a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate

July 2004 NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

DOE Needs to Take 

Action to Further 

Reduce the Use of 

Weapons-Usable 

Uranium in Civilian 

Research Reactors

GAO-04-807
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-807.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-807, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities, Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

July 2004

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

DOE Needs to Take Action to Further 

Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable 

Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors 

Currently, conversion to LEU fuel is technically feasible for 35 of the 66 

research reactors in DOE’s program that still use HEU fuel, but most do not 

have plans to convert. In the United States, 8 research reactors, including 6 

university research reactors, have not converted because DOE has not 

provided the necessary funding. Of the 20 foreign research reactors that use 

U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert because they have a 

sufficient supply of HEU fuel and either do not want to incur the additional 

cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding. Finally, only 1 of 7 

Russian-supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to 

convert. 

Conversion to LEU fuel is not technically feasible for 31 research reactors 

worldwide that still use HEU fuel. DOE has experienced technical setbacks 

in fuel development that have postponed the conversion of the 31 reactors 

until 2010 at the earliest. One fuel failed unexpectedly in testing, and DOE 

may cancel further development, depending on the results of additional 

tests. Initial testing of another LEU fuel produced positive results, but 

additional testing is required and the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at 

the earliest. 

Separately from the development of LEU fuel, DOE is developing LEU to 

replace HEU in the production of medical isotopes. DOE has not yet 

completed the work that would enable conversion of large-scale medical 

isotope production to LEU. One reactor has converted to LEU for smallscale production. However, large-scale producers are concerned that the 

cost of converting to LEU could be prohibitive. 

DOE and NRC have taken steps to improve security at foreign and U.S. 

research reactors. While operators at most research reactors we visited said 

that security had been upgraded through DOE or NRC efforts, we observed 

areas where further improvements could be made. Recognizing the possible 

need for further improvements, DOE and NRC are engaged in separate 

efforts to assess and improve security. 

Conversion Status of Research Reactors Included in DOE’s Reactor Conversion Program 

Nuclear research reactors 

worldwide use highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) as fuel and for the 

production of medical isotopes. 

Because HEU can also be used in 

nuclear weapons, the Department 

of Energy’s (DOE) Reduced 

Enrichment for Research and Test 

Reactors program is developing 

low enriched uranium (LEU), 

which would be very difficult to 

use in weapons, to replace HEU. 

To date, 39 of the 105 research 

reactors in the United States and 

abroad targeted by DOE have 

converted to LEU fuel. GAO was 

asked to examine (1) the status of 

the remaining research reactors in 

converting to LEU fuel, (2) DOE’s 

progress in developing new LEU 

fuels for reactors where conversion 

is not yet technically feasible, (3) 

DOE’s progress in developing LEU 

for the production of medical 

isotopes, and (4) the status of DOE 

and Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) efforts to 

improve security at research 

reactors. 

GAO recommends that DOE 

consider converting the 6 U.S. 

university research reactors, 

remove the HEU fuel from the 

reactors after their conversion, and 

evaluate providing additional 

incentives to foreign research 

reactors to convert to LEU. DOE 

agreed with our recommendations. 

GAO did not fully evaluate, and is 

not making recommendations on, 

DOE and NRC efforts to improve 

security at research reactors. 
Page i GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

Many Domestic and Foreign Research Reactors Are Still Using 

Weapons-Usable Uranium Even Though They Could Operate on 

Low Enriched Uranium 12

Technical Setbacks in Developing New Fuels Limit Progress in 

Converting the Largest Remaining Research Reactors 20

Using Low Enriched Uranium for Medical Isotope Production Is 

Feasible, but Concerns over Cost Could Limit Its Use 25

DOE and NRC Are Addressing Security at Foreign and Domestic 

Research Reactors 27

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Scope and Methodology 31

Appendixes

Appendix I: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures and Projected 

Costs 35

Appendix II: 39 Research Reactors That Converted to LEU Fuel under the 

Reactor Conversion Program 38

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy 40

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State 42

Tables Table 1: U.S. Research Reactors Using HEU Fuel That Could 

Convert to LEU 13

Table 2: 20 Foreign Research Reactors Still Using HEU Obtained 

from the United States 16

Table 3: Seven Foreign Research Reactors Using HEU from Russia 

That Could Convert to LEU 19

Table 4: 31 Research Reactors That Cannot Convert Using 

Currently Available LEU Fuels 21

Table 5: Number of Research Reactors Selected for Site Visits or 

Phone Interviews 32

Table 6: DOE’s Projected Costs to Complete the Reactor 

Conversion Program 37
Contents

Page ii GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figures Figure 1: Locations of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE’s 

Reactor Conversion Program 8

Figure 2: Conversion Status of 105 Research Reactors Included in 

DOE’s Reactor Conversion Program 11

Figure 3: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures, Fiscal Years 

1978 to 2003 35

Abbreviations

Argonne Argonne National Laboratory 

DOE Department of Energy

HEU highly enriched uranium

INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 

LEU low enriched uranium 

NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

RERTR Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program

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Page 1 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 30, 2004 Letr

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Chairman, Subcommittee on

Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Nuclear research reactors located throughout the world play a vital role in 

medicine, agriculture, industry, and basic scientific research. Many of the 

research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in one of two ways, 

either as fuel or as an ingredient for the production of medical isotopes 

used to treat cancer or conduct medical diagnoses. HEU is also a key 

component in the construction of nuclear weapons—it takes as little as 25 

kilograms of HEU to build a nuclear weapon. The amount of HEU located 

at research reactors worldwide ranges from several kilograms to in excess 

of 20 kilograms. 

The United States has a long-standing policy of reducing and, to the extent 

possible, eliminating the use of HEU in civilian research reactors. To 

support this policy, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Reduced 

Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program in 1978 to 

develop the technology to reduce and eventually eliminate the use of HEU 

in civilian research reactors worldwide.1

 DOE’s Argonne National 

Laboratory (Argonne) is the technical lead for the program and conducts 

research and development to find alternatives to the two uses of HEU in 

research reactors. The program’s goal is to replace HEU with low enriched 

uranium (LEU), which would be very difficult to use in nuclear weapons.2

 

The Secretary of Energy reiterated DOE’s support for the reactor 

conversion program and committed to the conversion of all U.S. civilian 

research reactors by 2013 in a speech on May 26, 2004.

To achieve the program’s objectives, Argonne conducts extensive tests on 

new LEU fuels and materials for isotope production to find suitable 

1

In this report, we refer to the RERTR program as the reactor conversion program.

2

HEU is enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. LEU is enriched to less 

than 20 percent.
Page 2 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

alternatives that do not negatively affect research reactors’ performance, 

operating costs, or operational safety. Part of Argonne’s strategy is to have 

multiple fuels under development to address the unique fuel needs of the 

different types of research reactors included in DOE’s reactor conversion 

program. Research reactors are designed for different purposes and have 

operating characteristics that affect their ability to convert to LEU. As a 

result, an LEU fuel that can be used in one research reactor may not be 

suitable for another.

The scope of DOE’s reactor conversion program includes LEU fuel 

development for 105 research reactors located in the United States and 40 

other countries. Since the inception of the program through July 2004, 39 of 

the 105 reactors have either converted or are in the process of converting 

to LEU. Argonne officials estimate that prior to converting to LEU, these 39 

research reactors used over 240 kilograms of HEU fuel per year, enough to 

build about 10 nuclear weapons. In contrast, they estimate that the 

remaining 66 research reactors, which have not converted to LEU, continue 

to use over 800 kilograms of HEU fuel per year. Thirty-five of these reactors 

could convert using currently available LEU fuels, and Argonne is 

developing new LEU fuels for 31 research reactors that cannot convert 

using any of the fuels already developed. In particular, after screening a 

large number of potential LEU fuels, Argonne has identified two fuels, 

dispersion fuel and monolithic fuel, for further testing and development. 

Both of these fuels use an alloy of uranium and another metal called 

molybdenum and differ in how the fuel is manufactured. Dispersion fuel 

consists of spherical particles of uranium-molybdenum alloy that are 

randomly dispersed in a thin layer of aluminum. In contrast, monolithic fuel 

consists of a thin sheet of solid uranium-molybdenum alloy.3

 

The reactor conversion program also develops LEU alternatives for six 

medical isotope producers, all located outside the United States, that use 

an estimated 85 kilograms of HEU per year in their production processes. 

The use of HEU for medical isotope production is separate from the type of 

fuel used in research reactors. Developing the technology to convert to 

LEU for medical isotope production requires a technical effort that is 

separate from the development of new LEU fuels.

