Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

August 2004 FORCE STRUCTURE

Department of the 

Navy’s Tactical 

Aviation Integration 

Plan Is Reasonable, 

but Some Factors 

Could Affect 

Implementation 

GAO-04-900 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-900.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact George Morse 

at (757) 552-8108 or morseg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-900, a report to 

the Senate and House Committees on 

Appropriations and the Senate and House 

Committees on Armed Services 

August 2004

FORCE STRUCTURE

Department of the Navy’s Tactical 

Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, 

but Some Factors Could Affect 

Implementation 

Concerns about the affordability of their prior tactical aviation procurement 

plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a new Tactical 

Aviation Integration Plan. Under this Plan, the two services will perform 

their missions using fewer units of more capable aircraft and reducing total 

program aircraft procurement costs by $28 billion over the next 18 years. 

Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the extent to which 

their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force to accomplish both 

services’ missions. The Plan also reduces the services’ tactical aviation force 

structure by decommissioning five squadrons, thus decreasing the number of

Navy and Marine Corps squadrons to 59, and reduces the total number of 

aircraft they plan to buy from 1,637 to 1,140. 

The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the Navy 

and Marine Corps’ operational requirements with a smaller force primarily 

on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the relative capability of 

different tactical aviation force structures. GAO’s review of the contractor’s 

methodology and assumptions about force structure, budget resources, and 

management efficiencies suggests that much of the analysis appears 

reasonable. However, GAO noted some limitations—including the lack of 

analytical support for reducing the number of backup aircraft—increase the 

risk that the smaller force will be less effective than expected. 

The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in selecting a 

reserve squadron to decommission. The Marine Corps made a clear and 

well-documented analysis of the operational, fiscal, logistical, and personnel 

impacts of different options that appears to provide decision makers with a 

reasonable basis for selecting the Reserve unit to decommission. By 

contrast, the Navy selected its reserve squadron without clear criteria or a 

documented, comprehensive analysis, and thus with less transparency in its 

process. 

Two other factors that might affect successful implementation of the Plan 

are the potential unavailability of readiness funding and delays in fielding the 

new force. Although the contractor recommended that the Navy identify 

future readiness-funding requirements, to date, the Navy has not conducted 

this analysis. In addition, the Department of the Navy is experiencing 

engineering and weight problems in developing the Joint Strike Fighter that 

will cause it to be delayed until 2013, at least 1 year later than had been 

projected, and other high risks to the program remain. Because these delays 

will cause the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, they 

might also increase operations and maintenance costs, making an analysis of 

future readiness funding requirements even more important. 

The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense 

Appropriations Act and the Senate 

Report for the 2004 National 

Defense Authorization Act 

mandated that GAO examine the 

Navy and Marine Corps’ Tactical 

Aviation Integration Plan. In 

response to these mandates, this 

report addresses (1) how Navy and 

Marine Corps operational concepts, 

force structure, and procurement 

costs change; (2) the methodology 

and assumptions the services 

used to analyze the potential for 

integrating the forces; (3) the 

analytical process the services used

to decide which reserve squadrons 

to decommission; and (4) other 

factors that might affect 

implementation of the Plan. 

To enhance the potential that the 

future tactical aviation force will 

meet the services’ mission needs 

and ensure more transparency in 

future decommissioning decisions, 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense 

• direct that the number of 

needed backup aircraft be 

assessed, 

• develop guidance and 

methodology for analyzing 

future decommissioning 

decisions, and 

• direct that future readiness 

funding for the future tactical 

aviation force be analyzed. 

In written comments, the 

Department of Defense generally 

agreed with the recommendations. 
Page i GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Plan Changes the Navy and Marine Corps’ Operational Concepts 

and Reduces Force Structure to Achieve Procurement Savings 6

Navy’s Analysis Generally Appears Reasonable, but Some 

Limitations Could Understate Risks 9

In the Absence of DOD Criteria, the Marine Corps and Navy Used 

Different Methods and Documentation Standards to Determine 

Which Reserve Units to Decommission 16

Two Other Factors Could Affect the Plan’s Implementation and 

Add Risk 18

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 25 

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 28 

Tables 

Table 1: Force Structure Summary for the Previous Program and 

the Navy and Marine Corps’ Integration Plan 8

Table 2: Previous Program and the Navy and Marine Corps’ 

Integration Plan Aircraft Procurement Summary 9

Table 3: Marine Corps Criteria for Selecting a Reserve Unit 

to Decommission 17

Figures 

Figure 1: Navy’s Projected Tactical Aviation Procurement Budget 

Compared with Original Procurement Plan, 

Fiscal Years 2002-26 5

Figure 2: Capability Scores Determined by Contractor’s Panel 

of Experts 11

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

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Page 1 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

August 13, 2004 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of the Navy formerly planned to spend almost $92 billion 

by fiscal year 2021 to replace legacy F/A-18C/D, F-14, and AV-8 aircraft 

with newer F/A-18E/Fs and the future Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. 

Concerned that it could not afford to purchase as many of these aircraft as 

originally planned, however, in fiscal year 2002 the Department of the 

Navy announced a new Tactical Aviation Integration Plan, whereby the 

Navy and Marine Corps concluded that they would be able to achieve their 

missions with fewer aircraft and units by operating as a combined force. 

Out of concern about how the Navy and Marine Corps’ future plans for 

their tactical aviation forces would affect mission capability, Congress 

mandated that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps’ Tactical Aviation 

Integration Plan.1

 In the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act, 

Congress directed GAO to assess Navy and Marine Corps requirements for 

tactical aviation and the role of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve assets in 

meeting such requirements.2

 In addition, the Senate Report for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 directed GAO to 

analyze the Navy and Marine Corps’ Plan to determine the validity of the 

assumptions made in formulating the Plan, the expected impact of the 

Plan on Navy and Marine Corps force structure, and the ability of the 

smaller force structure to meet operational requirements.3

 After meeting 

with your offices, we agreed on a strategy for completing work in response 

to both mandates and agreed to provide an interim briefing and a final 

report. We briefed your offices on our results from late February through 

April 2004. 

