F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v.

A R M A N D O C A B R E R A -P E R E Z , Defendant-Appellant

. No. 13-50148

D.C. No. 3:11-cr-03248-B TM-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California B arry T. Moskowitz , District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted March 6, 2014—Pasadena, California

F iled May

9, 2014

B efore: J ay

S. B y b ee, Carlos T. B ea, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e B eaU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 2

SUMMARY *

Crim inal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion
to dismiss an indictment charg ing attempted e n try a fter deportation.

The panel held that the d istrict c o u r t d id not err in apply ing the modified categ orical app r o a c h – based on the direct complaint, the plea ag reement, and the transcript of the plea colloquy – to conclude that the defendant’s conviction for ag g ravated assault, under Ariz o na Revised Statutes § 13- 1203(A)(2) and § 13-1204(A)(2 )

, co nstitutes a “crime o f violence” u nder the I mmig ration and Nation a l i t y A ct § 1 0 1(a)(43) and 18 U.S.C. § 16, and th a t t h e defendant therefore suffered no prejudice from the immig ration judg e’s alleg ed f a i l u re to advise him of his potential elig ibility for voluntary departure.

COUNSEL

Knut S. J ohnson, San Dieg o, California, for Defend a n tAppellant.

L aura E. Duffy

, United States Attorney
, B ruce R

. Castetter and J ill L

. B urkhardt, Assistant U nited States Attorney s, San Dieg o, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 3

OP INION

B EA, Circuit J udg e:

This case r equires us to determine whether the crime o f
ag g r avated assault, under Ariz ona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1203(A)(2) a nd § 13-1204(A)(2), constitutes

a “crime of violence” under the I mmig ration and Nationality Act (“I .N.A.”) § 101(a)(43)(F ) and 18 U.S.C. § 16, such that

an individual convicted under those Ariz ona stat u t e s would be inelig ible for voluntary d e p arture under 8 C.F .R. § 1 2 40.26(b)(1)(i)(E). Apply in g the modified categ orical approach, we hold that Defendant-Appellant Arma n do Cabrera-Perez ’ s c onviction for ag g r avated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) a

nd § 13-1204(A)(2) constitutes s u c h

a “crime of violence.” As a result, Cabrera-Perez was not elig ible for v oluntary departure at his F ebruary 9, 2005 immig ration hearing

. According ly

, Cabrera-Perez ’s attempt to attack collaterally the deportation ord e r underly ing his illeg al reentry conviction because he was not adequately advised of the voluntary

departure remedy

fails. 1

Background

I n 2004, Cabrera-Perez w as ch a rg ed by the state o f Ariz o n a’s d irect complaint with ag g ravated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1203 and § 13-1204. Count 3 stated:

Armando Cabrera Perez

. . . , on or a bout the 26th day of October, 2003, using a h a n dg un,

a deadl y weapon or dang erous instrument,

1 W e ad d ress o th er issu es r a i s e d i n th is ap peal in a co n cu rren tly f iled

m em o ran d u m

d isp o s itio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 4

intentionally placed [ his v ictim] in reasonable
appr e h ension of imminent phy sical injury

, in violation of [ A .R.S] § 1 3-1203, 13-1204

. . . .

Count 4 stated the same b u t n a m e d a different victim. On April 2, 2004, Cabrera-Pe r ez e x ecuted a plea ag reement in which he “ag ree[ d] to p lead g uilty to: Counts 3 and 4 ” of the direct c o mplaint. Two day s later, at his chang e o f plea hearing

, the s t ate trial court confirmed that Cabrera-Perez intended to plead g uilty to Counts 3 and 4
, as described in the plea a g reement. As to the factual basis f o r the plea, CabreraPerez ’ s attorney

stated:

On O c tober 2 6th, 2 003

. . . [ Cabrera-Perez ] had a g un and he fired the weapon in the
g eneral vicinity of [ the two victims]

, and they were, in fact, afraid for their safety

.

The court a ccepted Cabrera-Perez ’s g uilty plea “ t o the charg es as set forth in the plea ag reement” and sentenced him to twelve months’ incarceration and four y ears of probation. On May 4, 2004, the court suspended the i m p o s i t i o n of the
sentenc e and placed Cabrera-Perez on probation for four
y ears.

On J anuary 26, 2005, the I mmig ration and Naturaliz ation Service issued Cabrera-Perez a N otice to Appear, w h ich notice charg e d that Cabrera-Perez was subject to removal as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted

or parole d

, ” I .N.A. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), and as an “alien w ho has been convicted of

. . . a crime involving moral turpitude,” I .N

. A

. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I ). On F ebruary 9, 2005, CabreraPerez app e a r ed at his immig r ation hearing

. W h en the Im m i g r a t i o n J u d ge ( “ IJ ” ) a d d r e s s e d C a b r e r a

- P e r e zU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 5

individually

, Cabrera-Perez admitted that he had entered the U.S. illeg ally in November 2003 and that he was convicted in 2004 for ag g ravated assault. Cabrera-Perez ag reed that both of these admissions wer e “correct reasons [ for him] to be removed from the United States.” The I J then stated:

B a sed on y our testimo n y a n d review of the
st atute I find that each of the separate components of the a g g ravated assault statute to be a crime involving moral tu rpitude. B a sed o n the felony desig nation I find y ou a re subject to be removed. W h at country do y ou want to be deported to?

Cabrera-Perez responded, “Mex ico.”

The I J confirmed that Cabrera-Per e z had “seven dollars for v o luntary departure,” and then asked, “Do y o u w ant y our

case postponed for voluntary departure o r do y o u want the

case ended today ? ” Cabrera-Perez responded, “End it today

. ” The I J then stated, “You are not elig ible to be in the United States based on the facts of y ou r c ase, v oluntary return was

ex p lained in y our p resence.

. . . I t is o rdered that y ou are to leave the United States to Mex ico

. . . .” Cabrera-Perez stated that he understood this decision and that he w aived his rig ht
to file an ap p e a l

. The I J sig n e d an order which stated that Cabrera-Perez “was ordered removed f rom the U nited States
to Mex ico.” That same d ay , Cabrera-Perez was d e p o r t e d to Mex ico.

On May 8, 2011, Cabrera-Perez attempted to reenter the United States at the San Y sidro Port o f Entry

. Cabrera-Perez presented a photo co p y of a birth certificate and a California identification card, both bear i n g t he name of anotherU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 6

individual, to the Customs and B order Pro t e c t i on (“CB P”) Officer. The CB P officer noted that Cabrera-Perez did n o t appear to be the person in the photog raph on the identification card, and escorted Cabrera-Perez to the Port Enfor c e ment Team inspection area, wh e re a n other officer took CabreraPerez ’ s fing erprint and determined his true identity

.

On J uly 27, 2011, the g overnment indicted Cabrera-Perez

on a sing le count of attempted entry after deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1 326(a) and (b). The g overnment filed

a superseding indictment on Aug ust 3, 2011, a d d i n g o ne count of ag g ravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Two day s later, Cabrera-Perez pleaded not g uilty

.

On September 12, 2 011, Cabrera-Perez filed a motion to dismiss the superseding ind ictment, claiming that the underly ing removal order was invalid because the I J failed to adequately advise him o f his elig ibility for voluntary departure during the removal p roceedin gs in 2 005. 2 The district court ag reed with the g o vernment that Cabrera-Perez “suffered no prejudice from the I J ’ s alleg ed failure to advise [ Cabrera-Perez ] of h is elig ibility f o r voluntary departure because [ Cabrera-Perez ’s] prior Ari zona felony convictions [ for a g g ravated assault u nder A.R.S. § 13-1203 and § 1 3

- 1 2 0 4 ] rendered him inelig ible for such relief,” a s those convictions constituted “crime[ s] of violence ” within the meaning o f I .N.A. § 101(a)(43)(F ) and 18 U.S.C. § 16. As a

