FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 29, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LADONNA MULLINS and LINDA

EDWARDS,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 09-1031, 09-1091

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 04-cr-463-MSK)

Scott T. Poland, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant LaDonna Mullins.

Robert T. Fishman, of Ridley, McGreevy & Weisz, PC, Denver, Colorado, for

Defendant-Appellant Linda Edwards.

Martha A. Paluch, Assistant United States Attorney (David M. Gaouette, United

States Attorney; Patricia W. Davies, Assistant United States Attorney; Matthew

T. Kirsch, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Denver,

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and

GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
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LaDonna Mullins and Linda Edwards both owned real estate businesses in

the Denver metro area. Both also entered into a scheme to defraud the U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) by using false

information to obtain loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration

(“FHA”). For this, Ms. Mullins and Ms. Edwards were indicted for and convicted

of wire fraud, among other things. Both now challenge their convictions, and Ms.

Edwards her sentence, on multiple grounds, including on the grounds that certain

counts were time-barred; that the interstate wires underlying the wire fraud

charges weren’t reasonably foreseeable; that the government’s investigatory

methods violated the Sixth Amendment; and that, in sentencing Ms. Edwards, the

district court erred in calculating the loss her fraud caused. In the end, however,

we discern no reversible error in the district court’s proceedings and affirm the

judgments against both defendants.

I

Though complex in its detail, the basic thrust of the fraudulent scheme at

issue in this case is fairly straightforward. A prospective home buyer would

employ either Ms. Mullins or Ms. Edwards as his or her real estate agent. If it

turned out the buyer had poor credit that might impede obtaining a mortgage loan,

the agent would refer the buyer to Warren Williams or Rod Wesson to “clean up”

the buyer’s credit so the buyer could qualify for an FHA-insured loan, which is

generally easier to obtain than a standard loan. Other times, Mr. Williams or Mr.
- 3 -

Wesson would find prospective buyers and refer them to one of the real estate

agents to find a property for them. 

Either way, once all the players were in place, Messrs. Williams and

Wesson, appropriately known as “document makers,” would supply the buyer

with false pay stubs, W-2 forms, Social Security numbers, rent verifications, and

gift letters to help support the buyer’s loan application. To “back up” the

documents, Messrs. Williams and Wesson listed one of several fake companies

they’d established — including “W&W Enterprises,” “Comp. Systems,” and

“Neighborstat” — as the buyer’s employer. The telephone numbers provided for

those “employers” rang to the document makers, where Mr. Williams or Mr.

Wesson would purport to verify the fraudulent employment information on the

documents they’d created. 

Once a buyer qualified for an FHA-insured loan and bought a property

using false credit information, the document maker and real estate agent on that

transaction would divide the spoils. The closing real estate agent would kick

back part of her commission to the document maker who prepared the buyer’s

file, while the document maker would pay the referring agent a cut of the fee he

charged the buyer.

Authorities cottoned on to this scheme in 2001, when a HUD review of

mortgage companies turned up a suspicious recurrence of the same three

companies — W&W Enterprises, Comp. Systems, and Neighborstat — listed as
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employers on a number of applications for FHA-insured loans. Further

investigation revealed that the documents supporting the loan applications in

question contained false information and Social Security numbers that didn’t

match borrowers’ names.

In February 2004, a grand jury issued a 48-count indictment accusing

twenty-seven defendants, Ms. Edwards among them, of false statements, the use

of false Social Security numbers, and conspiracy. Later, however, the

government sought and won the dismissal of its own indictment, for the stated

purpose of investigating further suspected criminal conduct by Ms. Edwards and

others, and then reindicting them on more comprehensive charges. As part of its

investigation, and with the permission of the district court, the government used

Mr. Williams, one of Ms. Edwards’s erstwhile co-defendants, as an informant. At

the government’s direction, Mr. Williams initiated and recorded a number of

telephone calls and meetings with Ms. Edwards. Those conversations primarily

concerned two property sales Ms. Edwards was arranging, and for which she

wanted Mr. Williams to prepare false documents. Those transactions, together

with other conduct uncovered during the government’s investigation as well as

the counts alleged in the original indictment, were charged in a superseding

indictment brought against Ms. Edwards in February 2005. That indictment also

added Ms. Mullins as a defendant.
1

 Ms. Edwards was also charged with several other counts that were

dismissed prior to trial.

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Eventually, after two further amendments, the currently operative

indictment was issued in March 2007. It accused Ms. Mullins of five counts of

wire fraud and aiding and abetting. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 2. Meanwhile, Ms.

Edwards, who was involved in significantly more fraudulent loan transactions

than Ms. Mullins, was charged with seven counts of wire fraud, six counts of

making false statements to HUD, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3), and two counts of use

of a false Social Security number, 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B); each count included

an aiding and abetting charge.1

 In addition, the indictment called for forfeiture of

any proceeds either defendant derived from her crimes.

Ms. Mullins and Ms. Edwards were tried together in a thirteen-day jury

trial. In the end, Ms. Mullins was convicted of four counts of wire fraud and

acquitted of the fifth. The district court sentenced her to three years’ probation

and ordered her to pay $66,459.33 in restitution. The court also determined that

Ms. Mullins had derived $44,292.00 in proceeds from her fraud and declared that

amount subject to forfeiture. Ms. Edwards was acquitted of one count of wire

fraud and one count of false statements, but convicted of all other counts against

her. The court sentenced Ms. Edwards to forty-one months’ imprisonment,

ordered her to pay $646,521.87 in restitution, and entered a forfeiture judgment of

$139,854.96.
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Ms. Mullins now appeals her conviction; Ms. Edwards appeals her

conviction, sentence, and forfeiture. We address their arguments in turn,

beginning with Ms. Mullins.

II

Ms. Mullins offers four arguments on appeal which, she says, warrant the

reversal of her convictions. First, she argues that three of the charges on which

she was convicted were time-barred because the applicable statute of limitations

expired before she was indicted. Second, she contends that her wire fraud

convictions cannot stand because there wasn’t sufficient evidence for the jury to

find that she caused interstate wire transmissions. Third, she urges us to hold that

the district court plainly erred in limiting her cross-examination of a government

witness regarding the benefits he expected to receive in exchange for his

testimony. Fourth, and finally, Ms. Mullins argues that the district court erred in

refusing to give her proposed instruction charging the jury that it could find her

guilty of a lesser included offense. On examination, we find none availing.

A

Ms. Mullins’s first challenge to her conviction concerns the applicable

statute of limitations for the wire fraud counts against her. She argues that, for

three of the four counts on which she was convicted, the limitations period

expired before she was indicted and thus barred her prosecution. We disagree.
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1

In general, a five-year statute of limitations applies to non-capital federal

crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). This default applies to wire fraud charges, but 18

U.S.C. § 3293(2) carves out an important exception: “if the offense affects a

financial institution,” the government has ten years to indict a defendant before

the prosecution becomes time-barred. 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2). The three counts Ms.

Mullins challenges as brought outside the statute of limitations involve wire

transmissions sent in 1999 but not charged until 2007, as part of the third

superseding indictment. Accordingly, the viability of Ms. Mullins’s convictions

on those counts depends on whether the evidence adduced at her trial supported a

finding that those offenses “affect[ed] a financial institution.”

