VIETNAM STUDIES 

Logistic Support 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
Libmr)' or Congress Cawlog Number: 72-600389 

First Printed 1974-CM H Pub 90-15- 1 

For sill"~ by Ih(' SUI'<,riu1('ud('ul or I)ocumt'nls, u.s. GovcnlllH'nI I'rinuug omCl' 

Int.cmet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512- 1800; I)C OT('fI (202) 5]2-]800 

Fox: (202/5 12-2250 Moil: Stop SSOI>, WashingtOn, DC 20402-0001 
Foreword 

The United Sta tes Army has met an unusua ll y complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other serv ices, 

the Army has fought in support of a national pol icy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its 0\\' 11 

choosing, free of olltside coerc ion. In addition to the usual problems 

of waging armed confli ct, the assignment in Southeast Asia has 

required superimposing the immensely soph isticated tasks of a 

modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting 

them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dea ling 

with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units. 

Although this assignmem has officially ended, the U.S. Army 

must prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cogni z.1.nt that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army 

ever profited from try ing to meet a new chall enge in terms of the 

old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from 

a study of its experience. its shortcomings no less tha n its achievements. 

Aware tha t some years must elapse before the offic ial histories 

will provide a detailed and obj ective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more 

salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior 

officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day res ponsibiliti es has prepared a 

series of monographs. These studi es should he of grea t value in 

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at 

the same time contri buting to the historica l record and providing 

the American public with an interim report on the performance 

of men and oflicers who have responded, as olhers ha ve througb 

ollr hisLOry, to exacting and trying demands. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on officia l 

records, with additional materia l from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

partici pants, and from the personal experience of the author. 

III 
To facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography have been omitted fTom the published version; a fully 

documented account with bibliography is filed with the Office of 

the Chief of Military History_ 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were taking 

place in the presenl. 

The alilhor of this monograph, Lieutenant General J oseph M. 

Heiser, Jr., has been engaged in planning and directing logistical 

support to the U.S. Army soldier, other U.S. Services, and the 

Armed Forces of Allied Nations since his commissioning as an 

officer in the Ordnance Corps in 1943. Having served in the Southern Base Sector Command of the European Theater of Operations 

from 1943 to 1945, he became a staff officer of the Office of the 

Ch ief of Ordnance. He later served as the Executive Officer of the 

Ordnance School and Division Ordnance Officer, 7th Infantry 

Division, Korea. He was designated Commanding General, U.S. 

Communications Zone Europe in 1965. He then became, successively, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (Supply and Maintenance), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Commanding 

General of the 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam, and Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics of the U.S. Army. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 December 1972 

IV 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

t\'lajor Genrral USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

OUTing World War 11. Adminll Ernest J. King is alleged to 

have said, "I don't know what the hell this logistics is that Marshall 

is always talking about, but I want some of it." It's pretty well 

known that berore that war ended. e"eryone knew in general terms 

what it was that General Marshall was talking about and that 

Admir;l! King had plenty of it. 

Knowing in general terms what logistics means is not enough. 

The purpose of this monograph is to relate in specific terms what 

logisticians did and how they did it in supporting combat forces in 

Vietnam. Not only were American soldiers supported, but at the 

height of hostilities. ill addition to U.S. Forces, the U.S. Army 

in Vietnam also provided support to the military forces of the 

governments of South Vietnam. Republic of Korea, Thailand, 

Australia. New Zealand, and other allied countries. 

Probably the best balanced assessment of logistics support in 

Southeast Asia is provided in the final reporL by the i\filitary Opera. 

tions Sul:x:ommiuee of the Committee on Government Operations, 

HOllse of Represelllalives (Holifield Commiltee) wherein, after 

approximately four vears of Slll"vcillancc of supply SlipporL in 

Southeast Asia by Congress and the Go\'ernment Accounting 

Office. it was reported that, " ... supply support in Vietnam has 

been a truly remarkahle achievcmelll, bllt the question must be 

asked, did it email unnecessary. hence avoidable. costs? ... " The 

Army, in cooperation with Congress. the Government Accounting 

OHice. Office uf the Senctary of Defense. and the other military 

services, began a program called the Logistics Offensive (so named 

by General Abrams. the Commander. United States 1\filitary As· 

sist.mee Command. Vietnam. in e<lrly 1969) to immediately reduce 

the cost of providin~ logistics support and ret incre<lse combat 

crfcctivenclos. I his program i~ a ('Qlltilluing olle and up through 

~t"ptemhcr 1!)72, has yielded hCllefits estimated at 9.3 bill ion dollars. 

Of this total. 6.9 hill ion dollars have direrliy impacted un the 

prep.nalion of the Army's hudget submissions. The difference is 

considered to Le a bonus. laking into account redllced reqllire. 

ments for facilities. personnel. eqllipment, transportation. and 

utilities to suppOrt a more efficient logistic system. These savings 

have been accompanied with dramatic increases in logistics read iv 
ness for that part of the Army not in Vielllam. Based upon unit 

reports. equipment on hand inc::reased 44 percent from fiscal year 

1968 to fiscal year 1972. while equipment deployability, or 

operability, increased 41 percent during the same time period. In 

addit ion, the fi ne logistics support of the forces in Vietnam was 

maintained. 

In most human elldeavors, history shows a mixture of good and 

bad results. Combat support of Vietnam is certainly no exception. 

~ Congress noted, suppl y support has been a remarkable achievement. Also among the good are many overlooked facets. including 

the unpublicized constructive efforts which contrast with the publicized destructive oncs. For example, construction efforts by U.S. 

servicemen on behalf of the Vietnamese in 1968 and 1969 include: 

Schools ....................... 1.253 Churches ............... . ..... 263 

"Iospilals ........ ............. 175 Dispensaries ...... . 4Z2 

Markel Places ..... .. .. . 153 Bridges . .... . .. .. . . ... . .. . . .. . 598 

Roads (km.) ........ . ... .. .... 3,IM O .... ·ellings .. . ... . . .. .. .. ... . ... 7,099 

Much of this was accomplished by American soldiers in their non· 

dUly time- showing again the humanistic qualities of the American 

soldier displayed in other wars. 

In addition, because of the vast ex perience gained, the American Army has a larger group or professional military logisticians 

than ever in its history-many of them junior officers and enlisted 

personnel-which bodes well for the future. However, we must 

insure that lessons learned or wha t to do are adopted and that 

lessons learned of what not to do will result in correcti ve action so 

that those experiences will not recur. It is with this specific thought 

in mind that this monograph has been prepared. 

Finally, in Vietnam, there was a close and wonderful rela tionship between the man doing the figlHing and the man providing 

the support. In part, this was due to the fact that both were exposed to the same dangers and, that unlike World War It and 

Korea, there were no sa fe rear areas in Vietnam. In August 1968, 

Sergeant William W. Seay, a truck driver- a logistician- won the 

medal of honor by breaking up an ambush against his convoy on 

the road to Tay Ninll. This man gave his li fe to save the lives 

of his comrades and suppli es for the men fighting in the Tay Nillh 

border area. Logisticians are proud of Sergeant Seay and are proud 

too of the collective achi evements in providing the quality and 

quantity of support furnished to the combat forces in Vietnam. 

To perpetuate the great su pport provided the combat soldier 

and in memory of lhe heroic tasks performed by logist ics soldiers 

such as Sergeant Seay, the "LOG ISTICIAN'S CREED" has been 

VI 
published and distributed to serve as a lasting reminder of what 

has been done and as a challenge to what needs to be done by all 

Army logisticians serving in the defense of their country. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 December 1972 

VII 

JOSEPH M. HEISER, JR. 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 

Acknowledgments 

The story of logistic su pport in Vietnam is one of thousands of 

logisticians who worked Lilelcssly to provide that support. This 

volume relalcs their accompl ishments and <iuempts to do justice 

to all the many fa cets of that complex support operation. Even 

documen ting their story lIas not a otiC mall job, and so I \fish to 

extend my appreciation to <III those who participated in this enon 

with special thanks to: 

The Logistics i\ lonograph Revic\\' Team. This "murder hoard" 

was composed of (:cneral Frank T. ,\Iildl'cn , Lielltcnalll General 

Jean E. Engler. USA (Ret.). I.icul cn;w t Gencral Oren E. llurlbliL 

USA (Ret.). I.iCIl[CI1:lnt General John Norton, LiClilcnant Ceneral 

' ViJliam R. Peers. l.icllten;llH (;eneraJ Carroll H. Dunn , i\lajor 

General Clarence J. Lang, ~Iajor General Henry A, Rasmussen. 

Major General Richard .f. Seit7, Ihigadi er General Rohert \V, 

Duke, USA (Rei.). and hlr, Joseph P. Crihbins. Their collective 

kno\Vledge and first-hand experien('c were invalu:lble in providing 

background ;Hle! insight illlo the logistics sLOry as it unfolded in the 

early drafts of the ]'Vlonogra ph. 

Colonel ./ohn M. Miller .mel Colonel Willi:lm H. Hoffmann 

\Vho analyzcd and ssc~sed the historical significance of the 

wealth of information COlllaincd in the e;nly drafts :111<1 provided 

day· to-day guidance to the nltngraph Team. 

Lieutenant Colonel Alhen F. Boll who devcloped the initi:ll 

detailed topical OlLtli ne for the ~Ioll()graph 10 d iren the effons of 

the staff memhers of the Office of thc Depllly Ch ief of Staff for 

Logisti cs. 

The memhers of the OUlce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics learn who p:liml:lkingly researched and prepared the 

many p:lpers which fllrmed the basis for the Monograph. 

The Monogra ph Team. Thi~ team was composed of Colonel 

.1 :11111"5 R. \Vilson, t lSAR, l.ielllellant (:OIOIlCI ./ ol1 l1 B. Crockctt, Jr., 

USAR, Major Willard A, Newman. llSAR, i\ lajor Felix G. POTier, 

USAR, and SJ>5 Felix Ramos, who performed the yeoman task of 

research ing historical information ;lIld editing the separate staff 

papers into a singlc I olllprchensi\'c \·olnme. 

IX 
Lastly, I commend all the logisticians who participated in or 

supported opera lions in Vietnam, for they accomplished the deeds 

that are recorded herein. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 December 19i2 

x 

JOSEPH M. HEISER. JR. 

Lieutenant Cenera l, U.S. Army 
Contents 

Chtlpler Page 

I. INTRODUCTION 5 

II. LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 8 

Logistic Concept (1965) and Tn-Country Planning 9 

Port Situillion in Vietnam 23 

Warehousing and Storage Facilities 26 

Continental U.S. Production Bau 27 

Logistic Personnel and Training 30 

Security 34 

III. SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM .57 

Repair Parts Supply .!I8 

Short Supply Items 42 

Management Techniqlll!s 48 

Petroleum Support 72 

Common Supply Support 82 

Financial Controls 85 

Procurement 88 

IV. AMMUNITION LOGISTICS [06 

The Buildup 106 

Ammunition Supply Rates 109 

Ammunition Reporting III 

Ammunition Shorlages 115 

Munitions Procurement 118 

Ammunition Units and Personnel 121 

Transportation of Ammunition 124 

Storage Q11d Harllllhig of Ammunitiorl 127 

Security of Ammunition Depots 130 

Maintenance and Disposal I.!II 

v. AVIATION LOG ISTICS 1M 

Growth of the Aviation Fleet U4 

Growtll Of Avia/ion Logistic Support in South 

Vietnam U7 

Aircraft Mainter/Qllct: Personnel 1.!l9 

Facilities 11 1 

Xl 
Chapter Pag~ 

Weapons Systems Rcquisitioning Techniques 141 

Floating Airr-rafl Maint enance Facility 146 

Intensive Managemc'll 0/ Critical Assets 146 

Closed Loop Support for Aviation 148 

Direct Slipport Maintwall cc Con cepts 149 

The Aircraft Readincss, Utilization, and Loss 

Reporting Systems 150 

Use of Helicopters in Logistic Support 153 

Aerial Resupply 155 

VI. SERVICE SUPPORT IN VIETNAM: TRANSPOR· 

TATION AND MAINTENANCE 157 

Transportation 

Maintenance 

Vll. SERVICE SUPPORT I N VIETNAM: CONSTRUC157 

li5 

T I ON, REAL ESTATE, AND COI\'IMUN ICATIONS 188 

Construction and Real Estate 

Communications 

VIII. SERVICE SUPPORT IN VIETNAM: SUBSISTENCE 

188 

194 

AND MISCELLANEOUS 198 

Subsistence 

Other Support Servius 

Unique Support Missions 

IX. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF U.S. ADVISORS AND 

SPECIAL FORCES, VIETNAI\[ ARMED AND 

PACIFICATION FORCES, AND FREE WORLD 

198 

200 

215 

MILITARY ASSISTA!';CE FORCES 229 

Logistic Support of u.s. Advisors 229 

Logistic Support of the U.S. 51h Spedal Forces 

Croup 23 1 

Logistic Support 01 Repllblic 01 Vietnam Armed 

Forus 232 

Logistic Support 01 the SOllth. Jliet'lamese Pacification Program 24 1 

Logislic Support of Olher Free World Military 

Assistance Forces 245 

x. WORLDWIDE Il\fPACT OF VIETNAM ON 

LOGISTIC READINESS 

Impact on Active Army 

Impact Oil Reserve Components 

XII 

25 1 

251 

253 
Cllflpur 

XI. LESSONS LEARNED 

Personnel Lesso,u Learned 

Equipment Lessons Learned 

Policies and Procedures Lessons Learned 

APPENDIX: CO~ i\ fA DERS OF 1ST LOGISTICAL 

COMMAND, VIETNA?>.'J. 1965-1970 

GLOSSARY 

INDEX 

Charts 

No. 

Page 

255 

255 

256 

257 

265 

266 

267 

t. Authorized Troop Level in South Vietnam 13 

2. Procurement of Equipment and Missiles for the Anny 

Contract Awards 28 

3. Closed Loop Support Network 55 

4. Army Aircraft Inventory and Value HIS 

5. Secondary Item In ventory Required to Suppon the Aircraft Fleet 135 

6. Aviation Funding Programs 136 

7. Percent of Allocated Army Funds Spent on Aircraft 157 

8. Requisiti on and Supply Flow. 1965 11 2 

9. Requisition and Supply Flow, April 1966 to April 1968 143 

10. Requ isition and Supply Flow. April 1968 to September 

1969 145 

II. Operational Readiness of U.S. Army Vietnam Rotary 

Wing Aircrafl 152 

12. Organization of U.S. Army Vielllam Main tenance 

System 178 

13. The 1st Logistica l Command lo.<faintenance Stru cture 180 

14. Organizational Structure. Marine Maintenance Activity. 

Vielllam (August 1969) 185 

15. U.S. Army Organization for Facilities Maintenance. South 

Vietnam 193 

16. Typical Organization for Supply Service. Vietnam. 

1968-1970 202 

17. Logistics Advisory Directorate 254 

18. South Vietnamese Armed Forces Organization for 

Logistics 239 

19. Reserve Component Equipment Inventory Changes 254 

X III 
Maps 

No. Page 

1. Major Depots, Support Commands, and Main Supply 

Routes 12 

2. U.S. Army Pipeline System in South Vietnam 78 

8. Deployment of the 84th General Support Group in 

Vietnam 140 

4. Vietnam Rail System 165 

5. Ports, Land Li nes or Commu nication, and Major Logistic 

Commands 168 

6. Maintenance Support Units 179 

Tables 

I. u.s. Army and Total U.S. Military Personnel in 50Ulh 

Vietnam 

2. Push Packages Data . . .. . ..... . 

8. Countrywide Petroleum Consumption 

4. Percentage of Fuel Distributed by Commercial and 

MSTS 

5. Direct Fuel Comparisons for Operation and Maintenance, 

14 

41 

7l 

76 

Anny, During the Build-up Period . ...... 86 

6. Munitions Programs, Fiscal Years 1965-1970 119 

7. UH-J Production Schedule 136 

8. COnlract l\hintcnance Manning Level 139 

9. Intra-Vietnam Cargo Movement by Air, 1967-1969 154 

10. Operational Read iness Ra tes 177 

II. Real Estale Hold ings in South Vietnam 192 

12. Property Disposal Office Operations 210 

13. Propeny Moved (rom Pacific Command Property Disposal Offices 212 

14. Evacuation by Army Air Ambu lances in Vietnam .. 214 

XIV 
Illustrations 

Vietnamese Farmer Operates Roto-tiller Alongside Plow 

Pulled by Water Buffalo 

Gun Truck-5 ton l\'f54A2 "Hardened" Vehicle 

Gun Truck-5 ton M51A2 l\'fountcd with Stripped Down 

Pllg~ 

92 

93 

H ull of Armored Personnel Carrier 93 

Field Depot Tim Due Storage Area 5 Miles North of Saigon 94 

Field Depot Thl! Du e Storage Area After Improvemen ts 94 

Unloading of 2V2 LOn T ruck at Saigon Port 95 

Fish Markel Area in Saigon After Improvements 96 

Qui Nhan Logisti cal Depot 96 

Aerial View of Newport 97 

Air Drop of Supplies in Operation JUNCTION CITY 98 

Armored Personnel Carrier Gives 5,OOO-gallon Tanker Push 

Up Muddy Hill to Fire Support Base 99 

Aerial View of Vung Tau, Showing POL Jetty, Tank Farm, 

and Air Field 99 

POL Storage Farm al Tay Ninh Using Bl adders for Storage 100 

Loading of Class I Supplies From Depot at Cholon 100 

Refrigeration Conta iners and Storage Area at Cholon 101 

2Y2-ton Truck POL Convoy at Pleiku 10 1 

Ammunition Supply Poi nt Under Construction Near a Fire 

Base in Kontum Province, Celllral High lands 102 

Crane Loading Ammunition on to Transponer for Shipment 

to Ammunition Depot 102 

Fork Lift W ith 1751010 Shells to Move to the Stock Pile Area, 

Vung Ro Bay, Vietnam 103 

Bermed Open Storage Complex of the 542d Ammunition Field 

Depot, Bien Thu. Vietnam 103 

Aeria l View of An Ammunition Storage Area. Cam Ranh Bay. 

Vietnam . . . . . . . . 10·1 

Anillery Ammunition Prepared for Sling Loading by Heficopter. Bien Thu, Vietnam 104 

Fork Lift Un loading Pa llets of 105mm Howitzer Rounds From 

a Sea-Land Va n. Plciku. Viet nam 105 

Goer S-ton Cargo Carrier. All-terrain, All-weather Amph ibious 

Cargo Vehicle .. . .. 21S 

Coer S-ton Cargo Carrier Proceeding Cross·country Through 

Swampy Area 218 

CH-47 Chinook H elicopter Brings in Sling Load of Anillery 

Ammunition Duri ng Operation BOLUNC 219 

xv 
Page 

Air Delivery by Flying Crane of Ammllllition and AniHery 

Piece 219 

DeLong Pier Complex at Vung Tau with View of Rock Causeway and Sand Fill to be Used for Hardstand 220 

Use of Sea-Land Vans for Transponalion of Ammunition 220 

Unloading of Sea-Land Vans by Crane of Cargo Ship at Cam 

Ranh Bay 22 1 

Off-loading of Sea-Land Vans by Use of Gantry Crane at Cam 

Ranh Ba y 222 

Civilian Contractor Han Jin Trucks Waiting to be Unloaded 222 

Army Vessel LTC f olm U. D. Page Tied Up at Sout h Beach, 

Cam Ranh Bay 223 

USS Corpus Christi Utilized a~ a Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility Anchored Off Coast at Vung Tau 224 

Aerial View of Vietnam Rai lway Service Repair Crews Clearing Right of Way and Install ing New Track 224 

Use of CONEX Container 225 

Loadi ng Laundry Into Dryer at Cam Ranh Bay 225 

Maintenance Personnel Removing Engine from 5-ton Truck 

for Repa ir 226 

Use of i\ laintenan ce Vans in a Motor Pool Opera ti on 226 

Operation of Rome Plows in Clearing Trees and Undergrowth 

From Areas in Vietnam 227 

Landing Craft i\ lechanized (LC\f) Escons Barge Loaded with 

Rock, Fuel. Steel Girders and Other hems on the Vam Co 

Tay River 227 

Flyi ng Crane Lifts 175mm Gun at Vung Tau 228 

Vietnamese Rebuilding I-lome wi th Lumber Donated Through 

TARP Program in Bien Hoa 249 

Dam Built to Improve Irrigation System in the Village Rice 

Fields in Thuy Phu, Vietnam 249 

MALT Team Head Confers with American Advisor a]ld Local 

S-4 of a Viel11amese Supply Maintenance District Support 

Logistica l Company 250 

Illustrat ions are from Department of Defense fil es. The painting 

on the front co\'er is "Welcome Relief" b)' Specia list Kenneth .J. Scowcroft: on the back cover "Convoy on fhe Mang Yang Pass" by E. C. 

Williams. 

xvi 
LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

CHAPTER I 

Introduction 

This monograph on logistic support to Vietnam is an historical 

account of significant actions and events, and includes di~cllssions 

of the logistic environment, decisions, techniques, accomplishments, 

and lessons learned during the years 1965 through 1970 and, in 

some cases, early 1971. 

The monogTaph describes selected logistic events in order to 

assist the Army in its development of future operational concepts 

and provides reference material for a comprehensive historical 

record. 

This document traces the evolution of logistics operations beginning in the period before the extensive U.S. buildup in early 

1965. Environmental factors inAuenced th e manner in which the 

logistician had to perform his mission-overcrowded pons. lack of 

warehousing and storage areas for unloaded supplies, poor security 

conditi ons at existing facilities. and insufficient and inadequately 

trained personnel to perform the monumental task of support for 

combat operations. 

Supply suppon in Vietnam is discussed from the rnanagemem 

vie\\'point, including the particular or significant experience gained 

in various types or classes of supply services provided by the logistician such as maintenance. construction, real estate procurement 

and management, and transportation support including aviation. 

Each is illustrated to present a better understanding of techniques 

used and concepts developed which may influence future logistic 

support doctrine. A discllssion of graves registration, property disposal, bath, laundry. bakery. and food services is also included. 

In addition to the support of U.S. Forces, this mono/{Taph includes informa ti on on the logistics support to Army of the Republic 

of Vietnam, Free World Military Assistance Forces, logisti c responsibiliti es relative to the Pacification Program, and the effects 

on the total logistics efforts throughout the world. 

To understand the events and decisions related to logistics in 

the Republic of Vietnam. one must evaluate them against a backdrop of the conditions and problems which prevailed at the time. 

Fundamentally, none of the background is new or unique to the 

history of combat logistics. Nonetheless, each condition and each 
4 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

event had its own impact and posed its own problems. Never 

before had the Army's logistic system been tasked with the mission 

of supporting large numbers of grou nd combat troops operating in 

a counterguerilla role with a pipeline 9,000-11,000 miles long. The 

logistics doctrine developed as a result of years of experience in 

conventiona l ground warfare was not aJh'ays applicable in the 

Vielllam environment. i\rany of the techniques and assumptions 

which were accepted as valid ill conventiona l warfare did not apply 

in the harsh, primitive. jungle environment and the isolated support enclaves. Even so, Vietnam is a story of remarkable logistics 

achievement. At no time was logistic support a constraint on a 

major tactical operation. This record was made despite the condi· 

tiom which imposed a fantastic strain on logistics operations and 

which alTered an enormous challenge to all logisticians. 

Bordered on the west by Cambodia and Laos and on the east by 

a seacoast of approximately 1,500 miles on the South China Sea and 

the Gulf or Thailand. the Republic of Vietnam extends in a 

crescent shape along the southeastern side of the Indochina peninSlIla. The land area is dominated by a mountain chain, extending 

southward from the republic's nonhern border to within 60 miles 

of Saigon, wit h peaks ranging in height from 2,000 to 8,000 feel. 

The o\'erall topography of Vietnam comprises jungles, deltas, 

swamps, plains :Inc! mountains. The Mekong Della. southwest of 

Saigon. is a vast alluvial plain fed by the many mouths of the 

Mekong River and criss-crossed hy a dense network of canals. The 

Delta is one of the major rice producing regions of Southeast Asia. 

The topography of Vietnam created many difficulties for U.S. 

Forces, hindering such activities as construction, transportation 

and communications while. at the same time, facilitating the 

enemy'~ type of operations. 

The climate of Vietnam is tropical and subj ect to monsoon 

rains. There are two seasons: hot and dry, and hot and rainy. 

Highest temperalUres and hum idity are ex perienced in the southern delta in April and i>.fay. with the rainy season beginning in 

late i\fay and cont inuing through September. In the coastal and 

highland al"ea~ the highest temperatures and humidities are 

experienced during the momhs of July and August, with the 

rainy season beginning in October and continuing through Marcil. 

(11 the highland areas the nights are cool regardless of the season. 

Overall, the climate of Vietnam severely hampered a\l logistical 

operations. 

Th('" population o( the Republi c of Vietnam totals approxi1l1Oltel)" 1$ million. The bulk of this population has subsisted 
INTRODUCTION 5 

throughout the years by the cultivation of rice on lands irrigated 

through the use of primitive pumps and sl uices. The majority of 

the population lives in the open lowland plains and the rice bearing 

deltas. The uplands region has heen left to the ethnically alien 

and primitive mountain tribes. Although the majority of the 

population is ethnicall y and culturall y Vietnamese. there are 

significant minorities. This minority population is comprised of 

approximately 1 million Chinese (mostly living in the Saigon area), 

500,000 Cambodians, and approximately 1 million l\ lontagnard 

mountain tribesmen. Budd hism is the predominant religion in 

Vietnam, although there are approximately 2 million Roman 

Catholics. 

Saigon. the ca pital of the Republic of Vietnam, is the largest 

city in the Republi c and is loca ted approximately 50 miles inland 

from the South China Sea on the west bank of the Saigon River. At 

the time the U.S. buildup began in Vietnam, this CilY was a busy 

commercial pon, and the only port of significance in the country. 

As the population has increased from 2 million people in 1964, to 

approximately 3.5 million in early 1971. Saigon (i ncluding the 

twin city of Cholon) became overcrowdert. \Vith the overcrowding 

came man y problems which impaired facilities for health and 

sanitation, transportation. ami security. These problems weighed 

heavil y in the October 1967 decision to move most of the military 

Eacilities located in Saigon to Long Binh which was approximately 

20 miles northeast of Saigon. 

In 1965, Vietnam was primarily an agrarian country with a very 

low le"el of industrialization. The few industries established by the 

French were located in North Vietnam. By the end of 1970, there 

were only 82 large or medium manufacturing operations in all of 

South Vietnam. Public utilities and services were wholly inadequate by western standards. Faciliti es vital to a modern logistics 

base such as ports. terminal facilities, warehouses. communica tions. 

transportation, storage, and maintenance facilities. were either 

limited or nonexistenl. The lack of industry was nat urall y accompanied by a shortage of technicians and skilled lahol'. For the 

most pan. all necessary supplies, equi pment, and skills to suppOrt 

military operations had to be imported. and all necessary facilities 

had to be buill. 

In accordance with the obli gation as a member of the South 

EaSl Asia T reaty Organization the U.S. suppli crt military maleriel 

and equipmellt ;ll the request of the Republic of Vietnam. A [l,fi[itary Assistance and Ad visor)' Group was established to su pervise and 

coordinate this suppOrt program. This commitment for suppon was 
6 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

made by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 10 October 1954. 

In the following year, the Military Assistance and Advisory Group 

effort was given authority to orga nize and train as well as to equip 

the armed forces of SOllth Vietnam. 

In 1956 the communist organiza ti on in SOllth Vietnam (the 

Viet Cong) iniliatcd a campaign of terror (0 undermine the 

authority of the central government. This campaign included the 

assassination and kidnapping of government officia ls and supporters. 

By 1960 the number of assassinations had reached 1,400 and over 

700 kidnappings had occurred. President J ohn F. Kennedy approved requests for additional aid in 1961. As communist pressure 

increased and military requirements increased, the Military Assistance Command. Vietnam. was created in February of 1962. 

By the end of that year. U.S. advisers were in operational control of U.S. helicopter missions transporting and supporting South 

Vietnamese Army operations. Overall operational authority was 

vested in the U.S. Ambassador, with the Embassy handling the 

pacification program and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam , 

directly responsible to the ambassador for support in all other fields. 

In 1963 President Diem was assassinated. A series of coups followed 

the assassination. These happenings. in addition to assassinations 

and kidnappings by the Viet Cong. seriously weakened the Vietnamese government. The South Vietnamese Army sustained a 

series of defeats. Pacification of the countryside was nearly Slopped 

and the enemy was found everywhere. By 1965. it became obvious 

that a rapid buildup and employment of U.S. combat forces were 

needed to prevent the complete collapse of the Government of 

South Vietnam. 

General William C. Westmoreland, Commander. U.S. Military 

Assistance Command. Vietnam, stated that as late as March 1965 no 

decision had been taken on U.S. intervention with ground forces, 

oth er than the limited Marine Security force deployed to protect 

the On Nang Airfield. Consequently there was no logistic 

system in being. and no development of secure logistic bases. 

except the tOtally inadequate installations associated with South 

Vietnamese forces. There were inadequate ports and airfields, no 

logistic organization. and no supply, transportation, or maintenance 

troops. Due to the grave tactical situation, President Lyndon B. 

J ohnson directed the deploymem of U.S. combat forces. Because of 

force level ceilings and the decision not to mobilize the reserves, the 

logistical buildup lagged behind the combat force buildup. That 

this procedure succeeded. is a tribute to the imagination. deter-
INTRODUCTION 7 

mination. and energy of those officers and men in all the services 

who were charged with this almost impossible task. 

The Vietnam conRi ct was quite d ifferent from that for which 

the Army had trained, and, for that maHer, was at varia nce with 

combat dynamics upon which the Army's logistic doctrin e was 

based. Vi etnam was a war fought essentially by sma ll unitS 

(maneuver ballalions. companies, and similar forces) in constant 

pursuit of an elusive enemy. In stark COntraSllO ' ·Vorld 'VOIr II and 

Korea, Vietnam was characterized largely by small, isolated actions 

consisting of ground and air assaults mounted from the numerous 

isolated base camps dotting the countryside. There were no fixed 

terrain objectives. Even when sOllle key terrain feature was at issue. 

it was usually for a limited purpose and a designated time. 

There was no neat, linear division between enemy and friendly 

forces; no front line; and no rear bou ndaries. Consequentl y, there 

was neither an Army service area, nor a commun ications zone. In 

fact, the combat zone and the communica ti ons zone were one 

and the same. At no time were there really "secure" ports, depots, 

storage facilities, service areas, or suppl y rOlltes. The relative 

degree of security varied from time to time and place to place. 

Attacks on logistic facilities and operations at all levels were 

common, even in the later years of the \I'ar. These attacks included 

major ambushes of supply convoys; harassment b)' small arms fire: 

rocket and mortar bombardment: and vicious s"ppcr attacks againsl 

general depolS, ammunition pads, and petroleum tanks. Later in 

the war there were some more or less "cleared areas." In 19G5. 

there , ... as quite literally no "rriendly" territory. 
CHAPTER II 

Logistics Environment 

To understand the problems and conditions lhal characterized 

the logistical effort in Vietnam, one must keep in mind the sequence 

of events during Ihe early buildup period. The speed and magnitude of Ihe escalation of U.S, combat troop deployments in 

response to enemy aClion and pressure proceeded faSler than a 

logistic base could he developed LO support Ihese units. The 

Republic of Vietnam had a 1011' level of inciustrializ:Hion. t\ loclcrn 

logisti c fa cilities were limited or nonexistent. The in,coll ntry 

logistic system slipponing lIu.' .'\olllh Viclnamc~e Armed Forces 

was incapable of slIpporting major U.S. forces. The small, highly 

fragmented system supponing the U.S. advi~ory error! cOllld do no 

more than provide the skeleton for a later logistical system. The 

enemy controlled the Tlujor pan of South Vietn;II11, either by clirect 

occupati on or through lenor tactics. The principal terrain features 

as well as lann and water arteries were ei ther uncler enemy 

control. or 511 bject to the cnnstan t threat of i Illere! i("ti on. 

Logistics planning was funher complicated hy the fact that 

logistic tro p~ and units were deployed at ahollt the same rate as 

tactical forces rather than ill advance of them as de~ired for the 

limel y establishmcnt of an ildcquate logistic hilse. The chronology 

of U.S. unit arrivals in the Republic of Vietnam sholl"s a contiuu· 

Oll~ innow of del<lchmelll· ilnc! company.<;i!.e logistical suppon units 

during practiGlih e\cry mOl1lh of the perio<l spring I!lCi5 In su mmer 

1966. In addition. If)gi~tics units were deployed on a Technical SeT\'· 

ice basis (Table of Org:lnizalion and Equipment) whereas the 

new Combat Service to th e Army doctrine had already been 

approvcd, thus c,lIIsi ng lIIuch agony, i\ Ieauwhile. majnr lacticill 

forces. to includc the bulk .)f the 1st Infantry Division: the 1st 

Cavalr)' Division (Airmobil e): the I nd Airborne Brigade: tile 

1st Brigilde. IOlsl Airhorn e I)ivi<;ioo: ill1f1 the :kl Brig<lcle. 2:nh 

Infantry Di\'i~ioll (lI' hich \\"a~ lil ter In become the :'\d Brigade of 

the 4th Infantrv i\' i~i ll ) II'cre in·country and engaged in hallie 

hy JalHtalY 19fifi. Till' majl.r pal( of the 2;lth Infflnlr)' Division had 

arrived by April of thai vcar aud hrigadc·~i1e elemcnts arrived 

prallicalf)' c\·er)' l110mh during th e period Allgust l)e('emher 1966. 

to include elemellt~ of the 1th, 2:ith. (In<i 9th Infantry Divisions. 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 9 

as well as the 11th Armorer! Cavalry Regiment, and the separate 

19th and 199111 Light In fantry Brigades. The remaining brigade 

of the 9th Infantry Division arrived in J anuary 1967. i\leanwhile. 

funh er deployment decisions were made, and the Americal Division. the 101 st Airborne Division (-), and Olher units appeared in 

Vietnam during the period September 1967 to March 1968. 

Logistic COllcepl (1965) and hz-Country Planning 

As early as 1962, the need for a centralized U.S. logistical 

organization in South Vietnam was foreseen by Commander U.S. 

Military Assistance Comm,l1Ir1, Vietnam, Lieutenant General Paul 

D. Harkins. The proposal was disapproved, however by Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific and Commander in Chief 

Pacific, who fell that the requirement was not j\lstified at tha t time. 

The idea was revived in August 1964 by the i\fi litary Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. J-4, who helieved that the current and future 

siLUation would require a logistical command 10 support activities 

in South Vietnam. Accordingly. he sa l\' that a plan was prepared 

which included the prompt introduction of a logistical construction 

capabilit),. On 21 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed 

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. plan and recommended that 230 men be initially dispatched to South Vietnam to 

form a logistical command as soon as possibl e. Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara approved the plan in principle. but stated 

that additional justification was needed. particularly for the engineer construction group. l-!o\\'cver, he felt that tbe subject was 

of sufficient importance to send a special representative to South 

Viemam. and 0 11 31 January 1965 , a gronp from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense arrived in Saigon. After four days of con· 

ferences, this group recommcndcd the establishment of a logistical 

command with an initial strength of .150 men. The establishment of 

an engineer construction group, not recommended initially, was 

approved in April as planning for a further buildup developed. 

On 25 February 1965. the' Secretar}' of Defense approved the 

introduction of a logistica l planning group in the Republic of 

Vietnam consisting of 17 officers and 21 enlisted men. Colonel 

Robert 'V. Duke \\'as enrOllle to take command of the 9th Logistical 

Command in Thailand. He was intercepted in Hall'aii and ordered 

to the Republic of Vietnam to take chOlrge of the planning WOllp. 

He arrived in Saigon on (j l\ larch 1965. The halance of the officers 

and enlistcd men for the planning group arrived in Saigon during 

the last two weeks of ;\Tarch 19(.:i. On I April 196[), the 1st 

Logistical Command was activated in Saigon by Commander in 
10 LQCISTIC SUPPORT 

Chief U.S. Army Pacific General Order, using the personnel of 

the logistical planning gTOup as its initial Slrength. 

Prior to Ihis time. logistical support in ViClIlam had been 

fragmented, with the Army providing onl y Class 11 and IV items 

which were peculiar 10 the Army, Class V items used by the Army 

aviation units, and maintenance of vehicles, armament, and instrument calibration by a small Direct Support shop in Saigon. The 

rest of the support was provided by the Navy through Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon because the Navy had been 

designated as the executive agency responsible for supporting the 

~fililary Assistance and Advisory Groups and missions in Southeast Asia. 

The mission of the 1 SI Logistical Command as dc,'eloped by 

Colonel Duke and the initial small planning grou p was, in broad 

terms. that the 1st Logistical Command would aSSlime responsibility 

for all logistical support in Vietnam, less that which was peculiar to 

the Air Force or Navy. This initial mission included procurement, 

medical. construction. engineer, finance and accounting of all U.S. 

Army forces in-country. except Militar)' Assistance Command. Vietnam, advisors: and excluded communications, aviation, and military police support which were retained by U.S. Army Vietnam 

(the Army component command under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. and over the 1st Logistical Command). Requirements beyond direct support and general support maintenance 

capability were to be retrograded to Okinawa. Subsequent addon missions were planned to be put into effect as the capability 

hecame available. These add-on missions were to: assume support 

of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, advisors from Headquarters Commandant. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. a 

task accomplished on I September 1965, phase·out the Navy supply 

activity in Saigon-The 1st Logistical Command started assuming 

Headquarters Support Activity Saigon functions in September 1965, 

and completed the mission in i .. larch 1966-and assume common 

item suppon for all U.S. forces in South Vietnam. 

The lst Logistical Command was authorized direct communications with U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) on logistic 

matters. Logistic requirements were placed there. After screening, 

requirements were filled or passed to U.S. Anny Pacific. It either 

filled them or passed them to Army Materiel Command. This 

proved to be very unsatisfactory due to inadequate electrical communications with Okinawa. lack of adequate stocks and personnel 

resources in Okinawa as \I'ell a5 U.S. Army Pacific, and the man)' 

headquarters in the logistic chain. Through this chain there was a 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 11 

loss in excess of 40 percent of all requisitions subm itted in the 

initial stages of the buildup. A combat area should be able to submit requisitions directly to Continental U.S. Continental U.S. could 

then direct shipment to the combat area from the nearest source 

to that area having the required items in stock. 

The 1st Logistical Command. in coordina ti on with Military 

Assistance Command. Vietnam. operational planning. developed its 

own logistic concept for South Vietnam. The plan provided for 

two major base depots and five support commands. (Map J) The 

seas and rivers were initially to be the main su pply routes within 

Vietnam. However, a change over to road and rail would take 

place when the tactical situation permitted. Each support command would provide all logistic support on an area basis and have 

a 15 day stockage. Depots would have a 45 day stockage. The 

Saigon Depot would support the Vung Tau and Can Tho Support 

Commands. The Cam Ranh Bay Depot would support the Nha 

Trang. Qui Nhon and Da Nang Support Commands. 

A two depot concept was considered essemial due to the 

vulnerability of the Saigon River and port to Viet Cong action 

and the limited port capacity. Vung Tau was considered an alternate to the Saigon port in the event of loss of Saigon or blockage of 

the Saigon River. Cam Ranh Bay was selected as the other base 

depot and port due to its excellent deep water harbor, the existing 

pier, its central location. and U.S. capability to secure the area from 

Viet Cong attack. 

This plan by the 1st Logistical Command was implemented 

with only two changes: the Marines were landed at Da Nang and, 

by Commander in Ch ief Pacific direction. the Navy was given the 

responsibility for both tactical and logistical operations in I Corps. 

The Da Nang Support Command was eliminated from the 1st 

Logistical Command plan. Il was reinstated in 1968. The antici· 

pated scale of tactical operations in the Delta area of IV Corps did 

not materialize, so the Can Tho Support Command was not 

activated. The IV Corps was supported by the Vung Tau Support 

Command by sea and air. 

The origina l plan for the refinement of a logistical plan in an 

orderly fa sh ion followed by a deliberate and orderly impl ementa. 

tion never came to pass. Instead it quickly turned into a concurrent 

planning and implementation process. The Secretary of Defense 

approved at the 9- 11 April 1965 Hawaiian Conference an Army 

Combat force of over 33,000 troops with the first combat troops 

(173rd Airborne Brigade from Okinawa) to arrive in South Vietnam on 2J April 1965. This was just the beginning of the ac-
MAP I 

1ST LO<O C"O 

lSA!!O~ ""' ". 

MAJOR DEPOTS 

SUPPORT COMMANDS 

AND 

MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES 

o SuNlO,1 CO"''''~nd 

• Bn •• depOI 

_ MO'" , .. r.pl, ",.1' 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 13 

celerated buildup. (See ClJart J and Table J.) After the April conference there were a series of other force level planning con ferences 

in Hawaii. at which Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

would request forces that were required. However. the number of 

troops approved by the office of the Secretary of Defense was 

always less than the number requested by Iili tary Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. 

U.S. Forces were built up in an imbalanced manner. Continued 

enemy pressure 011 the beleaguered government of SOllth Vietnam 

and manpower ceil ings combined to cause the logistics base to be 

inadequate in relation to tlte total force level. 

Each time a new ceiling was established it was announced as 

a final ce iling and could not be changed. Therdore, all planning 

for future opera ti ons had to be based on this num ber. including 

requests by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Congress for 

supporting funds. This series of "final ceilings," and the decision 

not to call up a large number of Reserve Component units. established a pattern of "too late planning," and "too late determination of requirements" that affected every facet of the military establishment £Yom draft quotas 10 admin istration. training, equipping, procurement by Army l\hteriel Command, Defense Supply 

Agency, and Government Services Admi nistration. Th is resulted 

in a drawdown of reserve and project stocks to an unacceptable 

level. 

CHART I- AuTIIORIZED TROOI' LEVEL IN SOUTH Va:n.AM 

Men 

600,000 

500,000 

400,000 

300,000 

200,000 

100,000 

o 1961 

• Laos 

\ 284.0 

, 

, 

, 

1 Dee-I84.0 

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1910 197i 72 
14 l.OGISTIC SUPPORT 

TABLE I-U.S. ARMY AND TOTAL U.S. j\OhUT .... RY P ERSONNEL 

I N SoUTH VIETNAM 

Dal~ 

' ] Ott 1960 ............ .. 

31 Dec 1961 ............. . 

31 OK 1962 ............. . 

31 Dec 1963 ............. . 

51 D« 19M ............. . 

!II Mar 1965 ............ . 

!l0 Jun .................. . 

30 Scp .................. . 

51 Orc ... .......... . 

!I ~far 1966 

50 Jun ............. . 

SO Scp ...... ..... ....... . 

51 Dec .................. . 

SI Mar 1967 ............ . 

SO Jiln ...... . ' .......... . 50 Scp .................. . 

!I' Dec ....... . .......... . 

51 Mar 1968 .......•...... 

!O Jun .... .............. . 

3D Scp ........... . 

!I I Dec ........ ... ....... . 

· !l1 Jan 1969 ....... .. ... . 

!II Mar .. " ........•• ,. '0 Jun ..............••... 

50 Sep ............••••. .. !II Dec ........... ....... . 

" Mar 1970 ............. . 

50 Jun ..............•••.. 

30 Sep .............•..... 

31 Dec .... ........... .. .. 

31 Mar 1971 ..... .. 

5 Jun .................. . 

'IndlCIIH put flrcnlth In Sooth Vlctnam 

U.S . .... rmy PtrlOnncl 

800 

2.100 

1,900 

10.100 

14,700 

15.600 

27.300 

16,200 

116,800 

137.400 

160,000 

189.200 

239,400 

264.600 

285,700 

296.100 

"9.500 

!!7.300 

354,500 

554,200 

559,800 

565,600 

361.500 

360.500 

545.400 

!!OJOO 

521.400 

291.600 

295,400 

250.700 

227.600 

197.500 

Ik.wtcn 195.f-1960 U.S. Mili.ary StrCnlth aYf .... «I abou. 650 a.hilOn 

TO' 11 U.S. Military PerlOnnd 

900 

',200 

11 .300 

16.300 

2S,!00 

29,100 

59.900 

I!2JOO 

184.500 

23 1,200 

267.500 

313,1 00 

485.300 

420.900 

448.800 

459.700 

485.600 

515.200 

554.700 

557.800 

536,100 

542,400 

558.200 

538.700 

510.500 

474,400 

448.500 

41!,900 

394,100 

535,800 

301,900 

250,900 

The first US Army combat unit to arrive in South Vietnam 

(Inrd Airborne Brigade) was employed in the Saigon area to 

insure retention or Bien Hoa Airfield and to assist in securing 

Saigon. It was initially supported directly from Okinawa by a dail y 

C-130 aircraft flight, Later the support was assumed by the 1st 

Logistical Command. 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 15 

The second combat unit to arrive was the 2d Brigade of the 1st 

Infantry Division. Plans called for their employment at Qui Nhon 

to secure that area for future use. From the meager logistic reo 

sources in South Vietnam some were deployed to Qui Nhon to 

support that unit. Due to the buildup of enemy pressure on Saigon, 

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, made 

the decision two days before the arrival of the 2d Brigade of the 1st 

Infantry Division that the 2d Brigade would be employed in the defense of Saigon. This resulted in a scramble to relocate the few U.S. 

supplies and ammunition in South Vietnam from Qui Nhon south 

some 250 miles to Saigon. Numerous changes were made in tactical 

plans in the initial stages of the buildup due to Viet Cong pressure. 

Such changes were necessary, but had an adverse effect on orderly 

logistical planning and implementation. 

As logistical units arrived in South Vietnam they were assigned 

to appropriate depots or Support Commands as the tactical situation directed. In all Support Commands small units and detachments arrived ahead of the command and control units. As a result officers from the seventeen-man officer staff of the 1st Logistical 

Command had to be sent to the Support Command areas to receive, 

organize, assign missions, coordinate efforts, and command these 

small units and detachments pending arrival of a command and 

control headquarters. As an example, a U.S. Army major with a 

jeep and a brief case was the complete command and control unit 

for the Saigon area. This included finding and securing living 

areas and work areas for arriving units. Prior to June 1965, the 1st 

Logistical Command operated on a very thin shoestring. As more 

staff officers and command and control units arrived in June the 

command and control situation improved greatly. 

On 11 May 1965, the Commander U.S. Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, and his staff were briefed on the logistic 

plans of the 1st Logistical Command. This briefing included real 

estate requirements and requirements for tactical troops for depot 

and support command areas at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam 

Ranh Bay. The plan was approved on 12 May 1965. The first 

ship unloading operation at Cam Ranh Bay took place on 15 May 

1965. Since Army stevedores had not yet arrived in South Vietnam, 

and the SOllth Vietnam stevedore union refused to send civilian 

stevedores to Cam Ranh Bay, the first ship was unloaded by a U.S. 

transportation lieutenam and a small group of enlisted men assembled through levies on units for anyone with any stevedore or 

small boat experience. From such a start Cam Ranh Bay was built 

up to a major and efficient port. 
16 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

With the arrival of combat forces and the 1st Logistical Command becom ing operational, its small staff cou ld not accomplish 

all the planning that was required. A request \\'35 placed on U,S. 

Army Pacific for assistance. U.S. Army Pacific then provided fi ve 

officers on a 90 day temporary duty tour. These officers reported to 

the 1st Logistical Command on 23 April 1965 and were given the 

task to make a study of the Qui Nhan enclave. Nha Trang enclave, 

and the Cam Ranh Bay area, to determine the tactical security requirements and the feasibility of utilizing these areas as included 

in 1st Logistical Command's concept, and to refine the logistics 

planning fOT each area to include base development. 

These planners prepared a study which proved to be of great 

value in base development and the expansion of the 1st Logistical 

Command's capabilities. This study with appropriate ref:ommenda· 

tions and requests for tactica l troops for security of desired areas 

was presented to the Commanding General U.S. Army Vietnam and 

Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in May 

1965. Approval was ref:eived and sef:urity was provided as requested at each location , except Qui Nhon. General Westmoreland 

approved the sef:urity plan for Qui Nhon, but due to Viet Cong 

pressure and a shonage of U.S. forces the implementation of the 

plan was delayed over a month. Even then the forces available 

were not able to push Ollt and secure all of the originally planned 

areas. This left the ammunition depot at Qui Nhon exposed 

to enemy action. 

Upon completion of the enclave study, a new problem faced 

the planning grOlip. Il was ref:ognized that the continued influx of 

troops into the city of Saigon (10,000 in the next 4 months) would 

soon exceed its capability to absorb. It was also recognized that 

usable real estate and facilities were not available in the Saigon 

area. A threefold mission was given to the planning group: develop 

a shon range plan to absorb the influx of troops into the Saigon 

area, develop a long range plan that would ultimately move the 

hulk of U.S. Army personnel out of the Saigon area, and develop 

detailed plans for the security and logistical development of the 

Can Tho areas. 

A thorough reconnaissance was made and chosen areas were 

selected. In order to relieve the pressure on Saigon facilities, the 

Long Binh area was selected for the establishment of a major 

logistical and administrative base. A master base development plan 

was prepared which provided areas for all activities in Saigon. 

General Westmoreland (who was both Commander U.S. Miliwry Assistance Command, Vietnam, and Commanding General 
LOCISllCS ENVrRONMENT 17 

U.S. Army Vietnam) was briefed on the study and approved it in 

principle, except he elected to move Headquarters U.S. Army 

Vietnam to Long Binh (Headquarters Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, remained in the Saigon area). The 1st Logistical 

Command immediately began implementing the study by locating 

the ammunition depot, hospital, engineers, plus direct support and 

general support supply and maintenance support at Long Binh. The 

movement of headquarters type activities was delayed by the requirement for $2 million to develop an adequate commun ication 

system in the area and by the lime required for installation of the 

system. 

The study on Saigon proved to be of great value. Long Binh 

became a major installation in the Republic of Vietnam. The 

study on Vung Tau and Can Tho resulted in the elimination of 

Can Tho as a support command. The delta area was supported 

from Vung Tau and Saigon. The VlIng Tau portion of the study 

included plans for the development of Vung Tau as a deep draft 

port utilizing De Long piers. 

Major Logistics Constraints 

To the logistician, it is extremely important to have an early 

decision establishing theater standards of living. These standards 

should determine the basic authorization for POSt, camp, and 

station property, PX stockage of merchandise, whether base camps 

are to be constructed, construction standards, the degree of permanency for fixed installations, and utilities and services to be 

provided. Obviously, such a decision has a tremendous impact on 

the logistic system. Construction materials alone constituted some 

10 percent of total tonnage of materials coming into South Vietnam 

in 1965 and 1966. 

Without such established standards to use as terms of reFerence, 

it was impossible to realistically determine requirements for such 

items as real estate, supply, storage, maintenance, construction, 

electricity and other utilities, as well as the resultant port unloading 

capability required. Without such standards, the logistic system has 

no grounds for cha ll enging requirements placed lIpon it. Such a 

decision was never made in the early days of Vietnam. Therefore, 

every unit independently established its own standard of living, 

ordering from supply catalogs as if they were Sears and Roebuck 

catalogs. Commanders desiring to give their personnel the very 

highest possible levels of comfon and quality of food, requisitioned 

air conditioning and refrigeration equipment far in excess or that 

authorized by Tables of Organization and Equipment. This had a 
18 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

mushrooming effect. Requiremellls for electrical power genera ting 

equipment werc in tum increased to the point that demand exceeded the capabi lity of Tables of Organization and Equipment 

authorized equipment. A1; th e requirement for this equipment increased, the numbers of makes and models proliferated (as suppli ers of standard makes and models were un ab le to keep up with 

the rapidly increasing demands) . As the quantities of equipment 

increased, so did the requirements for repair pans and qualified 

maintena nce personnel. The repair parts were a problem because 

of the many varied makes and models and the resultant Jack of 

interchangea bility among their parts. It was difficult to maintain 

full Tables of Organization and Equi pment authorized maimenance 

strength much less the numbers of personnel required to maintain the excess equipment. Therefore, because these personnel were 

nOt readil y available in sufficielll quamities, back-up equipment 

was requisitioned (for emergency use) further burdening an already heavily taxed logistic system. Finally decisions were made on 

a piece-meal basis on such things as construction standards. But 

even with established standards, there was flexibility in interpreta· 

tion. More often than not, the imerpretation did not favor th e 

most austere construction or equipment requirements. This not 

only put a heavy burden on th e logistical system, but it also taxed 

th e Colllinenta l U.S. troop base which was not structured in numbers or skills to support the construction or equipment insta ll ation and subsequelll mailllenance requirements which evolved 

from the Vietnam buildup_ 

War Reserve Stoclts 

The stocks available in March 1965 were totally inadequate. 

For example, onl y onc DeLong pier was available whil e a dozen 

could have been used. The timely availability of th ese piers 

would have saved the government large sums of money in ship 

demurrage and speeded up the buildup of forces. 

Logistical Management OrganizatiOns 

Logistical management organizations were not available. As an 

example, it was a year before a su ppl y inventory control team 

arrived in South Vietnam. By th e time it had become operational , 

its equipment was found to be inadequate and had to be upgraded. This same situation was common in oth er areas of logistical 

management. In a new theater of operations under combat conditions, th ere is a pressing need early in the operation for manage-
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 19 

ment organizations to be compl etely mobil e. automated. and 

self-supporti ng. Further. these ea rl y logistics management or-ganizations and units were Techni ca l Service oriented even though the 

Combat Service to the Army functional doctrine had been approved. 

Difficulties were experienced in fitting the Technical Service or· 

ganizations into the new doctrine that had not been fully tested 

before Vietnam. 

Engineer Construction 

A.!; the buildup progressed. it became apparent that the en· 

gineer construction program was becoming so large it required a 

spedal command to oversee it. In Jul y 1965, the decision was 

made to deploy an engineer brigade to the Republic of Vietnam, 

and upon its arrival the engineer construction functions were 

transferred from the 1st Logistical Command to the Engineer 

Brigade. 

With increased combat requirements, the priority for logistics 

construction projects declined for a period and the construction of 

essential pon and depot facilities fell behind schedul e, adversely 

affecting the capability to handle incoming troops. equipment. 

and supplies. However, in December 1965, Commander in Chief 

Pacifi c directed that the highest priority be given to port and beach 

clearance and depot construction. After this the capability to 

handle incoming ca rgo steadily improved. 

Logistic Support Principles 

The organization for supply support foll owed the area support, 

"logistica l island," concept with the sea being the main supply 

route. Field depots were established in each support command to 

receive, Slore, and issue Classes II, IV, VII and IX items, less 

aviation. avionics, medical, and missile peculiar items. The depots 

provided area su pport as indicated below: 

I. The 506th Field Depot, Saigon (later US Anny Depot, 

Long Binh) was responsible for III and IV Corps. 

2. The 504th Field Depot. Cam Ranh Bay (later US Army 

Depot, Cam Ranh Bay) was responsible for the southern part of 

II Corps. 

3. The 58th Field Depot, Qui Nhon (later US Army Depot, 

Qui Nhon) was responsible for the northern part of II Corps. 

4. The US Army Fi eld Depot, DaNang was established on 25 

February 1968 with the mission of supplying Army peculiar items 
20 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

in I Corps. This depot operated as a field depot of the Qui Nhon 

base depot. 

Virtually all Army tactical operations received logistics support from 1st Logistical Command elements operating logistical 

support activities located at major base camps such as Tay Ninh, 

Bearcat, Phuoc Vinh, Can Tho, Pleiku, An Khe. and Chu Lai. When 

forces beyond the reach of these facilities required additional support, temporary fonvard suppon activities were deployed. 

Initially, medical services and medical supply were organic to 

the 1st Logistical Command mission. As the buildup progressed, 

the magnitude of the medical mission became greater. A decision 

was made to transfer this function from the 1st Logistical Command 

to a medical brigade. The 44th Medical Brigade assumed this 

function upon arrival in South Vietnam in 1966_ 

Aviation logistic support was initially provided by the U.S. 

Army Support Command, later U.S. Army Vietnam. The 34th 

General Support Group (avia tion supply and maintenance) was 

deployed to South Vietnam in mid-1965 to manage this function. 

The Logistical Support Activity was a continuing provisional 

activity composed of 1st Logistica l Command elements and generally located in a fixed base camp to provide direct and general 

supply, maintenance, and service support to U.S. and Free World 

Military Assistance Forces on an area basis. The type and number 

of units comprising a Logistical Support Activity was dependent 

upon the scope of the support mission. Many of these operations 

involved substantial portions of either a supply and service battalion, direct support maintenance baualion, or elements of both 

with the senior officer present serving as the Logistical Support 

Activity commander. Stackage levels of all classes at a Logistical 

Support Activity were determined by the densities of personnel 

and equipment supported, considering replenishment capabilities. 

Stackage objectives for the various classes of supply varied from 5 

to 45 days depending upon the commodities being stocked. 

A Forward Support Activity was a provisional organization , 

temporary in nature, and deployed in the vicinity of a supported 

tactical unit's forward operating base to provide direct supply, 

maintenance, and service support. It was deployed to support a 

specific tactical operation, when the tactical organic support capability was not sufficient to provide the support required. Upon 

completion of the operation, it was withdrawn from the area of 

operations, and its assets and personnel returned to their parent 

unit. Personnel and equipment comprising a Forward Support 

Activity were drawn from Tables of Organization and Equipment 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 21 

and Tables of Distribution and Allowances units assigned to the 

parent Support Command of the 1st Logistical Command. Forward 

Support Activities cou ld stock Class I, III, V, and limited, fast 

moving Class II and IV, if the tactical unit was unable to provide 

their own support. Stackage levels \\'ere set at a minimum level 

consistent with operational requirements (based on troop and 

equipment densities, resupply rates, capacity and consumption 

experience). Throughput was used to the maximum extent pos· 

sible to replace stocks consumed at Forward Support Activities. 

Maintenance and senices were provided as required depending 

upon the supported unit's organic capabilities, tactical deploy· 

ment, and densities. 

If a Forward Support Activity became a continuing activity, 

it was usuall y redesignated as a Logistical Support Activity. Nor· 

mally, a Forward Support Activity which continued operations 

over six months was redesignated as a Logistical Support Activity. 

The concept of using a Forward Support Activity to provide 

combat service support was developed due to the particular en· 

vironment in South Vietnam and the manner in which tactical 

units operated. Brigade.size units were engaged in search and 

destroy operations which in many cases were conducted in areas 

located a considerable distance from their base camp and major 

support installations. 

The 1st Logistical Command did not have separate authoriza· 

tion for the personnel and equipment required to operate Forward 

Support Activities, although the need for such authorization 

existed. Personnel and equipment were drawn from Tables of 

Organization and Equipment and Tables of Distribution and 

Allowances units assigned to the parent support command or were 

provided by the other support commands when the requirement 

exceeded the parent support command's capability. The initial For· 

ward Support Activity concept envisioned the organization and field. 

ing of FOT\\'ard Support Activities in support of tactical operations 

of short duration. Experience showed, however, that some Forward Support Activities were required for extended periods of 

time resulting in a degradation or the capability of the units 

from which personnel or equipment were drawn. 

Establishment of permanent brigade base camps and the deployment of non-divisional Tables or Organization and Equipment 

supply, service, and maintenance units to lhese areas reduced the 

requirements for For\\'ard Support Activities. In many locations 

where Forward Support Activities originally provided support, it 

was possible later to provide logistical suppon by a Logistical 
22 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Support Activity with composite support organizations providing 

tailored supply, service, and mailllenance support on an area basis. 

Then whcn brigades were deployed outside of their normal area 

of opera tions, in most cases, it was possible for the tactical units 

to obtain support in their new area from combat service support 

units in that area. \o\' hen required, augmentation of Tables of 

Organization and Equipment support units in forward areas 

enabled a direct support maintenance baltalion, for example, 

to provide acrOSS-lhe-board logistical SU pPOH to all divisional 

and non-divisional units in its area of responsibility. Although 

the requirement for operation of Forward Support Activities was 

significan tly reduced, each Support Command maintained on-call 

a Forward SuppOrt Activity (by specifically designated personnel 

and equipment) capable of rapid deployment when a Forward 

Support Activity was required by tactical units. The implementation of the Forward Support Activity and Logistica l Support Activity conce pt enabled tactical commanders to concentrate on their 

primary mission while rangi ng deep imo enemy territory. These 

commanders knew th at the required logistica l support would be 

available whenever and wherever required. 

As th e buildup progressed, the technology for the managemem 

of supplies improved and new and imaginative concepts and procedures were developed. The period 1965-1966 was characterized by 

fifteen months of unprecedented growth and development. Inheriting a fragmellled logistics structure consisting of some 16 

different sySlems managed by separate component services, U.S. 

Army Vietnam and the 1st Logistical Command pulled these systems together to form a unifi ed structure. H owever, even then it 

was not feasible to combine all aspects of support into one command. In (his period, the 1st Logistical Command managed a ll 

logistics and support functions for U.S. Army Vietnam except for 

aviation supply, maimenance support, and engineer construction. 

The logistics island concept and Logistics Support Activity and 

and Forward Support Activity support concepts were developed, 

and three major support commands were established at Saigon, 

Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. Major port and depot constructi on 

was undertaken in each area to support the hundreds of thousands 

of combat and logistiCS troops entering the country. In late 1965, 

the control of stocks in storage and on order was accompl ished by a 

laborious manual process. Each depot was considered a separate 

entity and requisitioned replacement supplies directly through 2d 

Logistical Command in Okinawa. Under lh is system, there was 

no practical accountability of total in-country supply levels. In 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 23 

less than three years, this process was repl aced by a complex control system involving the large-scale use of electronic computers. 

Coincidentally, procedures were evolved to provide continuous and 

up·to-date in ventory accounting of all stocks within Vietnam. In 

late 1967, a fully automated central inventory control center was 

established at Long Binh (handling all type of su pplies. except 

ammunition, aviation, medical and special forces items), and was 

known as the 14th Inventory Control Center. 

Modern computer equipment was installed in the 14th Inventory Control Center to attempt to bring some order to the supply chaos in the depot stock inventory. The major problem encountered was the tremendous influx of supplies which were over 

the beaches and through the port flooding the depots under a 

massive sea of materiel and equipment much of which was unneeded. Push supplies and duplicate requisitions of thousands of 

tons of cargo pil ed up in the depots, unrecorded and essentially 

lost to the supply system. In the latter part of 1967, control was 

slowly established over the requisitioning system through the use 

of automation and the flow of unneeded supplies abated somewhat. Through thesc improvements in control and accountability, 

in-country requirements cou ld be tabulated, interdepot shortages 

and excesses balanced, and requisition priorities evaluated. 

Port Situalion in Vietnam 

In the pre-buildup stage. most cargo destined for Vietnam was 

shipped directly from Contincntal U.S. depots and vendors to west 

coast military sea or aerial ports. From these ports it was loaded 

aboard ships or aircraft and moved either to Vietnam directly or to 

Okinawa which provided backup support. Cargo shipped directly 

to Vietnam, for the most part, was initially received at the Saigon 

water port or the Tan Son Nhm airport. Military ca rgo was 

treated very much as commercial or Agency for International De· 

velopment cargo, with little emphasis on specialized developmeOl 

of surface or air distribu ti on methods, facilities, or equipment. 

Between mid-1965 and late 1966, ca rgo continued to move 

primarily by ship. Airlift was used to move the great majority of 

troops and priority cargo, which accounted for only a small part of 

the total tonnage moved. Surface cargo, during this period. continued to flow to Okinawa, Vietnam and Thailand causing multipart 

discharging, although efforts were made (0 direct sh ipments to the 

final destination port. 

Initially, most waterborne cargo arriving in South Vietnam was 

received at the Saigon Port, the only pon with deep draft piers 
24 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

except fOT a small two-berth pier at Cam Ranh Bay which had 

been constructed in 1961 under the Military Assistance Program. 

The Saigon Pon was a civilian pon under the management control 

of the Republic of Vietnam's governmental port authority. II 

consisted of ten deep draft berths. U.S. Army cargo was unloaded by 

Vi etnamese civilian stevedores at benhs assigned by the civilian 

port authority. Coordination of military cargo unloadi ng and port 

clearance was handled by the Navy's Headquarters Support Ac· 

tivity Saigon. 

When the bui ldup began, the port continued to operate in 

this fashion. Headquarters Support Activity Saigon never knew 

from day to day how many berths or wh ich berths would be made 

available to them for the un loading of U.S. cargo. In addition, 

customs at the Saigon port dictated that cargo discharged from 

ships be placed on pier aprons to await port clearance by the cargo 

owner. It was up to the consignee to remove the cargo from the 

port. Cargo not consigned to U.S. forces rema ined on the piers 

for weeks and sometimes months, creating undesirabl e and 

crowded working conditions which adversely affected port opera. 

tions. Repeated efforts to get South Vietnam to clear the piers were 

unsuccessful. Some of the cargo being received by South Vietnam 

h'as U.S. Military Aid equipment which became South Vietnam 

equipment as it was unloaded. U.S. forces were accused many 

times of improper port clearance because this equipment was olive 

drab in color. Bul such equipment frequendy proved to belong to 

South Vi etnam and the U.S. Army had no authority to move it. 

The overloaded port fa cilities and the operational necessity to 

selectively discharge cargo to get high priority cargo ashore before 

less urgentl y required items resulted in excessive sh ip turn-around 

time which increased the total number of sh ips requ ired. This 

situation was complicated as cargo was manifested by broad categories onl y, for example, genera l cargo, makin g it impossibl e to 

loca te specific items. Holding the ships for length y periods resulted in demurrage charges of from $3,000 to $7,000 per day per 

ship. Also the inadequate and insecure railroads and highways 

forced the distribution system to rely heavil y on shallow draft 

vessels for transshipment of cargo between the Saigon Port and other 

locations, and intratl1 ea ter airlift between Tan Son NIHil air 

terminal and other loca tions. The problem was further aggravated 

by a shortage of shallow draft vessels both military (LCMs and 

LCUs) and civilian assets, which were used for omoading cargo 

from deep draft vessels at ports not having adequate berthing 

facilities (or the larger sh ips. Civil ian lighterage as well as military 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 25 

landing craft, primarily LCMs and LCUs were used for this purpose. 

The U,S. Army's 4th Transportation Command arrived in South 

Vietnam on 12 August 1965. It was given the mission of assisting 

Headquarters Support Activity Saigon in U.S. port opera tions and 

assuming that function compl etely as soon as possible, which it did 

in September 1965. In addition, it was charged with providing 

technical assistance to port and beach operations at Cam Ranh 

Bay and the support commands being established throughout 

South Vietnam. As U. S. Army terminal service companies were 

received, they were initiall y employed in unloading of ammunition 

at Na Bhe, the central ammunition receiving point just south of 

Sa igon, and were later employed in Saigon proper. tn May 1965, a 

request was made to the government of the Republic of South 

Vietnam to acquire the three Maritime Marine piers adjacent to the 

Sa igon port faciliti es for the exclusive use of U. S. Forces. These 

facilities were owned by a French shipping firm. This request ran 

into financial and political difficulties. but was finally approved in 

December 1965 after the personal intervention of General Westmoreland and the U. S. Ambassador. With the exclusive use and 

control of these facilities. port operations improved in efficiency 

and volume. The delay in obta ining these piers plus the shortage 

of yard and storage space and the lack of a depot structure and 

accounti ng procedures prevented the early establishment of adequate port facilities. 

Nevertheless, it was apparent that additional port faciliti es 

would be required in the Saigon area. The 1st Logistical Command 

made this kn own to Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, who directed his sta ff to develop plans for the 

facilities now known as Newport. Construction began on this fifty 

million dollar facility in early 1966. In April 1967, the first deep 

draft vessel was discharged at the Newport facility. Also, during 

this period, several other ports throughout Vielllam were in the 

construction phase. 

By the end of December 1967, the ports in use by the Army 

numbered 10; Saigon, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro, Vung 

Tau, Cat Lai. and Nha Trang were the deep draft ports; Dong 

Tam, Phan Rang and Can Tho were the shallow draft ports. These 

improvements in port capabiliti es brough t about a reduction in the 

average time a deep draft ship wa ited for a berth in Vi etnam 

ports from 20.4 days during the most critical period of 1965 to 

the 1970 average of less than two days. 
26 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

W arehollsing and Storage Facilities 

Prior to the buildup, warehouses and storage areas were literally nonexistcm, except for limited facilities in the Saigon area. 

Supplies were scallered in several locations throughout Saigon, all 

of which were substandard and overcrowded; some were onl y 

open storage. At the time the 1st Logistica l Command became 

operational , there was a constructi on backlog fOT the troops already 

incountry. Construction of logistics facilities competed with many 

other requirements. Since there was never more than $300 million 

in annual ca pability to apply against a total theater program of 

close to $2 billion, the construction effort look almost six years to 

accomplish. 

To initially offset this shonage of facilities, negotiations were 

initiated with the United Stales Overseas i\'lission to obtain 13 Japanese built warehollses with din floors and no eleClrica l wiring in 

the Fishmarket area in Sa igon. Three of these buildings were 

obtained by the end of 1965 and the remaining 10 during 1966. 

A contract was also let to construct an added 210,000 square feet of 

covered storage and to fill an area behind the \\'arehouses that 

would serve as hardstand for open storage and a troop cantonment 

area. This area housed the 506th Field Depot until a new depot 

was constructed in Long Binh in 1968 and the move to the new 

fa cilities was completed I Jul y 1969. 

By way of comparison, the new depot faciliti es at Long Binh 

provided 1,869,000 sq uare feet of black-topped hardstand and 

1,458,000 square feet of covered storage, whereas the depot facilities at the Fishmarket in Saigon had a total of only 670,000 square 

feet of covered storage space as late as March 1967. 

Additionall y, agreement was reached with the United States 

Overseas Mission on 16 i\ larch 1965 to provide and erect some pre· 

fabricated buildings owned by the United States overseas mission 

for use as warehouses in the Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay. 

Nha Trang, and Saigon areas. These buildings \\'ere finally avail. 

able for occupancy in February 1966, almost one year after the 

agreement. The same basic silllation prevailed at Qui Nhon where 

substandard and overcrowded facilities were occupied until com· 

pletion of the new depot at Long My in 1968. 

The United States constructed a major depot and port complex 

at Cam Ranh Bay costing over $145 million, $55 million of which 

came from Army appropriations. Cam Ranh Bay was an undeveloped area located at an excellent natural harbor which when 

completed had over 1.1 million square feet of covered storage, 

1.2 million square feet of open ammunition storage area, and 

bu lk storage faciliti es for over 775,000 barrels (42 gallons per 
LOGISTICS ENV IRONl\fENT 27 

barrel) of petroleum products. Construction of this complex was 

started earl y in the buildup period \I'hen it was envisioned that the 

main war effon would be along the Cam Ranh Bay- Ban Me 

Thuot- Pleiku axis. Since the war activity took place to the Nonh 

(Qui Nhon and Da Na ng) and SOllth (Saigon) , the depot was not 

utili zed to the degree the planners origi nally anticipa ted. As a 

result, there are some who cla im that the II'ar passed Cam Ran h 

Bay by. "Vh en taken in that particular context, there is some 

truth to the claim. 

Even though wa r activity took place in areas different from 

those expected, Cam Ranh Bay played an important role in the 

logistics picture. A U.S. Army Support Command was established 

there as a major logistica l command and control clemen t, the 

Korean forces were suppon ed almost exclusively from Cam Ranh 

Bay throughout the time they were in the II Corps Area , transshipping supplies from ocean goi ng vessels to coastal type shipping 

was accomplished there, and marine maintenance \I'as done there. 

The excellent and secure ammunition storage areas permilled keep. 

ing large stocks of needed ammunition in,colllllry relatively safe 

from enemy atla,k and the cold storage facilities permitted fresh 

vegetables to he brought down from Dalat and stored properly 

till distributed LO our forces. Also having a major slOrage and 

shipping facility close to the major air base operated by the Air 

Force was ~ d istinct advantage. At one time it \I'as plan ned to 

move the Headquarters of the 1st Logistical Command there (it 

was later decided that the 1st Logistical Command and Head· 

quarters U.S. Army Vi etnam should remain neal' Headquarters 

U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam) ::wel unlil fairly 

late in residual force planning, Cam Ranh Bay was going to remain 

as a major U.s. logistic compl ex. This too was dropped in favor of 

the Saigon-Long Binh area. 

Continental U.S. Production Ba.se 

At the time the Vi etnam buildup began. the Army's industrial 

base was operating at a relativel y low level. This can be seen hom 

a compa rison of the Procurement of Equipment and Missiles for 

the Army cOlHracu awarded before and after the buildup began. 

(Chart 2) 

Procurement and receipt of equipment lagged behind the in· 

crease in Arm)' strength during the buildup. The lag in production 

resulted in inadequate qua ntiti es of equipment being ava ilable to 

supply all worldwide needs. Extraordinary actions and manage· 

ment techniques were used to obta in the maximum benefits from 

the 1965 inventory and asset<; being produced. These are covered 
28 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

CHART 2 - PaOCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MISSILES FOR THE ARMY 

CONTRACT AWARDS 

$ Billions 

10 

8 

6 

• 

2 

~~2-----'6~3-----'M7-----"~5-----'6?6-----t6,,-----i~ 

Fiscal Year 

in greater detail in other sections, but in general, items critically 

needed in Southeast Asia were taken from reserve component units 

and active Army units not in Southeast Asia, and new issues of 

certa in items of equipment in short supply were centrally controlled by Headquarters, Department of the Army. 

There were four main reasons for production lagging behind 

equipment and supply requirements: 

1. A planning assumption that all hostilities would end by 30 

June 1967. During 1965, President Johnson announced the buildup of forces in South Vietnam. The Army immediately updated its 

existing studi es to ascertain the ammunition posture-both the 

availability of world-wide assets and the U.S. Army Munitions 

Command's capability to support combat operations from industry 

production. These updated studies became the basis for the supplemental fiscal year 1966 budget programs. The fiscal year 1967 

Army budget was restated on the assumption that Vietnam support 

would continue only through June 1967 . Because of this assumption, many planned mobilization producers were not interested in 

bidding. Due to production lead times involved, they would be 

reaching peak rates at the lime production supposedly would be 

cut back. Also more profit could be derived from the manufaclurer's production of consumer goods. 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 29 

2. The lack of a full mobilization atmosphere precluded the 

full employment of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (as 

amended) . Since the U.S. itself was not imminently threatened, it 

was not felt appropriate to creale a crisis situation among 

industry and the populace. Therefore, the powers granted by 

Congress in the Defense Production Act of 1950, which permit the 

Government to direct civilian industries to manufacture those 

items needed for national defense in preference to civilian oriented 

items, were used very sparingl y. This meant that in many cases 

civilian industries were unwilling to undertake the manufacture 

of defense oriented items at the sacrifice of interrupting their supply 

to a flourishing civilian market. However, in the cases where it was 

deemed necessary to employ provisions of the Defense Production 

Act, the problems were resolved effectively. 

3. The "No Buy" restriction placed on the procurement of 

major items of equipment for temporary forces (units that were to 

be manned only for the duration of the Vietnam conflict) by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense constrained Procurement of 

Equipment and Missiles for the Army programs. These procurement restrictions actually made it necessary for certain of these 

units to borrow equipment that had been purchased for other units 

or for reserve stocks. This resulted in a lessening of the readiness 

posture of the unit or reserve stocks for which the equipment 

was originally purchased. 

4. For some specialized and often high priced items there was 

frequently onl y one source of procurement. This "sole source" 

was a hindrance to rapidly increasing the quantities of the items 

available. The production facility manufacturing a particular 

item, in some cases, cou ld not increase its production fast enough 

to meet the rapidly rising mili tary requirements. Also, some man· 

ufacturers did not deem it feasible to expand their production 

facilities, at great expense, to meet temporarily increased sales 

to the government. In addition, for the same reason, new sources 

of supply were not easily convinced to enter into production of 

these items. 

The industrial base utilized by the Army consists of both government O\vned and privately owned production fa ciliti es including 

real estate, pialHs, and production equipment. Private industrial 

facilities are of primary importance and are only sllppiememed by 

the Army's resources. However, Army owned facilities are required 

to produce military items having no significant commercial demand. 

Accordingly, the Army has throughout its history maintained varying capabiliti es for production, mostly in the munitions area. 
30 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Prior to the buildup for Southeast Asia, only eleven of twentyfi ve Army owned munition plants were operati ng. Immediate actions were taken to activate whatever additional ammunition 

plants were required lO support the anticipated consumption. Six 

ammunilion plants were aClivaled in fiscal year 1966: six morc were 

activated in fiscal year 1967: and the last plant required to meet 

production requiremen LS was activated in fisca l year 1968. Only 

one government owned munition fa cility remained inactive. 

One important factor in the rapid improvement of the ammunition production base was the special emphasis given to munitions. During the laller part or 1965 when the increased tempo in 

Vietnam made it apparent that ammunition was going to be required in larger quantities than the post-Korea stocks would support. the Secretary of De(ense established a relatively small 

organization to control air munitions. Shortly therea ft er it was suggested to the Secretary of the Army that he establish a similar 

organization to control ground munitions. The organization was 

activated in the Army Secretariat and staffed by requesting people 

with the required expertise. On 15 December 1966. the Office of 

Special Assistant for Munitions was established in the Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and at that time the Anny 

Secretariat relinquished the responsibility and the authority to 

the Army staff. However, a close relationship existed beth'een 

Office of Special Assistant for i'vfunilions, the Army Secretariat, and 

the Ground Munitions Office in the Office o( the Secretary of Defense because of the intense interest in the ammunition program. 

This interest stemmed from the high dollar value of the program 

and congressional concern over ammunition mallers. Eventually 

the Office of the Special Assistant for Munitions became a Directorate within the Office of the Deputy Chid of Staff for Logistics 

known as the Office of the Director of Ammunition. 

Logistic Perso,md and Training 

During the peri <xl 30 June 1965 through 30 June 1967 a total 

of 1,057,900 personnel entered the Army and losses totaled 

584,500, The resul ting numerical lUrnover of personnel exceeded 

the Army's peak strength. Of the total gains. 977,000 were new 

accessions with no prior military experience (6 16.600 draftees; 

360.400 first tenn enlistees). Another 80,900 were procured from 

other sources such as reenliS1Ces with in 90 days of discharge. \"'hile 

the Army's total strength was ex panding by almost 50 percent. its 

monthl y loss or trained personnel averagcd over 24,000. These 

losses crea ted turbulence, denied the Army the usc of immediately 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 31 

available trained skills, and required that over one million men 

and women be brought on duty to achi eve an increase in overall 

strength of less than 474,000. Replacing skilled individuals with 

personnel of like skills was a serious probl em. The Army was 

faced not only with the problem of tra ining th ousands of personnel 

with entry-level skills, but also had to provide additional train ing 

in li eu of skill progression normall y acquired by on·the·job ex· 

penence. 

One of the most significant factors contributing to the personnel 

turbulence throughout the Army was the one·year tour for personnel 

assigned to South Vietnam. In late 1965, to avoid 100 percent rotation of men in a un it in Vi etnam at the end of their 12 month 

tour, the Army applied personnel management techniques to insure that not morc than 25 percent of a unit would be rotated in 

anyone month. These techniques incl uded tour curtailments. 

short extensions, exchanges of troops with other similar uni ts, and 

voluntary extensions of indi vid uals. 

The rapid buildup. coupled with the twel ve·month tour of 

duty, made the replacement program a problem of great magnitude. The regular replacemen t of personnel in the short·tour 

areas came close to representing a complete annual lUrnover. 

Rotation after a year boosted individual morale, but it also 

weakened u nits that had to send experi enced men home. Further, 

personnel turnover often in va lidated training previollsly accom· 

plished by a unit. A large portion of the Army's enlisted requirements is in skills that are not self-susta ining because the requirements for them in long-tour areas are inadequate to provide a 

rotation base for short-tour areas. The advantages in morale outwe ighed the disadvantages cited, but the drawbacks to short tours 

were there and cannot be glossed o"er. 

In man y cases, support personnel assigned to Vietnam did not 

have lhe essen tial experi ence in such areas as depot operations. 

maintenance, and supply management. There was a shortage of 

junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers who had the 

logistics ex peri ence necessa ry to supervise "across the boa rd" logistics for brigade size tactica l units at isolated loca tions. Many of 

the supervisory personnel did not have an)' experi ence or training 

olltside of their own branch and were assigned duti es and res ponsibiliti es above that normall y expected of their grade. 

Logistic sUPPOTl units deployed to Vie lllam were defi cient in 

unit tra ining. Of signifi cant impact lI pon mission accompl ishment 

was the method by wh ich the support units were trained in the 

early 19605. With reorganization from the techn ical service con-
32 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

cept to the Combat Service to the Army concept, functional training of units was decentralized in the Continental Army Command 

to post, camp and station level. There were no Quartermaster, 

Ordnance, or other titular heads looking after the training of their 

units. This condition fostered a haphazard incorporation of current 

doctrine and procedures in training which was already decentralized. 

A program was initiated at Atlanta Army Depot to provide 

on-the-job training in depot operations for selected enlisted personnel enroute to U.S. Army Vietnam. From 1967 through 1970, 

4,619 enlisted personnel received this training. 

Other special training programs were established to provide 

orientation and training for selected officer personnel at the Defense Supply Agency Depot at Richmond and at the U.S. Army 

Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 

Beginning in June 1968, the 1st Logistical Command initiated 

some fairly extensive training courses in South Vietnam. Project 

SKILLS was introduced to provide orientation, indoctrination, spe· 

cialist training, and on.the-job training on a recurring basis at all 

levels of command. SK ILLS I ALPHA was a detailed orientation and 

indoctrination of newly assigned colonels and higher key staff 

officers and commanders at battalion or higher level, Department 

of the Army civili ans of equivalent grade, and command sergeants 

major. SKILLS I BRAVO was a formal orientation and indoctrination 

for enlisted specialists newly assigned to elements of the command. 

SKILLS I CHARLIE was an orientation, indoctrination, and formal 

continuing on-the·job training of all enlisted personnel. With the 

increasing role of local nationals in the 1st Logistica l Command, the 

need for a loca l national training program was recognized and 

Project SKILLS II was initiated. This program was designed not 

only to help get a job done, but a lso to contribute to the selfsufficiency of the Republic of Vietnam in the future. 

The trained personnel shortage was also allev iated somewhat 

by the arriva l in-country of Program Six units which were force 

packages consisting of Army, Reserves, and National Guard combined by Department of Army and containing many highly educated personnel who possessed critical skills. 

Strategic Army Forces were tapped to meet Vietnam personnel 

requirements. The primary mission of Strategic Army Forces is to 

maintain combat readiness to respond to contingencies on a worldwide basis. In April 1965, a substantial drawdown of Strategic 

Army Forces personnel began . At that time approxima tely onethird of lhe command was composed of logistic and administrative 
LOGISTICS ENVTRONMENT 

personnel. This was not a balanced force, and under the impact 

of drawdowns, the percentage of logistic and administrative per. 

sonnel remaining in Strategic Army Forces units was reduced fur· 

ther to approximately one·fifth by the end of Fiscal Year 1966. 

Unit readiness was further degraded by drastic imbalances in 

enlisted grades and military occupational specialties. Logistical 

activities in South Vietnam often experienced shortages of personnel with specific skills and technical training. In some cases, 

skill categories were deficient in the numbers required because of 

the civilianization of Continemal U.S. military activities and the 

constant decline in the retention rate of experienced military personnel. Concurrent with the decision not to call the Reserves was 

the determination to continue normal separations. Consequently, 

discharges at the end of periods of obligated service, resignations, 

and retirements were continued as in peacetime. The Army was 

most severely restricted by this policy. There were shortages of 

officers in all grades except lieutenant. U.S. Army Europe was also 

called on to provide many trained troops and specialists with 

critical skills in the combat service support for South Vietnam. As 

a result, combat unit personnel in U.S. Army Europe were diverted from their intended assignments to perform maintenance, 

supply, and housekeeping tasks. Tour length policies and worldwide distribution of structure spaces caused an enlisted skill imbalance between short tour areas and the rotation base. For certain 

skills (for example helicopter mechanics, electronic maintenance, 

and supply personnel) the preponderance of structure spaces was 

in short tour areas. 

The percentage of support personnel versus combat personnel 

in South Vietnam fluctuated. Early in 1965 the percentage of 

support personnel was estimated by some authorities to be as low 

as 25 percent. At that time supply lines of communication were 

not as long as they later came to be. In 1966. as supply lines of 

communication had lengthened and a major effort was underway 

to alleviate the congested ports and depots, the percentage increased to approximately 45 percent. By 1969, at the height of 

our troop strength, the percentage of support personnel had 

dropped to 39 percent. However, this percentage rose again as 

our strength reductions cominued and a greater percentage of combat forces were withdrawn. For example, by the end of March 1971. 

the ratio of personnel had changed to 53 percent combat and 

47 percent support due to the requirement for support personnel 

to retrograde materiel of the departing combat units. These support percentages include only military personnel. In addition to 
34 LOGISTIC SU PPORT 

these personnel, civili an workers and contracting firms were employed rOT many suppon services (h roughom the Vietnam operation. 

In viewing the above percentages. it is important to remember 

that the classifi ca tion of Army units as either combat or support is 

not c1earcut, and the defin itions of these ca tegories are subject to 

varying interpretations. For example every infantry unit includes 

admi nistrative personnel whose mission is something other than 

comba t with the enemy; and every suppl y company contains truck 

drivers or helicopter pilots who travel dail y to the combat zone 

where they are subj ect to hostile operations and contacts. Vlith 

these qua lifica tions in mind. h 'C generally classify the total strength 

of each division , plus all other infantry, armor, artill ery, and 

certain aviati on, engi neer, and signal units as combat forces. All 

other lypes of units (for exampl e mai ntenance, supply, military 

police, medical, and transportation) are classified in the support 

category. 

The force structure of the active duty components of the Armed 

Forces mllst be designed to permit adequate logistic support of 

ready forces in quick reaction to emergency situations. During 

peacetime. emphasis was in some cases placed on the maintenance 

of combat and comba t su pport forces without adequa te combat 

service support units and trained technical personnel. As a consequence, when contingency operations are undertaken ancl the 

Reserves are not called up, serious de fi ciencies in logistic units and 

trained logistic personnel may be expected. There is a need, therefore. to enhance readiness to respond promptl y to limited war of 

scope comparable to the Vietnam conflict without reliance on 

national mobilization or callup of Reserves to conduct logistic operations. 

Security 

Logistic security. incl uding the physical protection of logistic 

personnel, installations. facilities, and equipment was one of the 

more critical aspect.s of the logistic effort in Vietnam. Ambushes, 

sapper and rocket attacks and pilferage caused logistics commanders to be constantly aware of the necessity for strict security 

measures. The tacti ca l siw3tion was not always evident or given 

consideration during the installation construction planni ng phase. 

There were no "secure" rear areas. Often planning personnel did 

not fully apprecia te the tactical situation, and some installations 

were constructed al the base of unsecured high grou nd, making 
LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 35 

the dominant terrain feature a prize for the enemy for observa tion 

purposes as well as offensive action. 

Personnel and equipment authorizations for logistic organizations were inadequate ror the addi ti onal mission of security. Radios and fi eld telephones were in short suppl y. These items were 

essential to the securit y of the installation perimeter, including 

the bunkers, towers, patrols, "sweep teams", and reaction forces. 

Night vision devices helped but were not available in adequate 

quantities. 

Pilferage and sabotage were prevalent at many installations. 

Some of the means utilized by commanders to minimi ze these 

actions are listed below: 

1. Frequent inventories were taken. 

2. Continous employee education was conducted. 

3. Physical barriers with intrusion delay devices and detection 

aids were employed. 

4. Employee identification badges were used to control access 

to various controlled areas, as well as the insta ll at ion ilSe lf. 

5. Access to Slorage areas for highly sensitive items were 

strictl y controll ed. 

6. Management teChniques Stich as spot inspection, spot searches 

of personnel. and bilingual signs warning personnel agai nst infractions of rules or theft were used to insure understanding by 

workers. 

7. Strict controls were implemented on receipts and transfers 

of cargo between ports and the fi rst consignees. Transportation 

Control and Movement Documents were used extensively for the 

transfer of cargo from one storage area to another. 

8. On sensitive items such as those highl y desired by the enemy. 

markings were subdued or obliterated, to prevent identification 

by the enemy, and in their place "U.S. Government" was stenciled. 

In subdued or obl iterated markings. the federal stock number had 

to remain visible and legible. 

9. Twenty-four-foot-h igh anchor fences were used around petroleum, oils, and lubricants tank farms to improve security from 

sapper attacks and other sabotage efforts by the enemy. 

10. Practice alerts were conducted frequently to assure that all 

personnel were familiar with their defensive assignments within the 

perimeter in case of an enemy attack. 

Convoy commanders were continually faced with security prob· 

lems in the movement of cargo from one location to another over 

the insecure highwa y system in Vietnam. Support from arlill ery 
36 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

fire support bases and medical units, and military police escorts 

were arranged when such was ava ilable. 

The compe lling need to move cargo dictated the "do it yourselF' principle. To help combat the lack of secUTity in this type 

of operation, and to monitor the shipments in an effective way, 

many sa feguards were initiated. Military drivers and trucks were 

used (0 haul post exchange and other sensiti ve supplies or readily 

marketable commodities_ Trip ticket controls, road patrols, check 

points, radio reports of departures and arrivals. and strict accounting for loading and offioading limes were used. Close li aison 

with Vietnamese law enforcement agencies along the truck route 

was established. Armed security guards were utilized to reduce 

the effectiveness of enemy ambushes. 

To offset the shortage of armored vehicles available for convoy 

escort, transportation units devised the expedient of "hardening" 

some cargo type vehicles. The beds of 5·ton trucks were usually 

floored with armor plate and sandt.agged. The sides and front 

of the trucks were also armor plated. The trucks were lIsually 

equipped with M60 and 50 caliber machine guns. One gun truck 

was assigned to accompany about ten task vehicles in a convoy. In 

1968 the V- 100 armored car was sent to South Vietnam and was 

exceptionally useful when available for convoy security. Helicopter 

gun ships were used to maintain aerial surve ill ance of convoy 

columns. In addition to providing the surveillance function and a 

rapid means of response to an enemy allack, these gu n ships 

presented a visible deterrent to the enemy. Clearing of roodsides 

and paving road surfaces to make mining more difficult and mine 

detection easier increased security. 

Of special help to the logistic commanders were the combat 

anns officers on the U.S. Army Vietnam and the Support Command 

staffs who advised and assisted them on security matters. With 

their guidance, logistic commanders were able to improvise within 

their own resources and provide an acceptable degree of security. 

Despite the various obstacles involved, the logistic security 

mission was in most cases effectively accomplished. Convoys delivered their cargos, and defensive measures at logistic installations 

repeatedly frustrated enemy attacks. 
CHAPTER III 

Supply Support In Vietnam 

For the first time in modern hinory, the U.S. Army was required to establish a major logistical base in a country where all 

areas weTe subject to continuous enemy observation and hostile fire. 

with no terrain under total friendly control. There was no communications lone; in fact, combat and communications zones were 

one and the same, and the logistics soldier was frequently and 

quite literally right with lhe front line tactical soldier. There 

was no meaningful consumption and other experience data upon 

which to base support estimates. As a result, there was an initial 

inRux of huge quanlitilies of supplies of every description to 

support the tactical troop buildup. This occurred well before the 

availability of either a logistic base or an adequate logistical organization. 

Adding to the difficulties in 1965 was the fact that the supply 

systems then being used in the United States were either automated 

or in the process of being automated. Personnel were being 

trained in automated supply procedures. But going into Vietnam 

the way we did meant going in with light, non-automated logistic 

forces. Actually the Army didn't have the computers and technological skills to support the buildup with an automated supply system. 

Initial operations in Vietnam involved the use of a manual 

system for in-country support. The interface between these systems, wh ich relied heavil y upon punch card operations, and the 

more computerized wholesale systems. posed difficulties until incountry mechanization was expanded. 

During the initial year and a half of manual operation , the 

sheer volume of traffic and the inability to interface with the 

automated Continental U.S. systems resulted in an almost insurmountahle backlog of management problems thal required 

two years to untangle. Even though UNIVAC 1005 card processors were installed in the depots in 1966-67 and replaced with 

IBM 70 10Jl460 computers in 1968. the lead time associated with 

the approval process, constructi on of facilities, writing and debugging computer programs. and making the system opera tional 

was such that, by the time a new system was on line, it was barely 

adequate to cope with the continually increasing requirements. 
38 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Automatic Data Processing System capability for logistic management must be introduced in a combat theater as soon as possible 

with adequate communica tions support and with the capability of 

interfacing with Automatic Data Processing Systems outside the 

combat area. 

By 1968 there was an automated supply system operating in 

Vietnam. Even at the direct and general support level there was 

automation to some degree. At this level there were NCR 500 

computer processors to compute repair parts requ isitioning objectives and dues-in and dues-outs. 

Repair Parts Supply 

Repair parts (Class IX) supply was especially interesting due 

to the fact that the number of items authorized for slockage 

mushroomed from an insignificant number in 1965 to 200,000 in 

October 1966 and then was reduced to 130,000 in May, 1967 and to 

75,000 by March 1971. Besides a monumental bookeeping exercise, 

there were other dynamics in the system. We had to automate so 

that we could manage. 

To get items in-country that would be needed by the arriving 

forces, Push Packages were used initially. The purpose oC this 

method of supply was to provide a form of automatic resupply to 

meet the anticipated consumption and to support the prescribed 

load lists, and the authorized slockage lists of committed units 

until normal requisitioning procedures could be established. In 

June 1965, when the lise of Push Packages began, all types of 

suppl y items were included, but by January 1966 Push Packages 

contained only repair parts. 

Among the factors entering into the decision to use Push Packages were: 

I. Theater prestockage had not been effected when the Vietnam 

buildup commenced except for lim ited U.S. Army Pacific war 

reserve prepositioned equipment in Okinawa and elsewherc. 

2. The long order and shipping time from Continental U.S. to 

Vietnam precluded the use of normal requisitioning procedures. 

3. The rapid introduction of a large number of combat uni ts 

into Vietnam was accompanied with an entircly inadequate number of suppl y support units and logistic supervisory personnel. 

Supply support units, such as Direct Support Units and General 

Support Units which would normally have carried the authorized 

stockage for supporting the combat units were not available in South 

Vietnam. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 39 

4. The tactical concepts of air mobility to be employed in 

Vi etnam dictated the immediate availability of repair pans for the 

great density of helicopters and other types of equipment. 

5. Engineer and service type units that were initially employed 

anticipated an early need for repa ir parts due to the primitive 

areas in which they wou ld be operating and the resultant high 

intensity of equipment usage. 

6. Procurement of military su pplies was not possible on the 

Vietnamese economy. 

Packages were made up for all large units and for small units 

when combined troop strengths reached approximately 5,000. 

These packages were shipped to Vietnam in various increments. 

The supplies included in each incremental package were developed 

from National Inventory Control data. The first two increments 

were shipped directly to the designa ted unit or force, while the 

remai ning increments were intercepted at the depots responsible 

for supporting the unit or force .. The composi tion of each su pply 

package was of necessity determined from data not associated with 

Southeast Asia operations. ,Vorld ' ·Var 11 and Korean experience 

was all that was available. As a result, in some cases the packages 

proved to be unbalanced in relation to demand, causing overages 

in some items and shonages in others. 

Nevertheless these automatic resu pply packages served a very 

definite and useful purpose in su pporting the initial buildup of 

combat troops in Vietnam, particularly during 1965 and early 

1966. ' ·Vithout this form of resupply, we would not have been able 

to support our comba t troops within the lime frame that we did. 

The success of the Push Packages is attested to by the fact that no 

major combat operation was ever dela yed or hampered by a lack 

of supply. A number of problem areas were encountered, however, which included: 

I. The inability of inexperienced unit supply personnel to 

sort, identify, and properly issue the volume of items received. In 

man y cases, the original Push Packages and the ir individual contents were identifiable onl y by shipment numbers and Federal 

Stock Numbers. Therefore, highl y skilled supply personnel were 

required for placing these items in the proper bins to make them 

readily available for use. 

2. A lack of secure warehouse and storage space and sufficient 

logistic units at depots. The size of individual Push Package increments arriving in Vietnam initi ally was too large for the discharge ca pacity, storage fa ciliti es ava ilable, and the capabilities of 

the supply units at the unloading areas. 
40 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

3. In some cases, unit dest inations were changed without 

changing the destination of the Push Package causing a delay in the 

receipt of the package by the intended unit. 

4. Inexperienced personnel became accustomed to the "push" 

philosophy and failed to evaluate measures for transition to the 

normal "pull" system. As a result of the dependence upon external 

assistance, units fa iled to mai ntai n effective demand data OT to 

initiate measures which would permit Slackage at intermediate 

support levels. 

Because of the problem areas encountered, suppli es in man y 

cases were available in-country, but could not be identified or 

loca ted. For example. in mid-J966 (even in 1968) some of the 

original Push Package su pplies still remained in the depots, unbinned, uniden tifi able and unusable for the purpose for which they 

were shipped. This factor together with the overagest resulting from 

unbalanced packages had the net effect of generating excess supplies 

in various locations in Vietnam. 

In future opera ti ons, Push Packages may again be required for 

initial or special supply support. These packages, as proven by experience, must be developed on an austere basis and include plans 

which permit transition to normal supply support. Push Packages 

should be based on the latest experience factors available and 

should be scrubbed to exclude those items which are "nice to 

have." Push Packages should make maximum use of standard containers with stocks prebi nned and accompanied by locator cards. 

T hese packages should also conta in prepunched requ isitions to be 

introduced into the system in order to establish support stocks at 

theater level. Push Packages should be approved only as an interim 

relief measure which permits the pull system to aga in respond to 

the unit's needs. 

On 10 June 1966, as a result of conferences, communications, 

and experience ga ined during the buildup, Department of the 

Army dispatched a message to U.S. Army Pacific and Army 

Materiel Command setting forth an automatic supply policy and 

procedure which stopped Push Packages and started the process 

of normali zi ng suppl y su pport. Essentially supply support of all 

forces was to be provided through norma l requisitioni ng procedures 

within U.S. Anny Pacifi c, and Army Materiel Command was to 

provide equipment density data for projected deployments to 

provide an order-ship lead time in excess of 195 days. 

Exceptions to the above, were a 90 day package of high 

mortality repair parts for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

support for new items of equipment introduced into Vietnam, 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 41 

and (or any unschedu led arrivals. These exceptions were considered on a case·by-case basis. Falling into the latter category were 

the 9th Infantry Division and the 196th and 199th Infantry 

Brigades. However, by January 1967 their stockage position and 

supply management ca pability had improved to such a level that 

U.S. Army Vietnam advised that Push Packages were no longer 

required for these units. U.S. Army Vielnam requested that any 

further preparation on movement of such packages be dis· 

continued unless they spec ifically requested or concurred in such 

shipment. 

TABU 2-PUSH P ACK AGES DATA 

Incrc· Line O:r 

PlCkages onent.! It~ms UnlU Supply V~l" e 

I- A .. .. .... .. .. • 51.000 Log Sup 120 8.745.664 

2 . ... .. . . ... .... 15 24,000 Inr Bde 24. 21 066.~21 

, .... . .... . ... 15 24,000 Airborne Me 24. 19,629,691 

+-A ...... . ... 15 75.000 Airmobile Di ... 24. 89 ~29.697 

'-8 ... .. ..... .. 15 78.000 Airmobile Su p 240 26.956,335 

4-C ..... . ... .. 15 59.000 Corps Sup 240 12.367.475 

, ..... ...... ... .. 133,000 Inr Di ... 21' 73,182,715 

8 .... . . . .. .. .. .. .. 115,000 Combat Su p Log &: Adm 21. 47.163,539 

9 . . ........ ... , .. 156,000 Combat Sup Log &: Adm 210 59.397.912 

10 ......... .. 50,000 Combat Sup Log R: Adm 21' 10,194,865 

11 ........... .... • 16.000 Combat Sup Log &: Adm 210 3.497.674 

12 ......... . . . ... • 2 1,000 Combat Su p Log &: Adm 210 4.161 ,050 

15 .. ............. 1 12.335 25th Di ... - Ist ll .. 2d Ode 60 611,414 

16 ........... . .. 1 II ,279 25th Di" -3rd Ode 60 588,039 

17 .......... . ... . 1 16,904 25th Oi ... (Minus) 60 1.546.130 

18 ... .... ..... ... 1 8 ,253 4th Inf Oi ... 60 1,047,092 

19 ..... . .... ... .. 1 3,732 11th Arm Cav Di ... 90 931 .187 

20 ...... .. .. .. . . 1 2.82~ 196th nd e 90 253.840 

21 ..... . .. .. ..... 1 5.430 9th Inr Di ... 90 1.342.41 3 

22 .......... .... . 1 2,950 1991h Inf Bde 90 215,897 

-- --- T Olal ........ ... . 15' 865,706 582.529,250 

Carn Ranh Bay 

XlJ ........ . ... 1 50.321 Depol Slocks 60 6 ,111 ,744 

YUH ....... ... . . 1 15,200 Hawk Missile "0 90 1.500,000 

-- --- 2 65.521 7,9 JI .7H 

Grand TOlal ..... 15' 931.227 -390,410,994 

·Equlvalent of t9S.220 shorl 10 "". 

The above tabulation (T able 2) of Push Packages shipped 

to Vietnam indicates packages shipped, number of line items. 

and dollar value of each package. Also shown are two special 
42 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

applications of Push Packages-the Cam Ranh Bay Depot Stock 

package and the special package for a Hawk battalion. 

As a result of Vietnam experience, U.S. Army Materiel Command automatic supply procedures have been revised. The selection of support items is equipment ori ented. rather than force 

oriented and employs the principle of repair by replacement of 

components and modul es (Contingency Operations SeleCtion Technique). Also, a technique has been developed for the pre-determin ation of austere, essential requirements for automatic suppl y su pport 

of lype units to permit effective planning for receiving, storing, and 

handling materiel incident to unit deployment. Another procedure 

has been adopted wh ich provides for the computation of requirements for support stocks based upon existing deployable 

divisions rather than type forces (Contingency Support Stocks). 

Still another technique, under continuing review and refin ement, 

calls for the containerization of minimum essential items of materiel 

needed to support specific quantities of an end item for a specinc 

period (Container Integrated Support Package) . The materi el 

incl uded in such support packages would be identified and binned 

within the containers to fac ili tate receipt, storage, issue, and 

replenishment actions. 

Short Supply Items 

Earli er it was noted that equipment to support our forces was 

produced after the need or requirement was apparent. Naturall y 

there were shortages. And the lag between the establ ishmen t of 

requirements and the availability of sufficient assets existed right 

up to 197 1 for some items. To satisfy the requirements for forces 

being sent to Vietnam and for the replacement of combat and 

other losses, equipment was withdrawn from and denied to the 

rest of the Active Army and Reserve components. Some items 

became so critical that their allocation was controlled by the 

Department of the Army through the appli cation of intensive 

management tcchniques. 

Satisfying the need for itcms in short supply was a different 

process for each item. Eiglu situations for eight different classes 

or types of equipment £0110\\' for illustrative purposes. 

Armored Personnel Carriers 

It wasn't easy to satisfy the requirements before 1967, but from 

1967 through 1969 the demand for armored personnel ca rriers in 

U.S. Army Vietnam jumped dramatically. Tables of OrganizaLion 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 43 

and Equipment requirements increased approximately 124 percent, wh ile at the same time new operational uses were causing 

greater exposure and increased battle losses. To reduce losses, 

overhaul was increased; and to minimize shortages, assets were 

withdrawn from lower priority units worldwide. Early in 1967, 

Army Materiel Command began developing a belly armor for 

armored personnel carriers to reduce damage and casualties 

caused by mines. A mine protection kit was developed consisting 

of bell y armor, rerouted fu el lines kits, and non-integral fu el 

tanks. By mid-March 1969, U.S. Army Vietnam had tested the 

first belly armor and it was enthusiastically accepted by commanders 

and crews. U.S. Army Vietnam asked for expedited procurement 

to equip all their armored personnel carriers, since high battle losses 

were projected and the kits had proven to be effective in reducing 

losses. 

In August 1967, it was decided that conversion of the armored 

personnel carri er fl eet from gasoline to diesel power was necessa ry 

to reduce the danger of fire after suffering enemy caused damage. 

At that time, 73 percent of the armored personnel carrier fleet in 

U.S. Army Vi etnam was gasol ine powered. An intensive effort was 

made to equip the entire U.S. Army Vi etnam fl ee t with diese l engines. All new diesel production was alloca ted to Southeast Asia: 

however, high losses and increased deployments exceeded the production rate. It was I July 1968 before the tota l armored personnel 

carr.ier fl eet in U.S. Army Vietnam was equipped with diesel 

engmcs. 

Beginning in April 1967. a Closed Loop Support program was 

developed to retrograde armored personnel carriers needing repairs. repair them, and return them on a scheduled basis. New 

techniques were developed in the repair of baule damaged vehicles 

in which damaged sections of hulls were cut Ollt and replaced. 

Pl ans were made to ex pand Sagami Depot, Japan to cover the 

requirements of the Eighth Army, U.S. Army Vietnam, and the 

Republic of Vietnam Army. Production schedul es were increased 

and a maximum elTort was exerted to recruit additional personnel. 

Starting in 1969 Sagami was able to support the U.S. Army Vietnam 

rebuild requirements thereby enhanc ing supply performance. 

Ground Surveillmlce Radars 

The AN / TPS-25A grou nd surveillance radar became a critical 

combat support item in 1968. It had proven to be very successful 

in locating personnel moving at night in the rice paddies of the 

Mekong Delta. Since it had not been produced since 1959. the with· 
44 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

drawal of the assets from other major commands and Reserve 

Components was necessary. The overhaul and shipment of the 

rada r sets to meet U.S. Army Vietnam's total req uirements was 

completed in August 1969. 

In order to maintain the inventory of radars in Vi etnam at a 

high state of operational readiness, they too were included in a 

Closed Loop Support Program reducing total requirements 

through the integTation of transportation, supply management, 

and maintenance. 

Engineer ConslruCti071 Equipment 

The Line of Communications Program was undertaken in 

Vi etnam by the 18th and 20th Engi neer Brigades. h soon became 

apparent that there was not sumcicm standard mi li tary design engineer construction equipment to complete the road construction program within the allotted time frame. Engineer construction equipment is normally associated with long lead times so if the program 

was to be accomplished by the desired time not only would large 

quantities of equipment be needed, but more operators and 

maintenance personnel would be required. Therefore, it was 

decided to acquire 31 different types of commercial items, totaling 

6G7 pieces at a total acquisition cost of $23,860,000. A plan prep.-.red by U.S. Army Vietnam called for the procurement of the 

equ ipmem with Mil itary Construction Army funds and included 

extra major components plus a one-year suppl y of repa ir parts. 

Deliveries covered the period January-September 1969. Mainte· 

nance above the operator level and repair parts beyond the one· 

yea r overpack quantities were provided by civili an contracting 

firms. 

The Ml6AI Rifle 

Initially U.S. and allied forces were equipped with either the 

M 14 or M I rifle. When the decision was made to equip all forces 

in Southeast Asia with the M IGAI rifle, we were faced with a 

limited, but growing, production capacity and ever increasing requiremel1ls. In country. it was merely a matter of establishing 

priorities to distribute the rifles as they were received and providi ng for the turn in of the MI and MI4 riAes for reissue or 

retrograde. In the Conti nen ta l U.S. however, a central point of contact was established in the Department of the Army in December 

1967, specificall y the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logis· 

tics, to monitor and control funding, procurement, modification. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 45 

distribution, and maintenance of this rifle. This office functioned 

through December 1970. 

Electric Generators 

The increased usage of electrically powered equipment by the 

Anny in Vietnam resulted in the requirements for electricity far 

exceeding that required during World War II. During that war, 

the average consumption per soldier was Ih kilowatt hour per day. 

In Vietnam the average consumption was 2 kilowatt hours per 

day, a four fold increase. 

Large capacity generating equipment was needed, because the 

Vietnamese local power sources were incapable of supplying our 

requirements. Some of the power requirements were satisfied by 

converting eleven T -2 petroleum tankers to power barges and by 

erecting fixed plants throughout Vietnam. The fixed plants were 

operated by contractors (either the Vinnel Corporation or Pacific 

Architects and Engineers) since military personnel are not trained 

in the operation of such commercial type equipment. 

Other requirements were met through the diversion of small 

tactical generators from their normal use. This meant that many 

small generators were used to perform a task better accomplished 

with a single large capacity piece of equipment. 

With increased requirements came many procurement actions 

resulting in an extensive number of makes and models in the 

theater. At the peak of the buildup, there were about 145 makes 

and models in the 1.5 kilowatt to 100 kilowatt range. 

Because of the around-the-clock utilization, age of the assets, 

lack of parts, lack of an adequate maintenance Hoat, and the 

numerous makes and models, requirements were generated so 

rapidly that authorizations documentation could not keep pace, 

resulting in difficulty in accounting for actual assets on hand. With 

time and strong management efforts the situation improved. 

Power requirements were met through additional inputs, a reduction in requirements, and the washing out of some or the 

non-standard equipment. However, complete standardization will 

not be possible until the introduction of the Military Standard 

Family which is programed for fiscal year 1913. 

The MI07 Self-Propelled Glln Tube 

The MI07 Self-Propelled Gun, mounling the 175-mm l\H 13 

gun lube, was introduced into South Vietnam by artillery units 

arriving in late 1965. This weapon posed significant operational 
46 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

readiness problems in early 1966. Due to inadequately trained 

maintenance personnel and a shortage of manuals. there was a 30 

percent deadline rate. The rate of fire of these weapons was 

consuming tubes on the average of one tube per gun every 45 

days. Since this far exceeded the planned consumption rate, the 

Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command initiated a 

worldwide cross leveling action to provide the U.S. Army Vietnam 

requirements. At the same time, he advised U.S. Army Vietnam 

of the results of a test utilizing a titanium dioxide additive, supplied in a cloth sleeve, which had doubled the 175·mm gun tube 

life expectancy. This increased tube life was expected to ease the 

critical supply posture in the 175-mm gun tubes. However, in 

Jul y 1966 a catastrophic failure of a 175·mm gun occurred in U.S. 

Army Vietnam and the Commanding General, U.s. Army Materiel 

Command, directed that no tubes, even with the additive. would 

be fired beyond 400 rounds at equivalent full charge. 

The supply situation on gun tu bes remained critical and Con· 

tinental U.S. airlift was employed to satisfy most of the U.S. Army 

Vietnam requ irements of this item through July 1967. In Septem· 

ber, gun tube shipment by surface transportation was begun. T he 

U.S. Army Vietnam stockage objective was attained in December 

1967 and in J anuary 1968 the U.s. Army Vietnam tube consumption stabilized. 

Tropical Combal Uniform.s and Combat Boots Under FLAGPOLE 

During the period August 1965 to August 1966. the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense originated a system for reponing items considered essential to the Anny Buildup by U.S. Army Vietnam fie ld 

commanders under the code name FLAGPOLE. This was a technique 

used by Secretary of Defense McNamara to be kept advised of 

the status of selected critica l items. 

Two of the items which came under FLAGPOLE were tropica l 

combat uniforms and tropical combat boots because at the onset 

of the conflict these items were in shon supply. Procurement 

and distribution of these items was controll ed by the J oint Materiel Priorities Allocation Board established by the J oint Chiefs of 

Staff who allocated monthl y production to the services. 

During the period of critical shon supply, all Army deliveries 

of tropical combat uniforms and boolS, rela tively new items in the 

supply system, were airlifted from producer to U.S. Army Vietnam 

without the need for the command to requisition on the Continental U.S. Automatic air shipments continued through May 

1967. Pending availability of tropical combat uniforms and boots 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 47 

in the Continental U.S., Department of the Army established a 

policy in September 1965 whereby penonnel deployed from the 

Continental U.S. with four utility uniforms and two pain of leather 

combat boots. The tropical combat items were subsequently obtained by the indi vidual in Vi etnam. This policy continued until 

a sustained supply position was reached. Effective I July 1967, units 

deployed were equipped at home station with five combat uniforms and two pain of combat boots. On 1 August 1967, penonnel 

replacements enroute to Vietnam (excluding E-95, W-4s, and field 

gTade) were issued four tropical combat uniforms and one pair of 

combat boots at the Continental U.S. Personnel Processing Centers; 

E-9s, 'V-4s, and field grade, because of direct call to aerial port, reo 

ceived these items in Vietnam. The distribution of lightweight 

tentage, lightweight ponchos, collapsible canteens and canteen 

covers was also controlled by J oint Materiel Prioritiei Allocation 

Board. Air deliveries were made from contractor source to U.S. 

Army Vietnam without the need for the command to requ isition on the Continental U.S. The "push" method of supply for 

theie items ended in May 1967, at which time the availability was 

adequate for U.S. Army Vietnam to requisition on the Continental 

U.S. 

Dry Batt~ry Supply and Storag~ 

The supply system provided dry batteries designed with the 

assumption that adequa te refrigerated space would be available 

to prevent deterioration in the extreme temperaturei common to 

Vietnam. However, there was not enough refrigerated space avail· 

able in Vietnam to provide the protection for the required stock 

levels. The combination or the lack of refrigerated storage space, 

the temperatures in Vi etnam, and an overtaxed supply system resulted in a syStem of expedited battery resupply out of Japan 

known as Project "Orange Ball." It was initiated in 1968 and in· 

volved the use of 20' x 8' x 8' refrigerated containers delivered 

in frolen condition every ten days to U,S. Army Vietnam depots. 

Project "Orange Ball" was designed to modify the supply system 

so that smaller quantities of batleriei were provided to the user 

at more frequent intervals. To provide the batteries faster under 

Project "Orange Ball," units that required batteriei handcarried 

requests for a two or three days supply to their Class I supply 

points. On their next scheduled visit to the supply point, two or 

three days later, they drew the batteries they had requested on 

their previous visit along with their rations, and at the same time 

submiued another request for two to three days supply of dry 
48 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

batteries which they would pick up on their next scheduled visit. 

From this specia li zed system, a direct delivery system of dry batteries from COllline1llal U.S. to U.S. Army Vietnam was instituted. 

Excl usive ded icated transponation by refrigerated container vessels (Sea and Land) was utilized . By this method, dry balteries for 

U.S. Army Vicmam were shipped direct from th e Continental U.S. 

contractor plants to Oakland Arm)' Terminal on a hi-weekly 

basis. Dry batteri es were then shipped by the refrigerated vessels 

to depot facilities in U.S. Army Vietnam. Upon their arrival In 

Vietnam, established "Orange Ball" procedures were used. 

Management Techniqu es 

There were three main phases of the conflict in Vietnam: 

buildup, sustain ing, and phascdown. Each phase requ ired special 

management techniques. 

During the buildup phase, emphasis was placed on getting 

equipment and supplies into Vietnam without regard for the lack 

of a sufficient number of logistic units in·country to account for 

and effectively manage the incoming items. This of course was 

necessitated by the rapidity of the buildup and the tactical require. 

ment to increase the combat strength in South Vietnam as rapidly 

as possible. As a result, supplies Aowed in ahead of an adequate 

logistics base, preventing the orderly establishment of manage· 

ment and accounting operations. 

The sustaining and drawdown phases can be considered together. During the sustaining phase, there were enough logistics 

units to start managi ng the suppli es in Vietnam, to identify ex· 

cesses, to retrograde unnecessary stocks, and to create order out of 

chaos. What was started during th e sustaining phase was not only 

carried over in the drawdown, but was intensified and added to. 

Interestingly enough some of the management devices used to support the buildup were useful in the latter two phases and were 

adopted for worldwide use. 

To support the buildup. many intensive management systems 

were employed. Eight of the most significant are described in the 

following paragraphs. They are as follows: the HAWK Stovepipe, 

Red Ball Express, the Depa rtment of the Army Distribution and 

Allocation Committee, QuiCk Reaction Assistance Teams, ENSURE, Closed Loop Support, Retrograde of Equipment-KEYSTONE, and the Morning Li ne of Communications Briefings. 

Vietnam. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 49 

H awk Stovepipe 

The 97th Artillery Group (Air Defense), equipped with the 

Hawk missil e system, was deployed to Vietnam in September 

1965. This was the first occasion for the Army to deploy a complex 

missile system into an active thea ter. and much a!tention was 

given to its support. Since there was no Army Hawk logistic support 

system in Vietnam at the time of deployment and since this was 

the only Army using unit, an opportunity existed to establish a 

logistic system to support this weapon with operational readiness 

being the paramount consideration (the U.S. Marines had Hawk 

and a logistic system which was later changed to rely on the Army 

for parts support). 

The support system developed for the Hawk battalions used a 

logistic line from the United States supplier directly to the using 

Hawk organi zation , thus the name Hawk Stovepipe. The Vielllam 

end of Stovepipe was the 79th General Support Unit which stocked 

all repair parts, both common and peculiar, requ ired fOT support 

of Hawk. T he United States end of the Stovepipe was the Army 

Missile Command's National In ventory Control Poi nt. All echelons 

between the inventory control point and the 79th were bypassed. 

The inventory control poin t was the single point of control over all 

requisitions received. Req uisitions Rowed from a Hawk battery 

to its battal ion d irect support platoon, to the 79th, then daily via 

U.S. air mail to the National Inventory Control Point. Usually within two hours after receipt, the inventory control point took action 

and materiel release orders were issued. Requisitions for other 

Continental U.S. National Inventory Control Points of the Army 

Materiel Command, Defense Supply Agency, or Federal Supply 

Service (General Services Administration) were sent to the Missil e 

Command Na tional Inventory Control Point for reroUling tb the 

supplying National Inventory Control Point. Follow-up action was 

taken by the Missile Command National Inventory Control Point 

on all requisitions, relievi ng the 79th General Support Unit of this 

administrati ve burden. Transportation was coordinated by a Mis· 

sil e Command transportation officer within the terminal areas 

at Fort Mason and T ravis Air Force Base, California. The major. 

ity of shipments were Aown Lo the Tan Son Nhu t Air Base, loca ted 

a short distance from the 79th General Support Unit's Hawk 

su pport element. 

As a result of this system, high priority requisitions for parts 

were 11.IIcd withi n eight days of rece ipt and lower priority requisi. 

tions were filled within 17-18 da ys of receipt. Another measure 

of the success of the Stovepipe system in Vietnam was the Hawk 
50 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

system's opera ti onal readi ness rale which averaged 90 percent. 

This was well above the readiness rate of Hawk units in the 

Test of the world. The Hawk Stovepipe's success in Vi etnam 

prompted its adaptation to missil e systems in other theaters. 

Red Ball Express 

Red Ball Express was a special supply and transportation procedure established by direction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) on 1 December 1965. 

Red Ball Express was designed to be lIsed in lieu of nOTmal procedures exclusively to expedite repair paTls to remove equipment 

from deadline status. Reserved and pred ictable airlih directly 

responsive to General "Villi am C. Westmorela nd was made ava ilable for this purpose. 

Weekly reports were provided to Secreta ry of Defense Robert 

S. McNamara , on the not operationall y ready.supply rates of 

specific critical items that he selected for review. The Red Ball 

Express system, as described below, was highl y successful in reducing and mai ntaining deadline ra les to acceptable leve ls. 

A Red Ball Control Office was established ill Sa igon with the 

Logistics Control Office, Pacific designated as the foca l point ill 

the Con tinental U.S. for system control. T ravis Air Force Base 

was lIsed as the Aerial Port of Entry for all Red Ball Express 

Shipmen ts. Special Red Ball sections were established at each Continental U.S. suppl y source. 

Red Ball Express req uisitions were prepared by the using units 

and placed on the nearest Direct Support Unit for supply. If the 

Direct Support Unit could not fill the requirements, the requisition 

was fonvarded to the supporting depot. If the depot could not sa tisfy 

the request, it was forwarded to the Red Ball Control Office in 

Vietnam, where in·country assets were searched for ava ilable stocks. 

If the requisition could not be satisfi ed in-country, it was then 

fonvarded to the Logistics Control Office, Pac ific for forwarding 

to the appropriate Continental U.S. supply source. The Logistics 

Control Office. Pacific also contacted U.S. Army Vi etnam for additional information, verification of stock numbers, quantities. or 

other missing or incorrect information to preclude the requisition from being rejected. Con tinenta l U.S. supply sources furnished 

the Logistics Control Office, Pacific with shipping informati on 

on Red Ball Ex press requisitions. All Red Ball Express shipmen ts 

were sent to Aerial Port of Entry, Travis Air Force Base, 

Ca lifornia. via premium transportation or air parcel poSl depending on the size and weigh t of the Shi pment. At Travis Air Force 
SUPPLY SUPPORT l N VIETNAM 51 

Base, Red Ball Ex press shipments were segregated according to 

the ir intended destination. When Red Ball Express materiel was air 

lifted, the Logistics Control Office, Pacific was furnished copies 

of aircraft manifest pages together with the tail numbers of the 

aircraft and in turn these data were furn ished the Red Ball Control 

Office, Vietnam via telephone or teletype. 

The final report submitted as of 31 July 1970 indicated approximately 927,920 net requisitions were processed from inception. Of 

this total, 98.1 percent or 909,998 requisitions representing 66,985 

short tons were airlifted to Vietnam. The Red Ball Express Hi-Pri 

requisition rate in relation to the Army's worldwide demands placed 

on Continental U.S. sources averaged 2.2 percent for the period 

fiscal year 1968 through fiscal yea r 1970. 

In 1968-69, Department of the Army objectives were reoriented 

toward a streamlined system designed to improve response to the 

customer. Department of the Army Circular 700- 18. published 

in November 1969. advanced these objectives by providing guidance on an INVENTORY-IN-MOTION principle of non-stop 

support direct from Continental U.S. to the Direct Support Unit 

leveL The circular tasked Army Materiel Command to position 

stocks in theater oriented depot complexes and to develop the 

logistics intelligence to control the system. The circular laid the 

ground work for the Army's current worldwide Direct Support 

System. Red Ball program characteristics, to include the integration of suppl y. transportation, and maintenance activities into a 

single system, the positive control of requisitions from inception at 

the Direct Support Unit un til materiel is delivered to country and 

the generation and application of management data were applied 

in the design of the Direct Support System. Since Jul y 1970. Direct 

Support System has been changing the image of large overseas depot 

operations. It is supporting the Army in the fi eld directly from the 

Continental U.S. wholesale base, bypassing theater depots and 

break bulk points. The overseas depots have gradually assumed 

the role of advance storage location for War Reserve, Operational 

Project Stocks as a safety level. 

Department of the Army Distribution and A llocation Committee 

It was clear in 1965 that depot stocks of major items and assets 

coming from production would be inadequate to satisfy the demands of the buildup and other worldwide requirements. If everything were to go to Vi etnam (as its priority would have permitled), the readiness posture of the rest of the Army could have 

been degraded to an unacceptable degree. For this reason, the 
52 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Department of the Army Distribution and Allocation Committee 

was established to control the d istribution of short-supply end items. 

This was to insure that the Army's available assets would be allocated in such a way that the Army would realize the maximum 

benefits. 

The committee was chartered under Army Regulation 15-9 

which established it as an agency of the Department of the Army 

staff and gave it sole responsibility [or the ilems under its can· 

trol. It was chaired by the Assistant Deputy Ch ief of Staff for Logistics (Su pply and Maintenance) and had as participants members 

of the Department of the Army staff, U.S. Army Materiel Command, National Inventory Control Points, and major Army commands such as U.S. Army Pac ific, U.S. Continental Army Command, and U.S. Army Europe. Participation by major commands 

was helpful in that the asset situation and distribu tion options 

could be understood and appreciated by all concerned at the same 

time. 

Since its founding the concepts and functions of the committee 

have undergone an evolutionary change. Whil e insuring that 

the requirements of Vietnam were satisfied. it was at the same 

time instrumental in restricting and stopping the influx of excess 

equipment to that thea ter in 1969. This was possible because of 

visibility of unit status and authoriza tions at the Department of the 

Army level. Other uses of the Department of the Army Distribution and Allocation Committee were to monitor long range distribution plans, to provide data available within Department of 

the Army for response to quick reaction queries concerning the 

Army's capability to support alternative organizational concepts 

or assistance programs, and to override procedures that would normally be correct but that would be unwise for a particular situation. 

Quick Reaction Assistance Teams 

To provide prompt response to requests for assistance from 

Vietnam, the Department of the Army directed the Army Materi el 

Command to form quick reaction assistance teams. By midFebruary 1966, Army Materiel Command had established a roster 

or Department of the Army civilian specialists who were prepared 

to depart from the Continental U.S. on 48 hours notice and remain 

in the theater up to 90 days to provide the expertise the under· 

sized logistics force lacked. The roster consisted of ov~r 300 personnel in variOllS grade and skill levels within approximately 40 functional areas of supply and maintenance operations. These individ· 
SUPPLY SUPPORT 1N VIETNAM 53 

uals were issued passports and visas for Vietnam (req uired at that 

time). They also received the necessary medical inoculations, 

so when their particular skills were required, they were able to 

provide quick reaction assistance. 

ENSURE 

The ENSU RE project encompassed procedures for Expediting 

Non-Standard Urge"i Requirements lor Equipment and was initio 

ated on 3 January 1966. The purpose was to provide a system to 

satisfy operational requirements for non-standard or developmental 

materiel in a responsive manner and bypass the standard developmental and acquisition procedures. Materiel items were developed 

and procured either for evaluation purposes (to determine 

suitability and acceptability) or for operational requirements. 

The procedure was applicable to materiel required by either U.S. 

Army forces or allied forces, or both. The Assistant Ch ief of Staff 

for Force Development was designated the principal Department 

of the Army staff member to control the ENSU RE project. All 

ENSURE requests were sent to his staff for initial evaluation. Concurrently these requests were also provided Commanding General U.S. Army Materiel Command, Commanding General U.S. 

Army Combat Developments Command, and Commander in Chief 

U.S. Army Pacific for their evaluation as well. 

A total of 394 ENSURE projects have been initiated since the 

beginning of the program in 1966. As of February 197 1, 44 of this 

tota l were in the process of being evaluated. 159 had been cancelled 

and 191 were completed. Completion of an ENSURE project is accomplished when the equipment is type classified as either Standard A or Standard B. 

Logistic support of an ENSURE item. after type classification, 

follows the normal support procedures associa ted with any other 

standard piece of equipment. During the period an EN SU RE item was 

under evaluation, logistic support was provided by the appropriate 

Nationa l Inventory Control Point lIsing the development and procurement support package deve loped when the items were approved 

for acqu isition and evaluation. 

Closed Loop Support 

During December 1966 another special intensive management 

program was developed to control the Aow of serviceable equipment 

to Vietnam and the retrograde of unserviceable assets to repair 

facilities. Closed Loop supplements the controls inherel1l in the 
54 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

norma l supply and maintenance system. Tn Ja nuary 1967, the program was in itiated for management of selected Materials Handling 

Equipment, Communications and Electronics Equ ipment, the 

M48A3 Tank, the Mi lS and Ml 13A l Armored Personnel Carrier 

and related major assemblies and componenlS. 

The objectives of Closed Loop Support were to insure timely 

response to the needs of operational units, to exert more effective 

control of critical serviceable and unserviceable assets in the 

logistics pipeline, to reduce the backlog of unserviceables at all 

levels, to insure the timely availability of reparable assets at depot 

maintenance overhaul facilit ies, and to improve asset contTol of 

the flow of controlled items throughout the system. Th is in tegt'ated 

progt'am provided better asset visibility for the Army materi el managers to plan, progt'am, fund. and operate the Anny logistic system more efficiently. 

Closed Loop Support is a totally integrated and controll ed 

special management program in which Department of the Army 

designated major end items of equipment and secondary items 

are intensively managed through the supply, retrogt'ade. and overhaul process to and from respective commands providing positive 

control and prescribed levels of logistics readiness. 

Fundament.al to the Closed Loop Support system is the Closed 

Loop Support network, an Army-wide functiona l grouping of controlled activities. supply, ma intenance. and transportation elements 

through which the Closed Loop Support system is operated and controlled. (Chart J) 

The following criteria governed the selection of items nominated for intensive management under the Closed Loop Support 

system: items whose high unit cost and /or complex nature limits 

nonnal logistical support; items essential to a particular mission; 

items in short supply that impact most severely on operational 

readiness of a given command; items in a critical worldwide asset 

position; and items considered critical by a major Army commander. Some of the criteria were the same as those used in selecting an item for Department of the Army Distribution and Allocalion Commiuee control. Indeed many Closed Loop items were 

controlled by Department of the Army Distribution and Allocation 

Committee. Therefore. at the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

level, Department of the Army Distribution and Allocation Committee and Closed Loop staff responsibilities were in the same staff 

element. 

Within Department of the Army Distribution and Allocation 

Committee the new or repaired assets are the "managed" items. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 

CHART 3-CLOSED Loop SUPPORT NETWORK 

Overseas I 

I 

Stor818 .. Re.supply 

Continental 

U,S, 

55 

Overseas ~E==~ii=~~~~=======~ 

i 

Aviation Systems Mlfor _.' '. T

~ ob' Storage 

Uslnr 

Unit 

Theatu 

Rebuild 

Command 71 

Electronics Command 35 

MlM:hanized Command 46 

Tactical Command 10 

Weapons Command . 31 

- Total 193 

20 91 

0 J5 

9 I' " 16 

12 43 

- 57 ,50 

General Direct Support Suport Unit- Unit ~=~~=~~~======~j - Reparable 

In Country Ship Activity 

I 

I 

Am 

Rebuild 

Facility 

Closed Loop differs in that the repairable assets constitute the life 

blood of the system. Army management, at all levels, gave special 

attention to predicting and controlling the Aow of unserviceable 

items to and from repair and overhaul facilities. To provide incen· 

tives for local commanders to turn in operating equipment sched· 

uled for repair, it was necessary to have a replacement item ava il· 

able for direct exchange. The concept 'vas simple and basic, but 

smooth operation of the concept in a system as large as the Army's 

requires more than routine controls. 

Once an item was selected as a candidate item, a detailed re· 

view process was conducted at a Closed Loop Suppon Conference. 

Representation at the Closed Loop Support Conference included 

representatives from the interested commands and activities, 

for example Department of the Army, Army Materiel Command, 

Major Commands, Nationa l Inventory Control Points, National 

Maintenance Points, Project Managers, Defense Supply Agency and 

others as appropriate. Conferees analyzed the allowances for equipment (Tables of Allowances and modifi ed Tables of Allowances, 

Special Authorizations, Tables of Organization and Equipment and 

Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment) ; stock status or 
56 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

equipment on hand by condition code previous transaction history; 

maintenance capability of direct and general support units, incountry depots. in-theater depots, Continental U.S. depots and contractor capability and availability; current repair and overhaul 

schedules; and procurement delivery schedules. After being approved as a Closed Loop Support item, the item was intensively 

managed and controlled at all logistic levels. 

Closed Loop project officers were appointed at Department of 

the Army and in each major command, agency, or activity by functional commodity or weapons system. These project officers were 

the principal points of contact in the network. They performed 

their Closed Loop SUppOTt duti es in addition to their other duty 

assignments. 

Each Closed Loop Support item was assigned a project code. 

This project code was then the trade mark of that particular item 

providing a ready identifier for that item on all documeillation (in. 

eluding transportation and handling), in all communications, and 

on all packaging and crating. 

