VIETNAM STUDIES 

FIELD ARTILLERY, 

1954-1973 

by 

Major General David Ewing Ott 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.G., 1995 
First Printed 1975-CMH rub 90-12 

For sale by the U.S. eO\'emment Priming Office 

Supcrinlcndclll ofDocumcllts, Mail Stol>: $SOP. Washington, D.C. 20402 
Foreword 

The United States Army met an unusually complex challenge 

in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the Army 

fought in sllpport of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free of 

outside coercion. In addition to the lIsual problems of waging 

armed conAict, the assignment in Southeast Asia required sllperim. 

posing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modern army upon 

an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands 

covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the 

basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustrations 

of antig"uerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns 

against well-trained and determined regular units. 

It is still necessary for the Army to continue to prepare for 

other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history 

never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from 

trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army 

nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shoTlcomings no less than its achievemenLS. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories 

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sought a fOTum whereby SOIne of the morc 

salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior 

officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still 

carry a heavy burden of day-to·day responsibilities have prepared a 

series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in 

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the 

same time contributing to the historical record and providing the 

American public with an interim report on the performance of men 

and officers who have responded, as others have through our history, 

to exacting and trying demands. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were 

taking place in the present. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on off.cial 

records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

iii 
secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a [ully documented 

account with bibliography is filerl with the {l.S. Army Center of 

Military History. 

The qualifications of Major General David Ewing Ott to write 

Field A1"lille1Y, 1954- 1973, are considerable. He served in combat 

with field artillery units in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. In 

World '~ar II he was a forward observer with the 868th Field 

Artillery Batlalion of the 65th Infantry Division, and during the 

Korean War he WetS executive officer and operations officer of the 

1i4th Field Artillery Battalion o[ the 25th Infantry Division. In 

Vietnam he served as execntive officer of II Field Force Artillery in 

1966 and as commander of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery 

in 1967. Other assignments that make him particularly qualified to 

write the monograph include instructor of field artillery gunnery 

at the Field Artillery School from 1948 to 1951; 5--3, 82d Airborne 

Division Arti ll ery, 1957 to 1959; commander of the 2d Howitzer 

Battalion of the 83d Artillery from 1959 to 1960; Chief, Artill ery 

Llranch, Officer Personnel Directorate, Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army; and Director, Vietnam Task Force, 

International Security Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

De[ense. General Ott is presently the Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Field Artillery Center, and Commandant, U.S. Army Field 

Artill ery School, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He is thus the Army's 

senior field artil leryman. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 March 1975 

iv 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

This monograph will illuminate some of the more important 

activities-with attendant problems. shortcomings. and achievements-of the U _So Army Field Artillery in Vietnam. The wide 

variations in terrain. supported forces. density of cannon. friendly 

population. and enemy activity which prevailed throughout South 

Vietnam tend to make every (tction and every locale singular. 

Though based large ly upon documents of an historical nature 

and organized in a generally chronological manner. this study does 

not purport to provide the precise detail of history. Its purpose is to 

present an objective review of the near past in order to assure 

current awareness. on the part of the Army. of the lessons we should 

have learned and to foster the positive consideration of those lessons 

in the formulation of appropriate operational concepts. My hope is 

that this monograph will give the reader an insight into the immense complexity of our operations in Vietnam. I believe it cannot 

hel p but reflect also the unsurpassed professional ism of the junior 

officers and noncommissioned officers of the Field Artillery and the 

outstanding morale and esprit de corps of the young citizen-soldiers 

with whom they served. 

I would like to express my appreciation to the following people 

who assisted in this effort: 

Major General Roderick Wetherill. as commandant of the Field 

Artillery School. authored the monograph from November 1972 

until his retirement in May 1973. when authorship was transferred 

to me. To General Wetherill go my sincere thanks for getting this 

project off the ground. Under his direction the initial outline was 

developed. a research team formed. and initial research conducted. 

Major General Gordon Sumner. Jr .• presently with the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). 

must be credited with conceiving this project and finding support 

for its accomplishment. 

Major Genera l W. D. Crittenberger. Jr.. presently Deputy 

Director. Plans and Policy Directorate. J-5. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

sponsored this project and helped to lay the initial groundwork. 

During the research and writing of the monograph his advice. based 

on his experiences as II Field Force Artillery commander in Vietnam, has been invaluable. 

Brigadier General Robert J. Koch. assistant commandant of the 

v 
Ficld Artillery School, has been my principal assistant in this effort 

(as he was for General Wetherill before me). He has helped me to 

steer the activities of all those who participated in producing the 

monogTaph. Beyond that, he has provided valuable input to the 

monograph based on his experiences as the commander of the 23d 

Artillery Group and the XXIV Corps Artillery in Vietnam. 

Colonel Vincent G. Oberg, director of the Army-Wide Training 

Support Department of the Field Artillery School, with the help of 

two of his division chiefs, Lieutenant Colonels Ray K. Casteel and 

Carl W. Sullinger, co-ordinated this effort within the Field Artillery 

School. He developed a plan of work, sought out source material , 

and formed the monograph research team. 

The monograph research team consisted of officers and clerks 

assigned to various field artillery activities on post and of officers 

who had recelllly completed the field artil lery officer advance course 

and were on casual, or ·'blackbird," status awa iting further assignment. The monograph team must be credited with accomplishing 

the leg work-researching the topic and expanding into more detail the general guidance they received. Members of the team were 

Lieutenant Colonel Calvin DeWitt III, Major Bob W. Garner, 

Major Ronald N. Funderburk, Major Craig H. Mandeville, Captain Richard L. Murphy, Captain Fred R. Franzoni, Captain Richard H. Reed, Captain Nicholas A. Radvanczy, First Lieutenant 

Melvin M. Yazawa, Mrs Pamela K. Morales, and Private First 

Class C. Foster Deen. 

Last, I extend my sincere thanks to all field artillerymen who 

contributed much of the source material for the monograph either 

by relating to us their personal experiences and observations or by 

lending us their personal files. 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma 

15 March 1975 

vi 

DAVIDE. OTT 

Major General, U.S. Army 
Contents 

Chapter 

I. THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 

Geography 

The Enemy 

Political-M ilitary Considerations 

II. THE ADVISORY EFFORT, 1950- 1965 .. 

Background- Military AssiJtance Adviso,y Group, 

Pagt! 

3 

3 

7 

18 

21 

Vietnam, Organized . . . . 21 

The Field Artillery Adviser 22 

The Adviser's Challenge 24 

The Adviser Learns, Too 31 

III. IN ORDER TO WIN 38 

The Impact of Vietnam on Field Artillery 

Organizations ........ . 

Fire Support Co-ordination 

Field Artillery Weapons 

Field Artillery Mobility 

The Fire Base 

Base Camp Defense 

Riverine Artillery ...... ... .. . 

IV. THE BUILDUP (1965-1967) 

The Buildup Begins and Early Actions Around 

Saigon ......... . 

New Arrivals . . . .. ... . 

The Pleiku (Ia Dmng) Campaign . .......... .. . 

The Buildup and Major Combat Operations 

During 1966 ....... . 

The Buildup and Major Combat Operations 

During 1967 

Overview: 1965 to Pre-Tet 1968 ....... . 

V. THE HOT WAR (1968-0CTOBER 1969) 

Tet 1968 ......... . 

Khe San" 

A Shau 

Actions at Fire Bases and Lessons Learned .. 

Peak Strength and Beginning of Redeployment 

Artillery Organizations ...... . 

vii 

39 

47 

49 

51 

55 

73 

75 

81 

81 

86 

87 

96 

110 

129 

137 

137 

148 

157 

161 

167 

168 
Chapter Page 

Safety 173 

Target Acqllisition 179 

Artillery Raids 184 

Harassing ami Int erdiction Fires 187 

Civic Action 188 

VI. VIETNAMIZATlON, NOVEMBER 

1969- FEBRUARY 1973 190 

Field Artillery Assistance Programs 190 

Operations In to Cambodia . ... . 205 

Toward Vietnamese Self-Sllfficiency 215 

1972 Enemy Offensive 220 

Problems Dllring PhaJe-Down of u.s. Forces 225 

VII. AN OVERVIEW . 231 

Work To Be Done 231 

The Field Artilleryman'S Performance 236 

I DEX HI 

Charts 

No. 

I. Characteristic Sapper Organization 

2. Field Artillery Task Organization, January 1968 

3. Field Artillery Task Organization, July 1969 

Maps 

16 

170 

171 

I. Administrative Divisions, South Vietnam ....... . . . . 2 

2. Vietnam Topographic Regions 4 

3. Enemy Activity, 1954-1965 36 

4. Ia Orang Valley . . . . . . . . . 88 

5. Area of Operations: MASHER/ WHITE WING . . 99 

6. Landing Zone BIRO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 

7. Operation JUNCTION CITY, 22 February-14 May 1967 114 

8. Battle of Suoi Cut, FSB BURT . . . . . . . . . . 119 

9. Fire Support Base CUDGEL 126 

10. The Tet Offensive, 1968 . ...... .. 139 

I I. The Battle of Hue: Enemy Attack, 30-3 1 January 1968 . 140 

12. The Battle of Hue: Friendly Situation, 

24-25 February 1968 141 

13. III Corps Tactical Zone . 144 

14. orth Quang Tri Province 149 

15. Khe San h Valley 150 

16. I Corps Tactical Zone .. 158 

17. Fire Support Base MAURY I 162 

viii 
No. 

18. Fire Support Base PIKE VI 

19. FSB CROOK: Enemy Situation, Friendly Fires. 

6-7 June 1969 . . . ....... . 

20. Enemy Base Areas ... 

21. III ARVN Corps Operations . 

22. 1st Cavalry Division Operations, May-June 1970 

Diagrams 

I. MIOI 105-mm. Artillery Field Position 

2. MI02 105-mm. Emplacement . 

3. Semipermanent 105-mm. Self-Propelled Howitzer 

Emplacement ................ . 

4. Towed 155-mm. Howitzer Emplacement ...... . 

5. Self-Propelled 155-mm. Howitzer Emplacement 

6. Heavy (8-inch or 175-mm.) Artill ery Emplacement .. 

7. Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne). 320th Artillery. 

Fire Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . 

8. Artillery Box . . .. .. . ......... . 

Illustrations 

AR VN Outpost ... 

AR VN Gun Section 

155-mm. Howitzer in Tuy An District Headquarters . 

Early Movement of Artillery by Air ........... . 

CH-47 With MI02 Howitzer . . . . ..... . 

CH-54 Lifting 155-mm. Howitzer 

Fire Support Base.J. .J. CARROLL ...... . 

Star Formation . . . . . .. . ........ . 

Building Parapets . . . . . . . ...... . 

1st Battalion, 40th Field Artillery, in Position Along 

Demilitarized Zone ..... 

Typical Towed 155-mm. Position 

Battery C, 2d Battalion, 138th Field Artillery, on Hill 88 ... 

Battery D, 3d Battalion. 13th Field Artillery, at Fire Support 

Base STUART ...... . . . . ...... . 

155-mm. Howitzer Position Using Speedjack and 

Collimator . . . . . . . . . ........ . 

6,400-Mil Chart ........... . 

Artillery Hill at Pleiku 

AN f MPQ-4 Counter mortar Radar 

TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar 

30-lnch Xenon Searchlight .... 

CH-47 Emplacing Airmobile Firing Platform 

ix 

Page 

164 

183 

208 

210 

2 I I 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

121 

152 

26 

28 

33 

34 

51 

52 

53 

54 

56 

57 

57 

58 

59 

60 

62 

69 

71 

72 

74 

76 
Page 

Riverine Field Artillery Battalion Command Post 77 

Riverine Battery Position ... . . . . . . . . . 78 

Riverine Platoon Moored to Canal Bank 79 

Riverine Gun Section in Traveling Configuration 80 

105-mm. Battery Firing From Hasty Position 82 

Aerial Rocket Artillery UH-IB with XM3 Weapons 

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 

Field Force Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 

175-mm. Gun ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ..... . . 98 

CH-54 Emplacing 155-mm. Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . 102 

MI02 Firing High-Angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 

Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, in 

Position on Operation WHEELER . . . . . . . . 123 

Aerial Field Artillery Cobra in Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 

Aerial Field Artillery Cobra and Light Observation 

Helicopter ........................................ 132 

Major General David E. Ott Demonstrates FADAC 135 

1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, Fire Direction Center 176 

FADAC Computer ........ 177 

Ammunition Resupply by CH-54 187 

Formal Fire Direction Center Class for ARVN Field 

Artillerymen ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 

ARVN 155-mm. Howitzer Static Position . . . . . . . . . . 206 

ARVN 103d Field Artillery Battalion in Training . . 207 

Illustrations on front and back covers of softback edition are the work of 

Specialist 6 Jim Gardner. 

x 
FIELD AR TILLER Y 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

~ AUlOIIQ .. OUS MUNICIPALITY 

o U '0 75 100 Milts 

rl-"...I.' ",-",I-'-r,-"'--' o n !>O 15 100 1C1LOWEfEIIS 

MAP I 

I CORPS 

C,l.PIU" Sl'£Cl4l 10,,£ 
CHAPTER I 

The Vietnam Environment 

The environment of Southeast Asia, and more specifically of 

Vietnam, posed particular problems that plagued all military activities. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 

Vietnam, began the publication of a series of "'lessons learned" reports in March 1962. Lessolls LefLmed Nllmber 31 , on artillery 

organization and employment, appeared in September 1963. Observations made in this report were prophetic. Artillery must be 

organized and employed in counterinsurgency to meet new requirements, for "'there are no well defined battle areas." Indeed, 

the report of the American advisers contin ued, "The entire republic of Vietnam can be considered an area of operations." (Map 

1) Moreover, the terrain in Vietnam was such that it became a 

major concern along with the tactics and techniques of the enemy. 

The artillery, especially, must adapt to the physical environment 

because, the report concluded, even "if time to displace were 

available the road net or terrain wou ld frequently prohibit displacement." 

These early observations foreshadowed some of the fundamental problems that American forces would encounter in succeeding 

years. The Vietnam environment-the human challenge as well as 

the elemental implica tions- detennined the character of the conAict in terms of geography, the enemy, and the government of 

Vietnam. 

Geography 

The coastline of Vietnam, which extends for more than 1,200 

miles, forms an S-curve that reaches from the southern border of 

China to the tip of the Indochina peninsula. The length of the 

coastline almost equals that of the Pacific coast of the continental 

United States. The total land area of Vietnam, some 127,000 square 

miles, is approximately the same as that of New Mexico. To the 

north, the country widens irregularly to a maximum of 300 miles; 

to the south, it reaches a maximum width of 130 miles. 

Vietnam may be divided into five distinct geographic regions: 

(I) the Northern Mountains, (2) the Northern Plains, (3) the 
LAOS 

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VIETNAM 

TOPOGRAPHIC REGIONS 

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.CA 
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 5 

Central Highlands. (4) the Coastal Lowlands. and (5) the Southern Plains. (Map 2) 

The Northern Mountains region encompasses about 40.000 

square miles of rngged terrain in what is part of the Annamite 

MOllntains. The peaks are higher in the north. northwest. and west. 

where they range from 4.000 feet to about 8.000 feet. The southernmost spur of the Annamite Mountains. over 750 miles long. 

originates in Laos and stretches southeastward to the VietnameseLaotian border and thereafter generally parallels the coast. To the 

east. the slopes fall off steeply to the narrow coastal plains; to the 

west. the Annamite SplIT slopes more gradually to the valley of the 

Mekong in Laos and Cambodia. 

The Northern Plains region includes the Red River Delta and 

the narrow coastal lowlands of North Vietnam. The area is well 

cultivated and densely populated. The delta proper. about 5.700 

square miles. is indented by the many small mouths of the Red 

River. Levees. some up to 35 feet high. are built along the major 

river and stream networks and divide the land into a series of 

saucer-shaped basins. Most of the land is not over 10 feet above sea 

level. and much of it is 3 feet or less. Hence. the whole area is subject to frequent flooding. 

The Central Highlands region is the l8.600-square-mile region 

of central South Vietnam. The northernmost portion of the highlands is adjacent to the Northern Mountains region and is largely a 

continuation of the Annamite Mountains. The ranges are rugged. 

with elevations near 7.000 feet. Farther sOllth the region is dominated by gently rolling volcanic plateaus with elevations between 

2.600 and 5.000 feet. 

The Coastal Lowlands region is the narrow belt of plains extending from the Mekong Delta to the Northern Plains region. The 

region. enclosed on the landward side by the Central Highlands. is 

never more than 40 miles wide. The entire coastal strip is segmented by mountain spurs that extend to the sea. The region is in 

varying degrees of cultivation and is interspersed throughout with 

sand dunes. 

The Southern Plains region takes in the intermediate lowlands 

and the fertile Mekong Delta. The intermediate lowlands constitute the transitional zone between the Central Highlands and the 

delta proper. Basically an undulating plain interrupted occasionally by marshland. this transitional zone slopes southward. Elevations range from 300 feet in the northern sector to sea level near the 

delta. Dense rain forests cover large areas of the region; however. 

dry field crops such as corn. sweet potatoes. and beans. in addition 

to the rubber plantations and the less extensive rice fields. are 
6 FIELD ARTILLERY 

scattered throughout. The Mekong Delta is the most fertile plain 

in Vietnam and is its largest rice-producing area. Almost the entire 

delta is covered with rice fields situated within an interlacing network of rivers, streams, and irrigation canals. The plain is low and 

level; nowhere is it more than 10 feet above sea level. Gradients 

vary as little as one-fifth foot per mile. The dominant relief features 

are the rice paddy dikes. The drainage network is irregular and, 

because of poor runoff conditions, the northern edge of the delta is 

marshland. Yet the Mekong, unlike the Red River, has a moderating element whenever the river is in flood. The Tonie Sap, a large 

freshwater lake in central Cambodia, serves as a regulating reservoir to stabilize the flow of water through the lower Mekong. 

During flood stage the silted delta outlets cannot carry off the 

flood waters. The swollen Mekong then backs up into the Tonie 

Sap and expands the lake so that it covers as much as four times 

its low-water area. As the flood subsides, the water reverts to its 

original flow from the lake to the sea. The regulating reservoir thus 

significantly reduces the danger of serious floods. 

All five major geographical regions contain several basic types 

of vegetation. Vegetation areas fall into six general categories: (I) 

rain forest, (2) open forest, (3) swampland, (4) marshland, (5) 

grassland, and (6) cultivated areas. The rain forest, predominant 

in the Northern Mountains, Central Highlands, and intermediate 

lowlands regions, consists of a continuous, multilevel canopy of 

numerous species of trees-primarily broad leaf evergreens. Secondary growth rain forests tend to contain small, closely spaced 

trees and dense undergrowth. The open forests of the plateau 

region of the Central Highlands and areas of the Northern Mountains and the transitional zone of the Southern Plains include 

widely spaced trees above a floor of tall, sharp-edged thatch grass. 

The primarily deciduous trees shed their leaves during the dry 

season. Swampland is characteristic of the coastal sectors of the 

Northern Mountains, the Red River Delta, and the Mekong Delta. 

Primary vegetation in these areas is the mangrove, a variety of 

evergreen that thrives in brackish water and muddy soil. The tree 

crowns form a dense canopy and the prop roots constitute an almost 

impenetrable ground barrier. Marshland fringes the northern edge 

of the Mekong Delta near the Cambodian border. Reclamation 

projects have lessened its extent. In the marshland areas, sharpblad.d reeds and rushes grow to heights of seven feet. Grassland is 

most prevalent in the Northern Mountains, near the Chinese border, but sections of grassland are dispersed throughout Vietnam. 

Thatch grass is the most common vegetation in these locations. The 
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 7 

vegetation and crops of the cultivated areas, particularly in the 

Northern and Southern Plains and Coastal Lowlands regions, include corn, beans, potatoes, and other dry field crops, as well as 

coconut, sugar cane, ruhher. and rice. The rleltas in particular are 

covered with rice paddies. 

As important as topogTaphy and vegetation in a geographical 

survey of Vietnam is a consideration of its climate. Paramount in 

climatic changes are the seasonal monsoons. During the southwest, 

or summer, monsoon, the heat of central Asia rises and causes 

humid air to Aow inland from the ocean, usually from mid-May to 

early October. The humid airAow hrings heavy rains to the plateau 

area and the western slopes of the mountain regions. Average rain· 

fall during these months ranges from 55 to 110 inches in the north 

and 40 to 95 inches in the south. However, sections along the 

eastern slopes and the coastal plains receive relatively little moisture. Except for local variations, high humidity, tropical temperature, and cloudiness prevail during these months. The northeast, 

or winter, monsoon results from the high pressure in the Asian interior forcing dry, cool air out toward the sea. This Aow generally 

begins in early November and continues until mid-March. The 

coastal region receives relatively heavy precipitation, whereas 

across the mountains in ·Laos the weather is hot and dry. During 

January, February, and early March, the coastal areas, especially 

along the Gulf of Tonkin, experience the "crachin"-a period of 

intermittent drizzle and low cloud overcast. The periods between 

these monsoons are known as the spring and autumn transitions. 

The spring transition, from mid-March until mid-May, is a period 

of very high temperatures and high humidity and a number of 

cloudy, overcast days. The autumn transition includes the weeks 

from early October until early November. For the central portion 

of the coastal plains, the heaviest amount of precipitation and 

cloud cover occurs during this transitional phase. 

The Enemy 

The requirements for countering insurgency in South Vietnam 

were considerably different from those experienced by U.S. artillery in past combat operations. First, the enemy could attack 

ground fOTces or the local populace at times and places of his 

choosing. Second, he was indistinguishable from the populace and 

even from some of the irregular friendly paramilitary forces. There 

could be little progress toward identifying and finding this elusive 
8 FIELD ARTILLERY 

enemy without first acquiring detailed knowledge of his organizations and methods. 

The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1941 formed the 

Viet Minh, or League for the Independence of Vietnam. A decade later, the Viet Minh had grown unwieldy and and was reorganized, following the March 1951 Congress of Unification of 

the l.ien-Viet and Viet-Minh Fronts, into the Vietnam Dang Lao 

Dong, or Vietnam "Vorkers' Party. Ho Chi Minh and the other 

leaders of the Viet Minh hoped ultimately to reconstruct, within 

this broad national front, a hard inner core around which a welldisciplined following ('ould be organized. The Central Executive 

Committee o[ the new Lao Dong Party was headed by Ho Chi Minh 

and included the fonner Viet Minh leadership. The Indochinese 

Communist Party meanwhile had been dissolved in 1945 after fifteen years of operalion and was succeeded by the Marxist Study 

Club. The Lao Dong Party was, in effect, a less ostentatious recreation of the Indochinese Communist Party. "V>le may tell the 

party adherents that the new party is basically the Communist Party 

under a new form," a confidential executive committee circular 

pointed out, "but to those that are outside of the party, we will say 

that it is a newly-created party merely continuing the revolutionary work of the preceding parties." 

In the years after the 1954 Geneva Accords, as it became apparent that the agreement for national elections would not be 

honored and that the Diem government would soon collapse, Lao 

Dong Party cadres went south and began organizing the dissidents in South Vietnam. By December 1960 the National Liberation Front (N LF) of South Vietnam had been formed. The organization of the Front, according to Douglas Pike, was a "phantom 

edifice." Lao Dong cadres first conceived the [ront on paper and 

then applied it to the grievances of the south. Organizational impetus, in other words, came from the Lao Dong Party, whereas the 

support, primarily an anti-Diem coalition, was indigenous. Lao 

Dong participation in the National Liberation Front, never seriously concealed, became apparent with the [ormation in January 

1962 of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which replaced 

the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party_ Communist domination marked the end of the phase of intensive organization building_ Membership in the National Liberation Front had reached 

approximately 300,000, and the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party initiated a period of internal NLF solidification which 

eventually culminated in Northern control of the Front. By 1964, 

relocated northerners made up about one-half of the Front's 40,000 

civilian cadres. 
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 9 

The military arm or the National Liberation Front was the 

People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF), which was known before 

196(; as th e Liberation Army of the Front. Allied forces referred 

LO the Force simply as Viet Cong- a nebulous term [or Vietnamese 

Communists that neverthel ess persisted. The army was made up 

of main force regulars and paramilitary units. The regulars (GhuLllc-Qllall), stationed mainly in secret bases and secured areas, 

were professional, well trained, disciplined, and thoroughly indoctrinated soldiers. They were chosen from battle-experienced 

regional lInits or infiltrated from North Vietnam. The organizational plan ca lled for the incorporation of party commissars from 

the ('ompany level lip and for a party ce ll in each plaLOon that 

worked with the ('ompany commissar. 

Until 1956, Communist forces in the south were mostly guerrilla units supplemented hya few regulars. The number of regular 

forces increased continuously in the succeeding years, so that by 

1963 the estimated strength of main force regulars was between 

25,000 and 30,000 and by 1965 about 35,000 men. The missions of 

the PLAF main force regulars resembled those of the armed forces 

of North Vietnam-the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), more 

commonly known as the orth Vietnamese Army ( VA). Coordination and efficiency were essential. "They have the ca pacity," 

North Vietnam Defense Minister General Va Nuyen Giap observed, 

"to annihilate major units or command posts of the enemy." 

The paramilitary forces of the People's Liberation Anned 

Force, made up primarily of indigenous personnel, consisted of 

regional units and loca l militia. The regional units were guerrilla 

bands that operated mainly in their home provinces and districts. 

Their primary responsibilities were to (I) train and assist the local 

militia, emphasiling not only military doctrine but also political 

activities, (2) screen the operations of the main force regulars, and 

(3) serve as reserves and reinforcements to the regulars. These 

activities kept the government forces off balance. In 1965, the 

regional forces contained an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 men. The 

local militia (Dall Qllon D" Kieh) were largely untrained, poorly 

equipped, and inadequately indoctrinated. However, as an integral 

part of the population, they filled an important logistical role for 

the regional and regular forces. Their social role was perhaps 

even more critical than their military potential. Proselyting the 

local populace called for nonmilitary indoctrination. It has been 

estimated that militia training, conducted by regional units or 

regular forces, included 70 percent political and only 30 percent 

military subjects. 

After 1959 Communist troop infiltration south was continuous. 
10 FIELD ARTILLERY 

The majority of the infiltrators were former Viet Minh who had 

regrouped to the north after the Geneva agreement. Until 1960 the 

North Vietnamese Army assisted the insurgency in the south mainly 

by providing specialists to the National Liberation Front and the 

People's Liberation Armed Force. By late 1964, the demand for 

more NV A units in the south forced changes in the makeup of 

infiltrators. North Vietnam began recalling former enlisted men in 

1964 and officers in 1965. The new need also altered draft requirement •. The draft formerly affected those between 18 and 25 years 

old; it expanded to include persons between ages 17 and 35. Also, 

by mid-1966 the semiannua l ca ll had become a quarterly ca ll and 

the term of service, Ollce :1 years, had been extended to the duration of the war. 

The enlarged numbers of infiltrators soon exceeded tbe capabilities of the North Vietnamese training units. The 338th Brigade 

until 1964 bad been responsible for infiltration training, but additional training commands were now needed to cope witb the buildup. Tbe 22d Training Group, 250th Training Division, 320th 

Training Division, and 350th Division joined the training efforts 

of the 338th. Together these units could train between 78,000 and 

96,000 men per year. 

The tempo of activity picked up in 1968 and inflated the manpower requirements of the military. Consequently, the People's 

Liberation Armed Force as well as the North Vietnamese Army 

underwent further modifications. The PLAF main force and regional units faced the dilemma of enlarged needs and diminished 

manpower resources. In 1968, approximately 60,500 men were 

recruited; in 1969, about 57,000. Of these, it has been estimated 

that 50 percent were recruited through the use or threat of force. 

Large numbers of these recruits were under 17 years old. The 

North Vietnamese Army, in turn, was forced not only to aid the 

PLAF main force but also to send some of its own elements to the 

regional units. The burden on manpower resources, though heavy, 

was not critica l for the North Vietnamese. An estimate of the 

number of males of military age (15 to 49 years) in January 1969 

showed that of a total of 4,607,000 approximately 2,700,000 were 

fit for military duty and that another 100,000 men would become 

eligible each year. 

The tactics of the North Vietnamese Army, and espec ially of the 

People's Liberation Armed Force, emphasized security, silence, and 

speed. The carefully detailed plans, the rehearsals whenever feasible, the speedy execution, and the equally quick and cautious 

withdrawals were forced upon them because of the preponderant 

firepower of the U.S. forces. Offensive activities had to be main-
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 1 1 

tained, the positional defense avoided; NVA and PLAF artillery 

support adapted to these prerequisites. 

Until 1967 the North Vietnamese Army and the People's Liberatinn Armed Force used primarily mortars and recoilless rifles in 

standoff attacks against allied military installations and outposts. 

The limited destructive capability of these weapons and the tightened installation security of the allies, which came to include those 

areas within medium monar range, fore'ed the enemy to lessen the 

frequency of his attacks. 

In early 1966 enemy use of Soviet cannon artillery became more 

common. The 85-mm. Soviet divisional gun, the 122-mm. Soviet 

M19~8 howitzer, the 1 22-mm. Soviet Dl4 gun, and the 152-mm. 

Soviet M 1939 gun-howitzer, as well as captured U.S. 75-mm. and 

105-mm. howitzers, increased the NVA and PLAF long-range destructive capability. However, allied firepower placed restrictions 

on their use. A survey conducted by the U.S. Army XXIV Corps 

Artillery over a seven-month period in 1968 concluded that the 

hours most preferred by the NV A for firing were from 1000 to 

1300, from 1400 to 1500, and from 1600 to 1900. The frequency 

rose steadily during the morning hours, peaked around 1130, and 

then dropped off considerably. Arti ll ery fire peaked again around 

1430 and 1830 and decreased significantly following each peak period. The preference for daylight hours, according to the survey, 

was probably determined by a desire to avoid counterbattery fire. 

Frequent nighttime moves from position to position were mandatory to avoid detection, and firing was limited to a few rounds per 

gun from several widely scattered positions. 

By late 1966 Soviet and Chinese Communist rockets were in 

the enemy inventory. These rockets were not only more suitable 

than cannon artillery for attacking larger targets but also lighter 

and more adaptable. And because of their low trajectory, rockets 

often escaped location by the U.S. AN f MPQ-4 (Q-4) countermortar radar. The 140-mm. rocket attack on Da Nang air base on 

27 February 1967 commenced a new phase in the war in terms of 

enemy capabilities by extending the attack range by about 3,500 

yards beyond tbe maximum range of the 120-mm. mortar and 

more than doubling the warhead payload. Moreover, rockets were 

more mobile than conventional artillery. A captured enemy training document explained that the "main purposes of the rockets 

are objectives having a large area, usually 400 x 400 m, such as 

enemy strongholds, air fields, storage points, or towns." The rockets 

could also be used "to support the infantry and to attack distant 

objectives that may affect the combat mission of the infantry." 

All the )'ockets could be employed from improvised launchers. 
12 FIELD ARTILLI-:RY 

The 140-mm. rockets used in the attack on Da Nang air base were 

fired [rom 134 crudely mounted launching positions consisting of 

single metal tubes mounted on wooden boards, with elementary 

elevation and deflection devices. The enemy accomplished simultaneous launchings by wiring several weapons to two ignition wires 

and then to a battery. A modified Soviet 122·mm. rocket was used 

during the 6 March 1967 attack on Camp Carroll. The launcher 

was a single tube taken [rom the Soviet mu ltiple rocket launcher, 

the 40·round B~I 2I , shortened by 18 inches [rom the original 

9.6 feet, fitted with a tripod mount, and equipped with a modified 

optical sight taken from the Soviet S2-mm. recoilless glill . In this 

form the weapon could he broken down into five manageable 

loads for jungle mobility. But the enemy was even ab le to launch 

the 122-mm. rocket by propping it against sandbag mounts or 

wooden stakes. Although errors increased, only three manpacks 

were sufficient to transport the weapon when it was used in this 

fashion. The 122-mm. rocket soon became the standard rocket of 

the North Vietnamese Army and the People's Liberation Armed 

Force. 

The Chinese Communist 107-mm. rocket, used in February 

1968 against the U.S. base camp at Quan Loi plantation, added 

another dimension to the NVA and PLAF arsenals. The 107-mm. 

rocket packed a smaller warhead and had a shorter range than the 

I 22-n1ln. rocket. However, because they were relatively light, three 

107-mm. rockets could be transported as easily as one I 22-mm. 

round. And like the 140-mm. and 122-mm. rockets, the 107-mm. 

could be launched from improvised pads. An enemy training document pointed out that 107-mm. rocket firing pads could be made 

of dirt, bamboo frames, or crossed stakes. The rocket could be 

launched from "road embankmellls, a dike between two rice fields, 

the brim of a combat trench, an earth mound, a bomb crater, or 

an ant hill." In the summer of 1968, reports mentioned the possible 

enemy use of multiple rocket launchers. U.S. forces had encountered twin-tubed 107-0101. launchers fitted as if they were intended 

to be attached to other tubes. These rather sophisticated launchers were obvious contrasts to the crudely improvised 140-mm. 

and 120-mm. assemblies. On 16 September 1968, the Americans 

captured a Chinese Communist-manufactured 12-round launcher 

for the 107-mm. rocket. Broken down, the launchers were easily 

transportable and delivered the 107-mm. rocket against separate 

targets; assembled, the multiple launcher massed 12 rounds on a 

single target area. 

Enemy units continued to make the most of their weapons by 

adapting available resources to prevailing requirements. For ex-
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 13 

ample, they created the 107-mm., 120-mm., and 140-mm. overcaliber rockets by attaching larger warheads to the original assemblies. 

Modification lessened accuracy, but the overcaliber rockets provided effective harassing and saturation fires. 

Enemy company commanders, like their counterparts in the 

cannon artillery lInits, were ronscious of U.S. firepower. A captured company commander explained in December 1968 that U.S. 

air observers could follow the rocket exhaust and pinpoint launch 

sites for air strikes. Hence it was necessary to employ "hit and run 

lactics in (lrcordance with the principles of guerrilla warfare." Fire 

control and co-ordination was primary. "No more than five rounds 

are fired from any single tripod-type lallncher. This takes about 

20 minutes." No more lhan two salvos were fired in about ten 

minutes time from improvised launchers. Displacement involved 

"the immediate pickup of all equipment and leaving the area 

with all possible speed, which takes about 5 minutes." 

By late 1969 the rocket, because of its advantages in terms of 

payload and mobility, had become the prime weapon of the NVA 

and PLAF artillery. The rocket units were organized into regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons. The regiment included 

a headquarters squadron, a signal and reconnaissance company, 

and three rocket companies. The number of rockets and launchers 

per company varied with the caliber of the weapons. A 107-mm. 

rocket con1pany normally consisted of twelve launchers and twentyfour rockets; a 122-mm. company, six launchers and eighteen 

rockets; and a 140-mm. company, sixteen launchers and sixteen 

rockets. 

The makeup of the cannon artillery units varied according to 

their location. Medium artillery pieces were prevalent only in the 

Demilitarized Zone, where regiments usually contained 36 tubes240[ 105-mm. and 12 of 130-mm. and 152-mm. In addition, a few 

85-mm. and 100-mm. pieces were sometimes incorporated. Elsewhere, conventional NVA and PLAF units normally included weapons not considered artillery pieces in American units. The 60-mm., 

81-mm., 82-mm., and 120-mm. mortars and the 57-mm., 75-mm., 

and 82-mm. recoilless riRes, along with the 12.7-mm antiaircraft 

machine gun, were commonly parts of their artillery arsenal. Less 

common, though still available, were the 70-mm. Japanese and 

75-mm. U.S. howitzers. Artillery training, in [act, envisioned the 

use of captured American artillery pieces. Assembly and disassembly of the 105-mm. howitzer and the use of U.S. aiming devices 

in laying the 75-mm. and 105-mm. tubes were included in the NVA 

and PLAF artillery curriculum. 

No description of the North Vietnamese Army and the Peo-
14 FIELO ARTILLERY 

ple's Liberation Armed Force and their effect on allied forces would 

be complete without mention of the ubiquitous sapper. During the 

first half of 1969, sapper attacks inflicted an average of over $1 million damage per raid. However, the role of the sapper was often 

misunderstood. Ilefore 1967, the enemy had not grasped the significance of the sapper as an assault soldier. The allies, on the 

other hand, sometimes erroneously categorized the sapper as a 

guerrilla simply because some guerrillas employed sapper tactics. 

The fusion blurred identification. The development of the sapper 

and his employment before and after the creation of a separate 

sapper combat arm, equivalent to the infantry and artillery, must 

be traced before his impact on the war can be appreciated. 

The term sapper originated in Europe and traditionally identified a combat engineer. In Vietnam this conventional association remained, but a more particular connotation increasingly 

qualified the sapper. The sapper signified a raider-ranger unit 

and gained notoriety as the lead element in an assault on a fixed 

installation or military field position. Armed primarily with explosives charges, the sapper breached the defensive perimeter and 

neutralized tactical and strategic positions and thus prepared for 

the attack of the main body. 

Before 1967, however, the sappers were often misused. As late 

as 1964, the People's Liberation Armed Force envisioned the use 

of sappers only during the first phase of guerrilla warfare, before 

the government of Vietnam could establish strongpoints and improve defensive positions. Sapper units remained subordinate to 

the infantry and served as reinforcements in assaults. Deep penetrations were disallowed. Sapper units were constrained in their 

operations until the artillery had fired. And sappers themselves 

were occasionally deficient when employed in raids. Inadequate 

preparation, incomplete reconnaissance, and inexperience of the 

demolition men used as penetrators all contributed to the poor 

execution of these missions. Nevertheless, the number of sapper 

units in South Vietnam increased steadily after 1965, and by 1967 

the enemy recognized the misemployment but also the potential 

of these forces. The North Vietnamese Army upgraded the entire 

organization and, in late April or early May 1967, created the 

Sapper Headquarters, Sapper Department, Joint General Staff. 

The sapper force, as an independent combat arm equiva lent 

to the infantry or the artillery, operated (I) in the assault without 

infantry, (2) in the assault with infantry, (3) in special action 

group activities, and (4) in "water sapper" operations. Sappers in 

special action groups operated essentially in the cities, proselyting 

the population and maintaining pressure, while water sappers 
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 15 

mined ships, bridges, and other water-associated targets. Special 

action groups and water sappers were of less immediate importance 

to the artillery in Vietnam than were sappers employed in the 

first two modes. 

Sapper assaults, with or without the infantry. depended on 

stealth and secrecy. Their primary method of attack called for 

making deep thrusts into allied positions from different directions 

and hitting several targets simultaneously. Organization was determined by the specific mission and the location and strength of 

the allied forces. Characteristically, however, the sapper force induded a~sa1l1t. security, fire support, and reserve elements. 

(Ch",./ I) 

Assaults without the infantry required fullest use of the fire 

support or reserve elements. either separately or in combination. 

The sappers disguised their attacks as attacks by fire through the 

use of monars by the fire support elements or as infantry assaults 

through employment of the reserve elements, which were the 

equivalent of infantry squads. If the deception worked, the opposing forces would deploy to their bunkers or to the defensive perimeter and leave the center of the installation vulnerable to assault 

teams. 

Sapper attacks with the infantry were either with the sappers in 

support of the infantry or the infantry in support of the sappeTS. 

Sapper units considered supporting the infantry a misuse of their 

tactical abilities. Attached to a large unit, they tended to lose the 

advantages of secrecy and surprise. Nevertheless, sappers continued 

to be employed as reinforcements to the infantry. The second 

mode of sapper operation-using the infantry as a reserve, security, 

or secondary assault element-seemed more effective. The greatest 

threat to al lied positions was an attack spearheaded by sappers 

with explosive charges, followed by the infantry some 100 to 200 

meters behind. 

During 1968, after the sapper organization had been made a 

separate combat arm, attacks by sappers or by un its employing 

sapper tactics occurred on a larger scale and often wefe accompanied by indirect fire support. By the end of that year, heavy 

Communist losses resulting from. large-scale offensives made the 

sapper and his techniques empirical necessities. Minilnum Inal1-

power expenditure was imperative, yet military pressure had to be 

maintained. The sapper was well suited to these dual demands. A 

captured enemy document explained that considerable damage 

could be intlicted by a relatively sl ight force through the cautious 

application of sapper tactics: small numbers of men could "inflict 

extensive damage on enemy installations." The sapper should con-
4 men 

1 8 4l'l 

1 Air.: -17 

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PUETUIIII 

4 men 

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CHART l-CHARACTERlSTIC SAPPER ORGANIZA

ASSIIl! !SS1Il! 'EmUII!! 

5 men 4 men 4 men 

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7l' .hapt'd ch.lrgel 5l' shaped ckargt'S 

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13 

I m

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5 AT 
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 17 

("entrate on strategic structures "'o<.;ated deep within enemycontrolled areas" rather than concern himself with inflicting 

casualties. The ability to penetrate, and not the preponderance of 

firepower or men, was crucial. But, the document warned, sapper 

attacks should "not normally last over ~O minutes after the enemy 

is aware of the sapper presence," 

From the beginning of 1968 until mid-1969, sappers were essential to the enemy'S effort. Although they participated in only 4 

percent of all assaults, these made up 12 percent of all significant 

assaults- those which innicted serious damage. From January 1968 

until May 1969, the frequency of sapper raids remained at about 

five per l11onth, but their effectiveness greatly improved. The 

average raid during 1968 resulted in approximately $300,000 damage. In 1969, the average raid innicted more than $1,000,000 damage and accounted for more allied casualties. The selection of 

targets testified to the increasing boldness of the sapper units. In 

1965 the use of sappers against allied combat positions such as outposts, fire support bases, and landing zones was still debated, but in 

1967 training for this type of attack was rapidly progressing. During 

1968 and 1969 these field positions made up 43 percent of the 

sapper targets; fixed mil itary installations such as storage depots, 

base camps, and Air Force installations accounted for 32 percent of 

the sapper raids; and population centers accounted for 18 percent 

of the total. More than 51 percent of the raids occurred between 

0100 and 0300_ General Giap showed the increasing confidence in 

sapper units when he exclaimed, "Regardless of how strongly the 

US or puppet troops are defended, they can be easily destroyed by 

our crack and special troops with their special combat tactic," 

The creation of the Sapper Headquarters in 1967, the need for 

troop conservation, especially after 1968, and the demonstrated 

effectiveness of the sapper during 1969 contributed to the growing 

emphasis placed upon these forces. The expansion of the sapper 

combat arm mirrored this emphasis. In July of 1967 the V-25 Infantry Battalion, a PLAF regional unit in Quang Naill Province, 

was scheduled to be upgraded to main force status and retained as 

a sapper force , Here was the first clear indication that large infantry units were being converted into sapper units. By June of 

1968, nine main force and regional force battalions and sixteen 

companies of sappers were in existence. In early 1969, the sapper 

force had grown to nineteen battalions and thirty-six companies, 

And by mid-1969, this force had increased to twenty-seven battalions and thirty-nine companies. 
18 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Polit iwl-M ilitary C ollsideratiolls 

The peculiarities of terrain and enemy operations fundamentally affected the employment of artillery in Vietnam. Gunnery 

errors in the past seldom had resulted in friendly casualties. 

Rounds th at cleared friendly lines were usually safe. In Vietnam, 

however, front lines were nonexistent and the enemy operated 

among the loca l population. Hence, as one study has estimated, 

abou t 50 percent of all artillery missions were fired very close to 

fri endly positions. If response was to be effective, such areas as nofire zones, specified strike zones, and free· fire zones had to be 

designated . Otherwise, fO·ordination and clearance with the lowest 

echelon of the central government, the district, was mandatory 

(the district chiefs presumably could account for the location of 

friendly elements within the immediate vicinity). In May of 1970 

Lessons Learned Number 77, on fire support co-ordination, stated, 

"The requirement for military and political clearances for artillery 

fire on or near populated areas has an adverse effect on the responsiveness of artillery fire." The goal of responding within two 

minutes after receiving a fire request was "seldom met for targets 

near any populated areas." Clearance requirements commonly delayed missions up to ten minutes. In fact, the report continued, it 

was "not uncommon for the artillery to be unable to fire at all 

because of lack of clearances." To reduce the time lost in firing, 

liaison with local government agencies and with allied forces was 

established. The creation of combined fire support co-ordination 

centers in some areas minimized the delays. But, the report concluded, the "lack of responsiveness is a source of constant concern 

and frustration at all echelons of command." 

The governmental and the military organizations in South 

Vietnam were parallel structures that, especially since the 1963 

overthrow of the Diem regime, had become closely indentified. 

The civil government faced the basic problem of central authority 

versus loca l autonomy, a predicament not peculiar to Vietnam but 

pronounced there because of the cultural importance of the village 

and its kinship relations. The central government extended into 

four regions-South, Center, North, and Highlands-which formerly were supervised through regional governors but which since 

1955 had been directed by four governmental delegates, one for 

each of the regions. These regions were subdivided into 44 provinces from 540 to 10,000 square kilometers in size and with populations ranging from 33,000 to 850,000. In addition, there were six 

autonomous cities that occupied positions equivalent to provinces 

in the governmental hierarchy: Saigon, Hue, Da Nang, Da Lat, 
THE VIETNAM ENVIRONMENT 19 

Cam Ranh, and Vung Tau. The provinces were subdivided further 

into some 236 districts with 2 to IO districts per province. The 

districts took in anywhere from 2 to 57 villages but averaged about 

10 villages per district. The villages encompassed ~ to 12 hamlets. 

Since the ordinance of 24 October 1956, the provinces have 

possessed a substantial amount of legal autonomy. Province chiefs, 

appointed by the central government, managed all provincial services. They controlled their own budgets, regulated public property, and dealt directly with the ministries at the national level. 

The districts were not legal political entities and hence possessed no autonomous budgetary or fiscal powers. Traditionally, the 

central government appointed the district chiefs upon the recommendation of the province ('hiefs. District chiefs thus represented 

the lowest territorial echelon of the central authority. 

The province and district chiefs functioned in military roles. 

The province chiefs co-ordinated all local security through the 

Regional Forces (RF) and could, in emergencies, call upon regular 

army units. Similarly, the district chiefs regulated the actions of the 

Popular Forces (PF). The Regional and Popular Forces were security forces drawn from the local population and usually confined 

themselves to their province or district areas. In a strictly military 

sense, their performance was often erratic. A unit might distinguish 

itself on one day, yet fail miserably the next because its local leader 

had been killed. Moreover, these forces complicated the problems 

of command and control and thus enhanced the need for coordination. The paramilitary units were, according to Major General Charles P. Brown, "a mixed bag." Some were consistently 

good, others consistently poor. "The majority would have to be 

categorized as mediocre. " 

The villages ostensibly contained a legislative Village Citizen's 

Council (VCC) and an executive Village Administrative Committee (VAC). The village chief headed the Administrative Committee, and the Citizen's Council, in principle, incl uded 

representatives from each hamlet. In the hamlet, the hamlet chief 

and his deputies administered domestic needs. 

The chain of command of the Republic of Vietnam Armed 

Forces (RVNAF), headed by the Joint General Staff UGS), encroached upon the basically civilian government structure. The 

Joint General Staff commanded the four military corps tactical 

zones (CTZ's) into which Vietnam had been divided. These zones 

corresponded to the four regions which had been presided over by 

governmental delegates since the elimination of the regional governors in 1955. The delegates in turn were superseded by the corps 

commanders. who functioned as assistants to the chief executive. In 
20 F IELD ARTILLERY 

the aftermath of the 19(i~ coup, military men increasingly replaced 

civilian authorities. Not only did the corps commanders oversee the 

four regions, many mil itary officers became province ch iefs and 

divisional tactical areas generally followed provincial boundaries. 

In addition. more mililrtry men served as district chiefs. 

Finally, the villages and hamlets, already part of the military 

panorama,were further highlighted in the early 1960's not only 

through the action of the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces 

but also by the implementation of the government's plans to create 

"strategic hamlets." Since insurgents ranged from the higher echelons of the People's Revolutionary Party down to the hasic threeman rells within the hamlets, the government altemplcd to cope 

with the insurgent challenge through its own proselyting program. 

In early 1962 the Diem government, with the strong support of the 

United States, initiated the stra tegic hamlet counterinsurgency program. Patterned after the British experience in Malaya in 1948, the 

strategic hamlet program attempted to isolate the rural population 

from the insurgent force in order to deny the latter any popular 

support and at the same time to enlarge the government's popular 

base through social reforms. The programs, scheduled for completion by early 1964, envisioned the construction of 11,864 strategic 

hamlets. 

Diem, in February 1963, expressed confidence in winning the 

war hecause the strategic hamlet program, he said, had separated 

the population from the Communists "physically and morally" and 

thus had undermined the fundamental principle of "Communist 

subversive \VaT." The insurgents. according to Diem, were "becoming more and more a foreign expeditionary corps reduced to fighting a conventiona l war." In Octoher 1963, Diem announced that 

8,600 strategic hamlets incorporating some 10.5 million persons had 

been completed. It soon became obvious, however, that the program 

was a mere facade of what had been visualized. Social reforms were 

not realized; instead, governmental control oflcn became morc intense within the reorganized and relocated hamlets. Coupled with 

the forced transfer of formerly indifferent peasants, these shortcomings gave credence to the Communist charge that the government 

had created "concentration camps." 

Thus, while the terrain and the enemy forced new and unusual 

demands on all military activity, the development of an indistinguishable military-political structure in Vietnam posed further 

problems in the conduct of the war. Dealing with these demands 

and problems propelled the U.S. effort in general, and that of the 

artillery in particular, in ne1v directions. 
CHAPTER II 

The Advisory Effort, 1950-1965 

Backgl"DII I/d-M ililary Assislal/ce 

Advisory G rOllp, Viell/lIm, 0 rga II ized 

The U.S. military advisory effort in Vietnam had a modest beginning in September 1950. when the United States l\lilitary Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Vietnam. was established in 

Saigon. Its mission was to supervise the issuance and employment 

of SIO million of military equipment to support French legionnaires in their effort to combat Viet i\jinh forces. By 1953 the 

amount of U.S. military aid had jumped to over $350 million and 

was used to replace the badly worn World \Var II vintage equipment that France. still suffering economically from the devastation of that war, was still using. 

From the outset. French forces were happy to receive the new 

material but refused American advice on how to employ it. The U.S. 

desire was that all Vietnamese units be organized and trained to 

provide internal defense of their own country and that aid be used 

to equip those units. Such a desire was at odds with existing French 

policy. The French Army was employed not only to counter enemy 

forces but also to assert France as a colonial power. A purely Vietnamese army would not be dependable in this latter role. Accordingly. major units were filled totally by French officers and nont:ommissioned officers with the ranks made up of Vietnamese. Senior 

French commanders were so loath to accept advice that would 

weaken their traditional colonial role that they effectively hampered 

various attempts by i\!AAG personnel to observe where the equipment was being sent and how it was being used. 

Slowly, however, the French were forced to change their policies. As they steadily lost their grip on the country, they saw that 

their days as a colonial power were numbered and that, if the country was to be saved from a Communist takeover, a strong. effective 

Vietnamese force would have to be provided. In 1954 the commanding general of French forces in Indochina, General Navarre, 

permitted the United States to send liaison officers to Vietnamese 

forces. But it was too late, as evidenced by daily worldwide news 

accounts of the seige and fall of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 
22 FIELD ARTILLERY 

that year. Under the Geneva Accords, France was forced to surren· 

der the northern half of Vietnam and to withdraw from South 

Vietnam by April of 1956. On 12 February 1955 at a conference in 

Washington, D.C., between officials of the U.S. State Department 

and the French Minister of Overseas Affairs, it was agreed that all 

U.S. aid would be funneled directly to South Vietnam and that 

all major military responsibilities would be transferred from the 

French to the Military Assistance Advisory Group mission under 

the command of Lieutenant General john O'Daniel. Because there 

were only 342 U.S. military personnel assigned to the group, not 

enough to accomplish the advisory mission, it was decided to make 

the training effort a joint U.S. and French mission under the title of 

Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM). The mission 

was short lived, since the French Expeditionary Force formally departed South Vietnam in April of 1956 as directed by the Accords 

and upon the insistence of President Diem. To fill the void, the 

MAAG mission was increased to 740 men by the end of june. 

During this reorganization period, General O'Daniel had stated 

a need for assigning military advisers down to the battalion level 

rather than concentrating them at the higher headquarters levels, 

but Military Assistance Advisory Group at that time ·did not have 

enough personnel. Further, President Diem was reluctant to allow 

advisers with tactical units. He was fearful that the United States 

would gain control or influence over his forces if Americans permeated the ranks of the army. It might be surmised that Diem 

wanted to maintain complete control of his armed forces, which 

constituted a major political tool to keep his opponents at bay. By 

1961, however, conditions had changed. Communist guerrillas were 

becoming stronger and more active, and enemy contacts increased 

in size and intensity throughout South Vietnam. 

It was evident that the Hanoi government had little intention of 

abiding by the Geneva agreements to honor the south's territorial 

integrity. President john F. Kennedy, during late spring of 1961, 

further increased the U.S. military commitment in both equipment 

and men. Aid had been averaging $50 million per year for the past 

several years but was sharply increased to $144 million for 1961. At 

the same time President Diem agreed to the assignment of advisers 

to battalion level. Accordingly, the adviser strength jumped from 

850 in 1959 to over 2,000 in 1961. By 1964 the advisory force numbered 23,000 officers and men. 

The Field Artillery Adviser 

The U.S. advisory buildup during the early 1960's included the 

assignment of field artillery advisory teams down to battalion level 
THE ADVISORY EFFORT 23 

es quickly as they could he trained and sem. Each team included an 

:lrtillery officer, usually a captain, and a senior noncommissioned 

officer. In Illost ceses both hed attended the six-week i\lilitary Assis· 

tance Treining Agency (MATA) course taught at the U.S. Army 

Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Caroline. The course 

was established to prepare students for future dUlies as advisers in 

Vietnam- LO leach them both what to expect and what was expected o[ them. The curriculum included, alllong other subjects, a 

profile of the l'Ountry, its people, government, history, and geography; the organization and employment of its military and para· 

rnilitery forces; and ba,ic lallgllege instruction. The "Redleg" (an 

artilleryman) advisers were given additional instruction concerning Vietnamese artillery and methods of employing field artillery 

effectively in Vietnam. In eddition to the MATA course, artillerymen attending resident courses at Fort Sill after fiscal year 1962 

were to receive orientations on counterinsurgency operations. Officers attending the field artillery career course participated in practical exercises in the employment of artillery in support of jungle 

operations. 

Field artillery advisory teams were assigned to battalions of 

both divisional end corps artillery. Eech Vietnamese division in 

1961 had a division ertillery consisting of one 4.2-inch mortar bat· 

talion and one 105·mm. howitzer battalion. Each battalion had 

three subordinate firing batteries. In 1961 the mortar batteries had 

nine weapons and the cannon batleries had four weapons each. 

[n 1963 mortar battery weapons were reduced to six and cannon 

battery weapons increased to six. From late 1964 to early 1965, 

4.2-inch mortar hatteries were replaced by 10S-mm. batteries; 

105-mm. weapons, with their longer ranges, had proved to be 

more valuable in accomplishing the mission of area coverage. Each 

of the [our Vietnamese army corps also had its own artill ery, usually 

two or three battalions, depending on the need. Corps artillery 

consisted o[ 105- and 155-mm. howitzer battalions. The 15S·mm. 

howitzer was the heaviest artillery in Vietnam during this period. 

Like division artillery, the battalions of corps artillery each had 

three batteries. Each battery initially had four weapons, increased 

to six by early 1965. 

The artillery advisory team was assigned to assist the Vietnamese unit commander and his staff in such areas as administrative 

procedures, personnel managment, logistics, operations, training, 

maintenance. and communicaLiol1s. with particular emphasis on the 

tactica l employment of artillery. The officer of the team, whose 

title was artillery officer adviser, proffered advice on all matters 

concerned with enhancing unit effectiveness. His noncommissioned 
24 FIELD ARTILLERY 

assistant, the firing battery adviser, concentrated on aSSIsting the 

battalion 5-3 and operations sergeant in planning, organizing, and 

supervising training of the firing batteries and individual gun sections. In addition to the battalion advisory teams, an artillery officer, normally a major, was assigned to each corps and division to 

advise the senior Vietnamese artillery commanders at those levels. 

This adviser had the additional task of co-ordinating the efforts of 

the advisory teams with the subordinate battalions. 

The young officers and noncommissioned officers who served as 

battalion advisers were of the highest caliber. They were at once 

professional, knowledgeable, and aggressive. Yet they were soon to 

learn that as advisers they could not "get things done" as they had 

in the American units in which they had served. Now they could 

only advise, not lead. Their advice could be accepted or rejected 

as the Vietnamese commander saw fit. Though often frustrating, 

this exclusively advisory status was necessary if the Vietnamese 

were to learn without the United States being accused of attempting to grab control of the military with intentions of making Vietnam a puppet state. Accordingly, advisers in the field were specifically directed to avoid any action that might be construed as leading 

a Vietnalnese military organization in combat against the enemy. 

To add to their frustrations, advisers were often fearful that 

their effectiveness would be judged by their superiors in relation 

to the effectiveness of the unit they advised. Unhappily, in some 

cases their fears were justified. An outstanding officer might be 

assigned to advise a mediocre unit which he was powerless to im· 

prove if the unit commander was indifferent to his suggestions. 

Though expressed humorously in this first verse of a rather lengthy 

poem, the dilemma was a very real one: 

I can't pull the throttle, 

I can't ring the bell, 

But if this goddamn train should stop, 

I'm the one that catches hell. 

(an adviser's lament-anonymous) 

The Adviser's Challenge 

Even when ail adviser's suggestion was accepted by his counterpart, it often seemed that the suggestion was executed in a painstakingly slow and inefficient manner, There were several reasons 

for this. 

First, advisers were faced with helping an army whose soldiers 

came from a culture with a set of values and philosophy far different from their own. The American believed that anything could 
THE ADVISORY EFFORT 25 

be accomplished with hard work, and he considered the year he 

would be in Vietnam' ample time to get the job done. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, believed that one must work hard to 

live hut that progress came ilholll slowly. He had fought an enemy 

all his life and could not comprehend why Americans felt that they 

could end the fighting overnight. Many other values held by Americans and Vietnamese clashed. Suffice it to say that it was often 

difficult for an adviser and his counterpart to understand one another. \Vhat was viewed .. 5 a reason a hIe approach to a problem by 

one was often viewerl as inane hy the other. Other than lnaking a 

sincere effort to understand one another's views. little could he 

clone to close this cultural gap. 

Another reason for apparent ineffectiveness of Vietnamese units 

was a void of trained and experienced leaders. Correcting this 

weakness was somewhat easier than overcoming cultural differences 

but was still a prodigious task. The French had purposely denied 

a majority of the leadership positions within their army to Vietnamese. There was evidence, however. of token acceptance of 

Vietnamese leaders as early as 1948. At that time, the French established an artillery training center forty kilometers northwest 

of Saigon to train noncommissioned officers as well as enlisted 

('annoneers for the French Expeditionary Force. In 1951 the school 

accepted Vielnamese officers [or attendance in the basic courses and 

in 1953 presented the first battery commander's course. After the 

reorganization of the Vietnamese Army the artillery school was 

reloca ted, first at the engineer school near Thu Dau Mot and then 

on 25 .July 1961 at Duc My, approximately fifty kilometers northwest of Nha Trang. At each location activities were expanded to 

train artillery officers and noncommissioned officers as well as artillerymen with specialized duties. Among other artillery-related 

courses, the first battery commander's COurse was offered in 1961 

and the first advanced course in 1965. Vietnamese artillerymen 

could take some pride in their branch being the first in the Vietnamese military to offer an advanced course. 

At unit level, advisers pressed their counterparts to provide 

training of junior officers. Some battalions developed aggressive 

training programs which brought officers in from the field to present classes and practical training on variolls aspects of the employment of field artillery. 

