J-S44001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMES EDMONDS

Appellant No. 1747 WDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 20, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007411-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2015

Appellant James Edmonds appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his bench 

trial conviction for one count of attempted murder,1three counts of 

aggravated assault,2three counts of recklessly endangering another person 

(“REAP”),3and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.4 We 

affirm.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 901.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
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The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows:

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 14, 2012[,] William 

Bosley pulled into the carport of the Carnegie Towers, Carnegie 

Borough, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. He was driving a 

green car. His cousin, Tyler Dorsey, and a young child were 

sitting in the back seat. Security videos taken by the Carnegie 

Towers showed a second vehicle driven by [Appellant]. The 

vehicle was in front of Bosley’s such that Bosley could not drive 

past. [Appellant] exited the driver’s side, and the co-defendant, 

Byron Hall, exited the passenger side of the second vehicle. 

[Appellant] was next seen approaching the shooter[5]and 

greeting him with a “fist bump”. The co-defendant, Byron Hall, 

was seen in the video at the left, behind the trunk of Bosley’s 

car. The security video also showed the co-defendant grab the 

victims’ car door so the victims could not exit, as Mr. Watson 

began to shoot. Next, [Appellant] is seen calmly walking as the 

two (2) men and child in the car are shot.

[Appellant] was arrested and originally charged with 

[c]riminal [a]ttempt [h]omicide, two (2) counts of [a]ggravated 

[a]ssault, three (3) counts of [REAP] and [c]onsipracy and an 

additional count of [a]ggravated [a]ssault was added before 

trial. After a non-jury trial, [Appellant] was found guilty on all 

counts. 

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, October 28, 2014 (“1925(a) 

Opinion”), pp. 2-3 (internal record citations and footnotes omitted). The 

trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration for 

the attempted murder conviction and concurrent terms of 3 to 6 years’ 

incarceration for each of the aggravated assault convictions. The court 

____________________________________________

5 The shooter exited the Carnegie Towers’ front door into the carport at the 

same time Appellant and the other co-defendant exited the vehicle.
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imposed no further penalty on the remaining convictions. Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion and an amended post-sentence motion, which 

the court denied on October 7, 2013. Appellant timely filed his notice of 

appeal on October 29, 2013. Both Appellant and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law in determining 

that there was sufficient evidence to convict [Appellant] of the 

charged offenses?

II. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law in denying the 

[m]otion for a [n]ew [t]rial due to the [v]erdict being against the 

[w]eight of the [e]vidence?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 1.

Appellant first claims that the Commonwealth adduced insufficient 

evidence to support his convictions. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 7-. 

Specifically, Appellant claims the evidence presented did not prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he participated in the commission of the crimes. See 

id. Appellant argues the surveillance video merely shows him engaging in a 

common greeting with the shooter prior to the shooting. Id. Accordingly, 

he argues he was merely present at the scene. Id. This claim lacks merit.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, this Court’s 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa.Super.2014).

Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, “[a] person commits an attempt 

when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which 

constitutes a substantial step towards the commission of the crime.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 901(a). Therefore, “[i]f a person takes a substantial step toward 

the commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind to commit such 

an act, he may be convicted of attempted murder.” In re R.D., 44 A.3d 

657, 678 (Pa.Super.2012). Further, our Supreme Court has repeatedly 

determined that “[t]he use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is 

sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill” required for a first degree 

murder conviction. Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1009 

(Pa.2007); see also Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1034 

(Pa.2007) (“a specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly 

weapon on a vital part of a victim’s body.”). 
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Regarding aggravated assault, the Crimes Code provides, in relevant 

part:

(a) Offense defined.–A person is guilty of aggravated assault if 

he:

(1) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or 

causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 

the value of human life[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702. The statute further defines “serious bodily injury” as 

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. “[T]he 

Commonwealth may establish the mens rea element of aggravated assault 

with evidence that the assailant acted either intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 