The following three types of reports were used by the system: 

I. A mon thl y Closed Loop Support summary which was a 

resume of programed versus actual performance. This report was 

compiled by Army Materiel Command from information received 

from Logistical Control Offices. supply and maintenance depots, 

supported commands. and any other activity which may have had 

an assigned function in carryi ng out the Closed Loop Support program. 

2. Problem Flasher messages which provided warnings of 

potential deviations from the scheduled movements of serviceable 

input. retrograde materiel, and material to be overhauled. Problem 

Flashers also described actions being taken to compensate for program deviations, gave the anticipated recovery date, and information as to any assistance required. 

3. Real-Time reports were dispatched by priority message by 

transceiver for each serviceable item shipped from or received by 

Continen tal U.S. and overseas air and water terminals. These reports provided notification of lift and receipt data to interested 

activities. The Closed Loop concept was initiated to provide critical 

item management for U.S. Army Vietnam. However, from this 

origin, the system has been expanded to the remai nder of the U.S. 

Army. 

Retrograde 01 Equipment-KEYSTONE 

In mid-June 1969, the President of the United States announced 

the first incremental withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the Republic 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 57 

of Vietnam. This initial redeployment withdrawal phase was given 

the project name KEYSTONE EACLE. 

The initial KEYSTONE increments identified problem areas in 

the classification and disposition of equipment generated by redeploying units. The standard technical inspection required extensive technical expertise and was time-consuming. Concurrently, 

the KEYSTONE processing points were experiencing a large backlog of 

equipment while requests for disposition and/ or claimants were 

processed. 

Two management techn iques evolved in support of KEYSTONE 

Operations. The classification of materiel was modified to reflect 

the level of maintenance req uired to upgrade the materiel for 

issue. SCRAM was the acronym used to identify Special Criteria 

for Retrograde of Materi el. SCRAM I materiel can be issued "as·is'· 

or requires minor orga nizational maintenance. SCRAM 2 maleriel 

requires Direct Support or General Support mai ntenance prior to 

issue. SCRAM 3 materiel must be evacuated for depot maintenance. 

SCRAM 4 is unserviceable or economicall y unrepairable and is processed to property disposal. 

The second technique provided the KE"STONE processing centers 

with disposition instructions in anticipation of equipment being 

turned in. The "predisposition instructions" were prepared based 

on estimates of quantities of equipment as well as estimates of the 

condition of equipment to be released by redeploying units. This 

asset projection was matched against other claimants for the serviceable equipment; unserviceable equipment was reviewed against 

approved maintenance programs. Generally, available items were 

used first to satisfy Southeast Asia requirements, then other U.S. 

Army requirements. The primary considerations in the preparation 

of these instructions were to preclude the trans.shipment of 

equipment. to reduce shipping costs wherever feasible, and to 

preclude the retrograde of mau!riel not required elsewhere. 

Momi7lg Line of CommfmicalionJ Brie{i'lgJ-Vietnam 

Major General Charles W. Eifler, who was the Commander 

of the 1st Logistical Command in Vi etnam from January 1966 to 

June 1967, developed a system for reviewing the sta tus of stackage 

for Classes I, III. and V types of supply. The system involved the 

daily review with his seven Directors and three staff officers along 

with their senior advisers of the stockage status for these classes 

of supply. The review utilized charts which covered every Depot, 

Supply Point, and every Supply Area in support of comba t operations in Vietnam. The daily review covered significant data for 
58 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

the number of troops supported and established stockage objectives which were compared with the Receipts and Issues for the 

preceding twenty-four hOUTS. An analysis or the stock balance was 

made each day and management action was taken on the spot when 

any area appeared to be in a critical position. It was an extremely 

effective management tool and there was seldom a day without a 

significant management action being taken on one of these classes 

of supply_ 

Other areas that could be critical WeTe also reviewed at the 

same morning sessions. Examples aTe: the number of artillery pieces 

deadlined with the reasons and actions being taken, and the status 

of port facilities with particular emphasis given to number or ships 

awaiting discharge and the number programed for the next thirty 

days. To put the logistic picture in the proper perspective a detailed review of the tactical situation was conducted every morning. 

Project fOT the Utilillltion and Redistribution of MaUriel 

During late 1967, after the Vietnam buildup had been largely 

completed, excess began to attract serious attention. Secretary of 

Defense McNamara took unprecedented action and directed that 

action begin immediately to redistribute excesses prior to the con· 

c1usion of the conflict, so as to assure their application against 

approved military requirements elsewhere in the military supply 

system. This action was designed to preclude a recurrence of 

the history of excesses and surpluses following past conflicts. In 

his memorandum of 24 November 1967, establishing the Project 

for the Utilization and Redistribution of Materiel, the Secretary 

of Defense designated the Seuetary of the Army as the executive 

agent for the Department of Defense and further directed that an 

Army general officer be designated as the Project Coordinator. The 

Commander·in·Chief, Pacific was directed to establish a special 

agency to maintain an inventory of excess mat~riel, supervise redistribution or disposal of such materiel within his area, and report 

the availability of mat~riel which could not be utilized in the Pacific 

area to other Defense activities in accordance with procedures 

developed by the Project Coordinator. 

The Commander in Chief, Pacific established the agency di· 

rected under the 2d U.S. Army Logistical Command on Okinawa. 

The agency was known as the Pacific Command Utilization and 

Redistribution Agency. 

Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency ini· 

tiated operation on 1 April 1968 on a semi-automated basis which 

continued until 30 June 1968 at which time it was fully automated. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 59 

Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency has undergone some major improvements to increase utilization of the excess materiel. In July 1968, a special off-line teletype screening 

procedure was deve loped and implemented in the Pacific Command Utili zation and Redistribution Agency operation to expedite 

the screening of bulk-lot items by Continental U.S. inventory 

managers and supply activities in the Pacific Command in 21 days. 

This procedure provided rapid disposition instructions to the 

owning service in order to open up critically needed storage space. 

In November 1968, the funding policy was revised to permit the 

transfer of specific categories of service excesses between Pacific 

Command component commanders on a nonreimbursable basis at 

field level. In D«ember 1968, a team of merchandising specialists 

was sent to Okinawa to develop an intensified merchandising progr;l;m. The task was to produce a catalog on high dollar value items 

which could be distributed to the Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency customers. The catalog provides 

visibility, interchangeability and substitute capability. In May 1969, 

a controlled tree issue program was implemented in Pacific Command Utilization and RediSlribution Agency, whereby materiel 

designated by Defense Supply Agency and Government Services 

Administration as not returnable to the Continental U.S. wholesale 

level could be issued without charge to the Pacific Command military custom-:rs_ The £Tee issue program was expanded in July 

1969 to include selected expendable and shelf-life items. 

In July 1969, Commander in Chief Pacific initiated a study to 

redesign the Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution 

Agency operations and Office of the Assistant S«retary of Defense 

(Installations and Logistics) directed implementation of some of 

the major concepts included in the Commander in Chief Pacific 

study, which were designated as Quick Fix improvements_ These 

improvements included increased military service and other Federal agency participation, Closed Loop status reporting, up-grade of 

the Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency auto· 

matic data processing equipment, and a reduced screening time 

concept. The Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution 

Agency Quick Fix improvements were implemented on I October 

1970. These improvements had a significant impact in the Department of Defense excess screening cycle by reducing the screening 

time from about one year to about 75 days. 

During the period I April 1968 through January 1972, the 

Military Services nominated $2_1 billion worth of excess to Pacific 

Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency for screening. 
60 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Of this $306 million worth was redistributed in th e Pacific Area 

and other overseas commands and $7 10.3 million worth was returned to th e Conlinelllal V.S. wholesale system. resulting in 

utiliza tion of $ 1.03 billion. or approximately 48 percent utilization. 

The balance of this materi al was declared Department of Defense 

excess and returned to the owning Services. 

Mmlagjng the Logistics System 

During the buildup and into the Spring of 1967, management 

emphasis was on getting the supplies to th e combat units. The 

inAux of logistics units to Vietnam; the need to establis h depots, 

ports, and orga niza ti onal structures; and just coping with a rapidly 

expanding system needi ng morc resources than were ava ilable 

re legated anything not related to the top priority effort to the 

sta tus of a back burner project. Excesses accumulated, but were 

not recognized, and requisitions continued to be submitted to Continental U_S. for items that were already in excess in Vietnam. 

T he nature of operations was such that authorizations did not 

necessarily represent the needs of units. Units ohen needed more 

or different items than were authorized and the requisitioning system honored such requisitions. The Army Authorization Document 

System was not able to keep up with the needs. Equipment a unit 

had in excess of its authoriza ti on was not reported in its in ventory 

reports (Army Regulation 711- 5). 

Frequently documentation 0 11 incoming supplies was either 

lost or ill egibl e upon arrival of the suppli es and the contents of 

containers was unknown. Unq ualified supply personnel set aside 

these containers to be identified later, which frequently ex tended 

beyond the rotation date of the individual who had knowledge 

of th e circumstances. 

Failures of the supply system to locate, identify, and provide 

a required item undoubtedly degraded supply discipline at the 

using unit level which in llIrn made a substantial contribution to 

further breakdown in control and to increasing excesses. Rather 

than usi ng normal follow-up procedures, it was common for the 

requesting unit to re-requisition the needed items one or more 

times, thereby bringing unneeded items into country as well as 

crea ting inHated demand data at th e supporti ng unitS and depots. 

In th e spring of 1967, concern about the numbers of high priority requisitions being received ITom Vietnam caused a number of 

National In ventory Control Poi nts, U.S. Army Pacific H eadq uarters, 

and oth er commands in the requ isition ing channel to challenge 

requisitions. Later th e program was formalized under the n ame 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 61 

Project CHALLENGE, which requ ired unit commanders to verify the 

priority or the requirement. Project CHALLENGE reduced premium 

transportation and handling costs and started to reinstate some degree of control on the requ isitioning process. 

tn addition to the excesses created by the Push Packages arri"ing in-country prior to the arrival of adequate logistics units, 

the deterioration of identifica tion marki ngs on packages added even 

more excesses as the unidentifi ed items on hand were re·requisi. 

tioned. 

The personnel assigned as warehousemen were generally untrained and inexperienced in supply operations which added to 

the confusion. To attempt to rectify this lack of experience and 

tra ining, the Department of the Army instituted Project CoUNTER. 

Early in 1967 a group of supply assistance personnel from 

U.S. Army Materiel Command organiza tions went to Vietnam 

on temporary d uty, under the code name Project CoUNTER. These 

people provided formal instruction in suppl y procedures and assisted in-coumy personnel in performing location surveys, conduct. 

ing inventories, identifying and classifying materiel, reviewing and 

improving prescribed load lists and authorized stockage lins, and 

generally assisted in suppl y management activities. In all, a total 

of four Project COUNTER teams were provided during 1967- 1968 

and proved extremely helpful in upgrading the technical com· 

petence of supply personnel in Vietnam. 

In order to direct attention and effort to the many tasks that 

had to be performed once there was a sa tisfactory logistic base 

in Vietnam, the Commanding General of the 1st Logistical Com· 

mand established an extensive command and comrol program 

for logistics management in 1968. The program was formalized 

into a number of objectives. performance statements, and progress 

reports, which were incorporated in a command publication referred to as the Pink Book. This was given wide distribUlion within 

the lst Logistical Command and tied together short and long 

range projects in all logistics areas to increase efficiency, to bring 

stock levels down, and to identify and reduce excesses. 

Early in 1969, during a meeting at Phu Bai including General 

Abrams, Commander U.S. Mili tary AssiSlance Command, Vietnam, 

Ihe Commanding Genera l of the 1st Logistical Command and olhers, 

General Abrams used the lerm Logistics Offensive 10 describe what 

was required of the Army logistics system in Vietnam. While Gen· 

eral Abrams meant it as a compliment for the progressive improve. 

ment being made in all areas of logistics, in reality he had issued 

a resounding chall enge to all professional Army logisticians to in-
62 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

stitute a series of actions with follow-up auention, si milar to those 

employed by tactical commanders in lau nching offensive operations. 

Soon after this, the 1st Logistical Command's Pink Book became known as the Logistics Offensive Program. This program 

was adopted by Department of Army for Army-wide application in 

September 1969. By 31 March 1971 this program had grown 

to include over 130 different projects. The follow ing list contains 

some of the projects contained in the Logistics Offensive Program. 

Sample Projects of the Logistics Offensive Program 

1. Inventory in MOlion 

2. VERIFY 

3. STOP/SEE 

4. CoNDITION 

5. CLEAN 

6. Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedures (V ARP) 

7. SEE MOVE 

8. KEYSTONE 

The concept of Inventory iT! Motion was first applied to ammunition and is discussed in some detail in the ammunition chapter. 

As applied across the board, inventory in motion was a supply 

management program that had as its goal integrating supply and 

transportation to reduce the requirement for stock levels in 

Vietnam and other storage areas. 

Integrated planning and control of the movement of supplies 

resulted in responsive resupply and smaller local inventories. Having fewer supplies on hand meant reduced care and preservation 

efforts, smaller storage areas to protect, and easier inventory management. Basically stocks in transit or in the pipeline were considered as being part of the inventory. 

The use of the inventory in motion concept for ammunition 

and bulk petroleum was facilitated by the relatively small number 

of different items and predictable consumption rates. Likewise, 

consumption of subsistence was relatively stable, being preuy 

much in proportion to troop strength. The effectiveness of applying 

invemory in motion procedures to other supplies such as repair 

parts, clothing and individual equipment, administrative and housekeeping suppli es and equipment, principal items, and packaged 

petroleum products was more difficult because of the large number 

of items and varying demand rates. One of the major problems was 

the lack of data announcing that tTUck convoys, airplanes, or vessels 

were scheduled to arrive on given dates. Consequently, advance 
SUPPLY SUPPORT I N VIETNAM 63 

pl anning at storage activities was limited and materiel actually in 

transit could not be considered as assets. 

It became apparent that an interface between supply and trans· 

portation data was necessary to achieve the desired asset visability 

of intransit materiel. A conference was held in September 1969 with 

representatives of U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Vietnam, 1st Logistica l Command, and the U.S. Army Logistics Control Office Pacific 

which resulted in crea ting a Logistics Intelligence File. Through 

the Logistics Intelligence File, U.S. Army Vietnam and the Cen· 

tral Financial Management Agency, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, were able 

to have daily updated information on each open requisition. This 

gave U.S. Army Vietnam the capability to determine where any 

requisition was at an y time , e.g., in process at the Continental U.S. 

National Inventory Control Point depot, intransit to the terminal, 

or in the terminal awaiting lift, as well as the lift data (such as 

transportation control number, carrier, and estimated time of arrival) . Through use of the Logistics Intelligence File, the concept 

of inventory in motion has been applied to most commodities in 

Vietnam. 

Another management program, Project VERIFY, was established in Vietnam to study the management procedures and statistical data used by the 1st Logistical Command to describe and 

evaluate its logistic efforts. The aim of Project VERIFY was to produce standardized management procedures, statistical terms, and 

usable standards that could be expressed as management objectives. 

The project concerned itself with the movement of supply items 

through the depots. It also was concerned with the Aow of paperwork 

pertaining to these supplies-noting the paths of the various copies 

in order to determine the control measures used. Data were sought 

to determine the time frames involved in the vari ous processes. 

These data were ana lyzed and corrective actions were taken when 

deficienc ies or inefficiences were found. This helped to implement 

other projects designed to speed up the movement of suppli es to 

the requesting units. 

During 1968 it was becoming appa rent that items were being 

requisitioned on a routine basis that were not actually needed in 

Vietnam. What the situation needed was some degree of personal 

attention to prevent the shipment of these items. In June 1968, 

Project STOP was initiated in U.S. Army Vietnam for the purpose 

of preventing shipping of suppl y items from Continental U.S. that 

were not needed in Vietnam. All possible actions were taken from 

cancelling requisitions not yet filled to stopping shipments up to the 

point where items were loaded on board ship. In addition, related 
64 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

procurements were terminated, stretched out, or diverted to other 

lIses. Stops on requisitions started with the 1st Logistical Command's 

submission of requests for cancellation of specific items by Federal 

Stock Numbers. hems slOpped were either stocked in Viel1lam in 

quantities excess to the requirements there, or in quantities exceeding the depot system's capacity to handle and store. 

In September 1968, Project SEE began with learns established 

at each major post in U.S. Army Vietnam to devote full time 

to physically examining (seeing) bulk items in storage at depots, 

on the piers, and being unloaded from ships. These learns initiated 

immediate action to determine whether the items aboard ships 

should continue to be unloaded, or whether they should be diverted 

elsewhere (in country or out of country) . When an item not desired was located, action was initiated to have the appropriate Federal Stock Number broadcast to all supply agencies involved includ. 

ing Army Materiel Command, Defense Supply Agency, and 2d 

Logistical Command in Okinawa, so that action could be taken 

throughout the system to stop movement of this item to Vietnam. 

In late September 1968 Project STOP and Project SEE were 

merged into one project which was given the code name of Project 

STOP/ SEE. Under this concept 1st Logistical Command designated 

items on a STOP/ SEE listing by Federal Stock Number and nomenclature which were in long supply, items deleted from the theater 

authorized slockage list, or luxury and convenience items. When an 

item appeared on one of these listings, 1st Logistical Command suspended requisitioning by blocking the computers in country and 

send ing copies of these listings to Continental U.S. Inventory Managers. These Managers then look steps to locate and cancel all open 

requisitions for these items and to frustrate shipments through 

STOP procedures. 

Project STOP/ SEE EXPANDED was a further extension of Project 

STOP/SEE and was initiated 19 November 1968. The Commanding 

General U.S. Army Vietnam, in accordance with Project STOP pro· 

cedures, requested blocking action by Federal Supply Class with 

Federal Stock Number exceptions. Under this program, the majority of Federal Stock Numbers within a Federal Supply Class were 

blocked at the Defense Automatic Addressing System Office and all 

low priority requisitions (IPD 09-20) for Vietnam were cancelled 

and the shipments were frustrated. High priority requ isitions (IPD 

01-08) continued to be honored. The U.S. Army Inventory Control 

Center Vietnam (formerly the 14th Inventory Control Center) then 

provided a standardized list of Federal Stock Numbers, by Federal 

Supply Class in card deck format, to the Logistics Control Office, 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 65 

Pacific for lise in completing Project STOP actions. By the end of 

February 1971, $644 million of requisitions had been cancelled 

through the use of STOP/ SEE techniques. 

Projea CONDITION was first implemented in the 1st Logistical 

Command in February 1969. It was implemented because of condi· 

tions found to exist when Project COUNT I (reliability of the loca· 

tion system and inventory) and Project CoUNT II (100% cyclic 

inventory) were conducted during the period September 1968 

to January 1969. The intent of Project CoNDITION was to purify 

condition data of materiel asseU at each depot. It consisted of two 

basic phases. Phase I was the separation of all stock counted into 

two categories; first, that stock which was obviously condition A, 

and second, all other stock which was designated as Code J. Phase 

II consisted of the condition coding of all incoming depot stocks 

as either Code A or K. Code K identified all receipts which were 

obviously not Code A. Quality control technicians inspected 

and determined the requirements and recommended priorities for 

care and preservation. 

Project CoNDITION was extended to Army Materiel Command 

and other major commands as an integral part of the Logistics 

Offensive. The objectives were to provide visibility of the actual 

condition of the inventory worldwide (not in the hands of troops) 

and to identify and monitor progress on that portion which re· 

quired care and preservation. 

Project CLEAN was established as an integral part of the In· 

ventory.in·motion concept to eliminate excess supplies from the 

Army supply system by determining what supplies were on hand 

in the field but were no longer required for mission accomplishment, 

and then to redistribute them to where they were required, retrograde them to maintenance activities, or dispose of them through 

disposal channels. During fiscal year 1970 and 1971, supplies 

valued at almost $1.5 billion were eliminated from oversea stocks. 

In these years, U.S. Army Vietnam alone retrograded over 671,000 

short tons of supplies. The authorized stockage list for Vietnam 

was reduced from a high of 297,000 different items in July 1967 to 

74,900 items in March 1971, without any loss of the high 

quality of support provided to the combat forces. 

The Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedures was a program 

developed in December 1969 to cope with the problem of excesses. 

A bit of background data reveals that during the buildup and sus· 

taining phases, U.S. Army Vietnam was given first priority for the 

fill of all major item requisitions. U.S. Army Vietnam requisitions 

were processed and filled with little regard as to whether formal 
66 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

authorization existed. In general, U.S. Army Vietnam requirements 

were not questioned and requisitions on the wholesale supply system were accepted at fa ce value. This policy was necessary because 

formal au thorization documents could not keep pace with the 

rapidly changing situation. As a result of this policy, U.S. Army 

Vietnam developed excess positions for many items. While some of 

these excesses were real, others were only apparent in that the items 

on hand were actually required for mission performance. but the 

need for them had never been recognized in an authoriza tion document. Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedures was intended to 

establish control over excess assets in the hands of U.S. Army Vietnam units, obta in visibility over the actual requirement situation in 

U.S. Army Vietnam, and reconcil e differences between U.S. Army 

Vietnam recorded quantities and National Inventory Control 

Point shipped quantities. 

Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedures was unique and con· 

stituted a departure from conventional asset control and accounting 

procedures. Under Vietnam Asset Reconcili ation Procedures, 

units reported to U.S. Army Vietnam those assets on band which 

were in excess of wriuen authority; however, there was no penalty 

for reporting these excesses. Reporting units were allowed to reo 

tain them on loan provided they were required for mission accomplishment. U.S. Army Vietnam reviewed the loans every 180 days 

as a minimum. Assets on loan to units were accounted for through 

the depot reporting system (Army Regulation 7 11-80» rather 

than the unit reporting system (Army Regulation 711-5). Assets 

within unit tabular authority continued to be reported through 

the regular unit reporting system. As of 31 December 1970, approximately $160 million (at budget costs) of previously unreported assets had been accounted for under Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedure!;. 

Project SEE/ MoVE was begun in July 1969, and sent to U.S. 

Army Pacific to assist the commands in understanding existing 

disposition instructions; to provide on-the-spot disposition; and to 

effect the necessary communication between the sub-commands, 

Department of the Army, and the appropriate Continental U.S. 

agencies to obtain rapid disposition instructions (note the relationship with CLEAN). Later the teams turned their efforts to 

rendering management assistance to U.S. Army Pacific in such 

areas as interpretation of Department of the Army, Army Materiel 

Command, and Defense Supply Agency regulations, policies and / or 

disposition priorities and instructions and effecting communication 

and co-ordination with U.S. Army Pacific, Department of the Army 

and/ or other appropriate Continental U.S. agencies. Also, they pro-
SUPPL V SUPPORT IN VIETNAM. 67 

vided U.S. Army Pacific with guidance and on·the·spot disposition 

instructions for categories of excess materiel not otherwise covered 

by instructions. 

The teams were headed by a representative from Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Logistics with members provided by Defense Supply 

Agency, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.s. Army Materiel Command. 

In·country U.S. Army Materiel Command technical assistance 

personnel were also utilized. Rotation of personnel was at the 

discretion of the agency concerned. The teams operated under the 

overall direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and 

under the control of U.S. Army Pacific. They were deployed to 

Vi etnam and Okinawa in February 1970 and terminated their operations on 15 June 1970. Duri ng this period, one team was also sent 

to Europe. 

KEYSTONE was the name given to the program for the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces from South Vietnam. In mid.June 1969, 

the President of the United States announced the first incremental 

withdrawal of U.S. Forces. This initial redeployment phase was 

given the project name KEYSTONE EAGLE. 

KEYSTONE EAGLE began on 19 June 1969, and was initially 

planned as a unit redeployment, with 9th Infantry Division (less 

one brigade and provisional supporting elements) scheduled to 

redeploy to Hawa ii to reconstitute the Pacific Command reserve. 

The redeployment was schedul ed to be completed on 27 August 

1969 to meet the Presidential commitment of having the initial 

troop withdrawal of 25,000 personnel completed by I September 

1969. Department of the Army published a Letter of Instruction 

for the redeployment of United States Army Forces from South 

Vietnam on 21 June 1969, providing general logistics and personnel policies governing the redeployment. The redeploying units 

were au thorized to redeploy with all Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment equipment, less selected U.S. Army Vietnam 

designated "critical" items (such as radars and MI6 riRes) , which 

were to be retai ned in-country to satisfy existing shortages within 

U.S. Army Vietnam units. 

The 1st Logistical Command was tasked by Lieutenant Genera l Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army 

Vi etnam to provide assistance to the Commanding General 9th 

Infantry Division and the mission was assigned to the Saigon Support Command. This mission was ultimately expanded to include 

the provision of complete logistics support of the division during 

the final 30 days of the redeployment phase. This entire support 

operation was unique in that it represented the first time in U.S. 

Army history a unit, actively engaged in combat, was disengaged 
68 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

rrom its mission, withdrawn to a base camp and required to prepare 

itself for redeployment. The logistic support of this unit redeploy· 

ment was extremely complex because of the need to continue to 

support other units still engaged in combat operations while simultaneously inspecting, preparing, packing and shipping the redeploying unit's Table of Organization and Equipment equipment. 

The problem was compounded by the fact that the majority 

of lhe personnel tllrning in the division's equipment were not 

redeploying with their parent unit, but would be reassigned incountry for completion of their twelve month tour. This personnel 

policy alor.e taxed the command and control element to the maximum. 

Finally, the complexity of this initial redeployment was further 

compounded by the lack of procedures and materiel to process Table 

of Organization and Equipment equipment for overseas redepl oyment to meet the strict U.S. Public Health Service and U.S. 

Department of Agriculture sanitation and entomological requiremen ts. To assist U.S. Army Vietnam in overcoming these problems, the Commanding General U.S. Army Materiel Command 

assembled a team of forty civilian personnel and deployed them 

to South Vietnam in earl y 1969. Additionally, a Composite Service 

Maintenance Company (604th Composite Service Company) and 

a Transportation Detachment (402d Transportation Corps Detach· 

ment) were organized in the Continelllal U.S. and deployed 

to South Vietnam to assist in unit redeployment. The 604th 

Composite Service Company was specificall y organized to assist 

in inspection, packaging and preparing equipment for redeployment and the Transportation Detachment was organized to assist 

with required documentation. 

Because KEYSTONE EACLE was planned primarily as a unit redeployment. the Department of the Army logistics guidance was 

minimal. This situation changed drastica ll y on 8 August 1969 

when Departmem of the Army directed that the redeploying units 

of the 9th Infamry Division would be deactivated in South Vietnam. 

The logistics impact of this decision, almost two-thirds of .the way 

through the redeployment was traumatic. Approximately onethird of the redeploying units' equipment was already enroute to 

Hawaii. Another one-third was at the Port of Newport awaiting out· 

loading, while the remaining one-third was being staged for move· 

ment to the port. Property accountability could not be maintained 

because the Property Book Officers were already in Hawaii with the 

advance party, and two-thirds of their equipment was frustrated in 

Somh Vietnam. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIET NAr.[ 69 

The combat situation at the former division base camp (Dong 

Tam). as well as the scheduled transfer of this fa cil ity to South 

Vietnam dictated that the equipment be moved. and the equ ipment 

was diverted to a holding area at Long Binh Depot, north of 

Saigon. Port clearance at Newport dictated that the materiel await· 

ing olltloading be moved, and it also was moved to the Long Binh 

area. Because of the lack of documentation, this materi el was 

ultimately capitali zed in the depot account and redistributed to incountry requirements. The KEYSTONE EAGLE incremental phasedown was completed on 28 August, although redistribution of all 

the materiel was not complcted until mid-October. The KEYSTONE 

EAGLE project provided an indication of what was to come. and it 

was recognized at Department of the Army that Department of the 

Army level control over the redistribution of assets genera ted from 

these phase-downs was essential. 

In late September 1969 the second KEYSTONE withdrawal was 

announced. This was KEYSTONE CARDINAL. which was a troop space 

reduction of 40.500 personnel. The principal large Army unit involved was the 3rd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division. Un its involved in this withdrawal were to be brought to zero strength in 

South Vietnam by 15 December 1969. None were to be redeployed 

intact to the Continental U.S. 

To provide control over the rcdistribution of the assets generated from these unit inactivations, Depa rtment of the Army provided logistics guidance in the form of an Annex to the Department 

of the Army Letter of Instruction for redeployment of U.S. Forces 

from South Vietnam published on I October 1969. This logistics 

guidance included instntctions on property accountability. canceling of requisitions, processing of materiel. inspection and maintenance standards and, perhaps Illost important. it established a 

reporting procedure for both obtaining and tracking disposition 

of mat(~riel turned in during KEY TO NE CARIll NAL. This reponing 

procedure involved the establishment of a telephone conversa tion 

between U.S. Army Vietnam, U.S. Army Pacific. and Department 

of the Army on a daily basis. The imcnt of this telephone COIl -

versation was to provide to U.S. Army Vietnam. on a twenty-four 

hour basis, the dispositi on for selected items of equipment turned 

in (Department of the Army Distribution and Allocation Commillee and Department of the Army High Interest h ems). This 

telephone conversa tion system also provided Departmelll of the 

Army with visibility of assets redistributed in and outside of 

South Vietnam. Although this system did provide the desired 

controls it was not responsive to U.S. Army Vietnam requirements. 
70 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

The 24-hour lum-around of disposition requests at Department of 

the Army equated ( 0 8- 10 days delay at the tum-in location and 

caused materiel to stack up with attendant storage and accountability problems. 

During KEYSTONE CARDINAL, a new maintenance inspection 

procedure was implemented to expedite processing of materiel. 

This procedure. referred to as SCRAM (Special Criteria-Retrograde 

of Army Materiel), included a much simplified inspection procedure which permitted classification of equipment into one of 

four categories. It also included maintenance expenditure and 

transportation cost data which could be utilized to determine 

ultimate disposition of materiel. This new SCRAM procedure was 

extensively tested during KEYSTONE CARDINAL and adopted for 

future KEYSTONE operations. KEYSTONE CARDINAL was completed 

on 17 December 1969 and the logistics support procedures developed in KEYSTONE EACLE were polished and refined in KEySTONE CARDINAL, providing (or publication of a U.S. Army Vietnam 

redeployment guide for logistics support. By the end of KEYSTONE 

CARDINAL, however, the requirement (or complete predisposition 

instructions for materiel being turned in was recognized as essential 

for future withdrawals. 

In early January 1970 KEYSTONE BLUEJAY, the third KEYSTONE 

withdrawal was announced. This was the largest increment to 

date-50,000 personnel. The principal units involved were the 1st 

In(antry Division and one brigade of the 4th Infantry Division. 

This increment was scheduled for the period 20 February through 

15 April 1970. Logistic guidance ,."as again published in a logistics 

annex to a Department of the Army Letter of Instruction. The 

predominant theme of these instructions was to retain all materiel 

required by U.S. Army Vietnam in-coumry to preclude Continental 

U.S. shipment. The predisposition instruction problem had not 

been completely resolved at the beginning of the increment so 

lhe telephone conversation procedure continued to be employed. 

In early March 1970, however, Department of the Army did 

develop and publish predisposition instructions for equipment 

forecasted to become available during the third increment. This 

list included all Department of the Army Distribution and Alloca· 

tions Committee items and additional selected items referred to 

as Department o[ the Anny High Interest Items. 

Because of the size of this increment, and the extremely short 

time frame, another critical problem surfaced-the cleanliness 

standards required for equipment retrograde. This problem had 

been anticipated and washing facilities had been constructed to 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 71 

accommodate the expected workload. It soon betame apparent, 

however. that the pacing operation in unit stand·down and equipment tum-in was cleaning the equipment to meet U.S. Public 

Health Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture standards for 

retrograde. Special equipment providing extremely high water 

pressure jets were procured in the Continental U.S. under ENSURE 

provisions and the special wash areas were operated around the 

clock to keep abreast of the work load. 

The massive size of this third increment also had a dramatic 

effect on depot operations throughout U.S. Army Vietnam. At the 

same time that force reductions were reducing the size of the 

supported forces, the evacuation of materiel back to depots posed 

an awesome workload. Recoup operations had to be significantly 

expanded to accommodate this materiel being returned while at the 

same time the depots were in a massive retrograde operation of 

their own. purging stocks of identified excesses. The Commanding 

Generalist Logistical Command initiated an intensive. command 

wide, retrograde program not only to identify and move excesses 

but to do it with corrett packing, preservation and true identification. The entire logistics effort of U.S, Army Vietnam was now 

focused on both responsive combat service support to the combat 

elementS and on retrograde of both serviceable and unserviceable 

materiel from the combat zone. 

Three times as much effort is requi~ed to process materiel 

for retrograde as to receive incoming materiel and accomplish issue; 

nevertheless. this task was accomplished by a logistic force reduced in size in equal proportions to the combat elements. 

KEYSTONE BLUEJ .... V was the beginning of an intensive effort to 

satisfy Army of the Republic of Vietnam requirements from 

assets being generated by U.S_ unit inactivations in-country. To 

assist in this effort. the Commanding Generalist Logistical Command established the 79th Maintenance Battalion as a KEYSTONE 

Battalion. This unit was assigned the mission of receiving materiel 

from K£YSTONE designated units, repairing it to meet Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam transfer standards, and accomplishing the 

issue to Anny of the Republic of Vietnam. KEYSTONE BLUEJ .... Y 

concluded on 15 April 1970 and the ultimate disposition of the 

generated materiel was completed in mid-June 1970. 

The fourth increment, KEYSTONE ROSIN, was announced on 1 

July 1970. This title was designated to encompass al\ troop withdrawal increments scheduled in fiscal year 1971. The first phase, 

ALPH ..... extended from I July 1970 through 15 October 1970 with 

a total projected troop strength reduction of 50,000 personnel. 
72 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

With the experience gained in the three preceding KEYSTONE 

increments, th e preparations and preliminary planning for KEY· 

STONE ROBIN were well documented in the Department of the 

Army Letter of Instruction, U.S. Army Pacific. and U.S. Army 

Vietnam implementing instructions. The two most significant im· 

provements made in logistics planning were: 

I. Predisposition instructions for Department of the Army 

Distribution and Allocation Committee and Department of th e 

Army High Interest Items were provided in early August covering 

the entire ALPHA phase of KEYSTONE ROBIN. 

2. U.S. Army Vietnam developed a computer based accounting 

system for establishing an audit trail on all transactions generated 

from KEYSTON E actions. The ALPHA phase of KEYSTONE ROBIN 

terminated on 15 October 1970 and the BRAVO phase began immediately. 

Because KEYSTONE ROBI N phases were scheduled to occur almost 

back-to-back. it was decided at Department of the Army to develop 

equipment and predisposition instructions for the two remaining 

KEYSTONE ROBIN phases and publish them in one document. 

Additionally, it was decided to expand the coverage of th ese 

pred isposition instructions to incl ude a ll Procurement of Equipment and Missil es for the Army principal items forecasted to be 

generated during th e remainder of the fiscal yea r 197 1 KEYSTONE 

redeployment and inactivations. The document was published late 

in October 1970 and forwarded to U.S. Army Pacific in earl y 

November. KEYSTO:-;'E ROBI N BRAVO concl uded on 31 December 

1970. 

Petroleum Support 

The supply of and the policies relating to bulk petroleum are 

under the purview of the Department of Defense and the Unifi ed 

Commanders. Headquarters Military Assistance Command. Vi etnam. received consumption data and demand forecasts for the 

four major products (motor gasoline. diesel £u el. jet fuel, and 

aviation gasoline) from th e three component commands and 

forwarded it through th e Joint Petroleum Office at Headquarters 

Commander in Chief Pacific to the Defense Fuel Supply Center 

for procurement and shipping action. The Army in Vietnam was 

responsible for rece iving, Sloring. distributing and accounting for 

all bulk petroleum in II . Ill. and IV Corps. The Navy was 

responsible In the 1 Corps area with Headquarters Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. coord inating tanker arrivals between 

the two commands. 'Vhen U.S. Army Vietnam took over logistical 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 

responsibility from the Navy in t Corps in June 1970 it also took 

over petroleum operations. 

A big petroleum storage construction effort was necessary to 

support the supply of petroleum. The Army and Navy constructed approximately 1.6 million barrels of fixed storage facilities: 

the bulk of these were in port areas such as Cam Ranh Bay. Qui 

Nhan and Da Nang. The Air Force had about 350,000 barrels 

of storage at air bases, and there was also slightly less than one 

million barrels of commercial storage (Shell, Esso, Callex). About 

90 percent of the commercial storage was located at Nha Be, not 

(ar from Saigon, and was the sole source of petroleum supply 

for the lIt and IV Corps areas. Military storage facilities in these 

areas were filled fTom products that had first been delivered to one 

of the three commercial facilities. 

TABLE S-COU/'oITRYWIDE PE11I.Ol.EUM CONSUMPTION 

(IN TlIOUSANDS Of BARRELS) 

Dl~e 

1964 .. ... ......... ....... .. . 

1965 ...... . ... .. .......... . . 

1966 .............•••........ 

1967 ....................... . 

2.700 

6.785 

'1.8><> 

",280 

Dale 

1968 ..... .... ........ ..... . 

1969 ................ .... . 

1970 .......••••...... ...... 

Quan"" 

45,650 

41.725 

!6,450 

Table 3 shows the consumption of petroleum in th ousa nds of 

barrels. ''''hen related to consumption, the in-country storage 

capacity shows that after 1966, the maximum possible number of 

days of supply on hand at anyone time was 30. However, this 

does not lake into consideration the fa ct that storage fa cilities 

are rarely full due to the need for flexibility in distribution and 

receiving times. After considering this factor, it is more accurate to 

conclude that 20 days of supply was the normal maximum qualllity 

on hand. In order to deliver 100 gallons to a troop unit, more 

than 100 gallons had to be delivered by tanker to care for normal 

handling and evaporation losses, enemy caused losses, and pilferage. 

These losses probably were as high as 3 percent of the quantity 

actually consumed (or 5.7 million barrels). 

Prior to 96~). requirements were small anc! although there 

were no refineries in Vietnam. three international oil companies 

(Shell. USO, Caltex) had adeq uate storage and delivery capabilities 

for Military Assistance Command. Vietnam. demands. These capabilities were sufficient tlmil earl)' 1965 when the petroleum supply 

and distribUlion system in Vietnam was supplemented by military 

equipment in III and IV Corps areas, and a predominantly 

military system was established in other areas of the country. 
74 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Even though procedures had been developed for a military su pply 

system, it was decided in 1965 to augment the existing commercial 

storage and distribution network with military facilities thereby 

reducing the number of facilities required. 

Contracts with the in-country firms prior to 1965 provided for 

delivery, as required, of the products specified into designated 

locations in Vietnam. The military used only 2,700,000 barrels in 

1964. In 1965, however, consumption jumped to 6.785,000 barrels. 

As a result of the increased tempo and shifting combat opera tions, 

monthly requirements changed frequently. Requests for purchases 

were submitted to Ddense Fuel Supply Center on a piecemeal basis 

for deliveries at new locations as dictated by the need. Sometimes 

the requirement was received after the product had been ordered, 

accepled, and used. The Defense Fuel Supply Center contracting 

officer ratified such agreements by contract amendments. 

Often quantities purchased for delivery to certa in loca tions 

were not called forward because shirts in the fighting to other 

locations had eliminated the specifi c requirement. As the requirements increased and locations became more numerous, frequent 

sma ll-emergency procurements and contract changes were neces· 

sary. As the delivery capabil ities of the oil companies became extended, contracting in the normal manner became difficult. Effective competiti on had d isappeared, and often one contractor had to 

be ca ll ed lIpon to make de li very to locations covered under another 

contractor's contract. Moreover. price analysis became next to impossible, and the urgency of the situation did not allow adequate 

time for negotiation. 

Assigned to Headquarters Military Assistance Command , Vietnam, the Sub-Area Petroleum Officer, Vietnam, sent each change in 

requirements by message through Commander in Chief Pacific 

to De£ense Fuel Supply Center and to the appropriate Service 

inventory control points. Defense Fuel Supply Center was not 

authoriled to take contractual action unti l furnished the au thenticating Mil itary Interdepartmental Procurement Req uest by the 

Service In ventory Control Point. Notwithstanding these conditions, 

no contract administrator \I'as assigned to Vietnam, and direct· 

communication between Headquarters Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the contracting officer was not authoriled. 

The problems associated \I'ith contract administration included 

duplicate billing. improper pricing guides and inadequate controls. 

These and other problems were evident in such areas as: government-owned product ill cllstody of contractors, commerc ial delivery 

procedures. and uncalibraled tanks and barges. As late as June 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 75 

1968, the contractors' operations and records were not reviewed on 

a continuing and systematic basis. There were instances in which 

the contractor billed twice for the same product, and /or had borrow 

and loan transactions involving commercial and U. S. fu el out· 

standing as long as six months beyond the contract period. Control 

over the requests for delivery of petroleum, oils, and lubricants 

from commercial sources to authori zed users was not establ ished, 

Requests were often placed directl y on commercial oil compani es 

by various individual users th roughout Vietnam, and as a result , 

the full quantity of petroleum products ordered from and deli vered 

by the contractors was not known at one centralized location. 

It was apparent that in this environment. drastic changes were 

needed in the kind of contracts IIsed and in the contracting 

procedure employed. It was also apparem that contracts had to be 

more flexibl e to be manageable. and some better means was 

necessary to anal yze the overall pricing structure to obtain (or the 

Government a fair and equitable pri ce. 

Defense Fuel Suppl y Center took steps beginning in earl y 1965 

to initiate the innova ti ons that were needed. Some of the steps 

that were taken are as follows: 

Estimated requiremen ts of each product to be sllppl ied through 

in·country contractor terminals at each ocean terminal for one year, 

by six month periods, were obtained. 

The quantity or each product to be supplied or services to be 

perrormed by each contractor during a gi ven period were covercd 

by a single contract. 

Locations to whi ch ultimate delivery was to he made were 

covered in more than onc contract. No contract limitations were 

placed on amollnts to be supplied from each terminal or to each 

destination, though the tota l contract quamity was not to be 

exceeded. 

Deliveri es to unspecified locations or deli veries by circuitous 

routes to specified loca ti ons (due to enemy interdicti on) were 

covered by pricing on the basis of mil eage travel ed. 

Specific provisions were developed to cover vessel delays or 

di versions. 

Prices were broken down hy price componen ts showing com· 

ponenlS for prod uct Free On Bo.'lrd refinery, transportation to 

Singapore area, handling in Singapore area, transportati on to Vi et· 

nam, handli ng ill-coullI ry, tra nsportati on in·country. drumming 

services. and illlo·pl ane deli very. Contracts provided for deli very 

Free on Boa rd refin ery to avoid Saud i·Arabi an taxes. 
76 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

In-country war risk charges and charges for tie-up of contractor's in ventory were eliminated. 

The coastal vessels to be provided and the conditions governing 

their use were specifically set forth in contracts. 

Defense Fuel Supply Center furnished guidance, in the form of 

product alloca tions, to Commander in Chief Pacific as to the 

volumes of each product to be suppl ied by each in-country contractor and Military Sea Transportation Service at each terminal, 

on the basis of proposed contract awards. 

Defense Fuel Supply Cent er included provisions requiring the 

contraclOrs to handl e Government-owned products delivered by 

Military Sea Transportation Service at contractors' terminals north 

of Nha Be. Nha Be, the main terminal, was not included , becallse 

the contractors declined to permit Military Sea Transporta ti on 

Service to make delivery into their facilities there. Apparently 

they feared enemy attacks on military ships might result, and 

effectively close out the terminals. However. the enemy did not 

attack commercial shipping to any degree. 

The extent to which we depended on the three in-country 

commercial distributors for resuppl y and distribution is illustrated 

by the percentages of fuel su ppli ed by them verSliS that suppl ied 

by the Military Sea Transportation Service. (Table 4) 

TABLE 4-PERCENTACE OF FUEL DISTRIBUTED BY COMMERCIAL 

AND MSTS 

Date 

1965 .. ......... . .. .... ........ .. . . ... . 

1966 

1967 . ...... . 

1968 

196' 

1970 

100 

87 

61 

57 

69 

" 

MSTS 

o 

" " ., 

" 57 

Fac ili ties in Vietnam were vulnerabl e to enemy action. The 

large commercial contractors Shell , Esso and Ca ltex had con tiguous 

petroleum, oils, and lubricants faciliti es at Nha Be wh ich were 

particularly vul nerable to mortar attack and other hostil e acts. 

In addition, access to the fac ilities by tankers would have been in 

jeopardy if one or more vessels had been sunk at a strategic 

poim in the channel leading to Nha Be. Si nce 1965, there have 

been a number of attacks on commercia l facilities at Nha Be, 

Tan Son Nhut, Qui Nhon and Lien Chieu. The most significant 

losses were at the Shell Nha Be Terminal in 1967 which amounted 

to approximately $3.5 million. 
I 

SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 77 

No single in-country contractor had adequate fac il ities and 

equipment to handl e the entire military requirement. It was 

necessary to award concurrent contracts to all three companies 

(Esso, Shell and Caltex). Moreover, because of the large and rapid 

increase in demand aft er 1965, all three su ppliers together were 

unable to furnish the additional product that was required. 

Insufficient quantities of tank trucks both commercial and 

military and the Army's ability to install military Victualic pipelines (constructed by joining 20 fOOL lengths of 6'" steel pipe with 

bolted couplings) resulted in the dec ision to install these pipelines wherever they were most needed and they could be protected. 

Map 2 shows the locations of these pipelines throughout Vietnam. 

T he Army was successful in effectively operating all of these lines 

with the exception of II Corps-primarily the Qui Nhon area 

where losses ran as high as 2.5 million ga llons per month due 

mostly to enemy action. The important lesson to be learned here 

is that if assets are not available to protect and secure the pipeline 

(although it can easily be repaired), it is more efficient to resupply fuel by truck, rail, and barge. 

The large volume, the long su pply lines, and the uncertainties 

in schedules res ulted in significant disruption in the worldwide 

tanker schedules of the three in-country contractors. Consequently 

they were unwilling to commit more tankers than were absolutely necessary to su pport the military requirements. While we 

never ran out, there were times when the tankage at Nha Be was 

uncomfortably low. 

To overcome the lack of storage ashore, the expensive expedient of using tankers as floa ting storage LO supplement the onshore storage was implemented. In addition, tankers making deli ver. 

ies often incurred substantial amounts of demurrage and made 

extensive backh auls from Vi etnam to Si ngapore or other Pacific 

military discharge areas (Korea, Japan, Thailand). Initially most 

of the Hoating storage tankers and tankers delivering petroleum, 

oils, and lubricants LO Vietnam were provided by the in·country 

commercia l suppliers. In February and March of 1968 these were 

supplemented or replaced by Military Sea Transport Service tank· 

ers. 

The complexity of the commerci al and military distribution 

system and the difficulties affecting accounting and reimbursement 

are indicated in the following paragraphs by examples in the 

Saigon area in 1968. 

In the Nha Be commercia l storage site, Esso and Caltex re· 

ceived US Government-owned product as well as their own. Shell 
MAP 2 

<)UI NMON-.N"N( 

ilQ '''l($-IINtN 

...... o;H(-.... ".\I 

" " 'lU-IlNa! 

v ..... , 110 UY-'\lV 010. 

" " 'lU-" Nt H .... ,US-., .. CH .... Ull(L 

I'Ol .,[II-C .... R ........ la, a., .• ""LU·"IOC>t· I ueH ,,"'US-IIINtN 

PI.i uO·············O.... ' 

An Mhc ·····6 Oul NIIOn 

S",GOH IIrvEII· ,aN SOH .. "\IT .. ~ • • HllU- " " CH-l , .. eH 

u.s. ARMY PIPELINE SYSTEM 

IN 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

" , I " " [ A " 0 I, I T N1lU 

, I 1tO~lloMnus 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 79 

(Asia tic Petroleum) received only their own product in their 

tankage. Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants was outloaded into 

either industry- or Army·controlled barges or tankers for water 

delivery and into contractor or U. S. Army tank trucks for highway 

delivery. Viell1amese army trucks also picked up bulk petroleum, 

oils, and lubricants or packaged bulk from commercial suppliers at 

Nha Be. 

An Army-comrolled boat or barge picked up jP-4 fuel and 

delivered it to the Binh Loi barge site for delivery through the 

Army pipeline to Tan Son Nh ut Air Base. That pipeline delivered 

the product to Shell, Esso, U. S. Air Force and U. S. Army tankage 

at the base. The product was received into whatever tankage was 

available. Aviation, motor gasoline and diesel fuel was delivered 

to the base by military or commercial tank tnlcks. 

At Tan Son Nhut, aircraft from all four U. S. Services and 

allied forces (for example, Vietnamese, Thai , Australian) were 

refueled. Additionally, commercial charters of American, Braniff. 

Continental, Fl yi ng Tigers. and Southern Air Transport were reo 

fueled there. Esso, Shell, the U. S. Air Force, and U. S. Army, all 

participated in refueling operations from the storage facilities 

mentioned above. 

To support Bien Hoa Air Base, Army·controlled (Army or 

commercial) barges delivered jP-4 fuel from Nha Be to Bu Long 

where it was pumped into Air Force-controlled tankage at Bien 

Hoa Air Force Base. Aviation , diesel, and motor gasoline were 

normally delivered by Army and commercial trucks. 

Large quantities of 55-gallon drums and 500-gallon collapsible 

bags of all types of product were airlifted to upc:ountry terminal 

locations. Delivery of these containers was to Army. Marine, Navy, 

Air Force, or Allied Forces as required. and was subsequently 

issued to Army, Navy, or Air Force as needed at the point of 

delivery_ It was not unusual for the Army to package jP-4 in 500· 

ga llon bags out of Army storage. and for the Air Force to then 

deliver the bags to Pleikll, Phu Bai, or Dong Ha where Army, 

Navy, Marines, or Air Force would use it. In the g·month siege of 

Khe Sanh, for example, the Army air·dropped fuel to the Marines 

for which signed receipts were obviously impossible to obtain. 

Supplementing all of the above, the U. S. Air Force bladderbirds alit of Tan Son NhUl or Bien Hoa at times flew as much as a 

million gallons of jet fuel a month to areas isolated or cut off 

from a ground line of communication and rarely obtained signatures for fuel delivered. 

Financial accounting procedures were not used by Army Class 
80 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

III supply points because of the decision not to extend the stock 

fund into Vietnam. Signed receipts were many limes impossible 

to obtain from consignees because of the following reasons: 

I. Tank trucks loaded with product enronte to Forward Support Areas were destroyed or damaged by enemy action. 

2. Deliveries by air were air-dropped if aircraft were unable to 

land because of enemy fire. 

3. All shipment to Forward Support Areas weTe consigned to 

Army activities although the Air Force could have been the 

predominant user of the product. 

4. At supply points within Fonvard Support Areas product was 

stored and dispensed from TUbber bladders and 500-gallon drums 

with no means to measure q uantiti es delivered to consumers. 

5. Self·service suppl y points were set up and no issue documenta· 

tion was made at these poin ts even when the consumer was a 

reimbursable customer. 

6. It was impossible to get all reimbursement issue documents 

coll ected and forwarded to a central accounting office because of 

communication difficulties. 

A number of steps were taken to reduce the reimbursement 

accounting problems. The most·far reaching of these is the Memorandum of Understanding between the three Services, wherein the 

Services were bill ed and re imbursed for bulk petroleum, oils, and 

lubricants issues in Vietnam on the basis of the Military Assistance 

Command. Vietnam, Month ly Bulk Fuels Report, modified to 

include documented base-level issues and prorated handling losses. 

All Army agencies have indicated satisfaction with this system. 

However. the Army Accounting System differs from that of the 

Navy and Air Force in that financial accountability was not extended by the Army into Vietnam. The Department of the Army 

had granted a deviation from accounting in accordance with 

Army Regulation 735-5: 

The accou nting problems that were encountered in POL support in 

Vietnam were primarily the result of a requirement for detailed finan· 

cial accounting for reimbursement procedures based on the bulk fuels 

report. Howe\'er, many of the problems of a combat area will be solved 

only with the assignment of a qualified Contracting Officer's Representative in-country. 

The Vietnam experience clearly demonstrated that, in an unstable 

area , the extent of financial accounti ng and the method of reimbursement should be decided early in the operation, preferably prior to deployment of forces. 

A joint field assistance team would have been of great value in 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 81 

Vietnam in Ics5ening problems in aCCQllllli ng as well as in asslstmg in 

thc arca of contractor rclations and c.ontract administrations. 

The relationships ami responsibilities of thc Defense Supply Agency! 

Defcnse Fuel Supply Center and other Department of Defense (DOD) aclivitie~ were nOt clea rl y defined as to their respccth'e role~ in contraCt 

administration for POL overseas in DOD Oirctive 4140.25, M(Hla!!emcnt 

of Petroit!tlrn PI'odt/CIS, January 6, 1965, and the implementin/oi: instructions thereto. 

Much of the joint Service participation in POL policy making wa~ 

lost wi th the inaclivation of the Directorate, Petroleum Logi~tirs Policy. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics). 

in 1966. A high.level Joint Petroleum Committee wilh representation 

from the Services. Defense Supply Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff 

would fill the void lert by the inactivation of the Directorate in 1966 

and would enhance overall POL logistics. 

Pilferage was a problem. About 5.7 million harrels of fuel \fa .. 

" losL" through pilferage. evaporation and enemy aCliom. At 15 

cents per gallon that is about $::16 million. On the Victname~e 

economy, it might he three times that amount. The dri\'ers of 

commercial trucks wcre generally poor men and carrying 3,000 

gallons or more of fuel in a truck was a temptation. :\Ian)' 

methods were devised to divert fuel illegally and sell it on the 

economy. Truck drivers installed fahe bottoms on tank~. had 

separate hidden compartments constructed, tampered with scab, 

forged documents, and took other devious measures to pilfer 

quantities of fuel from every deliver)'. A great deal of elTon and 

educating of U.S. military personnel was requited to eliminate 

such practic~. 

The above ground cross country steel bolted pipelines could be 

easily uncoupled with a wrench or plicrs allowing fuel to he 

carried away in cans and buckets as it leaked from thc linc. This 

usually occurred in areas where villages wcre close to the pipeline. 

Some of the fuel taken from pipelines was IIsed for cooking. 

Several large fires which caused considerable damage \\'cre started 

by such actions. 

To assure that the U. S. Government received the full measure 

of its assets in the custody of commercial suppliers as well as 

accurate receipts of commerc ial products from in-country procure· 

ments, the following steps were taken in II, III. and IV Corps. A 

file of authorized customer signature cards \\'as established at each 

call-fonvard oAice. All customers were required to forward one 

copy of each delivery ticket to the call-forward office. Special im· 

printing devices were issued to all major customers for imprinting 

delivery tickets with a coded impression. Contractors were re· 

quired to log all truck shipments to each customer, each month. 
82 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

In numerical sequence. Contractors were required to submit 

delivery summaries with supporting delivery tickets to the appropriate call-forward office for verification of deliveries prior to 

submission of Form DD 250 for billing purposes. Meters were 

installed at receivi ng activities. Standard Operating ProcedUTcs 

with check lists were made available to cllstomers for use in 

receiving cOntractor del iveries. Training classes rOT personnel in· 

volved with receiving COntractor deliveries were conducted. Similar 

procedures were establ ished by the Navy in I Corps. 

Despite the shortcoming the dual distribution system (military 

and civilian) may have had, it did provide the requ ired support. 

Without the cooperation and dedication of personnel employed by 

the commercial contractors, petroleum resupply to U. S. Forces in 

Vietnam could have been degraded in such a manner as to limit 

and drastica ll y curtail military operations. 

Common Supply Support 

The situation facing Army, Navy, and Air Force logisticians in 

Vietnam during the early days of the build·up was such that no 

one Service was particularly anxious to support another. Nonethe· 

less, it was recognized as far back as 1962 that overall economi cs 

could be realized through Common Supply Support. 

Common Supply Support in Vietnam began with the introduc· 

tion of the U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group and the 

assignment of responsibilities to the Navy in 1962 as the designated 

administrative agency to provide logistic support to the Military 

Assistance Advisory Grollp. As advisory forces grew, the su pport 

tasks soon grew well beyond that of an administrative agency. Com· 

man su pply items were issued directly to Army, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps units, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Crollp 

staff and to the senior logistics advisers in the four corps tactical 

zones for further distribution to advisers in the field. Included 

were subsistence, clothing, and general suppli es totaling 3,500 

items that were primarily for housekeeping, maintenance, and 

administration. This system was barely sufficient for the limited 

initial U. S. involvement. 

Primary logistics functions in the northernmost corps tactical 

zone in Vietnam were assigned to the Navy in October 1965, and 

to the Army (1st Logistical Command) in the other three corps 

tactical zone in April 1966. This system continued through the 

build-up and imo the post build-up period. 

The biggest drawback of Common Supply Support throughout 

the Vietnam era was the Jack of a definitive list of items for this 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 83 

support. \Vhere common use was a criterion, none of the lists de· 

veloped for common item support constituted more than a relatively 

sma ll portion of the total line items stocked by the Military Servo 

ices in Vietnam. They were, however, in many cases, high-volume 

demand items. 

Efforts by the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the Services during these periods to establish a single common 

supply system in Vietnam were singular in their lack of accomplishment. In November 1965, the Department of Defense had 

approved a Joint Chiefs of Staff study that recommended a single 

supply system and tasked the Army with establishment and operation of the proposed system. The Army plan called for implementation in four phases over a twelve month period. The final impact 

of this plan would have made the Army the sole source of common 

supply items in the entire theater. While General Westmoreland 

felt that a single system would be the most economical for reo 

sponsive long-term support, the peculiar situation in I Corps (predominately 'avy-Marine forces ashore and uneasiness of the tactical 

situation) dictated that the existing system be continued as being 

least disruptive and most responsive for the short-term support. 

As a result of Commander in Chief Pacific recommendations 

and General Westmoreland's commentS. the Depanment of De· 

fense disapproved the plan in December 1966 and concluded that 

required procedures for operating integrated depotS in South Vietnam were not sufficientl y advanced to accommodate a large expansion in common supply at that time. Until further planning 

could be accomplished and the I Corps assignment could be shifted 

to the Army. the Navy was to continue to provide r Corps support. 

Again, in March 1968, a modified expansion plan was submitted 

for implementation but again disapproved citing the disruptive 

effect of such an expansion, the reponed poor response ex· 

perienced by the Air Force for common supply items in II. Ill, and 

IV Corps, and the continued low demand satisfaction provided by 

the 1st Logistical Command depots. 

Thus, common supply. as it existed in Vietnam throughout the 

post buildup period, amounted to a continuation of the interim 

arrangements set lip in 1966 among the Services for the support 

of common items. 

The Army implementation in II, 111 and IV Corps of Common 

Supply Support was limited initially to the 1965 Navy Ii~i. of 

3,500 items. Late in the post buildup period, Army depots at 

Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay. and Qui Nhon were stocking between 

2,550 and 2,650 of these items. The system required that Navy 
84 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

and Air Force requests for COllllllon supply items in the II , III and 

IV Corps be submitted to one of the three Army Depots. H stock 

was not available at the depot receiving the requisition, it was 

passed via the Invcl1lory COlltrol Center 10 whichever other incoulltry depot had siock available. The Services did not have a list 

of common supply items which sho\\'ed acceptable substitutes. 

'Vhen stock was 1I0t availahle, in,coulI~ry requisitions were 

normally forwarded to the Continental U.S. via 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa. Due to an early poor record of fill , the Navy 

and Air Force elected to requisition from the Army on a fill or kill 

basis. When requisitions weTC killed by the Army source, the Air 

Force and lhe :'\'avy then would re·requisition through their 

particular service supply system. This situation continued until 

mid·1969, when both the ;.I"avy and Air Force e ither stopped or 

suhstantially reduced the lise of fill or kill procedures, indicating 

that the Army·run common supply system was effective. 

Upon the transfer of the logi~ti<"al support mission from the 

Naval support :1ctivity in Da Nang to the U.S. Anny, the 1st Logis· 

tical Command direct{'d restreening of all items declared surplus 

and exces~ prior La final dispos;d action. Over SCi million worth of 

property \\'as physically mo\'ed to the t 1• S, Army property disposal 

activity at DOl Nang from the Naval support activity. It took twelve 

months to complcte the ~creening :lIlel redistrihution of th e majority 

of the items. The hulk of thc items were tran~ferred to the Viet· 

namese Army hased nn valid requisitions th ey had outstanding ami 

a U.S. advisor validation of the requiremcllls prior to transfer. 

The U. <i. Army supported other elements he~ides th e military 

services. Many of the contractors performing seT\'ices for the Army 

were supponed by the Army suppl) system. i\fany repair parts 

items used by cOIJlraClors were eit her available or cou ld be made 

available through the Army supply s)'stelll. U. S. Government con· 

tractors in South Vielllam, however, experienced a great deal of 

difficulty in ohlaini ng suppon from th e U. S. Army supply system. 

\Vhether this is a resuit of the contractors not effectively meshing 

wilh the suppl)' system or the supply system's failure to antici pate 

the nature and extent of con tractors' requirements is nOt com· 

pletely clear. Nonetheless, there are several factors which arc 

readil y apparent. 

COntraClors were used in Vietnam because construction and 

service requirements were beyond the capabilities of the assigned 

military units. Ordinarily a contractor procures his own supplies, 

but this was not feasihle in Vietnam. Therefore. contractors were 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 85 

added to the supply system as a "using unit." In theory this works 

well, but from a practical viewpoint, it did not work satisfactorily, 

The contractor, because of his large sca le operation, should not 

be classified as a nonnal "using unit. " Experience revcaled that 

the direct support unil was unable to handle the multitudinous 

flow of needed support for the contractor, therefore the attempt to 

do so resulted in delay and inefficient support to the contractor, 

To prevent this happening in the future, all large contractors 

should receive support for their requests directly from the depol. 

Contractor operations were different fTom normal military 

operations and usually required nOIl·standard supplies. An example 

was the generator problem, The Vinnell Corporation and Paciftc 

Architects and Engineers operated a number of 1500 kilowatt 

generators, which supplied electrical po\\'er to facilities in South 

Vietnam. Parts for these generators were incorpor,\lcd into the 

supply system as non·standard repair parts and given Federal 

Stock Numbers. Unfortunately these parts did not move through 

the depot system fast enough to satisfy the cnntractors' needs. Since 

the items often were not available through the Army supply 

system, the more responsive (and more expensive) contractor procurement sources were frequently used. 

Fh!ancin/ ConfroiJ 

In order to gel supplies to Vietnam eluring the buildup and to 

StOp them once the drawdo\\'n began, an appreciat ion of the 

funding, in·country procurement activity, and management tech· 

niques that were employed in Vietnam and in the United States is 

necessary. 

The Planning. Programing, and Budgeting System was the 

basic financial management "elude used by the Army during the 

early phase of the war in Vietnam to support operations. 

The Operations and Maintenance. A1'my appropriation financed 

thal portion of the logistics system devoted to the procurement, 

supply management, storage, handling. and second destination 

transportation of materiel. It also provided the fTamework for 

budgeting for consumer funds which were utilized for purchasing 

operating supplies and equipmclll to support the deployed forces 

in Vietnam. The Arm)' decided not to extend the stock fund to 

Vietnam feeling that the managemelll constraint.!. were lOO burden· 

some in a combat environmcnt. 

In ftscal year 1966. Operation and Maimcnance, Army funds 

received by U.S. Army Paciftc for support of U.S. Army Vietnam 

were issued to General Accounting Office 86 in U.S. Army Ryukyu 
86 LOCISTIC SUPPORT 

Islands. This was due to a shortage of qualified accoullting personlle l and adequate automatic data processing capability in Vietnam and furth er it was an altempt to relieve th e U.S. Army Vietnam 

Commander of lhe added burden of fin ancia l reponing. 

Dy mid fiscal year 1967 the Army approved establishment of 

the Centralized Financial Management Agency in Hawa ii. This 

agency was given the responsibility for maintaining control over all 

funds extended to U.S. Army Paci fi c in support of Vi etnam except 

th ose alloned in-coulllry and funds allocated to U.S. Army Ryukyu 

Islands for Okinawa su pport activities. Table 5 shows Operalion 

and Maintenance, Army. direct fund comparisons. 

Eslablishmc lll of the Centra lized Financial Management Agency 

central ized control and accou nting of funds for support of U.S. 

Army Vietnam olll·of·country requirements. The system provided 

for central ized Ob ligation of funds upon receipt of billing fTom 

the supplier. The basic concept of the system was th at fund reservations were to be establ ished at Central ized Financial Man· 

agement Agency based llpon receipt of an image copy of all out-of· 

country requisitions. Essentially there was a policy of free now of 

requisitions from U.S. Army Vietnam with doll ar accounting and 

control established at Centralized Financial Management Agency. 

