[Cite as State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SAPP, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008.] 

Criminal law — Aggravated murder — R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) — Course-of-conduct 

specification requires connection between two or more offenses — 

Convictions and death penalty upheld. 

(No. 2003-0135 — Submitted September 28, 2004 — Decided December 29, 

2004.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County, No. 99 CA 84, 

2002-Ohio-6863. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

The statutory phrase “course of conduct” found in R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) requires 

that the state establish some factual link between the aggravated murder 

with which the defendant is charged and the other murders or attempted 

murders that are alleged to make up the course of conduct. In order to find 

that two offenses constitute a single course of conduct under R.C. 

2929.04(A)(5), the trier of fact “must * * * discern some connection, 

common scheme, or some pattern or psychological thread that ties [the 

offenses] together.” (State v. Cummings (1992), 332 N.C. 487, 510, 422 

S.E.2d 692, applying course-of-conduct provision in North Carolina 

death-penalty scheme, approved and followed.) 

__________________ 

 FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.

{¶ 1} On August 22, 1992, appellant, William K. Sapp, raped and 

murdered Phree Morrow, age 12, and Martha Leach, age 11. A year and 17 days 

later, Sapp raped and murdered Belinda Anderson, an adult woman. About three 
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months after he murdered Anderson, Sapp raped and attempted to murder another 

adult woman, Hazel Pearson. Sapp was sentenced to death for the murders of 

Phree, Martha, and Anderson. 

The Murders of Phree Morrow and Martha Leach 

{¶ 2} Phree Morrow and Martha Leach lived around the corner from 

each other in Springfield and became friends in the summer of 1992. On the 

afternoon of August 22, 1992, the girls went to Schuler’s Bakery together. At 

about the same time, two friends of Sapp’s, David Marciszewski and David’s 

stepson, John Balser, were seen near the bakery. Martha entered the bakery with 

an unidentified male. She purchased some cookies and doughnuts. The 

unidentified man paid for her order, and the two of them left the bakery. 

{¶ 3} Ralph DePriest, David Marciszewski’s nephew, witnessed the 

murders of Phree and Martha when he was 14. On August 22, 1992, DePriest was 

at the Marciszewski residence with Wanda Marciszewski, who was David 

Marciszewski’s wife and Balser’s mother. Balser entered the house and said, 

“Mom, I’m in some trouble.” DePriest and Wanda went outside and got into a 

van with David Marciszewski and Christopher Bibbs. They drove to an area near 

a pond, which lay behind the bakery. 

{¶ 4} When they arrived, DePriest saw Sapp kneeling beside two girls 

who were lying unconscious on the ground. DePriest described the girls as being 

“all messed up.” DePriest watched as Sapp, David Marciszewski, Jamie Turner, 

and Balser rubbed the girls’ genitals. Sapp made DePriest participate. After they 

had done this “for a while,” Wanda told them to kill the girls. 

{¶ 5} Balser and David hit the girls with rocks. DePriest saw Sapp pick 

up a rock and lift it over his head. DePriest turned away before Sapp brought the 

rock down. 

{¶ 6} Sapp threatened to kill DePriest if he ever told anyone what he had 

seen. Sapp, Balser, David Marciszewski, and Turner then moved the bodies a 
January Term, 2004 

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short distance from the pond to a nearby hill. DePriest helped them cover the 

bodies with skids. 

{¶ 7} The next day, the bodies of Phree and Martha were found in the 

vicinity of a pond behind Penn Street in Springfield, near Schuler’s Bakery. 

Wooden pallets, branches, and leaves covered the bodies. Phree had a rock on her 

head. 

{¶ 8} In the part of a large storm sewer known locally as the “Lion’s 

Cage,” police found a bicycle, a brick, and two pairs of shorts. Phree Morrow’s 

mother identified one pair of shorts as the pair Phree had been wearing when last 

seen. Another witness identified the bicycle as the one she had seen in the 

possession of two girls outside Schuler’s Bakery on August 22, 1992. 

{¶ 9} The shorts were examined by Timothy Shepherd, a police forensic 

criminalist. According to Shepherd, the shorts had not been torn from Phree’s 

body; rather, someone had “disassembled” them by cutting the seams with a sharp 

instrument. 

{¶ 10} Autopsies revealed that both Phree and Martha had died of blunt 

head trauma. Phree had been struck in the head at least six times, Martha three. 

The skulls of both girls had been fractured by blows having an impact equivalent 

to that of a free fall from a second-story window onto a concrete surface. Both 

girls also had bruises on their legs and torsos. Sperm was found on swabs taken 

from each girl’s vagina. 

{¶ 11} David and Wanda Marciszewski, John Balser, Jamie Turner, and 

Christopher Bibbs were all convicted of crimes arising from the murders of Phree 

and Martha. However, Sapp’s involvement did not come to light until 1996. In 

September of that year, sheriff’s detectives from Jacksonville, Florida came to 

Springfield to question Sapp about an unrelated matter. Sapp made incriminating 

admissions about an assault on Hazel Pearson, whose pants had been cut off in the 

same distinctive manner as Phree’s shorts. 
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{¶ 12} Sapp then became a suspect in the Morrow-Leach murders. A 

blood sample obtained from Sapp was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

for DNA comparison with the vaginal swabs taken from Phree and Martha. The 

FBI laboratory determined that the DNA loci obtained from the semen on both 

swabs matched the DNA loci obtained from a sample of Sapp’s blood. An FBI 

expert concluded that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, Sapp was the 

source of the semen found in both Phree and Martha. 

{¶ 13} On April 2, 1997, Sapp was brought to Springfield police 

headquarters for questioning. Over the course of two days, Sapp confessed at 

length to the crimes charged in this case. He gave the following account of the 

Morrow-Leach murders: 

{¶ 14} On August 22, 1992, Sapp was with David Marciszewski, Balser, 

Turner, and Bibbs. The five of them ended up at a pond located behind a business 

on Penn Street, not far from Schuler’s Bakery. Sapp claimed that the girls were 

already at the pond when he and his friends arrived. According to Sapp, Phree 

called Turner “ugly” and Balser a “retard.” Then Sapp punched Phree in the 

head. 

{¶ 15} Sapp cut Phree’s shorts off her body with a buck knife, an act he 

later referred to as “leaving [his] name.” He next made Phree roll over onto her 

stomach and forced Martha to lie on top of her. Then Sapp raped Martha. 

