VIETNAM STUDIES 

Com and Control 

1950-1969 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
•• II T.II "A 

_____ an 
VIETNAM STUDIES 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

1950-1969 

by 

Major Getleral George S. Eckhardt 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 2004 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72-600186 

First Prillled 1974-CMH Pub 90-8-1 

Fur salt, by 1111' Supt'nflh'mlt'lIl or IKM'flllIl'IIN, U,:;, !'OHnll1I"1I1 l'nlilill~ om"" 

lntcnlct; booklitol\',gpo,b'tlV Plumc; loll fn.'C (866) 512-1800; I)C 01\'0 (202) 512-1800 

Fox; 12021512- 2250 Moil: SLOP S$OP, Woshillb'tOII, DC 2(j.IQ2-0001 
Foreword 

The United States Army has met an unusually complex chal· 

Icnge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the 

Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmen ta l processes of its own 

choosing, frce of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems 

of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has 

required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a 

modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapt· 

ing them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These in volved 

helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing 

with the frustra tions of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined 

regular units. 

It is as always necessary for the U.S. Army to continue to prepare 

for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that 

history never repeats itself exactl y and that no army ever profited 

from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the 

Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its 

experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories 

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more 

salient aspects of that experience can be made availa ble now. At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior 

officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared 

a series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in 

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at 

the same time contributing to the historical record and providing 

the American pu blic with an interim report on the performance of 

men and officers who have responded, as others have through our 

history, to exacting a nd trying demands. 

All monographs in the series a rc based primarily on official 

records, with additiona l material from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

iii 
facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of 

Military History. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Victnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were 

taking place in the prcsent. 

Major General George S. Eckhardt has exceptional personal 

knowledge of command and control arrangements in Vietnam. In 

December 1966 he commanded the 9th Infantry Division and 

deployed it to South Vietnam. He commanded the division in 

combat until June 1967 when he was assigned as Deputy Commanding General, II Ficld Force, Vietnam. In January 1968 he 

became the Commanding Cencral of the Delta Military Assistance 

Command and Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zonc, with 

headquarters in Can Tho, Republic of Vietnam, and remained in 

these positions until the summer of 1969. The author returned to 

Vietnam in April 1971 as Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander, MACV, for Civil Operations and RuraJ Development 

Suppon (CORDS). 

Washington, D.C. 

15January 1973 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

In combat situations prior to Vietnam, U.S. military forces 

had an existing command and control structure which could be 

tailored to accomplish the task at hand. In Europe during World 

War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower modified the command 

structures developed for the North African and Mediterranean 

operations to form Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Force (SHAEF). After his departure from Bataan in 1942, General 

Douglas MacArthur had several months in which to design the 

command structure that ultimately contributed to the defeat of 

the Japanese. Finally, the U.S. Eighth Army. the dominant command structure controlling all UN forces in combat in Korea, and 

the General Headquarters, United Nations Command, in Japan, 

existed prior to the beginning of the Korean War. Such was not 

the case in Vietnam. There, the command and control arrangements, which ultimately directed a U.S. military force of over 

500,000 men, evolved from a small military assistance mission established in 1950. The Military Assistance Advisory Group's philosophy 

of assistance rather than command significantly influenced the 

development of the organization. 

This monograph describes the development of the U.S. military 

command and control structure in Vietnam. The focus of the study 

is primarily on the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(MACV), and the U.S. Army in Vietnam (USARV). The relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Commander in 

Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), and 

other outside agencies are discussed only as their decisions, policies, 

and directives affected MACV and operations within South Vietnam. The air war against North Vietnam and naval operations of 

the U.S. Seventh Fleet were CINCPAC's responsibilities and are 

only mentioned in regard to their impact on MACV and the 

forces under MACV. 

This study is not a conventional military or diplomatic history 

of the war in Vietnam. Rather, it is an analytical appraisal of the 

command and control structure. 

There is no single study of command and control in Vietnam 

in existence. Several primary sources cover particular time periods, 

v 
and special studies provide selective but restricted coverage. The 

command histories of MACV and CINCPAC are useful references. 

The end~of~tour reports of senior military officials who served in 

Vietnam, particularly the combined end·of·tour reports of Ad· 

miral U.S. Grant Sharp and General William C. Westmoreland, 

add further depth. 

The histories of the United States Army, Pacific, and United 

States Army, Vietnam, provided additional information, as did 

the special reports of the 1st Logistical Command. Data furnished 

by the Armed Forces Staff College and the Command and General 

Staff College provided material for the section on current doctrine 

for unified commands. The official histories of World War II and 

Korea, prepared by the Office, Chief of Military History, offer 

useful comparisons with the history of earlier unified commands. 

In researching and writing this monograph (he author re· 

ceived assistance from many organizations and individuals. 

The Deputy Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, 

Brigadier General Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., provided the author 

with much backup material and acted as an assistant from the 

inception of this monograph to its completion. Major Gencral 

Charles J. Timmes (Retired) provided a valuable scrvice in check. 

ing the monograph for accuracy concerning the period when he 

was the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group. The Office, 

Chief of Military History, provided advice and sources of informa· 

tion, made available unpublished documents and data relating to 

U.S. military activities in Vietnam, and assisted in preparing 

photographs, maps, and charts. 

The cheerful and efficient documentary research assistance of 

Miss Carmen Clark of the U.S. Army War College Library relieved 

the staff of much tedious work. Also, the U.S. Army War College 

Library under the direction of Miss Ruth Longhenry provided an 

ideal atmosphere for the research and writing. 

The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Combat Develop· 

ments Command at Carlisle Barracks gave its support, and the 

contributions of Colonel Ralph T. Tierno, Jr., of that organization 

were noteworthy. 

Major Paul L. Miles, Jr., Office, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 

was most co·operative and helpful in making available much 

primary source material. 

Thanks are due also to Colonel J ohn P. Lucas, Jr., of the Staff 

and Faculty, Armed Forces Staff College, and to Lieutenant 

Colonel Lloyd R. Kelly, Staff and Faculty, Command and General 

Staff College, for their contribution of research material. 

vi 
A particular debt of gratitude is owed the twenty·six senior 

military and civilian officials for taking time from their busy schedules to answer the questionnaire related to this study. 

Another contributor to the successful completion of this monograph was Mrs. Donna L. Moyer, whose tasks were keeping records, 

assisting with the organization, prepa ring associated correspondence, 

and typing many of the various drafts. She was ably assisted by the 

members of the U.S. Army War College typing pool headed by 

Mrs. J une L. Rhoads. 

Finall y, special debts of gratitude are owed to a member of 

the U.S. Anny War College faculty, Colonel James M. McGarity, 

who acted as a team chief for the preparation of the monograph, 

and to five members of the Class of 1971 of that college who, as 

members of the team, devoted considerable time in helping him 

with the research and writing. They are Colonel Leslie D. Carter, 

Colonel Charles J . Bauer, Colonel Duane H. Smith, Lieutenant 

Colonel William C. Rousse, and Lieutenant Colonel William P. 

Snyder. 

Saigon, Vietnam 

1 December 1972 

vii 

GEORGE S. ECKHARDT 

Major General, U.S. Army 

Contents 

Clwplcr 

1. THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1950-1962. ......... 3 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

Joint Doctrim jor Unified Commonds. . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 3 

The Begimling of U.S. Support to Vietnam.. .. . . . . • . . 6 

M AAG, Indochina: The Fomumur . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 7 

The Geneva Accords. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 9 

Post-Geneva Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 10 

Response 10 Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 18 

Command Rt/alionships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

11. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, 

VIETNAM , FEBRUARY 1962-JULY 1965 ..... 25 

The Command Is Established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

The Military Assistmlct Advisory Group .. . . . . . . .. . . . 30 

U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam . . . . . . . . ... .•. . . 31 

Contingency Considtrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 

Deputy Army Component Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 

Army-Air Force Rdations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 

organi~alion oj M ACV Headquarters (May 19(4) . . . 38 

Logistic Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 

The 1st Logistical Command.. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . . . 44 

Other Command Reorgani{ations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 

III. THE BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES, JULY 1965-

JULY 1966 . . ....................... . ....... . . 47 

U.S . Army, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 

Field Forces, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 

The U.S. Marine Cqrps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 

Orgalll<.ation oj Advisory Effort. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

Con/rol oj U.S. OPerating Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 

Co-ordination with Vietnamese and Free World Forces . . . 59 

Logistic Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 

Communications-Electronics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . • . . 61 

ix 
IV. THE CONTINUING BUILDUP, JULY 1966-

JULY 1969. . ............................ . .... 64 

Pacification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 

Response to the Communist Threat in the Norfll . . . . . . . . 73 

Naval Forets, Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

Mobile Riverine Force . ... . .............. , . . . . . . . 78 

Additional Military Assistance Commands. . . . . . . . . . . . 80 

U.s. Army Logistical Advisory Effort. . . .. . .. • . . . • .. 81 

Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

V. MODEL FOR THE FUTURE ................... 85 

APPENDIX, KEY U.S. OFFI CIALS IN V IETNAM, 

1950- 1969... ........ . . . . .. .. ..... ... . ........... 89 

GLOSSARy.. ............ . . . ... . ...... . .. .. . . . . .. . . . 93 

INDEX .. . ... . ..... .. ......... ... ........... .. .... .. 95 

Charts 

No. 

1. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 1956.. . . .... 15 

2. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1956.. . . 16 

3. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 1960 . . . . . . . 17 

4. U.S. Command Relationships in Vietnam, 1962 ....... 32 

5. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1965.. . ...... 56 

6. Pacific Command Relationships, 1967.. .. . ........... 67 

7. CORDS Field Organization .. .. . ... . . . . .. . . . .. . .. .. . 72 

8. Organizational Structure and Command Relationships 

of I Corps: March 1968 . . . ..... ... . .............. 76 

9. Command Relations for Riverine Operations.. . .. . . . .. 79 

10. Tactical Ground Forces... . . ...... .... . .. . ...... . 83 

11. Proposed Command and Control Arrangements . . . . . . . 88 

Map 

1. South Vietnam Administrative Divisions ... . . .... .. .. •. 2 

x 
III us trations 

Page 

Brigadier General Francis G. Brink ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

Major General Thomas J H. Trapnell . . . . . . ... . .. . .. . .. 8 

Lieutenant General J ohn W. O'Daniel . . . . . . ..... . . ... . . 11 

Lieutenant General Samuel T. WiJliams. .. ... .. .... ... .. 14 

Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr.... . . . . . ... ... . .. . 21 

Main Entrance to MAAG Headquarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

Lieutenant General Paul D. Harkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 

Main Entrance to MACV I Headquarters..... ... . . . .. . . . 39 

General William C. Westmoreland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 

Ambassador Maxwell O. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 

American Embassy Annex Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 

Headquarters of the U.S. Army, Vietnam .. ... . .......... 52 

MACV Headquarters Complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.. . .. . . . . . . .. .. . ... . .. . . 65 

Ambassador Ellswonh Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 

American Embassy in Saigon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 

Lieutenant General William B. Rosson .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 

General William W. Momyer, USAF ... . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . . 75 

Major General George S. Eckhardt. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . 8t 

Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr.. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 82 

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files except the pictures 

on pages 48, 65, and 69, which are from Department of State fil es. 

xi 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

1950-1969 
'. 

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AltD MlUTAR'!' R(GIOHS u.~ 

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1970. 
CHAPTER I 

The Formative Years: 1950- 1962 

Introduction 

]0 1950 the United States began to grant military aid to the 

French forces in Indochina in an effort to avert a Communist take· 

over of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. From that time U.S. military assistance, adapted to the increasing Communist threat, developed in three phases: military advice and assistance; operational 

support of the South Vietnamese armed forces; and, finally, the 

introduction of U.S. combat forces. The U.S. armed forces in each 

of these phases were fulfilling their mission under the U.S. policy 

of ensuring the freedom of Indochina and specifically the freedom 

of South Vietnam. 

The direction, control, and administration of U.S. armed [orces 

throughout this period of U.S. commitment initially was vested 

in a military assistance advisory group and, beginning in 1962, in 

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Both headquarters 

had joint staffs with representatives from all the armed services. 

Since the U.S. Army had the largest share of the mission of advising, training, and supporting the South Vietnamese armed 

forces, U.S. Army representation on the joint staffs and in the field 

was proportionately greater than that of the other services. The 

U.S. Army also provided the commanders of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam. 

The U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was a 

unified command, more specifically a subordinate unified command, under the Commander in Chief, Pacific. Precedents for 

such an arrangement are found in the command and control structures of World War I I. Lessons from that experience played an 

important role in establishing the doctrine for unified commands 

that, with modifications, was applied to the Korean War and the 

Vietnam conflict. 

Joint Doctrine Jor Unijitd Commands 

A unified command is a joint force of two or more service components under a single commander, constituted and designated by 
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Generally, a unified command will have 

a broad, continuing mission that requires execution by significant 

forces of two or more services under single strategic direction. This 

was the case in South Vietnam. 

The current doctrine for unified commands is based on the 

National Security Act of 1947, which authorized the establishment 

of unified commands in the U.S. armed forces. In 1958 an amend· 

mcnt to the act authorized the President to establish unified commands to carry out broad and continuing operations. Developing 

doctrine concerning the organization and operations of U.S. unified commands is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The "Jes Unified Command Plan" and yes Publica/ion 2: United 

Action Armed Forces (UNAAP) provide the guidelines governing the 

responsibilities of commanders in unified (multiservice) and specified (single service) forces. These publications include doctrine 

for unified operations and training. 

The three military departments, under their respective service 

secretaries, organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to 

unified and specified commands. It is also the responsibility of the 

departments to give administrative and logistical support to the 

forces assigned to the unified commands. One of the primary functions of the Department of the Army, for example, is to organize, 

train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land in order to defeat enemy land 

forces and to seizc, occupy, and defend land areas. 

Effective application of military power requires closely integrated efforts by the individual services. It is essential, therefore, 

that unity of effort is maintained throughout the organizational 

structures as well. This goal is achieved through two separate chains 

of command---operational and administrative. Operational control runs from the President to the Sccretary of Defcnse to the 

Joint Chicfs of Staff to the unified commands. The administrativelogistical chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary 

of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and then 

to the service components of the unified commands. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined the duties of unified and 

specified commanders who use the forces provided by the military 

departments. The Joint Chiefs establish policy concerning the 

command, organization, operations, inteUigence, logistics, and 

administration of service forces and their training for joint operations. These guidelines also apply to subonified commands. 

Army doctrine for unified commands is set forth in FM 100-15: 

Largn- Units, TMater Army Corps (December 1968). In this docu-
FORMATIVE YEARS 5 

ment, Army policy govcrning command in a theater of operations 

during wartime varies from that presented by the J oint Chiefs. 

According to the J oint Chiefs, the un ified commander does not 

additionally serve as a commander of any service component or 

another subordinate command unless authorized by the establishing 

authority. Current Army doctrine states: 

During peacetime the theater army commander normally commands 

all Army troops, activities, and installations assigned to the theater. [However] ... during wartime, the theater commander normally withdraws 

from the theater army commander operational control of army combat 

forces, theater army air defense forces, combat suppon forces, and other 

specified units required to accomplish the theater operational mission. The theater commander, therefore, normally exercises operational command of most tactical ground forces during wartime. . Exceptionally, during wanime the theater commander may direct the theater army 

commander to retain operational con trol of US ground force operations. 

In this instance, the theater army commander provides strategic and 

tactical direction to field armies and other tactical forces. 

Both doctrines, however, agree that the commander of a subordinate unified command set up by a unified command with approval of the Secretary of Defense has responsibilities, authorities, 

and functions similar to those of the commander of a unified command, established by the President. 

Component and subunified commands are subordinate to the 

unified command in operational matters. In other words, the 

unified commander has operational command of these elements. 

The term "operational command" applies to the authority exercised 

by the commanders of unified commands. It is also used in other 

command situations such as combined commands. No commander 

is given more authority than he needs to accomplish his mission. 

The unified commander's instructions may be quite specific; the 

component commander, however, is usually given sufficient latitude to decide how beSt to usc his forces to carry out the missions 

and tasks assigned to him by the unified commander. The subunified commander has the same authority as a unified commander 

over the elements in his command. The structure and organization 

of a subunified command arc determined by (he missions and tasks 

assigned to the commander, the volume and scope of the operations, and the forces available. With these factors in mind, the 

organization of a subunified command should be designed on the 

principles of centralized direction, decentralized execution, and 

common doctrine. Thus the integrity of the individual services is 

preserved. 
6 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

rite Beginning of U.S. Support 10 Vietnam 

The U.S. command and comrol organization for directing and 

administering American military assistance for Vietnam was in· 

flucnccd by World War II and Korean precedents. The origins of 

American military assistance policies developed after World War 

II are found in the aggressive expansionist policies of the USSR 

and the need to strengthen the free nations of the world, whose 

security was vital to the United States. Out of the U.S. resolve to 

assist the Free World grew the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza· 

tion (NATO) in 1949 and the Southeast Asia Trea ty O rganization (SEATO) in 1954, established after France had lost in Indochina. Since U.S. military assistance to Indochina in general and 

to Vietnam in particular was channeled through France during 

the first Indochina War (1946- 1954), French inAuence was felt 

strongly in the eady 1950s and a lso had its effect on the organization and operation of the U.S. M ilitary Assistance Group in Indochina. 

Military assistance after World War II was authorized on a 

regional, comprehensive scale by the Mutual Defense Assistance 

Act of 6 October 1949. Its chief objective was to strengthen the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which F rance was a key 

member. At the time, France was heavily engaged in the first 

I ndochina War and U.S. military assistance to Southeast Asia 

began to incrcase steadily. To supplement military assistance with 

economic aid, the U.S. Congress a year later sanctioned technical 

aid to underdeveloped nations by passing thc Act for International 

Development, popularly known as the Point Four Program. In 

1951 the two acts, along with other simila r measures, were consolidated in the Mutual Security Act, which was revised again in 

1953 and 1954 to mect the needs of the expanding Mutual Security 

program. An essential condition to be met before U.S. assistance 

could be given under this legislation was the conclusion of bilateral 

agreements between the United States and the recipient nation, 

which included the assurances that assistance would be rcciproca l, 

that any equipment and information furnished would be secured, 

and especiall y that equipment wou ld not be rctransferred without 

U.S. consent. 

Since it was the policy of the United States to support the 

peaceful and democratic evolution of nations toward self-government and independence, the Sta te of Vietnam and the kingdoms 

of Laos and Cambodia could not receive U.S. military assistance 

as long as they were ruled by France. Not until Fcbruary 1950, 

after the French parliament had ratified agreemen ts granting a 
FORMATIVE YEARS 7 

degree of autonomy to the Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, 

Laos, and Cambodia) within tbe French Union, could the U.S. 

government recognize these states and respond to French and 

Vietnamese requests for military and economic aid. 

i\;/ AAG, [lldochilla: Th~ FQrtrlmn~r 

On 8 May 1950 Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson concluded 

consultations with the French government in Paris and announced 

that the situation in Southeast Asia warranted both economic aid 

and military equipment for the Associated States of Indochina and 

for France. To supervise the flow of military assistance, Secretary 

of Defense George C. Marshall approved the establishment of a 

small military assistance advisory group. Total authorized strength 

at the time of its activation was 128 men. T he fi rst members of the 

g.·oup arrived in Saigon on 3 August 1950. After the necessary organizational tasks were completed, a provisional detachmentMilitary Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina- was 

organized on 17 September and assembled in the Saigon-Cholon 

area on 20 November 1950. The original structure, though temporary, provided for service representation by selling up Army, 

Navy, and Air Force sections within the group. 

Military aid agreements between the United States and the 

governments of Victnam, Laos, Cambodia, and France were signed 

in Saigon on 23 December 1950. Known as the Penta laleral Agreements, these accords formed the basis of U.S. cconomic and military 

support. U.S. military assistance was administered by the newly 

constituted Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. Its 

first chief was Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, who had assumed command on 10 October 1950. General Brink's main responsibility was to manage the U.S. military assistance program for 

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and to provide logistical support 

for the French Union forces. Military training of Vietnamese units 

remained in the hands of the French Expeditionary Corps, and 

personnel of the U.S. advisory group had little, if any, influence 

and no aUlhority in this maller. Because of this restriction, lhe 

chief function of the Mili tary Assistance Advisory Group during 

the early years of U.S. commitment in Indochina was to make sure 

that equipment supplied by the United States reached its prescribed destination and that it was properly maintained by French 

Union forces. 

On 31 J uly 1952 General Brink was sueeeeded as chief of the 

advisory group by Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, who 

held lhis posilion for almost two years. The U.S. chain of command 

during 1950--1954 ran from the President, as Commander ill Chief, 
8 COMMAND AND CONTROl.. 

GENERAL BRINK GENERAL TRAPNELL 

to the Department of the Navy (acting as executive agency), to the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific, and then to the chief of the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina. Early in this period, the 

chiefs of the advisory groups dealt mainly with the Commander in 

Chief, Pacific, but when the war began to go badly for the French, 

higher authorities in Washington, including the President, took a 

more immediate interest. Increasingly, Washington became concerned about the effcctiveness of U.S. military aid to the French 

Union forces, the expansion of the Vietnamese National Army, and 

the conduct of the war. 

To assess the value and effectiveness of U.S. military aid and to 

try to exert influence in at least some proportion to the growing 

U.S. commitment, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in 

Chief, Pacific, sent Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, Com· 

manding General, U.S. Army, Pacific, on three trips to Indochina. 

Genera l O'Daniel's visits were made after General Jean de Laure 

de Tassigny had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on 1 April 

1952, and after General Henri·Eugene Navarre had succeeded 

General Salan in May of the following year. General O'Daniel's 

efforts to observe the activities of the French command were only 

moderately successful. In no way was he able to influence either 

plans or operations. 

General Navarre realized from the beginning that the French 

Union forces were overextended and tied to defensive positions. He 

therefore developed a military plan, subsequently named after him, 
FORMATIVE YEARS 9 

that called for expanding the Vietnamese National Army and assigning it the defensive missions, thus releasing French forces for 

mobile operations. General Navarre also intended to form more 

light mobile battalions, and he expected reinforcements from 

France. With additional U.S. arms and equipment for his forces, 

Navarre planned to hold the Red River Delta and Cochinchina 

while building up his mobile reserves. By avoiding decisive battles 

during the dry season from October 1953 to April 1954, Navarre 

hoped to assemble his mobile strike forces for an offensive that by 

1955 would result in a draw at least. The military plan had a 

pacification counterpart that would secure the areas under Viet 

Minh influence. 

His plans were unsuccessful, however, despite increased U.S. 

shipments of arms and equipment. The French politely but firmly 

prevented American advisers and General O'Daniel from intervening in what they considered their own business. Following instructions from Paris to block the Communist advance into Laos, 

General Navarre in November 1953 decided to occupy and defend 

Dien Bien Phu. This fatal decision was based on grave miscalculations, and the Viet Minh overran Dien Bien Phu on 8 May 1954. 

Their tactical victory marked the end of effective French military 

operations in the first Indochina War, although fighting continued 

until 20 July, the date the Geneva Accords were signed. 

The Geneva Accords 

The Geneva Accords of20 July 1954 officially ended the fighting 

in Indochina. As a condition for its participation in the Geneva 

conference, the United States stipulated that an armistice agreement 

must at least preserve the southern half of Vietnam. This prerequisite was fulfilled by dividing Vietnam at the 17th parallel. The 

Geneva agreement also gave independence to Laos and Cambodia. 

Neither the United States nor the government of South Vietnam 

formally acknowledged the Geneva Accords, but in a separate, 

unilateral declaration the United States agreed to adhere to the 

terms of the agreements. 

Some of the provisions contained in articles of the Geneva agreements were to have unroreseen and lasting effects on the organization and application of U.S. military assistance and on the developing command and control arrangements of the U.S. Military 

Assistance Advisory Group. Among these provisions was Article 

16, which prohibited the introduction into Vietnam of troops and 

other military personnel that had not been in the country at the 

time of the cease-fire. The provision also fixed the number of ad· 

visers in the military assistance group at 888, the total number of 
10 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

French and Americans in the country on the armistice date. Of 

the total, the French representation consisted of 262 advisers with 

the military assistance group and 284 with the Vietnamese Navy 

and Air Force. Of the 342 Americans only 128 were advisers, as 

originally authorized before the cease-fire. The remaining spaces 

were filled on an emergency basis, temporarily with fifteen officers, 

newly assigned, and almost twO hundred Air Force technicians. 

These technicians were in Vietnam because they had accompanied 

forty aircraft given to the French early in 1954. Even though the 

U.S. advisory role in Vietnam was about to change d rastically, the 

magic figure of 342 was on the board and would be difficult to alter. 

