NORTHEAST ASIA—CULTURAL INFLUENCES 

ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Larry B. Rogers

June 2004
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-161-X
iii

PREFACE

 The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military 

offi cers and government civilians to refl ect and use their career experience to explore 

a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War 

College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic 

Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy 

Series.

In this paper, Mr. Larry Rogers discusses the Northeast Asian regional cultures and 

the current U.S. security strategy in regard to them, and makes recommendations for 

addressing regional cultural infl uences to meet U.S. objectives and protect U.S. interests.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

Director of Research

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LARRY B. ROGERS is currently serving as a Department of the Army Civilian and served 

21 years in the U.S. Army, retiring as an Offi cer in the Field Artillery in 1992. His current 

assignment is with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, International Army 

Program. His previous assignments included the Deputy Director of Training for Eighth 

U.S. Army in the Republic of Korea where he was involved in Army-to-Army training 

affairs and U.S. Government to Korean Government negotiations concerning live training 

real estate and infrastructure. Mr. Rogers holds a Master of Arts in Communication from 

the University of Oklahoma and is a 2004 graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
v

ABSTRACT

The U.S. core interests and National Security Strategy are founded on Western cultural 

operatives that assume all nation-states will respond to its infl uences in a predictable 

manner. When states do not respond appropriately, we assume they are either recalcitrant 

or irrational. A decade ago, this approach towards the states of the Northeast Asia region 

was highly effective as their economic or military dependency upon us, or their fear of 

both, usually forced them to respond within the scope of our objectives. Today, we no 

longer have the preponderance of economic or military power in the region, and old 

tactics will not continue to work effectively. Even within those states considered our 

allies, tolerance of what is deemed an abrasive U.S. presence is decreasing while antiAmericanism is growing. To continue to maneuver successfully to attain and sustain 

our interests requires that we carefully consider the perspectives, biases, and infl uences 

of these cultures to devise strategies that provide the most effective application of our 

elements of national power. This paper will discuss the Northeast Asian regional cultures, 

our current security strategy in regards to them, and recommendations for addressing 

regional cultural infl uences to meet our objectives and protect our interests.

1

NORTHEAST ASIA―CULTURAL INFLUENCES 

ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The development and implementation of the U.S. core interests and National 

Security Strategy (NSS) in regards to the Northeast Asia (NEA) region requires careful 

consideration of the cultures that we are attempting to infl uence. The effect of Western 

culturally-based persuasive strategies upon non-Western based cultures can easily lead 

to serious problems as evidenced by the issues we are facing today in postwar Iraq. Other 

cultures, even those within our own borders, do not always agree with our perspectives 

or see a need to adopt our cultural systems over their own. This is true particularly of 

cultures that existed for thousands of years before our own came into world prominence. 

To be successful in both the development and subsequent implementation of our security 

strategies for NEA, we must understand the cultural operatives1 at work to better apply 

our strategic infl uences. 

The social sciences have addressed intercultural interaction for many years. 

Publications abound that address the differences between the cultures of NEA and our 

own and offer solutions for addressing them. If we rely on might makes right, then the 

effects of cultural differences are of little concern. Coercive strategies, vice persuasive 

ones, will obtain the results we want. However, this will not continue in the long run. The 

key to effecting lasting change within a NEA culture is to recognize its cultural operatives 

and form persuasive strategies that leverage them. 

We accept the importance of knowing our enemy (or opponent) and knowing 

ourselves. Yet we limit our knowledge of both during intercultural relations as we seek 

our cognitive comfort zones. Diplomats who negotiate intercultural agreements know 

diplomacy, not sociology. Fortunately, many are aware of the cultural operatives at play 

through experience or from information provided by their staffs. Even so, they are still 

trained in Western diplomacy that is infl uenced heavily by Western cultural operatives. 

For example, negotiation can be learned in many Western institutions that focus their 

course content on how to apply Western psychology to persuade a counterpart. This 

works fi ne when negotiating with a Western culture, but applying these tactics and 

techniques on NEA cultures is not effective and can leave counterparts confused and 

belligerent. 

This paper will discuss and contrast potentially critical cultural operatives that exist 

within our own and the NEA cultures and describe possible pitfalls that should be 

avoided during the development and implementation of the U.S. NSS.

Western Thought―Eastern Thought.