2 Cab rera- P erez also arg u ed t ha t t h e su b stan ce o f th e rem o v al
p ro ceed in g s estab lish ed t h at h e w as in f

act v o lu n tarily d ep arted

, rat h e r th an rem o ve d fro m th e U.S. in 2 0 0 5

. T h e d istrict co u rt rej ected th is
arg u m en t “ [g ]iv en th e u n d isp u ted ex i s t e n c e o f a sig n ed rem o v al o rd er.” T h e j u ry also d eterm in ed th at “ th e g o v ern m en t h a[d ] pro v ed b ey o n d a

reaso n ab le d o u

b t t h at [Cab rera- P erez] w as d ep o rted an d rem o v ed f ro m th e Un i ted States o n

Feb ru ary 9 , 2 0 05 .”U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 7

result, the d istrict court denied Cab r e r a -Perez ’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment.

After a four day trial, o n D ecember 2, 2011, the jury returned g

uilty verdicts on both the illeg al reentry count and the identity theft count. On March 18, 2013, the district court held a sentencing hearing

. The district court g ranted CabreraPerez a downward variance of 4 0 months from the low end o f the Sente n cing Guidelines rang e, r esulting in a 7 0 month
sentence o n the illeg a l r eentry count. I n addition, the district
court sentenced Cabrera-Perez to a consecutive 24 months for the identity theft count, resulting in a total sentence o f 94 months, to be f

ol l o w e d by three y e ars of supervised release.

Standard of

Review

This Court r eviews d

e novo the denial o f a motion to dismiss an 8 U.S.C. § 1 326 indictmen t w h en the motion to dismiss is b ased on alleg ed d ue process defects i n t h e underly ing deportation proceeding

. United States v. Ramos
, 623 F .3d 672, 679–80 (9th Cir. 2010).

Analysis

A defendant charg ed with illeg al reentry in violation o f 8 U.S.C. § 1 326 may collaterally a ttack hi s u n d e rly ing deportation o rder if the defendant demonstrates that: “(1) the alien ex hausted any administrative remedies tha t may have been availabl e to seek relief ag ainst the order; ( 2 ) the deportation proceeding s at w hich the order was i s s u ed improperly deprived the a lien o f the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the en t ry of the order was fundamentally

un fa ir.” 8 U .S.C. § 1326(d). “F undamental unfairness” requires (1) a due process violation in removal proceedi n g sU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 8

and (2) p rejudice as a result of the due process violation. United States v. M

oriel-Luna

, 585 F .3d 1 191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009). B efore his trial, Cabrera-Perez soug ht to attack collaterally his underl y ing deportation order by filing a motion to d ismiss the sup e r s e ding indictment, claiming that the underly ing removal order was i nvalid because the I J failed to adequately advise h im o f his elig ibility for voluntary departure during the remova l p roceeding s in 2005. I n its order den y i n g Cabrera-Perez ’s motion, the district court concluded that “even if the I J failed to a dvise [ Cabrera-Perez ] of his rig ht to voluntary removal, there was no prejudice” b ecause Cabrera-Perez “committed a ‘ crime of v iolenc e ’ within the meaning of Section 101(a)(43)(F ) of the I .N.A. a nd [ was therefore] inelig ible for voluntary removal.” On appeal, Cabrera-Perez arg ues that the dist r i c t c ourt erred in its conclusion that his prior conviction f or ag g ravated assault from 2004 constituted a “crime of violence.”

8 C.F .R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(E) provides t h a t “[ a] n alien
may be g ranted voluntary departure b y an immig ration judg e

. . . o n l y i f the alien

. . . [ h] as not been convicted of a crime described in [ I .N.A.] section 101(a) ( 4 3 )

. . . .” Section 1 01(a)(43) includes “crime[ s] of violence (as defin e d i n section 16 of Title 18
, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [ is] a t least o ne y ear

. ” I

. N

. A

. § 101(a)(43)(F )

. I n turn, 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a “crime of violence” as:

(a) an offense that h a s an element of the use, attempted u se, or threatened use of phy sical force ag ainst t h e person or property o f another, orU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 9

(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substant i a l risk that phy sical f orce ag ainst the person or p r o perty of another may be used in the c o u rse o f committing the offense.

