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U.S. INITIATIVES AT NATO’S ISTANBUL SUMMIT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 16, 2004

Serial No. 108–115

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Robert A. Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 6

Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and 

NATO Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................... 14

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Robert A. Bradtke: Prepared statement ................................................................ 9

Ian Brzezinski: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 18

(1)

U.S. INITIATIVES AT NATO’S ISTANBUL 

SUMMIT 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:33 p.m. in Room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter presiding. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I open the hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe and welcome our witnesses and our guests. Today, we will discuss United States initiatives for the summit meeting that the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization will hold in Istanbul on June 

28 and June 29. 

Our witnesses today are Mr. Robert Bradtke, a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia; and Mr. Ian Brzezinski, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO affairs. 

The Istanbul Summit will mark a historic milestone, as it is the 

first meeting of all 26 national leaders. On March 29 of this year, 

seven nations joined the most successful alliance in history and 

thereby secured the freedom that they had worked so hard to gain. 

The decision to admit former communist nations from Central 

and Eastern Europe into the Atlantic Alliance is one of the great 

successes of American and Alliance foreign policy since the end of 

the cold war. 

It is also a success in which the House of Representatives has 

played an important role. Since 1994, the House has repeatedly declared its support for NATO enlargement, and the fundamental 

role of NATO in transatlantic security. 

Most recently, on March 30 of this year, by a 422 to 2 vote, the 

House approved H. Res. 558. That resolution, which I introduced, 

noted the accomplishments of the incoming NATO members and 

welcomed them. 

In addition, the resolution expressed our support for the door to 

be open for the three countries that currently remain candidates 

for NATO membership: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. 

To ensure that the enlargement process continues after the accession of the seven new members, the resolution recommends that 

the leaders of the NATO nations, ‘‘review the enlargement process, 

including the applications of Albania, Croatia, and Macendonia, at 

a summit meeting to be held no later than 2007.’’

2

The admission of seven new members this spring was a great accomplishment for NATO, but the enlargement process must continue. Today, I again urge the Bush Administration to support language in the Istanbul Summit communique to hold the next enlargement summit to consider invitations for any qualified aspirants no later than 2007. 

I think this is a reasonable timetable, one that gives NATO time 

to fully incorporate the seven new members into the Alliance, while 

ensuring that the three remaining candidates and others to be 

added to the waiting list are not forgotten. But instead are encouraged and energized by the certainty of another decision date. 

While the Istanbul Summit will be a celebration to welcome the 

new members of the Alliance, one of the most important subjects 

to be considered is the status of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, 

and the urgent need to augment that force. 

I cannot overstate how critical the next few weeks will be for the 

future of Afghanistan and for the credibility of the North Atlantic 

Alliance. Unless the NATO allies quickly remedy the grave shortfalls in military personnel and equipment, the NATO mission in Afghanistan faces a real danger of failure. 

Since last year, when NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, 6,500 troops from allied and partner nations have succeeded in providing a more secure 

environment in and around Kabul. 

However, the Alliance has failed to meet critical shortfalls in, 

‘‘quick reaction support; the backup forces that would assist NATO 

units that might find themselves in need of reinforcement, air support, or medical evacuation.’’ Beyond the shortfalls in the current 

force, ISAF faces three further challenges in the weeks ahead. 

First, I think it is essential that the reach of President Hamid 

Karzai’s government be extended to the provinces and that the 

power and influence of regional warlords, and narcotics kings be reduced. 

In this effort, the NATO nations had pledged that before the 

Istanbul Summit that they would collectively create five additional 

provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, to patrol the Afghan 

countryside. That summit is now a few weeks away, and those 

teams have not been created. 

Second, ISAF in August must replace more than 1,000 Canadian 

troops. Canada currently commands ISAF, but its commitment 

ends this summer, and its contribution will decline from 1,700 

troops in country today to about 600. 

Third, NATO must enable ISAF to provide security beyond Kabul 

before and during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 

September. If the allies at Istanbul do not commit more forces and 

the support assets to sustain them, the September elections in Afghanistan will likely do little more than legitimize the warlords 

and drug traffickers who are increasingly controlling much of the 

country. 

Two weeks ago, I returned from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Bratislava. Recognizing the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan, the leaders of the 26 national delegations, and 

I would say in an unprecedented action, authorized me to send a 

letter to our national leaders, expressing the concern of the AssemVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

bly and urging governments to provide the necessary resources for 

ISAF. 

By the way, I have responses thus far from Greece and France. 

I also will raise these concerns with those leaders when I address 

them at the Istanbul Summit through my role as President of the 

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 

Likewise, the Administration at Istanbul must press our allies to 

dig deeper and find the extra personnel and resources that are 

needed to make this mission a success. I might say that I emphasize to my colleagues that we would send them to all 26 national 

countries and national leaders, regardless of the fact that some 

countries, like our own, are pulling our own weight, along with the 

Germans, and to this point, of course, the Canadians, among others. 

The NATO allies have promised to make more than 1,000 infantry companies available for NATO missions. They have promised to 

make more than 2,000 helicopters available for NATO missions. 

They have promised to make almost 300 transport aircraft available for NATO missions. 

Yet, for the mission in Afghanistan, the allies seemingly cannot 

find a few more infantry companies, cannot find a few more helicopters, and cannot find a few more transport aircraft that are 

really essential to avoid failure. 

Actually, this crucial shortfall in pledged personnel and equipment is a failure of political will, pure and simple. Make no mistake about it, this is a failure that jeopardizes the success of our 

mission in Afghanistan and jeopardizes the very credibility of the 

Alliance. 

We often say that failure is not an option. Alas, in Afghanistan, 

failure is a distinct possibility. And unless allied leaders in the 

next few weeks demonstrate the political will to deploy the necessary assets in Afghanistan, failure gradually will become a reality. 

I think it is totally unacceptable that these drastic shortfalls 

exist despite the fact that there are more than two million military 

personnel in the active and reserve forces of the Euronpean NATO 

allies. 

Only 2 percent of those forces are deployed on NATO missions 

in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Allied countries have no shortage 

of military personnel, but NATO does lack units that can actually 

be used for the missions the Alliance now needs to conduct. 

The first step toward increasing the usability of European forces 

was the creation of a NATO Reaction Force, or the NRF, at the 

2002 Prague Summit. That force is expected to achieve an initial 

operating capacity in October of this year, and I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses about the progress in developing the 

NRF. 

To ensure that NATO has the critical capabilities that it needs, 

the national leaders agreed at the Prague Capabilities Commitment that they would assign these nations for multinational working groups to rectify shortfalls in key areas like air-to-air refueling, 

strategic lift, and precision-guided munitions. 

The report card on this initiative has been mixed, and so I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses what the assessment is to 

4

date. So, the Istanbul Summit will do more than welcome the seven 

new allies into NATO and review the process of NATO transformation since the Prague Summit 2 years ago. It could herald a 

new approach in NATO’s relations with its neighbors, particularly 

those to the south. 

At the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in April, Secretary 

of State Powell and his colleagues discussed a new strategy, a new 

security cooperation initiative that NATO might adopt toward that 

region that is becoming known as the Broader Middle East; that 

is, the array of mostly Muslim nations stretching from North Africa 

to Afghanistan. 

This initiative will be an important part of the agendas that involve the prime ministers in April, who also committed themselves 

to adopting a package of anti-terrorism measures at Istanbul, and 

I hope that our witnesses today will be able to discuss the Alliance 

role in the global war on terrorism. Unfortunately, it now appears 

unlikely that the Alliance will agree in Istanbul to assume a greater role in Iraq. 

Finally, the Istanbul Summit will mark a milestone in the first 

military mission that NATO undertook, the Stabilization Force in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

All indications are that the Alliance leaders will agree to hand 

over the SFOR mission to the European Union at the end of the 

year. I assume that means that they think it is ready at that point 

and that no risks will be taken with handoff. 

I think that this is a welcomed step that underlines the progress 

that NATO has made in stabilizing the security situation in Bosnia. I hope that the EU will demonstrate an ability for ensuring 

security within Europe, so that NATO can focus on the collective 

defense of Europe and North America against outside threats. 

Now, I know that in many respects that probably nearly all, and 

maybe all, our two witnesses have played an important role in formulating U.S. policy toward NATO for the past several years. 

Robert Bradtke has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs since 2001. 

A distinguished 30 year veteran of the Foreign Service, Mr. 

Bradtke’s extensive experience includes tenures as Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Executive Assistant to 

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Chief of Mission at 

the U.S. Embassy in London, and Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. 

Mr. Brzezinski has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs since November 2001. For 7 

years before that, he served as a senior staff member in the Senate. 

He worked for Senator William Roth from 1995 to 2000, including 

Senator Roth’s term as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and he was the chief staff member of the Secretary of the 

Senate Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I remember those days and I have a great deal of fondness and appreciation 

for your talent. It was my pleasure to regularly interact with you 

at that point. 

With those comments, I would like to turn to the distinguished 

Ranking Member, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, for any 

comments that he might like to make. 

5

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your comments, as I listened to them, I have a keen interest in them, and I want to thank 

you for holding today’s hearing regarding the upcoming NATO 

Istanbul Summit and I especially want to thank Mr. Bradtke and 

Mr. Brzezinski for testifying and shedding light on the goals of the 

United States in the NATO Istanbul Summit. 

The Istanbul Summit represents an important opportunity to reinvigorate cooperation between North America and Europe in the 

aftermath of Iraq. This will be an opportunity for the Atlantic Alliance to reevaluate NATO’s military transformation and expansion, 

and refocus and redirect peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan 

and the Balkans. And set forth a full agenda to reach out to steadfast partners in Central Asia, and to the Balkans, as well as those 

nations taking part in the Mediterranean Dialogue. 

While NATO remains the most important and effective global security alliance, it faces many external and internal challenges that 

must be met with the Istanbul Summit. Over the past year-anda-half, the transatlantic relationship has faced its most significant 

risks in decades. 

Disagreement over President Bush’s Iraq policy and the American-led coalition failure to find weapons of mass destruction, ferments distrust and erodes confidence among our allies. 

Unfortunately, this dissention comes at a time when neither the 

United States nor Europe can afford to allow differences to debilitate the response to threats of terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

Much has changed since the November 2002 NATO Prague Summit. The Alliance has unfinished business, including the rebuilding 

of Afghanistan, and we cannot afford to fail. Despite several setbacks in Afghanistan, including record poppy growth for heroin, 

deadly attacks on foreign workers and peacekeepers have necessitated the need for additional international troops to combat alQaeda and Taliban forces. 