(Pa.Super.2007). “Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial 

evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 564 

(Pa.Super.2006). However, “where [a] victim suffers serious bodily injury, 

the Commonwealth need not prove specific intent [but] need only prove [the 

assailant] acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.” Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 

A.2d 181, 185 (Pa.Super.1997). The manner and means of an attack will be 

considered in determining whether the requisite degree of recklessness has 
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been proven. Bruce, 916 A.2d at 664. Where an assailant performs an 

offensive act that almost assures that injury will ensue, the requisite degree 

of recklessness has occurred for the purposes of aggravated assault. Bruce, 

916 A.2d at 664 (“at very least, the conduct must be such that that one 

could reasonably anticipate death or serious bodily injury would likely and 

logically result”); Nichols, 692 A.2d at 185. 

The Crimes Code defines REAP thusly:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he 

recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another 

person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. “[REAP] is a crime directed against reckless conduct 

entailing a serious risk to life or limb out of proportion to any utility the 

conduct might have.” Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 

(Pa.Super.2014), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 985 (Pa.2014) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). “As a result, to support a [REAP] 

conviction, the evidence must establish that the defendant acted recklessly 

in a manner that endangered another person.” Id.; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. “A 

person acts in a reckless manner when he consciously disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk.” Id.; 18 Pa.C.S. 302(b)(3). 

“The material elements of conspiracy are: “(1) an intent to commit or 

aid in an unlawful act, (2) an agreement with a co-conspirator and (3) an 

overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 

A.3d 28, 34 (Pa.2014); 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. “An ‘overt act’ means an act done 
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in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.” Id. The overt act necessary 

to establish criminal conspiracy need not be committed by the defendant; it 

need only be committed by a co-conspirator. Commonwealth v. McCall, 

911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa.Super.2006). 

Further, this Court has explained the agreement/intent elements of 

conspiracy as follows:

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common 

understanding, no matter how it came into being, that a 

particular criminal objective be accomplished. Therefore, a 

conviction for conspiracy requires proof of the existence of a 

shared criminal intent. An explicit or formal agreement to 

commit crimes can seldom, if ever, be proved and it need not 

be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably 

extracted from the circumstances that attend its activities. 

Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred where it is demonstrated 

that the relation, conduct, or circumstances of the parties, and 

the overt acts of the co-conspirators sufficiently prove the 

formation of a criminal confederation. The conduct of the parties 

and the circumstances surrounding their conduct may create a 

web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

McCall, 911 A.2d at 996-97. The factors of the relation between the 

parties, knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances 

and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal episode, “may coalesce 

to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt where 

one factor alone might fail.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008, 

1017 (Pa.Super.2005). Finally, “[e]ach co-conspirator is liable for the 

actions of the others if those actions were in furtherance of the common 

criminal design.” Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172, 1178 
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(Pa.Super.2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Baskerville, 681 A.2d 195, 

201 (Pa.Super.1996)).

Further, the Crimes Code discusses accomplice liability in pertinent 

part as follows:

(a) General rule.–A person is guilty of an offense if it is 

committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another 

person for which he is legally accountable, or both.

(b) Conduct of another.–A person is legally accountable for 

the conduct of another person when:

. . .

(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the 

commission of the offense. 

(c) Accomplice defined.–A person is an accomplice of another 

person in the commission of an offense if:

(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the 

commission of the offense, he:

(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or

(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person 

in planning or committing it; or

(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his 

complicity.

18 Pa.C.S. § 306. To find a defendant guilty as an accomplice, a two-prong 

test must be satisfied. Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 

1251 (Pa.Super.2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 

1234 (Pa.2004)). 

First, there must be evidence to show that [the defendant] 

intended to facilitate or promote the underlying offense. 

Second, there must be evidence that [the defendant] actively 
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participated in the crime or crimes by soliciting, aiding, or 

agreeing to aid the principal [].