 1

 Hereinafter referred to as the Plan. 

2

 Pub. L. No. 108-87, §8141 (2003). 

3

 S. Rep. No. 108-46, at 123 (2003). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Based on our work in response to these mandates, this final report 

addresses the following questions: 

1. How would Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force 

structure, and procurement costs change under the Plan? 

2. What methodology and assumptions did the Navy and Marine Corps 

use to analyze the potential for integrating tactical aviation assets, and 

what, if any, limitations affect the services’ analysis? 

3. To what extent did the Navy and Marine Corps use a thorough and 

well-documented process to assess which reserve squadrons should be 

decommissioned in fiscal year 2004 to implement the Plan? 

4. What other factors might affect the implementation of the Plan? 

To accomplish these objectives, we analyzed the contractor study that 

supports the Plan by reviewing its methodology, major assumptions, and 

modeling input and approach. We also obtained information from officials 

at Navy and Marine Corps Headquarters, Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

Headquarters, Joint Forces Command, Atlantic and Pacific Naval Air 

Forces Headquarters, and Marine Forces Atlantic Headquarters in order to 

verify and assess both the information contained in the study and the 

resulting decisions about force structure, procurement plans, and 

operational impacts. We assessed the reliability of the services’ data by 

reviewing the methodology and pertinent contractor and service 

information used for the study and the Plan. In addition, as part of our 

analysis, we visited selected Navy and Marine Corps Reserve tactical 

aviation units in order to get their perspective on the possible 

decommissioning of reserve squadrons as well as future roles and 

missions. 

Concerns about the affordability of their future tactical aviation 

procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a Plan 

whereby the two services will be performing their missions using fewer 

units of more capable aircraft and reducing total program aircraft 

procurement costs from $92 billion to about $64 billion over the next 

18 years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the 

extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force 

for both services. The Plan will also reduce the services’ tactical aviation 

force structure by decommissioning three active and two reserve 

squadrons, thus decreasing the number of Navy and Marine Corps 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

squadrons to 59. By decreasing the number of squadrons, the number of 

aircraft in some squadrons, and the number of backup aircraft, the 

Department of the Navy would decrease the total tactical aviation aircraft 

procurement from the original program’s 1,637 to 1,140 aircraft, a 

reduction of 497 aircraft. 

The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the 

Navy and Marine Corps’ operational requirements with a smaller force 

primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the relative 

capability of different tactical aviation force structures. Although our 

review of the contractor’s methodology and assumptions about force 

structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies suggests that 

much of the contractor’s analysis appears to be reasonable, we also noted 

some limitations in the study that add risk. Specifically, we found the 

following: 

• The contractor modeled the Joint Strike Fighters aboard Navy carriers 

as if all would have the same performance characteristics despite 

knowing that the Marine Corps’ Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing 

version has significantly less range and payload capability than the 

Navy’s carrier version. 

• Following the contractor’s recommendation, the Navy decided to 

reduce the number of backup aircraft it would buy predicated on 

expected lower attrition rates and improvements in maintenance 

management without fully analyzing the feasibility of achieving these 

efficiencies. 

• The contractor’s force structure analysis showed that the new force 

had significantly more capability than the current force but relied on 

aircraft performance scores assigned by a panel of experts. However, a 

sensitivity analysis performed by the contractor also showed that 

variations in these scores significantly affected the forces’ relative 

capability and therefore the increased effectiveness might not be as 

high as reported. 

Each of these factors increases the risk that the future smaller force will 

not be as effective at accomplishing the Navy and Marine Corps’ tactical 

missions as the Department of Navy expects. 

The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in selecting 

a reserve squadron to decommission. The process developed by the 

Marine Corps Reserve produced a well-documented analysis of the 
Page 4 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

operational, fiscal, logistical, and personnel impacts of different options 

that appears to provide decision makers with a sound basis for selecting 

the reserve unit to decommission. By contrast, the Navy selected the 

reserve squadron to decommission without clear criteria or a documented 

comprehensive analysis supporting its decision. In the absence of standard 

Department of Defense guidance for analyzing and documenting 

decommissioning alternatives, a lack of transparency could occur in 

conjunction with future service force structure decisions. 

Two other factors might affect successful implementation of the Plan, 

including the potential uncertainty about future requirements for 

readiness funding and delays in fielding the new force. Although the 

contractor recommended that the Navy identify future readiness-funding 

requirements and ensure that a mechanism be in place for fully funding 

these accounts, to date, the Navy has not conducted this analysis. Without 

an examination of future funding requirements, the Navy cannot know 

whether sufficient funds will be available to maintain readiness levels that 

are adequate for the smaller tactical aviation force to meet the mission 

needs of both the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition, the Department of 

the Navy is also experiencing engineering and weight problems in 

developing the Joint Strike Fighter that will cause it to be delayed until 

2013—at least 1 year beyond when it had been projected to begin receiving 

the aircraft—and other risks to the program remain. Because these delays 

will cause the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, they 

might also increase operation and maintenance costs, making an analysis 

of future readiness funding requirements even more important. 

To mitigate the risks associated with implementing the Navy and Marine 

Corps’ Plan and enhance future decommissioning decisions, we are 

recommending that (1) the Secretary of the Navy conduct additional 

analyses of the expected efficiencies essential to reducing the number of 

backup aircraft and the necessary readiness funding and (2) the Secretary 

of Defense require comprehensive and well-documented analyses when 

services make decisions about which units to decommission. In written 

comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense generally 

agreed with our recommendations and cited actions it plans to take to 

implement them. Although some of the department’s proposed actions 

appear consistent with our recommendations, we believe it needs to take 

further steps. The department should develop clear criteria for the 

services to use in making future unit decommissioning decisions and 

require them to retain documentation of their analyses to facilitate 

oversight and transparency. The department’s comments and our 

evaluation are on page 21 of this report. 
Page 5 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

The Department of Defense’s 2001 Defense Planning Guidance tasked the 

Department of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive review to assess the 

feasibility of fully integrating Navy and Marine Corps aviation force 

structure to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency. The Department of 

the Navy narrowed the study to include only fixed-wing tactical aviation 

assets because of affordability concerns. Specifically, Navy officials were 

concerned that the projected procurement budget would not be sufficient 

to buy as many F/A-18E/Fs and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft as originally 

planned. The difference between the funding needed to support the Navy’s 

original plan for procuring tactical aircraft and the Navy’s projected 

procurement budget is shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Navy’s Projected Tactical Aviation Procurement Budget Compared with Original Procurement Plan, 

Fiscal Years 2002-26 

Note: The profile shown for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for fiscal years 2005-11 reflects funding for 

both the F/A-18E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter. 

