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PROGRESS IN CONSOLIDATING

TERRORIST WATCHLISTS—

THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER (TSC)

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

AND COUNTERTERRORISM

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

HOMELAND SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 25, 2004

Serial No. 86

(Committee on the Judiciary)

Serial No. 108–43

(Select Committee on Homeland Security)

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

and the Select Committee on Homeland Security 

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary 

and http://hsc.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel 

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

JAY APPERSON, Chief Counsel 

ELIZABETH SOKUL, Counsel 

KATY CROOKS, Counsel 

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel 

(III)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Arkansas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

BILLY TAUZIN, Louisiana 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, Illinois 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New 

York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, D.C. 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

[VACANCY]

JOHN GANNON, Majority Staff Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada, Chairman

JOHN SWEENEY, New York, 

Vice Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri,

Ranking Member 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, D.C. 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 25, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary .............................................. 1

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland Security .... 2

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Select Committee on Homeland Security ................................................... 4

The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary ...................................... 4

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland Security ......................................................................................................................... 5

WITNESSES 

Ms. Donna A. Bucella, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 8

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10

Mr. Charles Bartoldus, Director, National Targeting Center, Customs and 

Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15

Mr. James W. McMahon, Director, Office of Public Security, State of New 

York 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 17

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19

Mr. Jerry Berman, President, Center for Democracy and Technology 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 21

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims ................................................... 63

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee 

on Homeland Security ......................................................................................... 69

Questions and Responses for the Record from Donna Bucella ............................ 70

Questions for Responses for the Record from Jim McMahon .............................. 77

Questions and Responses for the Record from Charles Bartoldus ...................... 80

(1)

PROGRESS IN CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST 

WATCHLISTS—THE TERRORIST SCREENING 

CENTER (TSC) 

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND

COUNTERTERRORISM, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security] presiding. 

Mr. COBLE. Before we begin, about 25 people have stopped me 

and asked me if I was dying or if I am feeling okay, and in the 

hopeful event of some of you might be wondering if I am about to 

expire, I had a chemical facial peel this morning. I don’t look too 

great and I don’t feel too great, but hopefully I am not about to expire. So I wanted to set your minds at ease. Good to have you all 

with us, and my colleagues are on the way. 

Today the Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security and the Select Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, will conduct a joint hearing on the consolidation of terrorist 

watchlists at the new Terrorist Screening Center. 

I want to welcome all the Members from both Committees and 

the witnesses. Unfortunately, already in this election season we 

have heard a great deal of political rhetoric that fails to show the 

true bipartisan efforts of Congress to protect our Nation. It is easy 

to be a Monday morning quarterback, but such talk does nothing 

to improve our homeland security nor to support our public safety 

officers and troops in harm’s way. If there are problems, we need 

to try to resolve them quickly. If there are ways to improve our 

homeland security, we need to implement them efficiently and effectively. 

Today, it is my belief that our country is safer than it was prior 

to September 11, 2001. That is due not only to the work of the Congress and the Bush administration, but also the extraordinary efVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
2

forts of Federal, State and local law enforcement officers and our 

military men and women. 

This hearing focuses on one of those efforts. On September 16, 

2003, President Bush established the Terrorism Screening Center, 

through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, to provide 

ready access to information regarding suspected terrorists, to allow 

Government investigators, screeners, agents, and State and local 

law enforcement officers to respond promptly. 

The Terrorism Screening Center aims to improve the screening 

of known and suspected terrorists at consular offices at international points of entry and the tracking of these individuals 

abroad and at home if they manage to enter the United States. The 

Terrorism Screening Center aims to improve information-sharing 

at all levels of Government and to securely and quickly get the 

right information to the right people. 

Today we will hear testimony from the director of the TSC on the 

progress the new Center has made in reaching its goals; from two 

customers of TSC, the National Targeting Center at the Department of Homeland Security, and the director of the New York State 

Counterterrorism Unit and the Center for Democracy and Technology on concerns about civil liberties. 

I look forward to hearing from our panel today. And at this juncture, I guess protocol-wise, I should call on the—I see the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Gibbons, is not here, but the Chairman of the full Committee, I believe, of Homeland Security, Mr. 

Turner from Texas—and I will recognize him for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased today to 

join our colleagues from the Judiciary Committee to address the 

subject that we all know is enormously important to our homeland 

security, and that is determining our progress in developing an effective Terrorist Screening Center that integrates the multiple terrorist watchlists in a way that is meaningful in terms of protecting 

the security of the American people. 

I want to thank in advance the witnesses for being here today 

and I hope you excuse the questions, because I think all of you 

know we have had a great deal of concern on the Homeland Security Committee for some time regarding the delayed accomplishment of an effective, functional Terrorist Screening Center. I believe very strongly in the missions and the goals of the screening 

center, and I certainly value the hard work and the dedication of 

the personnel who work there, and I certainly want to contribute 

in any way that we can to the success of your objective. 

But because we are here 21⁄2 years after September 11, we still 

know that we do not have a fully integrated terrorist watchlist 

database to identify and apprehend potential terrorists. Some may 

ask, what does that mean in practical terms; why would anyone 

care if this has not been accomplished? 

What it means is that someone could still slip through the cracks 

because the Government is not able in real-time to check a name 

against every available watchlist of known or suspected terrorists. 

This is true when the police pick up a suspect, when border inspectors are deciding to let someone in the country, and when consular 

offices are reviewing visa applications. 

3

For a function that is absolutely vital for our homeland security, 

the delay in completing the project is totally unacceptable. The 

damaging effects, I would submit, are incalculable, since we can’t 

even begin to know what opportunities have been missed to arrest, 

question, or prosecute possible terrorists. And, of course, we know 

if we had this capability prior to September 11, two of the hijackers 

might not have been permitted to board airplanes on that fateful 

day. More backsliding and excuse-making ought to be met with the 

stiffest bipartisan criticism. 

Responsibility for this task shifted four times during the first 2 

years after 9/11. And since the responsibility for the project has 

been given to the FBI, the deadline for completing it has been 

moved to December of 2003, to March, 2003, to mid-summer of 

2003, and now through December of 2004. 

There cannot be further delay. And according to the experts with 

whom we have consulted, there are no technological barriers to getting this job done. It is simply a matter of will, commitment, energy, and dedication to the task. Leadership by the Administration 

needs to be exercised at the highest levels to ensure that the latest 

deadline is met. And we need the entire Government to be on the 

same page. 

It is striking to me that the same week Secretary Ridge announced that this project was one of his top goals for 2004, a senior 

official in the Department of Homeland Security questioned whether watchlist consolidation was even necessary. I want the message 

to be clear: There is a bipartisan consensus in Congress that we 

need to forge ahead as rapidly as possible to implement a robust, 

agile, and comprehensive terrorist screening capability through 

consolidation of all existing Government watchlists. 

Through vigorous oversight we have tried to help the process 

along. Four months ago, the Democratic Members of our Committee prepared a concise list of 10 attributes that we believe ought 

to be the cornerstone of an effective Terrorist Screening Center 

database. As we elaborated in the report, we believe the Terrorist 

Screening Center must be, among other things, comprehensive, accurate, acceptable, timely, flexible and correctable. So, for example, 

even once watchlists have been integrated, the screening center 

cannot be considered fully operational until the information is accessible to everyone who needs it: Border Patrol, immigration inspectors, local police officers, and Federal law enforcement. 

Consistent with the letter I sent to the screening center earlier 

this week, I hope we can hear more from your testimony regarding 

the progress that has been made. 

One of the related issues that I hope you will comment on is 

whether all the right people even know about the Terrorist Screening Center. My staff was on the border earlier this month in Texas, 

and we were told that the Border Patrol is not aware of or linked 

to the Terrorist Screening Center. Likewise, we had a discussion 

yesterday with the State homeland security director who said that 

local law enforcement in his State was not aware of this important 

resource. 

In closing, while we know progress is being made, I think there 

is much more that must be done. And if that means putting people 

to work 24 hours a day in three shifts, as our soldiers are doing 

4

in Iraq today, then that is what we need to do to get this job done 

and get it done now to protect the American people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Nevada Mr. Gibbons, who chairs the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism on the House 

Homeland Security Committee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to our witnesses 

today, I want to welcome all of you and thank you for your appearance before us today. I think your testimony is going to go a long 

way into helping us to understand how the Terrorist Screening 

Center is working and what Congress can do to help make it a 

user-friendly system. 

Four months ago, before Congress passed the Homeland Security 

Act, and almost a full year before the Department of Homeland Security was up and running, the President’s National Strategy for 

Homeland Security established a consolidated terrorism watchlist 

as one of the President’s highest priorities. While there have been 

substantial technical and legal hurdles to overcome in the process 

of consolidating and integrating these lists, the names of suspected 

terrorists are now available to law enforcement and Federal officials, and have been since December of 2003. 

The Terrorist Screening Center Initiative has given our law enforcement officers the ability to identify terrorists who pose a direct 

threat to our Nation. While this information is now available, improvements are being worked on to help make the system faster 

and more user friendly so that the law enforcement officials patroling our streets and our border protection workers have immediate, 

seamless access to the information that they need. 

While it is essential that the Terrorist Screening Center is robust 

and fully deployed, we must make sure that the proper procedures 

are in place to ensure that the information is not misused. It is important to note all the information that the Terrorist Screening 

Center maintains has been collected in accordance with existing 

laws, and officials will continue to be bound by any applicable laws 

and constitutional requirements. But I hope, Director Bucella, that 

you will further address the civil liberties issue a bit today, especially as it relates to systems that have been put in place to ensure 

that this information is not misused. 

I look forward to your testimonies and to the hearing and how 

we can help ensure that the Terrorist Screening Center serves as 

a single, seamless resource in our fight against terrorism. Thanks 

again to each of you for appearing here today. And, Mr. Chairman, 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman from Nevada. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member for the Subcommittee on 

Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to join 

you and our colleagues on the Intelligence Counterterrorism Subcommittee. Now, no one would question the need for law enforcement at all levels to conduct terrorism screening in today’s world. 

It is certainly appropriate to have information and processing of information by certain private entities such as airlines and nuclear 

5

power facilities integrated into their screening processes. All of us 

are willing to endure more inconvenience to accommodate reasonable security procedures designed to protect our persons and property as well as our Nation’s rights and liberties; yet we ought to 

be secure from terrorism with our traditional rights, not in exchange for them. If we have to diminish or balance our rights and 

liberties for security, we have handed those who scoff at our society 

a substantial victory. 

Even before 9/11 tragedies galvanized the need to be much more 

diligent in preventing terrorism, we were still seeing problems with 

protections of basic rights and remedies. Accounts of general racial 

and ethnic profiling and from abuse of sensitive data against citizens and others by either inept or overzealous or ill-willed persons 

in their efforts to ferret out ordinary street crime, such as drug 

crimes, were well established through lawsuits and conscientious 

evaluations of law enforcement practices in many jurisdictions. So 

with the breadth of access to information, dissemination, and vision 

to all law enforcement officers as well as private entities, we know 

that unless privacy measures are made systemic, the prejudices 

and biases already there will only be enhanced by the gravity of 

permitting terrorism. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses with the hopes that 

we can protect persons and properties as well as protect our traditional rights and liberties. I yield back. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. 

I note the presence of the Chairman of the full House Homeland 

Security Committee, Mr. Cox from California. Did you want to be 

heard, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COX. I would just make a brief opening statement. I want 

to thank you for holding this hearing and also thank Chairman 

Gibbons. This is the second joint hearing of the Homeland Security 

Committee and the Judiciary Committee. 

And I welcome you in joining our witnesses. This is an excellent 

panel and I think it will focus us on the topic before us. It has been 

less than 5 months since the President’s directive. The Terrorist 

Screening Center began carrying out the task of providing unified, 

accurate terrorist screening information to screeners around the 

country 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, through a single node. The 

Terrorist Screening Center will serve State and local officials as 

well as private sector entities that manage critical infrastructure. 

It will even serve foreign governments that have entered into immigration agreements with the United States if they are partners 

in the global war on terrorism. But the Terrorist Screening Center 

support is particularly important to our Nation’s first responders, 

our border protection officials, and the consular offices who adjudicate hundreds of visa applications everyday. Our overriding objective is, after all, to prevent terrorist attacks. 

There, the Terrorist Screening Center represents a quantum leap 

in the Nation’s ability not only to keep terrorists out, but also to 

apprehend terrorists who manage to get in. It will give law enforcement officers a reliable way to determine whether a person stopped 

for a routine traffic violation is, based on all the information available to the U.S. Government, involved in some way in terrorist activity. 

6

It also represents another important milestone in tearing down 

barriers to information-sharing between the Intelligence Community and law enforcement officials. Integrating the data contained 

in the Government’s legacy watchlist is a positive step. It was 

needed. Historically, 9 Federal agencies maintain 12 disparate 

watch lists. The contents of these watchlists weren’t accessible 

across agency lines and they weren’t comprehensively analyzed. 

That means we had no efficient way of accessing the information 

we had, and, as a practical matter, what you can’t access, you don’t 

really know. That is one of the hard lessons of the 9/11 attacks. 

But integrating the information on all those lists is a complex 

task, even in the era of interoperable computer systems and instantly searchable data bases, and it must be done right. And to 

be the right solution, TSC must not come at the price of the civil 

rights or first amendment freedoms of American citizens, because 

we are fighting to preserve our way of life. That is a fundamental 

part of protecting our Nation, and I believe it has been worth the 

time it has taken to get TSC done right. 

The information collected and maintained in the Government’s 

various watchlists was collected under different authorities for 

widely divergent purposes and it has been maintained in different 

formats. There was no agreed-upon set of discriminators to determine whether an individual should be watchlisted and the 12 legacy lists, taken together, had hundreds of thousands of names. 

They couldn’t be dumped into some massive Government data base 

of potential bad guys. Each name had to be analyzed to make sure 

it belonged on TSC’s integrated list. 

So at this hearing, we hope to get an update on the TSC’s 

progress and relationship to the Department of Homeland Security. 

And equally important, we hope to be reassured that TSC and the 

databases that feed it will not impinge upon the civil rights and 

civil liberties to which we as Americans are entitled. 

Mr. Chairman, there are also serious questions we must ask: Is 

the Terrorist Screening Center the solution for the present, or is 

it the solution forever? Is it structured in the most effective way? 

Does it work? Is it fast? Is it reliable? Is it being used by those who 

need it the most? Can a user get additional information on a TSC 

name hit quickly and reliably? Is TSC’s management and supervision appropriate? How can it be improved? Are civil liberties and 

privacy interests scrupulously safeguarded? Could a name get on 

TSC’s list erroneously? If so, how would that be discovered and how 

corrected quickly? 

And certainly I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses on these points. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield 

back on these issues. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, Mr. Cox. 

And I noticed Ms. McCarthy from Missouri has joined us, and 

good to have you with us, and the other Members of the Subcommittee as well. 

I say this to the panelists. We inevitably are going to be interrupted at least two or three times, so we will try to move along as 

quickly as we can. And if you would keep a sharp look-out on that 

panel at your desk, and when that amber light appears, it is your 

warning that the 5 minutes is about to expire, and when the red 

7

light appears you are on thin ice. If you could wrap up at the 5-

minute mark, we would be appreciative to you. 

We have read your written statements. We have four distinguished witnesses today. Our first witness is Donna A. Bucella, Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. Ms. Bucella is detailed to 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation as Director of the Terrorist 

Screening Center from the Transportation Security Administration. 

At TSA, Ms. Bucella is the Director of Aviation Operations. She 

has had a very distinguished career in public and private service. 

She received her bachelor of arts agree from the University of Virginia and her law degree from the University of Miami school of 

law. She began her legal career in 1984 in the U.S. Advocate Generals Corps and has been a reservist since 1987. She holds the 

rank of Lieutenant colonel. During her service in the U.S. Army, 

she served as defense counsel for the JAG Corps. In 1993, she became the Director of the Office of Legal Education for the Department of Justice. In 1999, Ms. Bucella was appointed by President 

Clinton and confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the U.S. Attorney for 

the Middle District of Florida. 

Our next witness is Mr. Charlie Bartoldus who became the Director of the National Targeting Center, Customs and Border Protection in September, 2002. Prior to his assignment as the NTC Director, he served as Director of the U.S. Customs Service port in 

Baltimore, Maryland. During his career in Customs, he has served 

as Director of Seizures and Penalties, Director of the Department 

of Treasury’s Executive Office of Asset Forfeiture, Director of Account Management under the trade compliance redesign, the ACE 

program, and Deputy Director of Outbound Programs. He began 

his Customs career in 1979 as a customs inspector at JFK International Airport in New York. 