What is a culture and why does it drive us to think, behave, and believe the way 

we do? Culture, as defi ned by the Encyclopedia Britannica, is the pattern of behavior 

and thinking that people living in social groups learn, create, and share. It includes 

their beliefs, rules of behavior, language, rituals, art, technology, their religious beliefs, 

and political and economic systems. Judaeo-Christian doctrine and post-Aristotelian 

scientifi c methodologies heavily infl uence our culture as well. Judaeo-Christian doctrine 

establishes what is right and wrong, good or bad, moral and immoral, and has been 

heavily engrained in our consciousness for centuries. These values and beliefs had such 
2

tremendous infl uence over the creation of our Constitution and laws that even citizens 

who are not of the Judaeo-Christian faith still live by its tenets. No major values that we 

espouse are not infl uenced by it. The Scientifi c Method establishes our rational system 

and is just as fully ingrained in our psyche through centuries of education and day-today application. We cannot communicate with anyone, even in casual conversation, 

without the use of such scientifi cally based concepts as causality, dichotomies, and logic. 

Although numerous factors infl uence our culture, understanding that these two factors 

alone are pervasive and dominate our daily lives helps us to better comprehend our 

cultural operatives and their strengths and weaknesses. 

NEA cultures have different roots that date back much further than our own. In 

these cultures, philosophy was the primary source of learned social behavior and the 

development of a rational system of thought. The scientifi c method did not become a 

part of their culture until less than two centuries ago and is certainly not integral as yet. 

Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism were the only systems used for thousands of 

years to determine proper behavior and proper patterns of thought. These philosophies 

engrained themselves within these cultures and infl uenced the development of their 

people. The results are differences that are both subtle yet profound. As an example, 

consider these value statements regarding moral worth. 

• Worth in the Judaeo-Christian view is determined by our choices.

• Worth in the Confucian view is determined by consequences of our choices.

Western cultures assess worth as being good or bad at the origin of the choice. We 

can chose to act or not act in a manner that is worthy or unworthy and, therefore, the 

choice itself is the measure.2 NEA cultures consider worth at the time of choice as well, 

but cannot be sure of the value of their decision until it produces a worthy consequence. 

How can this cultural difference play out in an act of intercultural communication? 

It, along with other operatives, can lead to friction between participants and eventual 

failure in communication. Assuming a case where we have a negotiator from each culture 

discussing an important issue, how should we expect their negotiations to proceed? 

Should they track along the same course during their negotiations? 

United States 

Greater certainty of worth Greater confi dence in choice

Greater confi dence in choice Increased aggressiveness

Increased aggressiveness Less patience

Less patience Appearance of arrogance

Appearance of arrogance Perceived as demanding

NEA

Less certainty of worth Less assurance in choice

Less assurance in choice Reluctance to chose

Reluctance to chose Attempt to compromise

Attempt to compromise Appearance of irresoluteness

Appearance of irresoluteness Not serious or committed
3

Of course, this is a simplifi ed assessment, but this type scenario has played itself out on 

several occasions during military negotiations with South Korean counterparts over the 

past decade. The perceptions of the participants infl uence their choices as they progress 

through the scenario and increase misunderstanding. Simple differences such as these, 

when functioning at a cultural emotional level, can lead to serious misunderstandings 

and the ultimate failure of U.S. negotiation strategies. 

Certain cultural operatives can have signifi cant effects on the development and 

implementation of the U.S. NSS. Table 1 lists some of these (United States and NEA) and 

depicts the contrasts between them.3

Operative U.S. Perspective NEA Perspective

Ideology World View—Truth is Discovered World—Truth is revealed

Pragmatic Spiritual

Separate from Nature Integral to Nature

Life is short; fear of death Life = Death; less fear of death

Impatience Patience

Rational Scientifi c Experiential / scientifi c

System Low contextual communication High contextual communication

Persuasive Rhetoric Associative Rhetoric

Time is linear Time is cyclic

Stress on the future Stress on past and present

Societal Heterogeneous Homogeneous

Structure Individualistic Collective

Egalitarian Hierarchical

A nation-state A culture-state

Interpersonal- Independent Interdependent

Behavior Competitive Cooperative

Confrontational Elusive

Egoistic Altruistic

Table 1. Contrasting Cultural Operatives.

As a word of caution, at the basic human level, Northeast Asians are very much 

like us in that they need or want much of the same things we do. They want security, a 

comfortable life, a safe environment, and to provide for their children. However, when 

issues arise that threaten these, they will react as their culture has taught them. When 

dealing with another culture where the result can be serious, all factors of behavior are in 

play and the ones listed in Table 1 can create some very interesting behaviors. The most 

signifi cant of these factors, that are somewhat more abstract, are discussed hereafter.

World View. 

