Filed 10/13/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Estate of BETTY LOU 

O’CONNOR, Deceased.

________________________________

KELLI ANNE PARILLE,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

THOMAS WILLIAM O’CONNOR,

Objector and Appellant.

 B272085

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BP142284)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, David J. Cowan, Judge. Affirmed.

Sohaila Sagheb for Objector and Appellant.

Bryan Cave, Edward M. Rosenfeld, Timothy L. Hayes 

and Aaron B. Ginsburg for Petitioner and Respondent.
2

In the last years of her mother’s life, daughter Kelli 

Anne Parille visited on a near daily basis, scheduling her

mother’s caregiving and hospital transportation. She also 

assisted with various business affairs, including opening a 

joint bank account with her mother. The issue on appeal is 

one courts have long grappled with—when an elderly person 

with a joint bank account dies, do the funds belong to the 

decedent’s estate or do they belong to the additional signer 

as a co-owner of the account? Under California law, “[s]ums 

remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint 

account belong to the surviving party . . . as against the 

estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing 

evidence of a different intent.” The trial court held that 

because there was no clear and conclusive evidence of a 

contrary intent, the accounts passed as a matter of law to 

Kelli upon her mother’s death. Because the trial court’s 

finding is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On June 27, 1990, William and Betty Lou O’Connor 

created the O’Connor Family Trust (OFT). The OFT was 

amended in 1992. William and Betty had three children—

Thomas Williams (Tom), Kelli Anne Parille (Kelli) and 

William Kevin (Chip)—who were equal residual beneficiaries 

of the OFT if they survived the surviving spouse. William 

died in 1994. Chip died in 2004.1 On August 1, 2006, Betty 

 

1 Although this date is not in the record on appeal, it is 

also not in dispute.
3

created the Betty Lou O’Connor Trust (BLOT). Tom, Kelli, 

and Chip’s two children are equal residual beneficiaries of 

the BLOT.

Betty died in 2012. Until her death, Betty remained 

Trustee of the OFT and BLOT. Upon Betty’s death, Annette 

Gomez became the Successor Trustee of the OFT and John 

Weitkamp became the Successor Trustee of the BLOT. 

Weitkamp was also the Executor of Betty’s estate. Gomez 

signed and prepared Betty’s federal estate tax return using 

IRS form 706, while Weitkamp signed and filed the form 

706. When Gomez became Successor Trustee of the OFT, 

she asked Kelli to disclose all the accounts belonging to 

Betty. According to Gomez, Kelli told her that Betty’s estate 

included two Wells Fargo accounts—accounts that had been

opened in October 2008 and contained approximately 

$477,218 at the time of Betty’s death.2

Tom contends that the Wells Fargo accounts are BLOT

assets. According to Kelli, however, the accounts do not 

belong to the BLOT. Instead, they were Betty and Kelli’s 

joint accounts while Betty was alive and now belonged 

entirely to Kelli as the joint owner with right of survivorship. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether Betty intended to create 

joint accounts with the right of survivorship in favor of Kelli 

when she opened the accounts, thus exempting the asset 

from the BLOT.

 

2 As discussed below, Kelli denies she disavowed her 

ownership interest in the Wells Fargo accounts.
4

Kelli saw her mother Betty five to six times a week 

during the last several years of Betty’s life. She organized 

Betty’s life, scheduling Betty’s caregiving and hospital 

transportation. Betty opened the Wells Fargo accounts 

while Kelli was assisting Betty with various business affairs. 

According to Kelli, Betty asked Kelli to meet her at the bank 

to open the accounts and “put my name on it with her.” Kelli 

testified she signed the signature card with Betty and Betty 

indicated the money in the accounts was for Kelli’s use. 

Kelli maintained she had “complete access” to the two 

accounts. Although Wells Fargo could not find a signed 

signature card for the accounts, it did find an unsigned 

consumer account application and legal name change 

request for the accounts.

3 The consumer account application

expressly listed Betty the primary joint owner of the 

accounts and Kelli the secondary joint owner. Kelli later

submitted a declaration stating that she had signed, and had 

witnessed Betty signing, the consumer account application.

The trial court ultimately declined to find that Betty 

and Kelli had signed signature cards when opening the 

Wells Fargo accounts. Nevertheless, the court did find that 

the accounts were joint accounts and that, upon Betty’s 

 

3 According to Wells Fargo, the opening of the accounts 

indicated that Betty and Kelli’s signatures must have been 

collected at one point in time. The legal name change 

request simply corrected the spelling of Betty’s last name 

from “O’Conner” to “O’Connor” 
5

death, the funds in the accounts were owned by Kelli.4 In 

short, the court determined, “[t]here being no clear and 

conclusive evidence of a contrary intent, on the death of 

Betty Lou O’Connor said accounts passed as a matter of law 

to Kelli [O’Connor] Parille.”

According to Tom, the trial court erred in granting 

Kelli’s petition seeking ownership of the accounts because:

(1) there are no executed documents reflecting Betty’s intent 

to create joint accounts with the right of survivorship in 

favor of Kelli and a joint account cannot be created orally; 

and (2) none of the unsigned documents produced by Wells 

Fargo indicate the creation of a joint account with the right 

of survivorship.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review questions of law de novo. (County of Yolo v. 

Los Rios Community College Dist. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1242, 

1248.) However, “[w]hen the trial court has resolved a 

 

4 The trial court initially ordered that the funds be 

deposited in an interest-bearing, federally insured blocked 

account. The order was interlineated to state: “Nothing 

herein is intended as a determination of the rightful 

ownership of the funds.” The trial court subsequently 

entered a stipulated order releasing the funds from the 

blocked account to BLOT Trustee, John Weitkamp with 

directions to distribute under the terms of the BLOT (1/3 to 

Kelli, 1/3 to Tom and 1/3 to Chip’s two children). The order 

provided that “nothing in this Order shall 

prevent . . . Kelli . . . from bringing a Petition seeking full 

ownership of the . . . funds.”
6

disputed factual issue, the appellate courts review the ruling 

according to the substantial evidence rule. If the trial court’s 

resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial 

evidence, it must be affirmed.” (Winograd v. American 

Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)

In applying the substantial evidence standard of 

review, “ ‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends 

with a determination as to whether there is any substantial 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the 

findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, 

giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and 

resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the 

standard of review so long adhered to by this court.” (Jessup 

Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.)

“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal 

significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of 

solid value. [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence . . . is not 

synonymous with “any” evidence.’ . . . [Citations.] The focus 

is on the quality, rather than the quantity, of the evidence.” 

(Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 

651.) “It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in 

the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact.”

(Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) 

Consequently, we do not evaluate the credibility of the 

witnesses. (Lenk v. Total–Western, Inc. (2001) 89 

Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) Rather, “we defer to the trier of fact 

on issues of credibility.” (Ibid.)
7

“Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or 

uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can 

reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without 

power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for 

those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting 

inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifying the 

inference to be drawn.” (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra,

72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.)

The substantial evidence standard applies to both 

express and implied findings of fact made by the superior 

court in its statement of decision rendered after a nonjury 

trial. (See Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792–

793 [implied findings].) The doctrine of implied findings 

provides that a “party must state any objection to the 

statement in order to avoid an implied finding on appeal in 

favor of the prevailing party . . . [I]f a party does not bring 

such deficiencies to the trial court’s attention, that party 

waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was 

deficient . . . and hence the appellate court will imply 

findings to support the judgment.” (In re Marriage of 

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133–1134, fn. omitted.)

Alternatively stated, the doctrine (1) directs the

appellate court to presume that the trial court made all 

factual findings necessary to support the judgment as long 

as substantial evidence supports those findings and 

(2) applies unless the omissions and ambiguities in the 

statement of decision are brought to the attention of the 

superior court in a timely manner. (In re Marriage of 
8

Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133–1134; see Eisenberg 

et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The 

Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 8:57, p. 8–28.)

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Statutes

The first law in California concerning joint tenancy 

assets was Civil Code section 683, which was enacted in 

1872 and read as follows: “ ‘A joint interest is one owned by 

several persons in equal shares, by a title created by a single 

will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or 

transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to 

executors or trustees as joint tenants.’ ” (Denigan v. San 

Francisco Sav. Union (1899) 127 Cal. 142, 149.) Initially, 

Civil Code section 683 was applied to cases concerning bank 

accounts, real property, and other types of personal property.

(See Denigan, at p. 142 [bank account]; Estate of Harris

(1915) 169 Cal. 725 [bank account, stock certificates, 

promissory note], Siberell v. Siberell (1932) 214 Cal. 767 

[real property].) In 1935, section 683 was amended by 

adding the following sentence: “A joint tenancy in personal 

property may be created by a written transfer, instrument or 

agreement.” Before the 1935 amendment, joint tenancies in 

personal property could be created by both oral and written 

agreements. After the 1935 amendment, joint tenancies 

could be created only by a writing. (California Trust Co. v. 

Bennett (1949) 33 Cal.2d 694. 696–697.) Up until July 1, 

1990, section 683 was the sole statutory authority governing 
9

the character and ownership of funds on deposit in joint 

tenancy bank accounts.5

In 1990, however, the California Multiple-Party 

Accounts Law (CAMPAL), Probate Code section 5100 et seq., 

became the governing statute for such accounts. (Lee v. 

Yang (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 481, 489.) Under CAMPAL, 

multiple party accounts include joint accounts. (Prob. Code, 

§ 5132, subd. (a).) “ ‘Joint account’ means an account 

payable on request to one or more of two or more parties 

whether or not mention is made of any right of 

survivorship.” (Prob. Code, § 5130.) Checking accounts, 

savings accounts, and certificates of deposit all come within

the CAMPAL definition of “account.”6 (Prob. Code, § 5122, 

 

5 Nevertheless, in the decades following the enactment 

of section 683, application of the statute to joint tenancy 

bank accounts had been undercut by cases holding that no 

writing was required, and that parol evidence was allowed to 

show the intent of the parties and the realities of ownership 

of the account. (See Estate of Brasz (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 

691, 697–698; Manti v. Gunari (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 442, 

453.)

6 Concomitantly, Civil Code section 683 was amended 

to provide that the statute did not apply to joint accounts 

under CAMPAL. (Civ. Code, § 683, subd. (b).) In other 

words, application of section 683 to CAMPAL accounts was 

now specifically prohibited. Subsequent cases have 

confirmed the application of CAMPAL to the exclusion of 

section 683. (See, e.g., Estate of Castiglioni (1995) 40 

Cal.App.4th 367, 383–384.) Indeed, since 1990, no reported

cases have applied section 683 to bank accounts. Thus, 
10

subd. (a).) “Words in substantially the following form in a 

signature card, passbook, contract, or instrument evidencing 

an account, or words to the same effect,” can create a joint 

account if “executed before, on, or after July 1, 1990”—“This 

account or certificate is owned by the named parties. Upon 

the death of any of them, ownership passes to the 

survivor(s).” (Prob. Code, § 5203, subd. (a).)

However, use of the form language is not necessary to 

create a joint account under CAMPAL. “If the contract of 

deposit creates substantially the same relationship between 

the parties as an account created using the form language 

provided in this section, this part applies to the same extent 

as if the form language had been used.” (Prob. Code, § 5203, 

subd. (b).) Notably, “an account payable on request to one or 

more of two or more parties is treated as a joint account 

under this part even though no mention is made of any right 

of survivorship unless the terms of the account or deposit 

agreement otherwise provide.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. 

com., Deering’s Ann. Prob. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 5302,

p. 624, italics added.)7

Finally, survivorship interests in multiple-party 

accounts are governed by section 5302, which reads in 

 

Tom’s reliance on, and repeated citations to, this particular 

statute is misleading and inapposite.

7 The California Law Revision Commission’s official 

comments are entitled to substantial weight when 

interpreting a statute. (See HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior 

Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 62.)
11

relevant part: “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of 

a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party . . . as 

against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and 

convincing evidence of a different intent.” (Prob. Code,

§ 5302, subd. (a).) No writing is required to create this right. 