The statute under which Cabrera-Perez was convicted, A.R.S. § 13-1203, provides:

A. A person commits assault by :

1. I ntentionally

, know i n g ly or recklessly causing any phy sical injury to another person;

or

2. I ntentionally placing another person in reasonable ap p r e h e n s i o n o f i m minent phy sical injury ; or

3

. K nowing ly touching another person wit h the intent to injure, insult o r p r o v oke such
person.

A.R.S. § 13-1204(A) provides that a “ p e rson c ommits
ag g r avated assault if the person commits assault as prescribed by § 1 3 -1203 under any of the following circumstances: . .

. (2) I f the person uses a d eadly weapon or dang erous instrument.”

I n determining whether Cabrera-Perez ’s conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1203 and § 1 3

- 1 204 constituted a “crime o f violence,” the district c o u rt correctly employ ed the two-part analy sis applicable to “divisible statutes,” as described by the Supreme Court in Descamps v

. United S tates , 133 S. Ct. 2276U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 10

(2013). 3 F irst, t h e district c ourt determined that under the categ orical approach, “A.R.S. § 13-1203 in its entirety is not categ orically a ‘crime of violence’ because subpart (A)(1) can be violated with a mens rea of ‘recklessness,’ a nd a ‘crime o f violence’ under 18 U.S.C. § 16 requires a mens rea of at least

ex treme recklessnesss.” See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzalez

, 466 F .3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[ N] either recklessness

nor g ross neg lig ence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that

a conviction is for a crime o f violence under [ 18 U.S.C.] § 16.”). B oth parties ag ree with the district court’s conclusion in this respect.

Second, the district court applied the modified categ orical approach, under which co u r t s “consult a limited class o f documents[ 4 ]

. . . t o determine which alternative [ element] formed the basis of the de fendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2 281. “T h e c o u r t can then

. . . compare the e lements of the crime o f con viction (including the alternative element used in the case) with the elements o f the g eneric crime.” Id. B oth parties ag ree that the d i s t rict
court was correct to apply the modified categ orical approach. The parties, however, d isag ree about the validit y of the district court’s conclusion that u nder the modified categ orical approach Cabrera-Perez ’ s crimes of convicti o n constituted “crimes of violence.”

3 A “ d iv isib le statu te

. . . sets o u t o n e or m ore elem en ts o f th e o f f en se in th e altern ativ e.” Desca mp s , 1 3 3 S. C t. at 2 28 1 (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s

o m itted ).

4 T h ese d o cu m en ts in clu d e “ th e statu to ry def i n itio n , ch arg in g d o cu m en t,

w ritten p lea ag reem en t, tran scrip t of p lea co llo q u y , an d an y e x p licit f actu al f in d in g b y t h e trial j u d g e to w h ich [th e d ef

en d an t] assen ted .” Un ited S ta tes v. Vid

a l , 5 0 4 F.3 d 1 0 7 2, 1 0 8 6 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 11

I n r eaching this conclusion, the district court considere d three d ocuments. F irst, the district court looked at the direct complaint which c h a rg ed Cabrera-Perez with ag g ravated assault. Counts 3 and 4 of the direct complaint both stated:

Armando Cabrera Perez

. . . using a handg un,

a deadl y weapon or dang erous instrument, intentionally p laced [ the v ictim] in reasonable apprehension of i m minent phy sical injury

, in violation of [ A.R.S.] § 13-1203, 13-1204

. . . .

The dis t r i ct court noted that Counts 3 and 4 “track the lang u ag e” of § 13-1203(A)(2) (“[ i] ntentionally placing another p e rson in reasonable apprehension of imminent phy sical injury ”) and § 13-1204(A)(2) (use of “a deadly
weapon or other d ang erous instrument”). Second, the district
court looked a t Cabrera-Perez ’s p lea ag reement, in which he
ag reed to plead g uilty to Counts 3 and 4 from the direct complaint. Third, the district court looked at the ch a n g e o f
p l e a colloquy at w hich Cabrera-Perez pleaded g uilty to Counts 3 and 4, and Cabrera-Perez ’s attorney a d opted the factual basis for the plea.