NATO’s operations in Afghanistan continue to a certain degree 

to serve as the model for transatlantic cooperation in the fight 

against terror. I am hopeful that the summit participants will conclude that despite valid disagreements over President Bush’s handling of Iraq, it is in the Alliance’s interests to expand NATO’s 

military role in Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, I very much look forward to hearing from the witnesses. If I may, in terms of asking of the witnesses, Chairman Bereuter talked about a failure of political will, and he provided statistics and went into great detail in terms of the response of many 

of our allies. 

And while I do not take exception with the Chairman’s depiction 

of the current situation, I would ask of the witnesses is that my 

experience in traveling throughout Europe, and I often wonder 

whether or not our European allies are quite frankly as honest and 

as forthright with the Administration officials, and with Republican Members of Congress as they are with Democratic Members 

of Congress. 

I often get the impression that when they are speaking to somebody like me that they let loose and they actually say what is on 

their mind. And it is frightening as an American to hear. 

6

And I wonder whether they are as honest when they are speaking with the Administration and with Congressional leaders, because I think we are creating our strategy to a certain degree in 

a vacuum of delusion. 

And I am not passing a negative judgment, except that the leaders of NATO go to these meetings and say the niceties now as a 

matter of function. But I think we are deluding ourselves if we 

think that the dissention and the destruction of Iraq has somewhat 

dissipated to the point where we are now making rational policy. 

I think it is my impression that many of our allies are still not 

rooting for us. They just are not rooting for us. And I would ask 

that if you think it is relevant to what degree are we factoring into 

not a judgment as to whether we were right, wrong, or indifferent, 

but what impact are the past disagreements having on the very 

failure of political wills that the Chairman is talking about. 

Is it simply a failure of political wills on behalf of those allies, 

or is it a factor of political will that is in some part or in great part 

caused by the riff of the past 2 years, and what do we do about 

it if it is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. As we hear from our witnesses, I will say that your entire statements will be made part of 

the record, and you may proceed as you wish to summarize or to 

highlight the key parts. And we will be looking forward to asking 

you questions. We will hear first from Secretary Bradtke. You may 

proceed. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BRADTKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Mr. Wexler, as I welcome this opportunity to talk about our 

goals for the NATO Istanbul Summit. Before I begin, I would like 

to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this Committee, and its staff for 

all the close cooperation we have had as we have worked on the 

NATO transformation and on NATO enlargement. 

And as you prepare to leave the House of Representatives, Mr. 

Chairman, I want to especially thank you for your role and your 

service for the last 2 years as the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 

I know that I speak for all my colleagues in the European Bureau of the State Department in saying that we will miss your 

leadership. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BRADTKE. As we approach the Istanbul Summit, NATO, Mr. 

Chairman, and Mr. Wexler, is an Alliance in action. Never before 

in NATO’s history as it been so active in so many places. 

The Alliance just expanded by seven new members and more 

countries are knocking on the door. In Afghanistan, NATO commands the International Security Assistance Force. In Iraq, NATO 

supports the Polish-led multinational division. 

In the Mediterranean, NATO patrols the seas of operation 

through Active Endeavor. In the Balkans, NATO continues its mission of ensuring peace and security; and in the Middle East and 

7

Central Asia, NATO’s diplomats and soldiers are reaching out to 

strengthen security cooperation. 

In view of the Istanbul Summit, this is an opportunity to assess 

progress since the Prague summit, and to reaffirm the importance 

of a vital and enduring transatlantic relationship. 

We will focus in Istanbul on three specific areas: NATO’s operations, NATO’s engagement with its partners, and NATO’s continuing capability transformation. 

In looking at NATO’s operations, in it no exaggeration to say 

that the future of the Alliance is being decided in Afghanistan. As 

you said in your statement, Mr. Chairman, and in your address to 

the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO’s credibility is at stake 

in Afghanistan. 

The Alliance has expanded its mandate beyond Kabul, starting 

with the Provincial Reconstruction Team led by Germany in the 

City of Konduz, and NATO aims to establish five more Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams. 

But to be successful, NATO would need at Istanbul to get more 

troops and military resources, in perhaps the most difficult collective mission that the Allies have ever undertaken. 

And I would like to say here that I do not believe the problems 

that we are facing in Afghanistan are a result of disagreements 

over Iraq. I think the allies political will is an important issue, and 

the Chairman mentioned that and some other factors that we can 

come back to. 

But I don’t think that the disagreements over Iraq have spilled 

over to Afghanistan. I think in Afghanistan there is a solid agreement of a need to help President Karzai and to get help to rebuild 

Afghanistan. 

In Iraq, NATO has already provided communications, force generation, and logistical support for the Polish-led Multinational Division. Fifteen allies have joined the United States forces on the 

ground in Iraq, and in Europe, if I could, I would like to pay tribute 

to the more than 100 soldiers from those allied countries that lost 

their lives in Iraq. 

The United States has made it clear that we support a larger 

NATO role in Iraq. With the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, which calls for regional organizations to help meet 

the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, NATO leaders in Istanbul will be looking more closely to what role the Alliance might play. 

In operations in the Balkans, we expect that in Istanbul that 

NATO will announce that its Stability Force in Bosnia, SFOR, will 

have successfully concluded its mission at the end of 2004. 

In 2005, the European Union will mount a new combined military/police mission in order to maintain stability and to speed integration into Europe. Under the Berlin-Plus arrangements, NATO 

and the United States are committed to providing the supported 

needed to ensure the success of this mission. 

At the same time, the commitment of the United States and 

NATO to Bosnia will continue. NATO will establish a small military headquarters, led by an American general officer, to take the 

lead in ongoing defense reform work, efforts to apprehend indicated 

war criminals, and the fight against terrorism. 

8

In Kosovo, NATO’s Kosovo Force, KFOR, have provided a safe 

and secure environment for stabilization and reconstruction. However, the outbreak of interethnic violence in March demonstrates 

the continued fragility of Kosovo. NATO will maintain KFOR’s current pledge, and the U.S. will continue to provide troops for that 

mission. 

NATO will continue to assess its size, structure, and mission of 

KFOR every 6 months in light of the situation on the ground. 

NATO’s operations also extend as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 

to continuing efforts in the war against terrorism. 

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has proposed a promising 

package of counter-terrorist measures for approval at the Istanbul 

Summit. These include an improved intelligence sharing through a 

new NATO Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit; strengthened military capabilities and exercises; and enhanced cooperation with 

NATO’s partner countries. 

NATO is also bolstering its successful counter-terrorist naval 

interdiction mission in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavor. Mr. Chairman, the military operations that I have outlined 

are important, but they represent only a part of NATO’s mission. 

Engagement with friends and partners is equally important. 

NATO remains committed to keeping its door open to new members. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, have all made important 

progress in their membership action plan. 

At Istanbul, NATO will not issue new invitations. However, the 

Alliance will recognize the accomplishments of these three countries, and to encourage them to further look at the hard work of 

reform, and reiterate our desire of a willingness to help. 

The front line states of Central Asia and the Caucasus are another region where in Istanbul NATO will seek to strengthen its 

relationships. All of these countries have made valuable contributions to the war on terrorism. 

NATO will intensify its efforts to engage these countries through 

the Partnership for Peace program, including a modest NATO advisory presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus to work with local 

governments on defense reform and security cooperation. 

At the Istanbul Summit, we also expect the Alliance will announce new initiatives to reach out and offer security cooperation 

to interested countries in the broader Middle East and North Africa. 

In looking at this region, we believe that NATO’s experience with 

the Partnership for Peace Program has much to offer. The initiatives will initially focus on practical cooperation in areas where we 

share common goals, such as fighting terrorism, and stemming the 

flow of weapons of mass destruction, and improving border security. 

At Istanbul, there will also be a NATO-Ukraine Council meeting 

between President Kuchma and the NATO Heads of State and government to discuss Ukraine’s progress toward integration into the 

Alliance. 

The United States supports each step that the Ukraine takes to 

move toward a full integration into the NATO’s Alliance institution. For Ukraine’s aspirations to be fulfilled, however, it is essenVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

tial that they demonstrate the commitment to democratic reform 

and the rule of law. 

At the summit, NATO Heads of State and government plan to 

emphasize the importance of a free and fair presidential election in 

the fall. 

Another key partnership that we will highlight at Istanbul is 

NATO’s relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council, 

which will meet at Istanbul at the ministerial level, has been a 

quiet success story. The close cooperation that has been fostered by 

the NATO-Russia Council is in all of our interests. 

We want to see the NATO-Russia Council do more to reach their 

good potential. Mr. Chairman, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Brzezinski will address in greater detail our expectations for 

Istanbul on the Alliance’s efforts to transform its military capabilities. 

I want to stress just one point. The continued transformation of 

NATO’s military capabilities is essential if the Alliance is to ensure 

the collective defense of its members and its ability to carry out the 

full range of its missions. 

As I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, NATO today can truly be described as an alliance of action, with a global reach, working every 

day to protect its members and our values, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the mountains of Afghanistan. 

We strongly believe that NATO’s Istanbul Summit will be a milestone for success on the road to a further transformed NATO, a 

NATO more capable of responding to security threats beyond Europe. 

NATO’s success is key to the fulfillment of U.S. foreign policy 

and security objectives. We simply cannot succeed without the active support of our allies, partners, and friends. 

Partnership, in the words of Secretary Powell, is the watchword 

of U.S. strategy in this Administration. And NATO is vital to that 

strategy. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradtke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Bereuter, Representative Wexler, Members of the Sub-Committee on 

Europe, thank you very much for this opportunity to speak with you about our goals 

for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s upcoming summit in Istanbul, Turkey 

on June 28–29. 

Before I begin, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this Committee and 

its staff for the close cooperation we have had in promoting NATO’s enlargement 

and transformation. As you prepare to leave the House, Mr. Chairman, I would particularly like to express my appreciation for your two years of service as President 

of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary and public support is key to 

the continued strength of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. I know I speak for all my colleagues in the European Bureau of the State Department in saying that we will 

miss your leadership. 

As we approach the Istanbul Summit, NATO is an Alliance in Action. Never before in NATO’s history has it been so active in so many places. In Afghanistan, 

NATO commands the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In Iraq, 

NATO supports the Polish-led multinational division. In the Mediterranean, NATO 

patrols the seas through Operation Active Endeavor, providing naval escorts and 

early warning on terrorist threats. In the Balkans, NATO continues its mission of 

ensuring peace and security in Bosnia and Kosovo. And in the Middle East, North 

Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and with Russia and Ukraine, NATO’s diplomats and soldiers are reaching out to strengthen security cooperation. The Alliance has just expanded by seven new members and more countries are knocking on 

10

its door, which remains open. Taken together, NATO’s unprecedented activism is a 

far cry from the irrelevance many skeptics predicted for the Alliance following the 

end of the Cold War. 