Articles 17- 19 contained restrictions regarding weapons, equipmentj ammunition, bascsj and military alliances. Shipment of new 

types of arms, ammunition, and materiel was forbidden. Only on 

a piece-by-piece basis could worn-out or defective items be replacedj and then only through designated control points. Neither 

North nor South Vietnam was to establish new military bascs, nor 

could any foreign power exercise control over a military base in 

Vietnam. Funhermore, neither the Nonh nor the South was to 

enter into any military alliance or allow itself to be used as an 

instrument for the resumption of hostilities. 

To ensure compliance with these and other provisions of the 

Geneva agreements, International Control Commissions were set 

up for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Each commission consisted 

of representatives from India, Canada, and Poland, their staffs, and 

inspection teams. The strength of the I nternational Control Commission in Vietnam- about 670 members- indicated its very considerable inspection and control capability. Because of the terms 

of the Geneva agreements, the commission's operations tended to 

favor North Vietnam, while restricting the functions of the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group and increasing its work load, The U.S. 

objective of creating a national army and achieving an effective 

military status for South Vietnam thus was severely handicapped. 

On the other hand, however, as late as 1959, the International 

Control Commission was praised by the chief of the U.S. advisory 

group in 1959 as benefiting South Vietnam and operating as a 

possible deterrent to Viet Cong attack, South Vietnam thus gained 

valuable time, which a llowed for political consolidation, economic 

development, and progress toward the establishment of a balanced 

military force. 

POSl-Geneva Arrmlgemenls 

The agony of Dien Bien Phu and the rapidly declining fonunes 

of the French forces fighting in Vietnam placed Washington in a 
FORMATIVE YEARS 

dilemma. The French requeSl 

for U.S. armed intervention 

sharply divided President 

Dwight D. Eisenhower's advis· 

ers. The President decided that 

U.S. intervention could become 

a reality only if undertaken with 

the help of U.S. allies, with the 

approval of the Congress, and 

with independence for the Asso· 

dated States of Indochina. None 

of these prerequisites was met. 

During the deliberations on the 

U.S. course of action, the Presi. 

dent consulted with General 

O'Daniel and subsequently per· .-r--

suaded him to postpone his 

retirement and accept the as· GENERAL O'DANIEL 

signment as chief of the Military 

11 

Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina. In deference to French 

scnsibilities and to ensure the seniority of the French Commander 

in Chicf in Indochina, O'Daniel relinquished his third star and 

reverted to the rank of major general. 

On 12 April 1954 General O'Daniel replaced General Trapnell 

and became the third U.S. Army officer to head the advisory group. 

He brought with him another expert on Indochina, Lieutenant 

Colonel William B. Rosson. Within two months General O'Oaniel 

obtained French agreement on U.S. participation in training the 

Vietnamese armed forces. French collaboration with U.S. clements 

was prodded by the French defeats on the battlefield and the replacement of General Navarre by General Paul Ely. Genera l Ely 

as High Commissioner for Vietnam and Commander in Chief, 

French Expeditionary Corps, combined the civil and military 

authority still exercised by France. 

The understanding on U.S. training assistance-the ElyO'Danicl agreement- had been reached informally on 15 June 

1954. It was 3 December, however, before diplomatic clearance 

allowed the formation of a nucleus of the Franco-American Mission 

to the Armed Forces of Vietnam. President Eisenhower's special 

envoy to Saigon, General J. Lawton Collins, concluded a formal 

agreement with General Ely on 13 December. This agreement 

provided for the autonomy of the Armed Forces of the State of 

Vietnam by 1 July 1955 and gave the chief of the U.S. advisory 

group in Indochina the authority to assist the government of Viet-
12 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

nam in organlzmg and training its armed forces, beginning 1 

January 1955. The agreement also ensured over-all French comroi 

of military operations in Indochina. 

The Ely-Collins agreement fundamentally changed the U.S. 

assistance role in Indochina from onc of materiel supply and delivery to a true military assistance and advisory role in support of 

Vietnamese government. With this step, the United States for the 

first time became fully involved in the future of South Vietnam. 

The new situation called for a basic reorganization of the advisory 

group to meet its enlarged responsibilities. In close collabora tion 

with the French, General Q'Daniei o rganized the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) on I February 1955. The 

U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, in a combined effort 

with the South Vietnamese and the French, was operating on three 

levels. Policy was established on the highest level by a committee 

consisting of the Vietnamese Minister of Defense, a senior French 

general, and the chief of the U.S. advisory group; a co-ordinating 

committee on the Defense Ministry level was composed of the 

same French and U.s. representatives and the Chief of Staff of 

the Vietnamese armed forces; and, in the field, heads of training 

teams were attached to Vietnamese units. 

These combined arrangements for training the Vietnamese 

Army continued for fourteen months until the French High Command in lndochina was deactivated on 28 April 1956. On the following day, personnel from the Training Relations and Instruction Mission were reassigned to MAAG's Combat Arms Training 

and Organization Division. For another year, the French continued 

to provide advisers to the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. During 

its existence, the training mission had 217 spaces for U.S. military 

personnel, almost two-thirds of the 342 spaces authorized for the 

entire advisory group. The proportionately high commitment to 

training activities was undertaken even though it reduced MAAG's 

ability to deal adequately with growing logistica l problems. From 

the beginning of its operations, most difficulties encountered by 

the advisory group could be attributed to the shortage of personnel, 

which in tum stemmed from the ceiling imposed by the Geneva 

agreements. 

In the meantime, the United States decided to decentralize 

MAAG operations, thus dividing command and administrative 

burdens and strengthening the U.S. advisory efforts in lndochina. 

A reorganization of the Military Assistance Advisory Group was 

also needed to adjust to significant political developments in the 

area. On 16 May 1955 the United States and Cambodia signed an 

agreement for direct military aid- a move followed on 25 Seplem-
FORMATIVE YEARS 13 

ber by Cambodia's declaring itself a free and independent state. 

On 20 July, Vietnam announced that it would not participate in 

talks for the reunification of North and South Vietnam through the 

elections that were scheduled for the following year, according to 

the Geneva agreements. On 26 October Premier Ngo Dinh Diem 

proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam, after deposing former Emperor and Head of State Bao Dai through a national referendum. 

Diem also became the supreme commander of South Vietnam's 

armed forces. Meanwhile, in Laos, a coalition government was 

being negotiated that would include the Communist Pathet Lao 

group. (An accord was finally reached on 5 August 1956.) In the 

midst of these events, the last French High Commissioner left 

Saigon on 16 August 1955. Because of these developments, a reorganization of U.S. military assistance to the newly independent 

states of Vietnam, Cambodia,'and Laos was needed. Consequently, 

on 13 June 1955 the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Cambodia, was organized in Phnom Penh. Assistance operations in 

Cambodia and Laos had differed significantly from those in South 

Vietnam, because activities in Cambodia and Laos had been 

limited to logistical support. Therefore, the mission of the newly 

formed advisory group in Cambodia was primarily logistical, in 

contrast to the mission of the one in Saigon, which included advisory and training duties. Until 1 November 1955, when the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, was redesignated 

the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, General O'Daniel 

retained the responsibility for the U.S. Navy and Air Force efforts 

in Cambodia. To comply with the Geneva agreements, U.S. military assistance and advisory activities in Laos were less conspicuous 

than in the rest of Indochina. In December 1955 the United States 

established a Programs Evaluation Office in Vietnam, which was 

in charge of military assistance. The Programs Evaluation Office 

operated under the Operations Mission of the U.S. Embassy. An 

overlap of functions existed in assisting the Royal Lao Air Force. 

The Air Force section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

Vietnam, continued to control all military aviation matters in and 

for Laos. Thus by the end of 1955, the advisory group in Vietnam 

was no longer responsible for military assistance programming and 

maintenance inspection for Laos and Cambodia. The final separation or MAAG duties for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was accomplished by 26 October 1956. 

In spite of its reduced responsibilities, the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, Vietnam, was still too busy to carry out all its 

remaining duties effectively. While thc combined training, including good relations and co-operation with French personnel, 
14 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

GeNERAL WILLIAMS 

was proceeding satisfactorily, a 

bott.leneck developed in the area 

of logistics. Logistic problems 

had started with the withdrawal 

of the French Expeditionary 

Corps. Until the pullout, the 

French had not allowed the Viet· 

namese to handle logistics. But 

with the rapid reduction of their 

forces, the French handed over 

logistical responsibilities to lhe 

Vietnamese Army at a rate far 

exceeding the army's ability to 

assume such duties. The Viet· 

namese had no personnel trained 

in logistica l operations because 

the French had not provided the 

special training. 

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, meanwhile had other problems, caused by 

the difficulty in finding, recovering, relocating, and shipping out excess equipment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Not only 

did General O'Daniei have to struggle with a logistical nighunare, 

but he was also hard pressed for personnel in his training mission, 

because the French were reducing their contingent of advisers. 

By 18 November 1955, the day General O'Daniel left Vietnam, 

the French contingent in the training mission had decreased to fiftyeight men. 

Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams was General O'Daniel's 

successor. One of General Williams' first tasks was to obtain additional personnel to compensate for the reduction of the French 

clement and to handle his mounting logistical requirements. General 

Williams' plea for more men was supported by the Commander in 

Chief, Pacific, but Washington was harder to convince. Interpreting 

Article 16 of the Geneva Accords narrowly, W'ashington authorities 

were reluctant to make a move toward any conspicuous increase 

in the strength of military personnel in South Vietnam, In talks 

with members of the International Control Commission and the 

govemment of South Vietnam, General Williams had ascertained 

that a one-for-one substitution of U.S. advisers for the departing 

French would not be considered a violation of the Geneva Accords. 

After long and careful deliberation, officials in Washington 

skirted the issue by maintaining the authorized strength of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, at 342 men, On the 
FORMATIVE YEA RS 15 

other h;md, to hel p General Williams solve his logistical problems, 

the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) was established on 1 June 1956 with a strength of 350 men. Its primary 

task was to locate, ca talog, ship out, and rebuild excess U.S. military equipmenl. I n addition, the recovery mission was to assist the 

Vietnamese in tra ining their a rmed forces, with a view to establishing their own workable logistical support system. Although the 

activity was subordinate to the MAAG chief in Vietnam, it wm: not 

a part of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. (CharI 7) 

For the next four years, General Williams tried to have the 

strength of the advisory g.·oup raised to 888, the total number of 

U.S. a nd French advisers in Vietnam at the time of the armistice. 

Since the work load of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission 

was decreasing, the logical step was to integrate TERM personnel 

into the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. General 

Williams believed that raising the strength of the advisory group 

by merging the two activities would not violate the intent or leller 

of the Geneva Accords. In April 1960 he reported that the International Control Commission had favorably considered the request to increase MAAG's strength from 342 to 685 spaces, 7 spaces 

less than the combined totals of the two activities but still over 200 

men short of the July 1954 figure. On 5 Ma y 1960 the U.S. government announced that, at the request of the governmen t of South 

Vietnam, the proposed increase wou ld be authorized. During the 

following months TERM personnel were integrated into the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vie tnam, which was itselr reorganized. (CharU 2 and 3) 

Res/lonse 10 IrlSurgency 

Arter the armistice in the summer or 1954 the United States was 

chicfl y concerned with the possibility of overt aggression rrom 

North Vietnam. To meet this potential externa l thrcat to the 

developing state or South Vietnam, the United Statcs had rormed 

the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and had placed 

South Vietnam unde.- its protection. Sin:.;c South Vietnam was 

prohibited rrom joining a ny alliance, SEATO's protcctive shield 

represcnted a strong detcrrent to the proclaimed intcntions or the 

North Vietnamese to unify a [l of Vietnam under Communist rule. 

This security was especia lly vital to South Vietnam, becausc it 

was just beginning to consolidate and establish the authority or the 

central government in Saigon. 

An essentia l clement in making the consolidation process work 

was the South Vietnamese Army. The a rmy was no more than a 
CHART I-TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOVERY 

Chief, 

Military Assislance 

Advisory Group 

Chief. 

Temporary Equipment 

Recovery Mission 

Operations 

Control 

Branch 

I I I 

Engineering Ordnance Quartermaster Signal Transportation Me

Branch Branch Branch Branch Branch Br

s..m" r..,n~., HQ M ...... G, Vic' nam, dalCd 18 A"S"" ]956, sub;":!: 8ri</ S_'7.j P.uISipifo"~1 E~. 
!iIl 

II! 
CUART 3-TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT RECOV

Chief, 

Military Assistance 

Advisory Group 

Chief, 

Temporary Equipmen

Recovery Mission 

Plans and Administration 

Operations Section Section 

I I I I I 

Engineering Ordnance N • ., Quartermaster Signal 

Branch Branch BtJnch Branch Branch 

s..u, Slwi; ... "'''''J' Nf>o</' oj <Iw IofiJ.Udy N.,is_ "'""_ i. v .. _ (Ft. Luv ... wortb: HQ. U5ACC
FORMATIVE YEARS 19 

conccpt when the first 1ndochina War ended. The misSion of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group was to make this concept a 

reality. The 50Ulh Vietnamese government depended on the army 

to provide a pool of administrators in the capital, the provinces, 

and the districts; to establish internal securi ty; and to defend the 

country against olltside aggression. 

The obstacles in the way of achieving a central aut hority were 

towering. The army was rife wit h dissension, disloyally, and corruption. Religious sects, such as the I-Ioa Hao and Cao Dai, and a 

gangster organization, the Binh Xuyen, had their own armed forces 

and were using them in a power struggle, In the Central Highlands, 

the Montagnards, ethnic triba l groups, refused to acknowledge the 

central government. In addition, some one million Ca tholic refugees 

from North Vietnam were being relocated in the south, upsetting 

a delica te religious balance, The progress of the Diem government 

toward stability must therefore be measured against this chaotic 

background. 

By 1957 what few had expected to see in South Vielllampolitical stability- had been accomplished. The economy was on 

a sound basis and improving. The armed forces had defeated the 

dissidents. The achievement obliterated Communist expectations 

of a take-over more or less by default. Diem's refusa l to allow a 

referendum in 1956 apparen tly had deprived the North Vietnamese 

of a legal means by which to gain control of the south. 

In 1957 the Communist North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party 

therefore decided on a change of strategy for winning its objective, 

The strategy was not new; it was a reviva l of the Viet Minh insurrection against French domina tion, and the tactics wel'e those of 

guerrilla warfare, terror, sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination. 

The goal was to paralyze the Diem administration by eliminating 

government officials and severing contact between the countryside 

and Saigon. At the same time, the Communists would usurp government control, either openly or surreptitiously, depending on the 

local situation. The new insurgents became known as the Viet Cong, 

and their political arm was the Na tional Liberation Front, proclaimed in December 1960. 

The first, faint signs of a change in Communist stra tegy, from the 

plan to take over South Vietnam through politicaJ means supported 

by external pressure to a policy of subversion and insurgency within 

the country, began to be noticed in 1957. The following year, the 

Viet Cong intensified and extended their politica l and guerrilla 

operations to a point where they created serious problems that 

threatened South Vietnamese government control in the countryside, Prodded by General Williams and faced with an election, 
20 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

President Diem belatedly ordered countermeasures in 1959 and 

committed more forces to interna l security. But after the elections, 

in the fall of 1959, the Viet Cong began to gain the upper hand. 

Government control was eroding, the countryside and the cilies 

were being isolated from onc another, and the economy was suffering. 

The crisis called for a re-cvaluation of the U.S. effort. In March 

1960 General Lyman L. Lt:mnitzer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 

visited South Vietnam. He reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

that the situation had deteriorated markedly during the past 

months. President Diem had declared the country to be in a state 

of all-out war against the Viet Cong and requested increased U.S. 

assistance in materiel and training. General Lemnitzer supported 

the request and recommended that the training and organization 

of the Vietnamese Army should be modified to shift the emphasis 

from conventional to antiguerrilla warfare training. He offered 

U.S. Army personnel, in the form of mobile training teams, to help 

achieve this objective. In ApriJ the Commandcr in Chief, Pacific, 

recommended that a co-ordinated plan be developed for the over-all 

U.S. effort in support of the government of South Vietnam. The 

Deparunents of State and Defense sanctioned this recommendation. 

In Saigon the U.S. Ambassador, the chief of the advisory group, 

and other senior officials, constituting what was known as the 

Country Team, drew up a planning document that dealt with the 

political, military, economic, and psychological requirements for 

fighting the Communist insurgency. This Counterinsurgency Plan 

for South Vietnam contained significant reforms, many of which 

had been proposed to the government of South Vietnam for some 

time but had not been accepted. Among the prominent features of 

the Counterinsurgency Plan were the reorganization of the South 

Vietnamese command and control organization; an increase in 

Vietnam's armed forces from 150,000 to 170,000 men; and additional funds of about $49 million to support the plan. The Counterinsurgency Plan urged the Vietnamese to streamline their command structure to allow for central direction, to eliminate overlapping functions, and to pool military, paramilitary, and civilian 

resources. 

The Military Assistance Advisory Group was a lso eager to 

provide more advisers at lower levels of command. At the beginning 

of the U.S. training effort, advisers had been limited to higher 

commands down to the division level, and to schools, training 

c~ters, territorial headquarters, and logistic installations. Only 

on a very smal1 scale and on a temporary basis had U.S. advisers 

been attached to battalion-size units. The new emphasis on counter-
FORMATIVE YEARS 21 

insurgency training early in 1960 

changed this situation. In May 

1960, coinciding with the integration of TERM personnel into 

the advisory group, the MAAG 

chief was authorized to increase 

the number of personnel assignments to field advisory duties at 

battalion levels. These assignments remained temporary, 

however, and were still made 

selectively- mainly to armored, 

artillery, and marine baltalions. 

Toward the end of 1960, the 

government of Vietnam transferred the paramilitary forces of 

its Civil Guard and Self Defense 

Corps from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Defense. 

Both organizations, vital to the 

GENERAl. MCGARR. (Photograph taken 

beJore his prOtllOtiol1 to lieutenant general.) 

maintenance of security in the provinces and d istricts, thus became 

eligible for MAAG training and assistance. In addition, U.S. Special 

Forces leams began training the newly established, S,OOO-man, 

Vietnamese Ranger force by the end of 1960. Clearly, the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was growing. At this time, General Williams 

ended his almost five-year tour as MAAG chief. He was succeeded 

by Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr on 1 September 1960. 

In WaShington the Eisenhower administration was replaced by 

the Kennedy administration. Among President John F. Kennedy's 

first concerns was the situation in Vietnam. At this crucial time, 

the Country Team's proposals for counte ring the Viet Cong insurgency arrived in Washington. Subsequently, the President decided to continue U.S. support for South Vietnam and increased 

both funds and personnel in support of the Diem government. On 

3 April 1961 the United States and South Vietnam signed the 

Treaty of Amity and Economic Rela tions in Saigon. One week 

later President Diem won re-election in his country by an overwhelming majority. To strengthen U.S.-Vietnamese tics further, 

President Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon B. J ohnson to 

Saigon on 11 May. In a joint communique issued two days later, 

the United States announced it would grant additiona l U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam in its fight against Communist forces. 

These measures, taken by President Kennedy, were based on 
22 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

preliminary surveys and consultations and on the recommenda· 

lions of a temporary organization set up to deal with the crisis. In 

January 1961 the Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Galcs, J r., had 

dispatched Major Genera l Edward C. Lansdale to Vietnam. On 

the general's return, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. 

Gilpatric, was put in charge of an interdepartmental task fo rce, 

subsequently known as Task Force, Vietnam, which identified 

and defined the actions the new administra tion was about to undertake. In Saigon a coulllcrpan task force was established, its members 

taken from the Country Team. In addition, General McGarr, the 

MAAG chief, was brought to Washington in April to give his advice. 

Washington had a lso accepted significant points of the Country 

Team's Countcrinsurg('ncy Plan, including support by the Military 

Assistance Program for a 20,OOO·man increase in the Vietnamese 

armed forces, for a 68,OOO-man Civil Guard and a 40,OOO-man 

Self Defense Corps, and for more U.S. advisers for these additiona l 

forces. In May President Kennedy appointed Frederick C. Nolting, 

J r., as Ambassador to South Vietnam, replacing Elbridge Durbrow. 

An economic survey mission, headed by Dr. Eugene Staley of the 

Stanford Research I nstitute, visited Vietnam d uring J une and 

July and submitted its findings to President Kennedy on 29 July 

1961. Later, in an address to the Vietnamese National Assembly in 

October 1961, P.·esident Diem referred to D r. Staley's report, 

emphasizing the insepa rable impact of military and economic as· 

sistance on internal security. 

Soon after the return of the Staley mission, President Kennedy 

annou nced a t a press conference on I t October 196 1 that General 

Maxwell D. Taylor would visit Vietnam to investiga te the military 

situation and wou ld report back to him personall y. Dr. Wa lt W. 

Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of 

State, accompanied Genera l Taylor. Upon its relUrn, the TaylorRostow mission recommended a substantia l increase in the U.S. 

advisory effort; U.S. combat support (mainly tactica l airlift); further expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces; and support fo r 

the stra tegic hamlet program, an earl y attempt a t Vietnamization. 

Subsequently, the military effort was directed primarily a t 

carrying out these proposals. The task was more than the MAAG 

headquarters in Vietnam could handle. In November 196 1 there· 

fore President Kennedy decided to upgrade the U.S. command by 

forming the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 

and selected General Paul D. Harkins as commander. General 

Harkins bad been serving as Deputy Comma nding General, U.S. 

Army, Pacific, and had been actively involved in the Pacific Com-
FORMATI VE YEARS 23 

MAIN E""'TRANCt: lU MAAG Hf.ADQL'A RTERS LC)CATt:o ON' '1'11.-\'>; I·IUNG OAO 

BoUI.f\:ARI). 1962. 

mand's contingcncy planning for Vietnam. Following an intcrview 

with President Kcnnedy in ea rl y 1962, he went to Saigon and established Headquartel·s, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

on 8 February 1962. 

Command Rtla{iorlships 

From 7 November 1950 through 7 February 1962 a single head· 

quarters provided command and control for the U.S. military effort 

in Vietnam. The numbel· of authori zed spaces increased from the 

origi nal 128 in 1950 to 2,394 by early 1962. 

The responsibility for directing and controlling military assistance programs lay with both the legislative and executive 

branches of the U.S. government. The Mutual Defense Assistance 

Act of 1949 provided the basis for these programs in Vietnam. 

\Vithin the executive branch, major assistance du ties were performed by the Office of the President, the Department of Defense, 

and the Dcpanmelll of Stale. Policies and objec tives of military 

assistance to Viet nam frOlll 1950 to 1962 were based on decisions 

made by three d ifferent administration. 
24 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

In the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined the military objectives. The Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for International Security Affairs co-ordinalcd the broad poli tica l 

and military guidelines established by the White House and the 

Departments of Slale and Defense. The Commander in Chief, 

Pacific, provided specific guidance and direction to Headquarters, 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. 

As the President's personal representative, the U.S. Ambassador 

to South Vietnam was charged with over-aJl responsibility for the 

co-ordination and supervision of U.S. activities in Vietnam. On 

political and economic mauen, he was guided by the Department 

of State. The chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in 

Vietnam was responsible to the ambassador for military malters 

under the Mutual Security Program and, as senior military adviser, was a member of the Country Team. 
CHAPTER Jl 

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: 

February 1962-July 1965 

The question of establishing a unified military command in 

South Vietnam was first raised in October 1961. After President 

Kennedy had bolstered the U.S. commitment in May and again 

in October, in terms of both personnel and funds, the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group reorganized to meet the inc.eascd demand for field advisers to the South Vietnamese armed forces. 

General Taylor's mission to Vietnam in October revealed. that 

these measures were inadequate for dealing with the Communist 

insurgency; therefore, in mid-November the President decided 

that the United Sta tes would assume a growing operationa l support role in addition to the existing advisory, training, and logistical 

missions. This decision marked the beginning of a new phase in 

U.S. support of the South Vietnamese government and its armed 

forces. 

Consequently, the U.S. command structure in Vietnam, which 

had become overextended even before the new requirements had 

been established in the President's program, had to be reorganized. 

In mid-November Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 

charged the J oint Chiefs of Staff with this task. The new command 

was to be named the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(USMACV). 

At the time, the Military Assistance Advisory Group was the 

only U.S. military headquarters in South Vietnam. A joint organization, it contained an Army, Navy, and Air Force section, 

each responsible for advising its counterpart in the Vietnamese 

armed forces and for assisting the chief of the advisory group in 

administering the Military Assistance Program. Logistical and 

administrative support of the Military Assistance Advisory Group 

was provided through service channels. The chief of the advisory 

group, General McGarr, however, exercised operational control 

over all U.S. Army units. For their logistical support, however, the 

units dependcd on Licutenant General Paul W. Caraway, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USAR VIS), on 

Okinawa. 
26 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

When the first U .S. Army aviation units arrived in Vietnam in 

December 1961, the need fol' logistical support sharply increased . 

