NO. 12-21-00066-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ARTHUR MICHAEL PALACIOS, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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APPEAL FROM THE 7TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Arthur Michael Palacios appeals the revocation of his deferred adjudication 

community supervision and the imposition of a fifteen-year prison sentence. In two issues, 

Appellant contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by not requiring him “to participate in 

an intermediate sanction facility as a less-restrictive alternative to imprisonment” and (2) the trial 

court improperly assessed a time payment fee and a warrant fee. We modify and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment as modified.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with the second-degree felony offense of burglary of 

a habitation. Appellant waived a jury trial and pleaded “guilty” in an open plea. The trial court 

found the evidence sufficient to find Appellant guilty, but deferred further proceedings and placed 

Appellant on community supervision for ten years. The State subsequently filed a motion to

adjudicate guilt. The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter, at which Appellant pleaded 

“true” to violating the terms and conditions of his community supervision. After the hearing, the 

trial court found the allegations in the State’s motion to be “true,” revoked Appellant’s community 

supervision, and sentenced Appellant to fifteen years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.
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LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES

In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider 

less restrictive alternatives to imprisonment.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an abuse of discretion.

Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Quisenberry v. State, 88 S.W.3d 

745, 749 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of community supervision 

as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); 

see also Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Proof of a single 

violation of the terms of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. Moore v. 

State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The preponderance of the 

evidence standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence supports a reasonable 

belief that the defendant has violated a condition of community supervision. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d 

at 763-64. If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in 

revoking community supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1984).

We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings to 

determine whether the evidence supports the findings. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (explaining the legal sufficiency standard for reviewing a 

jury’s verdict); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 

2d 560 (1979). At a hearing on a motion to revoke community supervision, the trial court is the 

trier of fact and determines the weight and credibility of the testimony. See Diaz v. State, 516 

S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the 

factfinder resolved any such conflicts in favor of its findings. See Montgomery, 369 S.W.3d at 

192.

Analysis

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s 

revocation of his community supervision. Appellant argues only that the trial court erred by 
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imposing a sentence of imprisonment rather than a less restrictive alternative, such as an 

intermediate sanctions facility to address his substance abuse.

Once a single violation of any condition of community supervision is established, trial 

courts “enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to continue, extend, modify, or revoke 

community supervision.” Merino v. State, Nos. 13-19-00240-CR, 13-19-00241-CR, 2020 WL

3116351, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.751(d) (West Supp. 2021); see also Ex 

parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds by State 

v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Smith v. State, 587 S.W.3d 413, 419 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.). The trial court’s broad discretion includes whether to 

place a probationer in SAFPF1 as an additional condition of continued community supervision. 

Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *3. Courts have consistently deferred to a trial court’s discretion 

to revoke community supervision over a probationer’s request for placement in SAFPF or a similar 

facility. Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *3; Hodge v. State, Nos. 02-10-00050-CR, 02-10-00051-

CR, 2011 WL 2756540, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 14, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication); Mathis v. State, No. 04-09-00075-CR, 2009 WL 3320270, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio Oct. 14, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Marriott 

v. State, No. 07-02-00203-CR, 2003 WL 22004084, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 25, 2003, 

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W3d 340, 343-44 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

Despite this clear deference to the trial court’s discretion, Appellant argues that “conditions 

and sanctions should be tailored to the circumstances and needs of the individual defendant.”

Appellant urges that “[i]ntermediate sanction facilities are an important piece of the progressive 

sanctions available for offenders who struggle with substance abuse[,]” and he maintains that the 

least restrictive intervention should be imposed. Appellant contends that he did not commit any 

violent crimes or use firearms or other weapons during his community supervision, and that “[t]his 

is precisely the type of case that warrants implementation of additional, progressive sanctions 

before revocation.” While we do not disagree with Appellant that there is a broad array of 

alternatives to imprisonment in Texas, we cannot, based on the record, agree with Appellant that 

the trial court abused its discretion in not utilizing one of those alternatives.

