IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0555

Filed November 2, 2022

COMMUNITY 1ST CREDIT UNION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JONATHAN L. HART,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

ASHLEY R. HART, KEVIN SMITH, KEVIN SMITH EXCAVATING, L.L.C., DAVE 

SMITH, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 

LOCKRIDGE, INC., VAN METER, INC., KATHERINE LUTON, CATERPILLAR 

FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, AGRILAND FS, INC., CANTRIL FEED 

& GRAIN, LLC, HBF HAYCO, LLC, FARM CREDIT SERVICES OF AMERICA, 

PCA, SEBOLT CONSTRUCTION LLC, ONDECK CAPITAL INC., JANET 

WILLIER, C. SCOTT SEBOLT, HELEN STEVENS, JOHN HUEBNER, BRYCE 

RIESSEN, GEORGE REYNOLDS, RICHARD REYNOLDS, and PARTIES IN 

POSSESSION,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Myron L. 

Gookin, Judge.

Jonathan Hart appeals from the district court order rejecting his request to 

set aside the sheriff’s sale in a foreclosure action. AFFIRMED.

Jonathan L. Hart, Centerville, self-represented appellant.

Gayla R. Harrison of Harrison, Moreland, Webber & Simplot, P.C., 

Ottumwa, for appellee.
2

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Badding, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2022).
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VOGEL, Senior Judge.

In February 2019, Community 1st Credit Union (Community 1st) filed a 

petition to foreclose its mortgages and seek in rem judgment against the various 

mortgaged properties. The petition named Jonathan Hart and Ashley Hart1 as 

mortgagors who allegedly defaulted on multiple promissory notes to Community

1st. It also named several other persons and entities as potential inferior lien 

holders on the mortgaged real estate. The district court granted default judgment 

against Hart, and in July the court entered a foreclosure decree. On September 

26, Community 1st purchased the real estate at a sheriff’s sale for a bid of 

$1,600,000. In January 2020, Hart filed for bankruptcy. In February 2021, the 

bankruptcy court granted partial relief from the automatic stay, “to permit the Iowa 

District Court in Appanoose County to address . . . the effect of the sheriff’s deed 

not being issued to date.” With limited exceptions, Hart remained under the 

protection of the bankruptcy court’s stay through the time of this appeal. 

On February 12, 2021, Hart filed a motion asserting the sheriff’s sale was 

defective because no sheriff’s deed had been recorded as required by statute. 

Community 1st acknowledged a sheriff’s deed had not yet been recorded, but it 

asserted no deed could be recorded because the sheriff had yet to issue a deed. 

At a hearing on the motion, Hart’s attorney clarified his requested relief: “The sheriff 

should be brought into this case as a party so that we can do some discovery. . . . 

I think this is a do-over sale.” The district court rejected Hart’s motion, finding, 

“Hart suffers no harm by the delay in recording the sheriff’s deed” and such did not 

1 The petition asserts Jonathan Hart and Ashley Hart are spouses and co-debtors. 

Only Jonathan appeals.
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warrant setting aside the sheriff’s sale. It then instructed the sheriff to deliver the

deed to Community 1st. Hart appeals.

We generally review foreclosure proceedings de novo. Compeer Fin. 

Servs., FLCA v. Braaksma, 966 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). However, 

when a foreclosure proceeding involves the interpretation of a statute, “[w]e review 

questions of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law.” Mlady v. 

Dougan, 967 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Standard Water Control Sys., 

Inc. v. Jones, 938 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Iowa 2020)). Statutory interpretation “begins 

with the language of the statute” in order “to determine the ordinary and fair 

meaning of the statutory language at issue.” Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 

(Iowa 2020).

Hart argues the sheriff’s sale violates Iowa Code section 654.16A (2019). 

Section 654.16A, titled “Right of first refusal following recording of sheriff’s deed to 

agricultural land,” states:

1. Not later than the time a sheriff’s deed to agricultural land 

used for farming . . . is recorded, the grantee[2]recording the sheriff’s 

deed shall notify the mortgagor of the mortgagor’s right of first 

refusal. The grantee shall record the sheriff’s deed within one year 

and sixty days from the date of the sheriff’s sale.

(Emphasis added.) The right of first refusal gives the mortgagor ten days from 

notice of a sale of the mortgaged property to match the terms and price of the sale. 

See Iowa Code § 654.16A(4).

2 The district court noted a dispute below over who is the “grantee” tasked with the 

duty to timely record the sheriff’s deed and notify the mortgagor of the right to first 

refusal under section 654.16A(1). On appeal, Hart argues Community 1st was the 

“grantee.” Because the issue is not necessary to our ultimate resolution, we do 

not reach the question of whether Community 1st was the “grantee” under section 

654.16A(1).
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Community 1st does not dispute that section 654.16A applies here and that 

no sheriff’s deed was recorded within one year and sixty days of the sale. 

However, Community 1st asserts the Iowa Code does not provide statutory 

authority to set aside a sale for failure to timely file a sheriff’s deed, and Hart points 

to no such authority. We thus turn to our general rule on execution sales: “Iowa 

law erects a strong presumption in favor of an execution sale. In the absence of 

fraud, collusion, or other substantial and justifiable prejudice, mere irregularities in 

the procedures leading to or following an execution sale will not support a debtor’s 

motion to set aside the sale.” S. Ottumwa Sav. Bank v. Sedore, 394 N.W.2d 349, 

351 (Iowa 1986).

Hart does not assert fraud or collusion, and he claims little in the way of 

prejudice from the failure to timely record a sheriff’s deed. The plain language of 

section 654.16A(1) shows the statute’s purpose is to ensure the mortgagor is 

notified “of the mortgagor’s right of first refusal.” Hart’s property is still under the

bankruptcy stay, and therefore Community 1st has not attempted to sell the realty; 

thus, Hart has had no opportunity to exercise his right of first refusal. As the district 

court noted, Hart is still entitled to notice and exercise of his right to first refusal 

once the sheriff’s deed is recorded under Iowa Code section 654.16A(4). The 

court also noted his challenge to the absence of a recorded sheriff’s deed has 

actually benefitted him by extending his time under the protection of the bankruptcy 

stay until resolution of his challenge.

In his brief to us, Hart asserts the absence of a recorded sheriff’s deed 

means his redemption period expired before “a true redemption amount [could] be 

established.” See id. § 628.3 (giving the debtor the right to “redeem real property 
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at any time within one year from the day of sale”). We find the absence of a 

recorded sheriff’s deed caused no prejudice to Hart’s right of redemption for 

multiple reasons. First, section 654.16A(1) allows one year and sixty days after 

the sale to record the sheriff’s deed, thus showing the sheriff’s deed may be 

properly recorded after expiration of the one-year period for redemption. Compare 

id. § 654.16A(1), with id. § 628.3. Second, the record contains no indication that 

Hart ever attempted to redeem the real estate or that the absence of a recorded 

sheriff’s deed actually interfered with Hart’s right of redemption. Third, Hart’s 

contemporaneous court filings acknowledge he was aware of his right of 

redemption, stating the “redemption period is currently in effect,” yet he never 

raised an issue with the right before it expired. Therefore, we find Hart suffered no 

prejudice from the absence of a recorded sheriff’s deed and no statutory authority 

exists to set aside the sheriff’s sale.

Hart also argues the district court should have granted his request for 

discovery into why the sheriff’s deed was not timely recorded. Because the court 

did not decide this issue, it is not preserved for appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 

641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review 

that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before 

we will decide them on appeal.”).

We affirm the district court’s denial of Hart’s motion to set aside the sheriff’s 

sale.

AFFIRMED.