First things first: what does it mean to “affect[] a financial institution”? 

The district court took this statutory language to mean that “the scheme to defraud

exposes a financial institution to a new or increased risk of loss or causes the

financial institution to suffer an actual loss.” Mullins R. Vol. V at 361. Ms.

Mullins, meanwhile, would have us read § 3293(2)’s ten-year limitations period

to apply only when the financial institution suffers an actual financial loss

attributable to the fraud. We think the district court has the better interpretation. 

While Congress certainly could have extended the limitations period only when

wire fraud “causes a loss” to a financial institution, it chose instead to use the

considerably broader term “affects.” And that means simply to “make a material
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impression on; to act upon, influence, move, touch, or have an effect on,”

I Oxford English Dictionary 211 (2d ed. 1989), or, perhaps more appositely to

this case, “to have a detrimental influence on,” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 35 (2002). 

As some of our sister circuits have recognized, there may be some point

where the “influence” a defendant’s wire fraud has on a financial institution

becomes so attenuated, so remote, so indirect that it cannot trigger the ten-year

limitations period because it does not in any meaningful sense “affect” the

institution. See United States v. Agne, 214 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2000); United

States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 216 (3d Cir. 1992). “[M]ere utilization of a

financial institution” as a conduit for funds with no attendant risk of loss to the

institution, for example, might not do it. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d

421, 426 (4th Cir. 2000). The district court instructed the jury as much in this

case. See Mullins R. Vol. V at 361 (“Mere use of a financial institution in a

scheme to defraud is not enough to demonstrate that the financial institution was

affected by the wire fraud.”). 

But whatever limits there may be, a “new or increased risk of loss” is

plainly a material, detrimental effect on a financial institution, and falls squarely

within the proper scope of the statute. The Seventh Circuit has reached this same

result, offering the observation that extending the statute of limitations for

“putting those institutions at risk, whether or not there is actual harm,” ably
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serves § 3293(2)’s manifest purpose of “deterring would-be criminals from

including financial institutions in their schemes.” United States v. Serpico, 320

F.3d 691, 694-95 (7th Cir. 2003). Our conclusion also finds support in our

circuit’s treatment of the federal bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344. In that

context, we have held that a potential risk of loss is enough to prove a scheme to

defraud a financial institution. See United States v. Swanson, 360 F.3d 1155,

1161 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252, 1257 (10th Cir.

1991). It would be anomalous to say exposing a financial institution to a risk of

loss defrauds or “victimize[s]” the institution, id., yet at the same time doesn’t

“affect” it. The latter term would seem to suggest a lesser standard pertains, and

in any event certainly not a greater one. 

2

Even if a risk of loss is enough to trigger the ten-year statute of limitations,

Ms. Mullins argues her convictions still must be overturned because the

government failed to prove even that. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence such as this, we must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government and determine whether any reasonable jury could

find that Ms. Mullins’s fraud exposed a financial institution to a new or increased

risk of loss. See United States v. Rakes, 510 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007).

And under that standard, we are constrained to affirm her convictions.
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The three counts Ms. Mullins challenges as time-barred involve two

lenders, National City Mortgage and FT Mortgage Company. In 1999, when the

charged fraud took place, the mortgage companies were wholly owned

subsidiaries of National City Bank of Indiana and First Tennessee Bank,

respectively. Each of those banks, in turn, was a federally insured financial

institution under § 3293(2). The jury heard materially identical testimony from

officers for each mortgage company, explaining how fraudulent information on a

loan application increases the risk of loss to the lender and its parent bank. 

Fraudulent information on a loan application — false Social Security numbers,

pay records, employment information, and the like — causes the lender to

overestimate a borrower’s ability to pay off the loan, creating a greater risk of

default, foreclosure, and loss to the lender.

This risk persists even after sale of the mortgage to a secondary investor. 

If the fraud were later discovered, the witnesses explained, the terms of sale

allowed the purchaser to force the mortgage company to buy back the loan at full

price despite its reduced value. The witness from FT Mortgage explained that in

such cases FT Mortgage would incur any loss from a mortgage that subsequently

defaults; alternatively, National City Mortgage’s representative testified that a

lender could resell the loan on the “scratch and dent” market, but for considerably

less than face value. Fraud could also preclude the mortgage companies from

obtaining FHA insurance on the loans. Or, if the fraud was discovered after FHA
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extended coverage, FHA could seek reimbursement from the lender in the event

of default. The mortgage companies, as wholly owned subsidiaries, would then

pass any loss suffered on to their parent financial institutions.

Assuming, as we must, that the jury credited this testimony, it was

sufficient as a matter of law to support the conclusion that, on each of the three

counts, Ms. Mullins’s fraud exposed a financial institution to an increased risk of

loss. The jury was free to conclude that the loans National City Mortgage and FT

Mortgage issued based on false information Ms. Mullins helped supply exposed

the companies to a greater risk of loss, through the mechanisms the companies’

officers described. And the jury could further find that this risk of loss passed

through to their parent financial institutions, which would bear any loss the

mortgage companies incurred. See United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195

(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a financial institution may be affected for purposes of

§ 3293(2) by absorbing losses of its wholly owned subsidiary); Pelullo, 964 F.2d

at 216-17 (same). Accordingly, the ten-year statute of limitations applies and her

prosecution on these counts is not time-barred.

Seeking to avoid this result, Ms. Mullins contends there was no realistic

prospect of loss to the mortgage companies or the financial institutions because

FHA insurance protected them from losses caused by borrower default, and

because the fraud was discovered only after the properties were sold and the loans

paid off in full. But, as we have already noted, FHA insurance guarantees against
- 12 -

foreclosure, not fraud, and FHA could refuse to insure loans predicated on fraud. 

Neither does it matter that the loans in question were paid off before the fraud

was discovered. That does mean, of course, the lenders and their parent banks

didn’t suffer an actual financial loss from the fraud. But, as we’ve already

explained, that isn’t necessary to trigger the ten-year limitations period. The fact

remains that the jury could find that, by using fraudulent information to obtain

loans, Ms. Mullins and her customers exposed the companies to a greater risk of

loss that persisted at least until extinguished by the final loan payment. That

looming possibility of harm, even if ultimately not realized, was enough to affect

the financial institutions for purposes of § 3293(2).

B

We turn next to the sufficiency of the evidence that Ms. Mullins “cause[d]

to be transmitted” interstate wire communications, an essential element of wire

fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To sustain her convictions, the evidence need not go so

far as to prove she “specifically intend[ed] the use of this or that wire,” but it

must at least show that Ms. Mullins did “an act with knowledge that the use of the

wires will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can

reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.” United States v.

Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pereira v. United States,

347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954)) (alterations omitted). We review Ms. Mullins’s challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, but in doing so we owe considerable
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deference to the jury’s verdict. See Rakes, 510 F.3d at 1284. We thus view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask if any rational jury

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that use of the interstate wires was a

reasonably foreseeable consequence of Ms. Mullins’s actions. See id. While

undoubtedly deferential, this review has some bite: if the evidence does no “more

than raise a mere suspicion of guilt” or requires “piling inference upon inference”

to conclude the defendant is guilty, we will reverse the conviction. Id.

