a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives

July 2004 BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions 

Needed to Eliminate 

Weaknesses in the Visa 

Revocation Process

GAO-04-795
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-795.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-04-795, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

July 2004

BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate 

Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation 

Process 

GAO’s analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security 

took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa 

revocation process identified in its June 2003 report. However, GAO’s 

review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a 

detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses 

remained in the implementation of the revocation process, especially in the 

timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For example: 

• Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of 

visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In at least 

3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke visas after 

receiving a recommendation to do so. 

• In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to 

post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not 

know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. 

• In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to notify 

immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in 

the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration investigators to 

request field investigations of these individuals. 

After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional 

actions were taken to improve the process, including revising procedures 

and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help 

avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its 

procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In 

March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that 

immigration investigators are aware of all individuals with revoked visas 

who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address 

legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. In April, the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI, 

identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security 

vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa 

revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State’s and 

DHS’s procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, 

such as specific time frames, for completing each step of the process. 

Outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal 

of individuals based solely on their visa revocation. 

Points of Delay Observed in the Visa Revocation Process 

The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security calls for 

preventing foreign terrorists from 

entering our country and using all 

legal means to identify; halt; and 

where appropriate, prosecute or 

bring immigration or other civil 

charges against terrorists in the 

United States. GAO reported in 

June 2003 that the visa revocation 

process needed to be strengthened 

as an antiterrorism tool and 

recommended that the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), in 

conjunction with the Departments 

of State (State) and Justice, 

develop specific policies and 

procedures to ensure that 

appropriate agencies are notified of 

revocations based on terrorism 

grounds and take proper actions. 

GAO examined whether 

weaknesses in the visa revocation 

process identified in its June 2003 

report were addressed. 

To improve the visa revocation 

process as an antiterrorism tool, 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretaries of Homeland Security 

and State jointly (1) develop a 

written governmentwide policy 

that clearly defines roles and 

responsibilities and sets 

performance standards and (2) 

address outstanding legal and 

policy issues in this area or provide 

Congress with specific actions it 

could take to resolve them. DHS 

generally concurred with the report 

and recommendations. State 

agreed to consult with DHS 

regarding our recommendations. 
Page i GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Initial Actions Taken to Address Weaknesses Were Inadequate 9

Recent Actions Taken to Address Identified Weaknesses in the Visa 

Revocation Process 19

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 29 

GAO Comments 33

Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 34 

GAO Comments 42

Figures 

Figure 1: The Visa Revocation Process in Effect from October 

through December 2003 6

Figure 2: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process 11

Figure 3: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas 

Revoked from October through December 2003 14

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

NIIS Nonimmigrant Information System 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center 

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Page 1 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

July 13, 2004 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

 International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

As stated in the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security,1

 the 

U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the 

homeland from future terrorist attacks. The strategy calls for preventing 

the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to 

identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or initiate immigration or 

other proceedings against terrorists in the United States. The U.S. 

homeland security strategy, involving a variety of federal agencies, has 

multiple tools for preventing potential terrorists from entering the country 

and identifying potential terrorists that have already entered. The visa 

revocation process is one such tool. 

In June 2003 we reported2

 that agencies lacked written procedures to 

ensure that appropriate personnel are notified and take specific actions 

when the Department of State (State) revokes visas3

 on terrorism 

 1

Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, 

D.C.: July 2002). 

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are 

Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June 

18, 2003). 

3

In this report, we use the term “visa” to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. The United 

States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. A visa is a 

travel document that allows a foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry 

for admission to the United States. 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

grounds.4 As a result, lookouts were not always posted, other agencies 

were not always notified of visa revocations, and there were potential 

investigative gaps on individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism 

concerns who were in the United States.5

 We recommended that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State 

and Attorney General, develop specific policies and procedures for the 

interagency visa revocation process to ensure that revocation notices and 

related information are transmitted to the appropriate immigration and 

law enforcement agencies in a timely manner. We also recommended that 

they develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law 

enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals 

who remain in the United States after their visas are revoked. 

At your request, we examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation 

process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. To accomplish 

our objective, we obtained information on policies and procedures put in 

place to improve the visa revocation process; interviewed key State and 

Homeland Security officials responsible for visa revocations; determined 

the steps taken to address policy and legal issues regarding removal of 

individuals with revoked visas raised in our June 2003 report; and analyzed 

data on all visas revoked on terrorism grounds over a 3-month period,6

including detailed information on a random sample of 35 cases selected 

from data provided by the Department of State in February 2004. This 

sample is not projectable because of data problems discussed in appendix 

I. We did not review Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activities to 

 4

The Department of State revokes a person’s visa as a precautionary measure after it learns 

that person might be a suspected terrorist. The purpose of this revocation is to obtain 

additional information from the person to determine if they are the same person that is 

suspected to be a terrorist by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued their 

visa. According to State officials, this authority is an important and useful tool for more 

closely scrutinizing the individual as they reapply for a new visa. The Department of State 

also revokes visas for reasons other than terrorism, such as alien smuggling, drug 

trafficking, and misrepresentation. State officials told us that visas revoked on terrorism 

grounds account for the vast majority of all visas revoked on national security grounds. 

5

In this report, when we refer to individuals whose visas have been revoked, we are 

referring to those individuals for whom the Department of State has issued a visa 

revocation certificate. According to the terms of the certificate, the revocation is effective 

immediately on the date the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United 

States in which case the revocation becomes effective immediately upon the alien’s 

departure from the United States. 

6

Our review covered only nonimmigrant visas that the Department of State revoked on 

terrorism grounds from October 1, 2003, through December 31, 2003. 
Page 3 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

investigate suspected terrorists. We conducted our evaluation in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took some actions 

in the summer of 2003 to address the weaknesses identified in our June 

2003 report. State issued new procedures for revoking visas and notifying 

DHS and other agencies of the revocation, and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, developed a workflow outline for 

determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the country and, if so, 

notifying officials responsible for enforcing our immigration laws. 

However, our analysis of visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from 

October through December 2003 revealed that weaknesses remained in 

the implementation of the visa revocation process, especially relating to 

the timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For 

instance, we found that backlogs or long delays sometimes occurred in 

screening names in the U.S. government’s most complete database of 

potential terrorists (called TIPOFF) against State’s database of current 

visa holders, in transmitting recommendations to revoke individual visas, 

and in revoking individual visas after receiving a recommendation to do 

so. We also found that agencies involved in the visa revocation process 

had conflicting records of how many visas were revoked for terrorism 

concerns between October and December 2003 and whether individuals 

who held these visas may be in the country. In addition, officials from 

DHS’s Customs and Border Protection could not document that they 

consistently notified immigration officials of the need to locate and 

investigate individuals with revoked visas who were present in the United 

States. Additionally, we found that U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), a component of DHS, requested that field offices 

investigate individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds who may 

be in the country more than 2 months after receiving notification of the 

visa revocation. Our review of visa revocations shows that DHS has 

located individuals in the country whose visas were revoked because they 

may be suspected or actual terrorists. ICE officials told us that some are 

still being investigated, three have been arrested on immigration charges, 

and others have been cleared. With respect to an alien already present in 

the United States, the Department of State’s current visa revocation 

certificate makes revocation effective only upon the alien’s departure. 