“The right under this part of a surviving party to a joint 

account . . . to the sums on deposit on the death of a party to 

a multiple-party account shall not be denied, abridged, or 

affected because such right has not been created by a writing 

executed in accordance with the laws of this state 

prescribing the requirements to effect a valid testamentary 

disposition of property.” (Prob. Code, § 5304.) Furthermore, 

section 5302, subdivision (a), “creates a right of survivorship 

in a joint account whether or not the account is described as 

a ‘joint tenancy’ or mentions any right of survivorship.” (Cal. 

Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Prob. Code

(2004 ed.) foll. § 5302, p. 624, italics added.) As noted above, 

the right of survivorship created by subdivision (a) may be 

rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of a different 

intent.8 (Ibid.)

 

8 “This strengthen[ed] survivorship rights, since under 

prior law the presumption of survivorship arising from the 

joint tenancy form of the account could be overcome by only 

a preponderance of the evidence.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. 

com., Deering’s Ann. Prob. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 5302, 

p. 624, italics added.)
12

II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court

The issue on appeal is one courts have long grappled 

with—when an elderly person with a joint bank account 

dies, do the funds belong to the decedent’s estate or do they 

belong to the additional signer as a co-owner of the account?

In hundreds of reported cases, courts have been required to 

determine a bank depositor’s intent at the time the depositor 

opened the joint account or added an additional signer to an 

already-existing account. (See Ann., Deposit of Fund 

Belonging to Depositor in Bank Account in Name of Himself 

and Another (1994) 149 A.L.R. 879, 880–881.) 

In such cases, “[t]he heirs or beneficiaries contend that 

the bank account belongs to them because the decedent only 

wanted someone to be available to sign in emergencies and 

did not intend the additional signer to receive the account at 

death. These parties urge the court to ignore the express or 

implied survivorship feature of the bank account and 

distribute the funds according to the decedent’s will or trust, 

or according to state intestacy statutes. On the other hand, 

the additional signer claims ownership as surviving joint 

tenant. Because the funds automatically belong to the 

survivor under the rules of joint tenancy, no funds from the 

account exist to pass to the decedent’s estate.” (Gregory 

Eddington, Survivorship Rights in Joint Bank Accounts: A 

Misbegotten Presumption of Intent, 15 Marquette Elder’s 

Advisor 175, 176 (2014) (hereinafter Surviorship Rights).)

“The most common rule is that funds remaining in a 

‘joint account’ belong to the survivor, absent clear and 
13

convincing evidence of the deceased depositor’s contrary 

intent.” (Surviorship Rights, supra, 15 Marquette Elder’s 

Advisor at p. 195.) As discussed above, California follows 

this rule. (Id. at p. 195, fn. 81.) However, as commentators 

have noted, “Presuming that the depositor intends 

survivorship rights ignores the plausible alternative reasons 

for opening the account.” (Id. at p. 196.) “This presumption 

of survivorship rights is inconsistent with the analogy to 

wills formalities because the bank account formalities are 

not convincing indications of intent to transmit property at 

death.” (Id. at pp. 196–197.) Nevertheless, “[a]s in other 

types of cases requiring clear and convincing evidence, the 

presumption is difficult to overcome.” (Id. at p. 197.)

Here, the trial court found that the presumption of 

survivorship rights had not been overcome. Given that there 

was no clear and conclusive evidence of a contrary intent, 

the court held that the accounts had passed as a matter of 

law to Kelli upon Betty’s death. The trial court’s finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, Betty 

opened the Wells Fargo accounts while Kelli assisted Betty 

with various business affairs. Betty indicated to Kelli that 

the money in the two accounts was for Kelli’s use and Kelli 

had complete access to the accounts. Wells Fargo confirmed 

that both Betty and Kelli had “withdrawal rights” on the 

accounts. The consumer account application listed Betty as 

the primary joint owner of the accounts and Kelli as the 

secondary joint owner. Kelli said she had signed, and had 

witnessed Betty signing, the consumer account application. 
14

A Wells Fargo officer authenticated the unsigned copy of the

application. 