The weakness of the system was that Centralized Financial Man· 

agemellt Agency \,'as not in the requisition channel and con· 

sequelllly was bypassed 011 numerous req uisitions. As a result, bills 

were received for mat erial without fund reserva ti ons having been 

established at Centralized Financial Management Agency. It was 

difficu lt to determine at a given point in lime the status of funds 

TABLE 5-DIIu' CT F UND CO;>.tPARISO:-;S "'OR QPERATIO:>l AND 

:>I"r.NAI\C , ARMY DtRIl"C THE H UH.D·U P PERIOD 

(1/1,' THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) 

Tunds n ' 1965 n ' 1966 TY 196i n ' 1968 TV 1969 

Approprialed ..... ...... 3,482.910 .,594.200 7,1048,477 6,995."2 7.986JIO 

Basic , ...... , .. ... ....... ' .• ~9.000 '.48'.600 5.1 Z2.427 6,9~2J75 7,805.000 

I'a y Supplemental ..... 4'.910 'MOO 93,000 52.757 +85.000 

Southeast A~ia 

SUllplcrnt:mal ... ... . .. - 1.077.200 1,93S.0~ - 96JIO 

Appropriatioll Transfers 

• Rcpn>g,.amming ... " . +63.(1-12 +~.899 1~2,571 + 1.134.9CH - 1.835 

Sou lhcast Asia .. ...... +65.700 +1~9,600 +45.135 +1 .255,234 - Other ....... ........... - 2.658 +1 19.299 +97.436 - 120,330 - 1.835 

Total l\"on .obligated Appro. 

priatio", ,,,"aibblc . .... 3.545.952 4.853.099 7.291.<1-18 8.130,03(; 7.984.475 

Total Obligated .... .... ..... '.5-i5.952 4,853.099 7.290.438 8,129.992 7.984.475 

Unobligated ................ - - 610 .. -
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 87 

and fund requirements. To alleviate this situation, Centralilecl 

Financial Management Agency proposed that a central control 

point be established through which all ~ .. fili tary Standard Re· 

quisitioning and Isslle Procedures transaction documellls "'ould 

flow for supply and fund management purpose. The Invelllory 

Control Center, Vietnam, the Av iation i\faleriel Management 

Center, and 32d Medi ca l Depot were to play aclive pans. The 

3S (Standard Supply System), which U.S. Army Pacific installed, 

mechanized supply and financial information for Vietnam and 

assisted in resolving this problem. 

Centralized Financial Management Agency was the proponent 

of a monthly report (RCS CSCAB-254) which served as the 

primary source of financial information. However. this occurred 

at the end of the buildup phase (3 1 October 1967). During the 

early years (1965- 1967) on ly limited information was availahle. 

If the total financial picture was desired, informa ti on had to be 

requested from U.S. Army Vietnam, V .S. Army Pacific, Army 

Materiel Command, U.S. Army RYl1kyu Islands, Logistin Control 

Office, Pacific and the Comptroller of the Army. 

Centralized Financial Management Agency used tapes lur trans· 

action report information or requisition copy images but found 

that by using this method, reconciliation of su pply and fiscal re· 

cords was virtually impossible. In the first reconcilia tion, 49,608 

requisitions were outstanding. 

Since U.S. Army Vietnam had no capability to determine or 

projecl funding requiremenu for procurement of either consump' 

tion or slockage items, U.S. Army Pacific provided budget esti· 

mates based on the best available records and assumptions. Using 

historical data to produce costs per man year supported and flyin g 

hour costs, U.S. Army Pacific projected materiel costs oased on the 

force structure as provided by Department of the Army. 

Budgets for Operation and i\ la intenance, Army supply opera· 

tions were based on a combination of U.S. Army Pacific forecasts 

of materiel requirements, historical costs of suppo1'ling military 

man years in country, and approved changes in the force structure. 

It can be seen that a solid financial management plan \\' 3 S not 

implemented until after the buildup phase in Vietnam. In 

fact , the Army did not elect to financially account for in·country in· 

ventories until 1969 when a system for financial inventory aCt 

counting was established for depots. Until that time all formal 

appropriation accoullting for the initial buildup requirements was 

done at a loca tion outside of Vietnam. 

Experience gained in Vietnam proved that financial manage· 
88 LOCISTIC SUPPORT 

melll must Te£cive concu rrent attention and priority with logistics 

management. \Vh en this OCCllrs, effective ancl efficient materiel 

management ca n foll ow. 

ProCliremelll 

Early in the buildup. it became apparent that to conserve 

resources and to meet demanding deadlines it would be necessary 

to contraci for much of the support Iradi tionally provided by 

military organizations. Thlls. th e United Slales Army Procuremem Agency. Vietnam was born . During the peak fiscal year 

I 968- fiscal )'car 1969 lime frame. this Agency awarded and administered COIHraCtS vai ll cd at approximately one-half billion dollars. Performing these contracts required contractors to employ 

over 52,000 people. 

The first Army procuremenl organization was established 

in Vietnam during February 1962. This was the Purchasing and 

Contracting Office which was assigned to the U.S. Army Support 

Group. Vietnam. On I April 1%5, this office was redesignated as 

thc Purchasing and Cuntracting Division of the 1st Logistical Command. As a result of the build-up of forres. the procuremem 

effon was expanded and o n 10 ay 1966 the activity was again 

reorgani7:cd and designaled as the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, 

Vietnam and was assigned to th e 1st Logistical Command. The 

commanding officer of U.S. Arlit)' Procu rement Agency. Vi etnam 

also served on the ISl l. ()gi~ icaJ Command Staff as the Director 

of Procurement. The mission of the U.S. Army Procurement 

Agency, Vietnam was to: 

I. Provide I'espomi\'c procurement support to the combat and 

mmbat support element .. of the l'nited States Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. the United States Army Vietll<lIn. Free " 'arid 

Military Assistance Forces. and clcmenL" of other military or 

civili an services as directed. 

2. Assist the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Oevelopment, support the Agenc)' for Int ern;ui on;d Developmenl. and 

support th e U.S. Emhassy in th e surve), and development of 

industria l, service. and agricultu ral sources and (,apahilities to provide increased production in th e Repuhli c of Vietnam. 

In performance of this mission. th e l'.S. Arll1)' Procurement 

Agency, Vietnam executed and administered a variety of contrac ts 

for supplies, subsistence. and services snch as repair and utilities 

senices. elcctrica l power generation and distribution, stevedoring, 

transportati on, equipment maintenance as well as laundry and 
SUP P LY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 89 

misce ll aneous services. The following table depicts the dollar value 

of these procurements: 

PROCURE;\It::-.'T PRQGRA!'-fS BY FISCAL YEAR 

(MIl.! 10;\"S OF OOI. LARS) 

1967 1968 196' 1970 

Supplies ................. S (;.9 S 11.2 S 6.7 S 6.9 

SUOsi5\cncc .......... .. 12.0 13.6 22.2 19.8 

Sef\'i~ .. ...... .. 156.4 234.3 207.1 210.8 

TOlab ... ....... ......... 5175.3 S2S9.1 S236.0 5237.5 

1971 

S ,.S 

23.0 

163.7 

5189.0 

Although these COlHraCIS were solicited. n egoliatecl , execulecl. and 

administered in a combat zone , all of the procurement aClions 

taken were in accordance with the Armed Services Procurement 

Regulation and pertinelll Army procedures and instructions. 

There were no unusual alHhorities or deviations W'anted lhe U.S. 

Army Procurement Agency. Vietnam. Their contracts. organiza. 

tion, and operations were r.:viewed and audited in the same manner 

as procurement activities in other overseas areas and in Ihe 

continental U.S. 

The largest contract, measured in the number of contractor 

personnel and dollar value, II"a5 the calitraCl for Repair and 

Utiliti es services. The concept of tactical operations in Vietnam 

called far the construction of base camps throughout the country 

from which (aClical operations were conrluued. Each hase camp ('on· 

sisted of temporary and semipermancnt slrtlclUI"CS which provided 

living areas. supply areas, and a base of operations. These hase 

camps werc simila r to posts, camps, ami stati on'i throughout the 

world and required similar Post Engineer services. In addition 10 

providing Repair and l ' lililies services. th e cOlllraClor was also 

responsible for the backup maintenance and supply funniolH In 

support the Repair and Utilities mission. 

The Repair and Util iti es contractor also provided rield rnaimen· 

allce and repair parts support for installed eCJuipment such as I{CTl' 

erators, air conditioners, refri~erators, and pumps. as well ~ 

operating the Class IV supply yards for COTlstruction Illateriilk Oh· 

taining Rcpair and til ilic~ services hy ('Oll tra!'t was not a II('\\" 

undertaking. This techniquc has heen utilized in Korea. under 

peacetime conditions, for a numher of years. Thc scope and rapid 

growth of lhe Vietnam reqlliremel1l re'illhed in situati ons which 

had not previously occurred. The lack of skilled labor in Victnam. 

for example, resuhed in lhe contractor hiring large numbers of 

U.S. and Third Country Nat ionals to maintain the desired level of 

performance, 
90 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

In addi ti on :0 org:lIlizing for performance of the Repair and 

(lliJilics mission. the contractor had to perform several functions 

not ILsually allied with norm<l] Repair and Uti liti es activities. In 

supporting the growth I)f the Repair and l llililics requirement , 

availahlt· miti!;!r), [ranspon<llioll was inmfliciel1l to move the ("on· 

IraClor'~ ~llpplics and m'llerials. The conlJ';lClor and subcontractor 

had to use their own resources. In addi ti on. communications 

throughout Vielllam posed a significalll control problem: therefore 

a separate radio network was established and operated. It was therefore necessary for the contraCI(,r to establish a procliremclH organ ization to supp!emcm government resources. In each of these instances. the magnitude of the requirement was not envisioned 

sufficiently in advance to allow in.depth planning thal would resuh 

in efficient utilization of resources. 

The power requirements for military operations in Vietnam 

were unique compared to previous military operations. In Vietnam, 

praCtically all nrens were illuminated by floodliglllS at night for 

security reasons. The hol. humid climate required a heavy usage 

of electrical refrigeration ;mel cool in g eq uipment to protect food. 

medical supplies, and other wenlher-sensitive malerinls. Further, 

the Army's sophistica ted communica tion , transportation, and weapons systems also require increased qua11lities of electrical power. 

During the summer ,mel fall of 1965, the U.S. Forces in Vietnam 

began to experience a critical shortage of utility type electric 

pall'er generati ng equipmetH. Due to the long lead time in 

procurement of large generators and the immediate need for 

electrical power genera ti on , a plan was conceived to send sta ndard 

size (T - 2) petroleum tankers from the mOlhball fleet to Vietnam 

and conVert them into electrical power generating barges when 

moored on site. In ~Iar("h 1966. a contract \\"as executed to pro"ide 

for rehabilitating", manning. and provisioning the ships, then sa iling 

them to Vietnam and mooring them on the planned sites. The 

turho-electric generators of the vessels were connected to a transmission cable which led to a transmitter station on shore for 

further distribution to land line systems. Subsequent contrncts 

were executed to provide for land based power genera ting facilities 

to replace th ese power barges. 

The procurement of suppli es and equipment in Vietnam was 

limited, with certnin exceptions. to combat emergency require. 

ments. There were 1\\"0 basic reasons for this policy: it acted as a 

control against inflation by limiting the Aow of dollars into th e 

economy and was a supporting factor in th e U, S. Balance of Payments Program. Further, the poor quality of Vietnamese manu-
SUPPLY SU P PORT IN VIET NAM 9 1 

factured end ilems compatible with U. S. military req uiremen ts 

made it impractical to consider the loca l purchase of most equipment. 

The variety and magnitude of the services provided U. S. and 

Free "Vorld Forces by contract augmellled the logistic system very 

effectively. The successfu l techniques and procedures developed 

by U.S. Army Procuremem Agency, Vietnam in providing these 

procurement services, in the combat zone, will be the basis for 

contract logistica l support in future conRicts. 
92 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

V IETNAMESE FARMER OP.;RATts ROTc)' TILLER ALONGSIDE P I.OW PULLED 

BY WATER BUFFALO 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 93 

GUN TRUCK-5-TON M51A2 "HARDt;NED" VEHICI_£., A80VE; CUN TRUCK5-TON M54A2 MOUNTED WITI-( SniPPED DOWN HULL OF ARMORED 

P£RSONN.:I. CARRIER, BELOW. 
94 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

F IELD DEPOT THU D uc STORAGE AREA 5 i\'I II.ES NORTH OF SAICON, ABOVE; 

FIELD DEPOT THu D ue STORACE AREA AFTER I MPROVEMENTS, BELOW. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNA M 95 

UNl.O .... DING OF 2Vz·TOS TRUCK AT S .... ICON PORT. 
96 l.OGISTIC SUPPORT 

FISH MARKET AREA IN SAIGON AFn:R IMPROvEMENn, ABOVE; QUI NUON 

LocISnCAL DEPOT, BELOW. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 97 

AERIAL VIEW OF NEWPORT 
98 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

AIR DROP OF SUPI'IoU::S IN OPERATION JUNCTION CITY 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 99 

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER GIV~:S 5,OOO-CAI.LON TANKER PUSH UP 

MUDDY HILL TO FIRE SUPPORT BASE, AROVE; AER IAL VIEW OF VUNG 

TAU, SUOWl"G POL .lETTY, TANK FARM, AND AIR FIELD, BELOW. 
100 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

POL STORACE FARM AT T .... y NINH USING BLADDERS FOR STORAGE, ABOVE: 

LO .... DlNG OF CLASS 1 SUPPLlJ::S FROM DEPOT AT CHOlON, BELOW. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 10 1 

REFRIGERATION CONTAII'IEIlS AND STORAGE AREA AT CUOLON, ABOVE; 

2!;2-TON TRUCK POL CoNVOY AT PLEIKU, UELOW. 
102 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

---- AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT UNDER CONSTRUCTION NEAR A FIRE BASE 

I N KONTUM PROVINCE, CEN1'RAL HIGH LANDS, ABOVE; CRANE LOADINC 

AMMUNITION ON TO TRANSPORTER FOR SHIPMENT TO 

AMMUN ITION DEPOT, BELOW. 

T 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 103 

FORK LIFT WITH 175MM SHEl.LS TO MOVE TO THE STOCK PII...E AREA , 

VUNC Ro BAY, VIETNAM, A80VE; BERMED OPEN STORACE. CoMPUX 

OF THE 5 420 AMMUN IT ION FIELD DEPOT, B IEN THU, 

VU:TNAM, BEl.OW. 
104 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

AERIAL Vn:w OF AN AMMUNITION STORACE Au ... , CAM RANIi BAY, 

VIETNAM, ABOVE; ARTILLERY AMMUNITION PREPARED FOR SLiNC 

LoADINC BY HEUCOPTER. BIEN THU, V IETNAM, BELOW. 
SUPPLY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM 105 

FORK LIFT UNLOADING PALLETS OF I05MM HOWITZER ROUNDS FROM A 

SEA-LAND VAN, Pl..EIKU, VIETNAM. 
CHAPTER IV 

Ammunition Logistics 

This chapter identifies the problems that develo~d in ammunition support. Ammunition is considered to be a "stovepipe" 

commodity in that it is requisitioned and reported on through a 

single channel. The high degree of ammunition support provided 

to the combat elements in Vietnam was the result of intensive 

management at Department of Defense, Department of the Army. 

and Theater level, and the dedicated efforts of men in ammunition units in the ammunition depots and supply points in 

Vietnam. 

The buildup in Southeast Asia impacted on the entire spectrum 

of ammunition logistics: design and development, procurement 

and production, budgeting. distribution, transportation, storage. 

personnel and units. reporting procedures. command and control. 

security, maintenance and disposal. 

The Buildup 

In March of 1965, the only U.S. Army ammUllItion stocks in 

Vietnam were those belonging to the 5th Special Forces units based 

in Nha Trang and the armed helicopter units based at Tan Son 

Nhut. 

The former was a mixture of modern, World ''''ar II and foreign munitions, all in limited quantities re.supplied monthly from 

Okinawa. The latter was essentially helicopter ammunition: 7.62-

mm, 40·mm Grenade, 2.75" Rocket. and various signal flares and 

smoke grenades. 

The slockage on hand Auctllaled around 1,500 short tons at Tan 

Son Nhul which was stored in an old French storage site on the 

Airbase. Even this quantity was too much for lhe fa cility which had 

safe storage capacity of approximately 900 short lons under a waiver 

due to its proximity to fuel storage, napalm mixing sites, and the 

main airbase runway. 

Elsewhere in the Pacific Theater, U.s. Army Pacific had ammunition reserves stored in Korea , Japan, Hawaii, Okinawa, and 

Thailand plus a limited supply in the Departmem of the Army 

Forward Floating Depot in the Philippines. These stocks were for 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 107 

the most part reserved for Commander in Chief Pacific can· 

tingency plans and were earmarked for deployment with U.S. 

Army Pacific units. The contingency plan for Southeast Asia Slated 

that units would carry their basic loads and would be supported 

for the first 180 days by Push Packages of ammunilion shipped 

from Continental U.S. depots. 

Based on the decision at the 9- 11 April 1965 Hawaii Conference to deploy combat units to Vietnam, several ammunition 

related actions were implememed: ammunition depot and supply 

point locations were selected, real estate was acquired, ammunition 

units were included in force requirements plans, and a Slackage 

objective of 60 days in·country was planned in conjunction with a 

SO·day off·shore reserve to be established on Okinawa. The 50·day 

in·country stockage objective was to consist of 45 days at Qui Nhon, 

Cam Ranh Bay and the Saigon area, and 15 days in Ammunition 

Supply Points. 

Concurrent with this planning and, perhaps a portent of 

things to come, the ISl Logistical Command requisitioned from the 

2d Logistical Command on Okinawa a 15-day supply of ammunition to support the 173d Airborne Brigade which was earmarked 

for early deployment to Vietnam. However, this requisition was 

canceled by the 2d Logistical Command as the Push Packages 

from Continental U.S. would sUSlain the deploying units until 

normal pipeline operations could be established. Things didn't 

work quite that well. The 173d Airborne Brigade deployed rapidly 

and immediately commenced combat operations and the Push 

Packages, delivered in 3~-day increments were far short of the 

quantity being consumed and also conta ined obsolete ammunition 

such as anti-tank mines, 3.5 N rockets, and anti·tank munitions for 

90-mm tank guns and IOO-mm recoilless rifles. As a consequence. 

the 1st Logistical Command requisition was purified and initiated 

anen'. This time ammunition, approximately 225 tons, was immediately airlifted from Okinawa to Tan Son Nhul. This action 

tied lip all the available transport aircraft in the theater for a 7-

day period and also dangerollsly overloaded the ammunition stor· 

age site at Tan Son Nhut, as this input coupled with the Push 

Packages totaled more than 4,000 short tons, 

From April through June, the ammunition picture was chaotic 

at best. Push Packages arrived before units, units were diverted 

fTom their scheduled debarkation points where their ammunition 

was offloaded, and ammunition piled lip on lhe beach at Cam 

Ranh Bay and aboard leased sampans and barges on the Saigon 

River. The problem was compounded by the delayed arrival of 
108 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

transportation terminal uniLS and Ammunition Companies to 

clear the pon and manage the receipt, storage, issue. and requisitioning of ammun ition. 

\Vith the establishment of Ileadquaners U.S. Army Vietnam 

in Jllly 1965, some order hegan to appear in the ammunition logis· 

tics picture. The arrival of the 182d Ammunition Stock Control 

Detachment along with onc ammunition company and several 

detachments also helped ahhollgh difficulties were still experi. 

enced in the next six mOlllhs. These celllered around the lack of 

ammunition command and control units. the lack of senior am· 

munition officers and staffs at Headquarters U.S. Arm)' Vietnam 

and the 1st Logistical Command. and the malassignmcm of the 

182d Stock Control Detachmelll to the Saigon Area Support Command. The 182d, through co-ordination with the few ammunition 

units that had by then arrived in Vietnam (one company and twO 

detachments) began the task of estahlishing an ammunition suppon system. Based on estimates of the ammunition on the ground 

and on unofficial counts of weapons densities. stockage objectives 

were computed and requisitions were initiated to maintain the 

fiO.day stockage objecti\e in-mulllr)'. 

With the buildup proceeding, the 182d Stock Control Detachment. without direct access to the 1st Logistical Command Ammunition Staff Office, continued to manage the ammunition SllppOrt program. Requisitions "'ere developed and passed to the 2<1 

Logistica l Command who in tllrn either filled the requisitions 

from stocks on hand or passed them to Headquarters U.S. Army 

Pacific. If Headquarters U.S. Arm)' Pacific was unable to fill the 

requisitions from other thealer assets, the requisitions were passed 

on to the Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency. Tt didn't 

take long-three months-to exhaust available U.S. Arm)' Pacific 

assets. By then it was clear something else had to be done. Consumption rates were higher than planning had foreseen and weapons 

density calculations were inaccurate. 

Improvements were made. some almost immedi<ltcly. others 

later. Some of the debys in the requisitioning system were eliminated when. in July 1965. Okinawa was by>passed. Requisitions then 

flowed directly 10 Ammunition Procurement :mel Suppl)' Agency 

with information to Headquarters U.S. Army Pacific\ Inventor)' 

Control Point. who filled requisitions to the extent possihle and 

notified Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency of those 

requisitions on which U.S. Arm)' Pacific had taken action. Even so. 

improvement in reporting was warranled to the extent that the 

Sccretary of the Army dispatched a team of ammunition cxperts 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 109 

to Vietnam to exam ine the problems incident to (he \'al idity and 

timel iness of the U.S. Army Vietnam "U.S. Army 'Vorldwide 

Ammunition Reponing System (WARS), ReS CSGLD- 1322" 

feeder report. 

The findi ngs and recommendations of this team represen ted a 

critical upturn in ammunition logistics and are synopsized as follows: 

J. Immediately implement the doctrine for Ammu n ition Servo 

ice in the Theater of Operations (F:-. r 9- 6) throughout the theater. 

2. Organize an Ammunition Staff headed by a full colonel. 

reponing to the G-4, U.S. Army Vietnam. 

3. Establish an Ammunition Croup as quickly as possible to 

provide operational control and management O\'er ammunition 

and ammunition units. 

4. Rea~ign the 182d Stock Control Detachment 10 G-4. U.S. 

Army Vietnam. 

5. Assign all ammunition units 10 include the I R2d Stock Control Detachment to the Ammunilion Group upon its estahlishment. 

''''hi Ie these recommendations were never fully implemented. 

the extent to which they \\'ere resulted ill ,m o\'erwhelming improvement for ammunition logistics. An operational st;IfT headed 

by a full colonel was activated at Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam, The 52<.1 Ammunition Group Headquarters ami Headquarters 

Company was activated, sem to Vietnam in February 1966. and ILsed 

as the nuclells of the Directorate of Ammunition at 1st Logistical 

Command. The 182d Stock Control Detachment was assigned In 

the Ammunition Dire('toratc at lSI Logistical COTllmand. Cnmm:lI1r1 

and Control of Ammunition Units wa~ ohtained through the ex· 

pedited arrival of Batlalion Headquarters and Headquarters Companies and the estahl ishment of Directors of Ammunition at each 

of the Area Logistics Commands. or eq ual importance. a system 

was developed wherehy the G- :\. U.S. Army Vietnam prm!iciC'd 

valid weapons densities to the 182£1 Stock Control Detachment. 

Ammllllili011 Slipply Rates 

The overriding issue during the lime frame J anuary- J ulle 

1966. (more important than the port thTII·put of ammunition 

which will be addressed later) was that of determining valid ~uppl} 

rates. The supply rates had far-reach ing impl ications in that they 

impact on the length of time n to P stocks would last. (D LO P 

stocks are those war reserves of ammunition which are stocked in 
110 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

peace time to provide the necessary reservoir of ammunition to 

sustain combat operations until such time that the planned production base can be activated and producing at a rate which equals 

consumption. The designation "0" signifies deployment date or 

the date that hostilities commence and "P" signifies production 

day, hence D-P stocks.) Supply rates are also a factor in determining 

when, in what quantities. and at what rate production of ammuni· 

tion should be established. For these reasons, it was virtually neces· 

sary that realistic supply ratcs be determined and approved, so 

that necessary funds could be provided in the revised fiscal year 

1966, 1967, and 1968 budgets. 

Prior to the onset of the buildup in Vielnam, the authorized 

ammunition expenditure rates (supply rates) were published in 

Supply Bulletin !J8- 26. These rates had been derived from historical data generated from World War 11 and the Korean conflict 

and modified by subsequent slUdies and war gaming exercises. 

The alarming sca le at which most of these consumption rates 

were being exceeded in Vietnam, due to the unique environmental conditions and operational concepts, resulted in a dramatic 

drawdown of reserve ammunition stocks. 

Headquarters U.S. Anny Pacific in coordination with Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam and Department of the Army concurrence, issued U.S. Army Pacific Regulation 710-15 on 9 June 

1966, titled Theater Required Supply Rates for Ammunition-SEA. 

Essentially, this regu lation provided for two rates; one being the 

Theater Stockage Objective Rate which provided the basis for 

determining U.S. Army Vietnam's Slockage Objective; and the 

other rate being the Required Supply Rate for the aUlhorized expenditure rate which was the basis for requisitioning replacement of 

combat consumption. Provisions were made for necessary rate 

changes and the regulation was updated semiannually. These 

rates, in rounds per weapon per day or rounds per unit per day. 

when multiplied by the applicable weapons or unit density determined a day of supply. This day of supply for each line item was 

utilized in computing Slackage objectives and requisitioning objectives. 

At the October 1967 Munitions Conference at Headquarters 

U.S. Army Pacific, the dual rate was discontinued and a single 

Required Supply Rate based on the highest six months consump· 

tion period was substituted to bring rates in line with the latest 

consumption experience data. Subsequent semi-annual ammu nition 

conferences were held at Headquarters U.S. Army Pacific for purposes of revising rates to insure their validity and to resolve 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 111 

ammumtlOn maintenance problems. In the 1968 fall conference, 

the rates were agai n revised to reflect two rates, an Intense Combat 

Rate and a Theater Sustaining Rate. These changes were the out· 

come of the consumption experienced in the 1968 Tet offensive 

and resulted in a significant tonnage reduction in the U.S. Army 

Vietnam Stockage Objective and in the Offshore Reserve. The 60· 

day in·country stockage objective was based on 30 days at the In· 

tense Combat Rate and 30 days at the Theater Sustaining Rate 

whereas the offshore reserve was based on 30 days at the Intense 

Combat Rate. During fiscal year 1969 three ammunition confer· 

ences were held at Headquarters U.S. Army Pacific wherein joint 

Department of the Army·U.S. Army Pacific revisions to the Required Supply Rates were hammered out. The fact that flexibility 

was allowed contributed significantly to the success of the overall 

ammunition support in the Vietnam conflict. 

Subsequent to the initiation of expenditure rates for U.S. and 

Free World Forces in Vietnam, similar rates were approved by 

Commander in Chief Pacific for Vietnamese Forces which were 

integrated into the separate ammunition supply system in support 

of the South Vietnamese Army. This system, known as the Vietnam 

Ammunition Procedures, had been established in 1964. Essentially, 

it began as a "push" system, but later in conjunction with rate in· 

tegra tion became a "pull" system. The system was managed by 

Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency who received from 

J-4, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, a forecast of the en· 

suing 120 days consumption. The effectiveness of this system is 

attributed to its small scope and intensive management efforts by 

both Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and Ammunition 

Procurement and Supply Agency as the increase in the tempo of 

the South Vietnamese Army combat effort increased. 

A mmunition Reporting 

Ammunition stock status reporting also played a significant role. 

The ammunition logistics system demands a comprehensive and 

timely report, bm such a report did not exist at the onset of the 

buildup in Vietnam. However, the necessity for such a report was 

soon evident, and a program was initiated to establish a meaningful 

report. 

The ammunition reporting systems in effect on 1 January 1965 

were peacetime oriented and were adequate for that environment. 

Within the Pacific Theater two reports existed. For management 

of munitions within the U.S. Army Pacific Theater, an Asset Balance 

Report was prepared and furnished monthly to the U.S. Army 
112 l.OGISTIC SUPPORT 

Pacific In ventory Control Poi nt hy each subordinate command to 

include U.S. Army Support Command Vietnam. The report wa~ 

prepared manually or by compntcr, dependent on the capability of 

each subordinate command. It contained the data peninent to peace. 

time management and was adequate for a peacetime environment. 

The sC<"ond report was the OrrfnatlCi! Ammllnition Stock SlntllS 

Report, This wa~ called th e ORO 26 report due to its unique reports control symbol-ORO 26 R I and was used by the Munitions 

Command for worldwide management of ammunition. This report. 

submitted on a quarterly basis. was consolidated at major command 

levels except in the U.S. Army Pacific theater where each subordinate command suhmitted individual reports direct to the National 

Inventory Control Point at Ammunition Procurement and Supply 

Agency (Ammnnition Procurement and Supply Agency was estab· 

1i~hed as an ammunition procurement supply agency under the 

munitions command). The exception was based on the fact that all 

ammunition assets stored in the theater were not theater·owned 

assets but included stocks in Department of the Army ownership 

accounts Ol'er which the theater had no control. The1ie assets were 

primarily in the Department of the Army Forward Depot and De· 

partment of the Army Forward Floating Depot ownership accounLS. 

The excessive manual effort and time required to prepare this 

report limited its usefulness to a historical record. It consisted of 

data for each line item typed on 12 by 18 inch preprinted forms 

and, depending on the subordinate command. consisted of up to 

~OO pa~es with as many as 60 pages of clarifying notes. The prepara· 

tion efforts resulted in a submission date of about 60 days sub· 

~eqlLent to the cutoff date . The contem of this report, coupled 

\\·ith its frequency and age of data at submission, negated its 

value as a wartime management tool (although it did pro"ide the 

National Inventory Control Point with the necessa ry munitions data 

for asset and distribution planning and determination of procure· 

ment objectives in peacetime). 

Prior to the onset of the buildup. the ORO 26 report posed 

:111 almost impossible task for the limited resources of the small 

;unmllnition detachment of the liS Army Support Command. With 

the establishment of U.S. Army Vietnam and the advent of the 

huildup. the task of preparing this report was a nearly impossible 

one for the 182nd Stock. Control Detachment. and the report 

rail ed to proviile necessary <lnd timely inform:ation to the National 

In venwry Control Point. Relief from the requirement for U,S. 

Army Vietnam was sought by Headquarters U.S. Army Pacific in 

mid-lfI6!j and was reluctantly granted in July 1965. Meanwhile. De· 
AMMUNfTfON LOGISTICS 113 

partment of the Army was involved in a program to develop a 

replacement report for the ORD 26 report. In Jul y 1965. the efforts 

of this program resulted in the W orldwide Ammunition Reporting 

System, the 1322 report due to a new reports control symbol 

(RCSCLD 1322 (RI )). The intial implications of establish ing 

this report were that there would be relief for the preparing clements in that it was desired on a semi-monthl y frequency and 

required 98 elemellls of data for each line item. 

Based on recommendations from Commander in Ch ief U.S. 

Army Pacillc to Departmen t of the Army and prior to the initiation 

of the lst report in September 1965, the report was revised to the 

extent that the frequency was changed to monthl y. the cutoff date 

was changed from the last cl ay of the month to the 26th of the 

month . and the due dale in Ammunition Procuremen t and Supply 

Agency for the theater rollup was moved back from the 5th of 

the following month to the 15th. 

The Inventory Control Poin! at U.S. Army Pacific responsible 

for rolling up the sub·command feeder reports into a singl e theater 

report was faced with a dilemma in that the Theater Asset Balance 

Report did not contain all the necessa ry input for the 1322 repOrt. 

Alternatively, the input data for the 1322 report did not provide 

all the necessary information required for management of theater 

assets. 

Confining the comments to U.S. Army Vietnam. the problem 

was overcome by a complex but workable system. The report data 

was assembled each month and a member of the 182d Stock 

Control Detachment hand carried it to the Inventory Control 

Point at U.S. Army Pacific. There the courier provided the nece.~­

sary interpretation for the theater roll up. then accompanied an 

In ventory Control Point courier to Ammunition Procurement and 

Supply Agency to assist that agency in further in terpreting the 

data. 

The necessity for a courier continued as the buildup progressed 

and the reporting system went through a period of purification. 

With the establishment of the Directorate of Ammu nition in the 

1st Logistical Command in late 1965 and the organi zationa l Telocation of the 182d Stock Control Detachment as an integral part 

of that office. the situati on improved. Physica lly. the Detachment 

moved from a warehouse in downtown Saigon to take up residence 

in two pyramidal tents on the fron t lawn of the 1st Logistical Headquarters. ' '''h it e this move served to improve the communications 

between the Directorate and the Stock Control Detachment. the 

environment subjected stock records files to constant ruination 
114 LOGISTIC SU PPORT 

by humidity, rain, mud, and dust. This silUation continued until 

late in 1966 when th e Iota I Directorate Office moved into newly 

erected Quonset huts adjacent to the 1st L.ogistical Headquancrs. 

Crucial not only to the management of ammunition logistics 

in Vietnam, but to the reporting system as weB was the amount 

of ammunition in-transit to and within Vietnam. Obtaining visibility of this ammunition was slowly but effectively overcome 

through the improvement in the communications system and by the 

then formalized structu re of the Directorates of Ammunition in 

each of the Area Support Commands. 

The situa ti on was further improved in lSI Logistical Command 

by th e arrival of two Department of the Army civilian management and reporting experts dispatched by the Munitions Command 

at V_So Army Vietnam's request. These two civilian personnel made 

a significant contribution during their six-month stay. By the time 

they departed, just prior to mid-196G, the 1st Logistical COlllmand 

was capable of not only managing ammunition assets in a professional manner. but were also producing an acceptable 1322 report. By mid· I 966, th e volume of th e report and its related prepara· 

lion had reached unforeseen proporti ons. The U.S. Army Pacifi c 

Inventory Control Point, newly reorganized and titled the Materiel 

Management Agency, was hard put to roll up snch a voluminous 

report for the theater. 

The problem was magnified at the National Inventory Con· 

trol Point not only by the turbulence in ammunition stock status 

in the Pacific Theater but a lso by the reverberations experienced 

in all other major commands as th e result of significant shi fts and 

activity in their stock status h·hich occurred from their contribution 

of ammunition to Vietnam. 

As a consequence, the Munitions Command initiated a program 

to automate the preparation of the 1322 Report. In essence each 

major command was to input by card or tape th e information that 

heretofore had been typed on blank formats for the 1322 report. 

A Munitions Command team visited Headquarters U.S. Army 

Pacific in late 1966 to present the program and discuss input reo 

quirements. As the requirement unfolded, it was apparent that the 

conversion of the theater roHup to cards wou ld entail a greater ef· 

fort than the manua l production of the reports. U.S. Army Pacific 

non-concurred in this program at the time. However, in early 

1967, in recognition of the need for improving and automating 

ammunition management withi n the theater, Headquarters U.S. 

Army Pacific established a team to accomplish this ohjective. 

The objective was two-fold: develop a computer program that 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 115 

would provide the optimum in ammunition management and that 

would also provide theater in put directly to the Na tional Inventory 

Control Point for the 1322 report. The concept was developed 

and implemented within six months. 

Included in the system design were the necessary programs 

for each subordinate command (Korea , J apan, Hawaii, and Vietnam) , taking into consideration the peculiarities of operations 

and available computer equipment. Teams were dispatched to 

each subordinate command to implement the system. The team 

dispatched to U.S. Army Vietnam carried completely deve loped 

programs for application to the UNIVAC 1004/ 1005. The implementation progressed smoothly and within twO weeks lime the 

system was insta lled and operating on shared time with a locall y 

adjacent Mach ine Record Uni t across the street from the 1st 

Logistical Command. 

However, this was only an interim measure and su bsequently 

the system was reprogrammed for applica tion to the IBM 360/50 

equipment at the 14th Inventory Control Center. The initial report was key-punched and airma il ed lO the U.S. Army Pacific Inventory Control Poi III in September 1967. Once the installation 

of the autodin transceiver system was compl eted in 1967. the cards 

were dispa tched via aulOdin direct from the termi na l drop in 

U.S. Army Vielllam to U.S. Army Pacific. T he team had developed 

and was prepared to implement automation of depot stock COlllrol 

which would not only further improve the management of ammunition at the depot level, but would also provide directl y daily 

input of management information and monthly 1322 input data 

to the 182d Stock Control Detachment. However, other overriding 

priorities for ava ilabl e computer time, coupled with the press ure 

of day to day comm itments at the Ammuni tion Suppl y Depots 

precluded the applica ti on of automation to the ma nagement of 

depot operations. As a consequence the total aUlomated management information system was not accomplished. 

Ammunition Shortages 

Almost from the onset ammunition shortages developed. Some 

shortages initially evolved from port thm.put problems and in· 

country d istri bution probl ems. The effects of these shortages 

were blunted to a degree in some instances by application of Available Suppl y Rates and by airlift of ammunition from the offshore 

reserve on Okinawa. These shortages were generally short lived 

and correctable with in the capability of the system. However long 

term shortages also deve loped which were not easily overcome. 
116 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

On the one hand were those long tenn shortages which prevailed from the onsel. On the other hand were those shortages 

which developed in late 1966 which were attributed to the unforeseen high consumption rates and the inability of the Continental U.S. production base to expand at a pace consistent with the 

buildup of forces in Vietnam. 

In the former category were shortages related to ammunition 

items which were: developed fOT, or highly applicable to, SOlltheast Asia, were either still in the research and development 

or product improvement phase, or so newly into production that 

required production schedules had not been atta ined. Examples 

of items in this category were the 40-mm ammunition ror the M75 

helicopter armament system. M557 Fuze for 81-mm Mortar. the 

new family of antipersonnel artillery ammunition, the 2.75" rocket. 

and the M564 j M565 family of Mechanical Time, Superquick and 

Mechanical Time artillery fuzes. Most of these shortages were 

ultimately resolved through adherence to controll ed expenditures 

or Available Supply Rates, and temporary lise of substitute items. 

In the latter category. an entirel y different situation existed. 

Certain ammunition items were being expended at such a high 

rate that D to P stocks, as well as all other available assets, would be 

consumed to the extent that the situation would culminate in a 

zero balance in-country before production could catch up to expenditures (p-day). A reevaluation was made to encourage a 

reduction in the Required Supply Rate and application of stringent 

Available Supply Rates where necessary to preclude additional 

leadtime for production expansion. Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command , Vietnam. immediately conducted a detailed 

analysis of the worldwide asset sta tus contained in th e 1322 report 

and notified Commander in Chief Pacific on 7 September 1966 th at 

eight ammunition items would reach zero balance in the near fulure 

and the situation would not he alleviated even with immediate 

increases in production due to order and shiptime limitations. 

Concurrently, Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific's analysis 

revealed that 21 additional items would also reach zero balance 

in forthcoming months. 

At an ammunition conference at Commander in Chief Pacific 

in October 1966. the correlation of data and a review of the facts 

emphasized the gravity of the situation. Immediate action was initiated at the highest levels of th e Department of Defense and the 

Department of the Army to bring the situation under control. 

At the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics level. th e Office of Special 

Assistant for Munitions. headed lip by Brigadier General Henry A. 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 117 

Rasmussen was informally established on 14 November 1966 and formally chartered on 15 December 1966 for the express purpose of 

putting the necessary resources together to provide intensive overall management of forty combat critical high dollar value ammunition items. A corollary action involved the establishment of the 

Department of the Army Allocation Committee Ammunition in 

September 1966. This committee, under the control of Deputy 

Chief of Slaff for Logistics, was concerned with the allocation. 

distribution and redistribution of all allocable ground ammunition. 

Ammunition was designated as allocable when actual or potential 

demand was determined to be greater than supply availability. 

The number of allocable items increased steadily from the initial 

eight items to ninty-seven by late 1969. Initially, the Department 

of the Army Allocation Committee Ammunition met almost daily. 

However, the frequency soon stabilized to a monthly schedule 

and by February of 1970, the Committee was meeting bi·monthly. 

The task undertaken by these two agencies was successful in aile· 

viating the gravity of the envisioned shortages to the extent that 

no combat operations failed or were unduly influenced in their 

outcome by lack of adequate ammunition. 

It soon became apparent that multi-service implications for 

certain ammunition items indicated a need for resolution at the 

joint Service level. In recognition of this problem, the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics on 27 January 1967 forwarded a Memorandum of Understanding to the Logistics Chief of each of the 

other Services, recommending the establishment of the Military 

Services Ammunition Allocation Board. On 20 April 1967, with the 

concurrences of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. 

the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps. this Board was formally approved. The Military Services 

Ammunition Allocation Board charter provided for the allocation 

and control of the distribution and redistribution on a worldwide 

basis of selected items of ground ammunition common to two or 

more services. The Office, Special Assistant for Munitions. was reorganized into the Directorate of Ammunition . Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics. in early 1968 (with expanded mission to 

cover all ammunition items) and continues in existence at this 

writing. Three examples of short supply ammunition and actions 

taken to resolve the shortages follow: 

The first item is the 2.75 inch Rocket. This rocket was originally 

designed as an air to air weapon. however circumstances in Vietnam 

led to the weapon being used primarily in an air to ground role. 

The increased number of aircraft employed usin$t the 2.7S inch 
118 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

rocket increased the demand to a degree that production capability 

and production capacity was not available to meet the demand. 

The Army was designated as the service manager for the 2.75 inch 

rocket procurement. The Army accordingly established a project 

manager for the rocket in December 1965. The initial task for the 

project manager was to find commercial contractors with the capability and capacity to produce quality components and deliver 

the quantities desired by the Services. Contracts were terminated 

with producers who could not meet delivery schedules and incentive 

awards were offered for production above scheduled quantities. 

These measures were successful in obtaining the required stock 

of rockets and cost reductions £Tom $88 to approximately $39 per 

rocket. Since 1965, over 27 million 2.75 inch rockets have been 

produced. In addition, rocket reliability was improved from 80 

percent to over 99 percent, a 17 pound High Explosive warhead 

with increased lethality and cost effectiveness has been produced, 

a proximity fuze and flechette warhead have been produced and 

fielded, and safety devices have been developed. 

The second item, the 4.2 inch high explosive cartridge saw 

production lagging behind usage till February 1968. This was 

due to poor forecasting. After improving this fault, production 

rates actually equaled or exceeded the usage rates. 

The third item, the 105-mm cartridge, both the high explosion and illuminating types, was in critical status through April 

of 1967. This situation was primarily caused by the continuing 

deployment of troop units not included in support programs and 

the lead time required for the production base to accelerate to 

meet these increased requirements. 

Munitions Procurement 

Of the many facets of ammunition logistics, the role of design. 

development, and product improvement were especia lly significant. 

The adverse weather and terrain, new combat concepts, and 

triple canopied jungle growth seriously influenced the storage and 

explosive effects of ammunition. The situation also dictated the 

hurried design and development of spec ial purpose munitions such 

as the tunnel destruction kit or extensive product improvement 

as in the case of the 2.75 inch rocket. In the latter example, the 

size of the warhead more than doubled, the types of warheads 

expanded, the fuzes were completely redesigned, and the overall 

reliability increased £Tom 80 percent to 97 percent. 

To further compound the overall situation, Department of the 

Army had estimated ammunition expenditures for fiscal year 1966 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 119 

to be the sustaining rate, 54 percent of the U.S. Anny Pacific 

rates set forth in SB 38-26, and the fiscal year 1966 budget was 

constrained initially by this factor. This constraint was removed by 

supplemental budget action, but valuable leadtime had been lost. 

To support the ammunition consumption and stockage requirements during 1965- 1970, the munitions procurement programs increased as shown in Table 6. 

TABLE 6-MUNITIONS PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEARS 1965-1970 

(IN MILLIONS OF OOLUo.RS) 

flta.l V,."r Ana, Total Ana" SoIIIMut Nola 

196' ................ . ", 1966 ...... .... ..... .... 1315 "" 

1967 . .. .. ..... . ...•.. .. 13" 1007 '" 

1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ",. 2266 

1969 ..... ... ... ........ "13 2'" 

1970 .. ......... 1731 .. 56 

These programs provided for support of U.s. Army Vietnam 

and South Vietnamese Army forces as well as other Free World 

Forces which were supported ITom U.S. Army assets. The requirements on which the programs were based included ammunition consumed, on hand, in off-shore reserves, and in the pipeline, and 

provided for the building of U.S. combat divisions to a peak 

strength in fiscal year 1969. 

With the buildup in Southeast Asia, munitions requirements 

increased significantly. This placed considerable strain on procurement agencies of the military departments since they were 

operating at peacetime personnel levels and under peacetime 

constraints. Required resources were not mobilized, as they were 

in previous wars, to support the increased munitions procurement 

activity. Although sufficient flexibility was provided in the Armed 

Services Procurement Regulations to allow timely contract place· 

ment through negotiation, there was a tendency to tighten rather 

than relax pre-contract administrative controls. This anomaly was 

heightened by the emphasis at the highest levels of government 

on obtaining maximum competition through the means of formal 

advertisement; or alternatively, if negotiated procurements were 

utilized, competition was required. This tightening of controls, 

coupled with the emphasis on competition, created a serious obstacle to the timely execution of contracts. Contracting for ammunition was further inhibited by a lack of interest by private 

enterprise, shortages in trained procurement personnel, dependency 

on foreign sources for certain munitions components, time required 
120 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

for processing Secretarial determinations and fi ndings. cancellation of administrative leadtime, Auctuating requirements, and 

limited capability of the production base. A few of these factors 

are discussed in the following paragraphs. 

Considering the impact of large expenditures of mun itions on 

the national economy and to ensure that the procurement actions 

were properly executed with maximum competition, Secretary 

McNamara promulgated a directive in July 1965 requiring certain approvals for all contracts awarded in support of Southeast 

Asia operations, when the basis of procurement was shifted from 

competitive to noncompetitive. This direClive required "before 

the fact" Service Secretarial approval for awards over one million 

dollars and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Install ations and Logistics) approval of awards in excess of ten million doll ars. If the 

exigency was such that extraordinary procurement actions were 

utilized to ensure continuity of production. then an after-the-fact 

review and notation was required. In 1969, in recognition of the 

fact that the buildup had been accomplished and that the above 

control had been established during a period of increasing procurement activity and was based on a concern that the exigencies 

of this activity tended unnecessarily to cause a sh ift from com· 

petitive procurement, this control was rescinded. This rec ision 

highlighted the need for continued maximum emphasis on competitive procurement. 

The established mobilization plans included the provision 

of production of munition metal parts by planned mobilization 

producers in private industry. In response to the munitions reo 

quirements generated from the buildup in Southeast Asia, the 

necessity for rapid acceleration of munitions production developed 

almost overnight. In the absence of full mobilization of national 

resources, these planned producers did not feel a strong obligation 

to respond to the needs of the Department of Defense. 

Historically, the decisions pertinent to the production of munition metal parts have culminated in situations whereby contract 

delivery schedules ran out in February of a given year. To ma intain continuity of production, thus avoiding shut-down and startup cost, follow·on procurement needed to be placed in the preceding July-August time frame. However, since funds were not 

normally available until the July-August lime frame. the mu ni· 

tions program could not be released as a total package at that 

time. Therefore, munitions items were required to be broken out 

by component for procurement. The time available precluded 

the letting of all the necessary contracts in a manner designed to 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 121 

ensure the best interest of the government. Experience indicated 

that a minimum of six months administrative leadtime was required to accomplish quality procurement and a minimum of three 

months was essential for reorder leadtime. To circumvent this 

lack of adequate leadtime, shortcuts were taken in the form of 

letter contracts, utilization of option clauses, and non-competitive 

procurements; or alternatively, producti on schedules were extended 

to retain continuity of producti on and bridge the delay. These 

shortcuts and alternatives were costly to the Army. 

Ammunition Units and Personnel 

Just as contingency plans depended on mobilization of private 

enterprise to augment in-house ammunition production capability, 

so too, did they envision mobilization of reserve forces. Since the 

number of ammunition support units required in time of war 

greatly exceed the number required in peacetime, these contingency plans provided for the selective activation of ammunition 

support units to accompany large scale deployments of combat 

units. Mobilization of reserve units did not take place and the 

peacetime ammunition support structure was grossly inadequate 

for the task. A Continental U.S. training base for military personnel was almost non·existent as Continental U.S. depots and 

post. camp. and station storage areas were largely civilianized. 

This same cundition prevailed at lhe Nationa l Inventory Control 

Point. In short, the Army's ammunition qualified military person· 

nel and organic units were fully committed to peacetime support 

operations. Additional necessary support existed only in reserve 

units and they were essentially inaccessible for the conflict at 

hand. This shortage delayed the activation and deployment of 

ammunition units to Vietnam and resulted in a shortage of am· 

munition managemem skilled officers, warrant officer. and enlisted 

men to staff the various headquarters and operating units. For 

example a detachment. deployed in late 1965. was formed at Fort 

Devens with the detachment commander being a master sergeam 

with no ammunition experience whatsoever, being instead a trans· 

portation Non Commissioned Onker with a truckmastcr's Military 

Occupation Specialty. None of his personnel were ex.perienced in 

ammunition renovation either. Although all were ammunition 

handlers. MOS 55B, less [han 10 percent were school trained. 

The detachment had a renovation capability in name only and 

required civilian augmentation to provide on·site training. 

At the beginning of the Vietnam buildup, the Army was in 

the process of converting the logistics support system to the Combat 
122 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Support To The Theater Army concept. Under this concept. 

ammunition support is accompl ished as an Army-wide service 

with the command and operational control of ammunition and 

other commodity oriented systems vested in a Group or Brigade 

Headquarters as appropriate. Since the total conversion was incomplete and untried in combat a decision was made to remain wit h 

the Logistical Command concept in Vietnam as opposed to assigning all ammunition units to the command and control of the 

52d Ammunition Group. Ammunition battalions, once they arrived in-country were, for control purposes, assigned to a General 

Support Group or Field Depot Command or direct to Army Support Commands as separate battalions. Hence, the ammunition 

channel of communication was from an Ammunition Battalion to 

a Group or Depot Command to the DireclOr of Ammunition at 

the appropriate Area Logistics Command to the Director of Ammunition at 1st Logistical Command. 

The buildup of ammunition support units continued to lag 

behind the increase in combat and combat support units to the 

extent that a balanced ratio of ammunition support units to units 

supported was not achieved unti l 1967. The initial ammunition 

supply units lO deploy to Vietnam were two ammunition supply 

detachments which arrived in May 1965. By Tables of Organiza. 

tion and Equipment, these units had little or no equipment and 

were designed to be attached lO a conventional Tables of Organization and Equipment 9-17 ammunition company where they 

could augment the handling capability of the company by 150 

short tons per day. By August 1965, the number of ammunition 

units had increased to four supply detachments, one ammunition 

company, and one stock control detachment. In September, three 

additional ammunition companies had arrived while the supported 

force had increased to two and two-thirds division equivalents. The 

first ammunition battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Com. 

pany 3d Ordnance Battalion, arrived in November 1965 and assumed command of the subordinate units and became the 3d 

Ordnance Battalion (Ammo). The battalion immediately moved 

to Long Binh to assume operational control of the Long Binh 

Ammunition Supply Depot and the two companies and detach· 

ments already on hand. The second battalion to arrive, the 191st, 

moved to Cam Ranh Bay, was assigned to the 504th Field Depot, 

and assumed the operational control of the Cam Ranh Bay Ammunition Supply Depol and command of the two companies and 

two detachments on hand. Subsequently, the 3d and last ammunition Battalion Headquarters to arrive, the 184th, moved to Qui 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 123 

Nhon, and was assigned directly to the Qui Nhon Area Logistics 

Support Command as a separate battalion. The Battalion assumed 

the operational responsibility of operating a U.S. depot within 

a South Vietnamese depot until late 1966 when a wholly owned 

U.S. depot was developed at a separate location. The Da Nang 

Area Logistics Command in the I Corps area did not receive an 

Ammunition Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

at first . The three ammunition companies and one detachment in 

the Da Nang Area were among a number of reports units assigned 

directly to the 80th General Service Group until the 336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a National Guard unit, was activated and deployed to 

Vietnam in July 1968 as an aftermath of the 1968 Tet offensive. 

This battalion was deactivated and redeployed in July 1969. At 

that time the 528th Ammunition Battalion (provisional) was 

formed and remained as the command and control element for 

ammunition units in support of I Corps. In September 1970 the 

528th Headquarters and Headquarters Company was redeployed 

and the ammunition units split up among the 26th and 80th 

General Support Units where they were assigned to various lypes 

of battalions for command and control. In early 197 1 when the 

command and control of ammunition for the Laotian incursion 

indicated a need for these units to be assigned to an ammunition 

battalion another provisional battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company was formed and all ammunition units assigned 

to it. 

While this overall organization provided for the systematic 

and orderly processing of ammunition matters, there was room 

for improvement. The capabilities of the battalion staff were never 

fully exercised and the delays incident to processing actions 

through these unrelated supply channels comprised of staffs and 

commanders unfamiliar with ammunition logistics resulted in unwarranted time-consuming delays. This observation is borne out 

by the operations of the 3rd Ordnance Battalion during the incursion into Cambodia in early 1970 unencumbered by a unique 

organizational relationship as a separate battalion reporting directly to the Saigon Support Command with free access to the Director 

of Ammunition at G-4. U.S. Army Vietnam. (1st Logistical Command was de-activated in early 1970). The successes achieved in 

this operation were instrumental in de-activating the Saigon SuppOrt Command (Directorate of Ammunition) shortly after the 

successful completion of this operation. 

The revision of the 9- 17 Table of Organization and Equip-
124 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

ment to change the ammunition company magazine platoon leaders 

from commissioned officers, MOS 4514, to Warrant Officers, MOS 

411A. resulted in a significant drawdown on the skill ed senior 

non-commissioned officer corps as this was the source from which 

this sudden demand was filled. The majority of the ammunition 

personnel who were instrumental in developing and operating 

the ammunition logistics system completed their onc year tours and 

redeployed. Not on ly were there few if any qualified personnel 

to replace them, but the turnover was so complete over such a 

short time span that many lessons learned through experience 

had to be learned again. While the impact of each subsequent 

cycle was lessened, the initial cycle re-emphasized the need for 

a continuing Continental U.S. training base. 

Transportation of Ammunition 

The quantity of ammunition moved to Vietnam averaged 

sl igh tl y under 40,000 shOTt tons per month in 1966, approximately 

75,000 short tons per month in 1967, and just under 90,000 short 

tons per month in 1968. In February and March of 1968, receipts 

exceeded 100,000 short tons per month. 

The problems in Continental U.S. ports encompassed an initial 

lack of adequate sh ip bottoms, the glutting of ports with am· 

munition cargo, and an inadequate number of berthing facilities. 

The resolution of these difficulties was relatively easy when com· 

pared to those faced in Vietnam. 

The lack of adequate ports and port facilities in Vietnam 

required initially that all ammunition had to be offloaded onto 

barges and lighters for transport to shore. From the shore it was 

moved by truck. 

Depot issues for 1966-1968 approximated receipts each month, 

frustrating the attainment of the slockage objective to the extent 

that the Slackage objective was only attained and maintained for two 

months in early 1968 when the Slackage objective was decreased 

by 74,500 tons. Had the capability existed to routinely offload each 

ammunition ship as it arrived, the slockage objective could have 

been maintained to the extent of availability of assets from Con· 

tinental U.S. almost from the beginning. The situation was com· 

pounded by the Army's responsibility for offloading Air Force 

munitions at Cam Ranh and Saigon. In 1965 Air Force tonnage 

alone increased from 2,576 short tons in January to 23,000 Short 

Lons in December 196:;. Air Force munitions requirements also 

increased each year. 

There were three major ports for offloading ammunition; Da 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 125 

Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. Other ports that played a 

lesser role in ammunition offioading were Qui Nhon and Vung 

Tau. 

At Da Nang, the amount of ammunition offioaded for the 

Army by the Navy was relatively small when compared to that of 

the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The total stockage objective was slightl y under 20,000 tons. With the redeployment of the 

rd Marine Division in late 1969 the situation changed to the 

extent that the Army became the largest user and the stockage 

objective increased to approximately 45,000 short tons. The am· 

munition was largely distributed among 7 Ammunition Supply 

Points. Initi all y all ships were offioaded in the outer harbor, 

although an isolated LST ramp was constructed and used for 

redistribution up and down the coast. 

At Qui Nhon all ammun ition ships were offioaded off-shore 

as sand bars at the river mouth precluded bringing oceangoing 

ships even into the outer harbor until 1967. In adverse weather 

with high seas running ammunition ships could not discharge and 

had to put to sea for sa fety. (This same condition existed in Oa 

Nang until a breakwater was constructed in 1968). An LST ramp 

was also available inside the harbor for coastal movement. 

At Cam Ranh Bay, a natural harbor. ammunition ships were 

offloaded in the outer reaches of the harbor, and the ammunition 

was barged or lighlered ashore just as at DOl Nang and Qui Nhon. 

A DeLong pier was implaced specifically for ammunition in late 

1966. H ere too LST ramps were ava ilable for coastal movements 

of ammunition. Only at Cam Ranh Bay was an optimum operational arrangement established. However, the logistical remoteness 

of this location to the supported units and the need for transhipment 

of ammunition to more active ammunition depots precluded more 

effective utilization. 

At Vung Tau, ammunition for the Delta region was offioaded. 

A pier was available, however the depth of the water precluded 

hilly loaded vessels from offioading ammunition and the facility 

saw little use. Ammu nition was largely d ischarged into barges for 

direct movement to the delta while the overflow to those needs was 

stored in a large Ammunition Supply Point at Vung Tau. 

Saigon was the most active of all the ammunition ports. This 

is attributed to the stackage objective at Saigon Support Command being almost double that of any other support command, all 

South Vietnamese Army ammunition initially being offioaded there , 

and the Air Force requirement there exceeding that of all other 
126 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

locations. Ammunition was discharged in mid-stream at Cat Lai , 

barged to a river port at Cogido, and then trucked to the depot. 

All of the major and most of the minor ports were operated 

by mi xed military and civilian contractor contingents. In some 

instances the contractor discharged the ship, barged the ammunition 

ashore, moved the ammunition over-land, and even offloaded it in 

the depots. At Saigon the contractor was restricted to discharging 

and barging to shore. From the shore the ammunition was transported overland by Army Transportation Units and offloaded by 

depot personnel. 

Until mid-1966, the d ischarging of ammunition ships was constrained by the fa ct that ammunition was removed from pallets 

at Continental U,S. outloading ports and loaded aboard ship by 

individual boxes and projectiles. While this maximized the use of 

ship bottoms, it created difficulties in Vietnam, because offioading 

by cargo nets and hooks was required and ammunition lot integrity 

had to be re-established within the depots. (Management of am· 

munition dictates that ammunition be stored and accou nted for 

by Jot number) . 

At the request of the Commanding Generalist Logistica l Com· 

mand this practice was halted and all ammunition shipped to 

Vietnam was palletized. Lot integrity was maintained by ships' 

holds to the maximum extent practicable. This decision improved 

the discharge rate of ammunition ships almost 100 percent, allowing discharge offioading time to be deaeased from seven days 

to fOUT days. 

Prior to this improvement in December 1965 52 ammunition 

ships with an estimated 165,000 short tons aboard were awaiting 

diSCharge. This predicament was an outgrowth of the effort to 

build up to the stockage objective while concurrently supporting 

the demands of combat units. A further factor was the necessity 

for selective discharge of certain ammunition items that were in a 

short supply status in the depots. This situation required manifests 

and stowage plans to be reviewed so that certain ships could 

be moved on berth for partia l discharge. The ships would then 

be returned to a holding area while other ships were ca ll ed in for 

selective discharge. Steps were taken to relieve the backlog in 

December 1965 by redistributing the shi ps to Da Nang. Qui Nhon, 

and Cam Ranh Bay. 

This situation added impetus fOT the install ation of the DeLong Pier at Cam Ranh Bay and general improvements in over·theshore offloading at other ports. However, ammunition ships continued to have to await discharge and the numher of days spent 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 127 

waiting for an empty berth remained serious until a general downward trend began in January 1968. For example, 12 ammunition 

ships were offloaded in December 1967, but eleven of them had 

spent some time in a hold category. The total number of days for 

all eleven ships totaled 71. January 1968 was the turning point 

and improvement conti nued thereafter. 

During the period October-December 1968. management techniques were applied to ammunition movements which made 

possible the reduction of ammunition stockage on-the-ground in 

Somheast Asia. This new management technique identified as 

ln ventory in Motio?! made possible a significant reduction from 

approximately 285,000 Sl tons of ammunition to approximately 

one-half that amount. This was achieved without reduction in unit 

readiness by providing the theater with total visibility of ammuniti on on-the-ground, ammunition in-transit-to-theater, and in-transitin-theater, that is, a transparent pipeline. With this visibility, the 

stockage objectives were reduced from I 13 percent in October 

1968 to only 81 percent of the total United States Army Vietnam 

and the South Vietnamese Army object ive being on the ground in 

Southeast Asia in February 1971. 

]n order to establish the h lvt:ntory in Molion concept it was 

necessary to study order and ship time and regulate issuance of 

requisitions to ensure prompt shipment of the needed items. 

Unnecessary delays had to be precluded at all points in the shipment. Management controls involved a teletype forecast of heavy 

tonnage items being received in Vietnam on the fint of each month 

so that schedu ling could be accomplished. This was followed by a 

transmittal of requisitions for the balance of ammunition items to 

arrive at Joliet, Illinois on the 10th of each month. These actions 

permitted planning for ships to be placed on berth over an entire 

o30-day span. This perniilled direct shipments from a place of production to the eventual destinations within a o30-day period and 

provided for an even workload at the discharge pcii nt. 

l nvenlory in Motion was originally appli ed to U.S. Army Vietnam forces and was broadened to include Somh Vietnamese Army 

ammunition as well. 

Storage a11d Handling of Ammunition 

The criteria for selection of an ammunition storage site are 

subordinated to the overriding factor of ensuring that surrounding 

facil ities are a sa fe distance from the storage site. The determination of this sa re distance is a genera l function of the quantity of 

net explosive weight and the allowable sa fe distance to adjacent 
128 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

facilities. Another constraint is that of hazard class which determines what ammunition items can be stored together or adjacent 

to each other. Any deviation from these criteria requires a waiver 

of sarety requirements. Once the stockage objective for each line 

item has been determined. its hazard class established. and net 

explosive weight computed then the unwa ivered size of the storage 

site can be determined. If ammunition is stored strictly in accordance with this criteri a, the probability of an explosion on a single 

storage pad causing ex plosions on other storage pads is remote. 

Even th ough available expertise and time would have permitted 

calculating storage area sizes, the results would have been nega ted 

as the size of the buildup and the magnitude of the stockage ob. 

jectives were not envisioned at the time real estate was acquired. 

Gross estimating techniques were utilized and, based on the 

envisioned deployment strength in 1965, real esta te was acquired 

to provide unwaivered storage capacity for approximately 85,000 

short tons of ammunition. However by the end of 1966, the stockage 

obiective had climbed to 23 1,000 short tons and by the end of 

)967 had reached a peak of 284,500 short tons. 

The expansion of ammunition depots stabilized in about mid· 

1968 with a capacity of approximately 238,000 short tons. The 

capacity above this figure was vested in Ammunition Supply Points. 

The number of Ammunition Supply Points fluctuated with the 

tactica l situation; in mid·196B. there were eight Ammunition Supply 

Points with a capacity in excess or 50,000 short tons. 

At Da Nang. there was no major Army Ammunition Supply 

Depot. Army stocks were essentially maintained in three Ammunition Supply Points at Oa Nang. Dong Ha. and Chu Lai. and 

co-located with U.S. Marine Corps storage in Da Nang. The number 

of Ammunition Supply Points increased with the redeployment 

of the 3d Marine Division in late 1969. Th~e Ammunition Supply Points were under adverse waivers as they were, for security 

reasons, inside secure cantonment areas. They. like most of the 

Ammunition Supply Points. literally developed in their locations 

because that was where the ammunition was offioaded by units on 

hand. While the risk associated with these heavily waivered Ammunition Supply Points ''''015 known and accepted. the trade off 

for security of the Ammunition Supply Point against enemy 

infiltration was necessary. 

At Qui Nhon, the Ammunition Supply Depot was initially 

co-located with a South Vi etnamese Army Ammunition Supply 

Point. However. the dema nd for additional capacity dictated the 

development of a new U.S. Army Ammunition Supply Depot which 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 129 

was established at Phu Tai in early 1966 and was operated by the 

184th Ordnance Battalion. From the standpoint of safety, the site 

and the layout of the depot were excellent. It was loca ted in a 

bowl-shaped vall ey surrounded on three sides by high ridges. The 

open side provided entrance to the main highway between Qui 

Nhon and Pl eiku . It had minimum waivers, but had two serious 

drawbacks: Ammunition offloaded from ships had to be trucked 

through the city, and the security of the depot was not good. Enemy 

attacks on the depot could be easily mounted by merely directing 

recoilless rifle, rockel, and mortar fire from the su rrounding high 

ridges. The terrai n lent itself to an easy approach for enemy 

sapper teams. As a result of this Phu Tai suffered more enemy 

attacks than any other depot. The two Ammunition Suppl y Points 

at Pleiku and An Khe supported by this depot were relatively good 

and reasonably secure. However, they were subj ect to the same 

waivers as those in the Da Nang Support Command be<:ause of 

their being with in heavily populated cantonment areas. 

The Ammunition Supply Depot established at Cam Ranh 

Bay in early 1965, operated by the 19lst Ordnance Battalion, was 

initially well located and required limited waivers for its loca tion. 

However, subsequem location of petroleum storage facil ities on the 

high ground behind the Ammunition Supply Depot and the adjacent loca tion of the Air Force ammunition storage site eventually resulted in having to obtain waivers for its operation. :rhe 

most adverse aspe<:t of this depot was posed by the sandy terrain. 

It was not uncommon for a storage pad to be inundated overnight 

by constantly shifting dunes. Also, the soft sand all but prohibited 

the orderly movement of vehicle traffic. Ultimately, approximately 

two-t hirds of the depot undenvent a major upgrading consisting 

of concrete storage pads with berms stabilized by the application of peni-prime, a petroleum based product that formed a 

hardened crust over the sand to pre<:lude its movement by wind 

action. Road networks were also stabilized to a degree by application of lauerite, a clay-gravel combination that was locally 

ava il able. The battalion's inheren t capability for maintaining 

berms and Toad nets, two bulldozers in each ammunition company, 

was unequal to the task of properly maintaining this Ammunition 

Supply Depot. 

The largest field Ammunition Supply Depot in Vietnam was 

at Long Binh. While the site was well located at first, it suffered 

the same encroachment as other Ammunition Supply Depots in 

that it was ultimately surrounded on three sides by other activities 

and units within the Long Binh cantonment area. However, by the 
130 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

time the encroachment had subsided, the Ammunition Supply Depots had expanded from an initial capacity of approximately 55,000 

short tons to 100,000 short tons in early 1968. 