This is epistemology that, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, is a system of 

generalized views of the surrounding world and man’s place in it. It defi nes the content 
4

of reality, the mode of thinking about reality, and the principles of life itself. Since the 

writings of Plato, Western science has been infl uenced by the belief that truth exists, and 

knowledge of it is gained through active discovery. The scientifi c method has always 

been our means of discovery and has infl uenced our behavior at the most basic levels. 

We stand apart from Nature, and we discover the truths that it holds even if we have 

to wrench it out. The NEA cultures were not infl uenced by the scientifi c method until 

only recently in terms of their cultural longevity. Their world view developed from a 

layering of philosophies that fundamentally established that truth will reveal itself. 

These philosophies rejected teleology, the proposition that the universe has design and 

purpose. Truth exists in nature, and one understands it by becoming one with it. 

Life and Death. 

Perhaps nothing separates our cultures more at the basic human level of existence 

than our beliefs concerning life and death. All humans seek an explanation of death and, 

since we have no means to measure and understand it, we rely on religions or philosophy 

to do so. Our predominant belief system is founded on Judaeo-Christian doctrine where 

life and death are separate existences; the latter of which will be eternal and either good or 

bad. Our short lives, relative to eternity, give us little time to achieve the goodness needed 

to ensure we attain Heaven. Shortness of life and uncertainty of what will happen after 

death drive our views on humanitarianism, right to life, the bemoaning of an untimely 

death, and the somewhat communitarian view that even one life is too high a price to 

pay. Eastern cultural views are quite different. In Confucianism, immortality is through 

the fulfi llment of your responsibilities to society. If you have done so before you die, then 

you will be immortal. Confucianism also established that it was socially responsible for 

an individual to take his or her own life for the good of the whole. Taoism states that life 

and death are both equal. If you accept that there is no death, then you are immortal. Zen 

Buddhism states that the fear of death is created through an obsession with the “self.” 

By subordinating the self, one eliminates greed, lust, and other drives that imprison the 

spirit. Death frees the spirit and is therefore to be anticipated, not dreaded. The Japanese 

code of Bushido practices this Zen concept where, if one has subordinated everything, 

including life, to the good of the group, then one can die and become immortal. People 

of the NEA cultures may often prefer death to life but cling to life in order to fulfi ll their 

social obligations. Given these beliefs, why would these cultures place a high value on 

life, particularly if death satisfi es a perceived social obligation? What, then, are their 

cultural views on humanitarianism, right to life, and the preciousness of life in general? 

They may agree with our positions on human rights but only as a political expedient. 

Effecting a fundamental cultural change regarding life and death will not occur until, or 

if, a new philosophy takes hold (e.g., Christianity). 

Scientifi c versus Experiential Learning. 

How we learn has a signifi cant infl uence over our cognitive process, how we relate to 

the world, and our view of reality. Professor Seymour Epstein (1991) proposed that there 

are two basic systems of learning, the Experiential System and the Rational System4. The 
5

Experiential System consists of three components: knowledge, activity, and refl ection. 

The Rational System consists of sign systems such as language and mathematics. The 

most direct contrasts between these two systems of learning are described in Table 2. 

Experiential learning continues to play a large role in NEA due to only a short period of 

infl uence from the Scientifi c Method. Their philosophies created an Experiential System 

of learning that has lasted for most of their histories. China was still practicing this in 

their Confucian-based national testing system less than a century ago. Although the 

rational system of learning was recently adopted, it will take generations to effect change 

fully. 

Experiential System Rational System

Holistic responding Analytic responding

Automatic, effortless processing Intentional, effortful processing

Emotional Processing Logical Processing

Associative connections Logical connections

Reality on concrete images Reality in abstract symbols

Slower, more diffi cult change Rapid, easier change

Crudely integrated, less coherent More highly integrated and coherent

Siezed by our emotions Control of thoughts

Seeing is Believing Need for justifi cation—logic and evidence

Table 2. Learning Systems.

Communication. 

Perfect communication between humans is virtually impossible. However, perfection 

is not required as long as a basic level of mutual understanding can be achieved and the 

risk of misunderstanding is manageable. Therefore, controlling risk becomes critical and 

is accomplished through management of the fi lters that color the communication process. 

Using Nancy Harper’s Human Communication Theory: The History of Paradigm5 and 

altering it to account for fi lters, we can see where communication fails (Figure 1). Clearly, 

miscommunication can occur easily at any point but most signifi cantly in the locations 

noted. Intracultural communication normally experiences fi lters during sensory input. 