Since I assumed my current duties three years ago, NATO has weathered two historic events that have had a profound impact on trans-Atlantic relations. The first 

was, of course, the September 11 attack on the U.S.—which brought the Alliance 

together under Article 5 for the first time since NATO was founded in 1949. NATO 

Allies reacted by launching reforms to transform NATO to deal with new threats, 

such as terrorism, which could come from anywhere in the world. The second event 

was the Iraq War, which, to be frank, created fissures inside the Alliance in 2003. 

But NATO proved its value as a political forum where we could have frank discussions with our closest Allies on Iraq. As a result, NATO has emerged in a better 

position this year as a security organization with global reach. 

The United States and all of its Allies can be proud of our 55-year alliance in 

NATO and its role in defending Allied countries during the Cold War. Times have 

changed, but NATO remains the essential security relationship for the United 

States. NATO remains a community of shared values with the fundamental mission 

of providing for the collective defense of its members. The task for NATO now is 

to confront terrorism and other threats of this new century, wherever they arise, 

and to promote our shared values with partners and friends beyond the Alliance. 

To accomplish these tasks, NATO will have to continue the political and military 

reforms that September 11 triggered within the Alliance. In that regard, we see the 

Istanbul Summit as the perfect opportunity to demonstrate Trans-Atlantic solidarity. 

SINCE THE PRAGUE SUMMIT

Before looking ahead to the Istanbul Summit, I would like to review progress that 

NATO has made since its last summit gathering at Prague in 2002. In the intervening eighteen months, NATO has accomplished the most fundamental re-tooling 

of the Alliance since its creation in 1949. A transformed NATO is emerging to meet 

its post-9/11 mission, one with new members, new capabilities, and new relationships, different than the old Cold War NATO or even the NATO of the 1990s. 

Since the Prague Summit, in the area of new members, seven new democracies—

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—formally 

joined the Alliance this year on March 29. NATO enlargement has extended the 

Euro-Atlantic sphere of security and helped to consolidate the democratic revolution 

in the former Warsaw Pact countries. With this enlargement, forty percent of 

NATO’s members are formerly communist countries. The new members add real 

value militarily and politically to our collective strength. The Alliance’s newest 

members have brought with them experiences with communist tyranny and a deep 

appreciation for the need to act in defense of freedom. All have contributed to the 

War on Terror, and all are playing an active role within NATO. 

Since Prague, the Alliance has also made progress in developing the new capabilities needed to win the War on Terror. The most impressive changes have been those 

to our military capability. NATO has been transforming itself from a defensive and 

static military alliance to deter a Soviet threat to Western Europe, into a more flexible, modern force to respond to threats from beyond Europe and to conduct stabilization operations. NATO is moving—albeit more slowly than we would like—toward 

more expeditionary militaries that can meet new challenges. 

NATO took a major step in this direction last October when, ahead of schedule, 

it inaugurated the NATO Response Force or NRF. When fully operational, the NRF 

will number up to 22,000 personnel with joint, air, maritime, and land components 

able to deploy wherever it is needed within five days. The NRF will reach this capacity in two years, but it is already capable of taking on difficult missions. NATO 

has also adopted a leaner, more flexible 21st century military command structure. 

There is a new Alliance Transformation Command in Norfolk, Virginia. Another 

Prague Summit initiative was creation of a Chemical Biological Nuclear Defense 

(CBRN) battalion, which the Alliance accomplished last year. This battalion is now 

an operational force. 

Finally NATO has also made important progress since the Prague Summit in 

deepening its relationships with Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. 

The two-year old NATO-Russia Council is redefining our relations with Moscow, 

promoting closer relations between our militaries. In NATO’s partnership with 

Ukraine, we seek stronger initiatives for political and military reform. The war in 

Afghanistan proved the value of relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia. Ties 

forged with those countries through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) facilitated the 

11

establishment of a U.S. military presence in the region that has been one of the 

keys to success in Operation Enduring Freedom. 

THE ISTANBUL AGENDA

As we approach the Istanbul Summit, NATO’s future is to look beyond Europe 

to meet new challenges and to advance the strategic vision for the Alliance in the 

21st century agreed to at Prague. Our agenda for Istanbul will reflect the milestones already reached and the way forward. It will focus on three key areas: 

NATO’s operations, its engagement with partners, and the continuing transformation of its capabilities. 

NATO’s Operations 

Afghanistan 

In Afghanistan, it is no exaggeration to say that the future of the Alliance is being 

decided. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stated, NATO’s 

first priority is Afghanistan, and its credibility is at stake. NATO has taken on command of the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan and has responsibility for stabilizing Kabul and its environs. To be successful in helping the 

Afghan people rebuild their country, NATO will need to commit more troops and 

military resources in perhaps the most difficult collective mission the Allies have 

ever undertaken. 

The Alliance has expanded its mandate beyond Kabul, starting with the Provincial Reconstruction Team led by Germany in the northern city of Konduz. By 

Istanbul, NATO aims to establish five more Provincial Reconstruction Teams to help 

the Afghan government extend its authority outside Kabul and to prepare for elections. Having undertaken these commitments, it is essential that Allies now provide 

the forces and resources to carry them out. As ISAF expands, the U.S. hopes that 

conditions over time will allow NATO to take command of all Provincial Reconstruction Teams. In the longer run, the U.S. would like to see OEF and ISAF under a 

unified NATO command, modeled on NATO’s successful operations in the Balkans. 

Iraq 

In Iraq, NATO is already providing communications, force generation, and 

logistical support to the Polish-led Multinational Division in South-Central Iraq. 

With sixteen Allies having forces on the ground in Iraq, there have been many calls 

for NATO to do more collectively. The United States has made clear that we support 

a larger NATO role in Iraq. With the passage of UNSCR 1546, which calls for regional organizations to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, the time has come for NATO to look more closely at what role it might play. 

We recognize that with many Allies already committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 

Balkans, and elsewhere, greater NATO involvement in Iraq would not mean a significant increase in the number of troops from NATO countries in Iraq. However, 

NATO can help those Allies, who are in Iraq, to stay the course. Options for a collective NATO role in Iraq could include command of one or more multinational divisions, security for the United Nations, additional assistance to the Polish-led division, or training the Iraqi army. 

The Balkans 

In Bosnia, NATO can look back with a sense of accomplishment at the success 

of the mission it undertook in 1995 at Dayton. NATO brought peace and provided 

the security umbrella under which the Bosnian people, the UN, the EU and the 

OSCE could work to reconstruct the country and to address the underlying factors 

that led to conflict. At Istanbul, NATO will announce that its Stability Force (SFOR) 

has completed its mission and will terminate at the end of 2004. NATO forces went 

into Bosnia to stop a war, enforce a peace and separate two warring armies in the 

same state. That has been accomplished and the security situation has changed dramatically. To meet the changed circumstances, a new international presence is needed. In 2005, the EU will mount a combined military/police mission in Bosnia, in 

order to maintain stability and to speed integration into Europe. This will be the 

most important security mission ever undertaken by the EU. Under the ‘‘BerlinPlus’’ arrangements of NATO support for EU-led operations, NATO and the U.S. are 

committed to providing the support needed to ensure its success. At the same time, 

the commitment of the U.S. and NATO to the security and stability of Bosnia will 

continue. NATO will establish a small military headquarters, led by an American 

general officer, to take the lead in ongoing defense reform work, efforts to apprehend indicted war criminals and the fight against terrorism. 

In Kosovo, NATO intervened in 1999 to stop a humanitarian disaster. The men 

and women of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) have provided a safe and secure enviVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ronment for stabilization and reconstruction in Kosovo. NATO is committed to UN 

Security Council Resolution 1244, cooperation with the UN Mission in Kosovo, and 

the development of a peaceful, multi-ethnic Kosovo—no matter what its future status. As part of that process, NATO strongly supports the Contact Group’s ongoing 

efforts to ensure progress on the eight UN standards for Kosovo, before it moves 

to a discussion of status. NATO is working jointly with the U.S. and the EU on an 

intensive dialogue between parties in Kosovo—and Belgrade—to focus on practical 

issues, such as confidence-building measures to improve the lives of all Kosovars. 

The outbreak of interethnic violence in March, which claimed 19 lives, demonstrated the continued political fragility of Kosovo. NATO’s ’lessons learned’ study 

provided suggestions for improved performance that are being aggressively addressed, such as the need for better intelligence and for riot control equipment and 

training. NATO will maintain KFOR at is current strength of 17,500, and the U.S. 

will continue to provide 1,950 troops to the mission. NATO will continue to assess 

the size, structure, and mission of KFOR every six months in light of the situation 

on the ground. 

The U.S. and NATO are committed to seeing the Balkans join a Europe whole, 

free and at peace. Nothing impedes progress toward that goal more than the continued freedom of individuals indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal 

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Individuals such as Ratko 

Mladic, Radovan Karadzic and Ante Gotovina are responsible for some of the worst 

crimes of the wars of the 1990’s, and their links to criminal and nationalist groups 

retard progress in the region. We have repeatedly called on all states in the region 

to fulfill their international obligation to comply fully with the ICTY, especially on 

the arrest and transfer to The Hague of these indictees. Further progress on the 

cases of Mladic, Karadzic and Gotovina is needed before Bosnia-Herzegovina and 

Serbia-Montenegro can join the Partnership for Peace and before Croatia could join 

NATO. 

Counter-Terrorism 

NATO is also committed to continuing its efforts in the war against terrorism. 

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has proposed a promising package of counterterrorist measures for approval at the Istanbul Summit. Among the new measures 

are improved intelligence sharing through a new NATO Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit; strengthened military capabilities and exercises to address threats including cyber-terrorism; and enhanced cooperation with NATO’s partner countries. 

NATO is also looking at ways to bolster its successful counter-terrorist naval 

interdiction mission in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavor. Since the operation began, more than 47,000 vessels have been monitored, nearly 480 non-combatant ships have been escorted through the Strait of Gibraltar, and over 60 vessels 

have been boarded. In March, NATO expanded the operation to encompass the entire Mediterranean. 

NATO’s Engagement 

Outreach to the Broader Middle East 

The military operations that I have just outlined are important, but they only represent a part of NATO’s mission. Outreach to friends and partners in Europe and 

Eurasia and beyond is equally important. NATO is undertaking an unprecedented 

effort to expand engagement with its neighbors to the South and to the East. At 

the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance will announce initiatives to reach out to the 

broader Middle East and North Africa. Through the G–8, the U.S. and its major European partners are exploring ways to promote indigenous reform in the broader 

Middle East and North Africa. NATO has a complementary role to play in promoting security and stability in the region. We believe that NATO’s decade of experience with the Partnership for Peace program has much to offer. At Istanbul, we 

hope that NATO will announce initiatives to offer security cooperation to interested 

countries in the broader Middle East and North Africa. Those initiatives would initially focus on practical cooperation in areas where we share common goals with 

countries of the region, such as fighting terrorism, stemming the flow of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction and improving border security. 

