NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

JASON S. MCCANLESS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SAMANTHA MCCANLESS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0458 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2014-093082

The Honorable David E. McDowell, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Crider Law PLLC, Mesa

By Brad J. Crider

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Landry Law Office PC, Phoenix

By Wm. Troy Landry

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 4-19-2022
MCCANLESS v. MCCANLESS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which Vice 

Chief Judge David B. Gass and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Samantha McCanless (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s 

ruling on her petition to modify legal decision-making, parenting time, and 

child support. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Jason McCanless (“Father”) (collectively 

“Parents”) married in September 2007. Parents’ marriage was dissolved in 

March 2015 by a Consent Decree that awarded them joint legal decisionmaking authority and equal parenting time for their three children. Under 

the parenting time schedule, the children would stay with each parent on a 

weekly basis.

¶3 After Father dropped the children off with Mother on March 

15, 2020, Mother took them to Concho, Arizona. While in Concho, Mother 

told Father she wanted to keep the children there until the COVID-19 

pandemic situation improved. Parents apparently agreed to temporarily 

modify parenting time to a biweekly rotation to accommodate her request. 

Shortly after reaching this temporary agreement, however, Mother told 

Father she changed her mind and wanted to keep the children in Concho 

for longer than two weeks because they were safer there. Father objected, 

noting she had just agreed to the biweekly rotation.

¶4 Mother’s counsel sent Father a letter outlining her concerns 

about the children, including COVID-19 safety, extracurricular activity 

expenses, and parenting time. Mother rejected Father’s request that she 

bring the children back from Concho and referred to Parents’ purported 

agreement to temporarily modify parenting time to the biweekly rotation. 

Father responded that Mother terminated that agreement when she said 

she would keep the children in Concho for the foreseeable future and that

his counsel advised him to contact the police if the children were not timely 

returned. Ultimately, Father contacted police after Mother kept the 

children in Concho for over three weeks.
MCCANLESS v. MCCANLESS

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¶5 On March 30, 2020, Father filed a petition to enforce parenting 

time (“Father’s Enforcement Petition”), asserting that Mother withheld the 

children and “us[ed] COVID-19 to justify her actions.” Father sought makeup parenting time, a $100 per day penalty for each day Mother did not 

permit him parenting time, and attorneys’ fees. 

¶6 Mother filed a petition to modify legal decision-making, 

parenting time, and child support (“Mother’s Modification Petition”) three 

weeks later. She requested an equal split of the children’s extracurricular 

activity expenses, an increase in her parenting time, temporary custody due 

to COVID-19, and attorneys’ fees. 

¶7 At the end of April, the superior court scheduled an 

evidentiary hearing on Father’s Enforcement Petition. After Mother 

returned the children and agreed to make-up parenting time, however, 

Father requested to vacate his upcoming Enforcement Petition hearing, 

which the court granted. Neither Father’s request to vacate nor the court’s 

order addressed Father’s make-up parenting time request.

¶8 The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s 

Modification Petition in May 2021. The court found substantial and 

continuing changes in circumstances justified modifying parenting time 

and legal decision-making, including that Mother made numerous legal 

decisions without consulting Father and incurred extracurricular expenses 

without his permission.

¶9 The superior court ordered continued joint legal decisionmaking authority and for each parent to be responsible for expenses 

incurred without the other parent’s consent. The court altered the 

parenting time schedule and ordered Mother to pay child support. The 

court awarded attorneys’ fees to Father and denied Mother’s request to 

compel Father to pay for extracurricular activities.

¶10 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Absent an abuse of discretion, we will uphold the superior 

court’s orders for parenting time, legal decision-making, and child support.

Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999) (citation omitted); Nold v. Nold, 

232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). The same standard 

applies to attorneys’ fees. Magee v. Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 590, ¶ 6 (App. 2004)
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(citation omitted). The superior court abuses its discretion when the record, 

viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s decision, is 

“devoid of competent evidence to support” the court’s decision. Little, 193 

Ariz. at 520, ¶ 5 (citation omitted). We will affirm the superior court’s 

ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 

52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).