At the peak of combat operations, it was not uncommon faT 

ret::eipts and issues withi n a 24-hour period at an Ammunition 

Supply Depot to exceed 5.000 short tons. The workload assoc iated 

with this effort can be appreciated by the fact that for every ton 

of ammunition received an average of three tons of ammunition 

must be re-warehoused-moved ITom the rear of the pad to the 

front so that oldest stocks could be issued fint. Further. lot integrity had to be maintained. 

Security of Ammunition Depots 

In the initial months of the buildup, security of Ammunition 

Supply Depots was of minor importance in that stocks of ammunition were relatively small and were stored in secure areas. 

However, as permanent sites were developed and occupied in late 

1965, security became significant. The first attack on an ammunition 

depot occurred at Qui Nhon in April 1966. This attack established 

the extreme vulnerability of the ammunition depots and over the 

ensuing (our-year period no less than 31 incidents at Ammunition 

Supply Depots were recorded. 

The greatest danger was the threat posed by enemy sapper 

teams. Th is threat was a constalll one and required aggressive 

defensive measures twenty-rour hours a day. The other threat was 

from enemy rocket and mortar attacks with the only derense against 

this being recurring tactical sweeps of the ollter perimeters can· 

ducted by combat security forces. 

Prior to enemy sapper attacks vegetation had been cleared alit 

from the storage sites to a distance of approximately 100 meters, 

a single row of coiled barbed wire installed, and anti·personnel 

mines, in some instances, implanted. Guard posts were established 

along with roving patrols. The increasing tempo of enemy probing 

actions culminating in three closely spaced attacks against Long 

Sinh in late 1966 emphasized the necessity (or more stringent 

security measures. 

At the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot, extra land clearing was initiated, coiled barbed wire interlaced with trip flares was 

installed, perimeter lighting and guard towers were constructed. 

and the number or guards was increased. However, due to the 

terrain surrounding the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot, 

it still remained a vulnerable target for enemy attacks. 

At Cam Ranh Say. the Ammunition Supply Depot was afforded 
AMMUNITION LOGISTICS 131 

much security by its location on the peninsular ann of land encircling the bay and its security was further assured by land d earing 

and minimal fencing_ 

Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot, by far the largest storage 

depot, was probably the most lucrative target_ During the period 

1966 through 1971 , Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot suffered 

seven successful enemy attacks; three in 1966, one in 1967, two in 

1968, and the last one in 1969. After the initial attacks, it was 

evident that the single row of coiled barbed wire backed up by 

anti-personnel mines was inadequate. A crash program was undertaken to clear the jungle vegetation 300 meters out from the perimeter and the perimeter fencing was increased from a single row 

of coiled barbed wire to three rows triple stacked. All three rows 

were interlaced at 10 meter intervals with trip Hares. The necessity for keeping the vegegation cleared out of, as well as between 

the rows of wire requ ired the removal of the mines. Observation 

towers, 44 in all, were built, with fighting bunkers at their bases, 

and perimeter lighting installed. By 1968 tbe increase in sapper 

attacks against all Ammunition Suppl y Depots resulted in a plan 

for installing sensing systems. However, this was delayed until 

1969. The only available sensing devices were pressure sensitive 

and they were largely ineffective. During the 1968 time frame, 

the Long Binh Post perimeter was expanded to the extent that 

the eastern border of the Ammunition Supply Depot was no longer 

the post perimeter but was now approximately two mil es inside 

the overall perimeter. No successful attacks were carried out agai nst 

the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot subsequent to March 

1969. The use of ammunition personnel as security guards for 

Ammunition Supply Depots proved to be ineffective for two reasons: (I) it detracted from their efficiency in ammunition operations and (2) the security of such critical installations required a 

professionally trained and operated security force to include sentry 

dogs and the best available electronic sensing equipment. 

Maintenance and Disposal 

Maintenance of ammunition in a combat zone is normally a 

routine function. In past conflicts, tra ined military renovation 

personnel were available to perform this function. However in the 

Vietnam conHict, the largely civilianized operation of ammunition 

facilities had precluded tbe availability of adequately trained 

military personnel or units skilled in maintenance of ammunition. 

The degradation of ammunition stocks due to the environmental 
132 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

conditions In Vietnam established the maintenance problem as 

one requ iring more than a routine effort. 

Early in 1966, it became apparen t that some maintenance capability was required and each ammun ition battalion was provided 

with a renovation detachment. However these units, each of approximately seventy men, were not provided with the necessary 

Ammunition Peculiar Equipment to perform renovation, but they 

d id have sufficient tools to perform preservation and packaging. 

Munitions packaging deficiencies were the first major problem as 

wooden boxes, pa ll ets, and contain ers deteriorated rapidly in the 

South Vietnam climate. Each Ammunition Supply Depot established 

a local "box shop," augmented with local labor, to produce these 

items. By early 1967, each battalion had an improvised renovation 

line where repackaging and some very limited renovation was 

performed. 

Unit returns and long tenn stockage items kept a ll detachments busy inspecting, repainting. and remarking where possible, 

and condemn ing where required. Typical missions assigned these 

detachments were: inspecting all 40-mm (duner) munitions for 

fuze tightness; inspecting the 81-mm High Explosive plastic containers for moisture damage to the rounds, derusting projectiles, 

mines, and rockets; repainting and restenciling as required; and 

continual repackaging. Some mortar fuze and ignition cartridge 

replacements were also performed. However. lack of components 

restricted any large scale renovation by U.S. depots in South 

Vietnam. 

The disposal of condemned ammunition has been a special 

problem in every conAicl. For this reason , highly skilled, thoroughly 

trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams were available from a 

well organized peacetime training base. These teams in Vietnam 

worked under the command and control of a detachment assigned 

to the Director of Ammunition at 1st Logistical Command and 

subsequently to Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam. They were 

equipped to respond almost immediately to any situation and 

provided support in the following areas: 

I. Destroying deteriorated ammunition. 

2. Destroying enemy damaged ammunition in storage. Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel were also responsible for return 

of storage locations to operational use as soon as possible. 

3. Assisting in the recovery of downed gunships and other aircraft, clearing booby-traps, and rendering safe the ordnance 

aboard these aircraft. 

4. Clearing of heavily booby· trapped and mined facilities and 
AMMUNITION LOG1ST1CS 133 

areas, disposing of discovered caches. and rendering U.S. sites unusable prior to abandonment. 

5. Clearing of dud munitions and time delay muni(i ~ in 

operational and support areas. 

6. Training combat troops on the enemy booby·traps and mines. 

All depots and forward support activiti es had personnel assigned 

or attached to destroy ammunition. Normall y disposal wa'i by 

detonation or burning at an approved disposal site. Care had to be 

taken in disposal shot site selection to prevent damage to nearby 

friendly real estate. Disposal shot size was determined by real 

esta te and surroundings, hut ca lculations were not always perfect: 

for example. one shot at Long Hinh , d uri ng a low cloud ceiling. 

jarred buildings severely and broke several windows. Prior to any 

in<Olmtrv disposal actions, efforts were made to return the munitions to Okinawa or Continenta l U.S. for renovation or demilitarization. At the Ammunition Supply Depots, condemned mun itions 

were disposed of by the battalion Explosive Ordnance OisposaJ 

sections. In the fonvard areas. Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel from area assigned Explosive Ordnance Disposa l detachments 

disposed of hazardous munitions on an as required basis. 

In an effort to assure Class V support to the com hat anns. 

each Ordnance ammunition baltaiion provided Technica l Assistance Contact Teams to advise and assist on maintenan('e. storage. 

and sa fety in the Forward Support Areas and Fire Base areas. The 

184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) at Qui Nhon was a leader in 

this effort and its assistance program was copied by the other 

units of the 1st Logistical Command. This technica l assistance 

program was extended in mid-1969 to the South Vietnamese Army 

and to Republic of Korea Forces Vietnam through the 1st Logistical 

Command's Project BUDDY. Major assistance was given South 

Vietnamese Army units in and around Nha Trang by the 19 1st 

Ordnance Battalion (Ammo). 
CHAPTER V 

Aviation Logistics 

Growth of the Aviation Fleet 

Since 1965, the Army Aviation Program has experienced an 

unprecedented and unprognmmcd acceleration of aircraft production, deployments, and utilization. During this time, it was 

frequently necessary to support the program with inventories of 

repair parts, components, and engines that in pre.Viemam war 

years would have been thought completely inadequate. At the same 

time aviation operating and support units in the field reached and 

maintained levels of operational readiness and flying hour rates that 

Illany believed were beyond reach with the "state-of-the-art" helicopters deployed to Southeast Asia. In order to meet operating 

requirements, it was necessary to improvise, innovate and in some 

cases revolutionize logistic support systems. As so often happens 

with emergency improvisations, when they work they become part 

of the system and yesterday'S emergency often becomes tomorrow's 

norm. 

From a relatively evenly balanced inventory of fixed wing and 

rotary wing aircraft in fiscal year 1960 (totaling some 5,528 aircraft) the Anny has progressed to over 12.000 aircraft in 1970, 

most being rotary wing. The acquisition value of the inventory, 

wh ich in fiscal year 1960 totaled $600 million, increased five times 

during this period. (Chart 4) The dollar value of secondary items 

required to support the aircraft fleet increased from $26 1.4 million 

to $2.2 billion, or eight times, as compared to the fivefold increase 

for the end item inventory. (Chart 5) 

Chart 6 outlines fiscal year 196 1- 1970 Army aviation funded 

programs. The Procurement of Equipment and Missiles progression was significant during the 1965-1968 time frame. During this 

period the Army was procuring and deploying large numbers oE 

aircraft and Procurement of Equipment and Missiles secondary 

items for support of increased in ventories and flying hours. The 

latter were essentially "Life of Type Subsystems." After the initial 

procurement, requirements were met from overhaul programs. 

Repair parts for Army aviation have been provided for in the 

Army Stock Fund since 1963. However, prior to that lime air-
Aircraft 

Inventory 

12,000--

o 

AVIATION LOGISTICS 

CHART 4--ARMY AIRCRAFT INVENTORY AND VALUE 

FISCAL YEAR 1960-1970 

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 

FiStaI 

Veo, 

135 

$3.0 

2.8 

69 10 

CHART 5--SECONDARY 

$ Millions 

ITEM IN VENTORY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT TilE 

AIRCRAFT FLEET 

2500'-------------------

2181.3 

r2000 1969.2 ~8-

1543.4 

1500 

lE!.2 

1000 

500 436.3 ~ ~ 

353.3 

o An 

61 62 63 64 65 56 67 68 69 10 

Fiscal Year 

craft repan parts were purchased with Operation Maintenance 

Army funds. Since the inclusion of aircraft repair parts in the 

Army Stock Fund, the Operation Maintenance Army account has 
136 

Million 

LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

CHART &-A VIATION F UNDINO PROORAM S 

Research. Development, Test, and Evaluation 

Depot Maintenance 

Equipment Ind I 

61 " 63 64 65 

Fiscal Year 

66 67 68 69 70 

provided onl y those dollars required to overhaul aircraft engines, 

components, and associated equipment (avionics, armament systems, and so forth) at depot level. The amount funded for 

Research, Development, Test, and Evalua tion remained relatively 

stable. The total fund ing program for Army aviation reached a 

high of $1.8 billion in fiscal year 1966. 

Chart 7 shows the percent of total Army funds spent on aircraft during the period 1969- 197 1. A major problem was caused 

by rapidl y changing requirements fOT particular aircraft, both increases and decreases. Table 7 shows the monthly UH- I produclion 

TABl.E 7- UH- 1 PRODUcnON SCH EDULE 

Month "" " .. "" "" "" 1970 

Jan ........ .......... 51 14 150 " " 100 

F" .. ..... ........... " ' 1 ISO 82 82 100 

Mar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 87 155 80 89 .. Ap' .............. .. .. 60 " 152 " 100 74 

1\ £3 y . .. .... ...... ..... " 99 ISO 80 100 

Jun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 100 143 66 .. " 14 

J"I ....... ... .. . .. ... 68 102 I" 65 100 71 

A", ...... ..... . .. .... 67 II. 120 65 101 67 

" p ........... 70 109 110 65 101 67 

0" .... ... ... ........ 71 125 100 " 101 .. Nov .... ..... ......... 14 I" 98 65 101 66 

Dtt .. . ... . . .... . 75 1<2 85 " 101 67 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 137 

CHART 7- PERCENT Of' ALLOCATED ARMY FUNDS Sf'ENT ON AIRCRAfT 

Percent FISCAL YEAR 1969- 1971 

100----------------------------------___ 

75,-----------------------------____ _ 

" 

25 

o 

10% 

r I 

Procurement 01 

Equipment 

and mlssifes 

lor tile Army 

End Items 

60% 

Procurement of 

Equipment 

and missiles 

lor the Army 

Secondary 

35% 

Stock 

Fund 

45% 

I---

Depot 

Maintenance 

schedule since 1965, which is illustrative of the general turbulence 

that was experienced. 

Airframes have a relatively easily identifiable basis of issue, and 

requirements and assets can readily be computed. A major difficulty, and one which resulted in problems and shortages throughout the period was the determination or requirements for ancillary 

equipment such as avionics, armament and ammunition, tools, and 

test equipment. 

Growth Of Aviation LogistiC Support in South Vietnam 

From an austere beginning when two helicopter companies 

arrived in Vietnam on II December 1961, the total number of 

U.S. Army aircraft increased to 510 by 1 January 1965 and then 

further increased to a peak of 4,228 by September 1969. When the 

buildup commenced in 1965, the U.S. Army Support Command 

Vietnam had one aircraft maintenance and supply batta lion (765th 

Transportation Battalion) to provide backup direct and genera l 

support for all Army aircraft in-country. This battalion was located 

at Vung Tau and consisted of direct support companies and one 

general support company. The three direct support companies were 

located at Vung Tau. Saigon. and Nha Trang. They provided back-
138 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

up support for separate aViation companies having their own 

organic or attached direct support and they provided direct support for small aviation detachments that lacked this capability. 

The one general su pport company was located with the battalion headquarters at Vung Tau. An aviation supply point in 

Saigon, operated by the aviation detachment of U.S. Army Support 

Command Vietnam, provided aviation-peculiar supplies for all 

Army aircraft in Vietnam. 

In 1965 the Commanding General, U.S. Army Support Command Vietnam established a committee to devise a plan to support 

a large influx of Army aircraft. Basic criteria for the plan were 

that it should provide for one-SLOp supply and maintenance service, 

and provide for an expansion of this service commensurate with 

increases in aircraft densities. Consideration of the operational 

structure to be supported led to the development of plans for three 

prime alternative organizations. These were as follows: 

I. Aircraft supply and maintenance units integrated in an aviation brigade. which was planned as a control element for all 

non-divisional aviation activities. 

2. Aircraft supply and maintenance units integrated in the 1st 

Logistical Command, wh ich had been recently activated. 

S. A separate headquarters commanding all non·divisional .aircraft supply and maintenance units. assigned to the Aviation 

Brigade, assigned to the 1st Logistical Command. or a separate command under U.S. Army Vi etnam. 

The decision reached was to establish a separate headquarters 

under the direct command of U.S. Army Vietnam. This basic 

organizational structure has operated throughout the Vietnam Era 

with only one minor variation. Originally. the command was under 

the staff supervision of the U.S. Anny Vietnam G-4. In October 

1967. staff supervision was changed to the U.S. Army Vietnam 

Aviation Officer. 

Following the September 1965 decision to establish a separate 

command, the nex.t two months were spent in developing an or· 

ga nizational structure and preparing the necessary authorization 

documents. In November 1965. a group headquarters was established on a provisional basis and finally, on 17 January 1966, a U.S. 

Army Pacific General Order was published activating the 34th 

General Support Group. 

As previously Slated, the total Army aircraft density increased to 

a high of 4,228 in September 1969. The deployed aircraft were 

assigned to a total of 142 company-sized units plus a number of 

miscellaneous smaller detachments. Of the 142 companies, 63 were 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 139 

organic to division, brigades, or squadrons and had their own 

organic direct support suppl y and maintenance capability. The 

remaining company-sized units were supported by cellular direct 

support detachments. The 34th General Support Grou p provided 

backup support to these company sized units as well as direct support 

and general support for all aviation activities in U.S. Army Viet· 

nam. 

The 34th General Support Group as displayed in Map 3, 

ultimately had 2 depot compani es, 5 general support companies, 

II direct support compani es, 4 aviation electronics compani es, and 

the Aviation Materiel Management Center with which to accomplish its mission. 

Aircraft Maintenance Personnel 

Qualitative personnel problems in suppl y and maintenance were 

particularly critical for aircraft because of the nature of the 

materiel maintai·ned. Civilian contractors were used to augment 

the military capability in critical skill areas, particularly in the 

areas of sheet metal and structural repairs. Table 8 shows strength 

authorizations by fiscal year for contractor personnel. 

TABLE 8-CONTRACT MAINTENANCE MANNING LEVEL 

Company TV 65 "" TV 67 "" "" FY 70 

Lockheed .... ................... 100 '" 287 

Lear Siegler ................... - - m 6" '" Dynalectron ............... ... ... ,. '" '39 5" 847 1056 

TOTAL .............. ... ... '" ,. '" 1007 1511 2120 1892 

The Aviation Systems Command provided either Department of 

the Army civilians or manufacturer's field service representatives 

to advise and assist in problem areas arising from the operati on of 

complex and sophistica ted equipment in the field. In the summer 

of 1969, 151 field service representatives were authorized. These 

field service representatives were in addition to the new equipment training learns sent into Vietnam upon introduction of a new 

equipment item. Project COUNTER team, discussed in another 

section, were also provided to the 34th General Support Group. 

This augmentation with contract labor and the employment of 

field service representatives and other teams to provide instruction was necessitated, to a large degree, by the fa ct that there was 

not an adequate military rotational base in Continen tal U.S. from 

which to draw upon for such critical skills as sheet metal and 

structural repair workers. Because of Vietnam priorities. nearl y 
DEPLOYMENT OF 34th GENERAL 

SUPPORT GROUP IN VIETNAM 

MAP ] 

100 "'.11 

1I)0;,.000:'(IOt 

.. ~ 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 141 

all first line Army aircraft were located in Vietnam. This furth er 

reduced the military ex peri ence base. Also, as in the electronics 

area, trained aircraft maimenance personnel were highly susceptible to incursions from industry, making retemion in the Service 

difficult. 

Facilities 

Facilities problems associated with the support of Army aircraft were largely related to the deve lopmem of storage and 

maintenance facilities. Overall operation of the system was not 

signifi cantly affected by port and Line of Communica tions limitations. 

Some deterioration of packaging and damage to supplies occurred as a res ult of delays in expanding storage facilities at 

Saigon, but the impact was not comparable to that in the general 

suppl y depots. 

Construction of aircraft maintenance faciliti es presented more 

serious problems because of the sensitivity of aircraft components 

to the elements. Maintenance tents provided as organizational 

equipment were not only shortlived in the tropical climate and 

expensive to replace, but generally were too small for the volume 

of work, resulting in a significant loss of valuable man-hours. 

These man-hours were consumed in moving aircraft in and out. 

In addition, shop vans proved too small to handle sheet metal 

work on bulky cowling and also for balancing blades. Construction 

of permanent facilities to offset these problems proved time consuming. For example, the 604th Direct Support Company moved 

into Ple iku in March 1966, and an adeq uate hangar fa cility for 

them was not completed until the summer of 1969. Although 

available statistics are inadequate to allow precise measurement. 

the weight of evidence indicated that a lack of adequate maintenance facilities appreciably degraded the efficiency of maintenance operations. 

Weapons Systems Requisitions Techniques 

During 1965, aircraft repair parts were provided by the aircraft supply point at Tan Son Nhut. This supply point was operated 

by personnel of the U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam Aviation Detachment and augmented by the supply platoon of the 

330th General Support Company and about 70 local national employees. All requisitions from operating units, genera l and direct 

support companies, other Services, and free world forces were 

submitted directly to the supply point which prov ided a retail 
142 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

service. Items not available within the 8,000 item Authorized 

Slockage List were requisitioned from Okinawa. At Okinawa the 

requisitions were filled if the items were available. However, if 

they were not available the requisitions were passed through 

U.S. Army Pacific to the appropriate Continental U.S. National 

Inventory Control Point. Chart 8 shows this requisition and 

supply flow. 

CHART 8 - REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW, 1965 

Oilier U.S. 

Army P8cilic 

Depots 

General Su pport 

Companies 

---REQUISITION 

---SUPPLY 

Continental U.S. 

National Inventory 

Control Points 

U.S. Army Pacific 

Inventory Control 

Points 

I 

Okinawa 

Stock C<lntrol 

(Vietnam) 

Direct SUllport 

Comllanles 

Ollerallon.' 

Units & Maintenance 

Detachments 

._ •• - MATERIEL REWSE ORDER 

Continental U.S. 

Depots 

Alrcralt SUllllly 

Point 

Free World 

Military Assistance 

Forces, Olher Services & 

Air Vietnam 

for Government 

Furnished Property 

Contract 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 143 

Following activation or the 34th General Support Group. several changes were made in the basic supply system. Chart 9 shows 

the requisition and supply now beginning in April 1966. Major 

changes included the following: 

CHART 9-ReQUISITlON AND SUPPLY FLOW, APRIL 1966 TO APRIL 1968 

other U.S. 

Anny P.clflc 

.. "b 

Conllnent.1 U.S. 

H.tlonal In'ltntory 

Control Points 

U.s. Army P.clflc tnventory 

Control Points 

Oklnaw. 

Air VlelMm 

GOvtmm.nt FurnlsMd Dlr.ct SUllport 

Propertr Contract Companlu 

General SUl)pOrt 

ComJllnln 

---REQUISITION 

---SUPPLY 

• _ ••• MATERIEL RELEASE· ORDER 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

Contlnenta' 

U.S. Depots 

Salton 00". ..., 

I 

I Q.lNho, I 

L 0.", J ------- (Itter 1961) 

Other 

S .. ,,'" 

Free Wor1d 

Nllitary 

AssIstance Forcn 

Note: Excludes plOlect mln •• eiI .Iraatt 

rep.lr parts for whkh Okinlw. and 

H.wall were IIh.:ud out be.inn!n. 

April 1966 . 
144 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Establishment of the Aviation Materiel Management Center 

using resources of the 58th Transportation Battalion. Resources 

of this battalion continued to be used for this purpose until 

February 1968 when an Aviation Materiel Management Center 

Table of Distribution was approved and the 58th was assigned to 

J Corps. The Aviation Materiel Management Center served as 

an inventory control center for all aviation materiel and provided 

centralized accountability for all depot stocks. Inventory control 

was converted from a manual operation to the use of an IBM 407 

Electronic Accounting Machine in early 1966, to a UNIVAC 1005 

at the end of 1966, to an IBM 1460 in March 1968, and to an 

IBM 360/50 in mid-1969. 

In April 1966, the Saigon Aviation Depot was removed from 

retail operations. After this, all requisitions passed through direct 

su pport companies except those for the U. S. Air Force and Air 

Vietnam. Beginning in late 1966 direct support companies were 

equipped with NCR 500 equipment to enable them to furnish 

data and interface with Aviation Materiel Management Center. 

An increased density of aircraft supported, together with increasing delays in obtaining supplies through the Okinawa U.S. 

Army Pacific route, resulLed in the third major change in the 

supply system. (Chart 10) Beginning in July 1966, Okinawa and 

Hawaii were bypassed for all aircraft parts. This introduced the 

stovepipe system whereby Aviation Materiel Management Center 

passed all requisitions directly to the Aviation Systems Command 

in St. Louis, with only an information copy to U.S. Army Pacific 

for billing purposes. In addition to a reduction in a high-dollar 

pipeline, this stovepipe system (Weapons System Requisitioning) 

greatly improved communications between the consumer in Vietnam and the National Inventory Control Point in the Continental 

U.S. 

In September 1969, weapons systems requisitioning procedures 

were further modified. Techniques were introduced to pennit 

Aviation Materiel Management Center requisitions for aviation 

items to be routed through the Defense Automatic Addressing 

System with an image copy of all transactions being passed to 

the Aviation Systems Command. A weapons system project code and 

the Aviation Systems Command distribution code were used to 

identify aviation item traffic. With minor variation, this procedure 

is being standardized for use by all Army weapons systems world· 

wide. 

Overall, the aviation repair parts system has been effective and 

responsive as was indicated by the low percentage of aircraft in the 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 145 

not operationally ready supply category (a 5.2 percent rate as or 

31 December 1970 compared with a standard of 7 percent) and a 

demand satisfaction rate consisten tl y around 65 percent. From an 

authorized slockage list of 8,000 lines in 1965, stockage increased 

to a high of 46,000 lines late in 1968. 

CHART IO-REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW, APRIL 1968 TO SEPTEMBER 

1969 

U.S. Arm, 

Pldllc Inventory 

Control Points 

U.S. Army 

AvlaUon Mlteriel 

Command 

T 

I 

1 

I 

" • jl Inlo for ,-__ .L __ ~ 

Funding 

, Aviation 

Materiel Management 

Center 

/" T It, 

/ I \ / \ 

/ ;1 \ / \ 

,,/ '" ,... \ ... Air Vietnam 

Other Nltlonal 

Inventory Control 

Points 

/ 

Contlnent,1 

U.S. Depots 

Salgnn 

Depot 

Qui Ntlon 

Depot 

lor CO'Iernmln1 

Fumlstled Property 

Other Direct Support 

Services Companies 

Contract L-----~ ·~-,nr~~ 

.-~~// ~ H ~""" ~L-__ _ 

General Support 

Companies 

----REQUiSITION 

---SUPPlY 

----MATERIEL RELEASE ORDER 

Operational Units 

& Maintenance 

Detlctlments 

Fru Wor1d 

Military 

Assistance 

Forces 
146 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

In line with the obj ectives of the Logistics Offensive, they 

were subsequentl y reduced to 25,495 lines by December 1970 without adverse effect on supply effectiveness. 

There was some item duplication in slockage lists of the 

Aviation Materiel Management Center and the 1st Logistical Command. The items were primarily industrial bulk materiel items 

used in repair operations and certain items of common hardware. 

The value of providing aviation units with a si ngle point for obtaining aircraft repair parts outweighed the cost of multiple slockage. 

Floating Aircraft Main tenance Facility 

In April 1966, the Army deployed a Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility to Vietnam. This was the USNS Corpus Christi 

Bay. This ship had been converted from a seaplane tender at the 

Navy yard in Charleston, S.C. in 1965. The Floating Aircraft 

Maintenance Facility was designed for use in contingency operations. initially for backup direct support and general support and 

provided a limited depot capability for the repair of aircraft components. It was equipped to manufacture small machine parts and 

also to repair items requiring extensive test equipment operating 

in a sterile environment such as avionics, instruments, carburators, 

fuel controls. and hydraulic pumps. The mobility offered by the 

ship also contributed to the effectiveness of aircraft support since 

it could move from one deep water port to another as the density of 

aircraft units shifted with changing tactical situations. 

Through the return of components to a serviceable condition, 

the issuance of parts from its shop stock in direct response to 

user requests, and the fabrication of hard-lOoget repair parts, the 

Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility was responsible for removing a substantial number of aircraft from a not operationally 

ready supply condition. 

In tensive Management of Critical Assets 

Prior to Vietnam, it was believed that an overseas pipeline of 

13 months would be required for aircraft engines (8 months for 

engines at wholesale level in Continental U.S. depot stocks and 

overhaul facilities plus 5 months in transit and in stock overseas) . 

One month of pipeline is the equivalent of the number of unserviceable engines generated in 30 days. At the peak of operations, 

each day of pipeline was worth SU 6 million, while 13 months 

would require spare engines in the value of $452.4 million. 

Through intensive management and the use of air transporta-
AVIATION LOGISTICS 147 

tion, actions were taken to reduce the pipeline time first to 912 

months, then 8 months, 7 months, and by December 1970 to 612 

months. Some of the methods and techniques used to keep the aviation inventory in motion included better asset visibility and control, 

weapons system management, closed loop/direct exchange, and 

retrograde control. 

Early in 1967, a reporting system was established to account 

for worldwide assets of the T53 and T55 gas turbi ne engines. 

This system, known as the Aircraft Component Intensive Management System, provided a postcard report to the Aviation Systems 

Command for each engine by serial number and gave every 

change in condition, location, or status, whether the engine was 

installed or was a spare. The reporting system later was broadened 

to cover 45 Aviation items including hoth engines and components 

representing a value of $1.3 hillion. 

For critical and high-value items required for Vietnam, Aviation Systems Command established a system known as Aircraft 

Intensive lv Managed Items. This system, wh ich in March 197 1 

included 227 items and extended worldwide, required that a forecast of monthly requirements he suhmitted to Aviation Systems 

Command each quarter. The customers and Aviation Systems 

Command met and "negotiated" monthly levels. Levels were hased 

upon forecasts of consumption (replacement) with minimal safety 

levels to preclude running out of stock. The customer requisitioned 

once a month, and Aviation Systems Command shipped the items 

by air to arrive in-country 15 days in advance of the month in 

which required. 

By May 1968 partly as a result of the Tel Offensive the requir..:-

ment for T53 engines for Huey and Cobra helicopters and T55 

engines for the Ch inook helicopter (CH-47) increased greatly. 

Since production and overhaul programs were behind schedule, 

a major prohlem developed. The only way to meet this probl em 

was to reduce the pipeline furth er. Elements in the pipeline with 

the potential for providing an early response were the intransit 

lime, and the in-coun try unserviceable engines. Accordingly, a com. 

bined grou nd and air transportation system was established. All nevI 

or overhaul ed T53 and T55 engines were accumulated at the 

Army Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Center, Corpus Christi. 

T exas, for direct air shipment to the Republic or Vietnam three 

tim~s a week by special mission aircraft. At the same time, unserviceable engines authorized for repair in Vietnam were reduced 

to those that could be repaired in 15 days; the remai ning unserviceable engines were returned for repair to the Continental U.s. 
148 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

by the special mission aircrafl. This system flushed out large 

quantities of unserviceable engines, reduced transportation costs, 

and provided a closed loop/ direct exchange program with U.S. 

ATmy Vietnam. This program was so effective that since early 

June 1968 there were no not operationally ready supply problems 

for these engines in spite of the reduced pipeline. 

Closed Loop Support for Aviation 

The first Aviation Closed Loop Support Conference was held 

at Headquarters U.S. Army Pacific in March 1967. Through 

1970, nine Aviation Closed Loop Conferences were held. Initially 

Closed Loop Support was limited to U.S. Army Vietnam, but as 

aircraft became available for other commands the program was 

expanded worldwide. In addition to providing a means of con· 

trolling the distribution of assets and providing visibility of equipment returning to Continental U.5. for overhaul, the Closed Loop 

Support program provided a forum for presenting and resolving 

problems in aviation logistics operations worldwide. 

From September 1969 to June 1970, the Army was confronted 

with a large backlog of unserviceable first line aircraft consisting 

principally of the UH- I, AH- I G, CH-47 and OH- 6. This situation 

not only denied aircraft to army units in the field, but also 

placed the Army in the position of needing to buy new aircraft 

while having a backlog of unserviceable aircraft on hand. A 

critical analysis was made of the mandatory time between over· 

hauls for aircraft; and based on Vietnam experience during the 

previous year (when 85 percent of all hightime Hueys returned 

to Continental U.S. averaged 2,140 hours) , it was agreed by 

Closed Loop Support conferees that the Huey (UH-I) Time Be· 

tween Overhauls could be increased from 2200 hours to 3300 hours. 

Appropriate increases in Time Between Overhauls were also made 

for other aircraft. Tn this manner, aircraft utilization was increased 

by delaying returns to Continelllal U.S. for overhaul. Transporta. 

tion and depot maintenance requirements were reduced, increas· 

ing the number of serviceable aircraft in the inventory at the 

least cost. This life extension program was carefully monitored to 

preclude any adverse impact on safety·or.Hight or materiel readiness. 

Also duri ng the September 1969 Closed Loop Support Con· 

ference, attendees evaluated the requiremelll for modifying the 

CH-47C helicopters (equipped with the T55- 1- 7C engine) to a 

full "C"' configuration with the - 11 engine. This requirement 

included 27 separate modifications and required approximately 

3,500 manhours to accomplish. During the Closed Loop Support 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 149 

conference. it was determined that the work could be done by Air 

Vietnam at less cost and in less time tha n if the helicopters were 

returned to the U.S. In January 1970, the modification effort began 

with Air Vietnam performing the work. This program required 

approximately two yea rs at a cost of about 52.6 million versus an 

estimated $10.2 million , if the aircraft had been relllrned to the 

Continenta l U.S. Also the aircraft were out of action for on ly 90 

cla ys rather than the 150 days that would have been requirecl. if 

the work had been done in the Continental U.S. 

Prior to the March 1970 Closed Loop Support conference. it 

had been planned to deploy 2~ CH- 54 B's, the modified "Flyi ng 

Crane," to U.S. Ann y Vietnam. However. after consultation \\'ith 

the U.S. Army Vietnam representative, and recognizing the p0-

tential phaseout of "Flying Cranes" in the next 18 months, it 

was agreed that such a transfer would be costly and was un· 

necessary since the CH- MA's in U.S. Army Vietnam were accomplishing the required mission in a satisfactory manner. Accordingly. the CH-54A's were reta ined in U.S. Army Vietnam, 

except for those hightime and crash-damaged aircraft that had to 

be returned. The CH-54B's were assigned elsewhere in the Army. 

Th is program reduced both transportation and depot maintenance overhaul costs that would have been incurred, if Ihe CH54A's had been returned to the Continental U,S. 

For aviation it was found practicable and in many cases more 

economical to ship by air nearly all aircra ft support including the 

aircraft as well as the supporting repair parts, components and 

engines. 

Direct Su.pport i\tai1lttmance Concepts 

Three separate concepts of direct support aircraft maintenance were employed in Vietnam. The infantry divisions centralized the aircraft direct support ca pabilitv in the aircraft maint~ · 

nance compan y of the maintenance battalion; the airmobile 

divisions central ized the capability in the transportation aircra h 

maintenance battalion: and the 1st Aviation Brigade companysized units were authorized an auached direct support aircraft 

maintenance detachment. 

Through the extensive operational experience in Vietnam it 

was found that conventional organizational maintenance organizations supported by centralized direct support units did not provide the desired level or availability to meet tactical require· 

ments. As a result various methods or maintenance support were 

tried in an attempt to increase readiness. The concept employed by 
150 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

the 1st Aviation Brigade was found to provide 10 percent higher 

readiness with 12 percent higher utilization when compared with 

units not having a direct support capability. In February 1968, as 

a result of an analysis made by Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

the Chief of Staff approved the concept of integrating the direct 

SUppOTt detachments inlO the aviation companies of the 1st Aviation 

Brigade. U.S. Army Vietnam was also requested to apply the conccpt to lhe infantry and airmobile division. 

Within the 1st Cavalry Division and the IOlst Airborne Division a combined tolal of nineteen detachments were organized , 

utilizing the resources of two of the divisions' four direct support 

aircraft mailllenance companies. The detachments were initially 

attached to the aviation units with an objective of integrating them 

at a later dale if th e concept proved to be practicable. 

A test was conducted in the 9th Infamry Division to determine 

the feasibility of adopting the decemralized direct support concept to all infamry divisions. Although this was h ighly successful 

in improving aircraft operational readiness rates, agreement could 

not be reached on additional personnel requirements for the 

decentralized organizations. 

The major aspect of the integrated system was that both 

organizational and direct support maintenance became the responsibility of a single commander. This responsibility permitted 

the commander to accomplish a ll functions associated with scheduled maimena nce to include component replacement and minor 

battle damage repair. The increased organic maintenance capabi lity for av iation units permitted the units to schedule maintenance 

according to their operational requirements, withoUl an unacceptable degradati on of tactical depl oyment capability. Backup d irect 

support maimenance units were still required to take ca re of 

extensive crash damage repairs; opera tional readiness noat sup· 

port: and repair pans storage, receipt and issue requirements. 

The Aircraft Readitless, Utilization, and LO.S5 Reportitlg Systems 

The reporting system and techniques employed to monitor 

aircraft readiness, utilization, and losses have undergone several 

major revisions since 1960. Changes were made to improve the 

accuracy, timeliness, and scope of information collected in order to 

have greater visibility over aviation inventories and to promptly 

highlight logistic support problems. 

Initially th e Army's reporting system included three major 

categories. These were <I) aircraft invemory. (2) nying hours, 

and (3) days in commission. It provided for the monthly reporting 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 151 

of worldwide army aircraft by serial number, unit assignment, 

flying hours accomplished during the month, and the operational 

readiness rate (which was variously known as aircraft in commission or aircraft available). Readiness data were compiled on 

the basis of the total number of days in c.:omm ission and out of 

commission during the month reponed and the reasons (that is 

supply. maintenance. other) for being out of commission. The 

number of days in commission for four plus hours was counted as 

being operationally ready for the 24-hour period. Conversely. aircraft out of commission for more than four hours were reported as 

being not opera tionall y ready during the entire day and the 

downtime was charged to supply. maintenance. or other. Reponing criteria allowed a wide range of interpretation and there 

were no aircraft readiness standards showing the degree of readiness to be maintained. 

In 1962 a supply bulletin, "Army Aircraft Maintenance Manhour Factors and Availability Norms," was published. It provided the factors and formulas needed to compute aircraft maintenance manpower requirements. It also gave guides to be used 

as a yardstick in measuring aircraft availability rates. This suppl y 

bulletin was not directive in nallire but was widely used as containing the best data available. Readiness standards placed liule 

demand on the commands, permitting down times for supply in 

excess of 10 percenl and an average maintenance down time for 

the fleet as high as 26 percent. Because of the low standards, there 

was little emphasis in the field or in the logistics system for improving aircraft read iness. 

In early 1963 Department of the Army Project 35. "Availability 

and Downtime Rates for Army Aircraft," was established. Project 

35 had as its objectives to establish and maintain realistic worldwide aircra ft ava ilability standards: to assu re that aircraft readiness 

was compatible with mission requirements and priority of assignment; and to provide to the Department of the Army information 

on the maximum potential use of its aircraft consistent with 

manning, materiel and money. All major commands and Depart. 

ment of the Army staff agencies were represented. Separate standards were set for aircraft with significant differences in mission 

requirements and logistic support capabi lities: for example, the 

UH- IA in the training base versus UH- I elsewhere. While Project 

35 was getting underway. the Office of the Secretary of Defense had 

established a working group to develop a uniform equipment 

readiness reponing system. This resulted in Department of Defense Instruction 7700.5, which became effective in January 1964. 
152 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

This Instruction prescribed standard read iness defin itions: operational ready, not operational ready-supply, and not operational 

ready-maintenance. The services wefe directed to establish standards and to repon aircraft readiness and down time to the 

nearest hour in a 24.holll" day. Department of the Army Project 35 

was well on the way to accomplishing all these things. and in 

January 1964 a new army regulation (AR 7 10- 12) was published 

implementing the Department of Defense Instruction. 

The Army's application of the Office of the Secretary of Defense system retained reporting aircraft uti lization (Hying hours). 

Later changes added reporting of the time accumulated on installed gas turbine engines by serial number. This information 

has proved extremely valuable in forecasting engine replacement 

requirements. Loss reporting is also included in the Army's reporting system. 

Chart 11 shows helicopter readiness rates of U.S. Army Vietnam for the period fiscal year 1965 until the 1st half of fiscal 

year 1971. A sharp decline in fiscal year 1965 was auributed to 

buildup activities. Inventories of helicopters in U.S. Army Vietnam increased more than ten times during the period and a 

readiness rate in excess of 70 percent was maintained despite 

the fact that these aircraft had to fly in excess of the programmed 

hours. In May 1970, following a Project 35 Committee review, 

U.S. Army Vietnam standards were adjusted upward be<..3use 

CHART [I-OPERATIONAL READINESS OF U.S. ARMY VIETNAM ROTARY 

WING AIRCRAFT 

Dec 6$ Mly 70 

510 STO 

7 5 

21 20 

" 75 

'"00 65.5 

loo-------------------'"'~~~ Nol O~rallooilly ... lIudy ~~-­ Su~pl, 

Nol OlHirll;oolll, lIudy Maonleo.n tt 

75--- ,,· __ .:;: ____________ ~y_S.!.D ____ ISOO 

... ___ - - --...... , OlHirlllonally IIndy 

"..... " , __ ~'CO"'C'---------------~:==-cn,""".CH,·,"','O·""'·."'"',"C""0"'0" __ __ ~- v _ 

25--------------------1500 

011 & flVING HII RATE (lEn SCAlE) INVENTORY (1IIGHT SCALE) 

o " 

, 

" " " " " "11 

o 

65 " 61 .. 69 70 10 20 , .. NOAS ••• •. , ••• 76 7.0 .. 5.0 5.' .., 

/fORM 12.S IS.8 20.3 221 212 21.3 19.0 18.8 196 

OR 82.' 120 70.3 TO' 718 73.9 76.0 75.9 76.1 

'"'" 56.1 .. 0 585 6S.7 61.3 69' .... 539 535 
AVIATION LOGISTICS 153 

experience showed (hat logistic support operations permitled the 

attainment of higher goals. The new goals decreased Not Operational Ready-Supply from 7 percent to 5 percent and Not Operational Ready- Maintenance from 21 percent to 20 percent. 

Despite the aging of the fleet and the high utilization rales, these 

new standards were met. 

Use of Helicopters in Logistic Sttpport 

Significant to operations in Vietnam was the use of hel icopters 

III the logistic support role. Their use freed the Army from a 

complete dependence on surfa ce transportation. The helicopter 

hecame an indispensible link in the forwa rd area of operation 

because of its ability to operate in virtually any weather condition, 

day or night, with little or no prepara tion of landing sites. 

The majority of the logistic missions were carried out by 

UH- l, CH-47, and Cl-J- 54 aircraft. The UH- I's and CH-47s were 

primarily to support the forward areas and delivered such diverse 

types of cargo as hot food , medical supplies, ammunition, consum· 

able suppl ies, and repair parts. 

The UH-I's operated fonvard to the platoon level, while the 

CH-47's transported heavier and more bu lky loads to battal ions 

and companies. The CH- 54's were primari ly employed to lift 

larger items of equipment to otherwise inaccessible loca tions and 

for evacuation of heavy lifts from the combat area to the support 

area. Extensive use was made of the external sling load concept. 

This required only the time to fasten the load to a cargo hook 

suspended beneath the aircra ft. By employing the sling load technique, it was not uncommon for the CI-I-47 to airlift 100 lon~ of 

supplies a day within a 10 mile radius. The significance (iT the 

helicopter role in combat support is further substantiated by data 

shown in Table 9. 

In addition to the daily combat service support and resupply 

missions, the larger helicopters, the CH-47 and CH- 54, developed 

a major capability in the recovery of other aircraft, vehicles and 

equipment requiring removal to the rear. Through extensive 

experience, procedures were developed whereby aircra ft and other 

equipment and materiel could be rigged for pick·up by helicopters in a matter of minutes, even in enemy territory under 

fire. To date, helicopters have accounted for the recovery of over 

10,000 aircraft. belonging to all of the services, val ued in excess 

of $2.5 billion. 
TABLE 9-1NTRA-VIETNAM c.uco MOVEMENT BY AIR

"" '''' 

Common Com .~ Common 

X"'" """. ~""kc 

Alrlih Airlift Al,lift 

Mo nth Srsttm liclicoptul Sut cm He!icopttn Systcm 

Jan . . . ......... . ........ 59.000 40.000 78.721 132.602 78.25<1 

Feb .•...•••• .•••.••••... 55.000 "')00 75.012 77.362 70.721 

Mar . . . .............•••• 65.000 SO,OOO 92.483 80.750 73.086 

Apr . .............•••. . 65 .. 100 55.000 ",948 94,387 69.382 

May .............. •.... 6-1.700 ".000 85,374 98.181 69,209 

June ............ .... ... 64.800 60.500 83,967 108.176 58.620 

July .. . ........ .. . .. ... . 64.700 65.000 82,957 110.800 57.026 

Aug . ••• .... •.. . . •. • . . • • 65,000 81.000 80.945 ".5<6 61,311 

Scp .... . . ..... •• •. .. .. .. 64.700 8).500 8 1,703 91.42 1 " ... 

OCI .. .. .. ... • ••• • ..••••. 74.800 106.000 81.725 87.322 62,923 

Nov . ....... . .. . ....... . " ,900 68.500 8',182 89,929 62.02

D«.. ........ .. .... .. .. . 72.000 113.soo 82.179 104,547 67.442 

Total ... .. .......... . . 780.000 828.000 997.174 1,123,032 791,685 

Note: e!ko~ tonnasa ...., for Army and A-lirinc Corpo ....... 1")' wlnK a ire .. ft. Ann, tonnJsa Incillde 3i

arlO mo_cmcnu. Muine lonnJla do not Include tutial Op(ntlom tOn nasa. Common Sc,..,1cc Airlift S
AVIATION I.OCISTICS 155 

Aerial Re5ll f)ply 

To test the feasibility and effectiveness of an intensive aerial 

resupply campaign, Operation Task Force Remagen was fonned 

and a test of aerial resuppl y was conducted during the period 16 

March through 29 April 1969. Task Force Remagen was conducted 

by troops from the 1st Infantry Brigade. 5th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) . 

The Task Force was composed of an armored batlalion and a 

mechanized infalllry battalion cross-reinforced, with the mission 

to prove or disprove that an armored and mechanized force could 

operate effectivdy over extended distances without a ground line 

of communication. For 47 da ys Task Force Remagen operated at 

a distance of between 40-60 kilometers from its base at the U.S. 

Marine Corps Vandergrift Combat Base, and relied entirely on 

helicopters for resupply. 

Requests for supplies and repair pans were forwarded to the 

Fon vard Support Element, who in turn forwa rded the requests 

to the 75th Support Battalion Logistic Operations Center at Quang 

Tri. The requested supplies were assembled overni ght and either 

flown or sent by convoy the next morning to the Forward Support 

Element for further delivery to the task force by ail". 

Both battalions involved in tr.e task force maintained combat 

trains consisting of tracked maintenance and resuppl y vehide~ . 

All replacement parts were Aown to the units in their field locations. exchanged for the defecti ve part and installed on the spol. 

Defective parts were then returned to the support clement for 

repair. Over 1000 tons of cargo were moved by helicopters from 

the forward element supply base at Vandergrift Comba t Bast' 

during the course of the operation. 

During this operation the task force received an average of 

thirteen helicopter sorties per day. It was estimated that with an 

average of thirty minutes per rou nd trip. four helicopters could 

have met Task Force Remagen's average daily resupply requirements. 

Looking to the flllllre, a project known as Log Lift has been 

established to incorporate current and future helicopters into the 

logistic system in order to help in carrying Ollt the ai ms of the Inventory hi Motion and Ma;'l tenallce Support Posi/ive programs. 

Under Project Log Lift. lhe Army will anal yze experi ence gained 

in Vietnam in order to develop future policy, practices and pro· 

cedures. Log Lift will also eva luate the use of ex isting helicopters 

and will project into the future when the Army plans to have a 

heavy lift helicopter with a payload of at least twice that of the 
156 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

currently available Chinooks and Cranes. This greater lih capability will reduce requirements for stocking of supplies and equipment in the forward area of the comba t lOne and wi ll further 

assist in retrograding cquipmcm and materiel requiring heavy 

maintenance and returni ng them to the user in mi nima l time: 

permit ship-to-shore operations any place in the world; and en· 

hance the overall mobility of the Army by providing a logistic 

support system as mobile as the combat arms being supported. 
CHAPTER VI 

Service Support in Vietnam: 

Transportation and Maintenance 

Service su pport described in the next three chapters include 

th e transportation, maintenance, constrllclion, faciliLies engineering, real estate, communications and aviation elements logistics. 

Also service support includes food service, &Taxes registration, 

laundry, bath and property disposal activities. There is also a 

brief discussion of other support missions unique to the Vietnam 

war. 

Staggering 3ffiOUIllS of suppl ies of all lypes (construction, 

maintenance, communication, aviation, transportation, and personal items for th e soldier) traveled along extensive sea and air 

routes acros:, the Pacific to Vietnam porls, into depots and storage 

areas, finally down primitive roads and an almost non-cxistent 

rail network to supply points where they were finally delivered to 

the individual soldier or unit. 

Service support followed the same trail and to meet the 

chall enge service support units also had to institute special management techniques_ 

Transportation 

Between 1965 and 1969 over 22 million short tons of dry ca rgo 

and over 14 million short tons of bulk petroleum were transported 

to Vietnam_ In addition to the cargo thcre \I"as also the requirement for transponing persollnel. Approximately 2.2 million people were transported to Vietnam and approximately 1.7 million 

were returned to the U.S. during this period. All the petroleum 

and more than 95 percent of the dry cargo were transported by 

ship. The remai nder of the dry cargo and 90 percent of the passengers travelled by air. 

Because of the similarities in military and commercial trans· 

portation operations, the transportati on corps had a good base of 

professional knowledge to draw upon. For the most part, transportation personnel sent to Vietnam, both officers and enlisted 

personnel, had been in the business before. 
158 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Transportation Buildltp-1965-1966 

This period was characterized by a rapid increase in combat 

troop strength and the tremendous inAux of supplies and equipment for their support. The transportation units that arrived 

during the l\by to August 1965 pcriod were company and detachment sized-units which were stationed along the coast. 

They were occupied primarily with their mission performance. 

their daily existence, security, and improvement of their cantonment areas. The 11 th Transportation Battalion (terminal) arrived 

in Saigon on 5 August 1965 to assume control of the Saigon 

military port from the U.S. Navy. Two days later, the 394th 

Transportation Battal ion (termina l) arrived at Qui Nhon to 

assume command of transportation un its in that area and plan for 

the September arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division at An Khe. On 

23 September. the 10th Transportation Battalion (terminal) ar~ 

rived at Cam Ranh Bay to assume responsibility for the Cam Ranh 

Bay terminal. 

The 4th Transportation Command (terminal Command) was 

the first senior transportation command and control unit to arrive 

in Vietnam. It arrived on 12 August 1965 and was given techn ical 

and operational control of all land and water transportation units 

assigned to the 1st Logistical Command. Included in th is mission 

were the operation of the Saigon port, the water terminals at Cam 

Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Phan Rang, Nha Trang and Vung Tau, and 

operation of the Army Air Terminal at Tan Son Nhut. 

Transportation Expansion-1966-1969 

By early 1966, the Saigon, Qui Nhon. and Cam Ranh Bay 

Support Commands were established. Each was given responsibility 

for complete logistic sup port within its area of operation. Th is 

included the control and operation of all common user land 

transportation and port and beach facilities with in the area. The 

Sa igon area was an exception with the 4th Transportation Command retaining responsibility for port operations under the operational control of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. The 4th Transportation Command was thereby re li eved of 

its South Vietnam-wide transportation command mission, and 

concentrated on the Saigon Port proper. Although the 4th was 

not organized or manned to perform a theater level tra nsportation command mission. the Command had done the job we ll. To 

assist the su pport commands in managing port operations. the 5th 

Transportation Command (terminal A) was assigned to Qui Nilon 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AN D MAI NTENANCE 159 

Support Command, and the 124th Transportation Terminal Command (terminal A) was assigned to Cam Ranh Bay in August 1966. 

M ovemen t Control Wit hi" South Vietnam 

Until September 1965 no co-ordinated movement control 

agency existed in South Vielllam. Air transportation was managed 

at the local level by individual Air Traffic Coordinating Offices 

located at the various aerial ports. Water transport requirements 

were sent directly to the Military Sea Transport Service, Far East. 

Highway transport needs were met by local support elements. As 

a result of such loca lized, decentralized traffic management, transport resources were either wasted or ineffectually employed and 

management data were not exchanged. There was no overall 

knowledge of the capability of country-wide transportation facilities. 

In September 1965, Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vi etnam, establ ished a jointly staffed Traffic Management 

Agency under his operational control and the staff supervision of 

the J-4. The agency became fully operational in earl y 1966 and 

was assigned the mission to: I. direct, control and supervise all 

functions incident to the efficient and economical use of freight 

and passenger transporta tion service required for movement of 

al l Department of Defense sponsored personnel and cargo within 

the Military Assista nce Command, Vietnam, area of responsibility 

(this was later expanded to include U.S. Agency for International 

Development requirements) ; 2. serve as a point of contact for all 

users of military highway, railway, inland waterway, intra-coasta l 

and troop carrier and cargo airlift capabili ty as made ava ilable 

by the component commander; 3. arrange for movement; 4. advise 

and assist shippers and rece ivers to insure that such transport 

capability is effecti vely utilized : 5. prepare and maintain current 

plans in support of contingency plans and prepare other Military 

Assistance Command, Vi etnam, pl ans as directed; 6. operate Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Traffic Coordination Offices; 

7. control movement o( cargo and passengers into terminals through 

coordination with terminal operators; 8. maintain liaison with 

transport agenci es of the host nation, host nati on military organizations and appropriate U.S. Forces required to accomplish 

the assigned mission ; 9. and control, manage and maintain the 

Military Assistance Commani:l, Vietnam, conta iner express operation. 

The mission letter establ ished the principle of centralized 

direction and control of traffic management and related servi ces 
160 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. hcadquancrs and decentralized traffic operations, services. and co-ordination at field 

offices operating in support of the component commands. It 

authorized the Commander, Traffic Management Agency, to communicate directly with the component commands, their units, 

installations, and activities concerning requirements, traffic management, and use of military owned nansportation, with responsiveness to the requirements of each of the components as 

the guiding principle. Originally Traffic Management Agency was 

organized with a directorate staff and three traffic regions. To meet 

changing requirements, two additional traffic regions were established in 1968. The to(al strength of Traffic Management Agency in 

July 1968 was approximately 400 personnel. The regional headquarters, with their district and field traffic offices, as well as the Air 

Traffic Co-ordinating Offices were located adjacent to major shipping and receiving activiti es and provided a point of direct contact 

for all transportation users and operators. The Traffic Management Agency command communic<ttions network operated over 

dedicated circuits that connected headquarters with the regional 

headquarters-and each region to its subordinate district and field 

traffic offices. 

Since its inception, Traffic Management Agency was authorized to coordinate directly with numerous agenc ies outside the 

specific Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, area of responsibil. 

ity. The Traffic Management Agency was collocated with the Military Sea Transportation Service Office, Saigon, and was authorized 

direct communication with both Commanding Officer Military 

Sea Transportation Service, and Commanding Officer Military 

Sea Transportation Service, Far East. To co-ordinate and obtain 

sealift capabilities to support tactical operations, which could 

not be supported by available resources, Traffic Management 

Agency was authorized to communicate directly with the Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet. The Air Transportation Co-ordination Offices representing all of the Services requested intertheater airlift allocations from Military Airlift Command. For 

intra-theater airlift beyond the capability of Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, assets, Traffic Management Agency requested assistance through the Western Pacific Transportation 

Office. Traffic Management Agency provided cargo booking guidance to Western Pacific Transportation Office [or inter-Pacific 

Command sllrface movements to Vietnam ports and also co· 

ordinated with the Pacific Command Movements Priority Agency 

regarding surface shipments from Continenta l U.S. to Vietnam. 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND r.rAINTENANCE 161 

A significant point in the concept of Traffic Management 

Agency operations was that it did not exercise operational control 

of the transportation a~sets made available for common· user servo 

ice. Rather, Traffic ivlanagemcnt Agency operatc(1 on the basis 

of managing toward the optimum use of these asscts. Forecasts 

of requirements were received from the l\rilitary Assistance Com· 

mand. Vietnam. component commands. 1l.S. Agency for Inter· 

national Developmellt. Vietnam Regional Exchange 'iervice. Re· 

public of Vietnam Armed Forces. and other authorized users. 

These requirements II'ere matched against ava ilable camnlOn·user 

transportation capability, based on priorities of movement estab· 

lished by the shippers. If requirements exceede<1 the capabilities, 

Traffic Management Agency inititated action to obtain the additional capability. If additional lift capability was not available. 

Traffic Management Agency would allocate the existing capability 

based on the policies, guidance, and priorities of Commander 1l.S. 

~Iilitary Assistance Command. Vietnam. 

The effectiveness of Traffic Management Agency improved as 

the theater situation stabilized, procedures were refined, opera· 

tional problems were recogn 7.t~d. and solutions wcre developed. 

The lack of a cenlralized traffil; management agency in South 

Vietnam during the early stages of the conniet contributed to an 

inefficient use of transportation rcsources. ~fo\'cment control agencies proved to be highly effective in providing suppOrt to the 

tactica l commander after the movement control agencies were 

implemented. Interface problems between Traffic Management 

Agency and the Military Assistance Command. Vietnam, components continued to exist. Rather than invalidate the system, 

these problems highlighted the need for an agency like Traffic 

Management Agency. 

Truck Transportation 

During the deployment of tactical units in mid-1965 most 

highway transport units were located at or near the major port 

areas. They provided port and beach clearance and local and line 

haul in II and III Corps. 

These serviccs were initially provided by three truck com· 

panics at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay and a combination of medium 

truck companies (two cargo and one Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants) at Qui Nhon. These capabilities were incrcased through 

1966 by the addition of more tTUck companies and command and 

comrol elements. 

~ force levels climbed, the requirements for highway trans-
162 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

portation units also increased. T hese requiremen ts \\Iere mel by 

three means: I. the arrival of a Transportation Motor Transport 

Group Headquarters in Saigon plus the arrival of additional military truck units; 2. the use of commercial trucking contractors; and 

3. the arriva l of the 1st Transportation Company (GOER) in II 

Corps. 

The 48th Transportation Group (Molor Transport) was the 

first tTUck group to arrive in South Vietnam and was assigned to 

the U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon in May 1966 to assume 

command of fi ve tTUck companies then operating in III Corps. The 

8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) arri ved at Qui 

Nhan in October 1966 and assumed command and control of the 

motor transport units in U.S. Army Support Command, Qui 

Nhon. The last truck group to arrive was the 500th Transportation 

Group (Motor Transport) which was assigned to the U.S. Army 

Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay in late October 1966. It was 

assigned responsibili ty for motor transport operations in the 

southern portion of II Corps. 

In the summer of 1966 large scale combat operations in the 

Central Highlands put a severe strain on the motor transport 

units provid ing line haul support in the Pleiku area. Convoy com· 

manders were required to continually operate over an insecure 

highway system. Convoy security support was provided by U.S. and 

Vietnamese units when priorities permitted ; often the desired 

degree of support was not available. It was also desirable to have 

armored personnel carriers integra ted into the convoy. but they 

were not always available. For this reason truck units employed 

the "hardened vehicle" concept (discussed in Chapler II) . Withi n 

the 8th T ransportation Grollp during the 1967- 1968 time fra me, 

the equivalent of one light truck company's capability was lost by 

converting their cargo vehicles to " hardened vehicles" to provide 

the necessary security. 

Except in port and beach clearance and for local haul within 

secure areas, truck units operated only during daylight hours, 

thus achieving less productive tonnage than stated in Tables or 

Organization and Equipment which envision a 20 hou r, two shift 

work day. Productivity was complicated by the unimproved roads 

which were made impassable by the monsoon ra ins. In September 

1966, the GOER vehicle was introduced into Vietnam. The 1st 

Transportation Company (COER) was the only company which 

utilized this vehicle. Total vehicles (COER) assigned to the 1st 

Transportation Company (GOER) were 19. T here were three 

configurations of the vehicle. the 8 ton vehicle, 8 ton 2,500 gallon 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 163 

tanker. and the 10 ton wTecker. The GOER vehicle was a large 

tire. rough terrain , cargo carrying vehicle built and designed by 

the Ca terpillar Tractor Company. The vehicles were quite versatile. having a cross country and swim capability. These vehicles 

were used extensively. but especi all y during the monsoon period. 

The GOERS were limited in their use, particularly on hard 

surface roads. and maintenance was difficult as repair parts 

had to come directly from Continental U.S. The service they 

performed was noteworthy in its effect on the transportati on 

system. 

The highway tonnages moved by a combination of military 

and commerci al motor transport during the period December 

1967- December 1968 was approximately ten million tons; and by 

the same means during the period Ja nuary-July 1969, approximately five million tons were carried. 

As the buildup continued it became apparent that the con· 

ventional milita ry truck was not designed to handle palletized 

and containerized loads efficientl y. The fixed sides of the cargo 

bodies on the 2lh-ton and 5·ton cargo trucks did not pennit fork. 

lifts to reach the full length of the cargo compartment. therefore the push and pull method was used in loading and unloading 

operations causing damage to the truck bodies. 

To facilitate operations, U.S. Army Vietnam obtained eighteen 

drop side cargo trucks from the U.S. Marine Corps to serve as test 

vehicles. T he test proved that dropside trucks were highl y desirable 

and effective cargo carriers and that through their use more cargo 

could be hauled with easier access to the entire length of the 

body and with little damage to the truck body. U.S. Army Vietnam 

requested that Depanment of the Army procure these trucks for 

use in Vietnam. 

By the end of 1965. it was apparen t to transportation planners 

that augmenta ti on of military motor transport capability was 

necessa ry to clear the South Vietnamese port congestion. During 

the peri od March 1966--June 1966, the US Army Procurement 

Agency, Vietnam, awarded 10 major contracts for trucking services to augment the military capability. One of the major contractors used in Vietnam was the Vinnel Corporation which also 

provided 5levedore support, beach and port clearance. and vessel 

maintenance support. The highway support offered by Vinnel included the operation of 30 Army-procured Kenworth trucks and 

trailers of the type and design lIsed in the Arabian Desert. This 

vehicle was probably the most effective vehicle on the sand dunes 

of Cam Ranh Bay. 
164 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

The three major tTUcking contractors used in the Saigon area 

were Equipment Inc., PhiJco Ford, and Do Thi Nuol1g. The Han 

Jin Company of Korea was util ized for tTucking and stevedore 

services in (he Qui Nhon area. The Alaskan Barge and Transport 

Company provided stevedore. tTu cking, and intra-coaSlal barge 

movement. Their intra·coastal opera tion util ized a considerable 

tug and barge neel between Cam Ranh Bay and its oUlpons. This 

intra-coastal barge movement included the entire South Vietnamese 

coast. 

The lise of contracLOr services for trucki ng, termi nal, and 

marine purposes provided the extra punch needed ill these opera· 

ti ons, and provisions should be made to include in future planning 

considera tion for lise of contra(lors when the opportunity arises. 

Rail TratlSportation 

The Vietnam Na tiona l Railway System was government owned, 

being opera ted under the supervision of tile Ministry of Com· 

munications and Transportation. The Vietnam National Railway 

System originated at Saigon, and served the entire coastal area 

from Phan Thiet to Dong J-Ia. (Map ") The overall condition of 

the roadbed and rolling stock was poor. The long period of intense 

interdiction and destruction by the Viet Cong and North Vietnam· 

ese regular units resulted in the railway system being unable to 

carry significant tonnages. The railroad was well engi neered, how. 

ever, with 413 bridges, 27 tunnels, controlling grades of less than 

1 Y2 percent, steel ties, and vertical elevations well above the water· 

ways. In 1969, the rolling stock of the railroad consisted of 59 

serviceable locomotives and over 500 serviceable freight cars. The 

major repair facility loca ted in Saigon was well equipped to per· 

form major engine and car repair. Other shop facilities along the 

length of the line were adequate to handle all types of minor 

repairs. T he railroad employs approximately 3,500 personnel 

(operating crews, maintenance and construction forces). Overall 

planning for railway restoration began in June 1966 as a joint 

effort by the Government of Vietnam and U.S. agencies. All 

reconstruction efforts were coordinated through three standing 

committees composed of members of Military Assistance Com· 

mand, Vietnam, Government of Vietnam, U.S. Agency for Inter· 

national Development, and the Government of Vietnam Joint 

General Staff with primary responsibility for railway restoration 

resting with the Joint Committee on railroad restoration. Actual 

construction was the responsibility of the Vietnam National Rail· 

way System except that rail spurs to U.S. mi litary install ations were 
VIETNAM RAIL SYSTEM 

_ _ 0 .... ,_, 

___ e, .. .. 

...... ..... ., ,..,"'." .. 

.-

" 4'" C'N( 

.. _ '0_" '''''OM 5 ..... c'NES 

.... -..,""'." .. . " ,. , ... c .... '0 .... ' " ,M ....ooot M'. t ..... t •• " .r ,. DI' U t • • '0"'" ' ."" •• •• _ •• , ••• """ "'M ... u' • •• _ •••• f ... , "'" • 

.... , ....... owe. 'OM .. .-. ... _ ........... n • 

. "".... .. MAP 4 
166 LOGImC SUPPORT 

funded and built by US fOTces. U.S. Agency for International 

Development furnished construction materials such as rail , lies, 

structured steel, bridge trusses, and eq uipment. Funds programed 

for railway restoration were limited as shown in the foll owing 

table: 

PROCRAMIl'>C FOR R AILWAY RESTORATION 

($ MILLIONS) 

Government 

Ym of Vietnam U.S. AID 

1966 ... • .8 

1967 ........••. ... . 2.' • 9.2 

1968 .... . ..•.••......... 2.6 '.1 

1969 ...................... . 2.5 45 

Totals . .. .. ........... . ~ 8.2 $ \6.8 

TOlal 

• • 115 

'.7 

7.' 

$ 25.0 

The U.S. Army had considerable interest in th is railroad because of the potential it offered in the bulk movement of cargo 

at low rates. The system was used to support tbe Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, construction program and transported 

hundreds of thousands of tons of rock and gravel to air base and 

highway sites. In 1967- 1968. 200 U.S. procured freight cars were 

delivered. These cars were maintained and operated hy the railroad for the U.S., and the freight rate for cargo handl ed on these 

cars was approximately 15 percent lower than normal rail rates. 