Since no U.S. Army element in South Vietnam could provide the 

support, General James F. Collins, Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Army, Pacific, directed the 9th Logistic Command on Okinawa 

to send a logistic support team to South Vietnam to set up a supply 

service between the newly arrived aviation units and U.S. Army, 

Ryukyu Islands. On 17 December 1961 an cleven-man team from 

the 9th . Logistic Command arrived in Vietnam. As the support 

requirements increased, the team was expanded to 323 men and 

designated USAR VIS Support Croup (Provisional). This group 

formed the nucleus that eventually became the headquarters of 

U.S. Army, Vietnam- the Army component of the U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

Meantime, plans for the establishment of the U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, had gone forward at command 

headquarters directly concerned with this matter. Planners generally 

agreed that the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, should have full responsibility for and authority over all 

U.S. military activities and operations in Vietnam. However, regarding the application of this principle, the degree of authority, 

and the place within the chain of command, the planners took 

different approaches. The key problem, in retrospect, was just 

where to find the slot for this new unified command and who would 

be in immediate control. 

The J oint Chiefs of Staff proposed forming a unified command 

that would report directly to them. The commander would control 

all U.S. forces in South Vietnam employed in a combined effort 

against the Viet Cong; he would also be the principal U.S. military 

adviser and sole spokesman for American military affairs in Vietnam. Additional responsibilities would include U.S. intelligence 

operations economic aid relating to counterinsurgency, and any 

functions of the Military Assistance Advisory Group dealing with 

improvement of the combat effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed 

forces. The chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group would 

retain control of the training mission and would continue to represent the Commander in Chief, Pacific, in planning and administering the Military Assistance Program. General Collins, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pac ific, agreed with the proposals 

of the Joint Chiefs but recommended in addition that all activities 

of the Military Assistance Advisory Group come directly under 

the unified commander in Vietnam. 

Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific, raised 

objections to the Joint Chiefs' proposal of assigning the U.S. Military 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 27 

Assistancc Command, Vietnam, directly to the J oint Chiefs. In 

Admiral Felt's view, the Communists were threatening all of 

Southeast Asia, not just South Vietnam; therefore, a single military 

effort., co-ordinated by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, was required. Accordingly, he suggestcd forming a subordinate unificd 

command in Vietnam under the Pacific Command. The Department of State concurred with Admiral Felt's proposal provided the 

U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam would retain over-all authority 

or U.S. activities in the country. 

Deliberations on the structure of the U.S. Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, and the headquarters' position in the chain 

of command were complicated by existing cOlllingency plans. 

Separate sets of plans had been drawn up ror possible U.S. unilateral operations on the mainland of Southeast Asia and for combined opera tions of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO) as well. A joint or combined headquarters was provided 

for in these plans, which was to be headed by the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, General Harkins. According 

to these contingency plans, General Hark ins' headquarters was to 

be under the control of Admiral Felt as Commander in Chief, 

Pacific. 

Because the joint (or combined) field commander in most contingency plans would be the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Army, Pacific, the headquarters of the U.S. Army, Pacific, had 

prepared many or these plans and also was to provide the nucleus 

ror the designated operational staffs. For this reason Admiral Felt 

had decided that the field commander would exercise control of 

the ground forces as his own Army componCIll commander. This 

decision was consistelll with Army and joint doctrine regarding 

joint task forces. It followed that this doctrinal precedent would be 

applied in establishing the U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam. The precedent did not apply to the Air Force and Navy 

components and their commanders, howevcr, which wcre to bc 

provided by the Pacific Air Force and Navy commands. Thc reason 

was the comparatively small effort required by these two services. 

The Command Is Established 

With the approval of President Kenned y and Secretary of 

Defense McNamara and by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Admiral Felt established the U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, on 8 February 1962, as a subordinate unified command 

under his control. Lieutenant General Paul D. Harkins, the Deputy 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, who, as the commande '~ 
28 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

designate for the task force headquarters in the event of operations in Southeast Asia, had 

participated in the planning for 

such operations, was appointed 

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

and promoted to general. 

In his new position, Ceneral H a rkins was the scnior U.S. 

military commander in the Republic of Vietnam and, as such, 

responsible for U.S. military policy, operations, and assistance 

there. General Harkins had the 

task of advising the Vietnamese 

governmen t on security, orgaGENERAL H ARKINS nization, and employment of 

their military a nd paramilitary 

forces. As provided for in the organi zation of the task force headquarters in the contingency plans, MACV's commander was also 

his own Army component commander. 

With an initial authorized strength of 216 men (11 3 Army), the 

Military Assistance Command was envisaged as a temporary headquarters that would be withdrawn once the Viet Cong insurgency 

was brought under control. In that event, the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group would be restored to its former position as the 

principal U.S. headquarters in South Vietnam. For this reason, the 

advisory group was reta ined as a separate headquarters under 

Major General Charles J. Timmes, who had succeeded General 

McGarr. The advisory group was responsible to the Military Assistance Command for advisory and operational matters and to the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific, for the administration of the Military 

Assistance Program. Although general logistic support continued 

on an individ ua l service basis, the Military Assistance Command 

was supported by the Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon, a 

small Navy logistical operation. 

The tempora ry character of the new MACV headquarters was 

further emphasized by the decision initially to limit General H arkins' 

planning tasks to Vietnam. General H arkins' responsibilities, however, soon expanded when he was assigned broader planning duties 

connected with U.S. unilateral and SEATO contingencies. Admiral 

Felt directed General H arkins to prepare the support of the Pacific 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 29 

Command's plan of action in the event of insurgency and overt 

aggression in Southeast Asia. In addition, General Harkins was to 

draft other plans in support of SEATO, thus shifting planning responsibilities in some areas from U.S. Army, Pacific, to the Military 

Assistance Command. This was a logical trend because General 

Harkins was still the commander-designate of joint and combined 

SEATO forces. Before the year was out, such contingency responsibilities were to contribute to a reappraisal of the need and desirability of a separate Army component command under Genera l 

Harkins' headquarters. 

After the Military Assistance Command had been established, 

the Pacific Air Forces formed the 2d Advance Squadron in Vietnam. 

The squadron originally functioned as the air component command 

and later evolved into the air component command headquarters 

in Vietnam. No immediate steps were taken to establish a naval 

component command on the Southeast Asia mainland, because one 

was not needed at the time. Naval duties were handled by the Navy 

section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and by Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon. 

As the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam, General 

Harkins was directly responsible for all U.S. military policy, operations, and assistance in Vietnam. He was authorized to discuss both 

U.S. and Vietnamese military operations directly with President 

Diem and other Vietnamese leaders. General Harkins also advised 

the Vietnamese on all matters relative to the security, organization, 

and use of their armed forces and of counterinsurgency or other 

paramilitary forces. He had direct access to the Pacific commander 

in chief and through him to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Secretary of Defense. Since the U.S. Ambassador was responsible 

for U.S. political matters and basic policy, Genera l Harkins was 

to consult him on these subjects; if the two officials disagreed, both 

were free to submit their respective positions to Washington. The 

ambassador and the commander were to keep each other fully 

informed, especially on high-level contacts with the Vietnamese 

government, on major military plans, and on pending operations. 

Command and control of Vietnamese forces remained with 

Vietnamese commanders, with General Harkins acting as the 

senior U.S. adviser. The Vietnamese organization provided that 

the Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese armed forces also be 

the commander of the Vietnamese AI'my (ARVN); he was, in 

every respect, his own Army component commander. Although 

this arrangement had not been a determining factor in the organization of the Military Assistance Command, the compatibility of 
30 COM MAND AND CONTROL 

the two command structures was to be an important influence 

when the issue of a sepa rate U.S. Army component commander 

was raised later. 

On 15 May 1962 General Harkins' responsibilities broadened 

when Admiral Felt established the U.S. Military Assistance Com· 

mand, Thailand (USMACTHAI), and appointed General Harkins 

its commander. In this capacity General Harkins had essentially 

the same latitude and authority as in his position as head of the 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Thailand command 

initially consisted of the following g roups: the men and equipment 

of a U.S. joint task force in Thailand, originally deployed as an 

clement of a SEATO exercise and latcr held there because of Com· 

munist activity in Laos; the joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, 

Thailand; and other U.S. military elements deployed to Thailand. 

Later in 1962, Major General Theodore j . Conway, Chief, joint 

U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand, was designated to 

serve concurrently as General I-Iarkins' deputy in Thailand. A 

staff was formed to assist General Conway with these additional 

duties. Administrative support of units and elements in Thailand 

rema ined the responsibility of the separa te services. Thus, while 

directing U.S. military activitics in Vietnam, General Harkins 

also took charge in Thailand of the Military Assistancc Program, 

the planning and support of Army activities, and contingency plans 

and exercises. 

The Military Assislanee Advisory Group 

During the confcrences that led to the establishment of the 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the question of how to 

fit the existing Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) into 

the new command structure was discussed. The planners, concerned 

about this problem, were aware that the Military Assistance Com. 

mand, at least temporaril y, would replace the advisory group as the 

principal U.S. military headquarters in Vietnam and would also 

absorb other functions that the advisory group had been charged 

with in the past. In retaining both headquarters, a certain amount 

of duplication would be unavoidable . Although abolishing the 

advisory group as a separate organization would have avoided 

this duplication, MAAG's traditional role and its working relationship with the Vietnamese armed forces, established over a ten· 

year period, would have been sacrificed, together with MAAC's 

institutional e;'(pertise, which the new command had yet to acquire. 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNA M 31 

For these reasons, the Milit ary Assistance Advisory Group was 

retained. The MAAC chief, General Timmes, continued to exercise 

control over U.S. Army units. lie also was charged with the development and administration of the Military Assistance Program 

and the day-to-day advisory and tra ining effort fOI· the Vietnamese 

armed forces. 

The U.S. Army's cha in of command arrangements were not 

changed by the establishment of the Military Assistance Command 

in Vietnam. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, Genera l 

Collins, continued to provide admini!nrative and logistical suppon 

to U.S. Army units in Vietnam through Headq uarters, U.S. Army, 

Ryukyu Islands. Gcncra l Harkins had opera tiona l control of Army 

units, but he delegated the authority to General Timmes. Thus, 

even though functions of the Military Assistance Command and 

the advisory group tech nicall y overlapped, the duplication in some 

areas of responsibility did not interfere with U.S. assistance and 

advisory activities in Vietnam. 

u.s. Army Support Group, Vietnam 

I n March 1962 Headquaners, U.S. Army, Pacific, issued a 

lettcr of instruction that removed thc "provisional " dcsignation 

from the U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, attached it to U.S. 

Army, Ryukyu Islands, for administrativc and logistica l support, 

and made its commanding officer the deputy Army component 

commander under the ~tilitary Assista nce Command. In turn, all 

U.S. Army units in Vietnam (excl uding advisory a ttachments) were 

assigned to the Army Support Group for administrative and logistica l 

needs. Although the support group was under the operational 

control of the Military Assistance Command, it was also required 

to support U.S. Army, Pacific, in carryi ng out il~ missions. In effect, 

this arrangemelll removed the support group from the command 

of U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, even though the group continued to 

depcnd on U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, for logistica l and administralive support. The twofold mission of the group was to support 

combat operations and to provide the nucleus for a type-B logistical 

command headquartcrs that would direct combat support units 

in Vietnam under existing contingency plans. 

In July 1962 the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, 

General Collins, corrected the dual arrangement by permanently 

assigning the U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, to U.S. Army, 

Ryukyu Islands. (Chart 4) This command relationship was to continue, until 1965, when the succcssor to the group, U.S. Army, 
32 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

C HART 4-U.5. CoMMAND RELATIONSHIPS I N VIETNAM, 1962 

Joint Chiefs 

of Staff 

Department 

of the Army 

Commander In 

Chief, Pacific 

: ................................ ........... • 

U.S. Army, 

Pacific 

U.S. Army, U.S. Military Assistance 

Ryukyu Islands Command , Vietnam 

...... I · · · · 

U.S. Army Support Group. Vietnam 

I 

Designated 

Army Units 

Command 

Operational Command 

· · · ..............•..... · 

s-.a: Orpanmc:nI of ........ y Managc_nl c"~w Tu .... ItnWw _ .b~" -J 1M "' ... " c--..t ..J 

c..t..l $hlltl ... I. v,."" .... Vol. II (Waahins'on, 29 July 1008), p. AV~12. 

Vietnam, was placed directly under U.S. Army, Pacific, thereby 

eliminating the Ryuk yu Islands headquarters from the chain of 

command. Throughout the entire period, the support group remained under the operational control of the Milita ry Assistance 

Command. The commander of the support group, a1though still the 

deputy Army component commander of the Military Assistance 

Command in Vietnam, became responsible for executing the plans 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 33 

and directives of General Caraway in the Ryukyus as well as for 

carrying out General Collins' missions in South Vietnam. Opera~ 

tional control of most Army units, particularly aviation companies, 

rested with General Timmes, chief of the advisory group in Vietnam, 

to whom General Harkins had delegated this authority. Under th is 

arrangement, Army strength rose from 948 to 7,885 men during 

1962. 

Control of Army aviation assets at this time illustrates the 

multiple lines of responsibility in Vietnam. Since General Timmes 

had operational control of Army aviation units, the senior adviser 

assigned to a Vietnamese Army corps could d irectly request U .S. 

Army aviation support. For example, the Vietnamese corps com~ 

mander could initiate and plan a helicopter operation. The adviser 

assigned to the corps would fonnally transmit a request to the 

commanding officer of a U.S. Army helicopter company for execu~ 

tion. Actual planning fo r such an operation thus involved the 

Vietnamese corps commander and his stafT, the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group's repl·esentative, and the commander of the heli~ 

copter company. Issues which could not be resolved locall y between 

the adviser and the commanding officer of the helicopter unit were 

referred to General Harkins through appropriate channels. Army 

aviation. unit commandcrs, therefore, had to deal with and satisfy, 

on a daily basis, the Vietnamese Army, the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, the Military Assistance Command, and the U.S. 

Army Support Croup. The support group, in turn, had to carry 

out responsibilities to the U.S. Army, Pacific; U.S. Army, Ryukyu 

Islands; and the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. 

Contingency Considerations 

Concern over the conflicting command and control arrange~ 

ments established by the various contingency plans resulted in a 

series of conferences in the fa ll of 1962 to examine the situation and, 

in particular, to study the need for a separate Army component 

commander. The responsibilities assigned to General Harkins under 

various contingency situations prompted him to recommend al~ 

ternate command arrangements for Vietnam. His recommenda~ 

tion led to counterproposals by the J oint Chiefs of StafT, Admiral 

Felt, and the service components. Strongly influenced by the 

Laotian crisis in 1962, General Harkins proposed that a ground 

component command headquarters, separa te from the joint or 

combined higher headqua rters, be established fo r aU unilatera l 

and SEATO contingency plans for operations in Southeast Asia. 

If these plans for Vietnam, Thailand, or Laos were to be mp e~ 
34 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

memcd, a combat-capable Army component commander and 

staff should be available to conduct the land war. Allhough the 

U.S. Army Support Group was the Army component command 

within the Military Assistance Command at the lime, its functions 

were limited to logistical and administrative matters and excluded 

operational matters, which were the concern of the chief of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group. Neither headquarters could 

qualify as a true Army ground component command . 

In commenting on General H a rkins' proposal, General Collins 

indicated that a headquaners like the Army corps headquarters 

provided in contingency plans would be appropriate for the conduct of grou nd operations. The corps headquaners would also be 

able to perform the other duties of a ground component command 

under joint (Military Assistance Command) or combined (SEATO) 

direction, at least during the first stages of an operation. General 

Collins emphasized, however, that his proposal would be valid 

only if the joint or combined commander was a U.S. Army general 

officer. 

Ceneral H arkins' proposal also dealt with the subject of the 

command structure in Thailand. He suggested that Army units 

in Thailand be placed directly under the deputy commander of 

the Military Assistance Command, Thail and, who would then be 

the Army component commander there. Admiral Felt, however, 

believed that the operations of the Army component command 

in Thailand should remain within Army (U.S. Army, Pacific) 

channels rather than being vested in a joint headquarters; he also 

indica ted that General Harkins should be his own ground component commander. Finally, Admiral Felt recommended new arrangements for Thailand that would relieve General Harkins of 

all responsibilities in Thailand and Laos. 

These issues were considered at a meeting held in Hawaii in 

Oc tober 1962. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara decided 

that Ceneral Hal'kins should retain his responsibilities in Thailand 

and his title of Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

Thailand (actually, the title decided upon at the meeting was 

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Thailand). The chief of the Military Assistance Group in Thailand 

would be the deputy commander of the Military Assistance Command, Thailand, under Ceneral Harkins and would have operational control over all U.S. forces in Thailand. Logistic and 

administra tive support of the forces there would remain the responsibility of the serviee components of the Pacific Command. A 

small joint staff of the Military Assistance Command would remain 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 35 

in Thailand, primarily for planning purposes. These arrangements 

became effective on 30 October 1962. 

General H arkins raised other command questions at this con~ 

ference, some of which were d iscussed but not settled. He pointed 

ou t, for example, that the component commands in Vietnam were 

neither organized nor staffed to carry out the planning, opera~ 

tional, and administrative tasks normally pedormed by component 

commands. I n Vietnam the componenl commanders had had 

primarily administrative and logistical duties. General Harkins, 

therefore, suggested that the component headquarters be I'eorganized 

and strengthened, so that they could assume their full share of command functions in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos, if unilateral or 

SEATO plans were ever implemented. 

The most significam result of the discussions about component 

commands was that the Pacific Air Forces' 2d Advance Squadron, 

the largest U.S. Air Force headquarters in Southeast Asia outside 

the Philippines, was expanded and redesignated 2d Air Division. 

The division controlled most operations of the Pacific Ail' Forces 

of the mainland of Southeast Asia. The command channel OI'iginated 

with the Commander in Chief, Pacific, went to the commander of 

the Military Assistance ·Command in Vietnam and Thailand, and 

then to the commanding genera l of the 2d Air Division; the Pacific 

Air Forces provided administrati ve and logistical SUPPOI·t. General 

Harkins thus acquired a responsive Air Force component command. For certain air operations over the Southeast Asia mainland outside the opera tiona l area of General Harkins' conunand, 

however, the 2d Ail' Division continued to report to the commander 

in chief of the Pacific Air Forces, and through him to Admiral Fell. 

The decision limited General Harkins' authority over, and responsibility for, air operations olher than those concerned with 

direct support and assistance to Vietnamese forces. 

Since naval activity in Southeast Asia had not significantly increased, a naval component command was not established. 

During 1962 the strength of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam 

rose from about 1,000 to over 11 ,000 men. Each service was responsible for its own logistic support, although Headquarters, Support Activity, Sa igon, continued to provide logistical and administrative support to Genera l Harkins' headquarters and countrywide 

support to all advisory personnel, including the Army's. Support 

for other Army forces in Vietnam came from Okinawa and the 

continental United States. Logistic operations were thus decentralized with only limited over-all co-ordination; common-user 

arrangements for major logistic items had not yet been developed. 
36 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Depllty Arm)' Componmt Commander 

Realizing that the command and control arrangements governing Army combat service support in Vietnam should be refined, 

General Collins acted to modify them in March 1963. With the 

concurrence of the Military Assistance Command and the approval 

of Admiral Fell, General Collins issued a letter of instruction in 

August 1963 appointing Ceneral Harkins the Army component 

commander for current operations in Vietnam. In addition, Brigadier General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Support Group, Vietnam, was designated dcplIlY Army 

component commander of the Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam. This change had the effect of channeling to General 

Stilwell most problems peculiar to the Army. General Harkins, as 

the head of the Military Assistance Command, had operational 

control over Army units; General Stilwell, as his deputy, exercised 

command less operationa l control of the units and continued to 

provide combat service support. 

These changes were minor since, in practice, responsibilities 

had already been divided along these lines. The new instructions 

did clarify command relationships between the Military Assistance 

Command, the advisory group, the support group, and U.S. Army, 

Ryukyu Islands, concerning control over Army advisers and organizations in Vietnam. Furthermore, the new arrangements were 

aligned with Admiral Felt's concept of a command structure in 

Vietnam. Additional advantages included improved control of 

Army men and equipment needed for counterinsurgency operations, and better co-ordination between the Military Assistance 

Command and the Vietnamese Army because of the similarity 

between the two organizations. 

The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, like the Military 

Assistance Command, had direct operational control ovcr Vietnamese Army forces, while the Vietnamese Army's headquarters 

exercised command less operational control, performing primarily 

suppOrt and training missions. Under the revised command arrangements, the U.S. Army Support Group was responsible for 

those component command missions and functions pertaining to 

Army activities in South Vietnam, particularly combat service 

support. U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, continued to exercise command less operational control over the support group. 

In addition to the duties carried over from the previous command structure, the support group became responsible for coordinating, through thc Military Assistance Command, Vietnamese 

assistance in providing security for U.S. Army organizations in 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 37 

Vietnam. The support group a lso was to provide logistica l support 

ror units or the U.S. Army Security Agency in South Vietnam, 

common supply support to other U.S. armed services in accordance 

with locally approved in terservice support agreements, a base rrom 

which to expand U.S. Army activities in Vietnam, and command 

elements as needed to direct and support additional U.S. Army 

units a rriving in Vietnam. Finally, the support group was to under· 

take long-range base development planning. It was to advise Army 

headquarters both in the Ryuk yus and in Hawaii or all Army component command runctions being delegated to General Stilwell by 

General Ha rkins. 

Throughout 1963 the duties or the U.S. Army Suppon Group 

steadil y increased, particul a rly those perta ining to comba t support 

activities and logistic requirements. During the yea r, the U.S. 

buildup continued, especia lly in aviation, communications, intclli· 

gence, special warfare, and logistic units, reaching a tota l or 17,068 

mcn, or which 10,916 were Army. Because or this expansion, General 

Stilwell late in 1963 proposed that the name or the support group 

be changed to U.S. Army SuppOrt Command, Vietnam. General 

Ha rki ns concurred and Gencral Collins and Admiral Fell approved 

the r<.-clesignation, providing the change in no way a ltcred the 

group's existing or potential roles and missions. The new designa· 

tion went into effect on I March 1964. 

Amry-Air Force Relalion$ 

In O ctober 1962 Admiral Felt assigned General H a rki ns the 

task or organizing and directing an airlirt system in Southeast 

Asia. The U.S. Air Force's 315th Air Division in J apan was !O 

exercise flight control over all aircrart in the system and supply a 

combat ca rgo group to provide ac tual a irlirt. General Harkins 

placed the cargo group under the 2d Air Division to sa ~i :-, the 

requirement or the Unified Action Armed Forces doctrine, which 

specified that component commanders rctain control or units or 

their own service. 

The requirements or the Unified Action Armed Forces, as well 

as Admiral Felt's directives, ra ised command probl ems between 

the U.S. Army and Air Force. The problems centered around the 

runctions or the air operations centers in Vielllam and the usc or 

Army Ca ribou a ircrart. The Air Force interpreted the term " air" 

as embracing a ll aircrart and wanted all aviation units, including 

those rrom the Army, to report to Air Force control racilities. Army 

commanders held that Army aviation elements should be controlled 

by the ground commander. 
38 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

A directive of 18 August 1962 from General Harkins stated that 

the air operations center, with the Air Force component commander as co-ordinator, was to advise on command decisions and 

pass them on to all forces concerned. Army commanders felt that 

this policy was inconsistent with the operational responsibility of 

the senior U.S. Army adviscr to each Vietnamese Army corps and 

that it violated the principle of unity of command. The Air Force 

component commander, on the other hand, pointed out that the 

corps' senior adviscrs lacked an air operations and planning staff and 

could not exercise effective camral of supponing aviation units. 

Under these circumstances, the Air Force component was the 

proper agency to assume air control; Army interests could be 

sel·ved by Army representation at corps air support operations 

centers. Since Admiral Felt had directed the Air Force component 

commander to co-ordinate operations of all U.S. aviation units 

through the tactical air control system, the Army lost direct control 

of its aviation units. 

Rlorgani~alion oj MACV Hladquarurs (May 7964) 

With the expansion of U.S. military activities in Vietnam, conmeting and overlapping I·oles of U.S. headquarters in Vietnamespecially of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the 

Military Assistance Command- became more apparent. Thus in 

eady 1964 the reorganization of the American command structure 

again came under high-level review. Various proposals focused 

primarily on the consolidation of the headquarters of both the advisory group and the l'vtilitary Assistance Command but touched 

also on such questions as the component com.nand structure and 

MACV's continuation as a subordinate unified command. 

Consolidation of the two headquarters had been considered 

when the Military Assistance Command was first activated in 

February 1962. At that time, it was decided that the command 

should set thc policy and supervise the conduct of the counterinsurgency effort in Victnam, but not become involved with the 

details of planning the Military Assistance Program, nor with the 

day-to-day advisory effort for the Vietnamese armed forces. These 

routine functions were to remain the responsibility of the advisory 

group. Moreover, the Military Assistance Command had originally 

been organized as a temporary headquarters. 