{¶ 16} After the rape, Sapp and the others took turns hitting Phree in the 

head with rocks. After each perpetrator had taken a turn, Sapp heard Phree 

gurgle. Sapp lifted a large rock over his head and – as Sapp described it – “threw 

it down, trying to send [it] on the other side of the world.” He later explained to 

police that he struck the second blow specifically “[b]ecause she wasn’t dead 

yet.” Sapp told police he used a “boulder” to strike the second blow because “[i]f 

it’s gonna be done, it’s gonna be done right.” 
January Term, 2004 

5 

{¶ 17} Next, Sapp hit Martha in the head with a rock. After that, he raped 

Phree. Sapp and the others then moved the girls and covered them with leaves, 

branches, and discarded pallets. They took the clothing and bicycles belonging to 

Phree and Martha and placed them in the storm sewer. 

{¶ 18} After the interrogation, Sapp was held in the Clark County Jail. 

On April 17, 1997, a deputy sheriff overheard Sapp tell another inmate: “I’m 

gonna make national news. * * * I’ve killed several people, but mostly it’s about 

two little girls. * * * But God forgives me for it now because I’ve been saved.” 

{¶ 19} On June 29, 1998, Sapp stated in the presence of two deputy 

sheriffs that he had “killed a couple of people” or that he had “killed people 

before.” 

{¶ 20} During June and July 1998, Sapp had several conversations with 

another Clark County Jail inmate, Johnny Saxour. According to Saxour, Sapp 

said that “whenever he got for [sic] the taste of blood, * * * he always went out, 

took care of his problems.” 

{¶ 21} Sapp told Saxour different versions of the Morrow-Leach murders. 

In one version, Sapp claimed that he “went with” the mother of one of the girls 

but became angry because the mother started seeing another man. Sapp told 

Saxour that “he tried to mess around with the other little girl and she didn’t want 

him messing around, so * * * she smacked him and then this other little girl 

jumped on his back and then * * * Turner * * * pulled her off of his back and 

throwed her down on the ground and took his foot and stuck it on the side of her 

head.” 

{¶ 22} In another conversation, Sapp told Saxour that he had tried to have 

sex with one of the girls. When he was rebuffed, “he took and started beating this 

girl * * * and that’s when they * * * started taking bricks and things and * * * 

caving their heads and stuff in * * * .” 

The Murder of Belinda Anderson 
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{¶ 23} On September 8, 1993, Belinda Anderson of Bellefontaine was 

staying with her sister Debra in Springfield. At 5:20 p.m. on September 8, Debra 

left the house to visit her parents. When she returned at 6:00 p.m., she found that 

Belinda had gone out, leaving a note. Debra never saw her sister again. 

{¶ 24} Nearly two years later, on July 8, 1995, Belinda Anderson’s body 

was found buried under the dirt floor of a garage in Springfield. At the time of 

Anderson’s disappearance in 1993, the house and garage had been vacant for 

several years. Anderson’s body had been placed in a plastic bag and buried in a 

shallow grave with the feet sticking out. She was wearing a shirt, shoes, and 

socks, but no pants. 

{¶ 25} An autopsy showed that Anderson had died of multiple trauma to 

her head and neck. She had three chop wounds and a bruise on her face, and 

some of her facial bones were fractured. A blow to the back of Anderson’s head 

had lacerated her scalp and abraded the outer layer of the skull underneath. Her 

larynx was broken. Each of these injuries had been inflicted before death. 

Because of the body’s decomposition, it was not possible to test for the presence 

of sperm or semen. 

{¶ 26} In his confession to the Springfield police, Sapp said that he had 

met Belinda Anderson for the first time on the day he killed her. According to 

Sapp, Anderson agreed to have sex with him for $40 and led him to a garage, 

which they entered through a hole in the back. Sapp claimed that he had paid 

Anderson in advance and that she began to perform fellatio on him. But then she 

stopped, saying that she had changed her mind and “wasn’t doing the rest.” 

When Sapp demanded a refund, Anderson started to leave. He reached down to 

grab her, and she hit him. 

{¶ 27} Sapp grabbed Anderson by the throat. She resisted. He threw her 

against a wall. He picked up a length of pipe and hit Anderson in the head. She 

“dropped.” Then she started to get up, threatening to call the police. 
January Term, 2004 

7 

{¶ 28} Sapp felt “like [he] was on fire inside.” He picked up a piece of 

metal and hit Anderson several times because “she wouldn’t shut up.” Sapp 

described to police how Anderson “gurgle[d].” He remarked, “[H]ow many times 

you gotta hit a person before they stop * * * trying to get up[?]” 

{¶ 29} Sapp claimed he never had sex with Anderson, except for the 

allegedly consensual fellatio. But he also told police that he had been determined 

to “get what [he] paid for” or get a refund. In any event, he cut Anderson’s pants 

off with a hunting knife, reasoning, “I done bought ’em, so I took ’em off for 

her.” He “didn’t even ask her.” 

{¶ 30} After beating Anderson and cutting her pants off, Sapp fled. A few 

days later, he returned. He put a plastic bag over Anderson’s head and another 

over her feet. Then he buried her in the garage. 

{¶ 31} Sapp later told Johnny Saxour about this crime. He told Saxour 

that “he just got a taste for blood and he * * * ran into this woman and * * * 

started beating on her * * * and took her in the garage to do what he had to do 

with her and then he stuck her underneath the floor.” Sapp told Saxour that he 

raped her and that he “used a jar of Vaseline on her.” 

The Attempted Murder of Hazel Pearson 

{¶ 32} On December 7, 1993, Hazel Pearson and her boyfriend, “Butch” 

Morgan, encountered a former girlfriend of Morgan’s in a Springfield bar. 

Pearson became upset and left. 

{¶ 33} The next morning, employees at a packaging company in 

Springfield saw Pearson sitting in a nearby parking lot. When they realized that 

she was hurt, they went to her aid. She was nude from the waist down. One of 

the employees asked her if she had been raped, and she nodded. Paramedics were 

summoned to take Pearson to the hospital. As they lifted her into the ambulance, 

numerous cuts on her body opened, and she screamed in pain. 
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{¶ 34} Pearson’s throat had been cut from ear to ear, and she had a deep 

stab wound in her upper abdomen. She had an open wound at the base of her 

nose, multiple cheekbone and jaw fractures, and a fracture of the orbital floor, the 

bone at the base of the eye. Underneath her lacerated scalp, she had a fractured 

skull and serious brain injuries. Her face was swollen and badly bruised. Her 

whole body was black and blue, and stones were embedded in her flesh. 