Therefore, according to DHS, if ICE special agents locate an alien in the 

United States for whom State has issued a revocation certificate that 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

states the revocation is effective upon his or her departure, ICE would be 

unable to place the alien in removal proceedings based solely on a visa 

revocation that had not yet taken place.7

After we initiated our inquiry for this report in January 2004, State and 

DHS took additional actions to address the weaknesses we identified 

through our analysis. DHS and State believe these actions will avoid delays 

experienced in the past. In April and May, State made significant revisions 

to its procedures8

 and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation 

cases. Starting in March, CBP took steps to ensure that ICE officials are 

aware of individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the 

country. Also in March, ICE developed written procedures instructing 

personnel to determine if individuals with revoked visas are in the country 

and, if necessary, investigate them. Finally, State and DHS began 

discussing how to address the legal and policy issues regarding the 

removal of individuals with revoked visas. In addition, the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI 

and established in December 2003, recently took some steps to improve 

the visa revocation process. In March 2004, TSC developed written 

standard operating procedures related to the screening of intelligence 

information and later began training additional staff to perform this 

function. Although the recent actions are important steps to improve the 

visa revocation process, additional measures are needed to further 

improve the process. There is no governmentwide policy regarding visa 

revocations, and the individual agencies’ written policies and procedures 

often do not contain performance standards such as time frames for 

completing individual steps of the visa revocation process, nor do they 

reflect a fully coordinated approach to implementing the process. Further, 

State and DHS continue their discussions of the legal and policy issues, 

with assistance from the Department of Justice. 

In light of our past work and the weaknesses we identified through our 

review, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security 

and State work jointly and with other appropriate agencies to develop a 

written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles and 

responsibilities and sets performance standards for the agencies involved 

 7

DHS could also attempt to remove these aliens based on the derogatory information that 

led State to revoke the individual’s visa. 

8

State told us that, in light of the evolving relationships between State, DHS, and TSC, State 

revises its standard operating procedures as necessary. 
Page 5 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

in the visa revocation process. We also recommend that DHS and State 

address outstanding legal and policy issues or, by October 1, 2004, provide 

Congress with a list of specific actions that could help resolve them. We 

provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, 

State, and Justice for their comments. DHS generally concurred with the 

report and recommendations. State said it would consult with DHS 

regarding the recommendations, with a view to addressing GAO’s 

concerns. The Department of Justice did not provide comments. 

Our nation’s border security process includes multiple mechanisms for 

addressing potential terrorist threats to the United States. One of these 

mechanisms is the visa revocation process. The visa revocation process is 

a homeland security tool that can prevent potential terrorists from 

entering the United States and can help immigration and law enforcement 

officials identify and investigate potential terrorists already in the country. 

The visa revocation process begins after consular officers at the 

Department of State’s overseas consular posts adjudicate visa applications 

for foreign nationals who wish to temporarily enter the United States for 

business, tourism, or other reasons. After receiving a visa, foreign 

nationals travel to ports of entry within the United States. At ports of 

entry, inspectors from DHS’s Customs and Border Protection determine 

whether the visa holder is admitted to the United States and, if so, how 

long he or she may remain in the country. Once foreign nationals have 

entered the United States, DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

assumes responsibility for enforcing our immigration laws, including 

ensuring that foreign nationals are eligible to remain in the United States. 

According to State officials, most visa revocations on terrorism grounds 

begin with information from the TIPOFF database, the U.S. government’s 

primary terrorist watch list. The TIPOFF database includes individuals the 

U.S. government suspects may have ties to terrorism. Information in the 

TIPOFF database is provided by various federal agencies including the 

FBI, State, and others. At the time of our previous report, this information 

was managed by State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In December 

2003, TSC assumed responsibility for this function. TSC was officially 

formed in December 2003 as a result of a presidential directive designed to 

increase information sharing across agencies and to facilitate better 

understanding between the intelligence and investigation communities. As 

an interagency organization under the administration of the FBI with 

representatives from State, DHS, and other federal agencies, part of its 

role is to work with federal agencies to provide access to the TIPOFF 

database. Figure 1 depicts the visa revocation process in effect during the 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

October to December 2003 time period we analyzed for this report as 

described in agency procedures and as explained to us by agency officials. 

Figure 1: The Visa Revocation Process in Effect from October through December 

2003 

Agency and process

Step 6: Determine if alien may already

 be in the United States

Step 7: If alien is in the country,

 locate, investigate, and

 (as appropriate), remove them

• Department of Homeland Security

• Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Department of Homeland Security

Step 5: Notify overseas post, DHS, 

 and others of visa revocation

Step 3: Post appropriate lookouts

• Department of State

Step 4: Revoke visa

• Department of State

• Department of State

Step 2: Identify visa holders who may

 be suspected or actual terrorists

• Department of State

• Terrorist Screening Center

• Department of State

• Terrorist Screening Center

Step 1: Compile intelligence on

 suspected or actual terrorists

Source: GAO.
Page 7 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

State uses information in TIPOFF to determine if visa holders may be 

suspected or actual terrorists. When TSC adds individuals in TIPOFF to 

the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), 

it provides a list of these names to Consular Affairs. State officials told us 

that the entry of these names into CLASS and the Interagency Border 

Inspection System (IBIS) should help prevent any of those individuals 

from entering the United States because border inspectors will be alerted 

to deny them entry. This lookout process does not completely address the 

potential vulnerability posed by individuals already in the country. 

Therefore, the visa revocation process is an important tool to help identify 

individuals whom immigration and law enforcement officials should locate 

and investigate. After TSC adds names to CLASS and IBIS, Consular 

Affairs compares these names with its database of all visa holders and 

sends an electronic spreadsheet back to TSC containing probable or 

possible matches. TSC refines this list by identifying direct matches and 

recommends that Consular Affairs revoke these individuals’ visas. It also 

sends Consular Affairs an information package containing a summary of 

the derogatory information that led TSC to the recommendation to revoke. 

After determining that the revocation is appropriate, the Consular Affairs 

officer posts a lookout in CLASS for the individual.9

 According to State and 

DHS officials, this lookout is then accessible in near real time to DHS 

inspectors at border ports of entry through the IBIS database. CBP 

inspectors at ports of entry use IBIS to check whether foreign nationals 

are inadmissible and should be denied entry into the United States. When a 

person comes to the United States by air or by sea, CBP inspectors are 

required to check that person’s name in IBIS before he or she is allowed to 

enter the country. After posting the lookout, the Consular Affairs officer 

writes an internal case file memo summarizing the derogatory information, 

creates a draft revocation certificate and cable for management review, 

and forwards these materials to the appropriate officials within State. 

Once these officials clear and sign the revocation certificate, Consular 

Affairs sends a cable instructing the overseas post that issued the visa to 

contact the visa holder, physically cancel the visa, and report all actions 

taken to State. State also notifies other federal agencies of visa 

revocations. Specifically, Consular Affairs’ Visa Office faxes a copy of the 

revocation certificate to CBP. In addition, the Visa Office sends a copy of 

 9

The lookout entry—known by the acronym VRVK—is used for all visa revocations, 

regardless of whether the reason for the revocation is related to terrorism or other 

concerns. 
Page 8 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

the cable by email that includes the wording of the revocation certificate 

to various other agencies, including CBP and ICE. 