Almost from the ·beginning some duplication of effort between 

the two headquarters had been unavoidable. Since the advisory 

group was under MACV's opera tional control, ~hc command had 

review authority over the group's activities. Unorthodox command 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COM MAND, VIETNAM 39 

M AIN ENTRANCE 10 MACV I H EADQUARTERS LocATED AT 137 PASTEUR. 

7962. 

channels resulled, funding for some activilies became complicated, 

and advisers in the field with Vietnamese units fe lt they served 

two masters. As the tactical situation deteriorated, it became more 

and more difficult to distinguish between the respectivc missions, 

functions, and responsibilities of the two hcadquarters. Vague and 

overlapping channels a lso cxisted in the Vietnamese armcd forces 

and in the government of Vietnam, and the management of military 

and nonmilita ry units ava ilable to assist the Vietnamese Army 

suffered . Finally, duplication also occurred between MACV and 

MAAG headquarters and the service components, especially in 

providing logistical and administrative support to advisory detachments in the field. 

As early as September 1962 General Ha rkins proposed that all 

advisory group functions exccpt those related to the Military Assistance Program be transferred to the componcnt comma riders of 

the Military Assistance Command, and that the headqua rters of 

the advisory group bccomc a staff division of MACV headquarters. 

This proposaJ was discussed with the Commander in Chief, Pacific, 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff several times during 1962 an,cJ 1963. 
40 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Admira l Fell opposed the plan primaril y because he did not want 

MACV headquarters to become bogged down in the details of the 

Milita ry Assistance Program and daY-la-day advisory activi ties. 

Following discussions with Secretary McNamara and Genera l 

Earle C. Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff, in March 1964 in Vietnam, General Ha rkins on 12 Ma rch submitted a new proposal for 

consolidating the Military Assistance Command and the advisory 

group. General '-larkins' primary objective was to eliminate the 

advisory group as an intervening command in the U.S. training 

and advisory effort, thus enabling tbe Military Assistance Command 

to manage U.S. military programs and resources more directly, in 

conformity with the requirements or the South Vietnamese governmelli's new Chien Thang Na tiona l Pacification Plan. Noting that 

65 percent or the U.S. military effort involved Army personnel or 

units, and that 95 percent or the counterinsurgency effort by the 

Vietnamese armed rorees was carried out by their army, General 

H arkins requested operational control over all Army advisory 

activities. Under his proposed reorganization, 'MACV headquarters 

essentially would be a U.S. Army specified command, rather than 

a subordinate unified command under the Commander in Chier, 

Pacific. General Harkins wa nted to retain a joint staff, although 

that staff wou ld be heavil y weighted with U.S. Army positions. At 

the same time, General I-Iarkins would be his own Army component 

commander. All Army administrative and logistical support activities previously handled by the Army sec tion or the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group wou ld pass to a single headquarters, 

U.S. Army SUPPOI"l Command, Vietnam, which had shared such 

responsibilities with the section. With the elimination or the Army 

section or the advisory group, the Army advisory program would 

become General H a rkins' direct responsibility. 

Under General H a rkins' proposal, all other advisory activities 

or the individual services would become subordina te to their respective component commands. U.S. Navy and .Marine Corps advisory 

activities would be handled by the Nava l Advisory Group, which 

ror a ll practica l purposes was a .. cdesignation or the Navy sec tion 

or the Military Assistance Advisory Group. The chier or the Naval 

Advisory Group would be the Navy component commander or the 

Military Assistance Command and exercise d irect operational 

control over Navy and Ma rine Corps advisory detachments. The 

Commanding General, 2d Air Division, would be MACV's Air 

Force component commander. The Air force section or the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group was to pass to the operational control 

or the 2d Ail' Division and become the Air Force Advisory Group, 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 41 

which in turn was to exercise direct operational control over Air 

Force advisory units. Air Force responsibilities in the Military Assistance Program, however, would be retained by MACV headquarters. These steps would place all Navy and most Air Force 

activities under single commanders directly responsible to General 

Harkins and would eliminate the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group as an intervening command in the U.S. training and advisory mission in South Vietnam: After the advisory group was 

eliminated, the Military Assistance Program would come under 

MACV headquarters. General Harkins' plan also called for combining the special staff sections of the Military Assistance Command 

and the Military Assistance Advisory Group. 

As the organization for the Military Assistance Program (MAP) 

ultimately developed within MACV headquarters, two staff directorates were established: the MAP Directorate and the Director 

of Army MAP Logistics. The former was a general policy, planning, 

and programming agency, and the latter assumed MAP logistic 

activities on a technical service basis. 

In his comments on General Harkins' proposals to the Joint 

Chiefs, the new Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral U.S. Grant 

Sharp, Jr., who assumed command in February 1964, reiterated 

his predecessor's opposition to the merger of the two headquarters. 

He objected to the reorganization because it would tie the MACV 

commander to the details of the Military Assistance Program and 

the various advisory activities and prevent key members of the 

MACV staff from assuming positions in contingency operations. 

Admiral Sharp believed that establishing separate Naval and Air 

Force advisory groups would be tantamount to setting up two new 

uniservice Military Assistance Advisory Groups. He rejected General 

Harkins' basic concept- MACV as a specified Army command 

reporting to the Joint Chiefs, rather than as a subordinate unified 

command reporting to the Commander in Chief, Pacific- in the 

belief that the unified effort in Vietnam needed to be strengthened, 

not diluted. Admiral Sharp also noted that the proposed reorganization would greatly increase General Harkins' span of controlfrom five major subordinate elements to twelve or more-thereby 

multiplying command problems instead of reducing them. 

Admiral Sharp proposed a more limited reorganization to the 

Joint Chiefs. He recommended that fie ld advisers in Vietnam come 

under the control of the Military Assistance Command instead of 

the Military Assistance Advisory Group, which could then be reduced. The advisory group could continue to handle all MAP 

activities, including detailed planning and programming, and to 
42 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

provide advisers to units- such 

as depots, schools, training centers, and administrative facilities- not directly involved in 

combat operations. 

Early in April 1964 the Joint 

Chiefs approved the reorganization essentially as proposed by 

Genera l Harkins. They did not, 

however, agree with his implied 

suggestion that MACV headqua rters become an Army specified command, although they 

recognized that the headquarters 

would be heavily staffed with 

Army person neL Finally, effective 15 May 1964, the Military 

GeNERAl. WESTMORELAND Assistan ce Advisory Croup was 

formally dissolved and the reorganized MACV headquarters was a uthorized. About a month later, 

on 20 June 1964, General William C. Westmoreland assumed command of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

Another organizational issue concerned research, development, 

testing, and evaluation activities in South Vietnam. Admiral Felt 

had proposed a consolidation of these operations in 1963, and in 

February 1964 the Joint Chiefs established the Joint Research and 

Test Activity. This organiza tion would control and supervise the 

several previously separate research and development agencies: 

the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency 

Research and Development Field Unit; the U.S. Army Concept 

Team in Vietnam; the Air Force Test Unit, Vietnam; and the 

J oint Operations Evaluation Group, Vietnam. With the reorganization of MACV headquarters, the J oint Rcsearch and Test Activity 

acted as a joint agency under the operational control of the MACV 

commander. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, however, retained 

genera l responsibility for all research, development, testing, evaluation, and combat development activities throughout the Pacific 

Command. 

Logistic Problems 

The logistic system in Vietnam had failed to keep pace with 

rapidly expanding and increasingly complex support requirements. 

Army units under the operational control of the Military Assistance 

Command continued to receive combat service su pport from the 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 43 

U.S. Army Support Command. The Navy's Headquarters, Support 

Activity, Saigon, established in 1962, continued to support MACV 

headquarters. Before the Military Assistance Advisory Group \ .... as 

dissolved, lhe support command assumed some of the logistic functions performed by the Army section, while the Navy's Support 

Activity in Saigon continued to provide countrywide support for 

Army advisory personnel. 

Although U.S. strength in Vietnam grew from about 16,000 

men (10,7 16 Army) to about 23,300 (16,000 Army) in 1964, logistic 

support operations were highly fragmented. Support for the U.S. 

Army came mainly from Okinawa and the continental United 

States; for the Marine Corps, from Japan and Okinawa; for the 

Navy, from the Philippines and Hawaii ; and for the Air Force, 

largely from the Philippines. For example, therc was no single 

logistic organization in Vietnam able to repair common-user items, 

such as vehicles, small arms, radios, generators, and office equipment. Transportation operations presented a particularly complex 

problem because personnel and equipment movements came under 

several transportation agencies. The search for ways to improve the 

logistic situation led to the next major change in the Army's command Slructure. 

The major deficiency in 10giSlic support operations in South 

Vietnam was the ahsence of an integrated logistic system. Although 

the Navy furnished logistic support to unified commands under the 

Pacific Command- a responsibility which Headquarters, Support 

Activity, Saigon, discharged for MACV headquarters- the Navy 

had neither the organizations nor the equipment to provide the 

growing level and diversity of support required. The Navy's support 

activity had been established in 1962 with duties limited to peacetime functions by the situation then existing in Vietnam, but it was 

not prepared to handle the kind and volume of support needed after 

1963. 

In addition to the support activity headquarters, the Navy was 

in charge of its own logistic system to support Navy personnel. 

Most Air Force logistic needs were filled by the 2d Air Division, and 

the Army was supplied by the U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam. 

Other smaller military logistic support systems, as well as those of 

nonmilitary U.S. government agencies, were also operating in 

Vietnam. Finally, there was a commercial logistic agency operated 

by suppliers of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, who delivered their 

products to U.S. and Vietnamese forces under various civilian contracts. In all, fifteen separate logistic systems supported operations 

in Vietnam, supplying more than 150 locations where Americans 

were stationed. The logistic system reRected a lack of advance 
44 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

planning . The absence of a central logistic agency resulted in confusion that could be remedied only by organizational changes. 

The 1st Logistical Command 

Although various improvements in the logistic organization 

had been considered previollsly, it was ead y 1964 before the principal commanders and service chiefs involved agreed that an Army 

logistic command was needed in Vietnam. When the U.S. Army 

Support Group was created in 1962, onc of its functions was to 

provide the nucleus fo r a lypc-B Army logistic command headquarters for contingency plans. When General Stilwell, the chief 

of the support group, a lso became the deputy Army component 

commander, his responsibilities increased to a point where his 

headquarters could not be expectcd to assumc the additional duties 

of a logistic command. To solve this problem, a separate Army 

logistic commapd, deployed to Vietnam, was proposed. 

Following a period of about three months, during which the 

strength, source of personnel, troop lists, and other related issues 

were worked out by the various headquarters concerned, Sec retary 

of Defensc McNamara approved the deployment of the 1st Logistica l 

Command from the United States. An engineer group and the 1st 

Logistical Command were assigned to General Stilwell's command, 

which had becn elevated from support group status to the U.S. 

Army Support Command, Vietnam, on 1 March 1964. 

The 1st Logistical Command was origi nally established as a 

reduced type-A command. This meant it could command an integrated organization with a total strength of 9,000- 15,000 men 

and could provide an orga nizational structure and a nucleus of 

trained logisticians and administrative pcrsonnel to support a major 

independent forcc of one reinforccd division, approximately 30,000 

mcn. Because of lhe U.S. buildup of forces in Vietnam, the 1st 

Logistical Command, on 10 July 1965, was authorizcd as a type-B 

command, onc step up from type A, with a strength of 5,930 men. 

In accord ance with its table of organization and equipment, this 

type of command could be augmented to a strengt h of 35,000-

60,000 men in order to support an independcnt corps command, 

approximately 100,000 troops. The initial mission of the 1 sl Logistical Command was to provide support for a ll U .S. Army forces. 

As it grew, lhe command was grad ually to take over the missions of 

Headqua rters, Support Activity, Saigon, and assume responsibility 

on a phased basis for common-user supply services to all organizations of the U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces south 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 45 

of Chu Lai. The Navy was assigned the same task in the sector 

north of Chu Lai as far as the Demilitarized Zone. 

By the end of 1965, in order to support lhe large number of U.S. 

combat elements introduced during the yea r, the strength of the 1st 

Logistical Command had increased to more than 22,000 menover four times the projected estimate made a year earlier. Head· 

quarters strength also grew from 159 men to 491. Toward the end 

of 1965 the 1 st Logistical Command was mainly concerned with 

sclling up subordinate logistic support areas at Qui Nhon, Nha 

Trang. and Vung Tau, and with developing the logistic depot and 

port complex at Cam Ranh Bay. The magnitude of the effort nceded 

to establish this logistic base prevented the developmelll of a com· 

mon·item supply system and the shift of support activity functions 

to the Army. 

Other Command organi~ations 

Beginning in March 1965, combat clements of the U.S. Marine 

Corps were deployed in the Da Nang area. When the I II Marine 

Amphibious Force was established at Da Nang on 6 May, its com· 

manding general, Major General William R. Collins, USMC, was 

designated the Naval component commander, a position prcviously 

held by the chief of the Naval Advisory Croup, MACV. Later in 

the year, Rear Admiral Norvell C. Ward was appointed Chief, 

Naval Advisory Group, MACV. Since Admiral Ward, and not 

General Collins, directed the Navy's advisory effort as well as its 

coastal surveillance force, General Westmoreland, for all practical 

purposes, had two Naval component commanders for most of 1965. 

On 25 June Major Gencral Joseph H. Moore, USAF, who 

commandcd the 2d Air Division and also served as the Air Force 

component commander, was made General Westmoreland's deputy 

commander for air operations at the grade of lieutenant general. 

Although Air Force and Navy advisers operated under their 

component commanders- subject to general directives from the 

MACV commander-there was no centra l direction or the Army's 

advisory effort. Army advisory clcments wcre widely dispersed. 

They served each of the four corps tactical zones of the Vietnamese 

Army, the ARVN Airborne Brigade, the Capital Military Region, 

and the Civilian Irregular Defensc Group. In all, nine Army ad· 

visory groups reported directly to General Westmoreland. 

On 10 July 1965, General Westmoreland's responsibility for 

military activities outside Vietnam was lessened when the positions 

of MACV commander and MAcrl-iAI commander werc separatcd. This action resulled from more than a year of discussions at 
46 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

the headquarters of the Pacific Command and at the Department 

of Defense. Military considerations- that Southeast Asia was a 

strategic entity and that fragmentation of command responsibilities 

would viola te the basic principle of unity of command- tended to 

support continued adherence to a central command. Political considerations, on the other hand, such as Thailand's complaint that 

U.S. forces in Thailand were commanded from Saigon, suggested 

separation. The case for separation prevailed, and Major General 

Ernest F. Easterbrook, who was at the time both the deputy commander of MACrH A I and the chief of the Military Assistance 

Group in Thailand, was appointed Commander, Military Assistance 

Command, Thailand. General Easterbrook retained his position as 

chief of the assistance group in Thailand, and by the end of 1965 

both headquarters were consolidated into one. 

In early J une 1965 a contingent of Australian and New Zealand 

forces arrived in Vie tnam. Both were placed under General Westmoreland's operational control and attached to the 173d Airborne 

Brigade. Thus the precedent of placing Frce World forces under 

the operational control of General Westmoreland was established 

and, later, followed by other nations. At no time, however, did 

Genera l Westmoreland cxercise operationa l control over the South 

Vietnamese armed forces. 

The major buildup of U.S. Army combat forces and support 

activities that had begun early in 1965 required yet another reorganization. An Army headquarters was needed in Vietnam with 

capabilities fa r exceeding those of a logistical command. The issue 

of a separate Army component command was revived and eventuaJly led to the decision to upgrade the U.S. Army Support Command and establish U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), in J uly 1965. 
CHAPTER III 

The Buildup of U.S. Forces: 

July 1965-July 1966 

In the Vietnam War, 1965 was a ycar of grave decisions. The 

North Vietnamese regarded the ycar as the beginning of the war's 

final phase, during which the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

was to be destroyed by direct military action and the government 

and the people of South Vietnam were to lose their will to fight. 

The Communist hopes came close to being realized: the Saigon 

government had been weakened by a series of coups following the 

1963 overthrow of President Diem; the Vietnamese armed forces 

had suffered a series of defeats that led to widespread demoralization; and government control, especially in the countryside, was 

eroding. The Viet Cong were expanding their power within the 

country, and beginning in 1965 the first North Vietnamese Army 

units in regimental strength were moving into the Central High· 

lands region. Enemy infiltration from the north was increasing and 

had reached a rate of more than one thousand men per month. 

At this critical juncture, U.S. authorities came to the can· 

elusion that the Vietnamese armed forces would no longer be able 

to contain the rising military threat to the security of their country 

without extensive additional military and economic assistance. 

This assistance, Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor and General 

Westmoreland recommended, would have to include commitment 

of U.S. ground combat forces. President Lyndon B. J ohnson decided to stand firmly behind the South Vietnamese people and 

defeat Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Thus the year 

1965, for the United States, was the year of military commitment. 

The crucial events that occurred between July 1965 and July 

1966 greatly affected the command and control arrangements in 

Vietnam. The rapid buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the initiation of combat operations by U.S. forces, the expansion of logistical 

support operations, and the introduction of Free World Military 

Assistance Forces in a combat and combat support role all contributed to changes in a command structure that had originally 

been designed to accommodate only a U.S. military assistance 

mission. 
48 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR 

Essentially, there was no 

c hange in the role a nd function 

of the U.S. Ambassador to Viet· 

nam. Genera l T aylor continued 

to have over-all responsibility 

fa r all U.S. activities in Vietnam. 

To assist the ambassador and to 

provide a mechanism fo r high 

level co-ordina tion and discussion, the Mission Council had 

been formed in Jul y 1964. The 

Mission Council consisted of the 

senior officials of the civil and 

military elements of the U.S. 

Mission meeting together on a 

weekly basis. Under the chairmanship of the ambassador, 

there was frank and complete 

discussion of problems and proposa ls covering the entire range 

of U.S. activities. General Westmoreland advised the council on military developments and 

plans. New U.S. plans and programs were often proposed to senior 

Vietnamese officials as they met periodically with the Mission 

Council. Thus the Mission Council was the policy-forming body 

of the United States in Saigon and gave co-ordinated guidance 

and direction to all U.S. agencies in South Vietnam. 

As mentioned earlier, doctrine for the U.S. armed forces prescribed a separa te Army component commander subordinate to 

the unified commander; but as early as 1963 military planners had 

determined that an Army component headquarters wou ld be unnecessary and redundant. I nstead, the joint force commander, 

acting either as a U.S. or combined commander, should also be 

his own Army componen t commander. An important consideration supporting this arrangement was the desire to align the U.S. 

military structure in South Vietnam with that of the Vietnamese 

armed forces. Sil.ce their J oint General Staff exercised operational 

control over the Vietnamese Army forces in the field, wh ile headquarters of the Vietnamese Army had command less operational 

control, it was logical and practical for the MACV commander 

similarly to reta in opera tiona l control of U.S. Army forces. 

As a result, General H a rkins, the MACV commander, had been 

designated the Army component commander in August 1963, and 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 49 

AMERICAN EMBASSY A NNEX B UILDING O N H AM.NelII B OULEVARD IN DowNT(Y. ... N 

SAIGON 

the commander of the U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, 

Brigadier Ceneral Joseph W. Stilwell, had been appointed the 

deputy Army component commander. General Harkins thus exer· 

cised direct operational control over U.S. Army forces in Vietnam, 

while Ceneral Stilwel1 retained command less operational control. 

In March 1964, when the support group was redesignated U.S. 

Army Support Command, Vietnam, this arrangement continued 

uncha nged. 

u.s. Am!)" Vietnam 

In late 1964 and early 1965, when a major buildup of U.S. 

Army ground combat forces was imminent, planners from U.S. 

Army, Pacific, and the Department of the Army began to restudy 

current command arrangements. The ever.growing responsibilities 

of the Army Support Command, especially its duties as the U.S. 

Army component headquarters, precluded its reorganization into 

a logistical command, as envisaged in contingency plans. The ob· 
50 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

vious solUlion was to establish a separate logistical command. These 

developments strengthened the arguments of planners who wanted 

an Army headquarters to command U.S. Army ground forces. 

10 view of the possible deployment of major Army ground com~ 

bat forces to Vietnam, the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. 

J ohnson, recommended to the Joint Chiefs in March 1965 that a 

sepa l'ate U.S. Army component command, under the operational 

control of the MACV commander, be established in Vietnam. Under 

his proposal, admi nistrative and logistical functions concerning 

U.S. Army activities wou ld be transferred from MACV headquarters to the new component command; the Army advisory 

effort would be similarly shifted, although the MACV commander 

would retain operational COntrol. Under this arrangement, the 

Military Assistance Command would be relieved of administrative 

functions not directly related to comba t or tactical operations. 

The Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Sharp, and the 

MACV commander, Genera l Westmoreland, both opposed General 

J ohnson'S recommendation. On the other hand, MACV's Chief 

of Staff, Major General Richard G. Stilwell, held that an Army 

component command would prove to be a valuable co·ordinating 

link between the Military Assistance Command, the U.S. Army, 

Pacific, and the U.S. Army Support Command. 

Through July 1965 there was a constant exchange of views 

between General Westmoreland and General John K. Waters, 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, concerning the establishment of a separate Army component command under the 

Military Assistance Command. General Waters favored an Army 

component command with its own commander. General Westmoreland, however, made the following proposals: that the U.S. Army 

Support Command be redesignated U.S. Army, Vietnam 

(USARV); that he personally retain the responsibilities of the Army 

component commander and be made Commanding General, U.S. 

Army, Vietnam; that the incumbent commanding general of the 

U.S. Army Support Command be redesignated Deputy Commanding General, USARV; and that all Army units deployed to Vietnam 

be assigned to the USARV headquarters. Genera l Westmoreland 

further recommended the establishment of several Army corpslevel headquarters in Vielnam which, under his operational control, 

would conduct U.S. combat operations in their respective tactical 

zones. Westmoreland's proposals were approved by General Waters 

and the Department of the Army, and on 20 July 1965 a letter of 

instruction from U.S. Army, Pacific, headquarters spelled out the 

new command relationship. 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 51 

The appointment of Genera l Westmoreland as USARV's 

commanding general was a step away from the creation of a true 

Army component command. Although the MACV commander 

had been the Army component commander since August 1963, 

the senior Army headquarters in Vietnam had had its own <.:om· 

manding general. With the change of July 1965, both positions 

were occupied by the same individual, Genera l Westmoreland. 

Thus he was put in the position of having to serve two masters: the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Army, Pacific. Similarly, U.S. Army organizations in Vietnam 

were responsible to the head of the Military Assistance Command 

for combat operations and to the commander in chief of U.S. Army, 

Pacific, for Army matters. The overlapping chains of command 

resu lted in duplication and confusion within the MACV- USARV 

structure. 

The command structure which evolved in Viell1am during 

1965 bore striking resemblance to Army command arrangements 

that had existed in the Pacific and Europe during World War 11 

and in the Korean War. During World War 11 General Douglas 

MacArthur had been both Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific 

Area, and Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the FalEast, the Army componcnt. Operational control of U.S. Army com· 

bat forces had rested with Genera l MacArthur as the commander 

of thc Southwest Pacific Area, a position analogous to that of the 

MACV commandcr. Far East headquarters, however, had retained 

operational control over certain combat support and combat service 

support units not directly involved in the combat areas. The same 

situation had existed in Europe, where General Dwight D. Eisen· 

hower, as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, had 

retained operational control over U.S. Army combat fo rces. General 

Eiscnhower had also been his own Army component commander as 

commanding general of the European Theater of Operations. 

During the Korean War General MacArthur had served as 

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander 

in Chief, Far East. As such he had exercised direct operational control over U.S. Army combat forces in Korea. He had exercised com· 

mand less operational control of all U.S. Army organizations in his 

role of Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, a command generally analogous to U.S. Army Forces in the Far East 

and the European Theater of Operations in World War II and to 

U.S. Army, Vietnam. This arrangement had prevailed until after 

the prisoner of war riots at Koje-do in 1952, when General Mark 

Clark succeeded MacArthur as the Far East commander in chief 
52 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

HEADQ.UARTERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, VU?TNAM 

and established a separate Army component- Army Forces, Far 

East. This arrangement lasted until the fighting slopped in 1953. 