Vietnamese personnel operated the engines. did their own 

repair work, and restored sections of track destroyed by the Viet 

Congo To help the Vietnamese keep up to date, the U.S. Army 

assigned technical advisors to the railroad, but for lhe most part, 

the Vietnamese ran the whote operation. 

Railway operations in Vietnam expanded in direct proportion 

to the interest and effort put forth by the U.S. and the Government 

of Vietnam. Besides providing low cost military transportation, 

railways helped the South Vietnamese in their social and economic 

development. 

Air Transportation 

Restrictions on land transportation placed added importance 

and reliance on intra-theater air transportation. The virtually nonexistent capability of the South Vietnamese Air Force air transport 

placed major relia nce on U.S. air transport resources to support 

military operations. The main U.S. capability was provided by 

the Common Service Airlift System operated by the U.S. Air 

Force, and aircraft organic to the various military organ iza ti ons. 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 167 

The Common Service Airlift System was composed of fixed wing 

aircraft and provided tactical as well as intra-theater airlift. Or· 

ganic aircraft were primarily employed by combat commanders 

for immediate battlefield mobility and support and were not 

readily available for intra-theater airlift purposes. Helicopters were 

not assigned to the Common Service Airlift System fleet, however 

they played an extensive and highly significant role which is dis· 

cussed in some detail later in this chapter. The helicopter provided 

a highly versatile lift capability that had never been available in 

such great numbers in previous military operations. Use of the 

helicopter complemen ted the capability of the fixed wing air· 

craft and surface capability by operation from airfields and other 

areas to locations inaccessible to other forms of transport. 

Initially the Common Service Airlift System was composed of 

U.S. Air Force C-123 and the C-7A aircraft of the Royal Australian 

Air Force and the U.S. Army. This Reet was augmented by U.S. 

Air Force C-130 aircraft in April 1965. The Common Service 

Airlift System organization further changed in January 1967 when 

the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 

agreed that the C-7A aircraft assigned to the U.S. Army wou ld 

be transferred to the U.S. Air Force. 

Water TrQmportation 

During the buildup phase, the few land lines of communication 

were in poor repair and subject to interdiction by enemy forces, 

and the mobility of U.S. Forces was achieved through the extensive use of water and air transportation. 

To fully exploit the potential of the long Somh Vietnamese 

coastline, and to supplement improvements in South Vietnam's 

four major deep water ports, a series of satellite sha llow-draft 

ports were developed. (Map 5) The improvements permitted 

intra-coastal shipping to increase tonnages between 1965- 1968 

(Tom several hundred tons to over three million tons. 

Ports were rapidly expanded through the use of DeLong 

piers. These piers were quite versatile and were fabricated in a 

variety of sizes and con figura tions ranging from 55 feet to 427 (eet 

long and 45 feet to 90 feet wide. They were towed from their 

ports of origin and quickly implaced at their destination. The DeLong pier is a good concept and a good facility, and should be 

included in future contingency plan packages. 

Although the development of the four major deep draft ports 

was importan t to the support of forces in Vietnam, the use of 

numerous shallow draft ports and special operations, such as 
MAP 5 

00_ t. 

u . .... , ._ .. , < ...... . . ...... --, "'''''''., ...... .. """ 

" .. ,'" ... 

DOl" 

PORTS, LAND LINES 

". 

~ .. , ." 

OF COMMUNICATION AND 

MAJOR LOGISTIC COMMANDS 

A"."" ••. " • S .... ", 

.. "c,~.f-----"' ___ ::::'. .. a. ! i '! . • " .O "~ •• " .. 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 169 

Wunder Beach (Than My Thuy) were vita l to the support of 

troops in such areas as I and IV Corps. Wunder Beach (Than My 

Thuy) in I Corps was a Logistics-Over-The-Shore type operation 

which was useful during the dry season. This beach operation 

allowed shallow draft vessels to unload directly on the beach without the use of piers and was an effective and efficielll means of 

discharging cargo. The suppon of shallow draft operations required the use and coordination of the Military Sea Transportation Service, the Seventh Fleet LSTs in the Western Pacific, and 

the U. S. Army watercraft resources. 

The U. S. Army Beach Discharge Lighter LTC John U. D. 

Page, which was made available for use in South Vietnamese 

waters after repeated requests and much delay, was lIseful in 

supporting intra-coastal requ irements within the Cam Ranh Bay 

logistics complex (Nha Trang-Cam Ranh-Phan Rang). COlllrol of 

the operation of this craft was retained at the Cam Ranh Bay 

Support Command. Because of its shallow draft and unrestricted 

loading ramp area , it was more versatile and valuable than an 

LST on a ship-far-ship basis_ I.!though a prototype and unique in 

the Army inventory since the late 1950's, this craft has justified its 

additional procurement for the purpose of modernizing and in· 

creasing the versatility of the shallow draft fleet. This ship moved 

an average of 10,000 to 15,000 short tons per month_ IIer propulsion system was damlged in 1967, but demand for the ship's 

services delayed its movement to a shipyard in Japan for overhaul 

until almost a year later. 

Early in the Vietnam buildup Landing Craft, Mechanized 

(LCM) and Landing Craft, Utility (LCU) , were used to perform 

ship.to-shore and selective discharge operations and for limited 

intercoastal and inland watem'ay operations. These craft were supported in the lighterage role by amphibians of the LARC V (5 ton) 

and LARC LX (60 ton) (formerly known as BARC) classes_ As 

deep draft piers were developed, some of these craft were diverted 

to other missions. such as the Wunder Beach operation, where no 

port facilities existed. 

Due to the periodic shortage of lUgs in the Saigon area, L.CMs 

were frequently used to tow ammunition barges from the in-stream 

deep draft discharge sites at Nha Be and laler at Cat Lai. 10 

barge discharge sites dispersed throughout the area. 

In northem I Corps. LCMs were used on the Perfume and eua 

Viet Rivers to shuttle dry cargo and petroleum, oils. and lubri. 

cants from coastal transfer sites to Hue and Dong Ha. 

In addit:on to their normal lighterage use, LCMs were em-
170 LOGlmC SUPPORT 

played in performing a variety of harbor service hmctions such 

as resupply, maintenance, ferry service. and patrol and were also 

used in direct support of tactical operations. 

As the capacity of deep draft piers improved, both the Army's 

and the Navy's LCUs were shifted to intra-coastal and inland· 

water ways. The use of LCUs accounted for approximately 29 

percent of the total cargo moved intra-coastally during that year. 

Prior to the completion of the LST ramps at Tan My, Navy LCUs, 

with periodic Army support, were the primary media for resupply 

to northern ] Corps. Extensive use of LCUs was also made for 

operations in lhe Saigon-VlIng Tau-Delta complex. Tn late 1967 

six SKILAKs, commercial off-the-shelf LCU / YFU type craft, 

were procured by the Navy to suppon operations in I Corps. 

To help alleviate the shonage of lighterage and coastal shipping 

capability, Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, recommended that a contract be negotiated with Alaska 

Barge and Transpon Company. The concept of utilizing civilian 

contractors was approved by the Secretary of Defense in November 

1965 and he directed the Military Sea Transportation Service 

to negotiate the contract. By 8 December the contract was signed 

and operations began in early 1966. This imra-coastal augmentation included a barge·tug fleet among which were two stripped 

down LST hulls for use as barges. 

Because only one major port, Cam Ranh Bay, had a deep 

draft pier for the discharge of ammunition, a large number of the 

available barges were used to support the ammunition discharge 

program. The ammunition discharge in the Sa igon-Cat Lai (Nha 

Be) complex, for example, was in effect a combination streamdischarge and inland waterway distribution system and placed a 

heavy requirement on the available barge assets. In each major 

port complex, contractor-furnished lighterage augmemed the limited military capability that was available. 

A new requirement was announced in 1967 to move a minimum 

of 85,000 shon tons per month of crushed rock into the Delta to 

suppon the highway rehabilitation program. This program increased the shallow draft barge and tug requirements and necessitated expansion of the contract support provided by Alaska Barge 

and Transport and another company, the Luzon Stevedoring Company. 

A number of LSTs were being utilized for carrying cargo from 

Far Eastern Pacific ports to South Vietnam. To relieve pressure 

on LST assets and in order to make more shallow-draft sh ipping 

available in South Vietnam, the Commanding Officer, Military Sea 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 171 

Transportation Service, Far East procured small foreign Rag ships 

and retained some of the Continental U. SAo-SOUlh Vietnam shipping resources for intra·theater use. This additional deep-draft 

shipping plus lhe improvements in ship tUTll·around time in South 

Vietnamese ports contributed substantially to decreasing the pres· 

sure on LST resources and permitted a greater use of LSTs for 

deliveries to shallow·draft ports in lieu of LCM's and LCU's. Never· 

theless, LST requirements continued to be sufficiently heavy to 

maintain pressure on the allocation and lise of theater LST assets. 

Transshipment of cargo from major South Vietnamese ports to 

areas supported by over-the-beach unloading continued on a large 

scale, although Commander :n Chief Pacific favored the development of additional deep-water berths in various ports such as Vung 

Ro, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau in order to reduce dependence on 

LST operations. 

The maritime Reet which supported the resupply of combat 

operations in South Vietnam was inadequate and outdated. Although a majority of the vessels had been in moth balls, they were 

worn out. These ships required an extensive amount of repair to 

put them in service and keep them aRoat. It would have been more 

cost effective if we had had a fleet of ships designed to meet the 

requirements for movement of troops and military cargo. 

Conlaitlerization 

Containerization was an important logistic concept used exten· 

sively in Vietnam. About 1950 the Army first developed a concept 

of utilizing a standard-sized container to give a semblance of 

automation to the movement of supplies through the pipeline fTom 

Continental U.S. stations and depots to overseas units and depots. 

The standard steel container called container express with a capacity of 9,000 Ibs was designed to be carried on trucks and rail 

cars and be handled by the general purpose 5-ton capac ity cargo 

gear on most ocean freighters. 

The Army efforts in containerization originated with the port 

and supply problems in World War 11 and Korea and made use 

of the advances made hy other services and industry in unitiza· 

tion and palletization of cargo. All services stressed palletization. 

In addition to the Army and Air Force investments in container 

express containers, the Marines had developed two standard-sized 

moum-oUl boxes for deploying forces; and the Air Force deve loped 

its 463-L system to handle palletized cargo in aircraft. 

In early 1965 the Army and the Air Force jointly owned an 

inventory of almost 100,000 container express containers. Every 
172 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

major U. S. Army unit moving to the theater carried its accom· 

panying spare parts and supplies in containers. For example, 

the U. S. 1st Cavalry deployment included about 2,500 containers. 

all prominently marked with the big yellow division patch. Army 

aviation units used com ainers with prebinned stockage of the 

myriad of small items-rivets, cottcr pins, and nuts and bollS 

peculiar to aviation support and Ulilized in large volumes As the 

con Aiel escalated, t"' cre was morc and morc demand for containers, 

and eventually the theater inventory exceeded 150,000 (of the 

tolal 200,000 units then owned by the Army and Air Force) . 

The 150,000 units in-theater represented about six million 

square reel of covered storage. This figure is impressive when compared to the fact that only about J I million square feet of covered 

storage had been built in the entire theater by the middle of 1969. 

Few of the containers moved into the theater ever returned. They 

satisfied a wide variety of needs for shelter including dispensaries, 

command posts, PXs, and bunkers. 

Containers played an integral part in a special project to make 

Cam Ranh Bay a major U. S. Army supply base. As in most locati ons in Vietnam, the construction of depot facilities did not keep 

pace with the influx of suppl ies and equipment. Jt was estimated 

in January 1966 that the Cam Ranh Bay depot would be support· 

ing a force of 95,000 men by the end of June 1966. In an effort to 

overcome the lack of depot facilities, the Army Materiel Command 

prepared. in effect. a prepackaged container depot containing a 60· 

day slackage level of repair parts for all units supported by the 

depot at Cam Ranh Bay. When completed. the entire package of 

ahout 53,000 line items together with a library of manuals, stock 

records, localar cards, and other documentation, was contained 

il! 70 military van semitrail ers and 437 binned containers. 

This represellled coma iner-orieilled logistics in a highly sophisticated form and was also a good example of the integration of 

supply and transportation systems. The projeCl packages arrived at 

Cam Ranh Bay on 21 May 19GG and a total of 13,538 material 

release orders were isslied during the first 10 days of operation 

with 011 1)' 26 warehouse denia ls-less than 0.2 percent. 

The next step forward in lIlilization of intermodal containers 

(containers that can be shipped by rail. truck, air or ship) in 

support of operations in Vietnam was the introduction of container 

ship support by Sea-Land Services, Inc. These ships were designed 

to carry the more familiar Sea· Land container which is essentially 

a trailer van that can be set on a trailer bed and be pulled by a 

truck (or on a rail flat /.:ar). The container can be removed from 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AN D l\IAINTE~ANCE 173 

the trailer bed ancl set on the COlllaincr ship. Special type rane~ 

are needed either at the pan or incorporated on the ship. Tn 19fi1l 

Sea· Land began providing container service to the Army on Okinawa. Sea-Land container support was extended to the Na\'y at 

Subic Bay in the Philippines. Tn 1967 Sea-Land was introduced 

into Vietnam. Since that time every command concerned with the 

support of U.S. Forces in Vietnam expressed sa ti"raction with 

the degree of success achieved in the container ship operations 

moving general cargo and periShabl e subsistence into Vietnam. 

Ammunition was also successfull y handl ed in container ship 

service. During De<:ember 1969 and January 1970, a Test of Container:1.ed Shipment of Ammunition was conducted to determine 

the feasibility of shipping ammunition from the United States to 

Vietnam by container ship service. A self·sustaining container ship 

was used in the lest to move 226 containers of ammunition from 

the United States to Cam Ranh Bay. Some of the f'O nt ai ners were 

unloaded in the ammunition depot at Cam Ranh Bay; other<; 

were transsh ipped on lighterage 10 Qui Nhon and on to forward 

supply points. The test was such a SIICCess that the 1st Logistical 

Command recommended the initiation of regularly scheduled am· 

munition resupply in container ships to reduce order and ship 

time and provide savi ngs in pipeline in ventory. The requirement 

for initial procurcmelll of container materials handling equip 

melll during the wind-down period in <;()uthea~t Aliia and Ihe 

~stablishment of n~w procedures for container lUovemelll of ammunition reslll ~d in a decision nOI 10 ~e containers for routille 

ammunition movement. 

Experiences of Southeast Asia show real ad,'antages in the IIS(, 

of conta iners. Cargo is moved fa ster. there is less damage and 

loss of ca rgo and there are major savings in handling costs and 

packaging. The new lransponation technique requires the lise of 

la rge and expensive equipment and special con tainer materials 

ha ndling equipment. to include sh ip or shore side gantry rane~. 

Accounting and control procedures must also be developed to 

effectively operate a container system. The system approach must 

be followed as the size and weight of container lim it improvision. 

If seH-sustaining ships are not ava ilabl e. shore side equ ipmelll 

must be provided. All conta iners ami their materials andl in ~ 

equipment must be compa tibl e for hOlh surface (mac!. (('IiI. sea) 

and air movement of containers. 

Experience with large intermodal cmll(l iners in Vietnam clearly 

indicated that their full exploitation could greatl y enhance the 
174 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

transportation, storage and handling of suppli es. The foll owing four 

advantages speak for themselves: 

1. Container ships can be discharged 7 to 10 limes faster [han 

breakbulk ships and with fewer personnel. Drastic reductions in 

berthing space and in port operating personnel requirements 

also resuh. 

2. The practicality of operating directly out of containers prebinned in the United States is feasible and was demonstrated at 

Cam Ranh Bay. 

3. All recipients of contai nerized cargo noted a reduction in 

damaged and lost cargo-particul aTiy ammunition, perishable items. 

and PX supplies. 

4. Because cargo is moved intact in a container from the Continental U.S. to the depot or directly to a forward un it, problems 

in sorting and identifying cargo are minimized. 

Augmenting the container service were Roll-on- Roll-off ships. 

T he Roll-on-Roll-off concept provided a land and water express 

service comprisi ng the through put concept of cargo between continental United States depots and overseas depots; and also between inter- and intra-thea ter depots. Cargo is checked at the point 

of origin and loaded aboard a trailer type conveyance, transported 

to a vessel at the port of loading, rolled into the vessel, stowed, 

and rolled off at the port of discharge and d ispa tched to forward 

destinations. 

The Roll-on-Roll-off operation combined the U,S. Army Trailer Service Agency with Military Sea Transportation Service Rollon-Roll-off type ships to facilitate the movement of general cargo. 

The service was used for providing scheduled depot-lo-depot delivery of combat support items, and gave a faster, more flexible 

response to theater logistics requirements. It reduced the intransit 

exposure of sh ip and cargo to enemy action, reduced oversea supply 

point requiremen ts, and reduced shiploading and discharge times. It 

also lessened the requirement for permanent port and rail faci lities. 

The Roll-on-Roll-off service which had been operating in support of Europe was transferred to Okinawa to support operations in 

Southeast Asia. Beginning in March 1966. th is serv ice operated 

between Okinawa, Cam Ranh Bay, Sa igon, Qui Nhon and Bangkok. 

The Military Sea Transportation Service sh ips Comet, TlmlSglobe, and Taurus plus 2,400 trailers were used in the Roll-onRoll-off operations. A typical Roll-on- Roll-off ship had the capacity 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 175 

to transport Roll-on-Roll-off trailers. containers. or large or small 

military vehicles. 

Materiel Handling Equipment was in short supply during the 

early build-up in Vietnam. This significan tl y impaired the unloading of materiel from transportation vehicles and the movement of 

materiel within the storage areas. This equipment was especially 

critical due to the palletization concept of stocking and moving 

supplies. Resupply and retrograde at the most fonvard logistic 

support areas were almost totall y dependent on Materiel Handling 

Equipment_ Shortages of Materiel Handling Equipment prevented 

the realization of the full potential of the palletization concept. 

In an attempt to meet the urgent demands for Materiel Handling Equipment during the early period. 47 different makes and 

models were procured. However, this resulted in an almost impossible task of stocking repair parts, which in turn created a high 

equipment deadline rate. This rate was not lowered until a standardization program was instituted. In 1966, steps were taken to reduce the 47 models to five commercial models plus two rough terrain fork lifts. By August 1967. this has been accomplished and the 

Materiel Handling Equipment situation improved. 

Maintenance 

The U.S. maintenance capability (less aircraft) in South Vietnam in March 1965 consisted of a three-bay third echelon main. 

tenance shop in downtown Saigon limited to vehicle and armament 

repair and instrument calibration, with a work force of ten per. 

sonnel. 

Adequate facilities in early 1965 were a problem. For example. 

an old rice mill located along the Saigon Canal was selected and 

acquired in May 1965 for the Saigon area maintenance facility. 

The bu ild ings were of brick construction ,vith dirt floors covered 

with two feet of rice hulls. Maintenance personnel removed and 

disposed of the rice hulls and cleaned out the buildings. Lacking 

engineer support, maintenance personnel poured their own concrete Aoors using a road grader to spread the concrete and installed 

the necessary electrical wiring in the buildings. The maintenance 

shops were opened one building at a time as they were made 

usable. 

Many direct support and general support units arrived in 1965 

without Authorized Stockage Lists or Prescribed Load Lists of 

repair parts. This problem was the result of three things. Con· 

tinental U.S_ activities did not know what units or types of equip. 

ment the direct support or general support units were to support: 
176 LOCISTIC SUPPORT 

therefore adequate pans lists could not be prepared. Req uests 

from Conti nental U.S. to the 1st Logistical Command for units and 

equipment densiLies could not he satisfi ed because the information 

of units and cquipmc lll cnrollte to 50mh Vietnam was not avai lahle. In addition. th e very nuid tactical situation in South VietmUll in early 196.\ with the resultant changes in in-country deployment of combat units, made it almost impossihle to develop unit 

densities of equipment 10 he supported with an)' reasonabl e degree 

of accuracy. The maintenance effort started short of repair parts 

and it did not recover until mid-1966. The iTllcrim period was 

characterized by a hip;hly skilled maintenance capability without 

suffiriclll repair part~ to Ill ilizc this capahility to the maximum. 

This period was a lso ch<lraneri zed by unusually low Operalional 

Readiness rates for engineer equipment. ~fateric1 Handling Equipment, trucks. water craft and generators. All of th ese were es· 

sential items in properly carrying out the logistica l mission. 

Maintenance Sup/Jort Positive reevaluated the Army Maintenance System to provide for performance of tasks at the level 

that pro"ides maximum readi ness and COSt effectiveness, ach ieves 

the hest mix of modular anel piece parts repair. increases the use 

of modular design of new equipment, expands direct exchange, 

improves design and applica ti on of test, measurement and diagnostic equ ipment. optimizes use of mobile maintenance and reduces requirements for complicated tools at the forward levels of 

maintenance. The maintenance stru cture must be flexible enough 

to combine se lected levels of maintenanCf:: within the Army force 

structure to permit responsive, effective and effic ient application 

of resources to sustain or improve the operational readiness of a 

complex commodity or weapon system. 

The initiation of the Red Ball Express in Der-ember 1965, as 

a rClluit of the Secretary of Defense's visit to South Vietnam. was 

a great help in improving operationa l readiness rates for critical 

items. As Authorized ~tockage Lists and P rescribed Load Lists 

wen' deve loped and received . adeq uate maintenance fa cilities were 

developed, and suppon ed units were stabilized, the Operational 

Readi ness rates increased to the highest ever found in a combat 

m ne. H owever. these rates were made possible onl y throllgh the 

expensive replacement of entire components (engines. differentials. trallsmissions) at direct support levels. Table 10 shows the 

Operational Readin ess rates for some selected items of equipment 

hetween June 1966 and June 1970. 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRA NSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 177 

TABU: I O-OPERATIONAL READINESS (IN PERCENT) 

Military 

Assistance 

Command. Actu a l O.,.,rulonal Rudln~ Rat ... Vietnam Item. Obj«tl"" June 1966 June 1967' June 1970" 

Trao:tors . ... . .. ..... . ..... ... . .. 80 80 .. 82 

Rough T errain ForI: Lift ...... 80 82 87 82 

1'>fl 09 How (SP) ... .. .. ... .... 85 92 " 81 

1'>1107 G" (SP) .. ... ... ..... . .. 85 85 86 

Generators ...... .... .. ...... . .. 80 85 89 " 81 

(all types) 

5·Ton Trucks ... .... .. ...... . 90 88 90 .. (all types) 

. 1968 and 1969 o".,ntlonal r~ dlneu nt~ d,d nDi dlffN male,l.lIy from th""'" .ho,",n fo. 1967. 

" Slight d\'Cllnc .hoWJ Ihe ImTnct of Cambodian O".,ntlon •. 

Reorganization in Combat 

The war in Vietnam occurred at a time of significant changes 

in the Army's organiza tional structure. At the start of the buildu p. 

maintenance support was provided hy units of the Technical 

.<)ervices: Chemical. Engineer. Medical, Orclnance, Quartermaster. 

Signal, and T ransportation. Units organized and trained by the 

Technical Services performed support operations at the fi eld level 

under doctrine and detailed procedures developed by each Technica l Service. The system contained inherent disadvantages because of its fragmentation into seven virtually autonomous structures_ In some instances, all seven Technical Services were involved 

in the support of a single end item. such as a tank. In mid-1966. 

a reorganization to the Combat Service to the Theater Army con· 

cept was begun in Vietnam. This was a large undertaking. It r equired deactivation of old units, activation of new units, realignment of functi ons, realignment of personnel , and red istri bu tion of 

equ ipment. Combat Service to the Theater Army eliminated Technical Services maintenance units (except medical) and created a 

functional organization tha t was compatible with the existing force 

stm cture, the divisions and the commodity oriented Continental 

U.S. base. It eliminated duplication of maintenance training, skills, 

tools, and test equipment. It was also designed to reduce the span of 

con trol of the force commander, increase responsiveness, and provide one stop service and support. The effectiveness of maintenance, howeve r, was impeded initially by the tu rbul ence caused 

by this reorganization. 

The U.S. Army Vietnam maintenance system incl uded all 

categories of maintenance from the operator's level to limited 

depot overhaul, as well as cal ibration of equipment, controlled 
178 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

cannibalization, and repair pans supply. Chart 12 depicts the 

organ izational rela tionship, and the approximate troop strengths 

of the major maintenance elements of U.S. Army Vietnam as of 

August 1969. The 1st Logistica l Command provided maintenance support of grollnd equipment to all U.S. Army forces. The 

U.S. Navy provided common item maintenance support, when 

requested. to Free World Military Assistance Forces. Map 6 depicts 

the general location and nature of maintenance SUppOTt uni ts in 

Vi etnam. All categories of maintenance SUppOTt were primarily 

accomplished through the four Support Commands of the 1st 

Logistical Command. Emphasis was on direct support as far for· 

ward as practicable. General support maintenance was provided 

primarily from the larger logistics bases where more stabil ized 

conditions existed. Depot level maintenance by military units was 

minimized by the use of contractors in·country and off-shore depot 

maintenance support. 

Between April and September 1965, 15 maintenance companies 

arrived in Vietnam. By late 1968, 35 maintenance companies 

were operating in Vietnam. The four Support Commands directed 

and co-ordinated maintenance serv ices within their areas of responsibility. The nuclei of the maintenance organizations were the 

general support groups which also served as the command and 

control headquarters for direct SUppOTt and general support battaCHART 12- 0aOANIZATtoN OF U.S. ARMY VIF.TNAM MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 

( A UGUST 1969) 

U.S. Army 

Vietnam 

(340,000 Personnel) 

I 

I I 

6 Divisions ,. 34th General 

Each With 1 14 Engineer logisllcal Support Aviatio 44th 

Olrect Construction Command Maintenance Medical 

r Support Battalions (10,000 and Supply Brigade (120 

Maintenance Each With 1 Mainlenance GIOUP (7,000 Maintenance 

Battalion Maintenance Personnel) Maintenance Personnel) 

Detachment Personnel) 

I 

I I I 

5 Bliga~e$ Da Nang Qui Nhon Clm Ranh Saigon Each With 1 Support Support Bay Support Support Maintenance Command Command Command Command 

Company 
MAINTENANCE 

SUPPORT UNITS 

AU';1US1 1969 

......... utn"al 

A.ig"on 

+ I>Itll"'" 

-'- Marin, 

- HPI.,ku 

H t'" Mh, 

• 

• 

• 

MAP 6 

• 

QuanG r" LZ NanCy H 

Camp E.ansH ", __ ca",p EGq! .. ......., 

'i GiaUl-1 p~u Ba, l-1 + 

.. 

• • 

.. 

.. 

':. 

C~U la, l-1 + 

• 

• 

Cha~nq 

Qui Nhon 

~ 

+ 

~ 

NhQ TranO ~ - • 

Cam Rank 

H 8:y..a.. 

• • • • • • " Donq ~ Tho" 

------ -~d. Ph" la. H-

• ':----''-/'-- lonq G<lIO H 

LonQ B;nh H _ T 

B ... , C,,, t---i 

~OonQ Tam ......... _ 

ConThoH-
180 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

lions. (Chart 13) Composite battalions were also formed within 

the Support Commands, to assllre service within geographical areas. 

For example, the 57th Transportation Battalion, loca ted at Chu 

Lai. served as the composite headquarters for two maintenance 

companies, a transportation company, a supply and services com· 

pany and several quartermaster platoons. In addition each combat 

division and separate brigade had its own organic direct support 

capability. The II th Annored Cavalry Regiment was an exception. 

It obta ined its mai ntenance support from the 1st Logistical Command on an area basis. As elements of the regiment relocated, the 

nearest 1st Logistica l Command unit provided service. This method 

of support proved unsatisfactory because of the 11th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment's high and fluctuating maintenance dema nds. In 

the future such organizations should be assigned an organic maintenance unit. 

T he many isolated positions, such as fire bases and landing 

zones, were supported through a system of maintenance detach· 

ments and cOlllact teams provided from the available resources of 

support command units. tn the major base complexes such as at 

Long Binh , Da Nang, Ple iku, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay. 

C IIART 13- THE 1ST LocISTICAL Cor-n.IAI'D MAINTENANCE ST RUCTU RE 

( A UGU ST 1969) 

Headquarters 

lst Logistical 

Ctlmmand 

I 

I 

U.S. Army U.S. Army U.S. Army U.S. Army 

Support Command Support Command Support Commlnd Support Command 

DI Hang Qui NlIon Cam Ranh Bay Slilon 

I I 

I I 54th General 

SuppOil Group 

29th General 

Support Group 

BOth Gener.1 26th GMeral (Nha Trang) (Lonl Binh) Support Group Support Group 

(D. N.na) (Phu Bai) 

I 

45th Generat 593d General 86th Genelll 

Support Group Support Group SUpport Maintenance 

(Pleiku) (Qui Nhon) Battalion (Cha Rang) 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 181 

forces were concentrated enough to employ conventional battalionsized maintenance units occupying permanent type facilities. 

The in·country maintenance of medical equipment was primarily performed by base and advanced medical depots with the 

32d Medical Depot providing technical assistance. However, medical units themse lves, operating under the control of the 44th 

Medica l Brigade (which was supervised by the U.S. Army Vietnam 

Surgeon), performed limited maintenance. Medical maintenance 

shops were colocated with medical suppl y depots. The base depot 

was loca ted at Cam Ranh Bay and subordinate advanced depots 

were located at Phu Bai, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, and Long Binh. 

Equipment Repair Problems 

Generally speaking, U.S. Army equipment in South Vietnam 

was the best ever fielded in combat. However, the lack of equipment standardization was a frustrating problem. For instance, ini· 

tially 145 differem sizes and types of commercial generators were 

used by the Army in Vietnam. Repair parts supply was difficult, 

at best. requiri ng extraordinary efforts for procurement, and in 

many cases the repair parts that were availa ble lacked interChangeability. The situation was much the same with material handling 

equipment. In March of 1966. steps were t .. ken to reduce the 

47 Materiel Handling Equipment models then in use to five com· 

mercial models plus two rough terrain fork lifts. By August 1967, 

th is was completed. 

Another major problem was the difficulty in maintaining some 

equipmem due to its design. Under the adverse environmental 

conditions encountered in Vietnam, the problem was magnified. 

For example, the road wheel oil fill plugs on the M551 Sheridan 

vehicle were located on the inside of the wheels making it necessary for a crew member to crawl underneath the vehicle to reach 

them. During the monsoon season this was virtuall y impossible 

unless the vehicle was inside a building or shelter of some sort. 

Also, there was no satisfactory way to keep twigs and leaves from 

being sucked up against the radiator of the M551 and cutling off 

the required air Aow. Therefore engines overheated. Practically 

all U.S. engines used dry-type air cleaners. To blow off the dust 

and wash them in soapy water as required by the man uals was not 

a practical operation under Vietnam combat conditions. 

While Operational Readiness rates were high, this was due to 

the expensive replacements of entire components. The wear out 

rate of engines, differentials, and transmissions was abnormally 

high and this was at least partially attributable to operator abuse 
lB2 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

and inadequate organizational maintenance. The cost and efforts 

involved in transporting, overhauling. and storing the components that should not have been worn out were significant and preventable. 

Though not a maintenance fault. failures of multi fuel engines 

created the requirement for a major oil-shore maintenance effort 

and a sizeable supply problem. In January 1967, more than 300 

5-too trucks were deadlined in Vietnam because of inoperative 

multi fuel engines (a similar condition existed for 2Y2-ton trucks) 

due to cracked blocks, blown head gaskets, valve stems and conneeting rods. A study indicated that many failures occurred between 9,000 and 10,000 miles and that the units hardest hit were 

the line haul transportation units whose engines were subjected to 

continuous use (2,000 miles per month in Vietnam). The pros· 

pect for improvement at this point was negligible because of the 

lack of repair parts and overhaul capacity. Multifue1 engines 

powered both 21'2- and 5-ton trucks. A similar condition also existed 

in Thailand. The annual engine replacement rate of 6 per 100 

vehicles per year increased to a rate of one engine per vehicle per 

year. 

By the summer of 1967, an airlift program, Red Ball Express 

was put into effect in an attemp to alleviate the shortage of engines 

and repair parts. The Red Ball Express was designed to be used 

in lieu of normal procedures exclusively to expedite repair parts 

to remove equipment from deadline status. Reserved and predictable airlift was made available for this purpose, The seriousness 

of the situation led to a multifuel engine conference on 28 August 

1967. The conference resulted in several recommendations, the 

most significant of which was that three multifue1 engines, LD 

427, LD 465. and LDS 465, were to be placed under Closed Loop 

Support management because of the inability of units in the field 

to cope with the maintenance problem. A further recommendation 

was made that return to the Continental U.S. be authorized for 

vehicles that could not be supported with multifuel repair parts 

or replacement engine assemblies. Because a large percentage 

of the producers' production capacity was consumed in end items 

assembly. some repair parts and new replacement engine assem· 

blies were not readily available. Department of the Army approved 

the recommendations of the conference and directed that necessary retrograde. overhaul, and shipping operations be initiated 

immediately. 

Although the conference had focllsed attention on the supply 

aspect and premature failure of engines. significant intangibles 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE ] 83 

remained unsolved, including proper operation of vehicles and 

user maintenance. Because of the characteristic difference of the 

multi fuel engine from the standard internal combustion engine, 

periodic maintenance and specific mandatory operational procedures 

differed sharply from procedures used with other vehicles and 

required closer attention. Simply put, despite years of testing effort, 

the multifuel engine did not possess the TUggedness and tolerance 

to withstand the abuses inherent in field operations. 

Marine Maintenance 

With the exception of the newly developed amphibian river 

patrol boats and Amphibious Cargo Resupply Lighters, there was 

only one US Army vessel in South Vietnam less than 14 years 

old. This vessel, the beach discharge lighter Page, was the only 

ocean going vessel that was not of World War II design. As part 

of the effort to maintain the over-age fleet, a systematic overhaul 

of all craft began in 1967, but a shortage of repair parts caused 

delays. For instance, 14 tugs, or 38 percent of the tug fleet, were 

being overhauled in out-of-country shipyards at one time. Five of 

these tugs had been undergoing overhaul for more than one year. 

This made it necessary to lease seven commercial tugs at a cost 

of $1,283,000 per year to insure continuity of tug boat service. 

The excessive amount of man·hours and dollars spent to maintain 

the obsolete vessels and equipment of the marine Aeet make it 

clear that these should be replaced by an up-lo·date Aeet. 

The U.S. Army marine fleet consisted of amphibious and conventional lighters, landing craft, tug boats, barges and other vessels up to 2,200 long tons capacity. To support this fleet, the 

Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam was organized in 1966, 

with headquarters at Cam Ranh Bay. In 1967 the Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam consisted of a headquarters and four 

small detachments which were positioned in the areas with the 

largest concentration of marine craft. One was located at Qui Nhon, 

one at Cam Ranh Bay, and two under the Saigon Support Command. The Marine Maintenance Activity supported the II, III 

and IV Corps, while the U.S. Navy supported the I Corps. Maintenance beyond the capacity of the Marine Mailllenance Activity 

was accomplished by in-country contractors and at off-shore 

facilities. Overall responsibility for the marine maintenance mission rested with U.S. Army Vietnam while operational control 

was the responsibility of Lhe support commands. The Marine 

Maintenance Activity exercised technical supervision over the 

four detachments. The Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam 
184 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

organization with detachment strengths, as of August 1969, is depicted in Chart 14. 

MainteMnce Support of Common ltemJ 

The major area of interface between the military services and 

maintenance systems occurred with the support of common items. 

In general, common maintenance support between the U.S. mili· 

tary services was very limited. Similar to the area of common 

supply support, the objective of each service for logistical self. 

suffic iency dominated in the buildup period and tended to persist 

for the duration. Commonality of equipment too was limited, and 

effective common maintenance support was frequently impaired 

by the geographica l deployment of the maintenance unit and the 

"customer" unit in different tactical zones. Insufficient stockage of 

both common and peculiar repair parts also impeded common 

maintenance support. An example of this was the equipment of 

the 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron, 5th Regiment, 9th Division , attached to the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang. Although the 

Marine Corps did provide Class I, II, III and V supply to the 

squadron it was unabl e to furnish maintenance support. The latter 

was provided by the U.S. Army Maintenance unit located at Da 

Nang until the Squadron was withdrawn from the zone and reo 

turned to the lIt Corps area. The U.S. Air Force and Navy 

received some maintenance support from the Army on such common 

items as administrative type vehicles in other tactical areas. This 

same type of general maintenance support was provided to medical and aviation units by the 1st Logistical Command and included 

some tactical vehicles. For example the Army provided maintenance support for UH-l helicopters used by the Navy in its "Seawolf' operation and for the Air Force modernization program of 

0-1 aircraft and UH- J helicopters for transfer to allied forces. 

Conversely under the Army-Air Force basic support agreements 

the Air Force allocated some 11 ,000 manhours per month of its 

commercial contract capability for maintenance support of Army 

aircraft. Repair of Army owned test sets and special equipment 

was also accomplished by the Air Force when appropriate under 

these arrangements. Military Assistance Command, Vi etnam. and 

adviser units lacking maintenance capability were also offered maintenance support. Cooperative exchange arrangements with the 

Navy were also conducted by the 1st Logistica l Command through 

the Support Commands. For example, the recapping of Army 

tires and the re-winding of unserviceable motors was accomplished 

under Navy contracts. Under similar support arrangements the 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE 185 

CHART 14-0RGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, MARINE MAINTENANCE 

ACTIVITY, VIETNAM ( AUGUST 1969) 

I 

U.s. Army Support Command 

QuI Nhon 

Marine M.intenlnce i----- Detachment 1 

18 .nlisted men; 

1 officer 

LEGEND: 

----Technical Supervision 

U.S. Army 

Vietnam 

I 

lst lo,lstlCiI 

Command 

U.S. Army Support C<lmmand 

Cam Ranh BIY 

M.rlne Mllntenlnce 

ActIvity. VietAim 

Hudqulr1ers 

266 enlisted men: 11 officers 

r---

I 

U.S. Army 

Support Comman" 

Sitgon 

M,rlne M.lntenance 

DetKhment 4 

DetKhm.nl 2 

80 enlisted min , S officers 

I 

Army maintained Marine Corps radar equipment to assure operational readiness. Conversely. the Marine Corps maintenance teams 

in the Da Nang Area assiSled the Army in repairing and cleaning 

office machines. 

The Army also provided maintenance support for common 

items of materiel in the hands of allied forces. beyond the capability 

of these forces. These services were furnished under cooperative 

logistics support arrangements with the allied nations invc!ved. 

Maintenance Workload 

By 1966. maintenance support was characterized by the heavy 

over·loading of direct support maintenance uniu whose normal 

mission was to repair and return equipment to using units. General support maintenance units werc forced to assume direct 

support missions. The Army reported to the Secretary of Defense 

on 29 August 1968 that S8 percent of the general support capability had been diverted to direct support level tasks. The resultant lack of general support was compensated for by the stand-
186 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

ardization of equipment, off-shore maintenance support, and the 

Closed Loop System. General support maintenance in-country 

increased from 37Y2 percent of total maintenance in 1966 to 49 percent in 1968. 

U.S. Army Vietnam reported that the Army Equipment Records System was generally ineffective in Vietnam. While its ob. 

jectives were valid, the system was too cumbersome to be used under 

the stress of combat. It required the collection of detailed information on all rhe equipment, but this required a level of skill which 

was not available. The Army equipment records procedures have 

since been revised and simplified. The new system, designated 

The Army Maintenance Management System, reduced the organizational reporting and recording effort at the crew and mechanic 

level by 80 percent and reduced automatic data processing by 50 

percent. 

OD·Shor~ Maitlt~"a"ce Probl~ms 

As maintenance requirements in Vietnam increased, it was 

essential that overhaul capabilities be established in the Pacific 

Theater to provide responsive support and reduce the lengthy 

overhaul pipeline. With the development in 1967 of Closed Loop 

support for armored personnel carriers in Vietnam, the Sagami 

depot maintenance capabilities in Japan were expanded to enable 

it to support the requirements of the Eighth Army, U.S. Army 

Vietnam and the South Vietnamese Army. Production schedules 

were increased after a successful effort to recruit additional per· 

sonnel. A labor force of approximately 615 was employed at 

Sagami by the end of June 1967. 

Okinawa continued lhe marine craft maintenance programs, 

with a strength of 210 personnel devoted to thal mission. In 1967, 

as U.S. Army Vietnam overhaul requirements continued to in· 

crease, the problem with multi fuel engines required the establish. 

ment of overhaul and modification programs on Okinawa. The 

number of maintenance personnel was increased to 1,38 1. These 

programs included maintenance of trucks, construction equip. 

ment, electronics and communication equipment, materia ls handling equipment, and marine craft. . 

During 1966 and 1967, maintenance uniLS were deployed to 

Okinawa as a part of the 2d Logistical Command, which was 

charged with the support of island forces and offshore general support for Vietnam. The general support workload was primarily 

for tactical wheeled vehicles, generators, materials handling equipment, and electronic communications items, and amounted to 50 
SERVICE SUPPORT: TItANSPORTATfON AND MAINTENANCE 187 

percent of the Vietnam requirement. This level of effort was 

maintained through 1969. 

In 1965, Army overseas depot level maintenance existed on a 

limited basis in Germany and Japan. Depot ma intenance activities were manned principally by local nationals with few spaces 

authorized for officers and non-commissioned officers. The only 

Anny depot level facility in the Pacific was located at U.S. Army 

Depot Command, Sagami, Japan. Depot capability in Japan consisted of a work force of 504 local nationals devoted to maintenance 

of Military Assistance. 

By 1969, overhaul in the Pacific reached a cost level of $35 

million. Production of combat vehicles in Japan was increased to 

100 personnel carriers and 12 tanks per month. Marine craft main· 

tenance contracting functions were assumed from the Navy and 

the use of all existing commercial facilities continued. By lhe end 

of June 1970, the following offshore organic depot maintenance 

personnel strengths had been reached. 

Okinawa 

Japan 

Mill' • .., 

". 

56 

DA CI"man 

14' 

" 

PhasedowPl of Mainie110nce Support 

Local Naclonllo 

1014 

'25' 

TOIII 

'909 

13'" 

'25' 

Combat units in process of standing-down prior to redeployment from South Vietnam turned in large quantities of equipment. 

During September 1969, a Special Criteria for RetrogTade of 

Army Mat~riel was instituted for Southeast Asia. This criteria 

provided simplified inspection and classification procedures for 

quickly determining the condition of materiel being considered 

for reissue, retrograde, or maintenance. As a result, equipment can 

be classified and retrograded promptly with less skilled personnel 

than would be required if filII technical inspections were used. 

Some scrap may have been shipped alit of country and some 

serviceable assets may have been scrapped, but equipment was 

moved at the same rate troops were withdrawn. Generally service· 

able equipment was retained. Only borderline unserviceable items 

may have been misclassified. This was not a great price to pay to in· 

sure meeting troop withdrawal and equipment turn.in schedules. 
CHAPTER VII 

Service Support in Vietnam: 

Construction, Real Estate, 

and Communications 

Construction and Real Estate 

The construction aspects oC the Vietnam war are described in 

this section on ly as an overview. A separate monognph has been 

written on this subject. 

Base Development 

Base development contingency plans prepared prior to the 

buildup in Vietnam recognized that operations would be conducted 

in a primitive area, almost totally devoid of logistics support capabilities, and that a vast construction effort would be required to 

build port facilities, Army airfields and heliports, storage depou, 

hospitals, communications sites, roads, bridges and base areas for 

tactical units. Also it was recognized that construction would be 

completed under adverse conditions of civil unrest, unpredictable 

warfare, and at a gTeat distance !Tom an industrial base. 

The contingency planning for base development in Vietnam 

was directed by Commander in Chief Pacific. Headquarters U.S. 

Army Pacific was responsible for preparing the Army portion of 

the plan. Actual development of the Army base development 

plan for 1965 was delegated by Headquarters U.S. Anny Pacific 

to Headquarters U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands. Headquarters Mili· 

tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, was responsible for co-ordina· 

tion and control of logistic support within the objective area. As 

operations increased in scope, the planning responsibilities were 

transferred to Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam. Thereafter, the 

planning system followed the established chain of operational 

control to the Joint ChieCs of Staff and of administrative and 

logistic control to the Department of the Army. Ultimate control 

on force structure and level of construction effort was maintained 

by Office of the Secretary of Defense without delegation. 

The original planning deve loped by Headquarters U.S. Army 
CONSTRUCTION, REAL ESTATE, AND COMMUNICATION 189 

Ryukyu Islands was in great detail and identified deficiencies and 

problem areas. Provisions were made for management of the construction effort first by U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands and later by the 

lst Logistical Command. As specified by Commander in Chief 

Pacific, planning was based on a relatively small in-country force 

level of 64,000 troops. The use of tents was envisioned for the 

first six months. The situation that developed was much different, 

both in size and nature of operation, than envisioned during plannmg. 

Standards and criteria for construction were established by 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Three standards of cantonment construction were prescribed. Each standard depended on 

the anticipated duration of occu pancy of the activity. The three 

standards were field, intermediate and temporary. However, standards of living for troops were allowed to develop to a high degree. 

The Commanding General U.S. Army Vietnam was authorized 

to construct to intermediate standards. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, reserved the right to authorize temporary standards. In general temporary standards included pre-engineered 

metal or painted wood buildings, and modern utility systems. 

Intermediate standards permitted wood buildings with limited 

utility systems and field standard included tents or wood buildings with minimal utility systems. 

Controls over construction were exercised by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Early in 1966 a Director of Construction was established at that headquarters in recognition of the 

magnitude of the military construction prQgram. The Directorate 

of Construction was assigned directive supervision and authority 

over all Department of Defense construction commands and agencies except for those organic to major combat units. This authority 

extended to the direct assignment of specifi c projects to construction commands and agencies and to the adjustment of equ ipment, 

materials, and other resources necessary to meet priorities established by Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Director of Construction was assigned the responsibility 

of supervising and coordinating the accomplishment of joint master 

base development plans. 

Military Construction 

From fiscal year 1965 through fiscal year 1971, Congress 

authorized approximately $1.387 billion of Military Construction, 

Army funds for construction in support of Southeast Asia. The 

majority of these funds, approximately $969 million, were provided 
190 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

for construction projects in Vietnam. From a relatively small Mili· 

tary Construction, Army program of approximately $40 million 

in fiscal year 1965, the funding program for South Vietnam 

peaked in fiscal year 1966 and 1967. During that period the basic, 

amended, and suppl emental Military Construction, Army programs 

and Military Assistance ProgTam transfers totaled approximatel y 

$707 million. The fiscal year 1968 and 1969 basic and supplemental programs totaled approximately $ 185 million. T here were 

no fiscal year 1970 Military Construction Army funds programmed 

for South Vi etnam because of the large unobl iga ted balances from 

prior years. The Army proposed $40 million for South Vietnam 

in fiscal year 197 1, but this was reduced by Congress to $27 mil· 

lion including $2 million in planning funds. 

Although the basic Military Construction, Army programs for 

fiscal year 1965 through fiscal year 1971 (except for fiscal year 

1970) provided constTliction fu nds for South Vietnam, the bulk of 

the funds were derived from supplemental appropriations (including amendments to the regular appropriations). The initial 

supplemental authorization was in fiscal year 1965 through a 

Joint Resolution by the Senate and House of Representatives and 

allowed a grea t deal of flexibility in carrying out the Presidential 

program in Southeast Asia. Subsequent supplemental authorizations were provided in lump sum amounts because of the continuing need for flexibility in the administration and execution 

of the construction program for Southeast Asia in order to adjust 

to changes in the military situation. 

In addition to the Military Construction, Army funds, Congress 

provided Office of the Secretary of Defense with contingency funds 

for emergency construction which the Secretary of Defense could 

use to provide for unforeseen construction requirements which 

he considered vital to the security of the United States. These 

funds were released to the Services on an as-needed basis by 

Office of the Secretary o[ Defense upon notifica tion to Congress. 

and provided the greatest degree of flexibility in meeting contino 

gency construction requirements in support of Southeast Asia. 

Within the $969 million Military Construction, Army funds authorized for South Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense Contingency 

Funds amounted to $135.6 million. As of 31 December 1970. $895 

million of the funds authorized had been obligated and the work 

in place totaled $808 million. 

Prior to the 1969 Presidential decision to improve the Republic 

of Vietnam Armed Forces capabilities and start United States troop 

withdrawals. the major portion of the construction effort in SOllth 
CONSTRUCTION, REAL ESTATE, AND COMMUNICATION 191 

Vietnam was to provide logistical fac ilities in support of United 

States combat operations. With the "Vietnamization" decision, 

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird limited new construction 

starts to the following categories: facilities required in Vietnamizing the war to include South Vietnam Armed Forces modernization and improvement and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. advisor facilities: Line of Communication program facilities 

such as roads, airfields, and ports; emergency facilities required 

for the safety. health. security, or in-country redeployment of the 

forces; necessary repairs to battle damaged facilities, and facilities 

required to support redeployment of U.S. units. 

From 1969 on. an increasing percentage of the available Military Construction, Army funds were used for Army of Vietnam 

improvement and modernization projects such as maintenance 

depols, storage facilities. training centers, and communica tion 

stations. 

Real Estate Manageme'll 

The Pentalateral Agreement between the United States. South 

Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia. and France in 1950 provided the basis 

for mutual defense and established that a host country would 

provide land at no cost to a nation's forces. This agreement is 

general in scope so administrative agreements were necessary between Government of Vietnam ministries and the U.S. Embassy 

and U.S. Forces. Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command. 

Vietnam. was given the responsibility for real estate operations 

in support of military needs. He was authorized to further delegate authority in carrying out this responsibility. 

The term of occupancy for using Vietnam bases was indefinite. 

Each U.S. request for real estate included the following statement: "Upon termination of use and occupancy of the area, 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, retains the option of reo 

moving or abandoning in place any structure or installation placed 

thereon." Leases were utilized by U.S. Forces to acquire privately 

owned buildings such as warehouses, office spaces, and billets which 

were required, but not made available by the Government of 

Vietnam. Rental payments were made from the requesting agency's 

Operation and Maintenance. Army funds. These payments were 

made in piasters. 

Table II outlines the breakdown on U.S. Army Real Estate 

holdings, lease costs, and construction costs in SOUIh Vietnam for 

the period 1964- 1970. 
192 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

TABLE ll- R U L EsTATE H O UliNGS IN SoUTH VIETNAM 

eo.t of eon" '1K(lon 10 the U.S. CoWTn mcnt ...... COO. " cret Under FllIOIL Year (thou .. n.dJ 01 doll "") (thousand< 01 dolll") A .... , Control 

.. .. .... ....... .. ... . . ... 5.044 .1< ". " ...... .. .. .. . .. . .. . . 5, 159 2,152 ". 56 ....... ... ......... .... 21,700 24,180 73.095 

67 ....... .. ... ....... .... m .... "'." 125.676 

68 .... ... .... ..... . ...... SM,9S6 14,641 184,159 

69 ..... . " .. •• •. .. .... ' .. 545.190 12.879 197,754 

70 ... .. .. .. .... .......... 6.5 1.162 11 .353 186.7.50 

Facilities Engineering 

In Vietnam for the first lime in the history of modern war· 

fare, extensive facilities engineering services were provided in an 

active theater of operations. Troops were provided with facilities 

without having to be occupied with the accompanyi ng problems 

of maintenanc~ and operation of th os~ facilit i~s. 

The Army relied almost entirely on a contractor, Pacifi c Archi. 

tects and Engineers, to furnish faciliti es engi neering support in 

II, III, and IV, and later in I Corps. Use of a contractor allowed 

engineer troops to be used for operational support and base construction. The contractor's organization was tailored to the particular installation supported. Using a contractor for a housekeeping 

type operation was consistent with th~ Department of Defense 

objective of minimizing the number of in-coun try support troops. 

The contract was worded so that Pacific Architects and Engi neers 

furnished the required labor, organi zation, and management and 

the U.S- Government provided equipment, repair parts, tools, 

and materials on a nonreimbursable basis as well as quarters and 

messing facilities on an as availabl e basis. At peak strength 

Pacific Architects and Engineers had a work force of over 24 ,000 

employees. 

On I July 1968 technica l control of the Pacifi c Architccts and 

Engineers contract passed from the 1st Logistical Command to the 

U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam. Although 

the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam retained administrative control of the Pacific Architects and Engineers contract, 

the contracting officer's representatives positions were filled by 

U.s. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam engineers who 

directed and supervised the contractor's efforts. (Chart I J) The 

three District Engineers at Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay 

supervised the Install ation Engi neers located at the various bases 
CHART IS-U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR FACILITIES MAINT

u.s. Anny J'p.n (Held of Procuring U.S. Army Vietnam 

AcliviUes) 

\ I , I , 

, 

, 

, lst Logistical 

Comm.nd 

I 

Management Contract U.s' Army 

Office Procurement Agency, 

VieJnlm (Gen. Manager) (Contracting Officer) 

I I 

District District District District 

M,nager Manager Manager EnginNr 

Saigon Qui Nhon e.m R.nh Bay Northern District 

I I 

Install.tion Inst,lI.tion Inst.lI.tlon Installation 

M.n.ger Manager Man.ge, Engineer 
194 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

and provided technical support to the installation in which they 

were located. 

Other real property maintenance support was furnished by the 

Vinnell Corporation, which operated and main tained high-voltage 

centra l power pl ants at severa l major installations. 

One of the unusual features of the Vietnam confli ct was the 

application of normal peacetime statutory and regulatory constrain ts 

which had a considerable effect on the facilities engineering program. The limitations on approval au thority for the use of operations and maintenance funds on minoT construction projects costing 

more than $25.000 and the strictures on approval authority for 

the alteration and repair of battle damaged facilities proved to be 

limiti ng factors in repairing the facilities, although the program 

was not hindered by a lack of funds to do the job. 

T he project approval limitation had substantial impact on the 

facilities engineering program. This was particularly true in lhe 

earliest years of the Vietnam buildup, when the bulk of facili· 

ties engineering effort (about 80 percent in fisca l years 1965 

and 1966) was necessarily devoted to new construction. 

Experience in Vietnam showed that utility requirement estimates were entirely too low. P lanning data on standards of living 

were in need of revision. The heavy demands for electrical power. 

water, and sewage systems had not been foreseen and local commercial and municipal systems were incapable of providing any 

support. 

Communications 

The Army communications system in Vietnam evolved from 

a single half-duplex radio teletype circuit between Saigon and 

Clark Air Force Base. Republ ic of the Philippines in 1951 to a 

system involving 220 installations with 13,900 circuits during the 

1965- 1969 period. 

To keep pace with these rapid developments. the 1st Signal 

Brigade was activated in April 1966. During 1967 its strength 

reached 19.700 personnel and contai ned all signal units not directly 

associated with tactical units. All strategic and tactical communica· 

tion systems were connected through the resources of the brigade. 

This extensive communications network, equipped with new 

standard tactical equipment, automatic message switching centers. 

and telephone exchanges required logistical suppon from the U.S. 

Army Vietnam 1st Logistical Command logistics system. For those 

fixed communica ti ons sites which were contractor operated the 

contractor was responsible for providing resuppl y. An unusual 
CONSTRUCTION, REAL ESTATE, AND COMMUNICATION 195 

aspect of the resupply system for communications equ ipment was 

in the field of Communications Security distribution. Due to security and accountability requirements Communications Security 

equipment was shipped to Vietnam by means of the Armed Forces 

Courier Service which used Tan Son Nhut as the port of entry. 

From there in-country distribution had to be made through 

a special Communications Security logistics system. This required 

special and intensive management to marry up Communicatiom 

Security equipment with the telecommunications equipment. There 

wali another special resupply system established for the Satellite 

Communications System. Requisitions for Satellite Communications 

items were fon ... arded via a dedicated communications network to 

the Satellite Communications Agency located at Fort Monmouth, 

New Jersey_ These requisitions were transmitted by leased teletype circuits directly to the prime contractor, Hughes Aircraft in 

Fullerton, California. Repair parts were then mailed directly to the 

communication facility via Army Post Office facilities. Items too 

bulky or which were prohibited from being shipped through mail 

channels were shipped to Nonon Air Force Base. California and 

then sent by air freight to their destination. In a number of cases, 

a courier was provided to insure that parts did not become lost 

or misplaced when the aircraft arrived in-country. 

Communications Support of Logistical Units 

The logistical system in Vietnam was greatly dependent upon 

good communications and demanded a wide variety of transmission media to transfer logistical data between logistics headquarters. logistics support elements, and supported units. The communications subsystem in support of logistics activities consisted of 

the Defense Communications Agency managed system, the U.S. 

Army Vietnam managed Corps Area Communication System, the 

Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System, and the manual 

switchboards that interfaced with the Southeast Asia Automatic 

Telephone System. Logistic activities were also provided lise of the 

Automatic Secure Voice Communications network in SOllth Vietnam. They were also provided access to the Corps Area Communication System communica tion center which interfaced with the 

worldwide Automatic Digital Network. 

Logistics of Stanrian/ Sig1lnlltems 

Common suppl y sigual equipment items, with the exception 

of classified NESTOR (mythological designator used to identify 
196 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

a family of secure voice devices) common supply items. were 

requisitioned through a common supply channel-the 1st Logistical Command. The c1assifled NESTOR items were handled 

through Communications Security logistical channels, however the 

1st Logistical Command common supply channel was used to 

distribute NESTOR ancillary items (for example installation kits 

and cable assemblies) . 

Logistics of Non-Standard Items 

The logistic support of U.S. Army Strategic Communications 

peculiar items was performed entirely by the 1st Signal Brigade. 

This brigade was simultaneously a customer for, as well as the 

supplier, manager and operator of the peculiar items. Much of 

the logistics support of the non-standard, fixed plant items was 

provided through operations and maintenance contracts which 

offered the expertise and logistical channels necessary to operate 

and support the systems. 

The Area Maintenance and Supply Facility concept was introduced to support both fixed and tactical systems. Under this concept two facilities were established in Vietnam to provide direct 

support and general support to the fixed communications electronics systems. Supply was accomplished on a major site basis, 

with each major site requisitioning for all its supported sites. 

The requisitions for all types of technical supply were submitted 

directly to an Area Maintenance and Supply Facility. Differentiation between defined common items and peculiar items of supply 

was made only at Area Maintenance and Supply Facilities. The 

Area Maintenance and Supply Facilities requisitioned common 

items from the theater depots and requisitioned peculiar items 

direClly from the Continental U.S. National Inventory Control 

Point. Maintenance was provided on a direct support and general 

support basis from the major sites and Area Maintenance and 

Supply Facilities respectively. 

Resources 

Since no signal personnel were assigned to 1st Logistical Command. the Signal Office coordinated required work with the 1st 

Signal Brigade which had the major communications role in Vietnam. Prime factors in determining the configuration and composition of the communications system were subscriber requirements 

and densities. However. due to the nonavailability of mobile 

communications equipment capable of meeting the soph isticated 
CONSTRUCTION, REAL ESTATE, AND COMMUNICATION 197 

requirements of a modem Army, the extensive use of fixed com· 

munications equipment was necessary. 

Syst~m EU~ctiv~n~ss 

The communications system was inadequate in early 196::; re· 

suiting in the loss of numerous requisitions. The needs of logis· 

ticians soon inRuenced the development of a responsive and reli· 

able communication system. By the summer of 1968 dial telephone 

exchanges, secure voice terminals, and message and data transmission facilities had been placed at every major logistical installation 

in South Vietnam. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Service Support in Vietnam: 

Subsistence and Miscellaneous 

Subsislence 

u.s. soldiers in Vietnam ate well. Ice cream and eggs to order 

were not uncommon items at fire support bases. Extensive lise 

of large refrigerators, refTigerator vans, and helicopters permitted 

troops in the field to enjoy garrison type rations on an almost 

routine basis. Naturally these conditions were not available in 

1965, but grew as logistics units arrived and facilities were established and improved. 

In early 1965, the Headquarters Support Activity. Saigon, 

under operational control of the U.S. Navy, was responsible for 

supplying perishable and nonperishable subsistence to all units in 

South Vietnam except in I Corps which was supplied by Headquarters 3d Marine Amphibious Force. Headquaners Suppon 

Activity, Saigon submitted its requisitions directly to Defense 

Personnel Support Center in Continental U.s. Perishables were 

shipped by air on a 2-2-3 day cycle to upcountry units. Nonperishables were shipped by Landing Ship Tank (LST) on a 

monthly basis to units located in Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, 

Nha Trang and Qui Nhon. The Navy continued to support all 

U. S. forces as the wholesaler until March 1966. At that time the 

responsibility for 11, III and IV Corps was transferred to Headquarters, Ist Logistical Command. 

When the Ist Logistical Command assumed the mission of subsistence support from the Navy, requisitions were centralized for 

II. lIT and IV Corps and submitted through 2d Logistica l Command in Okinawa to the Defense Personnel Support Center. Later 

the system was modified and requisitions were placed directly on 

Defense Personnel Support Center. In November 1969, the system 

was further modified requiring requisitions to be placed through 

the Defense Automated Addressing System in order to integrate 

"ubsistence data with other logistics information at the Logistical Control Office, Pacific. 

Originally field units subsisted primarily on B rations and 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 199 

the MCI or meal, combat, individual (an individually packaged 

meal, which does not require re£rigeration) . Units in areas such 

as Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Tau subsisted upon A rations 

including fresh fruits, vegetables and milk in accordance with 

the monthly Continental U.S. Master Menu. 

This was later changed to a special thirty·day menu developed 

for use in South Vietnam. This menu required more refrigeraLOr 

capacity than was available, and another menu, a twenty·eight-day 

cyclic menu was developed in late 1966 requiring less re£rigeJ"il' 

tion. 

Fresh fruits and vegetables were received from Continental 

U.S., Western Pacific, and in-countr)' sources. Items which could 

not be successfully moved through the long Continental U.S. 

supply line were procured from Western Pacific and in·country 

suppliers. 

In October 1967, the Sea Land Corporation began providing 

refrigerator cargo service to South Vietnam. Four C4] vessels ar· 

rived in Cam Ranh Bay every 15 days. Each vessel hauled 120 

refrigerated vans and 530 general dry cargo vans. The 120 refriger. 

ated vans were divided with 60 going to Saigon, 30 to Qui Nhon 

and 30 remaining at Cam Ranh Bay. Distribution was made to 

Saigon and Qui Nhon by a smaller shuttle vessel from Cam Ranh 

Bay. This system was used because of the costs to construct other 

land cranes to offload C4] vessels which do not have organic cranes. 

A T3, capable of carrying 93 refrigcrated vans and 360 gcneral 

cargo vans, was introduced to service the port of Da Nang. 

To provide a wide range of dairy produc(S, the A ration re<luired 

three recombining milk plants to be built in Vietnam. A Foremost 

Dairy plant in Saigon began production in December 1965. Undcr 

a contractual agreement with the Army, Meadowgold Dairi es 

constructed one plant in Cam Ranh Bay which began production 

on 15 November 1967 and another in Qui Nhon which began 

production on 4 February 1968. The cost was to be amortized and 

ownership transferred to the U.S. Government. By assuming the 

risk of the operations in Vietnam, lhe Army obtained the Meadow. 

gold product at a lower cost. To augment the ice cream provided 

by the milk plants, additional small size ice cream plants \\'cre 

brought into country to provide ice cream as far forward as pos· 

sible. The number of these plants reached a high of 40. 

Because construction of permanent genera l warehouses was a 

slow process and generally accomplished only in largely populated 

areas such as Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon, a large 

quantity of Class J items were stored in the open. The movement 
200 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

of subsistence to covered storage was not completed until early 

1970. 

Refrigeration was necessary for receiving, storing and issuing 

the perishable A ration components. Refrigeration was provided 

by use of 1,600 cubic feet pre·fab refrigerated units, permanent 

cold storage facilities, leased facilities, and Roating storage. 

The system of distributing subsistence supply encompassed 

sea, air and land transportation. Subsistence supply was affected 

by the long distances between depots and supported units and on 

occasion when the movement of perishable cargo was pre-empted 

by cargo with a higher priority. During the monsoon season 

support to isolated installations also taxed the available modes of 

transportation. 

Subsistence support to other U. S. Forces and Free World 

Military Assistance Forces as well as open messes and civili an 

contractors resulted in an additional burden on Class J opera ti ons 

down through the lowest level of distribution. Support of Free 

World Military Assistance Forces requ ired adjustment to the 

U. S. Army twenty-eight-day menu which included stockage of 

special items (for example, rice and kimchi) to meet their 

requirements. 

In addition to the usual A, Band MCI ration, the tactical 

situation created a need for unique rations (or use on patrol to 

augment the MCI ration. A lightwe ight ralion, the Long Range 

Patrol Ration, was developed by Natick Laboratories which was a 

dehydrated, precooked type available in eight menus and highly 

acceptable to the troops. A special indigenous patrol ration was 

also developed to support personnel of the Free World Military 

Assistance Forces. 

Other Sllpport Services 

OrganiUJtion for Support Services 

Support services include food service, graves registration, laundry and bath, labor, bakery, mess, medical, decontamination 

and property disposal. Food service elements were organic to each 

major headquarters and were responsible for monitoring food servo 

ice activities in their subordinate organizations. 

Graves registration support was provided by collecting points 

operated by divisional Supply and Transportation Battalions and 

by non-divisional Supply and Service companies. The collection 

points ensured that identification certificates were in order, the 

human remains were clean, documentation was correct, and per-
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 201 

sonal effects were accurately recorded and safegua rded. The reo 

mains were then transferred to one of the two in-country mortuary centers at Da Nang or Tan Son Nhut. The personal effects 

depots consolidated the personal effects from the individual's unit. 

the collecting points, and those items removed at the mortuary 

and forwarded them to Continental U.S. for delivery to the nextof·kin. 

