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92–869PDF 2004

AL-QAEDA: THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

AND ITS ALLIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 1, 2004

Serial No. 108–103

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DONALD MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

RENEE AUSTELL, Professional Staff Member 

JOSEPH WINDREM, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable J. Cofer Black, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 4

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable J. Cofer Black: Prepared statement ............................................. 10

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AL-QAEDA: THE THREAT TO THE UNITED 

STATES AND ITS ALLIES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:42 a.m. in Room 2172, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today, the 

Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and 

Human Rights is focusing its oversight responsibility on al-Qaeda, 

which, by all accounts, remains the number-one terrorist threat in 

the United States and to its people. 

On March 9th, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, CIA Director George Tenet underlined this view by 

warning that al-Qaeda terrorists were trying to acquire weapons of 

mass destruction and planning spectacular attacks against the 

United States and its allies. I agree that al-Qaeda continues to be 

a dangerous threat to all of our citizens and to our interests around 

the world. However, I also believe that al-Qaeda has fundamentally 

reorganized since September 11, 2001, and that our counterterrorism strategy needs to reflect the new al-Qaeda structure and new 

al-Qaeda strategy. 

Since it lost its sanctuary in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has evolved 

into a much more decentralized organization relying on either 

semi-autonomous cells or affiliated groups to carry out its deadly 

plans. Recent attacks bear out this strategy. The May 16, 2003, 

suicide attacks in Casablanca that killed 45 people were carried out 

by attackers belonging to a local terrorist group who were recruited 

and trained by al-Qaeda. 

In the November 2003 suicide bomb attack in Istanbul that 

killed 25 people and wounded more than 300, the group that 

claimed responsibility, Abu Haps Al Masiri Brigades, is linked to 

al-Qaeda. A few days later, an attack against a bank and British 

consulate in Istanbul has been tied to another local terrorist group 

with ties to al-Qaeda. 

Lastly, the preliminary results of the investigation into the Madrid bombings point to the involvement of Moroccan Islamic radicals who were members of the Al Sala Haljatayah, all organizations 

affiliated with al-Qaeda. 

These four attacks were executed by four different terrorist 

groups. However, each of these four organizations are connected, 

2

either through recruitment and training of Afghanistan or localist 

help, all tied to al-Qaeda. They demonstrate that al-Qaeda can inflict major casualties with smaller physical infrastructure and more 

decentralized operations. Although we must still guard against a 

large-scale, planned attack by Osama bin Laden or other senior alQaeda leaders, the United States must respond to the threat posed 

by al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations. 

On a related matter, I would like to also explore the extent to 

which al-Qaeda is not only an organization but has also become an 

ideology. Has it spawned completely independent groups or individuals who are bent on killing Americans or citizens with pro-American countries, and are we doing enough to isolate al-Qaeda and 

discredit the radical ideology of bin Laden as part of a long-term 

strategy to defeat this terrorist organization? 

I would like to now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman, for the purposes of an opening statement, and I just 

want to check. Were you going to yield your time to Mr. Schiff, or 

did you want to take the time? 

Mr. SHERMAN. What I would like to do is yield 3⁄4 of the time to 

Mr. Schiff. Why do not I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 

Burbank? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Very good. The gentleman from Burbank, Mr. 

Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, and, Ranking 

Member Sherman, I want to thank you for generously loaning me 

some of your time. 

For millions of Americans, last week’s hearings of the 9/11 Commission were an opportunity to revisit the horror of September 

11th. Now, 21⁄2 years after the attacks, we are able to look back 

at 9/11 and the months that preceded it and ask ourselves what, 

if anything, we could have done to prevent the calamity that morning. This is properly a job for the 10 commissioners, and I trust 

that their report will be comprehensive and fair but also unsparing. 

The murder of 2,996 people demands nothing less. 

Nevertheless, I would like to offer some thoughts on the conduct 

of the government in the years leading up to 9/11, for it is a cautionary tale that should guide all of us in thinking about the war 

on terrorism. I reject those on either side of the aisle who have 

sought to exploit the attacks for political gain, but that does not 

mean that we can shrink from fulfilling our duty to exercise oversight of the conduct of the Executive Branch. 

The commission and the joint congressional intelligence panel 

that investigated the terrorist attacks in 2002 have focused on a 

multitude of systemic and bureaucratic failures that crippled our 

ability to piece together the disparate bits of information that the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities were receiving in 

the spring and summer of 2001. However, I believe that the root 

of the problem was a combination of an inability or a refusal to 

imagine that attacks such as those that occurred on September 

11th were possible. It was a world view that did not view nonstate 

actors as urgent threats to our national security. 

The testimony before the 9/11 Commission, the report of the joint 

intelligence panel, and numerous media accounts have painted a 

fairly clear picture of some of our policies toward al-Qaeda, and I 

3

think that, at the sum of these, we know that in the summer and 

spring of 2001 American intelligence was picking up an incredibly 

high volume of information that suggested that al-Qaeda was planning a major attack against the United States. However, the danger posed by al-Qaeda did not fit the threat paradigm that framed 

our view of the world. 

Our failure to stop 9/11, if such a thing was even possible, was 

not a result of bad intelligence or ill will by officials of one Administration or those of another; it was, I think, a failure to imagine 

that such a thing was even possible. The need to imagine, to try 

to separate ourselves from the world view that guides our response 

to threats and information about possible threats, is especially important now. 

The al-Qaeda of today is different from the al-Qaeda of 2001. 

Like a virus, al-Qaeda has evolved and adapted to the U.S.-led war 

against it. Already diffused, it has become less an organization 

than a banner. Whereas 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, 

the majority of those arrested in the wake of the Madrid train station attacks were Moroccans. Two days ago, British Security Services arrested eight suspected terrorists and seized half a ton of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Those arrested were Islamic extremists, 

but all had been born and raised in Britain. British officials said 

that the eight had no known connection to the al-Qaeda hierarchy, 

but can there be any doubt that they were inspired by Osama bin 

Laden? 

President Bush has said that the struggle against al-Qaeda will 

be a long one. I agree with him. I also agree with Richard Clarke, 

who said that al-Qaeda has come to resemble a mythic hydra, 

where one head is lopped off, two more emerge from the bloody 

neck. We may have made remarkable inroads in destroying the alQaeda of 2001, but my question for Ambassador Black is this: Are 

we making progress against the al-Qaeda of 2004? 

Again, I thank the Chair and Ranking Member for their indulgence, and I look forward to hearing from our witness. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. It is said that there is nothing that 

we could have done. The fact is that after the East Africa bombings, after the Cole, or upon the inauguration of the new Administration, we could have initiated the very policies that we adopted 

in the fall of 2001, and we would have been justified in doing so. 

In the fall of 2001, we took action which so far has prevented alQaeda, with, I might add, some good luck on our part, from carrying out an attack here in the United States. 

I want to contrast what we did with Afghanistan for harboring 

al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and our approach toward Iran. Iran 

harbors at least three major al-Qaeda figures. They acknowledge it. 

They say these folks are in custody. I guess Club Med could be ‘‘in 

custody.’’ They say they will put them on trial. So far, that has not 

happened. 

I draw attention to the Big Three of al-Qaeda in Iran: Bin 

Laden’s son, Sayeed, who is, of course, a Saudi citizen; Sayeef Al 

Adel, the operative most likely to have masterminded the planning 

of the May 2003 Riyadh bombings, and he probably did that while 

he was in Iran. He is an Egyptian. Then there is Sulaman Abdu 

4

Gaysi, a self-styled spokesman for al-Qaeda who is a Kuwaiti national. There are others. 

Afghanistan harbored al-Qaeda. We invaded. Iran harbors al- Qaeda. We give the green light to Japan to send Iran $2.8 billion 

in oil investments. We ignore the Iran-Libyan Sanction Act or use 

all of the outs and waivers in it. We try to bring international attention to Iran’s nuclear program, but we have used up so much 

of the world’s goodwill by how we have dealt with Iraq. And then, 

finally, we import $150 million of caviar and carpets from Iran, and 

we do that because even the slightest inconvenience of our business 

is not something we are willing to do to bring pressure on a nation 

that is harboring al-Qaeda, major figures, including one of bin 

Laden’s sons, and is building nuclear weapons to someday smuggle 

them into the American cities. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman. 

I would like to welcome Ambassador Cofer Black today. Ambassador Black serves as Ambassador-at-Large and coordinator for 

counterterrorism at the State Department. 

The Department of State is the lead Federal agency dealing with 

international terrorism. On behalf of the secretary, Ambassador 

Black represents the department for the Counterterrorism Security 

Group. His office plays a leading role on the Department of State’s 

Counterterrorism Task Forces organized to coordinate responses to 

the international terrorist incidents. Ambassador Black’s responsibilities include coordinating U.S. Government efforts to improve 

counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments, including 

the policy and planning of the department’s Antiterrorism Training 

Assistance program. 

Prior to his State Department appointment, Ambassador Black 

served for 28 years in the Directorate of Operations at the CIA, including as the director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center. 

Welcome this morning, Ambassador Black. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. COFER BLACK, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BLACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the evolving nature of the al-Qaeda organization and the continuing threat that it presents the United 

States and our allies. 

This hearing provides a welcome opportunity to bring you and 

your colleagues up to date on this threat. I will also describe the 

steps we are taking to defeat the al-Qaeda organization. 

As the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, I 

have been charged with managing the U.S. Government’s international efforts to counter terrorism through the coordination of 

our efforts with those of our allies. It is precisely this sort of coordinated action that has scored some important successes against the 

al-Qaeda organization. 

Just over 21⁄2 years ago, our nation suffered a devastating attack 

on its own soil, a day that none of us will forget. Since that terrible 

day of September 11, 2001, we have undergone a transformation as 

a nation and have fully engaged in a war with terrorism. The 

5

President’s vision and message for the world has been crystal clear: 

Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or 

harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent and 

will be held to account. 

We are carrying out the President’s clear directive and our taking the fight to the terrorists worldwide using all of the elements 

of national power. We are also enlisting the support of friends and 

allies in the international community to great effect. We have made 

great progress in marshalling the collective strength of the international community into the counterterrorism fight, but we must 

continue to press forward to face and to defeat terrorism. 

Although there are numerous terrorist organizations of concern 

in the world today, the top priority of our efforts has been on the 

al-Qaeda organization, its affiliates, and those who support them. 