¶12 Mother argues that the superior court erred in (1) its findings 

of fact, (2) reducing her parenting time and by ordering briefing on makeup parenting time, (3) calculating child support, and (4) awarding Father 

attorneys’ fees.

I. The superior court did not misconstrue the evidence.

¶13 Mother claims that the superior court’s typographical errors 

in its ruling show it failed to understand the factual timeline. The court’s 

errors, however, were technical and would not alter the outcome. See Ariz. 

Const. art. 6, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for technical error in 

pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that 

substantial justice has been done.”). For example, the court mistakenly 

stated Parents married in September 2017 instead of September 2007. It

later noted in the same paragraph, however, that Parents divorced in March 

2015.

¶14 Mother correctly notes the superior court’s minute entry 

mistakenly stated that an evidentiary hearing was held on both Mother’s 

Modification Petition and Father’s Enforcement Petition when the hearing 

was only on Mother’s Petition. The court, however, noted multiple times 

in the record that the purpose of the hearing was to address Mother’s 

Modification Petition. First, at the outset of the hearing, when the court said 

“[w]e’re here today for an evidentiary hearing on [Mother’s] petition.” 

Second, in the minute entry when the court said the hearing would address 

Mother’s Modification Petition. Finally, in the court’s ruling when it stated 

it “took under advisement the issues raised in the Petition[]” and the 

hearing for Father’s Enforcement Petition “was vacated.” (Emphasis 

added). Because the record shows the hearing focused on the issues raised 

in Mother’s Modification Petition and Father’s response, Mother was not 

“prejudiced” by a lack of notice of the issues to be decided.

¶15 Mother’s claim that the superior court “failed to understand 

that it was Father who was retaliating against Mother” is also not supported 

by the evidence. As outlined above, Parents’ messages to each other show 

that Mother sought to strong-arm Father into agreeing with her. Father 
MCCANLESS v. MCCANLESS

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testified that although he and Mother discussed the two weeks on/two 

weeks off parenting time arrangement, it “turned into something worse and 

snowballed.” Mother testified that she voluntarily disobeyed the court

order and kept the children for over three weeks. The superior court heard 

evidence that Parents’ eldest daughter secretly sent Father a Snapchat 

message stating Mother would not allow the children to text him and said 

they would not see him until May because of COVID-19. Additionally, the 

record showed Mother’s statements and actions did not support her 

purported concern about COVID-19. Father repeatedly asked Mother to 

speak to the children, which she allowed them to do only intermittently. 

Mother’s allegation that Father filed a “false police report” to have the

children returned also fails because Mother violated the parenting plan. 

Although Father was two hours late when he dropped off the children on 

Mother’s Day/Mother’s birthday, there is no evidence this action was 

retaliatory.

¶16 Additionally, while Mother argued that the issue of her taking 

the children to Concho was “moot,” the superior court found Mother’s 

decision to keep the children was consistent with her pattern of unilateral 

decision-making and properly used this fact in conducting its best interests 

analysis under A.R.S. §§ 25-403 and -403.01.

¶17 Mother asserts that Father committed perjury by testifying 

that he did not receive her counsel’s March 2020 letter until after Mother 

filed her Modification Petition. This testimony conflicts with a text message 

Father sent acknowledging receipt of the letter before the Petition was filed. 

Notwithstanding Father’s statement, however, the record contains 

substantial evidence to support the court’s findings. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 

52, ¶ 16 (“Even though conflicting evidence may exist, we affirm the trial 

court’s ruling if substantial evidence supports it.”) (citation omitted). We 

find no abuse of discretion.

II. The court’s parenting time decision was proper.

¶18 To alter an earlier parenting time order, the superior court 

must determine that a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s 

welfare has occurred. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 343, ¶ 14 (App. 