Our third witness is Director Jim McMahon of the Office of Public Security for the State of New York. Congressman Sweeney from 

New York has requested to introduce him, and I am pleased to 

yield to Representative Sweeney. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is an honor to 

be able to introduce not just someone I served with, but he lives 

in my hometown and we grocery shop at the same place. 

I am pleased to introduce Jim McMahon who is currently the Director of the New York State Office of Public Security. Mr. 

McMahon has the distinguished record having served in the New 

York State Police for 37 years, including 8 as its top official, as the 

Superintendent. His accomplishments serve as a model demonstrating how Federal, State and local officials can work together 

productively on the urgent counterterrorism and homeland security 

mission. He will give us an important perspective demonstrating 

how law enforcement in both rural and urban areas interact with 

the new Terrorist Screening Center. While he is a Rochester, New 

York native, he currently resides in Clifton Park, New York. He is 

a U.S. Army veteran and has served Governors from both sides of 

the political aisle. Welcome, Director McMahon, and all of the witnesses. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, Mr. Sweeney. 

Our final witness is Mr. Jerry Berman, who is the President of 

the Center for Democracy and Technology and a member of the 

8

Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. From 1978 to 1988, Mr. Berman was Chief Legislative 

Counsel at the ACLU and Founder and Director of ACLU Projects 

on Privacy and Information Technology. In December, 1994, he 

founded CDT, a Washington, D.C.-based Internet public policy organization. In 1999, he served on the congressionally appointed 

Child Online Protection Commission Task Force to study technologies and other methods for protecting children from objectionable material on the Internet consistent with constitutional values. 

Mr. Berman received his B.A, M.A, and L.L.B. At the University 

of California, Berkeley. He was graduated with honors, was elected 

to Phi Beta Kappa, and served as editor of the California Law Review at the Bolt Law School. 

It is good to have each of you. As I have said before, we have 

your written statements and they have been examined and will be 

reexamined. And, folks, as you know, we are now in a situation 

where accusatory fingers are being pointed by everyone toward everyone. And when I last checked when you apply hindsight, it usually comes up 20–20. It is easy to play with hindsight. I think what 

we need to do is to try to benefit from mistakes—and mistakes 

have been made—but to benefit and hope that they don’t repeat 

themselves subsequently. 

Good to have you all with us. And, Director Bucella, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DONNA A. BUCELLA, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST 

SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Ms. BUCELLA. Good afternoon, Chairman Coble, Chairman Gibbons, and Members of both Subcommittees. The Terrorist Screening Center was created to consolidate terrorist watchlists from multiple agencies and provide 24/7 operational support for all Federal, 

State and local law enforcement officers across the country and 

around the world. 

We began operation on December 1. For the first time, local law 

enforcement has a direct, real-time line of communication to the 

Federal Government concerning terrorism. 

Today I will tell you about our daily operations, including some 

of our successes, our future plans, and how we will safeguard civil 

liberties. I will provide as much information as I can in this open 

forum. However, I will be happy to provide additional classified details in a closed hearing at your request. 

First, I would like to introduce our partners in combating terrorism: Captain Richard McLaughlin from the Arlington Police Department, Massachusetts; Sergeant Victor Hall and Officer Brad 

Land from the Arlington Police Department in Texas. 

The Terrorist Screening Center includes participants from the 

Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, State and Treasury. 

During our first week of operations, we answered 56 calls. And on 

at least two occasions during that week, we were able to link separate State and Federal investigations of two known or suspected 

terrorists. Since then, we have had a steady increase of calls, now 

averaging over 210 calls per week, and close to half of those calls 

are positive identifications of known or suspected terrorists that 

were encountered within, at, or outside of our borders. 

9

Let me take a moment to describe to you how we operate. A police officer checks the National Crime Information Center, NCIC 

database, during a routine traffic stop and may be directed to contact the TSC for assistance in the identification process. We run 

the name through our database to determine if the person is a positive match. If positive or inconclusive, we pass the information to 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterterrorism Watch, 

which then coordinates with the local joint terrorism task force or 

the case agent, who then directly responds to the police officer. 

For example, two individuals were arrested for speeding. We 

were contacted and assisted in identifying one of these individuals 

as a known or suspected terrorist. This encounter significantly impacted a long-term investigation confirming the immeasurable 

value of bringing local law enforcement into the war on terrorism. 

The State Department plays an essential role opposite the 

screening center. Since December 1, we have reviewed over 54,000 

security advisory opinions. Eighty of the visa applicants were determined to be associated with terrorism. Fifty-three visas have 

been revoked due to the actions at the Terrorist Screening Center. 

We have approached this enormous and complex challenge to 

consolidate terrorist watchlists by implementing a phased-in approach. Since December 1, we have had the ability to, one, make 

the names and identifying information of terrorists accessible to 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement; two, have a system for 

properly reviewing whether a known or suspected terrorist should 

be included in or deleted from additional screening processes; 

three, administer a process to ensure that persons who may share 

the same name with a known or suspected terrorist are not unduly 

inconvenienced; and four, implement a system to adjust or delete 

outdated or incorrect information to prevent problems arising from 

these identifications. 

We now have a single database which is updated daily and is unclassified, law enforcement-sensitive, containing identifying information of known or suspected terrorists. We are supplied with information regarding international terrorists from the Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center and domestic terrorist information from 

the FBI. Our database facilitates the consolidation of disparate information currently held by multiple agencies and used in different 

ways to be brought together for a single purpose, to help identify 

terrorists. 

We recognize that with all of these capabilities also comes the responsibility to ensure that we continue to protect civil liberties. We 

have absolutely no independent authority to conduct intelligence 

collection. In fact, we do not collect information at all. We only receive information collected by other entities with preexisting authority to do so, each with their own policies and procedures to protect privacy rights and civil liberties. 

The handling and use of information including U.S. persons’ information is governed by the same statutory, regulatory, and constitutional requirements as if the information was not to be included in our database. 

We are committed to addressing the issues arising from the 

misidentification of persons under previous watchlists and practices. Procedures are in place to review and promptly adjust or deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
10

lete erroneous or outdated information. And such records have already been identified and removed. 

The creation of our Center marks a significant step forward in 

protecting America by detecting, disrupting, or preempting terrorist 

threats. We are already contributing to nationwide efforts to keep 

terrorists out of the United States and locate those who may already be in our country. 

I have given you but a few of our successes. We have screened 

to date over 2,000 calls and the numbers continue to rise. State 

and local law enforcement officers now know if they have encountered a known or suspected terrorist during a routine traffic stop. 

Numerous State and local law enforcement officers are providing 

invaluable assistance and are integral in the efforts combating terrorists. 

As previously stated, the opening of our Center on December 1 

is the beginning, not the end. I appreciate your interest in our activities and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. COBLE. Director Bucella, we thank you for that. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bucella follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONNA A. BUCELLA

Good afternoon Chairman Coble, Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Members and Members of both Subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the missions 

and objectives of the new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD–6), issued on September 16, 2003, ordered the creation of the TSC, directing its operations to begin on December 1, 2003, and we met 

that goal. The TSC was created to ensure that government investigators, screeners, 

federal agents, and state and local law enforcement officers have ready access to the 

information and expertise they need to respond quickly when a known or suspected 

terrorist is encountered here in the United States, at our borders and at our embassies. Today, I will tell you about our daily operations, including some of our successes, our future plans, and how we will safeguard civil liberties. I will provide as 

much information as I can in this open forum, however, I will be happy to provide 

additional, classified details in a closed hearing at your request. 

TSC OPERATIONS

The TSC is a multi-agency Center, including participants from the FBI, Department of State, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secret Service, Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, and the 

Office of Foreign Assets Control. Other agencies, including the Postal Service and 

Drug Enforcement Administration, have agreed to participate. Our goal is to consolidate the Government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in screening processes. We will be a 

diverse Center, manned by experts to include intelligence analysts and law enforcement from a wide variety of agencies, and to communicate and coordinate efforts 

across the full spectrum of federal, state and local government agencies. Currently, 

the TSC is staffed by approximately 84 employees, including permanent personnel, 

temporary duty assignees, and contractors to staff our 24/7 operation. 

Since December 1, 2003, TSC has been providing key resources for screeners and 

law enforcement personnel. These include:

(1) a single coordination point for terrorist screening data;

(2) a consolidated 24/7 call center for encounter identification assistance;

(3) access to a coordinated law enforcement response to federal, state and local 

law enforcement;

(4) a formal process for tracking encounters and ensuring feedback is supplied 

to the appropriate entities, and

(5) a process to address the misidentification issues.

The TSC’s initial capabilities were limited because of the need to integrate records 

in a way that ensured that the data about known and suspected terrorists was as 

accurate as possible. Each agency contributing data to the TSC is using its own 

11

database. These databases, which were created to support the mission of the individual agencies, are in many instances their case management systems, not terrorist 

watch lists. 

Despite our limited capabilities in the first week of operation, the TSC answered 

56 calls, including one in which a local police department was seeking information 

regarding an ongoing investigation. A suspected terrorist had traveled over 1,000 

miles from his home, and the department’s call alerted the FBI to his activities. The 

police department coordinated their surveillance with the FBI investigation, resulting in solid intelligence for both local and federal law enforcement. 

Another call came from a West Coast police department that was investigating 

an individual for a state felony charge. The TSC determined the individual was a 

terrorism suspect in a federal investigation, and our operational component at the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism Division put the respective investigators together. The FBI 

and the local investigator are now sharing case information, resulting in a coordinated approach. Again, we are linking investigations and coordinating the U.S. Government approach to screening for suspected terrorists. 

There are three fundamental types of inquiries: interior (within the U.S.), border 

(at the border/ports points of entry) and exterior (outside the border). Interior inquiries will normally be made by state and local law enforcement. Border inquiries 

are made by Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Exterior inquiries are conducted 

by the State Department. 

The process for making an internal inquiry is relatively simple. A police officer 

checks the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database on a routine traffic 

stop, and he/she is requested to call the TSC because the person stopped has similar 

identifying information to a known or suspected terrorist listed in the NCIC. When 

the officer calls TSC, through the police department’s dispatch, the call center 

verifies the caller’s identity, takes the information on the encounter and the circumstances of the encounter, and checks his name through the TSC’s database. The 

TSC database includes the name, date of birth and other identifying information for 

a known or suspected terrorist. The call center quickly researches the underlying 

information, including classified, sensitive information. We make a determination as 

to whether the encounter is the same person as the one in our database. After notifying the officer of a positive, negative or inconclusive result, we help coordinate 

operational support as to how the person should be handled. For example, the officer may be advised—in appropriate and lawfully authorized circumstances—to arrest, detain or question the individual. Simultaneously, we contact our operational 

component at the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division known as CT Watch. CT Watch 

provides for the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to respond. In some cases, 

officers provide valuable intelligence from a simple car stop, and in other cases, 

JTTF agents will respond to assist. Two cases serve to demonstrate the process: 

In one case, local police arrested a suspected terrorist associate on a state criminal violation. After TSC assisted in the positive identities match, the CT Watch, 

contacted the FBI case agent, who immediately went to the local detention facility 

to talk with the individual. During that interview, the individual agreed to cooperate with the FBI. Another case illustrates the intersection between local law enforcement, homeland security and counterterrorism investigations. Local police arrested an individual and while conducting the ‘‘search incident to arrest,’’ discovered 

significant evidence of terrorist activities. The TSC confirmed the individual’s identity and our operational component, the CT Watch, notified the case agent. Intelligence gained from the local arrest has significantly affected a long term 

counterterrorism case, confirming the value of bringing local law enforcement into 

the war on terrorism. 

In addition to serving local law enforcement, the TSC receives a high volume of 

calls from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors who are stationed on the 

Nation’s borders. A typical CBP call involves incoming passengers on international 

flights. A CBP inspector will query a list of names and may receive several possible 

suspected terrorist hits from IBIS and NCIC. The CBP inspector will go through 

their National Targeting Center (NTC), where the record will be analyzed, then 

passed to TSC. Our process is the same as it would be for a law enforcement call, 

that is, to examine the underlying record which often contains all source sensitive 

and highly classified information on a 24/7 basis, and determine whether the individual is identical to the person in the Terrorist Screening Center Database. The 

TSC then appropriately passes any derogatory information on the subject, and CBP 

makes a determination on whether the individual will be allowed into the United 

States. 

Our consular officers are our first line of defense in keeping known and suspected 

terrorists out of our Homeland by denying visas to these individuals. In this regard, 

State Department assignees at the TSC are continuing the work previously done by 

12

the TIPOFF Office. Since December 1, 2003, when the TSC came into operation, 

State Department assignees and their staff at the TSC have reviewed over 54,000 

security advisory opinions, which are cables from U.S. Embassies and Consulates 

around the globe, to determine if the visa applicants described in these cables were 

‘‘true hits’’ with records contained in the database. Eighty of those ‘‘hits’’ resulted 

in true matches. As an example in December, a member of a terrorist organization 

applied for a visa at a U.S. consulate overseas. Consular officials denied the visa 

based on the TSC’s review of the information and confirmation that the individual 

was a ‘‘true hit,’’ i.e. matched the record at the TSC. The same process applied to 

a senior member of a proscribed terrorist organization based overseas. His visa was 

also denied. 

In addition, 53 visas have been revoked, as a result of the State Department’s 

careful comparison of new records entered into the terrorist database with visas 

that had been previously issued. 

Finally, since December 1, 2003, agreements between the State Department and 

several allies are now implemented at the TSC, resulting in over 125 possible ‘‘true 

hits’’ of known and suspected terrorists at the borders of those nations. During January, an individual known to the U.S. government as an affiliate of a terrorist organization attempted to board a flight to enter one of these nations. The individual’s 

identity was one of several thousand consolidated from various U.S. agencies and 

passed to this nation. According to protocols contained in our agreement, State Department assignees at the TSC worked with their counterparts in our allied nation, 

and the individual was removed from the flight despite holding valid travel documents. 

According to a 16 September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between Secretary Powell, Secretary Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft, and DCI Tenet, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center’s (TTIC) identities database will serve as the single 

source for the TSC’s terrorist database, excluding purely domestic terrorism. Currently TTIC, which assembles and analyzes information from a wide range of 

sources to identify potential terrorists, provides the TSC with the vast majority of 

its information about known or suspected international terrorists. 

The FBI provides the TSC with information about purely domestic terrorism—

that is, information that has been determined to have no link to foreign intelligence, 

counterintelligence, or international terrorism. The TSC consolidates this identifying 

information and makes it accessible for queries from federal, state, and local agencies for screening purposes. 

When a nomination is received at the TSC from TTIC or the FBI, it is reviewed 

by assignees to the TSC from participating agencies, who, in consultation with their 

assigning member agencies, determine how an encounter with this individual will 

be handled. The system is tailored to provide different feedback depending on where 

the encounter takes place. For example, an FBI representative who reviews a record 

may determine that an individual is subject to a criminal warrant and needs to be 

arrested by state and local law enforcement, while the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) representative may decide that the individual is not appropriate 

to board an aircraft. This tailoring ensures that specific guidance is provided to federal, state, and local agencies based on their legal authority. 

TSC CAPABILITIES

The TSC has approached the challenge to consolidate terrorists watch lists by implementing a ‘‘phased in’’ approach. 

We implemented phase one from September 16, 2003 to December 1, 2003, on the 

day the TSC achieved initial operating capability. During Phase One, the TSC had 

the ability to: (1) make the names and identifying information of terrorists, known 

to or suspected by the U.S. Government, accessible to federal, state and local law 

enforcement; (2) have a system for properly reviewing whether a known or suspected terrorist should be included in or deleted from additional screening processes; 

(3) administer a process to ensure that persons, who may share a name with a 

known or suspected terrorist, are not unduly inconvenienced in U.S. Government 

screening processes; and, (4) implement a system to adjust or delete outdated or incorrect information to prevent problems arising from misidentifications. 

Phase two occurred from December 1, 2003 to March 1, 2004 in the development 

of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The TSDB is an unclassified law enforcement sensitive database, containing identifying information of known or suspected terrorists. The TSDB allows the consolidation of disparate information, currently held by multiple agencies and used in different ways, to be brought together 

for a single purpose—to help identify and detain potential terrorists to prevent future terrorist attacks. 

13

We are currently in phase three which concludes before the end of this year. The 

TSC will create a more dynamic database and use a single, integrated system for 

ensuring known or suspected terrorists’ identities are promptly incorporated into all 

appropriate screening processes. The terrorist screening database will eventually 

allow private sector entities, such as operators of critical infrastructure facilities or 

organizers of large events, to submit a list of persons associated with those events 

to the U.S. Government to be screened for any nexus to terrorism. In addition, the 

TSC will begin to implement mechanisms for sharing terrorist screening information 

with additional cooperating countries and to obtain such information from these 

countries. The Department of State is currently working on this issue. 