As it happened, the use of interstate wires was integral to Ms. Mullins’s

and Ms. Edwards’s fraudulent scheme. FHA required each loan application to

carry an FHA case number, which was used to process and track the application. 

To obtain the case number, a lender logged in to HUD’s FHA Connection

computer database system and entered information about the property and

prospective borrower. That information was sent to HUD’s mainframe in

Maryland, which produced and transmitted an FHA case number back to the

lender. That case number then appeared on the various loan documents the real

estate agents handled through closing of the property purchase. And it was the

case number transmissions for each loan application — from Maryland to

Colorado — that formed the basis of the wire fraud charges against Ms. Mullins

and Ms. Edwards.

It was and is undisputed that those transmissions occurred, that they

crossed state lines, and that they were a necessary and integral part of processing
2

 While Roylance and Marvin arose under the mail fraud statute,

“interpretations of the mail fraud statute are, of course, authoritative on questions

of wire fraud.” Wittig, 575 F.3d at 1099 n.3 (citing Pasquantino v. United States,

544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005)). 

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FHA-insured loans. But even spotting the government all that, Ms. Mullins

maintains this use of the wires still wasn’t reasonably foreseeable to someone in

her shoes. On her view, the evidence showed that the process for obtaining the

case numbers was so obscure that even an experienced real estate agent like her

couldn’t have known or foreseen that making fraudulent applications for FHAinsured loans would result in those particular transmissions. Moreover, she

maintains that her real estate dealings were entirely Colorado-centric: her office,

her property listings, and all the people who helped her process loans were

located in the state. Thus, even if the case number wire transmissions might have

been foreseeable, Ms. Mullins argues that she nevertheless had no reason to think

they would be interstate wire transmissions. 

Neither of these arguments is persuasive. The wire fraud statute doesn’t

require that a defendant be able to anticipate every technical detail of a wire

transmission, before she may be held liable for causing it. It’s enough if she “set

forces in motion which foreseeably would involve” use of the wires. United

States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 167 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting Marvin v. United

States, 279 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir. 1960)).2

 That is, we are concerned with

whether “the use of the wires . . . in the ordinary course of business,” not the
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precise use of “this or that wire,” was known or reasonably foreseeable to

someone in Ms. Mullins’s position. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441,

1448 (10th Cir. 1992). The evidence at trial showed that Ms. Mullins knew she

was dealing with FHA-insured loans, and in fact selected FHA loans even without

consulting with her clients. The FHA designation, with case numbers, appeared

on closing documents Ms. Mullins saw. Those numbers had to get from FHA to

the loan papers somehow, and a rational jury could conclude that using wires to

do it was reasonably foreseeable. This is particularly so in light of evidence that

wire transmissions are integral to other parts of real estate transactions, such as

transferring funds, with which real estate agents are profoundly familiar. Indeed,

given the ubiquity of electronic communications in our day and age, one might

posit that use of the wires is always foreseeable when conducting such large and

complex transactions. Cf. United States v. Muni, 668 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1981)

(“The content of reasonable foreseeability must inevitably keep pace with

advances in technology and general awareness of such advances.”). For our

purposes, though, it’s enough to say that, by deliberately choosing FHA-insured

loans for her clients, Ms. Mullins could reasonably foresee the case-number wire

transmissions that were inexorably to follow. Or, at least, so a jury rationally

could find.
3

 As an initial matter, we note that several of our sister circuits have

indicated that the government need not prove it was foreseeable a wire

communication would cross state lines. Instead, they view the wire’s interstate

nature as merely a jurisdictional hook for bringing the case into federal court,

which doesn’t require any degree of mens rea. See United States v. Lindemann,

85 F.3d 1232, 1241 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 907

(2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1985) (also

noting exception when, absent interstate wire transmission, defendant’s conduct

“would not be a violation of state law and was not itself morally wrongful”); cf.

United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684-86 (1975) (holding statute prohibiting

assault on federal officer does not require defendant be aware victim was federal

officer). Our court, meanwhile, doesn’t appear to have ruled definitively on this

question. But cf. Roylance, 690 F.2d at 167 (“One causes mailings and triggers

operation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 when it is reasonably foreseeable his . . . activities

will result in the use of interstate mails.”). And we need not do so today; even

assuming without deciding that a foreseeability requirement extends to the

interstate nature of wire communications, it is satisfied here.

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We likewise reject Ms. Mullins’s contention that, if nothing else, the

interstate nature of the wire transmissions wasn’t foreseeable.3

 She maintains

that the real estate transactions underlying her convictions had everything to do

with Colorado and only Colorado: all of the people and properties involved were

located in the Centennial State. But that’s just not so. The charged wire

transmissions came from the FHA in Maryland. As its name suggests — and as

Ms. Mullins testified she was aware — FHA is an agency of the federal

government, whose seat resides outside of Colorado. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,

cl. 17; 4 U.S.C. § 71. From this, it’s no stretch for a jury to conclude Ms. Mullins

should have anticipated that wire transmissions involving the agency might cross

state lines, as they did. Thus, assuming the government had to prove Ms. Mullins
- 17 -

could reasonably foresee the interstate nature of the transmissions charged, a

reasonable jury could find it did so here.

C

Next, Ms. Mullins argues the district court violated her confrontation rights

and denied her a fair trial when it limited her cross-examination of a key

government witness, Roderick Wesson. Mr. Wesson was, of course, one of the

document makers at the center of the fraudulent loan scheme, as well as one of

the first defendants to cooperate with the government’s investigation. Seeking to

challenge his credibility, on cross-examination Ms. Mullins’s attorney asked Mr.

Wesson whether, as part of his deal with the government, he didn’t have to pay

taxes on his income from the scheme. The court overruled a government

objection on relevancy grounds, and Mr. Wesson answered: “I wasn’t asked to

pay any taxes. They told me I didn’t have any taxes to pay.” Mullins R. Vol. IV

at 1102. Pressing further, defense counsel asked Mr. Wesson whether any

criminal tax evasion charges had been brought against him. Again the

government objected. This time the court sustained the objection. The court

acknowledged that “this witness’ understanding of his agreement with the

Government is . . . pertinent to credibility [and] to what his motivation is for his

testimony.” Id. at 1124. But, the court continued, “[w]hether he has been

charged with tax evasion seems to me to be redundant and cumulative of that

which you have already elicited, which is that he has a deal with the Government
4

 There may be some tension within our circuit’s precedents as to the

proper standard of review for confrontation claims premised on cross-examination

restrictions. Compare United States v. Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir.

1999) (reviewing this question de novo), with United States v. Hinkle, 37 F.3d

576, 579 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing this question for abuse of discretion). But

see United States v. Hargrove, 2010 WL 2399348, at *6 (10th Cir. 2010)

(unpublished) (“We review rulings regarding limitations on crossexamination . . . for abuse of discretion. Whether a violation of the Confrontation

Clause arose from evidentiary rulings is a question we review de novo.” (citations

omitted)). Because we perceive no error even under the more generous (to Ms.