Property disposal services were furnished on a geographic 

basis. Property disposal yards were established in each of the 

four Corps Tactical Zones. Sale of material from the yards was 

controll ed by a central sales office working under the auspices of 

the Ist Logistical Command Headquarters, until I Jul y 1970. 

when Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam assumed responsibilit), 

for this operation. 

The other support services, (laundry. bath. bakery. mess, 

labor and decontamination) were furnished on an area basis. 

Because Fi eld Service Companies. Supply and Service Companies, 

Laundry Detachments. Bakery Detachments. and Mess Detachments 

were assigned geographic areas of responsibility. it was nec~sary 

to split some companies into platoon size units. The area concept 

abo resulted in service units having non·service parent units. 

(Chart 16) Bath support was augmented by Army engineer con· 

struction and self-help programs. 

Food Service 

From July 1965 to February 1966, Class I supplies were 

au tomatically "pushed" to South Vietnam and the food consisted 

of B rations and MCI rations. The Push Packages were shipped 

from the various depots in Continental U.S. to the most convenient 

outloading ports. Because of the urgency of the situation, ships of 

opportunity were used (ships in port not fully loaded, but available for government use). This resulted in the rations arrivi ng 

in South Vietnam and bdng offloaded at ports other than those 

called for in the operation plan. Also in man y cases the ships did 

not carry balanced components of the B ration. Th is caused an 

imbalance between the availability of variOllS food components 

and the nutritional need of the troops being supported. To 

worsen the situation, Push Package markings were often ignored 

and the components of the rations were issued and consumed by 

units near the port of discharge, causing an unbalanced diet. The 

Push Package concept was successful only on the first two increments. Even though the use of Push Packages was stopped in 

February 1966. it took until 1968 to phase out non·authorized 
" 

Tay Hinh 

Logistical 

Suppolt Activity 

" 228th 

Supply & 

Service 

CHART I6--Tl'PlCAL OROA1"IZATION FOR SUPPLY SERVICE, 

X 

Sallon 

Support Command 

I 

lU 

29th Genelll 

Support GIOUp 

" " " " 

SaIgon 6lOth 266lh Supply Cln Tho 

Logistical lOllstical 

Support Activity Maintenance & Semce Support Activity 

I 

, I , , 

" 299th 506th 624th 

'""'1 & Supply & Supply & 

223d So.", service Service 

Supply & 

service , ... 483' 82d QM 

field Service laundlJ 574

& 

C

, " 

'58th 8lstQM SUppl, & laund/)' SelVice 

Symbols above boxes give or(
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 203 

Slockage list items hom the system. During the eady pan of this 

period the food service program suffered. 

The buildup of troops and conversion from MCI feeding to 

the feeding of B ration meats and components of the A ration 

was rapid. Attempts were made to foll ow the Continental U.S. 

Master Menu in certain areas of Vietnam (Sa igon, Cam Ranh 

Bay and Vung Tau) but this was difficult due to limited refTigeration facilities. 

The twenty-eight-day menu developed in 1966 reduced the 

strain on refrigeration assets. In August 1969, a refined twentyeight·day cyclic menu was adopted. This menu consisted of 4,500 

calories of food energy per man per day and contained a wide and 

balanced variety of meats, vegetables, fruits, cereals and beverages. 

Over 90 percent of the meals were served hot. 

During June 1968, the "cantonment mess" project was initiated to upgrade dining facilities. This projea called for the 

.replacement of "field ty~" equipment with "garrison type" 

kitchen equipment in base corps dining facilities. The replacement equipment was to be the same type as that normally used 

in Continental U.S. It was not possible to use the cantonment 

equipment to the extent originally planned, however, due to 

limited electrical power, fuel and maintenance support. For these 

reasons, and for a need on the part of some units to maintain 

mobility, a number of units continued to use "field type" cooking 

equipment in base corps facilities. 

When possible. for troops on patrol and other field missions, 

meals were prepared in base camp kitchens and delivered in insulated food containers. When such deliveries could not be made 

because of weather, enemy action or terrain either the MCI (a 

canned ration) or the Long Range Patrol Packet was provided. The 

latter consists primarily of dehydrated components. The Ration 

Supplement Sundries Pack was also provided when troops did not 

have access to a Post Exchange olltlet. This pack contains such 

items as confections, tobacco including cigars and cigarettes, 

stationery, shoe laces and sewing kits. Originally it contained 16 

items. The latest revision. based on the recommendations of U.S. 

troops in Vietnam. has 24 components. 

Commissary Outlets 

There were two commissary stores in Vietnam and both were 

operated by the Army. One was located at Saigon, and the other 

one at Long Binh. Access to the stores was limited to personnel 

not having an organized dining £acility in their area. 
204 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

T his stringent policy was implemented in 1968 to offset large 

numbers of patrons crowding into minimal facilities to purchase 

limited amounts of retail subsistence items. By restricting use of 

the facility to personnel not having access to dining fa cilities, it 

virtually eliminated military patrons, but did provide commissary 

service to civilian government employees, contractor personnel, 

press representatives and other non-military personnel. 

Care and Disposition of Remains 

Early in ]96 1 the Commander in Chief. Pacific d irected the 

U. S. Air Force to provide service support for deceased military 

advisory personnel in South Vietnam. This support was rendered 

by mortuary personnel from Clark Air Force Base, Republic of the 

P hilippines. However, in 1963 a U. S. Air Force Mortuary was 

established at Tan Son Nhut. Its service was expanded in 1965 

to include support to Free World Military Assistance Forces. 

Later in 1965, as a result of an Army study on future mortuary 

support requirements, the Commander in Chief, Pacific directed 

that the mortuary mission be transferred to U.S. Army Vietnam 

effective I July 1966. 

The following table depicts the Army fatality workload experienced during the period 196 1 thru 1970: 

1961 5 

1962 - 25 

1963 - 72 

1964 146 

1965 - 1,081 

1966 - 5,719 

1967 6,445 

1968 - 10.560 

1969 - 8, 185 

1970 ',906 

Total 55,140 

As fatalities increased it became difficult to control Summary 

Court disposition of personal effects. So, on I September 1966. 

U.S. Army Vietnam activated the Personal Property Depot at 

Camp Red Ball as a Division of the U. S. Army Mortuary, Tan 

Son Nhut. This depot was responsible for receiving, screening 

and shipping personal effects to the person entitled to receive 

them. 

Due to the increase in combat activity and fatalities of U. S. 

Forces in the I Corps area, a stand·by mortuary at the Da Nang 

Air Base was placed in opera tion on 20 June 1967. ]n May 1967, 

the existing mortuary facility at Tan Son Nhut was determined 

inadequate and Commander U.s. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, directed a study to relocate it. As a result of the study, 

a new facility was constructed on the Air Base. The mortuary 

activity was relocated to the new facility on II September 1968; 

on 16 December 1968 the Personal Property Depot at Camp Red 

Ball was relocated to a newly constructed facility adjacent to the 

new mortuary. 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 205 

M01'tUllry 

Viet Cong activities taxed the capacity of both the Tan Son 

Nhut and Da Nang mortuaries during the Tel Offensive in February 1968. During this period, technical guidance and additional 

identification capability was provided through temporary duty 

of qualified civilian personnel from the Office Chief of Support 

Services, Department of the Army and off-shore mortuaries located 

in Japan and Thailand. Embalmer capability was increased 

through temporary assignment of in-country qualified and licensed 

enlisted personnel to assist the civilian morticians in preparation 

of remains. These two mortuaries processed 2,291 remains during 

that month which was possible only through the complete cooperation of the military and civilian personne l concerned. 

A plan for conducting a search and recovery program for remains of deceased persons in Vietnam was initiated as early as 

November 1968 with in-country graves registration units providing 

personnel for assignment to support this effort. The program was 

designated Operation Compassion. A central file bank for missing 

and "body not recovered" personnel for all Services was established 

at Tan Son Nhut Mortuary in support of this operation and for 

use in conducting searches upon cessation of hostilities. 

Plans eventually materialized in the activation of the Joint 

Casualty Resolution Center located at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand 

and a Central Identification Laboratory, Camp Samesan, Thailand 

to conduct search, recovery and identification of remains in Southeast Asia. 

Bath Seroices 

The bath service support in Vietnam was provided to all U.S. 

and Free World Military Assistance Forces. During the early 

stages of the buildup most of the bath support was provided by 

fixed or improvised facilities. As the number of troops increased, 

Table of Organization and Equipment mobile bath units were 

introduced and were operating by June 1968. These units, augmented by fixed and improvised facilities, provided adequate 

hot and cold water shower support; however, most of the field 

expedient showers had to be operated using cold water only. 

Often most desirable locations for shower points could not be 

used for security reasons. 

In December 1965, the total bath capability in South Vietnam 

consisted of 18 Table of Organization and Equipment mobile 

bath teams (with 8 shower heads each) having the combined 

capability of providing 126,000 showers per week-operating 16 
206 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

hours per day (two 8 hour shi£ts). At that time all of the bath 

units were assigned to the lst Logistical Command. The divisions 

and brigades contained no augmentations for bath units but 

received this support as required from supporting units of the 1st 

Logistical Command. 

By July 1967, the bath service capability in the lst Logistical 

Command had expanded to 60 bath teams, with a total of 69 

authorized. These teams, working two IO·hoUT shifts per day, were 

capable of providing 420,000 showers per week. Troops billeted in 

urban areas had access to permanent shower facilities. Troops occupying base camps bathed in fixed showers which were constructed as part of the cantonment. When it was not possible 

to provide showers with mobile bath teams, collapsible canvas 

Austrailian shower buckets with a 5.87 gallon capacity provided 

additional capability. Decontamination teams equipped with a 

truck containing a tank and shower unit were also employed as 

the need arose. All of these fixed facilities were used to the 

maximum extent possible in order to free the mobil bath units 

for support to the fonvard areas (fire support bases and logistical 

support activities to which the combat soldier had access after 

combat operations) . 

Laundry and Dry Cleaning 

Since almost all items of clothing and bedding used in Vietnam 

were made from materials that could be cleaned by laundering 

rather than dry cleaning, this portion will review the problems 

inherent in establishing laundry facilities. 

In August 1965, mobile laundry units were requested to provide the additional requirements generated by the troop buildup. 

However, this request could not be fil.1ed due to a lack of equipment. During December 1965, there were fifty standard-B field 

laundry machines (two-trailer units) in the 1st Logistical Command. These units were capable of servicing only 3,075,000 pounds 

of laundry per month. The total requirement per month exceeded 

7,000,000 pounds. 

During the early stages of buildup all laundry service, except 

the small amount that could be handled by supporting units 

having mobile laundry equipment, was obtained from local na· 

tiona ls. Since there were very few local commercial firms that had 

any sizeable capability at that time and no Army-operated facilities, most of the lau ndry service was furnished by maids, houseboys, and post exchange concessiona ires. Due to the wide dispersion of troops and as a matter of convenience, arrangements for 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 207 

these services were generally handled by the individual OT the 

unit desiring the service. 

During fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969 increased utilization was made of contract laundries because of commanders de· 

sires for pressed fatigues for troops in base camps. Although the 

Vietnamese contractors provided service below acceptable standards, their services were necessary to cover the large shortfall 

from organ ic laundry capabiliti es. The extent to which the U.S. 

Army depended on contract laundry is shown by the fact that in 

fiscal year 1969, production rose to a high of 12_8 million pounds 

per month at a cost averaging $855,000 per month. 

The mobile laundry equipment situa tion began to improve in 

December 1966 when the first of the new Standard·A machines 

arrived in Vietnam. These machines were mounted on single 

trailers and greatly increased the mobility of laundry units. By 

July 1967, Standard-A machines comprised 45 percent of the 

laundry equipment in country. During this period, however, only 

22 percent of the required 18 million pounds of laundry per 

month was processed by fie ld laundry units. Physical and tactical 

limitations, shortages of Standard-A machi nes, and inherent limi· 

tations of field laundries all contributed to the laundry support 

problem. The shortfall was resolved by reliance on local nationals, 

concessionnaires and contractors. 

In August 1967, there were 11 5 Standard.A laundry machines 

in-country with a capability of laundering onl y 25 percent of the 

total requirement. From November 1967 through January 1968, 

additiona l new Standard·A machines arrived in Vietnam bringing 

the total to 127 machines. Production from these and an undetermined number of Standard·B machi nes totaled 11.8 million pounds 

or an average of 3.9 million pounds per month for this period. 

During 1968 and 1969 the Standard·B machines were completely 

phased out of the system. The production rate for field laundri es 

during this period ranged from a low of 2.4 million pounds per 

month to a high of 4.2 million pounds per month. which was 

achieved in .June 1969. 

As the buildup continued additional laundry units were assigned and by June 1968 mobile facilities were established. During this same period local commercia l laundries were being 

placed under contract to handle the workload wh ich exceeded 

the ca pability of the mobil e facilities operated by the Army. The 

available mobile units had the ca pability to process only about 

half of the total laundry requirement, and this was limited to 

washing and rough drying. 
208 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Therefore, these units were employed primarily in support of 

medical facilities, isolated units, combat task forces, and in areas 

where there were large concentrations of troops and a sizeable 

workload of organizational type items. 

As the tTOOP buildup continued, it became apparent that th e 

laundry services could be provided more economica ll y by fixed 

facilities operating under the staff supervision of the Army. Plans 

were formulated for construction of ten laundries and sites were 

selected. 

Eight of the lcn fixed laundries progTammed for construction 

in fiscal year 1969 were cancelled. The cancellation resulted from a 

study in 1968 based on the factor of low priorities for this type 

of construction and lack of need for fixed laundries due to reduction 

of forces in South Vietnam. The remaining two were approved and 

programmed by U.S. Army Vietnam for construction in fiscal year 

1971 at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay. Due to further reductions 

of our forces in Vietnam, these two were never built, and the US 

Army continued to rely on contract laundries, with no fixed 

laundries in the Republic of Vietnam. 

Clothing 

The clothing issue-in·kind system of supply (provided for in 

CTA 50- 901 ) was placed in effect in Vietnam on I November 

1965. After that time, enlisted men were deployed there with the 

minimum quantities of items of the uniform. Relatively high 

value clothing items were recovered through turn-in and subsequently rehabilitated for reissue. Clothing items that were not 

turned in, and those not required in Vietnam, were placed in 

storage at home or government storage to be recovered and used 

by the individual on his ret urn from Vietnam. 

In March 1966. the 1st Logistical Command established an 

Army clothing sales store in Saigon. (Prior to that time a joint clothing sales store was operated there by the Navy.) The initial stock· 

age of this store consisted of clothing items for both male and 

female personnel; but, due to the limited demand for items of 

female clothing. these items were discontinued from stockage in 

October 1967. After this time, female military personnel obtained their items of the uniform by mail order from military 

clothing sales stores located in J apan and Okinawa. Initially, cash 

sales at the Saigon sales store averaged $60,000 per month. However, 

after officers and warrant officers were included in issue-in-kind 

under the provisions of CTA 50-90 I, the sales volume decreased to 

$13,000 per month (in fiscal year 1970) . 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 209 

Property Disposal 

The Property Disposal Operation was a function of Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, until I February 1966. It was 

then passed to U.S. Army Vietnam, and in turn to the 1st Logistical 

Command. During the early years, property disposal operations 

were hampered by the lack of tra ined military personnel. This is 

understandable since there were very few operational spaces for 

property disposal officer personnel anywhere in the world prior 

to the buildup in Vietnam. Traditionally. property disposal 

operations only generate high interest at or near the end of 

armed conflicts; during other periods it is usually assigned a low 

priority, perhaps because of its position at the rail end of the life 

cycle of materiel. 

Personnel shortages were evident and in 1968 actions were 

taken to overcome them. Additionally, resident and nonresident 

courses were established by the U. S. Army Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee for property disposal personnel. Resident 

courses consisted of the Defense Advanced Disposal Management 

Seminar, Defense Disposal Executive Development Seminar, and 

the Defense Disposal Management Seminar. 

A mobile instructor team was organized and conducted onsite courses. Additionally, the Quartermaster School conducted 

special property disposal courses for officers, enlisted men, and 

civilian employees assigned to the propery disposal program. Personnel assigned to lhe disposal operation in Vietnam in 1966 and 

1970 are compared in the table below: 

PERSONNEL ASSICNED TO PR.OPERTY DISPOSAL OPER.ATIONS 

IN VIETNAM 

FY 19611 FY 1970 

Officers and Warrant Officers ............. . , 

Enlistf!d Men .. .. . .. ....... . . . ........ . 16 577 " 

Department of the Anny Civilian$ . .. . ... . , 15 

Local Nationals . . ............... . 126 267 

Total . ... ... ...... . . .. . ........ .... ..... . 148 894 

Disposal operations were hampered by lack of an early countryto-country agreement. Such an agreement should have been consummated at the ambassadorial level early or before the buildup 

started specifying how the U.S. Army would conduct property 

disposal operations. An essential element would have been a stipulation that the host countTY would have no control over U.S. 

property sold for export. A country-to-country agreement was 
210 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

signed on 9 November 1968 but had this been accomplished earlier, 

a considerable number of delays would have been eliminated and a 

more efficient property disposal operation would have been 

established. Buyers were discouraged from bidding on properly 

offered for sale because of difficulties in obtaining host country 

customs clearances. a lack of labor, a slowness of host government bureaus in processing buyer requests for export licenses, a 

shortage of shipping, and long delays in awaiting berthing 

space. Simply stated, many arduous and difficult problem areas 

were encountered by representatives of the business community 

when conducting business affairs in a combat environment. 

The inventories of property disposal yards greatly increased 

during the enemy's Tel offensive of February 1968 and his offensive again in May 1968. The increase was due to two factors. 

First, a great deal of equipment was damaged or destroyed duri ng 

this period and was added to the inventory. Second, buyers were 

unable to remove property from property disposal office yards on 

a timely basis as a result of increased harassment by the enemy. 

These inventories were not reduced to a manageable level until 

early 1969. 

The quantities of properly received and the quantities dis· 

posed or during the peri od fiscal year 1968- 197 1 are shown in Table 

12. Also shown are the quantities on hand at the end of each of 

those fisca l years. There was a large increase in the quantity of 

scrap received during fiscal year 1970. There were several reasons 

for the increase. Scales were not available in the property disTABLE 12-PRoPERTY DISPOSAL OFFICE OPERATIONS 

(1968-1971) 

Usabll' "',1d"T &n,p(1n thOUUndl 

Cln mf1110m dol an) ,,~) 

Fiocal 0 .. Hand AI On Hind 

Yur R",dnd Dbpwed Of End Of FY ....... DI.1>OIftI 0 I End Of FY 

)968 ........ 96 78 " 80 

)969 ...... -- .. go " " " ,. " ,. 

(1.6) (1.7) 

1970 ..... --- '" 72 " .81 12. . ., 

1971 ...... -- m '" " 16' 50' 260 

(2.3) (6.5) 

Totals ..... ,,, ,,, .. , 608 

USABLE PROPERTY FIGURES I N PARENTHESES RI:PR£SENT DOLLAR RETURN TO 

GOVERNMENT. FIGURES FOR 11168 DOLLAR RETURNS ARE ESTIMATED. FIGURES 

:-:OT IN PARESTHESES IN TH IS COLVMN REPRESENT ACQU ISITION VALUE. 

SCRAP-FIGUR ...s IN PARENTHESES REPRESENT DOLLAR RETURN TO GOVERN. 

MENT . FIGURF..s FOR FY 1968 DOLLAR RETURN ARE ESTIMATED. FIGURES NOT I N 

PARENTIIESES IN T HIS COLUMN REPRESENT THOVSAND 0" TONS 0 .. SCRAP 

IlISPOSED OF. 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 211 

posal yards to weigh the scrap as it was unloaded. An estimate 

was made regarding the weight which normally resulted in less 

weight being recorded than was actually unloaded. Also the prop· 

erty disposal office yard dropped scrap from their records when ;J 

contract was signed by a buyer rather than wa iting until the 

buyer removed the scrap by a specified time, as prescribed in 

property disposal regulations. After this contract was in validated, 

the scrap in many cases was not again picked up on properly 

disposal office records. During 1969, a concentrated effort was 

made at the direction of the Commanding General, In Logistical 

Command to bring all the property disposal office records up to 

date. This resulted in a sizeable increase in the quantity recorded. 

Finally, the phase down of U.S. Army Vietnam resulted in 

marked increases in the amount on hand in the property disposal 

facilities. 

With the introduction of weighing scales in fiscal year 1970, 

the guesswork surrounding scrap inventories was eliminated and 

severe peaks and valleys were brought under control. However, 

downward adjustments continued for approx.imately a year 

thereafter because buyers under term contract were reaChing bare 

ground prior to fulfillment of contracts which were based on 

earlier inventory estimates. 

The property disposal operation, an element of the 1st Logistical Command, was assigned to the Property Disposal Agency Oil 

18 Augun 1970. The mission of the agency was to supervise the 

development and implementation of policies, directives, and regulations pertaining to receipt, control, issue, and sales of Department of Defense, non-Department of Defense, U.S. Federal 

Agencies, Free World Military Assistance Forces, and Military Assistance Program ex.cesses, and U.S. Forces generated and salvage 

material. The Property Disposal Agency was a culmination of 

efforts to enhance property disposal capabilities through improved 

equipment and increased personnel allocation. 

Military Assistance Program Excesses 

Because of the large volume of excesses being generated and 

sent to property disposal areas in the Pacific Command area, a 

special procedure was developed to make maximum use of lhese 

assets by the Military Assistance Program. Military Assistance 

Program Excesses covers procedures for the transfer of items, both 

major and secondary, ITom Pacific Command property disposal 

offices to Pacific Command Military Assistance Program recipients. 

A feature of this program is lhe policy that recipients will mow 
212 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

mat~Tiel and perform necessary rebuild at their own expense to 

the extent feasible. thereby saving Military Assistance Program 

accessorial and rebuild funds. By visual insptttion of material 

in property disposal offices and by review of listings of available 

irems, Military Assistance Advisory Group and recipient country 

personnel determine items which are appropriate to fill a valid 

programmed requirement. A message forwarded to Commander in 

Chief Pacific by a Military Assistance Advisory Group requesting 

approval of the Military Assistance Program Excesses transfer 

staru the process. Commander in Chief Pacific reviews this request to determine that items are of a category normally supplied 

thru the Military AssiSlance Program and (hat a valid program 

requirement exists. Upon approval, the Property Disposal Office, 

Military Assistance Advisory Croup, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Military Department are advised, and the trans· 

fer of the mat<!:riel effected. Table 13 displays quantities of 

property moved from Pacific Command Property Disposal offices 

under Military Assistance Program Excesses during a portion of 

1969 through calendar ytar 1970, and also displays rtmovals 

from January through March 1971. These quantities include re· 

movals from the entire Pacific Command area, bUl a majority 

was from Propeny Disposal office facilities in Vietnam. 

TABU I5-PRoPERTY MOVED FROM PACIFIC CoMMAND PROPERTY 

DISPOSAL OFFICES UNDER MILlTAR.Y ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 

EXCHANCE PROCEDURES 

Tai"'an . . .. ... .. 

Korea ..........•... 

Philippines . .. . ......... . 

Cambodia ...... .. . .... . 

Indonesia •....•...•.. .• .•.• 

TotalJ • ..• • • . •. • ••... .. 

Medical Stlpport 

Pmod Durl"l Whl( h Propcn, Wu Rtmo .. ed 'rom Pacific eo,,",,"JHi Prope11, OltpotlJ Of'fiu. 

Part of Caltndl' ,"fI' 1969 ,", AU 01 Caltrnb. ,"fir 1970 

""1 ,149.212 

16.400.728 

1,61.5.808 

$49,165,748 

Jlnul,.,. 1911 

Ihrou"h 

Mlrch 1!n1 

$ 9.6'8,090 

7,406,000 

468,799 

2,567.809 

"'J68 

'20,4.54,066 

In the Vietnamese and Korean conAicts 2.5 percent of U.S, 

personnel who were wounded and reached a medical treatment 

facility died. This represented a sizeable improvement over the 

percentages of World War II (4.5 percent) , World War I (8. 1 per· 

cent) and the Civil War (17 percent). However emphasis should 
\ 

SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 213 

be placed on the fact that these percentages represent only the 

percentages of wounded personnel who died after reaching medical treatment facilities. In the Vietnamese conflict a far greater 

percentage of wounded personnel reached these facilities alive 

than during any prior conflict. This was primarily due to the 

use of helicopter ambulances. These aerial ambulances were able 

to rapidly evacuate casualties wounded to such a degree that 

death would have resu lted in prior wars before the evacuee could 

reach a medical treannent facility. 

Medical service in Vietnam was as complete as that found any· 

where in the world. It included not only medical evacuation and 

hospitalization but also medical supply and maintenance, preventive medicine, den tal, veterinary and medical laboratory services, 

medical intelligence. and medical research and development activities. 

Initially medical support was organic to the 1st Logistical Command mission. As the buildup progressed and the magnitude of 

the medical mission increased, responsibility for the medical 

function was transferred to the 44th Medical Brigade upon its 

arrival in Vietnam 011 1 May 1966. At this time the 44th Medi· 

cal Brigade was assigned to the 1st Logistical Command; but in 

August 1967 because of the increased medical mission, the 44th 

Medical Brigade was reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam. In 1970, the 44th l\ledical Brigade and the Surgeons Office, 

Headquarters U.S. Army Vielnam were consolidated and designated the Medical Command. 

As our troop huildup began, medical units of all types were 

phased in along with the tactical and logistical units they supported. 

Completely equipped hos pitals staffed with well-trained specialists were soon located throughollt Vietnam. 

Cross-servicing, whereby one Service cares for the sick and 

wounded of another was used extensively. Navy hospital ships 

located off the coast of Vietnam were included in this operation. 

Aerial evacuation was used to transfer patients to these "floating 

hospitals." Service hospitals were so located that by 1968 ally 

casualty evacuated by helicopter was within 30 minutes flying 

time of a hospital capable of providing definitive surgical care. 

Stability of hospitals permitted semipermanent and in some 

cases permanent construction. Preoperative. operative. postoperative and other intensive care areas were air-conditioned. ]11 addition to weB constructed facilities, several of the surgical hospitals 

were equipped with the newl y developed r..fedical Unit, Self· 

Contained, Transportable. This is a system of shelters and 
214 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

equ ipment designed to provide the required medica l surgical capability faT pa ticm care in the fi eld under a wide range of environmental cond itions. and it represents a vast improvement over 

tent hospitals of the past. Modules can be combined to form any 

desired fie ld facility, or treatment facility. and can be tra nsported 

by CH-54 helicopters; although they are norma ll y transported by 

fixed wing aircraft. AiLer the arrival of the first Army Medical 

Department air ambulance unit in 1962, medical helicopter operations, called DUST OFF, C\'3cuated large numbers of military and 

civilian patients. Table 14 shows the number of patients moved by 

these air ambulances through 1970. 

TABLE I4-EvACUATlON 8" ARMY A IR. AM8ULA~CES IN V I ETNAM 

Ye~t 

Prior 10 1965 

196, 

1966 

196' 

1968 

1969 

1970 

TOlal Air Ambulance ..... . 

Hoist P~lienlS 1969 (01) . 

1970 ...... . 

TOlal including Hoist P~tient ' 

rlllen ... • 

12,000 

11,000 

65.000 

".000 

208.000 

241.000 

197.871 

828.871 

4, 188 

4.0428 

857.487 

' £.oct. Ilmr a plllenl I, mo,'w br bcUtllpcc., be II coumw .~.In A .18nl~nou number of Ihe 

.OO'·c c~.ro«l ~ civlll.n,. 

The courage and dedication of the air evacuation crews and 

medical teams was laudable. They continuously went into areas 

under fire and their casually n\te'.' were high. 

Military Assistance COlllm.lI1d Vietnam established a 30·day 

evacuation policy and endeavored to keep 40 percent of hospital 

beds empty at all times 10 take care of sudden surges of casualties that occurred from time to time. 

During the period I January 196.? through 30 April 197 1, 83 

percent of the admissions to U.S. Army Medica l Trealmenl 

Facilities were dne to disease and non-battle injury. Seventeen 

percent were due to wounds. 

Five groups of diseases accounted for the majority (65 percent) 

of the admission .. for disease. These were malaria, fevers of unknown origin, re~piratOlv :lilmcnts, skin problems, and diarrheal 

diseases, Malaria was exceeded only by wounds and non-ballie 

injuries as a calise of manrla}'s lost from duty. 

"Combat casualties" consisted of those personnel wounded as 
SUBSISTENCE AND M ISCELLANEOUS 215 

well as those killed in action. During the period January 1965 

through 30 April 197 1, 15 out of each 100 combat casualties fell 

in the killed category and 85 were wounded. Of the 85 wounded, 

two died after reaching a medical treatment facility and 83 lived. 

The Army Medical Service also provided medical support to 

Free World Assistance Forces in Vielnam. In addition, assistance 

was given to the Vietnamese military and civilian populations 

through various medical programs. U. S. military hospitals admitted and treated sick, wounded, and injured Vietnamese 

civilians on an emergency basis from the first. 

Medical suppl ies were handled through medical depots and 

hospitals. This was separate from the supply system for other supplies. This organization produced a customer oriented logistics 

system that was responsive to the needs of the patient and provided 

sufficient quantities of supplies for professional use. 

The 32d Medical Depot managed the in-country inventory 

for medical materiel. Upon arrival in Vietnam in October 1965, 

it was assigned to the 1st Logistical Command. On 1 ~fay 1966 it 

became a subordinate element of the 44th Medical Brigade. The 

32d Medica l Depot submitted requisitions to the U. S. Army Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands. That depot either filled them or passed 

them directly to the U.S. Army Medical Material Agency in 

Continental U.S. located at Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. The requisitions submitted to Continental U.S. by-passed the U.S. Army 

Pacific Inventory Control Point, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. The 32d 

Medical Depot consisted of a base depot at Cam Ranh Bay and, 

as requirements for support developed, advance depots were established at Long Binh, Qui Nhon, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. Each 

depot performed an area distribution mission through which 

issues were made to combat divisions, hospitals, Free \Vorld Military Assistance Forces, and other Services based upon inter-service 

support agreements. With the help of NCR automatic data processing equipment, the 32d ~fedical Depot managed a -S IS million on·hand inventory and mailllained a 45 to 60 day level of 

medical supplies. (A more detailed Medical discussion will be 

found in the Medical Monograph.) 

Unique Support Missions 

Riverine Forces 

This type of operation was remllllSCenL of campaigns dming 

the Civil War when the U.S. Army conducted riverine operations 

along the James and Mississippi Ri vers and in sOllthern swamps. 
216 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

This type of warfare was also used on Mindanao in (he Philippines 

during W orld War II. 

The initial Mobile Riverine Force, created in 1967, was com· 

posed of an Army Infantry brigade and a Navy Task Force integrated at each level of command. This composite force operated 

as a complete package, independent of fixed support bases. This 

type of force offered flexibility and greatly increased our operational capability in areas previously inaccessible to our forces. 

Logistic suppon for these forces was established at Vung Tau. 

U.S. Navy LST and Army landing craft were used to carry the 

major part of resupply cargo to Dong Tam, which was the major 

base camp for riverine operations. Throughollt the delta operation, transportation boat units (medium and heavy) played a 

major direct support role. Infantry troops were billeted aboard 

U.S. Navy barracks sh ips and were ca rried to combat by helicopter 

airlift and armored landing craft. 

Existing Army and Navy supply procedures were found to be 

adaptable to riverine opera tions. A few problems developed in 

using equipment immersed at times in briny or dirty water, but 

the command emphasis placed all preventive maintenance during 

these operations helped to relieve these problems. Riverine operations were a good example of interservice rapport. 

Support of XXIV Corps in I Corps 

Prior to the 1968 Tet offensive, the predominant U.S. land 

forces employed in I Corps were U.S. Marines supported by U.S. 

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. Prior to November 1967, the 

U.S. Army maintained support activities on a small scale at Da 

Nang for Army troops in I Corps. The number of troops was not 

sufficient to establish command headquarters as sllch, but our 

support activities maintained Army personnel in I Corps, in 

conjunction with the U.S. Naval Support Activity. The rapid 

influx of U.S. Army land forces during the Tel offensive required 

and equally rapid and extensive buildup of logistic forces and 

materiel. The requirement for an Army tactical headquarters to 

be established for the I Corps became apparent and the XXIV 

Corps came into being. Interim arrangements were lIsed, as the 

Army established supporting facilities, in addition to the ones 

already there which received supplies from either Army or Navy 

sources. Eventually redeployment of Marines from I Corps and the 

phasing out of the U.S. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang caused 

detailed planning to begin in preparation [or the U.S. Army to 

assume support responsibility [or this Corps. A target date of 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 217 

July 1970 was established. This action was the first of its kind 

anywhere in an active theater or operations. While other Army 

elements in Vietnam were reducing their scope of operations in 

line with the announced withdrawal policy, the logistic mission 01 

the Army in I Corps was expanded. 

Despite the problems generated by a lack of knowledge on 

the part of both Army and Navy personnel as to terminology and 

organization, the rapport achieved and maintained throughout 

the takeover, planning, and execution was probably the single 

most important contributing factor to its overall success. 
218 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

GOER 8-1'01'11 CARGO CARRIER, ALL-TERRAIN, ALL-WEATHER AMPIIIBIOUS 

CARGO VEIIICLE. ABOVE; GOER g'TON CARGO CARRIER PROCEEDING 

CROSS-COUNTRY THROUCH SWAMPY AREA, 8£LOW. 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 219 

CH--47 CHINOOK I-ln.ICOPTER BRI NGS IN SU/\'G LOAO ARTILl.ERY 

AMMUN ITION DURING QplcRA1"ION BOl.u;>;c, ABOVE; AIR 

DEUVERY BY FLYI/\,C CRANE OF AM:o.tUNITION AND 

AkTILLERY PIECE, BELOW" 
220 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

DELONG PIER CoMPLEX AT VUNC TAU WITH VIEW OF ROCK CAUSEWAY 

AND SANO FILL TO BE USED FOR HAJU)STANO, ABOVE; USE OF 

SEA·LAND VANS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION, BELOW. 
SUBSISTENCE AND MAINTENANCE 

UNLOADING OF SEA-LAND VANS BY CIlAN£ OF CARGO SHIP 

AT CAM RANH BAY 

221 
222 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

OFF-LOADING OF SEA-LAI\O V .... :-;S BY USE OF CAN"ffiY CR .... NE AT CAM 

RANI! H,,,,. "IIO\'E: C.VlI ... IAN CO:-.11tACTOR HAN JIN 

TRUCKS \VAITING TO liE UNLOADED, HELOW. 
SUBS ISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 223 

ARMY Vt:SSEL LTC JOliN U . D . PACE TIED UP AT SoUTH B EACH, 

CAM RANI! BAY 
224 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

I 

,.- -; 

USS CoRPUS CHRISTI UTIl.IZ.ED AS It. FLOATING AIRCRAFT J\fAINTE.NANCE 

FAClun ANCHOR!:I) On' CoAS1' AT VUNC TAU, "ROVE; AERIAL 

VIEW OF VIETNAM RAILWAY SERVICE REPAIR CREWS 

CUARING RIGIIT 0.- WAY AND INSTALUNC 

NEW TRACK, BELOW. 
SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS 225 

USE OF CONEX CoNTAINER, ABOVE; LoADING LAUNDRY INTO DRYER. 

AT CAM RANH BAY, BELOW. 
226 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REMOVINC ENCINE FROM 5'TON TRUCK FOR 

REPAIR, ABOVE; USE 01' MAINTENANCE VANS IN A 

MOTOR POOL OPERATION, BELOW. 
SUBSISTENCE AND M ISCELLANEOUS 227 

OPERATION OF ROME PLOWS IN CLEARING TREES AND UNDERGROWTH 

FROU AREAS IN VIETI<AM, ABOVE; LANOING CRAFT MECHANIZED 

(LCM) EsCORTS BARGE LOADED WITH ROCK, FUEL, STEEL 

GIRDERS AND OTHER ITEMS ON TH.E VAM 

Co T A Y RIVER, BELOW. 

-- - . --- ..:. ... 
228 l.OGISTIC SUPPORT 

~ .. ---- -- S- '- ~' -

V d 

FLYINC CRANE LuIS 175 MM GUN AT VUNC TAU 
CHAPTER IX 

Logistic Support of u.S. Advisors and 

Special Forces, Vietnam Armed and 

Pacification Forces, and 

Free World Military Assistance Forces 

Logistic Support of U. S. Advisors 

The logistic system available to supply the advisers assigned 

to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, prior to the buildup 

was based on the concept of a small group of advisors centrally 

supported from Saigon. When an adviser arrived in-country, he 

reported to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon, 

received a brief orientation, was issued the bare essentials of personal and field clothing. a weapon, a couple of magazines of ammunition, a mosquito net with bars, and eating utensils. He was then 

flown to his destination via Air Vietnam. Resupply of the adviser 

was the responsibility of the Vietnamese Army for ammunition, 

vehicles, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants, but such support was 

minimal. Since an adviser was required to either eat on the economy 

or buy his rations at the commissary or PX in Saigon, he was PTO.) 

vided a cost of living allowance. He was provided an imprest fund to 

pay (or equipment maintenance. However, in the early years of 

the Vietnam conflict, Saigon remained the umbilical cord of life 

for the adviser. 

In April 1962 , the Army established the United States Army 

Support Group. Vietnam, later designated United States Army 

Support Command, Vietnam. 

Upon activation. this organization assumed some of the logistic 

functions previously performed by the Army section, Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam, but not the support of up·country 

compounds. 

On I July 1962, the Headquarters Support Activity Saigon was 

established under a chain of command descending from the 

Commander-In-Chief of the Pacific Fleet but under the operational 

control of Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. After this change adviser support improved. Under various 
230 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

interservice SUpport agreements Headquarters Support Activity 

Saigon performed common item supply and service support funclions for all U.S. advisers including such things as subsistence, 

clothing, PX supplies. and billeling services. From its inception, it 

was envisioned that Headquarters Support Activity Saigon responsibilities would be limited to peacetime functions or at the most to 

the situation that existed in South Vietnam during the 1962- 1964 

period. 

In addition to Headquarters Support Activity Saigon, the U.S. 

Navy had its own logistic system in South Vietnam for the support 

of U.S. Navy personnel snch as U.S. Navy advisers under the 

Naval Advisory Croup. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

The U.S. Marine Corps had a semi·separate logistics establish· 

ment for support of the U.S. Marine Corps. Also the U.S. Air Force 

vested most of its logistic responsibilities ill ilS Headquarters, 2d 

Air Division. 

At the beginning of 1965, the combined U.S. logistic support 

effort in South Vietnam was capable of supporting about 20,000 

U.S. personnel. A small highly fragmented portion of this effort 

supported the U.S. advisory personnel. No one organization had 

full responsibility for logistic support. For example, the Head· 

quarters Support Activity. Saigon and the Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, Headquarters Commandant operated parallel 

supply lines for different commodities in support of U.S. advisers. 

Four different systems furnished repairs, and each of the Services 

had its own medical supply system operating on a "stovepipe" basis 

to Continental U.S. As the advisory effort increased in keeping 

with the expansion of the Vietnamese forces. and as the logistic 

system to support U.S. combat forces took shape, a logistic system 

for support of the advisors evolved whereby supply support was 

furnished from three basic sources: l'\'lilitary Assistance Command, 

Vietnam; the Vietnamese Army; and U.S. Army Vietnam. The 

type of support drawn from each of these sources was as follows: 

organizational clothing and equipment and individual weapons 

with a basic load of ammunition were issued by the Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, Headquarters Commandant. Compound defense weapons and ammunition were obtained from the 

Vietnamese Army Administrative and Direct Support Logistics 

company in each province. In cases where weapons were not com· 

mon to the Vietnamese Army, such as the M 16 riAe and M60 

machine guns, the weapons and ammunition were drawn from 

U.s. Army Vietnam. Subsistence was also drawn from U.S. Army 

Vietnam. Field ration messes were established where there were 
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 231 

fifty or more men and a mess association was authorized where 

there were less than fifty men. 

However, the expansion of the adviser effort often required the 

deployment, on short notice, of numerous seven or eight man 

detachments at district level. These small detachments were in 

many cases located in isolated positions, miles from the nearest 

support facility, and had to re ly primarily on periodic air resupply. 

The fonualion and deployment o[ mobile advisory teams of four 

or five members also presented unique support problems. In the IV 

Corps Delta area, for example, where many of these teams were 

employed, small water craft were about the on ly satisfactory 

means of travel. Sampans and other small Viemamese vessels 

were too slow to escape sniper fire and too small to carry the 

five man teams with the supplies and equipmelll necessary to 

support their mission. A decision was made to acquire commer· 

cial type U.S. manufactured boats known as "Boston Whalers." 

Approximately 200 of them were obtained. They were purchased 

through the ENSURE program (discussed in Chapler III). Three· 

fourths of these boats were used by mobile advisory teams and 

through their use team mobility was greatly improved. 

Logistic Support of us. 5th SpeCial Forces Group 

The mission of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and 

its predecessor (U.S. Army Special Forces (Vietnam» was to 

advise and assist the Vietnamese government in the organization, 

training, equipping, and employment of the Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group Forces. 

The first Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp had been 

built near Ban Me Tlmot in 1961. At the beginning of 1964, 

there were 25 of these border camps, a figure which would 

double by the end of the year. This network of strategically 

located fortified camps, each with an airstrip. proved to be invaluable reconnaissance and fire support bases for Vietnamese forces 

fighting the enemy main forces in the border areas. 

Because of the sensiti ve nature of the 5th Special Forces 

Group missions and operations, many aspects of its logistic support 

were also sensitive. The distinguishing feature of the 5th Special 

Forces Group logistic support was the reliance upon a Quick 

Reacting Procurement System for certain special forces equipment. 

The Army Materiel Command exped itiously purchased and shipped 

commercial or other service materiel not available in the Army 

inventory but needed to support special warfare programs. The 

bulk of the 5th Special Forces Group everyday support, however, 
232 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

came fTom the U.S. Army Vietnam logistic system. Because of 

the limited organic maintenance capability of operating detachments and lhe volume of nonstandard items in the 5th Special 

Forces Crollp. maintenance of equipment was based on repair by 

replacement. Unserviceable items were evacuated. either in or out 

of country. to the appropriate level of a supporting maintenance 

activity. 

An S4 section of the 5th Special Force Group headquarters 

headed the internal logistic organization of the 5th Special Forces 

Group. Additionally, 5th Special Forces Crollp Logistical Support 

Centers (organic in-country support elements) provided operational logistic support to deployed Special Forces detachments and 

to the counterinsurgency program. The Logistic Support Center 

organization provided a cross section of logistic functions and 

capabilities with necessary interfaces enabling it to draw upon a 

broad range of non-organic support capabilities both from within 

and without Vietnam_ 

Logistic Support 0/ Republic 0/ Vietnam Armed Forces 

V_ S. Military Assistance to the Vietnamese Armed Forces commenced on 23 December 1950, while the French Indochina War 

was still in progress. With the end of that war and the departure 

of the French. the United States continued to supply the Aedgling 

Republic of Vietnam with military materiel and equipment. President Eisenhower's commitment for their support was put into 

effect through the establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory 

Group. 

In 1955 the mission of the Military Assistance Advisory Group 

was expanded to include organizing and training the South Vietnamese Armed Forces as well as providing them with equipment 

and other materiel. Then in 1961 President Kennedy approved 

requests for additional aid. Increased communist pressure continued to generate larger military requirements, and in February 

1962, the Military Assistance Command was created for the purpose of improving command. control, and the support of the 

adviser program. The advisers, of course, advised the South Viet· 

namese Armed Forces in organizing and training their personnel 

and assisted them in acquiring necessary equipment. 

The South Vietnamese Armed Forces increased in manpower 

from approx.imately 435,000 in 1964 to 623,000 by the end of 

1966 and to over 1,000.000 by the end of 1970. The logistic 

adviser effort increased as lhe South Vietnamese Armed Forces 

personnel strength increased. On 20 July 1965, V.S. Army Vietnam 
OTHER LOG ISTIC SUPPORT 233 

was established to provide a control element for the U.S. Army 

Forces in Vietnam. On I September 1965, the logistic adviser functions and support of the field advisory program were transferred to 

U.S. Army Vietnam, with the exception of the staff advisory functions of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, staff. Effective 

15 March 1968, the operational control of the logistic advisory effort 

for the South Vietnamese Army was transferred from U.S. Army 

Vietnam back to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. With in 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Assistant Chief of 

Staff for Logistics, J4, served as the principal advisor to Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, on all matlers relating to the logistic systems wh ich supported the counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam and provided advice to 

the South Vietnamese Armed Forces on logistics, including materie l 

systems development, organization, plans, policies, and opera tions. 

The Director of the Logistics Advisory Directorate U-46) was 

the principal adviser to the Assistant Chief of Staff, ]-4, on all 

matters relating to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces logistics 

system and advised and assisted logistics elements of the South 

Vietnamese Armed Forces in providing effective, responsive. and 

economical logistic support. To accomplish this mission, the J-46 

directed the logistic advisory organi zaLioll shown in Cha rt 17. In 

addition to the advisory effort provided by the l.ogistics Advisory 

Directorate, the advisors listed be low also assisted the South Viet· 

namese Army in logistics at various levels: 

Corps G-4 Advisor, 

Division G-4 Adl·isor, 

I>il·j,ion Logistical Support naua1ion A(h'isol'S 

Sector S-I and s--t Ad \ ;.01', 

Sector AdminiSUali'·e &: Direct Support 

Logistic Advisors 

Medical Ad,·isors 

Ilupo ... ,bl_ 0 .... ";,,,,10" o ....... ,,')' 

Corps Senior A1h-isor 

Division Senior ,\(I\·isor 

Oil·islon Senior ,\dvisor 

PrOI·ince(Sec:tor) Senior Advisor 

Prol-intt(Sec:tor) Senior Advisor 

MACV Command Surgeon 

Improvisations were often required in order to accomplish 

the advisory effon in a timely fashion, within the available resources. 

The following are two examples of improvisation in organiza tional 

conceptS that were employed: 

I. Due to Ihe need for a sizeable increase in adviser strength 

and since considerable delay was expected in acquiring fill from 

Continental U.S. sources, an experimental concept usi ng Mobil e 

Advisory Teams was ttied in IV Corps in October 1967. Ni netccn 

teams, consisting of five U. S. personnel, and one Vietnamese 
234 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

CHART 17-LocISTICS ADVISORY DIRECTORATF, 

I Director J46 

Administration 11 

Office J461 

I Policy & Operations Organization & Materiel Deputy Chief of Staff Division J462 Division )464 lor Logistics CenlralloglstiC5 Command 

Advance Division J463 

I Operations II Plans & II Organization Materiel I Branch Policy & Authority Branch Branch Branch 

TKhnlcal Service Advisory Divisions 

I Enllineer II Ordnance I II ; Quartermaster y II and Commissary Signal II Transportation 

Area logistics Command Advisol)' Turns 

I I ALe I I 2ALC I I 3 Ale I I 4AlC I I I 

interpreter, were deployed. One team was assigned to each province and one to each South Vietnamese Army division. 

2. Based on results experienced by the Mobile Advisory Teams, 

Mobile Advisory Logistic Teams were designed. They were structured along much the same lines as the Mobile Advisory Teams. 

The teams were allocated one to each Area Logistical Command; 

except in the III and IV Corps, where, due to higher troop density, one additional team was allocated. The Mobile Advisory 

Logistic Teams mission was to provide on-the-spot administrative, 

supply and logistic training and assistance to depots, administrative and direct support logistic companies, and Regional and 

Popular Force units. 

The U. S. advisory elements, though predominantly U. S. 

Anny, included members from the other Services. These elements 

received common support from the component commander in 

whose area they were located. 

All logistic advisers were carefully selected to assu re that each 

one was fully qualified. The outstanding accomplishments of the 

advisers is evidence that this selectivity has paid off. Logistic 

advisers made a major contribution to bringing the South Viet-
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 235 

namese Armed Forces to the level where Vietnami1.3tion could begin. 

Until 24 March 1966, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces 

was generally equipped with U. S. equipment and mau~riel 

through the Military Assistance Program (Gram Aid). At that 

time the funding system was changed to a Military Assistance 

Service Funded program. Military Assistance Program type req· 

uisitioning and programming techniques, however, continued to 

be employed. For secondary items and cOllSumables, the South 

Vietnamese Armed Forces submilted requisitions through Military Assistance Command, Vielllam, to the U.S. Army Materiel 

Command International Logistical Center at New Cumberland, 

Pennsylvania for Continental U.S. items, or to the U. S. Army 

Depot, Japan for off·s!lore procurement, and Mili tary Assistance 

Program peculiar items. (Chart 18) There was an exception for 

medical items. Requisitions were placed on the Medical Depot 

in Okinawa for these items. Major items were "pushed" in 

accordance wi th delivery schedules furnished by Military Assis· 

tance Command, Vietnam. Ammunition was controlled by Com· 

mander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific. This supply system remained 

in effect until 1970. After this time, South Vietnamese Armed 

Forces Base Depots forwarded requisitions for secondary items 

and consumables to the 2d Logistical Command in Okinawa. If 

the 2d Logistical Command was unable to fill the requisitions 

from their on· hand assets, they forwarded the requisitions to 

the appropriate Continental U.S. supply source. 

An additional source of equipment became available to the 

South Vietnamese Armed Forces when the phase down of U. S. 

Forces began in 1969. At this time U.S. Army Vietnam began 

publishing listings of items of equipment that became surplus to 

its needs and that it could therefore make available to the South 

Vietnamese Armed Forces. After this, if South Vietnamese Armed 

Forces base depots received requisitions for items that they did not 

have on hand, they would check the U.S. Army Vietnam surplus 

listings. If the item was available from this source, they would 

request the item from U.S. Army Vietnam instead of the 2d Logistical Command in Okinawa. The system was later alilomated, 

and by 30 June 1971 more than $70 million in U.S. Army 

Vietnam excess consumabJes and more than $50 million in major 

items had been transferred. 

A constant effort \\'as made to upgrade weapons and equipment used by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. The matter of 

weapons was particularly critical, because the enemy had begun 
236 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

introducing modern communist-bloc weapons, including the highly 

effective AK47 automatic rifle as early as 1964. By 1967, all 

enemy units were equipped with this weapon, l\'hich had a much 

higher rate of fire than any of the U.S. World ''''aT II weapons 

with which South Vietnamese troops were armed, 

The 1\116 automatic rifles, long souglll (or issue to the South 

Vielnamese forces, began to arrive in April 1967, but in quantities 

that would equip only the airborne and Marine baltalions o[ 

the General Reserve. After strong recommendations on the part 

of General Westmoreland, an accelerated schedule of MIG shipments was approved in the fall of 1967, and by mid-196B all 

regular infantT)' maneuver battalions had received the new weapon. 

The United Stales Military Assistance Command established 

a Distribution and Allocations Committee in the fall of 1968. The 

committee was established to allocate, and control the distribution of critical materiel that was either in South Vietnam or due 

in COUlllry in an effort to accelerate the approved South Vietnamese 

Armed Forces improvement and modernization programs. The 

committee reviewed the mission requirements and asset positions 

of the United States Forces, South Vietnamese Armed Forces and 

Free \-\'orld Military Assistance Forces and recommended allocation and distribution actions in support of the military effort in 

SOllth Vietnam. Items considered by the committee were in actual 

or potential short supply. It included items managed under the 

Closed Loop Program, U.S. i\larine Corp Rebuild and Evacuation 

Prognun , and the U.S. Air Force Repairable Asset Management 

System. A data base was established for each item to include 

amount on hand, depot assets, and maintenance AoaL 

The continued improvement in the South Vietnamese Armed 

Forces modernization program led to the termination of the com· 

millee in June 1970, at the request of Commander in Chief 

Pac ific. 

In 1967 i\ lilitary Assistal1ce Command, Vietnam, and the Vietnamese J oint General Staff took action to expand the Somh 

Vietnamese Armed Forces commissary system in order to improve 

the diet of Vietnamese servicemen and their dependents while 

reducing the prices they had to pay for subsistence items. The 

U.S. contributed a one-lime grant of $42 million for food items, 

which when sold provided self.regenerating funds from which 

stocks could be replenished. Sales of the new items began in 

September 1967. By the end of the year, revenues exceeded a 

million dollars, covering the cost of overhead, construction equip. 

ment, and further expansion. By the end of June 1968, 201 
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 237 

retail outlets were in operation serving troops and dependents 

throughout Vietnam. 

During June 1969, Presidents Nixon and Thieu met at Midway 

Island. They discussed, among other subjects, increased logistical 

support to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Subsequently 

the "MACV Morale Study" recommended Military Assistance Service Funded support of canned meats and shortening for l.l million 

South Vietnamese servicemen during a two year period at an 

estimated cost of $42.7 million. A plan was prepared incorporating 

these recommendations. The U.S. Agency for International Development representative reviewed the plan in March 1970 and recom· 

mended that the plan be lengthened to a three year period with 

no increase in j\'liIitary Assistance Service Funded support. This 

latter plan proposed 100 percent or the necessary Military Assistance Service Funded subsistence supplement SUppOTt be furnished 

during the first year, 70 percent the second year and 30 percent 

during the final year. The plan envisioned a projected three year 

expansion of South Vietnam's farm and garden program and can· 

ning industry coupled with a rising economy permitting the government of Vietnam to attain self·sufficiency in furnishing adequate 

subsistence to its armed forces. In April 1970, General Abrams, 

Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam approved 

the plan for submission to the Department of Defense. 

The Secretary of Defense approved the plan with certain stipulations including: a fund limitation of $42.7 million, that Department of the Army not release funds until Commander U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, approved a distribution 

plan, and that Commander U.S. Mililar)' Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, review and concur in a South Vietnamese Armed Forces 

distribution plan prior to submission of requisitions. The distribu· 

tion plan was approved by Ceneral Abrams on 8 September 1970. 

It required both units and depots to stock subsistence supple· 

ments. Each troop unit and organization would draw an initial 

issue based on the payroll strength plus a safety level. The safety 

level was 10 percent for hospitals. tra in ing centers, and military 

schools and 3 percent for all other units. The depots were authorized 

to stock the ration supplements with a fony·five day operating 

and fifteen day sa fety level. The r<ltioll supplement included canned 

fish (mackerel, salmon, luna, sardines), meats (beef chunks, beef 

and gravy. luncheon meat , ham chunks, port sausage). poultry 

(chicken, turkey) and shortening. The items were i'isucd to 

authorized personnel at fixed rates per individual. 

The South Vietnamese Armed Forces logistic orF;:mizalioll 
258 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

(Chart 18) had a system that worked moderately well, but required 

improvements throughout the entire spectrum before attaining 

complete logistic self·sufficiency. Changes in the conduct of the 

war increased South Vietnamese Armed Forces logistic SUppOTt 

requirements at an accelerated rate. The Vietnamization program 

intensified the efforts of improving and modernizing the South 

Vietnamese Armed Forces logistics system toward self·sufficiency. 

Major factors which affected the South Vietnamese Armed Forces 

logistic capabilities were as follows: 

1. Rapid increases in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces 

combat force structure required commensurate increases in the 

logistics support base. 

2. The introduction of modern soph isticated weapons and 

support equipment in significant densities into the South Vietnam 

Armed Forces inventory enlarged the scope and complexity of the 

logistics support requirements. Large inventories of aircraft, helicopters, boats, vehicles. weapons, and communica tion assets required extensive supply storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition systems to support them. Basic to those 

systems were the requiremenu for technically-trained military and 

civilian personnel and modern depot facilities. Although additional 

logistic personnel were subsequently authorized, eEforu to fill 

authorizations with trained qualified personnel were slow to 

achieve desired resulu. Competition for civilian labor between 

U.S. Forces, civilian firms, and the South Vietnamese Armed 

Forces left the latter short of technically trained and skilled 

civilians. Depot repair capabilities and physical facilities also 

were inadequate to support requirements generated by the Improvement and Modernization Program. The rapid expansion of 

territorial forces placed a tremendous burden on the Administrative and Direct Support Logistical companies. 

To accelerate the development of South Vietnamese Armed 

Forces logistics self·sufficiency, a Logistics Master Plan concept was 

prepared which combined several individual logistic plans, pro· 

grams, projects, and studies, each designed to improve the South 

Vietnamese Armed Forces logistical system. The elemenlS of the 

Logistic Mastel;: Plan were as follows: 

1. The Combined Logistics OOert$ive Pia'i was basically a short 

range plan designed to foster a positive aggressive logistic oEfensive spirit in the conduct of logistic operations. The plan identified 

problems, designated agencies responsible for solving the problems, 

and established the completion date for each problem outlined 

in the plan. 
C HART 18--S 0I,;TH VIETNAMESE ARMEO FORCES ORGANIZATION FOR 

L OGISTICS 

I Ministry of Defense 

L Chlel Joint General Stan 

I Chlel of Stan 

I 

Deputy Chief of I 

St.n logistics 

Cent,,! logistics I 

Command 

., I ,,~ I lo, ' ... t.nt,.1 

, .... fo,~ ... Cotnm~n~ " ... , lo,lllIa Plocu"m.nt T,uljlllflaUon 

.. COm CoItl .. .... nd OIlIQ 

, .... II 1:0<", lo,lltla hll:--" ".. Win, I Command -. 

-1 Ski. ",. ~lrtics III Corps V •• lo.lltlcs SI\IIII •• eolllllllnd ~I", H Malnl'nlllQ "',. IV Co,,,, ••• l Supply to.lllla Ont~_ 

c .... '""-" H Suppl, 

. .... MedlColI 0.1111'11 lo,lll1a • Hoopltll Command 

I QUlrt,:mllllr 

yeommunlcallOllI 

(IKtroniti 

n,1d D,pols 

0100 Su~rt 

G'III .. 1 Support I 8.H o.PIIb 

Dlvil loni I ".r: ~" II .:~:,r.. II ""M II Medical 

C~. j 

I 

Lo.lttle I II.,lonll Suppl,. 81111i1011 Mllnl,"","\l8 Fore. l- I. 01«<1 SuPOOl'l P_III Fore. LOIIIIICI Coni ... 

·P,rtld .. CotnIllOR SKORd • .., U.m Supply SuPllOf1 101M AllYII. VilAf'. and YKK. 

" ProwI4 .. l",1111c SuPllOf1 Poe,tI., to AI'crllt . 

• · · "'rtld .. la,llIi< SuppOrt POCUtilf 10 1'1 . ... 1 V_I •. 
210 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

2. The Country Logi.stics Improvement Plan was a long range 

program which listed major objectives for improving the logistic 

operations of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. The plan 

was composed of spec ified projects. Each project identified Government of Vielnam and U.S. agenc ies responsible and assigned a 

compiClion date for each project. The Combined Logistic Offensive 

Plan and the COlllllry Logistic Improvement Plan were similar 

in (annat, the basic difference being that the former was a short 

range plan and the latter a long range plan. 

:J. The Brue Depot Upgrade Plan was intended to upgrade 

the South Vielllamese Armed Forces Engineer, Signal, and Ordnance rebuild depots by improving the depot structure through 

the improvemelll of facilities, mililies, technical skills and depot 

machine tools. 

4. Th e PlatlS for T Ur1IOVer of Facilities and Fllnctions Program 

was to provide for the orderly LTansfer of United States facilities 

and logistic functions to South Vietnamese Armed Forces, as 

U.S. elements withdrew. 

5. Budgeting and FlI1Il/ing COPlcept Improvement Program 

was to identify master plan programs which required special 

emphasis on funding requirements and designate responsible 

agencies to insure that programming budgeting, and funding 

aspects received appropriate allention. 

6. The Atlmil1islralivt: lmd Direct Support Logistical Com1JallY Study identifi ed problems and their causes, recommended 

solutions and designated action agencies responsible for corrective 

actions. The objective of this study was to improve logistic operations and support capabilities of the Administrative and Direct 

Support Logistical companies. 

7. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces Automated Materiel 

!I1tmageme'lt System outlined the objectives and general provisions {or an Automated I.ogistic System Development and the 

sequence of events for implementation and assigned responsibilities to applicable agencies. This program was designed to 

provide lhe SOllth Vietnamese Armed Forces with an automated 

capability to manage assets at the national level. 

8. The O'l·The-Job T raining Program "PROJECT BUDDY." 

In 1968, it was recognized that the time was rapidly approaching 

when, depending on the ability o[ the Vielllamese forces to take 

over the job of policing and defending their own nation , our 

U.s. strength in Vietnam would be withdrawn. 

III January 1969, the 1st Logislical Command piloted a program called Project BUDDY with the approval of Headquarters 
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 241 

u.s. Army Vietnam and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

Project BUDDY was designed 10 leach Ihe SoUlh Vietnamese 

Army to assume responsibilities in the logistics area by providing 

on-the-job training in logistics skills and management. While such 

trai ning had been going on for years, there was no previous 

requirement for a formal on.the·job trai ning program. 

On 13 October 1969, a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

directive was published for on· the-job training which was applicable to all of its subordinate and component commands. It 

established a combined effort by Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam and the SOUlh Vietnamese Armed Forces to identify 

skills in need of improvement and to provide South Vietnamese 

Armed Forces personnel with on-the-job training in these skills. 

On-the-job training consisted of numerous programs, varying in 

length from a few days to six months, and in scope from an upgrade of an individual's current skill to a qualification in a new 

Military Occupation Speciality. This training was conducted for 

both South Vietnamese Armed Forces officers and enlisted personnel. 

Operation BUDDY was a good program but after October 1969 

was not used to its full advantage. The middle management 

people at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam were more concerned with the prerogatives or the ir advisers and not enough with 

training the SOllth Vietnamese Armed Forces. As a result, only 

9,300 had been trained under this program by the end of fiscal year 

1970. 

9. South Vietnamese Army Ammunition Improvement Pian. 

This plan provided for the improvements necessary to give the 

South Vietnamese Armed Forces a capability to completely support 

their current and anticipa ted ammunition storage, inventory 

management, surveillance and maintenance requirements. 

Logistic Support of South Vietnamese Pacification Program 

Pacification is the process of establishing or reestablishing 

effective local self-government within the political framework of 

the legitimate central government and its constitution. It includes 

the provision of sustained and credible territorial security and the 

genuine, voluntary involvement of the people as well as the 

initiation of se lf·sustaining and expanding economic and social 

activity. Some obvious areas where milita ry forces can assist 

the pacification effon are the opening of roads and waterways 

and the maintaining or lines of communica tion, important to both 

economic and military activity. 
242 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

The objectives of pacification are not difficult to describe but 

the attainment or those objectives involves cullural and social forces 

not so easy to understand and certainly not easy to manage. 

Some of the means and organizations through which the U.S. 

logistic system assisted the pacification program of the Republic 

of Vietnam were as follows: 

Logistic support of the Vietnamese Regional and Popular 

Forces was included in the U.S. Military Assistance Service Funded 

program. Supplies were issued to these forces by Somh Vietnamese 

Army Sector Management and Direct Support Logistic Centers. 

The Peoples Self Defense Forces were provided certain designated items of su pply through the same channels as were the Regional and Popular Forces above. 

Logistic support of the Rural Development Cadre was gener. 

ally funded through the U.S. Agency for International Develop· 

ment system in accordance with the Agency for International 

Development and Department of Defense Realignment Program. 

Except for ammunition, petroleum, oils, and lubricants and main· 

tenance support which was provided by the South Vietnamese 

Army, support was generally provided through provincial ware· 

houses operated by the Agency for International Development. 

However, at times U.S. Army Vietnam provided requested support 

on a reimbursable basis. 

Supply support and funding (or the Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group was provided through the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group 

Counterinsurgency Support Office. The 5th Special Forces Croup 

placed the necessary requisitions on the U.S. Army Vietnam depots. 

The Civilian Irregular Defense Croup has since been phased Ollt 

and its activities absorbed by the South Vietnamese Army Re· 

gional and Popular Forces organization with support being provided 

through the South Vietnamese Army supply system. 

Support of refugees has been provided by the Government 

of Vietnam, U.S. and other voluntary agencies. U.S. Agency for 

International Development was the basic administrator of this 

program for the U.S.; however, U.S. troop support was provided 

on an as required basis, and included building temporary shelters, 

latrines and other utility items. Support normally provided under 

the U.S. and Government of Vietnam programs included an immediate rice allowance for 7 days of 500 grams per day per 

person and 3 cans of condensed milk per family. The rice al· 

lowance could be extended for up to 30 days. Resettlement or 

return to village assistance was provided next, and included a rice 

allowance of 15 kilograms per person per month. A housing 
OTHER. LOGISTIC SUPPORT 243 

construction allowance of 7,500 Vietnamese dollars and ten sheets 

of metal roofing was a150 provided after the enemy's Tet and 

May offensives of 196 ~. 1.0gelher these offensives left 13,000 

ci.vilians dead and 27,000 wounded, created over one million refugees and destroyed or damaged over 170,000 houses. 

On 2 February 1968, at the height of the Tet crisis, President 

Thieu announced the [ormation of a Central Recovery Committee to direct and coordinate the activities of all government 

agencies both civilian and military, in expediting civil recovery. 

This force received full and immediate support from all U.S. 

agencies, civil and military. The resulting project was known as 

Project Recovery. 

Fortunately when the enemy struck. again in May 1968, the 

Central Recovery Committee was still organized and agai n served 

as the catalyst for Government of Vietnam and U.S. action. By 

mid-May Project Recovery could point to a record of considerable 

achievement. The Celllral Recovery Committee provided care for 

a peak number of 750,831 evacuees that had been made homeless 

as a result of the Tet Offensive. By mid-May, only 286,000 

Tet refugees remained and 140,000 of these had been created 

after 5 May 1968. Over 33,000 metric tons of food, 66,000 LOns of 

construction materials, and 5,000 tons of miscellaneous c1Olhing, 

blankets, and other items were released Cram Saigon and regional 

warehouses. Relief and resettlement allowances amounting to 

over 483 million Vietnamese dollars were paid to nearly 60,000 

families. Almost 580,000 bags of cement and 634,000 sheets of 

roofing were distributed to approximately 64,000 families. 