Strengthened Partnership with Central Asia and the Caucasus 

The front line states of Central Asia and the Caucasus are another region where 

we believe NATO should strengthen its relationships. All of these countries have 

made valuable contributions to the War on Terror. At Istanbul, we hope that NATO 

will intensify its efforts to engage these countries through the Partnership for Peace 

program. Specifically, we would like to see a modest NATO advisory presence established in Central Asia and the Caucasus to work with local governments on defense 

13

reform and security cooperation. Georgia, for example, has made impressive 

progress in defense reform since last December’s Rose Revolution and could benefit 

from in-country assistance with next steps. 

NATO-Ukraine Relations 

At Istanbul, there will be a NATO-Ukraine Council meeting between President 

Kuchma and the NATO Heads of State and Government to discuss Ukraine’s 

progress toward integration into the Alliance. The U.S. is supportive of each step 

that Ukraine takes to assume NATO’s shared values and to move toward full integration. We want to work with Ukraine as a NATO partner to achieve concrete 

goals. Ukrainian troops on the ground with coalition forces in Iraq and with NATO 

forces in Kosovo vividly show Kiev’s commitment to trans-Atlantic security. For further progress toward NATO integration, the most important thing is fulfillment of 

Ukraine’s commitment to democratic reform and the rule of law. Ukraine’s presidential elections this fall will be a defining moment in its drive toward NATO membership. At the Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government plan to raise the 

need to hold free and fair elections with President Kuchma. 

NATO-Russia Relations 

One other key partnership that we will highlight at Istanbul is NATO’s relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council has been one of the quiet success stories of the past two years. Since its creation in Rome in May of 2002, we have seen 

relations between NATO and Russia deepen and mature. NATO’s interoperability 

program, for example, has led to a significant increase in Russian participation in 

Partnership for Peace activities. In April, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a 

permanent Russian military liaison mission at SHAPE, and to expand the access 

of NATO’s mission in Moscow. This closer cooperation is in all our interests. The 

NATO-Russia Council is the vehicle to advance this. President Putin has declined 

his invitation to Istanbul, but we hope to see Foreign Minister Lavrov attend a 

NATO-Russia Council meeting with Secretary Powell and the other NATO Foreign 

Ministers to discuss next steps in practical cooperation between NATO and Russia. 

We will use the opportunity to reiterate the Alliance’s position that Russia’s remaining commitments to withdraw from Georgia and Moldova must be completed before 

NATO members are ready to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, which remains one of Russia’s security goals. 

NATO’s Open Door 

NATO also has key relationships with the three countries that are working to join 

the Alliance through the Membership Action Plan. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia 

all have made progress on their Membership Action Plans. Abroad, Albania and 

Macedonia are contributing troops to coalition efforts in Iraq; Albania, Croatia, and 

Macedonia are contributing troops to NATO operations in Afghanistan. At home, Albania has created new governmental institutions designed to step up the fight 

against organized crime and corruption. Croatia has been pursuing defense reforms 

to transform its military into a more deployable, flexible force. Macedonia successfully made a smooth electoral transition to a new head of state and new Prime Minister following the tragic death of its President. At last month’s Partnership Commission meeting of Adriatic Charter, the three aspirants reaffirmed their commitment to deepening regional cooperation and strengthening their individual and joint 

efforts to accomplish the reforms necessary to bring them closer to NATO membership. At Istanbul, NATO will not issue new invitations or set a date for issuing invitations. However, the door to NATO membership remains open. The Alliance will 

recognize the accomplishments of all three countries, encourage them in their hard 

work of further reform, and reiterate our desire to see them succeed. 

NATO’s Transformation 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski will address in greater detail our expectations for continued work at Istanbul on the Alliance’s efforts to transform its military capabilities. I want to stress one point: The continued transformation of 

NATO’s military capabilities is essential if the Alliance is to ensure the collective 

defense of its members and its ability to carry out the full range of its missions. 

NATO is making progress to transform its capabilities through the Prague Capabilities Commitment approved at the 2002 Prague Summit, but much work remains 

to be done. Consortia of interested Allies are addressing some of the more significant capabilities shortfalls. In April, NATO endorsed a decision to sign a long-term 

Alliance Ground Surveillance acquisition contract by next spring. Thirteen nations 

participate in an airlift consortium, which has agreed to lease Ukrainian aircraft to 

help address the strategic airlift shortfall. This group hopes to sign an airlift memorandum of understanding in Istanbul. A consortium of eight nations is addressing 

14

strategic sealift through leased vessels. Nine nations are attempting to develop a 

solution to the air refueling tanker shortfall. Twelve nations plan to solve the shortfall in precision-guided munitions by combining individual national efforts to procure them. Allies have made progress in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense through development of NATO’s first CBRN battalion. These 

and other efforts must be strengthened with both resources and political will if 

NATO is to realize the capabilities improvements envisioned at Prague. 

And some of those resources and political will be needed to address the even more 

critical ‘‘usability gap.’’ Of the more than two million men and women in the armed 

forces of our Canadian and European Allies, less than 100,000 can now be deployed 

in the field. Declining budgets, poor training and standards, and a continued reliance on conscription account for this situation. Our European Allies and Canada 

must do more to ensure the deployability of their forces if NATO is to succeed in 

its 21st century missions. 

If NATO is to field long-term operations in places like Afghanistan, our European 

Allies will need to spend more wisely on defense and produce more effective militaries. The U.S. will spend $400 billion on defense this year; the 25 other Allies 

combined will spend less than half of that. The problem is not just the huge spending gap but the fact that the U.S., by devoting more to research and development, 

is receiving a greater return from its defense investments than our Allies, who still 

devote a considerable portion of their budgets to territorial defenses and personnel 

costs. 

BEYOND ISTANBUL

We strongly believe that NATO’s Istanbul Summit will be a milestone on the road 

to a transformed NATO capable of responding to security threats beyond Europe. 

NATO’s success is key to the fulfillment of U.S. foreign and security policy objectives; we simply cannot succeed without the active support of our Allies, partners 

and friends. ‘‘Partnership,’’ in the words of Secretary Powell, ‘‘is the watchword of 

U.S. strategy in this administration.’’ And NATO is vital to that strategy, especially 

in the fight against terrorism and the promotion of peace and freedom. Far from 

having passed into irrelevance, NATO’s importance has grown since the end of the 

Cold War and September 11. NATO today can truly be described as an Alliance in 

Action with a global reach, working every day to protect us and our values from 

the Straits of Gibraltar to the mountains of Afghanistan. 

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Secretary Bradtke. Secretary 

Brzezinski, we would be pleased to hear your testimony at this 

point. So you can proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Wexler. Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for your 

leadership that you have shown in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and here in Congress on issues that concern the transatlantic relationship. 

You and your colleagues on the Committee have been the driving 

forces behind key Alliance imperatives to the enlargement of its 

membership to the transformation of its capabilities, and the adoption of a more global, modern perspective, in NATO operations with 

respect to the challenges of the 21st century. 

We are very grateful for that, and I will second Bob’s point, 

which is that we will miss you when you leave the Hill this fall. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. The summit will provide an opportunity as Bob 

stated for Heads of State and government of the Alliance to take 

stock of what has been a period of unprecedented activity in NATO. 

Today, the Alliance operates globally. It has undertaken a serious effort to transform itself. Indeed, I think the case can be made 

15

that more transformation of NATO’s mindset and capabilities occurred over the past 2 years than in any 10 year period in the Alliance’s history. 

Let me briefly review—at risk of being a little bit redundant to 

Bob—some of the initiatives and accomplishments of the last 2 

years that have set the stage for the Istanbul Summit. 

First, we have established NATO’s new command structure, one 

that is more joint, more deployable, and better able to respond 

quickly to fast-moving crises around the globe. 

Second, as part of that command structure reform, NATO has established Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. As 

a driver of Alliance transformation, ACT, promises to be the backbone of military interoperability in Europe and across the Atlantic. 

Third, before the end of this month, NATO will set up a multinational CBRN Battalion. 

Fourth, we are moving forward with a NATO Response Force, a 

21,000-man joint combined force that is readily deployable on short 

notice anywhere around the globe. It will be capable of conducting 

a full spectrum of military operations. 

Fifth, NATO still undertakes and plans to expand Operation Active Endeavor, under which Allied ships and aircraft patrol the 

Mediterranean Sea against suspected terrorist vessels. 

Sixth, in August of last year, NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, ISAF. 

This is the first-ever NATO mission beyond the geographic confines 

of North American and Europe. It is important to note that every 

NATO Ally has contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom or the 

ISAF mission. 

And NATO is playing an important role in Iraq by assisting the 

Polish-led Multinational Division there. Indeed, more than half of 

the NATO Allies are contributing to the operations in Iraq. You 

know, not too long ago, many asked whether NATO would go out 

of the area or out of business? 

Would the Alliance address challenges beyond Europe? Or, had 

it accomplished everything for which it had been established, and 

was it no longer relevant and no longer needed? NATO’s counterterrorism operations, its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, its efforts 

in the Mediterranean, and its operations in the Balkans demonstrate unambiguously that the Alliance is out of area and very 

much in business. 

And in the midst of all this activity, NATO remains true to one 

of its core visions, that of a Europe that is whole, free, and where 

security and prosperity are shared and indivisible. And we know in 

the spring we celebrated the accession of seven new members. 

Mr. Chairman, the Istanbul Summit will serve as a bookend for 

this period of tremendous change in the Alliance, but will also be 

an opportunity to go forward, and to chart what needs to be done 

to help the Alliance accomplish what it needs to do on the global 

war on terrorism, and to chart a future course for its transformation. 

When one looks at the Istanbul agenda, one can look at it in four 

components. Bob had three, and we in the Department of Defense 

have four, but they are mutually reinforcing. 

16

They are NATO operations, enlargement, engagement, and defense transformation. Let me touch on each of them briefly. 

In operations, the Balkans will continue to be a priority of the 

Alliance. It has been an area of Alliance success. Ten years ago, 

NATO undertook the mission of separating warring armies and ensuring stability and peace in Bosnia. Today, it has accomplished 

those tasks. The Alliance approaches the Istanbul Summit intent 

on terminating the highly successful SFOR mission. The European 

Union, as Bob stated, has indicated its readiness to initiate a new 

follow-on mission to help Bosnia obtain its goal of full self-governance. 

But there should be no doubt that NATO will be actively engaged 

in Bosnia. A NATO headquarters will be established in Sarajevo 

and will assist Bosnian defense reform. It will have responsibilities 

for combating terrorism and apprehending of war criminals. 

