

we particularly note the trial court’s findings that, after DSS obtained custody of the 

children, respondent-mother had failed to maintain consistent contact with them and
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did not understand or acknowledge the negative impact that the manner in which 

she had chosen to live and the identity of the caretakers with whom she had placed 

the children had had upon them.

¶ 15 The trial court’s findings also reflect that respondent-mother did not enter into 

a case plan with DSS until 1 November 2018, which was more than a year after they 

had been placed in DSS custody. The trial court found that the terms and conditions 

set out in respondent-mother’s court-ordered case plan required her to comply with a

visitation agreement; resolve all of her pending legal matters; obtain and maintain 

housing that was sufficient for herself and the juveniles; provide verification of the 

stability of her housing arrangements through the provision of a lease agreement; 

obtain and maintain lawful employment that produced sufficient income to meet her 

own needs and those of the children; verify the nature and amount of her income by 

providing copies of pay stubs; refrain from the use of illegal or impairing substances 

and submit to random drug screens; comply with the requirements of her parole; 

obtain comprehensive mental health and substance abuse assessments and comply 

with any resulting recommendations; complete parenting education and demonstrate 

the ability to use the skills that she had learned as the result of that process; maintain 

consistent contact with DSS; sign releases authorizing the provision of information 

allowing DSS to verify her compliance with the components of her case plan; and 

provide certificates showing that she had satisfied the conditions of her release on 
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parole and her compliance with the other provisions of her case plans. In addressing 

the extent of respondent-mother’s compliance with the provisions of her case plan, 

the trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact:

3

54. [DSS] has had ongoing difficulty in Respondent 

mother signing releases for service[] providers or 

obtaining documentation about completed services.

. . . . 

59. A letter from Alternative Drug and Alcohol 

Counseling, LLC was admitted and received by the 

Court to Respondent mother’s parole officer 

indicating successful completion of treatment. She

did not previously provide this documentation. 

Documentation of completed drug screens was never 

received.

60. While on probation, Respondent mother was 

engaged in Potomoc Case Management Services. 

She did not provide documentation to or sign 

releases for [DSS] to obtain information about 

engagement in services or services offered by the 

agency.

. . . . 

62. Due to lack of releases or documentation, it cannot 

be determined whether Respondent mother 

completed a comprehensive mental health 

 

3 There are minor variations in the numbering of the findings of fact contained in the

separate different orders that the trial court entered with respect to each of the juveniles. In 

the interests of brevity and for ease of reference, we will quote the trial court’s findings as set 

out in the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Natasha in the text of 

this opinion. As a result of the fact that respondent-mother has failed to challenge any of 

these findings as lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, they are binding upon us for 

purposes of appellate review. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019).
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assessment or whether engagement in case 

management services adequately addressed her 

mental health needs.

63. After completing parole in Maryland, Respondent 

mother relocated to Yonkers, New York where the 

maternal grandmother resides.

. . . . 

65. Despite the distance from the juvenile[s], 

Respondent mother could have consistently 

communicated with [DSS], executed releases for 

providers, provided verification of engagement in 

services, and appropriately participate[d] in case 

planning.

. . . .

67. In June 2019, Respondent mother provided a drug 

and alcohol counseling letter for Alssaro Counseling 

Services in New York; however, [DSS] was unable to 

confirm that Respondent mother was engaged in 

their services.

68. Respondent mother subsequently indicated that she 

did not use Alssaro Counseling Services due to 

insurance issues and having to find another 

provider.

69. Respondent mother reports being drug tested, but 

she has not provided any documentation of 

completed negative drug screens. 

70. On August 1, 2019, when Respondent mother was 

present for a Permanency Planning Review Hearing, 

[DSS] referred Respondent mother for a hair follicle 

drug screen.
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71. Respondent mother failed to complete the requested 

hair follicle drug screen.

72. Respondent mother provided the results of a blood 

test from Empire City Laboratories completed on 

January 2, 2020; however, the test appears to be 

related to immunizations and communicable 

diseases. The test did not screen for substances. 

. . . .

75. Respondent mother has not completed a parenting 

curriculum and applied learned knowledge of skills 

to address her deficits.

76. Respondent mother continues to have housing 

instability. She reports renting a room or subletting 

an apartment; however, she has not provided an 

address to [DSS] or a copy of a lease or other housing 

agreement. Respondent mother receives her mail at 

the maternal grandmother’s home.