On appeal, Tom points to contradictory statements 

made by Kelli regarding ownership of the accounts, 

specifically pointing to comments Kelli allegedly made 

during preparation of IRS form 706. Form 706, the “Federal 

Estate Tax Return,” specifically asks whether the decedent

owned any property as a joint tenant with the right of 

survivorship at the time of death. The form 706 that 

Annette Gomez prepared after Betty’s death answered this 

question in the negative. Later in the form 706, Gomez 

stated that Kelli “did not claim any share of ownership” of 

the two Wells Fargo accounts. Kelli disputes this portion of 

the chronology. According to Kelli, Gomez had asked Kelli 

for permission to access the accounts for tax purposes after 

Betty died. Kelli told Gomez at that time: “You know, these 

accounts are mine. I’m going to give you limited access to 

this to do what you need to do.” Gomez said she understood. 

Kelli later changed the account passwords so that Gomez 

could no longer access the accounts.9

 

9 Betty and Kelli also jointly held two Bank of the West 

accounts. According to the form 706, Kelli “did not claim any 

share of ownership” of these accounts either. Kelli later 

testified this statement was accurate, unlike her purported 

disclaimer of the Wells Fargo accounts. According to Kelli, 

the Bank of the West accounts consisted entirely of “business 

funds” and was “not [her] money.” Conversely, the Wells 

Fargo accounts were for Betty’s and Kelli’s use and “were 

never used for business purposes.” Thus, according to Kelli, 
15

In short, Tom claims that Kelli had no expectation of 

receiving the money in the Wells Fargo accounts—and thus 

disclaimed any ownership interest in the accounts when 

Gomez prepared the form 706—until Wells Fargo told Kelli 

(after the form had been mailed) that the funds belonged to 

her. It was then that Kelli changed the passwords on the 

accounts. In other words, Betty never told Kelli that the 

money belonged to her—only Wells Fargo did so after Betty’s 

death. As noted above, Kelli contends that she informed 

Gomez the accounts belonged to her before the form 706 was 

prepared. Furthermore, Gomez herself later downplayed

Kelli’s alleged verbal disclaimer, stating it “was not a 

relinquishment of [Kelli’s] rights to the account because she 

did not disclaim the account in writing within nine months 

of [Betty’s] death, or deliver a written disclaimer to the 

bank.”10 Indeed, Gomez subsequently contacted Wells Fargo 

 

Betty did not intend that Kelli have survivorship rights in 

the Bank of the West accounts. Consequently, Kelli sent 

Weitkamp, the BLOT Trustee, the proceeds of the 

accounts—approximately $267,000.

10 Gomez cited Probate Code sections 278, 279 and 280 

in support of this determination. Section 278 provides that a 

disclaimer must be in writing and signed by the disclaimant. 

It must also identify the creator of the interest, describe the 

interest to be disclaimed, and state the disclaimer and the 

extent of the disclaimer. Section 279 provides that a 

disclaimer must be filed “within a reasonable time after the 

person able to disclaim acquires knowledge of the interest.” 

(Prob. Code, § 279, subd. (a).) With respect to an interest 
16

and confirmed that the two accounts were held in joint 

tenancy and that, upon Betty’s death, the accounts 

“automatically belonged solely” to Kelli.

Moreover, it is not our role to reweigh the evidence 

proffered during this particular factual dispute or evaluate 

the credibility of the witnesses. That is the province of the 

trier of fact. (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 630–631.) In addition, we note that even 

if Betty did not expressly inform Kelli that the accounts 

would belong to Kelli after Betty’s death, this would not 

change the legal analysis. Under California law, the 

presumption is that “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the 

death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving 

 

created by surviving the death of another joint tenant, “a 

disclaimer is conclusively presumed to have been filed within 

a reasonable time if it is filed within nine months after the 

death of the creator of the interest or within nine months 

after the interest becomes indefeasibly vested, whichever 

occurs later.” (Prob. Code, § 279, subd. (b), (b)(6).) Section 

280 provides that a disclaimer must be filed with any of the 

following: “(1) The superior court in the county where the 

decedent’s estate is administered or, if there is no 

administration of the decedent’s estate, the superior court in 

any county where administration of the decedent’s estate 

would be proper. [¶] (2) The trustee, personal 

representative, other fiduciary, or person responsible for 

distributing the interest to the beneficiary. [¶] (3) Any other 

person having custody or possession of or legal title to the 

interest. [or] [¶] (4) The creator of the interest.” (Prob. 