Al-Qaeda remains a potent force, despite the continuing efforts of 

the community of civilized nations to remove this evil from the 

world. Al-Qaeda is determined to strike the United States, our allies, and interests wherever it can, using the most destructive 

means at its disposal. Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt whatsoever 

that al-Qaeda would use unconventional weapons if it possessed 

the capability to do so. 

Since the Coalition’s successful ouster of the Taliban from alQaeda, the al-Qaeda organization has been deeply wounded. It has 

been forced to evolve in ways not entirely of its own choosing. However, it remains determined to murder Americans, whether overseas or in our own country. Al-Qaeda has amply shown its willingness to kill and maim large numbers of innocent civilians around 

the world, regardless of faith, nationality, race, class, and creed. 

Regarding the Madrid attack, the tragic events of 11 March in 

Madrid show the potent global terrorist threat. We continue to see 

mounting evidence of al-Qaeda links to the attacks, although we 

are still awaiting the conclusions of the ongoing investigation by 

the Spanish government. 

The Spanish government is uncovering evidence of linkages between suspects in custody and the perpetrators of the 16 May 2003 

Casablanca bombings. Time and Spain’s progress in its investigations will tell us about the extent of al-Qaeda’s involvement, particularly its senior leadership. 

One lesson from the Madrid bombings is clear. We have learned 

this lesson before in the streets of Istanbul, Riyadh, Casablanca, 

Bali, Moscow, and Mombassa: No country is safe from the scourge 

of terrorism. No country is immune from attack, and neither policies of deterrence nor accommodation will ward off attack. AlQaeda seeks only death and chaos, which is why we will continue 

to pursue the only viable course of action before us, which is to destroy this enemy utterly, both with the cooperation of our allies 

and by unilateral action when necessary. 

The removal of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan stripped alQaeda of its primary sanctuary and support and shut down longstanding terrorist training camps. Although our work continues in 

Afghanistan to root out the remnants of al-Qaeda’s former 

strength, al-Qaeda has lost a vital safe haven. With the loss of Afghanistan and its terrorism infrastructure there, al-Qaeda has 

6

been separated from facilities central to its chem-bio and poisons 

development programs. 

We and our coalition of partners have also removed the regime 

of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, a longtime sponsor of terror. The alQaeda-affiliated Zarqawi network continues to spread terror and 

death as the Iraqi people move toward a brighter future free from 

the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. 

Iraq is currently serving as a focal point for the foreign jihadist 

fighters, who are united in a common goal with former regime elements, criminals, and more established foreign-terrorist organizations to conduct attacks against Coalition and Iraqi civilian targets. 

These jihadists view Iraq as a new training ground to build their 

extremist credentials and hone the skills of the terrorist. We are 

aggressively rooting out foreign fighters in Iraq and will continue 

to devote the resources necessary to ensure that al-Qaeda and 

other terrorist groups will be unable to use Iraq as a training 

ground or sanctuary. 

We have relied on the support of our partners in the global coalition against terrorism to ensure al-Qaeda is unable to establish a 

new secure base of operations like that which existed under the 

Taliban Afghanistan. The partnership of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 

Yemen, and others has been, and will continue to be, essential to 

ensuring that al-Qaeda is never able to reestablish comfortable 

sanctuary anywhere in the world. 

Historically, al-Qaeda has been a top-down organization with 

strong central leadership control over almost all aspects of its operations. However, our ongoing operations against al-Qaeda have 

served to isolate its leadership and sever or complicate communications links with its operatives scattered around the globe. Unable 

to find easy sanctuary in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the al-Qaeda 

leadership must now devote much more time to evading capture or 

worse. 

This has further complicated al-Qaeda’s communications and coordination efforts, which are much harder and time consuming in 

the current operating environment. We have also seen examples of 

terrorist activities delayed for extended periods as al-Qaeda affiliates await instructions from an increasingly isolated central leadership. 

Also, as al-Qaeda’s known senior leadership, planners, facilitators, and operators are brought to justice, a new cadre of leaders 

is being forced to step up. These individuals are increasingly no 

longer from the old guard, no longer the seasoned, veteran, alQaeda trainers from Afghanistan’s camps or close associates of alQaeda’s founding members. 

Critical gaps have been cut out of the al-Qaeda leadership structure. These relatively untested terrorists are assuming greater responsibilities, and we are relentlessly going after these new leaders 

are they are identified. 

This confluence of factors may be resulting in a lack of clear strategic direction and operational mistakes by al-Qaeda. An example 

is the 8 November 2003 bombing of the Muhaya housing complex 

in Riyadh which killed 18 persons, predominantly Muslims, during 

the month of Ramadan. This target selection, made either by mistake or due to poor judgment, was a public relations disaster for 

7

al-Qaeda, which, in turn, has assisted aggressive Saudi efforts to 

role up the al-Qaeda presence in the kingdom. Whether this operation was plagued by operational or strategic error is still a matter 

of debate, but I believe that it is indicative of the complications 

faced by al-Qaeda in its truncated organization. 

A few words, if I may, now about al-Qaeda’s influence. I know 

I am going a bit past my 5 minutes. If I may, I think it is useful, 

Mr. Chairman,—I am talking as fast as I can—to get this out to 

frame your questions because I am trying to preempt some of the 

questions I know you would like to ask. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I appreciate that, and it is my error for not catching. I wanted to give you a little more time to start with. 

Mr. BLACK. I appreciate it very much. I hope this is useful to 

your Committee. I have tried to hit some of the high points that 

you are interested in to facilitate your questions. 

I would like to talk a little bit about al-Qaeda’s influence having 

spread to other organizations. There are growing indications that 

a number of largely Sunni Islamic extremist groups are moving to 

pick up al-Qaeda’s standard and attempting to pursue global jihad 

against the United States or our allies. 

There are also growing indications that al-Qaeda’s ideology is 

spreading well beyond the Middle East, particularly its virulent, 

anti-American rhetoric. This has been picked up by a number of 

Islamist extremist movements which exist around the globe. This 

greatly complicates our task in stamping out al-Qaeda and poses 

a threat in its own right for the foreseeable future. 

Literally, scores of such groups are present around the world 

today. Some groups have gravitated to al-Qaeda in recent years, 

where before such linkages did not exist. This has been at times 

merely an effort to gain greater public renown for their group or 

cause, but more troubling have been the groups seeking to push 

forward al-Qaeda’s agenda of worldwide terror. 

In particular, groups like Ansar al-Islam and the Zarqawi network post a real threat to U.S. interests. This has been shown very 

clearly by their deadly activities in Iraq. We have all seen the 

newspapers today, Mr. Chairman, and we see how that is most unfortunate, and our hearts go out to the relatives of those that have 

been lost in the struggle but particularly today in such a horrific 

way. Other groups of great concern include the Salafist Group for 

Call and Combat (GSPC), which operates mainly in the countries 

of North Africa, and Salifiya Jihadia, which claimed responsibility 

for the May 2003 Casablanca bombings. Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbeckistan (IMU) should also be on our 

short list. 

While it would be a mistake to believe that we are now confronted by a monolithic threat posed by legions of like-minded terrorist groups working in concert against our interests, it would be 

fair to say that we are seeing greater cooperation between al-Qaeda 

and smaller Islamic groups, as well as even more localized organizations. I think this last point is important. 

Identifying and acting against the leadership, capabilities, and 

operational plans of these groups poses a serious challenge now 

and for years to come. 

8

In addition to these groups, there are literally thousands of 

jihadists around the world who have fought in the conflicts of 

Kosovo, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere. As I said earlier, we 

see these ‘‘foreign fighters’’ operating in Iraq, where we are fighting 

them on a daily basis with the Coalition and Iraqi partners. These 

jihadists will continue to serve as a ready source of recruits for alQaeda and other affiliated organizations. 

A Strategy To Defeat Terrorism. Let me go back for a moment 

to frame the overall strategy that we have been employing to defeat terrorism. Following the 11 September attacks, we have forcefully applied the Bush doctrine: Any person or government that 

supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder 

of the innocent and will be held to account. We have done so 

through our national strategy to combat terrorism, which creates 

the policy framework for coordinated actions to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and its 

friends around the world and, ultimately, to create an international 

environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support 

them. 

We have implemented this strategy to act simultaneously on four 

fronts: First, defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control, and communications; next, deny further sponsorship, support, 

and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating with other states to take 

action against these international threats; also, to reduce the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the 

international community to focus its efforts and resources on the 

areas most at risk; also, to defend the United States by using our 

national strategy, employing all of the element of national power, 

diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and military. 

While the United States is committed to combating terrorism the 

world over in whatever form it takes to threaten the American people and American interests, the focus of our efforts since September 

has been on the al-Qaeda organization. I would like to tell you a 

little bit about the progress that we have made. 

A global dragnet has tightened around al-Qaeda, made possible 

by a broad coalition of 84 nations, all focused on the common goal 

of eradicating the terrorist threat that endangers all civilized nations. Since 11 September 2001, 70 percent of al-Qaeda senior leadership and more than 3,400 lower-level al-Qaeda operatives or associates have been detained or killed in over 100 countries, largely 

as a result of cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies. Terrorist cells have been wrapped up in nations in all corners of the globe, from Singapore to Italy and Saudi Arabia, as well 

as here at home in Buffalo, Portland, and North Carolina. 

A growing list of senior al-Qaeda associates have been removed 

from the scene and no longer threaten the United States, such as 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Hambali, Nashiri, who ran al-Qaeda 

operations in the Saudi Arabian peninsula; Abu Ali al-Harithi, Abu 

Assem al-Makki, and the rest. 

The al-Qaeda figures we take out of circulation perform roles in 

all operational areas, including finance, logistics, training, and procurement, among others. This has sapped al-Qaeda’s strength by 

disrupting its ability to coordinate complex operational plans and 

9

gather operatives, materials, and funding required to carry them 

out. 

We have also made extensive progress in the area of finances. 

More than 172 countries have issued orders freezing of seizing approximately $200 million in terrorism-related financial assets. 

In addition to attacking known accounts, more than 100 countries worldwide have introduced new terrorist-related legislation 

and regulations, including new laws to block money laundering. We 

have an effective program that keeps track of terrorist organizations. We have a designation process, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

you and your Committee for the helpful work you have done to 

move this along to save us time. I am very grateful, and I would 

appreciate your continued efforts in that area. The more time we 

save in one area, we can devote in others doing good works. 