{¶ 35} When Pearson woke up in the hospital, she noticed that her watch 

was missing. She recalled crawling toward some railroad tracks but could 

remember nothing else that had happened after she left the bar. 

{¶ 36} Police found a pair of jeans in the parking lot near the spot where 

Pearson had been found. Springfield police criminalist Timothy Shepherd 

examined the jeans and concluded that they had been “disassembled” in the same 

manner as Phree Morrow’s shorts. Police also found bloodstains underneath a 

nearby loading dock. In 1994, the custodian of a church in Springfield found a 

knife stuck into the church roof. 

{¶ 37} On September 26, 1996, at the Clark County Jail, Sapp mentioned 

the Hazel Pearson case to detectives from Jacksonville, Florida. Claiming that he 

had acted through another personality, Sapp mentioned that he had cut Pearson’s 

throat, that he had taken her watch, and that he had thrown the knife onto the 

church roof. 

{¶ 38} In his subsequent confession to the Springfield police, Sapp 

admitted that he had raped Pearson and had tried to kill her. Sapp told detectives 

that, on the day he met Pearson, he was “pretty f * * * ed up” from drink and pills. 

He saw Pearson crying on a street corner and approached her. Pearson 

complained to Sapp that her boyfriend was in a bar with another woman; Pearson 

had walked out of the bar after “some words and a little push contest.” 

{¶ 39} Sapp and Pearson walked together until they reached some railroad 

tracks. There, according to Sapp, they “kissed and messed around a little bit.” 
January Term, 2004 

9 

But Pearson said, “[W]hy is it that all men * * * got to have that stubble shit. Just 

like Butch.” Then, according to Sapp, she slapped him. 

{¶ 40} Sapp became furious. He was thinking that “[the] bitch needed to 

die. All bitches needed to die. It was time for that kind of shit to stop. It ain’t 

gonna happen no more.” Sapp assaulted Pearson. He beat her with a piece of 

steel cable, kicked her repeatedly, and stabbed her in the stomach. 

{¶ 41} At some point, Sapp removed Pearson’s pants and had intercourse 

with her without ejaculating. Sapp indicated to police that the sex was 

consensual. Consistent with that claim, Sapp initially told police that he had 

pulled Pearson’s jeans off. However, he then claimed to have torn them off and 

finally admitted that he spent seven to 12 minutes cutting Pearson’s jeans off. 

{¶ 42} Once Pearson stopped moving, Sapp hid her under a nearby 

loading dock and ran away. As he fled, he threw his knife onto the church roof 

and hid the piece of cable in a storm drain. Police later recovered the piece of 

steel cable identified by Sapp from the storm drain. 

{¶ 43} While confessing to this crime, Sapp mentioned that he owned a 

surgical scalpel that had belonged to his mother; it was the “[s]ame one she cut 

[his] pants off with.” 

{¶ 44} Sapp later told Johnny Saxour that he “jumped on” a woman at a 

location near Selma Road “because she had a pink outfit on and he didn’t like her 

outfit and he started beating her with a crow bar * * * . And he thought he had 

killed her, but somebody had hollered at him and he took a-running and he 

thought the girl was dead when he left her.” 

Indictment, Trial, and Sentence 

{¶ 45} The grand jury returned a 27-count indictment against Sapp. The 

indictment included three counts of aggravated murder with prior calculation and 

design pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A), three counts of aggravated murder during a 
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rape pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(B), and three counts of aggravated murder during a 

kidnapping pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(B). 

{¶ 46} Each aggravated murder count carried the following death 

specifications: (1) the aggravated murder was part of a course of conduct 

involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons pursuant 

to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and (2) the defendant committed the aggravated murder 

while committing rape or kidnapping, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). Counts 1 through 6, 

as originally charged, also carried specifications under R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) 

(offense was committed to avoid apprehension), but these specifications were 

dismissed on the state’s motion before trial. 

{¶ 47} Two counts charged Sapp with the attempted aggravated murder of 

Hazel Pearson. Sapp was also charged with four counts of rape, four counts of 

kidnapping, three counts of evidence tampering, pursuant to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), 

and three counts of abusing a corpse pursuant to R.C. 2927.01(B). Two arson 

counts were severed before trial. 

{¶ 48} Sapp was convicted of all counts and specifications, and a 

mitigation hearing was held to sentence him on the Morrow, Leach, and Anderson 

aggravated murders. Before submitting the case to the jury in the penalty phase, 

the trial judge merged the aggravated murder counts into a single count for each 

victim. 

{¶ 49} The jury recommended death on each aggravated murder count. 

The trial judge sentenced Sapp to death on each count. The court of appeals 

affirmed Sapp’s convictions and death sentences. The cause is now before us on 

an appeal as of right, pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A) and Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article 

IV, Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 50} In this appeal, Sapp raises 16 propositions of law. After full 

consideration, we conclude that Sapp’s claims do not require reversal of his 

convictions or sentences. We have also independently reviewed Sapp’s death 
January Term, 2004 

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sentences, as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires, for appropriateness and proportionality. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm Sapp’s convictions and death sentences. 

I. Course-of-Conduct Specification 

{¶ 51} In his fifth proposition of law, Sapp contends that the evidence 

does not support his conviction of the course-of-conduct death specification on 

Counts 14, 15, and 16, the counts charging the aggravated murder of Anderson. 

Sapp contends that the three murders and one attempted murder in this case do not 

constitute a single “course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or 

attempt to kill two or more persons” within the meaning of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 

While conceding that the Morrow and Leach murders, which happened at the 

same time and place and were similar in manner, constitute such a “course of 

conduct,” Sapp contends that the murder of Anderson and the attempted murder 

of Pearson are not part of that same course of conduct. 

{¶ 52} This proposition of law raises the question: When may a 

purposeful killing or attempt to kill be considered “part of a course of conduct” 

for purposes of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5)? We believe that the statutory phrase “course 

of conduct” found in R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) requires that the state establish some 

factual link between the aggravated murder with which the defendant is charged 

and the other murders or attempted murders that are alleged to make up the course 

of conduct. In order to find that two offenses constitute a single course of conduct 

under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), the trier of fact “must * * * discern some connection, 

common scheme, or some pattern or psychological thread that ties [the offenses] 

together.” State v. Cummings (1992), 332 N.C. 487, 510, 422 S.E.2d 692 

(applying course-of-conduct provision in North Carolina death-penalty scheme). 

