Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter

Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 04-1382

INGRID CRUZ RAMOS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JO ANNE BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Selya, Lynch and Lipez,

Circuit Judges.

Salvador Medina De La Cruz on brief for appellant.

H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Lisa E. Bhatia, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, and Karen B. Burzycki, Assistant Regional Counsel,

Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.

January 11, 2005
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Per Curiam. Claimant Ingrid Cruz Ramos appeals from a

decision of the district court upholding the Commissioner's denial

of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social

Security Act. After carefully reviewing the briefs and record, we

affirm the Commissioner's decision. 

On appeal, appellant argues that it was error for the

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to apply the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines (the "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2,

in light of the evidence of her nonexertional impairment.

Appellant also argues that the Commissioner failed to demonstrate

through particularized proof that appellant was capable of

performing jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national

economy.

We conclude that there is ample support in the record for

the ALJ's determination that appellant's mental impairment did not

significantly affect her ability to perform the full range of jobs

at the relevant exertional level. Although appellant cites

treating source evaluations in support of her contention that her

mental condition significantly limited her ability to function in

a work setting, the record contains substantial countervailing

evidence. While the evidence shows that appellant was consistently

diagnosed with severe depression, she was treated conservatively,

demonstrated no suicidal or homicidal thinking, and there is no

record of any hospitalization for that condition. Examination
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notes consistently indicate that appellant was alert, that she

demonstrated fair judgment, and that her orientation, intellect,

insight, and memory were adequate. The state agency consultative

examining psychiatrist noted that, although appellant's flow of

thought was slow, it was logical, coherent, and relevant. In

addition, appellant herself reported that she got along well with

co-workers and supervisors while she was working. The nonexamining state agency psychiatrist and psychologist concluded,

based on their review of the medical evidence, that appellant was

capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple and

detailed instructions, could sustain attention and concentration

for at least two-hour periods, and could complete a normal workday

and work-week. Accordingly, the non-examining physicians opined

that appellant's mental impairment did not significantly affect her

residual functional capacity ("RFC"). These assessments and the

reports of the consultative examining physicians provide

substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination. See

Berrios Lopez v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 951 F.2d 427,

431-32 (1st Cir. 1991); Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 373 (1st

Cir. 1985). 

To the extent appellant contends that her treating

psychiatrist's opinion was entitled to controlling weight, her

argument fails because the treating physician's opinion is

inconsistent with the bulk of the medical evidence and is not
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supported by any progress notes or clinical or laboratory findings.

The ALJ was justified in according the treating psychiatrist's

report little weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). To t h e

extent appellant suggests that the ALJ should have obtained the

testimony of a medical expert to resolve any apparent conflicts

between the treating physicians' assessments and the opinions of

the state agency physicians, her argument is unavailing because RFC

is not a medical assessment, but is instead an administrative

finding reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).

Moreover, as discussed above, it was appropriate for the ALJ to

rely on the reports of the consultative and non-examining

physicians in assessing appellant's RFC. See Evangelista v.

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir.

1987) (ALJ may piece together relevant medical facts from the

findings and opinions of multiple physicians). Since the

consultative and non-examining physicians concluded that appellant

suffered from mild limitations at most, the ALJ's RFC determination

appears to be sufficiently supported by the record.

Having determined that the ALJ's finding that appellant's

RFC was not significantly affected by nonexertional limitations, it

is apparent that application of the Grid was appropriate and that

no 'particularized proof' of appellant's specific vocational

capabilities or other vocational evidence was required. See Ortiz,

890 F.2d at 524 (reliance on Grid appropriate if nonexertional
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limitation reduces claimant's occupational base only marginally);

Lugo, 794 F.2d at 17 (similar). Accordingly, in light of

appellant's age, education, and past work experience, the ALJ

properly found that Medical-Vocational Rule 203.19 directed a

finding that appellant was not disabled. Affirmed. See 1s t

Cir. R. 27(c).