Because our mission cuts across traditional boundaries between law enforcement, 

national security, and homeland defense, we have begun an aggressive outreach program. Our outreach must include members of the intelligence community, federal 

law enforcement, non-law enforcement/non-intelligence related government agencies, 

critical infrastructures, and most importantly, officers from the Nation’s 18,000 law 

enforcement agencies. We not only train our law enforcement and government agency partners; viewing outreach as a two-way process, we also seek feedback and innovative ideas from them. 

SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTIES

We recognize that with all of these capabilities also comes the responsibility to 

ensure that we continue to protect our civil liberties. 

The TSC has absolutely no authority to conduct intelligence collection or other operations. In fact, the TSC does not collect information at all—it only receives information collected by other entities with preexisting authority to do so, each with 

their own policies and procedures to protect privacy rights and civil liberties. The 

handling and use of information, including U.S. person information, is governed by 

the same statutory, regulatory, and constitutional requirements as if the information was not to be included in a TSC-managed database. 

The TSC’s primary mission is to ensure that the identities data that is already 

known to the U.S. Government is held in one location where it can be queried by 

those who need it, including federal security screeners and state and local law enforcement officers. The structures which are in place also ensure that information 

about U.S. persons that has been determined to be purely domestic terrorism information with no link to foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or international terrorism does not go through the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, but instead is 

placed directly into the TSC by the FBI. The Attorney General has also been directed to implement procedures and safeguards with respect to information about 

U.S. persons, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence. 

We are also committed to addressing the issues and inconveniences arising from 

the misidentification of persons under previous watch-listing practices. Procedures 

are in place to review and promptly adjust or delete erroneous or outdated domestic 

terrorism information. The TSC works closely with TTIC regarding any international terrorism information errors, as only TTIC can make changes to the 

records it provides to the TSC. In addition, we are currently in the process of creating a dedicated staff specifically to address the misidentification process for the 

TSC. 

CONCLUSION

The creation of the Terrorist Screening Center marks a significant step forward 

in protecting America’s communities and families by detecting, disrupting, or preempting terrorist threats. The TSC is already contributing to nationwide efforts to 

keep terrorists out of the U.S. and locate those who may already be in the country. 

For this unclassified hearing, I have given you only a few of our successes. We have 

screened over 2,000 calls since our inception, and the numbers continue to rise. 

State and local law enforcement officers are now assisting in the identification of 

known or suspected terrorists here in the U.S., have provided invaluable intelligence 

for pending investigation, and are now integral in the efforts of combating terrorism 

in the U.S. I appreciate the Joint Subcommittee’s interest in the TSC’s activities 

and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. COBLE. And in a sense of fairness, Director Bucella used 6 

minutes, so I will allot—if you need 6 minutes, Director Bartoldus 

14

STATEMENT OF CHARLES BARTOLDUS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

TARGETING CENTER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. Good afternoon, Chairman Gibbons, Chairman 

Coble, and Members of both Subcommittees. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today on the subject of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBPs interaction with the Terrorist Screening Center, or TSC. 

I would like to begin with a very short update on the efforts that 

Homeland Security has taken during the merger itself to achieve 

one face of the border. CBP is responsible for effectively deploying 

42,000 employees in preserving the traditional missions of our 

predecessor agencies. The actions undertaken over the past year 

have set the stage for the planned conversion of approximately 

18,000 legacy Agriculture, Customs, and Immigration inspectors to 

Customs and Border Protection offices. People, technology, automation, electronic information, and partnerships are concepts that 

serve as the foundation of CBP’s antiterrorism initiatives. These 

concepts improve the security of our borders by reinforcing the 

components of our layered strategy of defense. 

Today I would like to focus solely on how these elements of our 

layered defense work with regard to CBP’s interaction with the 

TSC. As the Director of the National Targeting Center, which came 

into existence in October of 2001 in direct response to the events 

of 9/11, my staff and I have worked extensively with the Terrorist 

Screening Center since its formation in December of 2003. I have 

witnessed firsthand the improvements in the process and the information-sharing and coordination. 

CBP officers at the National Targeting Center routinely work 

with the TSC to evaluate and assess potential matches of individuals that may be attempting to enter the United States with harmful intent. 

The TSC enhances CBP’s effectiveness in several ways. The primary benefit to CBP has been TSC’s ability to provide substantive 

information pertaining to subjects. This information is critical to 

the positive identification of individuals and, consequently, the 

timely release of individuals deemed to be negative matches. The 

TSC provides for one consolidated point of contact, rather than 

having multiple contacts for different agencies and different departments, as was the case prior to the TSC’s formation. 

Prior to the creation of the TSC, hours could be lost waiting for 

responses on inquiries. However, now in addition to the ease of access, the average turnaround time we experience with the TSC is 

20 to 30 minutes or less. The reality of a single sensitive but unclassified database has greatly enhanced our ability to identify suspect individuals while facilitating legitimate travelers. CBP benefits from the clear channels and direction provided by the TSC as 

well as increased coordination, consistent training, and clear guidance that results from a single response and database. This has enhanced our law enforcement efforts. 

A critical component of CBP’s mission is the 100 percent screening of passengers and cargo entering the United States. The TSC 

single database allows CBP officers in the field and at the National 

Targeting Center to identify high-risk travelers and transactions. 

15

The interaction between the TSC and CBP provides for a cumulative view of law enforcement and intelligence database information rather than a single-scope vision. 

Continued cooperation between the TSC and CBP further serves 

to bridge the gap between the international and domestic venues 

in which terrorists operate. CBP has a strong history of cooperation 

and partnership with law enforcement agencies at the Federal, 

State and local levels. CBP’s layered defense is the cornerstone of 

our antiterrorism mission, and as a key component of that layered 

defense, we depend on the TSC in order to operate at our full potential. 

Essentially as the merger under the Department of Homeland 

Security matures, we find the layers of defense are increasingly 

transcending agency boundaries, and CBP’s interaction with the 

TSC is just one example of these successes. 

Thank you again, Chairman Coble, Chairman Gibbons, and the 

Members of the Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. I will 

be happy to answer questions. 

Mr. COBLE. Director Bartoldus, we thank you as well. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartoldus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES BARTOLDUS

Good afternoon Chairman Gibbons, Chairman Coble, and Members of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism and the Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, and Homeland Security. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the subject of U.S. Customs and Border Protection—CBP’s—interaction with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). 

I would like to begin with an update on the Department of Homeland Security 

merger itself, and the efforts to achieve ‘‘One Face at the Border.’’ CBP is responsible for effectively deploying approximately 42,000 employees and preserving the 

traditional missions of our predecessor agencies. Over the past year CBP has:

• Established a unified chain-of-command structure for the Office of Field Operations and the Border Patrol.

• Developed a new comprehensive Border Patrol strategy that incorporates the 

CBP priority mission.

• Created a new CBP uniform, patch, and badge with the phased roll out expected to reach completion July 2004.

• Refocused and broadened the skills of legacy employees by delivering Unified 

Primary training.

• Introduced new CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialist positions.

• Developed and delivered more than 50 new training courses in support of our 

homeland security mission.

These actions have set the stage for the planned conversion of approximately 

18,000 legacy Agriculture, Customs, and Immigration Inspectors to Customs and 

Border Protection Officers. 

People, technology, automation, electronic information, and partnerships are concepts that serve as the foundation for CBP’s anti-terrorism initiatives. These concepts improve the security of our borders by reinforcing the components of our layered defense. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION NATIONAL TARGETING CENTER

The Customs and Border Protection National Targeting Center or NTC came into 

existence in October 2001 in the immediate aftermath of the events of September 

11th. From its beginnings as the Office of Border Security, the NTC has grown 

swiftly, providing nationally directed targeting technology, targeting methodology, 

subject matter expertise, and training that encompasses the enforcement and regulatory missions of CBPs predecessor agencies. 

In January of 2003 the NTC staff moved to a state of the art facility in Northern 

Virginia, and CBP personnel assigned there represent subject matter areas in agriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
16

culture, customs and immigration. Other CBP offices providing staff to this effort 

include the Border Patrol, Office of Intelligence, and Office of Information and Technology. 

Additionally, the NTC supports the enforcement and regulatory missions of various agencies through a network of liaisons, which includes the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Contact is maintained with members of the 

intelligence community to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 

Intelligence Agency and other intelligence services. CBP’s commitment to collaborative targeting efforts is also demonstrated by the Food and Drug Administration 

Prior Notice Center located at the NTC and operational since December 11, 2003. 

There, CBP and FDA personnel conduct joint targeting on a round the clock basis 

in support of the Bio-Terrorism Act. 

AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM

The Automated Targeting System is an automated tool that permits CBP to process advance information and focuses its inspection efforts on potentially high-risk 

transactions and travelers. The ATS is a flexible, evolving system that integrates 

information from government, commercial, and enforcement databases. In the cargo 

environment, ATS analyzes electronic cargo information related to individual shipments to profile and rank them in order of risk based on the application of rules. 

ATS outputs are then reviewed for potential further action by CBP such as document review and inspection. 

I would like to note at this point that through a combination of national targeting 

efforts at the NTC, local targeting performed by Manifest Review Units, and International targeting performed at CSI locations, we review and evaluate data regarding all ocean shipments bound for the United States, prior to arrival. And, we 

screen 100% of those identified as high or potential risk. 

To reach this level of screening, CBP has worked aggressively over the past year 

to increase the quality, quantity, and timeliness of the cargo information we receive 

electronically. As a result, the industry data that feeds ATS is substantial. 

The 24-Hour Manifest Rule for shipped goods requires detailed and accurate information for all shipments destined for the U.S., 24 hours prior to lading overseas. 

This is key to CBP’s targeting successes in the sea environment. CBP implemented 

the 24-Hour Rule Manifest Compliance Program on February 2, 2003. CBP has seen 

great improvement in data quality through a phased-in strategy of informed compliance monitored and enforced by the NTC. 

This is further reinforced by the Trade Act Final Rule published on December 5, 

2003, less than one year after the process began with public meetings. It mandates 

advance electronic cargo information, inbound and outbound, for all modes for transportation. 

Today, I would like to focus on how these elements of our layered defense work 

with regard to CBP’s interaction with the TSC. 

CBP Officers at the NTC routinely work with the TSC in order to evaluate and 

assess potential matches of individuals on the TSC watch list that may be attempting to enter the United States with harmful intent. The TSC enhances CBP’s effectiveness in the following ways:

• The TSC provides for one consolidated watch list rather than the multiple 

lists that were maintained by different departments and agencies prior to 

TSC’s existence.

• TSC provides around the clock, real time access to substantive information 

pertaining to subjects on the watch list. This information is critical to the 

positive identification of watch listed individuals and consequently, the timely 

release of individuals deemed to be negative matches.

CBP also contributes to the TSC consolidated watch list via an information sharing arrangement with the Transportation Security Administration in which CBP 

provides Advance Passenger Information System data for TSA’s performance of a 

risk assessment on crewmembers on international flights. Any hit or other derogatory information is then coordinated with TSA and the appropriate agency which 

may result in the addition of names to the TSC watchlist. 

The interaction between the TSC and CBP provides for a cumulative view of law 

enforcement and intelligence database information, rather than a single scope vision. Continued cooperation between TSC and CBP further serves to bridge the gap 

between the international and domestic venues in which terrorists operate. 

17

CONCLUSION

CBP has a strong history of cooperation and partnerships with law enforcement 

agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. CBP’s layered defense is the cornerstone of our anti-terrorism mission, and as a key component of that layered defense, 

we depend on the TSC in order to operate at our full potential. Essentially, as the 

merger under the Department of Homeland Security matures, we find that the ‘‘layers’’ of defense are increasingly transcending agency boundaries, and CBP’s interaction with the TSC is just one example. 

Thank you again, Chairman Gibbons, Chairman Coble, and the members of the 

Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. COBLE. Director McMahon. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. McMAHON, DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SECURITY, STATE OF NEW YORK 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Chairman Coble and Chairman Gibbons, and distinguished Members of both Subcommittees. It is an 

honor for me to be able to testify here today about the Terrorist 

Screening Center from a perspective of a State and local law enforcement customer. 

Throughout my career in public service, I have been fortunate 

enough to have worked cooperatively with all the Federal law enforcement agencies as well as the majority of the 540 law enforcement agencies in New York State. These close cooperative relationships, many times informal, have been instrumental in reducing 

the incidence of violent crime in New York State to levels not seen 

since the 1960’s. 

The backbone formal information-sharing system for State and 

local law enforcement during this time was the National Crime Information Center, or NCIC. NCIC is a system that reaches law enforcement throughout the United States and has the capability of 

providing information through a patrol car radio or an in-car computer to nearly every officer across the Nation out on patrol. The 

information contained in the system is what we refer to as ‘‘hot 

files,’’ wanted persons, missing persons, stolen cars, stolen guns, or 

stolen property. 

In New York, since the deadly attack of 9/11, our first and foremost responsibility is to do everything humanly possible to prevent 

another terrorist attack by utilizing our 75,000 local law enforcement officers to the fullest extent possible. To facilitate this effort, 

we have built an intelligence center near Albany, New York. Our 

ultimate objective is to be able to provide timely, relevant, and actionable terrorism intelligence to patrol officers and detectives 

which could prevent a terrorist act or enhance a terrorist investigation by a Federal agency. 

NCIC is still the only national system able to reach the State 

and local patrol car. There are three scenarios that a State and 

local law enforcement officer can be faced with during an encounter 

with a person during a traffic stop or an ongoing investigation. The 

first is what we call the red light stop. In these cases, the patrol 

officer accesses NCIC with a name and date of birth inquiry and 

receives back information sufficient to arrest the subject if he or 

she is a person wanted by a State or local jurisdiction or by the 

Federal Government. 

18

The second situation involves a green light stop. This indicates, 

based upon the NCIC name and date of birth inquiry, that the person stopped is not actively wanted by any law enforcement agency. 

The third situation is the most complicated and the most critical 

to an ongoing terrorist investigation. This is what we refer to as 

a yellow light stop or investigative inquiry. In this situation, a police officer has someone detained or stopped. The person is not actively wanted, but the officer has suspicions about whether the individual is connected to a terrorist-related investigation or has suspected links to terrorism. It is this yellow light area where the Nation’s 700,000 State and local law enforcement officers can be most 

beneficial in assisting our Federal investigative partners. 

Kindly allow me to provide a hypothetical yellow light situation. 

A patrol officer responds to a call of a suspicious person filming the 

perimeter of a nuclear power plant. The individual is not from the 

area and has no apparent association with the immediate area. The 

officer is suspicious and therefore conducts an inquiry into the 

NCIC database. 

Prior to December 1, 2003, the inception date of the Terrorist 

Screening Center, there was no way to conduct a search of the various Federal databases to ascertain if the suspicious person had 

any ties to an ongoing investigation. The inception of the Terrorist 

Screening Center has provided State and local law enforcement, its 

customer, with an important tool to instruct the law enforcement 

officer in a noncustodial situation like the example I provided 

above as to what if anything he or she should do. 

Returning to the nuclear power plant hypothetical, I will detail 

what now occurs. The patrol officer queries the name and date of 

birth of the suspicious person through the NCIC system. If the individual is a person of interest, the patrol officer receives a Violent 

Gang and Terrorist Organizational File, VGTOF, hit that directs 

the officer to call a toll-free number for additional direction from 

the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Once the Terrorist Screening Center is contacted and confirms 

the individual, additional information is provided which places that 

hit into any one of four classifications: arrest, detain, investigate or 

query. This interaction also expands to include the FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch that has the ability to provide additional direction 

and information on what action to take next, in addition to providing further identifying data. The resulting conversation provides 

the law enforcement officer with the specific guidance necessary as 

to the type of action to take. This guidance could include observations to be made, the location and time of the observation, questions to be asked, or possibly that no further action is required. 

This interaction and the ensuing information that is obtained are 

not only important for investigative purposes, but also for the safety of the officer. In New York State, there have been 41 confirmatory incidents wherein a VGTOF hit was received through the 

NCIC system and involved the Terrorist Screening Center, the 

most recent which occurred within the New York State Police when 

a uniformed trooper made a vehicle and traffic stop that resulted 

in a traffic ticket being issued. The trooper then conducted an inquiry through the NCIC computer to ascertain if the subject was 

wanted. This inquiry resulted in a VGTOF hit which put the invesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
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tigating trooper in touch with the Terrorist Screening Center, who 

in turn advised the trooper that the individual queried was the 

subject of an investigative hit. The trooper was conferenced with 

the Counterterrorism Watch, which was able to provide additional 

information to the trooper as to what action to take next. This in 

turn resulted in the notification of the local Special Agent of the 

FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, and I am confident that that 

interaction provided valuable information to the FBI on a subject 

currently under investigation. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I see I am the subject of a red light stop. 