Many of the most promising young Vietnamese artillery officers 

and noncommissioned officers received further training at the U.S. 

Army Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where they were 

exposed to the latest thinking on field artillery employment and 
26 FIELD ARTILLERY 

ARVN OUTPOST. Large Fren,h-.<tyle outpost with a platoon of 

howitzers. 

developments. From fiscal year 1953 to fiscal year 1973, 663 Vietnamese artil lery officers alone were sent to Fort Sill. Peak attendance was during the early years of the expanded advisory effort, 

1960 to 1964, when yearly attendance exceeded 60 officers. 

Vietnamese field artillery leaders could not be effective if they 

were not knowledgeable in all aspects of the employment of their 

weapons. Formal training served that purpose. But an even more 

important factor in developing leaders was encouraging the Vietnamese to take command themselves. American advisers could not 

command Vietnamese units, and although the Vietnamese might 

make mistakes and perform awkwardly initially, they would be 

cha ll enged to perform and to develop into outstanding leaders. 

Thus, any frustrations that an adviser might feel in not being 

given a firmer hand to control the situation were well worth the 

end result of effective Vietnamese leadership. 

A third reason for ineffectiveness was poor operational practices, 

some inherited from the French and others developed by the 

Vietnamese over a period of years. Perhaps the most noteworthy 

of these practices was the use of the field artillery primarily as a 

defensive weapon. The French had unavoidably set a poor example 

for the Vietnamese. They had been forced to use their artillery 

defensively in the face of too few soldiers, poor communications, 
THE AnVISORY EFFORT 27 

limited road networks, and insufficient equipment. Since the road 

network was so vital to their operations and the Viet Minh tactics 

centered on cutting this network, the French developed a series of 

small outposts along the roads, each with one or two guns and 

mutually supporting wherever possible. For this purpose they used 

approximately 400 weapons of mixed calibers, including U.S. 105-

mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and UK 3.7-inch and 25-pound guns. 

These weapons were monned by crews of seven to eight men and 

usually were located in an outpost occupied by one or two infantry 

platoons. From these positions, artillery supported squad-size outposts positioned along roads and canals. As a result of this type 

of employment, the war was often known as the war of the "firing 

lieutenant." Each platoon of two guns was commanded by a French 

lieutenant who, becallse of his isolated location, actually conducted 

his own little war. Artillery employed in this static role was not 

organized into batteries or battalions. Thirty to forty guos were 

grouped under a small headquarters staff responsible for their 

administrative and logistical support. 

Though the French employed their artillery primarily in a static 

role, they also had regular artillery baltalions organized as division 

artillery. In early 1951, as Viet Minh operations approached conventional proportions, the French emphasized employment of these 

battalions in a conventional manner. But this offensive application 

of artillery was too little and too late to have any effect on the 

outcome of the war. 

The defensive posture LhaL Lhe French adopted for Lheir guns 

was readily copied by the South Vietnamese. Weapons were placed 

in static positions throughout the cOlll1lryside, where they often 

remained for years at a time, and seldom were used La support 

offensive operations. A purely defensive role was disheartening; 

one could never win on the defensive but could only hold off an 

atLack or lose. A defensive attitude came La permeate the ranks at 

aIL levels and resulted in operating procedures that would seem 

ridiculolls to anyone who seriously intended to win. Mortars were 

withheld from outposts where they might do some good because 

of the illogical reasoning that the outposts might be overrun and 

the weapons seized. Certain types of special ammunition and mines 

were withheld for the same reasons. It could only be unsettling to 

the morale of the defenders that they were denied weapons that 

might save their lives. 

This is not to deny that a system of scattered artillery outposts 

to provide area coverage was valid in itself. Hamlets, government 

compounds, and lines o[ communication required continuous aT· 
28 FIELD ARTILLERY 

ARVN GUN SECTION. Typical 1 05-111 m. position within a hamlet In 

Kontu1n Prouince, September 1963. 

tillery protection. Still, after years of occu pying static posItIOns, 

methods of effectively employing artillery offensively were all but 

forgotten. Artillery not pl aced in static o utposts was often held in 

unit motor pools when it should have been used to support ongoing 

operations or to relieve other artillery tha t could be so used. Artillery advisers relentlessl y pushed their counterparts to move their 

howitzers out of the motor pools and their mortars out of arms 

rooms and, wherever possible, to move their guns out of the static 

o utposts Lo support gro und operaLions. 

From 1961 to 1965 there were some changes toward a more 

offensive spirit on th e part of th e Vietnamese artillery. Major 

General Charles J. Timmes, Chief MAAG, Vietnam, noted in 

June 1964 that th ere was less hoarding of weapons in motor pools 

and more of a tendency toward employing all available weapons in 

the field. He gave much of the credit [or the improvement to field 

artill ery advisers. In add ition, a U.S. Army contact team noted in 

a report written in early 1965 that artill ery weapons were being 
THE ADVISORY EFFORT 29 

used frequently to support South Vietnamese Army operations and 

that there was little hesitation to move weapons in support of those 

operations. However, the same report noted that most often only 

two guns were used to support a battalion-size operation. The report was also critical of the fact that once a platoon of two guns 

was moved and emplaced to support an operation, it was seldom 

moved again throughout the duralion of the operation. 

Another poor operational practice was overcontrol of the ar· 

tillery commander by the supported maneuver commander. The 

Vietnamese followed the strictest interpretation of the French artillery commander's relationship to the grollnd commanders. At 

regimental level, the infantry commander actually commanded 

artillery assigned to his support. This alone was not necessarily a 

bad practice. U.S. artillery doctrine permits it, particularly, as was 

often the case in Vietnam, when both maneuver and supporting 

forces are some distance from their parent units on semiindependent operations. Given the command of his stJpporting 

artillery, however, the Vietnamese ground commander had a tendency to over-involve himself in the details of its employment. He 

often selected weapon positions and required that the artillery 

obtain permission from him before firing. As a result, corps and 

division artillery commanders were powerless to influence the action through their subordinate artillery headquarters, which were 

controlled by the supported commanders. They could only make 

recommendations on the employment of their weapons to their 

respective corps or division commanders. If the recommendations 

were accepted, they were passed on as orders through ground command channels. Subordinate maneuver commanders were then responsible for the execution of the orders. Artillery battalion commanders had no more power than their superiors to influence the 

action of their batteries other than to make recommendations to 

their supported ground commanders. A more efficient use of the 

system would have been for the infantry commander to give only 

general guidance to his artillery on how best to support his maneuver plan. The artillery commander, the more knowlegeable of the 

two on fire support matters, then would have the freedom and 

flexibility necessary to deliver the most responsive support. Unfortunately, Vietnamese infantry commanders were leary of giving 

their suboTdinates such leeway. 

Artillery advisers were justifiably critical of Vietnamese firing 

procedures. Again, Vietnamese ideas reflected past exposure to 

French techniques. The French forward observer computed firing 

data mentally and sent them directly to the guns. The data were 

not accurate but the system was speedy. The U.S. observer sent 
30 FIELD ARTILLERY 

his request for a fire mission to a fire direction center, where more 

accurate data could be computed and sent to the guns. Whereas 

French procedures were fast, U.S. procedures were accurate. Arguments could be made for either system, but accuracy would 

appear to be preferable in a situation in which targets were small, 

only two or three guns were likely to be within range, and the 

enemy was on foot. The U.S. fire direction center was adopted, 

but the information required to give accuracy to firing data was 

not available. The required registrations, surveys, and calibrations 

were not conducted and meteorological information was not avail· 

able. The result was that Vietnamese procedures were neither fast 

nor accurate. 

But Vietnamese artillery was not completely ineffective. Prisoner 

interrogations revealed that the enemy grudgingly respected AR VN 

artillery and intentionally planned attacks in areas that were beyond 

its range. Then, too, there were hopeful, though isolated, examples 

of South Vietnamese artillery operating aggressively and achieving 

outstanding results. One such example was Operation DAN THANG 

106 during the period 15-22 April 1963. Field artillery supporting 

the operation moved 110 times and fired 1,007 missions. One artillery concentration was credited with killing 60 Viet Congo 

Vietnamese artillery nonetheless had a long way to go, and to 

the advisers there were as many disquieting signs as there were hopeful ones. The ARVN operation at Ap Bac, a small village in the 

Mekong Delta, was bitter evidence of the weakness of the artillery. 

Too long in static positions and dependent on slipshod firing procedures, the artill ery in this case showed itself to be unequal to the 

task of providing responsive support to offensive ground operations. 

The attack against Ap Bac in January 1963 was well conceived 

but poorly executed. It was to be a three-pronged attack, including 

mechanized infantry, and was designed not only to surprise the Viet 

Cong but also to trap him and pin him down. Once the enemy was 

surrounded, government forces would tighten the circle and destroy 

him with all available fire support from small arms to tactical air 

power. Open rice land to the east of Ap Bac was left unguarded. The 

decision was that if the enemy attempted to escape in that direction, 

he would make an excellent target for aircraft and artillery. As the 

joint ground and air assault was launched, the Viet Cong 514th 

Battalion reinforced by local guerril la forces made attempts to escape the closing trap but was checked in every case. With all avenues of escape closed, the Viet Cong withdrew into the village, dug 

in, and prepared to fight even though they were outnumbered and 

outgunned. 

Problems started when areas near hel icopter landing zones were 
THE ADVISORY EFFORT 31 

not cleared by preparatory artillery fire. Enemy gunners shot down 

five helicopters with intensive automatic small-arms fire. which 

could have been neutralized by an adequate artillery preparation. 

Poor leadership, lack o[ aggressiveness by the South Vietnamese, 

incorrect and unco-ordinated use of the armored personnel carriers. 

and the unwillingness o[ the Vietnamese commanders to listen to 

their advisers caused the assault to slow and halt. Reinforcements 

were parachuted in but were not employed correctly. Night set in, 

and the Viet Gong picked up their weapons and casualties and escaped through the leaky trap set by the ground forces. Artillery was 

not fired during the night to hold the enemy in position; instead, the 

next morning the Vietnamese cut loose with an unobserved artillery 

barrage into the village and killed government soldiers. When 

the battlefield was searched, only three enemy bodies were found. 

Reports from the field attempted to declare this controversial battle 

a victory for the South Vietnamese. It was not. 

The A dviser Learns, Too 

Although the Vietnamese displayed significant weaknesses in 

certain aspects of the employment of their artillery, at the same 

time they demonstrated a considerable degree of ingenuity. They 

had been fighting essentially the same enemy for several decades 

and had developed or copied from the French various employment 

concepts that were particularly well suited to the peculiarities of 

their situation. Their country and the enemy presented a situation 

the likes of which the U.S. Army hall not [aced since the Indian 

wars. Artillery advisers were in a position to learn from their counterparts as much as if not more than their counterparts could learn 

from them. What advisers learned and reported to their superiors 

was later invaluable in the employment of U.S. artillery. 

Advisers learned, for instance-as their counterparts knew all 

along, that artillery could not be responsive if it had to be moved 

into supporting distance after a hamlet was attacked. A majority 

of the enemy's attacks were o[ small scale and lasted for only a short 

time. They normally terminated before artillery could be positioned. Even worse, the enemy could easily plan an effective ambush of any artillery convoy that was rushing to the relief of a 

hamlet. The artillery had to be pre-positioned throughout the 

countryside so that the maximum number of hamlets would be 

under the protective umbrella of one or more weapons. The amount 

of artillery available and the number of positions to be occupied 

dictated that only two or three weapons, rather than a full battery, 

could occupy a single position. This piecemeal application of artil-
32 FIELD ARTILLERY 

lery was colllrary to everything U.S. artillerymen had learned relative to the employment of field artillery; past wars had shown (hat 

artillery was most effective when the fires of entire battalions could 

be massed against the enemy. But in the past area coverage was not 

important. 

Cannons in this environment could be called on to fire in any 

direction. Artillerymen were quick to term this a "6,400" mil environment, the mil being the angular measurement used by the artillery with 6,400 mils in a complete circle. Procedures to shift fires 

quickly from one direction to another had been developed by the 

French and passed on to the Vietnamese, who made further 

refinements. The French routinely constructed in their outposts circular gun pits and protective parapets, which allowed the guns to be 

swung in all directions while providing protection for their crews. 

Sufficient Inarkers of known azimuth were located around the gun 

emplacements to provide convenient reference points no matter in 

what direction the guns were to fire. The Vietnamese adopted in 

theiT fire direction centers a circular firing chart that was several 

times the size of a normal chart but permitted the computation of 

fire missions in any direction. 

The ad viser also learned that the use of scattered outposts required a host of changes to what he had considered normal operating procedures. '>\lire communications could be cut or tapped easily 

and could be used only within outpost perimeters. Radio, previously considered a backup system, became predominant. Another 

change was that infantry was required to protect artill ery positions. 

This placed restrictions on the artillery that American advisers had 

not experienced. Artillery commanders, at best, were required to 

consider the availability of infantry protection in planning each of 

their moves. At worst, artillery movements could be totally controlled by an unwise infantry commander, who could deny protection if artill ery did not move when and where he desired. Still 

another change was that each outpost had to be able to direct its 

own fire. U.S. Army doctrine said that fires would be directed from 

battalion fire direction centers, with backup provided by the firing 

battery. With his batteries spread over wide areas, the battalion 

commander was too far removed [rom the action to have a full 

appreciation of each local situation. Commanders of batteries or 

their platoons were in the best position to establish priorities and 

decide what targets to engage. 

Advisers could not but be impressed with the innovative techniques devised by the Vietnamese that enabled a hamlet to call for 

artillery fire. In the initial years of the American advisory buildup, 

hamlets and villages were not equipped with radios but requested 
TI-IE ADVISORY F.FFORT 33 

155-MM. HOWITZER IN TUY AN DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. Typical emplacement to defend local populace. 

fires by prearranged signals such as colored Aares. A hamlet was 

given four nares of different colors, each color representing a car· 

dinal point. Red might represent nonh; green, south. If the hamlet 

was attacked, its defenders fired a flare of the color that indicated 

the direction of the enemy attack. From the outposts. data were 

computed and guns fired at various preplotted points on the appro· 

priate side of the hamlet. Another signal was a large wooden arrow 

lit with kerosene at night and swung horizontally to point in the 

direction of an enemy attack. This procedure required that the 

supporting arti ll ery outpost be at a higher elevation than the hamlet and in a position to see the arrow. As radios became available. 

they were issued to hamlet officials. An artillery target indicator was 

then devised. This was a simple circular board containing the outline of the hamlet and the relative locatiuns of preplanned num· 

bered concentration points. The operator pointed a rotating arrow 

in the direction of the enemy attack to find the azimuth and iden· 

tify the point nearest the activity. With a radio the operator could 

request fires by concentration numbers and make subsequent corrections. 
34 FIELD ARTILLERY 

EARLY MOVEMENT OF ARTILLERY BY AIR. CH-J4 with J05·mm. carriage. 

The Vietnamese had moved their fire support weapons by helicopter to support combat operations several years before U_S. combat units were committed in Vietnam. True. procedures for such 

movement had been developed and rehearsed by U.S. Army troops 

stationed in the United States, and it was largely American advisers 

who taught the procedures; further, the Vietnamese used U.S. heli· 

copters and pilots. Even so, this was the airmobil ity concept in its 

infancy and advisers could only profit from the experience. The 

CH-34 (then called the H-34) helicopter could lift the 10S-mm. 

howitzer under normal conditions. Unfortunately, atmospheric conditions and mountainous terrain in Vietnam greatly restricted lifting capacity. The solution was to strip the S80-pound shield from 

the weapon and leave it behind. Then the weapon was dismantled 

into two separate helicopter loads-the tube and the carriage. 

Both parts were lifted by sling from an external hook on the bottom 

of the aircraft. 

The 4.2·inch mortar, being considerably lighter than the 105-

mm. howitzer, was easier to move by helicopter and probably was 
THE ADVISORY EFFORT 35 

moved at least as ohen, though there are no records to support this 

assumption. One such move of paniclilar significance was made on 

5 May 196:1. Three mortars of the South Vietnamese 25th Battalion (advised by Captain Theodore F. Smith) were moved by H-2 1 

helicopters north of Bong Son into a landing zone well beyond the 

range of friendly artillery. Believing they were safe from artillery, 

the Viet Cong were cauglll hy slirprise and suffered "numerous" 

casualties. 

American advisers regained a respect for lightweiglll towed artillery weapons in Vielllatn. All but forgotten in scenarios pilling 

Ollr forces clg:lillSt a sopllisticatcd enemy in Europe, where the 

punch of heavier artillery was required, the 105-ml11. howitzer 

again came to the forefront as the principal Army combat artillery 

piece. Altho ugh the I05-mlll. projectile was much smaller and thus 

had less destructive power than the I 55-nnn. projectile, the I05-mm. 

howitzer was easy to manil:lndle, W:lS helicopter transportable, and 

had a high rate of fire . It therefore proved to be the most desirable 

U.S. artillery weapon in counterguerril la operations. 

One of the most important lessons learned by field artillery 

advisers was that efficient clearance procedures were :lbsolutely 

neccessary if artillery was to be at all effective. The necessity for obtaining clearance was peculiar to a counterguerri ll a operation in 

which the enemy operated in and around populated areas. Clearance was often agonizingly slow in com ing. The reasons for delay 

could be completely valid. For instance, the ground commander 

might be unsure of the location of one of his patrols or the responsible government official might have reason to believe that civilians 

were in the target area . On the other hand, the delay could be 

totally inexcusable and caused by inefficient clearance procedures 

or indifference of the responsible official. 

The above are only the more important of countless lessons 

learned from the Vietnamese by U.S. artillery advisers. Those advisers who were career soldiers would find themselves returning to 

Vietnam before the conclusion of hosti lities. Many would be assigned to U.S. artillery units and could use profitably much that 

they had learned as advisers. 

How effective was this early advisory effort? If we judge results 

against the established goal of providing assistance necessary for the 

South Vietnamese Army to defend its country, we must admit failure. Throughout the period the army continued to lose its hold on 

the country until, in 1965, it was in so tenuous a position that the 

United States was forced to illlercede with combat troops. (Map 3) 

But was the goa l a realistic one? Only four years passed from the 

time the U.S. advisory commitmelll was significantly expanded in 
, 

'VI , 

LAOS 

CAMBOD I A 

, 

/ 

IV CORPS 

MAP 3 

NORTH VIITNAM 

'\ , 

I 

\ SOUTH 

I 

I VIETNAM II 

I , 

, 

I 0 , Ban MeThuot 

SOUTH 

CHINA 

Moe 

SEA 

CORPS 

ENEMY ACTIVITY 

1954-1965 

() SITE OF M AJOR BATTLE 

@> AREA OF PROLONGED FIGHTI NG 

o 50 10010liLES 

I " , ' , I 

o I~O KILO METE RS '0 
TilE ADVISORY EFFORT 37 

1961 until American combat forces were engaged. Such a short time 

ca n hardly be considered adequate to prepare an army to face an 

adversary that would prove itself ca pabl e of giving even American 

forces a difficult time. 

Aside from problems of geogra phy, cultural differences, and 

Vietnamese military exper ience and practices, it must also be 

stressed that the overthrow of President Di em on I November 1963 

occu rred in the midst of the advisory effort. His government had 

been slow and plodding, reHening the many checks he had built 

into the government machinery to keep ambitiolls subordinates in 

rein . But Diem had kept a firm grip on the country that had can· 

tributed to cohesiveness and unity of purpose. In th e aftermath of 

the coup. however. came a series of military and civil power grabs 

that for the better part o[ a year disrupted the government to the 

point that only the most routine matters could be concluded . Unity 

of purpose was sacr ificed to personal advancement and ga in. 

But rega rdl ess o r th ese probl ems, the advisory period was userul. It ended with a better led and better train ed South Vietnamese 

fighting force, although room ror improvement remained. The U .S. 

adv isers G ill also be nedited with having helped th e South Vietnamese Army ride out th e a rterma th or th e coup. The advisory organiza tion remained functional even when the Vietnamese military 

or governtnent organ iza tions were not; in emergencies. for exampl e. 

advisers could appea l to their superiors to help cut red tape and 

effect the rel ease or needed supplies or reinrorcements.' And in genera l, what the advisers learned and reported over th e [our years 

gave U.S. combat commanders an ad vance appreciation of the situation as well liS insights into the tactics. organizations, and weapons 

most appropriate to defeat the enemy. 

T he advisory effort continued after U.S. combat troops were 

committed. Indeed, th e success of th ese troops gave advisers more 

time to h elp the Vietnamese defend their country. 

t Interestingl y enough, Ihe Vietnamese field artillery played a significant rol e in 

Diem's ove rthrow. Apparently the artillery was directed to tic dow II the palace guards 

and 1101 to damage the U.S. Embassy across the street from where the guards were 

billeted. Field artillery was positioned some 10,000 metcrs northwest of Saigon and a 

forward observer was positioncd down the strect from thc palace guard quarters. The 

baHalion COlllmander had no accurate plot of their quarters; he used a tourist lIl ap 

to cstablish a grid IOc.llion. Thc first round lin..'d was smokc and was a target hit. The 

battery continllcd to fire thc one gun with high ·explosive projcctilcs and destroyed' 

thc top o{ the SlruClU rc. No one was killed, yet Ihe guards wcrc ncutrali zed and forced 

to withdraw to the cellar for protection . The field artillery had been employed with 

surgical precision. NOI even a window was shattered in Ihe U.S. Embassy. (The di-

\ ol1 commander was thcli Gencral Nguyen Van Thieu.) 
CHAPTER 1II 

In Order To Win 

By late 1964 it was apparent that the South Vietnamese could 

not win the war alone despite heavy infusions of U.S. equipment 

and advisers. Most of the country was either firmly controlled or 

hotly contested by the enemy. The South Vietnamese Army weekly 

casualty rate was equivalent to a full battalion, a rate that could not 

be long sustained. To complicate matters further, the enemy was 

concentrating forces in II Corps Tactical Zone in preparation for a 

major offensive to cut the country in half at National Highway 19. 

Accordingly, President Lyndon B. Johnson, acting under authority 

of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, ordered U.S. combat forces to 

South Vietnam. The first troops, U.S. Marines represented by the 

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, arrived on 8 March 1965. They 

were followed two months later by the 173d Airborne Brigade. 

Combat troops would continue to arrive over the next three years 

until the total comnlitment was equivalent to over ten divisionstwo Marine divisions, seven Army divisions, three separate brigades, 

and an armored cavalry regiment plus requisite control headquarters and support. 

More than two battalions of field artillery would arrive in Vietnam for each combat brigade. One battalion would be in direct 

support of each brigade, and the remainder would provide augmenting fires or area protection. The very size of the field artillery 

indica ted that it was being counted on heavily to provide a major 

portion of the combat power required to win. Artillerymen at all 

levels were challenged to insure that so large and important a force 

be employed to its maximum effectiveness. 

If field artillery units were to be effective from the outset of 

their introduction to the war, they had to arrive in Vietnam well 

trained. In the United States, commanders of field artillery units 

alerted for deployment to Vietnam carefully planned and executed 

intensive training programs for their troops. There was little time 

and much to be done. 

A minor part of the total training of all units consisted of instruction in subjects applicable to all branches. Headquarters, 

United States Continental Army Command, directed that a sixteen-
IN ORDER TO WIN 39 

hour block of instruction consisting of the following subjects be 

given to all Vietnam-bound units: 

OrienL1tion-2 hours 

Perimeter defense- l hour 

Duties of sentries- l hour 

Ambush drill . mounted and dismounted-8 hours 

Field sanitation- l hour 

./ungle survival- l hour 

Lessons learned- l hour 

Miscellaneous- l hour 

The remaining training time was devoted to artillery-re lated 

subjects. All field artillery headquarters. from division artillery and 

artillery group down, underwent intensive training centered on elnplaying their units against irregular forces. Battalions conducted 

section. battery. and battalion training which culminated. when 

possible. in field train ing exercises to test unit proficiency. Battery 

commanders emphasized platoon operations and gunnery and fire 

direction procedures in the 6.400-mil environment. They foresaw 

the need for additional fire direction center personnel in the event 

their battery weapons were split among several locations. As a result. tilne permitting. survey and howitzer crews were cross-trained 

in fire direction center procedures. 

Because of leaves, reassignments, and last-minute arrival of replacements. classes and practical exercises often had to be conducted several times to insure that all personnel received the necessary training. Training for all units then continued aboard troop 

transports. Classes were presented for two hours daily. They were 

fo llowed by twenty to thirty minutes of physical training. conducted during the warmest part of the day in order to acclimatize 

soldiers to tropical heat. 

The Impact of Vietnam on Field Artillery Organizations 

Not in recent history had the U.S. Army faced an insurgent 

force of such significance on terrain that so favored the enemy as in 

Vietnam. Since the enemy largely dictated how the war would be 

fought. it was necessary for the Army to modify established operational doctrine considerably to be successful against him. These 

modifications had a tremendous impact at all organizational levels. 

The impact on field artillery organizations is most readily explained 

by comparing the tactics used in fighting a conventional war with 

the tactics developed in Vietnam. 

In a conventional grollnd war. U.S. maneuver forces are disposed along a line facing the enemy. To th e front. security forces 
40 FIELD ARTILLERY 

are positioned to warn of the enemy's approach and to delay him 

while inflicting maximum punishment. To the rear, additional 

maneuver forces are held in reserve by all ground commanders 

above company level, and each is committed by its commander 

when needed. 

Also to the rear are the combat support activities, including the 

field artillery, as well as combat service support activities. For the 

most part the fcar area contains no large enemy forces, so units 

operating there are considered sufficiently strong to defend themselves. With littl e enemy ground activity, wire communications are 

used extensively in the rear area . Radio is considered a secondary 

means of communication, for the most part used by units on the 

move. The main tineal to the survival of a unit is the enemy's fire 

power from aircraft and artillery that can reach behind the front 

lines. 

Most of the available field artillery is used to engage the enemy 

forward of front-line maneuver forces; therefore, most artillery 

units, though as scattered and dispersed as possible, are disposed 

laterally behind the front line. Each maneuver division has artillery to support its ground forces, the composition depending on the 

type of division. In most cases the division artillery has three similar battalions of light or medium cannon artillery, sufficient to support each of the three brigades of the division, and one or more 

additional battalions of heavier artillery to provide augmenting 

fires. 

The division artill ery commander supports the division commander's maneuver plan by assigning missions to his artillery battalions and by co-ordinating the employment of all available fire 

support, including nondivisional field artillery and fire support 

from other branches and services. A field arti llery unit can be 

assigned to support a single maneuver unit <it is then said to be in 

direct support), or it can be employed to augment the fires of other 

artillery units. In the latter case, a unit can have a reinforcing mission, augmenting the fires of a single designated field artillery unit; 

a general support mission, augmenting the fires of all field artillery 

units of the division; or a general support-reinforcing mission. A 

unit on this last mission again augments the fires of all field artillery units but gives priority to reinforcing the fires of a single designated artillery unit of the division. 

Mission assignment has proved to be an extremely effective 

method of weighting the main effort oE the division and economizing 

combat power elsewhere. It has provided the flexibility required 

for adjusting fire support to the ever-changing needs of the battlefield. Mission assignment has been particularly effective in conven-
IN ORDER TO WIN 41 

tional operations, in which units can displace virtually at will to 

give maximum support to the ground forces. 

In assigning missions lO subordinate battalions, the division artillery commander first places one of his three light baltalions in 

direct support of each committed brigade. Thus, if the division has 

two brigades on line and one in reserve, only the two brigades on 

line receive direct support artillery. The division artillery commander than assigns an augmenting mission to the third of this three 

similar battalions. Perhaps the most common mission for this battalion is to reinforce the direct support hattalion covering the area 

of greatest effort or I:lrgest thre:lt. At the same time, the reinforcing 

battalion is instructed to revert to direct support of the brigade in 

reserve when that brigade is committed lO battle. The division 

artillery conlmander most commonly places his heavy artillery battalion in general support of the division or in general support-reinforcing of the fires of a specific direct support ballalion. However 

the division artillery commander employs his baltalions at the 

beginning of an operation, he is free lO adjust them at any time lO 

meet unforeseen developments. 

In conventional operations, tnissions seldom are assigned to artillery units smaller than batta lion. A battalion in direct support of 

a brigade supports the entire brigade rather than assigning one of 

its batteries to each of the brigade's battalions. To control the fires 

of its three balleries, the ballalion establishes a centralized fire direction center. Centralized control permits the battalion to bring all 

the fires of its batteries lO bear at any point in the brigade sector. 

This massing of fires is possible because all batteries are likely lO be 

well within range o[ the entire brigade front. In fact, combat power 

might be so highly concentrated in some instances that all the artillery of a division can be massed on a single target. 

Even so, there are occasions on the conventional battlefield 

where firing batteries or battalions are widely separated; [or example, artillery units might be sent for"':lrd to support long-range 

screening or covering (orce operations, or units might be sent to 

suppon a force on an independent operation. Artillery organizations and doctrine have provided for such contingencies. Firing batteries have fire direction centers which under normal conditions 

provide backup support of the ballalion fire direction center but 

act independently where the ballery is too distant for its parent 

unit lO control or support it. "Vhen a ballery or battalion is distant 

from its parent unit, it is normally attached lO its supported maneuver unit. 

In a conventional battle plan before the Vietnam era, field artillery doctrine was that sizable amounts of field artillery, in addi-
42 FIELD ARTILLERY 

lion to that organic to division artilleries, are available to support 

ground operations. This artillery is organic to a field army and is 

organized into separate battalions or groups. (A group controls two 

or more battalions.) The field army commander provides additional 

combat power to his subordinate corps by assigning his field artillery to them. He can thus effectively weight the combat power of 

the corps that he considers to have the highest priority, based on the 

mission he has given it. The corps commander receiving artillery 

[rom field army in turn assigns the artillery to augment his subordinate divisions. He also gives primary consineratinn to lhilt division with the most critical mission. 

The waT in Vietn<ttn was anything but conventional. The enemy 

was not contained by a line of friendly forces. Instead, he operated 

throughout the country. mostly in small units, but massing formidable strength when and where he chose. Accordingly, military 

ground operations were characterized by numerous, concurrent, 

widely dispersed small-unit operations. These tactics permitted 

continuolls pursuit o[ the widely scattered enemy. To insure that 

the maximum area was defended by available troops, a section of 

terrain called an area of operations (AO) was assigned to each 

ground unit from the highest level down. A ground force commander conducted operations throughout his assigned area. The two 

field force commanders divided their areas, each corresponding to 

one of the four South Vietnamese military regions, among their 

divisions. The divisions in turn divided their territory into brigade 

areas of operations. Brigades split their areas among their battalions: battalions, among their companies. 

The wide dispersal of maneuver forces required significant 

changes in the employment tactics of supporting artillery. The size 

of brigade areas of operations and range limitations of the cannons 

prevented a direct support b;:Hlalion from massing the fires of its 

batteries in support of an entire brigade. Instead, artillery was disposed to provide the maximum area coverage, with each of the 

three batteries of a battalion in direct support of one of the three 

maneuver battalions of the brigade. The infantry battalion commander and the supporting battery cOlTIlnancier were jointly responsible for insuring that the battery was always positioned to 

cover adequately all maneuver forces of the battalion. 

Fire direction was no longer centralized at field artillery battalion but was decentralized to battery level or, when the battery 

was forced to occupy two positions, to platoon level. The primary 

justification for centralizing fire direction was the ability to Inass 
IN ORUER TO WJN 43 

fires. Now that that ability no longer existed, the best place to control fires was at the baltery, where the commander could best apprecia le the needs of the supported infantry baltalion. Firing batteries 

were isolated wilh lheir supported batt.,lions. They did not have 

the freedom of movement they would have on the conventional 

balliefieid but moved with their supponed infantry battalions and 

were protected by these battalions. vVire communications were vulnerable, and radios were used exclusively for communicating beyond defensive posilions. Because of the distances involved, a batlery, wilhout freedom of movement, could do little to support itself 

administratively or log'istic<llly withollt inCTe<lsed <lssistan('e from its 

parem ballalion. 

Small friendly ullilS operaling throughout lhe area of operations were dimcult to pinpoint and added to the dimcullies of providing supponing fires lo ground forces. Anillery forward observers 

with maneuver companies continuollsly transmitted position localions to lhe battery, hllt lhe terrain made land navigation dimcult 

and there was always lhe possihility of a mistake by the forward 

observer. Any mistakes could have resulted in friendly casualties. 

Out of respecl for that danger, an infantry battalion commander 

righlfully reslricted lhe activities of his direct support battery until 

its men had demonslrated their competence to his salisfaction. This 

took several weeks at hest. Once his confidence was won, the commander loosened restrictions and the total combat system worked as 

it had been designed to work. Fires were planned and executed 

wilhin general guidance from the ground commander, who was 

then free to devote his attention to the maneuver plan. 

The artillery and infantry have a lways had a close working rela· 

tionship, a requirement if maneuver and fire support are to be completely compl ementary. This relationship was never closer or more 

imponant than in Vietnam. The artillery battery was isolated with 

its supported infantry battalion. Each was dependent on the other 

for survival- the artillery for protection, the infantry for supporting fires. The relationship was funher strengthened by a policy of 

"habitual association" of a direct support baltalion with a specific 

brigade and each ballery of the battalion with a specific maneuver 

battalion. 

The policy of habitual association was logica l and easily execu· 

led. Every maneuver brigade was committed to the defense of an 

area of operations; none was placed in reserve. For that reason, each 

of the three light balta I ions of division artillery was always in direct 

support of a brigade. So rigidly was the policy of habitual associa· 

lion enforced that an artillery battalion and its associated brigade 
44 FIELD ARTILLERY 

often entered th e country at the same time, remained together 

throughout their involvement there, and withdrew from Vietnam 

or stood down together. 

Vietnam also had its impact on the activities of the division artillery. \Vith each of his light battalions in direct support of a maneuver brigade, the division artillery commander was powerless to 

vary their tactical mission or otherwise rearrange the support they 

provided. The on ly un it remaining with which he could influence 

the action was his heavy battalion, which generally consisted of 

three I 55-n1ln. batteries and an 8-inch battery. He would direct the 

hatteries of the heavy battalion to provide additional fires where 

he thought they were most needed. Often one of his 155-mm. batteries was committed to the direct support of the division cava lry 

squadron, reducing his Aexibility to inAuence the action even more. 

Furthennore, distances and the situation prevented the division artillery commander from utilizing his remaining artillery as responsively as he could in conventional operations. Heavy artillery was 

positioned in advance o( an operation and moved only infrequently, 

if at all. 

Since the capability to influence the battle at division artillery 

level was reduced, the work load normally associated with the capability was also reduced. Yet as the responsibilities of the division 

artillery commander were lessened in one area, they were increased 

in others. The wide dispersal o( artillery units increased the problems of supply and maintenance, and staff officers were kept busy 

seeking ways to increase the support the baltalions could provide to 

their batteries. Trucks and helicopters for hauling supplies were 

sought out and requested. Needed maintenance and administrative 

support was arranged for battalions to send to isolated batteries. In 

addition, the division :trtillery commander was responsible for contributing (orces, weapons, and equipment to the de(ense of the division base camp or for directing the entire base camp defense. Also, 

because winning the support o( the population was so important to 

the success of a counterguerrill a war, added emphasis was placed on 

civil affairs and the work load in that area expanded considerably. 

Division artillery staffs were augmented ,vith an officer to plan and 

direct civil affairs activities and to co·ordinate those of subordinate 

battal ions. 

The work load of the division artill ery commander in other 

areas was much the same as it had always been. He was still the adviser to the division commander on fire support matters. Intelligence had to be gathered and collated continuously and actions of 

division maneuver forces and artillery updated. A fire support element at division had to be established to support ongoing maneuver 
IN ORDER TO WIN 45 

operations. And the use or nondivisional fire support 1l1CanS, including fi eld artillery, Air Force lactical air and strategic bombers, and 

naval air and naval gunfire. htld to he planned, requested, and coordinated. 

As in conventional operations, there were large amounts of field 

arLillery in addition to that organic to divisions; however, the manner in which it was organized and employed was vastly different. In 

a conventional operation, Ilondivisionai field tlrtillery normally is at 

the field army level alld is apportioned to corps on the basis of 

their needs. United States Army, Vietnam (liSARV), was organized into two fielel forces ,md a separate corps. The field force, a 

new organizalioll to the Army, was rOllghly equiva lent in level of 

command to " corps bllt had greatly expanded slipply and administrative responsibiliti es. The corps, on the other hand, was a tactical 

headqllarters and its lean staff cOlild only co-ordinate logistical 

ilctivities. In Vietnam, field artillery \ViiS ;!ssigned on a permanent 

basis to each o f the field forces and the separate corps. This practice 

recognized that the requirements of each command tended to remain stable and that the long distances involved precluded continuous shifting of artillery from one field force to another. The 

stability of artill ery requirements of the two field forces and the 

separate corps was a result of the mission assigned to nondivisional 

artillery. Whereas divisional artil lery supported specific U.S. maneuv~r operations, nondivisional artillery served in an area support 

role, a role that was new to the field artill ery yet vital und er the 

circumstances. 

Of overriding importance in Vietnam, as in any counterguerrilla action, was winning the support of the people for their government. They had to be shown that the government could improve 

their lot as well as protect them from the insurgent. Field force artillery firing units were positioned to provide maximum coverage 

of population centers, I ines of communication, and government installations. Firing units answered ca lls for fire support from any 

friendly party, civil or military, within range. The position location of each unit had to be carefully planned in relation to the position loca tions of a ll others. This planning was done at field force 

level. In past wars commanders at such high levels were not concerned with the positioning of individual firing units; subordina te 

artillery commanders had the authority to decide within libera l 

territorial limitations where units could best be placed to perform 

their mission. But in Vietnam much of the responsibility for positioning their units was taken from them. 

As was true of division artillery, commanders of groups and battalions in field force arti ll ery had increased work loads in other 
46 FIELD ARTILLERY 

areas as a result of added logistical support problems and civil 

affairs and position defense responsibilities. Also, the role of nondivisional artillery created a requirement for continuous dialogue 

with local government representatives and supported military and 

paramilitary forces. Such dialogue was necessary not only for the 

artillery to do its job but also for its survival. Firing units providing 

area cover were often far from U.S. maneuver forces and had to 

turn to the Vietnamese for protection. 

Commanders of both division and field force artillery in Vietnam continued the practice of providing fire support through mission assignment, though the meanings applied to the missions were 

somewhat changed. Since lInilS were so widely dispersed, a single 

artillery unit normally could not be positioned to augment the fires 

of several other artillery units. Instead, general support became 

area coverage. For units of divisional artillery, area coverage placed 

primary importance on plugging gaps in the coverage of direct 

support units. For units of field force artillery. area coverage placed 

primary importance on supporting all friendly forces within range 

of their positions. Thus, quite contrary to its normal meaning, the 

mission of general support was often given to a unit that had no 

other field artillery within range. The meaning of the reinforcing 

mission changed little. Reinforcing artillery still augmented the 

fires of a specific artillery unit. General support-reinforcing artillery was positioned to augment the fires of a specific field artillery 

unit but otherwise provided area coverage. 

Another change occurred in respect to batteries too distant from 

their parent battalions to receive control or support. Practice in the 

past had been to attach such batteries to their supported maneuver 

battalions, but in Vietnam such an arrangement was not fully satisfactory. Maneuver commanders had neither the equipment nor the 

expertise to support artillery units adequately, particularly for 

lengthy operations. And field artillery commanders, who were 

schooled and experienced in the employment of artillery to serve 

the maneuver forces best, were unable to influence the situation. 

Instead of attachment, the status of operational control (OPCON) 

was most often used. For example, if a firing battery was to be separated from its parent headquarters, it was placed under the operational control of another artillery battal ion headquarters in the area 

in which the battery was employed. A battery that was under the 

operational control of a field artillery battalion was controlled by 

that battalion but continued to receive support from its parent battalion. Maneuver commanders could then receive the best possible 

fire support without being burdened with additional support requirements. 
IN ORDER TO WIN 47 

Though operational control served a useful purpose, its use 

complicated operations of battalions with both divisional and nondivisional artillery. At anyone time, one battalion might be controll ing its own three batteries plus several others that were under 

its operational control. Another battalion might have lost the operational control of all its organic batteries to another battalion. 

Artillery battalions had to be Hexible enough to direct the opera· 

tions of a varying number of batteries. 

On numerOllS occasions artillery units were employed in ways 

quite contrary to the general practice that had been developed in 

Vielnam. Division ltrtillery normally supported divisional maneuver forces whereas field force artillery served in an area support 

role. Vet on anyone day during the height of the U.S. commitment, 

one could point out numerous cases in which roles were reversed. For example, when division artillery supported divisional 

maneuver units in such rugged terrain that its organic l55·mm. selfpropelled howitzers could not follow, the division artillery 

commander might be provided with airmobile l55-mm. towed howitzers from field force artillery for the duration of the operation. 

There were also frequent occasions when field force artillery units 

were placed in direct support of maneuver units, and many times 

division artillery units provided area support. 

Fi,·c Support Co-ordi1latio1l 

The responsibility for co-ordinating the various types of fires 

available to the maneuver commander falls largely on the field artillery. At all maneuver headquarters above company level, an artillery fire support co-ordinator (FSCOORD) is responsible for 

co-ordinating all available fire power-field artillery, armed helicopters, Air Force and Naval tactical air, air defense weapons in the 

ground support role, and naval gunfire. In addition, an infantry battalion commander often delegates responsibility for co·ordinating 

the battalion heavy mortar fire to his co-ordinator. At maneuver company, the company commander is the fire support co·ordinator 

though a field artillery forward observer is available to aid and 

advise him. At maneuver battalion the co-ordinator is a liaison officer from the direct support field artillery battalion. At higher levels 

he is the commander of the artillery supporting the force; however, in practice he delegates the detailed co-ordination activities to 

a subordinate. The artillery battalion commander delegates the 

duty to the artillery liaison officer with the brigade. The division 

and corps (or field force) artillery commanders delegate the duty to 

an assistam co-ordi nator. Within each of the operation centers of 
48 FIELD ARTILLERY 

maneuver forces, a co-ordinator establishes and supervises a fire SLIpport co·ordination activity, called a fire support co·ordination center 

(FSCC) at battalion and brigade level and a fire support element 

(FSE) at division and higher. In the center are representatives of 

all available fire support units. Some representatives are not in· 

cluded in the fire support element, being normally found elsewhere 

in the tactical operations center; hut their presence in the center 

still allows efficient co·ordination. 

The field artillery I iaison officer (now titled the fire support 

officer) with either a maneuver battalion or brigade was tasked in 

Vietnam as never before. Because of advances in weapon technology, more types of fire support were available. To complicate mat· 

ters, each type of fire support wuld deliver a host of different 

munitions, each designed for a different job. The field artillery liai· 

son officer was the one who insured that the most appropriate ord· 

nance available arrived at the right targets at a specified time and 

that all the fires delivered complemented one another. Besides having more weapons to co·ordinate, he often had to support not only 

U.S. Army forces but also Vietnamese military and paramilitary, 

Korean, Australian, Thai, New Zealand, Philippine, and U.S. 

Marine forces during joint operations. That task required more 

than processing and passing requests to the appropriate support 

means; it required establishing priorities as well as insuring that 

the organic fires of the other force were co·ordinated with the support being requested. This frequently called for him or an Army 

forward observer to be on the scene to request and direct or co· 

ordinate the fires. His efforts were further complicated by differences in language and in operating procedures. 

As if such complications were not enough, he was required to 

obtain clearance to insure that no civil ians were in the area before 

employing weapons. Clearance was most often obtained from the 

government district in which the supported force was operating, 

and arrangements had to be made to open and maintain the neces· 

sary radio nets in advance of an operation. Clearance had not been 

required in past U.S. wars, in which the enemy was engaged forward of a battle line and was not operating among the friendly 

population. Another responsibility of the liaison officer that was 

peculiar to Vietnam was the co·ordination of air space usage. Artil· 

lery warning control centers (A "VCe's) were established, normally 

at maneuver battalion and brigade levels, to advise the numerous 

aircraft over the area of operation of current supporting fires. All 

support means were required to notify the warning center before 

firing. Aircraft entering the area wou ld, in turn, contact the center 
IN ORDER TO WIN 49 

and receive current information plus a flight path to follow to avoid 

firings. 

Field A,-til/e,y We"pons 

The wide variances in the types of field artillery weapons sent 

to Vietnam gave senior artillery commanders great flexibility in 

tailoring fire support to satisfy best the needs of the situation. 

The I 05-0101. towed howitzer most often served in the direct 

support role. Its light weight, dependability, and high rate of fire 

made it the ideal weapon for moving with light infantry forces and 

responding quickly with high volumes of close-in fire. Units were 

initially eqnipped with the MIOIAI howitzer, virtually the same 

10S-mm. howitzer that had been used to support U.S. forces since 

World 'Var II. In 1966 a new 10S-mm. towed howitzer, the MI02, 

was received in Vietnam. The first M102's were issued LO the 1st 

Battalion, 21st Field Artillery, in March 1966. Replacement of the 

old howitzers continued steadily over the next four years. 

Many of the more seasoned artillerymen did not want the old 

cannon replaced. Over the years they had become famil iar with its 

every detail and \\'ere confident that it would not disappoint them 

in the clutch. Old Redlegs could offer some seemingly convincing 

reasons why the 1\[101 was still the superior weapon: its waist-high 

breech made it easier to load; it had higher ground clearance when 

in tow; but most important, it was considerably less expensive than 

the 1\11 102. Their arguments, however, were futile. The new M 102 

was by far the better weapon. It weighed little more than I Y2 tons 

whereas the MIOIAI weighed approximately 2Y2 LOns; as a result, 

more anununition could be carried during heliborne operations, 

and a %-10n truck rather than a 2V2-ton truck was its prime mover 

for ground operations. Another major advantage of the M 102 was 

that it could be traversed a full 6,400 mils. The MIOIAI had a 

limited on-carriage traverse, which required its trails (stabilizing 

legs) to be shifted if further traverse was necessary. A low silhouette made the new weapon a more difficult target for the enemy, an 

advantage that far outweighed the disadvantage of being somewhat 

less convenient to load. 

Certain field force artillery units were equipped with the M 108, 

a 10S-mtn'. self-propelled weapon. The weapon was obsolescent but 

was still in the U.S. field artillery inventory. In Germany, it had 

been replaced by the ISS-mm. self-propelled howitzer as the direct 

support artillery for U.S. armored and mechanized divisions. The 

MI08 was too heavy to be lifted by helicopter, so its support of 
50 FIELD ARTILLERY 

highly mobile light infantry forces in Vietnam was restricted. Still, 

the MI08 was employed effectively in the area support role and, if 

the terrain permitted, in support of ground operations. 

The next larger ca liber artillery weapons were the 155-mm. 

howitzers. Firing units were equipped with either the towed 

MIl4AI or the self-propelled M109. Both weapons normally provided area coverage or augmented direct support artillery. Occasionally, however, the 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer was used in 

direct support of maneuver units, as with the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division. Or when a divisional cavalry squadron operated as 

an entity, it was often provided a 155-mm. battery for direct 

support. Like the MI08, the towed MI14AI was considered obsolescent. It was no match for the 155-mm. self-propelled weapon for 

supporting conventional ground operations against a highly mobile, armor-heavy enemy. In Vietnam, however, the MIHAl 

proved invaluable because it was light enough to be displaced by 

helicopter and so could provide medium artillery support to infantry forces even where roads were nonexistent. The 155-mm. howitzers, whether towed or self-propelled, had a maximum range of 

14,600 meters, over 3,000 meters greater than that of the 105-mm. 

howitzer. The weight of the 105-mm. projectile-95 pounds-was 

almost three times the weight of the 105-mm. projectile. For these 

reasons, the 155-mm. howitzers could provide a welcome additional 

punch to existing direct support weapons. 

The MI07 self-propelled 175-mm. gun and the MilO 8-inch 

howitzer had identical carriages but different tubes. The 175-mm. 

gun fired a 174-pound projectile almost 33 kilometers. This impressive range made it a valuable weapon for providing an umbrella of 

protection over large areas. The 8-inch howitzer fired a 200-pound 

proj.ectile almost 17 kilometers, pillS being the most accurate 

weapon in the field artillery. The 8-inch howitzer was found with 

most division artilleries, and both the 8-inch howitzer and 175-mm. 

gun were with field force artillery. At field force the proportion of 8-

inch and 175-mm. weapons varied. Since the weapons had identical 

carriages, the common practice was to install those tubes that best 

met the current tactical needs. One day a battery might be 175-

mm.; a few days later it might be half 175-mm. and half 8-inch. 

Aerial rocket artillery (ARA) proved to be extremely effective 

in augmenting and extending the range of the cannon artillery of 

the airmobile divisions. Aerial rocket artillery units initially employed the UH-IB or UH-IC (Huey) helicopter equipped with a 

weapon system that could carry and fire forty-eight 2.75-inch rockets. In early 1968 the improved AH-IG (Huey Cobra) was outfitted as an aerial rocket artillery aircraft. Its maximum speed of 
IN ORDER TO WI N 51 

C H-47 W ,TH Ml02 HOWITZER 

130 knots was some 30 knots faster than that of the Huey. In 

add ition, it carried a larger payload of 76 rockets. In early 1970 the 

designation of aer ial rocket artill ery was changed to aerial fi eld 

artill ery (AFA). By either name, it was in every sense a fi eld artillery weapon system, orga nized as sllch and controll ed by artillerymen through artillery fire support channels. 

Field A ,.tille,-y M obility 

T he importance of mobility in insurgency operations cannot be 

too highl y stressed . From experience in past guerrilla actions in 

Malaya and the Philippines, the concl usion was that a t least ten 

soldiers are required to counter every enemy soldier. The ratio is 

high because the enemy has the initiative. He can hit wherever he 

desires and thus require that fri endl y forces be ready in sufficient 

numbers at all locations likely to be contested . Once the enemy has 

attacked and withdrawn. sizable forces are needed to sweep the 

co untryside if there is to be any hope of finding him. Superior mobility allows the ava ilabl e fri endly units to be more widely deployed and permits planners to reduce the ratio of fri endly to 
52 FJELD ARTILLERY 

, 

/ 

• 

CH-54 LIFTING 155-MM. HOWITZER 

--

enemy troops. For example, a highly mobile infantry battalion and 

its supporting battery could complete an operation in one area and 

in a matter of hours be moved to another some distance away. 

Mobility in Vietnam for ground troops and artillery alike was 

provided by ground vehicles, Air Force assault aircraft, watercraft, 

and helicopters. More artillery was moved by road than by any 

other means. When a landing zone could be conveniently reached 

by road, it was to a unit's benefit to move in this fashion if operational considerations did not dictate otherwise. The unit could be 

moved in convoy by its own veh icles and in its entirety, whereas 

movement by helicopter usually required several lifts. Because of 

its weight, all self-propelled artillery was moved in convoy. The Air 

Force, usually employing C-130's, supported long-distance moves 

between improved or unimproved airstrips. Watercraft transported 

both infantry and artillery in the delta areas, where a network of 

rivers, rivulets. and canals favored such ITIOVement. 

The Vietnam war saw the first large-scale use of helicopters by 

the U.S. Army to transport troops, artillery, and supplies. Helicopters added a new dimension to the battlefield by providing the 
IN ORDER TO WIN 53 

FIRE SUPPORT BASE .T. J. CARROLL IN MILITARY REGION I. A large {ire 

51tpport base, ]. ]. Carroll contai,lCci f01l1' {iring unils. 

commander a more responsive and Aexible means to concentrate 

his combat power where it was needed. 

Before 1962, the hel icopter had been used sparingly, but 

through the imagination and drive o[ several key officers, notably 

Generals James M. Gavin and Hamilton H. Howze, the airmobile 

concept was developed. They envisioned the deployment of lightly 

equipped troops by li[t helicopters, with fire support to and within 

the objective area provided by light tube artillery and armed helicopters. 'Vhat airmobile troops lacked in weight they would compensate for with mobility. They were planned for use against a 

sophisticated enemy where highly mobile forces have always been 

needed. Covering force and screening operations, economy-of-force 

missions, flank and rear area security, and securing of key terrain, 

bridges, and installations behind enemy lines were a few possible 

applications. In 1962 the Airmobility Requirement Board (commonly known as the Howze Board) was formed to develop organizational requirements for an airmobile brigade. The eITorts of the 

board resulted in the activation of the 11 th Air Assault Division, 

which was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in 

June 1965 and programed for deployment to Vietnam. Though the 

division was initially configured [or use in a sophisticated environ-
54 FIELD ARTILLERY 

., -.... STAR FORMATION. Battery fl, 1st Batlalion, 77th Field Artillery, ill 

well-prepared base camp. 

ment, it proved to be extremely effective in Vietnam against an 

unsophisticated enemy. 

The airmobile division artillery was equipped with 105-mm. 

towed howitzers and UH-IB (Huey) helicopters armed with rockets. Howitzers were lifted by the division's own CH-47A (Chinook) 

medium-lift helicopters. The Chinook could carry 33 combat 

troops and internal cargo up to 78 inches high, 90 inches wide, and 

366 inches long or external cargo of 6,000 to 8,000 pounds, depending on atmospheric conditions. A IOS-mm. howitzer battery with a 

basic load of ammunition could be moved in as few as 11 CH-47A 

sorties. Other maneuver units that followed the 1st Cavalry Division also used Chinooks extensively to move their howitzers; however, with the exceplion of the 10 1st Airborne Division these 

helicopters were not part of the divisions but were provided by 

aviaLion groups supporting the military regions. Every infantry unit 

in Vietnam was, in fact ir not in name, airmobile infantry and its 

direct support artillery was airmobile artillery. 

The CH-54 (Tarhe), nicknamed the Crane for its lifting ability, followed the Chinook to Vietnam. It could lift up to 18,000 
IN ORDER TO WIN 55 

pounds either by sling or by an attachable pod, but sling loads were 

by far the more common in Vietnam. Of special importance to the 

field artillery was the Crane's capacity to lift the 155-mm. towed 

howitzer without breaking it down into two separate loads as was 

required for the CH--47 helicopter. This would expedite the positioning of medium artillery in areas not accessible by road. 

'Fhe Fire Base 

Cannon artillery is the only nonorganic fire suppOrt serving maneuver forces that is immediately responsive, always available, and 

totally reliable_ It is immediately responsive because it is positioned 

to be always within range of the supported force, whereas other 

fire support means most often must be brought to the battle area or 

moved within range. It is always available because it is organized to 

provide field artillery in direct support of every committed maneuver force. A maneuver commander may not always receive other 

fire power because it is apportioned according to the needs of all 

commanders. It is totally reliable because it can function in any 

weather and in poor visibility, when helicopters and planes are 

grounded or their effectiveness is reduced. 

Infantry commanders fully appreciated the value of field artillery support. In developing their maneuver plans, they worked 

closely with their supporting artillery commanders to insure that 

the plans could be fully supported by the artillery. If plans envisioned that maneuver battalions would be so widely dispersed that 

they could not be supported by direct support batteries operating 

from single battery positions, additional artillery was requested. If 

additional artillery was unavailable, the direct support batteries 

were split to occupy several positions and thereby increase area 

coverage even though fire power was reduced. Only on rare occaisons did Inaneuver forces in Vietnam operate beyond the range of 

friendly artillery. 

Use of available mobility allowed direct support artillery to follow supported ground forces virtually anywhere. But once field artillery was displaced to a preplanned position to provide supponing 

fires, it was extremely vulnerable to the enemy, who could attack in 

mass from any direction. Firing batteries had neither the personnel 

nor the expertise to defend their positions against determined 

enemy attacks. Accordingly, infantry units provided defensive 

troops. The position jointly occupied by supporting artillery and 

defending infantry was referred to as a fire base or fire support base. 

It was cOlnmanded by either an infantryman or an artilleryman, 

usually whoever was the seniur. From its fire base an artillery fire 
56 FIELD ARTILLERY 

l'v[ EN FROM BATIERY A, 20 BATTALION, 319TH FIELD ARTILLERY, BUILDING 

PARAPETS 

unit could shoot in any direction to its maximum range and would 

answer ca lls for fire support from maneuver forces operating under 

its protective umbrella. 

The position for a fire base was selected jointly by the artillery 

and infantry commanders. The primary concern of the artillery 

commander was that the position be adequate to SUppOrL rnaneuver 

elements throughout the area of operation. An important consideration was the availability of other artill ery within range of the 

position that, if required, could be cal led on to provide indirect 

fire in defense of the fire base. Other important considerations were 

the type of soil to support the howitzers and how readily the position could be defended and supplied by air. The primary concern 

of the infantry commander was defense of the position unless he 

intended to establish his headquarters on the fire base to take advantage of the avai lable security. In that event, he was concerned 

that the fire base be central to his maneuver forces so they could 

be effectively controlled. This priority was generally agreeable to 

the artillery commander, who could provide better all-round coverage from snch a location. 
1ST BATfALlON, 40TH FIELD ARTILLERY, IN POSITION ALONG DEMILITARIZED 

ZONE 

TYPICAL TOWED I5S-MM. POSITION. Note trail blocks. 
58 FIELn ARTILLERY 

'. - BATIERY C, 20 BATTALION, 138TH FIELD ARTILLERY, ON HILL 88, 

March 1969. 

Because of the manpower drain on maneuver units had they 

been required to defend all artillery positions. fire bases were constructed almost exclusively for direct support artillery. When such 

a fire base was established. it was usually to support a large operation of at least divisional size or to provide a position when no available one was even marginally acceptable. Division or field force 

artillery generally chose the best positions for their firing units not 

in direct support from among defensive positions already established. As a result. such a unit might occupy a fire base with one or 

more other artillery units or. for that matter. might occupy any 

other type of defensive position belonging to either American or 

allied forces. Any commander was happy to have the additional fire 

power that a battery would bring to his position . 

The organization of a fire base was a reflection of the flexibility 

and ingenuity of the American soldier. Terrain. area available. 

and number and caliber of weapons. plus numerous other variables. 

made it impossible to standardize procedures for occupying such 

positions. Still. some generalities can be cited. 

The formation of artillery pieces on the ground varied with the 
IN ORDER TO WIN 59 

BATTERY D, 30 BATTALION, 13TH FIELD ARTILLERY, AT FIRE SUI'PORT 

BASE STUART, JUNE 1969. Chain link fence has been installeel for proleclion against 840 rockets. 

terrain and the caliber and number of weapons. Insofar as possible, 

weapons were arranged in a pattern with as much depth as width 

to eliminate the need for adjusting the pattern of effects on the 

ground. Six-gun batteries, which included all 105-mm. and 155-mm. 

batteries, were emplaced in a star formation, with five guns describing the points of the star and the sixth gun in the center. This 

configuration provided for an effective pattern of ground bursts and 

for all-round defense. At night the center piece could effectively 

fire illumination while the other pieces supported with direct fire. 

Firing units with only three or four guns arranged their pieces in a 

triangular or square pattern, if terrain permitted. The diamond 

formation was most commonly used by composite 8-inch and 175-

mm. batteries. The 175-mm. guns were positioned farthest from the 

center of the battery, where the fire direction center and adminis· 

trative elements were located, thus reducing the effects of blast on 

personnel, equipment, and buildings. 

The infantry eSlablished a perimeter as tight as feasible around 

the guns. The desired configuration was a perfect circle, but this 

was seldom possible because of the varied terrain to be defended. 

Perimeter defensive positions were dug in and bunkered where 

possible. To the front, barbed wire was Slrung and claymore mines 

and trip Aares were emplaced. Infantry soldiers defended the fire 
60 FIELO ARTILLERY 

'-,!~ __ _ .1 

15S·MM. HOWITZER POSITION USI NC SI'EED]ACK AND COLLIMATOR. Speedjack is under center 0/ howitzer, collimator to the rear of howitzer on 

sfllldbags. 

base perimeter with their individual rifles and grenade launchers 

and with crew·served machine guns and recoilless rifles. In addition, the infantry was equipped with both SI-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars. Mortars were invaluable for fire base defense, not only for 

their heavy vo lumes o[ high·explosive fires but also for close-in illuminatio n during enemy night attacks. A fire base was fortunate 

if it had air defense weapons on its perimeter. Both the M42AI 

"Duster," a dual 40-mm. weapon, and the M55 (quad), four .50-

caliber machine guns fired simultaneously, provided impressive 

ground fires, though neither weapon had been designed for that 

role. These weapons were organic only to nondivisional air defense 

battalions and were not available in sufficient numbers to provide 

protection to all fire bases. 