Meanwhile, we have also strengthened our defenses here at 

home, including a comprehensive reorganization of our government 

to better protect the homeland, and we have implemented many 

procedures in this area. In terms of the State Department, we have 

enhanced areas such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training 

Program, our Terrorist Interdiction Program, and the like. Again, 

the support from Congress has been instrumental, and we are very 

grateful for it. 

This is definitely a long-term fight. This is a war. This is a fight. 

I wish I could bring you some good news, it was all going to be concluded shortly and positively. I think the qualities required for this 

are determination, as is reflected in the encouragements that come 

from our leadership. 

In conclusion, I would like to stress that while we have made 

substantial progress toward eradicating the threat posed by alQaeda, we are on a long, tough road. We cannot afford to falter, 

Mr. Chairman. The one lesson I have learned in counterterrorism 

is that weakness is exploited, and it must not be shown. 

The al-Qaeda organization has been gravely wounded and forced 

to evolve in new ways to survive. However, al-Qaeda is a patient, 

resourceful, and flexible organization, and it is able to draw on the 

global support of jihadists around the world. It must be denied safe 

haven. It has got to be kept on the run while we starve it of resources, dismantle its cells, and apprehend its foot soldiers at our 

borders. We do have advantages we are exploiting. We must more 

than match its flexibility and resolve and commit to combat alQaeda for the long haul and eliminate this evil. 

As President Bush recently said:

‘‘The war on terror is not a figure of speech. It is an inescapable calling of our generation. . . . There can be no separate 

peace with the terrorist enemy. Any sign of weakness or retreat simply validates terrorist violence and invites more violence for all nations. The only certain way to protect our people 

is by early, united, and decisive action.’’

I think I will stop at this point. I have greatly exceeded my time. 

I am very grateful for that, but perhaps I have, if not answered 

some of your questions, helped to frame some of your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]

10

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. COFER BLACK, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, 

COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today on the evolving nature of the al-Qaida organization and 

the continuing threat that it presents to the United States and our allies. This hearing provides a welcome opportunity to bring you and your colleagues up to date on 

this dangerous threat. I also will describe the steps we are taking to defeat the alQaida organization. 

As the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I have been charged 

with managing the U.S. Government’s international efforts to counter terrorism 

through the coordination of our efforts with those of our allies. It is precisely this 

sort of coordinated action that has scored some important successes against the alQaida organization. 

Just over two and a half years ago, our nation suffered a devastating attack on 

its own soil, a day that none of us will forget. Since that terrible day of September 

11, 2001, we have undergone a transformation as a nation, and have been fully engaged in a war with terrorism. The President’s vision and message for the world 

has been crystal clear: Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and will be 

held to account. 

We are carrying out the President’s clear directive, and are taking the battle to 

terrorists worldwide using all the elements of national power. We are also enlisting 

the support of friends and allies in the international community, to great effect. We 

have made great progress in marshalling the collective strength of the international 

community into the counterterrorism fight, but we must continue to press forward 

to face and defeat terrorism. 

Although there are numerous terrorist organizations of concern in the world 

today, the top priority of our efforts has been on the al-Qaida organization, its affiliates and those who support them. Al-Qaida remains a potent force, despite the continuing efforts of the community of civilized nations to remove this evil from the 

world. Al-Qaida is determined to strike the United States, our allies and interests 

wherever it can, using the most destructive means at its disposal. I have no doubt 

that al-Qaida would use unconventional weapons if it possessed the capability to do 

so. 

Since the Coalition’s successful ouster of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, 

the al-Qaida organization has been deeply wounded. It has been forced to evolve in 

ways not entirely by its own choosing. However, it remains bent on murdering 

Americans, whether overseas or in our own country. Al-Qaida has amply demonstrated its willingness to kill and maim large numbers of innocent civilians 

around the world, regardless of faith, nationality race, class and creed. 

THE MADRID ATTACK

The tragic events of 11 March in Madrid demonstrate the potent global terrorist 

threat. We continue to see mounting evidence of al-Qaida’s links to the attacks, although we are still awaiting the conclusions of the ongoing investigation by the 

Spanish government. 

The Spanish government is uncovering evidence of linkages between suspects in 

custody and the perpetrators of the 16 May 2003 Casablanca bombings. Time and 

Spain’s progress in its investigation will tell us about the extent of al-Qaida’s involvement, particularly its senior leadership. 

One lesson from the Madrid bombings is clear. We have learned this lesson before 

on the streets of Istanbul, Riyadh, Casablanca, Bali, Moscow and Mombassa: No 

country is safe from the scourge of terrorism. No country is immune from attack, 

and neither demographics nor policies of deterrence or accommodation will ward off 

attack. Al-Qaida seeks only death and chaos, which is why we will continue to pursue the only viable course of action before us: to destroy this enemy utterly, both 

with the cooperation of our allies and by unilateral action when necessary. 

SANCTUARY LOST

The removal of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan stripped al-Qaida of its primary sanctuary and support, and shut down long-standing terrorist training camps. 

Although our work continues in Afghanistan to root-out the remnants of al-Qaida’s 

former strength, al-Qaida has lost a vital safe haven. With the loss of Afghanistan 

and its terrorism infrastructure there, al-Qaida has also been separated from facilities central to its chem-bio and poisons development programs. 

11

We and our coalition partners have also removed the regime of Saddam Hussein 

in Iraq, a long-time state sponsor of terror. The al-Qaida-affiliated Zarqawi network 

continues to spread terror and death as the Iraqi people move towards a brighter 

future free from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. 

Iraq is currently serving as a focal point for foreign jihadist fighters, who are 

united in a common goal with former regime elements, criminals and more established foreign terrorist organization members to conduct attacks against Coalition 

and Iraqi civilian targets. These jihadists view Iraq as a new training ground to 

build their extremist credentials and hone the skills of the terrorist. We are aggressively rooting out the foreign fighters in Iraq, and we will continue to devote the 

resources necessary to ensure that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups will be unable to use Iraq as a training ground or sanctuary. 

We have relied on the support of our partners in the global coalition against terrorism to ensure that al-Qaida is unable to establish a new secure base of operations like that which existed under the Taliban in Afghanistan. The partnership 

of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen and others has been, and will continue to be, essential to ensuring that al-Qaida is never able to reestablish comfortable sanctuary 

anywhere in the world. 

THE STATE OF AL-QAIDA LEADERSHIP

Historically, al-Qaida has been a top-down organization with strong central leadership control over almost all aspects of its operations. However, our ongoing operations against al-Qaida have served to isolate its leadership, and sever or complicate 

communications links with its operatives scattered around the globe. Unable to find 

easy sanctuary in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the al-Qaida leadership must now devote much more time to evading capture or worse. 

This has further complicated al-Qaida’s communication and coordination efforts, 

which are much harder and time-consuming in the current operating environment. 

We have also seen examples of terrorist activities delayed for extended periods as 

al-Qaida affiliates await instructions from an increasingly isolated central leadership. 

Also, as al-Qaida’s known senior leadership, planners, facilitators and operators 

are brought to justice, a new cadre of leaders is being forced to step up. These individuals are increasingly no longer drawn from the old guard, no longer the seasoned 

veteran al-Qaida trainers from Afghanistan’s camps or close associates of al-Qaida’s 

founding members. 

Critical gaps have been cut out of the al-Qaida leadership structure, and these 

relatively untested terrorists are assuming far greater responsibilities. We are relentlessly going after these new leaders as they are identified. 

This confluence of factors may be resulting in a lack of clear strategic direction 

and operational mistakes by al-Qaida. An example is the November 8, 2003 bombing 

of the Muhaya housing compound in Riyadh which killed 18 persons, predominantly 

Muslims during the month of Ramadan. This target selection, made either by mistake or due to poor judgment, was a public relations disaster for al-Qaida, which 

in turn has assisted aggressive Saudi efforts to roll-up the al-Qaida presence in the 

Kingdom. Whether this operation was plagued by operational or strategic error is 

still a matter of debate, but I believe that it is indicative of the complications faced 

by al-Qaida in its truncated and besieged state. 

ALLIES IN SOWING TERROR

A few words now on how al-Qaida’s influence has spread to other terrorist organizations. There are growing indications that a number of largely Sunni Islamic extremist groups are moving to pick up al-Qaida’s standard and attempting to pursue 

global jihad against the United States and our allies. 

There are also growing indications that al-Qaida’s ideology is spreading well beyond the Middle East, particularly its virulent anti-American rhetoric. This has 

been picked up by a number of Islamic extremist movements which exist around the 

globe. This greatly complicates our task in stamping out al-Qaida, and poses a 

threat in its own right for the foreseeable future. 

Literally scores of such groups are present around the world today. Some groups 

have gravitated to al-Qaida in recent years, where before such linkages did not 

exist. This has been, at times, merely an effort to gain greater public renown for 

their group or cause, but more troubling have been the groups seeking to push forward al-Qaida’s agenda of worldwide terror. 

In particular, groups like Ansar al-Islam and the Zarqawi network pose a real 

threat to U.S. interests. This has been demonstrated very clearly by their deadly 

activities in Iraq. Other groups of great concern include the Salafist Group for Call 

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and Combat (GSPC), which operates mainly in the countries of North Africa and 

Salifiya Jihadia, which claimed responsibility for the May 2003 Casablanca bombings. Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbeckistan (IMU) should 

also be on this short list. 

While it would be a mistake to believe that we are now confronted by a monolithic 

threat posed by legions of like-minded terrorist groups working in concert against 

our interests, it would be fair to say that we are seeing greater cooperation between 

al-Qaida and smaller Islamic extremist groups, as well as even more localized organizations. 

Identifying and acting against the leadership, capabilities and operational plans 

of these groups poses a serious challenge now and for years to come. 

In addition to these groups, there are literally thousands of jihadists around the 

world who have fought in conflicts in Kosovo, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere. 

As I said earlier, we see these ‘‘foreign fighters’’ operating in Iraq, where we are 

fighting them on a daily basis with the Coalition and Iraqi partners. These jihadists 

will continue to serve as a ready source of recruits for al-Qaida and other affiliated 

terrorist groups. 

A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT TERRORISM

Let me go back for a moment to frame the overall strategy we have been employing to defeat terrorism. 