Based upon these findings of evidentiary fact, the trial court determined that:

Respondent mother’s continued failure to maintain a safe 

and stable home, and her failure to assure that the 

juvenile[s] received proper supervision and necessary care 

subjects the juvenile[s] to the risks of physical and 

emotional harm and creates an environment injurious to 

[their] welfare.

The trial court also noted that Natasha and Nylah had “heightened trauma-related 

therapeutic needs due to Respondent mother’s neglect” and that Nylah had required 

residential treatment for the purpose of addressing her mental health problems and 

accompanying behaviors. According to the trial court, the neglect that the juveniles 

had suffered in the past was likely to “repeat or continue” in the event that the 
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juveniles were returned to respondent-mother’s care, with this determination resting 

upon evidence concerning the prior neglect that the juveniles had experienced

coupled with respondent-mother’s failure to establish a “safe, stable, substance-free 

home”; her lack of contact with the juveniles; and her inability to address the 

juveniles’ trauma-related needs.

¶ 16 In response, respondent-mother asserts that the trial court’s findings do little 

more than restate earlier findings and that certain of them lack sufficient evidentiary 

support. However, the record does not support respondent-mother’s contentions. For 

example, respondent-mother conceded that, at the time of the termination hearing, 

she was subletting a single room for herself, admitted that she did not have a lease,

and acknowledged having lived with a friend before beginning to rent the room that 

she occupied at the time of the termination hearing. In light of this evidence, the trial 

court could have properly determined that respondent-mother had failed to establish 

stable housing that was suitable for both herself and the juveniles. See In re D.L.W., 

368 N.C. at 843 (stating that it is the trial court’s duty to consider all of the evidence,

to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to determine the inferences that 

should be drawn from that evidence).

¶ 17 In addition, the record reflects that respondent-mother’s case plan required 

her to submit to random drug screens. According to a social worker who testified at 

the termination hearing, respondent-mother never submitted to random drug 
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screens. The same social worker testified that, even though DSS had requested that

respondent-mother submit to a hair follicle screen when she was in North Carolina

in August 2019, she failed to do so. For that reason, the social worker testified that 

DSS had been unable to verify that respondent-mother had maintained sobriety. As 

a result, the trial court had ample justification for concluding that respondent-mother 

had failed to overcome her substance abuse problems.

¶ 18 As far as the issue of visitation is concerned, the record reflects that Natasha 

did not wish to have any contact with respondent-mother, whom she blamed for 

causing the circumstances in which the children found themselves. In addition, the 

record contains evidence tending to show that, for a period of time, Nylah lacked the 

stability to permit visitation with respondent-mother. A social worker testified that 

respondent-mother had a “strained relationship” with Merise in light of respondentmother’s “lack of involvement” with the child and asserted that respondent-mother 

had not seen Merise since her incarceration, which had occurred when Merise was 

four months old, and that Merise did not recognize respondent-mother. On the one 

occasion when she actually visited with Merise, respondent-mother only spent half of

her allotted visitation time with the child. For all of these reasons, we hold that the 

record contains ample support for the trial court’s determination that there had been 

little contact between respondent-mother and the children.
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¶ 19 The record also contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

determination that respondent-mother had failed to demonstrate the ability to deal 

with the juveniles’ “trauma-related needs and accompanying behavior[s].” Although 

respondent-mother testified that she was being treated for depression, she never 

provided any verification that tended to show the completion of a comprehensive 

mental health assessment or that she had been complying with any resulting 

treatment recommendations. In addition, a social worker and a social work

supervisor both testified that respondent-mother had a limited understanding of the 

mental health problems from which the children suffered. According to both the 

social worker and the social work supervisor, respondent-mother believed that the

children “just want to come home.” Moreover, the social worker testified that, in light 

of Natasha and Nylah’s special needs, both children needed a caretaker who 

thoroughly understood their mental health diagnoses and related treatment needs 

and that respondent-mother did not appear to have these attributes. Finally, a social 

worker testified that she had been unable to verify that respondent-mother had

completed the parenting class required by her case plan. As a result, the trial court 

had ample justification for concluding that respondent-mother was not prepared to 

address the juveniles’ trauma-related needs.