And NATO, of course, will remain committed to the KFOR mission, and will cooperate with the international community to help 

develop a peaceful, democratic and more ethnic Kosovo. 

The top agenda operationally in Istanbul will be Afghanistan, 

and I welcome your remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I am very grateful for the strong statements that you made to your colleagues at 

the NATO assembly in Bratislava and your letter to the NATO 

Heads of State and government. 

This is a decision point for the Alliance. It is a matter of political 

will. We have much at stake, not only for the credibility of the Alliance, but also for the progress that we have initiated and is under 

way in Afghanistan. 

We, of course, would welcome an increased NATO role in Iraq. 

With the recent establishment of the Iraqi interim government, the 

recent passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, and the 

fact that more than half of the NATO Allies have forces contributing to the stability operations in Iraq, we hope that NATO Heads 

of State and government will pledge support for the new Iraqi government, and perhaps consider an expanded operational role for 

the Alliance in Iraq. 

As the Alliance moves forward with its increasingly global agenda, it will of course not forget core vision of the transatlantic community, the creation of a Europe that is undivided, free, and secure. 

Heads of State will reiterate at the Istanbul Summit NATO’s 

open door policy. Indeed each NATO Ally, old and new, has an interest in welcoming, reinforcing, and assisting the decisions of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine to seek NATO membership. 

Bob spoke about what we call the area of engagement, and here 

NATO will focus on the Middle East. The brutal attacks of 9/11, 

and more recently in Casablanca, Istanbul and Madrid, demonstrate that if the Alliance is to ensure peace and stability in Europe and North America the Alliance needs to contribute to peace 

and stability beyond Europe. Toward that end the Alliance hopes 

to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue by expanding its activities 

in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and stability operations. 

NATO can also create a wider set of tailored relationships with 

selected nations of the Greater Middle East who have an interest 

17

in working with the Alliance. This year we will celebrate the 10th 

anniversary of the Partnership for Peace. This initiative has been 

highly successful in promoting stability and democratic principles 

in Eastern and Central Europe, and in ensuring interoperability 

between NATO and partner forces. 

It is our intention now to focus this program on strategically important regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 

And then there is the issue of defense transformation, a key priority. 

Our NATO operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and 

Afghanistan, and our support efforts in Iraq, have placed unprecedented demands on NATO’s force structure. These stresses have 

highlighted capability shortfalls that we discussed before and that 

continue to beleaguer Allied forces. Some progress has been made 

since 2002 in addressing these shortfalls, particularly in the area 

of CBRN defense and precision-guided munitions. 

But more work is clearly in order. This is particularly true in 

such areas as combat support, combat service support. These include engineering units, military police, and medical support, as 

well as air refueling, and strategic lift. 

The Prague Capabilities Commitment that sprang from the 2002 

Prague summit, and the NATO Force Goals process, will be the primary vehicles for nations to improve their capabilities. 

At the Istanbul Summit, we hope that NATO will adopt improvements to the latter, to the Alliance defense planning process. This 

is one of the defining elements of NATO that distinguishes NATO 

from all other alliances, and has made the Alliance second to none. 

We hope that Heads of State and government in future planning 

cycles will publicly endorse NATO’s Level of Ambition. The LoA is 

the statement of how many, what size, and what sort of operations 

NATO needs to be capable of handling, and is the basis for those 

force goals that we developed for Allies. 

What is needed is a higher level and public endorsement of the 

LoA, because I believe that this would increase political ownership 

and, I hope, commitment to NATO requirements. And our thinking 

behind this is very much driven by your thinking, sir, of bringing 

transparency to the process as a means to add more political 

weight to support the whole process. 

Another priority improvement that we seek is a reinvestment objectives program, to use NATO terminology. Many nations remain 

encumbered with excessive in-place territorial defense forces. The 

maintenance of these legacy forces drains precious euros from defense budgets. 

We need to encourage nations to eliminate static forces and reinvest those forces—not back to the national treasury, but back into 

those assets that would yield the more deployable and more militarily useful forces. 

Mr. Chairman, as NATO Heads of State and government convene 

at the Istanbul Summit, they will meet as an Alliance bound by 

common values, energized by a shared vision of a Europe that is 

whole and free and more responsive to the global challenges and 

opportunities before the transatlantic relationship. 

They have much work before them, and they will continue to 

press NATO on its unfinished business and to ensure that our AlliVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ance and the transatlantic link remains strong and relevant in the 

21st century. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing on the NATO Summit that will take place in Istanbul on 

June 28 and 29. 

NATO’s fundamental purpose remains collective defense. However, the missions 

that now flow from this responsibility are very different than those for which the 

Alliance planned during the Cold War and even those executed in the last decade. 

Unpredictable, seemingly wanton terrorist attacks, such as those that occurred on 

September 11, 2001 and more recently in Istanbul and Madrid, make clear the danger to open societies posed by those with a bent toward mass casualties. The scale 

of danger posed by terrorist organizations is especially alarming given their desire 

to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

The 9/11 terror attacks set the stage for transformation at NATO. The Prague 

Summit of November 2002 served as an important benchmark during a period of 

unprecedented activity and change in the Alliance. Indeed, more transformation in 

mindset and capability has occurred at NATO over the past two years than in any 

ten year period since the Alliance’s establishment in 1949. Allow me to briefly highlight some of the major accomplishments and initiatives that set the stage for this 

month’s Istanbul Summit: 

Operations EAGLE ASSIST and ACTIVE ENDEAVOR: NATO is playing a growing role in the global war against terrorism. We all can recall with great appreciation the Alliance’s invocation of Article 5 for the first time in its history immediately 

after the attacks of 9/11. Shortly after, our Allies launched Operation EAGLE ASSIST, sending NATO-owned Airborne Warning and Control aircraft to the U.S. in 

support of our Operation NOBLE EAGLE, helping patrol American skies and guarding against further attacks. 

NATO continues to execute Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, another important 

element of NATO’s Article 5 response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. 

Under this mission, Allied ships and aircraft patrol the Mediterranean Sea against 

suspected terrorist vessels. To date, ACTIVE ENDEAVOR forces have tracked over 

46,000 ships and have boarded over 480 ships suspected of terrorist-related activities. They have also escorted over 400 civilian ships through the Strait of Gibraltar. 

Afghanistan: In August 2003, NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. This is the first-ever NATO mission 

beyond the geographic confines of North America and Europe. Today, over 6,000 

NATO troops deployed to Afghanistan provide stability in Kabul and the region of 

Konduz—and every NATO Ally and many NATO partners are contributing or have 

contributed to the military effort in Afghanistan. 

Iraq: When Poland stepped up to the difficult task of leading the 16-nation Multinational Division South/South Central in Iraq, NATO provided support in the areas 

of force generation, operations planning, and communications. Today, some 17 

NATO Allies have forces contributing to stability operations in Iraq. 

Not too long ago many asked, would NATO go ‘‘out of area or out of business?’’ 

Would the Alliance address challenges beyond Europe, or had it accomplished everything for which it had been established, and was no longer relevant and needed? 

NATO counter-terrorism operations and its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate unambiguously that the Alliance is out of area and very much in business. 

Command Structure Reform: At the Prague Summit, NATO decided to modernize 

and streamline its command structure. This new command structure, approved in 

June 2003, eliminated 9 headquarters from the existing 20. This reform will enable 

NATO commanders to respond more quickly and jointly to fast-moving crises around 

the globe. 

Allied Command Transformation: As part of its command structure reform, NATO 

established Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, to better 

link U.S. and European transformation efforts. ACT already is creating new force 

planning and force generation approaches, analyzing lessons learned from operations, and developing new doctrine for employment of NATO forces. Under this 

Command, Centers of Excellence are being established in Europe that will provide 

training and concept development in counter-terrorism, civil-military cooperation, 

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formation, ACT promises to be the backbone of military interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic. 

CBRN Battalion: Before the end of this month, NATO will stand up a multi-national Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Battalion. 

The Battalion, currently led by the Czech Republic, is already conducting readiness 

training and exercises. This unit will be able to rapidly react to a CBRN attack 

alone, or serve as part of another NATO operation. 

NATO Response Force: At the Prague Summit, Alliance Heads of State and Government agreed to establish the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF, which is 

scheduled to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in October 2004, is a 21,000-

man joint force tailored to be lethal, versatile, technically superior to any envisioned 

threat, and readily deployable on short notice (5–30 days). The NRF is a vehicle for 

providing NATO with a high-end capability for the full spectrum of Alliance missions, with Allies committing forces on six month rotations. 

Before even reaching initial operational capability, the NRF has proven to be a 

profound driver of transformation. At the operational level, the NRF is forcing 

NATO military authorities to develop more demanding readiness and capability 

standards as well as training and equipping certification procedures for units designated to serve on NRF rotations. Alliance doctrine for NRF deployment will be 

standard curricula at NATO schools. 

The NRF’s influence is being felt in Alliance capitals as well. Member states recognize the need to change laws that restrict employment of their troops dedicated 

to NATO and the NRF. Some Allies are ensuring national laws smooth the way for 

quick dispatch of troops; other Allies are increasing the number of forces that legally 

can be deployed. The NRF has also initiated a healthy discussion over how to delegate planning and operational responsibilities so that in the event of a crisis, NATO 

political authorities are better able to deploy the force in a timely manner. 

NATO Enlargement: In April 2004, NATO welcomed seven new members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Their integration into NATO represents a significant step toward achieving our longstanding goal 

of building a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and 

indivisible. As members of NATO, these seven countries help reinvigorate the Alliance’s transatlantic link. They bring to the Alliance an appreciation for democracy 

and freedom that can only come from their recent memory of foreign domination 

and authoritarianism. This fact is only underscored by their consistent contributions 

to the Global War on Terrorism. Their soldiers serve alongside American soldiers 

and those of other Allies in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to NATO operations 

in the Balkans. 

Mr. Chairman, the NATO Summit that Turkey will host in Istanbul will serve 

as a bookend to a period of tremendous change in the Alliance. It is also an opportunity for NATO Heads of State and Government to take stock of what we and our 

Allies need to accomplish to successfully execute the global war on terrorism and 

to chart the future course of NATO transformation. One can address the key priorities of the Istanbul Summit agenda under the following headings: NATO Operations, Enlargement, Engagement and Defense Transformation. 

OPERATIONS

SFOR and KFOR: The Balkans has been a region of great Alliance success and 

will continue to be an important focus of Alliance activity. Nearly a decade ago, in 

1995, NATO undertook the tasks of separating warring armies and ensuring stability and peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Today, having accomplished these 

tasks, the Alliance approaches the Istanbul Summit intent on terminating the highly successful Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission. The European Union has indicated 

its readiness, under Berlin Plus arrangements, to initiate a new follow-on effort 

composed of police and military elements that will assist Bosnia with the remaining 

challenges associated with its efforts to attain full self-governance. NATO will remain engaged in Bosnia through a NATO headquarters in Sarajevo that will assist 

Bosnian defense reform, and have responsibility for combating terrorism and apprehending war criminals. 