Upon receiving the notification from State, CBP determines whether the 

individual may have already legally entered the United States by 

electronically searching immigration records. If CBP determines that the 

individual may be in the country, it notifies ICE. ICE officials also attempt 

to determine whether the individual may be in the country. Once ICE 

determines that an individual with a visa revoked on national security 

grounds may be in the United States, ICE employees query law 

enforcement and open source information to attempt to locate the 

individual. If they determine that the individual is in the country, they 

conduct an additional investigation in law enforcement and intelligence 

databases and forward the results of this preliminary research to the 

appropriate Special Agent in Charge (field) office or offices. The ICE 

Special Agent in Charge office then coordinates with the FBI and conducts 

an investigation to locate the individual and determine if the alien is in 

compliance with all terms of his or her admission.10

While FBI investigators do not play a formal role in the visa revocation 

process, they play a key role in the U.S. government’s overall border 

security efforts, including investigating suspected terrorists in the United 

States. The FBI supports border security by (1) working to deny entry into 

the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, 

or supporting terrorist activity and (2) aiding in supplying information to 

locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the 

United States. According to FBI officials, the TIPOFF database is central 

to the FBI’s efforts to track suspected terrorists in the United States. When 

names of suspected terrorists are added to TIPOFF, this information may 

originate from the FBI. When names are added to TIPOFF, the FBI may 

forward investigative leads to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, 

which in turn may relay information to one or more of the 84 Joint 

Terrorist Tracking Task Forces throughout the country for investigation. 

 10As we have previously reported, efforts to locate aliens once they have entered the United 

States are often complicated by incomplete or inaccurate information provided at the time 

of entry. For example, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Overstay Tracking: A Key 

Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 21, 2004). Additional information provided by aliens as a result of US-VISIT may help 

ICE special agents locate individuals whose visas are revoked after they enter the United 

States. US-VISIT is a governmentwide program for collecting, maintaining, and sharing 

information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. 

FBI’s Role in Border 

Security 
Page 9 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Following our June 2003 report, State and DHS took some actions to 

address weaknesses we identified in the visa revocation process, but these 

actions did not adequately address all of the weaknesses we found. State 

developed written procedures providing detailed instructions for 

personnel to follow when revoking visas. DHS did not develop an 

agencywide policy for visa revocations, but DHS’s Customs and Border 

Protection developed a workflow outline related to its role in the visa 

revocation process. Our review of visas revoked from October through 

December 2003 showed that despite State’s and CBP’s initial actions, 

weaknesses persisted in the visa revocation process. 

After our June 2003 report, State developed written standard operating 

procedures for processing visa revocations. These procedures were issued 

on July 7, 2003, and included written instructions for consular officers to 

follow once they decide to revoke an individual’s visa. Specifically, they 

included directions for posting lookouts, preparing and finalizing 

revocation certificates, and notifying appropriate State personnel of the 

action taken. Additionally, these procedures provided instructions for 

notifying both the overseas post that issued the visa and Homeland 

Security officials. State published a less detailed version of these 

procedures in its Foreign Affairs Manual on July 17, 2003, for use by 

consular officers. 

DHS did not develop an intra-agency policy regarding responsibilities for 

handling visa revocation cases. However, following our June 2003 report, 

DHS’s Customs and Border Protection developed a workflow outline 

showing the steps for determining whether individuals with revoked visas 

may be in the United States and, if so, notifying ICE immigration officials 

to take specific actions. These procedures were designed to ensure that 

appropriate lookouts were recorded and that, in cases in which the visa 

holder had entered the United States prior to the visa revocation, all 

research information from CBP was immediately relayed to DHS’s 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement for investigation. 

Our review of visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from October 

through December 2003 indicated that, despite State’s and CBP’s initial 

efforts, weaknesses remained in the visa revocation process. We found 

that backlogs in cases to be screened, delays in forwarding the appropriate 

intelligence to State, and delays in taking action to revoke visas all created 

weaknesses in the visa revocation process. (See fig. 2 for the points of 

delay we observed in our review of visas revoked over a 3-month period.) 

Initial Actions Taken 

to Address 

Weaknesses Were 

Inadequate 

State Developed Initial 

Procedures in 2003, but 

DHS Did Not 

Review of Revocation 

Process Identified Several 

Weaknesses 
Page 10 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

We also found instances of delays in State’s notification to DHS. In 

addition, conflicting records of how many individuals’ visas were revoked 

for terrorism concerns during our reporting period and which of these 

people may be in the United States suggest a risk that agencies may have 

been prevented from taking appropriate action in some cases. Further, we 

found that ICE was not consistently or promptly notified after CBP 

determined that aliens with revoked visas might be in the United States. 

We also found that ICE officials were generally unaware of the basis for 

individual revocations. Additionally, we found that ICE waited more than 2 

months to request that field offices investigate individuals with visas 

revoked on terrorism grounds who may be in the country. Finally, 

outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal 

of individuals based solely on their visa revocation. 
Page 11 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Figure 2: Points of Delay in the Visa Revocation Process 

• Delays in screening, due to backlog 

 of 5,000 names

• Delays in notifying State of suspected 

 terrorists with visas

• Delays in posting lookouts

• Delays in notifying DHS and others

• Delays in alerting immigration officials 

 of individuals with revoked visas who 

 may be in the United States

• Delays in initiating field investigations

Weakness observed

(Backlogs and delays) Agency and process

Step 6: Determine if alien may already

 be in the United States

Step 7: If alien is in the country,

 locate, investigate, and

 (as appropriate), remove them

• Department of Homeland Security

• Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Department of Homeland Security

Step 5: Notify overseas post, DHS, 

 and others of visa revocation

Step 3: Post appropriate lookouts

• Department of State

• Delays in acting on recommendations

 to revoke visas

Step 4: Revoke visa

• Department of State

• Department of State

Step 2: Identify visa holders who may

 be suspected or actual terrorists

• Department of State

• Terrorist Screening Center

• Department of State

• Terrorist Screening Center

Step 1: Compile intelligence on

 suspected or actual terrorists

Source: GAO.
Page 12 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Our review of all visas revoked on terrorism grounds from October 

through December 2003 showed that delays occurred in identifying 

individuals whose visas should be revoked. According to a State official, in 

August and September 2003, there was a backlog of approximately 5,000 

names of suspected terrorists in TIPOFF that had not been screened to 

identify any visa holders. Therefore, there was a delay between identifying 

individuals who may be suspected terrorists and determining whether they 

had a visa. This official explained that the backlog developed in part 

because of a quadrupling in the amount of counterterrorism intelligence 

gathered after September 11 without a commensurate increase in staff 

allocated to screen this intelligence information. She added that the 

backlog was cleared in December 2003 following the temporary 

assignment of additional staff from Consular Affairs. 

Our review of a sample of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns 

showed that delays occurred in transmitting recommendations to 

Consular Affairs to revoke visas. To eliminate the backlog of names to be 

checked, Consular Affairs temporarily assigned two full-time employees to 

screen these intelligence data from TIPOFF. TSC officials told us that 

terrorism intelligence should be screened to identify visa holders as 

quickly as possible. A TSC contractor who typically performs this duty 

said that TSC normally sends an average of no more than six 

recommendations for visa revocation per day. However, according to a 

TSC official, during the time that the Consular Affairs staff were 

temporarily assigned to screen intelligence, these staff waited until they 

had collected large quantities of recommendations and sent them to 

Consular Affairs in large batches. As a result, about 260 visa revocations 

on terrorism grounds during the 3-month period we examined were 

processed on 2 days, November 25 and December 1. This delay increased 

the risk that some of these individuals could have entered the United 

States before State was able to post the appropriate lookouts or revoke 

their visas. 