1 SAFPF is Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility.
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Appellant pleaded “true” to all of the alleged violations in the State’s motion to adjudicate 

guilt, which included failure to submit to numerous random urinalysis tests, failure to report to his 

supervision officer, failure to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings, and failure to complete the 

Lifeskills Program. The trial court accepted Appellant’s pleas of true and found that the allegations 

in the State’s motion to revoke were true. An appellant’s plea of “true,” standing alone, supports

revocation of his community supervision. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1979). On this record, the trial court could reasonably determine that Appellant was 

not a good candidate for continued community supervision or substance abuse counseling. See 

Webster v. State, No. 07-20-00248-CR, 2021 WL 1899359, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 

11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). As previously discussed, revocation 

proceedings are “highly discretionary.” Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *4 (citing Waters, 560 

S.W.3d at 661). Any one of Appellant’s numerous violations would have supported revocation of 

his community supervision. See Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *4 (citing Moore v. State, 605 

S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). Therefore, it was within the trial court’s 

discretion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision and impose a fifteen-year sentence of 

imprisonment. See id. We overrule issue one.

TIME PAYMENT FEE AND WARRANT FEE

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court prematurely assessed a time 

payment fee of $25 and improperly assessed a warrant fee of $50. The State concedes that the 

time payment fee was prematurely assessed and joins Appellant’s request that we delete the time 

payment fee; however, the State contends the warrant fee was properly assessed.

The bill of costs reflected a total of $314, which included a time payment fee of $25. “The 

pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of the time payment fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 

S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Consequently, assessment of the time payment fee in 

Appellant’s case is premature and should be struck in its entirety, without prejudice to its being 

assessed later if, more than thirty days after issuance of the appellate mandate, the defendant has 

failed to completely pay any fine, court costs, or restitution that he owes. See id. Accordingly, we 

sustain this portion of issue two and delete the time payment fee.

The bill of costs also includes a $50.00 “warrant fee.” The Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure requires a convicted defendant to pay certain fees to “defray the cost of services 
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provided in the case by a peace officer.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a) (West 

Supp. 2021). Specifically, the statute requires a defendant to pay $5.00 for an arrest without a 

warrant and $50.00 for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro fine. 

Id. art. 102.011(a)(1), (2). 

Appellant argues that this Court should delete the warrant fee because “the record does not 

demonstrate that Mr. Palacios’s arrest was pursuant to a warrant[]” and “no arrest warrants or 

capiases appear in the record[.]” However, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, two capiases appear 

in the record: one dated February 6, 2018, and the other dated February 2, 2021. Both capiases 

were executed and returned served. We have the authority to modify a judgment to make the 

record speak the truth when we have the necessary data and information to do so. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 43.2(b); Patterson v. State, 525 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.). 

Therefore, the judgment and corresponding bill of costs should be modified to include a warrant 

fee for each of the two capiases issued, an increase of $50, for a total warrant fee of $100. See 

Martinez v. State, 510 S.W.3d 206, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.); see also

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a)(2). We overrule this portion of issue two.

DISPOSITION

Having sustained in part and overruled in part Appellant’s second issue and overruled 

Appellant’s first issue, we modify the trial court’s judgment and bill of costs by striking the $25 

time payment fee, without prejudice to it being assessed later, if more than thirty days after the 

issuance of our mandate, Appellant fails to completely pay any fine, court costs, or restitution he 

owes. We further modify the judgment and bill of costs to add an additional $50 warrant fee for 

the second capias that was issued, resulting in a warrant fee of $100 and total costs of $339. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

BRIAN HOYLE

Justice

Opinion delivered March 23, 2022. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

MARCH 23, 2022

NO. 12-21-00066-CR

ARTHUR MICHAEL PALACIOS,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 7th District Court

of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-0049-18)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, 

and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the court below 

should be modified and as modified, affirmed.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of 

the court below be modified by striking the $25 time payment fee, without prejudice to it being 

assessed later if, more than thirty days after the issuance of our mandate, Appellant fails to 

completely pay the fine, court costs, or restitution he owes; and we modify the judgment and bill 

of costs to add an additional $50 warrant fee for the second capias issued; resulting in a warrant 

fee of $100 and total costs of $339; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed; 

and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.

Brian Hoyle, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.