Background 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Fiscal year 2002 dollars in millions

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026

JSF

F/A-18E/F

Fiscal years

Source: U.S. Navy.

Typical Navy tactical aviation budget

= $3,200 million per year
Page 6 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Figure 1 shows that, starting in fiscal year 2005, the Navy’s typical aviation 

allocation of $3,200 million per year would not be sufficient to support the 

previous procurement plan for F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. 

In December 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps jointly commissioned a contractor to study the feasibility 

of integrating Naval tactical aviation. The study prompted a memorandum 

of agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps in August 2002 to 

integrate their tactical aviation assets and buy fewer aircraft than 

originally planned. 

The Plan proposes that the Navy and Marine Corps (1) merge operational 

concepts; (2) reduce the number of squadrons, aircraft per squadron, and 

backup aircraft; and (3) reduce the total number of aircraft to be procured 

in the future. The Department of the Navy anticipates that these changes 

will save approximately $28 billion in procurement costs over the next 

18 years through fiscal year 2021. 

Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase the extent to 

which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force for both 

services. Under the Plan, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase 

cross deployment of squadrons between the services and would further 

consolidate missions and operations through changes in aircrew training 

and the initiation of command-level officer exchanges. 

Under the Plan, the Marine Corps would increase the number of squadrons 

dedicated to carrier air wings, and the Navy would begin to dedicate 

squadrons to Marine Aircraft Wings. In 2003 the Marine Corps began to 

provide the Navy with the first of six additional dedicated squadrons to 

augment four squadrons already integrated into carrier air wings during 

the 1990s. As a result, each of the Navy’s 10 active carrier air wings would 

ultimately include one Marine Corps squadron by 2012. Concurrently, the 

Navy would integrate three dedicated squadrons into Marine Aircraft 

Wings by 2008, primarily to support the Marine Corps Unit Deployment 

Plan Changes the 

Navy and Marine 

Corps’ Operational 

Concepts and 

Reduces Force 

Structure to Achieve 

Procurement Savings 

Navy and Marine Corps 

Merge Concepts of 

Operation 
Page 7 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Program4 rotations to Japan. The first Navy squadron to deploy in support 

of Marine Corps operations would occur in late fiscal year 2004, with other 

squadrons to follow in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. 

As part of the new operating concept, the Department of the Navy would 

satisfy both Navy and Marine Corps missions using either Navy or Marine 

Corps squadrons. Traditionally, the primary mission of Navy tactical 

aviation has been to provide long-range striking power from a carrier, 

while Marine Corps tactical aviation provided air support for ground 

forces. Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons will retain their 

primary mission responsibilities, but units that integrate would 

additionally be responsible to train as well as perform required mission 

responsibilities of the other service. For example, if a Navy squadron were 

assigned to the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program, its pilots would 

receive more emphasis on training for close air support missions, and, 

similarly, Marine Corps pilots would place more emphasis on long-range 

strike missions before deploying with a carrier air wing. Moreover, Navy 

and Marine Corps officers would exchange Command positions to further 

develop a more unified culture. For instance, a Marine Corps colonel 

would command a carrier air wing, while a Navy captain would command 

a Marine Corps Aircraft Group. 

As indicated in table 1, the Department of the Navy would create a smaller 

tactical aviation force structure consisting of fewer squadrons, reduced 

numbers of aircraft per squadron, and fewer backup aircraft. The number 

of tactical aviation squadrons would decrease from 68 under the previous 

plan to 59 by 2012. To achieve this reduction of nine squadrons, the 

department would 

• cancel plans to reestablish four active Navy squadrons as anticipated 

under its prior procurement plan, 

• decommission one Marine Corps Reserve squadron as well as one Navy 

Reserve squadron in 2004, and 

• decommission three active Navy squadrons. The first active squadron is 

scheduled to be decommissioned in fiscal year 2006; two other 

squadrons are to be decommissioned from fiscal year 2010 through 

fiscal year 2012. 

 4

 Marine Corps Unit Deployment program maintains three tactical aviation squadrons at 

Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, to meet contingency operations throughout the 

Western Pacific Theater. 

Plan Expected to Reduce 

Total Number of 

Squadrons, Aircraft 

per Squadron, and 

Backup Aircraft 
Page 8 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Table 1: Force Structure Summary for the Previous Program and the Navy and Marine Corps’ Integration Plan 

Service/Component 

Force structure 

under previous program

Force structure 

under integration plan 

Reductions 

in force structure

Navy-Active 40 squadrons/500 aircrafta33 squadrons/370 aircraft 7 squadrons/130 aircraft

Navy-Reserves 3 squadrons/36 aircraft 2 squadrons/22 aircraft 1 squadron/14 aircraft

Marine Corps-Active 21 squadrons/308 aircraft 21 squadrons/210 aircraft 0 squadrons/98 aircraft

Marine Corps-Reserves 4 squadrons/48 aircraft 3 squadrons/30 aircraft 1 squadron/18 aircraft

Total operational aircraft 68 squadrons/892 aircraft 59 squadrons/632 aircraft 9 squadrons/260 aircraft

Backup aircraft 745 508 237

Total aircraft 1,637 1,140 497

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis). 

a

The Navy currently has 36 active squadrons instead of 40 as listed in the table. The difference in 

numbers is due to four Marine Corps squadrons that are currently integrated aboard Navy carriers. 

The Navy’s previous plan was to buy enough aircraft to reestablish those four squadrons as Navy 

units. 

