IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60698

Summary Calendar

OBINNA IKENNA EZEOKOLI,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A087 036 429

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Obinna Ikenna Ezeokoli, a citizen and native of Nigeria, petitions this 

court for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying 

his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to seek adjustment of status 

under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Ezeokoli argues that the BIA 

erred by dismissing his motion to reopen as untimely. He maintains that the 

one-year statute of limitations applied by the BIA does not apply to him 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 15, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-60698

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because he was physically present in the United States at the time of the filing 

of the motion to reopen and has been in the United States continuously since 

2007. He asserts that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to him 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) because he was in removal proceedings 

and the motion to reopen was for adjustment of status under the VAWA. 

In reviewing the BIA’s “denial of a motion to reopen, this court applies a 

highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 

560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). The BIA does not abuse its discretion in 

denying a motion to reopen if the denial “is not capricious, without foundation 

in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the 

result of any perceptible rational approach.” Id.

The normal 90-day time period for filing a motion to reopen does not 

apply to a battered spouse seeking relief under the VAWA if, and only if, all 

four of the conditions listed in the statute are met. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv). 

Thus, while Ezeokoli was physically present in the United States at the time 

of the filing of the motion to reopen and this is one of the required conditions 

for the suspension of the normal 90-day limitations period for filing a motion 

to reopen, see § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV), Ezeokoli’s motion to reopen was still 

untimely because he did not file it within one year of the entry of the final order 

of removal. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). Ezeokoli’s reliance on § 1229a(c)(7)(A) 

is misplaced because that provision concerns the numerical limitation on 

motions to reopen, and it does not concern the time limitations for motions to 

reopen. See § 1229a(c)(7)(A). As Ezeokoli’s motion to reopen was not filed 

within one year of the entry of the final order of removal, the BIA correctly 

determined that it was untimely, and Ezeokoli could only obtain relief if the 

BIA waived the time limitation because he showed extraordinary 

circumstances or extreme hardship to his child. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). 

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Ezeokoli argues that the BIA abused its discretion by ruling that he had 

not shown extraordinary circumstances justifying the waiver of the limitations

period. He maintains that he was not able to file his motion to reopen within 

one year of the entry of the final order of removal because he did not file his I360 petition under the VAWA within one year of the final entry of removal. He 

contends that the BIA has not updated its regulations since the passage of the 

VAWA and regularly fails to consider the special circumstances surrounding 

petitions under the VAWA. According to Ezeokoli, the mistreatment and 

battering he received at the hands of his wife constituted extraordinary 

circumstances justifying the waiver of the limitations period. 

We do not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA in a removal 

proceeding, except for an asylum ruling, “which is specified under [the relevant 

subchapter at issue in this case] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General 

or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). We retain 

jurisdiction to consider “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

The statutory provision at issue here specifies that the time limitation 

may be waived “in the Attorney General’s discretion.” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). 

Thus, the ruling that Ezeokoli is seeking to challenge is a discretionary 

determination that we do not have jurisdiction to consider. See 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010); Joseph v. 

Lynch, 793 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2015). We do not have jurisdiction under 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) because Ezeokoli does not raise any constitutional claims or 

questions of law. Accordingly, this portion of Ezeokoli’s petition for review is 

dismissed. See Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.

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