Mullins) de novo standard, we apply that standard here, but leave the task of

reconciling whatever conflict there may be in our precedents for a case where the

(continued...)

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where he doesn’t have to pay any taxes.” Id. Ms. Mullins’s attorney replied,

“Fair enough, Judge,” and moved on with his cross-examination. Id.

Ms. Mullins now argues this limitation violated her Confrontation Clause

and due process rights to cross-examine Mr. Wesson. Because Ms. Mullins made

no objection at trial — on confrontation, due process, or other grounds — to the

district court’s decision, we will reverse only if it was “plain error for the district

court to fail to raise the constitutional issue sua sponte.” United States v. Perez,

989 F.2d 1574, 1582 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc). That is, Ms. Mullins must show

the district court committed (1) error (2) that is clear or obvious under current

law, and which both (3) affected her substantial rights and (4) undermined the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States

v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1019 (10th Cir. 2009); Perez, 989 F.2d at 1583.

Ms. Mullins’s argument fails on the first step, because there was here no

error at all.4

 Mr. Wesson’s deal with the government was undoubtedly fair game
4

(...continued)

standard of review might affect the outcome. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, ___

F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2376163, at *12 n.10 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

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for cross-examination. It shed light on what he stood to gain from testifying

against Ms. Mullins, and that motivation in turn directly implicated his

credibility. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). But the right to

cross-examine witnesses isn’t absolute. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude

insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on

such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, . . .

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d

1325, 1334 (10th Cir. 1998). The touchstone for whether the Confrontation

Clause has been satisfied is “whether the jury had sufficient information to make

a discriminating appraisal of the witness’ motives and bias.” United States v.

Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The jury had before it sufficient evidence to do just this.

It did because Ms. Mullins was allowed extensive cross-examination into

Mr. Wesson’s cooperation agreement with the government. That crossexamination revealed, among other things, that Mr. Wesson was sentenced to just

fourteen months’ prison time for his involvement in the mortgage scheme, was

paying off his $142,000 restitution order at a rate of $25 per month (with a

number of missed payments), and believed he didn’t have to pay taxes on his ill-
5

 Ms. Mullins also frames the limitation on her cross-examination as a

violation of her due process right to a fair trial. She refers to the government’s

obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose exculpatory

evidence, including material that might be used to impeach government witnesses, 

and from that infers a right to cross-examine witnesses on such matters. Brady’s

disclosure requirements and the right to cross-examination are, of course,

integrally connected. See Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir.

2000). In the absence of any allegation that the government failed to disclose

evidence, however, we think our Confrontation Clause precedent provides the

proper rubric for assessing her claim. Cf. United States v. Atwell, 766 F.2d 416,

421 (10th Cir. 1985). In any event, having concluded that her confrontation

rights weren’t violated, we are satisfied that Ms. Mullins wasn’t deprived of a fair

trial.

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gotten gains. The only restriction the court imposed on this inquiry was to bar a

single question about possible tax evasion charges against Mr. Wesson, which the

court believed cumulative after counsel had elicited Mr. Wesson’s understanding

that he didn’t have to pay any taxes. We think this limit was reasonable and

safely within the “wide latitude” the Confrontation Clause affords the district

court. It didn’t cut off all questioning on an important area of cross-examination,

and it left the jury with substantial information about Mr. Wesson’s leniency from

the government. We do not think the “jury might have received a significantly

different impression” of his credibility had the challenged question been allowed. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680.5

 

D

Finally, Ms. Mullins argues that the jury should have been instructed that it

could, in lieu of finding her guilty of wire fraud, convict her of the lesser
- 21 -

included offense of making a false statement to HUD, a violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1012. The district court rejected this argument, and so must we.

A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if “(1) there

was a proper request; (2) the lesser included offense includes some but not all of

the elements of the offense charged; (3) the elements differentiating the two

offenses are in dispute; and (4) a jury could rationally convict the defendant of

the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater offense.” United States v.

McGuire, 200 F.3d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Moore,

108 F.3d 270, 272 (10th Cir. 1997)). We exercise plenary review of the second

question — whether an offense is actually a lesser included offense of the charged

offense — while we review a district court’s determination as to whether the

evidence justifies a lesser included offense instruction for abuse of discretion. Id.

There’s no dispute Ms. Mullins satisfied the first requirement by proffering

a lesser included offense instruction to the district court. But her claim to the

instruction runs aground at the second step, where we ask whether the elements of

the requested lesser offense are a “subset of the elements of the charged offense.” 

Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989). If making a false statement

to HUD requires proof of some element different from or in addition to those wire

fraud requires, it isn’t properly considered a lesser included offense. See

McGuire, 200 F.3d at 674. And to list the elements of both crimes is to answer

the question. The elements of wire fraud are “(1) a scheme to defraud; (2) an
6

 Ms. Mullins argued for 18 U.S.C. § 1012 as the lesser included offense

before the district court, see Mullins R. Vol. V at 311-13; before us she seems to

stake her claim on 18 U.S.C. § 1010. But that provision, too, requires at least one

element — intent to obtain a HUD-insured loan — that wire fraud does not.

- 22 -

interstate wire communication; and (3) a purpose to use the wire communication

to execute the scheme.” Wittig, 575 F.3d at 1093 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Making a false statement to HUD, meanwhile, requires proof of (1) a

false report or statement (2) to or for the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (3) with intent to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1012. Whatever other

distinctions one might draw between the elements of these offenses, it’s

indisputable that making a false statement to HUD includes an element — that the

statement be to or for HUD — that wire fraud doesn’t. Thus, it isn’t included

within the charged offense and Ms. Mullins wasn’t entitled to the requested

instruction.6

Ms. Mullins appears to argue that making a false statement to HUD is a

lesser included offense of wire fraud in this case because the alleged fraud

included statements to HUD. It may well be that the same evidence used here to

convict Ms. Mullins of wire fraud could have also supported a charge of making

false statements to HUD. But the Supreme Court has rejected just such an

approach to lesser included offense instructions. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715-

21. We are only to compare the statutory elements of the two offenses, not ask

whether the evidence offered to prove the greater offense also establishes the
- 23 -

lesser. See id. And, as we’ve explained, Ms. Mullins’s argument fails under

that, the proper test.

III

We turn now to Ms. Edwards’s appeal. She raises essentially five

challenges to her convictions and sentence. First, she argues that the government

violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well as her right to due process

when it contacted her, through its informant, during the period when no

indictment was pending against her. Second, she alleges that the district court

gave the jury a defective instruction with respect to aiding and abetting. Third,

and like Ms. Mullins, she contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove

she could reasonably have foreseen the interstate wire communications underlying

her wire fraud convictions. Fourth, she alleges various errors in how the district

court calculated the loss caused by her fraud for sentencing and restitution

purposes. Fifth, and finally, she asks us to reverse the district court’s criminal

forfeiture order, on the ground that the court improperly shifted the burden of

proof from the government onto her. Considering these objections in turn, we

conclude none presents reversible error.