Intercultural fi lters add to this problem and magnify misunderstanding throughout 

the process. For example, a university professor in Japan once queried his students on 

their thoughts about a former highly respected United States ambassador who spoke on 

television the night prior.6 One female student stated that even though his presentation 

was excellent, “his wife was not such a good wife. . . . the ambassador had dandruff on 

his shoulder . . . In Japan, the wife is responsible for the husband’s appearance and if 

he is not properly groomed, it is obviously the wife’s fault.” When asked if the student 

remembered what the ambassador said, she stated she could not. She could only think 

about the dandruff. Certainly, cultural fi lters prevented active communication in this 

case, and the primary fi lter at work was contextually based. NEA cultures use high 

contextual communication that “is one in which most of the information is already in 
6

the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message.”7 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), Korea, and Japan are listed at the top of high 

contextual communicators. “People are more adept at reading nonverbal behavior and 

the environment. They also expect others to understand unarticulated communication. 

Thus, they do not speak as much as people from low-context cultures.”8 The opposite 

case may make this clearer. Westerners, with Germany topping the list, rely on highly 

precise language to code communication as accurately as possible. We say what we mean 

and mean what we say. But to a Chinese, for example, the context of the message may say 

something altogether different, coloring the credibility of our statements. 

Figure 1. A Communication Paradigm.

Concept of Time. 

To us, time is of the essence since it is perishable and, under Judaeo-Christian precepts 

of life, we have only one chance to get it right. The past is important only in the lessons it 

teaches, and the present is useful primarily as a moment in which to ponder the future. 

The future is all-important and becomes more so as it closes in on us; driving us to be 

hurried and not to focus much on lesser important aspects of life. In dealings with others, 

whether socially or professionally, we appear brusque, impatient, and intolerant. In 

NEA, the present and the past are considered as the most important. The past establishes 

the worthiness of one’s actions and is the period where one’s commitment to social 

obligations is measured. One must always take the time to meet social obligations, and 

politeness, patience, and tolerance are near culturally mandated traits.
7

Heterogeneous versus Homogeneous. 

We are the melting pot of the world, and we accept and incorporate cultural values on 

a day-to-day basis, giving us a somewhat mongrel appearance to homogeneous cultures. 

The PRC and Korea have over 4,000 years of existence as racially oriented cultures (Japan 

a little over 3,000 years). They do not accept new cultural views easily, and integration of 

other people into their cultures even less so. No culture that has survived for thousands 

of years aggressively seeks new and innovative ways to change its society or its racial 

ethnocentrisms. The PRC and Korea have survived over the millennia by bending like 

the willow when occupied by conquering or colonizing forces in order to either outlast 

opponents or assimilate them into their own culture. They have continued to emerge as 

culturally and racially pure. Japan, never conquered or occupied until the end of World 

War II, has shown this cultural resilience as well. How then do we expect these cultures to 

react to our intervention in their societies? They yield through compromise and survive 

in the end, as long as we do not threaten the core of their cultural existence. NEA cultures, 

regardless of the new global environment, will not be open to radical changes to their 

societies or political processes. 

Individualism versus Collectivism. 

The Encyclopedia Britannica describes individualism as a political and social philosophy 

that places high value on the freedom of the individual and generally stresses the selfdirected, self-contained, and comparatively unrestrained individual or ego. It describes 

collectivism as any of several types of social organizations in which the individual is seen 

as being subordinate to a social collectivity such as a state, a nation, a race, or a social 

class. Individualism (I, my, mine) is associated with principles such as inalienable rights, 

all men are created equal, the pursuit of happiness, as well as life, liberty, and justice. 

Individuals can join groups but move in and out of them as desired but within the limits 

of the culture’s communitarian infl uences. Collectivism (we, our, ours) is associated 

with the principles of sacrifi ce and subordination of self-interest to the general will of 

the group. The group defi nes the self with members who cannot move in and out freely 

and who sustain membership over a long period. The group and its social obligations 

and responsibilities drive day-to-day actions and the measure of self-worth. Individuals 

do not lead these collective cultures even when they are considered despotic. Approach 

the leader of a NEA culture, and you approach the entire culture. The model in Figure 

2 depicts the varying perspectives on the existence of the “self” within individualistic 

and collectivistic cultures in a general threat environment. Note that to successfully 

manipulate an individual within a collectivistic culture, the “self” must be migrated 

towards the outer perimeter of the group. This can only be accomplished by the group to 

which the person belongs and would entail a diffi cult information operations campaign 

to accomplish. Trying to manipulate the individual alone as a single entity will not be 

successful.
8

The West. The “self” in the left diagram 

is the fi rst concern in a threat situation 

to a person of a western culture. When 

the threat is perceived to be against “my” 

nation, the tendency is to group. When the 

threat reaches “my” family, the tendency is 

to revert again to an individual response.