Following the September 11 attacks, we have forcefully applied the Bush doctrine: 

any person or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit 

in the murder of the innocent, and will be held to account. We have done so through 

our National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, which creates the policy framework for 

coordinated actions to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests and its friends around the world and, ultimately, to create an 

international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support 

them. We have implemented this strategy to act simultaneously on four fronts:

• Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, 

leadership, finances, and command, control and communications;

• Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating 

with other states to take action against these international threats;

• Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting 

the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas 

most at risk; and

• Defend the United States, its citizens and interests at home and abroad. The 

National Strategy highlights that success will only come through the sustained, steadfast, and systematic application of all elements of national 

power—diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and military.

While the United States is committed to combating terrorism the world over, in 

whatever form it takes to threaten the American people and American interests, the 

focus of our efforts since September has been on the al-Qaida organization. Let me 

tell you about the progress we have made, and how the al-Qaida organization looks 

far different than it did in September 2001. 

U.S. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AL-QAIDA LOSSES

A global dragnet has tightened around al-Qaida, made possible by a broad coalition of 84 nations, all focused on the common goal of eradicating the terrorist threat 

that endangers all civilized nations. Since September 11, 2001, 70 percent of alQaida senior leadership and more than 3,400 lower-level al-Qaida operatives or associates have been detained or killed in over 100 countries, largely as a result of 

cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Terrorist cells have 

been wrapped up in nations in all corners of the globe, from Singapore to Italy and 

Saudi Arabia, as well as here at home in Buffalo, Portland, and North Carolina. 

A growing list of senior al-Qaida leaders and associates will no longer threaten 

the United States and our allies:

• Al-Qaida operations chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammad,

• Senior planner for Southeast Asia Hambali,

• Persian Gulf operations chief Nashiri and his suspected successor Khaled Ali 

al-Haj,

• Yemen’s most senior al-Qaida figures Abu Ali al-Harithi and Abu Assem alMakki.

13

The al-Qaida figures we take out of circulation performed roles in all operational 

areas, including financing, logistics, training and procurement, among others. This 

has sapped al-Qaida’s strength by disrupting its ability to coordinate complex operational plans and gather the operatives, materials and funding required to carry 

them out. 

We have made extensive efforts to attack al-Qaida’s financing, which is the lifeblood of its murderous activities, providing for the movement of operatives, the cooption of officials and local populations, and the acquisition of arms and explosives. 

More than 172 countries have issued orders freezing or seizing approximately $200 

million in terrorism-related financial assets and accounts. 

In addition to attacking known accounts, more than 100 countries worldwide have 

introduced new terrorist-related legislation or regulations, including new laws to 

block money-laundering and the misuse of charities in the support of terrorists. 

An important tool in countering terrorism financing is the authority the Secretary 

of State uses to formally designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This authority, 

under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 freezes a designated group’s assets in the United States, makes it a criminal offense for Americans to provide funding and other forms of material support and denies visas to 

members of the designated group. Thirty-six groups are currently designated. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express our appreciation to you and your staff for 

your sponsorship of the pending legislation to make the provision even stronger by 

making it easier to designate an alias of group if it adopts a new name and to simplify the time consuming review of the designations every two years. This will allow 

us to focus our resources on the legal documents needed to designate new groups, 

such as offshoots of al-Qaida, when they emerge. 

Meanwhile, we have strengthened our defenses here at home, including a 

comprehesive reorganization of our government to better protect the homeland. We 

have also implemented more stringent screening measures, and engaged with our 

international community to raise global standards. For example, in Africa, we and 

our colleagues in the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security are implementing a program to secure airports in countries where the danger to aviation 

is particularly striking (Safe Skies for Africa). 

We must also continue to provide frontline countries the training and assistance 

needed to support their counterterrorism efforts. The Department of State’s AntiTerrorism Training Assistance (ATA) Program, Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) 

and other counterterrorism training are vital parts of this effort. 

The support of the Congress for this and other capacity-building programs will be 

essential to eradicating al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Many of our most important successes have come through joint or unilateral actions by foreign governments. Improving the counterterrorism capacity of key states is clearly in our interest. While the dividends of such investment may not be immediately apparent, we 

must think of our global war on terrorism as a long-term fight that will take years 

or, indeed, decades, as was the case with the Cold War. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I should stress that while we have made substantial progress toward eradicating the threat posed by al-Qaida, we are on a long, tough road, and 

we cannot afford to falter. 

The al-Qaida organization has been gravely wounded, and forced to evolve in new 

ways to survive. However, al-Qaida is a patient, resourceful and flexible organization and is able to draw from a global support base of jihadists and international 

mujahedin movement. It must be denied safe haven and kept on the run, while we 

starve it of its resources, dismantle its cells, and apprehend its foot soldiers at our 

borders. We must more than match its flexibility and resolve, and commit to combat 

al-Qaida over the long haul, for there can be no accommodation with this evil. 

As President Bush recently said, ‘‘The war on terror is not a figure of speech. It 

is an inescapable calling of our generation. . ..There can be no separate peace with 

the terrorist enemy. Any sign of weakness or retreat simply validates terrorist violence, and invites more violence for all nations. The only certain way to protect our 

people is by early, united, and decisive action.’’

Our continued dedication to the eradication of al-Qaida with the support of our 

international partners is the only way to ensure the elimination of the threat posed 

by al-Qaida. The fates of the civilized nations of the world are inextricably linked—

we must face this fight together and eradicate the al-Qaida scourge from the face 

of the Earth. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. I would be happy to 

take your questions.

14

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I am just a little 

concerned. We may have a vote here shortly, so I will try to make 

my initial questions brief, and we will get down the line so everyone gets a fair opportunity. 

Mr. Ambassador, as far as you can discuss in open session, what 

is al-Qaeda’s current operational capabilities to plan and carry out 

a 9/11-style attack compared to its capability prior to 9/11? 

Mr. BLACK. Again, I will try to be as forthcoming as I can within 

the context that this is an open hearing, the results of which are 

broadcast around the world, including to my enemies, so with that 

in mind, I will be as helpful as I can. 

First of all, I have been at this for quite a while. I like to think 

I know what I am talking about. The al-Qaeda organization that 

we engaged before 9/11 and at 9/11 has been put under catastrophic stress. Seventy percent of their leadership has been arrested, detained, or killed. The majority of the rest of them are essentially primarily defensive, concerned primarily about their own 

personal security. There is a massive global hunt for them underway. It is relentless, 24 hours a day. So despite that, they do try 

and plan operations. They attempt to communicate with each other 

to lend coherence to their organization. 

So the al-Qaeda of old: Catastrophic stress; comprehensive, successful engagement; and heading toward complete destruction. The 

bad news is that, realizing that their capabilities are greatly reduced, they are reaching out, trying to co-opt the missions of other 

terrorist groups, particularly local ones and others, and try and cement their determination and their operational profile to their objectives, which is to destroy the United States, to impose their 

brand of Islam certainly in the Saudi Arabian peninsula and 

throughout the world. 

So greatly reduced, greatly reduced, but the men and women who 

are the practitioners of counterterrorism are mindful that until all 

of them are accounted for, there is a threat. We know from the past 

that they have actively sought weapons of mass destruction, that 

they have been, according to our best estimates, unable to put together all of these things at one time—the people, the equipment—

to launch an attack. That does not mean that this will continue. 

We have to always assume the worst and conduct ourselves operationally with law enforcement, intelligence. I just heard someone 

from the intelligence community the other day say that regardless 

of who minute or minuscule the information related to weapons of 

mass destruction, it is hunted down to the bitter end. There is no 

margin for error in these things. 

So I think we can say that we have been very successful to date. 

You are not completely successful until you close out the threat. 

That will be very difficult to do, but it will be the result of a long 

and successful struggle. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Keeping in mind how you described the diminution of their operation as a result of our effort to eliminate the 

threat, would it be fair to assess the threat today to that of maybe 

a cornered animal that is more likely to do an aggressive attack 

rather than the historic, calculating and methodical planning? And 

one follow-up question: Since 9/11, how has the recruiting gone 

internationally with al-Qaeda? 

15

Mr. BLACK. To try to encapsulate an answer to what is a very 

hard question, the main difference is the loss of expertise and personnel in the al-Qaeda organization, per se, of today. They are left 

with far fewer people that know how to do these things effectively, 

securely. They have franchised out so that their personnel are 

probably of a lower standard in terms of training and expertise. 

They have a greater issue with successfully planning an operation over time. They want to conduct, as in the period of 9/11, 

they want to conduct mass-casualties attacks; they want to kill as 

many people as they possibly can. They have had to degrade in a 

lot of their operations to operations that have less impact, that are 

easier to conduct. They have made fundamental operational mistakes, as I said in my testimony. They are likely to continue to do 

that. And in this new era, in this new time, where the old organization has been engaged and is heading toward complete destruction, and as the affiliates, the answer to your second question, the 

affiliates, those who have instinctive commonality with the objectives of al-Qaeda, those who watch television, those who access the 

Internet and gain inspiration from that, need also to be identified 

through intelligence/law enforcement means and engaged. 

There is an advantage for us and the community of nations resisting these guys, and most of them tend to side toward—being beginners, and beginners make a lot of mistakes. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you. Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Al-Qaeda killed 3,000 of us. They were hoping at 

that time that they had killed well over 10,000. Timothy McVeigh 

proved that you do not have to be a rocket scientist to kill 200 

Americans. In fact, the very techniques he used could be used right 

now. 

Has al-Qaeda not engaged in an attack that would result in 100 

or 200 or 300 American deaths on our soil because they are unable 

to, they do not even have a Timothy McVeigh capacity, or because 

they are unwilling to because they have set such a high standard 

for themselves that they do not want to cheapen their brand name 

by engaging in something less spectacular? 

Mr. BLACK. Sure. The problem that they have encountered is 

lack of capability. They have more than enough will and determination. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We know that they have the will and determination, if they had the capacity, to do another huge attack. 

Mr. BLACK. Correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you saying they lack the capacity to fill a 

Ryder truck filled with fertilizer and park it in an apartment building in my district? Do they lack that capacity, or are they simply 

unwilling to engage in such banal and unspectacular attacks? 

Mr. BLACK. I think the decision-making process, the ability to 

process operational activity, is increasingly difficult for them. It is 

a challenge for them to conduct this type of attack. 

Mr. SHERMAN. When you say ‘‘this type of attack,’’——

Mr. BLACK. I am saying it is not easy. That is what I am saying. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Even a Timothy McVeigh, two guys in a Ryder 

truck and a bunch of fertilizer, even the sophistication shown by 

a couple of guys; al-Qaeda does not have that level of operational 

capacity in the United States. 

16

Mr. BLACK. I would say that, under the current, very aggressive 

law enforcement action, the procedures that have been taken as the 

result of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security—what I am trying to convey is it is harder than it was before. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We know that. 

Mr. BLACK. I am just trying to make an operational point here, 

Congressman. I am saying there are challenges involved to maintain operational security, to accumulate all of this stuff, to have a 

casing plan of a target that is reflective and something that they 

can move against. So I am saying, if they could do it, they would 

do it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you are saying, if they could kill 150 Americans the way Timothy McVeigh did, they would. The fact that they 

have not is not because they do not want to engage in that level 

of attack; it is because they cannot engage in the level of attack. 

I will move on to another question. This one, I just want you to 

respond for the record. You told us that if al-Qaeda was harbored 

by a nation, that the full power and accountability of the United 

States would be brought to bear. Bringing in carpets and caviar or 

acquiescing to a $2.8 billion investment, waiving the Iran-Libya 

Sanctions Act; I wonder which of these are the retribution that we 

have imposed upon Iran for harboring the three al-Qaeda wellknowns, not to mention the others. It is absolutely shocking that 

we continue, for no reason except the taste for caviar, as far as I 

can figure, to import caviar and carpets from Iran. 

They did not hit us on September 11th until they got all of their 

ducks in a row. They even killed a major figure in Northern Afghanistan and made sure that went well, thus, in their own minds, 

depriving us of the easiest methodology for getting back at them. 

We got back at them in Afghanistan anyway but without the charismatic leader that they assassinated. 

If we had adopted right after the Cole was hit the same policy 

that we adopted after September 11th, would al-Qaeda have gone 

forward, that is to say, if we were threatening the Taliban in November and December 2000, if we were invading Afghanistan in 

January or February 2000, would al-Qaeda have gone forward with 

September 11th, and would they have been able to do so? 

Mr. BLACK. I do not know, Congressman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So it could have saved us. We do not know. 

Mr. BLACK. I cannot speculate. I do not know what would or 

would not have happened under those circumstances. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, this is, I think, the first time the Administration has said that there was anything that could have been done 

a year before September 11th that might have prevented it, and I 

believe my time has expired. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Black, I would like to ask you a few questions, just to get 

a good understanding of the background on this. I am not going to 

ask you to speculate, as the last question was, but maybe just to 

get some details about what is going on on the inside of the government that permitted this tragedy to happen on 9/11, and what has 

happened since then to make sure that that has been corrected. 

After September 11th, what became of the State Department and 

17

the CIA officers, but especially the State Department, who insisted 

that, before that date, we be cooperating and working with moderate Taliban elements. Are they still in decision-making positions 

in the State Department? 

Mr. BLACK. I have to admit, I am not too sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are right there. 

Mr. BLACK. I do not know how to respond to the question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, listen, you have a long history in terms 

of terrorism and this whole issue. 

Mr. BLACK. And I am happy to answer questions about terrorism, not necessarily on personnel, Congressman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, personnel make policy, and if people 

are wrong to the point that thousands of Americans lost their lives, 

we, on this side of the branch of government, we in the legislative 

branch, have a right to know whether the personnel who were responsible for this were held accountable. And what I am suggesting 

is that the people at the State Department who were responsible 

for the policies that led to 9/11, some of them may still be in positions of authority, and that is what I am asking you. Were the people who were insisting before 9/11 that we work with the Taliban 

and undercutting the efforts, I might add, of those people who were 

trying to set up resistance to the Taliban, are those people still in 

positions of making decisions over at the State Department? 

Mr. BLACK. I was not in the State Department then. I do not 

know. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You have worked in the State Department, 

but you have not bothered to check to see——

Mr. BLACK. Congressman, I have not checked that question. On 

issues of 9/11,—this is meant to be a threat briefing on that—I am 

happy to talk about al-Qaeda, happy to talk about that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Obviously, this goes to where al-Qaeda came 

from. 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, I know. If I could request, Mr. Chairman. I am 

scheduled to be in front of the 9/11 Committee on the 13th of April, 

so issues having to do with that, I would prefer to reserve for that. 

I am happy to talk about al-Qaeda and the terrorist threat, if I 

may, and I would like to leave other type topics like that to that 

time. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. If Members would try to focus their energy on the 

al-Qaeda threat, that would be——

Mr. BLACK. I would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note, you are a spokesman for 

the Administration, and you are here to testify. Mr. Chairman, I 

personally resent this Administration or any Administration not 

being willing to discuss the issues of importance at this level. This 

is how we learn. This is how we are going to do our job, and if we 

have people in this Administration or any other Administration 

who are refusing to talk about the people who actually made the 

decisions and whether or not they are still in decision-making positions, then if we are not insisting on those answers, we are not 

doing a job, and if you are not willing to tell us, you are not doing 

your job. 

Mr. BLACK. Well, Congressman, I am trying to respond to you, 

sir, with the greatest of respect. 

18

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Mr. BLACK. At that time, I was in the Central Intelligence Agency involved with that work. I was not in the State Department, and 

I was not involved in the decision-making process, and I was not 

intimately familiar with who was in what position making policy 

at the State Department. I did operational activities, and I produced intelligence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Might I suggest,——

Mr. BLACK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Having been in the Executive 

Branch myself,—I spent 7 years in the White House—might I suggest that you find out who amongst you in your group at the State 

Department now or who in the CIA was advocating those policies 

which led to this horrible tragedy that we suffered on 9/11 and not 

listen to their opinions or put them in other spots and be able to 

assure us that that happened? 

When I was in the White House, we said, ‘‘People are policy.’’ 

That is the first thing we learned. People were advocating certain 

things and were pushing certain things before 9/11, obviously, and 

I can tell you, I dealt with it before 9/11, obviously there were people pushing in exactly the wrong direction, which led to this catastrophe, and we need to know that has been cleaned up. Now, 

George Tenet is still director of the CIA, and as far as I am concerned, he should have been gone a long time ago. 

The only assurance you can give us is to assure us that those 

people who were pushing the wrong policies are no longer in positions of making decisions, and I would hope we get that from this 

Administration. Thank you very much. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Before Mr. Schiff speaks, I have a unanimous consent request that all Members be given up to 7 calendar days to 

furnish statements for the record. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection. In fact, everyone that would 

like to submit a statement for the record should be given that opportunity, and we will, with unanimous consent, abide by the 7-day 

rule. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, I wanted to get your reaction to a quote attributed 

to an American official closely connected with counterterrorism. 

This was in a piece by Fareed Zakaria recently, where he quotes 

this official as saying that:

‘‘States have been getting out of the terror business since the 

late 1980s. We have kept many governments on the list of 

state sponsors for political reasons. The reality is that the terror we face is mostly unconnected with states.’’

Is that an accurate statement, not necessarily that they are on 

the list for political reasons, which is, obviously, a very pejorative 

connotation, but is the dominant threat we face right now not that 

of state-sponsored terrorism but, rather, local groups, loosely affiliated, if at all, but bonded by this common murderous ideology? 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, sir. I think you are absolutely right. I think the 

trend is toward localized groups. I will say that the list of the state 

sponsors of terrorism is one that is very important to us. We look 

19

at it very closely. I would take exception that they are there for political reasons. 

I do counterterrorism, and they are on it for specific reasons of 

counterterrorism. It is hard to get on this list, but it is also hard 

to get off, and there is a reason for it. We always look at ways 

when people meet our requirements. A country as an example that 

is making good progress is Sudan. They are going through the 

checklists. They have done a lot of good work. There are some 

areas that we are very concerned about still, such as——

Mr. SCHIFF. Ambassador, I do not need you to defend that particular point, which is the least interesting, from my point of view, 

but you do concur with the view that the predominant threat right 

now is not from states and their sponsorship but, rather, from 

these loosely affiliated, local organizations. 

Mr. BLACK. I think the trend is in that direction. They are both 

dangerous. A state sponsor can utilize these groups to its own advantage. Their associations,—Iran and Hezbollah would be one example, but the trend is toward localized groups that are less connected. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The state sponsorship may be critical in terms of the 

really potent terrorist weapons like a nuclear device or a radioactive device, et cetera, but if, then, the predominant threat today 

is these local groups that share this global ideology, the Bush doctrine is very general; it is more like a goal than an operational 

strategy. 

Tell me, if you would, your view of what this ideology is that 

links these disparate groups of people because unless we have a 

clear understanding of the ideology, and we fight the ideology as 

well as those who carry the ideology, we are not going to be successful. It is obviously more than simple anti-Americanism because 

they are blowing up Saudis and Indonesians and fellow Muslims. 

It goes beyond those that have been working as allies in the war 

on terrorism. What is the essence of this ideology, and what is our 

strategy for going after it? 

Mr. BLACK. The essence of the ideology, I think, is to overturn 

the trends of current events, to impose one’s own vision of Islam 

and how society should be organized upon others. As an example, 

I think it is very instructive to look at the al-Qaeda organization, 

where, even before 9/11, you had isolated examples of maps of the 

world where they plan to have the whole planet—their favorite 

color is green—have it all go green. The objectives are comprehensive. 

A part of this strategy to impose their will on others is the acceptance that this will be a long struggle, it will take a long time, 

and, to a certain extent, al-Qaeda’s objective was to get this process 

in motion, to enlist others to their aid. There have been some aspects of our modern life that have facilitated this process—television, the Internet for forms of communication—to co-opt localized 

groups into the objective of overturning the establishment and to 

set up a brand of Islam that is extremely conservative and that is 

achieved by the use of terrorism. 

Mr. SCHIFF. What is our strategy to combat the ideology? And 

given how unpopular we are around the world right now, doesn’t 

that pose a real problem for us in essentially the propaganda war 

20

that is going on? How can we be successful when much of the world 

has such a violent animosity toward the United States right now? 