Under the Plan, the number of aircraft assigned to some tactical aviation 

squadrons would be reduced. All Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18C 

squadrons that transition to the future Joint Strike Fighter aircraft would 

be reduced from 12 to 10 aircraft. In addition, Navy F/A-18F squadrons will 

be reduced from 14 to 12 aircraft. Furthermore, by 2006, aircraft assigned 

to the remaining two Navy and three Marine Corps Reserve squadrons 

would be reduced from 12 to 10. By reducing the aircraft assigned to 

squadrons, the size of Navy air wings will transition from 46 to 44 aircraft 

in 2004, as the Navy procures new aircraft. A notional air wing in the 

Navy’s current force is made up of 46 aircraft comprising a combination of 

F/A-18C and F-14 squadrons. However, by 2016, carrier air wings would 

contain 44 aircraft made up of two squadrons of 10 Joint Strike Fighters, 

one squadron of 12 F/A-18E fighters, and one squadron of 12 F/A-18F 

fighters. 

The Department of the Navy’s Plan would also reduce the number of 

backup aircraft to be procured from 745 (under the previous program) to 

508, for a total reduction of 237 aircraft. Backup aircraft consist of those 

aircraft that are not primarily assigned to active or reserve squadrons. 

Specifically, backup aircraft are necessary to meet a variety of needs 

such as 

• training new pilots; 

• replacing aircraft that are either awaiting or undergoing depot-level 

repair; 

• meeting research, development, and test and evaluation needs; 
Page 9 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

• attrition during peacetime or wartime operations; and 

• meeting miscellaneous requirements, such as adversary training and 

the Blue Angels demonstration team. 

In implementing the Plan, the Department of the Navy expects to reduce 

the number of tactical aviation aircraft it will purchase by 497—from 1,637 

to 1,140. As indicated in table 2, it plans to procure, respectively, 88 and 

409 fewer F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Almost half (237, or 

48 percent) of the expected reduction in aircraft procurement is 

attributable to the plan to have fewer backup aircraft. By reducing the 

total number of new tactical aviation aircraft to be procured, the 

Department of the Navy now expects that its new procurement program 

will cost about $64 billion, as compared with nearly $92 billion for the 

previously planned force, resulting in a savings of approximately 

$28 billion. 

Table 2: Previous Program and the Navy and Marine Corps’ Integration Plan Aircraft 

Procurement Summary 

Aircraft type 

Previous program 

procurement 

Integration plan 

procurement 

Reductions in 

aircraft 

procurement

F/A-18E/F 548 460 88

Joint Strike Fighter 1,089 680 409

Total 1,637 1,140 497

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis). 

The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet its 

operational requirements with a smaller force primarily on the results of a 

contractor study. The contractor’s analysis generally appeared reasonable 

because it assessed the relative capability of different tactical aviation 

force structures and included important assumptions about force 

structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies. However, from 

our review of the contractor’s methodology and assumptions, we 

identified some limitations in its analysis that may understate the risk 

associated with implementing some aspects of the Plan. These limitations 

include (1) the contractor’s decision to model only the carrier version of 

the Joint Strike Fighter despite the Marine Corps’ plans to operate Short 

Take Off and Vertical Landing aircraft on carriers, (2) the contractor’s 

limited studies supporting recommended reductions in backup aircraft, 

Plan Expected to Reduce 

Procurement of Tactical 

Fighters and Save 

Procurement Costs 

Navy’s Analysis 

Generally Appears 

Reasonable, but Some 

Limitations Could 

Understate Risks 
Page 10 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

and (3) the contractor’s method for determining aircraft capabilities used 

in the force analyses. 

The contractor modeled the effectiveness of the current force, the larger 

force that the Navy had previously planned to buy, and the study’s 

recommended smaller force at three stages of a notional warfight. The 

warfight was based on a generic composite scenario that was developed 

with input from the Air Force and Army. It has been previously used by the 

Joint Strike Fighter Program Office to assess the effectiveness of a joint 

strike force in terms of phases of a warfight; geographical location of 

combat forces; the characteristics of targets, such as type and hardness; 

and whether targets are mobile. During the forward presence phase of the 

contractor’s modeling scenario, one carrier battle group and one 

amphibious readiness group were deployed, and aircraft operated at a 

maximum distance of 400 nautical miles from the carrier. In the buildup 

phase, three carrier battle groups and three amphibious groups were 

deployed in one theater, and aircraft operated at a maximum distance of 

150 nautical miles. During the mature phase, eight carrier battle groups, 

eight amphibious readiness groups, and 75 percent of all other assets were 

deployed to land-based sites, and aircraft operated at a maximum distance 

of 150 nautical miles from the carrier. 

To measure combat effectiveness levels, the contractor methodically 

compared the estimated capabilities of the current force, the previously 

planned force, and the recommended force to hit targets and perform 

close air support. To determine the relative capabilities of each aircraft 

comprising these forces, the contractor convened a panel of experts who 

were familiar with planned capability and used official aircraft 

performance data to score the offensive and defensive capabilities of 

different aircraft across a range of missions performed during the three 

stages of the warfight. As indicated in figure 2, the experts determined that 

the Joint Strike Fighter, which is still in development, will be the most 

capable aircraft and assigned it a baseline score of 1 compared with the 

other aircraft. 

Methodology Compared 

Relative Force Structure 

Capabilities 
Page 11 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Figure 2: Capability Scores Determined by Contractor’s Panel of Experts 

Figure 2 also shows that based on the capability scores assigned other 

aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter is expected to be approximately nine 

times more capable than the AV-8B Harrier aircraft, about five times more 

capable than the F-14D and F/A-18 A+/C/D aircraft, three times more 

capable than the first version of the F/A-18 E/F aircraft, and 50 percent 

more capable than the second version of the F/A-18E/F. In addition, the 

contractor measured the percentage of units deployed in order to ensure 

that Navy and Marine Corps personnel tempo and operational tempo5

guidelines for peacetime were not exceeded. 

The study concluded that, because of the expected increase in the 

capabilities of F/A-18 E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, both the 

previously planned force and the recommended new smaller force were 

more effective than today’s force. Furthermore, the new smaller force was 

 5

 Personnel tempo measures the frequency of deployments and time away from home. 