See, also, State v. Price (1990), 326 N.C. 56, 81, 388 S.E.2d 84. Thus, for 

instance, the factual link might be one of time, location, murder weapon, or cause 

of death. It might involve the killing of victims who are close in age or who are 

related. It might involve a similar motivation on the killer’s part for his crimes, a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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common getaway car, or perhaps a similar pattern of secondary crimes (such as 

rape) involving each victim. Whatever the link or links between the multiple 

murders might be, the statutory words “course of conduct” compel the 

government to present evidence of those connections. 

{¶ 53} In arguing that the Morrow-Leach murders and the Anderson and 

Pearson crimes do not constitute a single course of conduct, Sapp stresses the 

length of time separating the offenses. Anderson was murdered over a year after 

the Morrow-Leach murders, and the attempted murder of Pearson took place three 

months after that. 

{¶ 54} We agree with Sapp that when two or more offenses are alleged to 

constitute a course of conduct under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), the amount of time 

between the offenses is a relevant factor. See Price, 326 N.C. at 81, 388 S.E.2d 

84 (“temporal proximity” can be a factor in determining whether offenses are part 

of the same course of conduct). 

{¶ 55} Nevertheless, we have said that murders taking place at different 

times “may satisfy the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) specification so long as the offender’s 

actions were part of a continuing course of criminal conduct.” State v. LaMar, 95 

Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 71. Thus, the length of time 

between offenses does not necessarily determine whether the offenses form a 

course of conduct. 

{¶ 56} Instead, when two or more offenses are alleged to constitute a 

course of conduct under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), all the circumstances of the offenses 

must be taken into account. “The further apart the acts are temporally, the more 

incumbent it is upon a court to carefully consider other factors * * * in 

determining whether the acts * * * are part of a course of conduct.” Cummings, 

332 N.C. at 510, 422 S.E.2d 692. 

{¶ 57} Thus, in Cummings, the jury could find that two murders 26 

months apart were part of the same course of conduct because they had a common 
January Term, 2004 

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modus operandi and “similar, if not identical, motivations,” and the victims were 

sisters. Id., 332 N.C. at 511, 422 S.E.2d 692. And in Corwin v. State

(Tex.Crim.App.1993), 870 S.W.2d 23, 28, the court held that a defendant’s 

actions in abducting, raping, and killing or attempting to kill five women “in more 

or less the same way” over 13 years could reasonably be found to constitute a 

course of conduct. 

{¶ 58} Sapp points out that the factual circumstances and modi operandi 

of the offenses in this case varied in several ways. Phree and Martha were 

children, but Anderson and Pearson were adults. Sapp murdered Phree and 

Martha in concert with several other perpetrators, but he was the sole perpetrator 

when he murdered Anderson and attempted to murder Pearson. Phree and Martha 

were beaten to death with rocks, but Anderson was stabbed and beaten with a 

pipe, while Pearson was stabbed, slashed, and beaten with a piece of cable. The 

crimes against Phree, Martha, and Pearson took place outdoors, but Anderson was 

killed in a garage. The bodies of Phree and Martha were moved a short distance 

and were covered with debris; Anderson was partly buried under the dirt floor of 

the garage; Pearson was pushed underneath a loading dock. 

{¶ 59} Despite these differences, the offenses in this case were also 

similar in significant ways. Sapp removed the pants from Phree, Anderson, and 

Pearson in the same distinctive fashion, by using his knife to cut the seams open – 

a method Sapp himself referred to as “leaving [his] name.” Each victim was 

raped and left nude from the waist down. Each victim was battered in the head 

with an object picked up at the scene of the crime, and each suffered a fractured 

skull. 

{¶ 60} There was also evidence of a common motive. Sapp told Johnny 

Saxour that “whenever he got * * * the taste of blood, * * * he always went out 

[and] took care of his problems.” He also compared cutting off the victims’ pants 

to “opening up a Christmas present * * * fold by fold.” The evidence thus 
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indicates that Sapp committed each of these murders for pleasure, to gratify his 

recurring “taste for blood.” Moreover, in each case, Sapp perceived one of the 

victims as having provoked him somehow. Phree allegedly insulted John Balser; 

Anderson and Pearson allegedly struck Sapp; Pearson allegedly disparaged 

Sapp’s grooming. 

{¶ 61} Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the evidence 

in this case was legally sufficient to prove that the murder of Anderson and the 

attempted murder of Pearson were part of a single “course of conduct involving 

more than one intentional killing or attempted killing.” Accordingly, Sapp’s fifth 

proposition of law is overruled. 

II. Joinder and Motion to Sever 

{¶ 62} Before trial, Sapp filed a “motion to sever counts.” Sapp argued 

that the 27 counts in the indictment should be severed into four groups, each to be 

tried in a separate proceeding, as follows: 

{¶ 63} (1) Counts 1-13, charging Sapp with the aggravated murders of 

Phree Morrow and Martha Leach and with related crimes (rape, kidnapping, 

evidence tampering); 

{¶ 64} (2) Counts 14-20, charging Sapp with the aggravated murder of 

Belinda Anderson and related crimes; 

{¶ 65} (3) Counts 21-25, charging Sapp with the attempted aggravated 

murder of Hazel Pearson and related crimes; 

{¶ 66} (4) Counts 26 and 27, charging Sapp with arson. 

{¶ 67} The trial court severed the arson counts but otherwise denied the 

motion, and counts one through 25 were tried in a single proceeding. In his third 

proposition of law, Sapp asserts that the trial court prejudiced him by denying the 

requested severance. 

{¶ 68} Although Sapp filed a pretrial motion for severance, he did not 

renew it at the close of the state’s case or at the conclusion of all the evidence. 
January Term, 2004 

15 

The court of appeals held that Sapp’s objection to joinder was thereby waived. 

See, e.g., State v. Miller (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 679, 691, 664 N.E.2d 1309; 

State v. Walker (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 518, 522, 585 N.E.2d 848; State v. 

Strobel (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 31, 33, 554 N.E.2d 916; State v. Brady (1988), 48 

Ohio App.3d 41, 44, 548 N.E.2d 278; State v. Owens (1975), 51 Ohio App.2d 

132, 5 O.O.3d 290, 146, 366 N.E.2d 1367. But, see, State v. Miller, Stark App. 