Field Forces, Vietnam 

In March 1965 General Westmoreland had advised Admiral 

Sharp that if major U.S. ground combat forces were to be deployed 

to Vietnam, a combined corps-level field command would be 

needed. The MACV commander also indicated that he tentatively 

planned to designate his deputy as the commander of such a headquarters. Following discussions between the Military Assistance 

Command, the U.S. Army, Pacific, the Pacific Command, the 

Department of the Army, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary 

of Defense McNamara in mid-May approved a combined field 

forces headquarters in Vietnam under the deputy MACV com· 

mander. However, further debate between the interested head· 

quarters postponed its activation. Eventually, the Joint Chiefs ap· 

proved deployment of a U.S. Army corps headquarters to Vietnam 

and directed the Army Chief of Staff, General Johnson, to develop 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 53 

the necessary plans. There were two main reasons for adopting the 

term "field force" rather than "corps" for the tactical corps-level 

headquarters about to be introduced into South Vietnam. First, as 

General Westmoreland pointed out, since the new headquarters 

was to operate in conformance with existing South Vietnamese 

corps zones, having two corps designations--one American and one 

South Vietnamese-in the same tactical zone would have been 

confusing. Second, the standard U.S. corps headquarters was a 

fixed organization. Field forces headquarters, on the other hand, 

would be more flexible and could be tailored to fit precisely the 

individual mission and could be adjusted to future changes, notably 

to further expansion of the U.S. effort. 

Late in June, after further debate, the Joint Chiefs concluded 

that the field forces headquarters should be joint instead of Army. 

The Joint Chiefs believed that WeSlmoreland's plans envisaged 

control by this headquarters over U.S. and Free World ground 

combat organizations in both the I and I I Corps Tactical Zones, 

thereby bringing the forces of the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, 

and Republic of Korea under one tactical corps-level command. 

The J oint Chiefs therefore directed Admiral Sharp, the Pacific 

commander in chief, to plan the organization of a joint field forces 

headquarters and to COlllinue planning for the activation of a 

combined corps-level headquarters. 

These instructions were confusing because two separate concepts for the field forces headquarters were entangled. In an effort 

to e1arify the situation, GeneraJ Westmoreland explained to Admiral Sharp that he intended the headquarters to be evolutionary. 

In the beginning, the field forces headquarters would be a small, 

provisional organization, to be known as Task Force Alpha, and 

would control only U.S. Army forces in the Jl Corps Tactical 

Zone. After the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) reached Vietnam, 

Task Force Alpha would be expanded and designated Field Forces, 

Vietnam. In the event that Marine Corps forces in the I Corps 

Tactical Zone should come under the COOlrol of Field Forces, Vietnam, the headquarters could be augmented by Marine personnel. 

Ceneral Westmoreland contended that the headquarters should 

not include Navy or Air Force representation, since the support 

provided by these services would continue to be controlled by the 

Military Assistance Command. Westmoreland's proposal was 

adopted by the Joint Chiefs, and on 1 August 1965 Brigadier 

General Paul F. Smith temporarily assumed command of the newly 

activated Task Force Alpha until the arrival of the designated commander, Major General Stanley R. Larsen, on 4 August. 
54 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

The Military Assistance Command gave the task force two mis~ 

sions: to exercise operational control over designated U.S. and 

Free World units and to provide combat support to South Vietnamese armed forces. In co-ordination with the Vietnamese commanding generals of the 11 and I r I Corps, Task Force Alpha would 

participate in the defense of U.S. and Vietnamese installations, 

conduct unilateral or combined offensive operations, and mail1lain 

close liaison with MACV's scIliol' advisers at Vietnamese corps, 

division, and sector (province) levels. These advisers would be the 

task force's principal points of contact with Vietnamese troops. 

General Westmoreland emphasized that the relationship between 

the commanding general of the task force and the Vietnamese 

Army corps commanders would be one of co-ordination and cooperation. 

Task Force Alpha was redesignated Field Forces, Vietnam, on 

25 September 1965, as plans were being made for a second Army 

corps-level headquarters in Vietnam. This plan was approved by 

Secretary or Derense McNamara in December 1965, and Field 

Forces, Vietnam, was redesignated I Field Force, Vietnam. The 

new corps-level headquarters was designated I I Field Force, Vietnam, and assigned responsibility for the III Corps zone. 

The U.s. Marine Corps 

Viet Cong attacks against U.S. installations at Pleiku and Qui 

Nhon early in 1965 had prompted President Johnson to order the 

evacua tion of all dependents or U.s. government officials in Vietnam. Meanwhile, General Westmoreland and the J oint Chiefs 

discussed sending a Marine expeditionary brigade and additional 

Army rorces to Da Nang and other critical locations in Vietnam. 

The Joint Chiers recommended to Secretary McNamara that the 

Marine brigade be committed and that additional Air Force tactical 

squadrons be moved to the western Pacifie and to Vietnam. General 

Westmoreland agreed, but he advised Admiral Sharp and the 

J oint Chiefs that more security rorces might be needed, especially 

in Da Nang, in the Saigon-Bien Hoa- Vung Tau area, and in the 

Nha Trang-Cam Ranh Bay complex. There had been some discussion between General Westmoreland, Admiral Sharp, and the 

Joint Chiefs ovcr the possibility of sending the Army's 173d Airborne Brigade instead of the Marine's brigade. The 9th Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade was selected, however, and the leading 

elements went ashore on 8 March. The original mission or the 

brigade was entirely security-oriented, and the force was directed 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 55 

not to engage III day-to-day offensive operations against the Viet 

Cong. 

Early in March t 965, General Westmoreland proposed a significant change in basic U.S. policy in Vietnam. In response to an 

inquiry from the joim Chiefs of Staff, the MACV commander 

noted that the only way to forestall a Viet CoOng take-over of the 

country- except in the major population centers thaI were under 

the control of the government of Vietnam- was to commit additional U.S. and Free World forces. These forces would have to be 

prepared to perform whatever military operations were needed. 

General Westmoreland's proposal was supported by Admiral Sharp 

and the joint Chiefs, and in the next several weeks an accclerated 

planning effort was undertaken involving all foul' service departments, as well as the joint Chiefs, Admiral Sharp, and General 

Wesunorcland. The resulting strategy, to be carried out by the 

Pacific Command, called for U.S. forces to secure coastal enclaves 

from which they could engage in operations against the enemy in 

co-ordination with the Vietnamese armed forces, and where they 

could build major logistical bases to support future combined offensive operations. Strategy also dictated that the following force 

groupings be sent to Vietnam: a U.S. Marine Corps division (supported by an air wing), tentatively designated III Marine Expeditionary Force, to be deployed in the I Corps Tactica l Zone; and 

U.S. Army and Free World forces, to be deployed in the II and I II 

Corps areas. Such an arrangement would provide for a comparatively simple operational chain of command extending directly 

from the Military Assistance Command to the III Marine Expeditionary Force in the I Corps zone, and to the two Army field fO I'ces 

headquarters in the Vietnamese II and III Corps zones. 

Late in 1965 these plans were modified to include two U.S. 

Marine Corps divisions and their organic air wings in the I Corps 

Tactical Zone under the commanding general of the II I Marine 

Amphibious Force, as well as additional U.S. Army forces for the 

II and I II Corps zones. The basic concept for operational comrol 

of these forces remained unchanged. In South Vietnam the Ma rine 

Corps would be responsible for a geographic area of operations 

equivalent to the I Corps Tactical Zone under the operational 

control of Genera l Westmoreland, while the U.S. Army would have 

similar assignments in II and II I Corps zones. In the Mekong Delta 

the existing advisory structure remained in force. With the exception of some modifications for the delta area-the Vietnamese IV 

Corps Tactical Zone-these arra ngements prevailed until the 1968 

Tet offensive, which prompted significant U.s. reinforcemen t of 

the I Corps Tactical Zone. (Chart 5) 
56 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

CIIART 5-Mn.ITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, 1965 

s.",,,, R'''''fe~ 'N w., ~ 1' ... 1 ..... (. , ./ JO J"'" 1966) by Ad,ni,.l U.S. G,an. Sharp. USN, and Cen •• al 

Willi.m C. W",mo,..d.nd, USA (W.uhinBl0n: 1009), S..'ion II. Chap'.' Ill, p. 102. 

Organization of Advisory Effort 

Command and control of U.S. military advisers was exercised 

in two separate and distinc t ways. For Navy and Air Force ad~ 

visers, the chain of command ended with the respective service 

component commanders at the MACV leveL In the case of the 

Navy, the commander of the Naval Advisory Group reported 

directly to the Naval component commander, who was the Com. 

mander, U.S. Nava l Forces, Vietnam; a si ngle individual filled 

both positions. In the case of the Air Force, the chief of the Air 

Force Advisory Group a t MACV headquarters was also the commanding general of the 2d Air Division as well as the Air Force 

component commander in Vietnam. In other words, the advisory 

efforts of the Navy and the Air Force were under the operational 

control of their rcspective service component commanders, who 

received direction and guidance from General Wcstmorel and. 

Army advisers, on the other hand, were under the operational 

control of the MACV commandcr. During 1965 a total of nine U.S. 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 57 

Army advisory groups reported directly to General Westmoreland, 

the M..<\CV commander, rather than to the headquarters of the 

Army component commander, U.S. Army, Vietnam. These groups 

included separate advisory elements for the ARVN Airborne 

Brigade; the Regional and Popular Forces; the Railway Security 

Advisory Detachment; the Capital Military Region ; the Civilian 

Irregular Defense Group, advisory effort of the 5th Special Forces 

Group; and each of the fOllr Vietnamese Army corps. 

With the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces and the 

establishment of U.S. Army corps-levet headquarters in South 

Vietnam, modifications in the COlllrol of U.S. Army advisory efforts became essential. Following the arrival of the III Marine 

Amphibious Force in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the advisory group 

to the I Corps was placed under the operational control of the commanding general of the Marine amphibious force, who was designated the senior adviser to the 1 Vietnamese Corps commander. 

The previous senior adviser, an Army colonel, became the deputy 

senior adviser. In practice this new arrangement caused few changes, 

since the deputy senior adviser continued to operate much as he 

had in the past, employing both U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

officers and enlisted men as advisers. At the headquarters of the I II 

Marine Amphibious Force, the advisory effort thus could not be 

considered a fully integrated operation within the command structure. 

To the south, in the II and III Corps zones of the Vietnamese 

Army, similar arrangements developed. In the II Corps, aftcr Task 

Force Alpha had been formed and given operational control of 

all U.S. forces, Army advisory personnel remained under MACV's 

operational control. When the task force was replaced by Field 

Forces, Vietnam, the Vietnamese J I Corps' commanding general 

expressed annoyance that the senior U.S. Army officer in his area, 

who was the commanding genera l of the Field Forces, was not also 

his senior adviser. Accordingly, in October 1965, General Larsen, 

the Field Forces' commander, was appointed the senior adviser 

to the II Corps' commanding general; and- as was the case with 

the I II Marine Amphibious Force- the former senior adviser, a lso 

an Army colonel, became the deputy senior adviser. The same 

arrangements were made in the III Corps zone, with the commanding general of the I st Infantry Division acting as the senior 

adviser. 

Since no major U.S. forces were introduced into the IV Corps 

area, the advisory group there continued under the operationa l 

control of the MACV commander, General Westmorcland. 
58 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

COlltrol rif U.S. Operating Forces 

Throughout 1965, control of all U.S. Air Force elements in 

Vietnam was exercised by the service's component commander. 

The commanding general of the 2d Air Division, Lieutenant 

General Joseph H. Moore, was both the component commander 

and the chief of the U.S. Air Force Advisory Group at MACV 

headquarters. In May 1965 General Moore was designated General 

Westmoreland's deputy commander for air operations, a position 

not to be confused with the Deputy Commander, Military As~ 

sistancc Command, who had always been an Army general officer. 

Air operations against North Vietnam were controlled by the 

Pacific commander in chief through the commander of the Pacific 

Air Forces and, in the case of U.S. Navy air forces, through the 

commander of the Pacific Fleet. Thus General Moore exercised 

operational control over Air Force units in Southeast Asia as directed 

by the Pacific Air Forces commander; for air operations over South 

Vietnam, he was guided by directives from General Westmoreland. 

At the beginning of 1965, the component commander for U.S. 

naval forces in Vietnam was also the chief of MACV's Naval Advisory Group. With the arrival of Marine Corps ground combat 

forces in March, the commanding general of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade became the naval component commander; 

the commanding general of the III Marine Amphibious Force 

assumed this role when his headquarters came ashore in May. This 

arrangement was modified after the Coasta l Surveillance Force 

(TF tiS) was created in July. Both the advisory group and the 

Coastal Surveillance Force then came under the Chief, Naval 

Advisory Group, whose title became Commander, U.S. Naval 

Forces, Vietnam- Chief, Naval Advisory Group. Thus, General 

Westmoreland actually had two naval component commanders: 

one for conventional Navy forces and one for Marine Corps elements. 

Except for the Marine Corps command, the arrival of additional U.S. Navy and Air Force troops caused no significant change 

in the existing command and control structure in Vietnam. With 

each of these two services organized as a separate component under 

the Military Assistance Command, the respective commanders reported directly to General Westmoreland for operational matters 

and through their service chains of command for all other matters. 

Throughout 1965, as in t 964, General Westmoreland had subordinate Air Force and Navy component commanders in South 

Vietnam but acted as his own Army component commander. The 

Air Force and Navy component commanders had operational con-
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 59 

trol over their component forces, as General Westmoreland had 

over Army forces. This arrangement was compatible with the com· 

mand and control system of the Vietnamese Army, in which opera· 

tional control of army forces rested with the South Vietnamese 

Joint General Staff. 

Co·ordination with Vietnamese and Fru World Forces 

Before the Free World Military Assistance Forces came to 

Vietnam, there had been no need for a combined or multinational 

command. As U.S. and other Free World forces began arriving in 

South Vietnam in April 1965, however, General Westmoreland 

recommended establishing a small, combined U.S.- South Viet· 

namesc headquarters, commanded by a U.S. general officer with 

a Vietnamese deputy or chief of staff. For political reasons, General 

Westmoreland believed that such a headquarters would have to be 

introduced gradually and quietly. He also recommended forming 

an international military security task force as a low·leve1 com· 

bined staff in the Da Nang area. 

The idea of a combined command appeared to be favored by 

senior Vietnamese commanders when it was first suggested in 

April 1965. This attitude, however, was soon replaced by extreme 

sensitivity to the subject. When this change became apparent, the 

United States no longer pursued the matter of a combined com· 

mand, and General Westmoreland withdrew his earlier recom· 

mendations, including those concerning the security task force. 

Instead, U.S. field commanders were instructed to work with Vietnamese commanders on the basis of co-operation and co-ordination, rather than through a traditional combined command arrangement. To ensure close liaison with the Military Assistance 

Command, General Westmoreland appointed Brigadier General 

James L. Collins, Jr., as his special representative to the Joint 

General Staff of the Vietnamese armed forces. 

Only in the area of intelligence was there a combined or integrated effort between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. To take the best advantage of the resources of both, four combined intelligence centers were 

formed: the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV); Combined 

Military Interrogation Center; Combined Document Exploitation 

Center; and Combined Materiel Exploitation Center. CICV prepared 

intelligence reports for both U.S. and Vietnamese commands, and the 

other three exploited enemy prisoners, documents, and materiel. As U.S. 

troop strength rose and military operations became more extensive, the 

number of enemy documents, prisoners, and deserters increased. Consequently, the volume of intelligence data also grew. Pooling the 
60 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

resources at the Combined Intelligence Center, therefore, permitted 

a more efficient usc of the limited number of specialists and a faster 

dissemination of information. 

The introduction of Free World Military Assistance Forces into 

South Vietnam raised the question of their command and control. 

Two separate arrangements werc developed. For troops provided 

by countries other than the Republic of Korea, operational control 

rested with the U.S. military commander in whose area these troops 

werc used. In the case of the South Korean forces, a compromise 

was worked out between U.S., Korean, and Vietnamese officials 

by which these forces would remain under their own control, within 

the limits established by a council to be known as the Free World 

Military Assistance Council. The council consisted of the MACV 

commander, the commander of the Republic of Korea Forces, 

Vietnam, and the chief of the Vietnamcse Joint Gencral Staff, 

who served as chairman. 

LAgislie Support 

As early as 1962 the MACV commander had seen the need for 

a central logistical organization in South Vietnam and had recom· 

mended that a U.S. Army logistical command be scnt to Vietnam. 

It was late April 1965, however, before the Secretary of Defense 

formally approved the establishment of an Army logistical command for Vietnam. On 10 July 1965, the 1st Logistical Command 

was authorized as a full-strength, type-B command. By the end of 

the year the command had gro\vn from 5,930 men to more than 

22,000. It supported all U.S. and Free World forces south of Chu 

Lai. The sector to the north was a Navy responsibility. 

Communieations-Eleclronies 

During the initial buildup phase, communications systems in 

Vietnam were inadequate to perform the tasks facing the Military 

Assistance Command. Early in 1965, General Westmoreland, in 

conjunction with the director of the Defense Communications 

Agency. Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird, requested a can· 

solidation of communications-electronics functions at the MACV 

level. This proposal was approved by the J oint Chiefs of Staff 

in April 1965; an office of the Defense Communications Agency 

would be established in Vietnam under the MACV Communications-Electronics Directorate (J- 6). 

To supplement this joint management, all Army communications-electronics resources in Vietnam were combined in a single 

command, the 1st Signal Brigade. Established in April 1966, it 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 61 

supported the combat signal battalions of the divisions and field 

forces in eaeh corps area. Additionally, the 1st Signal Brigade 

operated the many clements of the Defense Communications 

System in Vietnam. To improve co-ordination and management 

of communications-electronics assets, the commander of the 1st 

Signal Brigade also served as the U.S. Army, Vietnam, staff adviser on all matters pertaining to Anny communications-electronics. 

Arwlysis 

Command and control in Vietnam has been a matter of controversy since U.S. ground forces were introduced in 1965. Critics 

have contended that the Vietnam War required clearer lines of 

command authority and greater subordination of individual service 

efforts to the control of a single commander. From among their 

recommended improvements, three significant alternative command structures emerged: a single combined command exercising 

operational control of 311 Free World forces, including the South 

Vietnamese; a separate unified command, directly subordinate to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, controlling all U.S. forces in Vietnam; and 

a separate U.S. Army component command, under the Military 

Assistance Command, exercising operational control of all U.S. 

ground forces in the Vietnam conflict. 

A combined command offered significant advantages in major 

combat operations, was supportcd by precedents sct in World War 

II and KOI·ca, and applied thc principle of unity of command. 

However, the nature of the Victnam conflict and the international 

political situation when the United States initiated combat operations were such that the benefits of a "supreme allied command" 

would have bccn cancelcd out by charges of U.S. colonialism and 

by difficulties inherent in a future reduction of U.S. forces. A major 

obstacle to a combined command arrangement was the reluctance 

of South Vietnam and South Korea to relinquish sovereignty over 

their armed forces. General Westmoreland recognized these problems. His decision to forgo the advantages of a combined command 

has been proven sound by subsequent events. 

The proponents of a separate unified command contended that 

eliminating the Commander in Chief, Pacific, from the chain of 

command would have simplified the direction of the war from 

Washington and eased the burdens of the commander in Vietnam. 

Thit argument was refuted by General Westmoreland, who maintained that the dUlies performed by the Commander in Chief, 

Pacific, and the service component commanders allowed him to 

focus his primary attention on operations in Vielnam, while his 
62 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

MACV HEADQUARTERS Co~ ... t.EX NEAR TAN SON NHUT, 1969. 

lines of communication to the rear were secured and managed by 

the Pacific Command. A morc valid objection to this proposition, 

however, was the fact that the war in Vietnam could not be considered as an isolated conflict. While the ground fighting was 

largely confined to South Vietnam, the threat of hostilities elsewhere in Southeast Asia required a contingency planning and 

response capability available only to the Commander in Chief, 

Pacific. Therefore, only a division of responsibility between the 

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command. and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, ensured effective management of the war 

in South Vietnam and preparedness for other contingencies in 

Southeast Asia. 

Early creation of a U.S. Army component under the Military 

Assistance Command, with operational control of combat forces 

and responsibility for fighting the ground war, might have been 

preferable to existing command arrangements. During 1964 and 

1965, however, the advantages of such an arrangement were not 

evident. U.S. ground combat forces were originally introduced to 

provide security for an existing organization. Only after the silua· 
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES 63 

tion deteriorated were these forces compelled to conduct limited 

offensive operations. Genera l Westmoreland had the choice either 

to retain the established and satisfactory method of operation, or 

to create an additional command headquarters between his MACV 

headquarters and the combat forces. He decided to retain the existing arrangement and to exercise operational control personally, 

not only because th is method worked but also because his command 

was designed to match the organization of the Vietnamese armed 

forces. The absence of a combined command in Viet.nam made 

co-operation and co-ordination among Free World forces a primary 

concern. From the U.S. point of view, co-operation and co-ord ination could be maintained effectively only if the Military Assistance 

Command, like its Victnamese counterpart the Joint General Staff, 

had full operational control of ground forces, and liaison bctween 

the twO commanders was as close as possible. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Continuing Buildup : 

July 1966-July 1969 

By mid-I966 U.S. forces in South Vietnam numbered about 

276,000 men, 166,000 of them Army. In March the headquarters 

of II Field Force, Vietnam, had been activated under the command 

of Major General Jonathan O. Seaman at the same lime that 

Major Ceneral Stanley R. Larsen's headquarters was redesignated 

I Field Force, Vietnam. In April 1966 the 2d Air Division was 

elevated to Seventh Air Force, and U.S. Naval forces, Vietnam, 

was established. With these changes, the command structure had 

matured to its full growth and henceforth was to undergo adaptation rather than major structural change until well after President 

Nixon announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces in June 1969. 

(Cha<' 6) 

PaciflCatiQrl 

A major organizational development during this period was 

the consolidation of the efforts of all U.S. agencies involved in 

Vietnamese pacification programs. Centralization of many diverse 

programs did not come easily, quickly, or even completely, but 

observers realized that a united effort was necessary in order to 

achieve better co-ordination among U.S. military and civilian 

agencies concerned with pacification. Especially important to 

success in this effort was the development of an organization tha t 

could effectively direct all programs after they were brought under 

the over-all control of the Military Assistance Command in the 

spring of 1967. 

Shortly before General Westmoreland became the MACV commander he visited Kua la Lumpur, Ma laya, in the company of Sir 

Roben G. K . Thompson, head of tbe British Advisory Mission to 

Vietnam, Alfred M. Hurt, Director of the United States Overseas 

Mission (later designated the U.S. Agency for International Development), and Barry Zorthian, head of tbe Joint U.S. Publie 

Affairs Office in Vietnam. The group spent several days studying 

the organization and techniques used by British and Ma layan 

leaders during the Communist insUl·gency in the 1 950s. On-thc-
CONTINUING BUILDUP 65 

AMBASSADOR LODGE 

spot observations eonfirmed the 

assumption that unity of command in the U.S. pacification 

effort in Vietnam was needed 

at the province level. Essentially, a single American " team 

captain" was required, who 

would act as the principal adviser to the province chief and 

be in charge of both civil and 

military matters. 

Although the Vietnamese 

and the Americans were aware 

that successful pacification required both the restoration of 

security and the development 

of the nation, progress toward 

these objectives had been 

limited during t 964 and 1965. 

In 1965 the Vietnamese 

changed the term "pacification" to "rural reconstruction" and 

later to "rural construction." By the end of the year they had developed the concept of rural construction cadres. These cadres were 

to consist of highly motivated, specia lly trained teams that would 

move into hamlets, defend them, and initiate development programs. A decision was made to train eighty of these teams in 1966. 

While the Vietnamese were attempting to make their pacification efforts more effective, the Americans were striving to improve 

U.S. suppOrt of these activities. The total U.S. effort involved 

several independent civil agencies as well as the military, but U.S. 

actions were not well co-ordinated. In January 1966 a meeting 

was held near Washington, D.C., to study ways of improving U.S. 

support for rural construction activities. Senior representatives from 

all agencies of the U.S. Mission in Saigon, from the Washington 

Vietnam Coordinating Committee, and from other U.S. government agencies attended. The meeting revealed that all agencies 

recognized the need for improved co-ordination of U.S. pacification 

efforts and that they favored the development of pacification and 

the training of cadres. Shortly thereafter, Ambassador Henry Cabot 

Lodge appointed Deputy Ambassador William J . Porter as coordinator of U.S. activities in support of rural construction and 

charged him to reconcile roles and duties within the U.S. Mission. 

In February 1966 the Vietnamese Minislry of Rural Construction was redesignated the M inistry of Construction to dispel the 
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68 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

mistaken idea that urban areas were excluded from this agency's 

concern. Because the Vietnamese translation did not make this 

distinction clear, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky coined the term "revolutionary development" (RD) to describe the mission of the ministry. In morc definitive terms, the U.S. and Vietnamese governments agreed on the following sta tement: 

RD is Ihe integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate and 

expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those coordinated military 

and civil actions to liberate the people from Viet Cong control; restore 

public security; iniliatc political, economic and social development; exlend effective Government of Vietnam authority; and win the willing 

support of people toward these ends. 

