United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-20408

John Anthony Buchanan, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Coronda Harris; Detention Officer Wang, #130996; 

Nurse Brandi Hawking; Deputy Sheriff Sergeant J. 

Wheeler; William Laws; Detention Officer W. Gibson; 

Detention Officer Sergeant Pickens-Wilson; Detention 

Officer Mendoza, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC 4:19-CV-4571

Before Jones, Southwick, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

John Buchanan awaits trial at the Harris County Jail. His leg was 

amputated below the knee eight years ago, so he requires an accessible cell 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 1, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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with handrails on the sink, shower, and toilet, as well as a shower chair and a 

low bunk bed. Alleging that jail officials disregarded his needs and unlawfully 

transferred him to an inaccessible unit, Buchanan brought this lawsuit. In 

deciding whether Buchanan has plausibly alleged a violation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (ADA), we must also decide whether Buchanan has 

alleged the “physical injury” that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 

requires for the recovery of damages for mental or emotional injuries. We 

conclude that Buchanan has alleged a physical injury and failure to 

accommodate. 

I.

For the first ten months of his detention, Buchanan stayed in Harris 

County Jail Unit 2H1, a unit equipped with handrails and a low bunk. One 

morning around 5:00 a.m., a jailer woke Buchanan up and asked him to 

respond to allegations that he had violated disciplinary rules. Buchanan did 

not understand what he was being accused of, so he asked another officer for 

a copy of the allegations against him. That officer said she did not know what 

paperwork Buchanan was referring to. Buchanan asked to file a grievance for

the jail’s failure to serve him with a copy of his alleged rules violation and 

asked to speak with the shift supervisor. 

About five hours later, a third officer rewoke Buchanan and told him 

to pack his belongings for a transfer to the “D-pod” housing unit. During 

the transfer period that followed, Buchanan noted his medical needs and 

asked why he was being transferred out of his accessible unit. The 

classification officer responded that he needed Buchanan’s old cell for a 

“seventy-five-year-old man with glaucoma.” When Buchanan arrived at the 

new unit, he tried to refuse the inaccessible housing and asked the officer 

stationed there for help to no avail. 

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The D-pod does not have handrails on the toilets, accessible sinks, or 

showers with chairs or handrails—all things that Buchanan relies on to take 

care of himself. Nor did D-pod have a bottom bunk for Buchanan. As a 

result, Buchanan experienced pain and discomfort when using the toilet and 

trying to shower. His inability to properly bathe led to skin sores on the part 

of his leg that fits into his prosthetic. 

The day after his transfer, Buchanan filed an administrative complaint

alleging ADA violations. Four days after the complaint, he was given a 

“flimsy” chair for use in the shower but still did not have access to handrails, 

toilet and sink supports, or a bottom bunk. 

Buchanan sued in federal district court, alleging ADA, Fourteenth 

Amendment, and First Amendment violations and seeking both injunctive 

and compensatory relief. While his case was pending, he was transferred 

back to the accessible Unit 2H1. 

The district court dismissed the case before service under the 

screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). It held 

that Buchanan could not seek compensatory damages because he had not 

shown a more-than-de-minimis physical injury and could not seek injunctive 

relief because his reassignment to the accessible unit rendered his claims 

moot.1 The court also addressed the merits of the ADA claim, first 

recognizing that individuals cannot be liable under the ADA, see Smith v. 

Hood, 900 F.3d 180, 184 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018), but treating the official capacity 

claims as ones brought against the public entity. The court ruled that

Buchanan did not state an ADA claim because the defendants reasonably 

1 We affirm the district court’s holding that the claim for injunctive relief is moot 

now that Buchanan is no longer in the cell that he contends is not ADA-compliant.

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accommodated Buchanan’s disability. The court also rejected Buchanan’s 

due process and retaliation claims.2

We affirm the dismissal of the due process and retaliation claims 

essentially for the reasons stated by the district court. For the reasons 

discussed below, however, the ADA claim should proceed past the pleading 

stage.

II. 

When a district court dismisses a case under the screening provisions 

of the PLRA as both frivolous and as failing to state a claim, we review the 

dismissal de novo, using the same standard of review as a 12(b)(6) dismissal. 

Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009); see 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e), 1915A(b). We will uphold a dismissal based upon failure to state 

a claim if, taking all the factual allegations as true, the pleadings do not state 

a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555, 570 (2007). We will affirm the dismissal of a claim as frivolous if it lacks

“any arguable basis in law or fact.” Samford, 562 F.3d at 678 (citation 

omitted). Those deficiencies do not exist for Buchanan’s ADA claim at this 

early stage of the case.

First, Buchanan does meet the PLRA’s “physical injury” 

requirement for claims seeking certain damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 

The statute prevents a prisoner from bringing a federal suit “for mental or 

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 

physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Because the PLRA does not define 

“physical injury,” over twenty years ago we applied then-existing Eighth 

Amendment principles to hold that the lawrequires plaintiffs to allege “more 

2 The district court also dismissed Buchanan’s equal protection and excessive force 

claims, but he does not appeal those rulings. 

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than de minim[i]s” injury though the injury “need not be significant.” Siglar 

v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has since 

clarified that Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims do not hinge solely 

on the extent of the injury alleged—although the degree of injury the plaintiff 

sustained is relevant, it is the nature of the force imposed “that ultimately 

counts.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010). But we are not sure 

this line of cases matters when the prisoner is bringing an ADA claim that 

does not require a showing of excessive force or deliberate indifference. 

Looking solely at the language of the PLRA, Buchanan’s allegations 

easily surmount its “physical injury” requirement. He alleges that due to the 

lack of an accessible shower, he sustained skin sores on his leg at the site 

where the rubber sleeve of his prosthetic fits onto the skin. For a leg amputee, 

skin health is “of utmost importance” and even small lesions may “become 

an extensive disorder that will seriously threaten” the amputee. S. William 

Levy, Skin Problems of the Leg Amputee, 4 Prosthetics & Orthotics 

Int’l 37, 37, 43 (1980). Buchanan’s skin sore allegations, if proven, are a

physical injury that allows him to recover damages.

Buchanan has also plausibly alleged a failure to accommodate his 

disability. The ADA requires public entities, including jails and prisons, to 

make “reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals.” Cadena v. El 

Paso County, 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). 

The district court held that Buchanan’s claim failed because the jail 

reasonably accommodated his disability when it provided a shower chair and 

later moved Buchanan to a more accessible housing unit, Unit 3F, about five 

weeks after Buchanan had left his original, accessible unit. Buchanan 

counters that the jail failed to reasonably accommodate him during the 

approximately four months before he was ultimately returned to his original 

accessible unit.

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The complaint plausibly alleges a failure to accommodate. After 

Buchanan was transferred to the D-pod, he immediately told a jailer that the 

unit did not meet his needs, soon after that filed an internal grievance, and 

finally submitted a “reasonable accommodation request.” For five days, he 

experienced great discomfort and pain every time he needed to shower, 

which resulted in the skin sores. The jail then gave him a “flimsy” chair to 

use in the shower. But even after that, the lack of grab bars on the toilet and 

sink caused Buchanan to experience pain every time he needed to use the 

toilet. He also continued to lack an accessible bed. Courts have recognized 

that these types of accommodations may be necessary for disabled inmates. 

See Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding 

plausible failure-to-accommodate claim because prison deprived plaintiff of 

toilet and shower grab bars); Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 290 

(1st Cir. 2006) (denying summary judgment to defendants on failure-toaccommodate claim because prison did not give access to shower chair or 

lower bunk); see also Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1024–26 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(explaining that lack of shower chair supported Eighth Amendment claim). 

How long Buchanan was in a unit that lacked the accommodations he alleges 

he needs is difficult to determine from the pleadings. But even taking the 

shorter period of five weeks, that is sufficient to allege an ADA violation. See

Cadena, 946 F.3d at 721 (holding that two-day deprivation of wheelchair 

precluded summary judgment).

We thus reverse the district court’s dismissal of Buchanan’s ADA 

claims brought against the defendants in their official capacity.

***

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and 

REVERSED IN PART. The ADA claim is REMANDED for further 

proceedings.

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