No. 2003CA00273, 2004-Ohio-3716, 2004 WL 1564157, ¶ 15, fn.1. However, 

the state has elected not to argue waiver. Hence, we will decide the joinder issue 

on its merits. 

A. Merits 

{¶ 69} “The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under 

Crim.R. 8(A) if the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character.’ ” 

State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293, quoting State v. 

Torres (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 20 O.O.3d 313, 421 N.E.2d 1288, fn. 2. A 

defendant requesting severance “has the burden of furnishing the trial court with 

sufficient information so that it can weigh the considerations favoring joinder 

against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 20 

O.O.3d 313, 421 N.E.2d 1288. A defendant claiming error in the denial of 

severance must affirmatively show that his rights were prejudiced and that the 

trial court abused its discretion in refusing separate trials. Id. 

{¶ 70} “Where the evidence of each of the joined offenses would be 

admissible at separate trials, severance is not required because prejudice due to 

the cumulation of evidence or the inference of a criminal disposition is largely 

absent.” State v. Hamblin (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 159, 524 N.E.2d 476. 

{¶ 71} In this case, if Sapp’s motion had been granted and the charges 

relating to each incident had been tried separately, nevertheless, “the evidence of 

all the offenses would have been admissible in each trial.” State v. Benner

(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 306, 533 N.E.2d 701. Because “each [murder] or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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attempted [murder] was relevant to the course-of-conduct specification,” evidence 

relating to each of the murders and attempted murders would have been 

admissible at separate trials of the Morrow-Leach murders and the Anderson 

murder. Id. 

{¶ 72} Moreover, evidence of each murder would also have been 

admissible at separate trials under Evid.R. 404(B) in order to prove the identity of 

the perpetrator. See, generally, State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 184-

187, 552 N.E.2d 180. During each incident, Sapp cut the pants off his victims in 

a distinctive fashion. Furthermore, he “consistently directed violence to a 

victim’s head.” Id., 49 Ohio St.3d at 186, 552 N.E.2d 180. Although the crimes 

differed from one another in some respects, “[a]dmissibility is not adversely 

affected simply because the other [crimes] differed in some details.” Id., 49 Ohio 

St.3d at 187, 552 N.E.2d 180. 

{¶ 73} Finally, claims of prejudice are less persuasive where the evidence 

is “amply sufficient to sustain each verdict, whether or not the indictments were 

tried together.” Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d at 344, 20 O.O.3d 313, 421 N.E.2d 1288; 

cf. State v. Schaim (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 62, 600 N.E.2d 661. In this case, 

Sapp’s confessions and statements, along with the corroborating evidence, 

provided strong evidence of guilt. The strength of the state’s proof “establishes 

that the prosecution did not attempt to prove one case simply by questionable 

evidence of other offenses.” Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d at 187, 552 N.E.2d 180. 

{¶ 74} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial judge did not 

abuse his discretion in denying severance, and joinder was not prejudicial to Sapp. 

We therefore overrule Sapp’s third proposition of law. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶ 75} In his fourth proposition of law, Sapp contends that his trial 

counsel were ineffective because they did not renew his motion for severance at 

the close of the evidence. 
January Term, 2004 

17 

{¶ 76} Ineffective-assistance claims are governed by a two-part test. The 

defendant must show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance 

falling below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) resulting 

prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the 

proceeding’s result would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington

(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Williams v. 

Taylor (2000), 529 U.S. 362, 390-391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389; State v. 

Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of 

the syllabus. 

{¶ 77} Sapp fails to show from the record that counsel’s nonrenewal of 

the motion was the result of any deficiency in their performance. Sapp also fails 

to show how he was prejudiced. As we note in our discussion of Sapp’s third 

proposition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. 

{¶ 78} Moreover, no reasonable probability exists that the trial would 

have turned out differently had a severance been granted, inasmuch as Sapp 

confessed to all the crimes he was charged with. Finally, because we have 

reviewed the severance issue on its merits, counsel’s failure to renew the motion 

has not caused Sapp to forfeit merit review of that issue. We overrule Sapp’s 

fourth proposition of law. 

III. Motion to Suppress Statements 

{¶ 79} In his first proposition of law, Sapp contends that his Fifth 

Amendment waiver and his ensuing confessions to police were involuntary and 

that the trial court should therefore have suppressed them. 

A. Fifth Amendment Claim 

{¶ 80} On September 26, 1996, sheriff’s detectives from Jacksonville, 

Florida interrogated Sapp at the Clark County Jail, where he awaited assignment 

to the state correctional system after being convicted in an unrelated case. The 

detectives intended to question Sapp about a homicide in Jacksonville. They 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

advised Sapp of his Miranda rights and asked whether he understood them. Sapp 

signed a written waiver. It appeared to the detectives that he understood his 

rights. Sapp stated that he was not under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs. 

(He did, however, inform the officers that he was taking Prozac.) During the 

interview, Sapp made admissions about the Hazel Pearson assault. The 

Jacksonville officers summoned a Springfield detective, who then questioned 

Sapp further about Pearson. 

{¶ 81} On April 2 and 3, 1997, Springfield detectives interrogated Sapp 

after bringing him back to Springfield from the state correctional system. Before 

questioning Sapp, the detectives advised him of his rights. On both occasions, he 

acknowledged his understanding and signed written waivers. During 15 hours of 

interviews, Sapp confessed to killing Phree Morrow, Martha Leach, and Belinda 

Anderson and assaulting Hazel Pearson. 

{¶ 82} “In deciding whether a defendant’s confession is involuntarily 

induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances * * *.” State 

v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1051, paragraph 

two of the syllabus. However, “ ‘police overreaching’ is a prerequisite to a 

finding of involuntariness. Evidence of use by the interrogators of an inherently 

coercive tactic (e.g., physical abuse, threats, deprivation of food, medical 

treatment, or sleep) will trigger the totality of the circumstances analysis.” State 

v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844, quoting Colorado v. 

Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 163, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473; see, also, 

State v. Dailey (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 91, 559 N.E.2d 459. Thus, at the 

threshold, Sapp must show that the detectives used an inherently coercive tactic 

on him. 