In Kosovo, NATO has also ensured peace and stability ever since operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 ended former Serbian Prime Minister Milosovic’s atrocities 

against the region’s Albanian population. At Istanbul, Allies will approve the most 

recent periodic mission review (PMR), an activity conducted every six months for 

both SFOR and KFOR that reviews each mission including its size and structure. 

The Spring 2004 PMR reaffirms the current size (17,000) of KFOR and takes into 

account the lessons learned from the outbreak in March of interethnic violence that 

caused nineteen deaths. While NATO forces were able to quell that violence, restricVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tive and incongruent national rules of engagement hampered the Alliance’s response. Minimizing national caveats in KFOR and other NATO missions is a key 

objective of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Jim Jones (U.S.). 

NATO will remain committed to the KFOR mission and will cooperate with 

Kosovars and the international community in the effort to develop a peaceful, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo. 

Afghanistan: A top agenda item of the Istanbul Summit is the Alliance’s effort to 

expand the ISAF role in Afghanistan. The Alliance is now attempting to generate 

the forces necessary for ISAF to take responsibility for security in the northern and 

western parts of the country, as well as establish Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs) in those regions (in addition to the PRT it now runs in Konduz). NATO is 

also considering assisting with the provision of security for the fall elections in Afghanistan. In the longer term, as ISAF expansion moves forward and as Operation 

Enduring Freedom moves from combat to stability operations, it would make sense 

for ISAF and Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan to be brought under a unified 

NATO command. 

To do this will, of course, require that Allies commit more resources to ISAF. I 

would like to express my appreciation, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts in urging Allies to ensure NATO’s success in Afghanistan. Your strong comments to the NATO 

Parliamentary Assembly in Bratislava earlier this month, and your letter to NATO 

Heads of State and Government, were invaluable in getting that message to our Allies. 

Iraq: We would welcome an increased NATO role in Iraq. Indeed the U.S. Government supported a NATO role even during the period leading to the launch of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. With the recent establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government, recent passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1546, and with 17 NATO 

Allies contributing forces to stability operations in Iraq, we hope NATO Heads of 

State and Government will pledge support for the new Iraqi government and perhaps consider an expanded operational role for NATO in Iraq. UNSCR 1546 requests member states and regional organizations to contribute assistance, including 

military forces, to the Multi-National Force (MNF). With its great experience in executing multi-national operations, the Alliance is in a position to assist MNF commands, undertake functional missions (such as training the Iraqi armed forces) and 

do more to assist NATO member states who have forces in Iraq. 

ENLARGEMENT

As NATO moves forward with an increasingly global agenda, it will not forget a 

core vision of the transatlantic community: the creation of a Europe that is undivided, free, and secure. Heads of State will reiterate at the Istanbul Summit 

NATO’s ‘‘Open Door’’ to future enlargement. The Alliance will continue working 

with Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—the three current ‘‘Membership Action Plan’’ 

participants—to ensure and encourage their continuing reform efforts. 

A NATO-Ukraine Summit at Istanbul offers our leaders an opportunity to chart 

a course for cooperation that improves Kiev’s prospects for membership. Ukraine 

has made much progress in military reform, but its leaders know that membership 

cannot be achieved through defense reform alone. Political and economic reform are 

equally important requirements. They are, indeed, the foundations of effective enduring military reform and the key to successfully preparing for the fiscal and political burdens that come with NATO membership. 

Eventually, if sufficient progress is made on political, economic, and military reforms, we would like to see the Alliance invite Ukraine to begin an intensified dialogue with NATO as a first step towards participation in the Membership Action 

Plan. A key indicator will be if Ukraine holds free and fair Presidential elections 

in November. 

The decisions of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Ukraine to seek NATO membership are decisions that each NATO Ally, old and new, has interest in welcoming, 

reinforcing, and assisting. 

ENGAGEMENT

The Middle East: The brutal attacks of 9/11, and more recently in Istanbul and 

Madrid, demonstrate that if NATO is to ensure transatlantic peace and security, the 

Alliance must contribute to peace and stability beyond Europe. President Bush’s 

‘‘forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East’’ recognizes that as long as freedom does not flourish in that part of the world, it ‘‘will remain a place of stagnation, 

resentment and violence ready for export.’’ NATO will enhance the Mediterranean 

Dialogue—in which Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia currently participate—by expanding its activities in counter-terrorism, counVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tering the threats posed by WMD and their means of delivery, interdiction, and stability operations. NATO can also create a wider set of tailored relationships with 

selected nations of the Greater Middle East who express an interest in working with 

the Alliance. 

The Partnership for Peace: The Partnership for Peace (PfP) will celebrate at the 

Istanbul Summit its tenth anniversary. This initiative has been highly successful 

in promoting stability and democratic principles in Eastern and Central Europe, ensuring interoperability between Partner and NATO forces, and in helping countries 

prepare for NATO membership. 

The states of Central Asia and the Caucasus are on the front lines of the Global 

War on Terror. It is in the Alliance’s interest to build their capacity to meet these 

threats. The U.S. has therefore proposed that NATO direct the PfP’s focus toward 

these strategically important regions. We want to better meet the needs of these 

countries by renewing the PfP’s original emphasis on security cooperation, defense 

planning, interoperability, and democratic control of defense forces. At the Summit, 

the Alliance will announce the assignment of NATO liaison officers to the Caucasus 

and Central Asia region. 

DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION

Allied operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan and Iraq have 

placed unprecedented demands on the NATO force structure. They are highlighting 

with urgency longstanding capability shortfalls in areas such as airlift and in the 

deployable combat support functions vital to sustaining out-of-area operations. 

Capabilities transformation will be one of the principal themes of the upcoming 

Summit. At Istanbul, NATO Heads of State and Government will address concrete 

measures that reflect and promote the transformation of Alliance capabilities and 

of its procedures for defense planning and force generation. 

Capabilities: Good progress has been made since 2002 on capabilities such as 

Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear (CBRN) defense and precision-guided munitions. By 2005, most of NATO’s high-readiness deployable forces will be equipped 

with current CBRN defense equipment, and most Allies will have the capability to 

deliver all-weather air precision guided munitions. The NATO Response Force and 

the multinational CBRN Battalion are milestone achievements. However, Heads of 

State will need to exhort further work on critical capability shortfalls such as combat support/combat service support (e.g. engineering, military police, medical), air 

refueling, and strategic lift (air and sea). The Prague Capabilities Commitment that 

sprang from the 2002 Prague Summit, and NATO Force Goals which establish national force commitments to the Alliance, will be the primary vehicles for nations 

to improve these capabilities. 

Defense Planning: At the Summit, we hope that NATO will adopt improvements 

to its defense planning process that should help Allies more effectively meet their 

respective NATO force goals. One of our most important revisions could be a commitment for Heads of State and Government, in future planning cycles, to publicly 

endorse NATO’s ‘‘Level of Ambition’’ (LoA). LoA is the statement of how many, how 

large, and what sort of operations NATO needs to be capable of handling, and is 

the basis of NATO’s overall military requirements. Currently agreed at the level of 

Defense Ministers, a higher-level public endorsement of LoA would increase political 

ownership of, and, we hope, commitment to, NATO requirements. 

Another priority improvement we seek is a ‘‘Reinvestment Objectives’’ program, 

whereby NATO planners assist nations in identifying non-deployable force structure 

that does not respond to modern NATO requirements and should be eliminated—

with savings reinvested toward needed, deployable capabilities. While some Allies 

are already reforming their force structures to increase deployability, sustainability 

and lethality, many nations remain encumbered with excessive in-place, territorial 

defense forces. The maintenance of these ‘‘legacy’’ forces drains precious Euros from 

defense budgets. We need to encourage nations to eliminate static forces and reinvest resources to create deployable, usable forces. 

At Istanbul, Heads of State and Government will task further work on a project 

aimed at pressing Allies to increase the proportion of deployable, usable forces in 

their defense structure. We are working on developing a system of targets and 

metrics that establishes benchmarks for force deployability and measurements to 

assess national performance. 

Force Generation: NATO has always had difficulty in filling agreed-upon force requirements for its missions. We need to improve NATO force generation procedures—a question of both process improvements and political will. We need to create better ties between force generation—which involves planning and commitments 

for current operations—and force planning, which involves planning and commitVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:37 Aug 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061604\94281.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ments for long-term force availability. Toward this end, we aim to establish shared 

databases between operations planners and force planners, and conduct comprehensive yearly planning conferences that compare ongoing operations and NATO Response Force requirements with long-range force plans. 

There is no question, however, that the key necessity remains: matching the political will to embark on operations with the political will to contribute capable forces. 

Nations need to back up their political decisions to engage in operations by providing the necessary military forces. 

NATO recognized at the Prague Summit that the Alliance had to transform itself 

to meet successfully the challenges of the post 9/11 world. Great progress has been 

made toward that end. Significant work remains to be done. As NATO Heads of 

State and Government convene at the Istanbul Summit, they lead an Alliance bound 

by common values, energized by a shared vision for a Europe whole and free, and 

more responsive to the global challenges and opportunities before the transatlantic 

relationship. They will press NATO to continue its unfinished work, to ensure that 

our Alliance and the transatlantic security link remains strong and relevant in the 

21st century. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared to answer any questions you and 

the Committee may have.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Secretary Brzezinski. I 

think we will proceed in a modified fashion, and I will start. Something that you just said in closing, Secretary Brzezinski, about 

more transparency. 

I have been interested in this subject because some of my European colleagues and the Parliamentary Assembly used some of the 

people in the U.S. Mission to NATO have suggested that Congress 

is very inadequate in the oversight that it conducts many things, 

including the military, and most students of the Congress would 

agree with that. 

Still, we have far more insight into what our military does, and 

how it is meeting its goals and objectives, and commitments, than 

do my colleagues in the European countries with respect to their 

Defense Ministers. 

At least they tell me that, and I believe that it is true. So, I have 

encouraged the last two SAC leaders, and of course they are both 

Americans, are very capable people, to be more candid with NATO 

Parliamentary Assembly members, particularly in their February 

meeting, than they have been. 

And apparently that is seen as too sensitive to tell them the 

truth, but my colleagues in these countries, and perhaps it is true 

of Canada as well, do not understand what it is that their Defense 

Ministries are not meeting the commitments that they make, including commitments at the Prague Summit. 