Based on our review of a sample of visa revocations, the Department of 

State did not always post lookouts in a timely manner. According to State 

and DHS officials, posting this lookout is a key step in the border security 

process because it is the primary mechanism for notifying border 

inspectors that individuals’ visas have been revoked and should not be 

admitted to the United States. State’s standard operating procedures 

issued in July 2003 directed Consular Affairs officials to post a lookout for 

an individual before the revocation is finalized. Although State posted 

lookouts in all 35 visa revocations we examined in detail, we found that in 

six instances, Consular Affairs did not do so until after the revocation was 

Delays Before Revoking Visas 

Posed Significant Risks 

State’s Lookouts Were Not 

Always Timely 
Page 13 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

finalized. In one case it took 8 days after the revocation certificate was 

signed for Consular Affairs to post the lookout. 

Our review of 35 visas revoked based on terrorism concerns also showed 

that delays occurred in Consular Affairs’ decisions to revoke visas after 

receiving a recommendation to do so.11 State officials told us that it should 

not take more than a week for them to complete the visa revocation 

process after receiving a recommendation to revoke. We attempted to 

determine how long it took Consular Affairs to revoke visas after receiving 

a recommendation to do so for our sample of 35. However, this 

information only existed for 6 of the 35 cases. In 3 of these cases, Consular 

Affairs revoked the individuals’ visas within 10 days of receiving the 

recommendation. However, in the other 3 cases, Consular Affairs took 

much longer to act on the recommendation. For example, in one instance, 

a Consular Affairs official told us that State officials deliberated for more 

than 6 months before deciding to revoke the individual’s visa. According to 

this official, Consular Affairs was deliberating whether the individual’s 

connection to terrorism was strong enough to warrant revoking his or her 

visa. In another instance, more than 17 months elapsed between the 

recommendation to revoke and the actual revocation. 

We also observed delays in the Department of State notification to DHS of 

visa revocations. It is particularly important that these notifications are 

timely when the alien whose visa is revoked may already be in the United 

States so that DHS can locate and investigate him or her. Of the 35 cases 

we reviewed in detail, CBP told us it received notification from State the 

same day a revocation was finalized in 9 cases; within 1 to 6 days in 23 

cases; and in 7 days or more in three cases. 

State, CBP, and ICE each maintain separate records on visa revocations. 

We found that for the October through December 2003 time period, each 

agency reported different numbers of revocations based on terrorism 

concerns. As shown in figure 3, State listed 338; ICE, 347; and CBP, 336. 

We found that only 320 names were on all three lists and that some lists 

contained names that were not on either of the other lists. 

 11State officials told us that there was no homeland security vulnerability during its 

deliberations because procedures call for posting lookouts to alert border inspectors to 

stop these individuals. 

Delays Occurred in Revoking 

Visas 

State’s Notifications to DHS 

Were Not Always Timely 

Agencies Reported Conflicting 

Information on Visa 

Revocations 
Page 14 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Figure 3: Inconsistencies among Agencies on Number of Visas Revoked from 

October through December 2003 

Instances where a name did not appear on all three lists show a potential 

breakdown in the visa revocation process. We could not determine why all 

of the names were not on all lists. However, we determined that some of 

the names were not included because the agencies disagreed over whether 

some of these individuals’ visas were revoked on terrorism grounds or 

when their visas were revoked, and others were not included because we 

were provided incomplete information. Regardless of the reason, this 

discrepancy is a cause for concern because CBP and ICE may not have 

taken timely action to determine if these individuals were in the country 

and, if so, to locate and investigate them. 

In our June 2003 report, we noted that State’s Visa Office neither kept a 

central log of visas it revoked on the basis of terrorism concerns, nor did it 

monitor whether notifications were sent to other agencies. In commenting 

on that report, State said the Visa Office had changed its practices to keep 

a log of revocation cases and maintain all signed certificates in a central 

file. However, in conducting this review, Visa Office officials told us that 

State did not maintain a formal list of all visas revoked. We also learned 

that State, CBP, and ICE did not have a system in place to regularly 

2

12

320

On

all lists

12

4

3 0

Number only listed on that agency’s list

Number only listed on 2 of the 3 agencies' lists

Number listed on all 3 agencies' lists

Source: Conceptual drawing of GAO's analysis of State and Department of Homeland Security data.

DHS

Immigration 

and Customs 

Enforcement

347 listed

DHS

Customs 

and Border 

Protection

336 listed

State

338 listed
Page 15 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

reconcile their separate records of visa revocations to ensure that each 

agency has consistent information. 

Our review of a sample of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds shows 

that CBP12 and ICE records also conflicted regarding whether certain 

individuals may have been in the country. In 3 of the 35 cases, CBP and 

ICE disagreed about whether an individual may have been in the country 

at the time of visa revocation and whether they might still be in the 

country. In two of the instances, CBP did not believe the individual was in 

the country and, therefore, did not refer the cases to ICE for investigation. 

However, ICE special agents determined that both of these individuals 

were and still are in the country—one is awaiting adjudication of a 

political asylum claim, and the other has a pending application to become 

a lawful permanent resident of the United States. 

In another instance, CBP believed an individual was in the country when 

his visa was revoked and subsequently notified ICE of the need to locate 

and investigate him. However, because ICE did not use CBP’s notification, 

it performed its own search of immigration records based on State’s 

notification and concluded that the individual was not in the country. 

Therefore, it did not investigate him. According to CBP data, this 

individual has been in the country for more than a year. 

These disagreements are due in part to the lack of clearly defined 

responsibilities for each of the DHS components. Because of DHS’s lack of 

an agencywide written policy regarding visa revocations, its component 

units’ procedures are sometimes duplicative. For example, CBP’s written 

procedures require its personnel to determine if individuals with revoked 

visas may be in the United States and notify ICE of any such individuals. 

According to ICE officials, they conduct their own record checks to 

determine if individuals with revoked visas are in the country and rely 

primarily on notifications from State to identify individuals on whom they 

need to conduct records checks. 

 12CBP’s data come from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), which does not have 

complete arrival and departure records for all non-U.S. citizens. NIIS records arrivals and 

departures of foreign citizens through the collection of I-94 forms. Some aliens are required 

to fill out and turn in these forms to inspectors at air and seaports of entry, as well as at 

land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are not required to fill out I-94 

forms when they enter the United States). NIIS does not have departure data for aliens if 

they fail to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 when they depart. 

CBP and ICE Disagreed on 

Which Individuals May Have 

Been in the Country 
Page 16 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

An ICE official told us that CBP and ICE have different responsibilities 

regarding visa revocations and, as a result, may have different levels of 

sensitivity to information regarding whether individuals with revoked 

visas may be in the country. CBP’s primary responsibility is to post 

lookouts to prevent individuals from entering the country. ICE’s primary 

responsibility is to prevent any national security threats by enforcing 

immigration laws once individuals have already entered the country. 