{¶ 83} Sapp contended at trial that the detectives played on his 

psychological vulnerability by promising to obtain help for his psychological 

problems. For instance, one of the Florida detectives told him, “You want to get 
January Term, 2004 

19 

some help for Bob [a reference to Sapp’s supposed alter ego], we’ll get you help 

for Bob.” At various times, detectives suggested that Sapp “need[ed] to talk” 

because it would help him in “dealing with” his problems. By telling the truth, 

they said, Sapp would “get the demon out,” “get rid of Bob,” and “take control [of 

himself] back.” He would thereby “get some peace,” “stop * * * the pain” and 

be able to “live a normal life.” 

{¶ 84} Promises of help with “collateral problems,” such as psychological 

problems, are not inherently coercive. See Miller v. Fenton (C.A.3, 1986), 796 

F.2d 598, 610; see, also, Hall v. State (1986), 180 Ga.App. 366, 367, 349 S.E.2d 

255. The detectives never offered to obtain psychiatric help for Sapp in exchange 

for information. See State v. Beck (Fla.App.1980), 390 So.2d 748, 749. Nor did 

they suggest that Sapp could expect to receive psychiatric help “instead of 

prosecution and punishment.” State v. Thaggard (Minn.1995), 527 N.W.2d 804, 

812. The detectives simply “suggest[ed] that telling the truth would relieve 

defendant of a psychological burden.” People v. Jones (1998), 17 Cal.4th 279, 

298, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890. That suggestion is not coercive. 

{¶ 85} Nor was the length of the interrogations coercive. The September 

26 interrogation by the Florida officers lasted about three hours and 25 minutes 

with a four-minute break about halfway through. 

{¶ 86} On April 2, Sapp was given a drink and permitted to use the 

bathroom before the interrogation began. This interview began at 2:30 p.m. and 

lasted until 11:45 p.m., with five breaks. The April 3 interview began at 9:35 a.m. 

and lasted until 6:00 p.m., with three breaks. Not counting breaks, the two 

interviews took slightly more than 15 hours during a 271⁄2-hour period. 

{¶ 87} While the interviews of April 2 and 3 were lengthy – necessarily 

so, considering the number of crimes to which Sapp was confessing – Sapp was 

never interrogated for more than four hours without a break. He was fed and 

given drinks during both interviews. He was permitted to use the bathroom and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

20 

take his medications. On April 2, Sapp slept overnight on a mattress in the 

interview room; he said he preferred that to sleeping in a cell. The interrogations 

were predominantly cordial in tone. Thus, we find that the police did not employ 

inherently coercive tactics on Sapp. 

{¶ 88} Moreover, Sapp’s waivers and confessions were voluntary under 

the totality of the circumstances. The totality of the circumstances includes “the 

age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, 

and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or 

mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” Edwards, 49 Ohio 

St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 89} As we have already noted, the circumstances of these 

interrogations were not coercive. Furthermore, Sapp signed written waivers on 

September 26 and April 2 before being questioned. “An accused’s signed waiver 

form is strong proof that the waiver was valid.” State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio 

St.3d 22, 32, 689 N.E.2d 1; see N. Carolina v. Butler (1979), 441 U.S. 369, 374-

375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286. Sapp indicated that he understood his rights. 

During the September 26 interrogation, he read his rights aloud from the waiver 

form. He never expressed any desire to remain silent or to consult counsel. 

{¶ 90} When Sapp executed these waivers, he was familiar with his rights 

and with the criminal justice system in general. Sapp had been interrogated in 

connection with other crimes — and had been read his Miranda rights — on two 

other occasions during 1996. The September 26, 1996 interview was thus Sapp’s 

second recent encounter with police questioning, and the April 2-3, 1997 

interview was his fourth. 

{¶ 91} Dr. John Gibfreid visited Sapp during the April 2 interview and 

provided him with Prozac and lithium. At the suppression hearing, Gibfried 

testified that Prozac is an antidepressant and lithium is a treatment for mood 
January Term, 2004 

21 

swings. Neither drug is a sedative or tranquilizer, and Gibfried testified that 

neither drug would affect a person’s ability to comprehend Miranda warnings. 

{¶ 92} The record permitted the trial court to conclude that Sapp’s 

Miranda waivers and his statements on September 26, 1996, and April 2 and 3, 

1997, were voluntary. Sapp’s Fifth Amendment claim therefore lacks merit. 

B. Sixth Amendment Claim 

{¶ 93} Sapp also raises a Sixth Amendment issue. He contends that 

police questioned him even though they knew that he had recently been 

represented by counsel in another, unrelated case. However, “an accused’s Sixth 

Amendment right is offense specific. Thus, * * * appointment of counsel with 

respect to one offense does not bar police questioning as to a second uncharged 

offense.” State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 446, 653 N.E.2d 271, citing 

McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158. 

See, also, Texas v. Cobb (2001), 532 U.S. 162, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321. 

At the time of the interrogations, there had been no “adversary judicial criminal 

proceedings,” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158, in the 

instant case. Hence, Sapp’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the instant case 

had not yet attached. 

{¶ 94} Sapp’s first proposition of law is overruled. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶ 95} In his second proposition of law, Sapp contends that counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance because they failed to ask the trial court to state, 

pursuant to the wording of Crim.R. 12(F), its findings of fact on the motion to 

suppress statements. 

{¶ 96} As previously noted, Sapp must show both deficient performance 

by counsel and prejudice – in other words, a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different. He contends 

that the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact is prejudicial because this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

court cannot properly review the denial of his motion to suppress without having 

the trial court’s factual findings before it. We disagree. The extensive record of 

the suppression hearing is “sufficient to allow full review of the suppression 

issue.” State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 443, 588 N.E.2d 819; see, also, 

State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 60, 549 N.E.2d 491. Hence, Sapp 

cannot show a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if 

his counsel had requested findings under the wording of Crim.R. 12(F). We 

overrule Sapp’s second proposition. 

IV. Instructions 

{¶ 97} In his ninth proposition, Sapp contends that the trial court 

improperly instructed the jury in the guilt phase. Sapp admits that he did not 

object to the challenged instructions at trial. Therefore, the claims asserted in this 

proposition are waived. In order to overcome the waiver, Sapp must show plain 

error. An alleged error is plain error only if the error is “obvious,” State v. Barnes

(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240, and “but for the error, the 

outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” State v. Long (1978), 53 

Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 98} The trial court instructed that Sapp was “responsible for the natural 

and foreseeable results that follow in the ordinary course of the events from the 

act.” Sapp contends that this instruction was improper because it permitted a 

conviction without a finding of specific intent to kill. However, we have held that 

it is not plain error to give the standard foreseeability instruction in a murder case 

where the instructions as a whole make clear that the jury must find purpose to 

kill in order to convict. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-

Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 105. Here, “[t]he trial court extensively instructed 

the jury on the requirement of purpose and intent prior to the causation language.” 