¶ 20 Although respondent-mother contends that the trial court failed to give proper

consideration to the progress that she had made and the extent to which her 
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circumstances had changed since her release from incarceration and that the trial 

court’s determination that “[t]he risk [to the juveniles of] continued mental, physical, 

and emotion[al] impairment if [they were] in Respondent mother’s custody remains” 

lacked sufficient record support, we are not persuaded by this argument. The trial 

court’s orders contain numerous findings describing the components of her case plan

that respondent-mother successfully completed. For example, the trial court found 

that respondent-mother had successfully satisfied the terms and conditions of her 

parole and that respondent-mother had obtained gainful employment. According to 

well-established North Carolina law, however, respondent-mother’s compliance with

a portion of her case plan “does not preclude a finding of neglect.” In re J.J.H., 376 

N.C. 161, 184 (2020) (citing In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40 (2020)); see also In re 

Y.Y.E.T., 205 N.C. App. 120, 131 (2010) (acknowledging that a “case plan is not just 

a check list” and that “parents must demonstrate acknowledgement and 

understanding of why the juvenile entered DSS custody as well as changed 

behaviors”). Although respondent-mother had made some progress toward satisfying

the requirements of her case plan, the trial court could reasonably determine, based 

upon the prior neglect that the children had experienced, respondent-mother’s failure 

to establish stable housing that was free from substance abuse, respondent-mother’s

lack of contact with the juveniles, and respondent-mother’s inability to meet the

children’s trauma-related needs, that future neglect was likely in the event that they 
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were returned to her care, see In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020) (holding that, even 

though the respondent claimed to have made reasonable progress toward satisfying 

the requirements of his case plan, the trial court’s findings relating to his failure to 

adequately address the issue of domestic violence, which had been the primary reason

for the children’s removal from the family home, were, “standing alone, sufficient to 

support a determination that there was a likelihood of future neglect”), and that 

respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination on 

the basis of neglect. As a result, since the trial court’s conclusion that a single ground 

for termination exists is sufficient, in and of itself, to support termination of 

respondent-mother’s parental rights, In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395, and since

respondent-mother has not argued that the trial court’s determination that 

termination of her parental rights would be in the children’s best interests

constituted an abuse of discretion, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019), we affirm the 

trial court’s orders terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in all three 

children.

B. Respondent-Father’s Appeal

¶ 21 Similarly, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by concluding

that his parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination. In determining that 

respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha were subject to termination for 

neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(i), the trial court made findings of fact 
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describing the circumstances that led to Natasha’s placement in DSS custody and 

noting that respondent-father had been incarcerated and had failed to take any action 

to facilitate a placement for Natasha when she entered foster care. In addition, the 

trial court found that:

41. Respondent father is incarcerated . . . [in]

Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. He has a tentative 

release date in 2021.

42. Respondent father has not provided any tangible 

items for the juvenile or otherwise provided financial 

assistance to support the juvenile. His ability is 

limited by incarceration.

43. Respondent father did not remain in consistent 

contact with [DSS] while the juvenile has been in 

foster care.

44. Recently, contact with Respondent father has 

improved. He has acknowledged and expressed 

remorse for his inability to protect the juvenile from 

abuse and neglect due to multiple inappropriate 

caretakers.

45. Respondent father did not correspond or sen[d] 

letters to the juvenile until a recent letter in which 

he expressed how much he cared for the juvenile and 

to ask for forgiveness. 

¶ 22 In his initial challenge to the trial court’s termination order, respondent-father

argues that Finding of Fact No. 42 lacks sufficient evidentiary support. After 

conceding that a social worker had testified that he had failed to provide any financial 

assistance to Natasha’s caretaker, respondent-father directs our attention to the

report relating to Natasha’s child medical examination, in which Natasha’s caretaker
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had stated that respondent-father was “help[ing] out materially and financially to 

provide for . . . [Natasha].” As we have previously noted, however, the trial court is 

responsible for resolving such contradictions in the record evidence. See In re D.L.W., 

368 N.C. at 843. As a result, we hold that Finding of Fact No. 42 has sufficient record 

support.