The defense responsibilities of the infantry did not end with 

the establishment of a strong defensive perimeter. Just as important was aggressive and continuous patrolling around the fire base to 

frustrate enemy attempts to reconnoiter the base and prepare for an 

attack. Usually, a single-battery fire base was provided a rifle com-
IN ORDER TO WIN 61 

rany to man the perimeter and conduct necessary patrols. This provision was recognized in the organization of infantry battalions in 

Vietnam, where each battalion was flssigned fOllr rine companies 

instead of only three. 

The field artillery on the fire hase also contributed to its defense. In fa ct. the contribution of the artillery was often the deciding fa ctor in staving off a determined attack. Artillery defensive 

fires included direct fire , (ountermortar fire, and mutually supponing fire. 

Direct fire. as its name Implies, required line or sight between 

weapon and targel. It involved the use of specia l antipersonnel 

Illunitions and techniques. The XM54fi antipersonnel projectile. 

called the Beehive round. was particularly effective in the direct 

fire role. The projectile was filled with over 8.000 Aechettes, or 

small metal darts. The field artillery direct fire capability was integrated with the infantry defense to cover likely avenues of approach 

and the nlost vulnerable areas. It was imperative that the infantry 

bunkers be built up in the rear so that the infantrymen were 

protected from the effects of the Beehive ammunition. Beehive 

was fired in combat for the first time on 7 November 1966 by 

Battery A. 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery. A single round 

killed nine attacking enemy and stopped the attack. The round was 

employed on many occasions with similar success, perhaps the best 

known being during the enemy attack on Landing Zone BIRD. 

Another effective direct fire technique was " Kill er Junior." perfected by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Dean. commander of the 1st 

Battalion. 8th Field Artillery. of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. The technique was designed to defend fire bases against 

enemy ground attack and used mechanical time-fused projectiles 

set to burst approximately 30 feet off the ground at ranges of 200 to 

1.000 meters. The name Killer Junior applied to light and medium 

artillery (105.mm. and 155-mm.), whereas "Killer Senior" referred 

to the same system used with the 8-incll howitzer. This technique 

proved lnore effecti ve in many instances than direct fire with Beehive ammunition because the enemy could avoid Beehive by lying 

prone or crawling. Another successful application of the Killer technique was in clearing snipers rrom around base areas. The name 

Killer came from the radio call sign of the battalion that perfected 

the technique. To speed the delivery of fire. the crew of each 

weapon used a firing table containing the quadrant. fuze settings. 

and charge appropriate for each range at which direct fire targets 

could be acquired. 

Countermortar (or couIllerbattery) fires. the second type of artillery defensive fire. were preplanned. unobserved fires that were 
62 FIELD ARTILLERY 

6,4OQ·MIL CHART. A1ap 011 back shoUJs a.rea coverage. 
~ £._,0 .. ' 

rES'1 So" jif' 

lit II IClI, 

IN ORDER TO WIN 

Diagram I. MlOl I05·rum. artillery field position. 

63 
64 FI ELD ARTILL ERY 

1 Cn.rd lil~ .. ,llSin ncb n4 trnck 

1 Pmnlll hiker 

3 tn.,d rack fl' ,11,.,,, ••••• iti .. 

• e.m" rack f,r tII,rnd Clnntilull .. itills 

5 limt lin utter wit, 'il'li'llnI" 

I C.nrd m' I., ch.iul ••••• iti •• 

1 C ... r" rad ,,, I"kin I •• uitin 

I Stud nurd ••• uilin 'U~, nek 

Diagram 2. M102 l05·mm. emplacement. 
Fiu hrrtls 

."Unr 

mw _mllrs 

00 

IN ORnER TO WI N 

SIIO'I 

.. all ad tim 

r- - - - ~ - - - - -'-p;;;qa~a-' 

A •• llilill rath I shlls I 

tn .. ru~, ru. 

I I 

I 

I 

Sioh I 

I 

--...j I 

I 

III I 

I 

I 

I 

--l 

I 

lei I 

I 

--~ 

PSP . trml Ir ce.nt I[ I 

..it~ I 

o 

Ellrun 

IT I 

Sectill t~li,.nl 

1I~ Inl rn. 

Diagram 3. Semipennanellt IOS-mm. self-propelled howitzer 

emplacement. 

65 
66 FIELD ARTILLERY 

huh.hl 

SIIO'I,'rllll11 

Pmuulhlhr 

a .. hls .,rc ,Itc,le' Itt""" II Ih _151 rlt'tut~ IS" 'mt .. tlln '""f "Ihn '1m ',,14d ilil Utl"1 'It. ''''I~ II m •••••• III ... 'tllt!1 .1 ..... ' 

Diagram 4. Towed I 55-mm. howitzer emplacement. 
$llIIbl' 

• uliliia 

I .. ilmm, 

.nrltlS 

IN ORnER TO WIN 67 

... ilmtrn 

1111 snti.. SnOII' 

••• i,1I1t If enislm 

1-

~ 

A •• llm .. rich 

[PIII"I" ~, su.hlS If 1.I.rit.·fin, .• misltnl 

1 .. ",ilm ,UI,II ,n .,u. , .. 1 .... iII .. fuh 11' er .. 

• .,run .m emr" .iI_ ,iere" sl .. 1 pink II' mRlls. 

Diagram 5. Self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer emplacement. 
68 

fin hutl 

o 

F IELD ARTILLERY 

o It_, ".It, ~I Firthrrtl O 

J 

L 

fin hrnls 

_ifill H._, ~lIrttrS ftl' ,tlSlll.1 lUI u,mld 1r.1 th firitc 

"smll Ihl "ui" •. Th hlitllr "~S Ilfl ulStrKtd ., IIlillUS. 

Diagram 6. Heavy (8-inch or l75-mm.) artillery emplacement. 

executed in th e event the fire base underwent an enemy rocket or 

mortar attack, ei th er as part of a gTolllld attack or as a "standoff" 

attack using rocket or mortar fire alone. A fi eld artill ery forward 

observer or liaison offi cer chose li kely positions for enemy weapons 

from a map and from informati on provided by aerial reconn aissa nce. Firing data to the positions were computed and a fire plan 

was prepared . T he fi re plan was re ta ined in the battery fire direction center, where it could be executed immediately when 

requested. This procedure might at first glance appear to depend 
IN ORDER TO WIN 69 

ARTILLERY HILL AT PLEIKU. An artillery base camp containing a field 

artillery group, three field artillery battalion headquarters, and nine 

firing units. 

to a great extent on luck, but it proved to be quite effective. An 

experienced artill eryman knowing the optimum range of enemy 

weapons, the likely routes into the area, and the criteria for good 

weapons positions could be very accurate in predicting future locations of enemy weapons. 

Mutually supporting fires, the third type of artillery defensive 

fire, were indirect fires provided by one fire base in support of another. Whenever a new base was established, field artillery forward 

observers and liaison officers contacted responsible personnel on 

other bases within range and made plans to support one another if 

attacked. Planning included choosing and prefiring targets close to 

the defensive perimeter of each fire base. The firing data were retained in the fire direction centers and used when requested. Immediately available close-in fires were thus assured. Subsequent corrections could be made if necessary. 

Time and again the indirect fires from mutually supporting artillery proved to be a principal factor in successfully countering an 
70 FIELD ARTILLERY 

enemy attack on a fire base. Having mutually supponing bases was 

considered so imponant that whenever a battery was required to 

occupy a position beyond the range of any friendly artillery, every 

effort was made to readjust other artillery positions to bring them 

within range. If that was not possible, batteries often split into 

three·gun platoons and occupied two separate but mutually supporting positions. 

The various designs of individual weapon emplacements constructed by batteries on fire bases reflected a great deal of initiative 

and individuality. The design normally was standardized within a 

battalion and, in some cases, throughout a division or group. Whatever the design, it provided for all-round protection of weapons and 

crews from direct fire, readily available overhead cover for the 

crews, and protection of ammunition. Common materials used were 

sandbags, ammunition boxes, powder canisters, pierced-steel planking, heavy timbers, and corrugated steel roofing. Steel culverts 

covered with sandbags were used to provide hastily constructed, yet 

effective, personnel cover. Standard cyclone fencing placed 20-25 

feet in front of positions protected howitzers, which, with their high 

silhouettes, were particularly vulnerable to enemy rocket attack. 

The loose soil of coastal areas and the saturated soil of the 

lowlands during the monsoons made it difficult to prevent the shifting of light and medium howitzers during firing. Logs were used to 

brace the MIOIAI IOS-mm. howitzers. Firing platforms on the 

MI02 IOS-mm. howitzers frequently were staked through piercedsteel planking or ridged-aluminum planking. The M I l4Al 155-mm. 

howitzer was panicularly prone to shifting. A common field expedient to help stabilize this weapon was 55-gallon drums filled with 

soil and buried venically and flush with the surface. Logs were often 

dug in horizontally in a circle around the weapon to brace its trails 

during firing. One method that proved effective in reducing displacement was devised by the 1st Ballalion, 84th Artillery. Old tank 

tracks with the ends linked together were buried vertically flush 

with the surface and in a circle. The howitzer was positioned in the 

center, with its trails against the tracks. 

The 6,400-mil environment required that gun sections be thoroughly versed in techniques to allow weapons to be shifted rapidly 

to a new direction of fire. Two sets of reference points, which normally consisted of two sets of aiming posts or one set of aiming 

posts and an infinity collimator, provided a visible angular reference in any direction. Azimuth markers or stakes around the gu n 

positions provided easy reference and facilitated the frequent shifting of trails from mission to mission. In the case of the 155-mm. 

towed howitzer, shifting trails was a time-consuming, laborious 
AN fMPQ--4 COUNTERMORTAR RADAR, positioned on a large tower tor 

bettcr area coverage. 
72 FIELn ARTILLERY 

TPS-25 GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR 

task. Through the initial efforts of Lieutenant Nathaniel Foster of 

the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, a pedestal 

that eliminated the need for lowering the howitzer off its jack before shifting trails was developed. Modification of Foster's initial 

platform led to the float jack, which made the weapon more responsive and flexible. 

Central to the firing battery was the fire direction center. This 

was a small, well-bunkered position. It had the personnel and 

equipment necessary to receive fire requests from forward observers 

with the supported force and to convert these requests to data that 

were usable at the guns. Fire direction centers, too, had to follow 

new techniques in order to respond to calls for fire from all directions. Firing charts had to allow for a 6,400-mil range of fire, and 

much experimentation was done in this area to devise the best system. Generally, an oversized firing chart mounted on a large table 

proved to be the most effective solution. 

The fire base proved its worth in Vietnam: it could be quickly 

constructed virtually anywhere; it could withstand the most formidable assaults that an unsophistica ted enemy could bring against it; 

and it permitted the field artillery to provide fire support of the 

same high quality as that provided in past wars. 
IN ORDER TO WIN 73 

Jillse Camp Defense 

The base camp was an installation occupied by a headquarters 

larger than a battalion. "Vhereas the fire base performed a combat 

mission. the base cam p was larger and contained controlling headquarters for combat activities as well as essential combat service 

support activities. A perimeter of bunkers encircled the base 

camp, and beyond the bunkers were intri cate baniers of barbed 

wire reinforced with flares and mines. Headquarters and combat 

service support personnel, augmented where required by infantry, 

manned the perimeter. Ground forces conducted continuous patrolling around the hase camp, usually out as far as the range of enemy 

rockets. 

The field artillery also contributed to the defense of a base 

camp. Cannons fired harassing and interdiction fires on likely enemy 

routes and positions. answered calls for observed fire from patrols. 

f,,·ed illumination rounds, and provided direct fires against enemy 

ground attacks. The number of cannons required for the defense of 

hase camps varied; a brigade or artillery grOllp base camp might 

require only a platoon of artillery, whereas a division base camp 

might need several batteries. 

In addition to cannons, field artillery targeting devices such as 

radars and searchlights. when avai lable. were integrated into the 

defense. The AN / MPQ-4 countermortar radar, organic to direct 

support artillery battalions, and the AN / TPS-25 ground surveillance radar. organic to division artill ery. were used in conjunction 

with shorter range infantry antipersonnel radars for locating targets. Once targets were located, they were engaged by cannons or 

other suitable supporting fires. Searchlights provided either visible 

or infrared illumination. They were oriented for direction on the 

same angular reference as the artillery weapons. If the enemy was 

spotted, an azimuth and an estimated distance could be relayed directly to the battery fire direction center. 

The responsibility for defense of a base camp was often assumed 

by the senior artilleryman occupying the installation. Phu Loi base 

camp, for example, was occupied by the 23d Artillery Group headquarters plus other combat support and combat service support activities. No infantry unit was permanently assigned, and on two 

occasions the group commander was designated as Phu Loi defense 

commander. Senior ground commanders at times also delegated responsibility for the defense of th eir base camps to their senior artillery commanders, as in the 4th Division, first at Camp Enari and 

later at Camp Radcliff. As installation defense commander the 

division artillery commander controlled that area around the base 
30·1NCH XENON SEARCHLIGHT. Battery I I 291h Field Arlilleryl at Fire 

Support Base Horseshoe, February 1970. 
IN ORDER TO WIN 75 

camp within a fourteen-kilometer radius. He co·ordinated patrol 

and reconnaissance activities in the area, (o-ordinated the perimeter 

defense effort, and established the installation defense co-ordination 

center, in which all efforts concerning reconnaissance. ground defense, reaction to enemy attack, target acquisition, and fire support 

were celllralized. Sizable portions of base camp defense responsibilities were also delegated to the artillery commanders of the 1st 

Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division . The former was 

given operational cOlllrol of a cavalry battal ion in Area of Operations CHIEF, encompassing the division base camp at Phuoc Vinh. 

The latter directed maneuver operations around the Big Red One 

artillery base camp at Phu Loi. 

Rive,"i1le Arlillery 

The terrain of the Mekong Delta was a serious hindrance to 

fighting forces in Vielllam. The delta is comprised of rivers and 

canals coupled with swamps and rice paddies. Roads and dry 

ground are scarce, and hamlets and villages have long since been 

built on what little dry ground there is. If artillery shared dry 

ground with a hamlet, the firing unsettled the people whose support the allies were trying so hard to win. Even when field artillery 

was positioned on dry ground, it was difficult to employ because the 

high water table made the ground soft. Without a firm firing base, 

cannons bogged down, were difficult to traverse, and required constalll checks for accuracy. All this lessened their responsiveness and 

effecti veness. 

A fighting force in the delta could not rely on ground vehicles 

for transportation or supply. Vehicles could seldom move the infantry close to the enemy, they were vulnerable to ambush, and the 

scarcity of dry ground overly cramped and restricted supply operations and the activities of cOlllrol headquarters and supporting field 

artillery. Helicopters were used successfully to transport troops and 

artillery to the area of operations. The airborne platform was developed to solve problems of the inadequacy and scarcity of dry 

ground. The platform, a 22-foot square, was similar to a low table 

with large footpads on four adjustable legs to distribute its weight. 

The platform could be lifted by Chinook and placed rapidly in 

boggy or inundated areas. A second Chinook brought in a 105-mm. 

howitzer MI02 and ammunition and placed it on the platform. 

(The hmo'itzer and platform could be lifted together by a CH-54 

Crane.) The platform provided space for the howitzer, the crew, 

and a limited amount of ammunition and permitted traverse of the 

howitzer in all directions. If one or more of the legs was mired when 
76 FIELO ARTILI.ERY 

CH-47 EM PLACING A IRMOBILE FIRING PLATFORM 

the platform was to be moved, the footpad was disconnected and 

left in place to be recovered separately. A principal disadvantage 

of the airmobile platform was that the gun crew was overexposed 

to enemy fire. It was impossible to construct bunkers or overhead 

cover since the nearest ground was under water, though sandbags 

positioned around the edge of the platform provided some protection. Another disadvantage was that ammunition resupply and storage was difficult because of limited space on the platform. 

Even more significant than the use of helicopters in the delta 

was the formation of a riverine task force, which relied on watercraft to provide transportation, fire power, and supply. The task 

force consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division and 

the U.S. Navy River Assault Flotilla I. 

Field Artillery support for the new riverine task force was 

initially provided from fixed locations, but the support was less 

than adequate. Field artillery needed to move and position itself to 

best support the ground action. This need was satisfied by the 1st 

Battalion, 7th Arti ll ery, in December 1966 when the battalion first 

employed the LCM-G medium-size landing craft as a firing platForm for howitzers. The LCM could be moved to a desirable position and secured to the riverbank. ]nternal modification was 

required so that the craft cou ld accommodate the M 101 A I howitzer, 
IN ORDER TO WIN 77 

RIVERINE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION COMMAND POST. with {ire directJ'on center on lefl, helicopter pad in center, and living quarteTs on right. 

but even then it was not wide enough to permit the howitzer trails 

to be spread fully. As a result, the on-carriage traverse was limited. 

Other shortcomings were that the craft did not afford as stable a 

firing platform as was desired and that excessive time was required 

to fire. 

More successful were floating barges. The concept originated 

[rom a conference in the field between Captain John A. Beiler, 

commander of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery, and Major 

Daniel P. Charlton, the battalion operations officer. Their ideas 

prompted a series of experiments to determine the most suitable 

method of artillery employment with the riverine force. 

The first experiment used a floating AMMI ponton barge borrowed from the 'avy and an MIOlAI 105-mm. howitzer. Although 

the AMMI barge served its purpose, it was difficult to move and 

had a draft too deep for the delta area. The barge finally used was 

constructed of P- l standard Navy pontons (each 7 by 5 feet) fastened together into a single barge that was 90 feet long by 28 feet 4 

inches wide. Armor plftle was installed around its sides for protection of the gun crews. Amrnunition storage areas were built on 

either end and living quaners in the center. This arrangement 
RIVERINE BA'ITERY POSITION. Six MJ02 howitzers preparing for an op· 

eration (fire direction center located in center right barge). 
IN ORnER TO WIN 79 

RIVERINE PLATOON MOORED TO CANAL BANK. Living quarters are located 

in center, ammunition storage on each end. 

provided two areas, one on each side of the living quarters, that 

could be used to position 105·mm. howitzers. Initially the MIOIAI 

howitzer was used but, as the newer M 102 weapon became available 

in Vietnam, it replaced the older howitzer. A mount for the M I 02 

was made by welding the baseplate of the howitzer to a plate 

welded to the barge deck. This mount permitted the howitzer to be 

traversed rapidly a full 6,400 mils. 

Three barges and five LCM-S's constituted an average floating 

riverine battery. Three LCM's were used as push boats, one as the 

fire direction center and command post and one as the ammunition 

resupply vessel. Batleries could move along the rivers and canals 

throughout the delta region; they frequently moved with the as· 

sault force to a point just short of the objective area. All the weap· 

ons had a direct fire capability, a definite asset in the event of an 

ambush. Then the howitzers often responded with Beehive rounds, 

which usually broke up the ambush in short order. 

When a location for the battery was selected, the barges were 

pushed into position along the riverbank. The preferable position 

was one where the riverbank was clear of heavy vegetation. This 

facilitated helicopter resupply, which could then be accomplished 

on the bank as close as possible to the weapons. Clear banks also 
80 

, " 

-.. 

." .. 

• 

to.' 

• 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

. " " ~' 

.. .. 4 • • , 

.r '.1 

___ , .. l "'I.~ • 

RIVERINE GUN SECTION IN TRAVELING CONFIGURATION. Note the five 

Beehive rounds at left of trails. 

provided better security for the battery. The barges normally were 

placed next to the riverbank opposite the primary target area so 

that the howitzers would fire away from the shoreline in support 01 

the infantry. This served two purposes: weapons could be fired at 

the lowest angle possible to clear obslructions on the far bank. and 

the helipad was not in the I ikely direction of fire. 

The barge was stabilized with grappling hooks. winches. and 

standoff supports on the bank side of the barge. Mooring lines were 

secured around the winches and reeled in or oul to accommodate 

tide changes so that the barges would not be caught on either the 

bank or mudflats at low tide. Equipment to provide directional 

reference for the weapons-including aiming circle. collimator. and 

aiming posls-was emplaced on the banks. Accuracy of fires proved 

to be comparable to that of ground.mounled howitzers. 

Without these new developments in riverine artillery. U.S. maneuver force activities in the delta area would have been seriously 

curtailed or often would have had to take place out of range of 

friendly field artillery. Instead. the field artillery was able to provide support when and where it was needed. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Buildup (1965-1967) 

The Bilildl/!, Begins and. Early Acl;ollS Amllnd. Saigon 

At 0530 on 5 May 1965, the first of 150 sorties of C-130 aircraft 

loaded with men and equipment of the 173d Airborne Brigade and 

its support elements landed at Bien Hoa Air Base in Saigon. 

Battalion-size elements of the U.S. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, had 

been operating around Da Nang in the northern portion of South 

Vietnam since March, but the arrival of the 173d, consisting of two 

airborne infantry battalions, marked the first commitment of a 

U.S. Army ground combat unit in Vietnam. The brigade, under 

the command of Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson, formed a 

defensive perimeter around the air base. In direct support of the 

brigade was the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (Airborne), a two 

firing-battery 105-mm. battal ion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lee E. Surut. 

Counterinsurgency operations dictated new tactics and tech· 

niques, and, as they affected maneuver units, so they affected their 

supporting artillery. Although the brigade had undergone rigorous 

training in Okinawa before its departure for Vietnam, the "first 

unit in" could not be totally prepared. Nevertheless, the airborne 

troopers of the 173d performed admirably. No sooner had the 

brigade unloaded its gear than it began to conduct operations 

around Bien Hoa, primarily search and destroy operations and 

patrol actions. The men of the 319th had a "jump" of two months 

on fellow artillerymen, which enabled them to compile an impressive list o( firsts. The first field artill ery round fired by a U.S. 

Army unit in the Republic of Vietnam came from the base piece of 

Battery C, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, during a registration mission. '>Vith that round, the U.S. field artillery role in the Vietnam 

war began. 

On 31 May 1965 the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, as part of 

Task Force SURUT, participated in the largest air assault conducted 

in Vietnam to that date. The task (orce, consisting of the 319th 

reinforced by a cavalry troop, an engineer platoon, and a composite 

platoon made up of volunteers from the support battalion, secured 

a landing zone and guided in CH- 37 Mohave helicopters carrying 
82 FJELD ARTILLERY 

I05-MM. BATrERY FIRING FROM HASTY POSITION 

the howitzers. Up to this point in the war, the Mohaves had been 

doing yeoman duty as all-purpose aircraft. So smoothly and efficiently did this initial move go that three hours later these same 

howitzers moutHed preparation fires on another landing zone for 

Task Force DEXTER, a reinforced infantry element of the l 73d 

Brigade. This was the first such operation ever conducted in actual 

combat by a U.S. Army unit-one that had been in Vietnam less 

than thirty days. 

The l73d soon had an opportunity to participate as the reserve 

force in an offensive operation. In June a Viet Cong regiment 

launched an attack on Dong Xoai, a district town ninety miles 

north of Saigon. With the press wrps closely following the events, 

the 173d moved to a forward airfield in case relief forces were 

needed. Although South Vietnamese troops ultimately relieved 

Dong Xoai, the Red legs of the 3d Ballalion, 3 19th Artillery, became the first U.S. Army unit in Vietnam La engage in an offensive 

operation by providing fire support for the South Vietnamese 

troops rei ieving Dong Xoai. 
THE BUILDUP 83 

After the Dong Xoai support operations, the 3d l3attalion returned to Bien Hoa lO ready for a history-making operation that 

commenced on Sunday, 27 .Iune. Fifty kilometers north of Bien Hoa 

lies the southern edge of a huge tangle of double-canopy forest and 

thick undergrowth. Called War Zone D, it had long been a guerrilla haven, un penetrated even by the French in their many years 

of fighting. In a massive, businesslike operation, five maneuver 

battalions penetrated deep into the area. The ~d Battalion (Airborne), 319th Artillery, provided co·ordinated fire support for the 

1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 50~d Infantry, of the 173d Airhorne Brigade and the :Id and 4th Battalions of the South Vietnamese Army 2rl Airborne I3rigade. The Royal Australian Regiment 

joined the operation <lfter the second day. The size of the assaulting 

force determined the significance of the operation for the artillery. 

It necessitated the rlose co-ordination of large volumes of artillery 

fires augmented by c1me air support and armed helicopters. 

l3efore the operation began, the brigade commander directed 

that artillerymen "exercise the complete system." Exercise it they 

did. One hundred forty-four aircraft providing support for the 

operation assisted in the displacement of five infantry battalions, a 

field artillery battalion, a support battalion, and a composite battal ion of cavalry, armor, and engineers. Throughout the entire 

operation, no seriolls incidents or major breakdowns in the system 

occurred. The artillery provided ten forward observers (including 

the ballalion property book officer), three I iaison officers (including the batLalion communications officer), and two aerial observers 

in addition to those forward observers and liaison officers normally 

provided. Three communication nets were used and all fires were 

cleared through the brigade fire support co-ordination center. The 

319th fired ne<lrly 5,000 rounds of 105-mm. ammunition during the 

rour~day period while maintaining contact and effecting co-ordination with the supporting Vietnamese and Australian artillery units. 

Known only as OPORD 17- fi5 , the designation of the original 

operation order, this venture into 'Var Zone D yielded satisfying 

results. By conservative estimates, the enemy suffered 75 casualties 

and lost several trucks and nearly 250 tons of food and supplies. In 

an honest appraisal of the field artillery role shortly after the conclusion of the operation, Colonel Surut admitted having discovered 

some "bugs" in the fire support system: 

Fire suppon coorclimnion initially slowed some nHSSlQns, but by 

D + 2 this bOll Ie neck was overcome. SafelY checks slowed the firing somewhat; however the checks are necessary [or close support. particularly 

with three major maneuver elements abreast. 
84 FIELD ARTILLERY 

General \Villiamson, the brigade commander, in a letter to the 

commandant of the Field Artillery School, discussed the initial 

operations of the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery: 

The artillery over here is doing a fabulous job. My Artillery Battalion Commander is having experiences that far exceed what most 

oLhers ha\'e had . .. 1 would suggest that the Artillery make every effOrL to gel the most promising young: officers Ollt he .. e for some very 

wonhwhile experiences. 

The 173d Airborne Brigade again tested its fire support system 

in War Zone D on G July. Along with a battalion of the Royal 

Australian Regiment and units of the 43d Regiment of the Army 

of the Republic of Vietnam, the brigade conducted four multiple 

air assaults supported by helicopter sorties just north of the Dong 

Nai River. The operation resulted in 56 enemy killed, 28 captured, 

100 tons of rice seized, and several tons of documents destroyed. 

For the field artillerymen, this second venture into War Zone D 

provided an opportunity to correct the mistakes of the previous 

operation. Clearance and safety checks now were routine and the 

liaison and co-ordination efforts functioned smoothly. General 

Williamson, in complimenting the co-ordination efforts of all involved, said: 

. . . as I looked at it from above, it was a Sight to see. We were 

withdrawing frorn the cenler Landing Zone while some friendly troops 

were still in the western Landing Zone. We had a helicopter strike 

going in a circle around the cenler Landing Zone. The machinegun and 

rocket firing helicopters kept making their circle smaller and smaller as 

we withdrew our fanding lone security. Just to the west side we had 

another heJicopter strike running north to south. We also had some· 

thing else that was jl1st a little hairy but it worked without any question. 

The artillery was firing high angle f,,·e to screen the north side o[ the 

landing zone. The personnel Jift helicopters were coming [rom the east, 

going under the artillery fire, sitting down on the LZ to pick up troops 

and leaving by way of the southwest. In addition to that, we had an 

airstrike going to the northeast. All of these activities were going on at 

the same time. We could not have done thaL a few weeks ago. The only 

reason we can do it now is that (we know) where our troops are and the 

fire support coordination center can coordinate fire and other activities. 

The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, maintained continuous 

"feedback" to the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School (Ialer 

the Field Artillery School) at Fon Sill, Oklahoma. Correspondence 

included letters, memorandums, and copies of debriefings and 

after·action reports which contained numerous insights on the em· 

ployment of artillery. At the school the correspondence was 

thoroughly studied and discussed with a view toward including any 

new and valuable information in classroom instruction. The fol· 
THE BUILDUP 85 

AERIAL ROCKET ARTILLERY UH-IB WITH XM3 WEAPONS SYSTEM, 

which carried {orty·eight 2.75·inch folding fin a,,·i./ rockets. 

lowing are only a few of the important insights and tips received 

from the 3d Battalion: 

I. Dense foliage in Vietnam made it particularly difficult to 

identify friendly troop dispositions and enemy targets to 

close air support aircraft. One system adopted to help cor· 

rect this shortcoming was to employ white phosphorous 

projectiles as marking rounds. 

2. Commanders must make every effort to preclude the check 

firing of one fire support system to accommodate another. 

General Williamson's description of actions in War Zone D 

was evidence that the 173d Airborne Brigade was getting 

good results with the continuous and concurrent employ· 

ment of various fire support systems. 

3. Responsive shelling report (SHELREP) personnel were 

necessary to establish an effective countermortar and 

counterbauery progTam. To this end, correspondence from 

the 173d Airborne Brigade recommended the use of artil· 

lery survey personnel in crater and shelling report teams. 

4. Whenever possible clearances of large zones should be ob· 

tained in advance of an operation. This foresight in opera· 
86 FIELD ARTILLERY 

tional planning wou ld resu lt in more responsive on-call 

supporting fires. 

New A ,.,-ivals 

The 3d Battalion (Airborne), 319th Artillery, relinquished its 

position as the only U.S. Army artillery unit in Vietnam on 16 July 

1965 with the arrival of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (the 

"Big Red One"), and its supporting field artillery, the 1st Battal· 

ion, 7th Artillery. Less than two weeks later the 1st Brigade, IOlst 

Airborne Division, arrived by ship at Cam Ranh Bay with the 2d 

Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery. In September the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) arrived and brought with it the first 

U.S. Army division artillery to arrive in Vietnam. 

The organization of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery was typical of o!her division artilleries that followed. The division artillery 

consisted of three light 10S-mm. howitzer battalions with three 

batteries of six guns each and an aerial rocket artillery battalion 

with thirty-nine aircraft. Most division artilleries contained three 

10S-mm. battalions but also included a fourth battalion of three 

ISS-mm. how;tzer batteries and one 8-inch howitzer battery. 

Whether aerial rocket artillery or heavy cannon artillery, the 

fourth battalion augmented and extended the range of the three 

10S-mm. battalions, each o( which was in direct support of a brigade 

of the division. 

Before the end of 1965, the remainder of the 1st Division 

Artillery arrived to provide support for the Big Red One in III 

Corps. Its organization was typica l of most of the division artilleries 

that would arrive later, its fire power coming from three 105-mm. 

battalions and a composite 155-mm. and 8-inch battalion. The 

initial field artillery buildup also included the first few separate 

battalions that provided the general support and reinforcing fires 

needed to complement the divisional artillery. 

As the number of U.S. troops committed to Vietnam grew, 

organizaLional changes to facilitate command and control were required. U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam, was redesignated 

U.S. Army, Vietnam (USA RV). Task Force ALPHA was activated 

on I August 1965 and based at Nha Trang with control over all 

U.S. units in the II and III Corps areas. III Marine Amphibious 

Force (III MAF) functioned as controlling headquarters for U.S. 

units in the I Corps area . In early 1966 Task Force ALPHA was 

redesignated I Field Force, Vietnam (IFFV), with responsibility for 

II Corps area. II Field Force, Vietnam (IIFFV), was activated. 

II Field Force was then assigned responsibility [or III Corps area. 
THE BUILDUP 87 

Coinciding with the activation of the II Field Force headquarters was the creation of controlling artillery headquarters. On 

30 November 1965, XXX Corps Artillery arrived at Nha Trang 

and assumed control of U.S. and allied artillery units under Task 

Force ALPHA. On 15 March 1966, XXX Corps Artillery was redesignated I Field Force Artillery. To the south, II Field Force 

Artillery, organized in January, arrived in Vietnam in March 1966. 

The force artilleries functioned as controlling headquarters for all 

nondivisional artillery. Commanded by a brigadier general, the 

field force artillery was similar to a corps artillery, long a part of 

the U.S. Army organization. The force artillery was made up of all 

separate artillery battalions, batteries, and detachments in addition 

to the artillery groups under its COntrol. The artillery group made 

its debut in the war with the arrival of the 23d Artillery Group in 

November of 1965. The group functioned as the controlling headquarters for its assigned battalions and normally had a mission of 

general support of the field force and reinforcing the fires of specific 

artillery units within the field force area of responsibility. Although 

many smaller organizational changes occurred in the course of the 

war, these first few significant steps laid the basic framework for 

the artillery command structure that by 1969 would support the 

operations of over a half million U.S. troops. 

The PleiklL (Ia Drang) Campaign 

In the early days of the buildup, units could not be permitted 

time for detailed planning and rehearsing. The North Vietnamese 

Army (NVA) had increased its forces significantly and had to be 

engaged at once. The situation was particularly critical in II Corps 

Tactical Zone, where at least three regiments of North Vietnamese 

regulars and one Viet Cong main force battalion were threatening 

to cut the country in half. Part of their mission was to meet and 

humiliate the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division. 

The 1st Cava lry Division did not arrive in Vietnam until September 1965, some of its units in early October. Yet on 22 October 

1965 the commanding general of the division received the following 

order: 

Commencing first light 23 Oct 65, 1st Air Cav. Deploys one BN TF 

(Minimum I Inf Bn and I Arty Btry) to Pleiku WIth mission to be 

prepared to assist in defense of Key US /CVN installations. Vic Pleiku 

or reinforce II Corps Operations to relieve Plei Me CIDC Camp. 

The Pleiku campaign, sometimes called the battle of the Ia 

Drang Valley, started with only a small force but eventually involved the entire division; Before the battle was over, the division 
88 FIELD ARTILLERY 

MAP 4 

• FilII[ S UP I>OItT BAS( 

C()ft /tlUr "l. ~al '" m.'.r6 

o IO Wl lfS 

1-1 -~----'----'-I _----'I o 10.ILO .,O[ItS 

accomplished several significant feats. (Map 4) Among these was 

the first air deployment and supply of tube artillery in an area of 

extremely rugged terrain and no roads. The operation proved that 

infantry units could always have tube artillery. as well as aerial 

rocket artillery. in support of their ground operations regardless 

of the terrain. The Pleiku campaign saw the first night employment of aerial rocket artillery in extremely close support of ground 

troops and in conjunction with tube artillery and tactical air. Also. 

for the first time large American units met and defeated battalion-
THE BUILDUP 89 

and regiment-size North Vietnamese Army units under control of 

divisional headquarters. This was also the first real combat test of 

the airmobility concept. 

The campaign opened on the morning of 23 October. Task 

Force INGRAM, composed mainly of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 

and Battery B, 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, moved by air from 

An Khe to Camp Holloway at Pleiku to reinforce the area . The 

commanding general of the 1st Air Cavalry Division received permission to move his entire 1st Brigade to Camp Holloway to assist 

in the security mission. 

While the 1st Brigade was repositioning its forces, a South Vietnamese task force was moving from Pleiku to the relief of the 

Plei Me civilian irregular defense group camp, which had been 

attacked by a North Vietnamese regiment. Unfortunately, the relief column was engaged and halted by two or three enemy companies. The South Vietnamese commander absolutely refused to 

move unless he was provided U.S. artillery support. In an effort to 

get the relief column moving, the artillery battalion commander 

placed an artillery liaison team with the task force and provided 

the support of two artillery batteries. Still, the attempt to get the 

column moving was initially unsuccessful because the Vietnamese 

commander then refused to move until he had been resupplied 

from Pleiku. It was several days before the relief column started 

to move, and then only after the U.S. artillery forward observer 

mounted the lead vehicle of the convoy and literally walked artillery fires down the road in advance of the moving column. With 

this support, the column received only sporadic small-arms fire and 

this was silenced by attack helicopters and Air Force tactical air 

strikes. The South Vietnamese column finally arrived at the Plei 

Me camp at dusk on 25 October. 

The reluctance of the Vietnamese commander to move on 23 

October was probably a blessing in disguise, because it allowed the 

cavalry to reposition two batteries of the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, better to support the future battle. This proved a significant 

advantage later. The delay also gave the brigade time to learn 

more about the enemy disposition in the area. 

On the morning of 26 October, the Vietnamese task force conducted a sweep around the Plei Me camp. Five minutes after noon 

the task force encountered mortar, small-arms, and recoilless rifle 

fire. The force immediately took casualties and faltered. The two 

batteries of the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, responded at once with 

supporting fires, which enabled the task force to regroup, withstand 

the attack, and take the offensive. The North Vietnamese forces 

suffered 148 killed and 5 captured in this action. The two artillery 
90 FIELD ARTILLERY 

units were credited with drawing first blood for the 1st Cavalry 

Division. Had they not been in position, what became the first 

friendly victory could well have been a defeat. 

The division started hunting for the enemy force with all available means. It planned to support any engagement by rapid air 

movement of artillery batteries and by tactical air strikes. The 

airmobility concept had envisioned the movement and supply of 

maneuver and support forces by helicopter, and the 1st Cavalry 

Division had been organized accordingly with light equipment and 

aircraft. From 27 Onober until the morning of I November, the 

enemy proved to be elusive. He attempted to retreat toward sanctu-

(lfY areas and avoided contact whenever possible. A few skirmishes 

occurred, but they were mainly between small forces. 

On the morning of I November, an air cavalry troop discovered 

a small enemy fo"e guarding a regimental aid station. Before the 

action terminated, an enemy battalion was engaged by the air 

cavalry troop. The air cavalry habitually operated beyond artillery 

range; its mission was to find the enemy and fix him in position, 

when possible, until the division ground forces and supporting artillery could be brought to the scene. In this case all friendly artillery was out of range, but even so the enemy lost the effectiveness 

of most of one battalion before the battle was over. The enemy 

withdrew pursued by division scout and aerial rocket artillery aircraft as well as Air Force tactical air strikes. 

On 2 and 3 November, light action continued and ambush 

positions were established throughout the area. One of the ambushes caught an enemy platoon-size force by surprise and totally 

destroyed it. The ambush patrol then pulled back into the patrol 

base area and established a tight defensive perimeter. At midnight 

of the 3d, the patrol base was attacked by an enemy battal ion-size 

force. It was evident that reinforcements were needed at once. The 

patrol base, which had been established by Troop B, 1st Squadron, 

9th Cavalry, had a landing zone within the perimeter sufficient to 

accommodate five helicopters. Into this landing zone came Company A, I st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, in platoon-size lifts, making this 

the first time that a perimeter under fire had been relieved by a 

heliborne force. Although cannon artillery was not within range of 

the patrol base initially, aerial rocket artillery was available and 

for the first time fired at night in very close support-as near as 50 

meters to friendly positions. Aerial rocket artillery continued to 

support the defense of the patrol base until the morning of 4 

November, when tube artillery was moved to a supporting position. 

The enemy broke contact shortly after artillery rounds began to 
THE BUILDUP 91 

fall on their positions. Although a large number of the enemy dead 

was carried away by the retreating forces, the body count was 112, 

with an estimated 92 others killed in action. Intelligence discovered 

that this enemy force was a North Vietnamese Army unit that had 

just arrived in the country. The cavalry division had insured that 

they received a warm welcome. 

The artillery also proved instrumental in defeating an enemy 

force engaged by elements of Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry. While on a sweep operation, Company B came upon an enemy 

element guarding a cache of weapons and ammunition. The artillery fire caused the enemy to disengage and abandon the cache. He 

lost 120,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition ; 126 rounds of mortar ammunition, recoilless rifle ammunition, and hand grenades; 

and 26 weapons, including mortars and recoilless rifles. 

Again, on 6 November, aerial rocket artillery fire was decisive 

in battle. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, became engaged 

with a battalion of the 33d North Vietnamese Army Regiment. 

The enemy battalion had attempted to encircle Company B, but 

the company's fire power plus artillery and air strikes held off 

the enemy threat. Company C was able to reinforce Company B 

before dark. After dark, when the most intense part of the firefight was over, the enemy withdrew his main force and left sni pers 

behind to harass the perimeter of the two companies. He was 

soundly defeated. His last cohesive fighting unit east of the Ia Drang 

River had sustained an estimated 460 killed and wounded. Many 

of these casua lties must be attributed to the fires of both tube and 

aerial rocket artillery. 

The enemy wanted no further engagements until he could 

regroup his forces after the mauling the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division had given him. Sufficient intelligence had been gathered to determine that the division was fighting three separate 

North Vietnamese regiments--the 66th, which had just arrived in 

the country; the 32d, which had ambushed the South Vietnamese 

task force on its way to Plei Me; and the 33d, which had attacked 

Plei Me. These regiments formed a full North Vietnamese Army 

division, which was being used offensively for the first time in 

South Vietnam. 

Of the three North Vietnamese Army regiments, the 33d had 

been particularly hard hit. When the unit attacked Plei Me, its 

strength was 2,190 men. In actions against the 1st Brigade, the 

regiment had lost 890 men killed, more than 100 missing, and still 

more suffering incapacitating wounds. Materiel losses had also been 

heavy. The regiment lost 13 of its 18 antiaircraft guns as well as 
92 FIELD ARTILLERY 

II mortar tubes and most of its recoilless rifles. In addition, there 

had been crippling losses of ammunition, food, and medical supplies. 

The North Vietnamese division headquarters next planned an 

attack for the morning of 16 'ovember against the original target 

- the Plei Me civilian irregular defense group camp. With this 

objective in mind, the three enemy regiments regrouped and 

headed eastward toward Plei Me. 

During the lull in battle, the 3d ("Gary Owen") Brigade relieved the now battle-tested 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division 

on the battlefield. The 1st Brigade returned to Camp Radcliff at 

An Khe for a well-deserved rest. No significant action occurred 

until 12 November, when the enemy, seemingly just to let the 3d 

Brigade know that he was still around, staged a violent battal ionsize attack against the 3d Brigade base at Landing Zone STADIUM. 

Aerial rocket artillery aircraft positioned at STADtUM responded 

immediately. All seven aircraft were airborne within five minutes 

after the attack started, and their combined fires stopped the mortar barrage. 

As the 3d Brigade began search and destroy missions to the east 

of Plei Me, it also set the stage for a sudden thrust to the west by 

pre-positioning artill ery at Landing Zone FALCON, twelve kilometers to the west of Plei Me. This artillery move took place on 13 

November. The field was now prepared for what was to be the 

major battle of the campaign, Landing Zone X-RAY. 

The 3d Brigade waited until the North Vietnamese assault 

elements were moving toward Plei Me. Then, at noon on 14 November, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, landed at the foot of the 

Chu Pong Massif, at X-RAY. The enemy was tota ll y surprised. Instead of launching a divisional attack on Plei Me and possibly 

gaining the tactical initiative, the North Vietnamese Army division 

was now required to defend its own base area in the Chu Pong 

Mountains and the la Drang Valley, long a sanctuary for Viet Cong 

and North Vietnamese forces_ Such so-called secret bases provided 

the insurgents with a secure area in which to store supplies, conduct training. carry out administrative functions, manufacture and 

repair arms and equipment, and provide an operating base for 

combat units. Not since the French occupation had Vietnamese 

government units penetrated the Chu Pong Massif; it was from 

this sanctuary and supply base in the la Drang Valley that the 

Field Front Headquarters and the 32d and 33d Regiments had 

moved to Plei Me on 19 October. 

Reacting swiftly to the cavalry landings, the enemy Field Front 
THE BUILDUP 93 

ordered the 66th Regiment to allack the landing zone. Strong 

elements of the regiment were established on the ridge line overlooking the landing zone to provide a base of fire for the attack. 

The 9th and 7th Battalions of the 66th and a composite battalion 

of the 33d (the combined forces of what remained of the 2d and 

3d Battalions) provided the initial assault forces. 

When the troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, landed at 

X-RAV, they expected to engage enemy forces, but they did not 

expect to f(tce an entire North Vietnamese Army regiment before 

the day was over. The enemy attacked with great ferocity against 

all clements of the 7th Cavalry. At least two cavalry platoons were 

immediately cut off and completely surrounded. The only thing 

that saved the platoons was the combined fire of the aerial rocket 

artillery unit and the two batteries of artillery at Landing Zone 

FALCON. The tube artillery support was frequently called to within 

less than 100 meters of the friendly positions. An additional company from a sister battalion of the 7th Calvary was helilifted into 

X-RAY and filled a vacant and vulnerable position on the perimeter. 

Throughout the night, the North Vietnamese Army forces attempted to crack the perimeter of one of the isolated platoons but 

intensive artillery protective fires that ringed the position broke up 

every allack. The main perimeter was also subjected to repeated 

probes, and these too were repulsed. Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, located at FALCON, fIred over 4,000 rounds of 

high-explosive ammunition during the night in close support of 

X-RAY. The probing allacks continued into early morning. At 

first light, a North Vietnamese Army force of over two companies 

once again allempted to penetrate the perimeter. Despite intensive 

air strikes and cannon and aerial rocket artillery fires, the enemy 

closed to hand-to-hand combat range, attacking from all directions. 

Artillery fire was brought to within 50 meters of the hard-pressed 

perimeter. This devastating curtain of steel finally broke the back 

of the allack. By mid-morning the fight had been reduced to the 

point that reinforcements could again be helilifted into X-RAY and 

the wounded air evacuated. 

To provide additional artillery support, Landing Zone COLUMBUS was established 4\12 kilometers to the northeast of X-RAY. This 

landing zone was midway between X-RAY and FALCON, where 

Batteries A and C of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were located. 

Battery B of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, and Battery C of the 

2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, were now moved into COLUMBUS. 

The enemy broke contact and filtered back into the mountains 

after suffering tremendous losses. He was pursued with heavy fire 
94 FIELD ARTILLERY 

power: cannon arlillery continua lly pounded the area; Air Force 

tactical air provided continuous support with a fighter bomber on a 

target run on an average or once every fifteen minutes; but the 

most devastating support was provided by B-52 bombers which 

struck without warning six kilometers west of X-RAY. Though the 

bombers had been employed initially in Vietnam some six months 

earlier, this was their first use in direct support of U.S. troops on a 

tanical operation. For the next five clays, the big bomhers systematically bombed large areas of the ehu Pong Massif. 

Early on the morning ol lhe loth , the enemy allemptcd again 

to overrun X-RAY and again there was a bloodbath. The defenses 

were just too LOugh to penetrate. The enemy lost 8~4 soldiers by 

actual body count and an estimated 1,200 more. 

On 17 November, X-RAY was evacuated in prepartHion for a 

LI-52 strike (referred LO as an Arc Light) that was LO be virtually on 

top of the landing zone. The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was moving 

overland from X-RAY toward a clearing to the northeast, which was 

to be used as a landing lOne designated ALBAN". About 300 meters 

short of the objective, the battalion became involved in an intense 

battle with the 8th Llattalion, 66th Regiment, of the North Vietnamese Army. 

As all too often happens in a meeting engagement, the exact 

locations of friendly and enemy positions were uncertain. Although 

artillery aerial observers were overhead and two baneries of 

I05-mm. and one battery of ISS-mm. howitzers were well within 

range, none could fire initially. It was solely an infantryman's 

battle for several hours. Lly midafternoon heavy supporting fires 

hegan falling among North Vietnamese Army elements. The first 

strikes were by aeria l rocket artillery, followed by a tactical air 

napalm run on an enemy comp.my that was forming [or an attack. 

The attack never started. 

Reinforcements were quickly brought inLO ALBANY, and the 

perimeter was consolidated before dark. Actually, two separate 

perimeters were established-one by the 2d Llattalion, 7th Cavalry, 

and one by two companies of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, which 

had moved toward ALBANY as reinforcements. The hard-hit 2d 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was able to expand the perimeter and recover friendly casua lties from the battle area. This freedom of 

movement was afforded by the continuolls artillery fire [rom CoLUMBUS and FALCON and the illumination provided by Air Force 

Aare ships. 

The punishment taken by both friendly and enemy units was 

severe during the short bauie at ALBANY. Over 270 troopers were 
THE BUILDUP 95 

casuallies. The enemy lost 403 soldiers by body count and an 

eSlimated 100 olhers killed. No estimale of wounded was made. 

The next morning. the battle area around ALBANY was relalively quiet. The enemy had moved on LOward his new objectivethe artillery unils at COLUMBUS. Al 1735 on 18 November. the last 

enemy offensive of the Pleiku campaign began. The remnants of 

two enemy regiments attacked COLUMBUS with heavy mortars and 

automatic weapons. Because the artillery based at FALCON was 

being moved to another location, tactical air strikes and aerial 

rockel artillery were used along wilh direcl fire from the artillery 

we"pons wilhin COLUMBUS lo repu lse the enemy "ttack. After three 

houTs the enemy aLLack lost momentum and subsided into sporadic 

small-arms fire and lhen quiet. The battle of the la Orang Valley 

was, for all practical purposes, over. 

The 2d Brigade now entered the ballie area and relieved the 

3d Brigade. The new brigade cOlllinued to search for the enemy. 

Contacts were made with scattered North Vietnamese Army elements of squad or platoon size. and then only after they had been 

flushed out and chased by heliborne cavalry or foot patrols. 

During the Pleiku campaign. the enemy lost over 1.500 confirmed killed and an estimated 2.000 more. His losses were so 

extensive theH an entire North Vietnamese Army division was made 

ineffective. His casualties were produced by all types of weapons. 

ranging from the 13-52 bomber to the individual rifle. But a very 

large proportion of lhose casual lies must be altributed to the artillery of the cavalry division. The enemy was driven back time and 

again. primarily by the illlensilY of artillery fire power. The division fired 40.464 artillery rounds and rockets during the campaign. 

Of the LOtal casualties. 562 enemy killed and an additional 1.863 

estimaled killed and wounded were officially credited to the artillery. 

Although the Pleiku campaign was the first time an entire U.S. 

division was committed in battle in Vietnam, the division had been 

commiued piecemeal, one brigade at a tilne. Piecemeal commitment in this case had certain benefils. As one brigade was committed. the relieved brigade along with its supporting forces. 

including the direct support artillery battalion. was withdrawn to a 

rest area and allowed to refit and to consider what had laken place 

in the baltle. 

The artillerymen had learned much from this campaign. First. 

the concept of displacing and supplying artillery by air was proved 

valid. particularly in support of an airmobile force. During the 

campaign. arlillery unils of the cavalry division artillery had made 
96 FIELD ARTILLERY 

a total of 79 tactical moves-67 of them by air. Continuous air 

movement by maneuver and support forces unsettled the enemy. 

Properly executed airmobile operations could keep constant pressure on him, wearing him down and destroying his will to resist. 

Second, aerial rocket artillery was shown to be extremely responsive and effeclive in augmenting cannon fires. Ground forces 

learned that aerial rocket artillery was reliable and extremely accurate. characteristics that were particularly important in close 

support missions. By controll ing hel icopter fires through artillery 

fire support channels, as was done with aerial rocket artillery, 

cannon and helicopter fires could be closely co-ordinated by a single 

individual, thus insuring that both were complementary. Third, 

artillerymen learned of the necessity of having artillery positions 

that were mutually supporting. Though Landing Zone COLUMBUS 

had stood off an enemy attack without mutually supporting artillery, its defenders had required air support, which in poor 

weather might not have been available. Fourth, because of the 

rugged terrain and dense foliage, target acquisition was a definite 

problem. Forward observers were still the best means of target 

acquisition because they were aJways with maneuver companies. To 

augment the forward observers, aerial observers were added whenever possible and were particularly effective in support of overland 

ground movements. Fifth, it was shown that the I05-mm. howitzer 

was a particularly good weapon for reconnaissance by fire. As the 

unit moved, the artillery forward observer would adjust artillery 

rounds in advance of the unit. This provided two benefits: the 

artillery could disrupt any activity or ambush site the enemy might 

have, and the location of the last round fired was a good indicator of 

the unit's location. This second advantage would allow for rapid 

delivery of artillery in the event the enemy ambushed the ground 

force. 

The BuildllP {Lnd Major Combat Operations During 1966 

During 1966 three divisions--the 4th, 9th, and 25th-came to 

Vietnam. Two separate brigades--the 196th and 199th Light Infantry Brigades--and the II th Armored Cavalry Regiment also 

arrived. The organization of supporting artillery varied somewhat. 

The divisional artillery of the three infantry divisions consisted of 

three 105-mm. howitzer battalions and one composite battalion of 

8-incll and 155-mm. weapons. The separate, or nondivisional, brigades were organized for independent operations. For that reason, 

they each had an organic I05-mm. howitzer battalion. The armored 
THE BUILDUP 97 

FIELD FORCE ARTILLERY. Eigla·inch howitzer ready to fire (note gunner's 

quadrant held by man on left). 

cavalry regiment, roughly equivalent to a brigade, had no artill ery 

battalion. Instead, each of its three subordinate squadrons had an 

organic l55-mm. self-propelled howitzer battery, which together 

equall ed an artillery battalion. The absence of an artillery battalion 

headquarters, however, precluded the co-ordination of all fires. 

As 1966 began, artillery in the Republic of Vielllam consisted 

of one 105-mm. battalion in direct support of each maneuver brigade, plus two additional 105-mm. battalions, one 155-mm. battalion, one 155-mm_ and 8-incll battalion, one aerial rocket artillery 

battalion, four 8-incll and 175-mm. battalions, and two artillery 

group headquarters. Before the end of 1966, the amount of artillery in Vielllam was to increase over 100 percent. There would be 

four group headquarters, six 8-incll and 175-mm. battalions, six 

155-mm. or 155-mm. and 8-incll battalions, twenty-four 105-mm. 

battalions, and the one aerial rocket artillery battalion_ There 

would also be two artillery 40-mm. "Duster" battalions that had 

been reactivated from Reserve and National Guard assets_ 
98 FIELD ARTILLERY 

175-MM_ GUN_ Battery C, 1st Battali01I, 8Jd Field ATtillery, at FiTe Support Base Bastague_ 

The very number o[ the operations during 1966 was particularly important for those concerned with artillery employment. 

Operation MASHER/ WHITE WING, conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry 

Division in early 1966, was the first large-scale operation to cross 

corps boundaries, and it involved a tie-in with U.S. Marine Corps 

forces as well as allies of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and 

the Republic of Korea. The effect of the operation on the enemy 

was devastating; it was the largest of the nineteen major operations 

conducted during 1966 and resulted in 2,389 enemy casualties. 

The operation took place mainly in Binh Dinh Province, largely 

controlled by the enemy and considered a very "hot" area. Binh 

Dinh is bounded by the South China Sea on the east, by foothills on 

its northern boundary with Quang Nga Province, and by large hill 

masses on the west and south. In the eastern part of the province, 

the terrain is mostly Rat coastal plains; to the west, the terrain becomes rugged but is interspersed with flat plateaus. Reliable in-
MAP 5 

AREA OF OPERATIONS 

MASHER / WHITE WING 

!I 10 MILES 

~----~--~~-r-------J! 
100 FIELD ARTILLERY 

telligence gathered over a period of months pointed to the presence 

of a large enemy force in the north of the province. Believed to be 

operating there were the 18th and 210th North Vietnam Army 

Regiments, the 2d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, and an unidentified regiment. 

The division plan for the operation covered four phases: Operations MASHER, WHITE 'VING, WHITE WING (EAGLE'S CLAW), and 

WHITE WING (BLACK HORSE). (Map 5) Phase I, Operation 

MASHER, began with a deception operation south of Bong Son to 

increase the security of Highway I and to lead the enemy to believe 

efforts would be directed southward. The 3d Brigade, the Gary 

Owen Brigade, conducted the initial assault. The artillery for this 

diversionary assault was task organized to allow for adequate fire 

support in the event heavy contact was made. 

The organic I05-mm. battalions were assigned the;r normal 

missions of direct support and the aerial rocket artillery battalion 

was assigned its normal mission of general support. In addition, the 

division had field artillery support available from higher headquarters. One 8-inch and 175-mm. battery was given the mission of 

general support to the division; one IOS-mm. battalion, that of 

reinforcing the South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade Artillery; and 

one searchl ight battery, that of general support. 

To weight the attack further, elements of direct support units 

that were not heavily committed in the opening phase of the 

operation were attached to more heavily committed units. Some 

units were also given on-order missions, which would facilitate 

planning for projected future operations. Additional fire power 

outside the division organic and attached resources was also made 

available for the operation. Tactical air support, both preplanned 

and immediate, was available for the entire operation. Naval 

gunfire support was available on call except for the period 10 

February-I March. The fires of a IOS-mm. battalion of the 22d 

South Vietnamese Division Artillery and a ISS-mm. battery of II 

Corps were also available. 

The initial assault into the area south of Bong Son met little 

opposition, and on 28 January, in conjunction with the Vietnamese 

Airborne Brigade, air assault and overland attacks were launched 

north of Bong Son. Two enemy battalions were found, fixed, and 

destroyed during the move north. Prisoner interrogation revealed 

that the enemy had moved out of the coastal plains and into the 

adjoining highlands to the north and west. 

In response to this intell igence, the division launched Phase II 

of the operation, WHITE WING. Originally scheduled for 4 February, the initial assaults were delayed for 48 hours because of bad 
THE BUILDUP 101 

weather. On (j February, with a battalion of Marines holding blocking positions to the north, the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, 

launched a co-ordinated five-battalion attack from both sides of the 

An I.ao Valley and swept south toward the 22d Division. 

As the 2d Brigade moved south, the 3d Brigade launched Phase 

III, a series of attacks into the area southwest of Bong Son. Highlighted by valleys, this area was appropriately nicknamed the 

"Eagle's Claw." A number of light to moderate contacts were made 

as enemy units within the valleys were caught between converging 

forces. Meanwhile, the 2d Brigade received some valuable intelligence information. Among the prisoners captured by the division 

was a battalion commander of the 22d North Vietnamese Army 

Regiment. He revealed that his unit held defensive positions in an 

area south of Bong Son. The brigade responded to this intelligence 

with an assault into the area and, in three days of continuous 

fighting, destroyed the 22d Regiment. While the 2d Brigade was 

engaged, the 1st Brigade relieved the 3d Brigade in the Kim Son 

Valley and in a matter of days rendered the 18th North Vietnamese 

Army Regiment ineffective, capturing all of the enemy antiaircraft weapons and recoilless rifles. 

The final phase of the operation, WHITE WING (BLACK HORSE), 

was a sweep into the Cay Giap Mountains southeast of Bong Son. 

The sweep, conducted with the South Vietnamese 22d Division, 

met only sporadic enemy resistance. By 6 March, 1st Cavalry skytroopers had made a complete sweep of Bong Son and the area 

could no longer be considered an enemy stronghold. The division 

had maintained contact with a determined enemy for 41 consecutive days and had again proved the effectiveness of airmobile operations. 

For the supporting field artillery involved in Operation 

MASHER/ WHITE WING, the success of the operation is of particular 

significance. The artillery showed that it could follow the fast pace 

of the airmobile troopers. Displacements were made quickly and 

efficiently without loss of the fire support capability. 

At the outset of Operation MASHER on 25 January, the division 

artillery forward command post displaced to Bong Son Special 

Forces Camp, where it was collocated with the division tactical 

operations center and the Vietnamese division command post. The 

move greatly facilitated clearance procedures and created a quick 

fire channel, which permitted immediate U.S. response to Vietnamese calls for fire and Vietnamese response to U.S. calls for fire. 

Although every attempt was made throughout the operation to 

position artillery so that displacements were held to a minimum, 

the speed with which ground troops moved and the size of the area 
CH-54 EMPLACING 155-MM. HOWITZER 
THE BUILDUP 103 

MI02 FIRING HIGH-ANGLE. 1st Ballalion, 21st Field Artillery, received 

the first MJ02 howitzers in Vietnam in March 1966. 

of operations nonetheless dictated an unusually high number of 

artillery displacements. Shown below are battery displacements for 

the 41-day period: 

MASIlER 

WIIITI:; WING 

Op.:r.llion 

WIIITF. WING (EAGLE'S CLAW) (11-28 February) . 

WHITE WING (BLACK HORSE) (1-6 March) 

TOlal 

·A\·crage of 12 CH-47 sorties per baHtfy displacement 

Displaccmenu by 

2 

28 

27 

o 

57 

Rood 

30 

27 

35 

17 

109 

When a field artill ery unit is moving, it cannot support the 

maneuver forces; the displacement that becomes necessary requires 

a considerable amount of planning and co-ordination to avoid depriving the ground troops of the support they need. Nevertheless, 

1st Cavalry artillerymen at all levels of the command met this 

challenge. Although most of the personnel assigned to the division 

were not strangers to airmobility, many of the supporting units 

were; yet they, too, completed air moves without major difficulty. 
104 FIELD ARTILLERY 

In early February during Operation WHITE WING. a CH-54 

Crane moved a l4.000·pound 155·mm. towed howitzer for the first 

time in comba t. The weapon belonged to Battery A. 1st Battalion. 

30th Artillery. This reat showed that medium towed artillery could 

go virtually anywhere the lighter (105·mm.) artillery could go; 

thus greater flexibility of the artillery and its supported forces was 

achieved. Much of the credit for the move must go to the men of the 

1st Cavalry Division Support Command. who fabricated and tested 

the special slings required to lift the 155·mm. howitzer. 

The large number of displacements by air put a tremendous 

strain on the air resources of the division. When the artillery was 

displaced by helicopters. ammunition was transported separately. 

During MASHER/ WIIITE WING. artillerymen attempled to deter· 

mine a means of economizing on " blade time" in the displacement 

of artillery. The product of this experimentation was a double· 

sling system that allowed the CH-47 to lift the 105·mm. howitzer as 

well as a load of ammunition. The ammunition was suspended 

underneath the howitzer by means of a long (18. to 20·foot) sling. 

Wilh crew riding inside the CH-47. this new method proved in· 

valuable in subsequent operations. since it permitted the displace· 

ment of a complete firing section in one aircraft sortie. The initial 

attempt to test this concept during combat was not made until 

Operation 11M BOWIE. which took place a few days later. though its 

development is attributed to the experiences of MASHER/ WHITE 

WING. 

The development of procedures to displace artillery during 

MASHER/ WHITE WING is of secondary importance to the actual 

shooting done by the field artillery. Operation MASHER/ WHITE 

WING testifies to the ability of the field artillery to maintain a 

devastating volume of fire and still move and communicate with 

the supported forces. During the operation. 141 .7 12 artillery 

rounds of all lypes were fired during 16.102 missions. A breakdown 

of expenditures by size and mission is shown below: 

Time on Target Enemy Contact 

Phue Preparations M isaion. Mission. Total 

MASHER ",. . .... 5 26 28 59 

WHITE WING 6 1 20 27 

(EAGLE'S CLAW) .. 50 124 66 240 

(BLACK HORSE) 36 6 15 57 

TOlals , . . .... 97 157 129 383 

106 FIELD ARTILLERY 

In addition to the artillery expended, the U.S. Navy supported 

the operation with 3,212 5-inch rounds, and the U.S. Air Force flew 

515 tactical air sorties during which over 1,000 tons of ordnance 

were dropped. 

Both tube and aerial artillery received a fair share of credit for 

enemy killed. Of particular value in this respect was information 

gleaned from prisoner interrogations. For example, a prisoner from 

the 8th Battalion, 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, revealed that on 3 February 1966, at the end of Operation MASHER, 

his unit had discovered and buried 200-400 bodies killed by artillery. All told, Operation MASHER/ WHITE W,NG yielded 2,389 enemy casualties, of which ~!\8 confirmed dead were credited to the 

field artillery. 

On the whole, Operation MASHER/ WIIITE W,NG was a tremendous success in defeating the enemy and freeing the civilian populace of the Bong Son area from enemy control. The complete fire 

support system functioned effectively throughout this operation. 

Target acquisition resources, artillery survey, artillery aviation, 

firing batteries, and support elements all acted as a team. The cooperative effort and enthusiastic response of the South Vietnamese 

artillery contributed significantly to the over-all fire support coordination effort. On the U .S. side, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 

19th Artillery (Airmobile), and the 1st Battalion (Airmobile), 

77th Artillery, exchanged liaison personnel during the operation 

to permit the direct support battalion of one brigade more easily 

to provide support for maneuver units of another brigade. Artillery 

communications functioned smoothly throughout the operation, 

and, last but not least, despite the vast area covered by the operation, artillery survey personnel from both division artillery and the 

support battalions traversed in excess of 190,000 meters and established 18 survey control points during the operation. If there had 

been doubts as to how an entire division artillery would fare in its 

first large·scale operation, MASHER/ WHITE W,NG erased them. 

Another significant 1966 field artillery action occurred during 

Operation BIRMINGHAM. This operation is noteworthy because it 

involved a major movement of supporting field artillery that required detailed planning and co·ordination. 

The operation was initiated when Military Assistance Command directed a search and destroy operation into northwest Tay 

N inh Province. Controlled by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, Operation BIRMINGHAM was directed at locating and destroying Viet 

Cong forces and base camps in the area. The 1st Division was 

operating in the Phu Loi area, 50 kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh, 
THE BUILDUP 107 

when the division commander received word to displace to Tay 

Ninh Province within a week. The 1st Division Artillery had to 

plan and co·ordinate the displacement of elements from seven field 

artillery battalions. The result was the smooth displacement of 72 

pieces of field artillery into Tay Ninh Province using all available 

means of transportation. The 1st Division Artillery Headquarters, 

functioning as the convoy control element, moved by road, with the 

1st Battalion, 7th Artillery, and the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, in 

the formation. Security for the convoy was provided by the 1st 

Squadron, 4th Cavalry ("Quarter Horse"). One battery of the 2d 

Battalion, 3:ld Artillery, moved by C-130 aircraft from Lai Khe to 

Tay Ninh city. Air Force C- 123 aircraft were used to displace a 

second battery of the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery, from Binh Gia, 

southeast of Saigon, to Tay N inh. An attached battery of the 2d 

Battalion, 13th Artillery, was airlifted by CH-47 helicopter from 

Phu Loi. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, under operational control of the 1st Division and in support of the South Vietnamese 

Airborne Brigade, moved separately by road; and a battery of 175-

mm. guns, in general support of Operation BIRMINGHAM, moved by 

road to Soui Da. To insure continuous and sufficient fire support 

for the road moves, the 1st Division Artillery Headquarters utilized 

its headquarters battery executive officer to co·ordinate fire support 

along the route of march. 

Brigadier General (then Colonel) Marlin W. Camp. 1st Divi· 

sion Artillery commander, was justifiably proud of the manner in 

which the move was conducted. The success of the move is espe· 

cially significant because friendly units had not ventured deep into 

northwest Tay Ninh Province in the past. 

For field force artillery to provide maximum area coverage, 

certain of its firing units were required to occupy extremely remote 

positions. In such cases, movement to the positions and position 

preparation required detailed planning. Those weapons that pro· 

vided the best area coverage by virtue of their long ranges were 

self·propelled weapons-8·inch howitzers and 175·mm. guns--too 

heavy to move by helicopter. For the most part, the "heavies" were 

restricted to movement by road. 

Some of the roads over which self·propelled weapons moved 

were in remote areas which had long been in enemy hands. These 

roads could be expected to be heavily mined with their bridges 

destroyed. Extensive engineer support was required to open those 

roads and the engineers, like the artillery that followed, were sub· 

ject to ambush at any time. Infantry and armor support was reo 

quired to help open the roads, provide protection, and keep the 
108 FIELD ARTILLERY 

roads open at least until the artillery movement was completed and 

support withdrawn. 

In a war characterized by the frequent movement of field artillery, the displacement of Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, in September 1967 is particularly impressive. The movement 

of Battery B was unusual because it was accomplished by Air Force 

tactical airlift. The battery, under the cammand of Captain Edward 

G. Walker, was moved from Bien Hoa air base to a landing strip 

at Song Be in heavily contested Phuc Long Province. To make t,le 

move, the weight of the weapons had to be reduced to the lift 

rapacity of the aircraft. This was done by removing the weapons' 

spades and tubes and transporting them by C-130 aircraft. The 

carriages could then be lifted by C-124's. B Battery was positioned 

at the end of the Song Be airstrip from where its weapons could 

easily reach to the Cambodian border. The men of B Battery 

worked on their new position for a month and then turned it over 

to B Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery. Both batteries 

swapped their weapons to avoid the problem of having again to 

move weapons to and from a remote area. The artillery position at 

Song Be was occupied until June 1971. The weapons could not be 

withdrawn by air in the same manner in which they had been 

moved to Song Be, since the landing strip was able to accommodate 

aircraft landing at peak capacity loads but was insufficient to allow 

them to take off with these same loads. The weapons were, therefore, withdrawn over a road that had been opened and improved 

during the four years that the Song Be position was occupied. 

As noted earlier, the first combat firing of the Beehive round 

occurred in November 1966. But it was the battle at Landing Zone 

BIRD in December that really woke up field artillerymen and infantrymen to the effectiveness of this new round. 

BIRD was a fire base located in the Kim Son Valley some 50 

kilometers north of Qui Nhon. (Map 6) No strangers to the valley, 

the 1st Cavalry Division had operated throughout the area since 

Operation MASHER/ WHITE WING early in 1966. The landing zone 

had only one half-strength infantry company (Company C, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry) for security in addition to twelve howitzers 

(six 105-mm. and six 155·mm.). The surrounding terrain afforded 

good cover for an enemy force that might decide to attack the base. 

On the night of 26 December 1966, two companies of the 22d 

North Vietnamese Army Regiment decided to test the light de· 

fenses and silently moved to within feet of the outer perimeter of 

BIRD. 

Shortl y after midnight the enemy launched a co-ordinated mortar and ground attack against the position. The attack penetrated 
outer 

MAP 6 

HelIcopter 

Pod c:::::l 

o cO 

THE BUILDUP 

LANDING ZONE BIRD 

(not to scale> 

SECONDARY 

ATTACK 

109 

the base [rom both the northeast and southeast. Driven slowly back, 

the defenders found themselves cornered in the south end of the 

base in the vicinity of gun number 2 of the 105·mm. battery position. Almost in desperation, Captain Leonard L. Schlenker, the 

battery commander, ordered the firing of Beehive and First Lieu· 

tenant John T. Piper, the battery executive officer, loaded the 

round, yelled a warning, and fired the round to the northeast in 

the direction of the enemy main attack. One hundred enemy sol· 

diers were at the northeast corner of the fire base, in and around the 
110 FIELD ARTILLERY 

number gun position of the 155-mm. battery. Piper fired one 

additional round and the attack was halted as suddenly as it had 

begun. 

The United States lost 30 men killed in action at BIRO while 

claiming 266 known enemy dead. For doggedly beating back a 

determined and numerica lly superior enemy, the three units at 

B,RO (Battery B, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery; Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery; and Company C, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry) 

were all presented the Presidential Unit Citation. Sergeant Delbert 

O. Jennings, weapons platoon sergeant, was awarded the Medal of 

Honor for his bravery, and Lieutenant Piper and Staff Sergeant 

Carrol V. Crain, Battery B chief of firing battery, both received the 

Distinguished Service Cross for their action. 

The most importalll benefit derived from the action at BIRD 

was recognition that the Beehive round was a tremendously valuable asset to the over-all fire base defense program. It had gained 

the confidence and respect of both artillerymen and infantrymen 

and would continue to playa vital role in position defense throughout the remainder of the war. 

The Buildup and Major Combat OPemtions During 1967 

The year 1967 ""y a cOlllinued growth in the number of field 

artillery units in the Republic of Vietnam. During that year, eleven 

nondivisional field artillery battalions arrived in Vietnam and began supporting operations in various parts of the country. They 

were joined by three additional division artilleries. In January, the 

9th Division Artillery set up its headquarters in Bearcat, and in late 

1967, the remainder of the Screaming Eagles of the lOlst Airborne 

Division joined their 1st Brigade. In a ceremony held at Chu Lai in 

September 1967, Task Force OREGON was redesignated the 23d 

(Americal) Division and thus was also born the Americal Division 

Artillery. The task force had been in existence since mid-1967 and 

was composed of three separate infantry brigades. 

In contrast to the previous year, 1967 was highlighted by largescale, multidivisional operations. The year was only a week old 

when Operation CEDAR FALLS began. Controlled by II Field Force, 

CEDAR FALLS involved the 1st and 25th Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and separate 

battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The operation 

was directed against the enemy Military Region IV headquarters 

and strongholds in the Iron Triangle region of III Corps. The 

success of the operation (389 enemy killed, 471 defectors) attested 
THE BUILDUP II I 

to the ability of the Free World forces to work together, fight side 

by side, and produce a well co·ordinated, multidivision offensive. 

While CEDAR FALLS was in (ull swing in the Iron Triangle, II 

Field Force planners were putting the final wraps on plans for 

subsequent operations. The largest offensive planned to date, Operation JUNCTION CITY had been on the drawing boards for months. 

It was aimed at Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army strong· 

holds in "Var Zone C, in northern Tay inh Province, which had 

long been a major Viet Cong stronghold and the location of the 

headquarters for the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). 

COSVN, the controlling headquarters for all Viet Cong activities 

in South Vietnam, had always heen an elusive target ;mel continued 

to be throughout the war. 

Committed to JUNCTION CITY were two U.S. divisions (1st and 

25th), five brigades (173d Airborne; 196th Light Infantry; 199th 

Light Infantry; 3d Brigade, 4th Division; and 1st Brigade, 9th 

Division), and the II th Armored Cavalry Regiment. II Field Force, 

Vietnam, under the command of Lieutenant General Jonathan O. 

Seaman, was the controlling headquarters for the operation. II 

Field Force Artillery, commanded by Brigadier General Willis D. 

Crittenberger, Jr., provided six field artillery battalions and four 

batteries of Dusters and quad.·50 machine guns (rom the 5th Bat· 

talion (AWSP), 2d Artillery. II Field Force assets were divided 

equally between the 1st and 25th Divisions, the two major subordinate elements. An additiona l eleven artillery battalions were 

committed to the operation in various support roles. A list of the 

participating field artillery units is shown below: 

II Field Force Artillery Units 

7-9 Arty (105 T) attached 1st Div 

2- 13 Arty (105 T), attached 1st Div 

2- 11 Arty (155 T) 

6- 27 Arty (8 / 175) 

2-32 Arty (8 / 175) 

2- 35 Arty (155 SP) 

5-2 Arty (A WSP) 

25th Infantry Division Artillery 

1-8 Arty (\05 T) 

7-11 Arty (105 T) 

2-77 (Arty 105 T) 

3-13 Arty (105 T) 

3-82 Arty (105 T) OPCON, DS 196th Bde 

Btry A, B, C, 11th ACR, OPCON, Supporting 11th ACR 

1st Infantry Division Artillery 

1-5 Arty (\05 T) 
112 

1-7 Arty (105 T) 

2-33 Arty (105 T) 

8-6 Arty (155 / 8) 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

3-319 Arty (Abn) (105 T), OPCON, DS 173d Abn Bde 

JUNCTION CITY was initially a two·phase operation; Phase I (22 

February-17 March 1967) called for a co-ordinated assault into 

western War Zone C and search and destroy operations against the 

Central Office and enemy forces and installations in the area. Phase 

II (18 March-IS April 1967) ca ll ed for a shift of emphasis to 

eastern War Zone C and continuation of search and destroy operations throughout the remainder of the war zone. The success of 

these first two phases resulted in a third (16 April-14 May), which 

called for a continuation of search and destroy operations to the 

southern edge of the war zone and the provision of security for the 

city of Tay Ninh and the town of Soui Da. (Map 7) For Phase III, 

II Field Force passecl control of the operation to the 25th Infantry 

Division. 

The objectives of Operation JUNCTION CITY were accomplished 

to varying degrees. The Viet Cong lost 2,728 soldiers. A number of 

his base camps and supply caches were destroyed, forcing him to 

move. Although the operation did not destroy the enemy's capa· 

bility to wage war, JUNCTION CITY can be said to have put him 

significantly off balance and to have eliminated War Zone C as a 

haven for enemy units. During the operation, U.S. forces con· 

structed in War Zone C three C-130 airfields and two civilian 

irregular defense group camps, giving Free World forces readily 

accessible points from which to launch future operations in the 

area should the need arise. 

JUNCTION CITY required most of the U.S. ground forces avail· 

able in the III Corps area, and a commensurate amount of field 

artillery supported the operation. The massive co·ordination effort 

dictated by the employment of the equiva lent of seventeen field 

artillery battalions was effec ted with surprising ease. The complete· 

ness with which the operation was planned is, in large part, the 

explanation for its success. To facilitate command and control of 

the operation, II Field Force for the first time displaced a tactical 

headquarters to the field. Colloeatecl with the tactical command 

post was the II Field Force Artillery command post. In addition, 

II Field Force Artillery tapped the resources of its 54th Artillery 

Group to provide a controlling headquarters for the separate 

howitzer batteries of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 

technique proved to be a success in aiding the co·ordination be· 

tween firing units. For the remainder of the field artillery battal· 

ions, existing liaison sections proved sufficient in strength to provide 
THE BUILDUP 113 

liaison between units. Unit boundaries were used as fire co· 

ordination lines throughout the operations, and the II Field Force 

fire support plan authorized direct co·ordination between divisions 

and supporting artillery groups. Field artillery fire planning was 

accomplished by division and separate brigades. 

The most significant combat action during Operation JUNCTION 

CITY took place around Fire Support Base GOLD, seventeen miles 

northwest of Tay Ninh. The fire base was occupied jointly by the 

2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, of the ~d Brigade, 4th Division, and the 

headquarters and all firing batteries of the 2d Battalion, 77th Field 

Artillery. At 0640 on 21 March infantry patrols sweeping the area 

around GOLD made contact with elements of a Viet Cong force 

apparently preparing to attack the base. The contact prematurely 

triggered the enemy attack which began with heavy fire from reo 

coilless rifles, rocket·propelled grenades, and 60·mm. and 82·mm. 

mortars. At 0715 the Viet Cong launched a co·ordinated ground 

assault from the east, southeast, and north with elements of five 

battalions under the control of the 272d Viet Cong Regiment. So 

violent was the assault that the enemy carried portions of the 

perimeter, but actions by the field artillery turned the tide. All 

batteries of the 2d Battalion, 77th Field Artillery, commanded by 

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Vessey, engaged the enemy with over 

1,000 rounds in direct fire including 30 rounds of Beehive, the 

largest number of these rounds fired in a single engagement to 

date. At the same time three batteries within range added their 

fire. The batteries included Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery 

(105·mm., towed), to the south which delivered more than 1,000 

rounds; Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (155·mm., self· 

propelled), which delivered almost 400 rounds; and a composite 

8·inch and 175·mm. battery from II Field Force Artillery to the 

south wh ich provided additional support. Further fire support was 

provided by Air Force tactical air. During the attack two maneuver 

battalions of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, were rushed to 

the scene, catching the enemy forces as they were attempting to 

withdraw and inflicting further casualties. The action in and 

around GOLD resulted in 635 Viet Cong killed (confirmed by body 

count) and 7 captured together with 65 crew served weapons and 

94 individual weapons. U.S. losses were 31 killed and 109 wounded. 

The action was given the name Battle of Soui Tre after the fact. 

Field artillery units involved in Operation JUNCTION CITY 

gained invaluable experience in employment, tactics, and tech· 

niques in a large-scale, multidivision offensive operation. To help 

preserve the element of surprise, field artillery units usually fired 

preparations of short duration; the fires of large numbers of units 
OPERATION JUNCTION CITY 

22 FEe - 14 MAY 1967 

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116 FIELD ARTILLERY 

were massed to insure the effectiveness of preparations yet to maintain brevity. A problem was the lack of a large number of suitable 

field artillery positions. Thus, several artillery units were often 

consolidated at one location. Landing Zone BLACKHORSE at one 

point in the operation housed 52 field artillery tubes-five 105-mm. 

batteries, three 155-mm. batteries, and an 8-inch battery. The disadvantages of crowding artillery into one location and presenting 

a lucrative target were far outweighed by being able to mass accurately the fires of a large number of weapons from a few locations. 

Since the elernent of surprise was essential, extensive position 

area surveys were impractical; the field artillery instead employed 

a relatively new technique called photogrammetic survey. Basically, 

the technique utilized air reconnaissance photos, the prominent 

terrain features in the photos serving as registration points and 

survey control points for position area survey. Although limited, 

the method proved far superior to that of obtaining co-ordinates 

by map inspection and served as a valuable expedient during the 

operation. 

Several other artillery-related techniques used successfully during JUNCTION CITY deserve mention: 

1. Artillery warning control centers (AWCC's) played a vital 

role in the operation. The tremendous number of aircraft in the 

area coupled with the large amount of constant artillery firing necessitated timely and accurate artillery advisories for aircraft. The 

1st and 25th Divisions operated centers for their respective areas 

of operation during Phase I of the operation. During Phase II, 

such responsibility was delegated to the direct support artillery 

battalion in each brigade area of operation. The advalllage of this 

system was that data were always current and did not have to be 

consolidated at a central location. One center in an area as large 

as that encompassed by JUNCTION CITY would necessitate an unacceptably heavy volume of radio traffic. 

2. High-angle fire was proved to be more effective in penetrating the thick jungle foliage than low-angle fire, principally because 

the projectile descended steeply, paralleling the tree trunks, so 

that the chance of its hitting a tree and detonating prematurely 

was reduced. High-angle fire in the jungle also assured added 

safety for supported ground troops. If high-angle fires detonated 

prematurely, they did so almost directly over their target. On the 

other hand, if low-angle fires detonated prematurely they did so 

some distance laterally from the target, possibly directly over the 

heads of friendly troops. 

3. During the operation, the effectiveness of the AN / MPQ--4A 

radar was proven. Careful planning prior to the operation resulted 
THE BUILDUP I 17 

in the placement of radars to provide mutual and overlapping coverage of the various units and fire support bases_ Each radar had 

a primary direction of coverage as well as alternate directions. 

If a fire base came under attack. usually a radar at another fire 

base would pick up the enemy rounds before the radar on the 

fire base under attack would. This flexibility greatly enhanced the 

ability of U.S. forces to deliver rapid counterbattery fire. 

4. On D-day. 22 February 1967. the artillerymen of Battery A. 

3d Battalion. 319th Artillery. under operational control of the 2d 

Battalion. 503d Infantry. 173d Airborne. participated in the only 

U.S. parachute assault cond ucted in the war. Led by the battery 

commander. Captain Charles C. Anderson. the entire battery parachuted into the area around Katum. The howitzers were dropped 

into the landing zone by C-130·s. From a position established in 

the vicinity of the landing zone. Battery A provided direct artillery 

support for search and destroy operations conducted by maneuver 

elements in the vicinity of Katum. 

In spite of the magnitude of the operation and the amount of 

artillery involved in JUNCTION CITY. there were surprisingly few 

problem areas of major significance. The most significant was in 

fire support. Ouring the operation. field artillery fires were frequently lifted to accommodate tactical air support. which is a bad 

practice. If supporting fires are properly co-ordinated. the need to 

check fire field artill ery should rarely occur. When it does occur 

maneuver forces are slighted because only when all available supporting fires. regardless of type. are able to function simultaneously 

will they provide the best possible support. 

On the whole. JUNCTION CITY was a successful operation. In 

the years of combat that followed. U.S. and allied forces maintained the capability of re-entering War Zone C at will. All artillerymen participating in the operation could take great pride in 

having contributed so effectively to the accomplishment of the mission. 

Perhaps it is only fitting that 1967. the "year of the big battles." 

should end as it had begun. Operation JUNCTION CITY began the 

year; the battle for Oak To ended it. Although much of the heavy 

fighting in 1967 took place in the south (for example. CEDAR FALLS. 

JUNCTION CITY. and the battle at Loc Ninh). Oak To was to the 

north in the Central Highlands of Kontum Province. The battle 

for Oak To was part of MACARTHUR. an operation that extended 

into early 1969. 

Reacting to intelligence reports that indicated a large buildup 

of enemy troops in Kontum Province. the 4th Infantry Oivision 

deployed its 1st Brigade to the Oak To airfield in late October 
liS FIELD ARTILLERY 

1967. On 2 November, a North Vietnamese Army reconnaissance 

sergeant defected and revealed that four infantry regiments and an 

artillery regiment were preparing to launch a large·scale attack 

against the Dak To-Tanh Canh area. This would have been the 

largest enemy offensive in the Central Highlands area to that time. 

The 1st Brigade initially made heavy contact with the enemy to 

the south and southwest of Dak To throughout the first week in 

November. Augmented by the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 1st 

Brigade maintained heavy contact throughout the Ben Het- Dak To 

area . Additiona l assistance came from the 42d South Vietnamese 

Army Regiment, operating to the east of Dak To, and from the 1st 

Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, which blocked enemy withdrawal 

routes to the so uth of Ben Het-Dak To. As the fighting intensified, 

the enemy was forced to commit his reserves to cover his withdrawal 

toward the southwest. The bitter fighting that followed ranks with 

the fiercest of the war. The turning point of the action was the fight 

for Hill 875, which was finally taken by elements of both the 4th 

Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade but not before the hill 

"received the heaviest concentration of Tac Air and all calibers 

of artillery bombardment of any single terrain feature in the II 

Corps area." 

After the operation, Major General William R. Peers, commander of the 4th Division, acknowledged the role played by the 

artillery in the battle: "The large number of enemy in the area 

and the fact that many of the contacts were against elaborately 

constructed enemy fortifications required that Tac Air and artillery be used at the maximum rates possible. The responsiveness of 

both air and artillery and the cooperation between them contributed greatly to the victory and was a real tribute to integrated 

direct support under difficult circumstances." 

The artillery committed in the battle of Dak To consisted of 

15 batteries of all ca libers, with a total of 77 artillery pieces available for support. These figures do not include the battery of aerial 

rocket artillery that became available when the 1st Brigade of the 

1st Cavalry Division joined the operation on I I November. Battery 

A (ARA), 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery, assumed a general supportreinforcing role. The U.S. aerial rocket artillery, coupled with the 

enemy's use of rockets, led to the unfamiliar sight of rockets being 

employed against rockets. 

Artillery expenditures for the 37-day period exceeded 150,000 

rounds of all ca libers. Artillery units completed 48 tactical displacements to meet the constantly changing demands of the battle. 

To eliminate fire support co-ordination problems, the 4th Infantry 

Division Artillery sent a tactical command post to Dak To on 9 
BATTLE OF SOUl 

FSB BURT 

(not to scale> 

SECONDARY 

CUT 

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MAP 8 
120 FIELD ARTILLERY 

November and U.S. artillery batteries provided liaison personnel 

to the fire direction centers of the three supporting Vietnamese 

artillery batteries. The effectiveness of the fire support co-ordination 

effort is evidenced by the successful integration of 2,096 tactical 

air sorties and 45 B-52 strikes during the operation. The battle 

of Dak To cost the enemy 1,644 lives and rendered three North 

Vietnamese Army infantry regiments ineffective, totally disrupting 

enemy plans for a major victory in the Central Highlands. 

The holiday truce ended abruptly on New Year's Day 1968 for 

the defenders of Fire Support Base BURT, a 25th Infantry Division 

base located ten kilometers south of the Cambodian border. (Map 

8) Beginning with sporadic mortar attacks in the late afternoon, the 

enemy sent four Viet Cong battalions against the hase. Among 

the defenders were two batteries of 105-mm. and one battery of 

155-mm. howitzers. The enemy ground attack commenced minutes 

before midnight, the official end of the truce. After a diversionary 

attack on the west side of the perimeter, defended by elements of the 

2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized), the enemy launched his 

main attack from the southeast, a sector defended by Company C, 

3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery. As the enemy slowly worked his way toward the bunker line, 

the artillery shifted from countermortar to direct fire in answer to a 

call from the infantry command post. Battery C began firing a heavy 

volume of direct fire with both high explosive and Beehive ammunition. The enemy attack slowed in the face of the artillery but 

picked up to the south of the fire support base, a sector manned by 

Company C, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, and Battery A, 2d Battalion, 

77th Artillery. Battery A commenced direct fire, and flare ships and 

armed helicopters were used extensively throughout the south side 

of the base. Fire Support Base BEAUREGARD, located twelve kilometers to the west, provided supporting fire west of BURT in an 

attempt to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or withdrawing in 

that direction. The 155-mm. (self-propelled) howitzers of Battery 

C, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, located on the north side of the fire 

base, supplied continuous direct fire to the north, northeast, and 

northwest. In addition to the direct fire, indirect fire from both 

BURT and BEAUREGARD was shifted out to the road running south 

from BURT. Although they were not discovered until daylight, two 

enemy battalions were assembled on that road as a reserve force to 

exploit weaknesses in the perimeter, If weaknesses existed, the two 

battalions never found them. By 0300, tactical air had arrived and 

was pounding the area to the south. The fires of the artillery gunships and tactical air broke up the Viet Cong attack: by 0600 contact 

was broken and 400 enemy lay dead in and around the base. 
US. SECURITY AREA 

THE nUILIlUP 

not to scale 

ANOERSON'S SECTION 

REGIONAL ':-ORtESI POPULAR FORCES U S SECURITY SECUR"'" AREA AREA 

121 

Diagram 7. Battery A, 2d Baltalion (Airborne), ~20th Artillery, 

fire base. 

The artillerymen of the 25th Division played a vital role in the 

success of the operation. In addition to maintaining a constant 

stream of both direct and indirect fire, artillery personnel cut out 

hasty landing zones for resupply aircraft and broke out and distributed over 1,500 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition and 

200,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, all during the hours of 

darkness and in the heat of battle. In addition, they establ ished an 

improvised air station in the fire direction center of Battery C, 2d 

Battalion, 77th Artillery, and assisted in the treatment and evacuation of the wounded. 

Despite the heroic actions of the 25th Division personnel, the 

battle cost 23 lives and 153 wounded. The successful integration o( 

infantry, artillery, and air power had saved Fire Support Base BURT. 

The battle of Soui Cut is a typical example of many such actions 

that occurred during the war in Vietnam. It is representative of 

well co-ordinated position defense and fire support. 

A second example of a determined defense by field artillerymen 

occupying a fire base occurred during the early morning hours of 

14 October 1967. Battery A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery (105-mm.), and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155-

mm.), were occupying an unnamed fire base on a ridge line in 

support of elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, 

of the 1st Brigade, 10ist Airborne Division, during Operation 

WHEELER. The fire base, which had been occupied for almost a 

month, was located haHway between Tam Ky and Thien Phuoc in 

the I Corps region. 
122 FIELD ARTILLERY 

To assist in the defense of the base, a force of 75 civilian irregular defense group (ClOG) personnel manned the perimeter 

bunkers. For fllrther security, Battery A nightly posted guards at 

each howitzer, the fire direction center, and the ammunition section. Because o[ the difficulty in distinguishing them from the 

enemy at night, the irregulars had been instructeo to remain within 

their bunkers during the hours of darkness. 

The perimeter bunkers were on the edge of a steep dropoff 

along the narrow ridge line. Because of the steepness of the slope, 

it was impossible to observe activity directly below the blinkers. It 

was lip these steep slopes that a platoon of sappers crept during the 

early morning hours and pre-positioned themselves for nil attack on 

the I05-mm. hattery. Their objective was to capture the weapons 

and turn them on the I 55-JTIm. battery and infantry battalion headquarters, which were located on eit her side of the 105-mm. battery 

position. 

At 0320, in extreme darkness, mortars, rockets, and recoilless 

riRes unleashed a devastating barrage on the area in conjunction 

with the sapper attack. Every position within the battery area was 

known to the enemy before the attack. The radios in the fire direction center were destroyed immediately. A sapper tossed a grenade 

into the center and then reached in and placed a satchel charge directly on top of the two VRC-46 radios. The enemy so effectively 

infiltrated the battery area that the artill erymen had no chance to 

repulse the initial attack; instead, the fighting began within the 

parapets. That the crewmen of the weapons were able to return 

fire with their howitzers testified to their discipline and courage. 

Although the enemy seemed to be everywhere in the battery area, 

the bancry commander, executive officer, and first sergeant, 

though wounded, moved from weapon to weapon, helping the more 

seriously wounded and assisting in the delivery of fire . 

Each weapon parapet had its own private war going by this time. 

All the men of nllmber I section had been wounded by the initial 

mortar attack; nevertheless, the section chief, Staff Sergeant Webster Anderson, and his men moved into the parapet and directed fire 

upon the enemy. Grenades fell all around them, bllt neither Anderson nor his men faltered . Two mortar rounds landed at Anderson's 

feet and severe ly mangled his lower legs. Although in great pain, 

he managed to move arOllnd in the protective parapet and continued to inspire his men. When a grenade landed next to one of his 

wounded cannoneers, Anderson grabbed the grenade and threw it 

from the parapet. In the process, his hand was blown off. The 

executive officer came upon IlUlnber 1 weapon at this time and, 

seeing Sergeant Anderson's condition, moved him to medical aid. 
THE BUILDUP 123 

BATrJ::RY A, 20 BATIALlON, 3201'H F IELD ARTILLERY, IN POSITION ON 

OPERATION WHEELER. An example of fl small, ct'owded ridgeli,ze 

position. 

For his actions, Sergeant Anderson later received the Medal of 

Honor. 

By now the battery commander had retrieved the sole remaining radio and had directed defensive fires upon the enemy weapon 

positions. These fires, in conjunction with direct fires from the 

105-mm. howitzers, silenced the enemy. The Viet Cong were 

finally driven from the battery perimeter after more than two hours 

of close combat. The infantry battalion headquarters and the 

155-mm. battery had not received a single enemy round during the 

battle. Because of the unknown nature and size of the enemy force, 

these two units were forced to man their own defenses and were 

initially unable to assist Battery A. Because of extremely bad 

weather, the only aircraft flying that night were medical evacuation 

helicopters, and even they had to be directed into the fire base by 

the battalion Q-4 radar, which was collocated with the 155-mm. 

battery. A total of three medevac aircraft evacuated the wounded 

and dead from the battery area under the worst possible flying conditions. 

Morning found Battery A with 6 killed and 29 wounded out of 
124 FIELD ARTILLERY 

an initial strength of 49. Twenty.two of the wounded required 

evacuation. The civilian irregulars lost 6 killed and 5 wounded. 

Fifty-six craters from 82-mm. mortar rounds were counted in the 

battery position. At least five mortar rounds had landed in each 

section parapet. Rocket and recoilless rifle Rashes had been observed 

and fired upon by the 105-mm. and 155-mm. batteries. Although the 

105-mm. battery was hurt badly during the attack, the objective of 

the enemy force was not realized. The field artillerymen stood by 

their weapons in the face of overwhelming odds and repulsed the 

enemy from the battery area without losing a single howitzer. 

Still another example of determined defense of a fire support 

base occurred on 18 November 1'lG7 at the opposite end of the 

country from Operation WHEELER, at Fire Support Base CUDGEL. It 

was one of three bases established in support of 9th Infantry Division units participating in Operation KEN CIANC in western Dinh 

Thong Province. 

The operation began at dawn on 15 November from a staging 

area at Dong Tmn, the 9th Division command post. In order to locate an area of dry ground large enough to accommodate four guns 

of his 10S-mm. howitzer battery, the commander of Battery C, 2d 

Battalion, 4th Artillery, Captain Dennis J. Schaible, accompanied 

the first flight of infantry. For security reasons, reconnaissance of the 

area had been limited 10 one brief flyover three days before the 

operation. Forty-five minutes after the insertion, the battery commander had located an area suitable for the four howitzers. This 

area was later named Fire Support Base CUDCEL. Fifteen minutes 

after the crews had lowered the first howitzer to the mushy ground, 

Battery C commenced preparation fires in support of positions previously selected for the other two fire bases. Later in the morning 

after the insertion of two infantry battalions into the area of operations, three howitzers of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, 

joined Battery C at CUDCEL. Battery D was the first battery employed in Vietnam with the airmobile firing platform, and this was 

its first operation. The four guns of Battery C were positioned near 

the northern perimeter and the three guns of Battery D flanked the 

southern portion of the perimeter. '\lith the addition of elements 

(ba ttalion headquarters, Company C, and the reconnaissance platoon) from the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, which would join the 

two artillery batteries at CUDGEL on the 17th, the cast of players was 

set for the battle of Fire Support Base CUDGEL. 

The base was bordered on the west by a canal approximately 33 

feet wide and 10 feet deep. On the north was a canal with similar 

dimensions and running east to west. To the south were scrub woods 

and thick undergTowth, and 10 the east were open rice paddies. The 
THE BUILDUP 125 

reconnaissance platoon was deployed on the western portion of the 

perimeter across the north-south canal, since the canal offered a 

good line of protection against enemy advance and was a good terrain feature on which to fix the two flanks of the company defensive 

position_ The right flank of the reconnaissance platoon, on the 

west side of the canal, was linked with the left flank of the 2d Platoon, Company C, which was on the east side of the canal. The 2d 

Platoon stretched to the east and linked up with the 4th Platoon, 

which extended south. The right flank of the 4th Platoon linked 

with the !ld Platoon, which deployed south and west to tie in 

with the 1st Platoon on the south. The right flank of the 1st Platoon, 

on the east side of the north-south canal, joined with the left flank 

of the reconnaissance platoon, along the west side of the canal. In 

addition to the perimeter established by the infantry company and 

reconnaissance platoon, Battery C had prepared automatic weapons 

positions on the east side of the north-south canal as a backup defensive position. A hot line between the battery fire direction center 

and the infantry battalion command post provided vital communications for the integrated defense. 

Intelligence had disclosed a heavy concentration of Viet Gong 

forces in the area. Battery C cannoneers prepared sandbagged positions as a precaution before dark on their first night at the fire support base. They improved their positions at every opportunity 

during the occupation of CUDGEL. Preparations were extremely 

difficult because the water level was less than one foot below the 

ground. All the foxho les filled with water and most of the protection had to be constructed above the soggy surface of the base. 

Soon after the occupation of the perimeter by the reconnaissance platoon, one member of the platoon saw what he thought to 

be someone wearing a helmet and crouching next to a stand of 

palm trees directly west of the position. The soldier was unarmed 

at the time; when he returned with his weapon to investigate, he 

could find nothing and did not report the incident. 

At 2130 the men of one of the listening posts set out by the 

reconnaissance platoon intercepted a Viet Cong scout and killed 

him with a burst from an M60 machine gun. Around 0150 the 

south side of the fire support base perimeter came under heavy fire. 

The 1st Platoon of Company C was in danger of being overrun. 

Within minutes, an intense mortar barrage fell on the positions 

occupied by the reconnaissance platoon and Battery C. This seemed 

to be a signal for enemy forces on the southwest of the perimeter 

to attack the reconnaissance platoon positions. It was later estimated that one company assaulted the reconnaissance platoon on 

the south and west to provide a base of fire with mortars and 
126 

vc 

vc 

" 

MAP 9 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

FIRE SUPPORT BASE CUDGEL 

(not to scole) 

recoilless rifles while two companies maneuvered against Company 

C on the south. 

When the mortar barrage began in the Battery C area, most of 

the men cried "incoming" and dived for protection. The battery 

commander and the fire direction officer (FDO) were in the fire 

direction center. Within seconds after the first mortar rounds burst 

in the battery area, the officer was on the radio requesting that 

supporting artillery prepare to fire the defensive concentrations to 

the south and west of the battery position. At the same time the 

battery commander was on the hot line to the infantry battalion 

command post and informed the infantry battalion commander 

that the fire direction center was in contact with the mutually 

supporting artillery and requested permission from the battalion 

commander to call for defensive concentrations. Though permission was quickly granted, it was ten to fifteen minutes befor~ the 

first artillel·y support [rom a sister battery was received. The enemy 

had also mortared Fire Support Base MACE, a few kilometers away, 

just before the ground and mortar attack on CUDCEL. (Map 9) 
THE BUILDUP 127 

The battery supporting CUDGEL was also supporting MACE and was 

already engaged in a fire mission when the call from the Battery C 

fire direction center was received. 

In the battle that raged for the next I y:! hours. the Viet Cong 

forces made a desperate attempt to penetrate the southwest portion 

of the perimeter by overrunning the reconnaissance platoon left 

flank and Company C right flank. They came perilously close to 

achieving their goal. 

The reconnaissance platoon and the 1st and 3d Platoons of 

Company C were the most heavily engaged infantry forces during 

the battle. The fighting in their sector was so fierce and at such 

close range that each position seemed to be isolated by intense 

enemy fire in a struggle for individual survival. The battle had 

been going on for approximately 30 minutes when the reconnaissance platoon leader gave the order to pull back across the canal to 

the positions occupied by Battery C. As the platoon evacuated its 

position. the enemy rushed forward and set up recoilless rifle and 

automatic weapons positions aimed point blank into the Battery 

C position across the canal. 

As soon as the reconnaissance platoon began to withdraw across 

the canal. Battery C was subjected to intensive automatic rifle. rifle 

grenade. and recoilless rifle fire. The battery commander requested 

and received permission from the infantry battalion commander to 

engage the advancing Viet Cong units with direct artillery fire. 

Permission to fire Beehive rounds was withheld. however. until the 

reconnaissance platoon had crossed the canal. Three of the four 

howitzers had been firing an illumination mission when the attack 

began and were pointed away from the direction of the enemy advance. Within a few minutes. the crews had turned the pieces 

around and taken the onrushing enemy under fire. The battery 

commander and the chiefs of sections adjusted the high-explosive 

direct fire while the fire direction officer was on the radio adjusting 

the indirect supporting fire. 

The Viet Cong countered with recoilless rifle and heavy machine gun fire. The first round from the recoilless rifle missed the 

guns and its flash provided a target for howitzer number 2. The 

cannoneers of number 2 fired at the recoilless rifle. but their first 

round was low. It struck the canal just below the target. exploded 

on contact with the bank. and sent mud and fragments back into 

the battery position. As the crew was about to fire a second round. 

a recoilless rifle scored a direct hit on the front carriage of the 

howitzer. The blast wounded the entire section. The tires and 

sling-load cushioning on the howitzer burst into flame. One of the 

cannoneers. Private First Class Sammy L. Davis. struggled to his 
128 FIELD ARTILLERY 

feet and returned to the now furiously burning howitzer. Disregarding a hail of small-arms fire directed against the position, he 

aimed and fired the howitzer. The damaged weapon recoiled violently and slammed Davis to the ground. Undaunted, he returned 

to the piece, but a mortar round exploded within 20 meters of his 

position and compounded his wounds. Private Davis loaded the 

howitzer, aimed it, and fired; this time he destroyed the recoilless 

rifle. Again the recoil of the howitzer knocked him to the ground, 

sent the howitzer skidding into a hole, and rendered it inoperable. 

By this time, most of the reconnaissance platoon had reached 

the friendly side of the canal. The artillerymen of Battery C 

dragged many of the infantrymen from the canal. Three men 

from one of the platoon listening posts were not so fortunate; the 

Viet Cong attack had cut them off. As the battle progressed, a round 

from another battery landed immediately in front of them. They 

decided that they must abandon their position or be annihilated by 

their own artillery. As they started back, another artillery round 

landed behind them and wounded two of the three men. They continued to low crawl back toward the canal. As they reached the 

bank of the canal, they saw the recoilless rifle that Davis had 

knocked out. Not knowing that the round that had knocked out the 

recoilless rifle had also put the howitzer out of action, they yelled 

across to the artillery to cease firing. Hearing their cries for help, 

Davis and another member of number 2 gun section, Private First 

Class William H . Murray, went to help the wounded men. Despite 

his painful wounds and his inability to swim, Davis picked up an 

air mattress and he and Murray struck out across the deep canal to 

rescue three men. Upon reaching the men, all of whom had by 

this time sustained wounds, Davis took up a position on the canal 

bank and fired on the Viet Cong, who were swarming the western 

bank, while Murray ferried the most seriously wounded infantryman across the canal. After emptying five magazines into the charging enemy, Davis and Murray floated the remaining two wounded 

infantrymen across the canal. Though still suffering from neglected 

wounds, Davis refused medical attention, joined another howitzer 

crew, and assisted in firing until the attack was broken later in the 

morning. For his action, Private Davis received the Medal of 

Honor, which was presented to him by President Johnson at the 

White House exactly one year from the date of the battle. 

While Davis was fighting his private battle with the recoilless 

rifle, the other howitzer sections were also heavily engaged. By 0245 

the 3d Platoon, manning the southern perimeter, had fallen back 

to the battery position. The platoon leader had been seriously 

wounded and the platoon sergeant killed. With a second side of the 
THE BUILDUP 129 

perimeter now open, gun number 4 once again shifted trails to level 

direct fire south into the vacant perimeter area . Throughout the 

raging battle, the battery commander continually requested permission to fire Beehive in hopes of breaking up the attack. Finally permission came, and Battery C fired a total of 21 Beehive rounds. Just 

after the first of these was fired, number 3 gun received a direct hit 

from a recoilless rifte. Although the recoil mechanism was leaking 

oil, the crew continued to fire the Beehive rounds until the piece 

would no longer return to battery. As the last of the Beehive rounds 

was fired, and almost as quickly as the firing had begun, that attack 

withered. By this time helicopter gunships and a G-47 Spooky had 

arrived on station to add their fire power against the retreating 

enemy forces. 

When the battle was over, 22 of the 44 artillerymen of Battery 

C had been wounded. Two of the 4 howitzers had been destroyed 

and over 600 direct fire rounds, including the 21 Beehive rounds, 

had been fired at the enemy. The infantry suffered 6 killed and 76 

wounded. The official number of enemy killed in the operation was 

placed at 83, but estimates of the actual enemy losses were more 

than twice that number. The efforts of Private Davis and the other 

field artillerymen in Battery C turned what could have been a 

Viet Cong victory into a clear defeat. 

Overview: 1965 to Pre-Tet 1968 

As 1967 drew to an end, the enemy was busy formulating plans 

for an offensive to be launched throughout Vietnam in celebration 

of Tel 1968. The eve of Tet is a good vantage point from which to 

look back on the U.S. field artillery'S first 2\12 years of combat in 

Vietnam. 

Beginning on 5 May 1965, with the commitment of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 319th Artillery, the U.S. Army involvement had 

increased until 54 artillery battalions were in various supporting 

roles throughout Vietnam. In nearly 1,000 days of combat, artillery 

progress and accomplishments contributed significantly to the success of the U.S. tactical mission. Artillerymen adapted to the unique 

situation posed in Vietnam. The length of time between the Korean War and the start of combat operations in Vietnam had deprived the Army of a high level of combat experienced personnel. 

Combat experience was the exception rather than the rule at company and battalion levels in all branches. Further, the nature of the 

Vietnam war negated much of the conventional war experience possessed by those who had previously been in combat. To overcome 

this inexperience and unfamiliarity with counterguerrilla opera-
130 FIELD ARTILLERY 

tions, the field artilleryman needed to be more creative, innovative, 

and flexible than ever before. Artillerymen fulfilled this need with 

the utmost professionalism. 

From the first few informal reports [rom the field in 1965 

through the volumes of operational reports and lessons learned that 

became formalized by 1967, the message was clear: the basic doctrine, tactics, and techniques that had been followed for years by 

artillerymen were still valid, but some modifications of the manner 

in which they were applied were necessary. These modifications 

initially resulted in problems, which were listed and discussed to 

determine expeditiously the best and most feasible solutions. Experiences were shared with artillerymen worldwide to insure 

against repetition of the same mistakes and to better provide adequate fire support. 

Probabl y no artilleryman of any grade or position proved more 

flexible in the face of adversity than the forward observer. Every 

maneuver company was assigned a field artillery forward observer 

who traveled with the company and called for and adjusted supporting fires. The "eyes and ears of the artillery," as he is often called, 

the forward observer in Vietnam faced many disadvantages in the 

early months of the war. A lieutenant by table of organization and 

equipment, the observer was often a young noncommissioned officer 

or enlisted soldier, in his first combat tour, and trained in the principles of conventional war. In Vietnam he encountered thick forest 

and jungle and, more often than not, lack of visibility of the target 

area. This often necessitated the adjustment of artillery by sound, 

something he was not trained to do. The nature of operations in 

Vietnam often resulted in infantry platoons and squads operating 

semi-independently, away from the company command post. Control of the platoons and squads kept company commanders so busy 

that the forward observer's responsibilities often included maintaining accurate and current locations of the company and subordinate elements. This was a significant problem, compounded by 

the fact that vegetation often obscured prominent terrain features 

and visible reference points. The 1st Cavalry Division reported in 

1965 that their forward observers, hampered by dense jungle, had 

improvised a rope and sling device with which to climb trees in 

order to observe artillery fire. Common methods of resolving map 

reading problems were the "pace and count" method of land navigation and the firing of a spotting round of smoke or white phosphorus, which was detonated in the air above a location that had 

been predetermined by the fire direction center and passed to the 

forward observer. In a series of taped interviews with company 

commanders who had served in Vietnam, the general consensus was 
THE BUILDUP 133 

use of the helicopter. Few individual replacements had much if 

any training in airmobility, yet all towed artillery units had to be 

ready to move on a moment's notice. The versatility of the artil· 

leryman offset his lack of experience. Units that had never displaced by air learned, and learned quickly. Occasionally peacetime 

habits, both good and bad, cropped up in Vietnam. One such habit, 

a negative one but easily correctable, was cited by the 23d Artillery 

Group. Delays in firing often occurred in firing sections with new 

section chiefs. The explanation was that these chiefs, with considerable peacetime experience, were in the habit of waiting for 

the safety officer to check firing data. A further problem was that 

firing batteries equipped with the M I07-mm. gun were hampered 

by the weapon's extremely short tube life. After firing 300 full 

charge rounds, it was necessary to replace the tube, a six-hour procedure. The artillery lived with this problem until a new tube with 

four times the tube life was developed. Stateside production of the 

tubes caught up with Vietnam demands in early 1968. In addition, 

the field time required to change tubes was reduced to two hours, 

principally the result of the efforts of an enterprising artilleryman 

who fabricated an adapter which prevented the nitrogen in the 

weapon's equilibrators from escaping. Previously, equilibrators 

were permitted to empty dUTing tube change and additional time 

was required to replenish the lost nitrogen. 

Initially, many combat experiences, creative ideas, and new tactics and techniques were peculiar to particular units or areas of 

Vietnam and were passed informally by word of mouth. To prevent disjointed concepts and ideas and to standardize procedures, 

information pertinent to artillery procedures was given wide dissemination. The best source was lessons learned reports, and information from them was distributed throughout Vietnam as well as 

up through channels, ultimately to be used in training by units and 

service schools in the United States. 

To standardize procedures in Vietnam and to reinforce written 

standing operating procedures, training schools were established at 

division artillery, artillery group, and field force artillery levels to 

train newly assigned personnel in artillery procedures and techniques peculiar to Vietnam or to the particular area or unit to which 

they would be assigned. The emphasis was primarily on forward 

observer and fire direction center procedures and techniques. These 

schools ranged in duration from three days to a week and were 

staffed and equipped from units already in Vietnam. Typical of this 

training was a six-day course in fire direction conducted by I Field 

Force Artillery for all its newly assigned fire direction officers. The 

41st Artillery Group conducted a five-day orientation course for 
132 FIELD ARTILLERY 

AERIAL FIELD ARTILLERY COBRA AND LICHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTER 

form hunter-killer team. 

and some were not qualified to do so. In add ition, it was believed 

that forward observers were not being properly utilized as a source 

of intelligence. It was concluded that more emphasis should be 

given to correcting these shortcomings during training in the conti· 

nental United States. 

Firing batteries throughout Vietnam experienced several common problems. Tables of organization and equipment prescribed 

personnel levels and authorizations that made 24-hour operation a 

severe strain on personnel. Modification of tables was necessary to 

permit round-the-clock operations, particularly in the fire direction center. Large areas of operation and great distances between 

battalions and their batteries put the emphasis on the battery center as the primary source of firing data. Often the battalion fire 

direction control mission became more a matter of control than direction. Too, mountainous terrain often hampered communications 

and thus the battery center had to check its own firing data. The 

frequent spl itting of batteries meant that a battery had constantly 

to ma intain the personnel and equipment to establish and maintain 

several fire direction centers. Another challenge for the field artilleryman was his new-found mobility resulting from the extensive 
THE BUILDUP 131 

AERIAL FIELD ARTILLERY CoBRA IN FLIGHT 

that map reading and responsibilities for maintaining unit locations were best left in the hands of the artillery forward observer. 

Another problem area for the observer was the employment of 

aerial rocket artillery. which was relatively new. The forward observer had received little if any training in aerial rocket artillery 

adjustment. He had to gain confidence in the system. but once that 

was accomplished. aerial rocket artillery inevitably became his 

"trump card." 

Artillery commanders in Vietnam were quick to recognize the 

need for well-trained. able observers. In 1965. a large proportion of 

"combat notes" and reports from the field emphasized the importance of the forward observer section to the successful accomplishment of the fire support mission. Initial reports from the l73d 

Airborne Brigade stressed the need for cross-training of personnel 

in these sections. The reconnaissance sergeant and the radiotelephone operator often had to assume fire-support responsibilities 
134 FIELD ARTILLERY 

newly assigned forward observers. Similar schools were conducted 

by II Field Force Artillery and its subordinate units. 

To improve co-ordination and liaison between U.S. forces and 

other Free World Military Assistance Forces units, many U.S. units 

conducted artillery orientation schools for allied personnel. The 

9th Infantry Division conducted such a school in 1967 in preparation for a joint U.S. and Thai operation. To facilitate artillery 

co-ordination in the II Corps area, the 41st Artillery Group conducted fire support training for South Vietnamese Army personnel. 

When the language barrier was overcome, the result of such training was a marked improvement in the speed and quality of 

artillery su pport. 

The ul timate in training experiences was on-the-job training 

(0 JT) in a unit engaged in actual combat operations. As time progressed and personnel were "infused" between units to prevent 

large rotational humps, individual training became possible. To insure adherence to basic artillery doctrine and safety procedures and 

to allow for standardization of artillery techniques, artillery staffs 

at group and division levels established various means of testing the 

proficiency of subordinate units. The most common technique was 

the formation of a team which visited a subordinate unit to render 

assistance and eval uate the artillery procedures used. The 23d Artillery Group conducted unannounced proficiency tests (UPT) of 

the basic artillery fundamentals and principles in their subordinate 

units. Requirements consisted of firing a registration mission, a 

time-on-target mission, and two adjust fire missions. The objective 

of such tests was to evaluate and assist, not to harass, and the practice proved quite successful. 

As lessons learned reached the continental United States, every 

effort was made to ease the training burden of combat units in 

Vietnam and to incorporate Vietnam-related procedures and lessons learned into instruction and training. 

At the Field Artillery School (then the United States Army Artillery and Missile School) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the emphasis was 

on instruction and training geared to meet the artillery requirements in Vietnam. The Field Artillery School dispatched liaison 

teams to Vietnam "to determine the actions required to improve 

the products of the [Artillery 1 Training Center and the Artillery 

School at Fort Sill for officers, enlisted men and deployable units." 

These visits included one in September of 1967 by Major General 

Charles P. Brown, Fort Sill commander and Artillery School commandant. Extensive interviews at all levels of artillery command 

were conducted during these visits and a list of matters requiring 

the attention of the Artillery School was made. Essentially, the ba-
THE BUILDUP 135 

MAJOR GENERAL, THEN COLONEL, DAVID E. Orr, 25TH DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER (RIGHT), DEMONSTI<ATES FADAC TO MAJOR GENERAL 

TILLSON, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION COMMANDER, July 1967. 

sic message gleaned from these trips was that although the over-all 

state of training of artillery personnel assigned to Vietnam was excellent, increased Vietnam-oriented training was required. Specifically, it was determined that increased emphasis was necessary in 

6,400-mil fire direction center procedures; counterguerrilla reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position training; and fire 

support co·ordination responsibilities at all levels, particularly those 

of the artillery liaison officer. 

By mid-1967, the Artillery School had begun to make significant 

progress in implementing changes in instructional programs to satisfy Vietnam requirements. A field artillery officer's Vietnam orientation course (FAOVOC) was instituted in July 1967. Four to five 

weeks long, the course concentrated solely on tactics and techniques 

used in Vietnam. In fiscal year 1968, 239 officers completed the 

course; in fiscal year 1969, over 1,000. The course was offered in 

addition to the officer basic schooling and was designed better to 

prepare officers for Vietnam service. The officer basic course was increased from 9 to 12 weeks, and the Artillery Officer Candidate 

School enrollment increased from 3,000 in fiscal year 1966 to 9,600 
136 FIELD ARTILLERY 

in fiscal year 1967. Increased emphasis on Vietnam training for noncommissioned and enlisted students resulted in short (2-3 week) 

section chief courses and a noncommissioned officer candidate 

course designed to emphasize skill development in artillery procedures. Fire direction center training stressed 6,400-mil fire direction procedures, including chart preparation and wind cards. On 

the basis of information received in Vietnam during liaison visits, 

additional training on the field artillery digital computer (FADAC) 

was implemented. The Tactics and Combined Arms Department 

constructed two Vietnam-type artillery fire bases for instruction in 

battery defense, and field exercises included a counterguerrilla 

phase in the scenario as students participating in training for reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position began occupying 

star-shaped and circular battery positions in addition to conventionallinear positions. Throughout the Field Artillery School, every 

attempt was made to prepare the field artilleryman for combat duty 

in Vietnam. 

The field artillery made genuine progress after its arrival in Vietnam in 1965. The quality of fire support was ever increasing as the 

artillery played a vital role in operations ranging from JUNCTION 

CITY, the largest combined operation to date, to small-unit actions 

such as those in the remote outposts of Landing Zone BIRD and Soui 

Cat. In over two and a half years of combat, the artillerymen had 

trained hard, fought hard, and shared experiences with personnel 

of other branches. As the 1968 Tel holiday season neared and the 

enemy made final plans for attack, seasoned artillerymen manned 

positions in 54 field artillery battalions scattered throughout Vietnam. 
CHAPTER V 

The Hot War (1968-0ctober 1969) 

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army in late 1967 

launched several costl y attacks. On 29 October the Viet Cong attacked the South Vietnamese district capital of Loc Ninh, ran up 

the flag of the National Liberation Front, and tried to hold the city. 

United States and South Vietnamese forces responded with massive 

air and artillery bombardment, but the enemy continued to press 

the attack despite heavy losses. Similarly, in early November four 

North Vietnamese Army regiments fought U.S. and South Vietnamese troops near Dak To. The U.S. command deployed the 

equivalent of a full division from the heavily populated coastal 

lowlands to the battle area. Again, as at Loc Ninh, the enemy 

sustained heavy casualties. A captured enemy document listed four 

objectives for the 1967 campaigns. These included encouraging 

units to improve, in combat, the technique of concentrated attacks 

to annihilate relatively large enemy units and effecting close c(}-

ordination with various battle areas throughout South Vietnam to 

achieve timely unity. The activity of late 1967 was a prelude to Tel 

1968. A high-level prisoner later revealed that the assault on Loc 

Ninh had been ordered to test mass formations and previously inexperienced troops in preparation for the 1968 offensive. 

Tel, the festival of the Asian lunar new year, usually was the 

occasion for a formal cease-fire. In 1968, however, the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, using reserve forces and the larger 

supporting weapons, launched a series of massive co-ordinated attacks in what became known as the Tel offensive. As revealed by 

captured enemy sources, the strategy for the offensive was based on 

the belief that the war would culminate in 1968 and that large-scale 

continuous attacks, in conjunction with a general uprising of the 

people, would precipitate the withdrawal from Vietnam of U.S. 

torces and the collapse of the South Vietnamese government, which 

would then be forced to accept a coalition government dominated 

by the National Liberation Front. 