A

Ms. Edwards first challenges the government’s actions in dismissing the

initial indictment against her (while stating its intent later to reindict on greater

charges), then using Mr. Williams to question her outside the presence of her
- 24 -

attorney, and then reindicting her. She contends she had a Sixth Amendment

right to counsel during the period when no indictment was pending against her,

and that the government’s actions violated that right. The government, for its

part, maintains the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only to currently

pending charges, and so had no effect at all, and couldn’t’ve been violated, during

the temporary indictment intermezzo. We conclude Ms. Edwards’s claim must

fail, though in doing so we need not adopt today the rule the government urges. 

Even assuming without deciding that Ms. Edwards did retain a Sixth Amendment

right to counsel between indictments, it didn’t attach to any charges for which she

was ultimately convicted. Accordingly, no Sixth Amendment violation could

have infected the criminal judgment rendered against her.

The Sixth Amendment forbids the government from eliciting incriminating

statements from a defendant outside the presence of counsel. See Maine v.

Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). But, the Supreme Court has instructed, this

protection is “offense specific.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001). It

“attaches only to charged offenses” — that is, offenses for which “adversary

judicial criminal proceedings” have begun, “whether by way of formal charge,

preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Id. at 167-68, 172

(2001) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)). Accordingly,

the government remains free to seek uncounseled statements from a defendant
7

 The Fifth Amendment, of course, affords a right to counsel during

custodial questioning, even before the start of adversary proceedings. Cobb, 532

U.S. at 171 & n.2 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). Ms.

Edwards makes no claim that her conversations with Mr. Williams were custodial,

or that her Miranda rights were in any way violated.

- 25 -

about uncharged offenses without offending the Sixth Amendment.7 That said,

the scope of the Sixth Amendment right is not completely defined by “the four

corners of a charging instrument”: its bar against the government seeking

incriminating statements from the defendant “encompass[es] offenses that, even

if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the

Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)] test.” Id. at 173. Apart from

this narrow exception, however, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for

uncharged offenses, even if they are “closely related to” or “inextricably

intertwined with” charged offenses. Id. (quoting id. at 186 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting)). 

So it is that, even assuming without deciding that Ms. Edwards enjoyed a

Sixth Amendment right to counsel between indictments, the right pertained only

to the offenses charged in the original indictment (or those that would be

considered the same offense under the Blockburger test). With respect to other

offenses that appeared only in later, superseding indictments, the criminal

adversary process simply hadn’t begun; the Sixth Amendment hadn’t been

triggered. And, as it happened, it was only on those latter offenses that Ms.

Edwards was convicted. She thus can’t establish a Sixth Amendment violation
8

 Ms. Edwards was charged in Counts 1 (conspiracy), 2-4, 11-14, 25 (false

statements within the jurisdiction of the executive branch), 26-27, 34-37, and 46

(false use of a Social Security number) of the original indictment. See Indictment

in United States v. Wesson, 04-cr-70 (D. Colo. 2004), Edwards R. Suppl. Vol. II

(“Original Indictment”). She was ultimately convicted on Counts 6, 8, 10, 15-17

(wire fraud), 19-21, 23, 26 (false statements to HUD), and 31-32 (false use of

Social Security number) of the third superseding indictment. See Third

Superseding Indictment, Edwards R. Vol. II at 657; Judgment in a Criminal Case,

Edwards R. Vol. II at 1506 (listing counts of conviction).

- 26 -

that might undermine the validity of any of those convictions and give us grounds

to reverse them.

This conclusion flows ineluctably from a comparison of the original

indictment and Ms. Edwards’s ultimate counts of conviction.8

 As we’ve noted,

the Sixth Amendment attaches both to formally charged offenses and to any crime

that would be considered the same offense as a charged offense under

Blockburger. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173. We thus ask whether each of the charges in

the original indictment and each of the counts of conviction “requires proof of a

fact which the other does not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; see also id.

(applying this test “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of

two distinct statutory provisions” (emphasis added)). If so, they are separate

offenses, and the Sixth Amendment poses no obstacle to Ms. Edwards’s

convictions. No violation occurred with respect to Ms. Edwards’s wire fraud

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 because the original indictment didn’t charge

any counts of wire fraud. The closest charge was a count under 18 U.S.C. § 371

alleging conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States, specifically
9

 That said, there are cases in the double jeopardy context where an

acquittal for conspiracy will, as a practical matter, collaterally estop the

government from proving the underlying substantive crime. See Wittig, 575 F.3d

at 1100-01. That obviously isn’t the case here.

- 27 -

violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1010 and 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). It is well

settled “that a substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that crime are not the

‘same offence’” under Blockburger. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389

(1992).9

 And so it goes without saying that a substantive crime and a conspiracy

to commit different crimes are likewise distinct under that test. 

Ms. Edwards’s other convictions were for false statements to HUD, 18

U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3), and the false use of a Social Security number, 42 U.S.C.

§ 408(a)(7)(B). Unlike wire fraud, alleged violations of these provisions did

appear in both the original indictment and the final judgment of conviction. But

the conduct underlying Ms. Edwards’s convictions was completely different from

that alleged in the original indictment: each count of conviction involved clients,

properties, loan applications, and Social Security numbers that appear nowhere in

the original indictment. Compare Original Indictment, Edwards R. Suppl. Vol. II

(counts 1-4, 11-14, 25-27, 34-37), with Third Superseding Indictment, Edwards R.

Vol. II at 657 (counts 19-21, 23, 26, 31-32); see Robbins v. United States, 476

F.2d 26, 32 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that, to be the same offense, two counts

“must be identical in law and fact”); United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544, 1549

(10th Cir. 1992) (holding two charges distinct under Blockburger because second
- 28 -

charge “involved different events and entirely different facts” than first). Ms.

Edwards thus can’t establish any Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or violation,

with respect to any of her counts of conviction. 

Seeking to avoid this result, Ms. Edwards quotes our statement in United

States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 1991), that “[t]he

government may violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel when it

deliberately elicits uncounseled statements about very closely related crimes

which arise out of the same course of conduct as the charged offenses,” as well as

authority from other jurisdictions holding that “the government may not evade the

Sixth Amendment simply by dismissing the initial indictment and reindicting the

defendant on charges stemming from the same investigation,” United States v.

Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1526 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also United States v.

Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 622 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that right to counsel

continued after dismissal of indictment when defendant was reindicted on charges

that “gr[e]w out of the same dealings” as the initial charges). She argues that,

because the initial indictment, the conversations with Mr. Williams, and the

superseding indictments “all revolved around allegations of fraud in connection

with the application for FHA-insured home mortgages,” once the initial

indictment was filed a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached to all possible

charges connected to that fraud. Edwards Opening Br. at 16-17; see also Edwards

Reply Br. at 3. 
- 29 -

The problem with this line of argument, however, is that the cases on which

Ms. Edwards relies all antedate Cobb, which explicitly rejected this interpretation

of the Sixth Amendment. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168-74 & n.1. As we’ve already

noted, Cobb focuses the Sixth Amendment right on offenses, not on transactions,

occurrences, or “crimes that are ‘factually related’ to a charged offense.” Id. at

168. 