I did provide further written testimony, as you said earlier, and I 

will be glad to answer questions. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McMahon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES W. MCMAHON

Chairman Coble, Chairman Gibbons, Congressman Scott, Congresswoman McCarthy, and the other distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Judiciary and members of the Subcommittee 

on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to testify on such an important matter. 

My name is Jim McMahon. I am the Director of Public Security for the State of 

New York. In this pos ition I oversee the efforts of all of New York’s State Agencies 

with regard to their capabilities to respond to, deter, detect and prevent acts of terrorism from occurring within the state. I was appointed to this post by Governor 

Pataki last year after serving 37 years in the New York State Police, the last 9 of 

which I served as Superintendent. I have been asked to testify today about the Terrorist Screening Center, or TSC, from the perspective of a state and local law enforcement customer. My testimony will begin with a chronological brief on the 

evolvement of information sharing in order to better show the TSC’s impact and 

how it has enhanced pre-existing law enforcement tools. 

Throughout my career in public service, I have been fortunate enough to have 

worked with many of the 540 law enforcement agencies in New York State that are 

comprised of over 75,000 dedicated law enforcement professionals who are putting 

their lives on the line, each and every day. 

I have also had a considerable amount of interaction, and an excellent working 

relationship, with my federal colleagues in the investigation of organized crime, robberies, homicides, and narcotics, crimes that have the potential of crossing jurisdictional boundaries and typify the importance of working together and sharing information. 

These close cooperative relationships, many times informal, have been instrumental in reducing the incidence of violent crime in New York State to levels not 

seen since the 1960s. 

The ‘‘backbone’’ formal information sharing system for state and local law enforcement during this time was the National Crime Information Center or NCIC. NCIC 

is a system that reaches law enforcement throughout the United States, and has 

the capability of providing information, through a patrol car radio, or an in-car computer, to nearly every officer across the nation out on patrol. The information contained in this system is what we refer to as ‘‘hot’’ files: wanted persons, missing persons, stolen cars, and stolen property. In the year 2000, in New York State alone, 

law enforcement made 30 million inquiries into NCIC and received nearly 3.5 million positive ‘‘hits.’’ This is just a snapshot of the effective role state and local law 

enforcement, cooperating in the performance of routine duties, can play in reducing 

crime, and why it remains a critical role in the post 9/11 era. 

On September 11, 2001, an organized terrorist group attacked our nation. This 

signaled a new era for our country, as well as for state and local law enforcement. 

This terrorist organization, and others like it, is determined to make our country 

its battlefield. In doing so, state and local law enforcement, 75,000 strong in New 

York State, and 700,000 nationally, have become our nation’s foot soldiers against 

domestic targeted terrorism. 

In New York, as here in Washington, our first and foremost responsibility is to 

do everything humanly possible to prevent another terrorist attack by utilizing our 

75,000 law enforcement officers. To facilitate this effort, we have built an intelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
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ligence center near Albany, New York, with direct connectivity to the New York City 

intelligence center. From these two points we have created a seamless information 

sharing system that reaches law enforcement in all corners of our state. 

Our ultimate objective is to be able to provide timely, relevant and actionable terrorism intelligence to patrol officers and detectives, which could prevent a terrorist 

act or enhance a terrorist investigation by a federal agency. To accomplish this objective, our federal partners have worked closely with state and local law enforcement to enhance the exchange of relevant terrorism information. 

NCIC is still the only national system able to reach the State and local patrol car. 

There are three scenarios that a state and local law enforcement officer can be faced 

with during an encounter with a person during a traffic stop or an ongoing investigation; the first is what we call a ‘‘red light’’ stop. In these cases, the patrol officer 

accesses NCIC with a name and date of birth inquiry and receives back information 

sufficient to arrest the subject, as he or she is a person wanted by a state or local 

jurisdiction or by the federal government. 

The second situation involves a ‘‘green light’’ stop. This indicates, based upon the 

NCIC name and date of birth inquiry, that the person stopped is not actively wanted by any law enforcement agency. The third situation is the most complicated and 

most critical to ongoing terrorist investigations. This is what we refer to as a ‘‘yellow 

light’’ stop, or investigative inquiry. In this situation a police officer has someone 

detained or stopped, the person is not actively ‘‘wanted,’’ but the officer has suspicions about whether the individual is connected to a terrorist related investigation 

or has suspected links to terrorism. It is this ‘‘yellow light’’ area where the 700,000 

sets of eyes and ears can be most beneficial in assisting our federal investigative 

partners. 

Let me provide a hypothetical yellow light situation. A patrol officer responds to 

a call of a suspicious person filming the perimeter of a nuclear power plant. The 

individual is not from the local area and has no apparent association with the immediate area. The officer is suspicious, and therefore conducts an inquiry into NCIC 

database. 

Prior to December 1, 2003, the inception date of the Terrorist Screening Center, 

there was no systematic way to conduct a search of the various federal databases 

to ascertain if this suspicious person had any ties to an ongoing investigation. The 

inception of the TSC has provided state and local law enforcement, its customer, 

with an important tool to instruct a law enforcement officer in a non-custodial situation like the example I provided above as to what, if anything, he or she should do. 

Returning to the nuclear power plant hypothetical, I will detail what now occurs. 

The patrol officer queries the name and date of birth of the suspicious person 

through the NCIC system. If the individual is a ‘‘person of interest,’’ the patrol officer receives a Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) ‘‘hit’’ that directs the officer to call a toll free number for additional direction from the Terrorist 

Screening Center. 

Once the Terrorist Screening Center is contacted, additional information is provided which places that ‘‘hit’’ into any one of four (4) classifications; arrest, detain, 

investigate, or query. This interaction also expands to include the FBI’s Counter Terrorism Watch that has the ability to provide detailed direction and information on 

what action to take next in addition to providing further identifying data. The resulting conversation provides the law enforcement officer with the specific guidance 

necessary as to the type of action to take. This guidance could include observations 

to be made, the location and time of the observation, questions to be asked, or possibly, that no further action is required. This interaction, and the ensuing information that is obtained, are not only important for investigative purposes, but also for 

the safety of the officer. 

In New York State there have been 41 confirmatory instances wherein a VGTOF 

‘‘hit’’ was received through the NCIC system and involved the TSC. The most recent 

of which occurred with the New York State Police when a uniform trooper made a 

vehicle and traffic stop that resulted in a traffic ticket being issued and an inquiry 

was done through the NCIC computer to ascertain if the subject was wanted. This 

inquiry resulted in a VGTOF hit which put the investigating Trooper in touch with 

the Terrorist Screening Center who, in turn, advised the Trooper that the individual 

queried was the subject of an investigative ‘‘hit.’’

The trooper was conferenced with the Counter Terrorism Watch, which was able 

to provide additional information to the trooper as to what action to take next. This, 

in turn, resulted in the notification of the local Special Agent of the FBI’s Joint Terrorist Task Force. I am confident that this interaction provided valuable information 

to the FBI on a subject currently under investigation. 

Lastly, I would like to mention a pilot program that complements the TSC and 

highlights the history of information sharing between federal and state law enforceVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
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ment. Initiated by New York State and the FBI, this program commenced prior to 

the TSC in October of 2003. In this program, the patrol officer contacts our intelligence center concerning a suspicious or ‘‘yellow light’’ stop with no VGTOF hit. 

Our intelligence center then contacts the FBI’s Counter Terrorism Watch in Washington, DC, to ascertain if the individual detained is a person of interest. The 

Counter Terrorism watch then queries the FBI’s automated case system in addition 

to other databases, providing our state intelligence center with relevant information 

for the patrol officer. Director Robert Mueller assigned a Washington based Counter 

Terrorism watch agent to New York and local law enforcement initiated 114 inquiries, some of which resulted in investigation hits. New York State is working with 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation to formalize this pilot project and expand it into 

a regional ten state information sharing initiative. This ten state regional proposal 

is a concept that was previously introduced during July 2003 testimony given by 

James Kallstrom, senior Advisor on Terrorism to Governor George Pataki, and submitted to the Department of Homeland Security. DHS endorsed the regional concept. 

I truly believe that, together, we have come a long way in understanding the importance of involving state and local law enforcement, its capabilities and its needs 

in preventing terrorism. This would not have happened if it were not for the full 

cooperation of our federal partners. The Terrorist Screening Center, the NCIC, the 

VGTOF file, the FBI Counter Terrorism Watch center, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the JTTF expansion, including the national Joint Terrorist Task 

Force, all have built a foundation that will provide the integration necessary to protect our homeland from future attacks. I also believe our proposed regional concept 

will compliment the Terrorist Screening Center and will be instrumental to the Department of Homeland Security in providing specific threat based intelligence information to state and local partners. 

In closing, I would like to thank each of you for allowing me to provide a state 

and local law enforcement perspective on this critical matter.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Berman, you are recognized for 6 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JERRY BERMAN, PRESIDENT,

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY 

Mr. BERMAN. Chairman Coble, Chairman Gibbons, and Chairman Cox, it is a pleasure to be here again to testify on the intersection between national security and civil liberties in this age of terrorism. 

We as an organization are very concerned about the national security issue. As a member of the Markle Commission, I call your 

attention to their report. I am not speaking for them today, but the 

report of the commission I was on recommended the consolidation 

of terrorist information, threat information, including watchlist information, but under direction by this Committee, that it should be 

under standards, guidelines, oversight and management supervision. Congress gave that job to the Department of Homeland Security. It set up a Privacy Office and a Civil Liberties Office, and 

the idea was that these lists would be consolidated but under 

standards that would protect civil liberties, ensure data quality, 

and ensure that dissemination was correct to the right people; that 

this sensitive information did not go where it didn’t have a need 

to go; that there would be ways to get off the list. 

That job is not being done. As I said in June, the oversight responsibilities are not being handled by DHS. At that time, we were 

talking about TTIC, which looked like it was going to do the 

screening function. TTIC is not part of DHS. After I testified in 

September, the Terrorist Screening Center was set up again under 

another Presidential directive, and what it did was move a function 

which had been at FBI, then gone to DHS, and then gone back to 

the FBI. In terms of overall supervision to ensure clear standards, 

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oversight, guidelines and civil liberties protection, it is not within 

DHS, it is within FBI. And I don’t think they have authority under 

any statute that I can find to perform the functions that the Committee laid out in its report for accuracy, completeness and timeliness. 

Let me get down to the bottom line. I do not know what standards are being applied here. All I know is that Secretary Ridge the 

other day said, There are right now 50,000 names in the terrorist 

watchlist at TSC. Several hundred of them have been, and I am 

quoting, ‘‘are engaged in criminal activity, potential connections to 

terrorist organizations and the like.’’ Who are the other 49,500 people in the database? I don’t think that right now TSC has the authority to decide who goes in that database. TTIC is entering the 

foreign counterintelligence people. The FBI has entered their whole 

domestic terrorism list. That includes people suspected of engaging 

in terrorism who may be the Oklahoma bomber, or it may be an 

environmental organization or an abortion clinic. We don’t know 

who is in that database, and this Committee has to make an inquiry about how that is done. 

We don’t know how information is purged. The MOU I have read 

between these agencies really gives the authority back to the FBI 

and to CIA and other agencies which maintain the watchlists in 

the first place, to continue to make decisions about who is in that 

database. When the Director of TSC says that it is under their 

statutes, their policies, and their guidelines consistent with the 

Constitution, that is not sufficient, because different agencies have 

higher standards for entry; different agencies have different needs. 

Even if we are going to have a complex integration under different standards, we need to know what those standards are, what 

are the levels of access, who gets on it and who gets where. The 

policeman on the beat right now, when he queries that database, 

is not sure whether it is an arrest, detention, or inquiry, because 

there are so many people in that database. He has to go off line 

and talk to people and go back through a whole chain of bureaucracy to see whether it is a serious person he has encountered on 

the street. 

On the other end, people may be detained, denied the right to 

travel, denied employment and so forth, because they are on the 

list and no one has cleared their name, or they are a mistaken 

identity, or it is overinclusive and including people who are not the 

hard-target terrorists. 

Under a system which is too broad, you have the same problem 

that you had after 9/11, people are going to fall through this list. 

We talked to police officers who are not calling this number and 

don’t know about the number and don’t know how to call it and 

don’t know until a day later that they may have had a suspected 

terrorist on the street. And then we know there are mistaken people in the database, which raises due process and civil liberties 

questions. 

I will return to all of this in questioning. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JERRY BERMAN


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Mr. COBLE. The Chair recognizes Chairman Gibbons for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I first direct my attention to Director Bucella, and thank you 

again, Director, for appearing here today. And I am sorry to have 

to throw you a hypothetical question to begin with, but I believe 

it really gets to the heart of the matter that we are dealing with 

here. 

The Intelligence Community knew in early 2000 that two of the 

potential terrorists were meeting with al Qaeda operatives in 

Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. These terrorists, Kalid al-Midar and 

Nawaf al-Hamzi, turned out to be two of the September 11 hijackers. If al-Midar and al-Hamzi were pulled over by a police officer 

in the United States today, would we be able to identify them and 

would we have caught them if they had been pulled over today 

with this watchlist? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Hypothetically speaking, anyone that has been 

identified by a Government agency, whether it be in the prior TIPOFF list by the State Department or by any other agency and was 

put in the TIPOFF, if those two individuals were in fact in that, 

when they are stopped for a traffic violation, a routine traffic violation, there would have been some indication that they needed to 

contact the Terrorist Screening Center for coordination with us. 

But I can’t hypothetically speak without having some more facts as 

to how they would have been—what guidance would have been provided. 

The names that are in our database, for example, the files are 

being reviewed and that is why we provide some guidance as to—

with CT Watch as to when there is an encounter, when there is a 

face-to-face contact, what the officer—what questions the officer 

needs to do. 

As you previously heard, there are four basic guidelines. One is 

to arrest. But you can’t arrest somebody unless there is probable 

cause to believe a crime is committed here in the United States. 

Second would be to detain, and there is a valid detainer on the person. Third would be to stop the person, ask them questions, and 

there would probably be a drop-down menu of a series of questions 

that have been recommended by the originating agency, whether it 

is the FBI or CIA, as to areas which if they encounter that person, 

what kinds of questions would you want us to ask if you had encountered that person. And the fourth category is to question in the 

standard operating law enforcement capacity and release. 

The big difference is, though, that now that information goes 

back from the patrol officer, goes to the JTTF and back to whomever put that person or who was investigating that person into the 

database. And that information is invaluable for intelligence information for a number of reasons. One, just because you are pulling 

someone over and they have the same name doesn’t necessarily 

mean they are, in fact, that terrorist. They may have the same 

name. There are other identifiers. 

In our database, we are not the mother of all databases. We don’t 

have all the derogatory information. That stays with each of the 

originating agencies. All we have in our database is the name and 

several identifiers. It is an identities database. It is not the 

35

recordholder for every Government agency. We have the capability 

of looking at these case files of each of the different Government 

agencies, and some are highly classified. That information will assist the State and local law enforcement officers with the identities 

match. As to all the details of that, that information is not shared 

by us. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I presume, then, also from what you have said, 

that if this person or these persons had been pulled over by a routine traffic stop and they did not have—or had false driver’s license, forged documents, they probably wouldn’t be in that database under that name and would not have been captured if they 

had used false documents. 

Ms. BUCELLA. One slight correction. Some of these people do 

carry their false identities with them. They sometimes carry several identities with them, several different passports, different documents, driver’s 

licenses. Fortunately, the State and local law enforcement officers first on the ground, they are there. If they see false identification, there are various State laws in which they can pursue that. 

So it is not all the time that somebody might have a false identification and that would be it. There are times that if they do have 

false identification, though, there would be no way for us to identify unless, of course, they were driving a vehicle that is not owned 

by them, and then there would be some further inquiry. 

We rely to a great extent on the State and local law enforcement 

officers doing what they do every day, and that is questioning individuals that violate the State laws. 