Te.l 1968 

Political a\ld military targets of the Tel offensive included pro-
138 FIELD ARTILLERY 

vincial and district capitals, the government in Saigon and its agencies such as the Regional Development Cadres and the National 

Police, and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. The enemy believed that if widespread attacks were successful, the inability of the 

government to protect the people would become obvious and the 

credibility of that government would be undermined. Installations 

and facilities that were essential to the conduct of the war and that 

were difficult to defend became tactical targets. (Map 10) In preparation for the Tel offensive, the enemy went to unprecedented 

lengths to assemble supplies and weapons and to infiltrate the cities. 

In Saigon, funeral processions concealed the movement of arms and 

ammunition. In Hue and Saigon, enemy troops in civilian dress 

escaped detection. In provincial centers such as Quang Tri, Da 

Nang, Nha Trang, Quin Nhon, Kontum city, Ban Me Thuot, My 

Tho, Can Tho, and Ben Tri, the enemy infiltrated in strength. 

The offensive began at 0015 on 30 January at Nha Trang. The 

same night eleven other cities in I and II Corps zones, as well as 

several military installations and airfields, came under attack. 

Enemy documents later revealed that these attacks were premature; 

the forces operating in these areas had not received the order for a 

one-day postponement of the offensive. The main attack took place 

on the following night, 30-31 January, when enemy forces hit eighteen cities throughout the country. The allies cleared most of the 

cities within hours. However, in a few cities, particularly Saigon 

and Hue, the fighting continued for days. 

The attack on Hue commenced at 0340 on 31 January. (Map 11) 

Elements of the 800th, 802d, and 806th Battalions, 6th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, and the 804th Battalion, 4th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, initiated a rocket, mortar, and ground 

assault on the city. Forces of the 4th Regiment soon occupied all of 

southern Hue except the Military Assistance Command compound. 

Meanwhile, to the north, two battalions of the 6th Regiment 

moved into the citadel, an old French fortress near the center of the 

city. By morning the flag of the National Liberation Front had been 

mounted on the flag pole of the citadel and the enemy controlled 

all of the fortress but the South Vietnamese Army 1st Division headquarters. 

The allies acted immediately to relieve the pressure on the Military Assistance Command and South Vietnamese Army compounds. While U.S. and Vietnamese marines along with the 1st 

Division bore down on the enemy forces to the south and within the 

city itself, the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, sealed off Hue to 

the north and west. Each of the maneuver forces fought exceptionally well, but the actions of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 
THAILAN 0 

001 A 

MAP 10 

SOUTH 

• 1(0 11110 11'1 

VIETNAM 

THE TET 9FFENSIVE 

1968 

• PROVINe[ CII "' '''IL' II NO OTNC" ClflU ATTACKED 

M ILITIIAY I"!TALLATION S IITTAGII(D 

o 10 100 MILU 

b ! a'o ,! I~ I(ILo .. n~lt! 
140 

THE BATTLE OF HUE 

ENEMY ATTACK 

30-31 JanllQf)' 1968 

4Q=:::: Ad, of allOC_ 

AU lofl . ollCH'Ol ll1'H11t 

., . ' '' ''I (, \ Ii i 

IMIl.OOIIt:T[1I1 

MAP 11 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

were the most significant from a fire support aspect. The 3d Brigade 

blocking force was comprised of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, and 

the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 3d 

Brigade, was committed to base camp defense and did not join the 

rest of the brigade until 19 February. On that day the 2d Battalion, 

50lst Airborne, of the IOlst Airborne Division, newly arrived from 

III Corps, also joined the 3d Brigade. The 3d Brigade direct support battalion, the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, established a fire 

support base at a South Vietnamese Army compound northwest of 

Hue. 

On 3 February the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, detected a large 

North Vietnamese force positioned near Que Chu, west of Hue. 
) 

" r 

~3/1 

THE BATTLE OF HUE 

FRIENDLY SITUATION 

AU PO.illoM CIIIJIroaifl>ott 

MAP 12 

THE HOT WAR 141 

~TF IIAAV 

The battalion, supported by indirect artillery fire, aerial rocket artillery, and helicopter gunships, attacked the well-fortified enemy 

position. By 5 February the 2d Battalion controlled the high ground 

in the Que Chu area overlooking the surrounding plains and, with 

precise artillery fire, was able virtually to stop all enemy movement. 

Beginning on 9 February, while the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 

maintained the blocking position, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 

entered the village of Bon Tri to the south of Que Chu and encountered a well-dug-in regimental-size enemy complex. For three 

days U.S. artillery, air strikes, and naval gunfire pummeled the 

positions. On 12 February the 2d Battalion had to break contact 

without any substantial change in the situation. The 5th Battalion 

took over the assault, but it too was unable to dislodge the enemy. 
142 FIELD ARTILLERY 

It remained for the 2d Battalion again to pick up the assault on 21 

February and finally secure the village. 

Meanwhile the remainder of the 3d Brigade, joined by the 1st 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and the 2d BaLLalion, 50lst Airborne, had 

begun its move toward Hue from the northwest. On the morning of 

21 February the brigade crashed into a strong enemy defensive 

position in the Ti Ti woods, approximately five kilometers northwest of the city. Tube artillery, along with naval gunfire and aerial 

rocket artillery, enabled the brigade to breach the enemy positions. 

The advance of the 3d Brigade toward Hue necessitated close 

fire support co·ordination. Elemellls of the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155-mm.), and 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (8-inch, self· 

propelled), had been situated at Landing Zone NOLE since 20 

February. From that position these elements had been supporting 

the Vietnamese and Marine units in and around Hue. With the 

approach of the 3d Brigade, co·ordination requiremellls became 

more exacting to avoid shelling refugees and friendly forces. On 21 

February the South Vietnamese 1st Division commander requested 

a field artillery liaison party from the 1st Cavalry Division to as· 

sist in the co-ordination of fire support. The liaison party, which was 

dispatched the next morning, cOlllributed to the success of the operation. 

At 0730 on 24 February, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces 

breached the southwest wall of the citadel and met only light resistance. An intense artillery preparation the night before had killed 

161 enemy. The citade l secured, the battle of Hue was officially 

over. (Map 12) The National Liberation Front flag which had 

flown from the citadel tower since I February came down. The recapture of Hue had involved four U.S. Army battalions, three U.S. 

Marine Corps baLLalions, and eleven South Vietnamese battalions. 

Ten Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army battalions had been 

committed in an attempt to hold the city. 

Colonel Richard M. Winfield, Jr., 1st Cavalry Division Artillery 

commander, in summarizing the actions and problems of the artillery, emphasized the conventional quality of the operation and 

concluded with a description of clearance activities and the consequences: 

In the battle Cor Hue, the brigade was operating four battalions in 

the most conventional type of conflict that this division had ever been 

faced with. The brigade had their normal supporting artillery-three 

direct support batleries, a medium batlcry. and, during the lallcT periods 

of the aLLack, an 8·incll baLLery. Those units, from the 3d to the 26th of 

February, fired 52,000 rounds. In addition, 7,670 rounds of 5-inch to 

8-inch naval ammunition, and 600 tons of Air Force-delivered munitions 

were expended in the area. In the last stages of the operation. the di-
THE HOT WAR 143 

vISIOn commander and I went into Hue and worked with the com~ 

manding ollieer of the 1st ARVN forces. We took whoever was needed 

for fire control and clearance so that we wouldn't have any major accidents against US Anny, ARVN. or Marine unit or civilian. who were 

all converging on Hue. This required tight and rigid fire control, which 

was exercised by both the GS battalion commanders. by myself. and by 

the senior officer whom I had placed in Hue to control those fires. We 

had 11 fire support agencies in Hue. Now, this of course, had an effect 

on our infantry units, which arc used to operating when they want to 

shoot-they call for fire and the fire is there. When we have all these 

clearance requirements and you have lO have minimum safe distances 

all around you, the fire becomes slow because of the clearance and becomes restricted both in the caliber of weapons and in the number of 

rounds you can fire. I would say that the fire support was adequate. It 

was tough to get, but it was certainly adequate. 

U.S. plans in the III Corps Tactical Zone for early 1968 envisioned only fourteen allied battalions rema ining within a 29-mile 

radius of Saigon. Since early December 1967. defense of the capital 

itself had been the responsibility of the South Vietnamese command. The 5th Ranger Group. with a U.S. 105-mm. howitzer 

battalion (2d Battalion. 13th Artillery) in direct support. was responsible for providing the necessary security. U.S. forces thus released from the defense of Saigon were incorporated into plans for 

assaults on enemy base camps in the Cambodian border region. 

Thirty-nine battalions were to operate against these camps. 

As the U.S. plans were set in motion. however. General Weyand. 

commanding II Field Force. became concerned over the results. 

Enemy resistance along the Cambodian border was weak. This 

weakness. coupled with the large volume of enemy radio transmissions near Saigon. convinced him of the necessity for redeployment. 

He conveyed his conclusions to General Westmoreland. The result 

was a shifting of forces. By the time of the Tel attacks in the III 

Corps area. twenty-seven U.S. maneuver battalions were in the capital area and the remaining twenty-five outside. 

The operational plan of the enemy in the III Corps Tactical 

Zone incl uded: 

I. Seizing the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex. Key targets: Bien 

Hoa Air Base. II Field Force headquarters. III Corps headquarters. 

prisoner-of-war camp between Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Long 

Binh ammunition storage area. 

2. Attacking targets in the Hoc Mon area northwest of Saigon 

while blocking allied reaction by interdicting Route I between 

Saigon and Cu Chi; maintaining readiness to exploit successes in the 

northern Saigon area. 

3. Blocking any attempted reaction by the U.S. 25th Infantry 

Division from the eu Chi-Dau Tieng region. 
144 FIELD ARTILLERY 

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE 

o p(.~ Klok 

D fAY NINH Fl . CItOO_NUI ,. 0[" 

,~, 

MAP /3 

Quail Lal o 

50"9 8• o 0 

OIlC Phon., 

°8unor.t 

LONG KHANH 

XUOI! Loe o 

°LO .. , 0100 

SINH 

TUY 

SOUTH 

VIETNAM 

4. Attacking district and government installations in Thu Duc 

and destroying the Newport bridge over the Saigon River between 

Saigon and Long Binh. 

5. Containing the 1st Infantry Division in the Lai Khe area 

and cutting off Highway 13 at An Loc. 

6. Seizing Tan Son Nhut Air Base and possibly the adjacent 

vice·presidential palace; taking over the presidential palace along 

with the U.S. and Philippine embassies; holding or destroying installations of the government of Vietnam such as the National Police stations and power plants. Success here would cause the government and the United States to lose face and would propel a move to 

the conference table, where the National Liberation Front would 

negotiate from a position of strength. 

7. Controlling Cu Chi, Duc Hoa (including the South Viet-
THE HOT WAR 145 

namese 25th Division headquarters), Ba Ria, Xuan Loc (18th Division headquarters), My Tho, Ben Tre, and Phu Loi-Phu Chang. 

In the III Corps area the Tet offensive began at 0300 on 31 

January in the Long Binh- Bien Hoa complex with a rocket and 

mortar attack on headquarters of the 199th Infantry Brigade and 

II Field Force. (Map 13) By 0321 Saigon and Tan Son Nhut were 

also receiving heavy fire. In order to control combat units in the 

Capital Military District (Gia Dinh Province), General Weyand 

ordered his deputy commander, Major General Keith Ware, and a 

small staff to Saigon to take operational control of all V.S. units. 

Task Force WARE, the operational headquarters, situated at Capital 

Military District headquarters, was operational by 1100 that same 

day and remained so until 18 February. 

At the outset of the Tet offensive, only one V .S. infantry battalion and four IOS-mm. howitzer batteries operated in Gia Dinh Province. Three of these batteries were in direct support of the South 

Vietnamese Sth Ranger Group. General Westmoreland, for political and psychological reasons, had refrained from maintaining V.S. 

maneuver units in Saigon and several other large cities. Once the 

Tet attacks began and American maneuver battalions arrived in the 

Capital Military District, division and field force artillery units relocated and supported the relief of the district. 

Fire support for American units in the Capital Military District, 

particularly in Saigon, posed serious problems for the artillery. Numerous homes and shops and heavy concentrations of people within 

the city limited the area where artillery could be fired. When artillery could be employed, it was slow to respond because of difficulties in obtaining clearance to fire. Vietnamese military units in the 

city and the city government had not been placed under a single 

control headquarters. As a result, no centralized clearance activity 

was established. Artillery liaison officers were required to obtain 

clearance locally from the national police station in their area of 

operations. The situation was corrected in June 1968 when the 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam established a single military 

governor in the Capital Military District. Artillery support was further limited in Saigon because buildings and other structures restricted the view of forward observers. Gunships and tactical air 

proved more adept at providing support because the pilots had a 

better view of the target area. As a result specific enemy locations 

could be pinpointed and damage held to a minimum. For these 

reasons most of the major field artillery engagements in the Capital 

Military District during the Tet offensive and counteroffensive occurred in the outer edges of Saigon and in other areas of the zone. 

Particularly impressive during Tet was the fire support pro-
146 FIELD ARTILLERY 

vided to the 1st Infantry Division in III Corps Tactical Zone. The 

division killed over 1,000 enemy troops. The Big Red One estimated that artillery and air strikes accounted for 70 percent of 

these enemy losses. The vol ume of field artillery fire increased 

substantially during the T et offensive. The 1st Infantry Division 

recorded the following: 

IOS- mm . 

155- mln. 

8--inch . 

4.2-inch 

TOlal 

Caliber Daily Aycrage Prior to Tel 

2,376 rounds 

925 

200 

1.100 

4.601 

Daily A\'cragc During Tet 

5,616 rounds 

1,459 

235 

1.570 

8.880 

The most significant engagement during Tet for units of the 1st 

Infantry Division Artillery and the 23d Artillery Group began on I 

February. The division had shifted its artillery south along Highway 13 in order to meet increased enemy activity between Lai Khe 

and Saigon. On the morning of 1 February, elements of the divi· 

sian engaged units of .the 273d Viet Cong Regiment at An My, 

approximately 4,000 meters north of Phu Loi. The artillery began 

by providing blocking fires. Then at 1330 the artillery placed de· 

structive fires upon enemy forces entrenched in the village. Throughout the day 3,493 rounds hit the northern half of the village and 

caused approximately 20 secondary explosions. A survey of the area 

before d?: k confirmed 201 enemy killed and evidence supporting 

estimates of more than twice that number. Once darkness set in, 

Ihe artillery again provided blocking fires. The next morning, the 

1st Infantry Division found the remainder of the 273d Regiment 

still entrenched in An My. The action resumed at 1030 with the 

artillery continuing to provide blocking fires. When rounds were 

fired on the village, numerous secondary explosions again resulted. 

After several hours of bombardment, friendly elements swept and 

secured An My and found 123 Viet Cong killed. Prisoner reports 

later confirmed the import of the encounter. The 273d Regiment 

was moving south when it met the 1st Infantry Division at An My; 

the ensuing battle rendered the 273d ineffective before it could 

reach its assigned objective and contribute to the T el offensive. 

The performance of the field artillery in III Corps Tactical 

Zone during Tel caused General Weyand to observe that the field 

artillery was instrumental in blunting or defeating many of the 

assaults in the zone: "Timely response, especially in the moments of 
THE HOT WAR 147 

fluid uncertainty during the initial phase of the attacks, and in 

spite of clearance handicaps, contributed to the successes of the infantry and armored units." 

Numerous smaller but significant field artillery actions occurred 

throughout Vietnam during Tet . For example, the 25th Infantry 

Division was plagued by enemy bunkers near the highway between 

Cu Chi and Saigon. Fires from the bunkers prevented free movement between the two locations. Numerous attempts to reduce the 

bunkers with artillery, air strikes, and infantry assaults were unsuccessful. An 8-incll howitzer delivering assault fire finally eliminated the bunkers. Also noteworthy were the actions of units of the 

54th Artillery Group which prevented the collapse of the Xuan Loc 

base camp. On 2 February Xuan Loc came under heavy attack. The 

quick and devastating fire of Battery C, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, 

saved the post. Battery C fired thirty-five 8-inch rounds and killed 

80 of the attackers. During the period 1-18 February similar missions supported the defense of Xuan Loc. The 2d Battalion, 40th 

Artillery, the direct support battalion of the 199th Light Infantry 

Brigade, was one of the first artillery units to respond to enemy 

attacks in III Corps. An observer detected the enemy launching 

rockets on II Field Force headquarters and shifted fire onto the 

launching sites. Several of the firing points were neutralized before 

the enemy had fired all his rounds. The enemy suffered more than 

50 killed. 

In IV Corps Tactical Zone the enemy offensive included attacks 

against My Tho and Vinh Long. On 31 January 1968, the Mobile 

Riverine Force was placed under operational control of the senior 

adviser in IV Corps. The riverine force initially was moved to the 

vicinity of My Tho, and two of its battalions conducted a three-day 

operation north of the My Tho River in response to a multibattalion Viet Cong attack on the provincial capital. Then, on 4 February, 

the riverine force moved to the provincial capital of Vinh Long and 

engaged three enemy battalions that were trying to seize the city. 

The 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery (105-mm., towed), was in direct 

support of the Mobile Riverine Brigade. One battery was equipped 

with airmobile firing platforms and two batteries were mounted on 

barges. The artillery battalion effectively delivered 8,158 rounds in 

support of the My Tho campaign. At one point a barge-mounted 

battery was required to make an airmobile deployment. The battery was provided a \I.i -ton jeep and a %-ton trailer for a fire direction center. The barges were beached and the pickup was made 

directly from them. This type of movement opened possibilities for 

deeper penetration into the Mekong Delta. 

Finally, in I Corps area on 12 February 1968, Battery C, 1st 
148 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Battalion. 40th Artillery (105-mm.). while in support of a South 

Vietnamese unit. became the first U.S. Army artillery unit to fire 

improved conventional munitions in combat. The target was 40-50 

North Vietnamese troops in the open. The battery fired 54 rounds 

of the new ammunition. resulting in 14 enemy killed. The round 

was a controlled. fragmentation-type ammunition similar to the Air 

Force cluster bomb unit. FIRE CRACKER became the code word used 

when a forward observer wanted improved conventional munitions. 

Khe Sanh 

The 66-day battle of Khe Sanh. which began in January 1968. 

became a classic defensive operation for U.S. forces. It tested American concepts of defense and demonstrated that good fire support 

could effectively neutralize a superior force. 

Khe Sanh sits atop a plateau in the shadow of the Dang Tri 

Mountains and overlooks a tributary of the Quang Tri River. Surrounding it on all sides are hills from which the North Vietnamese 

could shell the base. If controlled by the Marines. however. the hills 

would form a ring of protection for the base and afford good vantage points for detecting enemy movement. American involvement 

at Khe Sanh had begun in 1962. when Special Forces elements 

established a Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp at the site that 

was later known as the Khe Sanh combat base. Its purpose was to 

counter enemy infiltration through the area and provide a base for 

surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations in the western 

part of northern I Corps. Marine units occupied the base in late 

1966 and the Special Forces moved southwest to the village of Lang 

Vai. 

Between late 1966 and late 1967. activity around the base fluctuated from heavy contact to none at all. Then in December 1967 a 

surge of enemy activity began. Reconnaissance teams reported large 

groups of North Vietnamese moving into the area. The movement 

in itself was not irregular. but now the forces were staying. not 

passing through. The enemy was building up men and equipment 

in preparation for a siege. The enemy initiated major offensive 

action around Khe Sanh early in January 1968. when he shifted his 

emphasis from reconnaissance and harassment to actual probes of 

friendl y positions. 

On the night of 2 January an outpost at the western end of the 

base reported six unidentified figures walking around outside the 

wire. When challenged. they made no reply and were taken under 

fire. Five of the six were killed. Later investigation disclosed that 

the dead included a North Vietnamese regimental commander and 
THE HOT WAR 

, 

- --'" " 

MAP 14 

149 

PROVINCE 

not to Icale 

his operations and communications officers. The commitment of 

these key men to such a dangerous reconnaissance mission was a 

clear indication that something big was about to happen. (Maps 14 

and 15) 

In the predawn of 21 January, the enemy began his anticipated 

move against Khe Sanh. Just after midnight rockets and artillery 

shells began impacting on Hill 861 to the northwest of the city. A 

full-scale ground attack followed, only to be repulsed after several 

hours of fighting. At 0530 another intense barrage of 82-mm. shells 

and 122-mm. rockets hit Khe Sanh. Damage was substantial-a 

major ammunition dump and a fuel storage area were destroyed. 

When news of the attack reached the United States, many questioned the feasibil ity of defending Khe Sanh. The base was isolated 

and, with Route 9 interdicted, would have to be resupplied by air. 

Fearing that Khe Sanh would become an American Dien Bien Phu, 

critics favored a pullout. 

The problem, therefore, was not merely how to defend the 

base but whether the base should be defended at all. General Westmoreland and General Cushman, commander of III Marine Am-
150 

MAP IS 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

KHE SANH 

COMBAT BASE 

Khe 5 0nh 

long Vei KHE SANH VALLEY 

not to sca le 

, 

• u 

-

o 

" 

phibious Force, decided to defend Khe Sanh. The base and adjacent 

outposts commanded the plateau and the main avenue of approach 

into eastern Quang Tri Province. Although these installations did 

not stop infiltration, they blocked motorized supply from the west. 

Another advantage to holding the base was the possibility of engaging and destroying a heretofore elusive foe. At Khe Sanh, the 

enemy showed no desire to hit and run but rather chose to stand 

and fight. The marines could fix him in position around the base 

while air and artillery barrages closed in. Finally, two crack North 

Vietnamese divisions, which might otherwise have participated in 

attacks in other areas of South Vietnam, were tied down by one 

reinforced Marine regiment. The decision made, all that remained 

was to complete the buildup of men and materiel required to hold 

the base. 

Air power and artillery played an important role at Khe Sanh 

and were given the highest priority. The Khe Sanh defenders had 

three balteries of IOS-mm. howitzers, one battery of 4.2-inch mortars, and one battery of IS5-mm. howitzers; all five batteries were 

Marine artillery. In addition, they were supported by four batteries of Army 17S-mm. guns, one at the "Rockpile," north of the base, 
THE HOT WAR 151 

and three at Camp Carroll, to the east. These artillery pieces, 46 in 

all, were supplemented by go-mm. tank guns, 106-mm. recoilless 

rifles, and tactical air support. The fire support co·ordination 

center, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines (Artillery), located at Khe 

Sanh, controlled all supporting arms fire. Once the fighting began, 

the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lownds, said that 

the side which kept its artillery intact would win the battle. Only 

three American artillery pieces were destroyed during the entire 

siege. 

Since the enemy maneuvered mainly under cover of darkness, 

the Marine and Army batteries were most active during these 

hours. Preplanned artillery fires included combined time·on-target 

fires from nine batteries, separate battalion time-on-target missions, battery multiple-volley individual missions, and battery harassment and interdiction missions. Fire support co-ordination 

progressed to the point that artillery was seldom check fired while 

tactical aircraft were operating in the area. Throughout the battle 

158,981 rounds of various calibers of artillery were directed against 

enemy locations around the base. 

During the siege, air-delivered fire support reached unprecedented levels. A daily average of 45 B-52 sorties and 300 tactical air 

sorties struck targets near the base. Eighteen hundred tons of ordnance a day laid waste wide swaths of jungle terrain and caused 

hundreds of secondary explosions. In seventy days of air operation, 96,000 tons of bombs, nearly twice what the Army Air Corps 

delivered in the Pacific during 1942 and 1943, pulverized the battle 

area. 

In addition to volume, reaction time was a key factor. Relatively 

easy clearance procedures meant immediate response-unless 

friendly aircraft were in the target area-regardless of the weather. 

Artillery rounds were usually on the target area within forty seconds after the call for fire. This instant artillery impaired enemy 

movements within the tactical area of responsibility and helped to 

break up numerous attacks. 

Protective fires were carefully planned in advance. The fires of 

the artillery batteries planned by the fire support co-ordination center prevented the enemy assault forces from reaching the perimeter 

wire. Because the North Vietnamese usually attacked with their 

battalions in column, the center also planned fires to isolate the 

assault elements from the reserves. When the enemy launched his 

attack, the, center placed a three-sided artillery box around the lead 

enemy battalion. Three batteries of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, 

executed this mission. The fourth battery then closed the remaining side, which faced the friendly positions, with a barrage that 
152 FIELD ARTILLERY 

~ ~ KHE SANH BASE 

+ + '1lI111 IIIIII! ~ III! 115 •• fillS 

'-:;" ~ III FIICI 1·51 & 

~ 1111.1 115 .. fillS .~ lAC III STlIIIS 

Diagram 8. Artillery box. 
THE HOT WAR 153 

rolled from one end of the box to the other much like a piston 

within a cylinder. The enemy force in the box could neither escape 

nor avoid the rolling barrage. Those North Vietnamese who spilled 

out of the open end of the box came under the final protective fires 

of the marines along the perimeter. At the same time, the fire support co·ordination center placed a secondary box around the North 

Vietnamese backup units. The four U.S. Army 175-mm. batteries 

were responsible for two sides, which were about 500 meters outside the primary box. On order, the gunners rolled their barrage in 

toward the sides of the primary box and back out again. The third 

side was sealed by continuous Rights of aircraft under the control of 

radar. Whenever B-52's were available or could be diverted in 

time, arc light strikes saturated the approach routes to the battle 

area. 

The manner in which the center co·ordinated its air and artillery support was another critical element in the defense of Khe 

Sanh. The mini arc light, devised by the assistant fire support coordinator, was used against area targets. The mini arc light was 

similar to a B-52 strike but could be organized and employed more 

rapidly. When intelligence reports indicated that enemy units were 

in a certain region, the fire support co-ordination center plotted a 

500- by I,OOO-meter block in the suspected area or across a likely 

route of march. Then the center call ed two Intruder tactical aircraft, each armed with twenty-eight 500-pound bombs, for a radar 

bomb run. Meanwhile the batteries at Khe Sanh, Camp Carroll, 

and the Rockpile were alerted for a fire mission. Thirty seconds 

before the bombs were dropped, the 175-mm. batteries, concentrating their fires on one-half of the block, salvoed the first of approximately 60 rounds. When the aircraft rippled their loads down the 

middle of the block, the Marine artillery batteries opened up on 

the second half with about 200 155-mm., 105-mm., and 4.2-inch 

rounds. The trajectory and Right times of all ordnance were computed so that the bombs and initial artillery rounds hit at the same 

instant. The saturation of the target area all but insured that any 

enemy soldier caught in the zone during the bombardment would 

be a casualty. 

The micro arc light, developed and executed in the manner of 

the mini arc, used less ordnance and covered a 500· by 500-meter 

target block. The advantage of the micro arc light was that it could 

be in effect within ten minutes whereas the mini arc light required 

roughly 45 minutes. On an average night the fire support coordination center executed three to four mini arc lights and six to 

eight micro arc lights. 

Artillery also functioned extensively in the direct fire role 
154 FIELD ARTILLERY 

against targets of opportunity. The three Marine 105-mm. howitzers on Hill 881S demonstrated the effectiveness of this technique. 

An alert machine gunner on the hill spotted a twenty-man column 

of North Vietnamese slowly climbing Hill 758, due south of 881S. 

They were carrying what appeared to be several mortar tubes. The 

marines from a range of 1,200 meters managed to hit several of the 

enemy. Instead of scattering, the remaining soldiers clustered 

around their fallen comrades. The Marine gunners pushed aside 

their parapet, depressed the tube for a downhill shot, and slammed 

a dozen rounds into the midst of the tightly packed enemy group. 

All 20 were killed. 

While supporting air and artillery whittled away the strength of 

the enemy, the defensive posture of the Khe Sanh combat base 

grew more formidable. A full-scale ground attack would be costly. 

However, the North Vietnamese forces remained determined and, 

during the last ten days in February, launched several attacks. The 

most significant attack occurred 29 February- I March. 

Early in the evening of 29 February, intelligence showed the 

enemy moving toward the eastern perimeter of the camp. The fire 

support co-ordination center called for saturation of the enemy 

route of march. Massed artillery, tactical air, and mini and micro 

arc I ights were targeted in blocks to the east, southeast, and south. 

B-52 strikes added to the carnage in the area. The enemy attempted 

three ground assaults during the night at 2130, 2330, and 0315. 

All were stopped short of the perimeter by intense ground fire and 

air and artillery barrages. Later in the morning of I March, 78 

enemy bodies were found, some still in their assault trenches, peppered with holes from the artillery airbursts. Although the exact 

number of enemy killed was never accurately determined, Montagnard tribesmen inhabiting the surrounding hill reported finding 

200-500 bodies at a time stacked in rows along the trails and woods 

leading to the base. The North Vietnamese forces apparently had 

been caught while on the march and had been mangled by air raids 

and piston-like artillery concentrations. 

Beginning in mid-March, U.S. intelligence personnel noted an 

exodus of major North Vietnamese units from the battle area. Most 

of one division pulled back into Laos. As the enemy settled into a 

wait-and-see strategy, heavy incoming fires and limited ground 

probes nevertheless continued to plague the marines. But this waiting game proved disastrous because clear skies dominated the area 

for all but five days in March and the air strikes were stepped up 

considerably. The observers had unrestricted visibility and were 

able to ferret out artillery positions and bunker complexes. The 

clear skies and accurate supporting fires formed a potent comb ina-
THE HOT WAR 155 

tion, and the number of confirmed enemy dead recorded in March 

increased approximately 80 percent over the number recorded in 

February. 

On 31 March, the 1st Cavalry Division took control of the 26th 

Marine Regiment, signalling the start of PEGASUS, a fifteen-day air 

assault operation that ended the battle of Khe Sanh. The 1st Cavalry 

Division, along with the 1st Marine Regiment and the South 

Vietnamese 3d Airborne Task Force, began a push from Ca Lu, 10· 

cated east of Khe Sanh, to reopen Route 9 and relieve the pressure 

on Khe Sanh. The siege, in effect, was over. 

The basic plan of Operation PEGASUS called for the 1st Marine 

Regiment, with two battalions, to attack west toward Khe Sanh 

while the 1st Cavalry Division air assaulted onto the high ground on 

either side of Route 9 and moved constantly west toward the base. 

On D plus I and D plus 2, all elements would continue to attack 

west toward Khe Sanh. Then on the following day the 2d Brigade 

of the 1st Cavalry Division would land three battalions southeast of 

Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. The linkup 

was planned for the end of the seventh day. 

Fire support involved a multitude of units, requiring detailed 

planning and co-ordination for the two phases of the operationreconnaissance and attack. The objective of the reconnaissance 

phase was the destruction of the enemy antiaircraft resources between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh and the selection of landing zones for 

use by the advancing airmobile assault force. The 1st Squadron, 9th 

Air Cavalry, assumed this mission and was supported by an abundance of air and artill ery. Additional artillery was moved into the 

area during the reconnaissance phase and automatically came under 

the control of a forward division artillery fire direction center 

located at Landing Zone STUD and manned by personnel of the 1st 

Battalion, 30th Artillery. The additional artillery included one 

Marine 4.2-inch mortar battery at Ca Lu and two 105-mm. batteries 

(one Marine and one Army) at the Rockpile. On 25 March an 

8-inch battery and a 105-mm. battery moved from Quang Tri to Ca 

Lu and STUD, respectively. This move brought the total to 15 

batteries available to support the 1st Squadron, 9th Air Cavalry, in 

its reconnaissance. All batteries in the area began answering calls 

for fire from the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, on D minus 6 and commenced attacking planned targets that night. Prior co-ordination 

between the 3d Marine Division; the 108th Artillery Group; and 

the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines (Artillery), insured that all available target information would be in the hands of the forward fire 

direction center and that lateral communication would be estab-
156 FIELD ARTILLERY 

lished. Throughout this phase, air and artillery fire destroyed enemy automatic weapons, mortars, and troop positions. The attack 

phase consisted of the preparation of landing zones, suppression of 

enemy fires, and on-call support of committed ground forces. For 

this phase, ten 105-mm. howitzer batteries, four 155-mm. howitzer 

batteries, one 8-inch howitzer battery, and one 4.2-inch mortar 

battery joined the already overwhelming artillery force. Each cavalry battalion drew support from the battery with which it was 

habitually associated. Each cavalry brigade had reinforcing fire 

from a medium battery, and the 1st Marine Regiment could count 

on support from two 105-mm. batteries, one 155-mm. battery, and 

one 4.2-inch battery. The additional heavy battery with the mission 

of general support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division moved from 

Camp Evans to Landing Zone STUD. Thirty-one batteries supported 

the relief of Khe Sanh-the largest array of artillery ever to support 

a single operation in Vietnam to that time. 

Counter battery fire contributed significantly to the success of 

Operation PEGASUS. For some time, North Vietnamese forces had 

been able to shell Khe Sanh at will with 152-mm. and 130-mm. 

artillery plus rockets and mortars positioned to the southwest and 

northwest of the base. When the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery 

came within range of the enemy guns, rapid and massive counterbattery fires achieved superiority. From that point enemy artillery 

ceased to be a serious deterrent to maneuver. 

On 6 April at 1350, six days after Operation PEGASUS had begun, 

the initial relief of Khe Sanh took place. A lead company of the 

South Vietnamese 3d Airborne Task Force airlifted into Khe Sanh 

and linked up with the South Vietnamese 37th Rangers. Two days 

later the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had completed its sweep along 

Route 9 and the official relief took place. The command post of the 

3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry, airlifted to the base at 0800 and became 

its new landlord. By the evening of 8 April, all elements of the 

PEGASUS task force were in position on the Khe Sanh plateau. The 

North Vietnamese 304th Division faced entrapment and destruction as a great vise closed about the enemy daily. American and 

South Vietnamese units soon uncovered grisly evidence of how 

badly the North Vietnamese had been beaten. They found hundreds of North Vietnamese bodies in shallow graves and hundreds 

more that lay where they had fallen. The allies destroyed or captured 557 individual weapons, 207 crew-served weapons, and two 

antiaircraft pieces. In addition, they confiscated 17 vehicles ranging 

from PT76 tanks to motor scooters, tons of ammunition and food, 

and numerous radios and items of individual equipment. The 

mountain of captured or abandoned enemy stores indicated either 
THE HOT WAR 157 

that PEGASUS had caught the enemy Hatfooted or that the remnants 

of the enemy divisions had been unable to cart off their equipment 

and supplies. 

On the morning of 14 April, PEGASUS officially ended. The 

operation was successful, Route 9 opened, the enemy routed, and 

the base itself relieved. The North Vietnamese lost 1,304 killed 

and 21 captured. The battle of Khe Sanh established that, with 

sufficient fire power, an encircled position could be successfully 

held and the enemy devastated. 

A Shalt 

With the exception of the defense of Khe Sanh, post-Tel operations were similar to past counterguerrilla actions. The enemy, 

badly shaken, again eluded massed allied forces. It was necessary to 

hunt him in search and destroy operations conducted over large 

land areas. The two largest of such operations took place in the III 

Corps area and were known as QUYET TONG (Resolve To Win) and 

TOAN THANG (Complete Victory). Both took place in and around 

Saigon and were aimed at destroying enemy forces that had participated in the Tel attacks and were hiding in the area. Operation 

TOAN THANG involved 42 U.S. and 37 Vietnamese maneuver battalions and was the largest operation of the Vietnamese war. Artillery support was provided by 81 batteries of U.S. artillery and all 

Vietnamese artillery in the area. 

Though not the largest, perhaps the most significant operation 

of the period immediately following Tel was DELAWARE-LAM SON 

216. This operation, in April 1968, took friendly forces into the A 

Shau Valley, which had been controlled by the enemy since 1966. 

The operation, like PEGASUS, was preceded by intelligence acquisition by the 9th Cavalry. Antiaircraft weapons were pinpointed and 

destroyed by artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes. Two battalions 

of the 3d Brigade air assaulted into the northern portion of the A 

Shau Valley on 19 April. Hampered by extremely bad weather in 

the objective area, the brigade did not close until 23 April. On 24 

and 25 April the 1st Brigade was deployed in the central portion of 

the valley. On 29 April, one battalion of the South Vietnamese 3d 

Regiment was airlifted into the southern part of the valley and, by 

the end of the month, most elements of the regiment were operating in the south central portion. 

Artillery support for Operation DELAWARE-LAM SON 216 was 

provided by two organic battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division 

Artillery- the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, and the 1st Battalion, 

21st Artillery. In addition, two batteries of the attached 1st Bat-
158 

NORTH 

LAOS 

INDEX MAP 

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES 

MAP 16 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

CORPS TACTICAL ZONE 

In'lmol'-l bow\OQfJ 

0em;lIIo,11I4 Zone 

·C"~t-..... '...,.,i'--.--Ir IIIL[I - r';' I I n u IIl\.OWlTllIS 

QUANG NAM'~.:E!~~~~ 

.• 

b 

II CORPS 

talion, 30th Artillery (155, towed), reinforced the two direct support battalions, and the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (Aerial Field 

Artillery), were in general support. Heavy artillery was provided 

by six 175-mm. guns of the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, and 8th 

Battalion, 4th Artillery. One battery of the 1st Battalion, 21st 

Artillery, moved into the valley on 19 April 1968. Plans called for 

moving another battery; however, hazardous flying conditions prevented the move. No additional artillery was moved into the valley 

until 23 April. By 29 April, however, all the supporting artillery 

was in position. (Map 16) 

Movement into the A Shau Valley was much slower than 

planned because of enemy antiaircraft fire. The enemy air defense 
THE HOT WAR 159 

was composed of relatively sophisticated weapons and fire distribution means, served by well-trained and disciplined crews, and an 

effective communication system. Despite attacks by tactical aircraft 

and artillery, the air defense weapons took a heavy toll of U.S. 

aircraft on the first day of the operation. 

The entire operation by the 1st Cavalry Division was conducted 

by air. Positioning and supporting the artillery were hampered not 

only by enemy antiaircraft fires but also by difficult weather conditions. The operation was successful only because of feats of airmanship performed under instrument flight rule conditions by aviators 

of the 11th Aviation Group, the 9th Cavalry Squadron, and the 2d 

Battalion, 20th Artillery. Despite their efforts, however, careful 

management of ammunition and supplies by all supporting artillery 

units was necessary. On one occasion, water to swab the tubes of the 

155-mm. howitzers was even in short supply. 

The success of Operation DELAWARE can be measured principally by the amount of supplies and equipment captured, not by 

the number of enemy killed: 

Type 

Small anns 

Machine guns .. 

Antiaircraft guns 

Recoilless riOes .. 

Morlars ........... . 

Rocket launchers .................... . 

Flame throwers 

Tolal 

2,542 

36 

IS 

10 

2 

11 

31 

Explosives .... , . . .. .......... . . ........... . 2.182 pounds 

Plastic caps .. ' 5,994 

Sma1l arms ammunition ..... . 

Recoilless rifte ammunition .. . 

Assorted ammunition 

Mines '.... . .......... . 

Grenades 

Bulldozers 

Wheeled vehicles . 

Radios 

Tracked vehicles ... 

Road stores 

............. . ..... . 154,757 rounds 

796 rounds 

75,655 rounds 

35 

....... . 2.486 

2 

75 

6 

3 

71.805 pounds 

Later in the year, another operation was conducted into the A 

Shau Valley. Intelligence indicated that the enemy had rebuilt his 

defenses in the valley following the withdrawal of the 1st Air 

Cavalry Division. The enemy was actively clearing and improving 

access to and along Route 548 while moving large amounts of 

supplies and replacements in Thua Thien Province and southern 
160 FIELD ARTILLERY 

I Corps Tactical Zone. Accordingly the IO 1st Airborne Division 

was directed to conduct a follow-up operation into the valley and, 

during the period 19- 26 July 1968, built bases to support the 

operation. Before D·day, eight batteries of field artillery were 

moved into the bases. Each I05-mm. battery stockpiled 3,000 rounds 

of ammunition; each 155-mm. battery, 2,000 rounds. Two 175-mm_ 

batteries were within supporting range. 

The amounts and types of preparatory fires were impressive. 

Fourteen B-52 strikes were directed against the hard targets. Eleven 

of the strikes were within twenty-four hours of H-hour, the last at 

0850 on D-day_ Following the strikes, a tactical preparation of four 

Rights dropped Daisy Cutter bombs to neutralize any enemy in the 

landing zones. When the last aircraft cleared the landing zones, the 

artillery preparation began. Each 105-mm. battery fired 1,000 

rounds, each 155-mm. battery fired 600 rounds, and each 175-mm. 

battery fired 200 rounds on two landing zones. Approximately 

8,000 rounds of artillery were fired before H-hour by the ten 

batteries supporting the operation_ 

Enemy resistance was light on one landing zone and moderate to 

heavy on the other. Four gunships were damaged or destroyed 

during the initial phase of the operation, but no troop<arrying 

ships were lost. 

By 6 August, all elements of the IOlst and the Vietnamese task 

force had been moved into the A Shau Valley and were conducting 

reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) operations in their assigned areas, 

with very light contact. Withdrawal of the forces began on 17 

August 1968 and was completed on 19 August. Results of the operation were 181 enemy killed and 4 ca ptured, 45 individual weapons 

and 13 crew-served weapons seized, and the following miscellaneous 

enemy equipment captured or destroyed: 

Equipmen£ 

2-100 trucks destroyed .. ' 

Rice captured ..... . 

122-rnm. rockets ........ . 

Crew-served weapon ammunition ............... . 

12.7-mm. heavy machine gun ammunition . . ....... . ....... . 

Small·arms ammunition ........................ . 

~~ ... . ....•........ 

~fedicine ........ ......... . ......... . 

Medical kits ....... . 

Communication wire .. 

Switchboard ... 

Field telephones 

Quantity 

7 

12 tons 

II 

1,142 rounds 

18 cases 

52 cases 5. 

51 pounds 

• 

1 J kilometers 

1 

2 

HulS destroyed .. ......... . ....... . .... 215 
THE HOT WAR 161 

Actio1lS at Fire Bases and Lessons Learned 

Fire bases throughout Vietnam sustained numerous attacks in 

this period of maximum U.S. troop commitment. The fire base 

concept surpassed the most optimistic expectations. Occasionally 

the enemy was able to penetrate the defenses and take a heavy toll 

of personnel and equipment, but he never was able to take an 

American fire base. At the same time, lessons learned in countering 

enemy attacks during this period suggested further refinements of 

procedures for establishing and defending a fire base. For instance, 

actions at Fire Support Bases MAURY I and PIKE VI provided 

valuable insights on the proper positioning of artillery when several 

batteries occupied the same fire base. 

Batteries Band C (105-mm.), 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery, and 

Battery A (155-mm.), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, were occupying 

MAURY I, a 25th Infantry Division Artillery fire base. Although the 

base was located in what was probably the best available area, bamboo thickets and wood lines surrounded the clearing. The three field 

artillery batteries had been arranged within the perimeter in a 

triangle, with one battery at each point. The 155-mm_ battery was 

to the west and the 105-mm. batteries to the northeast and southeast. 

On the night of 9 May, MAURY I came under heavy attack. 

(Map 17) The enemy began his attack at 0200 with an intense 

mortar and RPG (Russian-made antitank grenade) barrage. He 

launched a diversionary attack against the northeastern and southwestern portions of the perimeter followed by the main attack 

directed against the western portion of the triangle, where the 

155-mm. battery was located less than 200 meters from the tree 

line_ 

The 155-mm. battery, between the two 105-mm. batteries and 

the attacking enemy, took the brunt of the attack. The RPG fire 

had a devastating effect on the 155-mm. howitzers. At 0330 an attempt was made to move two 105-mm. howitzers to the southwestern side of the perimeter to aid the medium battery. By this 

time, only one of the 155-mm. howitzers was serviceable; of the 

others, three had been completely destroyed, as had two M548 

ammunition trucks_ Flareships and gunships arrived by 0330 and 

Air Force fighter aircraft by 0500. At 0530 a relief element of the 

4th Battalion, 23d Infantry (Mechanized), arrived and battered 

its way into the beleaguered base. The attack was finally repulsed. 

All Beehive ammunition had been expended but, because of 

the speed and accuracy of the assault against the medium battery, 

less than 10 rounds of 155-mm. ammunition had been fired before 
162 FIELD ARTILLERY 

FIRE SUPPORT BASE MAURY I 

(not to scole) 

-i>iOO C~7'" 

AP.'.13 '" ~ '" W -soo 

.£;t ~. * ~ ~ 

-. .;EOo 

-., """"" ~ I~ ~ ~ ~ If, .zoo 

u 

.. B~7-11 , .. 0$ 0 

~ 

(IMAP 17 

the destruction of the howitzers. Eighteen Viet Cong were confirmed dead, and friendly losses numbered 10 killed and 66 

wounded. Four men died of wounds received in battle. These, 

along with 7 others killed and 39 wounded, were artillerymen. Five 

M I 09 howitzers were destroyed; one serviceable howitzer was later 

pieced together from two damaged howitzers. Two M548 trucks 

were destroyed, and one 5·ton truck was severely damaged. Four· 

teen M 16 rifles were either lost or destroyed. 

The defenders had been aggressive and determined in withstanding a heavy enemy attack. Despite their success, as with any 

actions, there were lessons to be learned. An analysis of the battle 

suggested techniques that might reduce American losses and in· 

crease enemy casualties in a similar situation. No bulldozer had been 

available to construct berms around the howitzers; ammunition 

was protected on the sides only; the medium battery situated at the 

point of the triangle should have been more centrally located 

within the perimeter and away from a tree line; and poor fields of 
THE HOT WAR 163 

fire reduced the effectiveness of the Beehive rounds. Positions that 

would have allowed maximum use of the Beehive round should 

have been chosen early in the occupation of the fire support base. 

On the morning of II May, Fire Support Base PIKE VI was occupied by Battery B, 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105-mm.); 

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (105-mm.); and Battery C, 3d 

Battalion, 13th Artillery (155-mm., self-propelled). (Map 18) The 

commander set up the base using the valuable experience gained 

from the attack on MAURV I. The batteries entered the fire support 

base early in the afternoon, and a bulldozer began constructing 

berms for the 155-mm. howitzers immediately. By nightfall only 

the turrets of the howitzers were exposed. The 105-mm. batteries 

had been carefully positioned to allow maximum use of Beehive, 

and two 105-mm_ howitzers, one from each battery, had been 

placed at strategic points along the perimeter some distance from 

the rest of the battery positions. Although the terrain was much the 

same as that at MAURV I, the nearby wood lines were covered by 

two attached Dusters. The light batteries enjoyed excellent fields 

of fire. The medium battery was positioned between the two light 

batteries and thus was able to support equally well in all directions_ 

At 0130 on 12 May 1968 the enemy attacked with a mortar 

barrage of approximately 400 rounds, all falling within 30-60 

minutes. Once again, the enemy began a diversionary attack from 

the south_ The Duster position on the southern tip of the base took 

60-70 Viet Cong under fire with its M60 machine gun and 40-mm 

cannon. The crew managed to fire only 12 rounds of 40-mm. ammunition, however, before the Duster was silenced by an RPG 

round. Leaving 16 enemy bodies in their wake, the crew fell back 

to a I05-mm. howitzer pit directly to their rear. The enemy managed to reach the Duster, but small arms and a few well-placed 

Beehive rounds from the 105-mm. turned him back_ 

As the main attack was starting from the west, artillery shells 

from adjacent units were already impacting around the perimeter. 

Support was called for and received from 155-mm. howitzers of 

Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, near Saigon. The entire 

western approach was covered by a 105-mm. battery which fired 

round after round of Beehive and time rounds, all with a very short 

fuze setting, into the attacking enemy_ The defense was entirely 

successful and the attack ended just two and one-half hours after it 

began. Mop-up operations in daylight produced a body count of 

110. Friendly force losses amounted to 5 killed and 30 wounded, of 

which 1 killed and 5 wounded were artillerymen. No equipment 

was losl. The damaged Duster was easily repaired, and two vehicles 

sustained minor damage. 
164 FI ELD ARTILLERY 

MAP 18 

Actions MAURY I and PIKE VI offered an excellent example of 

how techniques could be improved by observing lessons learned. 

The Killer Junior technique, for instance, was developed during 

this period and used profitably in defense of fire bases. The technique was expanded to include projectiles of improved conventional munitions as well as high explosive projectiles. Killer Junior 
THE HOT WAR 165 

was employed in the defense of PIKE VI as well as on numerous 

later occasions. The following are a few instances when the technique proved particularly effective: 

1. On 13 September 1968. Battery C. 2d Battalion. 13th Artillery. expended 1.305 rounds in defense of Fire Support Base BUELL 

and killed 76 enemy. 

2. On 25 September 1968. a platoon of Battery C. 6th Battalion. 

15th Artillery. expended 288 rounds in defense of Katum and 

killed 47 enemy. 

3. On 25 September 1968. a platoon of Battery B. 6th Battalion. 15th Artillery. expended 220 rounds in defense of a position 

at Thien Ngon and killed 142 enemy. 

The 25th Infantry Division conducted an appraisal of its fire 

support bases in late 1968. after many of the bases in the Tay 

Ninh area had been attacked. and made two major recommendations. First. commanders were to insure that insofar as possible 

fire bases be constructed in a circle and small enough for one 

ri fie company to defend. Both these recommendations were in accord with what were already considered correct procedures. Apparently there were sufficient deviations from correct practice to 

warrant further emphasis. The circular shape permitted equal fire 

power in all directions and allowed for faster em placement. The 

reduction in construction time became essential because the enemy 

began to deviate from his normal two- or three-day reconnaissance 

and to attack bases on the first or second night after the base was 

occupied. The smaller size of the bases also freed more companies 

for night ambushes and mobile patrols and reduced the number of 

enemy shells that landed in the area. These modifications proved 

highly successful in a series of engagements fought along the Cambodian border in early 1969. Each base was manned by one rifle 

company and one howitzer platoon. The apparent vulnerability of 

these small positions was tempting. and the enemy seized the opportunity to try to destroy them. But his forces ran into a storm of 

carefully preplan ned fire power. which not only broke the assault 

but also shifted to attack the enemy and his supporting weapons as 

he retreated. 

The second major recommendation was that the activities of 

fire bases be viewed as offensive operations. The base was considered the anvil and the maneuver force the hammer. Fire support 

or "offensive fires" were planned for the entire battle area. Enemy 

troops. attack positions. supporting weapon positions. and command 

centers were struck simultaneously. and then when activity declined. 

the routes of withdrawal and likely assembly areas were attacked. 

This system of deep. simultaneous. and continuous fires was em-
166 FIELD ARTILLERY 

ployed at Fire Support Base CROOK on the night of 5-6 June and 

served to test the validity of the fire support base evaluation. 

Perhaps the best example of the damage that could be inflicted 

on the enemy by the determined defenders of a well established 

fire support base occurred in late 1968 during Operation FISH HOOK. 

The operation, along the Cambodian border, was in an area astride 

a primary infiltration route running through War Zone C into the 

Saigon complex. Two fire support bases, RITA and DOT, and one 

night defensive position were established to obstruct and interdict 

enemy movement south from Cambodia. They were so located 

that each fire support base could mutually support the other with 

artillery fire and both could support the infantry position. 

Headquarters and Battery B of the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery 

(l05-mm., towed), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. 

Rogers, and Battery C, 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery (155-mm., selfpropelled), were located at Fire Support Base RITA. This base, 

with two batteries and the artillery tactical operations center 

(TOG), was the key position. The base was also occupied by one 

cavalry squadron and one infantry company. Battery D, 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, was at Fire Support Base DOT. During the 

period 25-30 October, there were enemy mortar and ground attacks on all three bases. Artillery support called in on all these attacks resulted in a Viet Cong body count of lOS. 

On I November 1968 at 0330, the west-northwest perimeter of 

Fire Support Base RITA was attacked by a North Vietnamese 

Army force of an estimated 800 men. (See Mop 13.) The attack 

immediately followed a "mad minute" reconnaissance by fire by 

the friendly forces. The enemy, initially surprising the friendly 

forces with the intensity of his attack, penetrated the defensive 

perimeter and was inside the position of the 155-mm. howitzer 

battery. A counterattack was mounted and the bunkers were retaken. A second attack and penetration was made at 0515 by the 

enemy against the southwest perimeter. Again, the enemy was 

beaten back by an aggressive counterattack and the defensive positions were re-established. When the enemy attempted to regain 

the initiative by attacking the northern perimeter with a third 

charge, the 105-mm. howitzers were swung to the north and lethal 

barrages were fired into the massed assaulting enemy. 

During the battle, the U.S. forces suffered 12 men killed and 

wounded. The enemy body count could not be obtained, but it was 

estimated that at least 200 bodies lay in the woods around the fire 

support base. The ferocious intensity of the battle, which raged 

from 0330 until 0645, with frequent concentrations of mortars impacting the fire support base until 0800, was attested to by the 
THE HOT WAR 167 

massive quantity of ammunition expended by friendly forces. The 

field artillery fired 1,300 rounds in direct fire and 800 rounds in 

indirect fire. In addition, the defense was supported by air strikes 

and innumerable strikes by helicopter gunships and fire teams 

from the 1st Infantry Division. Colonel Rogers directed the defense 

of the base with such heroism as to be awarded the Medal of Honor. 

Peak Strength and Beginning 0/ Redeployment 

On 4 May the enemy launched another wave of nationwide 

attacks against 109 cities and military installations, including 21 

airfields. These attacks lacked the intensity and co·ordination of the 

Tet offensive. Bien Hoa Air Base was the hardest hit installation; 

strong attacks occurred in Binh Duong and Hou Nghia Provinces. 

The enemy also tried to seize the Saigon-Bien Hoa highway bridge 

near Saigon. Heavy fighting continued near Dong Ha in northern 

I Corps on 6 May, and moderate to heavy fighting persisted around 

Saigon. Because of the attacks on Saigon, another task force was 

formed to control U.S. units in the Capital Military District. The 

task force was commanded by Major General John H. Hay, Jr., 

deputy commander of II Field Force, Vietnam. 

The buildup of U.S. forces continued through most of 1968. 

Between February and July, four additional artillery battalions arrived. Two were ISS-mm. towed battalions, which were assigned 

to the 41st Artillery Group and the S4th Artillery Group. One was 

a 10S-mm. towed battalion which was assigned to the 108th Artillery Group. The fourth was a ISS-mm. towed and 8-inch selfpropelled battalion which was assigned to the Americal Divison as 

its general support battalion. During July the 1st Brigade of the 

Sth Mechanized Division arrived with its ISS-mm. self-propelled 

direct support battalion. The 1st Brigade was the last major U.S. 

Army maneuver unit to be deployed to Vietnam. 

Later in the year, two additional artillery battalions arrived 

together with more support units and infantry battalions. These 

were National Guard units, the first to be deployed to Vietnam. The 

two artillery battalions were the 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery, from 

New Ham pshire, and the 2d Battalion, 138th Artillery, from Kentucky. They were assigned to the 23d Artillery Group and the 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam, respectively. The 4th Battalion, 77th 

Artillery (Aerial Rocket Artillery), arrived in December 1968 and 

was assigned to the 10 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile). With its 

arrival, the field artillery was at its maximum strength of the war. 

During the latter part of 1968, some major troop realignments 

took place. In September the 1st Brigade, 10Ist Airborne Division, 
J68 FIELD ARTILLERY 

moved to I Corps to rejoin the rest of the division, and the 3d 

Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, moved to III Corps from I Corps. 

In October, over the objections of the Commanding General, XXIV 

Corps, and Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, 

the 1st Cavalry Division began the move from I Corps to III Corps. 

The move was completed in November 1968 and the division began 

to operate in III and IV Corps areas. With these operations the 1st 

Cavalry added another first to its list, that of being the first divisionsize unit to operate in all four corps tactica l zones. 

On 8 June 1969, President Richard M. Nixon announced plans 

for returning 25,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam. One montb later, 

a C-141 Starlifter jet left Bien Hoa Air Base with members of the 

3d Battalion, 60tb Infantry. On 12 June tbe 9th Infantry Division 

received notification of its selection as tbe first major U.S. Army 

unit to leave the Republic of Vietnam. Tbe first field artillery 

unit to redeploy was tbe 3d Battalion, 34tb Artillery, wbicb left 

Vietnam on 26 July 1969. It was followed in mid-August by tbe 

1st Battalion, Iltb Artillery; 1st Battalion, 84tb Artillery; and tbe 

9th Infantry Division Artillery. Since tbe 3d Brigade, 9th Division, 

was remaining in Vietnam, the 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, also remained as its direct support battalion. Tbe next redeployment of 

artillery units took place in September and October, wben the 3d 

Battalion, 197tb Artillery, and tbe 2d Battalion, 138tb Artillery, tbe 

two National Guard units, were returned to tbe United States. Tbe 

2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, and 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery, 

were activated in Vietnam as replacements. 

The enemy Tet offensive and the allied counteroffensive propelled the artillery toward increased sophistication. During tbe 

period, the artillery was exposed to essentially tbree types of major 

operations, each witb its own peculiar demands. Because of the 

proximity of friendly forces and civilians, solving clearance problems was crucial in Hue and Saigon. The defense and relief of 

Kbe Sanh resembled a conventional situation with requirements 

for large volumes of supporting fires concentrated in a relatively 

small area. Operations into A Shau were highligbted by movement 

and supply by air and by support of dispersed ground forces. Tbe 

period thus offers an interesting study of tbe actions taken by field 

artillerymen to optimize the effectiveness of supporting fires in all 

situations. 

Artillery Organizations 

Various organizations were adopted for the field artillery in 

Vietnam during tbis period to meet both the peculiarities of certain 
THE HOT WAR 169 

short-term operational requirements and long-term needs. Artillery 

commanders at all levels were flexible and innovative in organizing 

their subordinate units to provide the best possible support. 

At the start of the Tet offensive 34 U.S. Army artillery battalions were in Vietnam. They were organized for the most part to 

provide dedicated support to divisions or separate brigades or to 

provide area coverage. (Chart 2) Units in I and II Field Force 

Artilleries served primarily in the latter role. I Field Force Artillery, with two artillery groups-the 41st and the 52d-and two 

separate battalions, provided force artillery in the II Corps areas. 

II Field Force Artillery, with two groups-the 23d and 54thprovided force artillery for both III and IV corps areas. The 108th 

Artillery Group was not assigned to either field force. Before Tet 

it had been placed under the operational control of III Marine 

Amphibious Force to provide artillery support in the I Corps area. 

The group was reinforced with the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery 

(8-inch and 175-mm.), from the 54th Artillery Group. 

This organization served U.S. maneuver forces and augmented 

South Vietnamese artillery when needed during Tet; however, 

some reorganization took place thereafter. During the first half of 

1968, General Westmoreland created two new headquarters to coordinate the actions of U.S. forces in I Corps and in the Capital 

Military District. In March the Provisional Corps, Vietnam (later 

changed to XXIV Corps), succeeded Military Assistance Command 

Forward, which had been operational since 9 February; and in 

June, the Capital Military Assistance Command re·established the 

co-ordination which existed during the brief existence of Task 

Forces WARE and HAY. The command paralleled that of the newly 

established Military Governor of the Capital Military District, who 

controlled all South Vietnamese Army forces, National Police, 

Regional and Popular Forces, and General Reserve in the district. 

This reorganization prompted, in tum, a reorganization of artillery. (Chart 3) In I Corps a provisional Corps Artillery, Vietnam, 

was formed. No separate U.S. artillery command was formed to 

serve the needs of the Capital Military Assistance Command, but 

artillery units around Saigon could look to a single centralized 

clearance and co-ordination activity. 

Despite the amount of artillery in Vietnam, the old cry that 

there were not enough artillery units to support the maneuver elements was heard again and again. The creation of a fourth firing 

battery in some artillery battalions, particularly with the division 

artillery direct support battalions, dramatized the requirements and 

response. There were generally two reasons for the extra battery. 