A comparison to the facts of Cobb confirms the point and its applicability

to Ms. Edwards. In Cobb, the defendant had been indicted for burglary when

police questioned him about the disappearance of two persons from the scene of

the burglary. The defendant eventually confessed that he had murdered them both

as he was burglarizing their home; the confession was admitted against him at the

ensuing murder trial. Id. at 165-66. Undoubtedly the burglary and murder

charges were factually related and “ar[o]se out of the same course of conduct.” 

Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1342. But the defendant’s indictment for burglary didn’t

trigger his Sixth Amendment rights on the murder charges, because each offense

required proof of some element the other did not. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174. The

same result must follow in the case before us. Even if we could be certain all of

the charges against Ms. Edwards arose from the same course of conduct — a

shakier proposition than in Cobb, which involved only one criminal transaction,

not many — the disparate proof required for the original counts and the counts of

conviction would still preclude an extension of the Sixth Amendment aegis from
- 30 -

the former to the latter charges. And that conclusion requires us to affirm Ms.

Edwards’s convictions.

To this, Ms. Edwards replies that the government’s behavior not only

violated her Sixth Amendment rights but also amounted to “outrageous

government conduct” such that the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee

compels the dismissal of the charges against her. United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d

1270, 1277 (10th Cir. 2003). But, to the extent that her outrageous government

conduct claim is premised on the alleged circumvention of her Sixth Amendment

right to counsel (rather than some independent misconduct), it follows that she

has failed to demonstrate any impermissibly “shocking” or “intolerable”

government behavior that might warrant reversal of her convictions on due

process grounds. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Recognizing this possibility, Ms. Edwards submits that the government’s

conduct was outrageous and in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process

guarantee for the independent reason that it violated Colorado Rule of

Professional Conduct 4.2. At the relevant time, Rule 4.2 provided that “[i]n

representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the

representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer

in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is

authorized by law to do so.” Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 4.2 (1993).
- 31 -

As an initial matter, though, it’s unclear whether or when a violation of an

ethics rule should produce an error of constitutional proportion. Cf. Montejo v.

Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2087 (2009) (“[Defendant’s] rule appears to have its

theoretical roots in codes of legal ethics, not the Sixth Amendment.”); Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of practice as

reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to

determining what is reasonable [assistance of counsel], but they are only

guides.”); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1973) (“A

violation of the canon of ethics as here concerned need not be remedied by a

reversal of the case wherein it is violated. This does not necessarily present a

constitutional question, but this is an ethical and administrative one relating to

attorneys practicing before the United States courts.”). 

But we need not enter that thicket because no ethical violation that might

warrant remedy occurred here in the first place. This is so for at least two

independent reasons. First, as we have held in interpreting its predecessor, Rule

4.2 applies, like the Sixth Amendment, only once adversary criminal proceedings

have commenced. See United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 737-40 (10th Cir.

1990) (interpreting Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-

104(A)(1)); see also United States v. Ford, 176 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1999)

(“Since prosecutors were investigating an offense other than the offense for which

Defendant was indicted, the contact does not pertain to the ‘subject matter of the
10 The district court also seemed to hold that the government was

“authorized by law” to act as it did because it received the district court’s advance

permission before contacting Ms. Edwards through its informant at a time when

the court believed she lacked counsel. See Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 4.2 (1993)

(allowing contacts with unrepresented persons when “authorized by law”). Given

that we think its conclusion affirmable for two separate reasons already, we have

no need to pass on this additional rationale.

- 32 -

representation’ as Rule 4.2 states.”). And, as we’ve explained, at the time Mr.

Williams contacted Ms. Edwards, such proceedings hadn’t begun with respect to

her ultimate counts of conviction. Second, the district court found that

government attorneys did not violate Rule 4.2 because they did not know Ms.

Edwards was represented by counsel at the time of Mr. Williams’s contact with

her. See Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct, Terminology (“‘[K]nows’ denotes actual

knowledge of the fact in question . . . .”) (1993). We cannot say the court’s

factual finding on this score was clearly erroneous, and it is undisputed that no

violation of Rule 4.2 could occur without such knowledge. Cf. Thomas, 474 F.2d

at 112 (discussing predecessor to the Rules of Professional Conduct without

reference to knowledge requirement).10 

B

Ms. Edwards next alleges the district court erred in failing to instruct the

jury that, to find her guilty of aiding and abetting wire fraud, it had to agree

unanimously which individual or individuals she aided and abetted. Because Ms.

Edwards didn’t object to the court’s instructions at trial on this basis, we are

constrained to review her argument on appeal only for plain error. See
- 33 -

Hutchinson, 573 F.3d at 1019; Section II.C, supra (describing four-part plain

error test). But here again we find no error at all.

Under the Sixth Amendment, a jury must agree unanimously on all

essential elements of a crime before the state may impose criminal penalties on a

defendant. United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1196 (10th Cir. 2000). 

There’s no dispute that the district court adequately instructed the jury in this

respect. It said:

An indictment may accuse a defendant of violating a statute in more

than one way or with more than one other person. In such event, it is

not necessary that the Government prove that the defendant used all of

the means or methods that are described or that the defendant acted

together with all of the persons identified. However, the Government

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used at least

one of the means or methods that are described. In order for you to

return a guilty verdict, all 12 of you must agree that the same act has

been proven.

Edwards R. Vol. III at 2055. 

Ms. Edwards contends, however, that the district court should have gone

further and instructed the jury that, in addition to agreeing as to the particular act

she committed to aid and abet wire fraud, it must also come to a unanimous

conclusion as to the particular person whose fraud she aided and abetted. Our

longstanding precedent instructs us otherwise. More than three decades ago, this

court held that “[p]roving beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific person is the

principal is not an element of the crime of aiding and abetting. It is not even

essential that the identity of the principal be established. The prosecution only
- 34 -

need prove that the offense has been committed.” United States v. Harper, 579

F.2d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 1978). As the government didn’t have to prove who

Ms. Edwards aided and abetted, it follows that the jury didn’t have to agree

unanimously on that person’s identity.

The rationale for this rule is obvious. Imagine, for example, that a

defendant hands a masked person a candlestick and cheers on as that person uses

it to bludgeon to death one Mr. Boddy. Afterward, the defendant is immediately

apprehended, but the assailant disappears without a trace. The clues as to the

assailant’s identity are ambiguous — it’s equally likely that Mr. Green, Miss

Scarlet, Professor Plum, Mrs. White, Colonel Mustard, or Mrs. Peacock is the

murderer. In such a situation, it might be impossible for a jury to agree,

unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, who directly committed the crime. 

But it is beyond peradventure that the defendant aided and abetted Mr. Boddy’s

murder and is equally culpable, whoever wielded the candlestick. So, too, here. 

Whether or not it’s proven precisely whose wire fraud Ms. Edwards’s actions

aided and abetted, that has no bearing on whether she committed a crime herself. 