Mr. COBLE. Gentleman’s time has expired, and we have a vote 

on. And I will say to the Members who are here, we are going to 

vote and come back immediately and continue the questioning. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. COBLE. We will resume our hearing. Since this is a joint 

hearing, folks, procedurally the way we are going to do this, we are 

going to go Democrat, Republican, Democrat, Republican, and we 

will start with the Subcommittee Chairmen and Ranking Members, 

and then I will recognize the Chairman of the full Committee and 

his Ranking Member. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Scott from Virginia, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Director, I wanted to follow up on the questions the gentleman from Nevada was asking about what happens after you get 

a hit. What provokes an inquiry to the system? Because usually 

you go through a normal outstanding warrant system just as a 

kind of routine. You get a traffic stop. They just kind of check, just 

run your name through the outstanding warrants to see if they 

have got an outstanding warrant. But what provokes this additional step to the—to this list? 

Ms. BUCELLA. The process is that when they check through the 

NCIC, there now is a separate designation for those that are 

known or suspected terrorists. That is separately. That has nothing 

to do—there is nothing else—they would not call us, for example, 

if there was just an outstanding warrant for a drug case or something like that. 

36

Mr. SCOTT. If you have a traffic stop and run the normal runof-the-mill check, will that access this hot list? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Automatically. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes. And if there is a person that is, in fact, a 

known or suspected terrorist, the NCIC will give guidance through 

the instructions to contact the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Now, if there is no outstanding warrant for a 

person, what does the—what could the police officer possibly do? 

Ms. BUCELLA. As I mentioned before, there are four instructions. 

If there is no warrant that is out, then you can’t arrest them, and 

there can’t be a detention. But the other two would be to stop, ask 

questions. As I mentioned to you before, the instruction could, in 

fact, be to ask questions as to where the person has been, any associates, where are they going. Many of those questions would be 

asked in the normal course of interaction between a local law enforcement officer. 

Mr. SCOTT. You get a traffic ticket, and you start asking about 

where you have been? I would think that the person might say, sir, 

am I under arrest, or may I go? Then what? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well, when someone does get pulled over, sometimes the officers do say, what is your hurry, where are you going? 

It depends on what the interaction is with the State and local law 

enforcement officer and the individual that has been pulled over. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what can you do when the person says, am I free 

to go? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well, that depends on what they were pulled over 

for. 

Mr. SCOTT. A traffic violation. 

Ms. BUCELLA. If they, for example, were arrested for a traffic violation for running someone over, DWI, driving without headlights, 

driving 100 miles an hour in a 30-mile-an-hour zone, then the 

State laws would pick up. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. But I mean if you get a run-of-the-mill traffic 

citation, speeding, and you run it through, and you find he is on 

the hot list, but no outstanding warrant, what happens? 

Ms. BUCELLA. No outstanding warrant, they would ask questions 

and release the individual and pass the information back to—if the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force was involved, that there had, in fact, 

been an encounter. 

Mr. SCOTT. How close—when you have names that are similar or 

the same, if you had a Robert Scott that is on the terrorist list, 

what is going to happen to me if I have a traffic ticket? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well, again, depending on the individual situation, 

what we have are the names and identifiers, so, for example, if a 

Mr. Scott is in the—our database, and he is 4 feet tall, clearly you 

would not—that would be one indicator that the person that the 

law enforcement officer is, in fact, encountering is not the person 

that has been identified as a known or suspected terrorist. 

Mr. SCOTT. You have height, weight, age, birthdate? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Right now, because there are a number, as I mentioned before, we have the accessibility to some of the classified 

databases. Some of the identifiers are, in fact, classified information. The people at the call center do not release the information. 

37

What they do is they elicit information from the police officer. They 

will ask, for example, what we would have—the nonclassified identifiers right now are the name, the date of birth, the passport number and the country of origin. The other identifiers, height, weight, 

could, in fact, be classified. The officer would not—we would not 

ask the officer to please tell us if he has brown eyes, tell if he is 

wearing glasses, tell us if he has got gray hair. We would say, 

please describe any other identifiers, height, weight, that information, so that we are not releasing any classified information. 

Mr. SCOTT. And is there an objective criteria to get on the list; 

and if your name is wrongfully on the list, to get it off? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Let me explain this list concept. We have—the 

way our—the names have come to us, come to us from a number 

of different Government agencies. Obviously, the State Department, in putting names in their list, they have a much lower bar, 

because what their encounters are with people at embassies trying 

to apply to get visas to come to the United States. So the State—

Department of State has a very, very low bar. They have identified 

individuals who are known or suspected terrorists that would never 

be arrested based on our bar here in the United States coming into 

the United States. The information has been gathered by many different agencies such that there is a different bar if someone is coming at our borders. It is a much higher bar than denying somebody 

from a visa. Then once somebody comes into the United States, it 

is even a higher bar if there is an arrest, because there has to be 

probable cause to believe that that individual has, in fact, violated 

the United States laws, or violated a State law. 

So there are many different levels, and based on the different 

levels of information and where the encounter is, is what then 

prompts the Counterterrorism Watch to give the guidance to the 

local law enforcement officer who is encountering that individual. 

So, therefore, the information that they may actually just say is, 

ask questions and allow them to go. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can I have one quick follow-up? Is this just for foreign people? I mean, if you have a domestic terrorist, what happens? 

Ms. BUCELLA. There are two different forms of information that 

feed into our center. Domestic terrorism names, they come from the 

FBI, and the international terrorist names come from or through 

the TTIC, and they come from all various different agencies. So at 

our center we have both domestic terrorists names as well as international terrorist names in our database. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. 

Thank you, Director. 

Folks, if time permits, we may well have a second round of questioning. 

I recognize myself for 5 minutes. Director, I know you have a 

good working knowledge and some degree of expertise for both the 

Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. Tell me, or tell us, 

if you will, why the FBI was chosen to administer TSC in lieu of 

Homeland Security, and whether it is your belief that the FBI is 

the better choice. 

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ment of Homeland Security. We also have another Deputy that is 

from the FBI, as well as an individual, another department, from 

the State Department, so we really are a joint partnership. At our 

center, I have representatives from CBP, from ICE, from Secret 

Service, from the State Department, from the FBI. It is a whole 

conglomeration. The FBI was tasked with this, and I do report directly to the Director of the FBI because we had to set the center 

up immediately. Because of the sensitivity of the information that 

we have at our center, a number of individuals, their clearances— they are working in a very secure environment—the clearances of 

individuals, people already had to have their clearances. The FBI 

was able to set this up from concept to actual operations in probably a little bit more than 45 days, and we actually set up a command center. 

Mr. COBLE. Okay. I need to move along because we impose the 

5-minute rule against ourselves as well, and I want to get a couple 

more questions in. 

Mr. McMahon, have there been any instances where you believe 

information should have been provided to local law enforcement 

that was not provided? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Since the inception of the TSC, we have had no 

problems, and we have been able to coordinate with the TSC and 

get the information back down. But I do—I have to say that we did 

a very extensive outreach of instructions to all law enforcement, 

State and local, in New York State on just how the process works, 

how to use it. And we did training including with that, and we are 

going to do some follow-up training. So we have not—— Mr. COBLE. The lines are open and free-flowing? 

Mr. MCMAHON. The lines are open. 

Mr. COBLE. Good. 

Mr. Berman, Director Bucella has described some safeguards for 

civil liberties. What safeguards would you suggest? 

Mr. BERMAN. There has to be a set of clear standards, which are 

articulable and public, that we can debate about who goes into this 

terrorist watchlist. I am not—I would say that there may be more 

sensitivity on the foreign counterintelligence side where foreigners 

are involved who are dangerous. They are under classified guidelines. But with respect to U.S. persons and citizens in this country, 

I believe that the guidelines have to be public and articulable so 

that we know who is going into this database. 

I believe there need to be clear levels of access, depending on the 

kind of watchlists being involved. The Director talked about different levels of sensitivity and different bars. We need to know 

what those are. There has to be a system of data quality to know 

how this system is being purged, how information is being corrected, so that misidentification, which is all too common, does not 

occur, because of the consequences that follow. 

And there also has to be redress. If someone is not able to fly 

or is denied a job on the basis of incorrect, inadequate or wrong information based on terrorist watchlists, they ought to have redress. 

And some of that can be accomplished under—if this screening 

function was under the Department of Homeland Security, which 

has at least the privacy officer and a civil liberties officer, but part 

of it would require some statutory changes. 

39

Mr. COBLE. Let me beat the red light by putting a question to 

Director Bartoldus. With the transfer of the TIPOFF Terrorist 

Watchlist function to the TSC Director, have the capabilities of 

other governmental entities with screening known and suspected 

terrorists been improved, and if so, how? 

Mr. BARTLETT. The primary improvement in the new system 

with TSC is the ability of our personnel to contact the TSC 24/7. 

Under the old TIPOFF program, the contact office was available 

between 6 a.m. And 10 p.m. At night. On weekends or at nights 

when we encountered somebody, we had to require a State Department employee to drive in, access a file, give us the answer, many 

times creating a several-hour delay. The mere fact that we get all 

responses in 20 to 30 minutes or less is a major improvement in 

the system. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. 

I see my time has expired. Now Ms. McCarthy would be next in 

line. I recognize the gentlelady from Missouri for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my 

thanks to the panelists for sharing their wisdom with us today. 

Congress requires you to implement a system for analyzing information on terrorist threats, and that you also have a relationship 

with TTIC in order to do that. TTIC is housed in the CIA. And I 

wondered—many of us in Congress thought that was probably unwise to separate the two when the information is so important for 

us to have. I wonder if you would comment on how that is working. 

And also, the director of the State of Missouri Office of Homeland 

Security, Tim Daniels, among others I visited with, tells me that 

information-sharing, as you discuss it here today, needs to go both 

ways, not just at the Federal level among agencies like you and the 

CIA, but with the State and local information offices and directors 

and personnel so that it can be—it would be timely and significant. 

And in your testimonies today, many of you reflected on incidents 

that have been important, and they have come from—in some instances they have come from those local first responders, some of 

whom are with us today, and we thank every one of you. 

So I really wonder if you—I would welcome any input you have 

on how we in the Congress can help best complete that information 

loop so it is indeed a loop, that information from local entities, local 

first responders actually, once it gets in the information loop, gets 

to the Federal level where you need it when you start hearing that 

from different locals, all of a sudden bells and whistles can go off, 

and we can be much better informed. Tell us what we must be 

doing to assist you in that goal that I know we all share. And anyone is welcome to comment on this. 

Director Bucella, perhaps you would like to start, and Director 

McMahon, I would love to hear from you. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I can just give you an example of what we are 

doing to try to do that in New York State. I think it is very hard 

for any Federal entity to try to get information coming in from 

every emergent first responder, and what we did is we set up 

counterrorism zones, we call them, in New York State. They are 16 

geographical areas that brings local law enforcement together, and 

then they address, from their geographic perspective, what they see 

40

as critical problems dealing with terrorism there, and they bring 

the first responder community in. 

Then we set up a State intelligence center so that you don’t have 

a bunch of stovepipe systems where we can filter a lot of that information up to a Federal level, see what is specific to New York, 

what should go up to a State level, up to a Federal level. 

So we are really looking at what could be intelligence and what 

is just information nice to know. And I think that helps a lot from 

a Federal standpoint at both DHS and both the FBI. So that has 

kind of been our answer in these counterterrorism zones, and we 

have a separate network for those that we get advisories out to law 

enforcement, and then we get an advisory below that level, some 

to the private sector, different sectors, whether it is the chemical 

sector, the energy sector. And then we also do it through emergency managers, fire and stuff and that way, and that has been 

working out very well. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. And do you feel like when you send that information to the national level that, in fact, someone is listening. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Yes. Yeah. We are——

Ms. MCCARTHY. How do you get that assurance? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Because we do—we talk. It is not going up electronically. We talk back and forth with them. They are accessible 

on doing that. 

But I will tell on you the Federal agency standpoint, they are 

part of our counterrorism zones. The FBI at the three resident offices are an integral part of it. So much of the information flow, too, 

comes down through them to us in a very timely basis on that. 

So we have had a wonderful relationship with the Federal, our 

Federal counterparts—and I will go back to the last orange alert. 

We at the State and local level had the best, most specific information of any of the orange alerts. They were general before, to be 

perfectly honest. And we did—for the first time we did conference 

calls with our counterterrorism zones, and the FBI got on the conference calls along with the head of intelligence from the New York 

City Police Department. We really could put together a State perspective, and the feedback from all law enforcement to us was that 

is very beneficial and helpful. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. And I bet it was helpful to the constituents we 

all serve, because that is part of the confusion we all have on what 

these colors mean and how best to react to that. 

But let me turn to our national Federal voices. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Thank you. 

Congresswoman McCarthy, you have just identified a tremendous and enormous challenge for us. Right now in the last 4 

months that we have been operating, we have been trying to do a 

tremendous outreach, not only just to our Federal agencies to find 

out sort of how they are operating, but also with our State agencies. There are 50 different States and I have called the director 

of homeland security for one of the States just because I knew the 

person and said, do you have a list? I mean, I know the Feds have 

it. Do you have a list? And the answer is, what do you think? I 

mean, it is that type of thing. 

There is much work to do. We, as the United States, have to operate in a coordinated effort. That means across State and Federal 

41

lines. We are the—the Feds are not the experts in what is going 

on in the States. The State law enforcement officer knows who is 

sort of out of whack in their neighborhood. Or they have threats, 

or they are aware of sensitive areas. But that information is getting up and going through the various Federal agencies, but there 

needs to be a coordinated approach. 

And at the Terrorist Screening Center we are trying, and we are 

seeing ourselves as the facilitators of that approach. We have the 

incredible perception from where we are sitting to be able to see 

what is happening in California and Oregon and Mississippi, and 

we are able to reach back through the JTTF to get them to talk 

to the State and local law enforcement officers. 

We are merely a facilitator, and we have seen some very, very 

unique opportunities. I know that we had New York come to visit 

us after they heard about this intelligence center, and they wanted 

to know, quite frankly, what were you, the Feds, doing; and were 

you doing what we are supposed to be doing. And we found out it 

was a perfect match. 

Mr. COBLE. Director, the gentlelady’s time has expired. If you 

can hold that thought, perhaps share it with us subsequently. 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the House Homeland 

Security Mr. Cox for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wonder if I can start with Ms. Bucella and ask you what you 

think should be the role of the Department of Homeland Security 

in TSC. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well, right now the role has been very aggressive 

because myself—and I am with the Transportation Security Administration, my Deputy is, and many of our people are. I think, 

first of all, that the Terrorist Screening Center should always have 

representatives from every single agency. It should not be one type 

of response. The absolute benefit that I have seen on a day-to-day 

basis is the expertise that everyone brings to the table with them 

at our center. We hope soon that we will be able to have members 

from DEA, the Postal Service. We also have people from the Office 

of Foreign Asset Control. We are also going to probably have people 

there from FINCEN. 

There is an incredible benefit to have the richness and diversity 

of all our different agencies and to include, to bring somebody from 

State and local to be working side by side. This is not—this is not 

a—one answer of one person’s going to take care of this. This is a 

cooperative effort where the United States Government has to be 

working in a seamless fashion. 

Mr. COX. Do you work together with Daniel Sutherland? 

Ms. BUCELLA. No. I am not sure what Mr. Sutherland’s position 

is, sorry. 

Mr. COX. Okay. How about Nualla O’Connor? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes. Nualla, absolutely. One of the things, the reasons, why I know Nualla is—obviously being a lawyer myself, I believe in bringing the lawyers up front when you start and not later 

on. And we have had a number of meetings with not only the FBI 

privacy lawyers, DHS privacy lawyers, TSA privacy lawyers, 

Nualla chaired a meeting, because we are very, very concerned 

about the misidentification issue. We want to make sure that if 

42

people are stopped, and they have the same name, if there is any 

other discriminating factor that we could put in our database to 

say that person is not the one, then that is what we want to do, 

because we really are concerned. I personally am concerned that we 

don’t stop people that—unless we know that they are known or 

suspected terrorists, and the only way we are going to be able to 

do that is to be able to gather as much information from those people. 

And Nualla has absolutely helped certainly in the discussion, 

and we have some documented procedures about how we work on 

some of the encounters. In fact, while we have been up in the last 

4 months, we have really had a number of people, somebody, for 

example, working in the United States but living in Canada, and 

one morning they come in. The next—that night they leave. They 

get stopped. Secondary, secondary. The next morning the person 

comes in again, and finally, among my staff I said, I want to know 

why that person is on—why they are stopped, why they are on secondary, and let’s see if it is good information or if it is outdated 

information. That individual’s name was, in fact, taken off of one 

of the databases, the case management databases, based on old and 

outdated information. We did not do the operational response. We 

sent the JTTFs out there. That is exactly what they are supposed 

to do. 