In order to consolidate the U.s. civilian pacification effort 

further, Ambassador Lodge established the Omce of Civil Operations in November 1966. L. Wade Lathram was named the first 

director; he was responsible to Deputy Ambassador Porter for U.S. 

civilian activities in support of revolutionary development and U.S. 

civil operations in the pacification program. At the same lime, 

General Westmoreland elevated the MACV Revolutionary Developmenl SuppOrt Division (created in late 1964 to co-ordinate 

military suppOrt of pacification) to direClorate level, increased the 

sta ff, and named a general officer as director. To strengthen civilmilitary co-ordination, Major Genera l Paul F. Smith was put in 

charge of revolutionary development in the office of Deputy Ambassador Porter. He was directly responsible for maintaining liaison 

with the Military Assistance Command in matters perta ining to U.S. 

and Vietnamese military suPPOrt of the program. Directors for 

four regions- the Vietnamese corps areas-were appointed by 

Ambassador Lodge in December 1966. General Westmoreland 

directed the commanding genera ls of the III Marine Amphibious 

Force and of the I and I I Field Forces and the senior adviser to the 

IV Corps to give all necessary assistance to the regional directors. 

Despite these measures, effective integration of civil and military 

activities in support of the revolutionary development program remained an elusive goa l. A major problem was the lack of personnel 

in the civilian agencies-the J oint U.S. Public Affairs Office, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of the 

Special Assistant-to work at the province (sector) and district 

(subsector) levels. In fact, the only permanent U.S. advisers at the 

district level were those of the Military Assistance Command. 

It was at the district and province levels that pacification had 

to begin and be made to work. Since military advisers were predominant at those levels and pacification depended on military 
CONTINUING BUILDUP 

security, integration of the civil· 

ian and military efforts was 

essential. Realizing this urgent 

need, President Johnson, in can· 

ferences with President Thieu 

and other South Vietnamese 

leaders at Guam in March 1967, 

decided to integrate the civilian 

and military U.S. support efforts 

under General Westmoreland. 

This decision heralded a major 

change in U.S. command arrangements that would have a 

lasting effect on the combined 

pacification effort. 

On the part of the United 

States, the first organizational 

and personnel changes came 

with the arrival in Saigon of AMBASSAOOR BUNKER. 

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 

69 

who replaced Ambassador Lodge in April 1967. Deputy Ambassador 

Porter was succeeded in office by Eugene M. Locke. In addition, 

Presidential Assistant Robert W. Komer, who had been overseeing 

revolutionary development support activities at the Washington level 

since March 1966, was assigned to General Westmoreland's head· 

quarters. In May 1967, Ambassador Bunker announced that the 

U.S. Mission's responsibility for the revolutionary development 

program was being integrated under the Military Assistance 

Command in a single. manager arrangement, and that General 

Westmoreland would assume the responsibility under the over·all 

authority of the ambassador. There were two basic reasons for 

assigning the task to General Westmoreland. First, security, a 

prerequisite tc pacifica tion, was a primary responsibility of the 

Vietnamese armed forces, which were advised by the Military 

Assistance Command- Westmoreland's headquarters. Second, the 

greater part of U.S. advisory and logistic resources were under Gen. 

eral Westmoreland's controL 

Presidential Assistant Komer was appointed Westmoreland's 

deputy for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support 

(CORDS) with tpe rank of ambassador, and the four regiona l 

directors of the Office of Civil Operations were assigned as deputies 

to the four senior advisers to the Vietnamese corps. The Embassy's 

Office of Civil Operations and MACV's Revolutionary Develop· 

ment Support Directorate (RDSD) mcrged to form, within thc 
70 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

AMERICAN EMBASSY ON THONG NIIUT B OULEVARD IN I)a,VNTQ'WN SAIGON 

Military Assistance Command, the office of Assistant Chief of 

Staff for CORDS. Mr. Lathram, who had been the director of the 

Civil Operations office, was given this new position, and Brigadier 

General William A. Knowlton, who had been the RDSD director, 

became his deputy. Of the resulting arrangement, Ambassador 

Bunker said: "Such a unified civil-military US advisory effort in 

the vital field of RD is unprecedented. . RD is in my view 

neither civil nOT military but a unique merging of both to meet a 

unique wartime need." Thus the single-manager concept had become a reality. It was based on the realization that the pacification 

effort and the war fought in the field were inseparable clements of 

the Vietnam conflict. 

On the part of the Vietnamese, organizational changes were 

more slowl y realized than in the U.S. camp. At the national level 

the government of South Vietnam, in November 1967, established 

the Central Revolutionary Development Council, headed by the 

Prime Minister. Members of the Central Council were the heads 

of the key ministries responsible for the many aspects of the pacifica. 

tion programs, notably the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Public 
CONTINUING BUILDUP 71 

Works, Land Reform and Agriculture, Health, Refugees, and 

Cltitll Hoi and the commander in chief of the army and all corps 

commanders. The Minister of Revolutionary Development served 

as Secretary General and his ministry was the Central Council's 

executive agency. Throughout South Vietnam, Regional Revo u~ 

tionary Development Councils were formed at the corps, special 

zone, provincial and municipal, and d istrict levels. Thus, by the 

end of 1967, a revolutionary development network was established 

that would put the country's human and material resources to work 

on the pacification effort. 

The revolutionary development network, however, was not 

wholly complementary to the U.S. single~manager concept fo r 

pacification. The reason was the special position of the South Viet~ 

namese province chief in the chain of command. Traditionally, the 

province chief was charged with security as well as general administration of all government services within his province. Appointed 

by the president, he was responsible to the president for his province 

and had direct access to the president a t all times. As far as national 

policy and government programs were concerned, the province 

chief was responsible to the Prime Minister, and regard ing general 

administration, to the Minister of the Interior. In addition, the 

province chief was subject to pressures from the corps commander 

and the division commander in his area. In a very rea l sense, the 

province chief was constantl y faced with conflicts of authority tha t 

were damaging to the national administrative machinery. To a 

lesser degree, this situation a lso applied to the district chiefs. 

The integration of revolutionary development support under 

the Military Assistance Command and the staff realignments that 

resulted had a profound influence on the U.S. advisory effort. 

First, a si ngle U.S. team chief was appointed for each province. In 

mid-1967, when the program got under way, twenty-five of these 

province senior advisers were military and nineteen were civilian. 

Second, the MACV subsector (district) advisory team became {he 

nucleus of the CORDS staff at the district level. The distric t staff 

now included both military and civilian personnel, and its chief 

was responsible for the management or support activities pertaining 

to revolu tionary development. The head of the team was redesignated the d istrict seni or adviser. Finally, staff elements at the field 

force and Marine Amphibious Force levels, which had previously 

been engaged in support activities, were each integrated into 

separate CORDS staff offices. Each CORDS office dealt directly 

with the province senior advisers withi n the corps tactica l zones 

regarding military operations related to the revolutionary development program. Thus, at the field force level the deputy senior 
CHART 7-CORDS FIELD ORGAN IZATION 

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-" 

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_ " ._.-.- .utVII "'101100 I ""'oI.-y 1 ... 

DI."I<I Stol .. 101 ..... 

------

s-t: USMACV c-..t 11111«;1.1967, Vol. II, p.:.89. 
CONTINUING BUlLDUP 73 

adviser (a military officer, not to be confused with the Civil Operations regional director, who had been designated deputy for 

CORDS) ceased to exercise command supervision over the province 

(sector) advisory teams within the corps zone. The deputy senior 

adviser did, however, continue to be responsible for the advisory 

activities of mili tary units. Thus, two separate chains of command 

developed: one for military and civil advisory efforts pertaining to 

pacification, and one for military advisory efforts pertaining to 

Vietnamese units. These field relationships remained essentially 

unchanged from 1967 onward. (Chart 7) 

Response to lhe Communist Threat in lhe North 

Following the introduction of major U.S. forces in South Vietnam in 1965, there was a gradual buildup of enemy forces in the 

northern part of the I Corps Tactical Zone. To counter this threat, 

the I Corps area was reinforced as much as possible from U.S., 

Vietnamese, and Free World forces already in South Vietnam. In 

August 1966 the Republic of Korea Marine Brigade was moved 

from the II Corps area to the southern part of the I Corps. This 

action permitted greater concentration of U.S. 1st Marine Division 

forces in the Da Nang area, allowing in turn the concentration of 

the 3d Marine Division in the two northernmost provinces. During 

early 1967, further concentration of forces in the northern part of 

the I Corps area was carried out by moving more units from the 

central and southern parts closer to the Demilitarized Zone. 

By April 1967, increased enemy activity prompted General 

Westmoreland to form Task Force OREGON and send it to the 

southern part of the I Corps zone, thereby freeing additional U.S. 

Marine units to move farther north. Task Force OREGON was 

comprised of a provisional headquarters, division support troops 

from various U.S. Army units, and three brigades taken from areas 

where they could be spared with the least risk. These brigades 

were the 196th Light Infantry Brigade from the I II Corps area, 

and the 15t Brigade of the 10 I st Airborne Division and the 3d 

Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (subsequently redesignated the 

3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division) from the 11 Corps zone. 

Later in the year, the 3d Brigade of the 25th Division and the lst 

Brigade of the 101st Division were replaced by the newly arrived 

198th and 11th Light Infantry Brigades. In September 1967 Task 

Force OREGON became the 23d Infantry Division (Americal). 

The original plan for reinforcing the I Corps zone called for 

U.S. Army forces to conduct operations south ofDa Nang, allowing 

the U.S. Marines to concentrate farther north. This division of 
74 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

responsibility according to sectors was designed to avoid operational 

and logistic confusion, but the concept had to be abandoned when 

the enemy buildup along the Demilitarized Zone and in Laos increased to the point where further U.S. deployments to the area 

werc nceded. Genera l Westmoreland moved U.S. Army forces to 

the middle of the northern I Corps a rea to support the U.S. Marines, 

with the result that units of the two services intermixed and the 

command and control structure became overburdened. To relieve 

the situation, the headquarters of the 15t Cavalry Division was 

moved north early in 1968. More U.S. Army units followed. The 

2cl Brigade, lOIst Airborne Division, moved to the vicinity of Hue 

in January, and in February both the 27th Marine Regimental 

Landing Team and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, were 

airlifted from the United States to the I Corps Tactical Zone. 

The controlling and planning capability of the III Marine 

Amphibious Force headquarters became severely taxed by the 

presence of these additional Army and Marine forces. General 

Westmoreland responded to the command and control problem 

by establishing MACV Forward headquarters in the Hue- Phu 

Rai area on 9 February 1968. From the new headquarters, General 

Creighton W. Abrams, the deputy MACV commander, exercised 

comrol for General Westmoreland over all joint combat and logistical forces- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine--deployed in 

the northern [ Corps area. These forces were being assembled to 

meet a major enemy offensive, which was expeeted in Quang Tri 

Province. 

One month later on 10 March 1968, MACV Forward, having 

served its purpose, was eonverted to a corps headquarters and 

designated Provisional Corps, Vietnam, under the command of 

Lieutenant General William B. Rosson. General Rosson exercised 

operational control over the 3d Marine Division (Reinforeed), the 

1st Cavalry Division, the 101 st Airborne Division (-) (Reinforced), 

and assigned corps troops. The new corps also co-operated closely 

with the Vietnamese 1st Division in the area. 

The [ Corps zone was divided into two parts by a boundary 

through Thua Thien Province that ran roughly north of Da Nang. 

The Provisional Corps, Vietnam, which was designated XXIV 

Corps on 12 August 1968, had operational control over ground 

tactica! units north of the boundary, while the III Marine Amphibious Force exercised operational control of the corps in the north and 

of all tactical units south of the boundary. Thus freed from the task 

of directing the battle in the north on a daY-lo-day basis, the commanding general of the Marine amphibious force, Lieutenant 

General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, was able to concentrate 
CON·nNUING BUILDUP 

GENERAL ROSSON. (Photograph takm 

ajttf his promotion to jour-Jtar gmeraf.) 

GENERAL MO~lYER 

75 

on the entire I Corps area, especially on CORDS functions and 

logistic support responsibilities. 

As operations in the north expanded, General \Veslmoreland 

decided that an important adjustment in the tactical aircraft control system in the I Corps area was needed. Before 1968 there had 

been two managers for air assets in the I Corps zone: the deputy 

MACV commander for air operations, who was a lso the commander 

of the Seventh Air Force, had operational control of the Seventh 

Air Force's men and equipment and of any Navy air support from 

Task Force 77; and the commanding general of the [II Marine 

Amphibious Force had operational control of the resources of the 

lst Marine Aircraft Wing. This air unit supported the U.S. Marines 

in the I Corps area, while the Seventh Air Force supported U.S. 

Army units, the Korean marine brigade, and the Vietnamese 

forces. General Westmoreland considered it "of paramount importance to ach ieve a single manager for control of tactical air 

resources"; therefore, on 8 March 1968 he appointed his deputy 

for air operations, General William W. Momyer, as manager of 

all air assets. The system for tactical a ir support was adjusted to 

conform with the new ground organizational structure and became effective on 1 April 1968. (Chart 8) 

The terrain and enemy activity in the I Corps zone made 

logistic support particularly difficult, and the intermixing of Army 

and Marine units created additional complications. The situation 

CONTINUING BUILDUP 77 

there produced unusua l command arrangements for supporting 

U.S. forces. Logistic support in Vietnam was organized on an area 

basis. In the I Corps area, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, 

Vietnam, was responsible for common item support, base develop· 

ment (excluding U.S. Air Force bases), and real estate services for 

all U.S. and Free World forces. Furthermore, he provided logistic 

support for military operations at ports and beaches as well as items 

peculiar to Navy and Coast Guard support. 

These responsibilities were carried out by the Naval Supply 

Activity at Da Nang. In addition, General Cushman supplied items 

needed exclusively by Marine units in the I Corps area. General 

Westmoreland, as commanding genera l of U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

was responsible for the supply of common items in the other three 

corps zones. Although Secretary of Defense McNamara had directed 

in late 1966 that plans be developed for the Army to assume com· 

mon supply support responsibility throughout South Vietnam, 

agreemeOl on procedures acceptable to all services had not been 

achieved. With the buildup of Army forces in the 1 Corps zone, 

however, Navy and Marine facilities could no longer meet the in· 

ereased demand, so U.S. Army, Vietnam, had to expand logistic 

support efforts into this area. The Da Nang Support Command 

was established as a major clement of the 1st Logistical Command 

to direct the sixty· five Army support units that USAR V deployed 

to the I Corps area. Five of these units provided direct support to 

the Navy and Marines, and nine assumed some of the Navy's re· 

sponsibilities, such as an over·the·beach logistic operation at Thon 

My Thuy. While the logistic support operations in the I Corps 

area during this period were efficiently carried out, they were ac· 

complished through a complicated control arrangement involving 

Army, Navy, and Marine headquarters. 

Naval Forces, Vietnam 

At the end of t 965 the commanding general of the II J Marine 

Amphibious Force was the tactical commander of Marine forces 

in the I Corps Tactical Zone as well as the senior adviser to the 

Vietnamese commanding general there. He was also the Navy 

component commander at MACV headquarters and was therefore 

charged with area co-ordination, logistic support, and base de· 

veiopment. In order to ease the burden of the Marine commander, 

General Westmoreland recommended to Admiral Sharp, Com· 

mander in Chief, Pacific, that a Navy command be established in 

Vietnam. Consequently, on I April 1966, U.S. Naval Forces, Viet· 

nam, was established with Rear Admiral Norvell C. Ward as com· 
78 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

mander. Naval Forces, Vietnam, assumed command of the Navy 

units in South Vietnam and, although assigned to the Pacific Fleet, 

was placed under the operational control of Ceneral Westmoreland. 

Concurrently, the I I I Marine Amphibious Force, together with 

its organic and assigned units, was designated a single service command assigned to the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and was placed 

under the operationa l control of General Westmoreland. 

Mobile Riverine Force 

In 1966 a concept was developed for extending U.S. combat 

power into the Mekong Delta area where the enemy was strong 

and where the United States had lacked the resources to assist the 

Vietnamese Army in achieving control. MACV headquarters organized what was originally called the Mekong Delta Mobile 

AOoat Force, soon to be known as the Mobile Riverine Force. The 

origina l plan called for basing one U.S. Army division in a location 

where it could operate along the Mekong and Bassac Rivers. Army 

troops were to be supported by U.S. Navy river assault groups, and 

one brigade of the division would be stationed aboard converted 

LSTs (landing ships, tank). This concept required new and unusual 

command relationships. 

General Westmoreland proposed that one brigade of the arriving 9th Infantry Division be the Army componcnt of a mobile 

joint task force. The Navy component would consist of tactical and 

logistic ships and craft to support the brigade afloat on riverinc 

operations. General Westmoreland further proposed that the joint 

task force be commanded by the assistant commandcr of the 9th 

Division, who would have a small joint stafT of opcrations, logistics, 

and communications personnel. 

In Honolulu General Waters, Commandcr in Chief, U.S. Army, 

Pacific, concurred with General Westmoreland's proposal. Admiral 

Sharp and thc commandcr in chief of the Pacific Fleet, however, 

favored a command arrangement in which the naval force would 

be under the operational control of the commander of the River 

Patrol Force (a task force, CTF 11 6, which was already conducting 

operations in the Mekong Delta) and would operate in support of 

the ground forces involved. A compromise solution ultimately developed, which placed U.S. Army units conducting riverine operations in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones under the olJCrational 

control of the commanding genera l of II Ficld Force. He could 

exercise control through a designated subordinate headquarters, 

such as the 9th Infantry Division. According to this arrangement, 

Navy units would be under the operational control of Admiral 
CHART 9-CololWANO RELATIONS FOR RIVERIN

""" 

IV Corps 

AdviSOry Group 

._._._._._ _._.L._ _._._:_ _.~ 

r ---LI --. I : r--~·-

I 

rI 

L_ 

I : : .... · ...... · .. · .. · .. · .... · .. · .... ; .. · .. 1 N...,.I Fore". V

· : I 

· ~ II Field For<:t. Vi!:tn"m! 

~ Army R,vlrlnl I. For<:I ... ... Navy R",lrine 

FOrCI 

............................... . . IArmy [Iementl I Navy Ellmlnt I 

land and ArI Oll! Base • 

!ArmY Elem!:ntl I NIVY [llment ! 

• • ....................•.. 

R1Yerine Operations from land o. Aftoat SaH 

'The Army will provid~ ,be buc command"" boIh uhorc aJld allo.,. The Na,'y will pl'O'oide h.appropria ... 

toward pl'O'o'ioion of ,un6", support and prtI,ce,ioI\ "laiN, ...... r,-""" ,h"' .... 

So.m., CIXCt>ACc--.J I/"Nq. 1iI:f(I. Vol. II. P. 620. 
80 COMMAND AND CON TROL 

Wa rd, who could a lso operate through a designated subordinate 

Navy commander. (Another task force, CTF 11 7, was established 

to control Navy riverine forces.) Finally, riverine operations would 

be conducted with Army and Navy units commanded separately, 

but the Navy would provide close support through procedures of 

mutual co~ordin tion. (Chart 9) 

The Mobile Riverine Force bega n operations on 1 June 1967 

with Operation CORONADO in Dinh Tuong Provi nce. The 2d 

Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division and the Mobile Riverine Force 

conducted a two-month offensive in the vast waterways of the 

Mekong Delta with extraordinary success. The force continued 

aggressive opera tions until 25 August 1969, when the riverine force 

was deactivated and its mission and equipment were taken over 

by the Vietnamese Navy Amphibious Task Force 21 1. 

Additional Military Assistance Commands 

The enemy's 1968 Tet offensive reveaJed serious weaknesses in 

the Vietnamese organization for the defense of the Sa igon area. 

For exam pic, the commanding gcneral of the Vietnamese J II Corps 

had the basic responsibility for the capital, but hc had no control 

over National Police units in his arca. During the Ttl offensive 

cmergency, GeneraJ Cao Van Vien, the cha irman of the Joint 

General Staff, tempora rily assumed command of all Vietnamese 

fo rces, including the National Police, within the Capita l Military 

District. No permanent structure was established, however, and 

when the cnemy resumt:d his a ttacks in May, the III Corps eommanding gencral assumed personal command of 311 forces in the 

Saigon area. In June 1968 Major GeneraJ Nguyen Van Minh was 

designated Military Governor of Saigon and of the adjoining Gia 

Dinh Province. Under the opcrational control of the I I I Corps 

commander, Gencral Minh was given primary responsibility for 

the defense of the capital and control of all Vietnamese government forces charged with the security of Saigon and Gia Dinh. 

These forces included the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the 

General Reserve, Regional and Popular f orces, the National 

Police, and the Military Police in the district. The Vietnamese Army 

commander of the Capital Military District became his deputy. 

Corresponding adjustments were made on the U.S. side. During 

the Tet offensive, a command group from the II Field Force had 

moved to Saigon. This temporary headquarters, called Hurricane 

Forward, controlled a ll U.S. forces in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area 

and had the mission of advising the Vietnamese armed forces there. 

In May. Hurricane Forward was reconstituted and dispatched to 
CONTINUING BUILDUP 

Saigon. The headquarters was 

redesignated Task Force Hay 

(for Major General John H. 

Hay, Jr., Deputy Commanding 

General, II Field Force, Viet· 

nam). On 4 June 1968, this 

temporary arrangement became 

permanent, and General Hay 

was officially appointed senior 

adviser to General Minh, the 

Military Governor, and com· 

mander of U.S. forces defending 

Saigon and Gia Dinh. The for· 

ward headquarters was designa· 

ted Capital Military Assistance 

Command, with the mission to 

plan and execute the defense of 

the Saigon-Gia Dinh area in co· 

ordination with the commanders 

GENERAL ECKHARDT 

81 

of the U.S. Seventh Air Force and Naval Forces, Vietnam, and the 

Vietnamese Military Governor of Saigon- Gia Dinh. This move 

significantly strengthened the U.S. and Vietnamese organization 

for the defense of the Saigon capital area. 

In another development, the senior adviser to the IV Corps 

Tactical Zone, Major General George S. Eckhardt, on 8 April 1969, 

assumed as an additional duty the position of Commanding General, 

Delta Military Assistance Command. The Delta Military Assis· 

lance Command was established to control the various U.S. Army 

units based in the delta area, including the U.S. 9th Infantry Dj· 

vision. 

U.s. Army Logistical Advisory Effort 

In May 1966 General Westmoreland asked Lieutenant General 

Jean E. Engler, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army, Viet· 

nam, to study whether USARV headquarters should assume the 

Army's logistical advisory functions, which at the time were being 

performed by MACV's J-4 section, the Logistics Directorate. After 

completion of his survey, General Engler made several observations 

and recommendations. The entire Army military assistance and 

advisory effort should, he contended, be the exclusive function of 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, freeing the Military Assistance Command 

to concentrate on the control of its components. General Engler 

concluded that MACV was no longer operating as a military as· 

sistance command in the true sense of the term, since U.S. tactical 
82 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

GENERAL PALMER. (Photograph to/WI 

after his promo/ion to jour-s/or geT/trot.) 

forces had been so greatly increased and their mission expanded. The newly instituted 

practice of funding military assistance programs through the 

individual services had furthcr 

changed MACV's role. General 

Engler maintained that logistics 

should not be separa ted (rom 

opera tions and advisory activities, and therefore these func tions 

should be performed by U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, in an expanded 

role as a full-fledged Army component. 

As a result of Genera l Engler's appraisal, logistic advisory 

fu nctions were transferred to 

USAR V hcadquartcl1l, but the 

broader question of USAR V's 

status was nOt resolved. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., who 

succeeded General Engler on I July 1967, elevated the logistic advisory group within the USAR V staff to a general staff section, 

which he designated the Military Assistance Section. This action 

was prompted by General Palmer's conviction that logistic advisory 

responsibilities were equal in importance to the mission of supporting 

U.S. troops. 

In the summer of 1967 a stud y called Project 640 was conducted 

by the Military Assistance Command. Its purpose was to examine 

the problems that had arisen because the MACV organization 

lacked a single sta ff focal point to co-ordina te and monitor all 

aspects of the assistance effort. As a result of the study, General 

Westmoreland established the post of Assistant Chief of Staff, 

Military Assistance, in the MACV staff to provide that focus. He 

also appointed a temporary committee to determine wha t functions 

could be transferred between MACV and USARV headquarters. 

On the committee's recommendation, logistic advisory functions 

were transferred from U.S. Army, Vietnam, back to the Military 

Assistance Command in February 1968. 

Summary and Conclusions 

During the period from mid-I966 to mid-1969 the authorized 

strength of U.S. forces in South Vietnam rose from about 276,000 
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84 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

men to a peak of 549,000. In June 1969, President Nixon announced 

from Midway Isl and the first of the U.S. force withdrawals, and 

graduated reductions continued from then on. 