First, in a brigade, it was not uncommon to have a fourth maneuver 
170 FIELD ARTILLERY 

element resulting from the use of the divisional armored cavalry 

squadron as a separate maneuver force. A fourth firing battery 

was essential to insure the timely delivery of fire to this fourth 

maneuver element. Second, the large areas of operations assigned 

to division were often difficult to cover by division or field force 

CHART 2-FIELD ARTILLERY TASK ORGANIZATION, JANUARY 1968 

I Field Force Artillery 

41st Artillery Cp 

7th Bn, 3d Arty (105. T) 

7th Bn, 15th Arty (8-in/175) 

2d Bn , 17th Arty (105·155. T) 

lSI Bn, 30.h Ar.y (155, T) 

52d Artillery Gp 

3d Bn, 6.h Arty (105, Sp) 

6th Bn, H.h Arty (8·;n/ 175) 

5.h Bn, 22d Arty (8·;n/175) 

lSI Bn, 92d Arty (155, T) 

5.h Bn, 27.h Arty (105, T) 

6th Bn, 32d Arty (8·in/17!'i) 

II Field Force Artillery 

2.M Artillery Gp 

2d Bn, lIth M.y (155, T) 

2d Bn, Ilth Arty (105, T) 

lSI Bn, 27th Arty (155, SP) 

6th Bn, 27.h Arty (8-in/ 175) 

2d Bn, 32d Arty (8-in/175) 

54th Artillery Cp 

7.h Bn, 8.h Arty (8·in/175) 

7th Bn, 9th Any (105, T) 

2d Bn , 35th Arty (155, SP) 

lSI Bn, 83d Arty (8·in/175) 

6th Bn, 77th Any (105, T)' 

6th 8n, 15th Arty (105, T)' 

Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, Forward' 

108th Artillery Gp 

1st Bn, 40th Arty (105, SP) 

8th Bn, 4th Arty (8·in/175) 

2d Bn, 94th Arty (175) 

lst lnfantry Division Artillery 

lSI Bn, 5th Arty (105, T) 

lSI Bn, 7th Arty (105, T) 

2d Bn , lld Mty (105, T) 

8th Bn, 6th Arty (155/8-in, SP) 

25th Infantry Division Artillery 

lSI Bn, 8th Arty (105, T) 

- --.,-.,-

1 Attachtd 2Sth Inrantry Division . 

• Attached 1st Infantry Division . 

25th Infantry Division-continued 

7th Bn, 11th Arty (105, T) 

2d Dn, 77th Arty (105, T) 

~d Bn. 13th Arty (155/8·in, SP) 

17M Airborne Brigade 

3d Bn, 319th Arty (105, T) 

199th Light Infantry Brigade 

2d Bn, 40.h Arty (105. T) 

11th Annored Cavalry Regiment 

3 Sqdn How Blry, (155, SP) 

1st Cavalry Division Artillery 

2d Bn, 9th Mty (105, T) 

1st Bn. 77th Arty (105, T) 

ht Bn, 2ht Arty (105, T) 

2d Bn. 20th Arty (ARA) 

4th Infantry Division Artillery 

6th Bn, 29.h Arty (105, T) 

4th Bn, 42d Arty (105, T) 

2d Bn, 9th Arty (105, T) 

5th Bn, 16th Arty (155/8·1n. SP) 

28<1 Infantry Division Artillery 

6th Bn. 11th Arty, 11 th Inf 

Bde (105, T) 

1st Bn. 14th Arty, 198th lnf 

Bde (105. T) 

!d Bn. 82d Arty, 196th Inf 

Bde (105, T) 

3d Bn, 18.h Arty (8·1n/l75) 

3d Bn, 16th Arty (155, T) 

lOin Airborne Division Artillery 

2d Bn, 319th Arty (105, T) 

2d Dn, 320th Arty (105, T) 

lst Bn. !21st Arty (105. T) 

9th Infantry Division Artillery 

2d Bn, 4th Arty (105, T) 

ht Bn, 11th Arty (105. T) 

3d Bn, 34th Arty (105, T) 

ht Bn, 84th Arty (155, T/8·in, SP) 

• Provisional Corps, Vietnam, aclivated aDd ~Iaced Military Assillantt. Vietnam, Forward 

on 10 March 1968. later redesignated XXIV Corps, Vietnam. 
THE HOT WAR 171 

CHART lI-FIELD ARTILLERY TASK ORGANIZATION, JULY 1969 

I Field Force Artillery 

41st Artillery Cp 

71h Bn. 13th Arty (105. 'I) 

71h Bn. 15th Arty (8-in/175) 

2d Bn. 17th Arty (105-155. 'I) 

6th Bn. 84th Arty (155. 'I) 

52d Artillery Gp 

3d Bn. 6th Mty (105. SP) 

6th Bn. 14th Arty (8-in/175) 

5th Bn. 22d Mty (8-in/175) 

1st Bn, 92d Arty (155. T) 

5th Bn. 27th Mty (105. 'I) 

6th Bn. 32d Arty (8-in/175) 

XXIV Corps Artillery 

l08th Artillery Gp 

1st Bn, 40th Arty (lOS, SP) 

8th Bn. 4th Arty (8-in/175) 

2d Bn. 94th Arty (175) 

6th Bn. 33d Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn, 83d Arty (8-in/175) 

2d Bn. 138th Arty (155. SP)' 

1st Cavalry Division Artillery 

2d Bn. 19th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn. 77th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn, 21st Arty ( 105. T) 

2d Bn. 20th Arty (ARA) 

1st Bn. 30th Arty (155. 'I) 

25th Infantry Division Artillery 

1st Bn. 8th Arty (105. T) 

'lth Bn. 11th Arty (105, T) 

2d Bn. 77th Arty (105. T) 

3d Bn. 13th Arty (155/S·in. SP) 

]( Field Force Artillery 

23d Artillery Gp 

2d Bn. 14th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn, 27th Arty (155. SP) 

6th Bn, 27th Arty (8-intl'5) 

2d Bn. 32d Arty (8-in/175) 

3d Bn. 197th Arty (155. T)' 

6th Bn. 15th Arty (105. 'I) 

54th Artillery Gp 

7th Bn . 8th Arty (8-in/175) 

7th Bn. 9th Arty (105. T) 

2d Bn. 35th Arty (155. SP) 

5th Bn. 42d Arty (155. 'I) 

6th Bn. 77th Arty (105. 'I)' 

1st Brigade. 51h Mechanical Division 

5th Bn. 4th Arty (155. SP) 

1'3d Airborne Brigade 

3d Bn. 319th Arty (105. T) 

199th Light Infantry Brigade 

2d Bn. 40th Arty (105. 'I) 

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 

2d Bn. 321st Arty (105. T) 

11th Annored Cavalry Regiment 

" sqdn how btrrs (155. SP) 

lst Infantry Division Artillery 

2d Bn. 4th Arty (105. T) 

1st Bn, 11th Arty (105. 1) 

3d Bn. 34th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn. 84th Arty (155. T/8-in. SP) 

9th Infantry Division Artillery 

2d lin, 4th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn, Illh Arty (105, T) 

3d Bn. ~4th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn, 84th Arty (155, T 18·in, SP) 

4th Infantry Division Artillery 

6th Bn. 29th Arty (105. T) 

4th Bn. 42d Arty (105. T) 

2d Bn . 9th Arty (105. 'I) 

5th Bn. 16th Arty (155/8-in. SP) 

23d Infantry Division Artillery 

6th Bn. 11th Arty. (105. 'I) 11th 

Inf Bde 

1st Bn, 14th Arty (105, T) 198th 

Inf Bde 

3d Bn. 82d Arty. (105. T) 196th 

Inf Bde 

3d Bn. 18th Arty (8-in/175) 

3d Bn. 16th Arty (155. 'I) 

1st Bn. 82d Arty (155. T /8-in . SP) 

IOlst Airborne Division Artillery 

2d Bn. 319th Arty (105. 'I) 

2d Bn. 320th Arty (105. 'I) 

1st Bn. 321st Arty (105, T) 

2d Bn, 11th Arty (155, T) 

4th Bn. 77th Arty (ARA) 

1 Arrived Oct 68, rcdc.ignat~ 1st Bn, ~91b Arty, Oct 69. 

I Arriv~ Sq> 68, redesignated 2d Bn, 12th Any, Scp 69 . 

• OPCON Senior AdvilCr, IV Corps. 
172 FIELD ARTILLERY 

artillery under conventional organization. A fourth firing battery 

alleviated this condition. Otherwise, the desire to keep maneuver 

elements within the range of a I05-mm. battery restricted operations. 

The requirement for additional firing batteries could be satisfied in a number of ways. In one instance Headquarters, U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, authorized a fourth battery for the 3d Battalion, 

319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade. The battalion in this case 

supported five maneuver elements and badly needed the additional 

artillery. Additional firing batteries in all other cases were organized 

from existing assets. Typical was the artillery reorganization in 

the Americal Division. Each of the division's direct support battalions was reorganized into two five-tube and two four-tube batteries. The 1st Infantry Division had a more unusual solution. 

One or two 4.2-inch mortar platoons were attached to each of 

the division's direct support artillery battalions and designated 

Batteries D and E. Although attached to the headquarters battery for administration, these platoons functioned tactically as separate fire units. The range of the mortars limited their employment 

in the direct support role. Consequently, they defended base camps 

or covered fire support bases that were out of range of other field 

artillery. The particular situation of many artillery battalions did 

not require the formation of a fourth battery. Even so, contingency plans were often developed to permit the reorganization on a 

moment's notice if the situation were to change. II Field Force 

Artillery, for instance, required all light and medium battalions 

to have contingency plans for forming a fourth battery from organic 

assets. None of these reorganizations made the support rendered 

less effective. The nature and size of targets most frequently encountered in Vietnam (six or less personnel) could be effectively 

engaged with four howitzers rather than six per battery. In fact, 

four-tube batteries were frequently more compatible with the small 

position areas available. 

One of the most interesting organizations was that of Battery D, 

2d Battalion, 13th Artillery. This was a composite 105- and 155-mm. 

battery which was formed temporarily on two occasions for a 

specific purpose. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, provided 

three 105-mm. tubes and Battery B, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery, 

provided three 155-mm. towed weapons toward the formation of 

the battery. The regular gun crews were transferred along with 

weapons. Other battery personnel and equipment requirements 

to flesh out Battery D were filled by both contributing batteries. 

The unit capitalized on the advantages of both calibers for jungle 

operations. Whereas the 155-mm. howitzer was more effective for 
THE HOT WAR 173 

firing in the triple-canopy jungle, the I05-mm. was more effective 

for close-in defense and for delivering fire at high rates. Battery 

D, known as the Jungle Battery, operated in direct support of the 

3d Mobile Strike Force, a joint U.S.-Vietnamese Special Forces command during operations in "Var Zone D. 

Safety 

Artillery units at all levels took every reasonable precaution to 

insure the safety of allied forces and noncombatants. The requirement that artillery units obtain both political and military clearance 

was but one of many rules that the artillery was required to observe 

in engaging the enemy. The rules were published in a directive 

entitled MA C V RILles of Engagement, cited below. They are evidence of the unusual care that was required of all soldiers and 

commanders to insure that friendly casualties were held to an 

absolute minimum: 

I. UNINHABITED AREAS. 

a. Fire may be directed against VC j NVA forces in contact in 

accordance with normal artillery procedures. 

b. Unobserved fire may be directed at targets and target areas, 

other than VC j NVA forces in contact, only after approval by Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander and US j FWMAF Military Commander, as appropriate, 

has been granted. 

c. Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity 

which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining Province 

Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander 

and US j FWMAF Military Commander's approval. 

d. Approval by Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander and USjFWMAF Military Commander, as appropriate, is required, before directing fire on targets 

of opportunity not clearly identified as hostile. 

2. VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. 

a. Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC j NVA 

targets in villages and hamlets occupied by noncombatants will be 

conducted as follows: 

(I) All such fire missions will be controlled by an observer 

and will be executed only after approval is obtained from the 

Province Chief or District Chief, as appropriate. The decision to 

conduct such fire missions will also be approved by the attacking 

force batta l ion or task force commander, or higher. 

(2) Villages and hamlets not associated with maneuver of 
174 FIELD ARTILLERY 

ground forces will not be fired upon without warning by leaflets 

and / or speaker system or by other appropriate means, even though 

fire is received from them. 

(3) Villages and hamlets may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving 

maneuver of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgment 

of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by 

such warning. 

b. The use of incendiary type ammunition will be avoided unless 

absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commander's 

mission or for preservation of the force. 

3. URBAN AREAS. 

a. Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/ NVA 

targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary destruction of 

civilian property and must by nature require greater restrictions 

than the rules of engagement for less populated areas. 

b. When time is of the essence and supporting weapons must be 

employed to accomplish the mission or to reduce friendly casualties, fire missions will be conducted as follows: 

(1) All fire missions will be controlled by an observer and 

will be executed only after GVN / RVNAF I US approval. The decision to conduct fire missions in urban areas will be retained at 

corps/ field force or NAVFORV level. Approval must be obtained 

from both the corps commander and the US field force level commander. This approval is required for the employment of any US 

supporting weapons in urban areas to include those US weapons in 

support of RVNAF. 

(2) Prior to firing in urban areas, leaflets and loudspeakers 

and other appropriate means will be utilized to warn and to secure 

the cooperation and support of the civilian populace even though 

fire is received from these areas. 

(3) Supporting weapons will be used only on positively located enemy targets. When time permits, damage to buildings will 

be minimized. 

(4) The use of incendiary type munitions will be avoided unless destruction of the area is unavoidable and then only when 

friendly survival is at stake. 

(5) Riot control agents will be employed to the maximum 

extent possible. CS agents can be effectively employed in urban 

area operations to flush enemy personnel from buildings and fortified positions, thus increasing the enemy's vulnerability to allied 

firepower while reducing the likelihood of destroying civilian 

property. Commanders must plan ahead and be prepared to use 

CS agents whenever the opportunity presents itself. 
THE HOT WAR 175 

4. THE ABOVE STATED PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE 

VIOLATED OR DEVIATED FROM EXCEPT, WHEN IN 

THE OPINION OF THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER, 

THE SITUATION DEMANDS SUCH IMMEDIATE ACTION 

THAT THESE PROCEDURES CANNOT BE FOLLOWED. 

SUCH SITUATIONS INCLUDE PRESERVATION OF THE 

FORCE OR THE RIGHT OF SELF·DEFENSE. 

S. RVN /CAMBODIAN BORDER AREA. 

a. Fire missions within 2000 meters of the RVN /Cambodian 

border will be observed, except under circumstances where fires 

are in defense of friendly forces and observation of such fires is not 

possible. These requirements are in addition to applicable control 

procedures stated elsewhere in this directive. 

b. Fire missions with intended target areas more than 2000 me· 

ters from the RVN /Cambodian border may be unobserved, subject 

to applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in this directive. 

c. Fire missions will not be conducted where dispersion could 

result in fire being placed on or over the RVN /Cambodian border. 

d. Commanders will review and comply with the provisions of 

MACV Rules of Engagement-Cambodian when planning for operations near the Cambodian / RVN border. 

Major commands subordinate to Military Assistance Command 

frequently published directives that interpreted the MACV rules, 

expand<;d them in greater detail, and often added qualifications 

which made them even more restrictive. 

Field artillery units adopted the following procedures in the 

employment of their weapons to insure accuracy and preclude 

friendly casualties: 

I. Firing a smoke shell set for a 200·meter height of burst as the 

first round for most observed missions. Smoke was relatively safe; 

thus, if the target location was improperly reported, supported 

ground troops would not be hurt. The forward observer made any 

correction necessary to insure that subsequent high explosive 

rounds fell in the intended locations. 

2. Double·checking or triple·checking all data at each echelon 

from the forward observer to the howitzer. This procedure created 

a problem for some units because of personnel requirements. In 

many cases, especially in force artillery units, a battalion did not 

control its batteries. When the battalion controlled the batteries 

and retained a technical fire direction center either the battery or 

the battal ion computed the mission and the other checked the 

data. When the batteries operated separately, each battery center 

had to be augmented so that it would have two shifts or two com· 
176 FIELD ARTILLERY 

1ST BA'ITALIONJ 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY, FIRE DIRECTION CENTER. Note 

primary plotting chart with check chart. 

puters and two chart operators for the double-check system. Data 

sent from the fire direction center by one computer were monitored 

by the other computer. The executive officer post received the data 

and read them back. Data then were passed to the guns through the 

executive officer post. One practice called for placing an AN /GRA39 remote radio set at each gun. This permitted all members of the 

section to hear the data being transmitted to the guns. One section 

then read back the data received. 

3. Conducting periodic gunner (firing) inspections and drills 

for subordinate units. 

4. Separating and segrega ting, by lot, projectiles and powder for 

separate-loading ammunition. 

5. Insuring that howitzers were boresighted at least twice daily 

and that batteries registered twice weekly. 

6. Conducting frequent staff inspections of subordinate units to 

see that safety policies were being complied with. 

Friendly casualties resulting from misplaced artillery fires were 

thoroughly investigated whenever the combat situation permitted. 

Often the mistake was unavoidable, and, for that reason, investigation first determined whether the mistake was an accident or an 
THE HOT WAR 177 

FADAC CoMPUTER WITH BACKUP CHART AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 

incident. A firing accident was defined as an occurrence not caused 

by human error or neglect. Malfunction of ammunition or equipment, civilian casualties in previously cleared areas, and personnel 

hit by debris or secondary fragments were classified as accidents. A 

firing incident, on the other hand, resulted from human error or 

neglect. Plotting errors by the forward observer or fire direction 

center, crew errors in setting quadrant elevation or deflection, and 

errors in transmitting unit locations or firing data, in obtaining 

proper clearance, in following the rules of engagement, or in identifying friendly units contributed toward firing incidents. If the 

firing error resulted in an incident, its precise cause was determined 

and necessary action was taken at all levels to prevent similar errors 

in the future. 

The investigation of artillery accidents brought to light a problem in illumination missions. The impact point of the baseplate 

and the projectile body could not be accurately determined because 

of the erratic trajectory after fuze function. Consequently, it became necessary to establish a buffer zone around the grids of illumination and impact. Clearance to fire into these buffer areas was 

required before illumination could be fired . 

A study conducted in 1969 by U.S. Army, Vietnam, into the 

causes of artillery, mortar, and aviation incidents and accidents set 

out to determine if incidents and accidents followed any discernable patterns so that commanders might be forewarned to give 
178 FIELD ARTILLERY 

careful attention to certain specific areas. The study showed that a 

majority of the accidents and incidents involved direct support 

units firing observed fire. The following chart outlines the incident 

and accident profile developed in the study as well as recommended 

corrective action: 

Section [ 

IncidentJ Accident Profile 

Occurrence-Time of Day 

Morning 

Afternoon 

Night (before midnight) 

Night (dtcr midnight) 

Clearance Causes 

Maleriel Causes 

Fire Direction Center Causes 

Artillery 

20% 

23% 

31% 

26% 

15% 

15% 

Aviation 

27% 

40'70 

21% 

12% 

7% 

8% 

Firing Battery (Mortar PlatoOn) Causes 

.'orward Observer Causes 

26% 

21% 

11% 

Mortar 

13% 

20% 

47% 

20'7. 

15% 

25% 

18% 

19'7. 

11% 

Location Errors 11% 11% 

Indefinite Target Location 

Fire Too Close to Friendly Locations 

Improper Employment by Ground Element 

Most Frequent Causes 

Improper Clearance 

Fire Direction Center 

1. Plotting Error 

2. Deflection Computation 

Error 

5. RTO/Compuler Read Wrong 

Data 

4. Friendly Locations not 

Plotted 

Firing Battery 

1. DcHection Error 

2. Quadrant Elevation Error 

3. Wrong Charge 

Forward Observer 

1. Misorientation 

2. Incorrect Observer-Target 

Azimuth 

Section II 

Recommended Corrections 

In the transmission of cleared and uncleared 

grids, address each grid individually specifying 

iLS cleared or uncleared status. Do not clear 

targets in groups. 

1. Use F ADAC as the primary source of firing 

data when possible. When not possible, use 

F ADAC for firing data check. 

2. Maintain firing charts in pairs, Use one as 

independent check of the other. 

!S. Require slow, distinct read backs. 

4. Require fire direction officers to pass a 

qualifying examination before assumption of 

duty in ballalion or battery FOC. 

5. Plot fire bascs and frequented locations on 

firing chart overlays. Continuously update 

overlay or mobile patrols and operations. 

1. Require gunners to pass a qualifying prac· 

tical cxaminatiorl before assumption of duty, 

2. Chiefs of section check quadrants with 

gunner's quadrant. 

!S. Prohibit chief of section participation as a 

crew member. 

I. Upon entering a new area of operation, conduct familiarization with terrain-map relation· 

ships for that area. Conduct practical tests. 

2, When making large lateral shifts in adjust-
Location Error 

THE HOT WAR 179 

menl, observers report a corrected azimuth to 

the target. 

Require infantry platoon and squad leaders to 

altain terrain-map proficiency described above 

for forward observers. 

Artillery units were concerned not only with the safety of 

friendly forces and noncombatants on the ground but also with that 

of aircraft. Aircraft safety was assured by the establishment of aircraft warning centers. These centers normally were set up and 

operated by fie ld artillery liaison sections at maneuver battalion 

and brigade. The liaison section was notified by artillery units in 

the area before firing and given the direction of fire, the maximum 

ordinate of the trajectory, and the point of impact of the projectile. 

Aircraft entering the area could then be advised of artillery firings 

and provided with recommended safe routes through the area . 

In most cases Army control of air space over the battle area was 

not contested by the Air Force. Where it was contested, local agreements were made between representatives of both services. The 

most common agreement was that air space below 5,000 feet would 

be controlled by the Army and that above 5,000 feet by the Air 

Force. In certain areas such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Da 

Nang, where the activity of the Air Force aircraft was the greatest, 

the Air Force controlled all air space. 

Target Acquisition 

Targets must be found and their location pinpointed if field 

artillery is to be effective. In Vietnam, as in past wars, forward observers augmented by aerial observers were the principal means to 

identify artillery targets. Despite the development and improvement of other target acquisition means, observers were, and promise to be for some time to come, more reliable, flexible, and 

responsive than any other system. This does not say that other 

target acquisition means are not valuable. Radars, sound and flash 

ranging, and sensors were all employed profitably in Vietnam. 

Three target acquisition batteries were deployed to Vietnam. 

They were Battery F, 2d Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery, and the headquarters batteries of the 8th Target Acquisition 

Battalion, 26th Artillery, and the 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 

25th Artillery. Each of the headquarters batteries was assigned to a 

field force headquarters to co-ordinate field force level target acquisition activities. Battery F established sound and flash bases in 

the XXIV Corps area to monitor the Demilitarized Zone. This was 
180 FIELD ARTILLERY 

the only sound ranging equipment employed, and though the 

equipment failed to detect a large number of targets, all sound 

located targets that were engaged resulted in secondary explosions. 

Two field artillery radars---the AN / MPQ--4 countermortar radar and the AN /TPS-25 ground surveillance radar-were deployed throughout the country. The AN / MPQ--4 was assigned to 

every direct support battalion and the AN /TPS-25 was assigned to 

every division artillery. Both radars were also assigned to field force 

radar detachments. 

Most units believed that the AN /TPS-25 did a good job and 

was a valuable piece of equipment. The AN / MPQ- 4, however, 

caused mixed reaction. Units identified two major shortcomings: 

the radar had a small sector of scan, and it could not locate lowtrajectory weapons, specifically rockets. The first shortcoming could 

be significantly alleviated where several radars were available to 

provide mutual and overlapping coverage. The second could not be 

corrected because the radar had been designed solely to detect hightrajectory weapons. 

An evaluation of the effectiveness of the AN / MPQ--4 was conducted in 1969. The study revealed that in 1,759 attacks over a. sixmonth period the radar determined only 342 confirmed launch 

locations for an over-all effectiveness average of 19.44 percent. For 

the months of May and June, the study singled out the limited 

sector of scan as the foremost disadvantage. The set could scan only 

a 445-mil sector at a time, which accounted for many nonsightings. 

Of 537 attacks by fire during these two months, 253 occurred out of 

sector, 56 during normal off time for the crews, and 20 while the set 

was down because of mechanical failure. In the remaining 208 

attacks in which sightings were possible, 89 sightings were made, 

for an over-all operator efficiency of 42.8 percent. The enemy, 

aware of these limitations, initiated mortar and rocket attacks from 

positions outside the scan of the radar. He first noted the orientation of the radar and then selected the axis of his attack. In order to 

cope with this handicap, U.S. troops employed a screen to conceal 

the direction in which the radar was oriented. 

As with any sophisticated equipment, the value of the Q--4 was 

directly related to the degree its use was emphasized by commanders. When careful consideration was given to its positioning and 

employment to realize its maXimUiTI effectiveness, command interest aroused in radar crews a feeling that their work was important. They, in turn, strove to obtain maximum effectiveness from 

their radars. On the other hand, lack of command interest often resulted in a radar being positioned on the corner of some installation 

where it was ignored, its crews bored and indifferent. 
THE HOT WAR 181 

The radar was found to be valuable in fulfilling certain tasks 

for which it was not specifically designed. Such tasks included 

registering batteries, locating the limits of friendly villages, determining the battery center when survey was not available, and 

directing friendly aircraft in bad weather or at night. Hamlets 

within range of an AN / MPQ-4 radar were located by hovering a 

helicopter over the hamlet while the radar computed an eightplace co-ordinate. On frequent occasions the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, used its Q-4 to establish the location of firing units within 

range. After the base piece had fired a round with charge I, high 

angle, the Q-4 because of the low muzzle velocity of the round 

could compute an accurate location within 50 meters. A good example of the radar's use in directing aircraft occurred during Operation WHEELER in October 1967. 

Sensors were employed extensively in Vietnam to determine targets. The sensor was not part of field artillery target acquisition 

equipment, but the intelligence elements responsible for their employment and the artillery worked closely together. Pre-positioned 

field artillery was the only fire support means that could respond 

immediately to sensor activations. The first family of sensors sent 

to Vietnam featured air and land emplaced types. They sensed 

intrusion by enemy vehicles or foot troops either seismically, 

acoustically, or magnetically. The sensors, planted in strings, had 

several important advantages. The direction of movement, the size 

of force, and the length of the columns could be determined. Once 

the direction of movement was determined, mortars and artillery 

were prepared to fire on another sensor further along the string 

when that sensor was activated. A mixture of sensors el imina ted 

erroneous readings and verified readings for more accuracy; alone, 

readings of the basic seismic sensor could be of questionable value, 

but acoustic and magnetic sensors mixed in the sensor string produced more valid data. Sensors first gained notoriety when they 

were used in the creation of the so-called McNamara Wall, a fortykilometer-long barrier system extending across the Demilitarized 

Zone and into Laos. The system consisted of sensors to detect 

enemy intrusion, physical barriers to impede enemy movements, 

and tactical troop units to strike at enemy incursions. Most of the 

fire power to support the system came from artillery, tactical air, 

and naval gunfire. The system aimed at cutting down the need for 

costly search operations in an area constantly subjected to enemy 

artillery and mortar fire from adjacent sanctuaries. Work on this 

project began in mid-1967 and continued until early 1968, when 

the buildu p of U.S. forces in I Corps pre-empted the logistical support needed to supply the construction material. 
182 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Although the physical barrier was never completed, certail 

portions of it were sufficiently developed to permit use. South Viel 

namese forces manned the complete static defense positions an. 

thereby freed the American troops for mobile operations. A part 0 

the early warning system operated during the siege of Khe Sanl 

and proved to be effective. Although in themselves no deterrent t< 

enemy movement, sensors enabled friendly forces to bring th, 

enemy under fire by providing targeting data for bombing anc 

artillery strikes. 

Once the McNamara Wall was shelved, sensors were made 

available to units in Vietnam. The experiences of the 25th Infantry 

Division provide two examples of their value. 

On the morning of 15 March 1969, sensors near Fire Support 

Base MALONE, a relatively secure troop recuperation area near Dau 

Tieng, were activated. (See Map 13.) The monitor alerted the 

command group and the fire support element to the possibility of 

enemy presence. The command group soon determined that an 

enemy force had assembled in a bamboo thicket several hundred 

yards from the base. Artillery and mortar barrages covered the 

area. At daylight a patrol searched the area and found 21 enemy 

dead and 4 wounded, 129 rounds of heavy weapons ammunition, 3 

rocket-propelled grenade launchers, a mortar, and a flamethrower. 

A pending attack had been thwarted. 

The attack against Fire Support Base CROOK on the evening of 

5-6 June 1969 serves as a second example. (Map 19) The base, 

established in April 1969 northwest of Tay Ninh city, hampered 

enemy operations and served as a springboard for American operations near the Cambodian border. Anticipating an attack, U.S. 

forces emplaced sensors along all possible approaches. On 5 June 

the sensors exposed enemy activity 950 meters east and 550 meters 

northwest of the base. Simultaneously, a tower-mounted radar 

picked up enemy movement along the wood line. Artillery and 

small-arms fire engaged the enemy. The North Vietnamese forces 

responded with a fierce mortar barrage and several probing attacks but never managed to reach the perimeter. At dawn the 

enemy withdrew and left 75 dead. The Americans suffered I killed 

from an enemy mortar round. The next night sensors heralded 

a renewed attack in greater strength. This time the American 

defenders, alerted by the sensors and aided by their night vision 

devices, accounted for 323 enemy dead and 10 captured without a 

single American loss. On the night of 7 June the Viet Cong launched 

another, much weaker, attack but then withdrew and left 3 dead on 

the battlefield. The early warning provided by the sensors on 

these occasions had stripped away the element of surprise. 
THE HOT WAR 

MAP 19 

183 

ENEMY SITUATION 

FRIENDLY FIRES 

Ground surveys and meterological data determination have 

traditionally been considered by the field artillery to be target 

acquisition activities, though in the strictest sense they are not. 

Ground survey and meteorological data provide accuracy to fires on 

targets that have already been acqu ired. 

Survey increases accuracy by determining the exact location of 

firing units in relation to other firing units, and, where possible, 

in relation to the forward observer and the target. The Vietnam 

environment made survey difficult. Survey control points were scarce 

and those that were available had often been disrupted; distances 

which survey parties were required to cover were often excessive 

and areas insecure; and field artillery often displaced so frequently 

that there was no time [or survey. The most common method 

for determining position location consisted of a sun shot taken 

by survey personnel at the battery location which would provide 

accurate direction. The position location was then determined by 

resection or rna p spot. 

If local meteorological data are available, weapons accuracy 

can be further improved, because weather effects can be applied 

by fire direction centers to the computation of fire missions. Accordingly, meteorological stations were established throughout 

Vietnam. Station sites were continuously eva luated and sections 

were relocated when necessary to provide optima l coverage. Where 

a large difference in altitude existed between a fire base and the 
184 FIELD ARTILLERY 

servicing station, the use of a supplemental mountain meteorologi. 

cal team at the fire support base proved effective. 

Arlillery Raids 

A principal offensive operation employed during this period 

was the artillery raid. It was a combined arms effort, but unlike 

other types of offensive operations, the entire effort supported the 

field artillery rather than the maneuver force. 

The artillery raid was designed to extend available combat 

power into remote areas and to mass fires on enemy units, base 

areas, and cache sites beyond the range of artillery at a fixed fire 

base. Artillery raids involved the displacement of artillery to supplementary positions, engagement of targets with heavy volumes of 

field artillery and other supporting fires, and withdrawal from the 

supplementary positions. The entire operation was conducted as 

rapidly as possible to achieve surprise and took maximum advantage 

of the airmobility and the aerial observation and target acquisition 

capabilities of the division. The majority of the raids were con· 

ducted with I05·mm. and 155·mm. howitzer units of division artillery; however, field force artillery, particularly 155-mm. towed batteries, was frequently employed in raids or in support of divisional 

artillery raids. 

Experience demonstrated that artillery raids were best conducted 

and controlled by a brigade headquarters. The decision to conduct a raid was normally made at division level. Target area selection was based on all available intelligence, and a specific area of 

operation for the raid was assigned to the brigade headquarters. 

Divisional or nondivisional artillery supported the operation with 

the requested or available number of firing batteries. The controlling brigade headquarters tasked a subordinate battalion to 

provide security, and the division made the required aviation lift 

available. A typical package included one I05-mm. howitzer battery, 

one understrength 155-mm. howitzer battery (three howitzers), 

one riAe company for security, aerial observers from division artillery, and, when available, air cavalry assets for target acquisition 

and damage assessment. 

In order to conduct artillery raids on short notice, divisions 

developed and published standing operating procedures in the form 

of operations plans. Contingency loads, assembled to support all 

quick reaction operations, were immediately available to support 

artillery raids. Particularly during the monsoon period, raids served 

the important secondary purpose of maintaining ainnobility expertise in artillery units that would otherwise remain static for 
THE HOT WAR 185 

extended periods. As troop strength decl ined. Americans were defending increasingly larger areas with fewer forces. This. in turn. 

resulted in the increased use of artillery raids as a method of 

making U.S. combat power more widely felt and denying the 

enemy the unrestricted freedom of movement he would otherwise 

have en joyed beyond the range of guns. 

Logisticians were kept busy delivering ammunition and supplies to field artillery units and providing required maintenance 

support. From the logisticians's point of view. the preferred method 

of supplying field artillery units was by truck convoy. augmented 

by helicopter delivery. Truck convoys were more economical. more 

dependable. and could move more supplies at one time than those 

helicopters normally available for resupply. The enemy situation 

and operational needs. however. dictated the manner in which 

units were supplied. Light firing batteries which moved frequently 

were often supplied entirely by helicopter. Other units which 

moved less frequently were generally supplied by helicopter on 

initially occupying a fire base. and later by truck if roads were 

available and could be cleared of mines and secured. Heavy units 

moved by road and could thus bring initial supplies with them 

and continue to be supplied by convoy thereafter. 

Supply by road in insecure areas was frequently accomplished 

every two or three days. On those days the road was swept for 

mines in advance and secured by ground forces long enough for 

the convoy to complete its run. Daily needs such as rations. water. 

and ice could then be supplied by helicopter. 

All firing batteries carried sufficient supplies and ammunition 

with them during their move to permit them to start construction 

and fire supporting missions immediately upon occupying a fire 

base. Stocks were increased or replenished in subsequent supply 

deliveries. No generalizations can be made as to the amounts and 

types of bunker and barrier material a unit would carry or receive 

later. Ammunition requirements. on the other hand. were established in written directives. Firing units were required to carry a 

basic load with them at all times. Basic loads varied somewhat 

depending on the area of operation and location of the ammunition supply point. The following basic load is representative: 

a. JOJ ·mm. Howitzer Dattery 

<I> High Explosive (HE) . . . .... . . ........ .. . . . 1.600 meters 

(2) Illumination (ILL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .520 rounds 

(5) While Phosphorus (WP) .............. . 60 rounds 

(4) Antipersonnel or "Beehive" ................. " .56 rounds 

(5) Improved Conventional Munitions (IeM) or "Firecracker" ....... . 24 rounds 
186 

b. 155- 111"'. Battery 

(I) HE 

(2) ILL 

(3) WP 

(4) ICM 

c. 8-/n ch Howitzer Ballery 

(I) HE 

(2) ICM 

FIELD ARTILLERY 

d. 4.2- 1Ilch Morlar Platoon (Irl/lmtry) 

(I) HE 

(2) ILL 

(3) WP 

. 1,200 rounds 

... .400 rounds 

. .48 rounds 

18 rounds 

.. 600 rounds 

.. 8 rounds 

. 1.200 rounds 

.. . 300 rounds 

50 rounds 

While occupying a pOSItion a firing unit was continuously supplied at a rate which allowed it to maintain a prescribed stockage 

objective. The stockage objective was established above the basic 

load and was used as an aid in ammunition supply management. 

A typical stockage objective for high explosive ammunition is as 

follows: 

AmmunWO'1 

l05- mm. 

155-mm. 

8-inch . 

4.2- inch 

Number 0/ Routlds 

. .... 2,000 

. 1,600 

.. ... 800 

. 1,600 

Maintenance support requirements varied with the type of unit 

and were satisfied in several ways. Units with towed howitzers generally ex perienced no unusual maintenance problems because the 

weapons had relatively few moving parts to malfunction. On those 

occasions when towed weapons needed to be repaired, they could 

quickly be picked up by helicopter from the fire base, brought 

to the repair facility and returned quickly when repairs were completed. Self-propelled weapons were more troublesome. They were 

more sophisticated, more likely to break down, and too heavy to 

move by helicopter. It was necessary to make arrangements to 

evacuate the equipment by road. Either a separate convoy for 

that purpose was formed or the weapon was held until it could 

be linked up with a convoy of some other unit. If the malfunction 

of the weapon was in its mobility system, additional arrangements 

were made to secure a tank retriever to tow the weapon. 

Whenever possible, maintenance contact teams were sent by 

helicopter to the fire base to attempt repairs on inoperative weapons. The teams were alerted by the unit requesting their support 

of the nature of the problem and were, therefore, able to limit 

their load to only those tools and spare parts required to make 
THE HOT WAR 187 

AMMUNITION RESUPPLY BY CH-54 on Fire Support Base 6 near Kontum. 

the repair. Still, all repairs could not be made on site, and though 

the efforts of maintenance contact teams alleviated the problem, 

they came far from solving it. 

In 1968 u.S. Army, Vietnam, recognized that user level and 

direct support maintenance was difficult to perform on site and 

was often neglected because of operational needs. As a result U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, established a repair and return program for 8-inch 

and 175-mm. units. A weapon and its crew stood down in a direct 

support maintenance facility for complete maintenance service of 

the weapon. 

Harassing and Interdiction Fires 

One topic of much discussion in Vietnam was the effects of 

harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires. These were unobserved 

fires placed on likely or suspected enemy locations or routes. Targets were most often chosen from aerial and map reconnaissance. 

Lieutenant General Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding 

General, U.S. Army, Vietnam, stated, "In my estimation, pure 

H&I fires in Vietnam environment have little, if any, value while 

doing practically no damage to the enemy. I have requested that 
188 FIELD ARTILLERY 

tactical commanders reduce their H&I fires." There were many who 

agreed with General Mildren, but there were many who did not. 

Numerous reports indicated that the Viet Cong feared the artillery 

firing at night and that this firing was inflicting damage and 

casualties. Even so, no one could deny that if not employed judiciously, harassing and interdiction fires could result in extremely 

large ammunition expenditures. 

During General Mildren's tour, the use of harassing and interdiction fires was reduced and a program of intelligence and 

interdiction (1&1) fires was instituted. Whereas targets for the 

former were often based on map reconnaissance alone, the latter 

were less arbitrary in that some type of enemy intelligence had to 

justify the firings. 

The 4th Division set the example in executing the intelligence 

and interdiction program. The largest portion of the unobserved 

fires delivered by the artillery with the 4th Division was fired on 

targets acquired by one or more intelligence means. Interdiction 

fire was used successfully in conjunction with the road security 

missions of the division. The division developed a road firing program that covered likely approaches to areas in which repeated 

mining incidents had occurred and approaches to key bridge and 

culvert crossings along Highways l4N and 19E. The fires, which 

were delivered periodically throughout the night and early morning, resulted in the reduction of mining and bridge incidents 

along these major highways. 

Intelligence and interdiction fires were effectively employed 

using the time-an-target technique. Instead of firing single rounds 

on a target over a period of time, a battery or several batteries 

would time the rounds so that all arrived on the target at the 

same time. These fires created shock and achieved maximum surpnse. 

Civic Action 

Field artillery units throughout South Vietnam supported the 

government's pacification program through a number of civic action programs. Short-term projects included food and clothing distribution, rodent and pest control, and medical assistence. Longterm projects included construction and follow-up support of 

schools, markets, hospita Is, and orphanges. 

Firing batteries normally carried out only short-term projects. 

They generally moved too frequently to do otherwise. Their 

usual contribution was in connection with the Medical Civic 

Action Program (MEDCAP). Battery aidmen supervised by the 
THE HOT WAR 189 

surgeon of the parent battal ion visited local hamlets daily to treat 

the sick and to educate local medical personnel. The seriously ill 

or injured were evacuated to civilian hospitals or, sometimes. to 

U.S. military hospitals. On one occasion the 1st Battalion, 44th 

Artillery, assisted an eight-year-old girl and her grandmother, each 

of whom had a missing leg. The two were evacuated to the German 

hospital ship Helgoland where they were fitted for artificial limbs. 

Long-term civic action projects were accomplished by the headquarters and service batteries of field artillery battalions and higher. 

Their accomplishments were impressive. The civic action project 

in Vietnam recogni7.ed as the most outstanding was Gadsden Village, accomplished by a field artillery unit- the 23d Artillery 

Group. The citizens of Gadsden, Alabama, adopted the 23d as 

their sponsored unit in Vietnam. They offered financial assistance 

to the group for any project to help the men. Instead of accepting 

the Alabama goodwill for themselves, the artillerymen decided to 

channel the aid to the homeless refugees in the Phu Loi area. 

With land donated by the Vietnamese government and the 

more than $21,000 contributed by the citizens of Gadsden, the 

artillerymen set out to help the refugees build a village. Houses 

were built with self-sufficiency in mind. There was enough space 

between the houses for a vegetable garden for each family. But 

the Redlegs did not stop with building houses. They constructed a 

six-room schoolhouse and hired trained teachers, built a community 

center building, and established a co-operative sewing center, a 

large dispensary, a soccer field, a hog-raising complex, and a water 

distribution system. Gadsden Village was exemplary of the goal of 

civic action-to hel p the people hel p themselves. 
CHAPTER VI 

Vietnamization, November 1969-February 1973 

President Richard M. Nixon, in November 1969, officially established the goal of the American effort in the Vietnam conflict 

as being that of enabling the South Vietnamese forces to assume the 

full responsibility for the security of their country. Although 

Vietnamization was a new word, the concept was neither new nor 

revolutionary but was, in fact, a return to an earlier policy-one 

that had all but disappeared in the feverish escalation from aid and 

advice to combat support to active participation. As early as the 

summer of 1967, the first tentative steps toward Vietnamization 

were being taken. Concerned about the effectiveness of Vietnamese 

Army, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces units, General Westmoreland directed that a conference be held to air views, consider 

proposals, and make recommendations through which assistance 

could be provided the Vietnamese military in order to mold it into 

an aggressive and responsible fighting force. 

Field Artillery Assistance Programs 

Senior American commanders met at Pleiku on 12 August 1967 

and, on the basis of their conclusions, the Commanding General, 

I Field Force, Vietnam, directed that the Commanding General, I 

Field Force Artillery, "establish liaison with Vietnamese units and 

... isolate problems to be alleviated through U.S. training su ppor!." I Field Force Artillery immediately assigned a liaison officer to II Corps (Vietnamese) Artillery to "provide a channel for 

the request of supporting U.S. artillery for ARVN operations in 

II CTZ." This officer was recalled when the necessary procedures 

had been established, and his duties were assumed by the artillery 

officer of II Corps Advisory Group. To provide further assistance, 

an "on-call" liaison officer from the 52d Artillery Group was designated. 

Even as this co-ordination was being established, a decentralized 

assistance program was developing. On 28 September 1967, Brigadier General William O. Quirey directed that all field force artillery battalions establish forward observer teams specifically to train 
VIETNAMIZATION 191 

Regional and Popular Forces units in the techniques of fire adjustment. Further, battalions were to provide any assistance necessary to assist Vietnamese artillery units to achieve maximum technical proficiency. This guidance, however, proved to be too general. 

Field force battalions provided only sporadic aid in the II Corps 

area, and effectiveness depended on the willingness of the Vietnamese participants in the program and the ability of the U.S. 

units to do the job. 

Meanwhile, I Field Force Artillery had initiated a four-month 

study of Vietnamese Army artillery operations in order to evaluate 

the effectiveness of their support. Total assets in II Corps were 

103 105-mm. howitzers and 41 155-mm. howitzers. Of these, 6 

155-mm. and 15 105-mm. tubes were committed to support training centers, 6 155-mm. and 13 105-mm. tubes were located at Duc 

My in support of the South Vietnamese Army Artillery Center 

and School, and 2 105-mm. pieces were situated in Da Lat in 

support of the South Vietnamese Military Academy. Although all 

school support weapons had the secondary mission of supporting 

the Duc My complex and Da Lat city, their primary function of 

school support prevented their effective utilization in support of 

operations. In addition 18 10S-mm. pieces were positioned in platoons at Special Forces and Civilian (rregular Defense Group 

camps. The remaining guns-55 105-mm. and 30 I 55-mm. pieces 

- had primary responsibility for supporting Army and Regional 

and Popular Forces maneuver elements. Because this artillery also 

had to provide fire support for road security and the various 

political headquarters throughout II Corps, platoon and splitbattery configurations were the prevalent formations employed. The 

size of II Corps Tactical Zone, some 30,000 square miles, and 

the magnitude of the mission proved the artillery incapable of 

providing even marginal fire support to maneuver forces during 

offensive operations. 

The study examined ten long-term operations and seventy-two 

short-term operations. Long-term operations were defined as those 

performed within the framework of the normal mission of the 

maneuver force and short-term operations as those in response to 

specific and immediate needs such as those based on special intelligence. Findings showed that artillery supported slightly less than 

half of the short-term operations. Of those operations which were 

listed as being supported by artillery, each maneuver battalion was 

shown to have received artillery support which averaged slightly 

more than one platoon (two guns). The average support was less 

than one platoon of artillery per battalion when all short-term 

operations were taken into consideration. The study also showed 
192 FIELD ARTILLERY 

that although South Vietnamese Army artillery units were 

thoroughly grounded in the [undamentals o[ gunnery, they were 

severely hampered by poor maintenance practices, slipshod repair 

parts support, and inadequate communications equipment. Further 

problem areas were encountered in the meteorological support and 

survey capabilities of the Vietnamese. Based on this study, specific 

programs were initiated to upgrade the ability of Vietnamese 

artillery to support maneuver forces in the field. This aid was 

aimed at increasing the responsiveness of the firing units in an· 

swering calls for fire and the ability of the ground soldier to re· 

quest and adjust fire. Because the mission o[ Vietnamese batteries 

continued to be security of roads and strategic installations, no 

attempts were made to increase the fire·massing ca pacity of these 

units. 

To remedy the problems exposed by the study, American artil· 

lery units in early 1968 initiated four assistance programs. Task 

Force DAr BAC I (Cannon I) was formed by the 1st Battalion, 92d 

Artillery, to assist Vietnamese artillery units in the Kontum area. 

This program was short·term, lasting only 23-27 February 1968. 

Its primary mission was to ascertain the condition of the Vietnam· 

ese weapons and to demonstrate the responsiveness of Vietnamese 

and U.S. artillery to calls [or fire from Vietnamese, Regional and 

Popular Forces, and U.S. units in the Kontum area. To accomplish 

this mission, the 92d Artillery established a fire direction center, 

collocated with the Vietnamese 221st Artillery Battalion at 

Kontum, that could control all artill ery fire in the area. The objec· 

tive was to creale a working Vietnamese fire direction center. Another team with interests in logistics and mailllenance was to 

examine and correct hardware deficiencies. Additional teams were 

designated to assist in firing battery operations, communications, 

and survey. Because of the short duration of the program, specific 

objectives were established for each day to insure that all areas were 

examined and upgraded. The program revealed that significant 

shortcomings in fire direction procedures were caused primarily by 

a lack of logistical support and by poor understanding of sophisti· 

cated gunnery procedures. Firing battery deficiencies were closely 

tied to logistical or maintenance support. Tubes ranged in age from 

thirteen to twenty·seven years and averaged 10,000 rounds per 

tube. The task force provided the necessary logistical support to 

upgrade the weapons and instructed Vietnamese in advanced fire 

direction procedures. The task force also pointed out that the reo 

maining problem areas were founded in the weak Vietnamese 

logistical system and recommended that artillery advisers spend 

more time with their units and actively establish liaison with 
VIETNAMIZATION 193 

neighboring American units so that assistance could be made more 

readily available. 

At the same time that Task Force DAr BAc I was being established, another program began to provide assistance to Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Special Forces artillery platoons. 

Responsibility for the program was given to the major artillery 

commands in II Corps. These commands provided technical assistance to th e Civil ian Irregular artillery platoons. Classes were conducted in fire direction, firing battery operations, and maintenance. 

Initial success resulted in the continuation of the program on a 

regular basis. 

Perhaps the most important of the four projects was the I Field 

Force and Army of the Republic of Vietnam Associate Battery 

Program, which commenced on 14 March 1968. The idea behind 

the program was to augment the existing advisory effort, improve 

the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces, and open channels for better 

co-ordination of fire support and mutual understanding. Under this 

concept, U.S. artillery units sponsored selected Vietnamese battalions in their locale and provided them with a responsive American headquarters from which to request technical, maintenance, 

and training assistance. 

Finally, I Field Force Artillery developed a program of instruction to train Vietnamese artillerymen in the use of antipersonnel 

(Beehive) ammunition in preparation for the time when Vietnamese firing units would be issued the special rounds. This program, 

however, never became functional because the Vietnamese Joint 

General Staff had not authorized their units to draw and employ 

the ammunition. 

The initial success of these programs, coupled with the disastrous defeat suffered by the Communist forces during their ill-fated 

Tet offensive earlier in the year, allowed the embryonic Vietnamization program to grow. During the fall of 1968 military leaders in 

Vietnam studied after-action reports, intelligence estimates, and 

staff studies pertinent to the Tet campaign and its immediate aftermath. From these evaluations a parallel course-one that would 

merge with President Nixon's some eight months later-began to 

germinate. On the basis of an over-all evaluation of the Army of 

the Republic of Vietnam, it became evident to these leaders that if 

Vietnamese forces were eventually to assume the burden of the 

ground war, a test of their ability to operate semi-independently 

would be necessary_ The stress on semi-independence rather than 

complete autonomy was in recognition of the inherent weakness of 

these forces in fire support and air assets. To this end, a suitable 

testing ground had to be found. The area had to be secure enough 
194 FIELD ARTILLERY 

to allow for unhampered transfer of forces before Vietnamese units 

became actively engaged but at the same time had to have potentially significant enemy activity to provide the Vietnamese with a 

viable test. Further, the testing ground had to be in an area of 

minimal danger to the pacification program. An ideal area was 

found in northern Kontum Province, with its sparse population, 

potential enemy threat from Laos and Cambodia, and relative 

isolation from the psychologically important population centers of 

the country. 

Preliminary disclissions between American and Vietnamese 

leaders began in late 1968, and a verbal agreement was reached in 

January 1969 between Lieutenant General William R. Peers, Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, and Major General Lu 

Mong Lan, Commander, II Corps. However, this agreement was 

not written, and the designated Vietnamese force, the 42d Regiment, and its command headquarters, the 24th Special Tactical 

Zone, failed to assume responsibility for the area by I February 

1969, as had been agreed. Further, negotiations were hampered by 

the natural confusion of a change of command at I Field Force, 

Vietnam, and it was not until 12 April 1969 that General Lu Lan 

indicated general agreement with a new proposal. A draft memorandum of agreement was drawn up and signed by American and 

Vietnamese officials on 24 April 1969. On the same day the exchange of forces neared completion and the Army of the Republic 

of Vietnam assumed responsibility for northern Kontum Province. 

In deference to the weakness of Vietnamese arti ll ery (six 105-

mm. howitzers and six 155-mm. howitzers) the agreement specifically provided that the 4th Infantry Division Artillery units would 

assume effective artillery coverage of National Highway 14, the 

major north-south artery in the highlands, and that the Commanding General, I Field Force Artillery, would provide general support 

artillery as required; support operations within the 24th Special 

Tactical Zone with a minimum of two light or medium artillery 

batteries; and maintain the fire support co-ordination center to coordinate all fire support means available, including operation of 

air advisory stations. 

I Field Force assigned the mission of providing the specified 

support to the 52d Artillery Group headquarters in Pleiku. The 

52d immediately provided six light, twelve medium, and five heavy 

artillery pieces to the 24th Special Tactical Zone to augment organic Vietnamese batteries. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 

a 4th Division Artillery unit, provided road coverage. Automatic 

weapons were allocated from Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (Automatic Weapons). With the assumption o( responsibility 
VIETNAMIZATION 195 

for northern Kontum Province by the 24th Special Tactical Zone, 

the first major Vietnamese ground operation began. Dubbed DAN 

QUYEN by the Vietnamese, it grew out of special agent reports 

indicating a major buildup of enemy units southwest of the Ben 

Het Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp, which sat precariously 

at the convergence of the Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese 

borders. 

In order to head off Communist plans to execute a strong 

offensive effort in the highlands, the 24th Special Tactical Zone was 

tasked to conduct operations to spoil Communist plans, protect Ben 

Het, and compel enemy forces to retire to their Cambodian sanctuaries. The operation was conducted in three phases: Phase I (5-

15 May) involved forces of three Vietnamese and two mobile 

strike force battalions screening the tri-border area west of Ben 

Het; Phase II (16 May-3 June), based on intelligence produced 

during the initial phase, was a six-battalion (plus) offensive operation conducted southeast of Ben Het and targeted against elements 

of the North Vietnamese 66th Infantry, 28th Infantry, and 40th 

Artillery Regiments; and Phase III (3-5 June) consisted primarily 

of bomb damage assessments by multibattalion Vietnamese forces 

and the establishment of a defensive screen around the Dak To, 

Tan Canh, and Ben Het areas. By operation's end the South Vietnamese had succeeded in mauling the Communist forces and establishing a favorable 7-to-l kill ratio. In support of the operation, the 

52d Artillery Group provided 29 tubes of artillery-12 IOS-mm. 

howitzers, 12 IS5-mm. howitzers, I 8-incll howitzer, and 4 17S-mm. 

guns--and assigned the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, to establish 

the forward command post for U.S. support forces. This command 

post was later expanded into a fire support co-ordination center for 

all American artillery in the area. From their own assets, Vietnamese forces utilized 8 155-mm. and 6 10S-mm. howitzers in support 

of the operation. A total of 73,016 rounds was expended by friendly 

firing units. Enemy soldiers captured during the campaign expressed a fear of first-round volley fire employed by both South 

Vietnamese and U.S. units in the fonn of random time-on-target 

missions. 

Although the operation, was deemed a success, a number of 

weaknesses became apparent. The magnitude and complexity of 

co-ordinating, integrating, and controlling available fire support 

means virtually overwhelmed the 24th Zone staff at the Dak To 

tactical operations center. Some of the blame for this failure was 

attributable to an inexperienced staff and the inadequate manning 

structure of the headquarters, but specific shortcomings were apparent as well. When the 92d Artillery established the U.S. fire 
196 FIELD ARTILLERY 

support co·ordination center at Dak To, South Vietnamese com· 

manders were encouraged to send representatives, but only one did 

so. Fire support activities thus were not properly co·ordinated, so 

flexibility was lost, resources were wasted, efforts were duplicated, 

and frequently targets were not attacked with the appropriate 

means at the proper time. This problem originated with the failure 

of the force commanders in organizing for combat to understand or 

appreciate the need to integrate closely maneuver plans and fire 

support plans and to collocate the tactical operations and fire sup· 

port co·ordination centers. The problem was finally rectified two 

weeks after the operation started when the commander of the 1st 

Battalion, 92d Artillery, was tasked to establish an integrated fire 

support co-ordination center. This agency quickly matured into an 

effective organization capable of providing timely and accurate fire 

support. 

Additional problems were encountered in fire clearances, coordination of fire support assets at company level, and requests for 

and adjustment of artillery fire. It became apparent that these 

deficiencies were a result of the dependence of the South Vietnam· 

ese commanders on American advisers. These weaknesses were not 

corrected satisfactorily and it was clear that additional stress in 

training would be required to upgrade the fire support coordination ability of Vietnamese units. 

Despite the weaknesses noted during the campaign, the per· 

formance of the Vietnamese forces proved that they could plan and 

successfully execute semi· independent ground operations against 

Communist main force units. The significance of this fact would 

not be apparent for another five months, when the policy of Viet· 

namization became the stated objective of the American command 

in Vietnam. 

By 1968, Military Assistance Command had submitted its plans 

for Phase II of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improve· 

ment and Modernization Plan. Phase II planning was based on 

assumptions that North Vietnamese intervention would increase 

and that the missions of the allied forces would remain substantially 

unchanged from those that had been stated for fiscal year 1968; that 

is, U.S. and allied forces were assigned to destroy Viet Cong and 

North Vietnamese Army forces and base areas, and South Vietnam· 

ese Army and Regional and Popular Forces units were to support 

the pacification program. Because of these assumptions, the im· 

provement plan was rather methodical and cautious. The proposal 

was submitted to the Secretary of Defense, who disapproved and 

returned it to the Saigon planners for substantial revision. In early 

1969 the plan was resubmitted as Phase lIa, which assumed the 
VIETNAMIZATION 197 

same basic premises as those of the initial Phase II plan but substantially increased the speed and scope of the modernization. On 

28 April 1969, the Deputy Secretary of Defense gave final approval 

of the Military Assistance Command program as modified by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and in his approv ing memo stated : "Vietnamizing the war should have the highest priority. Providing 

needed equipment for the RVNAF is therefore of greatest importance. To assure that equipment turned over to the RVNAF can 

be used effectively, it must be supported by (I ) training and (2) 

logistic support." 

Phase IIa of the Improvement and Modernization Plan recognized that major shortfalls existed in the fire power capabilities of 

the Vietnamese forces, and a substantial portion of the plan was 

devoted to rectifying this weakness. The equipment ceilings established by the plan were intended to increase substantiall y the 

artill ery capability of the Vietnamese. These proposed figures were 

further modified when Presidents Nixon and Thieu met at Midway 

in June 1969. President Thieu presented the requirements as seen 

by the Vietnamese to President Nixon, who in turn gave them to 

General Abrams for study, comment, and possible inclusion in the 

program. One of the requirements, as seen by the Vietnamese, was 

heavy artill ery in the form of four 8-inch field artillery battalions. 

After this proposal was scrutinized by Military Assistance Command, only portions of requests were approved. Three additional 

battalions of artillery, two 10S-mm. and one ISS-mm., were added 

to the fiscal year 1970 activation schedule. By the end of 1969, the 

artillery improvement plan had undergone a number of revisions 

but delivery of field artill ery weapons was being accomplished 

smoothly and ahead of schedule. 

EQUIPMENT DELIVERY STATUS, 1969 

I'ha~ I Phase II Appro\'cd MACV Total 

Accclcntcd Fisal Yea r MIdway Revised Shiproal item Fisca l Year 1970 Fiscal Year NO\'cmber o " 196" 1970 1970 December 1969 

HowilZer, 

I05-mm. 

MIOIAI .. 602 776 73 1 731 730 

Howillcr. 

I05-mm. 

MI02 60 6 1 0 60 60 

Howitzer, 

155- mm. 

MII4AI .. 701 274 290 289 294 
198 FIELD ARTILLERY 

At the same time the master plan for Vietnamization was taking 

shape, the required training base to prepare the South Vietnamese 

Army to assume a more proportionate share of the action immediately and the entire combat role in the future was receiving careful consideration from the appropriate American commands 

throughout the country. I Field Force Artillery, which had a substantial jump on the other headquarters in the establishment of a 

training assistance program for Vietnamese forces, reviewed its 

existing programs, found them to be valid, and, on the basis of 

additional studies, added two plans through which it intended to 

improve the capabilities of Regional Forces and Popular Forces 

units to ca ll for and adjust artillery fire in defense of their positions 

and in support of their operations. In addition, basic fire planning 

was taught to the Regional Forces so they could support their own 

operations. Based on this program, a comprehensive defensive target list was developed throughout II Corps and, if a target fell 

within range of an artillery unit, fire was adjusted onto it. This 

program increased hamlet and village security. Before the initiation 

of the plan, only 684 of the existing 4,208 defensive targets planned 

at various times during the war had been fired on. By August 

1969, with the emphasis applied by I Field Force Artillery, each of 

the 52 districts in II Corps had a fire plan, 5,869 targets had been 

developed, and 32 percent of the targets had been fired in. The 

effectiveness of the program was demonstrated during the week of 

II August 1969, when eight friendly hamlets drove off Viet Cong 

attacks by simply ca lling for previously fired-in defensive targets. 