Mr. BLACK. This strategy is based upon empowering the international community, build a coalition of nations, first of all, to conduct those law enforcement, intelligence, and legal activities to protect innocent people from attack. And then to go beyond that, if you 

are looking at underlying causes, we do have a lot of work to do 

there to get out a message. Even in the State Department, we have 

a new assistant secretary, Margaret Tutweiler, who is looking at 

the public diplomacy aspects. These are areas that we are looking 

at and need to do a better job of to get our message out. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Black, I want to commend you for the terrific job 

you have done for our country over the years. I realize there are 

limitations on the specificity of answers you can give us, so I will 

be satisfied with a conceptual answer to the question I am going 

to try to pose to you. 

If we are talking about 9/11, my understanding of Director Tenet’s testimony was that, in the summer of 2001, almost all of the 

evidence was indicating, if there was going to be a spectacular attack, it would be overseas. Also, our domestic agencies were at the 

highest possible alert throughout the summer of 2001. 

Richard Clarke said even if we had done everything he had 

wanted, it still would not have averted the September 11th attacks. 

Michael Sheehan, who I believe held a position similar to yours in 

the previous Administration and is presently doing an outstanding 

job in the New York Police Department, has said that no one could 

have anticipated the extent of the attacks of September 11th. 

My concern with all of this is those attacks did happen. What are 

we doing now to think outside the box, to perhaps think diabolically, to anticipate—maybe the question answers itself—to anticipate something that otherwise we would not anticipate, either an 

attack against the United States or against American interests 

overseas because it looks as if whatever thinking we had, both the 

previous Administration and this Administration, prior to September 11th did not anticipate the extent, the enormity, and the 

horrific nature of the attacks of September 11th? Do you worry 

about there being something else out there that no one is thinking 

of now, and what are we doing to try to anticipate that? 

Mr. BLACK. Yes. You are absolutely right. Do we worry about 

things? Do worry about things we have not thought of? Yes, all the 

time. I think a good sense of paranoia comes with this type of job. 

This country is in a lot better shape now than it was before. Does 

this provide comprehensive assurance that nothing bad will happen? No. But when I compare and contrast what we had before 

with what we have now, it has greatly improved, and it is my professional view, Congressman, that these improvements have been 

instrumental in protecting this country. 

On the one hand, you have an absolutely aggressive, go-get-them 

offense overseas, using partnerships with other countries, which is 

crucial. So that has attrited the capabilities of terrorist groups to 

project against American interests overseas but also against the 

21

United States. So a good offense, a better offense, is what we have, 

and it is getting better all the time. 

I know that the intelligence community has developed a new entity, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, where all they do is 

look at what is the threat. This is a great advantage for people like 

me at the State Department because, in some circumstances in the 

past, you might have one view from the Defense Intelligence Agency, one view from intelligence at Treasury and across the board. 

Here, you have basically one conduit that provides me with the reality of what the threat is. This is a great, great thing. So we have 

sort of essentially one-stop shopping. They take all of the information. They collate it. They are in contact with their counterparts in 

other countries. They coordinate. They assess what is the threat, 

and they provide that to us, the customer. What is it we have to 

look for? 

So more aggressive to collect information to disrupt overseas, 

both intelligence and law enforcement. The information, I think, is 

being handled in a more effective way that is of use to the consumer. A lot of it is also looked in terms of what is the impact on 

infrastructure. Hypothetically, if we get a report of terrorist interest in a bridge in your district or a type of bridge you have in your 

district, these people look at how hard is it to engage this target. 

What does it take to destroy a target like this? Experts take a look 

at this, come up with a fix, and they fix it and make it more secure. 

They do things like that, so there is a lot of red-teaming activity 

that goes into it. 

The other thing is you have a Department of Homeland Security 

that has increased our awareness. The Transportation Security Administration—the checkers at the airport. What Homeland Security 

does, looking at all of the types of vulnerabilities, pulling the first 

responders together. We still have a ways to go, and some people 

kind of shake their head and say, ‘‘It is not perfect. I went through 

an airport somewhere, and they did not do that great a job.’’

But if you look at it from the standpoint of a terrorist attacking, 

their environment, if you think of trying to assault a castle, the 

wall is higher, the wall is thicker, you know, there are more people, 

they have got a rotweiler running in the front, and their attack 

plan is greatly complicated, and this is what I was trying to convey 

in another question. 

If you are now put in the terrorist’s situation, you have a much 

harder problem, which means you have got to go through your 

whole cycle again of pacing, figuring it all out, and then as they 

are doing that, we keep ratcheting up the defenses overseas, we 

keep being offensive, so if you do this right, you are degrading their 

ability to attack. Some will get through is probably a high probability, but maybe the analogy is air defense, concentric rings of defense. You degrade the strike so what gets closest to it needs to be 

protected. The homeland is something that can be handled and 

dealt with here. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Ms. McCollum? 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ambassador Black, 

thank you for being here today. 

22

We keep talking about al-Qaeda, and we are here today to talk 

about al-Qaeda, but al-Qaeda is not a nation; it is ever evolving, 

as we all know. There are reports that it could be in anywhere up 

to 50 different countries. And my concern is, as we see the spread 

and the evolving of this, especially in light of what recently happened in Spain, we can start focusing on how to prevent attacks. 

We need to do that, and our Homeland Security is working on it, 

as well as the international community together, but we, in my 

opinion, have another challenge ahead of us, especially as al-Qaeda 

continues to evolve and spread and move out into different countries, and that is understanding the language and the culture. 

As you so well put it, and as people say, and I will paraphrase, 

long haul, long time, long term, decades, this is going to be for the 

next generation, that we are going to have to keep working on destroying groups like al-Qaeda as they continue to evolve, working 

internationally, as well as keeping opportunities for al-Qaeda to 

come in and find recruits, the next generation of youth that are victimized into becoming suicide bombers. 

So could you tell me what you are working on, if there are plans 

to capture not only people our age to start working and learning 

more about cultural sensitivities, those of us who have the ability 

to travel, people who are in the State Department who are involved 

in intelligence, to expand their knowledge of culture and language, 

and what we are doing or planning to do as a nation so that we 

have individuals with a diplomatic language and cultural skills so 

there are people who can pick up the nuances of what is in an email or what has happened in a phone call or what they are hearing? 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, ma’am. I would answer the question in two 

parts. One is that it is interesting for me to note, new immigrants 

to the United States from these very areas that we are interested 

in sometimes have such unique insights into the turn of a phrase 

or what a particular words means that you might not learn in 

school, so we have a great advantage, this being a melting pot and 

the people that naturally come in. 

There is an across-the-board effort in the government, and I 

would have to research this and get back to you in writing to see 

if there are established programs and the like, but Congresswoman, I have been really impressed at the amount of time that 

people in the government, from the Secretary of State to Deputy 

Secretary Rich Armitage to all of the assistant secretaries, myself, 

people in the intelligence community, the time they spend working 

with young people, going out and talking to high school students, 

college students, giving lectures and underscoring those skills and 

traits that are sought for and desired in essentially this type of 

work. 

And it is, I guess, sort of analogous to the days of the cold war, 

I guess, these days when you and I might remember learn Russian, 

see St. Petersburg, go through the Hermitage. We are trying to do 

this in areas now of interest to us that have great impact in counterterrorism. That is the good news. The bad news is there are a 

lot of countries that we are interested in, but the learning of languages is very important. 

23

I think if you want to be successful in the field of counterterrorism, whether it is in the State Department or the intelligence community, you have got to learn, you have to know, a good language. 

This would be a key part of your career, whether it is Arabic or 

Farsi or Chinese. That is a prerequisite these days. We encourage 

people to know cultures, to travel. 

The big change, in my view, is we are starting at a very young 

age, and because, as you underscored again, this is a long struggle. 

I know it will see me out. Perhaps it will also see you out. It is 

not going to go over quick. We are going to have to stick with it, 

and we are trying to build this infrastructure to reach out to kids 

to show them the great contribution they can make. It is not easy 

to encounter terrorism, but you can save lives, and they do seem 

to be attracted to it, so I think we are making progress in that 

area. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chair, if I may, other State Department 

issues besides counterterrorism that are more in the diplomatic, 

hand-to-hand areas; do you know if there are programs being involved in there? I serve on the Education Committee, and I have 

not seen anything forthcoming from the Department of Education 

to really embrace and enhance and encourage learning more languages, learning about more cultures because Leave No Child Behind, with the high-risk, high-stakes testing, actually schools are 

cutting those programs. 

Mr. BLACK. I would just have to say, what I am trying to report 

to you is the reality that I see from my position. If I may, I would 

have to go back and check. May I give you a written response? I 

am sure these programs have names, so we can give you the background to them. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I look forward to 

seeing that. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Chris 

Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Black, thank you for being a life saver. Thank you 

for dedicating 28 years of your life to protect Americans and our 

interests abroad. You have one of the most difficult portfolios, I 

think, at the State Department and the U.S. Government, and you 

should know everybody here deeply respects and are grateful for 

your work. 

Mr. BLACK. I appreciate that. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I do mean it. 

Let me just ask you a couple of questions. At the 9/11 Commission hearing this month, former Secretary of State Madeline 

Albright said that the terrorist attack on our two Embassies in Africa, in Nairobi and Darisalam, which killed more than 300 people 

and wounded thousands more, was her worst day. You probably 

heard her say that. And, obviously, for many of us, it was a terrible, terrible day and the aftermath of that, which was the culmination of a number of incidents, going back to the Beirut bombing, in which one of my constituents, Paul Inasinze, was killed, a 

Marine, during that terrible tragedy. 

24

On March 12, 1999, I chaired a hearing. I chaired the International Operations and Human Rights Committee for 6 years. We 

were putting together the State Department bill for that year, and 

we had a hearing on the security of U.S. missions abroad, and our 

principal witness was Admiral Crowe, as you know, the former 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our Ambassador to the 

U.K. The Crowe Commission, which had these two accountability 

review boards that looked at those bombings, made some very, very 

troubling findings about what the status was in terms of our security. 

Admiral Crowe said:

‘‘There was a collective failure of the U.S. Government over the 

past decade . . .’’

that would be the 1990s

‘‘. . . to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability 

of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries of the world.’’

Admiral Crowe pointed out, and this was his statement:

‘‘The boards were most disturbed regarding two interconnected 

issues. The first was that there was an inadequacy of resources 

to provide security against terrorist attacks and, second, there 

was a relatively low priority accorded to security concerns 

throughout the U.S. Government by the Department of State 

and other agencies in general,’’

and he said this was found in Washington as well as in the field. 