B a sed on this record of conv i c t i on, the district court determined that Cabrera-Perez was convicted u n d e r subpart (A)(2) of A.R.S. § 13- 1 2 0 3 and subpart (A)(2) of A .R.S. § 13-1204. F inally

, the district court concluded that CabreraPerez comm i t t e d a “crime of violence” because “the Ninth Circuit has held that convictions u nder subpart (A)(2) o f § 13- 1203 and subpart (A)(2) of § 13-1204 satisfy both a lternative
prong s of the test f

or a ‘crime of violence’ un d e r 1 8 U .S.C. § 16.” See United States v

. Ceron-Sanchez

, 222 F .3d 1169, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2 000), overruled on o t h er g rounds b y Fernandez-Ruiz , 466 F .3d at 1125 n.6.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 12

On appeal, Cabrera-Perez first claims tha t the record o f conviction does not indicate that h e was c on victed under subpart (A)(2) of § 13-1203 and subpart (A)(2) of § 13-1204. He a rg ues that the p lea ag re em ent did n o t state under which subpart of these statutes he ag reed to plead g uilty

. However,

as the district court correctly noted, Counts 3 a nd 4 o f t he direct complaint track the lang uag e of subpart (A)(2) of § 13- 1203 and subpart (A)(2) of § 13-1 2 0 4 word-for-word. Moreover, i n his plea ag reement, Cabrera-Perez ag reed to plead g uilty to Counts 3 and 4 in the direct com p l a i n t. 5 Therefore, apply ing the modifi e d categ orical approach, we conclud e t hat Cabrera-Perez was c onvicted under subpart (A)(2) of A. R

. S

. § 13-1203 and subpart (A)(2) of A .R.S. § 13-1204. 6

Second, Cabrera-Perez asse rts that “this Circuit [ has] repeatedly h eld that c h a

r g ing documents [ such as t h e direct

5 T h e p l ea ag reem en t s t ated o n l y th at Cab rera- P erez ag reed to p lead
g u ilty to “ Co u n ts 3 an d 4 .” T h e p lea ag reem en t d id n o t e x p licitly ref ere nc e t h e d irect co m

plain t. Ho w ev er, C ab rera- P erez d oes n ot arg u e

o n ap p eal th at th e ref

eren ce to “ Co u n ts 3 an d 4 ” in th e p lea ag reem en t w as a ref eren ce to ch arg es o t

h er th an in th e d irect co m

p lain t

.

6 Cab rera- P erez also arg u es th at “ [t]h e c h a n ge o f p lea co llo q u y w as

co m pletely d ev o id o f ev id en ce [th at] Mr. Cab rera- P erez[] ad m itted th at h e in ten d ed to cau s e f

ear in o t h ers w h en h e f ired a w eap o n in th e g en eral

v icin ity of h is n eig h

b o rs.” (em

p h asis ad d ed ). C ab rera- P erez su g g ests th at th e d istrict co u rt th eref

ore sh o u ld n o t h av e co n clu d ed t h a t h e w as

co n v icted u n d er § 1 3

- 1 2 0 3 (A )(2 ), w h ich req u ires in ten tio n al actio n

. W h ile Cab rera- P erez is co rrect th at t h e f actu al b a s i s ad o p ted b y h is

co u n sel at th e ch an g e o f p l ea co l lo q u y w as “ d ev o id o f ev id en ce” reg ard in g Cab rera- Perez’ s in ten t, Co u n ts 3 an d 4 of th e d i rect co m p lain t, to w

h ich Cab rera- Perez ag reed to p lead g u i lty

, s tated th at Cab rera- Perez

“ i n t en tio na lly placed [h is v i c t i m s ] i n r e a so n ab le ap p reh en sio n o f im m in en t p h y sical in