State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 346, 703 N.E.2d 1251. Thus, the 

causation instruction was not plain error, and the issue is waived. Williams. 
January Term, 2004 

23 

{¶ 99} Sapp also contends that the trial court incorrectly instructed the 

jury on reasonable doubt. But we have repeatedly rejected similar claims. See, 

e.g., State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 293-294, 731 N.E.2d 159; State 

v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 493, 653 N.E.2d 304. Thus, Sapp cannot 

show plain error, and this issue is waived as well. Because both issues raised in 

Sapp’s ninth proposition were waived at trial, that proposition is overruled. 

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶ 100} In his 12th proposition, Sapp contends that counsel’s failure to 

preserve claims of error constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, 

Sapp does not identify any specific claim whose waiver was prejudicial to him. 

We overrule Sapp’s 12th proposition. 

VI. Settled Issues 

{¶ 101} Sapp’s tenth, 11th, 14th and 15th propositions of law raise wellsettled issues and are summarily overruled. See, generally, State v. Poindexter

(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus; State v. Spisak (1988), 36 

Ohio St.3d 80, 82, 521 N.E.2d 800. We overrule Sapp’s tenth proposition on 

authority of State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 499-500, 709 N.E.2d 484; 

see, also, State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, 

¶ 36 (summarily rejecting claim). We overrule his 11th proposition on authority 

of State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus. We 

overrule his 14th and 15th propositions on authority of State v. Steffen (1987), 31 

Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio 

St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 

239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 

OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; and State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 528 

N.E.2d 1237. 

{¶ 102} In his 16th proposition of law, Sapp contends that appellate 

reweighing of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors is 
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unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 

L.Ed.2d 556. However, as Sapp acknowledges, the Ring court specifically 

declined to address appellate reweighing. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 

153 L.Ed.2d 556, fn. 4. We therefore adhere to our precedents, and those of the 

United States Supreme Court, which permit appellate reweighing. See Clemons v. 

Mississippi (1990), 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725; State v. 

Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 115, 559 N.E.2d 710; State v. Lott (1990), 51 

Ohio St.3d 160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 293. Sapp’s 16th proposition is overruled. 

VII. Cumulative Error 

{¶ 103} In his 13th proposition, Sapp contends that even if we find 

individual errors harmless, we should find their combined effect prejudicial. As 

Sapp offers no further analysis, this proposition lacks substance and is overruled. 

VIII. Independent Review 

{¶ 104} In his sixth and seventh propositions of law, Sapp claims that the 

jury and trial judge erred by finding that the aggravating circumstances 

outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. In his eighth 

proposition, he asks us to find that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh 

the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and he also argues that the death 

sentences are inappropriate and disproportionate. 

{¶ 105} Each of these propositions invokes our duty under R.C. 2929.05 

to engage in an independent review of Sapp’s death sentences. We must 

determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of aggravating 

circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 

factors, and whether the death sentences are proportionate to those affirmed in 

similar cases. R.C. 2929.05(A) 

{¶ 106} Aggravating circumstances: Sapp was convicted of two 

aggravating circumstances as to each murder: course of conduct, R.C. 

2929.04(A)(5), and felony-murder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
January Term, 2004 

25 

{¶ 107} The evidence supporting the (A)(5) specifications is sufficient to 

show that the murders and attempted murder in this case constituted a “course of 

conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons 

by the offender.” R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). The evidence of the (A)(7) specification is 

also sufficient as to each aggravated murder. Sapp admitted raping each victim. 

His semen was found in the vaginas of Phree Morrow and Martha Leach, and he 

told Johnny Saxour that he raped Belinda Anderson. 

{¶ 108} Mitigating factors: At trial, Sapp presented evidence of his 

traumatic childhood, his mental disorders, and his good qualities as a person. 

{¶ 109} Sapp’s childhood: William Kessler Sapp, a.k.a. William Kessler 

Lilly, was born in 1963, the son of Kessler B. Lilly Sr. and Margaret Lilly. He 

had four siblings, including Kessler B. Lilly Jr., also known as “J.R.” 

{¶ 110} Kessler B. Lilly Sr. testified that his mother (Sapp’s 

grandmother) and two of her sisters were mentally ill and committed suicide. 

Kessler Sr. also testified that Sapp’s mother, Margaret Lilly, was admitted to a 

mental hospital during their marriage, a fact that Margaret, testifying for the state 

as a rebuttal witness, confirmed. Kessler Sr. testified that Margaret practiced 

“black witchcraft” and believed she could cast spells and contact dead people. 

Margaret denied practicing witchcraft but admitted studying it and casting “[a] 

few love spells.” She also claimed to have extrasensory perception. 

{¶ 111} J.R. testified that Margaret Lilly neglected him and Sapp. She 

habitually slept until midafternoon and did not feed, bathe, or supervise them 

while their father was at work. Both Kessler Sr. and Margaret agreed that 

Margaret neglected her children. 

{¶ 112} During his interrogation of April 3, 1997, Sapp told police that 

his mother had scarred him with cigarettes, needles, and knives, dripped hot 

candle wax on his testicles, and performed sex acts on him. A private investigator 

for the defense testified that Sapp had numerous scars on his body, including three 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

26 

on his testicles that, in the investigator’s opinion, resembled scars caused by 

burns. 

{¶ 113} J.R. testified that Margaret used to burn him and Sapp with 

cigarettes and that she “forced [Sapp] to have sex with her.” But J.R. had told 

Springfield police before trial that Margaret never sexually abused him or Sapp. 

According to Kessler Sr., Margaret once burned Sapp’s hand on a stove. Another 

time, Kessler Sr. caught her hitting Sapp with a frying pan. Margaret essentially 

admitted burning Sapp’s hand but denied the other allegations. 

{¶ 114} Kessler Sr. divorced Margaret in 1971 and sent Sapp and J.R. to 

a children’s home. They later moved back in with Kessler Sr. Kessler Sr. 

remarried, but Kessler Sr. testified that his second wife also abused the boys and 

had sexual intercourse with Sapp. 