Mr. COX. The reason I asked about Nualla, of course, is because 

it is important that are you doing exactly what you described, and 

I am happy to hear that. The reason I asked about Daniel Sutherland is that he is the officer for civil rights and civil liberties. In 

title I of the Homeland Security Act, we created that officer right 

underneath the Secretary with responsibility, cross-cutting responsibility, for all the directorates because of the priority that Congress placed on this, which brings me to Mr. Berman’s point. 

Let me ask you the same question. What do you think should be 

the role for the Department of Homeland Security in this matter? 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, I think it really should be demonstrable, looking at the standards by which people are entered into these—into 

the watchlists. And we were hoping that Homeland Security would 

publish at least standards for U.S. persons about who would be 

qualified, is it limited, or at least verify to the public that it is limited to dangerous people who are wanted overseas or who may 

enter the country. Is it people who are really under probable cause 

to believe that they are engaged in terrorism or reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in terrorism, or does it reach all the 

way to anyone who is of interest to the FBI under any preliminary 

inquiry? 

There is a whole set of standards, but they become lower, with 

less evidentiary and then almost no evidentiary support. Do those 

people get entered into this watchlist? 

Mr. COX. Now, those are all good questions. I understood your 

testimony to include the assertion that while Homeland Security, 

the Department, has privacy and civil rights, civil liberties officers, 

that that does not exist in TSC or its parent as it is presently set 

up. I mean, is that right? Is there nothing analogous to the civil 

rights, civil liberties officer or the privacy officer at the FBI? 

43

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Berman, if you could make your answer terse, 

because the 5 minutes have expired. 

Mr. BERMAN. There is no ombudsman or privacy officer, civil liberties officer. There is an inspector general that keeps working on 

the FBI, at the Justice Department, but there is no—there has 

been a proposal to create a privacy officer at the FBI, but there is 

no such officer. We did not want to create privacy officers maybe 

at every agency, but to have some coordinating approach to both 

the national security side, but also the civil liberties side. 

Mr. COX. Well, the Chairman has been indulgent. It is only 5 

minutes, and the time has expired. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, the Ranking 

Member of the full Committee, Mr. Turner for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Bucella I want to inquire a little bit about how far we 

are along in developing a Terrorist Screening Center that meets 

the criteria that is set forth in the document that I know you have 

and I referred to in my letter to you a few days ago. And I want 

to be sure that I am reassured that you have the vision as to what 

we need to put together here. 

Obviously, you have been at this job, I think, since December 

when this task was passed back to the FBI, and as you know, I 

have been quite concerned that the job has been passed around two 

or three different places since 9/11 before it finally settled somewhere and some progress began to be made. 

But it does disturb me when I hear you giving your report. You 

made reference to, you know, 50 visas have been revoked as a result of Terrorist Screening Center. In my judgment, unless those 

holders of visas were determined to be terrorists suspects after 

they got their visa, they never should have gotten a visa in the first 

place. 

And so I am concerned that we are not yet envisioning the Terrorist Screening Center consistent with the 10 criteria that I set 

forth in the document I forwarded you. For example, are you confident that you have obtained all the terrorist watchlist information 

from every agency of the U.S. Government? Is it all accessible to 

you today? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Since September 23, when the HSPD–6 came out, 

and up until today, there is enough—there is a lot of information 

out there within all our Federal Government. We have a number 

of names. But we endeavor—and this is a work in progress—to be 

able to get all of the names from all of the different Government 

agencies. 

Mr. TURNER. And so your answer is no, you do not have it all. 

And I think specifically, from a previous briefing you gave the 

Committee staff, one of those areas is the Department of Defense. 

Several of us on our Homeland Security Committee have been 

down to Guantanamo, and we all know the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, the naval intelligence, all these agencies within DOD have 

a lot of names of suspected terrorists who can move by airplane 

flight in less than 24 hours. And I hope that we can continue to 

pursue the objective of getting all the information from all agencies 

of Government into the Terrorist Screening Center watchlist. 

44

Next question I have for you is are we making efforts to transform what I understand your current status to be, and that is to 

be a call center where people can call in and ask a question, and 

then, as I understand it, whoever took the call would turn and talk 

to an individual in your office that may be sitting at a terminal operated by the State Department, and may turn to somebody operating a terminal for some other agency that has a watchlist, and 

then turn to somebody else, and they all do their work, and, as has 

been suggested, within 20 or 30 minutes maybe you can get a 

check? I have been told that some of these watchlists are checked 

overnight; that you do not have the capability within 20 or 30 minutes to check all of these watchlists. And what I see we are doing 

now is piecing this together with bailing wire. 

We have got people in your shop that have access to a computer 

terminal, but I want to know, do we have, today, efforts ongoing 

and contracts outstanding to integrate the database of every agency of the Federal Government that has a terrorist watchlist into 

one unified terrorist watchlist at the Terrorist Screening Center? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Congressman Turner, first we currently have a 

database with the names and identifiers of a number of known and 

suspected terrorists. When a phone call comes in, it is usually from 

a dispatcher, or it could actually be from the NTC. Our turnaround 

time is very quick. As a matter of fact, I think one of my colleagues 

here will tell you how fast some of the turnaround time is. We do 

not have somebody answering the phone and then calling to the 

State Department person across the room and saying, could you go 

up on your database? 

One of the requirements at our center is that once you walk in, 

you wear the TSC hat. And we have people that have accessibility, 

not just FBI agents, but BICE and CBP individuals that have accessibility to the FBI database, that they are sitting there. So the 

person picking up the phone actually could have accessibility to all 

of those databases right there in front of them. 

But those databases are not just watchlists. Those databases contain information and case management information. That will 

never change. Our database will only have the names and identifiers in there. As to all of the other derogatory information as to 

why that person has been identified by one of the Government 

agencies as being a known or suspected terrorist will not be in our 

own database. That is not what HSPD–6 had dictated. 

HSPD–6 was very, very clear. We are only to facilitate in the 

identities match, and therefore our database has to be unclassified, 

but sensitive law enforcement and would just contain the information regarding the identifiers. 

Mr. COBLE. Director, Ms. Bucella, I regret having to continue to 

interrupt you and put a muzzle on you, but if you could wrap that 

up because we have Mr. Dicks waiting, and we have Mr. Keller 

waiting, and the gentleman from Texas’ time has expired. If you 

could wrap up momentarily. 

Ms. BUCELLA. I will wait for someone else to finish the question, 

sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Very well. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Florida Mr. Keller is recognized for 5 minutes. 

45

Mr. KELLER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got several 

questions. 

Let me start with Director Bucella. Let me give you just like a 

realistic scenario, and you kind of educate me on how this works. 

Let’s say that there is a man we will call Almidhar, just because 

that is a famous name, who is just flat out on the terrorist list. 

There is no dispute that you are maintaining his name on the Terrorist Screening Center list. He comes to the Orlando International 

Airport 2 hours before his flight to Reagan National in D.C. He 

walks up to the ticket counter. He pays for a ticket at the—with 

the lady who works for USAir. She gives him a ticket. Now we 

have captured that name. Who then does the check that compares 

the passenger manifest with the terrorist watchlist? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Currently what happens is the airlines right now 

has the no fly list, and so they would look at the no fly list. The 

no fly list was incorporated in our terrorist screening database. The 

TSA intel unit would then contact us. We would then contact 

through the NTC, which is really our—they are our dispatcher. 

They are the dispatcher, would then give the instructions as to 

whatever to do. We do not give the instructions as to what to do 

with the encounter. We are not in an operational setting. We are 

only there to facilitate the identities match. 

Mr. KELLER. So it is not the nice little lady that you buy the ticket from, she puts the name in the computer, and somewhere in the 

bowels of some basement somewhere there is a USAir, a TSA person, who has the no fly list, and they say, hey, there is a problem? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Probably in that case, well, if the person is here 

in the United States, and they are a terrorist, it depends on where 

they are going and what other interaction they are going to have, 

and it also depends on what—for example, what DHS has put in 

their lookout system as to what to do with that individual. 

Mr. KELLER. So this name sounds suspicious, this Almidhar 

name. Who then shows up to gather more information? Is that a 

Customs and Border agent? 

Ms. BUCELLA. It is ICE. 

Mr. KELLER. Mr. Bartoldus, Director Bartoldus, is that who 

shows up, your guy? 

Mr. BARTLETT. In the—for an international flight it would be 

CBP officers. We would immediately have queried in the system, 

contacted TSC, and then we contact locally ICE and JTTF. Normally, depending on who owns the record, FBI and ICE will both 

respond on site with our officers. At the same time through the National Targeting Center we have contacted Donna’s office. 

Mr. KELLER. So you can compare, there is a lot of people with 

similar names, but you mean you can look at dates of birth and Social Security number and height and weight, and it is not just a 

computer science. There is an art to this as well. There is some 

judgment call by the Customs and Border agent; is that right, Director Bartoldus? 

Mr. BARTON. That is correct. There are many of these queries 

that, when do you the interview, we have the level of data to make 

a determination whether it is a match or not almost immediately. 

Mr. KELLER. In my district of Orlando, Florida, Jose MelendezPerez stopped the 20th hijacker without any computers at all, just 

46

through being a sophisticated agent who asked the right question, 

correct? 

Mr. BARTON. People are a major part of our defense. 

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Now, some of the questions that were raised 

by Mr. Scott and Mr. Berman concern the mistaken identity issue, 

and let me just raise those with you, Mr. Berman. Mr. Scott says 

what if a guy named Bobby Scott is driving down the road speeding 

55 miles an hour in a 30 zone, and he gets pulled over? And the 

local police officer does an NCIC check, and he is concerned that 

he is going to be detained. Now, it is my understanding that, once 

again, the dispatcher gives the officer the information, and he has 

the discretion to arrest. And so—if Bobby Scott is a hit. But we 

look at this Bobby Scott, and he has a different date of birth and 

a different Social Security number and a different weight and a different height, and that officer says, you know, I am going to arrest 

him anyway. You are probably going to have some civil liability for 

false arrest or a 1983 action. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. BERMAN. You have a—the data that you just ticked off is not 

in this database. So as I understand it, and I am not at the operational level in any police department, if there is a hit on this, 

there is a call-back number. In some States it may be 1–800–TSC. 

In others it is just call your FBI agent. It does not resolve what 

that—the probative nature of that hit. 

Mr. KELLER. And let me do one final question, because I have 

only got like 10 seconds here. Director McMahon, you used the example of someone who is filming at a nuclear power plant and is 

kind of suspicious, and the police officer does an NCIC check. Isn’t 

one little flaw we have in the system that if you do the check on 

this guy, and he hasn’t been arrested before, he hasn’t been convicted before, but maybe he has done this at five other nuclear 

power plants, his name may not pop up; isn’t that correct? 

Mr. MCMAHON. That is correct. 

Mr. KELLER. What is the solution to that? 

Mr. MCMAHON. He wouldn’t pop up unless he is already the subject of an investigation, and then the hit would have been a VGTIF 

hit we talked about, which would have said, contact the Terrorist 

Screening Center. 

Mr. KELLER. If someone else had recorded it in there? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Yes. Or unless there was other particulars that 

would—where the patrol officer that stopped that person could create reasonable suspicion to move forward within their State laws. 

Mr. KELLER. Okay. My time is expired. Yield back. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington Mr. Dicks 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Director Bucella, why has it taken so long to put together the integrated terrorist watchlist? We have had all these other lists. I 

mean, the Ranking Member has made a major point of this. It has 

been discussed. Why has it taken so long, and can you do it quickly? Tell us why it has taken so long. 

Ms. BUCELLA. There are a number of reasons. One is there are 

not—they are not just watchlists. They are case management systems. There are—they come from many different agencies and they 

47

contain much different information. And so it is not a matter of 

dumping somebody’s data system with a bunch of names into just 

one database. 

Mr. DICKS. What is it? If it isn’t that, then what is it? How do 

you do it? 

Ms. BUCELLA. We have the agencies going back through their 

case files taking a look to make sure that what they have in their 

case file, if it is a known or suspected terrorist, that it is identified 

as such. It is a matter of—from the different prerequisite 

watchlists they have. The biometrics, the IDENT and the IAFIS 

system, those are not watchlists, those are data information. 

This is a tremendous challenge just to figure out in our Federal 

Government all of the different systems that are in existence. That 

is what the big challenge is. It is not only technologically, it is also 

just substantively of making sure that we have good and accurate 

information. 

Mr. DICKS. How much of this job is done? None. 

Ms. BUCELLA. No. There is a lot that has been done, but we have 

a lot further to go. 

Mr. DICKS. But this date has been pushed to the right, pushed 

to the right, pushed to the right, pushed to the right and it is now 

December of 04 that this thing will be completed. 

Ms. BUCELLA. No, that is the fully automated database will be 

completed, and that would give every Government agency the access ability to—by computer reach into our database for those identifiers. That is at the end of the year. Right now we have a database with names and identifiers and we have over 120,000 names 

in our database right now. But we are constantly populating. We 

are taking from the GAO list, we are currently, as we speak, 

uploading the IBIS case file, the NAILS case file, the NAILS list 

of names. This has been a long process. It is not just a matter of, 

as I mentioned to you before, of just dumping names into the system. 

Mr. DICKS. But we are continuing to add to this system and the 

system can be drawn upon right now. 

Ms. BUCELLA. We will always be adding. The system cannot be 

automatically drawn upon right now. We created a database which 

we have used at our screening center. The automated——

Mr. DICKS. But you can pick up on it from the screening center. 

At the screening Center you can pick up a name. It is just that the 

other agencies can’t come in at this point 

Ms. BUCELLA. Not yet. That is exactly it, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Now what is this problem with the Department of Defense? Are they cooperating or not cooperating? 

Ms. BUCELLA. It is not a problem with the Department of Defense. It is trying to figure out all of the information that the different agencies have. We have done outreach with the Office of 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have met with the Under Secretary’s Office for Homeland Security. We are just trying to make sure that 

we have all of the information. It all should be pushed through the 

Threat Terrorist Integration Center for the international terrorists, 

and that is what we are endeavoring to find out, what other information is in fact out there. This is a complex process. 

48

Mr. DICKS. Have you gotten anything from the Department of 

Defense yet? 

Ms. BUCELLA. We have some names from the Department of Defense, yes, that are already—that have already been pushed 

through the FBI and through TTIC. 

Mr. DICKS. And finally, those police officers back there, they can’t 

call directly from their car to the Terrorist Screening Center. They 

have to go through a dispatcher, the dispatcher then connects to 

the TSC, and then they have a discussion. The dispatcher says to 

the officer, here is what the TSC has told us. 

Is that basically it? I want to make sure my colleagues understand how this operates. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Right. The dispatcher is there, letting the officer, 

for officer safety, take care of the individuals that they are encountering for whatever reason they pulled them over. And then the 

dispatcher is taking the information from the officer and giving it 

to our center. And our center is trying to match up the information 

that the dispatcher has given. 

If the dispatcher—the requirements that the dispatcher would 

probably give back is, you know, either ask some more questions 

or move on or please give me some move descriptors, officer, as to 

what this individual looks like or what they are wearing or, you 

know, height, weight, and that type of information. 

Mr. DICKS. Staff has told us that in January the informationsharing would be done by March. And you are saying it is not done 

yet. 

Ms. BUCELLA. No, what I told the staff—— Mr. DICKS. That is the end of the year now. That has moved to 

the end of the year. 

Ms. BUCELLA. No. What I told the staff is that we would have 

a database by March, not a totally complete database. We would 

have a database that we would use. 

Mr. DICKS. But you don’t have one now. 

Ms. BUCELLA. We have a database now. It was up on March 

12th. March 12th it was up. I think when I briefed your staff, I 

said it would be up by the end of March and we had it operational 

by March 12th. 

Mr. DICKS. Is a memorandum of understanding necessary? MOU 

necessary? 

Ms. BUCELLA. I believe it gives some guidance to all the different 

agencies so everybody is on the same footing. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you Mr. Dicks. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Director Bucella, let me begin with you because I am trying to 

get this clear in my mind. As I understand it, in response to Mr. 

Dicks’ questions you just confirmed that you have an—I guess it 

is called a terrorist-creating database, not yet complete but you 

have a database, right? 

Ms. BUCELLA. We have a database, and though not yet complete, 

it needs to be improved upon so it is all automated. 

Mr. SHADEGG. It seems to me that almost all law enforcement 

databases are not yet complete, so——

49

Ms. BUCELLA. We have been operational, sir, for 4 months. So we 

are trying to do operations and get this database going. 

Mr. SHADEGG. What I would like to do is have you give me greater clarity of the difference between your database and the database, if there is one, that is maintained by TTIC. 

Ms. BUCELLA. TTIC is currently working on their database, but 

their database has all of the underlying reasons why that person 

is a terrorist and it has highly classified information on it. So that 

is the real distinction. And also TTIC only has international terrorist information in it. It does not have the domestic terrorism information. That other feed comes from the FBI. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, the FBI feeds into the TTIC database as 

well. 