j u ry .” T h eref

o re, th is arg u m en t f

ails.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 13

complaint here] a r e insufficient alone to prove the facts to which [ a defendant] [ h as] a dmitted.” (third alteration i n

o r i g inal) (internal q

uotation marks omitted). H owever, i n United States v. V

idal

, c i t e d by Cabrera-Perez

, the court rejected the use of Vidal ’ s charg ing documents to prove the facts to which he admitted because the record did not c ontain “a transcript of Vidal’s chang e of plea hearing or any r ecord[ ] of the terms of his plea barg ain.” 504 F .3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007). B y contrast, here, we have: (1) th e direct complaint, (2) the plea a g reemen t , and (3) the transcript o f the chang e of plea colloquy

. And, as the g overnment a rg u es, “each step in [ Cabrera-Perez ’s] process of c onviction refer[ red] back t o C o u n t s 3 and 4 of the [ direct complaint]

, which [ count s ] b y their c harg ing lang uag e alleg e” that Cabrera-Perez “intentionally placed [ his victims] in reasonable apprehension of imminent phy sical injury

. ” Therefore, b ecause the complaint is “‘a charg ing document that narrows the charg e to g eneric li m i t s , ’ the fact that [ Cabrera-Perez ] pleaded g uilty to th[ e se] charg e[ s] establishes that he was convicted of [the ge n e r ic offense]

. ” United States v

. Rivera
, 658 F .3d 1 073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2 011) (citation omitted).

F inally

, Cabrera-Perez takes issue with the d istrict court’s reliance on Ceron-Sanchez f o r the proposition that “convictions under subpart ( A )(2) of § 13-1203 and subpart (A)(2) of § 13-1204 satisfy both alternative prong s of the test for a ‘ crime of v i o l e n c e ’ under 18 U .S.C. § 16.” I n CeronSanchez

, 7 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a conviction

7 Cero n

- S an ch ez p lead ed g u ilty to attem p ted ag g rav ated assau l t

w i th a d e ad ly w eap o n in v io latio n o f A .R.S. § 13

- 12 0 4 (A )(2 ). A f ter Cero n

San ch ez w as released f

ro m p riso n , h e w as dep o rt e d

. Cero n

- San ch ez retu rn ed to th e Un ited States, w as arrested

, an d w as ch arg ed w ith illeg alU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 14

under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A) and § 1 3-1204(A)(2) constituted

a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16. 222 F .3d at 1172. The court c o n c l uded that e a ch of A.R.S. §§ 13- 1203(A)(1), (A)(2), and (A)(3)

requires either the use, att empted use, o r th reatened use of force a g ainst the person o f another, and by incorporation, a conviction under [ A.R.S.] § 13-1204(A)(2) meets t h e definition of crime of violence s e t o ut in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).

Id. at 1173. 8

reen try u n d er 8 U.S.C. § 1 3 2 6

. He p lead ed g u ilty

, an d

, at sen t en cin g , th e d istrict co u rt “ in c r e a sed Cero n

- San ch ez’ s o f f en se lev el b y 1 6 u n der U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1 .2 (b )(1 )(A ) w h ich ap p l ies if th e d ef

en d an t prev i o u sly w as d ep o rted af

ter a crim in al co n v ictio n f o r an ag g rav ated f

elo n y ,” as d ef

in ed in I.N.A

. § 1 01 (a)(4 3 ). 2 2 2 F.3 d at 1 1 7 1

. Un d er su b sectio n (F) o f I.N.A § 1 0 1 (a)(4 3 )—th e sam e pro v isio n a t i ssu e in th e in s tan t case—th e term “a g g rav ated f

elo n y ” in clu d es a “ crim e o f v io len ce” as d ef in ed b y 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 6

. On ap peal, Cero n

- San ch ez arg u ed th at h i s a t t e m pted
ag g rav ated assau lt co n

v ictio n d id n o t co n stitu

t e a “ crim e o f v i o len ce” b ecau se th at co n v ictio n “ w as b ased o n reck less co n d u ct an d