By the end of 1969 the control structure of major tactical ground 

forces was essentially the same as the onc developed during 1965 

and 1966. (Charll0) The 1966-1969 period was not marked by basic 

structural changes in the chain of command. The modifications that 

were made were evolutionary and consistent with tactical requirements and expanded command responsibilities. By establishing the 

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, U.S. civil and 

military efforts in support of Vietnamese pacification were at last 

united under General Westmoreland, the single manager. After 

the U.S. Army's XXIV Corps was deployed in the I Corps Tactical 

Zone, which used to be the Marine Corps' exclusive area, command 

arrangements were developed to control and support the combined 

efforts of Army and Marine forces. In the IV Corps Tactical Zon~ 

of the Mekong Delta, command arrangements were devised for 

directing joint Army-Navy operations of the M.obile Riverine 

Force. Finally, the Capital M.ilitary Assistance Command was 

organized to support the Vietnamese Saigon- Cia Dinh Capital 

Military District. MACV's command and control structure during 

the period from mid-1966 to mid-1 969 thus proved to be flexible 

and strong enough to adjust not only to the doubling of U.S. forces 

in Vietnam, but also to the expanded tactical and logistic requirements, as well as to the added mission of managing the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. The established command 

organization also held the promise of being able to cope with the 

phased reduction or U.S. forces in South Vietnam, which began in 

the summer or 1969, and with the complicated process of gradually 

turning over the war effort to the Vietnamese. 
CHAPTER V 

Model for the Future 

No conflict in recent history has divided the American nation 

as much as the war in Vietnam. This study does not attempt to 

analyze the controversies surrounding the war or the psychological 

factors bearing on it or questions of U.S. foreign policy. However, 

since military planners must develop doctrine that can be applied 

in future military contingencies, lessons learned in Vietnam can 

be helpful. Some of these lessons concern theory and doctrine on 

effective command and control structures. 

Military doctrine presupposes political decisions at the highest 

national level, which take into account the objectives and available 

means of military action. The planners use doctrine as a blueprint 

and apply it to the particular set of circumstances. These circumstances include the status of political relations between the United 

States and the country receiving assistance, the stability and effectiveness of the country's government, and the estimated magnitude, intensity, a nd duration of a U.S. military commitment. Obviously, these factors will influence the type of command organization selected to control U.S. military operations. 

Command and control arrangements must meet other, more 

specific criteria. From the U.S. viewpoint, command and control 

must be comprehensive enough to exercise control over all military 

forces assigned by U.S. national authorities; flexible enough to 

respond to changes in the situation, such as a demand for specific 

control of air or naval operations in support of ground forces; and 

able to provide national authorities with timely, accurate, and 

complete reports. The command and control structure must also 

be capable of close co-operation with and constructive support of 

indigenous and allied military forces, paramilitary organizations, 

and other agencies of the host country. 

In applying lessons learned in Vietnam to a hypothetical future 

conflict, the commitment of substantial contingents of U.S., aJJjed, 

and indigenous forces for an extended period of time will be assumed. Further aSsumptions will be that U.S. objectives include an 

early conclusion of hostilities on terms favorable to the host government, that the conflict is limited to predetermined geographical 

and political areas, and that indigenous forces are to be strengthened, 
86 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

thus enabling them to assume responsibility for internal security. 

This example is not to be interpreted as a replica of the conflict in 

Indochina, nor do the following suggestions imply criticism of the 

command and control arrangements of the war in Vietnam. 

The doctrine for command and control in this hypothetical 

case will be based on the premise that the conflict is classified as a 

single war, not one divided into separate geographical zones and by 

individual service missions. Another prerequisite will be unity of 

command, to ensure both tight control of the over-all U.S. effort 

by American political authorities and effectiveness of military 

operations and advisory activities. The command structure should 

encourage improvements in the operational capabilities of th" 

indigenous forces and promote co-operation with them. Finally, 

the command and control arrangements should be sufficiently 

flexible to adjust to changes during the course of the war. 

Given these premises, the optimum command and comrol 

structure would include the following recommendations. 

1. A unificd theater command directly under the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff should be established to conduct military operations. Othcr 

unified or specified commands may be assigned supporting missions 

depending on the type of conflict. The theater commander should 

have powers comparablc to those excrcised by supreme commanders 

in Europe and the Pacific during World War II. 

2. Initially. the unified command (theater headquarters) should 

exercise operational control over forccs provided by thc host govcrnmcnt. This command should also have operational control over 

military forccs furnished by allied nations. The prototypc of this 

arrangement is found in the Korean War. As an altcrnative, the 

unified command might only exercise control of U.S. and other 

outside forces committed to the theater. The degree of control over 

indigenous forces could be modified according to political circumstances but should be great enough to ensure prompt development of 

the ability of these forces to undertake unilateral operations successfully. 

3. Combincd operational and planning staffs should be established at the theater level and at major subordinate operating 

commands. A combincd planning group, headed by an officer of 

the host government and staffed by representatives of the governments providing forces in the theater, is considered the best means 

of bringing the over-aU effort together. An example of a combined 

staff is the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary 

Force in World War 11. 
MODEL FOR T HE FUTURE 87 

4. Component headquarters, subordinate to the unified (theater) 

headquarters, should exercise both command and operational control over the forces of their respective U.S. services, especially since 

component headquarters are in fact responsible for logistical support. The service component headquarters should translate broad 

operational and policy guidance from the theater headquarters into 

specific plans and programs. This procedure follows the joint doctrine of United Action Armed Forces. 

5. The component headquarters should exercise command and 

operational control over their clements of the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group assigned to the theater. The theater headquarters 

would have a separate, joint staff section to provide policy guidance 

to the service components concerning their advisory and assistance 

activities. A precedent for this type of arra ngement was established 

during the Korean War. 

6. Intermediate operational headquarters under the service 

components, such as field force or corps, provide a necessary command level fo r control of land comba t operations. If indigenous or 

allied forces are operating within the tactical zone of a fie ld force 

or corps, headquarters should be modified to function as combined 

staffs. Joint staffs a t the field force level would only be needed 

under special circumstances, for example, if the combat zone was 

geographically isolated or if Marine and Army units were operating 

in the same area. 

7. An organization like the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam should be established as soon 

as possible. h should directly control all civilian advisory effortS, 

especially those of the Central Intelligence Agency and the J oint 

United States Public Affairs Office. Without such control, civil 

affairs and counterinsu rgency and pacification opera tions cannot 

be adequately co-ordinated. The functions of a CORDS-type organization could best be controlled through an arrangement similar 

to the one specified for Military Assistance Advisory Group activities. 

8. O perational control of combat support and combat service 

support units needed on a day-to-day basis should be exercised by 

the intermediate field force or corps headquarters. Control of all 

other combat support and combat service support units should be 

retained by the Army component headquarters on the si nglemanager principle. This arrangement should apply specifica lly to 

Army air, engineer, signal, and medical units. 

9. For common items of supply and services, logistical support 

should be provided according to a single-manager principle agreed 

upon by the four services. (Chart 77) 
88 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

C HART 11 - PROPOSED CoMMAND AND CoNTROL ARRANGEMENTS 

CORDS 

I 

I 

Supreme Commander Combined 

Plannlnll 

SIa l! 

I MMG Plannlnll Slall 

I .............................. , .................................. . 

I-~-----~.----- 1--' 1 I . . i 

I 

I 

r--------.. I ~----~--r_--------_, 

I 

co,os 

Ol)er&tlonal Command 

_____ CORDS Co·ordlnation 

••••••••••••••• MMG Co.-ordlnalion 

• Includes U.S .. Indigenous. and FrH World forc&s 

• • InclUdes Marlne Corps units 

In Vietnam the doctrine of command and control drew heavily 

on historical precedent, but its application tended to be more com~ 

plex than it had been in the past and became more involved as the 

mission of the U,S. command expanded. Looking to the future, 

contingencies of the magnitude and complexity of the Viet nam 

War cannot be ruled out. Should the United States again feel compelled to commit military forces, the need for a simple, well-defined, 

and flexible command structure on the U.S. side may conflict with 

the intricacies of indigenous politica l and military institutions and 

customs. Therefol'c, any future U.S. military assistance to forcign 

nalions must be predicated on clear, mutually acceptable agreements, on a stra ight and direct line of authority among U.S. military 

and civilian assistance agencies, on full integra tion of all U.S. effOrls, and on the ability to motivate the host country's armed 

forces and governmental agencies to fight and wi n. 
Appendix 

KEY U.S. OFFICIALS AND COMMANDERS IN 

VIETNAM, 1950-1969 

Organhalion or Command 

U.S. Legation 

U.S. Embassy 

U.S. Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, rndochina 

U.S. Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, Vietnam 

U.S. Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam 

Ojficial or Commander 

Edmund A. Gullion 

Donald R. Heath 

Donald R. Heath 

G. Frederick Reinhardt 

Elbridge Durbrow 

Frederick E. Nolting 

Henry Cabot Lodge 

Maxwell D. Taylor 

H:::nry Cabot Lodge 

Ellsworth Bunker 

Brigadier General Francis 

C. Brink, USA 

Major General Thomas 

J. H. Trapnell, USA 

Lieutenant General John 

W. O'Daniel, USA 

Lieutenant General J ohn 

W. O'DanicJ, USA 

Lieutenant Genera l 

Samuel T. Williams, 

USA 

Lieutenant General Lionel 

C. McGarr, USA 

Major General Charles 

J. Timmes, USA 

General Paul D. Harkins, 

USA 

General William C. 

Westmoreland, USA 

General Creighton W. 

Abrams, USA 

Date oj 

AssumptiQ1I 

of Command 

17 Feb 50 

6 luI 50 

25 Jun 52 

10 May 55 

20 Mar 57 

21 Apr 61 

14 Aug 63 

2 Jul64 

12 Aug 65 

12 Apr 67 

10 Oct 50 

I Aug 52 

12 Apr 54 

12 Feb 54 

24 Oct 55 

Sep 60 

luI 62 

8 Feb 62 

20 Jun 64 

2 luI 68 
90 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Dale oj 

ASSUmplioll 

Organh.atioll or Command Official or Commlmder oj Command 

Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Wil- 27 Jan 64 

U.S. Military Assist- Ham C. Westmoreland, 

ance Command, Viet- USA 

nam Lieutenant General J ohn 2 Aug 64 

L. Throckmorton, USA 

Lieutenant General John 5 Nov 65 

A. Hcintgcs, USA 

General Creighton W. Jun 67 

Abrams, USA 

Genera l Andrew J .. 3 Jul 68 

Goodpaster, USA 

General William B. 1 May 69 

Rosson, USA 

U.S. Army Support Colonel Marvin H. 3 Apr 62 

Croup, Vietnam Merchant, USA 

Brigadier General Joseph 26 Aug 62 

W .. Stilwell, USA 

U.S. Army Support Brigadier General J oseph Ma l" 64 

Command, Vietnam W. Stilwell, USA 

Brigadier General Delk Jul64 

M. Oden, USA 

Brigadier General John Apr 65 

Norton, USA 

U.S. Army, Vietnam Genera l William C. 20 J ul65 

Westmoreland, USA 

Genera l Creighton W. 2 J ul 68 

Abrams, USA 

Deputy Commanding Brigadier General John 20 Jul65 

General, U.S. Army, Norton, USA 

Vietnam Lieutenant Genera l Jean 24 Jan 66 

E. Engler, USA 

Lieutenant General Bruce J ul67 

Palmer, Jr., USA 

Lieutenant General 22 Jun 68 

Frank T. Mildren, USA 

Commander, 2d Air Di- Lieutenant General Jo- 31 J an 64 

vISion seph H. Moore, USAF 
Organizalioll or Command 

Commander, Seventh Air 

Force, Deputy Commander Air Operations, Military Assistance Command, 

Vielnam 

Chier, U.S. Nava l Advisory Group, Vietnam 

Commander, U.S. Naval 

Forces, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Deputy Commander ror 

CORDS 

Senior Advisor, I Corps, 

Commanding Genera l, 

III Marine Amphibious Force 

Commanding Genera l, 

Field Force, Vietnam 

Senior Advisor, I r Corps, 

Commanding General, 

I Field Force, Vietnam 

APPENDIX 

Official or Commander 

Lieutenant General Joseph H. Moore, USAF 

General William W. 

Momyer, USAF 

General George S. 

Brown, USAF 

Rear Admiral Norvell G. 

Ward, USN 

Rear Admiral Norvell G. 

Ward, USN 

Rear Admira l Kenneth L. 

Veth, USN 

Vice Admira l Elmo B. 

Zumwalt, USN 

Ambassador Robert W. 

Komer 

Ambassador William E. 

Colby 

Major General William 

R. Collins, USMC 

Lieutenant Genera l Lewis 

W. Walt, USMC 

Lieutenant Genera l 

Robert E. Cushman, 

USMC 

Lieutenant General 

Herman Nickerson, Jr., 

USMC 

Major Genera l Stanley 

R. Larsen, USA 

Lieutenant General 

Stanley R. Larsen, 

USA 

Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, USA 

Lieutenant General William R. Peers, USA 

Lieutenant General 

Charles A. Corcoran, 

USA 

91 

Date oj 

Assumption 

oj Commalld 

2 Apr 66 

J ul 66 

Aug 68 

10 May 65 

Apr 66 

27 Apr 67 

30 Scp 68 

28 May 67 

8 Nov 68 

6 May 65 

5 Jun 65 

J un 67 

26 Mar 69 

25 Sep 65 

15 Mar 66 

Aug 67 

Ma r 68 

IS Mar 69 
92 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Organhalion or Command 

Senior Advisor, III 

Corps, Commanding 

General, I I Field 

Force, VicUlam 

Senior Advisor, IV 

Corps, Delta Military 

Assistance Command 

Commanding General, 

Provisional Corps, 

Vietnam, XXIV Corps 

Senior Advisor, Commanding General, 

Capital Military Assistance Command 

Official or Commander 

Lieutenant General 

Jonathan O. Seaman, 

USA 

Dal~ oj 

Assumption 

oj Command 

15 Mar 66 

Lieutenant Genera l Bruce 24 Mar 67 

Palmer, Jr., USA 

Lieutenant General Jul 67 

Frederick C. Weyand, USA 

Lieutenant General I Aug 68 

Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., 

USA 

Lieutenant Genera l 

Julian J. Ewell, USA 

Colonel George Barton, 

USA 

Brigadier General William R. Dcsobry, USA 

Major General George S. 

Eckhardt, USA 

Major General Roderick 

Wetherill, USA 

Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, USA 

Lieutenant General 

Richard G. Stilwell, 

USA 

2 Apr 69 

17 Sep 64 

3 Jun 66 

14 Jan 68 

jun 69 

to Mar 68 

15 Aug 68 

Lieutenant General Mel- 26 jun 69 

vin Zais, USA 

Major General john H. 8 Mar 68 

Hay, USA 

Major General Filhnore 3 Aug 68 

K. Mearns, USA 

Major General Walter B. t 3 Apr 69 

Richardson, USA 

Brigadier General Charles 7 Nov 69 

J. Girard, USA 
AFFE 

AFPAC 

ARVN 

CINCPAC 

CORDS 

COSSAC 

ETOUSA 

EUSAK 

FEC 

MAAG 

MACTHAI 

MACV 

MAP 

NATO 

RD 

RDSD 

ROK 

SEATO 

TERM 

TRIM 

USAFFE 

USARV 

USARYIS 

USMACTHAI 

USMACV 

Glossary 

Army Forces, Far East (U.S.) 

Army Forces in the Pacific (U.S.) 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Commander in Chief, Pacific (U.S.) 

Civil Operations and Rural Development 

Support 

Chief of Staff to the Supreme AJlied Commander 

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

Eighth U.S. Army, Korea 

Far East Command 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

Military Assistance Command, Thailand 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Military Assistance Program 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Revolutionary Development (Vietnam) 

Revolutionary Development Support Directorate 

Republic of Korea 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission 

Training Relations and Instruction Mission 

U.S. Army Forces in the Far East 

U.S. Army, Vietnam 

U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Index 

Abrams, General Creighton \V.: 74 

Acheson, Dean G.: 7,23. Su I>/so Stau!, 

Department of. 

Aet for International Development: 6 

,\dmini5trative support 

chain of control: 4 

JCS role in: -1-5, 24 

by MAAG, Vietnam: 25. 31, 39-40 

to Thailand: 34-35 

to USMACV: 35. 39-40, 50 

Advanced Racareh l'rojects Agency: 42 

,\dvisers and advisory groups. Sf( (lfso 

UJUllt,'y (l~" J:T<1UP II)' Rl>mr. 

control of: 36 

control by US MACV: 28-30, 40-42, 

45-46, SO, 54, SG-57 

declincd by France: 9 

Frcnch group: 12, 14 

in logistical functions: 61--82 

in lower units: 20-21 

MA,\ G's, lessons from Vietnam: 87-88 

numbers authorized: 9-10 

numb!:rs expanded: 22, 25 

in provincl'S and districts: 71-73 

Agency for International Devdopment: 

04,68 

,\ ir Fon:c, Department of the. Su United 

Statl'S Air Force. 

Air Force Ad"isory Group: 40-4 1, SG-58 

Air operations, fUt also Ak units: Tactical 

air support. 

control of: 33, 35, 37-38 

lessons from Vie tnam: 85-68 

Air units 

arrivals: 26 

commitment by JCS: 54 

control of, IC$SOns from Vietnam: 67-88 

control by USMACV: 33, 35, 37-38, 

45,54,51\-59, 75 

Airborne Brigades 

1st, 10lst Airborne Division: 73 

2d, IOlst Airborne Division: 74 

3d, 82d I\ irborno: Division: 7'1 

173d: 46, 54 

t\irlifl$ of troops and supplies: 37-36, 74 

Airmobile Divisions 

1st Cavalry: 53, 75 

101s1 Airborne: 74 

A!lied Expeditionary Forcc (19<t2-45): 51 

Allied forca, control of: 85-66 

Amphibious opcrations. Su t..'lobilc 

Riverine Force. 

Ar ~', Department of the 

and command in R VN: 49-50, 52 

roles and missions: 4 

Asia. Sf( ,ounl,)' olld {omma"d by "amt, 

Assistant Chief of Starr for CO RDS, 

USMACV: 70 

Assistant &cretary of Defcrue (ISA): 24 

Associatcd Sta tes of Indochina. Su Indochina. 

Australian forcl'S; 46 

Aviation unil$. Su ,\ ir operations; Air 

unil$; Tactical air support. 

BaoDai: 13 

Basn, operation and maintenance: 37, 77 

lJassac River: 78 

Bicn Hoa: 54 

Bihn Xuyen : 19 

Brink, Brigadier General I'-rancis G.: 7 

British Advisory Mission : 64 

Bunker, Ellswort h: 69-70. fU( o(so United 

Slatl'S Embassy. 

Cam Ranh Bay: 45, 54 

Cambodia : 6-7, 9-10,12-13 

Canada: 10 

Cao Dai: 19 

Capital Mililary Assistance Command: 

81,64 

Capita! Military District (Rcgion), RVN: 

45,57,60,84 

Caraway, Lieutenant Gene ral Paul W.: 

25, 33. Su a/so United Statl'S Army, 

Ryukyu Islands. 

Co:ntral Highlands: 19. 47 

Co:lltral Intclligencc Agenq: 87 

Co:ntral Revolutionary Development 

Council, RVN: 70--71 
96 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Chief of Staff, United States '\Tmy. Su 

J ohnson, General Harold K.: Lemnit~er, General Lyman L.; Wheeler, 

General Earle C. 

Chicn Thang National Pacification Plan : 

40 

Chi", HOI program: 7\ 

Chu Lal: 45, 60 

Civil affairs agencies, losons from Vietnam: 87-88 

Civil Guard, RVN: 21 -22 

Civil_military support, integration of: 69 

Civil Operations and Rural D<:vrlopment 

Support: 69- 73, 75, 84, 87- 118 

Civilian Irregular D<:knsc Croups, R VN; 

45, 57 

Clark, General Mark W.: 51-52 

Coalition war, lessons rrom Vietnam; 

85-88 

Coastal SurveiLlance Force: 58 

Cochinchina: 9 

Collins, General J. Lawton: J 1-12 

Collins, General James F.: 26, 31, 33-34, 

36-37. Srr QfJO United Stales Army, 

Pacific. 

Collins, Bdgadicr General J ame. L., Jr.: 

59 

Collins, Major General William R., 

USMC: 45. Stt also United Statt'S 

Marine Corps, III Marine Amphibious foree. 

Combat sen'ice support: :lG-:l7, 42-43, 

87-ll6 

Combat support, JCS role in: 4-5. 24 

Combat support to R VN forces: 54 

Combat units. Stt Cround forct'S. 

Combined Intclligenc<: Center, Viemam: 

59-60 

Command and control 

in ARVN: 29-30, 36, 48-49, .'",9 

of frc<: World foren: 4G, ~J3-54. '19--61 

I~ns from Vietnam: 85--tl8 

in MI\i\C, Indochina : 7-9 

in R VN armed foreN: 29-30, 39, 46, 

48,61,63,71,80 

in USA RV : 51-5:.1 

in USMACV: 26-29, 35, 37-39,47-49, 

51-52, ~-55, 58-59, 61-63, 84, U8 

Wcstmoreland proposals: 50, 2-~, 59, 

61--63, 78-80 

Command<:r in Chid, Pacific. S" F('h, 

Admiral Harry D.; Radford, AdCommander in Chief, Pacific-Continu<:d 

miral Arthur W.; Sharp, Admiral 

U. S. Crant, Jr.; United Sta tes 

Pacific Co'nmand. 

CommunicatiOIU·dcelronics: 60--61, 87-

88. Stt "Iso Signal uniu. 

Component headquart<:n, lessons from 

Vietnam : 87-88 

Contracu and contracton: 43 

Conway, Major Cell<:ra! T heodore J .: 30 

CORONADO Operation: 80 

eo"" 

organiution proposed: 34, SO, 52-54 

Provisional, Vietnam: 74 

XX IV: 74, 84 

Corps Tactical ZOlles, R VN 

I: 53, 55, 57, 73-77,84 

II : 53, 55, 57, 73 

III : 54- 55, 57, 73, 78, tlO 

IV: 54-55,57,68,78,81,84 

Counterinsurgency operations 

by /\RVN: 40 

joint efforts in: 40 

lessons from Vietnam: 87-88 

Plan for South Viemam: 20 

Cu,hrnan, Lieutenant General Rob<:rt E., 

Jr., USMC: 74, 77. St< also Unit<:d 

Stlltes Marine Corps, I I I Marine 

Amphibious Force. 

Da Nllng: 45, 54, 59, 73-74, 77 

Da Nang Support Command: 77 

Ikfell.!<:, Dep"rtmcnl of: 20, 23, 46. Su 

a/s6 Gates, Thomas 5., Jr.; McNamara, Rob<:rt S.; Marshall, General 

of the Army George C. 

Defense Communications Agency: 60 

Ik ftniIC Communications S)'$lem: 61 

Delta Military ~sis 'ance Command: til 

Demilitarized Zone: 45, 7:\-7-\ 

Depc:ndenlS, evacufllion of: 54 

Ikpots, opc:ralion and maintemUlc(': 4:; 

IJ.e5Crlcrs, enemy: 59-60 

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 13, 19-22,29,47 

Dien Bkn Phil: 'J 

Oinh Tuong Pro"inc<:: 80 

Doctrine. Su a/$(J Command lind control. 

on join! task forces: 27, 85-88 

lessonl from Vielnam: 85-88 

on unified command: +-5, 37, 4f! 

Documen!s, captured: 59 

Durl1row, Elbridg.:-: 22. St( afro United 

Statn Embassy. 
INDEX 97 

Euterbrook, Major General Ernest F.: 46 

Eckhardt, Major General George 5.: 81 

Economic lUSistance progranu : 6, 21- 22, 

26,47 

Eiac:nhowcr, General of the Army Dwight 

D.: 8, 11 ,21,51 

Ely, Ceneral Paul, French Army: 11 - 13 

Engineer units, control of: 67-88 

Engler, Lieutenant General J ean E.: 

8 1- 62 

Equipment. &t Matttiel . 

Ethnie tribal poups: 19 

European Theater of Operations (1942-

45): 51 

Felt, Admiral Harry D. : 26-26, 30, 33-42. 

&, also United Sta tes I'aeifie Celln· 

mand. 

Fidd .-orces, Vietnam: 52-54, 57 

I: 54, 64, 68 

II: 54, 68,78,80-81 

France 

adviac:r groups: 12, 14 

dllClines adviscn: 9 

influence on MAAG, Indoehina: 6 

logistical fuppon to: 7 

military _istance to: 3, 6-7, 10-1 1 

Franco-Americ:an Mi.ion: II 

Free World Military Assistance Council : 

60 

Free World Military Assistance Forces: 

44,46-47,53-55,59-61,77 

Gangsta organizations: 19 

Gatel, TItomu 5., J r.: 22-23. Sa also 

Defense, Department of; Secretary of 

Defentc. 