2020) (citation omitted). “The superior court is vested with broad discretion 

to decide whether a change of circumstances has occurred.” Id. (citation 

omitted). The court then must determine parenting time “in accordance 

with the best interests of the child” and in contested cases, make “specific 

findings” regarding the relevant best interests factors. A.R.S. § 25-403(A)-

(B).
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¶19 Here, the superior court first determined that a substantial 

change in circumstances occurred from the Consent Decree. The court 

noted that although some circumstances asserted as rationale for 

modification were not substantial and continuing when considered in 

isolation, the threshold was met when viewing the totality of the evidence. 

The court relied on the record to find that Mother’s unilateral decisionmaking was substantial and continuing. Thereafter, the court conducted a 

detailed best interests analysis under A.R.S. § 25-403. The record supports 

the court’s findings and conclusions.

¶20 Mother next argues that the superior court abused its 

discretion in ordering briefing on Father’s request for make-up parenting 

time. Mother is correct that despite having previously vacated the 

evidentiary hearing on Father’s Enforcement Petition, the court’s order 

invited Father to file a brief regarding make-up parenting time, which he 

did in June 2021. Several weeks later, however, the court filed an order 

stating: “In light of [Mother’s] Notice of Appeal and the court’s erroneous 

inclusion of Rule 78(c) Ariz. R. Fam. L. Proc. language in its [ruling], this 

Court presently lacks jurisdiction to address [Father’s] request for make-up 

parenting time. [Father’s] Request will be held until the Court is reinvested 

with jurisdiction.” The superior court did not rule on Father’s Enforcement 

Petition and the matter has yet to be resolved. As such, it is not a final order,

and we lack jurisdiction to consider it and any arguments pertaining 

thereto. See Yee v. Yee, 251 Ariz. 71, 76, ¶ 14 (App. 2021) (to be appealable, 

a special order after final judgment must resolve all issues raised in the 

petition that initiated the post-decree proceeding).

III. The child support calculation was not erroneous.

¶21 The purpose of a child support order is “[t]o establish a 

standard of support for children consistent with the reasonable needs of 

children and the ability of parents to pay.” A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § 1(A) (2018) 

(“2018 Guidelines”) (current version at A.R.S. § 25-320 app. (2022)). 

Provisions of any decree regarding child support may be modified “only 

on a showing of changed circumstances that are substantial and 

continuing.” A.R.S. § 25-327(A); see Schroeder v. Schroeder, 161 Ariz. 316, 323 

(1989) (“The question whether a substantial and continuing change in 

circumstances occurred . . . [is] a question of fact.”). The decision to modify 

child support is within the superior court’s “sound discretion.” Nia v. Nia, 

242 Ariz. 419, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) (citation omitted). “Evidence regarding 

current or reasonably projected income, and of recent years’ income may 

assist the court in determining whether an increase or decrease in income 

is ‘continuing.’” Id. at 423, ¶ 12 (citation omitted). If a parent’s earnings are 
MCCANLESS v. MCCANLESS

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voluntarily reduced, the court may impute income to the parent up to his 

or her earning capacity. 2018 Guidelines § 5(E).

¶22 Here, the Consent Decree provided that neither parent was to 

pay child support. The superior court found, among other things, that 

Mother met the burden to demonstrate that a modification of the Consent 

Decree was “justified as a substantial and continuous change in 

circumstances affecting the parenting time and legal decision making for 

the Children.”

¶23 In calculating child support, the superior court found Mother 

voluntarily worked for no compensation at her husband’s law firm. Mother 

testified that she made twenty-one dollars per hour at her previous job and 

believed that she would eventually make around twenty to twenty-two 

dollars an hour at the law firm. Based on her testimony, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in imputing an income of twenty-one dollars per hour 

to Mother.

¶24 Mother also contends the superior court erred by not 

including Father’s commissions in its income calculation. Indeed, gross 

income “may include” commission income. 2018 Guidelines § 5(A). 