Code, § 280, subd. (a)(1)-(4).)
17

party . . . as against the estate of the decedent.” (Prob. Code,

§ 5302, subd. (a).) In order to rebut the presumption, Tom 

had to present clear and convincing evidence of a different 

intent. (Ibid.) As the trial court determined, Betty’s 

purported silence on the matter did not satisfy this exacting 

standard.11

III. Other Issues on Appeal

A. Admission of Unsigned Documents

Tom also contends the trial court abused its discretion 

and committed reversible error by admitting the consumer 

account application and legal name change request into 

evidence. Specifically, Tom claims that the unsigned 

documents were not properly authenticated, were without

foundation, and were hearsay.12 “ ‘An abuse of discretion 

 

11 Indeed, “clear and convincing” evidence requires a 

finding of high probability. This standard is not new. More 

than 100 years ago, we described such a test as requiring 

that the evidence be “ ‘so clear as to leave no substantial 

doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating 

assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” (Sheehan v. Sullivan 

(1899) 126 Cal. 189, 193.) Tom’s declaration that Betty 

commonly titled accounts in her children’s names as a 

matter of convenience, rather than a method of passing 

ownership, was either not credited by the trial court at all or 

was insufficient to rebut the presumption of ownership. 

Once again, we defer to the trier of fact on issues of 

credibility. (Lenk v. Total–Western, Inc., supra, 89 

Cal.App.4th at p. 968.)

12 Tom also contends that the documents “failed to 

contain any information from which it would be gleaned that 
18

occurs “where, considering all the relevant circumstances, 

the court has exceeded the bounds of reason or it can fairly 

be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order 

under the same circumstances.’ ” (In re Marriage of Bower

(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 898–899.) We presume that the 

trial court order is correct, and imply findings that are 

necessary to support the judgment. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 

99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.)

Tom’s hearsay claim is without merit. Under the 

business record exception to the hearsay rule, “[e]vidence of 

a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is 

not made inadmissible by the . . . rule when offered to prove 

the act, condition, or event if: [¶] (a) The writing was made 

in the regular course of a business; [¶] (b) The writing was 

made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; [¶] 

(c) The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its 

identity and the mode of its preparation; [and] [¶] (d) the 

sources of information and method and time of preparation 

were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code,

§ 1271, subd. (a)-(d).)

 

Betty intended to create joint accounts with the right of 

survivorship in favor of Kelli.” However, as discussed above, 

the very fact that these were joint accounts created the 

presumption of this right under California law. (Prob. Code, 

§ 5302, subd. (a).) Indeed, Probate Code section 5302, 

subdivision (a), creates a right of survivorship in a joint 

account whether or not the account mentions any right of 

survivorship. (Prob. Code, § 5302, Cal. Law Revision Com. 

com.)
19

A trial court has wide discretion in determining

whether a qualified witness possesses sufficient personal 

knowledge of the identity and mode of preparation of 

documents for purposes of the business records exception. 

(Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 

Cal.App.3d 769, 797 & fn. 28.) Indeed, “any ‘qualified 

witness’ who is knowledgeable about the documents may lay 

the foundation for introduction of business records—the 

witness need not be the custodian or the person who created 

the record.” (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 

324.) Thus, a qualified witness need not be the custodian, 

the person who created the record, or one with personal 

knowledge in order for a business record to be admissible 

under the hearsay exception. (See id. at p. 322; 1 Witkin, 

Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 243, p. 1108.)

Furthermore, “bank statements prepared in the 

regular course of banking business and in accordance with 

banking regulations are in a different category than the 

ordinary business and financial records of a private 

enterprise.” (People v. Dorsey (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 953, 

960.) Consequently, even if mistakes are made in the entries 

on bank statements, “such matters may be developed on 

cross-examination and should not affect the admissibility of 

the statement itself.” (Id. at p. 961.)