Operational tempo measures the intensity of actions for military units by tracking the 

number of days per quarter that the unit is deployed. 

Capacity scores

0

0.2

0.111

0.195 0.193

0.316

0.65

1

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

AV-8B

F-14D

F/A-18A+/C/D

F/A-18E/F Block 1

F/A-18E/F Block 2

Joint Strike Fighter

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
Page 12 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

just as effective in most instances as the previously planned force because 

the smaller force had enough aircraft to fully populate aircraft carrier 

flight decks and therefore did not cause a reduction in the number of 

targets that could be hit. However, the analysis showed that beginning in 

2015, there would be a 10 percent reduction in effectiveness in close air 

support during the mature phase of a warfight because fewer squadrons 

and aircraft would be available to deploy to land bases. The analysis also 

showed that the smaller force stayed within personnel and operational 

tempo guidelines during peacetime. 

The contractor’s analysis was based on three key assumptions that 

generally appeared to be reasonable and consistent with DOD plans. First, 

it assumed that the future naval force structure would include 12 carrier 

battle groups, supported by 1 reserve and 10 active carrier air wings, and 

12 amphibious readiness groups. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 

validated this naval force structure and judged that this force structure 

presented moderate operational risk in implementing the defense strategy. 

Second, it assumed that the Navy and Marine Corps’ tactical aviation 

procurement budget would continue to be about $3.2 billion in fiscal year 

2002 dollars annually through 2020. This was based on the Department of 

the Navy’s determination that the tactical aviation procurement budget 

would continue to represent about 50 percent of the services’ total aircraft 

procurement budget as it had in fiscal years 1995 to 2002. Third, it 

assumed that the Department of the Navy could reduce the number of 

backup aircraft it buys based on expected efficiencies in managing its 

backup aircraft inventory. 

Our analysis also showed, however, that certain limitations derived from 

the contractor’s study could add risk to the expected effectiveness of the 

future smaller force. These limitations are 

• the study’s modeling assumption that the effectiveness of the Marine 

Corps’ Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version of the Joint Strike 

Fighter would be the same as the Navy’s carrier version despite 

projected differences in their capability; 

• the study’s assumption that certain efficiencies in the management of 

backup aircraft could be realized, without documenting and providing 

supporting analyses substantiating how they would be achieved; and 

• the study’s process for assigning capability measures to aircraft which, 

because of its subjectivity, could result in an overestimation of the 

smaller force’s effectiveness. 

Analysis Included 

Reasonable Assumptions 

Some Limitations in the 

Navy’s Analysis Understate 

Risks in Implementing the 

Plan 
Page 13 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

The contractor’s study assumed that all Joint Strike Fighters aboard Navy 

carriers, including those belonging to the Marine Corps, would have the 

performance characteristics of the carrier version of that aircraft. 

However, the Marine Corps plans to operate only the Short Takeoff and 

Vertical Landing version of the aircraft, which is projected to be 

significantly less capable than the carrier version in terms of range and 

payload (number of weapons it can carry). The Marine Corps believes this 

version is needed to satisfy its requirement to operate from austere land 

bases or amphibious ships in order to quickly support ground forces when 

needed. But the carrier version’s unrefueled range and internal payload are 

expected to exceed those of the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing 

version by approximately 50 and 100 percent, respectively. 

The contractor mitigated the differences in the two versions’ capabilities 

by modeling a scenario whereby the aircraft would operate from carriers 

located 150 miles from the targets during the mature phase of the 

warfight—well within the range of the Marine Corps’ version. By contrast, 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the targets struck from carriers 

would have been outside the range of the Short Takeoff and Vertical 

Landing version of the aircraft unless in-flight refueling was performed, 

thereby reducing its effectiveness. The study noted that because of the 

differences in performance, substitution of the Short Takeoff and Vertical 

Landing version for the carrier version would result in decreased 

effectiveness when the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version’s 

performance parameters are exceeded. However, the study did not 

conduct additional analyses to quantify the impact of using Short Takeoff 

and Vertical Landing aircraft aboard carriers. Therefore, if the Plan is 

implemented whereby the Marine Corps operates the Short Takeoff and 

Vertical Landing version of the aircraft exclusively as one of four tactical 

aviation squadrons aboard each carrier, under a different scenario 

featuring a greater range to targets, the overall effectiveness of the tactical 

fighter group could be less than what the contractor’s study predicted. 

Navy officials acknowledged that operating the Short Takeoff and Vertical 

Landing Joint Strike Fighter aircraft from carriers presents a number of 

challenges that the Navy expects to address as the aircraft progresses 

through development. 

The contractor’s study recommended cutting 351 backup aircraft based on 

expected improvements and efficiencies in the Navy’s management of 

such aircraft. The study identified three main factors prompting its 

conclusion that fewer backup aircraft would be needed. 

Projected Capability 

Differences of Joint Strike 

Fighter Versions Could Affect 

Expected Effectiveness of 

Smaller Tactical Aviation Force 

Projected Efficiencies in 

Managing Backup Aircraft 

Were Based on Limited 

Analysis 
Page 14 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

• Actual historical attrition rates for F/A-18 aircraft, according to the 

Navy, suggest that the attrition rate for the F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike 

Fighter could be lower than expected. The Navy determined that 

attrition might be only 1 percent of total aircraft inventory, rather than 

the expected 1.5 and 1.3 percent included in the Navy’s original 

procurement plan for the aircraft respectively6

; thus, fewer attrition 

aircraft would suffice. 

• Business practices for managing aircraft in the maintenance pipeline 

could be improved. According to the contractor, if Navy depots 

performed as much maintenance per day as Air Force depots, it 

appears that the Navy could reduce the number of aircraft in the 

maintenance pipeline; thus, fewer aircraft could suffice. 

• Testing, evaluating, and aircrew training could become more efficient. 

According to the contractor’s study, fewer aircraft would be needed to 

test and evaluate future technology improvements because of the Navy 

and Marine Corps’ two Joint Strike Fighter variants (the carrier and 

Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing versions would have many common 

parts). In addition, advances in trainer technology and the greater 

sortie generation capability of the newer aircraft could enable them to 

achieve more training objectives in a single flight; thus, fewer aircraft 

could suffice. 