¶ 23 Secondly, respondent-father contends that Finding of Fact No. 43 conflicts with 

the record evidence. In support of this contention, respondent-father points to

evidence that (1) he contacted the guardian ad litem on 9 November 2017 for the 

purpose of offering to assume responsibility for caring for Natasha and Nylah 

following his release from incarceration; (2) that DSS had noted in a February 2018 

court report that respondent-father had signed and returned the information release 

and consent forms that DSS had sent to him; and (3) that respondent-father had 

informed DSS on 25 October 2018 that he might be released prior to his tentative 

release date, that he did not wish to relinquish his parental rights, that he hoped to 

reunify with Natasha, and that he wanted a social worker to tell Natasha that he 

loved and missed her.

¶ 24 Although the record clearly reflects that respondent-father had some contact 

with DSS, it also supports the trial court’s finding that his contacts with DSS had 

been inconsistent. For example, the record evidence tends to show that respondentfather had not had any contact with DSS between late 2018 and the preparation of a 
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court report in February 2020, in which DSS had stated that “[c]ontact with 

[respondent-father] has been inconsistent until recently when he reached out 

wanting to discuss his case[.]” The court report further indicated that DSS had been 

able to maintain contact with respondent-father in recent months and that he had 

expressed remorse about his inability to care for and protect Natasha when she 

needed his help. Although respondent-father did send Natasha a letter in which he 

asked for her forgiveness and made clear how much he cared for her, the letter in 

question had been his first contact with Natasha after her entry into DSS custody. 

As a result, the record adequately supports the trial court’s finding concerning the 

inconsistency of respondent-father’s contacts with DSS.

4

¶ 25 The trial court further found that the neglect that Natasha had experienced

was likely to “repeat or continue” in the event that she was returned to respondentfather’s care, with the trial court having based this finding upon the evidence 

concerning the neglect that Natasha had previously suffered, the fact that the neglect 

that led to Natasha’s placement in DSS custody had occurred while he was 

incarcerated, and the fact that Natasha had been temporarily placed in foster care 

while in respondent-father’s custody in 2007. In addition, the trial court found that, 

because of his lack of regular contact with Natasha and the fact of his incarceration, 

 

4 We also note that the trial court softened the import of Finding of Fact No. 43 in

Finding of Fact No. 44 by noting the recent improvements in the level of contact between

respondent-father and DSS.
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respondent-father had failed to ensure that Natasha had received appropriate care 

and supervision. The trial court further found that respondent-father’s “criminal 

activity and absence from the juvenile’s life constitutes abandonment resulting in his 

inability to protect her from abuse and neglect [which] subject[ed] the juvenile to 

physical and emotional harm.” Finally, the trial court found that respondent-father 

remained incarcerated, that it was “unclear whether reentry upon release will be 

successful[,]” and that respondent-father “does not have the present or near future 

ability to establish a safe home for the juvenile.”

¶ 26 In respondent-father’s view, the record did not contain sufficient evidence to 

support a finding that Natasha experienced neglect while in his care, with the only 

support for this assertion consisting of references contained in child protective 

services reports from 2007 to 2016. According to respondent-father, the statements 

in question constituted mere allegations and were, for the most part, directed toward 

conduct in which respondent-mother had engaged. A careful review of the record 

reflects, however, that a social worker had testified that, in 2007, Natasha had been 

placed in foster care as the result of concerns relating to domestic violence, drug 

distribution, and respondent-father’s use of drugs. In light of this evidence, the trial 
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court was entitled to infer that neglect by respondent-father had resulted in 

Natasha’s placement in foster care in 2007. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843.

5

¶ 27 In addition, respondent-father argues that the trial court’s references to his 

incarceration as having resulted in neglect or abandonment rested upon a 

misapprehension of law given that “[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword 

nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision,” In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 

198, 207–08, aff’d 357 N.C. 568 (2003), with the trial court having erroneously 

predicated its determination that he had neglected Natasha upon the mere fact of his 

incarceration. Id. Although the trial court did find that respondent-father had failed 

to send any tangible items for Natasha’s benefit or to provide her caretakers with 

financial assistance, it acknowledged that respondent-father’s incarceration limited 

his ability to do so. Cf. In re A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516, 530 (2020) (stating that “[a] parent’s 

incarceration is a circumstance that the trial court must consider in determining 

whether the parent has made reasonable progress toward correcting those conditions 

which led to the removal of the juvenile” (cleaned up)). The trial court also found

that, during his period of incarceration, respondent-father made no attempt to 

 

5 Even if this finding lacked sufficient evidentiary support, any such defect would not 

fatally undermine the trial court’s order given the absence of any dispute about whether

Natasha had been adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile in 2018. See In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 

149, 153 (2017) (holding that a prior adjudication of neglect based on a mother’s substance 

abuse and mental health issues was “appropriately considered” by the trial court as “relevant 

evidence” in proceedings to terminate the parental rights of a father who was incarcerated at 

the time of the prior adjudication).
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contact Natasha, with the exception of sending a single letter, and that he had had 

limited contact with DSS. See In re S.D., 374 N.C. 67, 75–76 (2020) (stating that 

“incarceration does not negate a father’s neglect of his child because the sacrifices 

which parenthood often requires are not forfeited when the parent is in custody,” so 

that, “while incarceration may limit a parent’s ability to show affection, it is not an 

excuse for a parent’s failure to show interest in a child’s welfare by whatever means 

available” (cleaned up)). Finally, the trial court made the unchallenged finding that,

when respondent-father was not incarcerated, “he was only involved in the juvenile’s 

life in a limited way[.]” As a result, while the trial court did refer to respondentfather’s incarceration in its findings of fact, it did so only in the context of 

acknowledging the limitations upon his ability to take certain steps that would have 

helped him develop and maintain a relationship with Natasha that resulted from his 

incarceration rather than basing its finding of neglect solely upon the fact that he 

was incarcerated. As a result, after a careful examination of the record, we hold that 

the trial court did not err by concluding that a repetition of neglect was likely, see In 

re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645, 653–54 (2020) (stating that “evidence of changed 

conditions must be considered in light of the history of neglect by the parents and the 

probability of a repetition of neglect” and that, although respondent-father had made 

some recent, minimal progress in attempting to reunify with Natasha, “the trial court 

was within its authority to weigh the evidence and determine that these eleventh-
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hour efforts did not outweigh the evidence of his persistent failures to make 

improvements . . . and to conclude that there was a probability of repetition of neglect” 

(citation omitted)), and that respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha were 

subject to termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

¶ 28 Secondly, respondent-father contends that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the termination hearing. In respondent-father’s view, the failure of his 

trial counsel to ensure that he was able to attend the termination hearing on a remote 

basis and the fact that his trial counsel failed to present evidence, cross-examine 

witnesses, lodge any objections, or advance any arguments on respondent-father’s 

behalf constituted deficient performance that prejudiced his chances for a more 

favorable outcome at the termination hearing. We do not find respondent-father’s 

argument persuasive.

¶ 29 A “parent has the right to counsel, and to appointed counsel in cases of 

indigency, unless the parent waives the right,” in a termination of parental rights 

proceeding. N.C.G. S. § 7B-1101.1(a) (2019). “Counsel necessarily must provide 

effective assistance, as the alternative would render any statutory right to counsel 

potentially meaningless.” In re T.N.C., 375 N.C. 849, 854, 851 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2020). 

“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent must show that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency was so serious as to deprive 

[him] of a fair hearing.” Id. (cleaned up). “To make the latter showing, the respondent 
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must prove that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there 

would have been a different result in the proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. 

Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985)).

¶ 30 A careful examination of respondent-father’s brief clearly demonstrates that 

he has failed to show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the allegedly 

deficient performance of his trial counsel. Simply put, nothing in the record suggests

that there was anything that respondent-father’s trial counsel could have done to 

overcome the obstacles that he faced in this case arising from the undisputed evidence 

that respondent father had failed to make any significant effort to prevent Natasha 

from entering into DSS custody and had failed to take significant steps to develop 

and maintain a relationship with Natasha or to remain in consistent contact with 

DSS once Natasha had entered DSS custody. Thus, we hold that respondent-father 

is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s termination order on the basis of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, given that the trial court’s 

determination that a single ground for termination exists is sufficient, in and of itself, 

to support the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights in Natasha, In re 

E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395; the fact that respondent-father has not argued that the trial 

court’s determination that the termination of his parental rights would be in 

Natasha’s best interests constituted an abuse of discretion; and the fact that 

respondent-father’s challenge to the quality of the representation that he received 
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from his trial counsel lacks merit, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 

respondent-father’ parental rights in Natasha as well.

AFFIRMED.