3

In this report, we use the terms “dispersion fuel” and “monolithic fuel” to refer specifically 

to the new LEU fuels being developed by the reactor conversion program that use an alloy 

of uranium and molybdenum.
Page 3 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Concerned about the potential theft or diversion of HEU from research 

reactors, DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are engaged 

in efforts to monitor and improve security at research reactors, many of 

which are located on university campuses or other facilities used by 

students and researchers. Since 1974, DOE has engaged in efforts to 

improve nuclear material security in over 50 countries, including security 

over nuclear material at research reactors. In the United States, NRC 

regulates research reactors to ensure an acceptable level of safety and 

security and conducts regular inspections to ensure compliance with 

regulations on safety and security. 

In response to your request concerning the use of HEU at civilian research 

reactors, we examined (1) the status of research reactors worldwide in 

converting to LEU fuels developed by DOE’s reactor conversion program, 

(2) the program’s progress in developing new LEU fuels for use in research 

reactors that cannot convert to currently available LEU fuels, and (3) the 

program’s progress in developing LEU for use in the production of medical 

isotopes. In addition, because HEU continues to be used and stored at 

research reactors worldwide, we gathered information on the status of 

DOE and NRC efforts to improve the security of research reactors in the 

United States and other countries.

To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation on the reactor 

conversion program from DOE and Argonne, including information on the 

status of reactors in converting to LEU, development of LEU fuels, and 

development of LEU for medical isotope production. We visited research 

reactors in the United States, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 

Portugal, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; attended an annual international 

conference on DOE’s reactor conversion program; and obtained 

information on the status of developing LEU fuels and LEU for the 

production of medical isotopes from reactor conversion program officials 

at Argonne. We also discussed the status of the program and security of 

HEU at foreign and domestic research reactors with foreign officials in the 

countries we visited and with DOE and NRC officials. However, we did not 

evaluate the effectiveness of the security at research reactors or DOE and 

NRC efforts to improve security. We conducted our review from July 2003 

to July 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

You also asked that we examine two other DOE programs closely related to 

the reactor conversion program: the Foreign Research Reactor Spent 

Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program and the Russian Research Reactor Fuel 
Page 4 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Return program. The Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Acceptance program is intended to recover and store U.S.-origin research 

reactor fuel, including both HEU and LEU, from 41 eligible countries 

throughout the world. The Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return program 

assists in the return of Russian-origin research reactor fuel to Russia, 

mostly from countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 

Europe. Together with DOE’s reactor conversion program, these programs 

support the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating the use of 

HEU for civilian applications. As agreed with your office, we will address 

these two programs in a follow-on report. 

Results in Brief According to Argonne’s analysis, conversion to LEU fuel is technically 

feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors in DOE’s reactor conversion 

program that still use HEU fuel, but most do not have plans to convert. In 

the United States, 8 research reactors, including 6 university reactors, 

could convert to LEU fuel, but DOE has not provided the necessary funding 

(estimated by DOE at about $5 million to $10 million per reactor). In 

addition, a university research reactor that converted to LEU in 2000 is still 

storing HEU fuel because DOE has not removed it. DOE officials said they 

have not made the conversion of the 6 university research reactors a 

priority because the reactors use only a small amount of HEU fuel. Officials 

at NRC, which regulates most of the U.S. research reactors included in 

DOE’s reactor conversion program, said that they consider the conversion 

of the university reactors a security enhancement and one of their priorities 

and that the delay is purely a matter of funding. Operators of the 6 reactors 

said they would convert to LEU fuel when DOE provides the funding. 

DOE’s reactor conversion program cooperates closely with operators of 

foreign research reactors and promotes conversion from HEU to LEU. 

Ultimately, however, it is the owners of the foreign reactors that make the 

decision to convert to LEU. Of the 20 foreign research reactors that use 

U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert to LEU because they 

generally have a sufficient supply of HEU and either do not want to incur 

the additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding. 

Finally, since DOE’s reactor conversion program initiated cooperation with 

Russia in 1993, no research reactors that use HEU fuel supplied by Russia 

have converted. Only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could 

use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. DOE officials said that 5 other 

Russian-supplied reactors are also likely to convert to LEU fuels that are 

currently available or are expected to become available within the next 

year.
Page 5 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Technical setbacks in developing new LEU fuels have postponed the 

conversion of 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot use currently 

available LEU fuels until 2010 at the earliest. According to Argonne 

officials, unexpected failures that occurred when testing dispersion fuel—

the worst they have ever experienced during fuel development—could 

render the fuel unusable for most research reactors. As a result of the test 

failures, Argonne has delayed the completion of dispersion fuel until 2010 

and may recommend that DOE cancel further development altogether if the 

fuel cannot be sufficiently improved. Canceling development of dispersion 

fuel would leave monolithic fuel as the reactor conversion program’s only 

remaining option for converting the remaining 31 reactors. Initial testing of 

monolithic fuel has produced positive results, and if tests continue to be 

successful, it should perform better than dispersion fuel. However, the 

development process is still at the beginning stages; additional testing is 

required, and the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at the earliest. 

Argonne officials said that the current fuel development schedule is already 

compressed and that no further acceleration is possible. Rather, any 

technical problems would likely result in further delays. Furthermore, if 

both fuels fail, Argonne is not working on any other LEU fuel that could 

replace HEU in the remaining research reactors.

DOE’s reactor conversion program has not yet completed the work that 

would enable conversion of large-scale medical isotope production to LEU, 

and large-scale producers are concerned that the cost of converting to LEU 

could be prohibitive. Currently, one reactor in Argentina has converted 

from using HEU to LEU for the small-scale production of medical isotopes. 

Argonne officials said that further development is necessary on using LEU 

for large-scale production. Large-scale producers have built expensive 

facilities designed to produce medical isotopes using HEU. Any attempt to 

adapt the facilities to use LEU would involve additional costs. 

Furthermore, using LEU instead of HEU would increase the amount of 

waste generated by the production process. Argonne officials said they are 

working to overcome these challenges and expect to complete 

development of LEU for large-scale medical isotope production in 2 to 3 

years. Two large producers of medical isotopes told us that conversion to 

LEU would be difficult and costly, and one of them is currently assessing 

the economic feasibility of conversion.

While operators at most research reactors we visited said that security had 

been upgraded through DOE or NRC efforts, we also observed areas where 

further improvements could be made. Recognizing the possible need for 

further improvements, DOE and NRC are engaged in separate efforts to 
Page 6 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

assess and improve security at foreign and domestic research reactors, 

respectively. A DOE task force established in 2004 is currently gathering 

information on all research reactors worldwide, including reactors that 

have been shut down, and prioritizing the need for increased security at 

reactors based on a number of factors, including how much HEU is stored 

on site. According to DOE officials, the task force addresses the need to 

combine data from different sources to identify potential security gaps. The 

task force has submitted a report to the Secretary of Energy with 

recommendations for possible implementation by DOE. The task force 

efforts are in addition to assistance that DOE has provided since 1974 to 

other countries to improve security at their research reactors. In the United 

States, NRC is conducting assessments of the security at research reactors 

under its jurisdiction and may increase security requirements based on the 

results of the assessments. NRC took actions after the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, to improve the security at domestic research 

reactors—for example, by requiring that some reactors consider installing 

additional physical barriers. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to consider 

placing a higher priority on converting the 6 U.S. university research 

reactors that are able to convert with existing LEU fuel, to place a high 

priority on removing the HEU fuel from the reactors after their conversion 

and transporting it to the appropriate DOE facility, and to evaluate the 

costs and benefits of providing additional incentives to foreign research 

reactors that currently use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to convert to LEU.

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Energy and 

State and to NRC for their review and comment. DOE, State, and NRC 

generally agreed with the recommendations in our report and provided 

detailed comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 
Page 7 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Background Nuclear research reactors are used for training and research purposes 

throughout the world. Research reactors are generally smaller than nuclear 

power reactors, ranging in size from less than 1 to 250 megawatts 

compared with 3,000 megawatts generated by a typical power reactor. In 

addition, unlike power reactors, many research reactors use HEU fuel 

instead of LEU in order to produce the appropriate conditions in the 

reactor cores for conducting a wide variety of research. DOE has identified 

161 operating research reactors that were designed to use HEU fuel and 

has included 105 of them in the reactor conversion program. The research 

reactors included in the program are spread out among the United States 

and 40 other countries, including Canada, France, Germany, and Russia 

(see fig. 1).
Page 8 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 1: Locations of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE’s Reactor Conversion Program

Canada

6

United States

25

Jamaica

1

Argentina

2

Brazil

1

Chile

1

Colombia

1

Mexico

1

Source: Argonne National Laboratory.

Western and

Eastern Europe

Sweden 

Switzerland 

Czech Republic 

France 

Bulgaria 

Turkey 

Romania 

Hungary 

Ukraine 

Greece 

United Kingdom 

Austria 

Germany 

Denmark

Netherlands 

Poland

Portugal

Slovenia

Belgium 

Number of 

Reactors

2

1

2

5

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

5

1

3

1

1

1

1
Page 9 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Israel

1

Australia

1

Libya

2

Kazakhstan

2

Uzbekistan

1

Pakistan

1

Iran

1

Philippines

1

North Korea

1

South Africa

1

Vietnam

1

3

3

1

5

5 1

1 1

1

1 1

1

2

1

1

Japan

Taiwan 5

1

2

2 1

Russia

14

Western and

Eastern Europe

1
Page 10 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

In addition to the 105 research reactors covered under the reactor 

conversion program, DOE has targeted six medical isotope producers that 

use HEU as an ingredient in their production processes, including four 

large medical isotope producers located in Belgium, Canada, the 

Netherlands, and South Africa. 

For a variety of reasons, DOE has excluded from its reactor conversion 

program 56 research reactors that use HEU fuel, including 9 in the United 

States. Some of the reactors are used for military or other purposes, such 

as space propulsion, that require HEU. Others are located in countries such 

as China that so far have not cooperated with the United States on 

converting their reactors to LEU. Finally, the time and costs associated 

with developing LEU fuel for some of the reactors may exceed their 

expected lifetime and usefulness.

The United States has historically provided nuclear technology to foreign 

countries in exchange for a commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. 

Starting in 1953, the Atoms for Peace program supplied research reactors 

and the fuel needed to operate them to countries around the world. The 

research reactors supplied by the Atoms for Peace program initially used 

LEU fuel, but many countries gradually switched from LEU to HEU in 

order to conduct more advanced research. In addition, HEU fuel could 

remain in the reactor core longer and was less expensive than LEU fuel. By 

the late 1970s, most research reactors were using HEU fuel and the United 

States was exporting about 700 kilograms of HEU a year to foreign 

research reactors. Like the United States, the Soviet Union also exported 

research reactors and the HEU fuel to operate them to other countries.

In order to achieve the program’s objective of reducing the use of HEU in 

civilian research reactors, Argonne is developing new LEU fuels in 

cooperation with counterparts in other countries, including Argentina, 

France, and Russia. Developing LEU fuels involves testing fuel samples in 

research reactors to determine how the fuels behave under normal 

operating conditions. Fuel manufacturers and reactor operators around the 

world participate in the program by manufacturing and testing LEU fuels. 

Owners of foreign research reactors fund conversion of their reactors from 

HEU to LEU. In 1993, Argonne expanded the reactor conversion program 

to include cooperation with Russia on the conversion of Russian-supplied 

research reactors to LEU fuel. The Soviet Union had independently 

initiated a program in 1978 to reduce the enrichment of HEU fuel in 

research reactors but suspended the program in 1989 due to lack of 

funding. Russian-supplied research reactors use fuels manufactured in 
Page 11 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Russia that are not interchangeable with fuels used by U.S.-supplied 

research reactors. Therefore, DOE’s reactor conversion program 

differentiates between U.S.-supplied and Russian-supplied research 

reactors.

Since the reactor conversion program’s inception in 1978, 39 of the 105 

research reactors included in the program have either converted or are in 

the process of converting to LEU fuel. (See app. II for a list of converted 

research reactors.)4

 Of the remaining 66 research reactors that still use 

HEU fuel, 35 can convert using currently available LEU fuels but have not 

done so, and 31 cannot convert to any currently available LEU fuels and 

still require HEU in order to conduct the research for which they were 

designed (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: Conversion Status of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE’s Reactor 

Conversion Program

4

In comments on a draft of this report, the State Department also noted that a growing 

number of new and planned research reactors have decided to use LEU fuel.

Cannot convert to LEU 

and require new LEU 

fuel development

DOE’s reactor 

conversion program

105 research reactors

Fully or partially 

converted to LEU

Could convert to LEU 

but are still using HEU

Foreign reactors using 

HEU from the U.S.

U.S. reactors

using HEU

Foreign reactors using 

HEU from Russia

Source: Argonne National Laboratory.

39 reactors 31 reactors 35 reactors

20 8 7
Page 12 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

A research reactor can begin the conversion process after a suitable LEU 

fuel is developed and available commercially. The decision to convert from 

HEU to LEU also depends on research reactor owners having the necessary 

financial resources, including for the purchase of new fuel. In the United 

States, NRC regulations require that research reactors under its 

jurisdiction, including reactors operated by universities, convert to LEU 

fuel when an LEU fuel that can be used to replace HEU fuel has been 

developed and when federal funding is made available for the conversion.5

 

The conversion process begins with analyses to determine whether the 

reactor can safely convert and the impact of conversion on the reactor’s 

performance. After the analyses are completed and regulatory approval for 

conversion is obtained, the operator can remove the HEU from the reactor 

and replace it with the new LEU fuel. The HEU fuel can be disposed of 

once it has been removed from the reactor core and has cooled.

Many Domestic and 

Foreign Research 

Reactors Are Still 

Using Weapons-Usable 

Uranium Even Though 

They Could Operate on 

Low Enriched Uranium

According to Argonne’s analysis, conversion to LEU fuel is technically 

feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors worldwide that still use HEU 

fuel. However, only 4 of the reactors—3 foreign reactors that use U.S.-

origin HEU and 1 Russian-supplied reactor—currently have plans to 

convert. Eight U.S. research reactors, including 6 university reactors, could 

convert to LEU fuel, but according to DOE officials, DOE has not provided 

the funding to convert them. In addition, DOE has not removed HEU fuel 

from a university research reactor that has been storing HEU since it 

converted to LEU in 2000. According to Argonne officials, of the 20 foreign 

research reactors that currently use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have 

plans to convert to LEU because they generally have a sufficient supply of 

HEU and either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do 

not have the necessary funding. Finally, since DOE’s reactor conversion 

program initiated cooperation with Russia in 1993, no research reactors 

that use HEU fuel supplied by Russia have converted. According to 

Argonne officials, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could 

use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. They said that 5 other Russiansupplied reactors are likely to convert to LEU fuels that are currently 

available or are expected to become available within the next year.

5

10 C.F.R. § 50.64. The NRC regulates most of the U.S. research reactors included in DOE’s 

reactor conversion program, with the exception of 4 DOE research reactors.
Page 13 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Eight Research Reactors in 

the United States Could 

Convert to Low Enriched 

Uranium but Still Use 

Weapons-Usable Uranium

In the United States, there are 6 university research reactors and 2 other 

research reactors that could convert to LEU fuel but still use HEU fuel. 

Although DOE has funded the conversion of 11 university research reactors 

to LEU fuel, the last university reactor converted in 2000. DOE officials said 

DOE has not provided the funding to convert the 6 remaining U.S. 

university reactors. DOE recently added 2 other domestic reactors to the 

reactor conversion program, and neither of these reactors currently has 

plans to convert to LEU, also because DOE has not provided the necessary 

funding. (See table 1 for a list of the 8 reactors.) 

Table 1: U.S. Research Reactors Using HEU Fuel That Could Convert to LEU

Source: Argonne.

Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges from 0 to 0.2 kilograms per 

year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power 

levels that they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for their entire lifetime 

without replacing fuel.

In addition, the university research reactor that converted to LEU in 2000 is 

still storing HEU fuel because DOE has not removed it. Because the reactor 

now uses LEU fuel and has no need for HEU, the reactor operator told us 

that he is eager to return the HEU to DOE for long-term storage and 

disposal. DOE has a separate program that supports university research 

reactors, including provision of DOE-owned fuel, and funds their 

conversion to LEU and removal of spent fuel.6

 According to the DOE 

Reactor

Oregon State University

Purdue University

Texas A&M University

University of Florida

University of Wisconsin

Washington State University

General Electric NTR Reactor

DOE NRAD Reactor

6

DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology administers the program for 

supporting domestic university reactors. The program has an annual budget of about $18 

million and provides a variety of assistance such as research grants, tuition assistance for 

nuclear engineering students, and funding to upgrade reactor facilities.
Page 14 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

official in charge of the university reactor support program, the program 

has limited funding, and requests for additional funding to support 

conversion have not been approved by the Office of Management and 

Budget. Furthermore, the university reactor support program did not 

receive additional funding to remove HEU fuel from the research reactor 

that converted to LEU in 2000 until fiscal year 2004, after a group of 

domestic research reactor operators successfully lobbied Congress to add 

$2.5 million to the program’s budget to pay for the removal of spent fuel 

from the reactors.

Officials at NRC, which regulates the 6 university reactors, told us that they 

consider the conversion of the reactors to LEU, the timely removal of HEU 

fuel after conversion, and the removal of HEU from the reactor that 

converted to LEU in 2000 as a security enhancement and one of their 

priorities. NRC officials said that converting the 6 reactors is technically 

feasible and that the delay in converting the reactors is purely a matter of 

funding and should be expedited by DOE. However, DOE officials said that 

DOE had not made the conversion of these reactors a priority. 