Kimbrough, 872 A.2d at 1251 (internal citation omitted). “Both 

requirements may be established wholly by circumstantial evidence. Only 

the least degree of concert or collusion in the commission of the offense is 

sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as an accomplice. No 

agreement is required, only aid.” Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 749, 

755 (Pa.Super.2012). 

To establish complicity, mere presence at the scene of a crime 

and knowledge of the commission of criminal acts is not 

sufficient. Nor is flight from the scene of a crime, without more, 

enough. However, those factors combined, along with other 

direct or circumstantial evidence may provide a sufficient basis 

for a conviction, provided the conviction is predicated upon more 

than mere suspicion or conjecture.

Id. at 756 (citing Commonwealth v. Rosetti, 469 A.2d 1121, 1123 

(Pa.Super.1983)).

Here, the surveillance video of the incident showed Appellant and his 

co-defendant arrive at the Carnegie Towers’ carport together in a vehicle 

driven by Appellant before the victims arrived. Appellant parked his vehicle 

such that it essentially blocked forward exit from the carport and waited. 

Appellant and the co-defendant made multiple beckoning hand motions to an 

off-screen individual prior to the victims’ arrival. The victims’ vehicle arrived 

and parked directly behind them. Immediately after the victims’ vehicle 

stopped, Appellant and the co-defendant exited their vehicle just as the third 

co-defendant – the shooter – appeared from the front door of the building. 
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All three men made eye contact, and Appellant greeted the shooter with a 

fist bump as the co-defendant passenger made his way to the driver’s side 

of the victims’ vehicle. As the victims’ vehicle began to back away, the codefendant held the door shut while the shooter approached and opened fire 

into the vehicle. Appellant initially ducked slightly at the shots and 

continued toward the entrance of Carnegie Towers, but calmly returned 

outside while the shooting was still in progress. After the shooting, 

Appellant and the co-defendant calmly watched as the shooter ran past 

them. Neither Appellant nor the co-defendant showed any alarm at the 

shooter’s proximity. 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth this 

evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of attempted 

murder, aggravated assault, and REAP as an accomplice, as well as 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim fails.

Appellant next claims that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 11-14. Appellant bases this claim on the 

lack of direct evidence proffered by the Commonwealth of Appellant’s 

intent.6 See id. He is again incorrect.

____________________________________________

6 Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim merely argues that the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence because the Commonwealth’s evidence 

failed to prove the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. This is actually a 

restatement of his sufficiency claim, which fails for the reasons discussed 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The denial of a new trial based on a lower court’s determination that 

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence is one of the least 

assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial. See

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa.2013). This Court 

reviews weight of the evidence claims pursuant to the following standard:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no 

obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial 

court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must 

do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege 

that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a 

juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth 

juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa.2000) (internal 

citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).

Stated differently, a court may award a new trial because the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence only when the verdict is so contrary to 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

supra. However, as it is easily disposed of for the reasons stated infra, we 

will address Appellant’s claim as though he had argued a proper weight of 

the evidence claim.
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the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice,7“such that right must be 

given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Goodwine, 692 

A.2d 233, 236 (Pa.Super.1997). Moreover, appellate review of a weight 

claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a 

review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753. When reviewing the 

trial court’s determination, this Court gives the gravest deference to the 

findings of the court below. We review the court’s actions for an abuse of 

discretion. Id.

Simply stated, the trial court’s verdict in this matter illustrates that the 

court reviewed the surveillance video – to which Appellant offered no 

contradictory evidence – and found that it credibly evidenced Appellant’s 

participation in the crimes, as discussed supra. The trial court confirmed its 

assessment/verdict by denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new 

trial based on the weight of the evidence. Nothing about the verdict shocks 

____________________________________________

7 This Court has explained the notion of “shocking to one’s sense of justice” 

as follows:

When the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal, or when the 

jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge 

to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall 

from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial 

conscience.

Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa.Super.2004) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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the conscience. Thus, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim warrants no 

relief.

For the preceding reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2015