Ms. BUCELLA. For your international terrorists, sir. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Okay. So you are saying the TTIC database will 

be international terrorists and it would include classified information. And your database would include international terrorists and 

domestic terrorists. 

Ms. BUCELLA. The names and identifiers only. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Names and identifiers only, not the basis for 

which they were placed on the list? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHADEGG. And if I understood the description you gave to 

Mr. Dicks, the reason this is taking a substantial amount of time 

is to verify that someone actually belongs on the list. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Okay. At an earlier hearing, we were told that it 

would be impossible for an officer on the street to get data directly 

from this Terrorist Screening Center, essentially to get data directly out of your database. And in a sense I think the description 

you just gave us confirms that. That is to say, an officer in a patrol 

car who calls in with a suspect he is currently detaining doesn’t 

talk directly to you or—and doesn’t electronically access your database. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHADEGG. He goes through a dispatcher. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Uh-huh. 

Mr. SHADEGG. And the dispatcher passes the information on to 

you. You then pass the information back to them. If they provide 

you with sufficient identifiers, you give them back a confirmation 

or a denial: We don’t have anybody by that name, or we do have 

somebody by that name. 

Is that accurate? I see you shaking your head no. 

Ms. BUCELLA. No, sir it isn’t. First—let me tell you why we use 

a dispatcher. To authenticate and verify that that person is, in fact, 

a lawful police officer, number one. Number two, we don’t give the 

confirmation or rejection. If it appears that the person is in fact the 

same individual that would be in our database, we forward the call 

to the Counterterrorism Watch at the FBI. They are the operational arm, along with the Joint Terrorism Task Force. We drop 

off the line while the Counterterrorism Task Force, the CT Watch, 

is talking to the individual so that they can then provide guidance 

to the law enforcement officer on the street as to what they should 

do with that individual they are encountering. 

50

Mr. SHADEGG. Okay. That leads me to two follow-up questions. 

One of the questions I had was that at the earlier hearing, we were 

given the impression that when a line officer on the street makes 

this call and thinks he has somebody who may be a suspect, a terrorist suspect, that one of the reasons that they cannot access you 

directly is that it requires essentially the approval of some supervisor, that this ought to be checked for—that this stop, person they 

have stopped, a suspect, merits screening as a terrorist. Are you 

aware of any such requirement? 

Ms. BUCELLA. No. And I am also not aware of the previous hearing as to who was even talking about this. 

Mr. SHADEGG. It is a hearing of the Homeland Security Committee, probably 2 weeks ago, and maybe a month ago. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Sorry, sir. 

Mr. SHADEGG. All right. The second question I have is I understand that because are you not operational, you just maintain a 

database, this procedure is in place where you essentially bring 

in—who did you say? 

Ms. BUCELLA. The Counterterrorism Watch at the FBI. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Okay. Do we have experience, although you have 

been up and running fairly short, with how much time that takes 

because my—you know, my police officers are going to be concerned 

about that issue. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well I can give you—it depends on where the encounter is and when we get the phone call. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, for me, the encounter is way out in rural Arizona in the Navajo Indian reservation. 

Ms. BUCELLA. If there is a local joint—usually the information 

can be provided, CT Watch turnaround time is very very quickly. 

But, for example, I can get the answer for you as to what our experience has been in Arizona. But for right now I can’t; however, I 

heard from New York that our time has been very very good. I 

mean, it varies. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Well give me, other than very very good, give me 

some specific—some time frames. Is this a 2-minute process, a 4-

minute process, a 16-minute process? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Congressman if I can jump in on that. What usually happens is you get the VGTOF hit, person of interest. The call 

goes in to our dispatch center. Dispatch center calls the TSC, going 

back and forth to the car. They verify that that is the individual. 

The CT Watch is brought in. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Well, the first question is, how long does it take 

to verify the individual? 

Mr. COBLE. Folks, we are going have to wrap up quickly. 

Mr. MCMAHON. We have been in minutes, but then with the CT 

Watch which gives specific information, get the person’s name, associate’s name, where they are going, whatever, and then let them 

go, it is running, you know, actually—usually I would say on average of 12–15 minutes, maybe, on something like that. Because 

when we talked, we said there should be—we were in about a 20-

minute maximum guideline that we would need, and the FBI has 

been meeting that. 

Mr. SHADEGG. My time obviously expired. I appreciate the Chairman’s indulgence. 

51

I would appreciate a written response to both questions: How 

long it takes to confirm, on average, that this is a person worth 

looking into; and then how long it takes to dispose of the matter. 

I think that is the concern of the average American. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Prior to recognizing the gentlelady from Texas, I want to welcome the three law enforcement officers who Director Bucella introduced to us earlier. I failed to extend a welcome to you gentlemen. 

Good to have you all with us. 

And, Mr. Berman, in response to one of the questioners, I don’t 

recall who was examining you, but you indicated some concern 

about the fact that the Department of Homeland Security did, in 

fact, have a privacy officer, but the FBI did not. But the Department of Justice, as you know, does have an Office of Information 

and Privacy, and since the FBI is housed therein, that ought to assuage—well, I shouldn’t say that. I hope that assuages your discomfort. 

I am now pleased to recognize the gentlelady from Texas for 5 

minutes, Ms. Sheila Jackson. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

might I add my appreciation for the gentlemen as well, and welcome to our Committee. I hope that you sense a great curiosity and 

certainly a great recognition of the moment that we have in terms 

of dealing with these questions of homeland security. 

Let me also add my appreciation to both Mr. Coble and Mr. 

Scott, Mr. Gibbons, and Ms. McCarthy for this joint hearing. I 

think it is really vital. I listened intently to the hearings yesterday 

of the 9/11 commission for the time that I was in the hearing room 

to listen to a part of two witnesses, and that is Mr. Tenet of the 

CIA and Mr. Clarke. And I believe that even though they might 

have been conflicted in where they were going with their testimony, they were very clear that we have not yet punched all the 

buttons on the war against terrorists. 

In addition, I think George Tenet emphasized that the local law 

enforcement are key and must be integrated into the system extensively. And I agree with that. 

One of the comments—and I don’t want to attribute it to Mr. 

Clarke, for my recollection may not be completely accurate in that 

there were many witnesses—but I am not afraid to say that the 

thrust of some of the remarks were that even if the prize plum of 

Osama bin Laden is caught, that does not in any way end the war 

on terrorism. The terrorist activities are sufficiently diffuse and 

spread out, if you will, to indicate to us that we might even just 

be beginning. And so this whole question of the integration of the 

intelligence system and having it work is a key part of our survival. 

One of the other points, I serve as the Ranking Member on the 

Immigration Subcommittee here on the Judiciary, and we balance 

and complement the Homeland Security Committee’s issues. But I 

think it is well noted that one of the best defenses of terrorism is 

to ensure if you talk about homeland Security, that the terrorist 

never gets to your land. 

[4:20 p.m.] 

52

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is where the watchlists and other integrated activities occur. 

So I have a series of questions, and I appreciate very much, Ms. 

Bucella, but I would also include and welcome others who may 

wish to answer. You probably answered this three and four and ten 

times, but answer it again, if I am correct as to the Terrorist 

Screening Center that was supposed to be operational by December 

1, 2003, if I am correct, and find out what is happening with that 

and its completeness and its operations. 

The other point that I would like to trace is the utilization of this 

watchlist. I know there have been some questions dealing with civil 

liberties and the privacy questions. I want to ask questions about 

the visa operations. When foreign guests attempt to secure visas in 

their foreign posts in the United States embassies, what is the effectiveness of the watchlist by that process? They attempt to secure 

a visa. We are now sending names to a watchlist. What is the turnaround or the integration of the data such that you immediately 

are able to look at that name and coordinate it? 

As you well know, there are a lot of Mohammeds and you can 

be sure that I am getting a lot of complaints on the system because 

I am not the Mohammed that people were looking for. I want us 

to be secure, but I also want us to recognize there are other elements of our life and business as well. 

The whole concept of Field Intelligence Groups. Houston happens 

to be one of a very few regions that has that. I think it is a vital 

in terms of coordinating intelligence activities with the local law 

enforcement. What is the effort of the FBI to put these kinds of entities into regions, as many regions as possible? 

These questions are to you, Ms. Bucella, and to others who may 

be able to comment on them. 

Ms. BUCELLA. I first would like to comment on your question regarding the visas. The visa system is still being administered by 

the State Department. The State Department was, according to the 

MOU—part of their function came over to not only the Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center, but part of it came over to the TSC. The 

State Department employees are still reviewing those visa applications, but many times when somebody applies for a visa, it is not 

real-time. It is usually a week or 2 weeks. I am not sure. The expertise on the entire visa program, that would be better addressed 

to the State Department. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thought you were looking at a list that you 

comprised when they are talking about a watchlist, and my understanding is that the data collection was a problem in terms of interpreting and getting it up to date. I realize the—if you will, the 

categorizing of responsibilities. I know that they keep that, but 

they are supposed to be looking at a watchlist. 

Ms. BUCELLA. The names that they are looking at are at our center. But the derogatory information, the underlying data, that resides at the TTIC. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Here we have a mixture of confusion. 

Ms. BUCELLA. No. Really, the function of the Terrorist Screening 

Center is only to have the names and identifiers of those known 

or suspected terrorists in their data base. We are an unclassified 

database. The responsibility of who keeps the derogatory informaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
53

tion on international terrorists resides with TTIC. So we have separate functions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And that is who the—— Mr. GIBBONS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Could she just quickly answer those last two 

dealing with the operations and the operational aspect? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Again, the Terrorist Screening Center is merely facilitating in the identities match. As to the operations of field intelligence groups, I am not the person to be asking here. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Only thing I can say is—and I don’t think this 

would have happened prior to 9/11, the field intelligence group in 

Albany is putting that unit into the State Intelligence Center, 

which is like 2 miles away, instead of having two stovepipe systems. So I see a great integration. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. [presiding.] Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding 

this very important hearing. 

I want to particularly welcome Jerry Berman, who was in another life wearing the hat of the Chairman of the Internet Caucus 

Advisory Council which is very interested in issues like this as well 

because of the technology that is deployed and the effects it has not 

only on the safety of our citizenry but also their rights to privacy. 

I wonder, Mr. Berman, if you might outline for me the problems 

that exist with a multitude of different watchlists in terms of protecting the privacy of citizens. Are we better off with one watchlist 

or we better off with the alphabet soup of watchlists that we have? 

Related to that, when we start mixing watchlists so that someone 

who is on one watchlist for some reason gets on to another database watchlist that is built around another reason, is there a risk 

that people could be confused for being suspected of something they 

are not suspected of? 

Mr. BERMAN. I think the answer is yes, yes. I think that the— it is a daunting and maybe impossible task to create one single, 

consolidated watchlist. I think that the different agencies have different bureaucracies, they have their own culture, they don’t want 

to share information, and they have different functions. So mixing 

all those watchlists into one may be impossible, and it may not be 

necessary. It may be possible to have a set of watchlists that can 

be responded to on a computerized basis that have different levels 

of access both to protect privacy and the security of the information, but which trigger requests down line. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. It can be done in real-time. Look at all those 

lists separately but look at them almost simultaneously. 

Mr. BERMAN. There are the 200 most dangerous people who 

ought to be identified, and that ought to be triggered and sent back 

to an FBI agent and hit on that flag. They shouldn’t have to call 

back 24 hours later and go through a bureaucratic system to find 

that out if it is the most dangerous people. If it is someone who 

is not really suspected of terrorism, that flag may say call back 

later and then call the FBI. 

Maybe that is where the Terrorist Screening Center is going. 

But, right now, I don’t think they have the technology. I don’t think 

they have the money to use the kind of auditing technology that 

54

the private sector could bring to this. I think they may want to. 

And I don’t think they have controls on the civil liberties side, even 

if we had the right computers, on the problem of what is going in 

the system. The Director says, you know, we are trying to purge 

and make sure it is the right information. But they have no control 

over what the FBI wants to put on their watchlists. It is up to 

them. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask any of the other panelists if they 

want to respond to that question. 

Ms. BUCELLA. One of the things that concerns I think everyone 

is to have one master database with all the underlying information 

being in one place. If that were ever compromised, that would really hurt America. 

However, let me tell you one of the things that we have found 

at our center. We filled a lot of holes because of the perspective of 

where we are sitting. We have been able to marry up or facilitate 

the communication between many different Federal agencies having pieces of investigations on the same program. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. We all agree with that and we want to have the 

access to that, but what I would like to know from you is, what do 

you think about one of those agencies with access to a watchlist or 

data base of another agency taking information off that database 

and putting it on to their own database? Are there protocols or 

standards for doing that? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Right now, nobody can just pull from our database. 

We want to make sure that all the information we have on the individual is up to date. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me interrupt you there. When we set up the 

Department of Homeland Security, the Judiciary Committee went 

through quite an extensive debate about what function the State 

Department should serve in issuing visas. There are some who 

wanted to have more of a law enforcement type perspective on the 

person who is actually issuing these visas in these countries 

around the world where applicants come in and apply for a visa. 

Look at them from a different perspective than a State Department 

employee who might have a political consideration for why certain 

persons should be allowed to come to the United States for diplomatic reasons. 

Can you say to me whether you are getting adequate cooperation 

from the State Department at those consular offices around the 

world providing you with sufficient information so that as you 

screen people on these watchlists, you are getting the cooperation? 

Are you finding the right people to give you data about or could 

that be done better? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Right now, the partnership that we have with the 

State Department has been absolutely essential not only in educating us as to the visa program but, for example, if based on information that an individual gets a visa and they subsequently find 

out that there is additional information coming from one of the 

Government agencies, they are right there with us. We are able to 

immediately contact DHS, CBP so that if the individual does come 

into the United States or tries to come into the United States, they 

can be blocked immediately at CBP. 

55

Even if there was a visa issued based on faulty information or 

incomplete information, if that person gets on a plane and while 

they are in the air subsequent information is found out by any 

Government agency, we immediately contact the National Terrorist 

Screening Center—the National Targeting Center, excuse me—and 

they will respond immediately at any of our ports of entry, whether 

the person is trying to come in over the border in Canada or trying 

to fly to the United States. That has been another hole that we 

have been able to fill. 

Mr. GIBBONS. In view of the fact we are going to have another 

vote coming up shortly and we want to get to a second round, I am 

going to limit the second round of questioning to one very quick 

question for each of the Members; and I will start off with Mr. 

Bartoldus. Let me ask you, in the advancement of technology that 

is going to take place in this data watchlist that we are talking 

about, where you are going from the automatic targeting system to 

the new ACE system, the automatic commercial environment that 

you have, what does the link between ACE and the Terrorist 

Screening Center look like? Is that part of the consideration that 

you are talking about? Also, how is the database for agents in the 

field being considered when you look at this new system? How does 

it change what you do? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. The automated targeting system is the current 

system that is used by CBP officers to identify high-risk passengers 

or cargo in advance of arrival. It is fully compatible with our mission directives under the ACE program. 

I actually have assigned two of my staff at the National Targeting Center as our ACE liaisons, and we developed the new automated commercial environment as a bridge between our current 

system and the future system. So we are fully integrated and sat 

down with Donna’s deputy in several meetings so, as we develop 

the new system, we are developing it with an eye toward TSC and 

immediate sharing of data. 

Mr. GIBBONS. It will improve your coordination and information 

sharing when you go to this ACE system? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. Yes. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Berman, if your name gets on the list by mistake, what is the process for getting your name off? 

Mr. BERMAN. I may have to bring litigation right now or maybe 

I could call the Department but I don’t know where I would go. I 

don’t know how my name got on the list right now. I don’t know 

which agency put it on. I am assuming I am stopped or can’t fly. 

I could ask the Terrorist Screening Center if they have got my 

name on the list, but they would refer me back to the agency which 

provided the watchlist and they may tell me. But I don’t know 

what the standard was. I may have to file litigation. I mean, I 

would like to have a response to that. I don’t know what the process is. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Cox. 

Mr. COX. Well, I think that is an excellent question and we ought 

to ask the rest of the panel, beginning with the Director if we 

might, what the answer might be to that question. 

56

Ms. BUCELLA. It does depend. If you were stopped at an airport 

and you were on a no-fly list, the TSA has a process in place in 

an office of the ombudsperson. If you were stopped going through 

a secondary search—Mr. Bartoldus could speak to that—but you 

could be, in fact, brought into secondary for a whole host of reasons 

that have nothing to do with terrorism. 