Nonetheless, “[i]ncome from any source which is not continuing or 

recurring in nature need not necessarily be deemed gross income for child 

support purposes.” 2018 Guidelines § 5(A).

¶25 The court’s child support calculations were not erroneous 

based on the guidelines and the evidence. The court’s child support 

worksheet shows that it diligently reviewed Parents’ finances and adjusted 

child support obligations based on Father’s monthly payment amount for 

the children’s insurance.

¶26 Additionally, although the superior court found that Mother 

made significant expenditures for the children’s extracurricular activities 

which benefitted them, she regularly made them without Father’s consent. 

Mother testified that because the Consent Decree did not provide for 

extracurricular expenses or reimbursement, she and Father would 

communicate regarding whether to reimburse the other. Communications 

indicate that Mother pressured Father to agree to the expenses. For 

example, when Father indicated that he would pay for a less expensive 

cheer program for their eldest daughter but not for the more expensive 

travel program, Mother replied: “I hope [eldest daughter] really hates you.” 

Despite this evidence, however, the court reduced Mother’s child support 

obligation to sixty-seven dollars per month—to be used towards 
MCCANLESS v. MCCANLESS

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extracurricular activity expenses. The court’s child support determination 

was proper.

IV. Attorneys’ fees and costs were properly awarded to Father.

¶27 The superior court may award attorneys’ fees after 

considering the financial resources and the reasonableness of the parties’ 

positions. A.R.S. § 25-324(A). We review an award of attorneys’ fees for an 

abuse of discretion and will not disturb the superior court’s order “if there 

is any reasonable basis for it.” Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc’y, 209 Ariz. 

260, 265, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶28 Mother argues that the superior court abused its discretion in 

awarding Father his attorneys’ fees. We disagree. The court found Mother 

acted unreasonably by (1) making unilateral legal decisions, (2) attempting

to extract contributions from Father for expenses she incurred, and (3) 

seeking modification based on Father’s refusal to contribute to 

extracurricular expenses he did not agree to pay. Parents provided 

financial affidavits for the court to assess their financial resources. There 

was a reasonable basis for the court’s fee award.

¶29 Mother contends that the superior court should have required 

Father to submit a China Doll affidavit before determining attorneys’ fees. 

See Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183 (App. 1983). A China Doll 

affidavit aids the court in assessing the reasonableness of requested fees. Id. 

at 187-88. Here, Father’s financial affidavit stated that his attorneys’ fees 

were $3,500. Father testified he was willing to file an application for an 

order of attorneys’ fees and costs. The court awarded Father $3,500 for 

attorneys’ fees and costs. See generally A.R.S. § 25-324.

¶30 Although a China Doll affidavit can aid the court in 

determining a fee amount, it does not help determine if a party is entitled 

to fees under A.R.S. § 25-324. “Once a party establishes its entitlement to 

fees and meets the minimum requirements in its application and affidavit 

for fees, the burden shifts to the party opposing the fee award to 

demonstrate the impropriety or unreasonableness of the requested fees.” 

Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowner Ass’n, 216 Ariz. 482, 491, ¶ 38 (App. 2007)

(citation omitted). Although the better practice is to require a China Doll

affidavit, we have not held that a China Doll affidavit is mandatory to 

receive fees in a child support or parenting time action.

¶31 The superior court had substantial evidence before it 

regarding Parents’ resources from their financial affidavits and trial 

testimony. Although the record does not indicate that a fee application or 
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China Doll affidavit were provided, a reasonable basis exists for the fee 

award given Father’s avowal that his fees were $3,500. Mother cites no 

evidence that the fees were unreasonable, and we find no abuse of 

discretion. 

¶32 Father requests attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under 

A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 25-324. We decline to award Father attorneys’ fees but 

award him costs upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 21. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

CONCLUSION

¶33 We affirm.