Furthermore, while operators at all 6 universities told us they are willing to 

convert to LEU fuel, they said it is not a high priority because they do not 

consider their HEU fuel to be a likely target for theft. For example, one 

reactor operator explained that the reactor is structured in such a way that 

the HEU is located inside a concrete enclosure that even experienced 

reactor staff need almost 2 days to access. These 6 reactors use only a 

small amount of HEU fuel—less than a kilogram per year, which is not 

enough to make a nuclear weapon. In contrast, there are other research 

reactors included in DOE’s reactor conversion program that are larger than 

the 6 university reactors and use tens of kilograms per year. 

Nevertheless, operators of the 6 university research reactors said they 

would convert to LEU when DOE provides funding. Furthermore, the DOE 

official in charge of the university reactor support program said that 

converting domestic university reactors is an issue of U.S. nonproliferation 

policy. He said that converting domestic reactors to LEU would support 

U.S. efforts to influence foreign reactors to convert to LEU in accordance 

with the U.S. nonproliferation policy to reduce the use of HEU in civilian 

research reactors worldwide. Although they did not consider conversion a 

priority from a security perspective, two of the university reactor directors 

we spoke with recognized the importance of converting university reactors 

to LEU as part of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Page 15 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

According to DOE officials, conversion for each reactor is projected to cost 

between $5 million and $10 million. However, a project engineer at DOE’s 

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory who tracks 

DOE expenditures on conversions of U.S. university reactors had originally 

told us that conversion would cost between $2 million and $4 million per 

reactor, depending on the type of reactor. DOE could not provide 

documentation to support either of the estimates. DOE officials said that 

conversion costs for 4 of the university reactors are higher because their 

fuel is no longer manufactured in the United States and must be purchased 

in France.7

 

Other than funding, there are no significant obstacles to converting the 6 

university reactors to LEU. Based on our visits to 3 converted university 

research reactors and interviews with Argonne officials and the operators 

of the 6 remaining university reactors, converting to LEU does not reduce 

the performance of the reactors to the point that they cannot be used to 

conduct research and train students effectively. Operators at 5 of the 6 

university reactors still using HEU fuel told us they expected performance 

to be adequate after conversion. In addition, operators of converted 

reactors told us that using LEU instead of HEU reduced security concerns 

and had a minimal impact on the cost of operating the reactors. Argonne 

officials said that one of their objectives when providing technical 

assistance to convert reactors to LEU is to complete the process with only 

minimal effects on performance and operating costs. In fact, two reactor 

operators (one in Rhode Island and one in Massachusetts) told us that 

performance at their reactors had improved as a result of conversion. 

According to Argonne officials, 2 other reactors in the United States (the 

DOE NRAD and General Electric NTR reactors) could convert to LEU but 

are not currently planning to do so. The officials said they recently added 

these 2 reactors to the scope of the reactor conversion program so that the 

program would be comprehensive in its coverage of civilian research 

reactors that use HEU. The NRAD research reactor is a DOE reactor, and 

DOE would have to fund the purchase of new LEU fuel if a decision were 

made to convert the reactor. According to a DOE official responsible for 

the reactor, the budget for the NRAD reactor is limited, and purchasing new 

LEU fuel to convert the reactor would take funding away from other 

7

If DOE provides funding for converting these 4 university reactors, the schedule depends 

on the ability of the French manufacturer to supply the fuel in a timely manner. However, 

the French supplier is not accepting new requests for reactor fuel until 2007.
Page 16 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

activities at the facility where the reactor is located. The DOE official 

considers the conversion of this reactor a lower priority because it has a 

sufficient supply of HEU fuel to last for the life of the reactor and because 

the facility has other nuclear material that would be more attractive to 

terrorists than the HEU fuel in the reactor. The General Electric NTR is a 

privately owned reactor and is also not required to convert until DOE 

provides funding.

Twenty Foreign Research 

Reactors Continue to Use 

Weapons-Usable Uranium 

Fuel

Fourteen of the 20 foreign research reactors that currently use U.S.-origin 

HEU fuel do not have plans to convert to LEU. According to Argonne 

officials, these reactors generally have a supply of HEU sufficient to last 

many years (in some cases for the life of the reactor) and either do not 

want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the 

necessary funding. Three of the reactors are planning to convert to LEU, 

and 3 others currently plan to shut down (or, in the case of 2 reactors, 

convert to LEU fuel if they do not shut down). See table 2 for a list of the 20 

reactors.

Table 2: 20 Foreign Research Reactors Still Using HEU Obtained from the United 

States 

Country Reactor Status

Argentina RA-6 Conversion planned

Canada Slowpoke-Alberta

Slowpoke-Halifax

Slowpoke-Saskatchewan

France MINERVE

Ulysee-Saclay

Germany FRJ-2 Conversion planned

Israel IRR-1 Shutdown planned

Jamaica Slowpoke

Japan KUCA

UTR-10 Kinki

KUR Shutdown or conversion planned

Mexico TRIGA

Netherlands HFR Petten Conversion planned

LFR

Portugal RPI Shutdown or conversion planned
Page 17 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Source: Argonne.

Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges from 0 to 38.3 kilograms per 

year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power 

levels that they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for their entire lifetime 

without replacing fuel.

Some of the foreign research reactors would like to convert but do not have 

the necessary funding. For example, the operator of a research reactor in 

Jamaica told us that converting to LEU would improve the reactor 

performance but that purchasing LEU fuel for the reactor would cost $1.5 

million, which is more than the reactor operator can afford. Therefore, the 

reactor operator is planning to continue using its current supply of HEU, 

which will last possibly 20 years. Similarly, according to Argonne officials, 

the reactor operator in Mexico would be willing to convert to LEU but does 

not have the necessary funding. While funding may not be an issue for 

other foreign reactors, many of them are designed to operate on a small 

amount of fuel meant to last for the life of the reactor. Converting to LEU 

would require the disposal of the fuel that the reactor operator had already 

purchased and is still usable. According to Argonne officials, operators of 

certain reactors in France, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 

do not have plans to convert because the reactors have lifetime cores that 

do not need to be replaced. 

To support the objective of the reactor conversion program to reduce and 

eventually eliminate the use of HEU in research reactors, the United States 

has implemented policies designed to influence foreign research reactors 

to convert to LEU. For example, DOE’s Foreign Research Reactor Spent 

Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program provides foreign reactors that use HEU 

fuel of U.S.-origin the opportunity to return their spent fuel to the United 

States if they agree to convert their reactors to LEU fuel. In addition, the 

Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorizes NRC to approve the export of HEU to 

foreign research reactors only if the recipients agree to convert the 

reactors once a suitable LEU fuel is developed.8

 Since there are limited 

suppliers of HEU fuel and few options for disposing of spent fuel, the U.S. 

South Africa SAFARI

United Kingdom Consort

Neptune

Viper

8

42 U.S.C. § 2160d.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Reactor Status
Page 18 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

policies in support of the reactor conversion program have been effective 

in influencing some research reactors to convert to LEU. In particular, of 

the 20 foreign reactors that can convert to LEU but are still using HEU, the 

2 that use the greatest amount of HEU per year are planning to convert by 

2006. One research reactor in the Netherlands (HFR Petten) formally 

agreed with the United States to convert to LEU in order to continue 

receiving U.S.-origin HEU fuel until conversion could take place and to ship 

spent fuel back to the United States. The U.S. policies in support of 

conversion were effective in influencing the reactor operator because the 

reactor uses 38 kilograms of HEU fuel per year and regularly needs to 

obtain new HEU fuel and dispose of spent fuel. Similarly, the FRJ-2 reactor 

in Germany has an agreement with DOE to convert to LEU fuel as a 

condition of returning spent fuel to the United States.

However, U.S. policies in support of the reactor conversion program do not 

influence foreign reactors using so little HEU that they can operate for 

many years without replacing their fuel or disposing of spent fuel. While 

Argonne provides technical assistance for conversion, current DOE policy 

precludes purchasing new LEU fuel for foreign reactors that use U.S.-origin 

HEU fuel. Under this policy, purchasing new LEU fuel—which, according 

to a DOE project engineer, is the main cost of conversion—is the 

responsibility of the reactor operator. According to a DOE official, DOE has 

paid for new LEU fuel only once, in Romania, in exchange for the return of 

Russian-origin HEU fuel to Russia. DOE spent $4 million to purchase LEU 

fuel for the Romanian reactor, which is still only partially converted and 

requires more LEU fuel before conversion is complete. DOE officials said 

that current DOE policy allows purchasing LEU fuel for research reactors 

that use Russian-origin HEU fuel in exchange for returning the HEU to 

Russia. However, DOE does not have a similar policy for research reactors 

that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel. DOE officials said they are considering 

revising this policy to allow purchasing LEU fuel for U.S.-supplied research 

reactors.
Page 19 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Only One of Seven RussianSupplied Reactors That Can 

Use Low Enriched Uranium 

Is Scheduled to Convert

According to Argonne officials, 7 Russian-supplied research reactors, all 

located outside Russia, could convert using LEU fuels that are currently 

available or are expected to become available within the next year. 

However, only 1 of the 7 reactors, located in Ukraine, is scheduled to 

convert.9

 (See table 3 for a list of the 7 reactors.) 

Table 3: Seven Foreign Research Reactors Using HEU from Russia That Could 

Convert to LEU

Source: Argonne.

Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges from 0 to 13.9 kilograms per 

year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power 

levels that they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for their entire lifetime 

without replacing fuel.

The Ukrainian reactor operators told us that they expect to begin 

conversion to LEU at the end of 2004 at the earliest and that they are 

currently analyzing the safety of converting to LEU with the assistance of 

DOE’s reactor conversion program. Unlike many of the U.S.-supplied 

research reactors that are not planning to convert because they have an 

adequate supply of HEU, the Ukrainian reactor is running out of HEU fuel 

and will have to place an order for new fuel by the end of 2004. The reactor 

operators told us they support conversion to LEU fuel because the negative 

impact on the reactor’s performance will be tolerable, the operating costs 

will be about the same after conversion to LEU, and converting to LEU 

would eliminate the threat that HEU could be stolen from the facility. The 

reactor operators are scheduled to complete the safety analysis in 

9

The reactor conversion program includes 28 Russian-supplied reactors—14 in Russia and 

14 outside Russia (primarily in countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). 

Conversion of 21 of the reactors, including the 14 in Russia, requires development of new 

LEU fuels.

Country Reactor

Bulgaria IRT-Sofia

Germany ZLFR

Hungary VVR-SZM

Libya IRT-1

Libya Critical Facility

Ukraine VVR-M

Vietnam DRR
Page 20 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

November 2004 and then submit an application to obtain approval for 

conversion from the Ukrainian nuclear regulatory authority. However, 

Argonne officials said the schedule for converting the Ukrainian reactor is 

ambitious and conversion of the reactor could be delayed. According to 

Argonne officials, if the Ukrainian reactor does not get regulatory approval 

for conversion to LEU before it runs out of fuel, it may decide to place an 

order with the Russian supplier for more HEU fuel instead. 

According to DOE officials, 5 other Russian-supplied reactors that can use 

LEU fuel are likely to convert. Conversion of the reactors in Bulgaria and 

Libya depends on the commercialization of the Russian-origin LEU fuel, 

which DOE expects to take place in 2004. DOE has also engaged in 

discussions on conversion with the operators of the research reactor in 

Vietnam. According to Argonne officials, conversion of the research 

reactor in Hungary requires at least several more years of analysis. In 

particular, the reactor must test an LEU fuel sample before the Hungarian 

government approves conversion, and this process will take several years. 

Argonne officials said the research reactor in Germany has a sufficient 

supply of HEU fuel and therefore is not planning to convert to LEU.

Technical Setbacks in 

Developing New Fuels 

Limit Progress in 

Converting the Largest 

Remaining Research 

Reactors

Technical setbacks in developing new LEU fuels have postponed the 

conversion of 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot use currently 

available LEU fuels until 2010 at the earliest. Argonne is pursuing the 

development of LEU dispersion fuel and LEU monolithic fuel to convert 

these reactors. Argonne officials said the failures during testing of 

dispersion fuel are the worst they have ever experienced during fuel 

development. As a result, Argonne has delayed completion of dispersion 

fuel until 2010 and may recommend that DOE cancel further development 

altogether if solutions cannot be found. This would leave the reactor 

conversion program with only one alternative LEU fuel—monolithic fuel. 

According to Argonne officials, monolithic fuel has performed well in the 

one test conducted so far. However, many more tests are required. Because 

of lessons learned from dispersion fuel failures, Argonne recently delayed 

the projected completion date of monolithic fuel from 2008 to 2010 in 

anticipation of the need for additional tests. Argonne officials said they 

have compressed the development schedule of both dispersion and 

monolithic fuel as much as possible and any further technical problems will 

result in additional delays. Moreover, Argonne is focusing all LEU fuel 

development efforts on dispersion and monolithic fuel, and if both fuels 

fail, no LEU fuel will be available to convert the remaining reactors in the 

reactor conversion program.
Page 21 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE May Cancel 

Development of One Low 

Enriched Uranium Fuel 

That Has Had Significant 

Problems

The 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot convert to currently 

available LEU fuels include some of the largest reactors in terms of amount 

of HEU used per year. Argonne officials estimate the reactors use a total of 

about 728 kilograms of HEU per year. Many of the 31 reactors are used to 

conduct advanced scientific research that could not be done if they were to 

convert to currently available LEU fuels. Representatives of 8 of the 

research reactors told us they need HEU fuel to operate and conduct 

research until LEU fuel with the right performance characteristics is 

developed. (See table 4 for a list of the 31 reactors.) 

Table 4: 31 Research Reactors That Cannot Convert Using Currently Available LEU 

Fuels

Country Reactor

Belgium BR-2

Czech Republic LWR-15

VR-1

France ORPHEE

RHF

Germany FRM-II

Kazakhstan VVR-K

VVR-K Critical Facility

North Korea IRT-DPRK

Poland MARIA

Russia IRT-MEPhI

IR-8

IRT-T

VVR-TS

VVR-M

IVV-2M

MIR-M1

CA.MIR-M1

SM-3

CA.SM-3

RBT-6

RBT-10/2

PIK

PIK Physical Model
Page 22 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Source: Argonne.

Notes: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges from 0 to 120 kilograms per 

year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power 

levels that they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for their entire lifetime 

without replacing fuel.

Research reactors located in the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Poland, Russia, and 

Uzbekistan are Russian-supplied reactors.

DOE’s reactor conversion program has run into problems in developing 

new LEU fuels intended to replace HEU in these research reactors. The 

most serious problems have occurred in tests of dispersion fuel, the 

development of which began in 1996. According to Argonne officials, 

dispersion fuel would be usable in the Russian-supplied research reactors 

and 1 U.S. reactor.10 Most recently, tests of the dispersion fuel have 

revealed weaknesses that would make the fuel unsuitable for use in 

research reactors. In particular, when samples of dispersion fuel were 

tested in research reactors, the fuel failed unexpectedly under reactor 

operating conditions the fuel was designed to withstand. 

A number of factors illustrate the seriousness of the problems with the 

dispersion fuel. First, according to Argonne officials, the same problems 

have been encountered in separate tests and under different operating 

conditions in reactors in the United States, Belgium, France, and Russia. 

Second, the problems were unexpected and worse than encountered in 

United States Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MITR)

University of Missouri (MURR)

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NBSR)

DOE HIFR

DOE ATR

DOE ATRC

Uzbekistan VVR-CM

10The development of LEU dispersion fuel also has important consequences for U.S.-

supplied foreign research reactors that have already converted to LEU and participate in the 

Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program. Many of these reactors 

had planned to switch to LEU dispersion fuel from the LEU fuel they are currently using 

because spent dispersion fuel could be disposed of through reprocessing. With the program 

scheduled to stop accepting fuel in 2009 and development of dispersion fuel delayed until 

2010, foreign research reactors that have already converted to LEU fuel that cannot be 

reprocessed may not have a way to dispose of spent fuel. We will address this issue in more 

detail in a forthcoming report on the program.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Reactor
Page 23 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

previous LEU fuel development efforts. Finally, if the failures were serious 

enough, the fuel could leak radioactive material into the reactor coolant 

and cause facility contamination. If this occurred, the dispersion fuel would 

not be approved for use in research reactors. 

Argonne officials said that, as a result of these test failures, they have 

delayed projected completion of dispersion fuel from 2006 until 2010 to 

allow time for additional development and testing. Argonne officials plan to 

pursue options to modify dispersion fuel to make it resistant to failures. 

However, they said they would also consider recommending that DOE 

cancel further development of dispersion fuel if it is determined the fuel 

cannot be sufficiently improved. In addition, because of the problems 

encountered in the development of dispersion fuel, Argonne has shifted its 

primary focus to the development of monolithic fuel. 

More Time Is Needed to 

Develop an Alternative Low 

Enriched Uranium Fuel 

Initial testing of monolithic fuel has produced positive results under the 

same operating conditions under which dispersion fuel failed. According to 

Argonne officials, if they are successful in developing monolithic fuel, it 

will offer better reactor performance than dispersion fuel and could be 

used to convert the remaining research reactors in the reactor conversion 

program to LEU.

Nevertheless, the successful development of this fuel is still uncertain, and 

Argonne has not yet demonstrated that all remaining research reactors still 

using HEU could convert to it. Argonne officials said they began developing 

monolithic fuel relatively recently, in 2000, and to date have conducted only 

one test. Additional testing could reveal problems that have not yet 

surfaced. Furthermore, this fuel requires development of a new 

manufacturing method because the methods used to manufacture other 

research reactor fuels are not suitable for monolithic fuel. Argonne is 

conducting research on different manufacturing options but has not yet 

demonstrated that monolithic fuel can be manufactured on a large scale. 