Therefore, ICE officials told us that they initiate investigations of 

individuals out of an abundance of caution, even if CBP may not believe 

the individual may be in the country. They added that notifications from 

CBP merely supplement ICE’s efforts to determine if individuals may be in 

the country. 

Once they receive notification of a visa revocation from State, DHS 

personnel at CBP should notify ICE if they determine that the individual 

whose visa was revoked may be in the country. CBP’s workflow outline 

states that CBP verifies that any lead information on individuals whose 

visas are revoked and may be in the United States is immediately provided 

to ICE for investigation. A CBP official confirmed that, because these 

cases are highly urgent, they should be handled immediately. However, 

CBP could not document that it had notified ICE promptly, or in several 

cases, that it notified ICE at all. According to CBP data on the 35 cases in 

our sample, 10 aliens may have been in the United States at the time of 

their revocation. In 3 of these cases, CBP records indicate that ICE was 

never notified that the alien might be in the country. In the other 7 cases, 

CBP notified ICE but could not document that the notification occurred 

until at least 3 months after the revocation. 

While ICE could readily identify which visa revocation cases were based 

on terrorism concerns, agency officials stated that they often received no 

derogatory information showing that individuals whose visas State had 

revoked on terrorism concerns might pose a national security threat. 

Because ICE personnel are responsible for fully investigating every case in 

which the individual may be in the country, they expend resources 

conducting investigations on individuals who they believe may pose little 

or no threat to national security. According to ICE officials, the growing 

number of visa revocation cases based on terrorism concerns places a 

significant strain on their investigative resources, and ICE was forced to 

pull agents off active investigations of known national security threats to 

investigate visa revocation cases. 

As discussed earlier, State officials told us that the vast majority of visas 

revoked for terrorism concerns are based on derogatory information 

ICE May Not Have Been 

Informed of Aliens with 

Revoked Visas Who May Be in 

the Country 

ICE Officials Are Generally 

Unaware of Basis for Individual 

Revocations 
Page 17 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

contained in TIPOFF. According to TSC, of the 35 cases we examined in 

detail, 32 of the individuals whose visas were revoked appeared in 

TIPOFF. However, in May 2004, ICE officials told us that they were not 

aware that most of State’s visa revocations on terrorism grounds are based 

on information in TIPOFF. In June 2004, they informed us that their 

records check located only 6 of the 35 individuals from our sample in 

TIPOFF. Also in June, State officials told us they recently began providing 

DHS with the TIPOFF record number for each individual whose 

revocation was based on derogatory information in TIPOFF. 

Our review of 35 visa revocations on terrorism grounds from October 

through December 2003 shows that ICE forwarded requests for field 

offices to initiate investigations of individuals who may be in the United 

States more than 2 months after receiving notification of the visa 

revocation. ICE officials explained that requests sent to field offices 

specify a date by which the field offices should complete their 

investigations. These officials added that, in instances when the individual 

is in TIPOFF and in the country, they take immediate action to locate and 

investigate him or her. After receiving notification from State, ICE 

determined that field offices should investigate 8 of the 35 cases we 

examined in detail. In all 8 of these cases, ICE waited more than 2 months 

to initiate field investigations. In 2 cases, ICE received notification from 

the Department of State of the visa revocation in mid-October 2003 but did 

not send a request to field offices to investigate these individuals until the 

end of February 2004. In the other 6 cases, ICE received notification from 

the Department of State of the visa revocation in early December but again 

did not send a request to field offices to investigate these individuals until 

the end of February. 

ICE officials told us that it might have taken longer than it usually takes to 

initiate these investigations because of an increase in their workload 

resulting from the raising of the nationwide terror threat level to “code 

orange” (high) during the period of our review. On December 21, 2003, 

DHS raised the terror threat level from “code yellow” (elevated) to “code 

orange” for 19 days. In June, ICE officials told us they were considering 

revising their policies to ensure that all future investigations are initiated 

promptly. 

Separate from our sample of 35 visa revocations, we reviewed the more 

than 300 visa revocations based on terrorism concerns from October 

through December 2003. According to ICE records, ICE determined that 

64 of these individuals needed to be investigated because they might have 

been in the United States at the time of revocation. ICE indicated it had 

ICE Initiated Field 

Investigations More Than 2 

Months after Receiving 

Notification of Visa Revocation 

DHS Investigated Individuals 

with Visas Revoked on 

Terrorism Grounds 
Page 18 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

initiated investigations on all 64 of these individuals and has concluded a 

majority of these investigations. Data provided by ICE show that these 

investigations resulted in confirming departure of some aliens, clearing 

others, and arresting 3 on administrative immigration charges.13 On June 8, 

2004, ICE officials told us that they have no specific derogatory 

information that would indicate that any of the individuals remaining in 

the United States represent a threat to national security. We also noted 

several cases where the visa revocation process prevented individuals 

with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from entering the United 

States or helped remove them from the United States. 

Revocation of a visa is not explicitly a stated grounds for removal under 

the Immigration and Nationality Act.14 State’s visa revocation certificate 

states that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date 

the certificate is signed unless the alien is already in the United States, in 

which case the revocation will become effective immediately upon the 

alien’s departure from the United States. Therefore, if ICE special agents 

locate an alien in the United States for whom the Department of State has 

issued a revocation certificate that states that the alien’s visa is revoked 

effective upon his or her departure, ICE would be unable to place the alien 

in removal proceedings based solely on a visa revocation that had not yet 

taken place. In light of the Department of State’s current revocation 

certificate, the issue whether, under the current statute and regulations, 

DHS would have the authority to initiate removal proceedings on the basis 

solely of a visa revocation has not been litigated and remains unresolved 

legally. According to DHS officials, if State changed the wording of the 

certificate to make the revocation effective retroactively to the date of 

issuance of the visa, the government would no longer be effectively barred 

from litigating the issue. However, in June 2004 State and DHS officials 

told us that they had reached an informal understanding that should the 

wording of the revocation certificate be changed, it would not be changed 

in all instances, but only on a case by case basis. In commenting on a draft 

of this report, DHS stated that on a case by case basis DHS may ask that 

State change its revocation certificate related to an admitted alien to make 

the revocation effective retroactively to the date of issuance of the visa, 

 13ICE provided us a breakdown of results of the 64 investigations, but we have not included 

these data because DHS classified them as law enforcement sensitive. 

148 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. An alien may be placed in removal proceedings under a charge of 

inadmissibility based on terrorist activities as defined in Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2). 

Existing Law Does Not 

Expressly Provide for the 

Removal of Aliens Based Solely 

on Visa Revocations 
Page 19 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

and State will consider such a request in consultation with DHS and the 

Department of Justice. 

Since we initiated our inquiry in January 2004, State and DHS have taken 

additional actions to address identified weaknesses in the process. These 

included revisions to visa revocation procedures, reviewing past 

revocations, and taking steps to address legal and policy issues. In 

addition, in mid-April, TSC identified visa revocations as a potential 

vulnerability that could compromise homeland security and developed an 

informal process for coordinating actions and sharing information relating 

to visa revocations. However, we identified some weaknesses that still 

need to be addressed. 