It’s enough that someone committed wire fraud, and that Ms. Edwards sought to

make it succeed. The district court didn’t err in refusing to instruct the jury

otherwise.
- 35 -

C

Like Ms. Mullins, Ms. Edwards attacks the sufficiency of the evidence

establishing that interstate wire transmissions were reasonably foreseeable. See

supra Section II.B. And, as with Ms. Mullins’s challenge, we are obliged to

sustain Ms. Edwards’s convictions. Evidence at trial showed that Ms. Edwards

deliberately chose FHA-insured loans for her clients and that FHA case numbers

appeared on closing documents she saw. As we’ve already described in affirming

Ms. Mullins’s convictions, it was reasonably foreseeable that those numbers

would be the product of interstate wire transmissions.

If anything, the evidence showing Ms. Edwards reasonably foresaw the use

of interstate wire transmissions was even stronger than it was for Ms. Mullins. 

Warren Williams testified that Ms. Edwards explained to him the procedure by

which a loan officer or processor had to obtain an FHA case number before a

transaction could be completed. The jury also heard from Nina Cameron, a

former loan officer and erstwhile friend of Ms. Edwards who worked with her on

many real estate transactions, including at least fifteen involving false credit

documents. Ms. Cameron was well familiar with the computerized process for

obtaining FHA case numbers and described how a loan processor must go through

the FHA website to receive them. Viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Ms.
11 A few housekeeping details: First, although Ms. Edwards argued in the

district court that either the 2000 or the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines should apply

to her case, on appeal she raises no quarrel with the district court’s decision to

use the 2002 version. Second, we note that the district court did not announce a

precise loss figure but rather simply stated that the amount exceeded $400,000. 

As Ms. Edwards and the government agree, however, it’s clear from the exhibits

on which the court relied that the actual loss amount was $460,113.98. Third, the

government’s initial loss estimate included a number of expenses and fees it said

were associated with the management and sale of the foreclosed properties. The

government removed these charges after a defense objection, and they are no

longer at issue in this case. Fourth, the district court calculated Ms. Edwards’s

restitution amount by the same method, ordering her to pay $646,521.87. This

amount exceeds the loss figure because, under the Sentencing Guidelines, interest

(here, interest due on the fraudulent mortgage loans) may not be considered in

(continued...)

- 36 -

Edwards, too, knew that getting the case numbers involved interstate wire

transmissions, or at least reasonably foresaw that possibility.

D

Ms. Edwards attacks her sentence on two grounds, both related to how the

district court calculated the financial loss attributable to her fraud. To quantify

that loss, the court took the outstanding balances due on sixteen defaulted loans

Ms. Edwards assisted in procuring and subtracted from each the foreclosure sale

price when HUD liquidated the mortgaged property. In other words, the court

compared what was owed on the loans to what was actually received. In the end

the court determined that Ms. Edwards’s fraud had caused a $460,113.98 loss, and

so increased her base offense level by 14 levels, as directed by the applicable

Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) (2002) (directing 14-level

enhancement if fraud causes loss between $400,000 and $1 million).11 Ms.
11(...continued)

calculating loss for increasing a defendant’s base offense level, see U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1, cmt. n.2(D), but may be included in a restitution order. Apart from this

distinction (whose application she doesn’t contest), Ms. Edwards suggests no way

in which the loss calculation for sentencing and the restitution calculation should

have been conducted differently from each other. We therefore consider both

together.

- 37 -

Edwards registers no objection to this general method of calculating loss, but does

levy two attacks against its application in her case. First, she argues that HUD

irrationally sold many of the foreclosed properties for well below their actual

values, thus unreasonably and unforeseeably inflating the loss charged to her. 

Second, she maintains that the district court erroneously included in its loss

calculations one loan that was refinanced prior to foreclosure, even though it

excluded two other refinanced loans. Were we to correct these alleged errors, she

says, her loss total would fall below $400,000 — the threshold for a 14-level

enhancement — and thus require re-sentencing.

1

When a defendant challenges the procedural reasonableness of her sentence

by attacking the district court’s loss calculation, our task is to determine whether

the district court’s factual finding of loss caused by the defendant’s fraud is

clearly erroneous. See United States v. Sutton, 520 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.

2008). That is, we may disturb the district court’s loss determination — and

consequent Guidelines enhancement — “only if the court’s finding is without

factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left
- 38 -

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Aquila, Inc. v.

C.W. Mining, 545 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted). To be clearly erroneous, “a finding must be more than possibly or even

probably wrong; the error must be pellucid to any objective observer.” Watson v.

United States, 485 F.3d 1100, 1108 (10th Cir. 2007). In conducting our inquiry,

we are mindful that the district court “need only make a reasonable estimate of

the loss,” not make a perfect accounting. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.2(C). 

Accordingly, we owe the sentencing judge “appropriate deference,” in recognition

of her “unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon

that evidence.” Id. 

Before us, Ms. Edwards doesn’t dispute that subtracting a property’s sale

price from the remaining loan balance is an appropriate metric for measuring loss. 

Rather, she insists that the proceeds HUD took in from liquidation sales —

though technically reflective of the loss caused by her fraud — were unreasonably

low and thus don’t reflect the “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm”

attributable to her fraud for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.2(A)(i). By way of example, she points to two sets of

appraisals conducted on the properties: the first conducted when Ms. Edwards’s

clients purchased them, the second a year or two later, in apparent preparation for

HUD’s liquidation sale of the properties after borrowers defaulted on their loans. 

She faults the later appraisals for assigning significantly lower values to the
12 Ms. Edwards made these same arguments, as well as others no longer at

issue, to the district court. The court found some of her objections meritorious

but rejected others (including, of course, those she now presses). The government

contends that, because Ms. Edwards failed to renew her objections when the

district court announced its revised loss calculation, we should review that figure

only for plain error. Ms. Edwards maintains her previous objections were enough

to preserve her arguments. We don’t have to resolve this dispute, however,

because we hold the district court didn’t err even under the less stringent standard

of review Ms. Edwards wishes us to apply.

- 39 -

properties — as much as 40% less — than did the first appraisals only a short

time before, even while home values in the Denver metro area were allegedly

rising. Because HUD’s liquidation sales of the properties were based on these

dramatically lower appraisals, she contends the agency’s receipts from those sales

were also unreasonably low. The result, she says, was to inflate the district

court’s loss calculation beyond what she reasonably could have foreseen when she

committed her fraud. What’s worse, she adds, is that HUD sold the properties

erratically: some at their appraised values, others above their appraised values,

and — most significantly to her — others well below their appraised values. Ms.

Edwards argues that she couldn’t have foreseen this “utterly inconsistent and

seemingly irrational” disposition of the properties and so shouldn’t be saddled

with the below-appraisal losses it produced. Edwards Opening Br. at 31. 

The district court rejected Ms. Edwards’s argument.12 As the court

recognized and Ms. Edwards doesn’t dispute, the (or at least an) appropriate

measure of loss here is the difference between the amount owed on the defaulted

loans Ms. Edwards facilitated and the amount HUD recovered in liquidating the
- 40 -

properties. Those actual amounts aren’t in dispute. The appraisals, be they high

or low, are relevant only insofar as they indicate the sale proceeds were

reasonable (and thus foreseeable). The district court carefully considered the

alleged problems with the appraisals in this light. Indeed, it lamented the paucity

of information about how HUD conducted its appraisals and why the figures they

produced were lower than the first set of appraisals. But it also noted that neither

did it have any such information about the original appraisals. In short, the court

“kn[e]w nothing about the appraisals” other than that the later, lower valuations

were “more contemporaneous to the ultimate sale after foreclosure.” Edwards R.