Three reactor operators hoping to convert to this fuel told us it is 

impossible to predict whether the new LEU fuel will be successfully 

developed and that creating a reliable LEU fuel could take many years 

more than expected. 

Development of monolithic fuel may be delayed if Argonne encounters any 

problems in the fuel development process. Argonne officials said they have 

already delayed projected completion from 2008 to 2010 to allow time for 

additional testing. The schedule for developing monolithic fuel does not 
Page 24 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

factor in any technical problems that may occur during testing but rather 

assumes that every phase of development will be successful. Argonne 

officials said they have already compressed the schedule as much as 

possible and that it would be difficult to significantly accelerate fuel 

development any further because each set of tests requires a fixed amount 

of time. The officials also stated that fuel development would have been 

delayed even further had Congress not increased funding for the reactor 

conversion program from $6.1 million in fiscal year 2003 to $8.5 million in 

fiscal year 2004, which enabled Argonne to pursue a more aggressive fuel 

development schedule. Assuming no further delays in fuel development, 

Argonne officials said the first research reactors could begin ordering new 

LEU for conversion within 6 months of completing the development of 

either dispersion fuel or monolithic fuel in 2010. 

Support for Conversion to 

Low Enriched Uranium Fuel 

Varies among Research 

Reactor Operators

In our visits to foreign and domestic research reactors that cannot convert 

to currently available LEU fuels, we found that reactor operators’ response 

to the prospect of conversion to LEU fuels varies widely. For example, the 

operator of the BR-2 reactor in Belgium said it had agreed to convert to 

LEU when feasible as a condition for continuing to receive U.S.-origin HEU 

fuel. In contrast, a new German reactor at the Technical University Munich 

designed to use HEU (the FRM-II reactor) may still not be able to convert 

to LEU even if Argonne is successful in developing monolithic fuel. The 

reactor operator has agreed to convert to a lower enrichment of HEU that 

is less usable in nuclear weapons. However, during our visit to the reactor, 

the operator said it had no plans to convert the reactor to LEU fuel because 

conversion would require expensive reconstruction.

Argonne has contracted with Russia to work jointly on development of new 

LEU fuels, but DOE has not negotiated a formal agreement with the 

Russian government to convert research reactors in Russia to LEU. DOE’s 

reactor conversion program includes 14 research reactors operating in 

Russia that, combined, use 225 kilograms of HEU fuel per year. In 2002, the 

Secretary of Energy and Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy issued a joint 

statement identifying acceleration of LEU fuel development for both 

Russian-supplied and U.S.-supplied research reactors as an area where 

joint cooperation could lead to reduction in the use of HEU. However, the 

Russian officials responsible for developing LEU fuels told us they are 

focusing on converting Russian-supplied reactors in other countries first. 

The officials also do not consider the conversion of research reactors in 

Russia to LEU a priority because security has been improved at the 

reactors and the reactors need HEU fuel to conduct advanced research. 
Page 25 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Furthermore, Russian officials told us that under Russian law, operators of 

HEU reactors in Russia are not required to convert to LEU. In fact, since 

1986, Russia has been building a new research reactor that is designed to 

use HEU fuel rather than LEU.

Three U.S. research reactors (at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 

the University of Missouri, and the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology) where conversion is not currently feasible fall under NRC 

regulations that would require conversion to LEU if the reactor conversion 

program is successful in developing new LEU fuels.11 Furthermore, the 

Secretary of Energy committed to the conversion of all U.S. research 

reactors by 2013 in a speech on May 26, 2004. However, without federal 

funding to support the conversion, the reactors may continue to use HEU. 

For example, the operator of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

reactor said that conversion to LEU could be delayed even after a new LEU 

fuel is developed if DOE does not provide funding in a timely manner. 

Using Low Enriched 

Uranium for Medical 

Isotope Production Is 

Feasible, but Concerns 

over Cost Could Limit 

Its Use

The reactor conversion program has demonstrated the potential for using 

LEU to produce medical isotopes on a small scale, but large-scale 

producers are concerned that the cost of conversion could be prohibitive. 

With assistance from the reactor conversion program, one reactor in 

Argentina used for the production of medical isotopes converted from HEU 

to LEU in 2003. However, Argonne officials said the conversion was 

feasible only because the reactor produces medical isotopes on a small 

scale, using a relatively small amount of material in the production process. 

(Prior to converting to LEU, the Argentine reactor used less than a 

kilogram of HEU per year. In contrast, four large medical isotope producers 

targeted by the reactor conversion program, located in Belgium, Canada, 

the Netherlands, and South Africa, each use as much as 25 kilograms of 

HEU per year.) Argonne is still working to overcome problems with using 

LEU that limit the ability of the Argentine reactor to increase its production 

capacity. 

Argonne officials said they are 2 to 3 years away from completing work that 

would allow the large medical isotope producers to convert from HEU to 

LEU. Argonne officials said they have developed LEU materials that can be 

used by all medical isotope producers and only the adaptation of the 

1110 C.F.R. § 50.64.
Page 26 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

production processes from using HEU to LEU remains. They said that 

adapting the medical isotope producers’ processes, each of which is unique 

in some aspect, is technically feasible and is just a matter of time. One 

reason why the production processes must be modified is that almost five 

times more LEU than HEU is required to produce the same amount of 

medical isotopes. The increased amount of nuclear material creates 

obstacles to conversion. For example, using LEU would produce more 

waste, which in turn could increase the burden of treating and storing the 

waste. In addition, the facilities, chemical processes, and waste 

management systems for producing medical isotopes are customized to use 

HEU and would require modifications to accommodate LEU. 

In discussions with the two large medical isotope producers in Belgium and 

Canada, both cited a number of factors that would make conversion to LEU 

costly and difficult, including the fivefold increase in the amount of LEU 

that would be required to achieve the same level of output when using 

HEU. As part of its technical analysis, the Canadian producer is currently 

conducting an assessment of converting to LEU to determine whether 

conversion would be economically feasible. The Canadian producer 

currently uses U.S.-origin HEU and, under U.S. law, must agree to convert 

to LEU when a suitable LEU alternative is developed.12 (The other three 

large medical isotope producers currently receive their HEU from 

countries other than the United States and are therefore not subject to U.S. 

requirements to convert to LEU.) U.S. law also allows for an exception to 

the requirement to convert to LEU if conversion would result in a large 

percentage increase in operating costs. Officials at DOE and NRC, which 

implements the law governing U.S. HEU exports, acknowledge that 

medical isotope producers operate on small profit margins, and as a result, 

the cost of converting to LEU may be prohibitive. However, Argonne 

officials said that conversion to LEU could result in a more economic 

process. DOE officials said they would not accept a statement by the 

Canadian producer that conversion of medical isotope production to LEU 

is not economically feasible without documentation to support that 

conclusion.

1242 U.S.C. § 2160d.
Page 27 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE and NRC Are 

Addressing Security at 

Foreign and Domestic 

Research Reactors

Research reactor operators at most reactors we visited said that security 

had been improved because of DOE or NRC efforts. However, DOE and 

NRC have recognized the need to further improve security at research 

reactors throughout the world, including in the United States, and are 

engaged in separate efforts to assess research reactor security and its 

effectiveness.

At the foreign research reactors we visited, we observed security 

improvements to storage areas for HEU fuel, systems for controlling 

personnel access to the reactors, and alarm systems, including motion 

detectors and camera monitoring. DOE provided assistance to some of the 

foreign reactors to make the security improvements; other reactor 

operators had made the improvements with their own funding based on 

DOE recommendations. At U.S. research reactors, we saw physical 

security improvements around the reactor buildings, such as new fences 

and concrete barriers. Several operators of university research reactors 

told us they were using funding from DOE’s university reactor support 

program to purchase new security equipment.

We also observed areas where further improvement could be made. For 

example, we visited one foreign research reactor’s facility for storing spent 

HEU fuel where DOE had provided only minimal assistance to improve 

security. According to DOE officials, DOE has generally not provided 

assistance to improve the security of spent HEU fuel because it is 

radioactive and too dangerous for potential terrorists to handle. DOE has 

placed a higher priority on protecting fresh fuel—fuel that has not been 

irradiated in a reactor—because it is easier to handle. However, operators 

of the fuel storage facility said that the spent fuel had been in storage for a 

long time and had lost enough radioactivity to be handled and potentially 

stolen.

During a visit to another foreign research reactor, we observed a new alarm 

system monitoring the entrance to the reactor building, a fresh fuel vault, 

and motion detectors that had been installed with DOE assistance. DOE is 

in the process of adding further enhancements to the security of the 

facility. However, we also observed that the fence surrounding the facility 

was in poor condition, security guards at the front gate were unarmed, and 

there were no guards at the reactor building, which we entered without 

escort. At another research reactor, DOE identified security weaknesses 

and offered assistance to make security improvements. However, 

according to the U.S. embassy in the country where the reactor is located, 
Page 28 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

the improvements had not been made as of March 2004 because the reactor 

operator did not act on DOE’s offer of assistance. We discussed examples 

that raised questions about security of foreign research reactors with DOE 

officials during meetings on March 12 and 22, 2004, and they agreed that 

DOE needs to do more to address potential security concerns.