In III Corps Tactical Zone, II Field Force Artillery was also 

examining the Vietnamization of artillery support. Until the summer of 1969, assistance to Vietnamese artillery had been limited to 

small contact teams concerned primarily with assisting the Vietnamese to solve maintenance and logistics problems by making 

American supply channels available for immediate, pressing needs. 

However, during the summer of 1969, through the efforts of the 

commanders of II Field Force Artillery and III Corps Artillery, the 

need for a co-ordinated assistance program was examined. Such a 

program would complement the II Field Force and III Corps 

Operation DONG TIEN (forward together). A combined working 

committee was formed to develop a plan for the program, define its 

concepts, and establish policies and procedures for co-ordinating 

all mutual support projects, which would increase the capabilities 

and effectiveness of the combined artill ery team in III Corps. The 

objectives of the program, as seen by the committee, were to improve co·ordination and mutual understanding between allied artillery units; to improve fire support effectiveness by combining 
VIETNAMIZATION 199 

planning and co-ordination of fire support, standardizing techniques, and improving quality of training; and to increase artillery 

firing capabilities. 

To accomplish the program objectives, the planning committee 

developed nine mutual support projects: 

Project I: Exchange visits of battery personnel 

Project 2: Combined fire support co-ordination centers 

Project 3: Procedures and co-ordination requirements for 

planning combined fire support 

Project 4: Standardized operationa l readiness evaluations 

Project 5: Combined unit refresher training program 

Project 6: Standardization of tube calibration procedures 

Project 7: Standardization of registration policy 

Project 8: Combined use of meteorological data 

Project 9: Combined survey control plan 

The proposed projects were translated into concrete programs 

and initiated in a low key through the associate battery concept. 

Key personnel from both U.S. and Vietnamese units visited their 

"sister" batteries to gain a better understanding of each other's 

problems, observe battery operations, and exchange views. This 

exchange of ideas led naturally to the establishment of the standardized operational readiness evaluations (ORE's) as outlined in 

Project 4. A denotative checklist was developed to measure the 

effectiveness of artillery units. The checklist was particularly effective because it matched performance against an established 

standard rather than against another unit, minimizing the threat 

of embarrassment or loss of face- an important consideration with 

the Vietnamese. To prepare units for operational readiness evaluations, unit refresher training was initiated. Mobile training 

teams were created and dispatched to isolated areas to give instruction. Classes were kept small so that thorough instruction could 

be given to key personnel and specialists, and on-the-job training 

was conducted whenever possible. 

In order to standardize procedures and improve the accuracy 

of Vietnamese artillery fires, the committee developed a plan to 

insure that all weapons were calibrated annually. Second, a standardized registration policy was adopted throughout III Corps 

and emphasis placed on persuading Vietnamese units to accept 

American registration practices. 

To refine artillery accuracy further, teams provided assistance 

to Vietnamese units to develop the capability to use meteorological data. All U.S. meteorological stations in III Corps began to 

conduct dual-language broadcasts four times daily in order to provide Vietnamese artillery units with the requisite data. Finally, a 
200 FIELD ARTILLERY 

combined effort was initiated to extend survey control to all artillery units in II I Corps. 

By May 1970, the DONG TIEN Program was well under way 

and had scored a number of successes. Over 88 percent of the 

howitzers employed by Vietnamese artillery in III Corps were calibrated; survey was brought in to 67 of 122 Vietnamese firing 

positions, an increase of 55 percent in six months; meteorological 

data were received and employed by the majority of the Vietnamese 

units; and a substaluial number of the Vietnamese arti llery units 

were employing American registration techniques. 

·With the refinement and improvement of Vietnamese fire support, the necessity to control these fires became apparent. Combined fire support co-ordination centers were created in various 

provinces throughout III Corps. These centers included Vietnamese, U.S. and Free World forces artillery representatives, U.S. 

Air Force representatives, and, where necessary, U.S. Navy personnel. In addition to planning fire support and clearing fires, they 

provided a readily accessible means for the interchange of fire 

requests between Vietnamese and American units. These agencies 

significantly increased mutual support and reduced primary reliance 

on U.S. artillery. 

In addition to DONG TIEN, three other significant programs 

were initiated. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group Artillery 

School was opened at Trang Sup on I September 1969. It was 

created to train ClOG artillerymen to assume the fire support of 

seven Special Forces camps. The school was staffed and operated 

by the 23d Artillery Group, which designed a compact but thorough 

ten-week course. The school conducted three sessions during which 

186 Civilian Irregular artillerymen were trained and deployed to 

designated camps. With the irregulars assuming artillery duties at 

these outposts, Vietnamese Army artillerymen were relieved to 

return to their regular force structures. In September 1969, III 

Corps Artillery began training a Vietnamese Army artillery battery 

in air movement techniques and jungle operations. Training was 

completed in December 1969, and the battery assumed direct 

support of the 3d Mobile Strike Force, a mission that had been 

the responsibility of the U.S. Jungle Battery, a composite battery 

of three 105-mm. and three 155-mm. howitzers. This III Corps 

training program enabled six guns to be returned to force artillery assets. Finally, the Fire Direction Officer's School, conducted 

by Field Force Artillery for its own officers, was made available to 

Vietnamese personnel. This week-long course assisted in standardizing artillery procedures in III Corps by providing comprehensive 

instruction in the latest gunnery techniques employed by U.S. 
VIETNAMIZATION 201 

artillery. By May of 1970, 56 Vietnamese officers had been graduated from this school. 

At about the same time, considerations for Vietnamization were 

being examined in Military Region I. With the impending redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, the Vietnamese role would 

increase significantly. From November 1969 until 9 March 1970, 

the primary exchange of ideas and programs took place between 

XXIV Corps Artillery and Vietnamese 1st Division Artillery because, until its redeployment in March 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the principal American headquarters in the northern 

provinces. This interplay between the Americans and Vietnamese 

consisted of decentralized programs initiated at all levels through 

personal contact and co-ordination established by the U.S. commanders. 

In early 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery, in anticipation of the 

impending departure of the Marines, began to study the feasibility 

of a more intensive and central ized Vietnamization program. A 

XXIV Corps regulation was prepared by corps artillery to outline 

the minimum requirements for insuring effective co-ordination 

of U.S. and Vietnamese fires. The regulation also included provisions for establishing liaison between supporting artillery elements 

and territorial force headquarters down to subsector level. At the 

same time, work was initiated to revamp the artillery and air strike 

warning system since, at the time, a dual system existed within 

the Vietnamese and U.S. chains of command. As American withdrawals continued, inordinate difficulties might be experienced by 

both U.S. and Vietnamese pilots unless the system was effectively 

Vietnamized. After careful study, the collocation of the respective 

warning agencies was adopted at the most practical solution---{)ne 

that would allow for the most orderly eventual transfer of responsibility to the Vietnamese when U.S. strength in Military Region I 

no longer justified the combined effort. 

During March 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery initiated an artillery instructor training program in support of the Vietnamese 

artillery refresher training project. Representatives of all artillery 

battalions in the Vietnamese 1st Division and the Quan Da Special 

Zone underwent three weeks of instruction to prepare them to 

conduct training in their own organizations. Separate courses were 

presented in fire direction procedures, firing battery operations, 

and maintenance. Upon completion of the instructor training 

phase, each battalion formed a mobile training team which was 

augmented by one U.S. officer and one U.S. noncommissioned 

officer. These teams then moved to the field to conduct refresher 

training at battery locations. Early indications were that the pro-
202 FIELD ARTILLERY 

gram was successful and that the proficiency of the firing units 

was clearly improved. 

One month later a team of officers from XXIV Corps Artillery 

and I Corps Artillery (Vietnamese) cond ucted a survey to determine the proficiency of Regional Forces and Popular Forces 

personnel in artillery adjustment procedures and the desirability 

of conducting training in the subject. The team interviewed Vietnamese officials and U.S. advisers in all five provinces; all agreed 

on the necessity for forward observer training and agreed to support a combined U.S. and Vietnamese program to provide such 

training. Two programs were instituted, one for Regional Forces 

and one for Popular Forces. XXIV Corps directed that the 23d 

Infantry (Americal) Division incorporate the Regional Forces 

training into its Regional Forces and Popular Forces leadership and 

orienlaLion course. The goa l of the course W;::IS to train observers 

from sector headquarters (1 each), subsector headquarters (I each), 

battalion headquarters (2 each), company group headquarters (2 

each), and company (3 each). 

The first class started on 10 June 1970, and 889 Regional 

Forces officers were scheduled to undergo training. 

Training for the Popular Forces was assigned to I Corps Artillery, which designed a comprehensive three-day course stressing 

basic essentials and live firing. A total of 3,138 Popular Forces 

leaders was scheduled to learn adjustment procedures in an eightweek period beginning 15 June 1970. 

Further, agencies responsible for existing programs that had 

been established to support American units were directed to shift 

their emphasis to Vietnamese artillery batteries. In February 1970, 

the corps artillery firing battery inspection team began providing 

technica l assistance to Vietnamese units. Detailed technical checks 

of fire direction procedures, firing battery operations, maintenance, 

and safety were made at each battery visited. On-the-spot critiques 

were given during the inspections and formal reports were submitted to I Corps Artillery. Logistical support was limited primarily to technical assistance and emergency aid to insure that 

the Vietnamese suppl y system was exercised. Whenever emergency 

assistance was given in the form of supplies or repair parts, one of 

the contingencies under wh ich it was granted was that the Vietnamese unit initiate parallel supply action in its logistics channels to insure that the demand was recorded. 

Even as these programs were being initiated, Military Assistance 

Command was finalizing the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Improvement and Modernization Plan for fiscal year 1971. An 

analysis of Vietnamese combat capabil ity conducted as part of this 
VIETNAMIZATION 203 

FORMAL FIRE DIRECTION CENTER CLASS FOR ARVN FIELD ARTILLERYMEN 

plan revealed that a primary shortfall existed in artillery. The 

study projected weaknesses in fire power for the coming three 

fiscal years in the following areas: medium. heavy. and long-range 

artillery for 1971; medium and heavy artillery for 1972; and medium artillery for 1973. 

In addition. the rapid expansion of Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces cut drastically into their experienced manpower 

pool and. in turn. diluted the leadership and technical base of 

newly created artillery units. To offset this problem Military Assistance Command emphasized the improvement of instruction at 

the Vietnamese Artillery School and approved its expansion. During 1970 the Artillery School enrolled 2.327 students. well above 

the 1.715 initially planned for the year. Instruction was improved. 

New programs were prepared for the survey officer course and the 

survey instructor course. A copy of the program [or the U.S. artillery advanced course was obtained from Fort Sill. edited to 

emphasize essential portions. and provided to the director of instruction for updating the battalion commanders course. Several 

new gun emplacements with concrete ammunition and personnel 

bunkers were built in the school demonstration area. 

In June 1970 the most significant training improvement occurred 

when the school began to co-ordinate service practice. fire direction. 
204 FIELD ARTILLERY 

and gun crew training during live fire exercises. This arrangement 

saved ammunition and training time and released support troop gun 

crews to perform maintenance. Their training improved noticeably 

after the commandant directed that classes be inspected daily and 

written reports submitted. 

In consonance with the American Vietnamization plan, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Artillery Command implemented 

a new training program entitled the Reorganization Technique 

Plan. The program was to operate in an eleven-month time frame 

and was to raise the technical proficiency level of all Vietnamese artillery units. During Phase I, January and February 1970, the Artillery Command developed the concepts and disseminated instructions 

and lesson plans to the artillery units, which in turn formed mobile 

instruction teams. In Phase II, March 1970, the various division 

artillery and corps artillery headquarters consolidated the mobile 

training teams, issued instructions, and conducted instructor train· 

ing. In Phase III, April-November 1970, two-week training programs were presented at all firing positions and a proficiency test 

was administered. To insure the adequacy of the training, the corps 

or division artillery headquarters administered a unit test thirty 

days after the mobile training teams had completed the training 

and individual testing of all firing elements. 

Once Military Assistance Command had established the added 

emphasis necessary to create a strong training base, it examined 

the problems of the projected artillery shortfalls. It became apparent 

that the fragmented positioning of artill ery, as practiced by South 

Vietnamese Army units to secure lines of communication and stra· 

tegic centers of population, detracted from the artillery's support of 

offensive operations. Even with the activation of new artillery battalions, the ratio of tubes to maneuver battalions did not increase 

significantly. Further, the requirement to man artillery platoons in 

static locations cut into the manpower pool of Vietnamese forces 

and created difficulties during new unit activations. To offset this 

weakness, Military Assistance Command approved the addition of 

176 two-gun fire support platoons to replace Vietnamese artillery in 

fixed sites. Each platoon was authorized 29 spaces to be provided 

from Regional Forces assets. By year's end 100 of the 176 platoons 

were activated, and of these 53 were deployed throughout Vietnam. 

Training of the territorial artillerymen varied from military region 

to military region. In Military Region I, contingency plans, which 

had been formulated by XXIV Corps Artillery to train these forces, 

were activated. In Military Region II, training was accomplished at 

the Artillery School and the Vietnamese division training centers; 

II Field Force Artillery reoriented the Civilian Irregular Defense 
VIETNAMIZATION 205 

Group Artillery School to prepare territorial forces to assume the 

artillery mission. In Military Region IV, the Vietnamese Corps Artillery established a training center for the Regional Forces artillerymen. With at least part of the light artillery problem solved, 

planners in Saigon attacked the Vietnamese long-range fire power 

weakness. After thorough investigation, Project ENHANCE was 

promulgated. This plan authorized the activation and deployment 

of five 175-mm. gun battalions. Three of these battalions were scheduled for deployment in Mil itary Region I. The remaining two 

battalions were projected for Regions II and III. Two battalions 

were to be trained, equipped, and deployed along the demilitarized 

zone in 1971 to replace withdrawing American units. 

Operations 1"to Cambodia 

Although commanders throughout Vietnam were placing primary emphasis on Vietnamization and the structure of the program 

was taking shape, the American effort and the ability of Vietnamese 

forces to absorb it had not had a significant test. The vehicle through 

which the Vietnamese fighting potential could be tested and its 

progress more reliably gauged was rapidly approaching in the 

spring of 1970. 

The sanctuaries and base areas established by the Communist 

forces along the South Vietnam-Cambodia boundary had long 

been a frustrating irritant to both American and Vietnamese military leaders. (MIIP 20) Although the occupation of these areas by 

the North Vietnamese was a flagrant violation of Cambodian neutral ity, the position taken by Prince Sihanouk and his government 

made it impossible to conduct operations across the border in an 

effort to deny the enemy the free use of these sanctuaries. Sihanouk's 

neutrality was flexible, ranging from open hostility toward South 

Vietnam and her allies to a more agreeable tolerance of the North 

Vietnamese and the Viet Congo Over the years, this tolerance permitted the establishment and maintenance of these base areas. 

In the spring of 1970 the political atmosphere in Cambodia 

changed drastically and erupted into violence, which culminated in 

the overthrow of the Sihanouk regime. With the formation of the 

Lon Nol administration, the attitude of the Cambodian government 

changed completely; its hostility was directed away from the South 

Vietnamese and against the Communists. This reversal of position 

made possible the subsequent incursions into Cambodia. 

Intelligence reports had been indicating a massive logistics 

buildup in the Cambodian sanctuaries in the Military Region III 

area for some time. Evidence was strong that the Communists were 
206 FIELD ARTILLERY 

ARVN 155·MM. HOWITZER STATIC POSITION 

planning a major offensive-possibly similar in intensity to the 1968 

Tel offensive. In addition, military intelligence had pinpointed the 

location oE the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), the rna· 

jor North Vietnamese headquarters for South Vietnam, in the "Fish 

Hook" region oE Cambodia. The intent of the Cambodian incursion 

was to forestall an enemy offensive, despoil the sanctuaries, and, if 

possible, capture the Central Office. At the same time, the achieve· 

ment of these objectives would so disrupt Communist plans and 

capabilities that the Vietnamization program would greatly benefit 

from the added time gained. 

South Vietnamese operations into Cambodia commenced on 14 

April 1970 with several limited penetrations into the "Angel's 

Wing" area. These penetrations were followed by a major Vietnamese thrust launched on 29 April 1970. Operation TOAN THANC 

42 (Rock Crusher) was initiated by the Vietnamese III Corps attacking with three task forces into the Angel's Wing area and then 

south into the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia. (Map 21) Each 

task force was supported by one battery of mixed 105-mm. howitzers 

and augmented by U.S. self-propelled medium artillery as needed. 

II Field Force Artillery supported the attack with six batteries of 

medium and heavy artillery, intially deployed to the north and east 
VIETNAMIZATION 207 

ARVN 1030 FIELD ARTILLERY BATIALlON IN TRAINING 

of the area of operations in order to provide maximum support for 

the maneuver units. Liaison to further insure timely support was 

established with all Vietnamese task forces, III Corps, and IV Corps. 

All U.S. artillery fires in TOAN THANG 42 were co-ordinated and 

controlled by a forward element of the 23d Artillery Group, which 

was collocated with the Vietnamese III Corps tactical operations 

center at Go Dau Ha and later at Tay N inh. During the latter 

phases of this operation, two medium and two heavy batteries displaced into Cambodia to keep pace with the rapidly moving Vietnamese forces. These batteries provided close and continuous 

support to the maneuver elements but were not allowed to displace 

west of Svay Rieng, the westernmost limit of the politically imposed 

U.S. operational boundary. As the operation progressed, two of the 

task forces turned north to Prey Vang and the Chup Plantation. 

On 27 April 1970, the 1st Cavalry Division was given the mission 

of planning and executing a campaign to eliminate the North Vietnamese base areas in the Fish Hook region of Cambodia adjacent to 

Military Region III. (Map 22) To accomplish this mission, elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Vietnamese 

1 st Airborne Division were placed under the operational control of 

the 1st Cavalry Division. Task Force SHOEMAKER was formed to 

carry out the attack. 
Trab'k 

MAP 20 

Svay 

Rllnt 

U ''''U I 

--""- - ... \ .............. --

WAR ZONE c 
) 

::;jii:';;'H::-:- ... ~~ ...... __ ( ___ , '"0' CO, 

ENEMY BASE AREAS 

o 

I 

o 

'0 ZO "" lU 

I~ " I~"ILO EUII~ 

No", Afl LocofiDn. AndS"'$ 018'1$" At. Appr(ll,,,,,,t. 
210 FIELD ARTILLERY 

III ARVN CORPS OPERATIONS 

not to scole 

Trobek 

MAP 21 

The maneuver plan was simple and direct. The 3d Brigade of 

the Vietnamese 1st Airborne Division would occupy blocking positions north of the objective area, and elements of the 1st Cavalry 

Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would make a 

four-pronged attack from the south. Artillery would be provided 

from all the elements involved in the attack, and additional fire 

support would come from II Field Force Artillery units. 

The fire support available was formidable and included the 

largest concentration of artillery, tactical air strikes, and B-52 
VIETNAMIZATION 

lU CAVALRY DIVISION OPERATIONS 

MAY - JUNE 1970 

'--'--+I~,r+", ,,-'-' ~, -ll---~_-i~ loIilU 

, ALL POIITIONS ""PAOUIUT( 

...--'\ " "', ...... ~ '- ~ '. '" 

MAP 22 

211 

strikes committed in support of an operation of this size by the Free 

World Military Assistance Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. The 

fire support co·ordination planning required to support the operation was extremely complex and detailed. Initially, targeting information was limited; however, after the operation was approved, 

additional information became increasingly available from II Field 

Force and Military Assistance Command sources. The bulk of the 

fire planning was conducted during 27-29 April 1970. After the 

basic fire support annex and artillery fire support appendix were 

prepared, detailed co-ordination of fires with other fire support 

assets was conducted. Care was taken to insure that the various fire 

supports did not interfere with each other, times on target were adjusted to insure flight safety for ordnance-carrying aircraft, and definitive air corridors were established. The annex and appendix 

with target lists and overlays were distributed on 29 April for the 

D-day H-hour fires and on 30 April for the planned fires in support 

of subsequent phases of the operation. 

Ninety-four cannon artillery pieces were positioned to support 

the initial phases of the attack: thirty-six 105-mm. howitzers, fortyeight 155-mm. howitzers, four 8-inch howitzers, and six l75-mm. 

guns. The initial positioning of artillery took place during the period 29 April-l May 1970. By 30 April (D minus 1), the II Field 
212 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Force heavy and medium artillery, the direct support artillery for 

the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and one Vietnamese airborne 

artillery direct support battery were in position and prepared to 

support the operation. 

At 0600 on I May, D-day, an extensive 390-minute planned 

artillery and air preparation was initiated. Beginning with the 0600 

preparation fires, in support of elements of the 1st Airborne Division, until the end of the preparation at 1245, a total of 2,436 artillery rounds was fired. These fires were effectively integrated with 

48 tactical airstrikes to complete the D-day preparations. Throughout the morning tactical air and cannon and aerial field artillery 

were simultaneously employed in the attack on multiple target 

complexes. The total fire support delivered for D-day operations 

included 185 tactical air sorties, 36 arc light missions, and 5,460 

artillery rounds. 

During the period 2- 5 May, the detailed fire support planning 

paid handsome dividends as many lucrative targets were engaged. 

The heavy concentration of cannon artillery and flexible fire support co-ordination allowed fires to be massed again and again with 

relative ease. Artillery moves to support advancing friendly (orces 

began on 2 May and were subsequently made whenever necessary to 

insure continuous artillery coverage. II Field Force Artillery units 

alone moved 198 times during the sixty-day operation to maintain 

pace with the maneuver forces. 

On 5 May plans were initiated for an expansion of operations in 

Cambodia. As a result of the planned expansion, Task Force SHOEMAKER was dissolved and the responsibility for fire support coordination was passed from the task force to the 1st Cavalry 

Division. 

With the initiation of Operation TOAN THANG 45 northeast of 

Bu Dop by the 2d Brigade of the I st Cavalry Division, in Base Area 

354 by elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division, and in Base Area 

350 by the Vietnamese 9th Regiment, fire support co-ordination 

activities were expanded but did not change significantly from the 

smooth-functioning procedures previously established. Positioning 

II Field Force Artillery units centrally and well forward had facilitated the support of the additional maneuver units as they attacked into Base Areas 354, 707, 350, and 351. Except for a few 

batteries located in critical areas of I II Corps, virtually all remaining units of II Field Force Artillery were moved to the Cambodian 

border or across it. During one three-day period, 32 artillery moves 

were conducted to place the firing elements in the best positions to 

support the expanded operations. 

During the withdrawal phases of both TOAN THANG 43 and 
VIETNAMIZATION 213 

TOAN THANG 45, extraction support plans were formulated to derive 

maximum benefit from all available fire support. The purpose of 

these plans was to deny the enemy access to the extraction sites and 

air corridors. Like the fire plans that had been developed for the 

conduct of the operation, the extraction support plans were comprehensive and effective. Each direct support artillery battalion 

planned the extraction fires for the supported brigade, and the 

division fire support co-ordination center co-operated closely with 

the Vietnamese airborne division artillery commander to establish 

the fire scheme for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. These 

plans were so effective that continuous fire was maintained around 

the extraction sites and air corridors during the entire operation. 

By 1800 on 29 June 1970, all American units were withdrawn from 

Cambodia. 

At the same time that the well-publicized campaign across the 

Cambodian border was kicking off in the Military Region III area, 

the 4th Infantry Division, located in the central highlands of II 

Corps Tactical Zone, received a warning order to be prepared to 

conduct operations across the border into Base Area 702 to locate 

and destroy enemy resources, installations, and command facilities. 

Planning was initiated immediately for the two-brigade assault. Fire 

support was provided by division artillery units reinforced by medium and heavy elements of the 52d Artillery Group. Division artillery established a forward tactical command post at New Plei 

Djereng and, in conjunction with a permanent liaison party provided by the 52d Artillery Group, developed the fire support plan 

for the operation, called BINH TAY I. Because South Vietnamese 

elements were involved in the operation, it was necessary to form 

the additional liaison parties to support Vietnamese units. A special 

fire support team was established with the Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group unit at New Plei Ojereng to insure 

timely clearance of fire requests. Firing units were positioned in 

forward areas on 4 May 1970 to facilitate joining the maneuver 

forces and reduce the time required to lift the units into the selected 

fire support bases. After the planned occupation of the fire bases by 

the light and medium artillery batteries, only one battery was relocated within the base area. This move was required because of a 

decision to increase the troop density in the 1st Brigade area of 

operation. With this one exception, all artillery units remained in 

their initial positions throughout the Cambodian operation. Although artillery support of the operation was adequate, ammunition resupply problems hampered the total effectiveness of the 

firing units. A temporary ammunition supply point was established 

at New Plei Ojereng; however, its stockage was not in accord with 
214 FIELD ARTILLERY 

the recommended stockage objective. A critical shortage was 

avoided only because the initial combat assau lts of the maneuver 

forces were delayed one day. 

Although significant amounts of material were captured and destroyed, Operation BINH T A Y I was less than a total success. Because of other commitments and operational requirements in II 

Corps, 4th Division elements were withdrawn ten days after the 

operation started and substantial areas were left unexploited. The 

lack of air assets, both Army and Air Force, artillery resupply problems, and heavy initial contact severely hampered the efficiency of 

the operation. Although Vietnamese forces continued to operate in 

Base Area 702 until 25 May 1970, the major tactical effort was 

complete with the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade units on 16 May. 

The Cambodian incursion was an overwhelming success both in 

materiel captured or destroyed and the artillery rounds expended 

in support of the operation. During the two· month assault, friendly 

units expended 847,558 rounds of which 261,039 were fired by Vietnamese artillery units. Reported surveillance credited artill ery 

units with 253 killed and 70 bunkers and 20 tunnel systems destroyed. Surprisingly, all artillery kills were reported by Vietnamese 

sources and 230 were reported as a result of the preparation fires 

that initiated the operation. The 1st Cavalry Division, in whose 

area of operations 708,965 rounds were fired by both U.S. and Vietnamese field artillery, did not credit the artillery with any kills or 

any bunker or tunnel destructions. 

The Cambodian operation measured in terms of Vietnamization showed that weaknesses in Vietnamese fire support techniques 

still existed. Vietnamese artillery was not employed to its full effectiveness by task force commanders. Repeatedly, these commanders 

waited too long for tactical air, gunships, and light fire team support 

when direct support artillery was within range and ready to provide immediate fire. Throughout the operation, task force commanders called for tactical aircraft and light fire team strikes without 

regard to the nature of the target being engaged. Often, light fire 

teams were called to engage well-fortified positions--targets better 

suited for artillery engagement. This failure to expeditiously engage the enemy materially reduced the effectiveness of the combat 

mission. Often, Vietnamese artillery liaison officers and forward observers were not properly utilized. On numerous occasions the maneuver element commanders personally adjusted artillery fire and 

Vietnamese Air Force air strikes although trained observers were 

available. On several occasions, Vietnamese fire support officers 

were intimidated by their supported unit commanders to the extent 

that they would not approach the commanders with recommenda-
VIETNAMIZATION 215 

tions on the use of artillery. These failings resulted in lowering the 

effectiveness of the fire support and removed the commanders from 

their more immediate responsibilities of command. In addition. 

some co-ordination and liaison problems emerged between U.S. and 

Vietnamese forces. These problems were most acute whenever U.S. 

units were under the operational control of Vietnamese commands. 

and the difficulties manifested themselves in displacement. emplacement. and security arrangements. At times. slow reaction by the 

responsible Vietnamese headquarters in target clearance matters 

hampered the ability of the American artillery units to provide 

responsive fire support to elements in contact. 

One of the most significant successes of the Cambodian incursion was really a byproduct of the action. With Vietnamese troops 

committed in such large numbers to the operation. territorial security became the primary responsibility of the Regional and Popular Forces. Their reaction to the challenge was surprisingly good 

and. more important. the confidence they gained from their successes served as a valuable psychological boost. 

Tow(lrd Vietnamese Sell-Sufficiency 

With the termination of the Cambodian operation. primary attention was returned to Vietnamization. The performance of Vietnamese units during the recent campaign was carefully scrutinized. 

their strengths and weaknesses were analyzed. and emphasis was 

placed on those areas in which improvement was necessary. It also 

became apparent that the ability of ARVN artillery units to support maneuver forces adequately was substandard. Although the 

deployment of territorial artillery. as projected and approved by 

Military Assistance Command, was considered the ultimate answer, 

it was evident that. because of the physical limitation of training 

and equipping them. these platoons could not deploy rapidly 

enough to release Vietnamese artillery units to provide standard 

tactical support. At the same time. the redeployment of American 

artillery was progressing so rapidly that the "repositioning tactic" 

employed earlier in the year was losing its validity. It became apparent that immediate stopgap measures were required. More and 

more senior artillery commanders admitted that the platooning of 

American artillery for extended periods of time to increase area 

coverage was the best solution. Though it had been common practice in Vietnam to separate U.S. batteries into platoon positions. 

the practice had been viewed as a short-term expedient only. In 

the fall of 1970. Brigadier General Thomas J. McGuire. I Field 

Force Artillery commander. summed up the feeling of most artil-
216 FIELD ARTILLERY 

lery commanders when he said. " ... even though US artillery is 

prepared to respond rapidly by moving and shooting to destroy the 

enemy. we are prepared to replace ARVN artillery platoons and 

batteries which are on LOC [lines of conununication] missions so 

that these AR VN batteries may move with the AR VN maneuver 

elements and support them on operations." 

This tactic became standard procedure for American artillery 

units during the latter phases of the war. It also magnified the 

myriad problems that had plagued Vietnamese artillerymen when 

they platooned their guns. U.S. commanders founel that the problems----<:omrnand and control, technical proficiency. maintenance, 

anel apathetic personnel- they had attributed to the "personality" 

of the oriental were. in fact. the result of the fragmented employment of artillery units. Diminishing assets made logistical support 

of these subunits difficult. the lack of qualified fire direction personnellimited the efficiency of the platoons. the absence of well-defined 

missions caused morale problems. and battery commanders were 

often out of touch with major parts of their units. 

To offset diminishing long-range fire capabilities. heavy artillery raids were planned and conducted frequently. These raids normally were co·ordinated: the targets were carefully planned. the 

ammunition was quickly fired. and the guns were returned to their 

normal positions. 

By the end of the year. the Vietnamese artillery posture had 

increased substantially and further deployments were planned. A 

total of 1.116 tubes were providing artillery support throughout 

the country. 

ARVN ARTILLERY POSTURE. 31 DECEMBER 1970 

Uniu Au Lhorized Activat~ ~plovro 

I05- mm. batlalion (divisional) ... ..... 30 30 30 

105-null. battalion (airborne) .. .... 3 3 3 

JO!l- mm. battalion (separate) .. 7 7 7 

155- mm. battalion (divisional) 10 10 10 

155-mm. battalion (separate) ... ....... 5 5 5 

li5-mm. ba nation (separate) ........ 2 0 0 

Seclor artillery plaloon (IM- mm.) ..... 176 100 53 

With the approval of Project ENIIANCE in the fall of 1970. XXIV 

Corps was directed to prepare a comprehensive training program 

for presentation to cadre personnel of the 101st Artillery Battalion. 

the first Vietnamese 175-mm. gun unit scheduled for activation. 
VIETNAMIZATJON 217 

Corps artillery began this mission by carefully scrutinizing the composition of the proposed unit to insure that each facet of 175-mm. 

gun employment received sufficient coverage in the program of instruction. Added emphasis was placed on maintenance. since this 

was to be the initial experience of ARVN forces with self-propelled 

artillery. Meteorological training received special consideration 

because. by tables of organization and equipment. the Vietnamese 

gun battalions were assigned meteorological teams. In early 1971 

the program of instruction was approved. and the schooling of sixteen Vietnamese cadres began on 15 March 1971. On 19 April cadre 

training was completed and the general instruction of troops initiated. Fire direction and firing battery procedures were taught at Fire 

Support Base CARROLL. meteorology was taught at Fire Support 

Base NANCY, and driver and maintenance procedures were 

taught at numerous locations throughout Military Region I. Although instruction was conducted by the newly trained cadres. 

American experts were available to supervise and advise as necessary. Deployment of the first 175-mm. gun unit was scheduled for 

J ul y-A ugust 1971. 

The year 1971 brought another shift in the Vietnamization concept. Since the promulgation of the Vietnamization program in November 1969. the basis for Vietnamization had been training 

programs and combined operations conceived and controlled by 

Americans. By 1971. the American troop strength in Vietnam had 

been halved and it became apparent that the capability of U.S. 

units to directly support training programs was fast diminishing. 

At the same time. American commanders felt that if Vietnamese 

forces were to become self-reliant. they would have to provide the 

training impetus for themselves. Assistance was offered only as 

needed and required. This shift in policy produced some hopeful 

indications as the Vietnamese began to assume the initiative in 

meeting most of their requirements. 

In 1971 . Military Assistance Command reviewed the Vietnamization program and divided it into three phases: 

Phase I-Turn over ground combat responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 

Phase II- Develop air. naval. artillery. logistics. and other support capabilities of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to the 

degree that effective independent security can be maintained. 

Phase Ill- Reduce the American artillery presence to a military advisory mission and. finally. withdraw as the South Vietnamese 

become capable of handling the Communist threat without U.S. 

military assistance. 

Although these phases were rather definitively stated. work was 
218 FIELD ARTILLERY 

being done in both Phases I and II because it was impossible to 

achieve any success in the first phase without substantial gains in 

the second. 

Having examined and approved the feasibility of providing selfpropelled 175-mm. guns to Vietnamese forces, Military Assistance 

Command began studies relative to the turnover of self-propelled 

155-mm. howitzers. The concept called for the activation of three 

battalions armed with the M 109 howitzers. The study was continued 

until 23 August 1971, when General Abrams informed General 

Vien, Chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, that the activation of the three new battalions was not feasible and that" ... introduction of this new weapon into ARVN will overtax the training 

base and the logistics system, which is not now prepared to cope 

with the maintenance difficulties presented by this weapon ... " 

Meanwhile, in January 1971 U.S. and ARVN commands 

planned an operation across the border into Laos from Quang Tri 

Province in northern Military Region I. Both U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence estimates had strongly indicated that the 

enemy was preparing to conduct an intensified resupply and reinforcement operation in southern Laos as well as to build up supplies and equipment in Military Region I. Sources estimated enemy 

strength across the Quang Tri Province border to be 13,000 line 

and 9,000 support troops. In view of the successful Cambodian sanctuary operations of 1970, the logical tactical follow-up would be an 

effort to disrupt North Vietnamese supply and reinforcement operations. 

The operation, termed LAM SON 719 and commanded by the 

commanding general of the Vietnamese I Corps, did not call for the 

employment of American ground forces in Laos. However, U.S. air 

assets augmented the South Vietnamese Air Force in supporting 

ground operations. To permit a greater Vietnamese effort, American ground units provided extensive ground support in northwestern Quang Tri Province. 

U.S. and Vietnamese forces estimated a four-phase offensive: 

Phase I-U.S. units would open fire bases in Khe Sanh Plateau 

and secure Route 9 as well as staging areas and artillery positions 

from which to support subsequent operations. 

Phase II-Vietnamese forces would attack into Laos on three 

axes, with the major axis along Route 9. Attacks would carry no 

further west than Tchepone, about thirty kilometers into Laos. 

Phase III-Gains would be consolidated. 

Phase IV-Friendly forces would be extracted. 

Planning for the employment of U.S. artillery to support Phase 

I was extensive. Although ARVN maneuver units had their own 
VIETNAMIZATION 219 

light and medium artillery, they needed augmentation by heavy 

U.S. artillery operating from the border. To this end, fire support 

was planned between the I Corps fire support element and the 

XXIV U.S. Corps fire support element through I Corps Artillery, 

the I Corps G-3, and the I Corps Artillery adviser. In addition, 

plans included co-ordination with the 108th U.S. Artillery Group, 

the control headquarters for heavy U.S. artillery. 

The 108th Artillery Group consisted of the 8th Battalion, 4th 

Field Artillery, and the 2d Battalion, 94th Field Artillery, each 

with four 8-inch howitzers and eight 175-mm. guns, as well as Battery B, 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery, with four 175-mm. guns. 

The 4th Battalion, 77th Aerial Field Artillery, IOlst Airborne 

Division, was also available to support the operation and, being an 

air asset, was not restricted by borders. Three 175-mm. batteries 

and one 8-inch battery were situated along the Laos-Vietnam border. 

The remaining batteries were set up in the Khe Sanh area. 

Phase I, dubbed Operation DEWEY CANYON, proceeded without 

a significant hitch. However, subsequent phases, which were to be 

conducted primarily by Vietnamese forces, went awry. Plans called 

for the Vietnamese 1st Airborne Division to conduct an airmobile 

attack all the way to Tchepone. At the same time, the Vietnamese 

1st Armored Brigade was to attack along Route 9 and link up with 

the airborne division to open up necessary supply lines. Unfortunately, the armored brigade did not fulfill its mission. It could 

neither advance with sufficient speed to provide a timely linkup nor 

keep the route to its rear open. Supplies to the airborne force had 

to be moved by air against intensive enemy antiaircraft fires. The 

consolidation phase ended quickly and extraction began in haste. 

Enemy pressure forced the abandonment of equipment, including 

artillery pieces. Notwithstanding the loss of equipment, statistics 

were quite impressive in favor of Vietnamese forces. Over 19,360 

enemy were killed in action whereas ARVN forces sustained 1,749 

killed. 

In terms of Vietnamization, LAM SON 719 again pointed out 

Vietnamese weaknesses, particularly the inability of units to coordinate fire support. Without the assistance of U.S. advisers, who 

had been left behind, the South Vietnamese displayed a marked deficiency in requesting and controlling artillery and tactical air. Weapons were poorly matched to targets, air strikes were often requested 

for targets more suitable [or artillery, and aerial field artillery was 

often requested to attack targets beyond its capabilities. So inefficient was the fire support co-ordination system that in most cases 

maneuver units abandoned the procedures and sent fire requests 

directly to fire support elements. 
220 FIELD ARTILLERY 

1972 E1lemy Offe1lsive 

In mid-1971, shortly after the concl usion of LAM SON 719, 

Military Assistance Command redeployed the 1st Brigade of the 5th 

Infantry Division and thus removed the last American maneuver 

unit from the demilitarized zone. Artillery units of the 10Sth Artillery Group, however, remained because Vietnamese forces still 

desperately needed artillery assets. To fill the void created by the 

withdrawal of the American forces, the Joint General Staff activated the Vietnamese Division. This unit was a conglomeration of 

independent units already operating in Military Region I and newly 

created units still being trained and outfitted. Artillery elements 

taken from I Corps Artillery assets and redesignated the 30th and 

32d Artillery Battalions supported the newly created division. Of 

these, the 30th Artillery Battalion was a 155-mm. howitzer unit. The 

third direct support element, the 33d Artillery Battalion, was activated on I December 1971. Unit training was to start 17 January 

1972, and field deployment was scheduled for I April 1972. 

Over-all, 197 1 was a wait-and-see year. More and more responsibility was given to Vietnamese units. and their performance was 

evaluated. Although operationally their performance was spotty, 

there were some hopeful indicators. Territorial artillery assumed 

greater fire support 'responsibilities, and by year's end 100 platoons 

had been deployed; the Artillery School continued to revamp and 

upgrade its program to include initiation of the artillery officer's 

advanced course in August; and in some divisions, the artill ery began to assume traditional support roles and develop habitual support relationships with the maneuver regiments. By December, 

deployed Vietnamese artillery strength had increased to 1,202 tubes 

of various calibers, including twelve 175-mm. guns. 

ARVN ARTILLERY POSTURE, 31 DECEMBER 1971 

Unit Authorlted ActiV2tcd Deploved 

IOS- mm. ballalion (diviSional) ....... BB BB 32 

IO';"mm, battalion (separate) ... .... .. 5 5 5 

10S- mm. ballalion (a irborne) ... .. 3 B 3 

IS5- mm. battalion (divisional) .. . II II II 

155-mm. battalion (separate) 4 4 4 

175-mm. battalion (separate) 2 2 I 

Sector artillery platoon (IOS-mm.) 176 135 100 

By mid-December 1971, intell igence sources were beginning to 
VIETNAMIZATION 221 

note increased enemy activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in 

the demilitarized zone area of Vietnam. As this buildup continued 

and a pattern of sorts developed, American and Vietnamese com· 

manders began warning their commands to prepare for a major 

enemy offensive commencing with the Tel holidays in mid· 

February. As the pulse of enemy movements picked up through 

January 1972, commanders increased vigilance and expected heavy 

action to erupt with the Vielnamese new year. American leaders 

believed that the expected offensive would be the greatest test of 

Vietnamization, perhaps with the preservation of the entire nation 

at stake. Wary eyes studied the demilitarized zone. IE a major attack 

materialized, the untested 3d Division would have to bear the brunt 

of the fighting. 

Tel passed with no significant increase in enemy action. Allied 

commanders continued to expect an attack, but the vigilance and 

readiness established for the holidays could not be maintained. As 

the days after Tel slipped by without action, the nervous edge of 

the troops faded and daily routine returned to normal. Then on 30 

March 1972 the North Vietnamese launched an infantry.armor attack through the east central portion of the demilitarized zone 

against the fire bases defended by elements of the 3d Division. 

With this attack, the Nguyen Hue offensive started. The North 

Vietnamese units quickly routed the defending forces and slashed 

forward toward Dong Ha. South Vietnamese forces fled in the face 

of the onslaught, and Dong Ha fell with little resistance. Farther 

south in Military Region I, the North Vietnamese attacked east 

[rom Laos and by 14 April had captured Fire Support Base 

BASTOGNE and were threatening Hue. Meanwhile, in Military Region III, Communist forces launched their An L.oc campaign on 

I April by overrunning Fire Support Base PACE, 35 kilometers 

northwest of Tay Ninh city. On 5 April, the North Vietnamese 

attacked Loc inh and controlled the city by the next morning. 

The withdrawing South Vietnamese forces suffered continual attacks and sustained heavy casualties as they moved south on Route 

13. By this time General Minh, commander of III Corps, realized 

that the main enemy effort would be in Binh Long Province and 

quickly reinforced An Loc. On 10 April, the anticipated offensive 

began. The North Vietnamese 9th Division, supported by armor 

elements, auacked An Loc. 

In Military Region II, the initial enemy action was limited to 

increased harrassing tactics, interdiction of Route 14 at the Kontum 

Pass, and the successful closing of the An Khe Pass on Route 19 on 

I I April 1972. 

Action in the Mekong Delta was negligible. 
222 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Early in the offensive, some of the objectives of the co-ordinated 

attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam became apparent: 

I. To divide the national reserves and force piecemeal and, 

therefore, indecisive commitment of these forces. 

2. To give the impression of greater strength by attacking on 

several .. fronts." 

3. To promote a lack of decisiveness on a South Vietnamese 

command structure faced with few clearclit options and several ominous potentia l situations. 

4. To encourage widespread dissatisfaction with the government of Vietnam by demonstrating its inabi lity to protect its people. 

The strategy of the enemy in attaining these objectives centered 

on the provincial capitals. These cities or towns were focal points 

because of, first, their governmental prominence; second, their relative isolation; and, third, their comparatively weak defenses. It also 

became clear that the ultimate objective of the North Vietnamese 

was the captu.e of Quang Tri, Qui Nhon, Kontum, An Loc, Tay 

Ninh, and, because of its psychological importance as the historical 

and cultural center of Vietnam, Hue. The loss of these cities could 

well have precipitated the collapse of the South Vietnam government. 

The first two weeks of the offensive were disastrous for the 

South Vietnamese forces. Throughout the country they experienced 

heavy personnel losses, had to face infantry and armor attacks in 

significant numbers for the first time, and, often, especially in Military Region I, found themselves outgunned by enemy artillery. 

During the first ten days of the Nguyen Hue offensive, South Vietnamese units lost 81 105-mm. howitzers, 32 155-mm. howitzers, and 

4 175-mm. guns. Most of their losses were due to reliance on aircraft for fire base evacuation and the inability of the aircraft to do 

the job because of enemy artillery. In Military Region I, the 30th 

and 31st Artillery Battalions of the 3d Division lost all their guns 

and the 33d Artillery Battalion escaped similar fate only because it 

was still in training and only partially deployed. Still, the 33d managed to lose 2 of its guns. All the fire support bases north and west 

of Dong Ha were overrun and the artillery positioned there was 

captured or destroyed. Artillery losses throughout the remainder 

of South Vietnam were fewer only because units were more widely 

deployed. 

Throughout April and May the North Vietnamese Army continued to apply pressure along all the fronts. In Military Region I, 

enemy units attacked and captured Quang Tri in early May. In 

Military Region II, the drive in the highlands began on 23 April. 

In quick succession Fire Support Bases 5 and 6, Tanh Canh, and 
VIETNAMIZATION 223 

ARVN ARTILLERY LOSSES, 31 MARCH-IO APRIL 1972 

weaen 

cali r Unit Military Region Number 

I05-mm. . . ... ... Marines I 16 

IOS- mm. · ...... .. 31st Field Artillery Baltation I 18 

IOS-mm. .. ..... 33d Field Artillery Battalion I 2 

I05-mm. ... .... .. 14th Field Artillery Battalion I 5 

I05-mm. .. .. 22d Field Artillery Hanalion I 6 

ISS- mm. ... . . ... 30th Field Artillery Battalion I 18 

175- mm. .,' .... IOISl Fie ld Artillery Battalion 1 4 

15S-mm. ..... 2201h Field Artillery Battalion 11 2 

155-mm. ..... .. . 37th Field Artillery Banalion 11 2 

IOS-mm. .... . ... 51st Field Artillery Battalion III 2 

lOS- mm. · ..... .. 53d Field Artillery Battalion III 12 

IOS-mm. · ... ... 52d Field Artillery Balla lion III 4 

IOS- mm. .. " 182d Field Artillery Battalion III 6 

IOS-mm. .. -" ." Ranger Border Camp III 2 

IS5-mm. . .. .. .. 50th Field Artillery Battalion III 8 

IOS-mm. ...... . .. 91st Field Artillery Battalion IV 1 

IOS-mm . .... ... 21lth Field Artillery Battalion IV 2 

I05- mm. .... 213th Field Artillery Battalion IV 1 

I05-mm. ... .... 419th Field Artillery Platoon IV 2 

I05-mm . . ... .. ' 449lh Field Artillery Platoon IV 2 

ISS- mm. " ...... 90th Field Artillery Battalion IV 2 

Dak To fell and northwestern Kontum Province was in enemy 

hands. In Military Region III, An Loc remained under pressure, 

Dau Tieng suffered attacks, and the interdiction of Route 13 continued. 

As these actions occurred, South Vietnamese forces began to regroup. They stiffened their resistance to enemy pressure and, with 

the aid of massive air support, including large numbers of B-52 

arc light strikes, slowed the momentum of the enemy thrust. During May the action began to stabilize as ARVN forces established a 

defensive line along the My Chanh River in Military Region I, 

stopped the enemy at Kontum, and stubbornly resisted at An Loc. 

Although enemy pressure remained great throughout May, the 

thrust of the offensive had been blunted. Once checked, the North 

Vietnamese attack never regained its force. Throughout the counteroffensive that followed, opportune application of artillery and 

air power prohibited enemy buildups and attacks. 

The late May stabilization permitted South Vietnamese commanders to scrutinize carefully the over-all situation and take ap-
224 FIELD ARTILLERY 

propriate actions. When it became apparent that An Loc and 

Kontum would not fall. they turned their attention to planning a 

counteroffensive in Military Region I to recapture Quang Tri ProvInce. 

Whereas the actions around both Kontum and An Loc were 

monuments to air power. the counterattack out of the My ehanh 

River line proceeded along conventional lines. The purpose of the 

counterattack. du bbed Operation LAM SON 72. was to provide a defense for Hue. secure the Quang Tri and Dong Ha area. and destroy enemy forces and restore government control to Quang Tri 

Province. 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces limited their operations 

during most of June to repositioning of forces. probing attacks to 

test enemy strengths. and cover and deception activities. Then. on 

28 June. the counterattack began. The Airborne Division conducted the main attack west of Route 1 in the direction of La Vong 

and Quang Tri. The Marine Division conducted the supporting attack along Route 555 in the direction of Trien Phong and Quang 

Tri. Initial progress was slow but steady. South Vietnamese forces 

met only moderate resistance. As they approached the Thach Han 

River. however. enemy reaction stiffened. By the time the Airborne 

Division had reached the outskirts of Quang Tri city on 7 July. it 

was clear that the enemy intended to hold the city at all costs. The 

counterattack ground to a halt. Although the initial plan called for 

Quang Tri to be bypassed. recapture of the city now became an 

emotional national objective. On 27 July. the boundary between 

the Airborne and Marine Divisions was shifted and the more heavily 

equipped marines were given the mission of taking the city. The air· 

borne troopers were ordered to secure the Thach Han River line. 

seize Fire Support Base BARBARA, block enemy supply routes from 

the west. and secure Route I- the corps main supply line. 

Success during August continued to be limited. and it was not 

until early September that the final phase of the Quang Tri battle 

began. Then the marines launched the final push against the citadel 

within the city. Progress was slow and costly in the face of determined enemy resistance. but on II September 1972 the marines 

succeeded in breaching the citadel wall. After heavy fighting at 

close quarters for five days. the marines gained control of the citadel 

on 16 September and by nightfall on the 17th the city belonged to 

the Marine Division . Activity now shifted to the area of operation 

of the Airborne Division as they drove to capture Fire Support Base 

BARBARA. Their efforts were hampered by heavy attacks by fire and 

deteriorating weather as the October monsoon began to bring its 

heavy rains. However. by the end of October the fire support base 
VIETNAMIZATION 225 

was reca ptured and the major tasks of the counteroffensive were 

accomplished. 

The employment of artillery in support of the counteroffensive 

in Military Region I gradually evolved from the fire base concept to 

conventional tactics. This change resulted from the introduction of 

l22-mm. and l30-mm. artillery weapons by the enemy and the effective use of these weapons against fixed fire bases. Although artillery contributed extensively to the success of the combat 

operations, poor artillery procedures were evident in all units. The 

failure to survey, register, and apply meteorological data and the 

use of improper ammunition-handling procedures reduced the accuracy of artillery fire. Further, a tendency to substitute massive 

unobserved fires for less intense observed fires resulted in excessive 

ammunition expenditure rates. At the same time, the development 

of the I Corps fire support element at Hue during May 1972 

enabled the corps, for the first time, to integrate all U.S. and Vietnamese fire support means. The fire support element worked extremely well and contributed substantially to the success of the 

corps operation. 

Problems During Phase-Down of U.S. Forces 

The massive emphasis given so suddenly to Vietnamization 

caused a variety of feelings among the Republic of Vietnam Armed 

Forces leaders. These feelings became more and more verbal in 

early 1970. In connection with an assessment of the Vietnamization effort, II Field Force, Vietnam, indicated: 

To most senior ARVN Commanders, Vietnamization has provided 

the motivation ... to assume the responsibility for the defense of their 

country in as short a time as possible. Many of these responsible individuals also express concern lest the Vietnamization process move too 

rapidly, leaving them to face a determined and waiting enemy before 

they are fully ready. Other responsible AR VN officers are optimistic 

about ARVN combat units takmg over now ... but they emphasize 

the continued need for U.S. combat support (helicopter, artillery, etc.) 

and logistics support . . . until these ARVN capabilities are fully 

built up. 

Even as Vietnamese leaders were expressing anxiety over the 

relatively high speed of the Vietnamization programs, American 

commanders began experiencing operational difficulties caused by 

redeployments, stand-downs, and space reductions. To counter these 

problems, comprehensive studies were conducted to discern the 

most efficient utilization of the remaining assets. These studies revealed gaps in artillery coverage, poor utilization of heavy artillery 
226 FIELD ARTILLERY 

capability. and unsatisfactory positioning of light artillery. The best 

example of the results of such a study was Operation METRO MEDIA 

executed by I Field Force Artillery. Between January and March 

1970. over seventeen sequential and co-ordinated complete relocations of artillery battalion headquarters and subordinate elements 

were conducted. The moves resulted in I Field Force Artillery 

assets being positioned most effectively to accomplish the required 

support mission. Better utilization of the long-range capability of 

heavy artillery was realized and a quick reaction artillery force was 

created in the central portion of Military Region II. 

Further problems were generated by the actual redeployment 

of artillery units. Since withdrawal plans and Vietnamization programs did not emanate from the same source. more often than not 

the administrative considerations of stand-down clashed with the 

tactical requirements of the commands affected by redeployment. 

Often. artillery coverage was not immediately available to replace 

that provided by the recalled elements and a short-fuzed shuffle of 

the remaining artillery assets ensued. This tended to lower the effectiveness of offensive operations because of the lack of adquate fire 

support. The withdrawal of the 9th Infantry Division from Military 

Region IV is a good example of this loss of fire power. The movement of the division from the Mekong Delta caused an immediate 

loss of three artillery battalions. Even when all the artillery with 

the Vietnamese 7th Division became operational. there was a net 

loss of two artillery battalions. and the addition of two battalions to 

IV Corps assets was insufficient to upgrade the artillery posture of 

the upper delta without affecting other portions of IV Corps Tactical Zone. Additional hardships resulted from the lack of experience by which to gauge the time requirements of stand-down. The 

effort to insure optimum artillery coverage for the longest time often 

placed inordinately heavy administrative requirements on the redeploying units. 

The time squeeze was most apparent in personnel matters. in 

which transfers within the country and tour completion requirements posed difficulties. In addition. early stand-down cut into the 

active artillery posture. forced hasty repositioning. and at times 

affected offensive operations in progress. At the same time. early 

stand-down caused administrative problems by leaving units with 

no equipment. no mission. and no motivation-a situation ready 

made for racial tensions. drug incidents. and morale problems. 

An additional problem that affected artillery units was the farflung deployment of some firing elements. This widespread positioning prevented the battalion headquarters from effectively 

controlling the stand-down of their batteries. To overcome this situ-
VIETNAMIZATION 227 

ation, higher headquarters directed battalions in the same locale as 

the isolated unit to assist the battery during stand·down operations. 

The assisting battalion was not staffed to absorb the added work 

load. 

As redeployment progressed the experience factors were estab· 

lished, most of the administrative hardships were overcome, and a 

general system was developed. The tactical difficulties, however, 

remained and often grew. Because of the technical and personnel 

limitations, Vietnamization in certain areas of the country lagged 

behind the pace of the American withdrawal programs. 

With the introduction of tube artillery by the enemy during the 

Nguyen Hue offensive, the weakness of South Vietnamese target 

acquisition means and counterbattery techniques became apparent. 

This inability to produce lucrative artillery targets was compounded 

by the consistent abil ity of enemy artillery to outrange South Vietnamese artillery and thus make counterbattery fires almost impossible. To offset this weakness the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill 

sent target assistance teams to Vietnam to aid in "target acquisition, 

with emphasis on the counterbattery program." The teams arrived 

in Vietnam on 21 May 1972 and deployed to the field two days later. 

Their success depended on the specific needs of each South Vietnamese division: its mission, its degree of involvement with the 

North Vietnamese offensive, and the attitude of its commanders. 

The teams were fairly successful in helping to establish counterbattery intelligence centers, especially in I Corps where units were 

heavily committed to combat operations against North Vietnamese 

forces. 

ENEMY ARTILLERY EMPLOYED DURING NGUYEN HUE OFFENSIVE 

Weapon 

M46 18().....mm. field gun 

D74 122-mm. field gun 

M88 122-mm. howitzer 

A19 122-mm. corps gun 

M44 lOO-mm. field gun 

D44 85-mm. field gun 

ZlS8 76-mm. field gun 

Supplying Country 

Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of China 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of China 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

The following results highlighted some of the target acquisition 

efforts of the target assistance teams and South Vietnamese units: 

the 18th Division acquired 178 confirmed targets over a seventeenday period; the 21st Division destroyed 6 howitzers; the 22d Division destroyed 2 howitzers; and I Corps destroyed II ISO-mm. guns, 

2 122-mm. weapons, and ammunition storage. 
228 FIELD ARTILLERY 

However, the main source of targeting information concerning 

hostile armor and artillery weapons continued. to come from airborne visual and electronic observation conducted by U.S. Army and 

Air Force resources. 

More telling of the state of Vietnamization was the report of the 

target assistance teams. The Vietnamese Artillery School, the report 

concluded, performed "its mission in an outstanding manner" and 

its curriculum incorporated sufficient instruction in target acquisition. "The inadequacies in the proper employment of counterbattery tactics and techniques appeared to be generated in the field." 

Units such as the Vietnamese 25th and 1st Divisions had personnel 

knowledgeahle in counterbattery procedures but saw no need to 

employ counterbattery tactics and techniques. They entertained, 

the teams reported, "no real sense of urgency." This neglect led to 

deterioration and eventual inability to employ effective counterbattery programs. The teams observed that the units required 

"strong AR VN command emphasis with corresponding advisory 

followup." The solution, then, seemed to lie not with more instruction but with constant supervision. Here, in microcosm, was 

the dilemma of the entire Vietnamization program. U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, units had to support maneuver elements and simultaneously supply the drive behind Vietnamization. Personnel problems alone often destined the latter task to be secondary. And, 

without full-time support, the Vietnamese failed to perceive the 

necessity of certain procedures. Consequently, they remained dependent on American aid. 

The teams also provided valuable information concerning North 

Vietnamese Army artillery employment methods. Their analysis 

indicated that the North Vietnamese artillerymen were extremely 

professional and capable. The gunners generally fired at optimum 

range and preferred to mass widely separate pieces in surprise fires. 

Their ability to utilize artillery in this manner indicated that they 

surveyed gun positions, established effective communication systems, 

and exercised centralized control of fires. 

On the other hand, the target assistance teams found that South 

Vietnamese artillerymen still ignored basic requirements necessary 

for effective fire support. AR VN artillery units did not conduct 

registrations and limited survey functions to utilize the existing 

survey established by American units prior to redeployment. Moreover, all South Vietnamese units except the 1st Division ignored 

meteorological data . For these reasons, it became apparent that although artillery fires normally were available, Vietnamese commanders preferred to call on tactical air assets to neutralize targets. 

Although the Nguyen Hue offensive remained in the forefront 
VIETNAMIZATION 229 

throughout most of 1972, Vietnamization continued. During August, September, and October, the activation of three 175-mm. gun 

battalions marked the completion of the Project ENHANCE schedule. 

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam projected the employment of 

these battalions in Military Regions I, II, and III. Of these units, 

the 104th Artillery Battalion was the first to receive guns supplied 

directly from the United States rather than guns transferred within 

the country from departing American units. 

The South Vietnamese Artillery School initiated a systems engineering approach in the structuring of programs of instruction. A 

thorough program of briefings and discussion insured that key personnel understood the systems engineering concept and that continuity would be maintained if key personnel were transferred. The 

school added classes in crater analysis and target acquisition for 

cadre personnel from the various branch schools and training centers throughout Vietnam. These classes were to be a base for 

similar courses at these various places. 

Facilities at the Artillery School remained inadequate. There 

were only fourteen classrooms. When these were filled, classes were 

held in other facilities or on the parade field. The school submitted 

a compound improvement construction plan to V Area Logistics 

Command on four occasions, the last in October 1972, but received 

no replies. 

A revised table of organization and equipment would have increased the instructor force level adeq uatel y to support the student 

population. Submitted some eighteen months before, the new table 

had still not been approved in late 1972. 

Despite these shortcomings, the school managed to provide the 

basic training required to establish the foundation for South Vietnamese artillery. On 20-21 December 1972, the Field Liaison Directorate, Liaison and Inspection Team, evaluated the school and 

gave it a good rating. 