In April and May 2004, State took several actions to improve its 

performance in the visa revocation process, including revising its 

procedures and formalizing its tracking of visa revocations. In the course 

of responding to our inquiries, State’s Visa Office discovered that its 

standard operating procedures had not always been followed correctly. In 

response, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs informed us 

on April 27, 2004, that in light of the importance of visa revocation cases, 

the procedures were revised to provide more explicit details for each step 

in the process. For example, the procedures were revised to highlight the 

importance of posting a lookout code into CLASS before the revocation 

certificate is signed. Additionally, the Visa Office now requires its 

personnel performing visa revocations to certify that they have completed 

all steps in the process and to provide the date on which each step was 

completed. At the end of the process, a designated supervisor must now 

review the revocation file and certify that the standard operating 

procedures were completed correctly. State revised these procedures 

again in late May 2004 to further clarify which federal agencies should 

receive notification of the revocation. Finally, the Assistant Secretary for 

Consular Affairs told us that the Visa Office planned to formalize its 

previously informal system for tracking visa revocations to make it a 

definitive reference point for information about all visa revocations. 

Officials from CBP took two steps following the initiation of our review to 

ensure that appropriate action was taken on prior visa revocations. On 

March 25, 2004, CBP officials sent notifications to ICE regarding 

individuals with visas revoked from October through December 2003 who 

may be in the country. CBP officials told us that they sent these 

Recent Actions Taken 

to Address Identified 

Weaknesses in the 

Visa Revocation 

Process 

State Revised Its 

Procedures and 

Formalized Its System for 

Tracking Cases 

CBP Reviewed Past 

Revocations to Provide 

Additional Information to 

ICE 
Page 20 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

notifications to ICE because, in responding to our inquiry, they determined 

that they could not document previous notifications to ICE of these 

individuals. 

In May 2004, a CBP official informed us that CBP was performing a review 

of all visa revocations in its lookout database to ensure that all appropriate 

notifications had been sent to ICE. This review identified 656 individuals 

with revoked visas who may be in the country. CBP provided this 

information to ICE. We reviewed these data and determined that 34 of 

these individuals’ visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from 

October through December 2003. 

In January 2004, ICE assigned a special agent to CBP in order to assist 

with information exchange and coordination of visa revocation issues. 

According to DHS, if CBP determines that an individual whose visa was 

revoked is in the country, ICE is notified immediately. Also, on March 1, 

2004, ICE issued written standard operating procedures for all visa 

revocation investigations. ICE officials acknowledged that prior to March 

2004, ICE did not have a policy that specifically addressed visa 

revocations. However, ICE explained that it had procedures for handling 

all investigative leads received, including visa revocations. ICE’s March 

2004 procedures outline the steps that ICE officials should take for cases 

where an individual has entered the United States and subsequently has a 

visa revoked. These procedures begin with the receipt of a visa revocation 

cable from State and include steps for determining if individuals are in the 

country, conducting records searches to determine where the individual 

may be, and forwarding necessary information to field offices for further 

investigation. 

In February 2004, officials from DHS, which has overall responsibility for 

visa policy, told us they were considering a regulation relating to visa 

revocations that could allow the removal of individuals from the United 

States because their visas have been revoked by State. In June 2004, DHS 

officials told us that they were still considering this regulation and were 

coordinating with State and the Department of Justice. Additionally, DHS 

was working with Justice to address questions regarding DHS’s authority 

to issue such a regulation. State officials told us that making changes 

regarding removal of persons with revoked visas would require both State 

and DHS to make legal and policy decisions and establish a formal written 

agreement regarding procedures. 

ICE Assigned Staff to CBP 

and Developed Written 

Standard Operating 

Procedures 

State and DHS Took Steps 

to Address Legal and 

Policy Issues 
Page 21 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Since its formation in December 2003, TSC has taken actions to clarify its 

role, increase its capacity to handle visa revocation cases, and analyze the 

visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, in March 

2004, TSC developed written standard operating procedures outlining the 

process for screening intelligence information to identify visa holders who 

may be terrorists and for recommending that Consular Affairs revoke 

these individuals’ visas. TSC also recently began training additional staff to 

screen terrorism intelligence for matches with visa holders. Previously, the 

center had one full-time staff member dedicated to performing this 

function. 

TSC officials told us that, in mid-April 2004, TSC identified the visa 

revocation process as a potential vulnerability to homeland security. As a 

result, it developed a process for TSC to coordinate the sharing of 

information on visa revocation cases. This process outlines 

responsibilities for representatives from State, CBP, ICE, and the FBI who 

are assigned to TSC. According to a TSC official, this process is designed 

to coordinate the efforts of these representatives, without relying on 

formal notifications transmitted among the agencies. When new names are 

added to the TIPOFF database, all the agency representatives receive this 

information at the same time. According to TSC’s new process, State 

personnel assigned to TSC determine if the person has a valid visa; CBP 

personnel determine if the individual may be in the country; and, if the 

individual is in the country, ICE and FBI personnel determine if they have 

open investigations of the individual. Because this process was developed 

after the October to December 2003 time period, we did not assess its 

effectiveness. 

In April 2004, TSC also initiated a review of pending visa revocation cases 

based on terrorism concerns to determine whether any of the individuals 

in question were in the United States and whether DHS and FBI were 

aware of their presence and had open investigations on them. A senior FBI 

official assigned to TSC told us that as of May 27, 2004, this review was not 

complete, but that, in some instances, law enforcement or immigration 

officials needed to open investigations on some of these individuals. 

Despite the steps taken by State and DHS, additional actions are needed to 

improve the visa revocation process. There is no governmentwide policy 

outlining roles and responsibilities for the visa revocation process, and 

State and DHS have not completed their discussions on legal and policy 

issues related to removing individuals with revoked visas from the United 

States. Although CBP and ICE have written internal procedures related to 

TSC’s Efforts to Improve 

the Visa Revocation 

Process 

Additional Actions Are 

Needed to Improve the 

Visa Revocation Process 
Page 22 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

their respective roles and responsibilities in the visa revocation process, 

DHS has still not developed an agencywide policy governing the process. 

As a result, CBP and ICE take responsibility for performing some of the 

same tasks. While CBP’s workflow outline states that CBP is responsible 

for determining if individuals with revoked visas are in the United States 

and referring cases to ICE, ICE’s standard operating procedures indicate 

that ICE staff are also responsible for performing this function. In some 

cases, State, CBP, and ICE are not familiar with what the different 

agencies’ policies and procedures expect of them. Because agency officials 

do not always recognize what other agencies’ written policies expect of 

them, important information may not be passed from one agency to the 

next, and efforts may be duplicated. Further, since the agencies do not 

have a system in place for routinely reconciling their visa revocation 

records, there is a heightened chance that individuals with visas revoked 

for terrorism concerns and who are in the country will not be investigated. 

State’s and DHS’s written procedures also lack specific time frames for 

completing individual steps in the process. For instance, State’s 

procedures dated May 20, 2004 lack guidance on how quickly Consular 

Affairs officials should act on recommendations from TSC to revoke 

individuals’ visas. Further, they lack guidance on how quickly Consular 

Affairs officials should notify the overseas post and other federal agencies 

once the revocation certificate is signed. In addition, ICE’s written 

procedures do not specify a time frame for referring cases to Special Agent 

in Charge offices. This general lack of time frames is significant, given the 

extent of delays we observed in the visa revocation process and the 

potential threat posed by the individuals whose visas have been revoked. 