Although the contractor recognized the potential of these efficiencies 

when recommending the reduction to the number of backup aircraft, it did 

not fully analyze the likelihood of achieving them. According to the 

contractor, it recommended the reduction based on limited analysis of the 

potential to reduce the number of attrition and maintenance pipeline 

aircraft. As a result, the contractor also recommended that the Department 

of the Navy study whether it could achieve expected maintenance 

efficiencies by improving its depot operations. However, the department 

has not conducted such an assessment. 

The Department of the Navy considered the risk of cutting 351 aircraft too 

high and instead decided to cut only 237 backup aircraft—the number 

reflected in the Navy’s plan. Historically, the Navy’s backup inventory has 

equaled approximately 95 percent of the number of combat aircraft. The 

contractor recommended that the Navy reduce its backup aircraft 

 6

 We did not assess the reliability of the Navy’s data generating the attrition rates for the 

F/A-18 aircraft. 
Page 15 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

requirement to 62 percent of its planned inventory of combat aircraft. 

Concerned that this might be too drastic a cut, the Navy decided to use 

80 percent when determining the number of backup aircraft in its Plan. 

Although the Plan’s higher ratio of backup aircraft to combat aircraft will 

reduce operational risk by having more aircraft available for attrition and 

other purposes, the Navy’s 80 percent factor was not based on a 

documented analysis. Navy officials noted that because of budget 

limitations, it would be difficult to purchase additional aircraft to support 

the smaller tactical aviation force in case some of the projected 

efficiencies are not realized. 

The contractor relied on aircraft capability scores assigned by a panel of 

experts as a basis for comparing the relative effectiveness of the aircraft 

and alternative force structures examined. The results showed that by 

2020, the previously planned and new smaller force would be four times 

more effective at hitting targets than the current force. However, the 

panelists subjectively determined the capability scores from official 

aircraft performance parameters provided by the Navy. The contractor 

reportedly conducted a “sensitivity analysis” of the aircraft capability 

scores and found that changing the scores affected the forces’ relative 

effectiveness. Since the contractor did not retain documentation of the 

analysis, we could not verify the quality of the scoring, nor attest that the 

relative effectiveness of the new force will be four times greater than the 

current force as the study reported. Nevertheless, the contractor’s 

acknowledgement that score variations could affect relative force 

effectiveness raises the possibility that the estimated increases in 

effectiveness, both for the previously planned force and for the 

recommended smaller force, might not be as high as the study concluded. 

Navy and Marine Corps officials agreed that gaining a significant increase 

in total capability was key to accepting a smaller, more capable tactical 

aviation force. However, if the capability of the recommended smaller 

force is significantly less than that indicated by the study, the smaller 

force’s ability to meet both Navy and Marine Corps’ mission requirements 

could be adversely affected. 

Subjectivity in Aircraft 

Capabilities Scoring Could 

Reduce Expected Force 

Effectiveness 
Page 16 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

The Navy and Marine Corps took significantly different approaches toward 

the task of assessing and documenting their decisions on which reserve 

units to decommission. The Marine Corps used a well-documented 

process that clearly showed what criteria were applied to arrive at its 

decision, whereas the Navy’s approach lacked clarity and supporting 

documentation about how different options were evaluated. DOD has not 

developed criteria to guide such decommissioning decisions. In a previous 

report, we reviewed the Air Force’s decision to reduce and consolidate the 

B-1B bomber fleet and found that Air Force officials did not complete a 

formal comprehensive analysis of potential basing options in order to 

determine whether they were choosing the most cost-effective units to 

keep.7

 We also stated that in the absence of standard guidance for 

analyzing basing alternatives, similar problems could occur in the future. 

In this instance, the absence of standard DOD guidance for analyzing and 

documenting decommissioning alternatives allowed the Navy to use a very 

informal and less transparent process to determine which reserve 

squadron to decommission in fiscal year 2004. The lack of a formal 

process could also hinder transparency in making such decisions in the 

future, which adversely affects Congress’s ability to provide appropriate 

oversight. 

The Marine Corps established a team that conducted and documented a 

comprehensive review to support its decision about which Marine Corps 

Reserve squadron to decommission.8

 In conducting its analysis, the Marine 

Corps assumed that (1) reserve assets that had not been decommissioned 

must be optimized for integration in future combat roles, (2) mission 

readiness and productivity are crucial, and (3) the political and legal 

ramifications of deactivating reserve units must be considered. The study 

team established a set of criteria consisting of personnel, operational, 

fiscal, logistical, and strategic factors and applied these criteria when 

evaluating each of the Marine Corps’ four reserve squadrons. Table 3 

identifies the selection criteria applied to each squadron. 

 7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Review of B-1 Process Identifies 

Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis, GAO-02-846 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2002). 

8

 The study team submitted the report to the Commander, 4th Marine (Reserve) Air Wing, 

on December 7, 2002. 

In the Absence of 

DOD Criteria, the 

Marine Corps and 

Navy Used Different 

Methods and 

Documentation 

Standards to 

Determine Which 

Reserve Units to 

Decommission 

The Marine Corps 

Conducted a 

Comprehensive Analysis to 

Support Decommissioning 

Decision 
Page 17 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Table 3: Marine Corps Criteria for Selecting a Reserve Unit to Decommission 

Personnel Detailed demographics analysis was conducted to determine the number 

and status of personnel for each location. The implications of relocating 

and retraining squadron personnel were examined. 

Operational Unit, pilot, and aircraft readiness, productivity, and efficiency were 

assessed. Sortiea analysis was conducted, and aircraft utilization rates 

were examined. Support provided for training exercises and other events 

was analyzed. 

Fiscal Operational and training costs were examined. Cost per flight hour, cost to 

support combined arms training at Marine Corps Air/Ground Task Force 

Training Center Twenty-nine Palms, Calif., and operations/maintenance 

and personnel costs were assessed. 