Vol. V at 2807. Based on this fact, as well as the commonsense observation that

properties in foreclosure may well fall into disrepair and decline in value even in

a rising market, the district court deferred to the second set of appraisals. The

court thus credited HUD’s sale prices as the appropriate subtrahend in its loss

calculation and, from that, found Ms. Edwards was responsible for more than

$400,000 worth of loss.

We are in no position to upset this conclusion, or the corresponding 14-

level increase it triggered. The simple fact is, whatever questions the appraisals

might raise, their significance isn’t so clear-cut as to compel the conclusion that

the sale figures — the actual basis for the loss calculation Ms. Edwards seeks to

undo — couldn’t have been foreseen. As the district court noted, the declining

appraisal values could have reflected the disrepair suffered by properties subject
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to foreclosure. Neither, we might add, do the allegedly erratic sale prices Ms.

Edwards attacks command the inference that HUD was irrational in its liquidation

practices. Even assuming without deciding that sale prices substantially and

uniformly below contemporaneous appraisal values might have suggested as

much, that’s not what happened here. Properties also sold at and above their

appraised values. That might instead suggest the agency was simply a motivated

seller confronted with the vagaries of an ever-changing marketplace, which surely

was foreseeable. At a minimum, this possibility means we can’t say the district

court’s finding — that HUD’s sale prices reflected the reasonably foreseeable

pecuniary harm caused by Ms. Edwards’s fraud — was pellucidly in error.

2

Ms. Edwards’s second attack on her sentence again involves the district

court’s loss calculation. The government initially included in its proposed loss

calculation several properties with refinanced mortgage loans. This meant the

initial loans, which Ms. Edwards facilitated, had been paid off before the

borrowers defaulted on their new loans, which Ms. Edwards wasn’t involved in

obtaining. Upon Ms. Edwards’s objection, the district court excluded from its

final loss calculation two refinanced properties, transactions “1K” and “1T.” The

court observed that, while Ms. Edwards’s fraud may still have been a contributing

cause of the later defaults in some way, the intervening refinancing meant she was

no longer the proximate cause of any loss. Understanding itself to have discretion
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whether or not to consider such losses in sentencing, the district court chose to

remove those two properties from its final loss calculation.

As it turns out, however, one more refinanced property — transaction “1U”

— was still included in the loss calculation. Ms. Edwards now says that apparent

oversight was in error. And, because subtracting the $61,478.13 loss from

transaction 1U would bring the total loss calculation below the $400,000

threshold for a 14-level enhancement, she says we must remand her case for resentencing to correct the error.

It’s unclear from the record before us why the district court didn’t exclude

transaction 1U from its loss calculation. But it is clear that the fault for the

oversight must lie with Ms. Edwards. She didn’t object to 1U’s inclusion before

the district court and so didn’t give the court a fair opportunity to correct the error

(if error it was). See United States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th

Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we may disturb the district court’s judgment only if Ms.

Edwards demonstrates plain error. See Hutchinson, 573 F.3d at 1019; Section

II.C, supra (describing four-part plain error test).

She hasn’t carried that burden. Even assuming dubitante that including

1U’s refinanced loan in the loss calculation was obviously erroneous under settled

law, Ms. Edwards hasn’t satisfied the final two prongs of plain-error review —

namely, showing that the error affected her substantial rights and undermined the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Hutchinson,
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573 F.3d at 1019; Section II.C, supra. “For [a plain] error to have affected

substantial rights, the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d

1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). And to show that

a sentencing error affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings, “the defendant must demonstrate a strong possibility of receiving a

significantly lower sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). 

Ms. Edwards can make neither of these showings because there’s no

indication her sentence would have been different had transaction 1U been

excluded. With the 14-level enhancement for loss exceeding $400,000, Ms.

Edwards’s offense level was 25, which, given her criminal history category of I,

corresponded to an advisory Guidelines range of 57-71 months. The district court

granted a generous downward variance, however, ultimately sentencing Ms.

Edwards to 41 months’ imprisonment and noting that this term fell within the

Guidelines range for an offense level of 20, which the defense had requested. See

Edwards R. Vol. V at 2817, 2825. Had transaction 1U been excluded from the

loss calculation, Ms. Edwards would have fallen slightly below the $400,000

threshold for a 14-level increase, but still would have been subject to a 12-level

increase. And that would have resulted in a Guidelines sentence of 46-57 months,

still well above what she actually received. Thus, even if including transaction
13 Ms. Edwards attacks her restitution order on identical grounds and offers

no reason why a different result should pertain there. We thus affirm the district

court’s restitution order as well.

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1U was a procedural error, we can’t say it affected Ms. Edwards’s substantial

rights or impugned the integrity of the district court proceedings. Cf. United

States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 332 F. App’x 498, 500 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished);

United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 304 F. App’x 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished).13

E

Finally, Ms. Edwards submits that the district court misallocated the burden

of proof in determining the amount of her criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 982. The key issue at the forfeiture hearing was which transactions

should be considered part of the fraudulent scheme underlying Ms. Edwards’s

wire fraud convictions; the gross proceeds from such transactions would then be

subject to forfeiture. According to Ms. Edwards, instead of requiring the

government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence which transactions were

part of the scheme, the district court put it to her to disprove which transactions

were not. Ms. Edwards failed to make this objection to the district court, so we

review only for plain error. See Hutchinson, 573 F.3d at 1019; Section II.C,

supra (describing four-part plain error test). We see none.

Ms. Edwards’s argument rests entirely on a statement by the district court

at her forfeiture hearing:
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Therefore, the Court cannot find that the jury found that all of these

transactions [offered by the government] were part of the scheme; but

the Court has reviewed the trial record, and using the preponderance of

evidence standard which is applicable to the forfeiture finds in the

absence of evidence to the contrary that the transactions on Exhibit 2

are subject to a forfeiture award and therefore intends to award — to

impose a forfeiture judgment of $139,854.96.

Edwards R. Vol. III at 2827 (emphasis added). Ms. Edwards reads the

emphasized language to mean that, in the eyes of the district court, the

government satisfied its burden of proof only because she failed to introduce

evidence to the contrary. We think, however, that the quoted passage

demonstrates that the district court did precisely its duty in assessing the evidence

about forfeitable proceeds. It reviewed the trial record and concluded that the

evidence there supported finding many — but not all — of the offered

transactions part of Ms. Edwards’s fraudulent scheme. The comment Ms.

Edwards challenges reflects nothing more than the court’s observation that no

contradictory evidence cast doubt on that conclusion. Though Ms. Edwards was

of course under no obligation to provide evidence showing the transactions

weren’t part of the scheme, in the absence of such evidence it can hardly surprise

that the government’s forfeiture evidence may then constitute a preponderance of

all the evidence on that score.
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* * *

The judgment of the district court, with respect to both Ms. Mullins and

Ms. Edwards, is 

Affirmed.