State’s and DHS’s discussions of legal and policy issues regarding the visa 

revocation process have not been completed. DHS officials told us that the 

agencies continue to discuss possible mechanisms for addressing these 

issues, including possibly changing the wording of State’s revocation 

certificate or studying the feasibility of drafting a regulation to address 

these issues. According to State and DHS, the complexity of these issues 

have required an extraordinary amount of review and coordination with 

various interested government agencies. As of June 2004, neither State nor 

DHS could provide a time line for addressing these legal and policy issues. 

Our testing of the visa revocation process from October through 

December 2003 identified several gaps in the process. Since then, DHS 

and State have taken several actions to improve the process. DHS and 

State believe that these actions will avoid the delays that were 

Conclusions 
Page 23 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

experienced in the past. TSC’s recent initiative to coordinate the sharing of 

information on potential terrorists should also improve the process. 

Nevertheless, some additional actions are needed to further improve the 

process. A governmentwide commitment is necessary to address the 

weaknesses in the implementation of the visa revocation process so that it 

can be a more effective antiterrorism tool. 

To strengthen and improve the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism 

tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly 

with the Secretary of State and other appropriate agencies to take the 

following two actions: 

• Develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines the roles 

and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the visa revocation 

process, including TSC. This policy should include directions for sharing 

information and tracking visa revocation cases throughout the interagency 

visa revocation process. It should incorporate performance standards 

(e.g., time frames for completing each step in the process) and periodic 

interagency assessments to determine whether information is being shared 

among the agencies involved and appropriate follow-up action is being 

taken and to reconcile data differences if they occur; and 

• Address outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the status of aliens 

with visas revoked on national security grounds who are in the United 

States at the time of the revocation. If these issues cannot be addressed, 

the Executive Branch should, by October 1, 2004, provide Congress with a 

list of specific actions (including any potential legislative changes) that 

could help resolve them. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland 

Security, State, and Justice for their comments. 

The Department of Homeland Security said it generally concurred with the 

report and its recommendations. DHS believes that our identification of 

areas where improvements are needed will contribute to ongoing efforts 

to strengthen the visa revocation process. DHS emphasized that persons 

whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns may not be 

terrorists and that revoking a visa is a precautionary measure to preclude 

an alien from gaining admission to the United States until more 

information is obtained to decide if the person should be admitted to the 

United States. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 24 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

The Department of State indicated that it believes that its handling of the 

revocation process overall has been excellent and has improved over time. 

State indicated it would consult with DHS regarding implementation of 

our recommendations. State also provided additional information on the 

visa revocation process and the procedures currently in effect. 

DHS and State also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of 

Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, Secretary 

of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General. We also will make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff 

have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128. 

Key contributors to this report were John Brummet, Jason Bair, 

Elizabeth Singer, Mary Moutsos, Janey Cohen, and Etana Finkler. 

Sincerely yours, 

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 25 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

The scope of our work covered the interagency process for visas revoked 

by the Department of State (State) headquarters on the basis of terrorism 

concerns between October 1 and December 31, 2003. To assess the 

policies and procedures governing the visa revocation process, we 

obtained copies of written procedures from the Department of State and 

the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

In addition, we interviewed officials from State, DHS, the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

To assess the process for revoking visas on terrorism grounds, we 

examined data and records provided by State’s Visa Office on visa 

revocations from October through December 2003. The Visa Office 

provided us an initial list of such revocations in February 2004 and an 

amended list in April 2004. We also obtained information from CBP and 

ICE on the number of visas revoked on terrorism grounds during this time 

period and compared these data with that provided by State’s Visa Office. 

We found that the total number of visa revocations differed among these 

three data sources. We identified discrepancies and discussed these with 

agency officials. In addition, we obtained copies of the official revocation 

certificates for individuals whose visas State revoked during that time. We 

determined that State made at least 338 visa revocations during this time 

period, but we also determined that the data on visa revocations were not 

sufficiently reliable to provide an exact count of the number of 

revocations. However, the data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of 

this report. 

We used the Visa Office’s February 2004 list of 318 cases to draw a random 

sample of 35 to review in detail. We cannot generalize from this sample to 

the full universe of all cases because, after we had drawn our sample, the 

Visa Office subsequently supplied us with an amended list of 338 cases. 

For the individuals in our sample of 35, we obtained printouts from State’s 

Consular Consolidated Database, which provided us with the individuals’ 

names, biographic data such as dates and places of birth, passport 

numbers, and visa information such as issuing posts and types of visa. We 

also obtained a copy of the cable sent by State headquarters to the post 

that issued the visa that was revoked. This cable included a reference to 

the specific section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that was used 

as the basis for the revocation as well as a list of other agencies the cable 

was sent to. The Visa Office also provided documentation of the lookouts 

it posted in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 26 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

We met with officials from TSC and State’s Visa Office to determine the 

steps taken prior to finalizing visa revocations. TSC officials provided 

copies of their written policies and procedures for dealing with visa 

revocations and described the process it follows in such cases. TSC 

officials also informed us whether individuals in our sample of 35 visa 

revocations are in the TIPOFF database and, if so, when a 

recommendation to revoke these visas was sent to State. To calculate the 

length of time between the recommendation to revoke and the actual 

revocation, we compared the information provided by TSC with the dates 

on the revocation certificates provided by State. 

To determine when State posted lookouts and notified other agencies of 

visa revocations, we obtained information from the Visa Office. This 

included printouts from the CLASS system showing when a lookout was 

posted, who posted the lookout, and what lookout code was used. In 

addition, we examined the revocation cables sent to other agencies. We 

also obtained information from CBP and ICE regarding when they 

received notification from State. We determined that the CLASS system 

was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of showing when lookouts were 

posted. 

To determine if and when ICE officials were informed by CBP of 

individuals with revoked visas who might be in the country, we obtained 

documents from and spoke with officials from CBP. These officials 

provided an electronic version of CBP’s Visa Revocation Case Tracking 

Spreadsheet for the period we examined. This spreadsheet contained 

information on all visa revocations during the period, not just those based 

on terrorism concerns. The spreadsheet included the names, dates the 

notifications of the revocations were received, dates of the most recent 

entry and exit from the United States, and the date on which CBP 

informed ICE that the individual might be in the country. 

We also compared State, CBP, and ICE records regarding the number and 

names of individuals with visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from 

October through December 2003. We obtained lists of all such cases during 

the period from State and ICE. We then compared these lists to one 

another and to CBP’s Visa Revocation Case Tracking Spreadsheet. 

To determine which individuals with revoked visas might be in the 

country, we examined CBP’s entry and exit data in its Visa Revocation 

Case Tracking Spreadsheet. These data are based on information from the 

Nonimmigrant Information System, which does not have complete entry 

and exit data (e.g., it does not include departure information if aliens fail 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 27 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 form when they leave the 

country). As such, we determined that these data are not sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of determining which individuals with visas 

revoked on terrorism grounds are in the country. In addition, because ICE 

officials told us they do not rely on CBP to determine which individuals 

might be in the country, we obtained additional entry and exit data from 

ICE for our sample of 35 cases. To assess the reliability of the ICE data, we 

interviewed officials who were knowledgeable about the data and 

compared it with CBP’s data. Where we found discrepancies, we discussed 

these cases with officials from both CBP and ICE. We determined that the 

ICE data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing the 

ongoing results of investigations of individuals that had been in the United 

States with revoked visas; however, some investigations were still 

outstanding and, in some cases, ICE officials were not completely certain 

whether the individuals had actually departed the United States. 