Logistical Basing impacts and divestiture expenses were examined. Suitability of 

facilities (billeting, work areas, messing, etc.) and operations, training, and 

maintenance supportability were assessed. 

Strategic Doctrinal, organizational, and regional issues were examined. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps. 

a

A single mission or flight of an aircraft. 

The study results were presented to the Marine Requirements Oversight 

Council for review and recommendation and to the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps.9

 The Commandant decided in May 2004 to decommission 

reserve squadron VMFA-321 located at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, 

by September 2004. 

In December 2003, the Navy decided to decommission one of three Navy 

Reserve tactical aviation squadrons, VFA-203, located in Atlanta, Georgia. 

The Chief of Naval Reserve stated that the Navy used a variety of criteria 

in deciding which unit to decommission. These criteria included the 

squadrons’ deployment history, the location of squadrons in relation to 

operating ranges, and the location of a reserve intermediate maintenance 

facility. Navy officials, however, could not provide documentation of the 

criteria or the analysis used to support its decision. Without such 

documentation to provide transparency to the Navy’s process, we could 

not determine whether these criteria were systematically applied to each 

reserve squadron. Furthermore, we could not assess whether the Navy had 

 9

 The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force structure, and requirements validation. 

The Navy Did Not Conduct 

a Formal Analysis or 

Provide Documentation 

to Support Its 

Decommissioning Decision 
Page 18 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

systematically evaluated and compared other factors such as operational, 

personnel, and financial impacts for all Navy Reserve squadrons. 

Two other factors could adversely affect the successful implementation of 

the Plan and increase the risk level assumed at the time the contractor 

completed the study and the Navy and Marine Corps accepted the Plan. 

These factors are (1) uncertainty about requirements for readiness funding 

to support the tactical aviation force and (2) projected delays in fielding 

the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that might cause the Department of the 

Navy not to implement the Plan as early as expected and might increase 

operations and maintenance costs. If these factors are not appropriately 

addressed, the Department of the Navy may not have sufficient funding to 

support the readiness levels required for the smaller force to meet the 

Navy and Marine Corps’ missions, and the transition to the Plan’s force 

might be more costly than anticipated. 

The contractor’s study stated that because the Navy and the Marine Corps 

would have a combined smaller tactical aviation force under the Plan, the 

services’ readiness accounts must be fully funded to ensure that the 

aircraft readiness levels are adequate to meet the mission needs of both 

services. Furthermore, the contractor recommended that the Navy 

conduct an analysis to determine the future readiness funding 

requirements and ensure that the Navy has a mechanism in place to fully 

fund the readiness accounts. So far, the Navy has not conducted this 

analysis, nor has it addressed how it will ensure that the readiness 

accounts will be fully funded because Navy officials noted that they 

consider future budget estimates to be adequate. However, a recent 

Congressional Research Service evaluation of the Plan noted that 

operations and maintenance costs have been growing in recent years for 

old aircraft and that new aircraft have sometimes, if not often, proved 

more expensive to maintain than planned.10 Furthermore, our analysis of 

budget data for fiscal years 2001-3 indicates that the Department of the 

Navy’s operations and maintenance costs averaged about $388 million 

more than what was requested for tactical aviation and other flight 

operations. Without a review of future readiness funding requirements, the 

Navy cannot be certain that sufficient funding will be available to maintain 

 10 Congressional Research Service, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan: 

Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C., Sept. 2003). 

Two Other Factors 

Could Affect the 

Plan’s Implementation 

and Add Risk 
Page 19 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

the readiness levels that will enable the smaller tactical aviation force to 

meet the mission needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps. 

Delays in fielding the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, both known and 

potential, could also affect the successful implementation of the Plan. As a 

result of engineering and weight problems in the development of the Joint 

Strike Fighter, there will be at least a 1-year delay in when the Navy and 

Marine Corps had expected to begin receiving the Joint Strike Fighter 

aircraft. As noted in the Department of the Navy’s most recent acquisition 

reports to Congress, the Navy has delayed the Short Takeoff and Vertical 

Landing version from 2010 to 2012 and the Navy’s carrier version from 

2012 to 2013. Furthermore, in March 2004 we reported that numerous 

program risks and possible schedule variances could cause additional 

delays.11

Recent Joint Strike Fighter program cost increases could also delay the 

fielding of the aircraft. In DOD’s December 31, 2003, procurement plan, the 

average unit cost of the aircraft increased from $69 million to $82 million. 

Assuming that the Department of the Navy procures the 680 Joint Strike 

Fighter aircraft as proposed under the Plan, the total procurement cost 

will be approximately $9 billion higher. This increase in cost, when 

considered within the limits of the expected $3.2 billion annual 

procurement budget, will likely prevent the Department of the Navy from 

fielding the smaller but more effective tactical aviation force as early as 

expected. Additionally, these delays will oblige the Department of the 

Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, which could result in 

increased operations and maintenance costs. A potential increase in 

operations and maintenance costs makes it even more important for the 

Department of the Navy to conduct an analysis to determine its future 

readiness funding requirements. 

The contractor’s study results provided the Department of the Navy with a 

reasonable basis for concluding that it could afford to buy a smaller but 

more capable force that would meet its future operating requirements by 

using fewer Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons of more 

capable aircraft as a combined force and achieving efficiencies that allow 

it to reduce the number of backup aircraft needed. However, there are 

 11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon 

Programs. GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004). 

Conclusions 
Page 20 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

known management and funding risks to realizing the new smaller forces’ 

affordability and effectiveness. Until Navy management assesses the 

likelihood of future lower attrition rates and aircraft maintenance, test and 

evaluation, and training requirements, the Navy runs the risk that the 

number of backup aircraft it plans to procure will not be adequate to 

support the smaller tactical aviation force and add concern to the Plan’s 

affordability. Furthermore, in the absence of clear DOD guidance citing 

consistent criteria and documentation requirements for supporting 

decisions that affect units, such as which Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

squadrons to decommission, we remain concerned about the transparency 

of the process for reducing the force to those with oversight responsibility. 