He also said that the Administration’s request, at that time, was 

inadequate; it just was not enough. 

My good friend, Mr. Delahunt, was at that hearing when we 

quizzed Admiral Crowe and others, and he made the point, rightfully so, that requests had been made for more money, but the Office of Management and Budget had intervened and said, no, you 

are not going to get it. We then forced the issue. I pushed my bill, 

which we dubbed the Embassies Security Act, to completion. It was 

signed into law as part of this overall State Department reauthorization. It had a lot of disparate elements, but that was the engine 

that drove it, and in the end, we got some, but I do not think all, 

of that money by the time we got to the appropriations process. 

I guess my question is, you know, we have been hearing the 

blame game, which I, frankly, resent when I hear people talking 

about it because there is blame all around, but, frankly, when good 

people do all that they could possibly do, and OMB steps in, as 

they did then, and say you are not getting it, there is a problem, 

and our hearing highlighted that problem. I remember Dan 

Gensler from the Foreign Service Association,—he was the President—he made the point that we go from crisis to the next, and 

everybody is Johnny on the spot for the first year, and then it just 

falls off the table, and people are no longer as diligent. 

I have not seen that in this Administration. I have not seen it 

over the last 3 years, and, believe me, I have followed it very, very 

closely. 

My question to you would be about resources. Have we allocated 

sufficient resources to do the job? I would just say parenthetically, 

25

so many things may have led to 9/11, maybe not, but when I was 

in Berlin not so long ago as part of the OSC Parliamentary Assembly, which I chair, we heard from some people within the State Department, one of whom told me that in Bangladesh—this is just 

one little tidbit of information, but it plays into what really happened and what preceded the horrific events of 9/11—that on 31 occasions, people had gone to our Embassy or our consular in Bangladesh, had sought a visa, and their express purpose was for flight 

training. This was in the late 1990s. They were denied, every one 

of them. 

They probably went somewhere else and eventually got it or got 

it under another pretext, but they had actually said flight training 

was why they wanted to come over here. And it did not ring any 

bells there, even though they were denied. There was no follow up 

here in Washington, and, in the end, those records were destroyed 

after a 2-year period, so we do not even know if Atta or anybody 

else were among those who were seeking that. So no bells went off, 

and that was in the 1990s, late 1990s. 

But my question really goes to the adequacy of resources, if you 

could speak to that, because that was very serious. The first year 

after the bombing of our Embassies, $1.4 billion, as requested by 

Admiral Crowe, was provided like that. The next year, zero funding 

for 2000 for the very things that Admiral Crowe had agitated for 

and asked for. 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, sir. If I may, I think you have a very valid point. 

If I may, I would like to give you a written response. That particular account would be done by diplomatic security. That would 

be Ambassador Frank Taylor, and he and I and Deputy Secretary 

Armitage would be eager to respond to. 

As sort of an observer on Embassy security, I would tell you that 

I personally have always been so pleasantly surprised. The Secretary of State chairs a meeting at 8:30 in the morning, and I always sort of remember the amount of time spent on Embassy security, security overseas, how Embassies have been hardened, improvements that have been made, where we are planning to harden 

it. So I would tell you, as an observant of these types of activities, 

there is a tremendous emphasis on it. We do take it awfully seriously, again, because we know this is going to be for a long period 

of time that we have to keep this missions secure. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just very 

briefly follow up. 

And the issue is not just hardening and setbacks and making 

sure that the glass is sufficiently protected so shards do not kill 

people if there is a bombing. The issue is also personnel so that the 

eyes and ears of the American government extend in that venue so 

that if there is a threat, we have an early warning device before 

it comes here because that is the outer reaches of U.S. interests. 

Mr. BLACK. I do not know if this is in response to your question, 

but a program that we are very interested in is the Antiterrorism 

Assistance Program. We asked for a few monies, and we got less 

than we wanted. We think it is a good program, as well as our program of Terrorism Interdiction Program that was also cut. So I 

guess, in complete frankness, we did not get everything we asked 

for, but that is where we are, sir. 

26

Mr. GALLEGLY. Nick Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It appears that there are thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Islamic extremists that wake up every morning trying to 

think of ways that they can kill or damage Americans or the West, 

so I appreciate your comment that we cannot totally protect ourselves when we have got that kind of an attitude and that kind of 

determination to damage us. 

I would like to get your reaction to what happened yesterday or 

the day before in Fallujah, where the four Americans were tortured, beaten, burned, stomped on during their burning, and the 

cheering crowds around. Two questions. One, what is the relation 

with al-Qaeda? But first of all, help me better understand the kind 

of attitude that seems so inconceivable to most of us that a crowd 

can gather around and cheer with that kind of, for lack of a better 

word, brutality. 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, sir. I cannot tell you how sad we all are to see 

that, and this takes me back. I have seen these things before. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Specifically, is there still training in 

Muslim teachings that can excite individuals to be that terrorist? 

And I suspect that there must be. What is the attitude? Of course, 

it is in the area where they are vulnerable. 

Mr. BLACK. If you are looking at this particular case, you have 

a population that is generally pretty hostile to the United States, 

and this is the Fallujah area. This is basically the base of the people that were doing well with the Saddam Hussein regime. By this 

new dispensation, this new change, the Coalition’s facilitation of a 

drive toward democracy, they have everything to lose and nothing 

to gain. They are fighting for a way of life that they have lost. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Just so my 5 minutes do not go totally 

by——

Mr. BLACK. I am sorry. I want to try to answer your question. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. These young people—it appears from 

the newspaper articles that they are fairly young, under 20—that 

are cheering. 

Mr. BLACK. I think since it specifically happened in the Fallujah 

area, which is very Saddam Hussein oriented, tribally oriented, 

they do see us as the enemy, and their natural inclination until we 

prove them otherwise is to vent their frustration, what they see as 

their humiliation and defeat against an outside force, against representatives of that entity. It is not that uncommon. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Would there be indications, or do we 

have information, that the Islamic fundamental interpretation of 

the Koran is still being taught in the area, and that is part of the 

reason? 

Mr. BLACK. The last reports that I have read on this particular 

subject in this area is that in that particular area there is a proportionately high number of mosques that are being very anti-Coalition, anti-American, but they are usually quite adept at stopping 

just short of espousing violence against Americans. 

So you can look at that in two different ways. One is legitimate 

expression stopping short of violence, or you can see this as sort of 

code words to go forth and wreak violence. The people that did this 

27

were not, you know, three guys on an excellent adventure. These 

are people that have had the training, have a vested interest——

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. People that were stomping on those 

burned bodies. 

Mr. BLACK. Those would be sort of people standing by. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Let me just ask you to finish up on any 

relationship you see between al-Qaeda and that kind of Islamic terrorism that is taking place. 

Mr. BLACK. From our perspective, it is associated. It is in proximity. There is not specifically a direct tie between that crowd and 

al-Qaeda as we know it. They just find themselves, the enemy of 

my enemy is my friend. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Ms. Watson? 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here in the 

tough situation that we face, and I have a multipart question, so 

let me go through my statement and question, and then any piece 

of it you would like to respond to, I would appreciate it. 

There is concern that the terrorist organizations are trading in 

African natural resources as a means of screening and moving 

their financial assets, and it is reported that Charles Taylor, when 

he was President of Liberia, from al-Qaeda’s trade in West African 

diamonds, was part of this network. On Tuesday, your colleague at 

the Treasury Department, William Fox, the head of the Treasury’s 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, told a meeting of the 

World Diamond Council in Dabai that the industry was vulnerable 

to abuse by criminals and terrorists. He is reported to have said:

‘‘Although evidence to prove the connections between diamonds 

and terrorists is still being developed, we are receiving enough 

information from government agencies, private concerns, and 

the industry to warrant a closer examination of the problem.’’

And I would like to know what you might know or what you 

might tell us about these connections, and what is your office doing 

to undermine the source of funding that allows al-Qaeda to come 

into Iraq and do the kinds of dastardly deeds that were just done? 

The General Accounting Office said late last year that diamonds 

and other commodities could be used to earn, move, or store terrorist assets but said the extent of the business was unknown, in 

part because the U.S. Government had failed to collect information 

about the problem systematically. 

So if you can, would you let us know if your office has made any 

effort to investigate and collect data on this problem, and if not, 

why not because it is obvious that there is a great amount of funds 

out there being used by al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and I 

think that the diamond trade might be part of that. So if you can 

respond, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, ma’am. I will try. I think this would stem from 

a couple of points, if I may. The first thing is it generally does not 

take a lot of money to conduct a terrorist operation, comparatively, 

a lot less than we would naturally think. So generally, you are not 

involving large sums of money. 

We have an active program that seeks to identify and to cut financial links to terrorists. As a result of this, we have frozen more 

than $130 million around the world of monies associated with terVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:55 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 092869 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITHR\040104\92869.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

rorist groups. In some countries, like Saudi Arabia, we look, particularly, at funding from potential charities to terrorist groups and 

seek to cut that and identify it. 

As we are more effective in cutting off the established financial 

links to terrorist groups,—wire transfers to banks, things like 

that—it is only natural to assume that terrorists will seek other 

ways to move monies to support their training and their operations. The African piece, in particular, whether they are talking 

about emeralds out of the Copper Belt in Zambia or diamonds out 

of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, there are other associations with this that, in my mind, take precedence over, particularly, use for terrorism. Yes, it is a possibility. It is something that 

we need to look at closely. It is generally associated more with established criminal activities or smuggling activities. 

So it is something that needs to be looked at. We have to look 

at any new form terrorists may hijack to move resources and 

money, but that would go well beyond, I think, ma’am, hard gems. 

It can go to anything that has value that they would attempt to 

escape our scrutiny and to reach their operatives. So I would agree 

with Mr. Fox. This is something that deserves close attention. 

I will say, my recollection is efforts to investigate these kinds of 

things in the past have not supported the contention that terrorists, at least the terrorists that we are looking at, al-Qaeda and 

their associates, have been associated with this trade, with using 

hard gems as a vehicle from the source. We are looking at all of 

these avenues. 

There is a tremendous infrastructure, certainly in counterterrorism, but there are lots of people and organizations and computers 

and everything that look at how terrorists move money. This was 

a cornerstone, certainly, of this Administration—‘‘to drain the 

swamp’’ is the phrase that they always use—to look at these links 

to try to keep money away from them, and it is complex. 