Mr. COX. Let us say I am not being stopped or anything, it just 

came to my attention while I was at home one day, somebody told 

me I am on this list and so I want to do something about it because 

I don’t think I should be on it; what do I do? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. Speaking for CBP, you can always write a letter 

to our headquarters in Washington, D.C. Or your local office. They 

will fully research it, respond to you saying whether or not we have 

a record, you know, depending—as long it is not a classified record. 

Or if there is a record of another agency, we will refer you to that 

other agency and they almost all have ombudsmen. 

Mr. COX. Do I have to know which agency is a priority? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. If it was not our record and you asked us, we 

would confer with that other agency and refer you to that agency 

and send a letter back to you and the other agency. 

One other quick point. If your name matches someone else who 

is on the list, that is information we collect and we use that in our 

screening, so that we can identify next time you come across the 

border that you are not the person we are interested in. 

Mr. COX. Let us say I pursued the Berman route and I file a lawsuit because my letters didn’t get answered or I got a form letter 

or something. Not that you would ever do that, but let us go down 

this path. What right would I have in discovery in this litigation 

to obtain the records that are the basis for my being included in 

the list? And let us assume that they are classified. Somebody is 

going to tell me I think, well, we can’t tell you why you are on the 

list, right? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. CBP operates under the standard FOIA laws. If 

something is classified beyond the FOIA laws, then it is not discoverable. 

Mr. COX. Since we are dealing with terrorism here and it has a 

big international component and it involves the Intelligence Community, I would assume in a lot of these cases names on the list 

are there because of classified information, right? 

Ms. BUCELLA. That would be fair to say. 

Mr. COX. It is reasonable to assume that if I want to get my 

name off the list and there are well-meaning people in the Government who are trying to help me, they are still going to have to 

write me back, even if it is not a form letter, saying, well, you are 

on the list and we can’t tell you why. 

Ms. BUCELLA. I would have to get an answer for you because I 

am not quite sure that they could even confirm that you were on 

the list. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, there are ways of dealing with classified information in litigation, but it is going to be a hard road to 

litigate, unless I was denied the right to travel or some other benefit. But I think the larger point is that TSC is not in a position 

to do this. It is going to refer you back to any number of 14 different watchlists, which are the watchlists that are supposed to be 

57

consolidated in any event. The issue was to consolidate the 

watchlist and at least to make them systematic and accessible in 

certain ways to resolve terrorist issues, but it was also to bring us 

under some standard and guidance so that we would have some 

civil liberties protection. That is what DHS was set up to do. And 

it seems to me that the system is not functioning the way Congress 

intended it to function. 

Mr. COX. I think what this real-life thought exercise has led us 

to is that, first, it is very important when we put names on the list 

that we take every reasonable precaution to make sure it is done 

right to begin with; and second, as Mr. Berman points out, that we 

not have it be so variegated that it depends on where it came from 

and who is making the decisions and so on. 

HSPD 6 is very different from the Homeland Security Act. The 

Homeland Security Act has shot throughout the notion that there 

is a one-stop shop, whether it is fusion of intelligence and so on, 

or this question. It also has, as I pointed out earlier, an officer for 

civil rights and civil liberties and a privacy officer, and that officer 

for civil rights and civil liberties is responsible for the whole Department, not just an individual directorate, so that there is constancy throughout. Lastly, we don’t——

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Cox, we have been trying to limit the number 

of questions on this second round. I don’t want to cut you off unnecessarily, but in order to be fair to everyone. 

Mr. COX. If I may, I will just finish the sentence and say if we 

have the Department of Homeland Security playing a more significant role here, we will have somebody who can, no matter how 

your name got on the watchlist, from what source, deal with these 

kinds of inquiries, to not only provide the standards up front, but 

also help people who are trying to get themselves off when they 

think they are improperly put on and provide routine standard answers that won’t be different, depending on where you entered the 

system and which agency it is. 

I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Bucella, Mr. Bartoldus, have you had a chance to see the 

presentation of the Markle Foundation that Mr. Berman is an advisory board member on, the presentation regarding the integration 

of data, the software that would allow different levels of classification to be accessible to different people who may be qualified and 

eligible to receive the different levels of classification? 

Ms. BUCELLA. No, sir, I have not. 

Mr. TURNER. I would urge you to do it. And I am very disturbed 

by what I am hearing today. I get the sense that there is nobody 

designing a system that is capable of integrating the various databases, the various information kept by various agencies, integrating them in a way where they are accessible in real-time. I get 

the feeling you are telling us that by the end of the year, you will 

have a single database constructed by collecting the data from the 

other 12 databases that exist. But I don’t sense that that is going 

to be accomplished in a way that has a vision for an overall integration of databases in developing a system that provides accessiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
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bility in real-time to various levels of information that should be 

made available. 

Who is designing, who is in charge of developing the information 

technology architecture for the Terrorist Screening Center? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Right now in the next week, we are—we have been 

developing some requirements and reaching out to all of our Federal partners to make sure that we can have some type of 

connectivity, because by the end of the year what we want to do 

is allow our system to be queried electronically by other systems. 

Mr. TURNER. Are you going to do that internally with Federal 

employees? Are you reaching out with a request for proposals to 

the private sector to accomplish that task? How do you intend to 

do it? 

Ms. BUCELLA. We have been meeting with contractors. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you have any timetable when you might have 

a request for proposal for that kind of system? 

Ms. BUCELLA. No, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. I would urge you to move forward with that and 

also urge you take a look at what the Markle Foundation has produced in the process of developing that. Again, I am disturbed, because as you know—and I don’t place it all at your feet. I mean, 

obviously you have been in this job since December. The FBI has 

just been asked about that time to take over the task. But we are 

21⁄2 years after 9/11, and none of these programs that we are 

spending billions on, U.S. VISIT, Caps II, none of them are going 

to work unless there is a unified integrated database comprising all 

the agencies that contain this data. We will never be able to stop 

issuing visas to the wrong people unless we have it done right. 

And I would urge the Department of Homeland Security and the 

FBI to try to have a larger vision on what the architecture should 

look like to get this job done in the right way and effective way so 

that it is comprehensive, it is available to the people that need to 

see it at the various levels, and it is available in real-time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. Mr. Goodlatte. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to yield 

my one basic question to the Chairman of the Committee. 

Mr. COX. I actually don’t want to belabor the point, just say at 

the time we announced the creation of the TSC, I applauded the 

effort of the consolidation for the reasons that the Ranking Member, Mr. Turner, just pointed out. But I said at the same time, that 

the screening center should be part of the Homeland Security Department because it is the most appropriate location for the new 

center, for some of the reasons that I think we have been talking 

about here. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security has statutory obligations to 

provide authoritative threat assessments that have major implications for the security of Americans against terrorism. And to do 

this, he or she in the future has to have the tools and the resources 

that centers such as the TSC are going to provide. In addition, I 

think it is becoming clear that to obtain all of the benefits that we 

want from consolidation, we need a consolidator. 

So I guess my final question to the Director would be, Ms. 

Bucella—and I know this is something of a friendly question inasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:53 Jul 09, 2004 Jkt 089266 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\032504\92674.000 HJUD1 PsN: 92674
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much as you are technically an employee of the Department of 

Homeland Security, is there anything—let me ask it the easiest 

way. Is there any harm that would come from making the Terrorist 

Screening Center part of the Department of Homeland Security? 

Ms. BUCELLA. I can only answer as to some of the challenges 

that we have found in setting up the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Because the Department of Homeland Security was not in the past 

involved in the intelligence world, we have had a very—— Mr. COX. It didn’t exist in any world. 

Ms. BUCELLA. It is a brand new agency with 22 different organizations that have been brought together, different cultures, just 

trying to get the intercommunication done, but more specifically at 

our center, just trying to get the people with the right clearances 

so that they can come through the door and answer the 20,000 

phone calls—2,000 phone calls that we have received since we have 

been up. 

It has been a challenge to make sure that we can get the proper 

background clearances. The FBI agents have had a very large 

group of individuals that already have those clearances because 

they have been involved in intelligence and the terrorism aspect of 

it. But as to the future, I am not the expert here. 

Mr. COX. So we have got the exigencies of getting such a thing 

set up, but there is nothing in nature that would be offended if all 

of this were ultimately reported to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Ms. BUCELLA. The Terrorist Screening Center has an incredible 

mission that we may need to move forward on. I am not looking 

as to the future of where it is going to be. I just want it to work 

right. And the men and women that work with me are from all different agencies, and it is something that I would invite you to come 

see us, because it is incredible to see the partnership that is occurring there on a daily basis. We may have Coast Guard there with 

their uniforms on, but they are working side by side with the FBI 

and the State Department and it really is a cooperative effort. 

Mr. COX. I want to applaud you for that, and we are very, very 

pleased with the effort that is being made and the progress that 

is being made. 

Mr. Berman, I can tell you want to be heard on this. 

Mr. BERMAN. The argument for DHS is Representative Turner’s 

point, which is DHS could drive the vision that would break out 

of the traditional intelligence baronies that existed prior to 9/11. I 

thought that was part of the vision. And the Markle Foundation, 

of which I am a member, recommended that DHS take the lead in 

driving that kind of vision, including using some of the information 

technology that I discussed with Representative Goodlatte. 

That is not going to happen through the traditional baronies. 

And what I am afraid has happened through the creation of TTIC, 

TSC, and all the rest, is a new alphabet soup which returns authority essentially to the traditional agencies so that they maintain 

maybe a changed world, but a lot of the status quo and power that 

they had originally, and that DHS is not in that visionary role or 

driving leadership in reorganizing their intelligence functions. 

Mr. COX. Well, that is my abiding concern as well, and I think 

you aptly stated it. 

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Scott, in an order of fairness, I will grant you time for an 

additional question or two. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am a little concerned about what happens if your 

name gets on the list by mistake, where you factually are the 

wrong person. Certainly you would have no right to take your 

name off if the person with your same name is properly on the list. 

I guess my question is, if you have the same name as someone 

on the list, how do you ever make an airplane flight without having 

missed the first one—I mean, how long does it take after you have 

gotten a hit, show up at the airport in plenty of time, you got a 

hit, by the time you have gotten cleared you have missed your 

flight; is that right? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Not necessarily, and especially not since the TSC 

has been in existence. We have had occasion where not only on a 

plane but at the border, we have encountered a person actually 

with the same name and date of birth, but different identifiers. We 

have now gone back to the different case files systems, the case 

management systems, for example, the CBP, and there is a notation in the file, ‘‘Please ask the hair color immediately,’’ or ‘‘Ask the 

weight immediately.’’

That is going to be a long process, but that has actually been in 

it and we have been able to make sure that people have not been 

unduly inconvenienced and they can go through the system a lot 

faster than they were able to previously. And Mr. Bartoldus can 

speak a little more about that. 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. When I talked to my staff before I came here, 

I said, Is there ever a time you would not call TSC? They go, 

‘‘Yeah, the frequent crossers who we have all identified with TSC 

are the people who are not looking for it, but their passport was 

stolen once or identity was stolen once, and the stolen identity is 

what we are looking for.’’ We have been able to work with the TSC and our own staff to 

put systems in place to make sure those people are facilitated when 

we encounter them again. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Congressman Scott, what we are doing every day 

is refining the system. 

Mr. SCOTT. How long does it take from the time you buy your 

ticket to the time you get a hit to the time you have been cleared? 

How long does that take? When you buy a ticket, give them your 

name, your name automatically goes through the system, right? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. No. For CBP purposes, it goes through the system when you are on the airplane or approaching the airplane. 

What we do in those circumstances is, you have been identified as 

a frequent traveler who has a name match or you have been encountered before and you are not the person we are looking for, we 

immediately identify that you usually make the same flight or the 

same exit. The record is hard-coded and improved that day by that 

event and captured by that event. 

The other benefit of TSC is the information that is collected by 

the law enforcement officer, the border crossing agent, or whatever 

is incorporated into the field and the record to constantly update 

it. 

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Mr. SCOTT. Obviously, that is the second time. The first time was 

different. 

Mr. Berman, did you want to make a comment? 

Mr. BERMAN. There are several people who have contacted the 

ACLU, contacted our organization, there have been stories in the 

Wall Street Journal. And I know one person, I won’t mention his 

name, who just doesn’t fly anymore because they cannot get out of 

the system because they have the same name, and it requires they 

get detained, and then there is a reconciliation back through the 

system to see whether that person is the person; and they don’t 

have enough query fields on the computer itself to be able to match 

a number of information fields. And they can correct me if I am 

wrong, it requires calling the agency and walking back the information, how tall are you, because for security reasons they won’t 

provide that information up front. 

So it is a query system. So it is not unduly inconvenienced, but 

that can be inconvenient, not being able to fly. I mean, I am prepared to hear that that is not the case. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Scott. 

We have reached the end of the day for all of you and all of us 

on this Committee, and we want to thank each of you for your time 

here today. The buzzer is very timely. We ignore it as everyone else 

does. But I want to thank each of you again for taking part in this 

Committee hearing. Your testimony has been very valuable in helping us better understand this issue. 

We may have some written questions from the Committee to you, 

and the record will remain open for 1 week. We would expect and 

request that you respond to those questions in a timely fashion. 

This concludes the oversight hearing on the progress in consolidating terrorist watchlists, the Terrorist Screening Center. The 

record, as I indicated earlier, will remain open for 1 week. Again, 

thank you for your cooperation and this Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the joint hearing was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE

ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Thank you, Chairman Gibbons and Chairman Coble, for holding this important 

hearing—the second hearing the Homeland Security Committee has held jointly 

with the Judiciary Committee. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. 

On December 1, 2003, at the President’s direction, the Terrorist Screening Center 

stood-up with the task of providing unified, accurate terrorist screening information 

to screeners around the country, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through a single node. The TSC will serve State and local officials, as well as private sector entities that manage critical infrastructure. It will even serve foreign governments that 

have entered into immigration agreements with the United States, if they are partners in the global war on terrorism. But the Terrorist Screening Center’s support 

is particularly important to our nation’s first responders, our border protection officials, and the consular officers who adjudicate hundreds of visa applications every 

day. 

Our overriding objective is, after all, to prevent terrorist attacks. There, the Terrorist Screening Center—TSC—represents a quantum leap—in this nation’s ability 

to keep terrorists out and to pursue potential terrorists who have managed to get 

in—for example, by giving law enforcement officers a reliable way to determine 

whether a person stopped for a routine traffic violation is, based on all the information available to the U.S. Government, involved in some way in terrorist activity. 

It also represents another important milestone in tearing down barriers to information sharing between the Intelligence Community and law enforcement officials. 

Integrating the data contained on the Government’s legacy watch lists is a positive step—it was needed. Historically, nine Federal agencies maintained 12 disparate watch lists, the contents of which were not accessible across agency lines and 

were not comprehensively analyzed. That means we had no efficient way of accessing the information we had—and as a practical matter, what you can’t access, you 

really don’t know. That’s one of the hard lessons of the 9/11 attacks. 

But integrating the information on all those lists is a complex task, even in the 

era of interoperable computer systems and instantly searchable databases—and it 

must be done right. And to be the right solution, TSC must not come at the price 

of the civil rights or First Amendment freedoms of American citizens. Because we 

are fighting to preserve our way of life—that’s a fundamental part of protecting our 

nation. And I believe it has been worth the time it has taken to get TSC done right. 

The information collected and maintained on the Government’s various watch 

lists was collected under different authorities for widely divergent purposes and 

maintained in different formats. There was no agreed upon set of discriminators to 

determine whether an individual should be watch-listed. And the 12 legacy lists, 

taken together, had hundreds of thousands of names. They could not just be dumped 

into some massive, Government database of potential bad-guys. Each name had to 

be analyzed to make sure it belonged on TSC’s integrated list. 

So at this hearing, we hope to get an update on the TSC’s progress and relationship to the Department of Homeland Security. And, equally important, we hope to 

be reassured that TSC, and the databases that feed it, will not impinge upon the 

civil rights and civil liberties to which we, as Americans, are entitled. 

There are also serious questions we must ask: Is the Terrorist Screening Center 

the solution for the present—or forever? Is it structured in the most effective way? 

Does it work—is it fast, reliable? Is it being used by those who need it most? Can 

a user get additional information on a TSC name ‘‘hit’’ quickly and reliably? Is 

TSC’s management and supervision appropriate? How can it be improved? Are civil 

liberties and privacy interests scrupulously safeguarded? Could a name get on TSC’s 

list erroneously? If so, how would that be discovered and how corrected, quickly and 

certainly? 

I look forward to hearing from each of the witnesses on these important issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

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QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD FROM DONNA BUCELLA


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QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD FROM JIM MCMAHON


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QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD FROM CHARLES BARTOLDUS


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Æ


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