And at this point I would like to suggest that the Administration 

and the Defense Department reconsider this cautionness and laying the cards on the table before calling. The fact that it will be 

a closed session in February just for the Parliamentary Assembly, 

and you are very familiar with how that goes. 

And I would offer that to you as a suggestion because it seems 

to me that is one way for parliamentarians to begin to take greater 

control over how their military is expending their funds, and to 

help us really stand up for the capabilities that have been pledged. 

I noted that in Istanbul, Secretary Bradtke, that your comments 

about Ukraine, and of course I appreciate very much the two of you 

working with our delegation before my visit and our overall visit 

to Ukraine last month. 

23

You said that Heads of State will ask the Ukrainian Government 

to hold free and fair elections transparency, and I made that request to President Kuchma directly, and I asked him if he would 

have any objection to election observers that were logically 

accreditable coming into Ukraine to observe the election in whatever numbers that the international community would send them, 

and he said that would be the case. 

And in light of the violence that has taken place in an opponent’s 

election, which I have been told is a crucial election in the direction 

of Ukraine and its future. So I am wondering whether the United 

States will have its own election observers either directly or indirectly, and to what extent do you think the international community can be persuaded to provide significant election observers or 

teams that have desirable Ukrainian and Russian language capabilities. 

People suggest that only 1 out of 40 polling places will have an 

election observer, and it would really come down to a much better 

ratio than that I think if in fact people are to have confidence that 

the election process will be free and fair. 

And given the fact that the TV is controlled, with one exception, 

by the government, that at least would be an offsetting advantage 

to cause people to come out and vote their conscience and vote their 

best interests as they understand it. 

So what are we doing in that respect, and what could we do, Secretary Bradtke? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, regarding the transparency of the defense 

planning process, your points are very well taken, and we are very 

eager to work more closely with your Committee and with the 

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and to provide briefings on the 

process. 

We are eager to change and bring more transparency to NATO, 

and that requires a consensus on the part of our NATO Allies. You 

have driven home very clearly the need to bring more buy-in from 

the political processes of these governments, and it is very much 

that which motivates us to push our first step toward making more 

public the Level of Ambition. 

And also we are working to come up with a set of metrics that 

could be used publicly, and that could help governments, parliaments, and us better assess the readiness of nation’s forces to 

serve in NATO mission. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Secretary, of course decisions made by the 

NRF are unanimous, have to be unanimous, but it seems to me 

that the specter can make directly a comment to parliamentarians 

saying that Country X, here are your promises, and you have only 

met 15 percent of this one, and you have only sent two companies, 

and you have committed two battalions. 

And that does not take a consensus. That does not take a decision of the NRF with respect to do that it seems to me. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. It does in a way, sir, because those force goal 

commitments are right now NATO classified. They are shared only 

with the governments of the NATO Alliance, and the governments 

that signed up for the particular force goals, and those individuals 

whom governments believe should have access to the goals. 

24

Mr. BEREUTER. So unfortunately you are saying that most European countries would not consider their elected parliamentarians to 

be part of the government of that country? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would not put it quite in those words, but sir, 

they have their own ways of developing consensus and support, 

which can sometimes be controversial procurement decisions and 

budgeting decisions. 

Mr. BRADTKE. If I could just respond on your point. This is obviously a historic election that the Ukrainians are facing and we 

want to have vigorous observation and an election observer mechanism in place if we possibly can. 

We are now in the Administration developing our plans, and certainly want to engage organizations like NDI, or IRI, and we also 

want to work with the OSCE, which has the capabilities and experience in this area as well. 

We also want to set up a structure where Ukraine could see 

problems and could see evidence of fraud and feed that quickly into 

international observers and mechanisms so that we can broaden 

out our base beyond just foreign observers, who may or may not 

understand in some cases what it is that they are seeing. 

So we are very much committed to a broad-based and a vigorous 

effort to observe and monitor these elections. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, and I will turn now to Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. For months I listened to Secretary Powell’s very eloquent speeches about the potential role for NATO in 

Iraq, and Congressional leaders, Republicans and Democrats, I 

think alike talk about the possibility of an open and expanding role 

of NATO in Iraq. If I understand what occurred at the G–8 summit, essentially what efforts the Administration made to entice our 

allies into a expanded role in Iraq was rebuffed, and I was just curious if the goal of the expanded role of NATO in Iraq is dead, and 

if it is not dead, what do we realistically expect that they will be 

doing as we turn over sovereignty to Iraq? 

And the second question that I have is if I understand the facts 

correctly, in terms of NATO’s commitment in Afghanistan, in 2 

weeks they were supposed to have six Provisional Reconstruction 

Teams in place, and I think we would all agree that there is a political failure as far as if they will, and Mr. Bradtke suggested that 

he did not believe that there was a significant role in that political 

will and the failure of that political will in relation to over Iraq. 

So what is the cost? 

Mr. BRADTKE. If I may start with NATO and Iraq. We had said 

this for some time that we think that NATO should play a larger 

role in Iraq, and we have said that in the background that there 

are currently in addition to the United States 15 other NATO allies, who have something in the range of 18,000 troops already in 

Iraq. 

So again NATO countries are present, and we had looked at the 

possibilities for a larger role for NATO as a collective organization. 

I think we have been focusing in particular on two possibilities 

here. 

One is what can NATO do to help those countries who are already in Iraq. We do not think it is realistic to think that there is 

25

going to be large numbers of new troops. Secretary Powell said that 

over the weekend. 

But what we do want to focus on is one category of how we can 

help those countries who are there to stay there, and how to help 

facilitate their efforts in Iraq. 

And the second thing, and it is important to keep this in mind 

as we get to the first of July and the transfer of sovereignty, is that 

after July 1st, what an Iraqi sovereign government wants becomes 

very important here. 

We want to talk to the sovereign government to see what kind 

of role they are interested in having NATO play. We think that 

there are possibilities here, for example, to help train the Iraqis to 

provide for their own security. 

So these are two broad areas that we are looking at and that we 

will be discussing I suspect in these 2 weeks before Istanbul, and 

that we may just focus their discussions when we get to Istanbul. 

So again we remain interested in a larger NATO role in Iraq. We 

don’t expect that it would be large numbers of new forces committed. The question is can we help those countries that are there 

to remain there, and how do we take into account the views of the 

sovereign Iraqi government about the kind of role it wants NATO 

to play. 

On Afghanistan, again, as I said before I believe there is a strong 

agreement in the Alliance on Afghanistan, and that I don’t see Iraq 

is spilling over to affect that. But we have not made the kind of 

progress we should have been making on providing forces for expanding PRTs, and a larger NATO role. 

I think that there are a number of reasons for this, and I suspect 

that my colleague can add a few more as well. One reason is that 

our most capable allies are pretty well stretched. 

Countries who have capabilities that are outside of Europe and 

sustain them in the field are engaged in Iraq. They are already engaged in Afghanistan. 

In the case of France, for example, it has been engaged in Haiti, 

and Africa, and so again some of the most capable allies are engaged in other places. 

It comes back to the visibility problem that Mr. Brzezinski mentioned, which is that NATO does not have forces that are 

deployable and sustainable in the field in sufficient numbers. 

There are too many forces that cannot be used for combined 

issues, and that are made up and have undertaken missions in 

places like Afghanistan. 

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, which of our allies that are—which of the 

ones that we are talking about that are overextended in Iraq? 

Mr. BRADTKE. I said Iraq, but I meant the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. If you take the British, for example, they are clearly 

quite stretched, and again I mentioned the French. 

One of the difficulties in getting just the French forces for ISAF 

is that they have a thousand troops in Haiti, and which we have 

been very grateful for, and has been very helpful to us. 

And they have been active in Africa as well. So again I felt that 

those are the two countries that are perhaps traditionally and historically the ones who have had forces that were deployable. 

26

Mr. WEXLER. Fair point as to the British, and it is our Administrative collective conclusion then that a thousand forces NATO, and 

in Haiti, and what forces they have in Africa, that is all we can 

expect? 

Mr. BRADTKE. Well, if you take the total number of French forces 

that are currently deployed outside of metropolitan France, it is 

about 40,000, about 40,000 troops. So when we approach them, 

that is the point that they make. They have got 40,000 troops deployed out of metropolitan France. 

Mr. WEXLER. Without reaching any judgment, then what value 

is the French participation in NATO? 

Mr. BRADTKE. Well, France is in the Balkans. 

Mr. WEXLER. About how many troops? 

Mr. BRADTKE. If you will bear with me. The French have 2,600 

troops in KFOR, and they have another 750 or 760 in SFOR. They 

also have more than 500 in ISAF right now, and they have several 

hundred troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. 

But again as an example, I think that some of our more capable 

allies are more stretched. That does not mean that others should 

not be doing more. 

Mr. WEXLER. Is Turkey overstretched? 

Mr. BRADTKE. Turkey is, and if you look at the rotation of forces 

in Afghanistan, and we would be able to comment on Turkey’s capabilities as well. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Canadians 

will be giving up the leadership of ISAF, and it will be just handing 

it off in September, and the idea is that after the meetings that 

Turkey would then come in. 

So again there is a rotation here, and I think that Turkey will 

be doing their part. But what I said it not to take away from the 

point that I think that our allies can’t do more. I think there is a 

problem here of political will, of perception. 

Afghanistan put a lot of allies in a country that is a long way 

from Europe, and we still have not had the recognition that those 

security threats have come up in places like Afghanistan are as important as the threats that might be on the doorstep of Europe. 

So again we need to work with our allies to get them to understand the importance of doing this. I believe that by the time that 

we get to Istanbul we will succeed in generating the forces so that 

ISAF can complete stage one of its expansion. 

I think that there is a very good prospect that we will get there 

by the end of the summer. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. Secretary Brzezinski. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I guess I would just add two points, sir. One, regarding Iraq, we are very aware of the statements that were made 

by President Chirac and other Europeans at Sea Island. 

I guess I would just mention that we have more than half the 

Alliance—Bob counted 15, and mine is actually 16, but it more 

than half with an interest in having NATO pledge more than a 

minimum political role in Iraq. 

One or two leaders can block NATO consensus, and that is one 

of the things that makes NATO a unique alliance. I mean, the 

views of one or two leaders should not be misconstrued as the consensus of the rest. 

27

And actually in the conversations that I have with my colleagues 

in the Ministries of Defense and some of their Foreign Ministry 

counterparts I see a broad readiness and willingness to do more. 

But this is an Alliance decision, and it will take consensus to get 

it, and I think with the progress that is being made in the U.N., 

and the setting up of the new Iraqi Government, and the fact that 

there is such an Alliance interest and presence through member 

states, that we will make progress, and Bob outlined a good spectrum of the areas where that is possible. 

On Afghanistan, it is true that European and Allied forces, including our own, are stretched more than they have ever been, 

even during the Cold War, because of the global nature of their deployments. 

