NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-1082

S.N.

vs.

R.N.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, R.N., appeals from a permanent G. L. c. 258E 

harassment prevention order entered against him in July 2021. 

The plaintiff, S.N., is the defendant's sister. The defendant 

claims on appeal that the judge erred by granting a permanent 

order because the defendant had not violated the prior, one-year 

order, and because the judge relied on evidence that was not 

properly authenticated. We affirm. 

Discussion. We note at the outset that the defendant 

cannot challenge the permanent order because he requested the 

judge to impose it. The judge entered the initial order in July 

2020 and the plaintiff moved to extend it in July 2021. At the 

end of the extension hearing, the judge stated that he intended 

to extend the order by one year. Unprompted, the defendant 

asked the judge to make the order permanent. The judge asked 
2

both the plaintiff and the defendant to confirm whether they 

wanted a permanent order; both parties confirmed the request 

multiple times. The defendant immediately announced that he 

intended to appeal but did not say on what grounds. Having 

requested the order be made permanent, and confirming that 

request, the defendant cannot change tactics on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 288 (1989). See also 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 382 Mass. 379, 382 (1981) ("we shall 

not disregard the theory of law on which the parties proceeded 

at trial").

Even if the defendant's claims were properly before us, 

they are without merit. Our review of a judge’s decision to 

extend or make permanent a harassment prevention order is 

limited to whether the judge abused his discretion. See 

Crenshaw v. Macklin, 430 Mass. 633, 636 (2000) (concerning abuse 

prevention order under G. L. c. 209A); Yasmin Y. v. Queshon Q., 

101 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 257 (2022) (courts may apply same 

standards under G. L. c. 209A and G. L. c. 258E). Under G. L. 

c. 258E, a judge may extend a harassment prevention order "for 

any additional time reasonably necessary to protect the 

plaintiff," or the judge may enter a permanent order. G. L. 

c. 258E, § 3 (d); see Crenshaw, supra (grant of permanent order 

is within judge’s discretion). Here, the judge heard testimony 

from the plaintiff that while the initial order was in effect, 
3

the defendant arrived at short notice at their elderly mother's 

vacation home where he knew the plaintiff was staying, despite 

the mother having told him to stay away. The defendant also 

made repeated telephone calls to the mother at the vacation 

home, during which he made insulting comments about the mother 

and the plaintiff. The plaintiff further testified that the 

defendant disparaged her repeatedly in e-mails to and 

conversations with their siblings. Given this conduct, it was 

not an abuse of discretion for the judge to conclude that 

extending the order was necessary to protect the plaintiff from 

harassment.1 See G. L. c. 258E, § 3. And since both parties 

requested a permanent order, it was within the judge's 

discretion to grant one. See Crenshaw, supra; Lonergan-Gillen

v. Gillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 750 (2003) (noting permanency 

of order is theoretical since either party may move to modify it

at any time). 

1 The defendant claims that our evidentiary rules barred the 

judge from viewing e-mails on the plaintiff's cell phone between 

the parties' siblings describing this conduct. Nothing 

prevented the judge from relying on the e-mails, however, 

because "the rules of evidence need not be followed [in abuse 

prevention proceedings], provided that there is fairness in what 

evidence is admitted and relied on." Frizado v. Frizado, 420 

Mass. 592, 597-598 (1995). See V.M. v. R.B., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 

522, 526 (2018). 
4

Finally, the defendant's claims relative to the original 

harassment prevention order are waived because he did not appeal 

from that order.2 

Order dated July 28, 2021, 

affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, 

Wolohojian & Walsh, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: May 16, 2023.

2 In any event, the defendant's argument on appeal relative to 

the original order seems to be that he was denied a "factual 

finding" because of errors in the summons, primarily that the 

summons indicated that the plaintiff filed the complaint under 

G. L. c. 209A, not G. L. c. 258E. During the hearing on that 

order, however, the judge asked the defendant to confirm that 

the court clerk had sent him a copy of the complaint by e-mail. 

The defendant confirmed that he had in fact received the 

complaint and that it stated that it was a complaint for 

protection from harassment under G. L. c. 258E. In this 

context, the defendant had adequate notice of the nature of the 

complaint. Moreover, the defendant filed several motions asking 

the District Court to vacate, nullify, or reconsider the initial 

one-year order, all of which were denied. 

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.