Here, Wells Fargo Assistant Branch Manager Gabriel 

Vallarta testified that the bank had pulled the records on the 

two accounts and that although it could not locate a signed 

signature card, it was Wells Fargo’s practice to collect 
20

signatures before an account could be opened. Furthermore, 

Vallarta noted, “[t]here are situations in which we can make 

an exception to open the account as long as we do collect 

those signatures at a future date.” In this instance, the 

opening of Betty and Kelli’s joint account indicated that “the 

signatures had to have been collected at one point in time.” 

In addition, Kelli stated she and Betty both signed the 

consumer account application, a document that was dated 

October 1, 2008—five years before Betty’s death.

13 Given 

this quantum of evidence, we cannot say that the trial court 

“exceeded the bounds of reason” in admitting the documents 

into evidence or that “no judge would reasonably make the 

same order under the same circumstances.” (See In re 

Marriage of Bower, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 898–899.)

 

13 We also note that even if the application was missing 

in its entirety, “[t]he content of a writing may be proved by 

otherwise admissible secondary evidence.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 1521, subd. (a).) Indeed, oral testimony regarding the 

content of a writing is admissible “if the proponent does not 

have possession or control of a copy of the writing and the 

original is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent 

intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence.” (Evid. 

Code, § 1523, subd. (b).) To that end, courts have admitted a 

standard form of the lost document. (See Kenniff v. 

Caulfield (1903) 140 Cal. 34 [blank form used in drafting lost 

deed]; see also Rogers v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1990) 218 

Cal.App.3d 1132, 1137 [lost or destroyed document may be 

shown by an unsigned copy or oral evidence].)
21

B. Creation of Joint Accounts

Probate Code section 5203, subdivision (a), requires an 

executed writing. As noted by Tom, subdivision (b) of the 

statute does not abrogate this requirement, but rather 

permits a contract of deposit to be substituted for the other 

types of writing identified in subdivision (a) which can be 

used to create a joint account with the right of survivorship. 

Given that the trial court expressly found that the accounts 

were joint accounts, which belonged to Kelli upon Betty’s 

death, the trial court must have impliedly found that Betty 

and Kelli signed the consumer account application. Tom did 

not object to this portion of the trial court’s ruling. Thus, 

Tom cannot appeal these particular findings here. (See In re 

Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1138.)

Tom next contends that even if the consumer account 

application had been signed, Kelli would not have been 

entitled to the accounts’ funds because a joint account held 

by multiple parties is presumed to be a tenancy in common 

rather than a joint account with the right of survivorship. 

As discussed in detail above, this is not the law in California. 

Therefore, Betty did not need to explicitly designate the joint 

accounts as joint accounts with the right of survivorship in 

order for Kelli to receive this right. (See Prob. Code, §§ 5203, 

subd. (b), 5302, subd. (a).)

As noted above, the consumer account application 

listed Betty as the primary joint owner and Kelli as the 
22

secondary joint owner of the accounts.14 Betty indicated the 

money in the accounts was for Kelli’s use and Kelli had 

“complete access” to the two accounts. Wells Fargo 

confirmed that both Betty and Kelli had “withdrawal rights” 

on the accounts. Because the consumer account application 

created substantially the same relationship between the 

parties as an account created using the form language, 

section 5203 applies to the same extent as if the form 

language had been used. (See Prob. Code, § 5203, subd. (b).)

C. Betty’s Course of Conduct

Tom contends that had Betty wanted to make a devise 

to Kelli, it would not have been through “vague documents 

created by the bank.” Rather, Betty, as a sophisticated 

businessperson, would have made a specific devise through 

the BLOT, as she did for other beneficiaries. Furthermore, 

Tom claims, had Betty intended to gift the funds in the 

accounts to Kelli, she would have told her so, and 

transferred the funds to Kelli while still alive. As the trial 

court determined, “[s]uch a speculative possibility falls short 

of clear and convincing evidence” of a contrary intent. (Copp 

v. Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 847.)

 

14 Tom claims that the consumer account application 

contains “[t]he mere word ‘owner’ ”—thus creating a tenancy 

in common—when the application clearly lists Betty and 

Kelli as joint owners. 
23

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their 

own costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

LUI, J.