We obtained information on actions taken to locate and investigate 

individuals in the United States with visas revoked based on terrorism 

concerns. ICE officials provided us with summary data on all visa 

revocations based on terrorism concerns during the period. In addition, 

they provided detailed information on their efforts to locate and 

investigate each of the 35 individuals in our sample. We also met with 

officials from the FBI and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to 

determine their activities regarding investigating individuals with visas 

revoked based on terrorism concerns. 

To determine the steps taken to improve the visa revocation process since 

our June 2003 report, we met with State, DHS, FBI, and TSC officials. 

From these officials we obtained copies of policies and procedures 

developed since our previous report. We also obtained information on 

changes in the visa revocation process since our prior report. In addition, 

we met with State and DHS officials regarding the steps taken to resolve 

outstanding legal issues regarding visa revocations. These officials 

described the discussions they have had regarding changing the wording 

of State’s certificate of revocation and DHS’s regulations. DHS declined to 

provide us with a copy of a draft regulation they had prepared, noting that 

it was the subject of ongoing intra- and interagency discussions. 

We were briefed by FBI officials regarding their efforts to investigate 

suspected terrorists in the TIPOFF database. However, we did not review 

these efforts. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

We conducted our work from January through June 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 29 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 1. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 30 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 2. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 31 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 32 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 33 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s letter dated June 17, 2004. 

1. We have revised the report to reflect the fact that, while ICE did not 

have procedures specific to visa revocations prior to March 2004, it 

had procedures that applied more generally to all investigative leads. 

2. Our report did not indicate that any of the individuals included in our 

review were necessarily suspected or actual terrorists. The 

Department of State revokes a person’s visa as a precautionary 

measure after it learns that person might be a suspected terrorist. The 

purpose of this revocation is to obtain additional information from the 

person to determine if they are the same person that is suspected to be 

a terrorist by requiring them to return to the consulate that issued their 

visa. In commenting on our draft report, State explained that all of 

these revocations were based on information suggesting possible 

terrorist activities or links. 

3. Based on our analysis, we reported that ICE and CBP records 

conflicted regarding whether specific individuals whose visas were 

revoked on terrorism grounds were or may still be in the country. With 

regard to one of these individuals, ICE concluded that the individual 

was not in the country and therefore, it did not investigate him. 

According to CBP data, this individual has been in the country for 

more than a year. As a result of such discrepancies between agency 

records, we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic 

interagency assessments to determine whether information is being 

shared among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process and 

appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data 

differences if they occur. 

4. We acknowledge that ICE requests sent to field offices specify a date 

by which they should complete their investigations. However, our 

statement refers to a lack of time frames for sending requests to field 

offices, not to a lack of time frames for those field offices to complete 

their investigations. 

GAO Comments 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 34 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 35 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 1. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 36 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 2. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 37 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 38 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 3. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 39 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 5. 

See comment 4. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 40 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 8. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 6. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 41 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

See comment 9. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 42 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated June 23, 2004. 

1. The posting of lookouts in CLASS and IBIS is an important tool for 

preventing potential terrorists from entering the country. However, 

posting these lookouts is not designed to track individuals who 

entered the United States before the Department of State revokes their 

visas. As such, the visa revocation process remains a useful tool for 

promptly identifying, locating, and investigating individuals who may 

be in the United States and may pose a threat to homeland security. 

2. We acknowledge that the Department of State should appropriately 

deliberate over visa revocation cases. However, State officials told us 

that their involvement in the entire visa revocation process should take 

no longer than one week. Given this standard, State’s delay in three 

cases of more than 6 months appears excessive. 

3. This report includes a review of all 330+ visas revoked on terrorism 

grounds from October through December 2003, including a detailed 

review of a random sample of 35 cases. We chose to review this 3-

month period to allow some time for the agencies involved to 

implement our recommendations for improving the visa revocation 

process contained in our June 2003 report. In addition to this report, 

we previously reviewed all 240 visas revoked on terrorism grounds 

from September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2002, and found 

similar weaknesses. As noted earlier, posting CLASS and IBIS lookouts 

is not intended to track individuals who entered the United States 

before the Department of State revoked their visas. As such, the visa 

revocation process remains a useful tool for promptly identifying, 

locating, and investigating individuals who may be in the United States 

and may pose a threat. 

4. In February 2004, we requested detailed information from State on 35 

individuals whose visas State had revoked on terrorism grounds from 

October through December 2003. In April, we received this 

information. After reviewing the data, we discussed our preliminary 

findings with the Managing Director of State’s Office of Visa Services, 

including delays in State’s decisions to revoke three individuals’ visas. 

The same day, we provided State the names of these three individuals 

and requested information on why these delays occurred. In May, a 

State official provided an explanation of State’s actions regarding these 

individuals. However, we chose to exclude this information from our 

report due to the sensitivity of the type of information involved. 

GAO Comments 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 43 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

5. In February 2004, we requested detailed information (including when 

lookout codes were entered) for a random sample of 35 visa 

revocation cases. In April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for 

Consular Affairs informed us that in researching and gathering this 

information, State discovered that, in some cases, the officer 

responsible for handling revocations did not enter the revocation 

lookout code immediately into CLASS before the revocation certificate 

was signed. 

6. Based on information State provided during the course of our review, 

we note that State revises its standard operating procedures for visa 

revocations as necessary. After reviewing our draft report, State 

provided us with a revised copy of its standard operating procedures 

dated June 17, 2004, which included more explicit time frames. We 

believe this is a good step toward implementing our recommendation. 

7. In conducting this review, we requested a list of individuals whose 

visas were revoked based on terrorism concerns from October through 

December 2003 from State, CBP, and ICE. State asserts that the 

conflicting records were probably due to different methodologies for 

compiling various agencies’ lists. We note that we observed multiple 

instances where conflicting records could not be explained by 

differing methodologies. For example, in some cases the agencies 

disagreed over whether the individuals’ visas were revoked based on 

terrorism grounds and, in other cases, agencies did not initially provide 

names that they later acknowledged should have been included in their 

lists. 

Given these conflicting records and the possible threat to homeland 

security, we are recommending that State and DHS conduct periodic 

interagency assessments to determine whether information is being 

shared among the agencies involved in the visa revocation process and 

appropriate follow-up action is being taken and to reconcile data 

differences if they occur. 

8. We have updated our report to reflect the current status of State’s and 

DHS’s discussions of legal and policy issues and have removed all 

references to unresolved legal disagreements. We have added 

information reflecting a recent informal understanding reached by 

State and DHS that, on a case by case basis, DHS may ask that State 

revoke a visa retroactively. However, we note that legal and policy 

issues regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa 

revocations continue to exist, and agency discussions on how to 

address these issues have not been completed. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 44 GAO-04-795 Visas Revoked on Terrorism Grounds 

9. During the course of our review, State’s and DHS’s discussions evolved 

regarding legal and policy issues relating to removing individuals from 

the United States based on visa revocations. Based on discussions with 

State and DHS officials, we have removed any implied linkage between 

revising the visa revocation certificate and a regulatory or statutory 

amendment. 

(320248) 
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