The East. Collective cultures tend to 

respond at the group level at all times. 

Social obligation to the group subordinates 

the members to its needs virtually eliminating 

individual level responses to threats.

Figure 2. Individual―Group Model of Threat to “Self.”

Egalitarian versus Hierarchical. 

All men are created equal, but in NEA, they thereafter are sorted out by varying 

determinants. A Korean graduate of Columbia University once mentioned that alumni 

meetings in Korea were always conducted in the English language since the Korean 

language is socially based and requires the use of numerous honorifi cs to sort persons 

by social position. English does not do this, and conversation among the varied alumni 

members could take place comfortably without having to stratify the party members 

according to age, graduation date, current job position, and take-home pay. NEA cultures 

place considerable importance on status and establish rigid rules of behavior accordingly. 

Even within Korea, where Christian beliefs are now accepted widely, equality remains an 

interesting concept but only that. Today, the Five Confucian Relationships still dominate 

these cultures, as seen in Table 3. 

King and the subjects Built upon justice

Parents and children Love and fi lial piety

Old and the young Respect for the old

Spouses Differences in roles

Friends Trust

Table 3. Confucian Relationships.

Nation-state versus Cultural State. 

According to Samuel P. Huntington’s hypothesis, nation-states will not be the source 

of confl ict in the future.9 Civilizations, or cultural groupings that exist across nationstate boundaries, will be the new source. The civilizations he lists include Western, 

Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly 
9

African. Although this proposal is modern and forward thinking, still an underlying 

fl aw in its logic exists. The concept of a nation-state is purely a Western invention. We 

have assumed that the PRC, Korea, and Japan agreed all along that they were nationstates. In fact, they only accepted this construct as part of their obligation for joining the 

Western-established and highly-infl uenced global environment. However, they do not 

accept it among themselves and, as they have grown within the global environment, the 

continued application of our nation-state concept has created some degree of resentment 

on their side. Lastly, thinking of these cultures in terms of a nation-state has prevented 

us from seeing other perspectives in their behaviors and better understanding their 

motivations. For example, why does the PRC lay claim to Taiwan when they have never 

physically owned it for more than 8 years of its history? Two highly feasible culturally 

based reasons for this exist. First, in China, boundaries are not the defi ning principal for 

where their culture resides. The Chinese of Taiwan are of mainland descent and thereby 

defi ne Taiwan as a part of the whole and subject to the rule of the majority. Second, there 

has never been closure over who truly rules all Chinese. The Nationalists fl ed to Taiwan 

and, until it can be brought under the PRC’s control, there will always be a question of 

who leads their culture.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE NSS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Our cultural operatives are fi rmly embedded in the development of our national 

interests and subsequently, within the NSS. Understanding the cultural operatives at 

work during the formulation of these interests and strategies can be a critical part of 

their successful implementation. What cultural operatives infl uenced our thinking in 

developing our interests and strategies? Will they inherently create confl ict with the 

cultures we are trying to infl uence during implementation? If so, how do we mitigate 

this confl ict? This section will discuss how the cultural differences discussed previously 

can affect our national security development and implementation and pose risks to its 

success.

According to the NSS of 2002, our core national interests consist of the security of 

the homeland, economic well-being, and the promotion of our values.10 The fi rst two 

core interests are basic to human nature and do not differ much among cultures or 

states. However, the promotion of our values is a different case and is heavily culturally 

oriented. Promotion, as an active process, is viewed by some as an intrusive attempt to 

eliminate or alter their cultures. This is arguably where we encounter the most resistance 

to our strategies. What gives us the right to force our values on others? All cultures have 

some room to compromise but few will do so when it threatens their cultural values, 

the heart of who they are. Thus at the outset, one of our basic interests is in confl ict with 

many other cultures and, as such, so are the strategies we developed to support that 

interest. Those strategies for the NEA that are somewhat more contentious are discussed 

below, along with the Western cultural operatives that infl uenced their development and 

will infl uence their implementation.

Strategy: “Defend the peace, preserve the peace, and extend the peace.” In Western 

cultures, the foremost defi nition of peace is a lack of confl ict, disturbance, or war and, 

concomitantly, the loss of life. Western cultural operatives underlying this strategy 
10

are ideology, rational system, and societal structure. Pragmatism, fear of death, future 

orientation, individualism, and our egalitarian ideals are the key factors. 

