UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

 Appellee,

v. ALAN CURTIS TUKES, Defendant

 Appellant. No. 11-2019 (D.C. No. 1:09-CR -02985-JEC-1) (D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , EBEL , and GORSUCH , Circuit Judges.

Alan Curtis Tukes appeals his federal conviction for bank robbery, arguing that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) at the time of the crime. Exercising jurisdiction under 29 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.

* The case is unanimously ordered subm itted without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disf avors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 6, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I On September 23, 2009, a masked man robbed a Compass Bank in Albuquerque, New Mexico. A teller filled the robber’s backpa ck with money at hi s request, but slipped an electronic tracking device into the backpack along with the bills. Following the signal from the tracker, the police honed in on a van th at Tukes was driving. A search of the van revealed the backpack with the money an d the tracking device, as well as clothing that matched the robber’s attire. The government indicted Tukes for ba nk robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which requires proof that the bank at issue wa s FDIC insured at the time of the robbery.
See United States v. Cooper , 375 F.3d 1041, 1044 (10th Ci r. 2004). At the July 2010 trial, a prosecutor asked Barbara O’Neal, the bank’s branch ma nager, the following question: “Now, the Compass Bank, is that a bank that is fede rally insured by the [FDIC]?” She responded, in the present tense: “Yes, it is.” Wh en asked whether the bank “has” any documentation pr oving its insured status, she replied, again in the present tense: “Yes. We have a certificate.” When asked whether the certificate “hangs” in the branch, O’Neal again replied in the affirmative. The district court admitted the certificate, dated November 8, 1993, into evidence. The government offered no additional evidence of the bank’s insured status. At summation, Tukes argued that the g overnment had not proven that the bank was FDIC insured at the time of the robbery. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Tukes now appeals, arguing that the evidence of th e bank’s insured status on the date of the3 robbery was insufficient to support his conviction.
II We review a challenge to th e sufficiency of the eviden ce de novo. United States v. Cooper , 375 F.3d 1041, 1044 (2004). We may reverse a judgment of conviction only if, viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to th e government and drawing all reasonable inferences, no rational juror coul d have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is well-established that an FDIC certificate alone is not sufficient to prove that a bank was insured on the date of th e robbery. United States v. Darnell , 828 F.2d 644, 648 (10th Cir. 1985). Tukes contends that O’Neal ’s present-tense test imony can prove only that the bank was insured at the time of trial and is thus legally insufficient to prove the bank’s insurance at the time of the robbery ten months earlier. We reject Tukes’ argument. Although it is certainly possible to interpret O’Neal’s present-tense statement to mean only that the bank was insured at the time of trial, our sister circuits have held that analogous present-tense testimony can be understood to mean that a bank was insured at the time of the offense. See United States v. Rangel , 728 F. 2d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 19 84); United States v. Safley , 408 F.2d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 1969). We need not solely re ly on the present-tense testimony as to insured status, however, because the prosecutor also pres ented the jury with the 1993 FDIC certificate, which, according to O’Neal, “hangs” in the bank as pr oof of insurance. Taken together, this evidence easily supports the inference that the bank’s insured status had continued4 uninterrupted since 1993. Viewing the evid ence in the light most favorable to the government, it is clear that a rational juro r could have conclude d beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured at the time of the robbery.
III Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED

. Entered by the Court: Carlos F. Lucero United States Circuit Judge