[Cite as State v. Worstell, 2019-Ohio-5228.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellant 

-vsGALEN WORSTELL 

 Defendant-Appellee 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2019 CA 00034 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

18CR00828 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 16, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

WILLIAM HAYES WILLIAM CRAMER 

Licking County Prosecutor 470 Olde Worthington Road, Ste. 200 

By: CLIFFORD J. MURPHY Westerville, OH 43082 

Assistant Prosecutor 

20 South Second Street 

Newark, OH 43055 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 2 

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Galen Worstell [“Worstell”] appeals Judgment of the 

Licking County Court of Common Pleas overruling his motion to suppress evidence. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Worstell was charged with aggravated drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A)(2)/(C)(1)(d) and aggravated drug possession in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)/(C)(1)(c). Both counts alleged that the drug was methamphetamine in 

amount more than five times bulk, which made both counts second-degree felonies. 

{¶3} Worstell filed a motion to suppress, arguing that it was unconstitutional to 

stop the vehicle he was riding in and to continue to detain him after another passenger 

was found with drugs. 

Motion to Suppress Hearing. 

{¶4} Deputy Dan Pennington of the Licking County Sheriff’s office testified that 

on October 3, 2018, he was training a new deputy, Deputy Delane King. They were in 

full uniform and driving a marked cruiser, and they were engaged in traffic enforcement. 

Deputy King was driving and Deputy Pennington was in the passenger seat. 

{¶5} At around 7:42 p.m., they were stopped in an abandoned lot along 

Lancaster Road across the street from a Pilot gas station. They saw a 2000 Plymouth 

Voyager minivan drive past on Lancaster Road and travel left of center. The traffic 

violation was not captured on the cruiser dash cam. 

{¶6} Deputy Pennington explained that they followed the minivan for a while in 

order to run the tags. When the tags came back as expired and the registered owner as 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 3 

having an expired license, they decided to stop the minivan. He then activated the 

cruiser’s dash camera video recording system. (T. at 25-26). 

{¶7} After stopping the minivan, Deputy King approached the driver side, while 

Deputy Pennington approached the passenger side. Deputy Pennington spoke with the 

occupants and informed the driver of why he was being stopped. Deputy Pennington 

requested identification from all the occupants. The driver was Jeremiah Horton, the front 

seat passenger was Jason Adams, and the middle seat row passenger was Worstell. 

The driver admitted that the van had been pulling to the left. 

{¶8} Adams did not have his identification with him, so he provided a social 

security number. While Adams was talking, Deputy Pennington suspected that he had 

something in his mouth because it sounded like he was choking. Deputy Pennington 

asked Adams to remove the item from his mouth and he complied. It appeared to be a 

bag of methamphetamine. Adams confirmed that it was methamphetamine. 

{¶9} The deputies removed all the occupants from the vehicle. In searching the 

vehicle, the deputies found two meth pipes and a digital scale under the front passenger 

seat. Under the middle row, where Worstell was sitting, the deputies found another digital 

scale. In the back seat, or third row, the deputies found a black drawstring bag containing 

methamphetamine. 

{¶10} Deputy Pennington Mirandized all three occupants and questioned them. 

Adams admitted that the methamphetamine found in his mouth was his, along with the 

scale and pipes beneath his seat. Horton claimed that the black drawstring bag found in 

the back seat of the minivan belonged to Worstell. Worstell admitted that the 

methamphetamine found inside the black bag was his, and that he had purchased it in 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 4 

Columbus for $500 and was bringing it back to sell in Newark. At some point, the driver, 

Horton, admitted that he was taking Adams and Worstell to get methamphetamine. 

{¶11} Deputy Pennington also testified that the registered owner of the minivan 

was Horton. Because Horton's license was reported as suspended, they had the option 

of impounding the minivan if there was nobody else to drive it. Adams and Worstell both 

had suspended licenses. As a result, the minivan would have to be towed and 

impounded, resulting in an inventory search. 

{¶12} The dash cam video from the deputies' cruiser was shown during the 

hearing and admitted into evidence. 

{¶13} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding 

that there was sufficient evidence of a traffic infraction to justify the stop and that the 

discovery of the methamphetamine in the mouth of Adams was sufficient to justify 

extending the stop to include a full search. The court also noted that the evidence was 

subject to inevitable discovery given the expired tags, expired licenses, and possibility of 

impoundment and resulting inventory search. 

{¶14} Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Worstell pled no contest. At 

sentencing, the court merged the possession charge into the trafficking charge. The court 

then imposed four years mandatory prison time concurrent to a prior case and a fine of 

$750, which was suspended due to Worstell's indigency. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶15} Worstell raises one Assignment of Error, 

{¶16} “I. APPELLANT’S RIGHTS TO BE FREE OF UNREASONABLE 

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 5 

WERE VIOLATED BY A TRAFFIC STOP THAT WAS UNSUPPORTED BY A 

REASONABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC OFFENSE.” 

Law and Analysis 

{¶17} In his sole assignment of error, Worstell argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress and in finding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion 

to stop the minivan. Worstell contends that it was dark, the cruiser was parked at an angle 

to the roadway and the traffic violation was not recorded on the cruiser’s dashcam video 

recording system. 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 

{¶18} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of 

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness 

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988; 

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing 

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists 

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio 

App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as 

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the 

applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio 

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534 

U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 6 

116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial 

court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra. 

Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 

Whether the Deputies stop of the minivan was lawful. 

{¶19} The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed, “‘[a]uthorities seem to be split as 

to whether a traffic stop is reasonable when supported merely by reasonable suspicion, 

or whether the heightened standard of probable cause must underlie the stop.’” City of 

Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 13, 

quoting Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 188 F.Supp.2d 762, 767(E.D.Mich.2002). 

There are actually two types of “traffic” stops, and each has a different constitutional 

standard applicable to it. In State v. Moller, the Court of Appeals observed, 

 First is the typical non-investigatory traffic stop, wherein the police 

officer witnesses a violation of the traffic code, such as crossing over the 

centerline of a road, and then stops the motorist for this traffic violation. 

Second is the investigative or “Terry” stop, wherein the officer does not 

necessarily witness a specific traffic violation, but the officer does have 

sufficient reason to believe that a criminal act has taken place or is 

occurring, and the officer seeks to confirm or refute this suspicion of criminal 

activity. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-

1880 [20 L.Ed.2d 889]. A non-investigatory traffic stop must be supported 

by probable cause, which arises when the stopping officer witnesses the 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 7 

traffic violation. See Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 

S.Ct. 1769, 1772 [135 L.Ed.2d 89]; Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977), 434 

U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 [54 L.Ed.2d 331]. By contrast, an 

investigatory Terry stop is proper so long as the stopping officer has 

“reasonable articulable suspicion” of criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 

88 S.Ct. at 1879-1880. 

12th Dist. Butler No. CA99-07-128, 2000 WL 1577287 (Oct. 23, 2000); Accord, State v. 

Baughman, 192 Ohio App.3d 45, 2011-Ohio-162, 947 N.E.2d 1273 (12th Dist.), ¶ 14; 

State v. Nwachukwa, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-15-03, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 24; ¶ 26; State v. 

Woods, 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-13, 2018-Ohio-3379, 117 N.E. 3d 1017, ¶14. 

{¶20} The cause for a non-investigatory traffic stop has been succinctly stated by 

the Supreme Court of Ohio: “Where a police officer stops a vehicle based upon probable 

cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution[.]” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 

Ohio St.3d 3, 11-21, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). Probable cause is defined in terms of “facts 

or circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had 

committed or was committing an offense.’” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 

854, 861, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 

13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). 

{¶21} In State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4538, 894 N.E.2d 1204, 

the defendant argued that his actions in the case – twice driving across the white edge 

line – were not enough to constitute a violation of the driving within marked lanes statute, 

R.C. 4511.33. Id. at ¶ 15. The appellant further argued that the stop was unjustified 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 8 

because there was no reason to suspect that he had failed to first ascertain that leaving 

the lane could be done safely or that he had not stayed within his lane “as nearly as [was] 

practicable,” within the meaning of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). In rejecting these arguments, the 

Supreme Court noted, “the question of whether appellant might have a possible defense 

to a charge of violating R.C. 4511.33 is irrelevant in our analysis of whether an officer has 

a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. An officer is not required 

to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime might have 

a legal defense to the charge.” Id. at ¶ 17. The Supreme Court concluded that a lawenforcement officer who witnesses a motorist drift over lane markings in violation of a 

statute that requires a driver to drive a vehicle entirely within a single lane of traffic has 

reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to warrant a traffic stop, even without 

further evidence of erratic or unsafe driving. Id. at syllabus. In Mays, the Ohio Supreme 

Court made the following observation as it pertains to Ohio law, 

 Appellant’s reliance on [Dayton v.] Erickson [76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 

N.E.2d 1091 (1996)], and in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 

116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, is misplaced. Probable cause is certainly 

a complete justification for a traffic stop, but we have not held that probable 

cause is required. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable 

and articulable suspicion. State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411, 

618 N.E.2d 162. The former subsumes the latter. Just as a fact proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt has by necessity been proven by a 

preponderance, an officer who has probable cause necessarily has a 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 9 

reasonable and articulable suspicion, which is all the officer needs to justify 

a stop. Erickson and Whren do not hold otherwise. 

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. The Ohio Supreme Court 

concluded, 

 Therefore, if an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal 

violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is 

constitutionally valid. 

119 Ohio St.3d 406, ¶8 (emphasis added). See, State v. Marcum, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 

18-CAC-11 0083, 2019-Ohio-2293. 

{¶22} In the case at bar, Deputy Pennington testified that he witnessed a left-ofcenter violation. The trial court found this testimony to be credible, based in part upon 

the minivan driver’s admission that the vehicle had been pulling left. 

{¶23} In State v. Brinkley, the Ohio Supreme Court emphasized, 

 As we held in State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 

57, 437 N.E.2d 583, “the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses 

are primarily for the trier of the facts. * * * This principle is applicable to 

suppression hearings as well as trials.” Accord DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 

39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v.

DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 528 N.E.2d 542; State v. Mills

(1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972. 

105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-Ohio-1507, 824 N.E.2d 959. 
Licking County, Case No. 2019 CA 00034 10 

{¶24} We find the trial court’s decision is based upon competent, credible 

evidence in the form of Deputy Pennington’s testimony. We find that unless the cruiser 

is immediately behind a vehicle at the time of the traffic violation, it would be impossible 

to record the violation in real-time. There is no requirement that a traffic violation be 

recorded. 

{¶25} Worstell’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶26} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Baldwin, J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur