Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 20-0354

══════════

CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Fernando Ramirez and Minerva Ramirez, 

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the 

Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas 

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued September 29, 2021

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Justice Huddle and Justice Young did not participate in the 

decision.

The issue of first impression in this personal-injury case is 

whether a limitation of liability provision in a utility tariff approved by 

state regulators bars the utility’s liability for damages suffered by a

residential customer’s houseguests. We hold that it does. The tariff 

provides, without exception, that the utility “shall not be liable for any

damage or loss” in the limited circumstance where damage or loss is 
2 

“caused by the escape of gas from Consumer’s housepiping or

Consumer’s appliances.”1 That is precisely how the houseguests were 

injured, but the lower courts agreed with the houseguests that the 

liability limitation is applicable only to any damage or loss sustained by 

the utility’s customer. We hold that the liability limitation precludes 

the houseguests’ negligence claims because (1) the tariff’s terms 

expressly apply to “all consumers” and (2) the houseguests meet the 

tariff’s special definition of that term. A tariff approved by a regulatory 

body is not a “mere contract” and instead carries “the force and effect” of 

law, at least as to those to whom the tariff applies. The houseguests are 

bound by the tariff’s terms because, as consumers, the tariff applies to 

them and, like any other law, neither assent nor actual knowledge is 

required to enforce its terms as written. We therefore reverse and 

render judgment that the tariff forecloses the houseguests’ ordinary 

negligence claims against the utility.

I. Background

In December 2011, Adrian and Graciela Castillo purchased a new 

home built by WestWind Homes d/b/a WestWind Development, 

G.P.-Laredo. The home’s gas lines were installed by plumber Armando 

Aguilar & Sons Contractor. After the City of Laredo issued a certificate 

of occupancy certifying the home was habitable and built to code, the 

Castillos moved into the residence. Shortly thereafter, CenterPoint 

1 Emphasis added.
3 

Energy Resources Corp. installed a gas meter outside the home and 

initiated gas service. 

Over the next three years, Graciela’s parents, Fernando and 

Minerva Ramirez, were frequent visitors and guests at the home. 

During these visits, the Ramirezes used the home’s gas services,

including for cooking and showering. In February 2015, while Fernando 

was attempting to repair the Castillos’ electric clothes dryer, he 

inadvertently opened the valve on an unused gas line behind the dryer. 

Escaping gas accumulated to combustible levels and ignited, resulting 

in an explosion that damaged the Castillos’ home and seriously injured 

Fernando. 

The Ramirezes sued the homebuilder, the plumber, and 

CenterPoint for personal-injury damages under negligence and 

gross-negligence theories. The Ramirezes alleged that all three 

defendants had breached a duty to plug or seal the unused gas line. The 

Ramirezes did not contend that the defendants’ equipment failed but, 

rather, that the defendants failed to provide essential equipment.

The plumber settled, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against 

the homebuilder and CenterPoint. After the close of the plaintiffs’ 

case-in-chief, the trial court directed a verdict for the homebuilder and 

CenterPoint on the Ramirezes’ gross-negligence and 

exemplary-damages claims. In response to three negligence 

submissions, the jury found that only the defendants were at fault and 

apportioned responsibility 60% to the homebuilder, 34% to CenterPoint, 
4 

and 6% to the plumber.2 The jury awarded the Ramirezes more than 

$6.9 million in actual damages.

CenterPoint moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

and, in the alternative, a new trial. The motion asserted a number of 

grounds, including that the jury’s verdict was immaterial because 

CenterPoint is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the 

terms of its tariff, which was filed with and approved by state regulators. 

CenterPoint asserted that, under the filed-rate doctrine, the tariff’s 

terms, which generally limit the company’s liability for damages 

resulting from gas usage after delivery to the meter, are (1) binding as 

law, (2) presumed reasonable, and (3) applicable to the Ramirezes’ 

ordinary negligence claims.

The trial court denied CenterPoint’s motion and rendered 

judgment on the verdict. Based on the jury’s 

proportionate-responsibility findings, the trial court rendered judgment 

that the homebuilder was jointly and severally liable for all of the 

Ramirezes’ damages and CenterPoint was liable only for its 

2 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.003 (stating that a 

proportionate-responsibility jury issue shall include a settling party if there is 

sufficient evidence to submit a jury issue as to that party).
5 

proportionate share of the damages.3 While the case was on appeal, the 

homebuilder settled with the Ramirezes.4 

The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against CenterPoint.5 

With respect to the main issue here, the court held that the provisions 

in a utility’s tariff are enforceable only against the utility’s customers 

and the Ramirezes were not CenterPoint’s customers, presumably 

because they did not contract for the utility’s services.6 The court 

acknowledged that the tariff’s special definition of “Consumer, 

Customer and Applicant” broadly defines the terms to mean “a person 

or organization utilizing services or who wants to utilize services to 

CENTERPOINT[.]”7 Even so, the court held that the scope of the 

defined term was narrowed to exclude houseguests like the Ramirezes 

because (1) the tariff states that the terms “‘Consumer, Customer and 

Applicant’ are used interchangeably” and (2) the terms “Consumer” and 

“Customer” are used in select tariff provisions that would be “absurd” if 

3 See id. § 33.013(b)(1) (“[E]ach liable defendant is, in addition to the 

defendant’s liability under Subsection (a), jointly and severally liable for the 

damages recoverable by the claimant under Section 33.012 with respect to a 

cause of action if: . . . the percentage of responsibility attributed to the 

defendant with respect to a cause of action is greater than 50 percent[.]”).

4 No. 04-18-00103-CV, 2019 WL 3432103, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

July 31, 2019) (per curiam) (mem. op.).

5 628 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020).

6 Id. at 536-39 (discussing Lone Star Caliper Co. v. Talty Water Supply 

Corp., 102 S.W.3d 198, 200-03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. granted, judgm’t 

vacated w.r.m.), and Henderson v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 977 S.W.2d 439, 

447 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied)). 

7 Id. at 536 (emphasis added) (quoting CenterPoint’s tariff).
6 

applied to noncustomers.8 From the court’s perspective, 

interchangeable use means that “each term can be substituted wherever 

any of the terms are used,” so any narrower use within the tariff 

necessarily constrains the special definition to a narrower meaning

throughout the tariff.9 The court did not define the term “customer” 

except to state that the Ramirezes were not CenterPoint’s customers.10 

The court also noted that the Ramirezes were not residents or tenants 

in the Castillos’ home but did not explain the significance of those facts 

to the analysis.11 The court posited, however, that it could not be the 

case that anyone using gas services inside the home would be subject to 

the tariff’s liability limitations.12 

After determining that the Ramirezes were not “consumers” as 

that term is defined in the tariff because they were not CenterPoint’s 

“customers,” the court held that the tariff’s liability limitations did not 

apply to their negligence claims because a tariff can only govern the 

relationship between a utility and its customers.13 Applying this 

categorical rule of nonapplicability, the court rejected CenterPoint’s 

8 Id. at 536-37 (referring to the tariff’s “definition of ‘Consumer’s 

Housepiping,’ the requirement that the consumer provide additional 

information during the application process, and the required notice to the 

customer by CenterPoint before the customer’s utility service can be 

terminated”).

9 Id. at 537.

10 Id. at 536.

11 Id. 

12 Id. at 537.

13 Id. at 537-39.
7 

argument that, under the tariff’s plain language, the limitations on 

liability extend to any damage or loss caused by gas after it leaves the 

meter or escapes from the consumer’s housepiping, not just a customer’s 

damage or loss.14 The court also ruled adversely to CenterPoint on its 

remaining issues challenging the submission of jury questions on 

negligent-undertaking and negligence per se theories and the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict.15

CenterPoint filed a petition for review, which we granted to 

address the enforceability of the limitation of liability provisions in the 

natural gas provider’s tariff. On that point, we agree with CenterPoint 

that, under the filed-rate doctrine, the liability limitation in Section 14 

of the tariff plainly and expressly precludes the utility’s liability for the 

Ramirezes’ damages and applies to them as “consumers” of the utility’s 

gas services. Accordingly, we do not reach the other issues raised in 

CenterPoint’s petition for review.

II. Discussion

A. CenterPoint’s Tariff

“Gas utilities are by definition monopolies in the areas they serve. 

As a result, the normal forces of competition that regulate prices in a 

free enterprise society do not operate.”16 For that reason, “[p]ublic 

agencies regulate utility rates, operations, and services as a substitute 

for competition.”17 Under the Gas Utility Regulatory Act, the Texas 

14 Id.

15 Id. at 539-41.

16 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 101.002(b).

17 Id.
8 

Railroad Commission is granted broad regulatory authority “to protect 

the public interest inherent in the rates and services of gas utilities” and 

“to establish a comprehensive and adequate regulatory system for gas 

utilities to assure rates, operations, and services that are just and 

reasonable to the consumers and to the utilities.”18 To ensure utilities 

provide “safe, adequate, efficient, and reasonable” services,19 the 

Railroad Commission can adopt reasonable rules, regulations, 

specifications, and standards; examine and test equipment; address 

complaints; ask the attorney general to apply for a court order to 

prohibit or enjoin violations or require compliance with the commission’s 

rules or orders; recover civil penalties for violations; and bring an action 

for contempt of its lawful orders.20

Under this statutory scheme and associated regulations, gas 

utilities like CenterPoint are required to file a proposed tariff with the 

Railroad Commission for review and approval.21 “A tariff is a document 

18 Id. § 101.002(a); see id. § 104.001(a) (“The railroad commission is 

vested with all the authority and power of this state to ensure compliance with 

the obligations of gas utilities in this subtitle.”); R.R. Comm’n v. Tex. Coast 

Utils. Coal., 357 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011) (examining the 

Legislature’s “extraordinarily broad delegation of authority to the Commission 

in regard to rate regulation”), aff’d, 423 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2014). 

19 TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 104.001(a), .251.

20 See id. §§ 104.256, 105.021–.024, 105.051, 121.201–.211, 121.302–

.310. 

21 Id. § 102.151 (“A gas utility shall file with each regulatory authority 

schedules showing all rates . . . .”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 7.315 (pertaining to 

the filing and approval of tariffs with the Railroad Commission). 
9 

that lists a public utility’s services and the rates for those services.”22 

Tariffs may permissibly include provisions limiting a utility’s liability 

for economic and personal-injury damages.23 We have explained that “a 

limitation on liability is an inherent part of the rate the utility charges 

for its services” that allows regulated utilities to reduce costs for lower 

rates to customers and reflects the reality that regulated entities are 

“‘peculiarly the subject of state control.’”24

Consistent with the regulatory scheme, CenterPoint filed, and the 

Railroad Commission approved, the tariff that was in force when the 

accident in this case occurred.25 The tariff applies to “all Consumers” 

“[u]nless otherwise expressly stated” and except “insofar as [the tariff’s 

rules] are changed by or are in conflict with any statute of the State of 

Texas, valid municipal ordinance, valid final order of any court or of the 

Railroad Commission of Texas, or written contract executed by 

Company.” In the event of a conflict any “such statute, ordinance, order 

or contract shall control to the extent that it is applicable to the 

Consumer(s) in question,” but “whenever possible, the[] rules shall be 

22 First Assembly of God, Inc. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 52 S.W.3d 482, 489 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citation omitted); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 7.315(c) (listing required contents for gas utility’s filed tariff). 

23 See Sw. Elec. Power Co v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 219-22 (Tex. 2002)

(examining a tariff provision limiting liability for personal-injury damages); 

Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan USA, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 668, 672-75 (Tex. 

1999) (examining a tariff provision limiting liability for economic damages).

24 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 217; Auchan, 995 S.W.2d at 674-75 (quoting Cole 

v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 246 P.2d 686, 688 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952)).

25 See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 7.315(e). The court of appeals took

judicial notice of the tariff’s terms because it has the force and effect of a law. 

628 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020).
10

construed harmoniously with such laws, contracts, ordinances, and 

orders.” The tariff specifies that the terms “‘Consumer, Customer and 

Applicant’ are used interchangeably” and broadly defined to “mean a 

person or organization utilizing services or who wants to utilize services 

to CENTERPOINT[.]”26

CenterPoint asserts that the Ramirezes qualify as “consumers” as 

that term is defined in the tariff because (1) the undisputed evidence 

establishes they were “utilizing” CenterPoint’s gas services and (2) the 

tariff does not limit the breadth of its reach to those who have paid or 

contracted for the services being utilized. CenterPoint asserts that, as 

“consumers,” the Ramirezes would be subject to all of the tariff’s 

provisions, including its provisions limiting the utility’s liability, even 

absent a contractual relationship. CenterPoint faults the court of 

appeals for applying a definition at odds with the tariff’s defined terms 

and notes that the court’s narrow construction would make the tariff 

inapplicable to cohabitants such as spouses, children, roommates, and 

tenants who are utilizing CenterPoint’s services to the same extent as 

the utility’s direct customer. In CenterPoint’s view, the tariff’s special 

definition reflects regulatory acknowledgment that, after delivery, 

CenterPoint has no ability to limit gas use or consumption exclusively 

to the bill payer.

Even so, CenterPoint asserts that the Ramirezes’ status as a 

“consumer” is irrelevant because the pertinent liability limitations apply 

without regard to the plaintiffs’ status. CenterPoint cites two tariff 

26 Emphasis added.
11

provisions as barring the Ramirezes’ negligence claims for damages, 

losses, or injuries caused by gas usage after the point of delivery, 

whether they are “consumers” under the tariff’s definition or not. 

First, the tariff assigns consumers the responsibility for 

“installing and maintaining Consumer’s housepiping,” meaning “[a]ll 

pipe and attached fittings which convey gas from the outlet side of the 

meter to the Consumer’s connection for gas appliances.” Then, in 

express terms, the tariff releases CenterPoint from all liability—

without exception—in a narrow circumstance:

14. ESCAPING GAS

. . . Company shall not be liable for any damage or 

loss caused by the escape of gas from Consumer’s 

housepiping or Consumer’s appliances.27

As CenterPoint notes, the release in Section 14 extends to “any” damage 

or loss emanating from a specific source—the consumer’s housepiping or 

appliances. Although Section 2a of the tariff provides that “[u]nless 

otherwise expressly stated, these rules apply to all consumers . . . ,” 

CenterPoint points out that Section 14 does not include language 

limiting its scope to damages or losses incurred by anyone in particular. 

For this reason, CenterPoint maintains that the liability limitation’s

applicability depends only on the source of the damages and Section 14 

categorically bars all damages claims falling within its express terms.

The second limitation of liability more broadly precludes the 

utility’s liability after gas leaves the “point of delivery,” meaning “[t]he 

27 Emphasis added.
12

point where the gas is measured for delivery into Consumer’s 

housepiping”:

17. NON-LIABILITY

. . . . 

(b) Company shall not be liable for any damage or 

injury resulting from gas or its use after such gas 

leaves the point of delivery other than damage 

caused by the Company [1] in the manner of 

installation of the service lines, [2] in the manner in 

which such service lines are repaired by the 

Company, and [3] in the negligence of the Company 

in maintaining its meter loop. All other risks after 

the gas left [sic] the point of delivery shall be assumed 

by the Consumer, his agents, servants, employees, or

other persons.28

Section 17, unlike Section 14, divides responsibility for risks between 

the utility and others, including but not limited to consumers. Unlike 

Section 14, however, the liability limitation in Section 17 is subject to 

three specific exceptions. The parties dispute the applicability of only 

the third exception—negligent maintenance of the meter loop—under 

the evidence adduced at trial.

Citing the filed-rate doctrine, CenterPoint contends the tariff 

provisions are presumptively reasonable and enforceable as a bar to the 

Ramirezes’ negligence claims because they are “consumers” as that term 

is defined in the tariff and subject to all of its terms including the 

limitations of liability in Sections 14 and 17. Additionally, CenterPoint 

28 Emphasis added.
13

argues that the liability limits in Sections 14 and 17 expressly and 

plainly foreclose the Ramirezes’ negligence claims against the utility 

regardless of their status as consumers. 

B. Filed-Rate Doctrine

The filed-rate doctrine applies here because state law has created 

a regulatory agency and a statutory scheme under which the regulator 

determines reasonable rates for the utility services CenterPoint 

provides.29 Under the filed-rate doctrine, a tariff filed with and 

approved by a regulatory agency in accordance with the statutory 

scheme is presumed reasonable unless a litigant proves otherwise.30 

Once approved, “regulated utilities cannot vary a tariff's terms with 

individual customers, discriminate in providing services, or charge rates 

other than those properly filed with the appropriate regulatory 

authority.”31 An approved tariff carries the binding force and effect of 

29 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 216.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 217. The Texas Legislature has codified the filed-rate doctrine 

in various provisions of the Gas Utility Regulatory Act. See, e.g., TEX. UTIL 

CODE §§ 104.003 (“The regulatory authority shall ensure that each rate a gas 

utility or two or more gas utilities jointly make, demand, or receive is just and 

reasonable. A rate may not be unreasonably preferential, prejudicial, or 

discriminatory but must be sufficient, equitable, and consistent in application 

to each class of consumer.”), .005(a) (“A gas utility may not directly or indirectly 

charge, demand, collect, or receive from a person a greater or lesser 

compensation for a service provided or to be provided by the utility than the 

compensation prescribed by the applicable schedule of rates filed under Section 

102.151.”).
14

law until suspended or set aside and, while in effect, defines the terms 

under which the utility’s services are provided.32

Because competitive forces are absent from the regulatory 

environs,33 public utilities have no power to increase rates for all 

customers based on losses and risks specific to an individual or a class 

of customers.34 A public utility “cannot pick and choose its customers 

on the basis of the potential liability”35 or “accurately estimate its 

exposure to damages”36 or “efficiently insure against risks” because they 

are required to take all comers at fixed rates.37 Accordingly, the 

regulatory body’s rate-making authority encompasses the power to limit 

liability as an inherent part of the rate the utility charges for its 

32 See Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 217; see also Trammell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 

57 Cal. App. 3d 538, 550 (1976) (“[I]t is the PUC, empowered by the 

Legislature, and not the parties to the transaction, which by approving the 

tariff fixed the terms and conditions upon which a telegram message is sent. 

The law, not a contract between the parties, prescribes the classifications, rates 

and liabilities attendant thereon.”).

33 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 101.002(b) (recognizing that, due to governmental 

regulation of gas utilities, “the normal forces of competition that regulate 

prices in a free enterprise society do not operate”); Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 215 

(observing that then-extant regulatory authority governing electric utilities 

was “a substitute for competitive forces”).

34 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 221.

35 Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan USA, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 668, 

674 (Tex. 1999) (noting that a utility must provide nondiscriminatory service 

to all customers within its area). 

36 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 217.

37 Id.
15

services.38 We have held that tariff provisions limiting the types of 

damages for which a utility will be liable should be enforced as written 

and that claims for damages other than those provided by the tariff will 

be foreclosed.39 Such provisions, whether limiting liability for economic 

losses or personal-injury damages, are presumptively reasonable.40 

In Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Grant, we held, as a matter 

of first impression, that a provision in a tariff limiting an electric utility’s 

liability for personal-injury damages was reasonable as a matter of law 

and enforceable against a customer’s ordinary negligence claim.41 In so 

holding, we observed that the limitation was narrowly drawn in that it 

applied to a specific set of circumstances and did not broadly immunize 

the utility from personal-injury claims arising from its negligence.42 By 

way of example, we noted that “the tariff provision would not shield [the 

utility] from liability if an employee, in the performance of his or her 

duties, injures a person while driving to a job.”43 The tariff did not 

violate public policy, we said, “because it [did] not purport to relieve [the 

38 Id.; see Sw. Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 

411, 417-18 (1959) (declining to strike down an exculpatory provision in an 

approved tariff that relieved a towboat owner of liability for its own negligence 

in towing barges because tariff provisions limiting liability are part and parcel 

of the rates charged and the regulator may have had a sound basis for 

approving such a clause). 

39 Auchan, 995 S.W.2d at 672.

40 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 222; Auchan, 995 S.W.2d at 675. 

41 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 214.

42 Id. at 220.

43 Id.
16

utility] from liability under all conceivable circumstances.”44 Moreover, 

the provision expressly provided a remedy for damages caused by the 

utility’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.45

Our conclusion that a tariff can limit a utility’s liability for 

personal-injury damages was further informed by factors we had 

previously considered in upholding a tariff limiting liability for economic 

damages.46 We noted that many of the same factors that supported the 

reasonableness of a limitation on economic damages also applied in 

personal-injury cases.47 Among the most significant were that (1) a 

regulated utility’s inability to raise rates for incurred liability “could 

have a direct detrimental effect on its finances”; (2) the requirement of 

nondiscriminatory service means the utility cannot refuse service to 

customers who have a greater potential for suffering losses; and 

(3) extensive regulation of the utility industry afforded consumers 

protection through regulations providing remedies to consumers and 

penalizing utilities for unsafe or inadequate service.48 

Although Grant involved an electric utility rather than a gas 

utility, the same factors apply in this context.49 Once rates are set, the 

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 Id. at 220-21.

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 In 1999, the Legislature deregulated the electricity-generation 

market and permitted certain electricity providers to compete for customers. 

The tariff at issue in Grant was governed by the pre-1999 regulatory scheme. 

Id. at 216.
17

utility has no power to vary those rates to account for catastrophic loss 

and potential financial distress. Absent liability limitations, utility 

customers would be subjected to higher utility rates for essential

services, and the financial stability of service providers would be 

imperiled.50 Our regulatory scheme protects the public’s strong interest 

in the financial integrity and effective functioning of public utilities that 

provide critical services.

The Ramirezes do not challenge the tariff’s validity or the 

Railroad Commission’s authority to approve the liability limitations 

contained therein. Nor do they contend that the relevant liability 

limitations are unreasonable.51 Rather, they assert that the tariff’s 

provisions cannot be construed as binding on a litigant who lacked a 

contractual relationship with the utility. Alternatively, if the tariff’s 

provisions can be so construed, the Ramirezes argue that the release of 

liability conflicts with a local building ordinance that requires open gas 

valves to be plugged “gas tight” before gas to a dwelling is turned on. 

50 See Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan USA, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 668, 

675 (Tex. 1999) (“The public interest in protecting the financial integrity of

public utilities is another basis for concluding that tariff provisions such as the 

one at issue in this case are not unreasonable when applied to claims for 

ordinary negligence.”); see also Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 221 (observing that “a 

utility's liability exposure could have a direct detrimental effect on its 

finances”). 

51 Unlike the tariff in Grant, the liability limits in CenterPoint’s tariff 

do not expressly except gross negligence or willful misconduct, but no such 

claims are at issue here, and we are not asked to consider the enforceability of 

the tariff’s liability limitations in such circumstances. See Auchan, 995 S.W.2d 

at 675 (expressing no opinion as to whether a tariff may limit liability for gross 

negligence or willful misconduct because the plaintiff had abandoned its 

gross-negligence claim).
18

The Ramirezes take the position that this asserted conflict renders the 

tariff’s liability limitations inoperative under the tariff’s directive 

pertaining to conflicts with other law. Finally, the Ramirezes argue the 

Open Courts Provision in the Texas Constitution precludes enforcement 

of the tariff’s limitations of liability.

We hold that the Ramirezes come within the tariff’s broad 

definition of a “consumer” and Section 14 plainly bars their negligence 

claims. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of Section 17’s 

applicability or determine whether either liability limitation applies 

without regard to the Ramirezes “consumer” status.

1. The Ramirezes are “Consumers” under the Tariff

The tariff broadly defines the terms “Consumer, Customer and 

Applicant” as applying to “a person or organization utilizing services or 

who wants to utilize services to CenterPoint Energy Entex.”52 The tariff 

does not define the word “utilizing,” and no technical meaning is 

indicated or asserted by the parties. Commonly understood, “utilize” 

simply means to “make use of,”53 “to put to use,”54 and to “make practical 

and effective use of.”55 The trial testimony reflects that the Ramirezes 

52 Emphasis added.

53 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1980); WEBSTER’S THIRD 

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).

54 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016); 

WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1996).

55 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
19

actively made use of the gas services CenterPoint provided to the 

Castillo residence.

Mrs. Ramirez testified that, as the Castillos’ houseguest, she used 

hot water from gas water heaters to wash dishes and clean clothes and 

occasionally cooked meals on the gas stove. Mr. Ramirez similarly 

testified that he ate meals prepared by his wife, who would cook in the 

Castillos’ kitchen using the gas stove. He also conceded that he took 

gas-heated showers. In routinely cooking, cleaning, eating, and 

bathing—even on a temporary basis—the Ramirezes made use of the 

gas services CenterPoint provided and, accordingly, were “consumers” 

under the tariff’s definition of the term.

The court of appeals concluded otherwise, but the analysis is 

somewhat hazy. We discern two possible rationales for the court’s 

refusal to apply the tariff’s definition as written: (1) “the Ramirezes were 

visiting the Castillos and were not residents or tenants of their home”56

and (2) “the tariff provides the terms consumer, customer, and applicant 

are used interchangeably,” which necessarily means that “each term can 

be substituted wherever any of the terms are used,” yet “the tariff 

contains various references to these terms where extending the term to 

non-customers would be absurd.”57 Neither of these rationales supports 

the conclusion that the definition the tariff provides is actually narrower 

than it purports to be. 

56 628 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020).

57 Id. at 537.
20

The first rationale engrafts textually unsupportable constraints. 

The tariff does not limit the term “consumer” to residents, tenants, or 

even those who have paid or contracted for services. While residents 

and tenants fall within the broad definition, so too do visitors making 

active use of the gas services, as the Ramirezes were. The tariff does not 

specify a class of consumers that would exclude the Ramirezes, but 

instead encompasses all persons “utilizing” CenterPoint’s services.

The court’s second rationale effectively writes out the tariff’s 

definition and substitutes the ordinary meaning of the word “customer” 

based on an asserted absurdity that would purportedly ensue from 

applying the definition the tariff supplies.58 The court of appeals pointed 

to “the definition of ‘Consumer’s Housepiping,’ the requirement that the 

consumer provide additional information during the application process, 

and the required notice to the customer by CenterPoint before the 

customer’s utility service can be terminated” as provisions that could not 

reasonably be applied to noncustomers.59 From this conclusion, the 

court deduced that the tariff’s stated definition does not mean what it 

plainly says.60 The court’s analysis proves too much.

Isolated provisions in the tariff would, as a practical matter, apply 

only to those who are CenterPoint’s customers or applicants as opposed 

58 The ordinary meaning of “customer” is “a person who purchases goods 

or services from another; buyer; patron . . . a person one has to deal with.” 

WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1996). Consistent 

with part of the tariff’s definition, an “applicant” is “a person who applies for 

or requests something.” Id.

59 628 S.W.3d at 537.

60 Id. 
21

to those who are simply “utilizing” CenterPoint’s services. But applying 

the tariff’s definition produces no absurdity in these contexts because 

none of the cited uses is inconsistent with the supplied definition. 

Rather, each such use is subsumed within that definition and either 

reasonably applies to a subclass of covered persons or could reasonably 

extend to noncustomers.61 Incidental use of defined terms in a narrower 

fashion does not mean that, contrary to their otherwise expansive 

definition, the terms actually carry a narrower meaning throughout the 

tariff.62 

It would be useless—and unnecessary—for the tariff to provide a 

specific definition if the terms were intended to carry only their ordinary 

meanings. And it would be useless—and unnecessary—to make the 

tariff applicable to “consumers” if the tariff was intended only to bind 

“customers” and “applicants” as those terms are ordinarily understood. 

Because it is possible to do so, we must construe the tariff to give effect 

61 For example, a person “utilizing” gas services could reasonably be

responsible for “installing and maintaining Consumer’s housepiping” even 

though such person is not the utility’s customer, like a resident, tenant, or 

homeowner. It is not absurd for the tariff’s definition of “consumer” to 

encompass such a noncustomer. Likewise, the requirement that a “consumer” 

provide information during the application process invokes the second portion 

of the tariff’s definition, referring to a person “who wants to utilize services,” 

meaning only a prospective customer. Here, too, there is nothing unreasonable 

about extending the defined term “consumer” to such a noncustomer. Nor does 

the requirement that notice be given to a “customer” before terminating utility 

services alter the tariff’s definition because the narrower use is not repugnant 

to it. The fact that a narrower meaning might apply in some instances does 

not mean that it applies in all instances.

62 See FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P., 426 S.W.3d 

59, 64 (Tex. 2014) (construing contract language).
22

to all of its terms so that none is rendered meaningless.63 The court of 

appeals erred in construing the term “consumer” as bearing the ordinary 

meaning of the term “customer” because doing so renders the former 

surplusage and nullifies the tariff’s stated definition. 

Because the evidence conclusively establishes that the Ramirezes 

actually utilized CenterPoint’s services, they are “consumers” even 

though they neither paid nor contracted for those services and generally 

would not be considered to be CenterPoint’s customers under the 

ordinary meaning of that term. Rather than giving rise to an absurdity, 

the breadth of the tariff’s definition accords with a practical 

understanding that a gas utility’s rate-regulated services may be 

“utilized” by someone other than the person whose name is on the utility 

bill.

2. Section 14’s Limitation of Liability Applies

The Ramirezes’ injuries fall within the express scope of the 

limitation of liability in Section 14 because it is undisputed that the gas 

leak at the Castillo residence occurred after the point of delivery from a 

leak in the housepiping at the unused connections for gas appliances in 

the laundry room. The Ramirezes nonetheless argue that Section 14 

cannot be applied as written because Texas law provides that a tariff 

governs only the relationship between the utility and a customer, as that 

63 See TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 

2016) (construing “the statute as a whole [and] giving effect to each provision 

so that none is rendered meaningless or mere surplusage”); J.M. Davidson, 

Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003) (“[W]e must examine and 

consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the 

provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless.”).
23

term is commonly understood. The court of appeals agreed. Although 

acknowledging that this Court had not directly addressed the issue, the 

appeals court cited statements in our precedent to the effect that a tariff 

governs the relationship between a utility and its customers and 

prohibits customers from suing the utility over issues the tariff’s terms 

govern.64 The court also relied on opinions from two sister courts, Lone 

Star Caliper Co. v. Talty Water Supply Corp.65 and Henderson v. Central 

Power & Light Co.,66 both of which declined to enforce tariffs against 

noncustomers.67 

The court of appeals erred in treating the tariff as if it were a 

private contract between CenterPoint and its customers. A public 

utility’s tariff has “the force and effect of law” and is not “a mere 

contract.”68 By approving the tariff, the regulatory agency—not the 

parties to the transaction—fixed the terms and conditions under which 

the utility’s services are provided.69 “The law, not a contract between 

64 628 S.W.3d 530, 537 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020) (referring to Sw. 

Elec. Power Co v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 217, 222 (Tex. 2002), and City of 

Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. LLC, 539 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tex. 2018)).

65 102 S.W.3d 198, 202-03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. granted, 

judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). 

66 977 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied). 

67 628 S.W.3d 530, 537-39 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020). 

68 Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 217, 222; see, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve 

Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 572 (1921) (explaining that an approved tariff 

governs the utility’s services “not as . . . a matter of contract, . . . but [as] a 

matter of law”); City of Richardson, 539 S.W.3d at 263. 

69 W. Union, 256 U.S. at 571; Trammell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 57 Cal. 

App. 3d 538, 550 (1976). 
24

the parties, prescribes the classifications, rates and liabilities attendant 

thereon,”70 and it is axiomatic that laws apply to those who fall within 

their ambit regardless of assent or even knowledge.71 Accordingly, the 

absence of either knowledge or consent on the Ramirezes’ part does not 

preclude enforcement of the tariff according to its plain terms.72 

The court of appeals misread our precedent as imposing such a 

constraint. While it is accurate to say that we have held that a tariff is 

binding on a customer, we have never held that it is not binding on a 

noncustomer notwithstanding tariff language that makes it so. The 

cases of this Court that were referenced in the court of appeals’ opinion 

involved the tort claims of customers, and our statements to the effect 

that a tariff governs the relationship and liability between a utility and 

a customer are but a truism, not a rule of limitation. 

The court of appeals’ opinions in Lone Star Caliper and 

Henderson might be distinguishable on the terms of the tariffs at issue 

there except for the breadth of the language used in those opinions. That 

is arguably the case in Henderson, in which the tariff expressly limited 

the indemnity and release clause to the “customer” and did not provide 

a special definition of that term.73 But rather than relying solely on the 

70 Trammell, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 550 (emphasis added).

71 W. Union, 256 U.S. at 569, 571-73.

72 Id. at 572.

73 977 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied)

(holding that the plaintiffs were “consumers” for purposes of the Texas 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act but not “customers” of electricity to which the 

tariff’s release and indemnity provision applied under the ordinary meaning of 

that term).
25

ordinary meaning of the tariff’s terms, the court’s opinion, as written, 

could be construed more expansively. Lone Star Caliper also seems to 

apply an absolute rule of nonenforceability under a contract theory of 

enforcement.74 To the extent those cases conflict with our decision 

today, we disapprove them. 

We hold that the tariff’s liability limitation in Section 14 is 

enforceable against the Ramirezes’ negligence claims. This result 

derives not only from the tariff’s plain language but also accords with 

our precedent and the economic reality that public utilities do not 

operate in the same environment as unregulated businesses. In 

Auchan, we observed that

“a public utility, being strictly regulated in all operations 

with considerable curtailment of its rights and privileges 

shall likewise be regulated and limited as to its liabilities. 

In consideration of its being peculiarly the subject of state 

control, ‘its liability is and should be defined and limited.’ 

There is nothing harsh or inequitable in upholding such a 

limitation of liability when it is thus considered that the 

rates as fixed by the Commission are established with the 

rule of limitation in mind.”75

As a regulated entity, CenterPoint has no ability to limit who may use 

its services and no control over who a paying customer allows to use its 

services—whether it is the customer’s roommate, significant other, or a 

74 102 S.W.3d 198, 202-03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. granted, 

judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (“In order to enforce the terms of the tariff against 

Lone Star, Talty must first establish that Lone Star is one of its customers. 

This is an essential element of the affirmative defense.”).

75 Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan USA, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 668, 

674-75 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Cole v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 246 P.2d 686, 688 (Cal. 

Dist. Ct. App. 1952)).
26

hundred guests at a party. As we explained in Grant, tariff provisions 

limiting a utility’s liability enable utilities to provide vital services in an 

effective, consistent, nondiscriminatory, and cost-efficient manner.76 

Without a limitation of liability, the potential for substantial damages

awards either threatens the financial integrity of the utility or must be 

passed on with regulatory approval to all rate payers. Those 

consequences ensue whether the tort claims come from the bill payer or 

the bill payer’s cohabitants and guests. 

Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a tariff’s 

liability limitations may extend to noncustomers because tariffs have 

the force and effect of law and liability limitations are an inherent part 

of the filed rate.77 While some courts have held that limitations of 

76 73 S.W.3d 211, 217, 221-22 (Tex. 2002); see L.A. Cellular Tel. Co. v. 

Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)

(enforcing a tariff to preclude personal-injury claims and recognizing the 

existence of “an equitable trade-off—the power to regulate rates and to set 

them below the amount an unregulated provider might otherwise charge 

requires a concomitant limitation on liability”).

77 See Leo v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 964 F.3d 213, 217 & n.4 (3d Cir. 

2020) (holding that the filed-rate doctrine applied even though the party suing 

did not pay the premium on the underlying tariff); Patel v. Specialized Loan 

Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018) (“An important, though 

heretofore overlooked, corollary of the nondiscrimination and nonjusticiability 

principles is that the filed-rate doctrine’s applicability does not turn on 

whether the plaintiff is a rate-payer. . . . Even non-customers, for instance, 

cannot directly challenge a filed rate.”); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 361 

P.3d 942, 946-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a tariff’s limitation of 

liability extended to a noncustomer’s claims), aff’d in relevant part & 

depublished in nonrelevant part, 385 P.3d 412 (Ariz. 2016) (per curiam); Colich

& Sons v. Pac. Bell, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714, 718 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a 

tariff’s limitation of liability provision is binding on the public generally 

because such a provision is an inherent part of the utility’s established rates 

and has the force and effect of law); Trammell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 57 Cal. 
27

liability are not enforceable as to noncustomers or as to personal-injury 

claims of customers, those cases are distinguishable because they 

involve different tariff language,78 challenges to the scope of regulatory 

authority,79 or an explicit repudiation of the precedent of this Court.80 

App. 3d 538, 551, 553 (1976) (“As the tariff and the limitation of liability 

provisions have the force and effect of law, they are binding on the public 

generally and necessarily on the recipient of the telegram.”); cf. Rothstein v. 

Balboa Ins. Co., 794 F.3d 256, 259 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] claim challenging a 

regulator-approved rate is subject to the filed rate doctrine whether or not the 

rate is passed through an intermediary. The claim is therefore barred if it 

would undermine the regulator’s rate-setting authority . . . .”). 

78 See Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 

461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (“Reading Tariff No. 201 narrowly, as we must, 

we are convinced that the Tariff applies only to C & P’s direct customers.”); 

Vendola v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 474 So. 2d 275, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 

(“The tariff will not yield to the construction contended for by Southern Bell.”); 

Abel Holding Co., Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 371 A.2d 111, 114-15 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 

App. Div. 1977) (“[W]here, as here, the plain language of the limitation of 

liability clause does not specifically apply to the situation involved, it will not 

be construed or applied so as to limit the right of one not a party to the contract 

to recover against one who is a party to the contract for the latter’s tortious 

conduct.”). 

79 Tyus v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 134 N.E.3d 389, 406-08 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2019) (holding that a tariff limiting liability for personal injuries to 

noncustomers was ultra vires and void because the legislature did not give, or 

intend to give, the regulatory agency the power to shield a public utility from 

liability caused by the utility’s negligence to noncustomers), transfer denied, 

160 N.E.3d 512 (Ind. 2020).

80 See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Mo. Gas Energy, 388 S.W.3d 221, 231 & n.8 

(Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (expressly disagreeing with Grant and other states in 

holding that the Missouri Public Service Commission could not “abrogate a 

customer’s right to sue a public utility company for negligence involving 

personal injury or property damage”).
28

3. No Conflict with Local Ordinances

In the alternative, the Ramirezes contend that the tariff cannot 

be enforced as written because it must yield to a conflicting local 

building code ordinance applicable to “turning gas on.” The ordinance 

adopts and incorporates the International Residential Code, which 

mandates that “[b]efore any system of piping is put in service or 

concealed, it shall be tested to ensure that it is gas tight”; “[d]uring the 

process of turning gas on into a system of new gas piping, the entire 

system shall be inspected to determine that there are no open fittings or 

ends and that all valves at unused outlets are closed and plugged or 

capped”; and subject to certain exceptions, “[g]as outlets that do not 

connect to appliances shall be capped gas tight.”81

The local ordinance does not conflict with the tariff’s limitation of 

liability.82 Even if the ordinance created a private cause of action, which 

81 See City of Laredo, Tex., Code of Ordinances §§ 7-1, 7-7. 25-3, 25-6 

(adopting the International Residential Code) (1985) (available at 

https://library.municode.com/TX/laredo/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTI

ICOOR_CH7BUBURE); INT’L RESIDENTIAL CODE §§ G2415.13, G2415.17, 

G2417.6.2.

82 Cf. Del Carmen Canas v. CenterPoint Energy Res. Corp., 418 S.W.3d 

312, 315-16, 323 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, C.J., 

concurring in part) (holding that enforcement of the limitation of liability in 

Section 14 of CenterPoint’s tariff did not conflict with, or relieve CenterPoint 

of the obligation to comply with, federal regulations imposing a duty to provide 

natural gas that is readily detectible to a person with a normal sense of smell); 

id. at 333-34 (Christopher, J., concurring in part) (explaining that none of the 

federal regulations the plaintiff relied on conflicted with the limitation of 

liability provision in Section 14 and, to the extent the regulations imposed a 

duty, the tariff did not relieve CenterPoint of its obligation to comply with the 

regulatory scheme, which remained enforceable through statutory remedies 

and enforcement mechanisms that afford protection to the public).
29

CenterPoint disputes, that cause of action would not give rise to a 

conflict. A liability limitation only comes into play if the utility could be 

liable for violating some duty or obligation imposed by law or contract. 

An ordinance imposing a duty is not inconsistent with a tariff provision 

limiting liability for damages; to the contrary, they are correlated with 

one another. Both can be given effect even though the result is a bar to 

any liability flowing from breach of any duty the ordinance imposes.83 

4. No Open Courts Violation

Nor does enforcement of the tariff violate the Texas Constitution’s 

mandate that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury 

done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy 

by due course of law.”84 This provision “includes at least three separate 

constitutional guarantees: 1) courts must actually be operating and 

available; 2) the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through 

unreasonable financial barriers, and 3) meaningful remedies must be 

afforded.”85 The Ramirezes’ cursory open-courts argument suggests 

that enforcement of the tariff’s provisions limiting liability would 

83 Cf. BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of Hous., 496 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 

2016) (“[A] general law and a city ordinance will not be held repugnant to each 

other if any other reasonable construction leaving both in effect can be 

reached.”). We also note that the local building ordinances include their own 

enforcement mechanism for the public’s protection that are unaffected by any 

limitation of CenterPoint’s liability in a private cause of action. See City of

Laredo, Tex., Code of Ordinances § 1-6 (governing general penalties and 

continuing violations) (1985) (available at https://library.municode.com/TX/

laredo/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH7BUBURE). 

84 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.

85 Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc.-Tex., 889 S.W.2d 259, 

261 (Tex. 1994).
30

contravene the third guarantee, which precludes the Legislature from 

“abrogat[ing] the right to assert a well-established common law cause of 

action unless the reason for [the Legislature’s] action outweighs the 

litigants’ constitutional right of redress.”86 A litigant challenging 

legislative action on open-courts grounds must show that (1) “the 

litigant has a cognizable common law cause of action that is being 

restricted” and (2) “the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when 

balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute.”87

Assuming the open-courts provision is implicated here, 

enforcement of the limitation of liability in Section 14 does not infringe 

the Ramirezes’ constitutional rights. The tariff does not withdraw all 

remedies or avenues of redress88 or make a remedy by due course of law 

contingent on an impossible condition.89 Section 14 of the tariff is 

narrow, does not (and did not) preclude the Ramirezes from seeking a 

remedy as against other parties for their indivisible injuries, and for the 

reasons articulated above, is not unreasonable or arbitrary when 

balanced against its purposes.

86 Id. (quoting Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 

448 (Tex. 1993)).

87 Id. at 262.

88 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Fuller, 892 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Tex. 1995)

(recognizing that the open-courts provision generally “restricts the 

legislature’s ability to withdraw all legal remedies from one having a cause of 

action well established and well defined in the common law”).

89 See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921-23 (Tex. 1984) (discussing 

circumstances under which impossible conditions preclude meaningful access 

to the courts and holding that, as applied, an Insurance Code provision 

establishing a two-year limitations period for medical maltreatment violated 

the open-courts provision).
31

III. Conclusion

CenterPoint is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 

(1) the limitation of liability in its filed and approved tariff is reasonable, 

enforceable, and binding under the filed-rate doctrine and (2) the tariff 

plainly bars the utility’s liability for ordinary negligence as alleged by 

the plaintiffs in this case. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ 

contrary judgment and render judgment for CenterPoint.

 

 John P. Devine

 Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: February 11, 2022