The inconsistency in the Marine Corps’ and Navy’s approaches and 

supporting documentation confirms the value of such guidance to ensure 

clear consideration of the best alternative. Finally, until the Department of 

the Navy knows the readiness funding requirements for operating the new 

smaller force, it cannot be certain that it can maintain the readiness levels 

required to meet operational demands. Such an assessment of these 

requirements would provide a sound basis for seeking proper funding. 

To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps integrated 

tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both services and 

ensure more transparency when making future decommissioning 

decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 

three actions: 

• direct the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly assess all of the factors 

that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft needed to 

support a smaller tactical aviation force under the plan to integrate 

Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces, 

• develop guidance that (1) identifies the criteria and methodology for 

analyzing future decisions about which units to decommission and 

(2) establishes requirements for documenting the process used and 

analysis conducted, and 

• direct the Secretary of the Navy to analyze future readiness funding 

requirements to support the tactical aviation integration plan and 

include required funding in future budget requests. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 21 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Director, Defense 

Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, stated that the 

department generally agreed with our recommendations and cited actions 

that it is taking. The department’s comments are reprinted in their entirety 

in appendix I. 

In partially concurring with our first recommendation to thoroughly assess 

all of the factors that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft, 

DOD stated that the Department of the Navy’s Naval Air Systems 

Command would complete an effort to review all aircraft inventories to 

determine the optimum quantity required by July 2004. However, we were 

not able to evaluate the Navy’s study because Navy officials have since 

told us that it will not be completed until late September or early October 

2004. 

With regard to our second recommendation to develop guidance that 

would identify criteria and a methodology for analyzing future 

decommissioning decisions and require documenting the process, DOD 

stated that it would change Directive 5410.10, which covers the 

notification of inactivation or decommission of forces, and require it to 

contain the criteria and methodology used to make the force structure 

decision. While we agree that the new guidance, if followed, would 

disclose these aspects of the decision-making process, it does not appear 

sufficient to meet the need we identified for consistency and 

documentation to support force structure decisions. Therefore, we believe 

that DOD should take additional steps to meet the intent of our 

recommendation by developing consistent criteria and requiring 

documentation to ensure transparency for those providing oversight of 

such decisions in the future. 

In partially concurring with our third recommendation related to future 

readiness funding requirements, the Department of Defense stated that the 

Department of the Navy is currently developing analytical metrics that 

would provide a better understanding of how to fund readiness accounts 

to achieve a target readiness level. We support the development of 

validated metrics that would link the amount of funding to readiness levels 

because they would provide decision makers with assurance that 

sufficient funding would be provided. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 22 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

To determine how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force 

structure, and procurement costs would change under the Plan, we 

obtained information about the Navy and Marine Corps’ current roles and 

mission, force structure, and projected tactical aviation procurement 

programs and conducted a comparative analysis. We also met with Navy 

and Marine Corps officials at the headquarters and major command levels 

as well as Congressional Research Service officials to further understand 

and document the operational, force structure, and procurement cost 

changes expected if the Plan is implemented. 

To determine what methodology and assumptions the Navy and Marine 

Corps used to analyze the potential for integrating tactical aviation assets 

and any limitations that could affect the services’ analysis, we analyzed 

numerous aspects of the contractor’s study that provided the impetus for 

the Plan. Specifically, we met with the contractor officials of Whitney, 

Bradley & Brown, Inc., to gain first-hand knowledge of the model used to 

assess aircraft performance capability and the overall reasonableness of 

the study’s methodology. We also reviewed the scenario and assessed the 

key analytical assumptions used in order to evaluate their possible impact 

on the implementation of the Plan. We examined operational and aircraft 

performance factors to determine the potential limitations that could 

affect the services’ analysis. Additionally, we held discussions with 

officials at Navy and Marine Corps headquarters, Joint Forces Command, 

Naval Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic Commands, Marine Forces Atlantic 

Command, and the Air Combat Command to validate and clarify how the 

Plan would or would not affect the ability of tactical aviation forces to 

meet mission needs. 

To determine the process the Navy and Marine Corps used to assess which 

reserve squadrons should be decommissioned in fiscal year 2004, we 

obtained information from the Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters and 

the 4th Marine Air Wing showing a comparative analysis of Marine Corps 

Reserve squadrons. In the absence of comparable information from the 

Navy, we held discussions with the Chief of Naval Reserve and the 

Director, Navy Air Warfare, and visited the Naval Air Force Reserve 

Command to obtain information about the decision-making process for 

selecting the Navy reserve unit to be decommissioned. We also visited the 

Commander of the Navy Reserve Carrier Air Wing-20, along with four 

reserve squadrons, two each from the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves, to 

clarify and better understand their roles, missions, and overall value to the 

total force concept. 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 23 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

To determine what other factors might affect the implementation of the 

Plan, we analyzed the contractor’s study, Congressional Research Service 

reports, and prior GAO reports for potential effects that were not 

considered in the final results of the analysis. We discussed these factors 

with officials from Navy and Marine Corps headquarters as well as Naval 

Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic Commands and Marine Forces Atlantic 

Command to assess the impact of the Plan on day-to-day operations. 

We assessed the reliability of pertinent data about aircraft capability, force 

structure, and military operations contained in the contractor’s study that 

supports the Plan by (1) reviewing with contractor officials the 

methodology used for the analysis; (2) reviewing the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, prior GAO reports, and service procurement and aircraft 

performance documents; and (3) conducting discussions with Navy and 

Marine Corps officials. We concluded that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of this report. 

We performed our review from July 2003 through May 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, 

Office of Management and Budget; and other interested congressional 

committees and parties. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-4402 if you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are 

included in appendix I. 

Janet St. Laurent, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Page 24 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable David R. Obey 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 25 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 26 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft report may differ 

from those in this report. 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 27 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 28 GAO-04-900 Force Structure 

Richard G. Payne (757) 552-8119 

George O. Morse (757) 552-8108 

In addition to those named above, Willie J. Cheely, Jr.; Kelly Baumgartner; 

W. William Russell, IV; Michael T. Dice; Cheryl A. Weissman; Katherine S. 

Lenane; and Monica L. Wolford also made significant contributions to this 

report. 

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

(350414) 
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