{¶ 115} Sapp’s marriage: Karen Sapp is Sapp’s former wife. She was 

involved with him for eight years, and they had three children. Karen also had a 

son from another relationship. She testified that Sapp had nightmares about his 

childhood. Karen also testified that Sapp had a good side. He worked every day, 

helped her with cooking, cleaning, and child care, and accompanied her to the 

doctor’s office during her pregnancies. Sapp treated Karen’s son “[p]retty much 

like his own.” 

{¶ 116} Karen also testified that Sapp had a quick and violent temper, 

especially when he drank. Sapp physically abused Karen approximately six times 

during their years together, principally by choking her and throwing things at her. 

Each time, however, Karen persuaded him to stop. However, when Springfield 

police asked Karen before trial whether Sapp had ever abused her, she concealed 

the choking incidents and said only that he had slapped her once. At trial, Karen 

claimed that she did not consider choking to be abusive compared to what she had 

suffered in her childhood. 
January Term, 2004 

27 

{¶ 117} Sapp’s mental condition: Dr. Kathleen Burch, a clinical 

psychologist, interviewed Sapp for a total of 25 hours. She administered 

personality and neuropsychological tests. The materials she reviewed included 

medical and psychological histories of Sapp and his family; police reports; Sapp’s 

jail, school, and children’s services records; his correspondence with relatives; his 

videotaped confessions; and videotapes of Sapp’s parents. She also interviewed 

Karen Sapp. 

{¶ 118} Dr. Burch concluded that Sapp has “very severe mental health 

problems.” She diagnosed “chronic and severe” bipolar affective disorder – i.e., a 

“manic depressive illness.” Burch found “strong evidence” of a neurological 

dysfunction that adversely affected Sapp’s impulse control, judgment, and ability 

to “process complicated information.” 

{¶ 119} Burch explained that bipolar affective disorder is caused by a 

chemical imbalance in the brain. “[T]here is considerable evidence that early 

childhood experience can cause a change in the chemical balance * * * in the 

brain that’s associated with this kind of disorder.” The condition can also be 

inherited. 

{¶ 120} A person in a “manic” or “hypomanic” state “usually will do 

things that show a lack of judgment.” These may include “indiscriminate sexual 

behavior,” a tendency to be “irritable and argumentative and get into fights,” and 

other “impulsive” behavior. Then they “crash and go into a depression and often 

they can’t really think very well.” 

{¶ 121} Sapp also had a “severe personality disorder.” Burch attributed 

this to his temperament, experiences, and reactions to his experiences, which 

together “have shaped him into a person who has tremendous difficulty getting 

along in the world and dealing with other people.” 

{¶ 122} Burch diagnosed an “antisocial personality disorder,” a pattern of 

attitudes and behavior involving “disregard for the rules of society.” Such a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28 

disorder is “very often” associated with childhood abuse or neglect. She also 

diagnosed a “borderline personality disorder.” This disorder is characterized by 

lack of “a secure and stable sense of self identity.” People with borderline 

personality disorder tend to be oversensitive, quick to anger, and impulsive. Such 

persons suffer from mood swings and sometimes have “psychotic breaks” during 

which they become paranoid and delusional. 

{¶ 123} Weighing: Sapp clearly suffered severe abuse and neglect in 

childhood (Margaret’s denials are not credible). This evidence is entitled to some 

weight, although it is not a strong mitigating factor by itself. See, generally, State 

v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 547, 747 N.E.2d 765 (“we have seldom 

accorded strong weight to a defendant’s childhood”). Sapp’s good qualities, 

enumerated by his former wife, Karen, are also entitled to some weight, despite 

the impeachment of Karen’s testimony on cross-examination. 

{¶ 124} Dr. Burch diagnosed Sapp as having a bipolar disorder and a 

borderline personality disorder and testified that both conditions make him 

unusually impulsive and quick to anger. But these murders were not impulsive 

acts on Sapp’s part. The jury found that they were committed with prior 

calculation and design. Sapp told Saxour that when he got a taste for blood, he 

“went out [and] took care of his problems.” Sapp carried a knife during each 

murder and used it to remove the pants from his victims, savoring this act as if 

unwrapping a long-anticipated Christmas present. In light of these facts, Sapp’s 

disorders are entitled to little weight in mitigation. See State v. Group, 98 Ohio 

St.3d 248, 2002-Ohio-7247, 781 N.E.2d 980, ¶ 165-166. 

{¶ 125} Weighing these mitigating factors against the aggravating 

circumstances applicable to the murder of Martha Leach, we conclude that the 

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In particular, we believe, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) circumstance deserves 

great weight. 
January Term, 2004 

29 

{¶ 126} The same aggravating circumstances apply to the murder of 

Phree Morrow. One mitigating factor applies to Phree’s murder that did not apply 

to Martha’s: Phree’s alleged insult of John Balser. However, a verbal insult from 

a 12-year-old child deserves no weight in mitigation. We conclude that the 

aggravating circumstances applicable to the murder of Phree Morrow outweigh 

the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 127} Finally, we conclude that the aggravating circumstances 

applicable to the murder of Belinda Anderson outweigh the mitigating factors 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 128} Proportionality: The death sentence in this case is proportionate 

to sentences we have approved in cases carrying death specifications under 

R.C.2929.04(A)(5) and (A)(7). See State v. Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 

533 N.E.2d 701; State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895; State 

v. Hawkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 612 N.E.2d 1227; State v. Lorraine (1993), 

66 Ohio St.3d 414, 613 N.E.2d 212; State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 

435, 650 N.E.2d 878. 

{¶ 129} Sapp’s convictions and sentences of death are affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 

O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 

 PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 

__________________ 

 PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶ 130} I concur in the sentence of death with respect to the murders of 

Phree Morrow and Martha Leach. I dissent from the conclusion that the murder 

of Belinda Anderson was part of the same course of conduct. The murder of 

Anderson occurred over a year after and was not related in any way to the 

murders of Morrow and Leach. See State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

30 

10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 113 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). In this case, as in Scott, 

“there was ample evidence to support [an]other death-penalty specification[], 

rendering the course-of-conduct specification unnecessary.” Id. at ¶ 116. I 

concur in part and dissent in part. 

__________________ 

 Stephen Schumaker, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew P. 

Pickering, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Spiros P. Cocoves; Gamso, Helmick & Hoolahan and Jeffrey M. Gamso, 

for appellant. 

__________________