Recognizing that the security at some research reactors may need to be 

improved, DOE established a task force in 2004 to identify the highest risk 

reactors and to develop options for improving security at reactors believed 

to be of greatest concern. The task force is currently gathering information 

on all research reactors worldwide, including reactors that are shut down, 

and prioritizing them based on a number of factors, including how much 

HEU is stored on site, the vulnerability of the reactors to theft of HEU or 

sabotage, plans for conversion to LEU and removal of HEU fuel, and the 

potential terrorist threat to countries where the reactors are located. The 

scope of the initiative comprises 802 research reactors and associated 

facilities, including 128 facilities possessing 20 kilograms or more of HEU 

on site.13 DOE officials said the task force addresses the need to combine 

and coordinate information from different sources within DOE, which did 

not have a comprehensive database prior to the task force to document 

visits and security observations made by various DOE program officials to 

foreign research reactors. According to DOE officials, the task force has 

submitted a report to the Secretary of Energy with recommendations for 

possible implementation by DOE, such as expediting conversion to LEU 

and providing additional assistance to foreign research reactors to improve 

security. According to task force members, security assistance to foreign 

reactors could be provided by DOE, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, or countries other than the United States.

NRC is also engaged in efforts to assess and improve the security at the 

U.S. research reactors it regulates. NRC took actions after the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, to improve security at U.S. research reactors—for 

example, by requiring some reactor operators to consider installing 

additional physical barriers and strengthening screening requirements for 

entrance to facilities. In addition, NRC is conducting assessments of the 

security at the research reactors it regulates and may increase security 

13The task force is looking at all research reactors worldwide, while the reactor conversion 

program targets operating research reactors that use HEU. Not every research reactor that 

possesses HEU is part of the conversion program because some of the reactors have 

military applications that require HEU fuel or use a unique HEU fuel that would require a 

separate LEU fuel development effort.
Page 29 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

requirements based on the results of the assessments. According to NRC 

officials, the agency’s security evaluations of U.S. research reactors will be 

completed in December 2004. Based on the results of the evaluations, NRC 

will decide to strengthen current regulations, leave regulations as they are, 

or address security concerns at each reactor on a case-by-case approach.

Conclusions While several research reactors are scheduled to convert to LEU fuel in the 

next few years, progress in converting many remaining reactors has stalled. 

In part, converting these reactors is a matter of completing development of 

new LEU fuels, which has been delayed by unforeseen technical problems. 

However, if DOE’s reactor conversion program is to achieve its objective to 

reduce and eventually eliminate the use of HEU in civilian research 

reactors, DOE may need to re-evaluate its policies with regard to the 

program. Many of the research reactors that could use currently available 

LEU fuels have not converted because they lack incentives, funding, or 

both. Until recently, the policy of DOE’s reactor conversion program has 

been to provide technical assistance to support conversion of research 

reactors to LEU but not to pay for conversion or, in particular, purchase 

new LEU fuel. In the case of six U.S. university reactors, DOE has not made 

purchasing LEU fuel for conversion (and completing the conversion 

process at another reactor by removing HEU fuel and shipping it to a DOE 

facility for disposal) a high priority. While many of the U.S. reactors that 

could convert to LEU use only a small amount of HEU per year, converting 

them would demonstrate DOE’s commitment to the nonproliferation 

objective of the reactor conversion program. 

DOE has generally expected the operators of foreign research reactors that 

use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to purchase new LEU fuel with their own funds. 

The policies DOE has relied on to influence operators to convert to LEU—

requiring that reactor operators agree to convert as a condition of receiving 

U.S. HEU exports or returning spent fuel to the United States—do not work 

for reactors using so little HEU that they can operate for many years 

without replacing their fuel. Without funding for conversion, it is possible 

these reactors could continue using HEU for years. DOE may need to 

consider offering additional incentives to foreign reactors, including 

purchasing new LEU fuel, to influence them to convert to LEU.

Regardless of progress in converting domestic and foreign research 

reactors to LEU in the near term, delays in completing the development of 

new LEU fuels mean that other research reactors will continue to use HEU 

until at least 2010. If the reactor conversion program experiences 
Page 30 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

additional problems in one or both of the two LEU fuels currently under 

development, some research reactors could be left without a viable option 

for conversion to LEU. Given the continuing use of HEU at these research 

reactors, DOE and NRC efforts to evaluate and improve reactor security 

are essential components of the overall effort to reduce the risk of 

proliferation of HEU at civilian research reactors.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

In order to further reduce the use of HEU in research reactors in the United 

States and abroad, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the 

following three actions:

• consider placing a higher priority on converting the six remaining 

university research reactors in the United States that can use currently 

available LEU fuel;

• once a reactor has been converted, place a high priority on removing the 

HEU fuel and transporting it to the appropriate DOE facility; and

• evaluate the costs and benefits of providing additional incentives to 

foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to convert to 

LEU, particularly to reactor operators that are willing to convert but do 

not have sufficient funding to do so.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Energy and 

State and to NRC for their review and comment. Comments from the 

Departments of Energy and State are presented as appendixes III and IV, 

respectively. NRC’s written comments were not for publication. DOE, 

State, and NRC generally agreed with the recommendations in our report 

and provided detailed comments, which we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. 

In its comments, DOE noted that the United States has 11 more research 

reactors to convert to the use of LEU fuels, with conversion currently 

feasible for 6 of the reactors. However, DOE’s February 2004 project 

execution plan for its reactor conversion program identifies 14 U.S. 

research reactors still using HEU fuel that are included in DOE’s reactor 

conversion program, with conversion currently feasible for 8 of the 
Page 31 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

reactors. We used the number of reactors from DOE’s project execution 

plan in our report.

In its comments, State questioned DOE’s cost estimate for converting U.S. 

research reactors where conversion to LEU fuel is currently feasible. State 

noted that DOE’s cost estimate of $5 million to $10 million per reactor 

where conversion to LEU fuel is currently feasible seems much too high, 

especially in comparison with DOE’s expenditures of about $0.4 million to 

$1.6 million per reactor to convert 11 U.S. university reactors to LEU fuel 

between 1984 and 2000. State wrote that the DOE office that administers 

the program for supporting U.S. university research reactors has been 

reluctant to fund the conversion of more research reactors and has a 

tendency to overstate the potential costs to deflect pressure to spend 

money on conversions. We asked DOE officials what support they had for 

the cost estimate. In response, a DOE official said that DOE does not have 

documentation to support its cost estimate.

In another comment, State suggested we include recognition of the 

growing number of new and planned research reactors around the world 

that have been designed to use LEU fuel. State wrote that modern worldclass reactors do not need HEU fuel to conduct high-quality research. DOE 

officials also provided information on the use of LEU fuel in new research 

reactors constructed since the inception of its reactor conversion program 

in 1978. Although our report does not focus on new research reactors 

designed to use LEU fuel, we agree that this is a positive development in 

keeping with the objective of DOE’s reactor conversion program and we 

added a footnote recognizing these new reactors.

Scope and 

Methodology

To review the progress of the reactor conversion program, we analyzed 

program documentation, including DOE’s February 2004 RERTR Program 

Project Execution Plan. We also interviewed key DOE, Argonne, NRC, and 

State Department officials; conducted site visits to foreign and U.S. 

research reactors and interviewed reactor operators by telephone; and 

attended an annual international conference organized by DOE’s reactor 

conversion program. 
Page 32 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

For site visits and telephone interviews, we selected foreign and domestic 

research reactors from three categories: reactors that had converted to 

LEU, reactors that could convert using currently available LEU fuels but 

were still using HEU, and reactors that could not convert using currently 

available LEU fuels. Within each of the three categories of reactors, we 

selected a nonprobability sample of reactors based on a number of criteria 

such as reactor types, including U.S.-supplied reactors, Russian-supplied 

reactors, and reactors that use HEU in the production of medical 

isotopes.14 We visited 5 research reactors in the United States, including 3 

that had converted to LEU and 2 that cannot convert to currently available 

LEU fuels and are still using HEU. We conducted phone interviews with 

reactor operators from 1 other U.S. reactor that cannot use currently 

available LEU fuels and all 6 of the U.S. university research reactors that 

can convert to LEU but are still using HEU. We also visited 10 foreign 

research reactors in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 

Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. These included 2 converted reactors, 4 

reactors that can use LEU fuel but have not yet converted, and 4 reactors 

that still require HEU. (See table 5.) 

Table 5: Number of Research Reactors Selected for Site Visits or Phone Interviews

Source: GAO.