General Reserve, RVN: 80 

Geneva Accords: 9-10, 14, 18 

Gia Dinh Province: 80-81, 84 

Gilpatric, RosweLL : 22 

Ground forces 

control by MAAG, Vietnam: 31, 33-34 

control l tructure, USA RV : 83-84 

control by USMACV: 3 1, 36-37, 48-

49,51,54,58-59,61-63,83-84 

Westmoreland pro~ expansion : 54-

55, 74 

Guam conference: 69 

G uerrllla optrations, enemy: 19-20 

H amlet defense: 22, 65 

Harkins, General Paul D.: 22-23, 27-30, 

33-42, 48. &. olso United Sta tes 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

Hawaii: 43 

Hawaii eonfer~: 34-35 

Hay, Major General John H., Jr.: 81 

Hoa Hao: 19 

Hue: 74 

Hurricane Forward: 80-81 

H urt, Alfred M. : 64 

India: 10 

Indochina statel: 7, I L. &t als. ,.""t,)' II)' 

nallt'. 

Indochina War (1946-54): 6-9 

Infantry Brigades. Stt also Airborne 

Brigades. 

2d, 9th Division : 80 

3d, 4th Division: 73 

3d, 25th Division : 73 

I lth Light: 73 

196th Light: 73 

198th Light: 73 

Infantry Divisions. Stt als. Airmobile Divisions. 

ht: 57 

9th: 78-80 

23d (Americal): 73 

Intelligence estimatel and optrations: 26, 

59-60 

Intermediate headquarte,.., l(:llOns from 

Vietnam: 87-88 

International Control Commissions: 10, 

14, 18 

J apan : 37, 43 

J ohnson, General H arold K .: 50, 52-53 

J ohnson, Lyndon B.: 21 

dvil_military support, integrat(·., 69 

and commitment to RVN : 47 

evacuates dependents: 54 

Thieu, conferences with: 69 

J oint Chiefs of Stair 

and air units commitment: 54 

and eommand in RVN : 33, 52-53 

and communications organiution : 60 

and Marine Corps commitment: ~55 

operational-admin istrative roles: 4-5, 

,. 

and troop uniu elCpam ion: 54-55 

unified commands, role in : 25-26, 86 
98 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

J oint Chief$ of SI:,ff- Continm:d 

USM,\CV, cOnlrol by; 26-27, 29 

and U511.'IACV reorganization : 42 

Joint General Staff, R VN: 36, 48, 59-60, 

63 

Joim operatioN, kssons rrom Vietnam: 

85-8. 

J oint Operations Evaluation Group, Vklnam : 42 

J oint Research and t Activity: 42 

J oint (;uk fon:n. doc trine on: 27, 85- 88 

J oint Unil(:cI Slate$ Military AssiSlancc 

Group. Thailand : 30 

Joint UnilC:d Slales Public Affain Office; 

&1,68,87 

Krnnedy, J ohn F.: 2 1- 23, 2$, 27 

KnowllOll, Urig:.dicr Geller .. ] William A.: 7. 

Kojc-do riolS (1952): 51 

Komer, Rober! W.: 69 

Korn. &~ Republic: of Korn forces_ 

Korean War cxrxriencc: 0, 51, 61, 86-88 

Kuala Lumpur: G4 

K y, Nguyen Cao: 611 

Landing ships, tank: 71l 

Lansdale, Major General Edward G., 

USI\F: n 

Lao Dong: 19 

Laos: 6-7, 9-10, 13, 1(), 33- 35. 74 

La , Major General Stanky R.: 53, 

57,64 

L:llhram, L . Wade: (,8 

Laltre de Tauign)', Gene ral J ean dr, 

freneh Army: 8 

l..emnitzer, General Lyman L.: 20 

Linn of eommuni/:ation : 62 

Loc:ke, Eugene />.1.: (;9 

l.oeIge, lienry Cabot: 6\ (;8-69 

Logistical Commanili 

1st: 44-45, 60, 77 

9th: 26 

Logistical support 

advisory func tiON, US,\RV: 81-82 

departmental role in: .. 

to Fra~: 7 

lasons from Vie tnam: 87-88 

hy MAAG, Vietnam: 14- 18,25-26,31, 

:S9-40 

McNamara on organization : 4'1, GO, 77 

to Thailand : 34- 15 

Logistical l upport-Continued 

by USMAC V: 28, 35, 39-40, 42-4$, 

47,50,60,75-71,81- 62 

Logistical systems and opt-rations: 35, 37, 

42-45,49-50,55,60,81-82 

MacArthur, General of the Army 

Douglas: 51 

McGarr, Lieutenant General Lionel C.: 

2 1-22, 25, 28. S" allo United Statel 

Milita.y Assistance Advisory Group, 

Vietnam. 

McNamara, Robert S. Su alw Defen"" 

Departll'lCnt of: Secretary of DefenS<'. 

and command in RVN: 34, 40, 52, 54 

and logistical organization: 44, flO, 77 

USMACV approved by: 27 

lind USMACV reorganization: 25 

Maintenance and repair: 43 

Malaya: 64 

Marshall, General of the Army George 

C.: 7. S" (JIlt, Defense, Deparllnenl 

of. 

Materiel 

enemy losscs: 59 

supply to RVN : 20 

Medical units, control of: 87-88 

Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force: 78 

Mekong River and Delta: SS, 78-80, 114 

Midway conference: 84 

Military auistance advisory grou".. Su 

United Statn Military Assistance 

Ad"isory Group. II)' ((Jlm/,y. 

Military assistance programs 

authorization : [, 

10 Cambodia: 12- 13 

directoratn ntablished: 41 

to France: 3, 6-7, 10-11 

Geneva A«ords, df«1 on: 9-10 

10 Indochina lIatn: 7- 9, 12 

to Laos: 13 

lesson, from Vie tnam: 85-88 

to RVN : 6-7, 21 - 22, 25, 28, 3 1, 38, 

40-41,47 

USMACV {unction, in: 8 1-{12 

Military Police, RVN: 80 

Minh, Major Gl"ncrai Nguyen Van, 

ARVN: 80-81 

Minislry of Agriculture, R VN: 71 

Ministry of ConJlruclion, RVN : 65 

r-,'l inistry of Ildcnsc, R VN: 21, 70 

Ministry of Ocfense, Vietnam : 12 

MiniUry of Health, RVN : 71 
INDEX 99 

:"Iinistry of Interior, RVN: 2], 70-71 

Ministry of Land Reform, RVN: 7] 

Ministry of Public Work!:, RVN : 70-7] 

Ministr)' of Rdugccs, RVN: 7] 

"'Iiniury of Rcvolutionary De"clopment, 

RVN : 7] 

Ministryof Rural Construc tion. RVN: 65 

Mi5sion Counci!: '16 

1-lobile Riverine Force: 78-80, 84 

Momyer, C .. ncral William W., USA i' : 15 

Montagnards: !9 

Moore, Lieutenant Ceneral Joseph H., 

USAF : 45, 5f1 

Mutual Defense ,\ssistance Act 1011d Pro· 

gram: 6, ]4,23 

Mutual Security Act and Program: 6, 24 

National Liberation Front: 19 

National Polier, RVN: 80 

National Seeurit), Act (19~7): 4 

Naval Advisory Group: 4()-41, 45, 56-58 

Naval opc:ratiOl's, Icssolls frou. Vietnam: 

85 

Naval Supply Aeti"it)': 77 

Navarre, General Henri.Eugene, French 

,\rm)': 8- 9, II 

Na"y, Department of the. Su United 

States N1OVY. 

New Zealand forces: 46 

Nha Trang: 45, 54 

Ni=-:on, Richard ",of.; 64, 84 

Nolting, f rederick C.: 2'2, 2>1, 27, 29. Su 

also United States Embassy. 

North Atlalltie Treaty Organization: fi 

North Viemam, aggression by: 18-24 , >17, 

73-77. Sit illso Vie t Cong. 

North Vietnam Arm)': 47, 59. Su illso 

Vitt Cong. 

O'Daniel, Lieutenant General John W.: 

8-9, 11- ]2,14. Srr Qlsil United States 

Army, Pacific; United Statn ilitary Assistance Ad"isory Group, 

Indochina; United Stales Military 

AssislanCe Advisory Group, Vietnam. 

Oflice of Civil Operations: &8-69 

Omce of Special Assistant: f>ll 

Okinawa: 25-26, 43. Sit olso United 

Stales Army, Ryukyu Islands. 

Opc:rational control, ehain of: 4 

Pacific area. &( United Sta ~'S Army, 

Pacific; United StatC'!l " acific Com. 

mand. 

Pacific Fleet: 56, 78 

Pacification programs 

lessons from Viemam: fl7-tlS 

US:"'IACV role in. 9, 64-73, 64 

in Vietnam: 9, 64-73, 64 

Palmer, Lieutrnant Grnrral Bruce, J r.: 62 

Pathrt Lao: 13 

Penta]a teral '\greelllenlS: 7 

!'rtrolcum, oil, lubricants: 43 

Philippin~'S: 43 

Phnom Penh: 13 

Phu B,li: 74 

Planning groups, lessons from Vie tnam: 

65-86 

Pkiku: 54 

Point ,,'our Program: 6 

"oland : ]0 

"oliticalliaison: 29 

Populllr Forces, RVN: 57, 80 

I'oner, William J .: 65, 68-69 

Ports, operation and maintenance: 45. 77 

i'rnident, United States. Stt olso Eisen· 

hower, Gtneral of the Army Dwighl 

D.: J ohtuOn, L)'ndon S.; Kennedy, 

John F.; Ni=-:on, Richard M. 

operational.administrativc rolrs: 4, 23 

rolc in MAAG, Indochina: 7-U 

Prisoners of war, enemy: 59 

Progranu E,-aiuation Office: 13 

Projcct 640: 62 

Quang Tri Provine.::: 74 

Qui Nhon: 45, 54 

Radford, Admiral I\rthur W.: 8, 20, 2>1 , 

Su olIo United StalC'!l Pacific Com. 

mand. 

Railway Security lind ,\ d,-isory Detach. 

ment: 57 

Ranger units, RVN : 21 

Real eslal<: servi<:es: 77 

R.::d Rivrr D<:1ta: 9 

Refugees, movement soUlh: 19 

Regional ,,' orc<:5, RVN: 57, 60 

R<:1igious SCCl'l: 19 

Repair parIS. Stt Maintenance aud repair. 

Rep;'lIriation program. Str Ch;~u /-I,,; pro· 

gram. 

Rrpubli<: of Korea forcn: 53, 73, 75 

Republic of Vie tnam: 7 

autonomy, U.S. role in: 9-10 

indcpc:ndcnce proclaimed: 13 

JCS on command in: 33, 5'1-53 
100 COM MAND AND CONTROL 

Republic of Vietnam-Continued 

JCS on U.S. expansion : 54-55 

J<'UOnl from conflict: 85-88 

McNamara on command in: 34, 40, 

52,54 

materiel supply to: 20 

military assistant<! 10: 6-7, 21-22, 25, 

28,31,38,40-4 1 

pacification program: 9, 64-73, 84 

political cdscs: 41 

repatriation program: 71 

liability nlablishC'd : 19 

U.S. forces. expansion of: 47-84 

U.S. strength, IXriodic: 8-10, 12, 14-

IS, 18,23,28.33, 37. 43, 64, 82-84 

Vielnamization program: 2'2, 84 

withdrawals from: 64, 84 

Republic of Viemam armed forces. Su 

,,/Jo Republic of Vietnam ,\rmy 

(ARVN). 

combat effcclivcm.'u: 26, .. 7, 80 

combat support: 54 

combined command, reaClion to: 59, 61 

command and cOlllro] in: 29-30, 39, 

46,48,61,63,71,80 

eXpAnsion and reorganization : 20-22 

mission: 18- 19 

training prografT1S: 20-21, 26. 31, 40-

41,65 

unified command, cstablishing: 25 

USMACV, co-ordina tion with : 59-60 

Republic or Vietnam Army (ARVN). Su 

D/SI> Republic of Vietnam armed 

rorcn. 

ht Division: 74 

Airbornc Brigade: 45, 57 

command and control in: 29-30, 36, 

48-49, 59 

co-ordination with: 36 

counteriruurgency effort: 40 

In TIl offensive: 80-81 

Rcscareh and development: 42 

Revolutionary development, RVN : 68-71 

Revolutionary Development Support Division: 68-69 

River al$3ult groups: 78 

River Patrol Force, USN: 78 

Rosson, Lieutenant General William S.: 

II, 74 

ROSIOW, Wah W.: 22 

Rural (re}corulruction : 65 

Russia. Su Soviet Union, e1<pan'ioniSi 

policies. 

SlIigon: 7, 22, 54, 80-81, 84 

Saigon-Cholon area: 7 

Salan, General Raoul, .'rench Army: 8 

Seaman, Major General J onathan 0.: 64 

Secretary or the Army. &e Army, Department of the. 

Secretary of !Xfensc: 4. Set O/SI> Defcnse, 

Department of; Gates, Thomas 5., 

Jr.: McNamara, Roberl 5.; Marshall , General of the Army George C 

Sccretary of State. Sre Acheson, Dean G. 

Security measures: 20, 36-37, 59, 6+-73, 

86 

Self-DcfenllC Corps, RVN: 2 1-22 

Service component headqullrten, lcuoru 

from Vietnam: 87-86 

Sharp, Admiral U. S. Grant, J r.: 41, 50, 

52-~, 77-78. Su a/so United Stalct 

Pacific Command . 

Signal unih, Sit a/s., Communications_ 

electronics. 

lst Brigade: 60-61 

JCS on organization of: 60 

Single-manager principle, Insoru rrom 

Vietnam: 87-86 

Smith, Major General Paul 1'. : 53, 68 

Southeast Asia : 27-29, 33, 35, 62. Su ,,/so 

'IJIl"Ir..r '" (IJmm""d b.1 """". Southeast t\Jia Treaty Organi~ation: 6, 

18,27-30, 33, 35,46 

Southwnt Pacific Area (1940-45): 51 

Soviet Union, expansioniSt policil':S: 6 

Special ForCCllroops: 21, 57 

Specified commands 

defined : 4 

ICS$OnJ from Vittnam: 85-88 

Staff organization, lessons from Vietnam: 

...... Sialey. Eugene: 22 

Stanrord Rcscarch lrul;tutc: 22 

Starbird, LieUlCnant General Alfred D.: 

60 

Statc, Dcpartrrn:nt of: 20, 23, 27. Sa "If 0 

Acheson, !Xan C. 

State of Vietnam. Su Vietnam. 

Stilwell, Brigadicr General J oseph W.: 

36-37,44, 49 

Stilwell, Major General Richard G.: 50 

Strategic hamil'l program: 22, 65 

Supply lou~. Sit Matcriel, enemy losses. 

Supply systcn15 and opcrations: 26, 37, 

44-45 
INDEX 101 

Support Activity, Saigon, USN: 28-29, 

35,43-44 

Tactical air ~upport : 33, 37-36, 75 

Tactics, Viet Cong: 19 

Task Fon:e 2 11 , RVN: 60 

Ta..k Forces, U.S. 

77: 75 

115: 56 

116: 78 

I] 7: 80 

Alpha : 53-54, 57 

doctrine on: 27 

Hay : 81 

Oregon: 73 

Vietnam: 22 

Taylor, General Maxwell D.: 22, 25, 47-

48. SIl"lso United States EmbllS$y. 

Ttf offensive: 55, 60--81 

Thailand: SO, 33-35 

Theater commands, wartime role: 5, 66 

111ieu, Nguyen Van: 69 

Thompson, Robert G. K.: 64 

Thon My Thuy: 77 

Thua Thien Province: 74 

Timmes, Major General Charl(:$ J.: 28, 

31, 33. Seulso United States Military 

Auistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. 

Training programs 

in RVN arrrn:d forces: 20-21, 26, 3 1, 

4()-11,65 

in Vietnam state: 11-12, 14, 16 

Training Relations and Instruction Mission: 12 

Transportation systems: 43 

Trapnell, Major General Thomas J. H.: 

7, II 

Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations: 

21 

Unified Action Armed Forces: 37, 87 

Unified commands 

eUTTent doctrine: 4-5, 37, 48 

defined: 3-4 

JCS role in: 25-26, 66 

ICS$Ons from Vietnam: 85 

in R VN armed forca: 25 

United Nations Command, Korea: 51 

United States Air Force: 10, 13,27,29, 

35, 37-38, 40, 43, 54, 58 

Pacific Air Forces: 29, 35, 58 

Seventh Air Fon;:e: 64, 75, 61 

2d Advance Squadron: 29, 35 

United States Air Fon:e-Continued 

2d Air Division: 35, 37, 40, 43, 56, 58, 

64 

315th Air Division : 37 

United Stales Army, Hawaii: 37 

United States Army, Japan. S •• Japan. 

United States Army, Pacific: 26-27, 29, 

31-32, 34, 49-52. Stt also Collins, 

General James F.; O'Daniel, Lieutenant General John W.; Waters, 

General J ohn K. 

United States Army, Ryukyu Illands: 

25-26, 31-33, 35-37. &t also Caraway, Lieutenant General Paul W. 

United States Army, Vietnam 

activation: 49-52 

eommand authority and missioru: 5 1-

52 

formation proposed: 29, 33-34, 46 

ground forces, oonlrol structure: 83-64 

logistical advisory funclioru: 61-82 

nucleus group: 26 

United Sta tes Army Concept Team in 

Vietnam: 42 

United States Army Fon:es, Far East 

(1939-45): 5 1-52 

United States Army Security Agency: 37 

United States Army Support Command, 

Vietnam: 37,40,43-44,46,49-50 

United States Army Support Group, 

Vietnam: 31-34, 36-37, 44, 49 

United States Coast Guard: 77 

United States Embassy: 13, 20. &, "Iso 

Bunker, Ellsworth; Durbrow, Elbridge: Lodge, Henry Cabot; Nolting, Frederick C.; Taylor, General 

Maxwdl D. 

United States Marine Corps: 40, 43, 45, 

53-58, 73-74, 77-78, 84 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: 78 

III Marine Amphibious Force: 45, 55, 

57-58,63,71,74-75,77-76 

III Marine E1<peditionary Force: 55 

1st Marine Aircraft Wing: 75 

lst Marine Divi5ion : 73 

3d Marine Divi~ion: 73-74 

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade: 54-

55, 58 

27th Marine Rq!;iment: 74 

United States Military AMistance Advisory Group, Cambodia: 13 

United States Military Assistance Ad· 

visory Group, Indochina. Set "Iso 
102 COM MAND AND CONT ROL 

Ul1il{'d Siaies Milimq' A5S;S\OIIICe Advisory Group, Indochina- Continued 

Ikink, Brigadier General Francis G .; 

O'J);mid, Lieutenant CrncTal John 

W.: T rapnell. Major General 

Thomas J. '-I. 

formation, command chain and oper-

:lIions; 7- 9 

French influence on: (j 

func tions divided: 13 

reorganization and redesignation: 12-

United '" Staid! I-Iilitary Assistance I\d-

,'i!lOry Group, Thailand; 30 

Ullill-d Slatl"!l t\-l iJilary Assiswncc Ad. 

"iMlry G"our, ViCln"m, Stc alio 1'>1cCarr, Li.:ancnant General Lionel C.; 

O'Danid, Lieutenant General John 

\V.: Timmcs, Major General Chllrks 

J.: Williams, Lieutenant General 

Samuel T. 

alnorbcd by USMACV: 40-42 

activation ,lIld rCilct;vation: 1:1, 2H 

'ldministrativc supporl; 25, 31, :19-40 

/\rllly representation: 3 

Army uniu, control of: 31, 33- 34 

inactivated: 22, 27 

joint structure: 25 

logistical support and problems: 14- 16, 

25- 26,31,39-40 

mission and authority: 28, 30- 31. 38- 39 

organization chart: 16 

reorganiza tion: 12- 13, III 

strength, pcriodic. S(( Republic of Vict. 

nam, U.S. strength, periodic. 

Temporary Equipment Rt:covery M is· 

sion: 15. 17- 18 

United States M ilitary Assistance Command, T hailand: 34,45-46 

United Sta les M ilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam. Su also 1·l arkins. 

General PaulO.; Westmoreland. 

Gem:ral William C. 

Ilbsorb!! M AAG, Vietnam: 40-42 

activa tion: 22- 23. 25-27. 30, 38 

administrative support: 35. 39-40, 50 

advisers, control of: 26- 30, 40-42. 45-

46.50.54,56-57 

Air Force rcprt'SCntation: 53 

a ir "niu and operations, control of: 33, 

35, 37- 38,45. 54, 58- 59. 75 

/\ rmy representation: 3, ~O, ~2 

United 5t:)!es Military Assistance Command, Vietnam- Continm:d 

Army units, control of: 3 1, 36- 37, 46-

49,51,54, 61-63, 8~ 

command Iluthority and missions: 26-

29,35.38- 39,47-49,51- 52,54- 55, 

58-59,84 

command conllicu and problems: 37-

38.51 -54,61-63,88 

communications organization and problems: 60-61 

Forward headquarters: 74 

Free World Forces, control of: 46, 53-

54,5!H)1 

ground forces, control struet" .. ::: 58- 59, 

83- 84 

JCS. control by: 26- 27, 29 

JCS on reorganization: '12 

joint structure: 27 

Korean units, control of: 60- 61 

linC'S of communication: 62 

logistical support and problems: 28, 35, 

39-40, 42-45, 47, 50, 60, 75- 77, 

81-82 

/l.kNamara on organization: 25, 27 

/I.·llIrine Corps units, control of: 58, 78, 

84 

military assistance functions: 81 - 82 

Na,'y representation: 53 

Navy uniu, "ontrol of: 35, 58- 59 

p'."ification, role in: 9, f>4- 73, 84 

politica l liaison: 29 

rdation 10 other COln manm: 34- 36 

reorganizations: 25, 38-42, 46, 81-82 

R VN forces, co-ordination with: 59-60 

as 5p~'Cified eOlllmand: 40-42 

strength. periodic. S" Republic of Vietnam, U.S. strength, periodic. 

Thailand, responsibility for: 30 

as unified command: 46, 61-63 

United StatCl M ission: 6~, 69 

United States Nava l Forces, Victnam: 50, 

~8, 64, 77-78, 81 

Uni ted States Navy: 13, 27- 29, 40-4 1, 

43, 4~, 58, 60, 7~, 78-80 

United Sta tes Overse..., M ission: 64 

United Sta tes Pacific Command : 3, 8, 

27-28,34- 35,43,46,51 - 52,55,58, 

6 1-62.66-67. S" also Felt, ,\ deniral 

I'larry 0 .; Radford, Admira l Arthur 

W.; Sharp, Admiral U. S. Grant, Jr. 
INDEX 103 

Unity of command, k!lSOna from Vit-tnam: 

11(;-88 

USA RY IS Support Group (I'rovi,ionlll): 

'" 

Vien, Gweral Cao Van, ARVN: 80 

Viet Cong: 21, 47 , 54-55, 59. Sit also 

North Vietnam, aggression by; North 

Vi('tnam Arllly, 

Viet Minh : 9 

Vietmllll: 6, 9. Su a/so North Vietnam, 

IIggr(S!ion by ; Republic of Vietnam. 

ad,'lsen, numbers authorited: 9-10 

armament, restric tions on : 10 

Vie tnam Air Force: 10, 12 

Vielmun Army: 14, 18 

Vietnam Coordinating Committce: (,5 

Vietnam Na,'Y: 10. 12 

Vielnam~ National /\rmy : 8-9 

Vielnamiution program : T.l , 84 

Vung Tau : 45, 54 

Ward, Rcar :\dmiral Nor"ell G.: 45, 

77-80 

Washington eOnfcrenct': ('5 

Watcn, Gcneral John K .: 50, 76. Strallo 

United Statn Army, Pacific. 

Westmoreland, General \Villiam C.: 45, 

47-48,!iO. Sit QIJo Umwd ~'S ili. 

tary ADiatancc Command, Vietnam. 

and air un;IlI, eomm;unc:nt and control: 

.s4,75 

lUI /\rm)' oomponrnt commandrr: 58-59 

<;Ivil.military Slippot't, hradi: 1>9 

command, proposals for: 50, 52-54. 59, 

61 -t.3, 78-80 

Mal:.ya, visit to: 64 

and arine Corps commitment: ;,4-55 

and Mobile Riverine .'oreo:: 78-BO 

namo:d Comma nd ing Gl'no:ral, 

US,\RV: 5 1 

nam l'd Commandi n g Gene ral , 

USMACV: 42 

Navy command, propmed by: 77-78 

and troop units expansion: 54-:,5, 74 

Whed er, General Earle G.: 411 

Williams, Lieutenant Gcncrlll Samuel T .: 

14-19, 21. Su tl/so United Statn 

Military AssittallCc Ad"ilOf)' Group, 

Vielnllm. 

World War II experience : 3, 6, 51. 61. 86 

Zorthian, Barry: 64 

• 

SO[lrfl ( HI'" ... , "