One of the things that have been used where we are also making 

progress in shutting down are jawalas, which is the informal transfer mechanism. Basically, if you are in California, and I am somewhere else, I call you. I make a deposit at my end, you make a deposit at yours, and it obviates classical financial communications. 

So we are looking at all of this, being mindful of the fact that 

as we make progress to shut down one medium, like criminals or 

crooks, they will find another way to do it, and the trick is just to 

get ahead of these people. 

Ms. WATSON. In the time I have left, Mr. Chair, I would like to 

make this——

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentlelady’s time has expired, so if you would 

make it brief, I would allow just a brief question. 

Ms. WATSON. Yes. As you relate to other questions that will be 

asked here, who is the enemy? How do we get to them? So that is 

why I asked that question. I know they are operating in other 

places around the world. We talk about al-Qaeda. Where are they? 

How will we get to them? How will we hold them responsible for 

those acts that are committed? Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BLACK. Is it all right to respond to that, sir? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Yes, if you would like. 

29

Mr. BLACK. The question of who we are dealing with has evolved 

over time. I can remember the beginnings of the al-Qaeda organization in Khartoum, Sudan. They developed lines of communication, 

infrastructure. They matured into an organization that had lines of 

communications out to other like-minded people. The people that 

we are looking at are the ones who feel there is a lot of psychology 

involved in this. There is a lot of victimization, where trusted elders basically entrap young people into this and encourage it. 

There is a production line, essentially, to sensitize young people 

into a cause, into a way of life, but it is based, I think, on feeling 

some psychological aspects having to do with the family, aspects of 

humiliation, wanting to wreak revenge, a throwback to history 

when their society was more predictable, more understandable. It 

is a drive for conservatism, and there is a drive to overturn what 

is an established path of history. 

It is quite a trick, I think, to take a young person, and now it 

has even turned to young women who are prepared to leave their 

young children to become suicide attackers. There has also been, in 

my view, a failure of moderate leaders in these countries to stand 

up, to speak reason, to describe what is right and what is wrong, 

and to work with their own populations to provide them the opportunities they need so that they feel comfortable in their own societies. So we are having to make up for quite a bit. 

I think the first step, certainly, which is ongoing, is to identify 

and stop those that are trying to kill us and to kill our families, 

is the first step, and the second is working with our partners 

around the world to come up with societies that facilitate and allow 

freedom of expression and that take away feelings of humiliation, 

lack of power and who confront the radical terrorist leaders that 

bring these young people into this cause. 

I am very confident we will win; their cause is so misguided and 

crazy, from our standpoint. But unfortunately, this is going to take 

time, it is going to take effort, and I think, as the President has 

said, we have to have determination and stick with this, and I 

think, with the passage of time, we will all be safe, but it will be 

quite the struggle. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your testimony today. 

First, just a follow-up question. In your earlier testimony, you mentioned, in passing, that we have frozen about $130 million in 

assets around the world. Can you speak to the degree to which 

those are assets associated with Osama bin Laden or his family? 

To what degree have we frozen his assets? 

Mr. BLACK. I would have to give you a written breakdown. I am 

just not prepared, at this point, to give which particular group, but 

this is across the spectrum of assets, terrorist assets, and not just 

the al-Qaeda organization. A goodly amount of this, and, again, I 

have to apologize—I am going to have to give you a written response—a good percentage of this has been conducted overseas by 

our partners in freezing funds overseas, so this is the aggregate 

total. 

So I think that is good, but the other point is that we are making 

progress, particularly in countries like Saudi Arabia, where the 

30

funding mechanisms are being looked at very carefully. A charity 

is now only allowed to have one bank account. Those in Saudi Arabia that wish to make contributions, say, to refugees in Iraq have 

to do it in kind, not with cash. Saudis are no longer allowed to contribute cash to the cash box in mosques and in public places that 

used to exist to collect funds. They are concerned about the diversion of these things. They have all been removed. There are established, controlled mechanisms that are subject to audit, and we all 

have ways to look at this. We do look at it to make sure these monies go for good works. 

So I guess I would say, Congressman, there is a system. At the 

beginning, people always think about how great the problem, a big 

problem. At least, we have started, and we are on the right road. 

Mr. PENCE. I sense, then, an affirmative response that some of 

the assets may be assets of Osama bin Laden. 

Mr. BLACK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PENCE. I have some memory of press accounts of a billion 

dollars in personal resources that may be associated with him or 

available to him, and most of my constituents would think that 

tying up his money would be a very important aspect. 

Mr. BLACK. Correct. I would say, if I could just interject,——

Mr. PENCE. Please. 

Mr. BLACK [continuing]. We do know from intelligence that their 

operational people, their cells, are having extreme problems trying 

to access funds, trying to get money. These guys are under real 

stress, and they are in needs of even small infusions of new monies. So we are making progress. We have had impact. We have a 

lot more to do, but we are getting there. 

Mr. PENCE. A good sign. 

Let me go next, then, to—I was very interested in some of your 

reflections on Osama bin Laden and his possible leadership role in 

al-Qaeda. What is your sense? I know that your prepared summary 

suggests that the jury is out as to whether or not Osama bin Laden 

is still continuing to lead this organization. Forgive me if you have 

already responded. 

Mr. BLACK. No, I have not. 

Mr. PENCE. Is he still in charge of al-Qaeda, in the judgment of 

the State Department? 

Mr. BLACK. That is a good way to put it, and I think it is reflective of the larger intelligence community, but, again, for a real definitive view, you would probably want to access them. They would 

be happy to provide that information to you. But, you know, the 

sense is that he is not leader in the way we think of it, a leader 

who is in control, holds meetings with his lieutenants, communicates with his subordinates, receives information, validates plans, 

and allocates resources. No. This guy spends most of his time trying to figure out, you know, how they are going to come for me, and 

is this going to be the day? 

With that in mind, there are elements of communication he 

maintains in contact, but I think the development is that command 

and control has decentralized to others. We would probably have 

the same system if this country was under a catastrophic, classical, 

military attack. Subordinate commanders would assume control, 

and you are seeing that in a very loose way. 

31

Mr. PENCE. Which gives evidence of the fact that, through a variety of countermeasures, his leadership has been largely neutralized 

over al-Qaeda. 

Mr. BLACK. Yes. The impact, his effectiveness, has been greatly 

reduced, yes, sir. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Pence. Without objection, the 

Chair would recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I want to join Mr. Smith’s observations about 

your contribution, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you for what you do, 

and you do it extremely well. And I think this has been an excellent hearing. I think you have educated us, and as a segue to Mr. 

Pence, I, on my own, just from the readings I have done, I have 

reached a conclusion, too, that Osama bin Laden, at this point, is 

more of a symbol than an actual CEO, albeit it is still important, 

because symbols are important, it is obviously important to either 

capture him or kill him. 

But the concern that I have, all of us, the American people, 

Members of Congress, those that do not deal with it on an every 

day basis is this: The focus is so discreet on al-Qaeda that I am 

concerned that there is a sense that if al-Qaeda is defeated, terrorism is going away. My own observation is that as al-Qaeda 

wanes in the era of terrorism, these smaller, localized, regional 

groups, in fact, are growing, for whatever reason, and I do not want 

to get into that today. But am I on the right track when I make 

that comment? 

Mr. BLACK. I think you are absolutely correct. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me ask you this, and I thought what your 

testimony was particularly important on this point: I think we 

have really got to define the enemy today. There are multiple terrorist groups all over the world, some of which really do not pose 

a threat to the United States, and that is our concern. It is a concern that has to be our priority, albeit we are concerned about terrorism in general. 

I think you stated earlier that the nexus of these groups are 

their shared corrupted version of a great religion. The states that 

are currently on the terrorist list put out by DOS, the state sponsors of terrorism, on that list, which of those states are harboring, 

protecting, or supporting that particular group of organizations, 

however loosely organized they may be? 

I am trying to think of who is on the state-sponsors-of-terrorism 

list, but could you run through them for us? 

Mr. BLACK. I will try, and I hope I do not leave any out. If you 

begin with Iran, here you have a country that has been on the list 

a long time. There is no doubt about it that they are a state sponsor of terrorism. They actively support Hezbollah, a validated foreign terrorist organization, with funds, support, information, training. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me just interrupt because I know time is 

quick. 

Mr. BLACK. I am sorry. I could go on. I am glad you cut me off. 

32

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. But Hezbollah, for example; do they share 

this corrupted version of Islam? 

Mr. BLACK. This really gets sort of in a philosophical point. 

Hezbollah’s drive is the relentless overturning of the State of 

Israel. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me just run through them. My aide just gave 

me the list. 

North Korea does not harbor any of these particular terrorist 

groups. 

Mr. BLACK. Not that I am aware of. It is more their propensity 

for and actions in the past. One of the most important of these, of 

course, is the hostages from Japan. I want to mention that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not questioning the list itself, but about the 

enemy, this enemy that attacked us. Cuba? 

Mr. BLACK. Their past actions and their performance. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Libya? 

Mr. BLACK. Libya making dramatic changes. They retain some 

contacts with terrorist groups we are concerned about, but we are 

working with them to resolve that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Syria? 

Mr. BLACK. Syria in contact with everybody, providing aid, comfort, and support to a spectrum of terrorist organizations. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sudan? 

Mr. BLACK. Sudan, great progress, assisting in the global war on 

terrorism, but they so far have not expelled offices of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which we have instructed them 

they must do. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. So Iran and Syria, in terms, again, of these not 

secular terrorists but these fundamental Islamist terrorists. Syria 

and Iran? 

Mr. BLACK. Syria and Iran are very high on this list, yes, Congressman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I want to thank the Members for their participation today, and I would just like to say to you, Mr. Ambassador, 

that we all have concerns and questions about some of the operations of our intelligence gathering over years and months past, 

and certainly I understand Mr. Rohrabacher’s concerns and identify with some of them. 

But I want to make it very clear that I want to associate myself 

with the comments of Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey and Mr. 

Delahunt regarding the job you have done, the candor you have 

provided to this Committee, and the growing relationship that we 

have personally established, and I want to thank you for the 28-

plus years of service you have had and for the tremendous contribution that you make to this Committee, and with that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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