In our site visits and telephone interviews, we asked a standard set of 

questions (depending on the conversion status of the reactor) on technical 

aspects of converting to LEU, cost of conversion, impact of conversion on 

reactor performance, and assistance provided by DOE’s reactor conversion 

program.

14Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population because, in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.

U.S.-supplied Russian-supplied

Reactor 

status In the U.S. Abroad In Russia Abroad Total

Converted 3 of 11 2 of 28 - - 5 of 39

Convertible 8 of 8 3 of 20 - 1 of 7 12 of 35

Not yet 

convertible 4 of 6 2 of 4 2 of 14 1 of 7 9 of 31

Total 15 of 25 7 of 52 2 of 14 2 of 14 26 of 105
Page 33 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

To review the progress in developing new LEU fuels for use in research 

reactors, we conducted in-depth interviews with Argonne officials 

responsible for managing LEU fuel development; operators of reactors that 

plan to convert to new LEU fuels when they are developed; and fuel 

development experts at the Bochvar Institute in Russia, which is 

collaborating with Argonne. At the annual international conference 

organized by DOE’s reactor conversion program, we participated in 

sessions on LEU fuel development, and we reviewed technical papers on 

the progress of fuel development. For technical expertise, we relied on 

GAO’s Chief Technologist, who participated in meetings with Argonne 

officials and reviewed the information that Argonne provided. We used the 

interviews and annual conference to also review progress in the 

development of LEU for use in the production of medical isotopes. In 

addition, we interviewed two of the four large medical isotope producers 

(in Belgium and Canada) that are currently using HEU to produce medical 

isotopes and that would be candidates for conversion to LEU once Argonne 

completes development. 

To gather information on DOE and NRC efforts to improve research reactor 

security, we interviewed officials at those agencies and discussed security 

improvements with reactor operators we interviewed. We also observed 

security improvements at research reactors we visited. However, we did 

not evaluate the effectiveness of the security at research reactors or DOE 

and NRC efforts to improve security. 

We obtained data from DOE and Argonne on the conversion status of the 

105 research reactors included in the reactor conversion program, the 

amount of HEU used per year by the 105 reactors (including the amount 

used prior to conversion for the 39 research reactors now using LEU), and 

DOE expenditures for the reactor conversion program since its inception in 

1978. All amounts are in constant 2003 dollars, unless otherwise noted. We 

assessed the reliability of data we obtained through discussions with 

Argonne officials. We also obtained responses from Argonne officials to a 

series of data reliability questions covering issues such as quality control 

procedures and the accuracy and completeness of the data. Based on our 

assessment, we determined that the data we obtained from DOE and 

Argonne was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We conducted our work from July 2003 to July 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 34 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary of 

State; the Chairman, NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at 

(202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report include Joseph Cook, 

Jonathan McMurray, Kirstin B.L. Nelson, Peter Ruedel, F. James Shafer Jr., 

and Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief Technologist.

Sincerely yours,

Gene Aloise

Acting Director, Natural 

Resources and Environment
Page 35 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix I

Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures Apendxies

and Projected Costs ApendxiI

DOE estimates that the reactor conversion program will cost 

approximately $213 million through the program’s projected end in 2012.1

 

Expenditures since the program’s inception in 1978 through fiscal year 2003 

totaled approximately $139 million in constant 2003 dollars. (See fig. 3.)

Figure 3: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978 to 2003

Costs for the reactor conversion program are broken into four categories:

• Fuel development includes all of the activities associated with testing 

and analyzing new LEU fuels, such as the LEU dispersion and 

monolithic fuels that are currently under development. This activity also 

includes developing the methods for manufacturing new LEU fuels. 

Most of the reactor conversion program costs over the life of the 

program are in this category. 

• Reactor analysis includes studying the conversion of individual research 

reactors, both domestic and foreign, once a suitable LEU has been 

developed. For example, Argonne provides technical assistance to 

research reactors to determine the impact of conversion on the reactors’ 

performance and safety. This category does not include the cost of 

1

Dollar figures cited throughout appendix I are in constant 2003 dollars, unless otherwise 

noted. 

Assistance to Russia

$9 million

Source: GAO analysis of Argonne National Laboratory data.

57% 27%

7%

9% Development of LEU for medical isotope 

production

$13 million

Reactor analysis

$37 million

Fuel development

$79 million 
Appendix I

Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures 

and Projected Costs

Page 36 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

purchasing LEU fuel for research reactors. For example, the 

responsibility for purchasing LEU fuel for U.S. university reactors 

belongs to another program in DOE that is separate from the reactor 

conversion program.

• Development of LEU for medical isotope production includes activities 

associated with testing and analyzing LEU materials to replace HEU in 

the production of medical isotopes. This activity also includes 

development of manufacturing and waste management processes for 

using LEU instead of HEU and technical assistance to medical isotope 

producers. 

• Assistance to Russia includes funding to support research and 

development on new LEU fuels for Russian-supplied reactors. It also 

includes analysis of the impact of conversion to LEU on Russiansupplied reactors. The assistance to Russia was previously funded 

through a one-time grant of approximately $1.7 million, about two-thirds 

of which has been spent, from the State Department’s Nonproliferation 

and Disarmament Fund (NDF). 

In addition to the $139 million spent by the reactor conversion program, 

DOE’s university reactor support program spent approximately $10 million 

between 1984 and 2000 to convert 11 university research reactors in the 

United States, according to an official at the Idaho National Engineering 

and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). The cost of converting each 

reactor varied from around $400,000 to $1.6 million and was primarily for 

the cost of fabricating the fuel. The costs varied depending on the type of 

fuel and where it was manufactured. 

DOE’s projected costs for completing the reactor conversion program total 

about $74.7 million.2

 (See table 6.) This amount includes $26.3 million for 

reactor analysis, $25.8 million for fuel development, $4.8 million for the 

development of LEU for medical isotope production, and $17.8 million for 

assistance to Russia. 

2

The projected costs for the reactor conversion program are not in constant 2003 dollars. 

Argonne adjusted these costs for inflation with an increase of 5 percent for every year after 

2004 and using 2004 as the base year.
Appendix I

Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures 

and Projected Costs

Page 37 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 6: DOE’s Projected Costs to Complete the Reactor Conversion Program (in thousands)

Source: GAO analysis of Argonne data.

DOE’s cost estimates are based on the assumption that at least one of the 

two LEU fuels that Argonne is developing will be successful and will be 

used for the reactor conversion program. DOE also assumes that Russia 

and other countries will continue to assist Argonne in conducting fuel tests 

as necessary for fuel development. DOE’s estimates do not include the cost 

of purchasing new LEU fuel to convert research reactors. These costs are 

expected to be funded by other DOE programs or by the operators of 

foreign research reactors. 

Fiscal Year

Reactor 

analysis

Fuel 

development

Development of LEU for 

medical isotope 

production

Assistance to 

Russia Total

2004 $1,125 $4,122 $890 $2,404 $8,541

2005 1,586 4,286 946 2,709 9,527

2006 1,494 3,426 1,000 3,604 9,523

2007 1,692 4,526 986 2,917 10,121

2008 3,259 3,023 638 1,984 8,904

2009 3,835 2,189 200 1,680 7,903

2010 5,320 2,284 75 1,064 8,743

2011 4,784 1,544 60 842 7,230

2012 3,250 409 0 560 4,219

Total $26,345 $25,809 $4,795 $17,763 $74,712
Page 38 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix II

39 Research Reactors That Converted to LEU 

Fuel under the Reactor Conversion Program ApendxiI

Country Reactor Fully converted Partially converted

Argentina RA-3 X

Australia HIFAR X

Austria ASTRA X

TRIGA X

Brazil IEA-R1 X

Canada MNR X

NRU X

Slowpoke-Montreal X

Chile La Reina X

Colombia IAN-R1 X

Denmark DR-3 X

France OSIRIS X

Germany BER-II X

FRG-1 X

Greece GRR-1 X

Iran NRCRR X

Japan JMTR X X

JRR-4 X

Netherlands HOR X

Pakistan PARR X

Philippines PRR-1 X

Romania TRIGA X

Slovenia TRIGA X

Sweden R2 X X

R2-0 X

Switzerland SAPHIR X

Taiwan THOR X

Turkey TR-2 X
Appendix II

39 Research Reactors That Converted to LEU 

Fuel under the Reactor Conversion Program

Page 39 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Source: Argonne.

Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors prior to conversion ranged from 0 to 

70.1 kilograms per year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at 

such low power levels that they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for their 

entire lifetime without replacing fuel.

United States Georgia Institute of Technology X

Iowa State University X

University of Massachusetts at Lowell X

Manhattan College Zero Power Reactor X

University of Michigan X

Ohio State University X

Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center X

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute X

University of Missouri at Rolla X

University of Virginia X

Worcester Polytechnic Institute X

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Reactor Fully converted Partially converted
Page 40 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 41 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 42 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of State

(360374) Page 43 GAO-04-807 Nuclear Nonproliferation
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