, th eref o re, [d id ] n o t co n stitu

te a crim e o f

v io len ce f

o r ag g rav ated f

elo n y p u rp o ses.” Id

. at 1 1 72

. A

p p ly in g t h e categ o rical ap p ro ach

, th e Nin th Circu it af f irm ed th e d istrict co u rt, co n clu d in g th at “ Cero n

- San ch ez’ s statu te o f co n v ictio n reach es o n ly co n d u ct th at w ou ld co n stitu te a crim e o f v io len ce.” I d

. a t 1 1 7 3

.

8 T h e co u rt also co n clu d ed th at a “ co n v ictio n u n d e r [ A. R

. S .] § 13

- 1 2 0 4 (A )(2 ) [] satisf

ies th e altern ativ e def

i n itio n o f a crim e o f v io l en ce set

o u t in 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 (b ),” w h i ch co v ers f

elo n y co n v ictio n s w

h ich b y th eir

n atu re “i n v o l v e [ ] a su

b stan tial risk t

h at p h y sical f

o rce

. . . m ay b e u s ed
ag ain st th e p erso n o r p ro p erty o f an o th er.” Id

. (th ird alteratio n in o rig in al) (in t ern al q u o tatio n

m ark s o m i tted ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 15

Cabrera-Perez a

rg ues that Ceron-Sanchez does not support the proposition that A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) and § 13- 1204(A)(2) constitute “crimes of violence” in lig ht of our

more recent en banc opinion in Fernandez-Ruiz. Ho wever, whi le the en banc court in Fernandez-Ruiz did o verrule Ceron-Sanc h ez , “the specific focus o f [ the analy sis in Fernandez-Ruiz was] whether the offense defined in [ A.R.S.] § 13-1203(A)(1) [ as o p posed to § 13-1203(A )(2)] [ w as] a crime of v i o l e nce under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).” 466 F .3d at 1125. I ndeed, the F

ernandez-Ruiz court stated that “ because

we ultimately c onclude that not all o f the conduct p roscribed by [ A.R.S.] § 13-1203(A)(1) meets the definition of a crime of violence, we d o not consider [ A.R.S.] § 13

- 1 2 03(A)(2).” Id. at 1125 n.6.

As a result, the reasoning a p p lied by the Ceron-Sanchez
court to conclude that a

violation of A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) constitutes a “crime o f violence” is still valid. I n p articular, A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) satisfies the first prong of 18 U .S.C. § 16 because “[ i] ntentionally placing another p e rs o n in reasonable a

pprehension of imminent p h y s i c a l i n j u r y , ” A

. R

. S. § 13-1203(A)(2), has as an e lemen t “the use, attempted u se,

or threatened use of phy sical f orce ag ains t the person o r property of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 16( a)

. Unlike in Fernandez-Ruiz

, w h e r e the court determined that not all conduct proscribed by A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1) constituted a “crime o f v iolence” under 1 8 U.S.C. § 16(a) because subsection (A)(1) included “reckless” conduct, s u bsection (A)(2) prosc r i b e s o nly intentional conduct. 466 F .3d 1132. W e therefore hold that convictions u nder A.R.S. § 13- 1203(A)(2), and con v ictions under A .R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2)

w h i ch incorporate A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2), c o n s t i t u t e “ c r i m e s of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A B R E R A -P E R E Z 16

U l t imately

, the district court d id not err in apply ing th e modified cat e g orical approach to conclude that CabreraPerez ’ s crimes of conviction constituted “crimes o f violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, s u ch that Cabrera-Perez suffered no p rejudice f

r om the I J ’s alleg ed failure to advise Cab r e r a

Perez of his potential elig ibility for voluntary departure. W e therefore affirm the district court in this respect.

Conclusion

F or the foreg oi n g reasons, we AF F IRM the district court’s d e n ial of Cabrera-Perez ’s motion to dismiss the indictment.