Strategy: “Require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and 

Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance 

deployment of U.S. forces.” This is a product of our geo-political analysis of NEA as well 

as the entire Pacifi c littoral. We require bases and stations to project power to ensure our 

interests along the NEA littoral and within the Eurasian land mass. Western cultural 

operatives underlying this strategy are ideology, rational system, and societal structure. 

Pragmatism, scientifi c methodology, future orientation, nation-state, and independent 

nature are the key factors.

Strategy: “Maintain forces in the region that refl ect our commitments to our allies, 

. . . and build on stability provided by these alliances . . .” This is also a product of our 

geo-political analysis of the NEA. The belief is that the presence or threat of military 

force is the primary means of achieving stability that then creates better opportunities for 

us. This tends to be the bottom line, and NEA cultures are aware of where our loyalties 

lie. Western cultural operatives underlying this strategy are ideology, rational system, 

societal structure, and interpersonal behavior. Pragmatism, fear of death, impatience, 

scientifi c methodology, stress on the future, nation-state, and confrontation are the key 

factors.

Strategy: “Look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and global 

affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our close defense and 

diplomatic cooperation.” The assumption is that Japan shares common interests and 

values with us. When viewed as part of the international environment, the Japanese 

certainly appear to act in concert with Western values. However, internally, their 

interests and values are culturally centric and not necessarily aligned with our own. The 

assumption that Japan could become another Great Britain in its ties with the United 

States is rather far reaching. Regionally, friction still exists among the other cultures, 

and Japan and its interests are still viewed as aggressive and potentially harmful to their 

existence. Western cultural operatives underlying this strategy are rational system and 

societal structure. Scientifi c methodology, control of nature, persuasive rhetoric, future 

orientation, egalitarianism, and nation-state are the key factors. 

Strategy: “The U.S. relationship with the PRC is an important part of our strategy 

to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacifi c region.” This is predicated 

on the belief that the PRC will develop as the regional economic power with fi rst order 

infl uence over the NEA states and, eventually, the United States will need to manage the 

PRC’s power among the other cultures in the region. Korea and Japan will not accept 

the PRC as a “cultural” superior, and friction will arise requiring actions on our part to 

manage that friction. Western cultural operatives underlying this strategy are ideology, 

rational system, and societal structure. Separate from nature, scientifi c methodology, 

egalitarianism, and nation-state are the key factors.

CULTURAL LEVERAGES AND STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS

Central to the success of our objectives is the recognition of where high risks are 

present and mitigating the effects of the operatives that could create confl ict. Of all 
11

the strategies listed, those targeting the PRC are arguably the most sensitive and the 

most likely sources of cultural confl ict. Dealing with this culture is a pivotal issue and, 

therefore, a discussion on possible intercultural friction is in order. 

Our relationship with the PRC is not satisfactory enough to promote a Western vision 

of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacifi c region. Even assuming we can come 

to terms with China’s Marxist government, we still have the very basic and sensitive 

issue of human rights to overcome before our relations support our objectives. Altering 

the beliefs of the Chinese leadership on this issue is not enough. The beliefs of the entire 

culture have to be altered to effect true change. Given their philosophical nature, human 

rights are simply not a serious factor in their day-to-day lives. Changing the culture 

will take years of indoctrination in Western beliefs, normally accomplished through the 

infusion of Christian doctrine. If we want a faster solution, we will have to accept a less 

than optimal result and use their cultural traits to obtain it. Consensus and compromise 

are the key. Consider a quote from Deng Xiaoping when commenting on the reunifi cation 

of the mainland and Taiwan. “We should take the method of ‘one country, two systems’. 

. . . By doing so, we would be able to give an explanation to the people.”11 Collectivism 

provides an answer that can satisfy the whole through short-term compromises that 

achieve a “fi rst step” political answer, coupled with a long-term solution. This approach 

would be far more acceptable to the PRC and provide at least a political solution to the 

West. This demonstrates a respect for their interdependent nature and our recognition 

of their cultural principles. Patience is required, as we must approach the total solution 

over the long term. The PRC’s cultural operatives that can be leveraged to achieve 

our strategies and methods for mitigating our own embedded cultural operatives are 

discussed below.

Life and Death. 

Peace and stability are our aims and are not incongruent with those of the PRC. 

However, their culture views these aims differently than ours, and we need to target 

the value they assign them to achieve our strategy. Peace and stability are viewed by the 

PRC culture as lofty goals that will provide social harmony and prosperity. Neither are 

highly valued for their ability to protect and preserve human life. As such, we must avoid 

using life as the measure of peace and stability. As well, we cannot assign deadlines, 

milestones, or impart a sense of urgency on our part to come to an agreement. We should 

approach it as a 20-30 year effort, taking it step-by-step and working pieces of the issue 

year-by-year. Cultural change is acceptable if it is viewed as an interdependent process 

in harmony with their vision and undertaken in a slow and controlled process.

Scientifi c Methodology. 

In the development of our strategic analysis of the PRC, we employ Western scientifi c 

methodology to assess their actions and determine causality-based responses. When 

dealing with Western-based cultures similar to ourselves, this is effective. With the PRC, 

this approach is doubtful at best. We cannot use logic or causality statements to predict 

or infl uence their actions. They are experiential based, and action to consequence logic 
12

doesn’t carry weight. Approaching the PRC experientially and leveraging their view that 

nature will produce the right result over time will improve the chances of our success. 

Referring to the PRC’s experience with the “unequal treaties” of the 19th century and 

approaching a solution from an interdependency approach will achieve greater openness 

on their part. Avoiding future orientation, nation-state references, and persuasive rhetoric 

during negotiations or interpersonal relationships is key.

Communication. 

We must consider that our communication style tends to label us as arrogant, 

impatient, intolerant, and brusque. Their high contextual communication style can be 

leveraged using their most relevant experiential learning base such as Confucian writings 

or analogies from recent history. We must avoid highly complex legal approaches and 

deal almost at the interpersonal level of trust as their culture places greater importance 

on the spirit of an agreement rather than on the letter. During interpersonal sessions, 

speaking clearly, slowly, and avoiding complex adjectives and adverbs will reduce the 

high contextual level of our language. A study of their cultural habits in social situations 

can help to avoid missteps with overt gestures or culturally based taboos (e.g., the 

ambassador’s dandruff). Reducing intercultural communication fi lters is an absolute 

requirement as we step lightly around the culturally loaded issues of the region.

Concept of Time. 

Patience and tolerance are highly valued traits within the PRC culture. Our strategies 

with them and others in the region must be in terms of one or two generations to effect 

change. Human rights are not a nation-state issue with the PRC, but a cultural one that 

will take time to change. This strategy will also be very effective in dealing with the 

Taiwan issue. Both territories will become unifi ed, given time and cultural similarities, as 

long as we work to control Taiwan’s current tendencies towards independence. Time is 

not essential to the PRC, and we must practice this trait, as well, to be successful. 

Individualism versus Collectivism (I, Me, Mine versus We, Our, and Ours). 

Any opportunity we seize to create greater interdependency between the PRC and 

ourselves will be viewed as culturally favorable. Addressing issues with them from the 

perspective of individual interests will not. Group consensus building is paramount in 

their culture, and this means a high level of compromise that ultimately reduces specifi city 

in the content of an agreement. As well, the PRC will expect us culturally to subordinate 

our individual interests to the needs of our bilateral “group.” Even the appearance of 

the subordination of our interests to our bilateral group will be satisfactory in their eyes. 

Additionally, we must avoid employing confrontational tactics and espousing egalitarian 

virtues as these create a negative environment during negotiations and detract from 

the interdependent social context that their culture automatically tries to create within 

interpersonal relationships. 
13

Egalitarian versus Hierarchical. 

Marxism has not erased thousands of years of cultural infl uences, and hierarchy 

continues to exist socially and politically. People of the PRC consider themselves 

culturally superior to others even at the lowest level of their social order. However, they 

can accept our being culturally equal to them as long as we are willing to play along. 

Alluding to cultural superiority over them will alienate them immediately. Attempting 

to embarrass them culturally by comparing them to others or facing them with world 

opinion will amount to the same thing; painting them as culturally inferior. However, 

regional comparison is another matter. This would leverage cultural tensions that have 

existed among the NEA players for thousands of years. Although they all enjoy a certain 

amount of shared cultural identity, they are at odds with each other in terms of social 

cultural primacy. A comparison of one to another (e.g., the PRC to Japan), where Japan 

is seen in a more favorable light by other members of the world, consistently will invoke 

a need for the PRC to exceed Japanese accomplishments so as to subordinate them 

culturally. Where feasible, subtle comparisons of the PRC’s lack of accomplishments to 

the greater ones of South Korea or Japan could be very effective. Comparisons between 

the PRC and Taiwan most certainly are not recommended. 

CONCLUSION

Our strategies in dealing with the cultures of Northeast Asia must include a 

consideration of the differences in how they think, view the world, and view themselves. 

Failing to consider these differences is similar to ignoring battlefi eld intelligence prior 

to conducting combat operations; we go in blind. Without assessing the psychology 

and behavior of people from the NEA region, we have only the patterns of Western 

psychology and behavior to rely upon. As this paper has pointed out, this will not result in 

a successful strategy. The cultural operatives resident in the NEA region are well-known 

after years of study along with insights into their cultures and strategies for successfully 

interacting with them. Given the growth of the cultures of the NEA and their importance 

to both regional and world stability, it is imperative that we employ and integrate as 

much knowledge of their cultural operatives into the development and implementation 

of our NSS as possible. It is apparent that the PRC has done this for quite some time. After 

all, they and the other cultures of the NEA have joined our “western” world order and 

have proven that they know how to operate within it as well as infl uence it. Their study of 

our cultural operatives appears to be far better than ours has been. Lastly, in dealing with 

these hierarchal and ancient cultures, we should be careful in how we couch our national 

interests so that we are not hobbled before we even begin to develop and implement our 

subsequent strategies. Our values and system of governance should be promoted, but 

proclaiming our intent beforehand only incites these ancient cultures to resist all of our 

advances and infl uences as a survival refl ex. Thus, we are failing before we even begin. 
14

ENDNOTES

1. Cultural Operative: cultural factors at work within an individual that strongly infl uence personal 

and interpersonal behavior. These factors are derivative of a complex layering of language, beliefs, values, 

morals, customs, codes, rituals, and ceremonies within a person’s psyche. These factors, whether exhibited 

within an intra or intercultural setting, will govern to a large degree how any social interaction will 

progress. The strongest of these factors, generally beliefs and values, operate at both the subconscious and 

basic conscious levels to govern social and psychological behavior. Every culture has operatives that are 

similar to others, but the importance given to each is distinctly varied. 

2. The concept of measuring the worth of a decision during choice is found within Deontology (the 

study of moral necessity, duty, or obligation). Deontological theory sets forth that the concept of moral 

worth is intrinsic in human nature and an integral part of our actions. Rules Deontology is defi ned by 

formally established and accepted rules of conduct (e.g., Christian moral values, the Constitution, the Bill 

of Rights, or Federal Law). These rules then become the measure against which moral worth is judged 

during a choice and subsequent to an action. However, moral philosophers such as Immanuel Kant stated 

that in determining or measuring moral worth, moral considerations in themselves are the conclusive 

reasons for guiding behavior or actions. Kant stressed that the test of moral worth rested upon the intent 

to meet one’s moral obligations (duty) and did not require any reference to the consequences that a choice 

may have caused. The intent behind the choice, if morally based, was the true measure of the worth of the 

choice regardless of the consequences. More information on this subject may be obtained at: 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral;

http://www.angelfi re.com/md2/timewarp/ross.html;

http://www.acton.org/publicat/randl/liberal.php?id=330;

http://www.routledge-ny.com/ethics/entries/deontology.pdf;

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/d2.htm#deon.

3. Jacque Segars Behrens and William F. Bennet, Sr., eds., Nancy M. Hood, Tech Ed., Looking Forward, 

Looking Backward, Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University, 1986, quoted in Esther Kuntjara, “East is East, 

West is West, and the Twain Shall Meet,” available from http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/8229/

eiewiwattsm.html, Internet, accessed on December 9, 2003.

4. Seymour Epstein, “Cognitive-Experiential Self-theory,” available from http://www.wheaton.edu/

psychology/faculty/mrm/Documents/Talks/APU/Talk%203%20PowerPoint.pdf psychology/faculty/mrm/Documents/Talks/APU/Talk%203%20PowerPoint.pdf, Internet, accessed on February , Internet, accessed on February 

14, 2004.

5. Nancy Harper, Human Communication Theory: The History of a Paradigm, Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden 

Book Company, 1979.

6. John C. Condon and Fathi S. Yousef, An Introduction to Intercultural Communication, New York: 

Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986.

7. Esther Kuntjara, “Intercultural Communication in High Contextual Cultures,” 1995; available from 

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/8229/ icihcc.html, Internet, accessed on December 9, 2003.

8. Ibid.

9. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Summer 1993, available from http://

www.alamut.com/subj/economics/misc/clash.html, Internet, accessed on December 9, 2003.

10. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The 

White House, September 2002.

11. Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, September 1998, available from http://

www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Book_titles.htm, Internet, accessed on December 4, 2003.