Another support program was introducing relugees to techniques for improving yields of agricultural crops, particularly vegetables. Handicraft projects were also organized and small industries were developed. Food-for-work projects were also started, 

utilizing food made available under Public Law 480. Title II. 

The lines of communication program has directly benefited 

civilians and local economies by providing improved roads for 

transportation of people and goods. The total Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Lines of Communication improvement 

program called for the upgrade of 4,075 km of road. As of 15 

May 1971, over 60 percent of this work had been completed. More 

than 1,700 kill of the \l,1o rk was done by U. S. Army troop effort 

and the remainder by the U.S. Navy, South Vietnamese Army, or 

by contractor personnel. 

Another program that benefited the Vietnamese people was 

the assistance by U. S. agencies in restoring the Vietnamese Rail-
244 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

way System. This program had a dual goal objective. The fi rst was 

to provide transportation assets that would move great tonnages 

at low cost, and the second was to renew an economical means of 

travel for the Vietnamese people between theiT homes and the 

larger market areas. Overall planning for railway restoration began 

in June 1966. It was a joint effort by the Government of Vietnam 

and U. S. agencies. All reconstruction efforts were co-ordi nated 

through three standing committees, composed of members of 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Government of Vietnam, 

U.s. Agency for International Development, and the Joint General 

Staff, with primary responsi bility resting with the J oint Committee 

on Rail Restoration. 

The rail system suffered extensive damage during World 'Var 

II and the French Indochina War: but, with U.S. Agency for 

International Development assistance, it was rebuilt between 1954 

and 1959. Then in 1960, the system came under attack agai n when 

the Vi et Cong began a concerted and continuing campa ign towards 

its destructic'O. 

Evidence of the accomplishments of the restoration progTam 

is witnessed by the fa ct that the system entered 1968 with onl y 

475 km of operational railroad, but early in 1970 the system consisted of 1,109.3 km of meter gauge main line from Saigon to 

Dong Ha in I Corps and approximately 130 km of branch line 

trackage. 

A Medical Civic Action Program was conducted by Military 

Assistance Command. Vietnam, through the use of U.S. Forces 

and directed toward improving the local health environment, to 

include tTeatment and education of civilians in basic sanitation 

methods and other preventive hea lth measures. This program was 

funded through US Mil itary Service channels, with subsequent 

charge made to the Agency for International Development and 

Department of Defense realignment program based on a fl at charge 

per treatment rendered. 

A Military Provincial H ospital Assistance Program was crea ted 

to furnish expendable medical supplies in su pport of the Ministry 

of Health hospitals and health service faciliti es. Medical care 

under this program included care to the population in general, 

paramilitary personnel. and civilian war casualties. The U.S. Army 

provided personnel as augmentation teams to assist the Government 

of Vietnam Ministry of Health in various hos pital facilities. In 

addition, the U.S. Army provided half of the funding support for 

this program. 

Requisitions to obtain supply support of this program were 
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 245 

forwarded to the U.S. Army Medical Depot in Okinawa. Supplies 

were shipped to the Ministry of Hea lth Medical l.ogistic Center, 

Phy Tho, Saigon, and issued through the Ministry of Health 

logistics system. 

The Government of Vietnam Na tiona l Police Field Forces were 

provided suppl ies and equipment through U.S. Army channels. 

Army fUl1d~ were utilized and requisitions were submitted through 

U.S. Army channels by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

Civil Operations Revolutionary De\elopmelll Command, Viet· 

nam. 

Commodity support was provided to upgrade in·country port 

and waterway facilities. The program was funded by U.S. Agency 

for International Development with subsequent reimbursement 

from Army funds. Supplies were basically obtained through Agency 

for International Development channels with the U.S. Army provid. 

ing technical assistance as well as suppl ies on an as required and 

as available basis. 

Logistic Support 0/ Other Free World Military 

Assistance Forces 

Upon the introduction of Free World combat forces into Vietnam in 1965, the U.S. assumed the preponderance of logistic 

su pport for the Free World i\ lilita ry Assistance Force units. These 

units came from the Republic: of Korea, Thail and, Republic of 

the Philippines, Australia, and Neh' Zealand. 

'Vith the exception of Australian and New Zealand forces. the 

other Free World Military Assistance Forces had been Military 

Assistance Program supported. Thus, many items of their equip. 

ment had to be replaced by items normally issued to U.S. Forces 

to make them supportable by lhe U.S. logistic system. 

The role of these units upon deployment to Vietnam was 

generally not determined until the eve of deployment, thus delaying until the last moment a determination of their specific 

equipment requirements. Of particular sign ificance in alleviating 

equipment and suppl y shortages earlier than would have been 

otherwise possible was the conversion of Free , Vorld Military Assistance Force support from Military Assistance Program to Military Assistance Service Funded Program. In this connection Military Assistance Service Funded has application only to local forces 

in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailrllld and third country forces in Viet· 

nam. It should be noted. however. that til e funding for the Slip' 

port of Australian and New Zealand forces has heen accomplished 

by financial agreement im'olving no appreciable cost to the U.S. 
246 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Generally Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff approved the Free World Military Assistance Forces 

force structures to be supported by the United States. Military 

Assistance Command, Vielnam approved the Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowances 

in co-ordination with the Allied governments concerned. U.S. Army 

Regulation 795- 10, "U.S. Army Materiel and Service Support for 

RVNAF / FWMAF," governs the funding and requisition procedures for the Free World Military Assistance Force. Major item 

losses suffered by U.S. and Free World forces were reported to 

U.S. Army Major Item Data Agency through the AR 711-5 Army 

Equipment Status Reporting System. This agency then developed 

loss factors for replacemenl planning for the preparation of Army 

Materiel Plans and for use by the staff planners in developing 

and executing the Procuremenl of Equipment and Missiles Army 

portion of the Army budget. 

General supplies (Classes II, IV, VII and IX except missile 

peculiar items), ammunition, petroleum, medical supplies, memorial services (moTtuary, cremation, etc), laundry and bath services, procurement services, and terminal and water transportation services were normally pro"ided to Free World Military 

Assistance Forces through U.S. Army Vietnam or U.S. Navy logistic system in the same manner as the supplies and services were 

provided to U.S. Forces. Two areas where exceptions existed were 

maintenance and subsistence. The U.S. system provided limited 

maintenance SUppOH to the Free World Military Assistance Forces. 

This support was furnished for selected items only and was to 

provide a back-up support to the allied maintenance system. 

Aviation maimenance support was provided to Australian, Thai, 

and Korean Forces. Reports were furnished to U.S. Army Pacific 

on aviation maintenance .Jor 1'unding and data collection purposes. 

The Directorate of Food, Headq uarters, 1st Logistica l Command, monitored the [our U.S. Army Support Commands who 

requisitioned, received, accoumed for, issued, and supervised the 

Class I SUppOH for all Free World Military Assistance Forces in 

South "-ietnam. The Directorate of Food was responsible for 

funding and monitoring local procurement and contract services 

support of dairy products, bread, fresh fruits and vegetables, and 

ice. 

Initially, the U.S. government agreed to provide subsistence 

support to the Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam but did nol 

specify a "Kimchi Ration." T he Republic of Korea forces in 
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 247 

Vietnam received either the MCI or the A ration. The agreement was amended in 1967 to provide one meal of the Korean 

Combat Ration daily. This special ration was developed in Vietnam, with assistance from a U.S. country team and the U.S. Army 

Natick Laboratories. The majority of the items in the ration (including the Kimchi) were indigenous to Korea. Thus the Republic 

of Korea Forces in Vi elllam were provided one meal of the A 

ration, one meal of the MCI and one meal of the Korean Combat 

Ration. Australian and New Zealand forces were furnished the 

standard A ration supplemented with marmalade and local purchase items. The Philippine forces were furnished the standard A 

ration with additional rice in lieu of some of the potatoes. The 

Thailand forces here furnished components of the standard A 

ration supplemented by loral purchase. They were also supplied 

with coconuts, morning grass, lemoll grass and ginger rool. (The 

South Vietnamese Armed Forces were provided with components 

of the A ration supplemented with indigenous items. They were 

also provided the ~ICI and the Long Range l)atTOI Packet). 

The 32d ~redical Depot was responsible for the medical 

supply support of the Free World i\Witary Assistance Forces. 

The U.S. Army provided lim ited mairHenance support to the 

Free World Military Assistance Forces except in I Corps, where 

the U.S. Navy provided the service until mid.1970, when the 

Army also assumed the responsibility for that area. ThiS support 

was furnished for selected items to provide back-up support La 

the allied maintenance s)'stem. 

Agreements were made to provide aviation maintenance sup· 

POrt to Australia n, Thai. and Korean forces operating in Vi etnam. 

Th is worked smoothly with reports furnished to U.S. Army Pacific 

for funding and data collccti on purposes. Standardized and simpl ified reponing reduced con fusion and adminislralive workload 

in the field . Support of the Free World ~Iilitary Assistance Forces 

was excellent. 

A mission of the U.S. Army memorial activities in the Republic of Vietnam was to receive, process, identify and evacuate 

the remains of deceased Free World i\ lilitary Assistance Forces. 

As part of the 1st Logistical Command's mission of providing 

this monuary service cremation fa cilities were established for Lhe 

Republic of Korea Forces. Initially. cremation services were pro. 

vided by contract with T obia Mortuar), of Saigon. Two crematory unilS of the type used in civili an funeral homes in Continental 

U.S. were procured and became operational in JUlie 1967. Remains 

of other Free ,"Vorlc! Military Assistance Forces forces were proc· 
248 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

essed through the mortuaries in the same manner as U.S. person nel and then evacuated to their cou ntries. 

The U.S. Army provided laundry and bath service support 

to Free World Military Assistance Forces in II , III , and IV Corps 

from the time of their arrival; service to I Corps began in 1970. 

Laundry service was supplememed by contract laundries where 

requ irements exceeded organ ic Army capability. 

The mission of the terminal and water transponation system 

was to operate deep and sha llow draft pons. and logistics over 

the shore sites in South Vietnam and to pro,ridc intra-coastal 

and inland waterway lighterage services. The mission also included 

receiving. documenting, loading. discharging, and transhipping 

Free World Military Assistance Force and Agency for International 

Development cargo as it moved through the water terminals. 

The U.S. Army Procurement Activity also provided procure· 

ment support to the combat support elements of the Free \\'orld 

Military Assistance Forces along with i\lilitary A~sistan ce Com· 

mand, Vietnam; U.S. Arm) Vietn:un; and elements of the other 

U.S. military services. 

Free \Vorld ~rilitary Assistance Forces \\"ere trained primarih 

by sending small numbers or selected personnel to schools in the 

Continental U.S. and by aliI' military assistance ad\'ison per:;OIl· 

nel in their own countries. In South Vielll<llll . the Free \\'orld 

i\·filitary Assistance Forces received informal training as required. 

U.S. units providing combat servicc support to these fon.es instructed their key personnel on the lise of U.S. materiel and 

systems, and in turn recei\'ed orielllalion 011 the supported Free 

\Vorld l\lilitary Assistance Forces procedures_ Thi~ oTle was reo 

peated as necessary when new replacements arrived in either unit. 
OTHER LOGISTIC SUPPORT 249 

VIETNAMESE REBUII.DING I·l oME WITH L UMBER DONATED T~IROUGH 

TARP PROGRAM IN BIEN HOA, ABOVE; DAM BUILT TO I MPROVE 

IRRICATION SYSTEM IN TilE VILLAGE RICI:: FI ELDS I N 

TIIUY PH U, VIETNAM, BELOW. 
250 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

MALT TEAM HEAD CONFERS WITH AMERICAN ADVISOR AND 

LOCAL S-4 OF A VIE1"NAMF...sJ:: SUPPLY MAINTENANCE 

DISTRICT SUPPORT LOGISTICAL CoMPANY. 
CHAPTER X 

Worldwide Impact of Vietnam 

on Logistics Readiness 

Impact on Active Army 

The diversion of new production assets and withdrawal of 

equipment from the major Army commands in 1965- 1966. to 

support high priority requirements in Southeast Asia, had a predictably adverse impact on the worldwide logistics readiness posture of the Army. For example, by June 1966, only 35 percent 

of Continental Army Command's active Army units were meeting 

logistics goals in equipment on hand and 25 percent were meeting 

equipment status goals. A similar posture existed in other commands. U.S Army Pacific (less U.S. Army Vietnam) had only 

40 percent of the Active Army units meeting equipment on hand 

goals and 18 percent meeting equipment status goals. At the 

same lime, U. S. Army South reported only 46 percent equipment on hand and 50 percent equipment status; U. S. Army 

Alaska reported 64 percent equipment on hand and 50 percent 

equipment atus; and U. S. Army Europe reported 66 percent 

for equipment on hand and 50 percent equ ipment status. Similarly 

the majority of our major combat units outSide of Vietnam were 

C-S, marginally ready; or C-4, not ready. For example, both the 

2d and 7th Infantry Divisions in Korea were C-4. 

Because of the ever-growing demands of combat, worldwide 

logistics readiness was not able to show substantial improvement 

during the next two years. In the latter part of 1968, the Army 

initiated an intensive management program, designed to over· 

come reported shortfalls. Procedures were established to inten· 

sively manage mission essential items required at unit level, work· 

ing through each major command headquarters. These procedures 

provided pinpoint management of resourceS, refinement of unit 

authorizations and redistribution of assets. Readiness Improvement 

Programs, developed in conjunction with each command involved. 

are now a major element of the Logistics Offensive. In 1969 the 

intensive management procedures began to take effect as reductions in high priority requirements by the forces in Vietnam 

allowed the application of available assets to other commands. 
252 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

The Army's logistic readiness posture has reflected almost continuous improvemclll worldwide since that time. During September 

1970, the Army reached its highest levels in equipment on hand 

and equipment deployability since the drawdown for Southeast 

Asia began. During this period, o,'er 90 percent of all reporting 

units met or exceeded logisti c goals for equipment on hand, and 

69 percelH faT equipmclll deployability. These levels were maintained throughout the remainder of fiscal year 1971 with only 

temporary AuctuaLions. 

Impact on War Reserve Stocks, Operational Projects Stocks, 

arid POM.CUS Stocks 

In addition to redistributing assets from units not in the 

combat zone, it was necessary to draw upon Pre-Positioned War 

Reserves, Operational Project Stocks, and POMCUS Stocks (Prepositioned Materiel configured to Unit Sets) in order to meet the 

unprogrammed requiremen ts in Vietnam. War reserve stocks in 

the Pacific were used to support early deployments to Vietnam. 

Later there was a considerable drawdown worldwide to meet 

increased requirements for Southeast Asia. 

In Fe_bruary 1966, to further increase assets available for use 

in Vietnam, Department of the Army instructed all major com· 

mands to make a special review (in addition to the regular annual 

review) of all their operational projects. Any materiel not absolutely essential would he made available to meet requirements 

in Vietnam. Equipment which had been con figu red in unit sets 

in the Western Pacific area was also included in this drawdown. 

Full recovery from the drawdowns of these Pre-positioned 

War Reserves, POMCUS, and Operational Projects Stocks had 

not been ach ieved by m id-1971. 

In March 1970, a study labeled PROJECT STRAT REQUIREMENT was initiated by the Duputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics, to validate and recommend for revision, as necessary, 

methods and principles used in the determination of theater 

war reserve and automatic supply requirements. The purpose was 

to veri£y the accurac.y of requirements determination, so that 

both prepositioned materiel overseas and post D-day automatic 

supply are responsive and effective in meeting the needs of combat 

forces in wartime. The study was completed in September 1970 

with recommendations which, wilen full y implemented, will improve the range and quantit y of items included in theater war 

reserves and automatic supply planning. Simultaneously with 

PROJECT STRAT REQUIREMENT, a special review of world-
WORLDWIDE LOGISTIC IMPACT OF VIETNAM 253 

wide operational projects \\'as conducted. The main objective of 

this n:view was to revalidate command operational project requirements, eliminating stocks which were not truly mission essemial. This review resulted in a reduction in requirements of 

$272,774,000. The study was approved by the Army Chief of Staff 

on I February 1971 and action has begun on the implementation 

of its recommendations. 

Impact 011 Reserve Components 

The Reserve Components suffered a major setback concerning 

receipt o( modern equipment during the Army's buildup for the 

conduct of large scal e operations in Vietnam. During the period 

fiscal years 1965- 1968, the delivery of equipment to the Reserve 

Components was in token qualllities because the limited supply 

was required to fill higher priority requirements. Deliveries during 

this (our year period amounted to approximately $460 million. 

In addition to the inadequate equ ipment deliveries, the Reserve 

units were tapped as a source of equipment to be withdrawn and 

redistributed to active Army claimants. These withdrawals 

amounted to approximately $209 million. Major items withdrawn 

from the Reserve Components to fill urgent Vietnam req~lirements 

included over 200 aircraft, 460 40·mm guns, 50 M88 Recovery 

Vehicles, and approximately 650 3J4-Ton Vehicles. Since fiscal 

year 1966, Office of the Secretary of Defense has monitored and 

maintained approval authority of all equipment withdrawals from 

the Reserve Components to meet active Army requirements. 

Chart 19 portrays the general impact that the Vietnam build· 

up had upon the Reserve Components. It displays by fiscal year 

the various inventory changes in billions of dollars. These changes 

reAect the value of equipment issued minus the value of obsolete 

equipment LUrned in. It is significant to note that during fiscal 

year 1964 the Reserve Component inventory was approximately 

$2. 18 billion and because of the requirements generated by com· 

millnents in Southeast Asia, the inventory did not show improve· 

ment over the fisca l year 1964 level until mid fiscal year 1969. 

The phasedown of U.S. operations in Southeast Asia permitted 

an accelerated deli very of equipment to (he Reserve Components. 

Beginning in fiscal year 1969, equipment deliveries to lhe Reserve 

Components increased at a noticeable rate. Deliveri es were valued 

at approximately $150 million in fiscal year 1969 and at $300 

million in fiscal year 1970. As of the end of the 3d Quarter of 

fiscal year 1971, equipmelll valued at approximately $590 mi llion 

had been allocated for delivery against an estimated allocation 
254 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

CHART 19- RESERVE COl'>II'ONENT EQUIPMENT INVENTORY CHANGES 

$ Billions .. 0-----------------

3.0'------------------ " ,~''--

" 

2.0=""-0iiiii0== ... __ --~~' ---

1.0-------------- ---

0 1 I 

Years 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 

(- 36) (- 140) (+35) (+29) (+40) (+205) (+500) (+588) 

of $600 million for tht: entire fiscal year. These deliveries havf 

improved the equipment readiness of the Reserve Component 

units, but there still rema ins much to be done considering that 

the units have on hand about 61 percent of the equipment 

required for the conduct of effective premobiiizalion training. 

Principal deliveries during fiscal year 1970 included a signifi cant 

number of new tactical vehicles and radios, sufficient M14 and 

M J 6 rifll!$ to permit the complete modernization of the Reserv( 

Componclll rifle inventory, preferred aircraft including the CH- 54 

and VH- ID, and the first M60 tanks. 

To further improve the equipment situation of the Reserve 

Componen ts. Department of the Army in fiscal year 1971 devel· 

oped a maintenance program which permits lhe Office of Reserve 

Components to select criticall y required items ror overhaul and 

subsequent issue to the Reserve Component units. It is anticipated 

that during the fiscal years 1971- 1974 equipment valued at $1 

billion will be provided under th is program. This will be in 

addition to new items issued under normal distribution programs. 
CHAPTER XI 

Lessons Learned 

Although no one can predict the future, the likelihood of 

being involved in another limited war seems to be high. Since 

the advent of the nuclear age, limited wars and insurgency operations have been both frequent and common. Since World War II, 

the U. S. Army has gone through the Korean War, the Lebanon 

landing. the operation in the Dominican Republic. and was 

involved in Vietnam for a decade, being there in strength since 

1965. A number of lessons have emerged from the Vietnam years 

that can be applied in similar future campaigns. These can be 

grouped under three broad headings: Personnel, Equipment, 

and Policies and Procedures. 

PerSQ11t1ci Lessons Learned 

1. A twelve month tout is too short if a logistic system is to 

operate at near peak efficiency. When casualties (combat and 

non-combat) are considered, about 10 percent of the personnel 

change every month. On the other hand, if other benefits merit a 

fixed short combat tour policy, then in-theater personnel turbulence must be held to a minimum by strictly limiting the l1umber 

of assignment changes for each individual during his tour. 

2. The Continental U.S. training base is overly civil ianized. 

The small pool of trained and experienced military people in 

maintenance operations, ammunition operations, storage and warehousing operations, and supply management is incapable of providing the number of skilled personnel needed when a force 

buildup starts. Either depots and instali<llion logistics facilities 

should increase their military strengths or Continental U.S. 

civil ians in these facilities should be used to support an overseas 

buildup until the Continental Army Command school system can 

turn out the required number of trained military men and women. 

An additional benefit that would result from using more military 

in Continental U.S. logistical installations would be that there 

would be assignments in Continental U.S. where skill ed overseas 

returnees could employ their expertise. 

3. There is a need 10 improve driver training programs 

in Continental U.S. Poorly trained drivers add to maintenance 
256 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

workloads and cause the overseas commanders to divert personnel 

resources to establish driver training programs. Continental U.S. 

training should include operating in combat Lype conditions. 

4. Units of the Reserve Compone11ls called to active duty 

performed well. The decision La rely on draftees or regulars 

instead of calling up reserve units meanL that valuable logistics skills were not put to lise. The few National Guard and 

Reserve units that weTC used in the Da Nang area during the 

summer and fall of 1968 werc very good. Brigadier General 

James W. Gunn, Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Da Nang remarked that " ... these units proved to be 

olltstanding in every respect. They were composed of mature 

officers and men who ,Irrived in-country with 100 percent of their 

TOE strength and equipment. They were for the mOSt part we11 

educatcd and highly motivated and skilled ... " 

5. Replacement centers in combat zones should aSSlire that 

every individual has a set uf rcadable fingerprints in his 201 

file. The prompt and Cllrrent identification of the dead is a must. 

Equipmenl Lessons Leamed 

I. The use of Del.ong Piers in Vietnam showed that new 

porl\ can be created quickly or existing ones expanded in a 

relatively short time. As a cOl'llingency for any possible future 

conflict in undevcloped areas, these piers should be stockpiled in 

several geographic areas. 

2. Cross-country petroleum pipelines can be used in insurgency 

type operations. Their use reduces the !lumber of tfllcks required, 

thereby shortening convoy lengths. However, there is a price to 

pay in fuel losses as the cnemy is given an opponunity to easily 

interdict the supply system and local inhabitants can readily pii£er 

a valuable and useful mmmodity. Using pipelines in insecure or 

panially secure area\ means the acceptance of higher fuel losses 

in order to save other resources. Pipeline knowhow dis.1.ppears in 

pcace time_ 'Ve must h,lve pcople who can inspect the equipment 

in storage and determine what is needed to make it work. Pumps 

in storage for twenty ycars just won't work-even if they do they 

are probably not nearly as reliable or efficient as ones developed 

in the i11lerim. There is a need for better surveillancc and updating 

procedures. 

3. Logistic management has become increasingly dependent 

on automatic data proccssing and high·speed digital data trans· 

missions, both within the contingenc), area and between Continental 

U.s. and overseas locations. Therefore, logistic contingency plan. 
LESSONS LEARNED 257 

ning must be expl icit as to communications requirements and 

heavy transportable self-contained equipment must be developed 

to provide prompt availability ot high-quality circuits, automatic 

switches, and terminal equipmelll to tie into the aULOmalic digital nel\\Tork. 

4. Containerized sh ipments reduce port congestion and handling time and upon offioading the containers can be used as a 

substitute for covered storage facilities. There is a need for COIltainer ships to have self-s upporting gear for off loading in early 

combat and at both shallow draft locations and deep water pons_ 

Containerized shi pments should be used LO a maximum in the 

early stages of an operation and especially so in an underdeveloped area. 

5. There is a need to standardize imermodal conta iner sizes. 

They should not be so large that port or city congesti on will 

preclude their use or that they will be incapable of being lifted 

by heavy lift helicopters. 

6. Dry battery supply and storage- We must assure that there 

is adequate refrigerated storage space for dry batteries. 

7. Fresh foods call be provided to the combat soldier on a 

regular and routine basis. This requires a lot of refri geration 

equipment and use of heli copters, but is worth it in terms of 

morale and combat effectiveness. 

8. Armored vehicles of the VIOO type (the M706 Armored 

Car) should be available in adequate numbers to provide convoy 

security. The field expedient of "ha rdening" (armor plating) 

assigned cargo type vehicles prevents the most effective use of these 

vehicles-hauling cargo. 

9. The 5-10n and 2V2- ton trucks with dropsides make loading 

and unloading with forklifts an easier and fa ster operation. 

Policies and Pro ceclurc.~ Lessons Learned 

I. We must recognize early in any similar operation that 

requirements for an expanding force will increase faster than will 

the ability of man\lfacturers to produce the needed items. The 

declaration of a national emergency will lessen the degree of the 

shortfall, but a shortfall will exist for some period of time. Therefore, specia l management actions, to include withdrawing assets 

from luw priority organizatioJl!> for redistrihution to the high 

priority ones, controlling the allocation of new assets in short 

supply, and programing retrograde, repair, and reissue should be 

instituted earl y. Shortages can be tolerated easier in the low 
258 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

priority units than in units in combat, but readiness levels also 

have to be watched and the impact of overall shortages minimized. 

2. The logistic organization is over-structured and [00 imbalanced toward functionalism with too little weapons systems 

or commodity orientation. Beginning at the Department of the 

Army and progressing out toward the theater of operations, consolidation and elimination of superstructures mllst take place. 

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at Headquarters Department 

of the Army and at Army Materiel Command, for example. are 

functionally duplicating command management of logistics without 

specific weapons systems or commodity intelligence at either level. 

Funher study is needed to determine which echelons of command 

management can be eliminated or changed to facilitate logistic 

support of a theater of operation such as Vietnam. The role of 

an intermediate headquarters is questionable in the direct chain 

between the source of logistics intelligence data and malt~riel and 

the supported logistic echelon in the zone of combat operations. 

A componelll commander required to furnish major logistic support 

to ground forces in a contingency operation must be provided 

with a logistic management capability, vested in an officer whose 

rank and logistic experience are appropriate to the ultimate scope 

of the logistic operation. This senior logistician and his staff 

must participate in prior planning for contingency operations and 

be deployed to the area concurrently with the forward echelon 

of the headquarters of the combat forces. 

3. While separate pipelines for Medical, Signal, Aviation and 

Special Forces logistics worked, and usually worked well under 

the environment existing in Vietnam, it is doubtful that we can 

afford more than one pipline into a theater of operations in future 

conflicts. This is particularly so where the pipeline is of great 

length both in geography and time and where the pipeline is 

subject to enemy action. 

a. Since initiation of accelerated action in the Republic of 

Vietnam the mobile National Cash Register 500 automatic 

ledger posting machine has been installed as the standard direct 

support or general support stock control and accounting system in 

Army non-divisional combat service support units. This system was 

initially developed to fill the urgent need of support units in 

Republic of Vietnam during 1965- 1966. Due to exceptionally successful deployment in Republic of Vietnam, the system was adopted 

for Army-wide installation. In addition, divisional support units 

in Republic of Vietnam utilized this standard system for supply 

appl ications. Division Logistics System, using the mobile UNIVAC 
WORLDWIDE LOGISTIC IMPACT OF VIETNAM 259 

1005 card processor was developed during this same time frame for 

use by divisional support units. 

b. As a "spin off" from development of the standard combat 

service support system for support of the Army in the field, a 

Quick Reaction Inventory Control Unit has been added to the 

Army Force Stntcture. This unit is to be readily available for 

overseas deployment to provide immediate in-theater stock control 

and supply management to provide a base for orderly development of theater level support operations. The QuiCk Reaction 

Inventory Control Uni\ is currently being trained at Fort Lewis. If 

conditions dictate that several separa te pipelines are required, it 

is possible to operate these unique systems within the structure 

of the Quick Reaction Inventory Control Unit. The Quick Reaction Inventory Control Unit is a combination of people, organizations, automated and manual machines, and procedures to provide effective combat service support to a task force. 

c. The primary lesson learned during the buildup, that central 

logistic system design, development and control was required, has 

been applied in the expansion of responsibilities for standard 

systems developmem in Headquarters Department of the Army, 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for LogistiCS and its Class II 

activity, Logistics Doctrine Systems and Readiness Agency. This 

latter expansion has not yet come to complete fruition, but control 

of military standard support, such as Military Standard Requisi. 

tioning and Issue Procedures, Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures, Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures and logistic data elements had 

been initiated. Functiona l proponelll participation in standard operating systems design and development has been implemented. 

4. There is a need to establish standards of living for troops 

early in a campaign. Once the standards have been decided on, 

they should be binding on all troops of all sen ices. From these 

standards flow the requirements for real estate, construction materials, utilities, real property maintenance, post, camp and station 

property authorizations, as well as some engineer unit requirements. Also affected by the troop standards of living is the extent 

to which Post Exchanges are to be established and stocked. For 

logisticians, this is particularly important because PX supplies also 

consume pon, shipping and in-country transportation space. Army 

and Defense contingency planning should include alternative plans 

for different standards of living. In the absence of such criteria, 

every unit will establish its own standards, usually high; and 
260 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

constantly stri ve to upgrade them. This places excessive demands 

on an already busy logistic system. 

5. Security in Vi etnam type opera Lions is a larger considera· 

tion for logistical units than in wars characterized by front lines 

and relativel y secure rear areas. Convoys need to have protecti on, 

both ground and air. Insta llations need personnel and semry 

dogs for local security. They also need equipment such as night 

lighting devices and sensors to su ppon the local security forces. 

Stock levels should be as small as possible to present less lucrative 

targets. The huge excesses that developed in Vietnam were costly 

in men and dollars to dispose of or retrograde. The shipment of unneeded materiel from the Continental U.S. in future conflicts 

should be avoided. 

6. Automatic data processing equipment and computers are 

needed. The intelligent and coordinated use of th is equipment and 

its associated technology can provide the basis for an efficient and 

flexible logistic system. 

7. The concept at common supply su pport is usually sound for 

selected items, but it cannot be imposed without considerable 

advanced pl anning both as to the items to be commonly supplied 

and the conditions and silUation in the area concerned. The 

most profitable areas for the application of common suppl y support 

included subsistence, selected items of petroleum , oils. and lubricants and construction materiel. There is a need and an ongoing 

effort (Department of Defense Study Group) to develop criteria 

defining the commodities or items and conditions under which 

common supply support should be applied. 

8. The lise of contractors to augment or supplement the military forces is fea sible and workable. Where contractors are to 

be su pported by the Army logistica l system, they can be better 

supported by depots than by d irect support units. The Army 

suppl y system can obtain demand data for nonstandard com· 

mercia l parts. However. the determination whether to support 

contractors from the Army's supply system or to have the can· 

tractor provide his own support should be the result of a careful 

analysis. The cost effectiveness and responsiveness of each method 

should be evaluated. 

9. A combined military and commercial petroleum distribution system is workable. However, a need exists to have a petroleum, 

oils. and lubricants Contracting Officer in country to dea l with 

loca l commercial petroleum firms. 

10. The concept of Push Package is sound. Tmplementa-
WORLDWIDE LOCISTIC IM PACT OF VIETNAM 261 

lion procedures have heen rev ised to provide fewer items based 011 

equipmem densities. 

11 . Preventive maintenance progTams are basic to achie\'ill~ 

higher operational rates 011 equipment. Command atten tion is a 

continuing need. 

12. The use of commercial equipment on mil itary proje(. ts is 

feasible and efficient. This is paniculariy applicable to large scale 

engineer efforts such as the Line of Communications road can· 

struction program. The Vietnam experiences showed tha t when 

standardized items of critica l military construction and lLtility 

equipment are not available or appropriate, a program should be 

established to standardize ava ilable commercial items. 

13. An adequate intra·theater airlift capability must be plan· 

ned foT. Pl ans for air transporting 10 percent of the anticipated 

cargo and 65 percent of the total monthl y forces shou ld provide 

an adequate initial capahil ity. 

14. The equipment required for the operation of a propcrty 

disposal activity should be planned for and made a pari of the 

approved Table of Distribution and Allowances and Tahle of 

Organilation and Equipment. Country 10 country agreements 

should be made at the ambassadoria l level 10 insure Ihat thc 

host country does nOt have COlllrol over U.s. equ ipmelll being 

sold to out of COll ntry pu rchasers. 

15. A number of policie ~ evolved from the process of phasing 

down forces in Vietnam under the KeyslOne Programs. Se\'cll of 

these £ollow: 

a. Redistri bution of assets genera ted from deactivati{Jlls :1IIt! 

redeployments must be controlled through the ex isting wholt:sale 

distribu"tion' system to assure adeq uatc cancella tion of outstand· 

ing requirements. 

b. A maintenance fa cility must he established to repair :l:N t~ 

llIrned in hy deactivated units" These assets must be Imlllght 

to an issuable condition. 

c. All redeploymelll and deacti vatiOIl planning must incl ude 

comprehensive instructi ons 0 11 disposition o£ all materiel forc· 

casted to become available. 

d. The workload a~soc ated with preparation, presenralion and 

packaging of retrograde materiel must be recognized, and augmenta. 

tion Ta e~ of Or:ganizatinll and Equipment must he developed 

to provide the required staffings. 

e. Doctrine developed to support cleployment of forces fr(lm 

lhe Continental U.S. to overseas areas is not adequate for redeplo) 

Illell! of forces from the wmbal lOne back to the ContinClital 
262 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

U.S. The biggest deficiency is the failure to recognize that the 

assistance of the Continental U.S. Post Engineer. Post Signal, 

Post Medical and Post Maintenance facilities are not available 

in the combat zone. 

f. The sanitation and entomological requirements imposed 

on retrograde materiel from Vietnam actually determined the 

speed with which retrograde could be accomplished. 

g. Organic divisional support elements are incapable of providing normal mission support to the division in combat for a 

period up to as long as the last 30 days prior to their redeployment. This logistics support must be provided by non-divisional 

support elements exclusively. 

16. Loss of several Ammunition Supply Points to fire and enemy 

action justifies the need to find a better method of storing ammunition in a combat zone. Covered storage would have provided 

a significant decrease in losses caused by burning debris resulting 

from explosions. 

17. Financial management must receive concurrent attention 

and priority with logistics management. Further. when this occurs, 

effective and efficient materiel management can follow. This was 

proved by our experience in Vietnam. Vietnam experience has 

proved that financial management techniques, when utilized to an 

appropriate degree , could be useful tools in the effective and 

efficient management of materiel in combat areas. Financial management systems for Operations and Maintenance funds supporting combat operations are most effective when they are mechanized, require a minimum change from the normal Service system. 

and provide for the distribution of materiel cost to appropriate 

COSt accounts. The Services, when planning contingencies, should 

outline appropriate financial management systems for Operation 

and Maintenance funds supporting operations in the combat areas. 

18. An adequate transportation capability, with a proper balance between sealift and airlift resources, is essential to the 

deployment and successful support of forces deployed in an overseas area. Since the bulk of materiel must be transported by 

surface means, an adequate and responsive sealift must be inbein ~. Such a capability is dependent on a modernized Military 

Sea Transportation Service nucleus fleet backed by access to the 

resources of an equally modem U.S. merchant marine. A responsive and adequate airlift must be available to support initial 

depl oyments, to provide for follow-on movement of personnel, 

items designated for nonnal movement by airlift, and for highpriority materiel. The growing capability of U. S. civilian and 
LESSONS LEARNED 268 

military airlift emphasizes that the services must develop and 

test boldly engineered logistic systems to exploit the advantages 

inherent in this mode of transportation. 

19. Provisions should be made for a Traffic Management 

Agency to be established prior to any type of projected operations. 

The Traffic Management Agency should have operational control 

of the transportation assets that are available for common-user 

service. Using an agency such as Traffic Management Agency 

means a sizeable reduction in the waste of transportation resources. 

20. The attendant maintenance and supply requirements associated with unnecessarily sophisticated or complex equipment 

and weapon systems may outweigh the value of the dubious 

operational improvements. For purposes of illustration: 

a. Why multi-fuel engines? Concentration of fuel distribution may have been more economical. b. Did we need communications retransmission capability in tanks? c. Did we train sufficient 

marksmen to justify precision rifles? d. Would not light weight 

cheaply constructed mass fire weapons serve better than expensive maintenance significant items? e. Must vehicles be waterproof 

for their occasional submerging? f. Would light weight plastic 

flotation bags serve better? 

Salvage and Scavenge, 

I. Battle damaged or abandoned American equipment provided 

the innovative Viet Cong with a source of raw materials. The fol· 

lowing provided some illustrations: 

a. 155-mm shells were used as mines to destroy tank or personnel carrier tracks. 

b. High-powered American rifle shells were adapted to "water 

pipe" guns by expanding the bullets with coins with holes in them. 

Inaccurate as the weapon may be. a hit is devastating. 

c. 155-mm shells and others of similar size have been successfully used as mortars. 

Battlefield Policing 

Total destruction of abandoned equipment appears necessary. 

There is considerable evidence that the soldier is overly equipped 

and discards items on the march. 

\ 

Appendix 

Commanders of 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam 

1965-1970 

Colonel Robert W. Duke 

Major General Charles W. Eifler 

Major General Shelton E. Lollis 

Major General Thoffia5 H. Scott, Jr. 

Major General Joseph H. Heiser, Jr. 

Brigadier General Hugh A. Richeson 

Major General Walter J. Woolwine 

I April 1965- 1 January 1966 

I January 1966- 12 June 1967 

12 June 1967- 11 August 1967 

II August 1967-1 August 1968 

I August 1968-22 August 1969 

22 August 1969- 1 September 1969 

I September 1969-26 June 1970 
AVEL 

AMMC 

os 

FAMF 

FWMAF 

GS 

GSGP 

JP-4 

LCM 

LCU 

LST 

MCI 

POL 

RVNAF 

TOE 

TRANS 

Glossary 

Aviation Materiel Management Center 

Aviation Electronics 

Direct Support 

Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility 

Free World Military Assistance Forces 

General Support 

General Support Group 

A Kerosene·base Fuel for Turbine Engines 

Landing Craft. Mechanized 

Landing Craft, Utility 

Landing Ship. Tank 

Meal, Combat, Individual 

Petroleum, Oils. and Lubricants 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Table o£ Organization and Equipment 

Transportation 
Index 

Abn.ms, Genen.1 Creighton W.: 61, 237 

Ad ministrath'e and Direct Support 1.0' 

gistical Company Swdy: 240 

Advisor!, United Statea: 229-!4 

Agency for International De"clopmem: 

25, 88, 159, 161, 164, 166, 237, 

242, 244-45 

Air Division, 2d: 250 

Air Force, United State.. Stt United 

States Air Force. 

Air Transportation Co·ordination 0[· 

fices: 160 

Airborne Brigade, 113d: 8, II, 14, 107 

A[r Vietnam: 229 

Airborne Dj"isionl 

82d: 69 

101st: 8-9, 150 

Alrentt: 167 

enginet: 146-48 

in"entory: 134-57 

logillic support: 137-39 

maintenance: 137-41, 146-47. 149-50 

rtadineu: 150-53 

repair paru: 141, 144-46, 149 

supply: 137-38, 145 

5uppon : 20, 23 

utilization: 152 

Aircraft Inten, j,'ely ~hnaged Items: 147 

Airlifts: 23, 166-(i7 

Alaskan Barge and Tnnsporr Com. 

pany: 164, 170 

Allocation Committee Ammunition . 

Departmem of the Army: 117 

Americal Division (23d Infantry Dj,·i· 

sion): 9 

Ammunition 

maintenance and dbpo$.lll : 131-33 

plants: 50 

procurement: 118-21 

reporting: 109, 111-15 

5C'curity of depots: 130-31 

shortages: 115-18 

UocU: 62, 106-1 5, 124-50 

storage and handling: 25-27. 127- 30, 

173, 262 

suppl)' tato: 62. 109-11 , 11 5-16 

transportation of: 124-27 

uniu and personnel : 121-2-1 

Ammunition Battalion (l'I'odsional), 

528th : 123 

Ammunition Croup, 52d: 109, 122 

Ammunition fmprovement Plan, South 

Vietnamese Army: 24 1 

Ammunition Procuremcnt and Supply 

Agency: 108, 111- 13 

Ammunition Stock Control Detachment, 

182d: 108 

Ammunition Supply Depot: 128-32 

Ammunition Supply Poin!!: 107. 125. 

128-29, 262 

I\ n "he: 20, 129. 158 

Area Maintenance and Supply Facility: 

Armed '" Servico Procurement Regula · 

tion: 89, 11 9 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 11th : 9, 

40. ISO 

Armored personnel carriers: 42 ... 0, 54 

Army Aeronautical Depot Maintenance 

Center: 147 

Army Authorization Document System: 

60 

Army Electronics Command. Fori Mon · 

mouth : S2 

Army Equipmenl Records Syslem: 186 

Army Mainlenance U anagcment System: 

Army '" Materiel Command : 10, U. 40, 

42-43. 46,49,51-52.56,64-67, 172, 

231. 258 

Army Medical ServIce: 215 

Army Missile Command: 49 

Army Munitions Command : 28. 114 

Army Stock Fund : 134-35 

Army Support Commands: 20, 27, ~, 

112. 137-58, 141, 229 

Artillery Group (Air Defense) , 97th: 

49 

A!Se1 Balana Report: III. II! 

Assistant Chief of Stiff for Force Dc. 

"elopllIem: .5S 

5S t~nt Chief of Staff for LogiSlics: 23S 

Au ;ltant Deputr Chief of Staff for 

Logiuia (Supply and Maintenance): 

A" illanl " Secretary of Defen5C' (Installa -

tiOn! and Logistia) : SO , 120 

Atlama Arm)' Depot: 32 

Auttnlian (orco: 245-47 

Authoriled Stockage List : 142, 175- 76 
268 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Automated ~fa eriel Management Sys· 

tern, South Vietnamese Armed 

o,ces: 240 

Amomalic data pr()(~ng; 37- 38, 86. 

H4, 186. 215. 256, 258, 260 

AlUomatic Digital Network: 195 

Automatic Se<:ure Voice Communica· 

tion,; 195 

AutOln.uion: 23, 37, 58, 64, 144, 198 

A";alion Brigade, lsI: I!S, 149-50 

A"iuion Materiel Management Center: 

87, 139. 144. 146 

Aviation Offic.er, United Siald Army 

Vietnam: 138 

Aviation System! Command: 159, IH, 1., 

Ban Me Thuot: 27. 231 

Bangkok: 174 

Base Depot Upgrade Plan : 240 

Ralh 5e rvi ces: 2O()....{\1. 20s-<)6. 248 

Baneries, dry: 47-48 

8earcat: 20 

Bien Hoa: 14. 79 

Sinh Loi : 79 

Boou: 46--47 

Budget: 28. 87. 110. 119 

Budgedng and Funding Concept 1mpro,'ement Program: 240 

Bu Long: 79 

Buildup: 6, 8, 19,22.27,51. 37, 48 . 50, 

106-09. 119. 122, 1.58, 255 

Cahex oil company: 75, 76-77 

Cam Ranh &y: 11,15, 16,19,22,24,25, 

26. 27, 73, 83, 107, 122, 124, 125. 

126. 129, 150. 158, 159, 161. 162, 

163,164. 169,170,172. 17!1. 174. 180, 

181. 183, 192. 198. 199, 208, 215 

Cam Ranh Bay Support Command : 158, 

169 

Camp Red &11: 204 

Can Tho: 11, 16. 17. 20, 25 

Ca,ualties: 205. 213-15 

Cat Lai : 25. 126. 169. 170 

Caterpillar Tractor Company: 163 

Canlry Divi,ion ( .... irmobile), 151 : 8. 

150, 158. 172 

Central financial )bnagement Ag1: n('y: 

Central " Identification u,ooutory: 205 

Central RC'{OI'el)' Commill~ : 243 

Centralized financial Management 

.... gency: 86-87 

Chu Lai : ZO. 128, ISO, 181,215 

Civil Operation, and Re"olutionary 

De"elopmem: 88 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group Force;,: 

231, 242 

Ci"ilian ~pecia1isu: 52, 114 

Closed. Loop Support Conference: 55, 

14&-49 

Clmed Loop Su pport program: 4!--o!:4. 

48, 53-56, 148-49, 182, 186, 236 

Cogido: 126 

Combat Service to the Theater .... rmy: 8. 

177 

Combat Support to the Theater Army 

concept: 121-22 

Combined Logistia Olferu;"e Plan: 2'8. 

24. 

Commander in Chief Pacific: 9, 11. 19, 

189,204 

Commander in Chief, United States 

Army Pacific: 9, 58 

Commi.uaries: 20!I-(H, 2'6 

Common Service Airlift System: 166-67 

Common Supply Support: 82-85 

Communications equipment manag.::· 

ment program: 54 

Communication, ,ystem: 194-95 

Composite Sen'lce Maintenance Com· 

pany, 604th: 68 

Computers: 23, 37-'8, 72, 112, 11 4-15. 

258, 260 

Container IntegTated Support Package: ., 

Containerbation: 42, 16'. 111 -75, 257 

Contiuental Army Command: ,2 

Contingency Operation, Selection T ech· 

nique: 42 

Contingency Support Stocks: 42 

Contneton: 45. 84-85, 88-90, 11 8-20, 

126, U9, 163-&1. 192, 194-95. 260 

Corp' 

I: II. 72- 73, 82-83. 12', 144, 169-70. 

183. 192, 216, 248 

II : 27, 72, 77. 81. 83-M, 161-62. 183. 

192, 198, 248 

111: 72- 73, 81. 83-84, 161-62. 18.5-84, 

192, 198, 234, 248 

IV: 11. 72-73.81,83-84,169,183,192, 

198, 23!!-34, 248 

XX IV: 216 

Corps Area Communication S)·stem: 195 

Country I.ogistio ImprO"ement Plan: 

24. 

D to P stocks: 109-10, 116 

Da :-lang: 6, II , 19,26,27, 73. 84. 123, 

125. 126, 128. ISO, 184, 185. 201. 

204, 205, 216. 256 

Dal:l.I: 27 

necontamination : 200 
INDEX 269 

Defense Amomatic Addressing Sy~tem: 

64, 144, 198 

Defense Communications Agency: 195 

Defense Fuel Supply Center: 72, 74-76, 

Defe" nse Production Act of 1950: 29 

Defense Snpply Agency: 13, 32, ~9, 59, 

64, 81 

DeLong pier: 17-18, 125-26, 167, 256 

Departmem of the Anny High Imerest 

Items: 72 

D<:partment of Defense Study Croup: 260 

Depots: I ]' IS, 19-20, 22, 26, 32-35, 

51, 69, 71, 122-23, 128, 150, 255, 

258, 240 

Deputy Chief of Staff for LogiSiiOl, 

Office of: 30, 44, 117, 252, 258-59 

Diem, PrC$ident Ngo Oinh : 6 

Direct Support System: 51 

Direa Support Uniu: 38, 50 

Directorate of Ammunition : 30, 109, 

1I 4, 117, 123, 132 

Directorate of Construction: 189 

Distriburion and Allocation Committee, 

Department of the Army: 48, 51-52, 

54, 72, 236 

Do Thi Nuong (contractor): 164 

Dong Ha : 128, 164, 169 

Dong Tam: 25, 69, 216 

Duke, Colonel Robert W,: 9- 10 

Eiller, Major General Charles W,: 57 

Eisenhower, President Dwight D,: 6, 232 

Electric power equipment: 18, 45, 85, 

90. 194 

Electronics equipment management pro· 

gram: 54 

Engineer Brigades: 19 

18th: 44 

20th: 44 

Engineer construction: 19, H, 189-94 

ENSURI': project: 48, 53, 71, 2! 1 

Equipment. Inc,: 164 

Esso oil company: 7!. 76-77, 79 

Explosil'e Ordnancc Disposal teams: 

132-!3 

Federal Stock Numbers: 64 

t'edenl Supply Service (General Services Administration): 49 

Field Depots 

58th: 19 

504th: 19, 122 

506th: 19, 26 

US Army, Da Nang: 19 

Fl.AcPOI.I::: 46 

Floating .. \ircrart Main tenance Fadlity: 

'" 

Food service: 200-03 

Fort De"ens, ~fassachuselts : 121 

Fort Mason, California: 49 

Fon Monmouth , Ne.~ J ency: 195 

Fon Shafter, Hawaii: 65, 215 

Forwa rd Depot : 112 

Forward Floating Depot: 106, 112 

Forward Support Activity: 20-22, 155 

Free 'Vorld Assistance Forces: 215, 236, 

245-48 

General $en'ice Group, 80th: 123 

General Services Administration 13, 59 

General Suppon Group. 34th; 20, 158-

39, 143 

Genenl Support Units: 38 

261h: 123 

79th; 49 

BOth : 123 

Generators, ~e Electric power equip· 

ment. 

GOER l'ehicle: 162-63 

Gra' "es registra tion: 200, 205 

Ground l\{unil ions Offi(e: !O 

Gunn, Brigadier General James W.: 256 

Han Jin Company: 164 

"Hardened vehicle" concept: 36, 162 

Harkins, I.ieutenant General Paul D.: 9 

Hawk mi$$ile: 49-50 

Helicopters: 6, 56. 106, 134, 137. 152. 

155, 167 

AH- IG: 148 

CH-47: 147-48. 153 

CH-54: 149, 153, 156. 214 

OH-6: 148 

UH- \ : 136, 148. 153, 184 

ambulance: 213 

Flying Cr.lne: 156 

Hospitals: 213-15, 244 

Hue: 169 

Hughes Aircraft : 195 

Impro\'ement and Modernitation Pro· 

gram: 238 

Inbntry Brigades 

196th: 41 

199th: 41 

Infantry Divisions 

1$1 : 8, 15. 10 

4th: 8, 70 

5th: 155 

9t h: 8-9, 41 , 67-68, 150 

25th: 8 

Inventories: 18, 23, 62. 238, 259 

In .. entOTY Control Centers: 23, 84, 87. 

'15 

In .. entror Control Point, United States 

Arm y Pacifi(: 108. 112- 14 , 215 
270 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Im'cntory-ln·Motion principle: 51, 62, 

127. 155 

J ohnson, President Lyndon n.: 6, 28 

joim Casualty Resolution Center: 205 

Joint Chid! of Staff: 9, 8.s. 188. 246 

Joint Ceneral StaR, Vlcmame$l:: 164 

Joint Materiel Priorities Alloa.tion 

Board: 46--of7 

Kennedy. President John F.: 6, 2'2 

KUUONr. projcctl: 48. 56-57.67- 12,261 

Laird, Secretary Melvin R. : ]91 

Landing cTart: 24- 25, 125, ]67- 71, 18'. 

198, 216 

Laundf)' services: 200-(11,206-08, 248 

Lien Chicu: 76 

Ughl Infantry Brigades 

19th : 9 

19!1Ih: 9 

Line of Communic.ations Program: H, 

191, 243, 261 

Log lift: 155 

LogistiC Support Center: 252 

Logbtical Commands 

1st: 9-11 , 14- 17, 19, 20-22, 25-27, 32, 

57,61-65,67,71,82-84,88, 107-00, 

113- 14 , 122-2'. 126. 132- 3"', IS8, 

146, 158, "'. 178. 180, 184, 189. 

192, 194, 196, 198, 201, 206, 208-09, 

211, 21!1. 215. 240, 246-47 

!!d: 22. 58, 64, 84, I07-()8, 186. 198. 

m 

9th: 9 

Logistic!! island conctpt: 19. 22 

Logistical Support Activit)·: W-22 

Logistia Advisory Dir«torate: 235 

Logblia Control Office. P3cilic: 50-51. 

Logistics " Doctrine Sl'stems and Readiness Agency: 259 

I,ogistia Intelligence File: 65 

1..0000iuics Muter Plan: 238 

Logistics Offensive: GI-S2. 146. 25 1 

Long Sinh: 5. 16. 17, 23, 26, 27, 69, 

85, 122. 129, 150, 151, 180, 181, 

199, 2{)5, 208, 215 

Long : 26 

Long Range Patrol Ration: 200.205,247 

LUlon SIe\'l!doring Company: 170 

:<\am3ra , s«retary Robert S,: 9, 46, 

50, 58, 12{) 

~Iaintenance SUPPCIrI Posith'e program: 

155, 176 

M3nagemenl: 18-19, 22. 48, 85. 127, 

251 . 256-57,262 

Marine Amphibious Force, 3d: 198 

Marine Corps, Vnltl'd Slates, Su Unitl'd 

State! Marine Corps, 

Manne Oi"i, ion. Sd : 125, 128 

Manne ;\hintenance Acth'ity, Vietnam: 

'83 

Materials handling equipment man3gemen! program: 54 

Materiel Management Agency: 114 

Ml'dical Brigade. 44th: 20. 181, 21S, 215 

Ml'dial Civic Action Program: 244 

Ml'dical Command: 213 

Medical Depot. 52d: 87, 181. 215, 255. 

245, 247 

Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands: 215 

Medical S('rvices: 20, 181,200,212- 15, 2H 

Mildren, Lieutenant General Frank T.: 

67 

Military Airlift Command: 160 

Military Auistance Ad~isoT)' Group: 5-S. 

10, 82, 212. 229, 252 

Military Alsisanee Command, Vielnam: 

6.9-11. IS, 15-17, 25. 27, Ill, 116, 

159-61. 164, 166. 170, 18~9. 191, 

209, 214, 229-50, 232- 33. 255-57. 

24 1. 244-46 

Military Auistance Program: 24, 211-12, 

2'5. 245 

Military Au istanee Service Funded Pro, 

gram: 235. 237, 242. 245 

Military Construction Army Program: 

44. 189-91 

Miliur)' Provincial Hospital Assistance 

Program: 244 

Military Sea Transport Service: 77. 159 

Military Sea Transportation Service: 76. 

160. 169-71, 174. 262 

Military Senices Ammunition Allocation 

Board: 117 

Mines: .36, 43 

Mobile AddilOry Teams: 235-'4 

Mobite R;"erine Force: 216 

Morning Line or Communications Drier, 

ings, Vietnam; 48. 57-58 

Mortuaries: 204-05. 247 

;\luhiruel engines: 182 

Natick Laboratories: 200 

~ational Guard: 32, 125, 256 

N;u ional Im'enlory Control: 39 

<Xalional IIwentory Control Point: 49. 

5',60, 11 2, 114-15, 121. 142, 144. 196 

:"\a~al Support Act;"it)', Da Nang; 216 

;"'a~ , United States. Sn United States 

Navy. 

:<\ESTOR: 195-96 

:<\e ... Zealand forces: 245, 247 

Newpon : 25, 68-69 

<Xha Be: 25, 73, 76, 77. 79. 169 
INDEX 271 

Nha Trang: 11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 106, 

133, 157, 158, 198 

Night vision devices: 35 

Nixon, President Richard r.f.: 237 

Norton Air Force Base, California; 195 

Okinawa: 10. 11 . 14, 22, 23. 58, 58. 59. 

64. 86. 106. ]08, 115. 142. 144. 

175, 174, 186. 21S, 245 

On.the·Job Training Program: 51-52. 

240 

Operation Compassion: 205 

Operation and Maintcnance, Amly: 85-

86, 15.5, 262 

Operational Projcct Stocks: 51. 252 

Ordnance Battalions 

5d: 122-23 

184lh: 122. ]29. 155 

19151: 122, 129. 155 

336th (Ammo): 125 

Pacific Archit~ts and Enginecrs: 45, 85, 

192 

Pacific Command Movcments Priority 

Agency: ]60 

Pacific Command Uliliulion and Re· 

distribution Agency: 58-59 

Pacilication: 6, 24 1-45 

Pallctization: 126, 165, 171 . 175 

Peoplc Self Defcnse Forces: 242 

Penona] Propert,' Dcpot: 204 

Pelrolcum: 27, 72-82, 90, 129, 157, 260 

Phan Rang: 25, 158 

Phan Thict: 164 

Philco Ford: 164 

Philippinc forces: 245. 247 

Phu Bal: 61, 181. 215 

Phu Tal: 129 

Phlloc Vinh: 20 

Phy Tho: 24.5 

Pilfcragc: 54-55. 81 

Pink Book: 61-62 

Pipelines: 77, 79, 81, 256 

Planning: 10-11. ]6.28. 138.164,188-89 

Planning, Programing, and Budgeting 

System: 85 

Plans for Turnover of Facilities and 

Functions Program: 240 

Plciku : 20, 27, 129, 141. 162. 180 

POrlS: 5, 11 , 17. 19. 22- 26, 124-27.167- 71 

Pre·positioned Materiel Configured to 

Unit Seu: 252 

Pre·positioned War Reseryes: 252 

Prescribed Load Lists: 175- 76 

Problem Flasher: 56 

Procurement: 29, 88-91. 11 8-21. 231 . 248 

Procuremcnt of Equipmcnt and Mil-sites 

for the Army: 27.29, 72, 134,246 

Program Six unllll: 32 

Projccts 

B UDDY: 133, 244}.-41 

C II,o\U.F,N(;I?:: 61 

CL~N: 65-66 

CoNDITION; 65 

CoUNT; 6.5 

CoUN'l"tJl.: 61. 159 

"Orangc Ball ": 47-48 

R«OI'ery: 243 

SEI?:: 64 

Sr.r:j MOVE: 66 

SI!;ILU: 32 

STOP: 63-64 

STOl'jSU: 64-65 

STRAT REQUIREMENT: 252 

VI'.Jl.lrY: 65 

Propcrty Book Officers: 68 

Property disp<l$al: 2(l()....()1. 2{l9-11 

Push Packages: 38-42,61,107,201.260 

Quang Trl: 15.5 

Qui Nhon: 11. 15. 16, 19. 20. 22. 25. 

26.27,75,76,77.83, 107, 122, 123. 

12.5. 126. 128, ]29, 130, 133. 1.58, 

161 , 162. 164, 171. 174, 180, 181. 

185, 192, 198. 199,215 

Qui Nhon Area Logistics Support Com· 

mand: 125, 158. 

Quick Fix improvcments: .59 

Quick Reacling Procurcment Systcm: 

231, 250 

Quick Reaction A!Sistancc Tcams: 48, 

52-53 

Quick Reaction Inl'cntory Control Unit : 

259 

Radar, ground survcillance: 43-44 

Radios: 3.5. 194 

Railroads: 164-66. 243-44 

Rasmussen, Brigadier Gcneral Henry A.: 

116-17 

Readiness: 51. .5~55. 176. 181,251-52 

Readincss Improvemcnt Programs: 251 

Real estatc: 191-92 

Real·Time reports: 56 

Red Ball cxpress: 48, 50-.51. 176. 182 

Redeployment: 57, 67-68 

Rcfrigeration: 47-48, 199-200 

Rcfugees: 242-43 

Rcpair parts: ]8. 58-42, 89--90. 15.5. 141 . 

144-46. 149, 172, 176. 178. 182 

Republic of Ko rea forces: 21, 133. 245-47 

Republic of Vietnam forces: 6, 8. 45, 71, 

III , 119. 133, 161. 190-91, 229-30, 

232-42. 247 

Requisitioning: n, 23, 38, 40. 51, 60-(;1. 

65, 141-44, 235 
272 LOGISTIC SUPPORT 

Reserve Componcnu: 15, 52-54, 121. 

2S3-5<l. 256 

Retrograde of Equlpment-Keynone. See 

KUSTONI'; jKOjects. 

Rifles: 4""5. 236 

Riverine: forces: :l 1S-16 

Rockeu: 116-18 

,Roll-on-Rol1 ·aff operations: 17<1-75 

R0I3tion. troop: 51. 33 

Rural Development Cadre: 242 

SJ,bougc: 35 

Sagami Dc-pot. J apan: 43. 186-87 

S:llgon:,5, 10, 11 , 14, 15, 16, 11, 19. 

22. 25, 24, 25, 26, 27, 107, 113, 125. 

124, 125. 126, 137. 158. 1-41 , 14<1, 

158, 161, 162. ]64, 169, 170, 1740 , 

175. 192, 194, 199.203, 208. 229 

Saigon Support Command: 67. 123, 125. 

ISS. 162, ISS 

Sau:l1ilc Communications Program: 195 

SCRAM: 57, 70, 187 

Se'a ·Land Services Inc.: 172-75. 199 

Secretary of the Army: 50 

Secretary of Defense: 9, II , U , 29-30, 

176, 188, 237. 246 

Secure voice II!Tminals: 197 

Securhy measures: 16, !4-36, 130-31. 195, 

'60 

Shell oil rompany: 73,76-77,79 

Signal Brlpdc. h t: 194, 196 

SKILAK (Tall: 170 

Skills. St:t: TTlining. 

South East Asia T reaty Organiution: 5 

Special AMistam for Munitions, Office 

of: 30 

Special Criteria for Rt:trograde of Mate· 

riel. 5<11 SCRAM. 

Special Force •• 5th: 106. 2"-'2. 242 

Standards of living, theater: 17. 259 

Stock Control Detachmen t, 182d: 109, 

11 2- 13,11.5 

Stackage: 18, 20-23, S8--4 1. 57-58. 62, 

65. 106-1.5, 124-~, 144-46. 184,252-

Storage " : 26-27, ,9 

ammunit ion: 127-30 

petroleum: 7' 

Sto\'epipe s)'Item: 49-50, 144 

Strategic Army For~ : '2-" 

Subic Bay: 17' 

Subsistence, troop: 198-200 

Support Activity SlIigon, Headquarters: 

10, 24- 25, 198, 229-30 

Support Battalion, 75th: 155 

SuppOrt Commands: 1 L. 15,20.123, 125. 

129, 158-59, 162. 184, m 

Support Croup. Unhed Slates Army, 

Vietnam: 229 

Tables of Distribution and .Allowance.: 

21,246. 261 

Tables of Organilation and Equipment: 

8, 17-18, 20-22, 42-... ", 67-68, 

122- 2', 162, 205, 246. 261 

Tan My Thuy: 169-70 

Tan Son Nhut: 2', 24, 49. 76. 79, 106. 

107, 141. 158. 195, 201. 204, 205 

Tanks: 54 

T ask Force Remagen : 155 

Tay Ninh : 20 

Technical Str\'ices: 8, 177 

Telephones: '5. 69. 194- 95. 197 

Tef offensh'e: Il l. 17', 147.210,216, 24! 

Thailand : 2'. 182. 205 

T hailand forces: 245-47 

Theater Requi red Supply Rales for 

Ammuni tion : 11 0 

Thieu, Presidcnt: 2!7, 24! 

Traffit Coordination Offices: 1.59 

T raffit fanage en t Agenty: 1.59-61. 26' 

Training: 30-'4, 124. 255 

Transporta tion Banalion, 

10th (terminal): 1.58 

11th (terminal) : 1.58 

57th: 180 

58th: 144 

'94lh (terminal) : 158 

765th: 131 

Transportation Commands 

4th (terminal Command) : 25, 158 

51h (terminal A): 158 

l24th (termi nal A) : 159 

Tnnsporlation Company (COER). hi: 

T ran'" sportation Cor ps Detachment, 402d: 

T ransportation " Croup (Motor TTlr]'· 

pon ) : 162 

Tnvis Air Force BUe, OIlifornia: 49-50 

Trucks: !l), 161-61, 182 

Uniforms: 46-47. 208 

United Statd Air Force: 10. 73. 82-84. 

125. I·H, 166-67. 171, 184,204.250. 

, .. United Staid Army. Eighth : 4' 

Uniled Statts Army Engineer Con,trut · 

tion Agency. Vietnl m: 192 

United Sta.tts Army Logistics Manage. 

ment Center. Fort Ln:: 209 

United Staid Arm)' Medical Materia l 

Agency: 215 

Uni ted Stain Army Pacific: 10, 16. 40, 

110, 18g 
INnEX 273 

Unlled States Army Procurement 

Agenq-, Vietnam; 8&-89, 91. 16~, 

192. 248 

United Stilles Army Ryukyu Islands: 10, 

I8&-89 

United SUtd Army T uiler Service 

Agency: 174 

Uni ted States Army Vietnam: 10. 16-17. 

22, 27. S6, 45-14. 63. 108. 114. 188. 

232-33 

United States Congre!S: 13. 29, 190 

United States Depucmem 01 Agricul . 

ture: 68. 71 

United. SU tes EmbaNY: 6. 88 

United States ~hrine Corps: 6. 11 , .9. 

82- 83, 125. 128. 171. 184- 85, 216, 

230. 2S6 

United States Militar ' Auiuance Com· 

mand, Vietnam; 27, 188.229 

United Slates ~av)': 10. 11. 72-13. 82~. 

125, 158, 160. 170. 178. 183-84. 198. 

216-17.230.246 

United States Oversen MiMion: 2fi 

United Sta tes Public Health Service: 68. 

71 

Vandegrift Com!»! Bue: 155 

Vietnam AIoKt R«1)ncil iation Proce· 

dures: 65-66 

Vietnam Sational Rai h"a), Sptrm: 1&1 

Vietnam Regional Exchangr Service: 161 

Vielnamilil.tion: 191. 238 

Vin nel Corporation: .5, 85. 16', 194 

"ung Ro: 25, 171 

\lung Tau: 11 . 17. 25. 12 ~ 137, 138. 158. 

170. 171. 198. 216 

War Resen·e. Operational Project 

Siock.s: 51. 252 

Warehouses: 26-27. 39 

Weapons System Requisitioning: 14'1 

Western Pacific TransportatiOn Office: 

160 

Westmoreland, Crneral William c.: 6. 

16, 25. 50. 83. 236 

Worldwide Ammunition Reporting Sp· 

trm (WARS): 109. I IS 

Wunder Beach: 169 


PIN: 081036-000