But the fact remains that our Allies, as articulated by the Chairman, have put on the table a large number of forces, helicopters, 

airlift, medical units, and such, that are part of their commitments, 

designated forces, to be available for new operations. 

They have politically endorsed the objectives of expanding ISAF. 

They have endorsed the objective on supporting the security operations to help facilitate the elections. 

So there really is a mismatch between political will and how they 

are willing to back it up. There are two dynamics that kind of permeate NATO force generation that are unhelpful. 

One is the fact that there is a tendency to always turn and say 

that the United States can do it. They are a global power, they 

have this huge force structure, they have done it before, and they 

will fill in the force shortfall. They have always done it in the past. 

And it is a bad habit, and it is one that is unsustainable in light 

of the demanding operations that we are undertaking, that our Allies our undertaking, and that NATO is undertaking. 

And then, second, there is kind of an ability in our Allies to stay, 

well, not only have we put on our list of available forces a company 

or helicopters, but so has this country, and this country, and they 

can step forward. 

And it is a little bit of a kind of standoff until the very last 

minute when it becomes absolutely imperative, and Allies recognize 

that they will all lose, and then people step forward, and they 

shake out their forces and come up with the resources. 

I am somewhat optimistic that with Istanbul coming up, and it 

is such a high profile event, that with its decisions having such an 

impact on Afghanistan, a region that is not only indirectly significant to their interests because of its location, and the countries 

that it borders, but also because of the drug problems that tend to 

flow from that area, that region, over to Europe. 

So they have a real vested interest in making sure that the ISAF 

mission and the whole Afghan effort is successful. It is not a clear 

direct answer to you, but I hope that it gives you a sense of why 

in the end in these coming 2 weeks we are going to be able to 

shake out those shortfalls. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I have a few questions and I am going to continue the line of questioning by Mr. Wexler, and maybe I can raise 

just a few points that the two of you can kick off with responses 

to. 

28

First of all, even given the number of troops that the French and 

British have, and the countries that are likely to have deployable 

forces and a history of deploying them, 2 million men and women 

in uniform in NATO allied countries, it is still hard to explain why 

there are not sufficient units and sufficient helicopters available. 

And those commitments have been made, and it is sort of a cliche that I downgraded myself when I heard it, but it does raise the 

question that perhaps there are too many people in the ceremonial 

bands, and whether or not there are enough land combat units, or 

whether there are enough special operation units in these countries 

today. 

I wonder now that the—well, first of all, the Spanish force, and 

the controversial decision that the Spanish Government would indicate that it would withdraw troops from Afghanistan shortly, I believe, or excuse me, from Iraq. 

And I understand that they had been pressed to send those 

troops to Afghanistan and the excuse has been, well, wait until 

after the elections. Well, your elections are over, and so I am wondering what the prospects are in sending Spanish troops to Afghanistan in the very near future. 

Another point with respect to Afghanistan has the Administration considered asking the Alliance to send a land brigade of the 

NATO Response Force to Afghanistan to provide security with the 

September elections, and then switching to Kosovo. 

What is our long term exit strategy, and I hope that it wouldn’t 

be so long term, but what is our exit strategy on Kosovo? We have 

ethnic cleansing that is going on in parts of Kosovo. Now we have 

found that the Serbian population in these enclaves and in these 

cities and protect against any slaughter. 

They want independence, and they are all kinds of reasons why 

that is so controversial, and why so many countries have their interests and totally oppose independence. How are we ever going to 

get to the point where forces can be withdrawn, and we can expect 

peace and tranquility to prevail? 

Mr. BRADTKE. Let me take two of those questions, and I will 

leave one for Ian. On Spain, Spain is clearly aware of our interests 

and NATO’s interests in seeing a larger Spanish contribution in Afghanistan. 

The NATO Secretary General, who was in Madrid a week or 2 

ago, raised this point, and I will let the Spanish Government decide 

the timing of whatever it is going to say. 

It would be very helpful if Spain could step in and meet some 

of these shortfalls in forces and equipment. On Kosovo, the violence 

on March 19 or in March rather, which killed 19 people, was a serious setback. 

Frankly, we have been trying to work with the United Nations 

since the end of last year on this concept of standards which would 

lead to a discussion and a review in mid-2005 on what the extent 

of democratic standards and the rule of law on civil society, and on 

the market economy. 

And whether enough progress could be made on the standards by 

mid-2005 to then begin a discussion on what the status of Kosovo 

should be. That was going to be time lined and be stretched out. 

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The events of March were a setback to that process, and I think 

we realized that things were just moving too slowly, and that we 

needed to be more engaged, and that the contact between our 

major European partners and Russia needed to be more engaged. 

The United Nations needs to be more engaged in managing this 

process of standards. So we will be having in Kosovo probably 

about every 6 weeks meetings of the contact group, which will be 

designed to measure progress on this package of standards that the 

United Nations put down. 

We also have established what we call an intensified dialogue involving NATO, and the European Union, and the United States, 

again with the notion of trying to put pressure on all sides to work 

on these issues of standards and to deal with one another in a constructive way. 

It is a process that we are trying to intensify, and Mr. Holkeri, 

the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative, has announced that he is leaving, and we expect there to be a new Special 

Representative named in a couple of days, and we will look to this 

individual also to bring energy to this process. 

Because letting the situation drift along unresolved is going to be 

creating a greater danger. And again we believe that the basic path 

here in trying to work on this set of standards so that we can have 

a discussion in mid-2005 is a likely process. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Brzezinski, there are several questions and 

I would like your response on them. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, you mentioned the NRF, and the election 

support in Afghanistan. Let me just make a couple of points on 

that. One is that this is an idea that is under discussion. 

Second, we should remember that the initial operating capability 

date for the NATO Response Force is for October of this year. And 

it is a force which has not reached what we call its full operational 

capacity, which is scheduled for October 2006. So it is still a very 

nascent kind of entity. 

And we have exercised it and it has demonstrated some capabilities, and we are of course looking for opportunities on how we can 

shake it out. The second point is that the NATO Response Force 

was generated first and foremost to provide a capacity to respond 

aggressively to an emergency situation. 

And the question raised by some Allies is whether election support really constitutes an emergency situation. Perhaps one way to 

get around that is that while we have the capacity—it has about 

a brigade capability and it is supposedly deployable—it needs to be 

tested. 

And election support is an opportunity where you could have a 

mission that has a clear start date and a clear end date, and in 

which we could have a test run for the NRF, and do so in a way 

that would be very helpful in Afghanistan. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Brzezinski, some criticism has recently 

been leveled against the United States, saying that we are not 

meeting our capability goals, and also suggest that is true of the 

NRF, and I wondered if you could respond to that. 

I also noted in August when I visited the corps headquarters, 

and a location near Milan, and that the last two officers to arrive 

were Americans. Why is it that we are getting—the way we are 

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with respect to the Prague summit capabilities, and why would it 

be that we are seemingly the last to fill some of our responsibilities, even if that is only one case. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I can’t speak for the case in Milan, but I will 

look into it and get back to you. In terms of our role in the NATO 

Response Force, I think we have a pretty good role. 

We are in rotation number two. We have about 800 personnel, 

we have an airlift, we have some intelligence platforms committed 

to it, and a ship. So it is not an insignificant capacity. 

Mr. BEREUTER. But no land combat units? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. We do have land units, but not land combat 

units, and our——

Mr. BEREUTER. What is the rationale there? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, part of the rationale, sir, is that this is 

meant to be a NATO initiative, and there has been a tendency in 

the past for NATO initiatives to be totally filled out by U.S. forces. 

My Secretary is very intent on having a genuine NATO Response 

Force, and we want to put the burden mostly on the Europeans. 

And the good news is that the Europeans have come forward, and 

they are robust at filling up in the first two locations of the NATO 

Response Force, and we are making good progress on the third rotations starting in July. 

And we are measurably steadily increasing our contribution. Our 

contribution for rotation two was more than the contribution for rotation three, and our contribution to rotation three is more than 

our contribution to two. So it will steadily go up. 

So far I have not seen any indication that not doing more harming NRF. In fact, the NRF is evolving in a manner that is exceeding expectations and is having a profound impact upon NATO 

transformation. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Bradtke, you know about our military 

operations and peace enforcement, and peace and stability activities are contributing mightily to the huge deficits that our country 

is running up. 

And I keep hearing from European Finance Ministers that we 

simply do not have the financial resources to keep those commitments that we evidently made. I would suggest that in part that 

is because they are now facing the cost of a huge social welfare system, and a declining population. 

But certainly another factor could be that in order to continue to 

qualify for euros, that they have to meet certain budgetary requirements, and their excuse for not making the defense expenditures 

that they made. 

And keeping some of it under 2 percent of GNP, and which is 

sort of a minimum expectation that the newest members of NATO 

may be spending as part of their GNP. And would you like to comment on that, please? As a matter of equity, for the American taxpayer? 

Mr. BRADTKE. We certainly would like to see our European allies 

to spend more money on defense, and there are a number of countries that simply are not bearing their fair share of the burden. 

We do hear the story that you mentioned, because of the constraints of being part of the Euro zone, and they are not able to 

31

increase their defense expenditure, and in some cases make short 

term commitments of resources. 

That is something again that we have had for a long period, for 

the last couple of decades trying to upgrade their defense expenditures. I think the second part of it is how they are spending their 

money, and if they spend it more efficiently and wisely, you get 

more out of the expenditures that they make. 

The figures that you cited, that there are 2 million men and 

women in their armed services, and with a deployable number that 

is less than 100,000. That is not a very efficient use of whatever 

resources are being put in. 

Again, we need to made this point, and we need to continue to 

urge our allies to increase their defense expenditures, and we will 

continue to work through NATO through the transformation process and try to make those expenditures more efficient. 

But I will say that I feel that as we calculate what our own interests are, that I believe that it is important that we are involved in 

the places around the world where we are involved in. 

Our deployments are serving American interests, and it is important to our national security, and it is important to pursue U.S. influence around the world. So again, this is a burden, and perhaps 

a burden that we bear disproportionately, but I think it is one that 

I think serves American interests. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I don’t disagree with you at all as you would expect, but I do think since it is in their back yard, they should have 

greater expectations about what they are going to spend. 

We have a series of votes, and I hope that you recognize that the 

questions directed your way are in no way hostile, but I hope establish in the record in giving you some questions expressed by Members of Congress that it might be helpful to you with your own 

international counterparts in NATO, and in the countries that are 

involved in PfP. 

I thank you very much for your response to our questions and 

for your written statements. We very much appreciate your cooperation and assistance that both of you have provided, and along 

with your colleagues that have supported you, and not only testifying here today, but working with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and European, and other allies. Thank you very much. The 

Subcommittee hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:43 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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