From October 1972 until the cease-fire in early 1973, the entire 

scope of the war changed. As peace rumors increased, combat action 

rose. Both sides began final "land-grabbing and flag-raising operations." Vietnamization became primarily a logistical exercise in an 

attempt to stockpile as much equipment in Vietnam as possible. 

For all practical purposes, the active Vietnamization program had 

ended. 

With the signing of the cease-fire on 25 February 1973 and its 

effective date on 28 February 1973, the United States involvement 

in Vietnam came to an end. During the last three years of that involvement, efforts were concentrated on preparing the Vietnamese 

to defend their country without active American participation. An 
230 FIELD ARTILLERY 

assessment of that effort would show that despite the adoption of 

program after program to assist AR VN forces in becoming proficient in all phases of fire support, little improvement was to be 

seen in combat. The Ben Het-Dak To Campaign in 1969 pointed 

out weaknesses in fire support co-ordination, adjustment of fire, 

and clearance procedures. One year later the same weaknesses appeared during the Cambodian incursion. The LAM SON 719 operation in 1971 did not change the picture, and the Nguyen Hue 

campaign during 1972 added technical shortcomings to the fire coordination weaknesses noted in the earlier actions. In addition, surveys conducted throughout Vietnam during the period continued to 

show that Vietnamese forces ignored advanced gunnery procedures. 

In retrospect, it is apparent that in almost all the field artillery 

programs that were cited as successful during the Vietnamization 

period, American units were actively involved, providing labor and 

material. The Vietnamese were merely recipients of a service. It can 

be argued that by providing the major impetus to the Vietnamization program the Americans doomed the program to marginal success at best. By providing services to the Vietnamese, the argument 

woullt go, the American command failed to involve the Vietnamese 

actively and therefore failed to teach them how to perform the work 

themselves or convince them of the program's value. 

But the American command was in a quandary. Senior commanders were certainly intelligent enough to foresee the disadvantages of allowing American units to do the work while the 

Vietnamese sat i<4y by. On the other hand, much had to be accomplished in a short time. Any adviser could attest to the fact that 

it took time to convince AR VN commanders that an improvement 

was needed and to show them how to carry it out. If U.S. programs 

were to be successful, they would at least have to be implemented 

and, restricted by time, Americans would have to furnish the major 

impetus. Then the Vietnamese could at least be exposed to those 

techniques necessary to provide the best fire support possible. With 

American air power denied them, Vietnamese forces would turn 

more and more to their artillery to fill the gap in fire power. To 

provide this support, the artillery hopefully would be forced to utilize the techniques to which they were exposed during Vietnamization. Whether in fact they do is, of course, the question. 
CHAPTER VII 

An Overview 

Work To Be Done 

The U.S. Army's experience in Vietnam showed that developments and refinements in Army doctrine. organization. and materiel 

must help to realize the maximum effectiveness of American fire 

power in future conflicts. A major effort of the Army will continue 

to be devoted to fighting a conventional war because the greatest 

threat to national survival is recognized as coming from the Soviet 

bloc and Warsaw Pact countries. Priority must go to training. organizing. and equipping U.S. forces to fight on the terrain of fully 

developed countries against a sophisticated. armor-heavy enemy. But 

placing emphasis on preparing for one type of war will not necessarily preclude preparing for others. since many of the important 

needs of the Army in the areas of field artillery materiel and doctrinal development are equally applicable to the armor-heavy conventional war and to the counterguerrilla threat. 

The primary emphasis of U.S. field artillery in training will be 

on survival on the modern battlefield. planning fires more quickly. 

and shooting faster because the gravity and intensity of future combat will require immediate response. To suppress enemy fires immediately will. in the long run. better accomplish the mission of close. 

continuous. and timely fire support to the maneuver forces. As 

discussed in Chapter V. the success of U.S. artillery fire at Khe Sanh. 

where rounds were "on the way" in forty seconds. is ample testimony to this fact. In Vietnam the field artillery. for reasons cited in 

earlier chapters. was not always responsive. While the Army may 

again be required to operate under strict rules of engagement. it is 

also developing new techniques. doctrine. target acquisition equipment. and extended range weapons. and is re-emphasizing the fire 

support mission as a vital part of the combined arms team. All of 

these new developments have one purpose-to make field artillery 

responsive. The field artillery was often accused of being too slow 

and unresponsive in Vietnam because to achieve the accuracy demanded in many cases. double and triple checks were cranked into 
232 FIELD ARTILLERY 

the fire support process. The more checks, the more rules placed on 

the system, the longer it took to get a round off. Thus, some of these 

accusations were justified, but now training is designed to achieve 

the best of both worlds- faster response without degrading the concern for safety and accuracy. This training is applicable to a counterinsurgency or to the conventional, mid-intensity conflict. 

Target acquisition is another excellent example of the meshing 

of U.S. Army needs in counterguerrilla and conventional warfare. 

Field artillery experiences in Vietnam underscored the fact that 

developments in target acquisition organizations and materiel 

through the 1960's had not kept pace with developments in weapons and mobility systems. Two general historical examples from 

Vietnam illustrate this point. First, American survey equipment 

was unequal to the task. In order to conduct a detailed survey 

with the means available, survey teams were required to bring 

control unusually long distances from questionable survey control 

points over insecure terrain. Even when these obstacles could be 

overcome, the means used were unresponsive to the needs of the 

many firing batteries that moved continuously, often two or three 

times in one day. As a result, survey personnel took shortcuts to 

obtain position and direction, although the shortcuts lessened accuracy. The requirement for similar rapid moves exists on the 

modern battlefield, conventional, armor-heavy, or otherwise. Second, the field artillery was deficient in locating enemy mortars, 

rockets, and artillery. The sector of scan of the 1950-era radar, 

the MPQ-4A, was unacceptably small. The Army had no radar 

designed to track low-trajectory projectiles, and the equipment 

available to vector on enemy firing positions by sound ranging 

was obsolescent and consequently never used effectively in Vietnam. 

Much has been done to correct these target acquisition deficiencies. Advances in survey equipment and follow-up position 

determining systems indicate that the field artillery's requirement for fast, accurate survey is on the way to being solved. Needs 

have been stated for new countermortar and counterbattery radars, 

and the Army is in the advanced phases of the equipment development cycle for the new radars. Also being developed but not yet 

in the inventory is new sound ranging equipment that will be 

easier to emplace and will be faster and more accurate in determining enemy target locations. 

Even while U.S. ground troops were still fighting in Vietnam, 

some promising developments occurred in target acquisition. A 

new moving target locating radar, the AN ITPS-58 (RA TAC) 

was introduced to replace the AN I TPS-25. The RAT AC, which 
AN OVERVIEW 233 

has a longer range and a wider sector of scan and is easier to emplace than its predecessor, proved quite effective though its availability was limited. Perhaps more important than the RATAC was 

the employment of several types of unattended ground sensors. 

Though the over-all effectiveness of unattended ground sensors 

was difficult to assess, the concept proved workable and has 

prompted follow-up development. 

While target acquisition systems are being developed and refined, the Field Artillery School has been conducting studies to 

determine those organizations that can best employ the systems. 

It is generally conceded that the present organization, which centralizes most of the target acquisition assets at corps artillery in 

the field artillery target acquisition battalion, is no longer adequate. 

While in some situations corps artillery will have a need to control a system whose coverage is wide and deep enough to serve 

the entire corps, in many other situations such centralization will 

inhibit the responsiveness of fire support. A sizable target acquisition capability at the division artillery and direct support battalion 

levels is needed in order to acquire and destroy targets at lower 

artillery levels in response to more localized needs on the modern 

battlefield. 

In tactical operations planning Vietnam showed that the importance of the fire support co-ordinator and the forward observer 

to the success of a battle has expanded significantly over the past 

decade. The mobility of U.S. forces has advanced to a point that 

in any future conAict, whether a small-scale insurgency or a highintensity war, the situation on the battlefield most likely will be 

fluid, with continuous night and day operations. No longer can the 

Army depend on the neat phasing of operations that permitted 

the luxury of detailed advance planning for employing maneuver 

forces and their supporting fires. Planning will be ongoing and in 

reaction to the circumstances of the moment. Moreover, the weapon 

systems available to support ground troops have proliferated over 

the years, as have the types of ammunition for each system. Fire 

support co·ordinators, particularly at the lower levels (maneuver 

battalion and brigade), will have to be chosen from the very 

best field artillery officers available. They and the forward observers with the maneuver units must bring decisive fire power 

of the right types and amounts to fulfill the needs of the everchanging situation on the ground. On the modern battlefield they 

must know at once what fire support is available, how to get it, 

and how to employ it. They must be able to co·ordinate each of 

the various fire support means available to them so that they 
234 FIELD ARTILLERY 

obtain the maximum effect from all. Through it all they must 

keep direct support battalions fully informed about what the supported maneuver forces are doing on the ground_ 

Despite the challenge that modern warfare presents to the fire 

support co-ordinator and the forward observer, neither can be 

given the training time required to learn their duties on the job_ 

They must be trained and prepared to assume full duties immediately upon arrival in the combat theater. When the system is 

operating correct! y the ground commander, knowing how to use 

fire support, can concentrate on the plan of maneuver, confident 

that his fire support co-ordinator and the fonvard observers will 

arrange the necessary fires to support the maneuver plan with 

minimum supervision. 

The field artillery community has recognized the increased importance of fire support co-ordinators and forward observers and 

has taken action to insure that both will be fully qualified to assume their duties in the event of war. The program of instruction 

on fire support co-ordination for the field artillery officer advanced 

course and the instruction given lieutenants in the basic course 

on duties of the forward observer have been expanded to include 

more practical training in a more realistic environment. Fire planning is also being streamlined and will be realistically based on 

priority, not on quantity of targets. 

We expect the high density of aircraft on the modern battlefield to require that air space usage be carefully co-ordinat~. 

Vietnam exposed the overlapping control of usable air space, tor 

the field artillery was given the mission of controlling air space over 

battle areas because it seemed a logical extension of its duty of 

co-ordinating fires. 1£ the field artillery fire support officer coordinates the activities of all supporting fire in the target area, 

he is in fact co-ordinating the use of air space. The argument is 

valid SO long as the air space co-ordination responsibilities of the 

fire support officer are limited to the target area. But this was not 

in fact the case. These responsibilities most often included a large 

area of operations and involved the issuance of advisories to administrative air traffic as well as all other air traffic entering or 

traversing the area. In Vietnam the artillery liaison sections, particularly at maneuver battalion and brigade levels, devoted a large 

portion of their efforts to controlling, or managing, air traffic, sometimes to the detriment of the primary duty for which they were 

organized and equipped-the co-ordination of supporting fires. At 

present, studies are being conducted to determine how this matter 

might best be resolved. Over the long term, air space management 
AN OVERVIEW 235 

may be automated, and the Army is attempting to determine 

exactly what is required of an automated system before materiel 

is developed. 

Overshadowing the whole problem of managing air space are 

service missions and functions that recognize the Air Force component commander as the air space manager in a combined environment. In practice, the Air Force has allowed the Army to 

manage air space over the battle area. Still, there is no assurance 

that the Air Force will be able to operate in future conflicts as it 

did in Vietnam. 

In materiel, the requirements for upgraded artillery weapons 

in a conventional war conveniently overlap the requirements for 

artillery weapons in a counterguerrilla war. In Vietnam, weapons 

with longer ranges were needed to mass fires and to provide 

increased area coverage, just as they will be needed in a conventional war on the modern battlefield. Also, lightweight artillery 

contributes as much to the strategic mobility of airborne forces as 

it does to the tactical mobility of airmobile forces in either a 

conventional or counterguerrilla war. Both types of force will be 

well served by the new towed models of 105- and 155-mm. howitzers, which are in advanced stages of development. The new weapons will be close to the same weight and will have the same 

reliability but will shoot considerably farther than those they are 

to replace. 

These, then, are the major areas on which the field artillery 

is concentrating its attention to prepare for future conflicts, regardless of the type of battlefield on which it is called to fight. In retrospect it is apparent that field artillery units initially sent to Vietnam 

were not always properly organized to accomplish the job before 

them. Major internal reorganizations and major changes to operating procedures were often required. This is no criticism of the 

state of preparedness to fight in Vietnam, for the U.S. Army was 

trained and its forces were organized to fight in a conventional war. 

There was no time to reorganize, and, even if time had been available, the Army had little counterguerrilla expertise within its ranks. 

Uncertainty of exactly what was to be done or how to do it resulted. 

Vietnam provided valuable insight into how American forces 

might best fight and be organized to fight in future counterguerrilla operations, and detailed tactical field artillery lessons are 

available. 

The challenges peculiar to counterguerrilla warfare for the 

field artillery may be addressed by doctrinal and organizational 

studies to determine how best to employ weapons effectively. These 
236 FIELD ARTILLERY 

studies are relatively inexpensive, so the eventuality of another insurgency can be prepared for despite a redirection of priorities or 

budgetary restrictions. 

The Field Artille'ymall's Performance 

Vietnam underscored certain doctrinal, organizational, and materiel insufficiencies that have been mentioned earlier. They are 

being corrected in the postwar period. It must be noted, however, 

that these insufficiencies did not prevent field artillerymen from 

carrying out their mission. 

In every modern war the performance of the field artillery 

forward observer party has surpassed the most optimistic expectations. Vietnam was no exception. There an observer party generally 

consisted of only two men-the forward observer, who was most 

often a lieutenant but sometimes a junior noncommissioned officer, 

and a radio operator. Americans had in Vietnam the smallest 

forward observer party of any army in the Free World. Numerically, these parties represented a small part of the total field 

artillery force, but their number belied their importance. They 

were responsible for traveling with infantry rifle companies and 

calling for and adjusting indirect artillery fires in support of the 

companies. The forward observers were, therefore, the key to the 

proper functioning of the entire field artillery system-a responsibility that in many armies is fulfilled by the battery commander. 

Vietnam presented unusual problems to the forward observer. 

Thick jungle foliage frequently obscured his observation and, 

thus made difficult the adjustment of fires and determination of 

position. In the Mekong Delta, where observation was good, the 

land was often so flat and unvarying throughout that position determination was difficult. The forward observer used a number of 

tricks to support the infantry: he requested spotting rounds when 

his location was in doubt; he adjusted with smoke before firing 

high-explosive ammunition to insure the safety of ground troops; 

when in dense foliage, he adjusted by sound; and he continuously 

sought out vantage points-hills, rocks, trees-that would allow 

him to observe supporting fires. 

There can be little doubt that the forward observer succeeded 

in supporting the rifle company. The very esteem in which he 

was held by the infantry is evidence enough that he got the job 

done. As in the past, the infantry valued artillery support so much 

that it was hesitant to move without its forward observer or beyond the range of its supporting cannons. If the forward observers 

had done nothing more than provide supporting fires, that would 
AN OVERVIEW 237 

have been enough; most often, they did more. They commonly 

navigated for the company, directed the fires of organic infantry 

mortars, and assisted the company commander in numerous other 

ways. On occasion the forward observer, by virtue of his rank and 

the absence of other company officers, found himself second in 

command succession to the company commander. Vietnam reinforced the reputation of American noncommissioned officers and 

junior officers as the maneuver company commander's strong right 

arm. 

Field artillery fire support co·ordinators at all maneuver levels 

from battalion up also deserve recognition for a job well done. 

The complexities of co·ordinating supporting fires on the modern 

day battlefield in general, and in Vietnam specifically, have been 

discussed earlier. There can be no doubt that tremendous demands 

were placed on fire support co-ordinators, especially those with the 

maneuver battalions and brigades. In addition, they were short on 

doctrine applicable to their situation, they were hampered by 

rules of engagement and necessary clearance procedures, and they 

were required continuously to co·ordinate air space usage. Yet 

they met the challenge superbly. They quickly learned the capabilities of each type of available weapon system, how to get it, 

and how to orchestrate its employment with other weapons on the 

battlefield. 

During offensive operations, the fire support officer with a 

maneuver brigade or battalion often traveled with the maneuver 

commander. Most often the two, in addition to any subordinate 

commanders or staff officers the maneuver commander elected to 

take, orbited the battlefield in a command and control helicopter, 

a control method not likely to be used on the modern battlefield. 

The commander supervised and controlled the maneuver of his 

forces. The fire support officer, normally a field artillery captain, 

brought fire power to the battle area in support of the ground 

forces. He bore heavy responsibility for an officer of his tank. 

His job required that he think and act calmly and precisely, yet 

quickly, under intense pressure in response to the ever-changing 

situation below. 

Artillerymen with firing units did a superlative job in providing continuous, and with the Military Assistance Command rules of 

engagement, responsive, support to ground forces. Their use both 

of existing mobility systems and of the fire base concept allowed 

firing units to follow and support forces with the same high 

quality support accredited to the field artillery in the past. Field 

artillerymen had experience in moving by road convoy and, as 

expected, did it well. Still, the environment increased the dangers 
238 FIELD ARTILLERY 

to convoy movement and necessitated more detailed preparations 

than previously had been required. Roads had to be swept of 

mines and secured in advance, and personnel had to be thoroughly 

rehearsed in counterambush procedures. More impressive than 

their ability to move by convoy was the field artillerymen's ability 

to follow maneuver forces by helicopter and boat. A practiced 

direct support artillery battery could move by air quickly and 

efficiently. With only a few hours notice, battery personnel could 

break down their position and rig all their weapons, equipment, 

barrier materials, and ammunition for sling loads to be carried 

by helicopter. Combat loading was practiced so that when the first 

weapon arrived at its new position, equipment and ammunition 

would be ready to fire at once. The ability to move and support 

by boat was particularly noteworthy because the equipment used 

was simply never designed for that purpose. The development of 

U.S. riverine artillery involved a series of equipment and operational innovations, each one resulting in greater efficiency. 

The most common term to come out of the Viemam war was 

"fire base." The fire base was not a defensive outpost but an 

integral part of an offensive effort. Once the field artillery firing 

unit was moved and positioned, the establishment of a carefully 

planned fire base allowed the unit to stay in the position. The 

fire base provided protection for firing units, even in the most 

hostile regions. If a firing unit was brought into position in the 

morning, by nightfall overhead cover had been constructed, the 

infantry defenses had been prepared, infantry and artillery defensive fires had been integrated and rehearsed, and mutually 

supporting fires from distant fire bases had been planned and 

fired. These defensive preparations insured that the firing unit 

would always be effective when called upon to serve its function 

of supporting offensive operations with indirect fire. 

Normally the fire base was the forward command post of the 

maneuver battalion. The men of the firing units were quick to 

adopt new schemes to bring responsive fire support to the infantry 

from their established fire bases. New procedures in the fire direction centers and at the weapons permitted the rapid shifting of 

fires with no loss of accuracy and little loss of time. 

Field artillery commanders at all levels demonstrated flexibility 

and imagination in the performance of their mission. Much of 

the field artillery had been organized to fight conventionally. As 

a result, changes in organization and procedures had to be made at 

all levels to accommodate the situation. At the battery, fire direction centers were augmented with additional men and equipment 

to provide for decentralized operations and to permit firing units 
AN OVERVIEW 239 

to occupy several separate positions. At direct support battalions, 

it was often necessary to organize additional firing batteries to 

provide the coverage required by maneuver brigades whose area of 

operations might cover hundreds of kilometers. At all battalions, 

many of the maintenance, supply, and administrative activities of 

the batteries were centralized and supervised so that battery commanders were relieved of many of those responsibilities. At higher 

levels, commanders were given new responsibilities such as base 

camp defense, which required internal reorganization of headquarters. Changes to operating procedures often required a corresponding .organizational change, which could only be accomplished by 

use of assets authorized by tables of organization and equipment. 

Thus, when battery fire direction centers were increased in size and 

capability, personnel and equipment were taken from other sections 

within the battery or provided from the existing assets of the parent 

battalion. Or, when an additional firing battery was added to a battalion, it was organized from personnel and equipment taken from 

each of the other batteries. This ability of artillery commanders, restricted by tables of organization and equipment, to accomplish 

necessary internal reorganization to meet the situation was impressive. 

The field artillery advisers in the early years of the war must 

also be recognized. Theirs was the lonely task of "advising" officers 

and men who had been in combat for years. They worked long 

and hard to teach the Vietnamese how to employ American weapons. They Were often frustrated in the early years by the relative 

inefficiency of the Vietnamese artillery and the great reluctance 

with which their advice was sometimes accepted. That these were 

common complaints of the French advisers with the fledgling 

American army in the 1780's made them no less frustrating in the 

1960's. Still, over the years the adviser's efforts achieved results 

and the South Vietnamese artillery at the time of the U.S. withdrawal had officers and men with the requisite knowledge and 

equipment to do the job. 

Effective performance from individual field artillerymen is 

certainly required if the entire system is to be effective but offers 

no assurance that the system will be effective. An assessment of 

field artillery performance cannot be made in isolation from the 

rest of the Army. The field artillery was an integral part of total 

U.S. combat power, all working toward the successful completion 

of a single mission. 

The most professional army that the United States has ever 

fielded was sent to Vietnam to help a faltering nation repel an 

insurgency. Time after time American soldiers met the enemy 
240 FIELD ARTILLERY 

on the battlefield and defeated him soundly. They pushed him 

from hamlets and villages, pursued him across the countryside, 

drove him from the highlands, and finally followed him into his 

sanctuaries. They bought time for the South Vietnamese to build 

their armed forces and bring their government to their people. It 

is true that American forces did not destroy the enemy; he could 

not be destroyed, only repulsed, because of the boundary limitations 

and manpower restrictions that were imposed. But Americans left 

Vietnam a stronger nation with the requisite know-how and equipment to do the job. 

In all of this, the field artillery contributed significantly to the 

successful completion of the Army's mission. It helped ground 

forces repel the enemy and followed the ground forces in pursuit. 

It aided in the protection of hamlets, government installations, and 

lines of communication and held the enemy at bay while the South 

Vietnamese government worked with the people to better their 

lives and gain their support. It also helped build and strengthen 

the South Vietnamese field artillery to a point where it is capable 

of providing the support needed by its army. That is what the field 

artillery set out to do. 
Index 

A Shau Valley: 157-60, 168 

Abrams, General CreiglHon W.: 197,218. 

See aiso United Siaies Army, Viet· 

nam; United States Military Assist· 

ance Command, Vietnam. 

Accidents, prevention and investigation 

of: 176-79 

A<lmini ~lration, cond uct of: 23, 43, 226, 

239 

Advise .. ' 21-37. 190. 192.219.230.239 

Aerial ob.o;crvers: 83, 94, 96, 179, 228 

Aerial rocket artillery: 50-5 I, 8B, 90-96, 

100-10. 118. l3l. 141-42. 212. 219. 

See also Tactical air support. 

Aerial supply. See Airlifts of troops and 

supplies. 

Agriculture: &-7 

Air Assault Division, 11th: M-54 

Air assaults, See Airborne operations; 

Airmobilily concept, development 

and application of; Parachute assaults, 

Air defense: 47,60,219 

Air defense, enemy: 31, 157-59 

Air operations. Set: Strategic air support; 

Tactical air support. 

Air space, co·ordinating usage of: 4B, 1 i9, 

234-35, 237 

Air strikes. See Strategic air support; Tactical air support. 

Air supply. See Airlifts of troops and supplics. 

Airbol'l1e Brigade, 173d: 3B, BI-86, 110, 

112-20. 131 

Airborne Infantry Regiments 

32711" 121- 24 

503d: 117 

Airborne operations: 51, 117 

Aircraft. See al50 Helicoptcrs. 

8-52: 9'1- 95, 120, 151-54, 157, 160,210-

II. 223 

C-47, 129 

C-123, 107 

C-124, 108 

C-130, 52. 107-08. 112. 117 

Aircraft-Continued 

C-141' 168 

sa relY. assuring: 179 

Iransport by. Set: AirIHIS of troops and 

supplies. 

Aircraft warning centers: 179,201 

Airfields, construction or: 17, 112 

Airlifts of troops and supplies: 34-55, 

44, 52-56, 75, 81-83, 88-96, 101-04, 

107- 10, 133, 147, 156, 16S, 185, 213, 

219. 238 

Airmobile Divisions 

1st Cavalry: 53-54, 75, 86-96, lOS, 130, 

142. 15&-60. 168. 207-15 

JOist Airborne: 54, 160, 167 

Airmobile firing platfonn. Su Fire sup· 

port. 

Airmobility concept. development and 

application of: 54, 53-54, SI- S2, 84, 

89- 96. 101. 133. 155-60.219 

Amb ush actions: 39,90, 165 

Ambush actions, enemy: 51,75.96,107 

Americal Division. See Infantry Divi· 

sions, 2M. 

Ammunition 

antipersonnel projectile, XM546: 61, 

79 

Beehh'e round : 61,79. 108-10, 11 3, 120, 

127.129. 161. 163. 193.213-14 

expenditures and resupply: 49, 75-76, 

83. 95. 104-06. 118. 121. 129. 142. 

146--47,151.159-60, 165, 167, 185- 86, 

195. 212 

improved conventional munitions: 148, 

164--65 

incendiary rounds: 174 

in Republic of Vietnam Army: 27 

smoke rounds: HIO, J 75 

time-fuled: 61 

white phosphorous: 85, 130 

An Khe: 89,92 

An Khe Pass: 221 

An Lao Valley: 101 

An Loc: 144, 221-24 

An My: 146 
242 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Anderson. Captain Charles C.: 117 

Anderson. Staff Sergeant Wch~lcr: 122- 24 

Angel's Wing area: 206 

Annamilc l\·folllllains: 5 

Antiaircraft dcfcll5cs. See Air defenses. 

Antipersonnel projectile XM:i46. Su Am· 

munition . 

Ap Bac: 30 

Arc Light. Su Tactical air sUppori. 

Areas o( operations: 42. 2M) 

CHlU: 75 

Armor support: 107 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 11th : 96, 

110-17, 207-15 

Armored personnel cnrricn: ~I 

Army Artillery: 42 

Army Rescrve units: 97 

Artillery assistance programs: 190--205 

Artillery Battalions. See nlso Artillery 

units. 

IS(. 5th Artillery: 111-17, 166-67 

ht. 7th Artillery: 76, 86, 107- 10, 112-

17,142 

lst. 8th Artillery: 61, 115. 16.3-65 

ht, 11th Artillery: 168 

1st. 21st Artillery: 49.95, 140, 157-60 

1st, Mth Artillery: 104. 142. 155, 157-

60 

hI, 391h Artillery: 168,219 

1st, 40th ATtillery: 147-48 

1st, 44th Artillery: 189 

1st, 77th Artillery: 106 

1st, 83d Arlillery: 142, 147,1.58-60,169 

lst, 84th Artillery: 70, 168 

1st, 92d Artillery: 192,195-96 

2d, 4th Artillery : 124-29, 168 

2d, 9th Artillery: 181 

2d, II th Anillery: 111-17 

2d, 121h Artillery: 168 

2d, 13th Artillery: 107, 111-117, 143, 

16.5. 172-73 

2d, 17th AniUery: 89-96 

2d, 19th Artillery: 89, 106. 110, 157-

160 

2d, 20th Artillery : 118-20. 158-60 

2d, 26th Artillery: 179 

2d, 32d Artillery: 111-17 

2<1, 3311 Artillery: 107,112- 17 

2<1. 35th Arlillery: 111- 17 

2d, 40th Artillery: 147 

2d. 77th Artillery: 111-17,120-21 

2d, 94th Artillery: 219 

2d. 1381h A1"tillery: 167-68 

Artillery Ballalions-Conlinucd 

211, 320th Artill ery: 61, 86, 121-24 

3d. 13th Artillery: 111- 17.120-21 , 161-

65 

3d, 16th Artillery: 121 -24 

3d, Mth Artillery: 77, 147, 168 

3d, 82d Artillery: tll-17 

3d. 1971h Arti llery: 167-68, I i2 

3d, 319th Artillery: 81-86, 107, J 12- 17, 

129, 172 

4th. 42d Artillery: 194 

4th, 60th Artillery: 194 

4th, 77lh Artillery: 167. 219 

5th. 2d Artillery: 111 - 17 

6th, 15th Artillery: 165 

6th, 16th Artillery: 110 

6th. 27th Artillery: 108, 111 - 17 

6th, 77th Artillery: 163-65 

7th, 8th Artillery: 108 

7th, 91h Artillery: I I 1-17 

7th, 11th Artillery: 111- 17, 161-63 

8th, 4th Artillery: 158-60,219 

8th, 6th Artiller)': 72, 107-10. 112- 17. 

166-67 

8th, 25th Artillery: 179 

Slh. 26th Artillery: 179 

Artillery Command, Republic or Vietnam Armed Forces: 204 

Artillery Croups 

23d: 73,87, 133,1'16,167,169,189,200, 

207 

41st: 133-54, 167, 169 

52d: 169, 190,194-95,213 

54th: 112, 147. 167. 169 

108th: 155, 167,219- 20 

Artilliery and Missile School. Su Artillery School. 

Artiller)' raids, Su Fire support. 

Artillery School: 23, 25-26, 84, 154-56, 

227, 233 

Artillery schools, Republic oC Vietnam 

Army: 191,200-205,220,228-29 

Artillery units. Su also Artillery nattalions. 

in airliCts. Su Airlifts of troops and 

supplies. 

in airmobile division: 54 

in aTluy artillery: 42 

arrivals and departures: 3, 38, 81, 

86-87, 110, 129, 167-68, 215, 217 

artillery assistance program: 190-205 

combat effectiveness and deficiencies: 

231, 236-40 
INDEX 243 

Artillery Ullits-Contillued 

in corps artilJery: 42, 44-45, 255 

critiques of operations: 129--36, 16S66, 251-36 

in division artillery: 40-44, 46-47, 86, 

96-97, 255 

emplacement and displacement: 44--4:', 

50, 55, . 101-04, 107-08, 118-20, )33, 

212-13. 215, 226-27, 232. See aLto 

Airlifts of troops ;1I1c1 supplies. 

enemy: 13 

exchange program: 199 

in Field Forces: 45-47,87 

fourth battalion concept: 169-70 

group organization: 42, 87 

infantry, relations with : 4H4, 55 

Jungle Bauery: 200 

los5Cs. See Materiel IOS5CS. 

mobility of: 45,51-55,238 

nondivisional unilS: 46-47, ~97 

organization anti training: 5,25--24,58-

59,45,81, 87,96-97, 153-56, 16S-", 

251, 233-54, 23S-59 

in parachute assaults: 51, 117 

personnel problems. See Personnel 

management and turbulence. 

platoon program: 215-16 

proficiency tellS: 134 

separate battalions: 86 

soldiers, demands on and accomplishments: 129-30, 239-40 

strength, periodic: 97, U6. 169 

task organizations: 170-71 

Artillery warning control centers: 48, 

116, 179, 211 

Artillery weapons 

8-inch howitzer: 44, 50, 59, 61 

105-mm. howitzer: 55, 49--50, 59, 61. 

70, 77-79, 235 

155-mm. howitzer: 44. 47, 49--50. 59, 

61, 70, 116, 235 

175·mm, gun: 50, 59 

in airlifts. See Airlifts of troops and 

suppJies. 

on barges: 77-80 

deficienciCl and improvements: 155. 

251,255 

dispositions and emplacements: 55-59, 

70-71, 76-80 

Duster 40-mm. weapon: 50, 97. 111. 

165-65 

enemy types: 11,227 

on landing craft: 76-77 

Australian rorces: 48, 83-84 

Aviation Group. 11th: 159-60 

Awanb. See D('cora tions and awards. 

Ba Ria : 145 

Ban Me Thuot: 158 

Barges, artillery usc or: 77-80, 147, 258 

Base camps: 17,44,73-75,160 

Base camps, enemy: 11 2. 20!i, See also 

Camhodia; L.aos. 

nearcat: 110 

Beehive round. See Ammunition. 

neiler. Capta in John A.: 77 

Ben Het: 11ft. 1%.230 

Ben Tre: 138.1 45 

Ri('n Roa : RI, R3, 108, 143, 145, 167-68. 

179 

Binh Dinh Province: 98-110 

Binh Duong Province: 167 

Binh Gia: 107 

Binh Long Province:: 221 

BINH TAY I operation: 215-15 

BlltMINCHAM operation: 106-10 

BLACK HORSE operation: 100-10 

Bon Tri: 141 

Bong Son: 35, 100-106 

Box fire, application of. See Fire support. 

Bridge demolition. enemy: 188 

Brown, Major General Charles P.: 19, 

154 

Bu Dop: 212 

Bulldozers: 162-65 

Bunker systems: 75 

Bunker systems. enemy: 147.154.214 

Ca Lu: 155 

Caches, enemy. See Food losses, enemy; 

Materiel lo55CI, enemy. 

Calibration and registration. See Fire 

support. 

Cam Ranh: 19 

Cam Ra~h Bay: 16 

Cambodia: 5-6, 108, 120, 143, 165-66, 

175,182,194-95,205- 15,230 

Camp. Brigadier General Marlin W.: 107 

Camp Carroll: 12, 151. 155 

Camp Enari: 75 

Camp Evans: 156 

Camp Holloway: 89 

Camp Radcliff: 7S. 92 

Can Tho: IS8 

Canals. See Waterways. 
244 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Capital Military Assistance Command: 

169 

Capital Military District: 145, 167, 169 

Casualties: 94-95. 110. 113. 121 , 123--24, 

129.162-63.166.176.182 

allied: 17.38,219 

enemy: 15.30,83-84,89,91,94-95.98. 

106. 110. 112-13. 120. 129. 142. 14&-

48, 154-55, 157, 160, 162-63, 165--66, 

182. 195.214.219 

Cavalry Battalions and Squadrons 

lst, 4th Cavalry: 107 

1st, 5th Cavalry: 94-96 

1st, 7th Cavalry: 92-96, 157 

1st. 8th Ca valry: 90, 111- 17 

lst, 9th Cavalry: 90, 155 

2d, 7th Cavalry: 94-96. lri6-57 

2d, 8th Cavalry: 91 

2d. 12th Cava1,y: 89-96. 108. 110. 140-

42 

5th. 7th Cavalry: 140-41 

Cay Giap Mountains: 101 

Cease-fire agreements: 137. 229 

Central Highlands: s-6. 117-20 

Cenlral Office of South Vietnam: 111-

12. 206 

Chariton. Major Daniel P.: 77 

Chemical agents: 174 

China. People's Republic of: 6 

Cllu-Luc-Quan: 9 

Chu Pong Massif: 92,94 

Chup Plantation: 207 

Civic action programs: 188-89 

Civil affairs: 44.46 

Civilian Irregular DC£ense Croups: 87. 

89. 92. 112. 122-24. 148. 191. 193. 

195. 200. 204-05. 213 

Civilians, control of and support by: 20, 

35. 44-45. 138. 174 

Clearances, fire. See Fire support. 

Climate: 7 

Cluster bomb unit: 148 

Coastal Lowlands area: 5, 7 

Combat service support: 40. 75 

Combat support: 40, 106 

Command and control: 29, 42. 46-47, 55, 

86-87. 112. 130. 237-38 

Command and control. Republic of Viet· 

nam Army: 19-20, 22, 29, 37, 43. 

145. 169. 216 

Communications systems and operations: 

32-33.40.43.83. 106. 125. 132. 155-56 

Communications systems and operations, 

enemy: 143, 159, 228 

Computers, tactical use of: 136 

Congress of Unification: 8 

Conscription programs, enemy: 10 

Continental Army Command: 38 

Convoys, supply ancl movement by: 52, 

18!'1. 237-M 

Corps 

XXIV: 168-69.179.202.21&-17 

organization: 45 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam: 167,169 

Corps Artillery 

XXIV, 11. 20H)2. 204. 21&-17. 219 

XXX: 87 

Pro\lisional Corps. Vietnam: 169 

Corps Tactical Zones: 19 

1: 86. 118-24. 138-43. 147-48. 160. 167-

68. 181 

11 : 38. 87-96. 134. 138-57. 169. 190-91. 

213 

lll: 86. 110. 112. 140. 143-47. 157. 168-

69. 198 

IV: 147. 168-69.226 

Counlerbattcry/countermortar fire. See 

Fire support. 

Counterinsurgency. meeting: 7-8, 255-36 

"Crachin": 7 

Crain, Staff Sergeant Carrol V.: 110 

Critiques of operations: 129-36, 165-66. 

231-36. See also Lcsssons learned. 

Crittenbcrger. Brigadier Ceneral Willis 

D .• ) .. : 111 

Cu Chi: 145-44. 147 

Cushman, Lieutenant Ceneral Robert E., 

USMC: 149 

Da Lat: 18. 191 

Da Nang: 11- 12.18.81.138.179 

Daisy Cutter bomb: 160 

Dim Quan Du Kich: 9 

DAN QUYEN operation: 195 

DAN THANe: o~ration: 30 

Dang Lao Dong: 8 

Dang Tri Mountains: 148 

Dau Tieng: 143. 182, 223 

Da\lis, Pri\late First Class Sammy L.: 127-

29 

Dean, Lieutenant Colonel Robert: 61 

Decorations and awards: 110, 123. 128. 

167 

DC£ectors, enemy. See Repatriation program. 
INDEX 245 

DELAWARE operation: 157-60 

Demilitarized Zone: 13, 179, 181, 220-21 

DEWEY CANl'ON operation: 219 

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 18.20,22.37 

Dien Bien Phu: 21 

Dinh Thong Province: 124 

Direct fire, See Fire support. 

Distinguished Service Cross award: 110 

Districts and district chiefs: 19 

Division Artillery 

1st Cavalry Division: 86, 142. 156--60 

In Infantry Division: 86, 107-17. 172 

4th Infantry Division: J 18-20. 188. 194 

9th Infantry Division : 110, 168 

25th Infantry Division: 111-J7, 121. 

161-6~ 

Documents. capture :lIlcl exploitation of: 

15- 17.84.137-38 

Dong Ha: 167,221-22,224 

Dong Nai River: 84 

Dong Tam: 124 

DONG TI£N operation: 198-200 

Dong Xoai : 81-82 

Drugs: 226 

Duc Hoa : 144 

Duc My: 25, 191 

Duster 40-mm. weapon. See Artillery 

wcapons. 

EACLE'S CLAW opcration: 100-10 

Engineer support: 107 

ENHANCE project: 205. 216-17, 229 

EqUipment losses. See Matcriellos.ses. 

FADAC (field artillery digital computer): 

136 

Field Artillery School. See Artillery 

School. 

Field expcdien ts: 70 

Field Forces, Vietnam: 42,45 

1,86-87. 190.194 

11 ,86-87. 110-17. 143.147.225 

Field Forces, Vietnam, Artillery 

I, U3. 169. 190-94. 198. 200. 215-16. 

226 

11 ,87. 111- 17.134.145.169.172.198. 

204. 206. 210-15 

Field Front Headquarlers, North Vietnamese Army: 92-93 

Field liaison Directorate, Republic of 

Vielnam Army: 229 

Fire adjustment. See Aerial observers; 

Forward observers. 

Fire Rases: 17. 55- 72, 110. 121-24. U6, 

161-67. 238 

!i and 6: 222-23 

BARIIARA: 224-25 

BASTOC':NE: 221 

BEAURECARO: 120-21 

BUELl.: 165 

n URT: 120-2 1 

CARROLL: 217 

CROOK: 166, 182 

CUDGEL: 124-29 

GOLD: 113 

MACE: 126-27 

MALONE: 182 

MAURY I : 161-63 

NANCl': 217 

PACE: 221 

PIKE VI: 163-65 

Fire control, co-ordination and direction 

of: 18, 35, 41-44, 47-49, 55, 83-84, 

96-97. 107. 112-15. 118-20. 152-35. 

142. 151 . 174 . 195-96. 199-201.210-

15.219.230.233-34.257-38 

Fire co·ordination. See Fire control, coordination and direction of. 

FIRE CRACKER ammunition: 148 

Fire direction, See Aerial observers; Fire 

control, co·ordination and direction 

of; Forward observers. 

Fire dirCClion centers: 30, 32, 39, 41, 59, 

68-69. 72. 132-33. 136. 155-56. 238-

39 

Fire Direction Officer's School, Republic 

of Vietnam Army: 200 

Fire support. See olso Aerial rocket artillery; Tactics. 

from airmobile firing platform: 124, 

147 

artillery raids: 184-88, 216 

(rom barges: 77-80, 147,238 

in base camp defense: 73-75 

box fire: 151-53 

calibration and registration: 199-200, 

228 

in Cambodia: 205-16 

clearances for: 48. 83-86, 142-43, 145, 

151. 168. 173-79. 196. 215. 230. 237 

control, co·ordination, and direction: 

18. 35. 41-44. 47-49. 55. 83-84. 96-

97. 107. 112- 13. 118-20. 132-35. 142. 

151. 174. 195-96. 199-201. 210-15. 

219. 230. 253-54. 257-58 
246 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Fire support-Continucd 

counlcrbattcry / countcrmortar fire: 

61-69,85,117,120,156,227-28 

in counterguerrilla operalions: 7-8, 

235-36 

at Dak To: 117-20 

deficiencies and corrections: 18, 8!-84:, 

231-32 

direct fire: 61. 73. 79, 153--54 

effectiveness: 95, 106. 1I~18. 146-47 

enemy: 13. 149 

erron, investigating: 177 

fire plan: 68--69 

firing data. computing: 152-33, 17$-76 

harassing and interdiction missions: 

151, 187-88 

in la Orang campaign: 87-96 

indirect fire: 69-70, 238 

intelligence and interdiction fires: 188 

at Kalum: 165 

at Khe Sanh: 148-57 

Killer Junior and Senior techniques: 

61,164 

in Laos: 218-19 

lessons learned: 5, 18, 51-57. 59, 84-

86, 95-96, 115-16, 130-36, 161-65, 

231-36 

mission assignment: 40-42, 45-47. 174-

75, 231 

multiple volley missions: 151 

mutually supporting: 69, 96. 166. 258 

in parachute assaults: 51, 117 

by Republic of Vietnam Army: 26-.5~ 

in riverine operations: 75-80, 2~8 

in Saigon area: 157 

at Thien Ngon: 165 

time.on.target fires: 41, 1M, lSI , 188, 

195, 211 

types: 48 

Fire support base •. See Fire bases. 

Fire support co·ordination centers: 48, 

83, 199-200 

Fire support co·ordinator: 47 

Fire support clement: 48 

Firing charts: ~2, 72, 156 

Firing data, computing. See Fire support. 

Firing tables: 61 

:Fish Hook area: 206--07 

FISII HOOK operation: 166-()7 

Flares, tactical use of: 35, 59, 7~. See also 

Illumination, battlefield. 

Food losses, enemy: 85-84, 92 

Forward observers: 29-~O, 4~, 47-48, 68, 

72,83,89,96, 130-33, 179, 190-91,214, 

2~!-S4, 2~6-~7 . See also Aerial ob· 

servers. 

Foster, Lieutenant Nathaniel: 72 

Fourth battalion concept. See Artillery 

units. 

France and French Army: 21-22, 25-27, 

29-32, 83, 239 

Free Wold Military As.sistance Forces: 

1~4. 200. 211. See also by name. 

Gadsden Village: 189 

Gavin, Lieutenant General James M.: 

53-54 

General Reserve, Republic of Vietnam 

Army: 169 

Geneva Accords, 1954 : 8, 10, 22 

Geography. See Terrain fea tures. 

Gia Dinh Province: 145 

Giap, General Vo Nguyen: 9, 17 

Go Dau Ha : 207 

Grenade assaults, enemy: In, 122, 127. 

161, 163 

Grenade launchers: 60 

Guerrilla units and operations, enemy: 

9,22,30, 135-36 

Gulf of Tonkin: 7, ~8 

Hamlet organization: 19-20 

Harassing and interdiction fires. See 

Fire support. 

Hay, Major General John H., Jr.: 167 

Helgoland (hospital ship); 189 

Helicopters 

AH-IG Huey Cobra: 50 

CH-21 Shawnee: 55 

CH-54 Choctaw: 54 

CH-57 Mohave: 81-82 

CH-I7 Ch;nook: 54-55, 75, 103-04, 107 

CH-54 Tarhe (Crane): 54-55, 75, 104 

UH-I Huey: 50,54 

airlifts by. See Airlifts of troops and 

supplies. 

assaults by. See Tactical air support. 

fire support by. See Tactical air IUp' 

port. 

losses: 51, 159-00 

supply and transport by. See Airlifts 

of troops and supplies. 

Highway I: 100, 143, 224 

H;ghway 9: 149, 155-57, 218-19 

mghway 13: 1«,146,221,223 
INDEX 247 

Highway 14: 194, 221 

Highway 14N: 188 

Highway 19: 38,221 

Highway 19E: 188 

Highway 548: 159 

Highway 555: 224 

Hill 471: 1:.5 

Hill 758: 154 

Hill 861: 149 

Hill 875: 118 

Hill 881S: 154 

Ho Chi Minh: 8 

Ho Chi Minh Trilil: 221 

Hoc Mon: 143 

HOll Nghia Province: 167 

Howze, General Hamilton H.: 53 

Hue: 18, 138-43, 168, 221-22, 224-2(, 

Ia Orang Valley: 87-96 

Illumination, battlefield: 59-60, 94, 120, 

127, 177 

Improved conventional munitions. See 

Ammunition. 

Improvement and Modernization Plan, 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces: 

196-97, 202 

Indirect fire. See Fire support. 

Indochinese Communist Party: 8 

In£antry 

artillery relationship with: 4~4. 55 

support of and by: 32, 4S-44, 59-61, 

107~8, 165, 236-38 

I!1fantry Battalions 

ht, 503<1 Infantry: 8S 

2d. SOlS{ Infantry: 140,142 

2d. 50Sd Infantry: 8S 

3d, 60th Infantry: 168 

4th, 2Sd Infantry: 161-63 

Infanlry Brigades 

1st, 1st Cavalry Division: 89-96, 101-

06, 118-20, 159-60 

1st, 4th Infantry Division: 117-20 

1st, 5th Mechanized Division: 50, 167, 

220 

1st, 9th In£antry DiviSion: 111-17 

1st. IOIst Airborne Division: 86, 121-

24, 167 

2d, lst Cavalry Division: 95-96. 101-

06, 155-57 

2d, 1st Infantry Division: 86 

2d, 9th Infantry Division: 76 

2d, IOlst Airborne Division: 110 

Infantry Brigades-Conlinued 

3d, 1st Cavalry Division : 92-96, 100-

106, 138-42, 156-60,212- 15 

3d, 4th Infantry Division: J 1 1-17 

3d, 9th Infanlry Division: 168 

Sd, 82d Airborne Division: 168 

!kl, 10ht Airhorne Division: 110 

196th Light: 96, 111-17 

1991h Light: 96, 111- 17. 145, 147 

Infantry Divisions 

America!. See 23d (America) below. 

1st: 75, 106-17, 138, 144, 146, 167 

4th: 73, 96,117-20,213-15 

9.h: 96, 124-29, 134, 168,226 

23d (Ame,",al): 110,167,172,202 

25.h: 96, 110-17, 120-21, 143, 147, 165, 

182, 212-15 

Infantry Regiments 

22d: 113, 120 

6O.h: 124-29 

Infiltration, enemy: 8-10, IS8, 148 

Infrared devices: 73 

Inspections: 176 

Instructors. Republic of Vietnam Army: 

201~, 204, 229 

Intelligence and interdiction fires. Su 

Fire support. 

Intelligence operations and reports: 44, 

91, 98-101, 106, 117, 125, 132, 153-

54, 157, 159. 195, 205-06, 218, 220-

21 

Intelligence operations and reports. en· 

emy: 148 

Iron Triangle area: 116-11 

Irrigation canals. See Waterways. 

Jennings, Sergeant Delbert 0.: 110 

JIM BOWIE operation: 104 

Johnson. Lyndon n.: 38, 128 

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 197 

Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces: 19, 193, 218, 220 

loint operations. See Riverine operalions. 

JUNCTION CiT\' operation: 111-17. 136 

Jungle Battery. Su Artillery units. 

Katuro: 117. 165 

KEN GIANG operation: 124-29 

Kennedy, John F.: 22 

Kentucky National Guard, 167-68 

Khe Sanh: 148-57, 168, 182,219,231 

Khe Sanh Plateau: 218 
248 F IELD ARTILLERY 

Killer Junior and Senior techniques. See 

Fire support. 

Kim Son Valley : 101 , 108 

Kontum: 138, 192.222-24 

Kontum Pass: 22 1 

Kontum Province: 117. 194-95.223 

Korean (orces. See Republic of Korea 

forces, 

La Vang: 224 

Lai Khe: 107, 144. 146 

LAM SoN operations: 157-60, 218-19, 

224.250 

Lan, Major General Lu Mong. Republic 

of Vietnam Army: 194 

Landing crart, artillery fire from: 75-77 

Landing Zones: 17, 51,52,90 

ALBANY; 94-95 

B'RD: 61. 1011--10. 136 

BUCKHORn: 116 

COLUMBUS: 95-96 

FALCON: 92-95 

NOL£: 142 

STADIUM : 92 

STUD: 155-57 

X·RAY; 92-94 

Lang Vai: 148 

Language barrier: 48. 154 

Lao Dong Party : 8 

Laos: 5. 7. 154. 181. 194-95.2111-19.221 

LeaRets, warning by: 174 

Lessons learned: S. 18, 51-37. 59, 84-86. 

95- 96. 1IS-16. 130-36. 161-65.231-36 

Liaison personnel and measures: 18. 21, 

46. 48. 68. 8S-84. 89. 106. 112- 13. 

120. 134-55. 142. 145. 179. 190. 192. 

196.201.207.213-15. 234 

Liberation Army of the Front: 9 

Lien.Viet : 8 

Lines of communica tion: 27. 45 

Loc N;nh: 11 7. 137.221 

Logistical systems and operations: 23.43. 

46. 185. 192. 198. 202. 216 

Logistical systems and operations. en· 

emy: 9. 205 

Lon Nol: 205 

Long Binh: 143-45 

Loudspeakers, warning by: 174 

MAcARTllUR operation: 117-20 

McG uire. Brigadier General Thomas j.: 

215-16 

Machine guns: 60 

Machine guns. enemy: 13 

McNamara , Robert S.: 196 

McNamara Wall: 181:-82 

Maintcnance and repair: 23. 44. 186-87. 

198.216.239 

Malaya: 20. 51 

Map reading: 13()-31 

Marxist Study Club: 8 

MASHER operat ion : 98-110 

Materic1losscs: 129. 149. 151, 161-63.219 

enemy: 83,91- 92. 101. 112- 13. 15&-57. 

159-60. 182. 214. 227 

Republic of Vietnam Army: 222-23 

Meda l of Honor awards: 110, 123, 128. 

167 

Medica l Civic Action Program: 188-89 

Medical evacuation and treatment: 121. 

123 

Medical suppl y losses, enemy: 92 

Mekong River and Delta: 5-6. 30. 52. 

75-SO. 147.221.226.256 

Meteorological data : 30. 185-84, 199--200, 

228 

METRO MEDIA opera tion : 226 

Midway conference: 197 

Mil system: 32. 70, 72. 135-36 

Mildren. Lieutenant General Frank T .: 

187-88 

Military Academy, Republic of Vietnam: 

191 

Military assistance programs: 21-22, 19()-

205 

Military Assistance Training Agency : 23 

Military Regions: 42 

I: 201. 204--1)5. 217-25. 229 

II: 204-05. 221-23. 226. 229 

III: 205.207.213. 22 1. 223.229 

IV: 110.205. 226 

Militia units, enemy. See Paramilitary 

units. enemy. 

Minh, Major General Nguyen Van: 221 

MinCng opera tions: 59,73 

Mining operations, enemy: 14- 15. 107, 

188. 238 

Mission assignment . See Fire support. 

Mobile Riverine Force: 147 

Mobile Strike Force, 3d: 173. 200 

Monsoons. See Weather, effect on oper· 

alions. 

Montagnards: 154 

Mora le problems: 226 

Mora le status. Republic of Vietnam 

Army: 27-28.3 1.35-37.216 
INDEX 249 

Mortar fire assaults: 237 

Mortar fire assaults. enemy: II . 15. 68, 

89.92.95. 108. 115. 120. 122-26. 158. 

145. 149. 156, 161. 163, 166, 180, 182 

Mortars: 60 

enemy: 13 

Republic of Vietnam: 27-28.34-35 

Motor vehicles: 44 

Multiple volley missions. See Fire support. 

Murray. Private First Class William H.: 

128 

Mutually supporting fires. See Fire support. 

My Chanh River: 22S-24 

My Tho: 158.145.147 

My Tho River: 147 

Napalm, tactical use of: 94 

National Guard units: 97, 167-68, 172 

National Liberation Front: 8--10, 137-38, 

142. 144 

National Police: 138, 144-45, 169 

Naval air and gunfire support: 45, 47. 

76-80. 100. 106. 141-42 

Navarre. General Henri-Eugtne: 21 

Navigation, land: 43, 130, 237 

New Hampshire National Guard: 167-

68. 172 

New Plei Djereng: 213 

New Zealand forces: 48 

Newport: 144 

Newsmen: 82 

Nguyen Hue offensive: 221-22, 227-28. 

250 

Nha Trang: 25, 86-87. 138 

Night operations: 88 

Night operations, enemy: I I, 50, 108, 

122-24. 151 

Nixon, Richard M.: 168, 190, 193, 197 

Noncommissioned officers: 24, 136 

Noncommissioned officers, Republic of 

Vietnam Army: 25 

Nondivisional artillery. S~~ Artillery 

units. 

North Vietnamese Army: 9-14, 87-96, 

III. 118. 157-57. 166. 182. 196. 205. 

221-25. 228. ~e also Viet Congo 

9th Division: 221 

304th Division: 156 

4th Regiment: 138 

6th Regiment: 138 

18th Regiment: lOG-WI, 106 

North Vietnamese Army-Continued 

22d Regiment: 101 , 108 

28 th Regiment: 195 

32d Regiment: 91-92 

.33d Regiment: 91-9.3 

40th Artillery Regiment: 195 

66th Regiment: 91-94, 195 

210th Regiment: 100 

Northern Mountains area: ~ 

Northern Plains area: .3,5,7 

O'Daniel, Lieutenant General John W.: 

22. See also United States Military 

Assistance Advisory Croup, Vietnam. 

Officer Candidate School: 135 

Officers, Republic of Vi<'lnam Army: 25-

26. 51. 205 

Okinawa: 81 

On· the-job training: 134, 199,234 

Operational control. Su Command and 

control. 

Operational readiness evaluations: 199 

Operations procedures. Su Fire support; 

Tactics. 

OI'OOD 17-65: 85 

Orientation training: 39, U!--SS 

Outposts: 17,27,32 

Parachute assaults: 31 ,117 

Paramilitary units, enemy: 9-10 

Paramilitary units, Republic of Vieinam. 

See Civilian Irregular Defense 

Groups; Popular Forces; Regional 

Forces. 

Parrot's Beak area: 206 

Patrol actions: GO. 73, 75, 81. 95, 113, 

165, 182 

Peers, Lieutenant General William R.: 

118. 194 

PECASUS operation: 155-57 

People's Army of Vietnam. Se~ North 

Vietnamese Army. 

People's Liberation Armed Force: 9-14. 

e~ also Viet Congo 

People's Revolutionary Party: 8. 20 

Perimeter defense: 39, 54-61. 7.3-75. 90, 

95-94. 12~29. 136. 148-57. 16H;6 

Personnel management and turbulence: 

25. 226. 228. 259 

Philippines Embassy: 144 

Philippines forces: 48 

Photogrammetric survey: 116 

Photography, aerial: 116 
250 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Phu Chang: 145 

Phu Loi: 73, 75, 106-07, 14!H6, 189 

Phuc Long Province: 108 

Phuoc Vinh: 75 

Physical training: 59 

Pike. Douglas: 8 

Piper, First Lieutenant John T.: 109--10 

Platoon program. See Artillery units. 

Plei Me: 87, 91-92 

Pleiku: 87-96, 190, 194 

Political crises: !l7 

Political structure 

enemy: 7-9 

Republic of Vietnam: 18-19 

Popular Forces, Republic of Vietnam: 

19-20, 169, 190-92, 196, 198,202,215 

Population, control of. See Civilians. control of and support by. 

Power plants: 144 

Presidential Unit Citation award: 110 

Press corps: 82 

Prey Vang: 207 

Prisoners of War, enemy: SO. 84, 89, 91, 

10(HOI, 106, 115, 160, i95 

Provinces and province chiefs: 18-19 

Quan Da Special Zone: 201 

Quan Loi: 12 

Quang Nam Province: 17 

Quang Nga Province: 98 

Quang Tri: 138, 155,222,224 

Quang Tri Province: 150,218,224 

Quang TTi River: 148 

Que Chu: HIHI 

Qui Nhon: 108. US, 222 

Quirey. Brigadier General William 0.: 

190-91 

QUVET TONG operation: 157 

Racial tensions: 226 

Radar systems: 179 

AN / MPQ-4- countermortar: 11. 116-

17, 12!, 18G-8I, 232 

AN /TP5-25 ground surveillance: n. 

180,232 

AN /TP5-58 target,locating: 232 

R.adio communications. See Communications systems and operations. 

Radio set AN /eRA-39: 176 

Ranges. artillery pieces. See Artillery 

weapons, by type. 

Recoilless riHe fire: 151 

Recoilless rifle fire. enemy: 11 . 89. 115. 

122-24, 126- 29 

Recoilless rifles: 60 

Recoilless rifles. enemy: 15 

Reconnaissance 

aerial: 68. 116. 124. 187 

enemy: 148, 165 

by fire: 96. 166 

ground: 75. 135-56. 148. 155. 160 

map: 187-88 

Red River and Delta: 5--6 

Reference points: 70 

Refugees. assistance to: 189 

Regional Development Program: 158 

Regional (orccs. enemy. See Paramilitary 

uniu, enemy. 

Regional t'orces, Republic o( Vietnam: 

19-20, 169, 190-92, 196, 198, 202, 205, 

215 

Registration procedures: 199-200,228 

Reorganization TeChnique Plan, Republic of Vietnam: 204 

Repair facilities and parts. See Maintenance and repair. 

Repatriation programs: 110 

Republic of Korea forces: 48. 98 

Republic of Vietnam: 18-20.158 

Republic of Vietnam Air Force: 214.218 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces: 19. 

138, 196-97,203-04,217,225 

Republic of Vietnam Army: 48, 82. 89. 

98, 110, 14IH5, 148, 169, 182 

V Area Logistical Command: 229 

24th Special Tactical Zone: 194-95 

~ Airborne Task Force: 155-57 

I Corps: 2111-19,227 

11 Corps: 100, 190-205 

111 Corps: 198-200, 206-15, 221 

IV Corps: 207, 226 

I Corps Artillery: 202,219-20,225 

III Corps Artillery: 200 

lst Airborne Division: 207.219,224 

lst Division: U8-45, 201, 228 

lst Division Artillery: 201 

3d Division: 220-22 

7th Division: 226 

18th Division: 145, 227 

21st Division: 227 

22d Division: 100-101,227 

25th Division: 145, 228 

5th Ranger Group: 145. 145 

Airborne Brigade: 100, 107 
INDEX 251 

Republic of Vietnam Army-Continued 

Airborne Brigade Artillery: 100, 106 

138, 190-97, 205-&1, 217, 225 

1st Armored Brigade: 219 

.!Id Brigade, 1st Airborne Division: 210-

15 

3d Regiment : 157-60 

!lth Regiment: 212 

42d Regiment: 118, 194 

4M Regiment: 84 

.!Id Battalion, 2d Airborne Brigade: 8.!1 

4th Battalion, 2d Airborne Brigade: 8S 

25th Battalion: S5 

.!10th Artillery Battalion: 220-21 

.!list Arlillery Battalion : 222 

52d Artillery Battalion: 220 

.!I.!Id Artillery Battalion : 220, 222 

.!17th Ranger Battalion : 156 

JOist Artillery Battalion : 216 

100th Artillery DattaE"n: 229 

22lst Artillery Battalion: 192 

advisers, relations with: 24-.!I7, 190, 

192, 219, 2S0, 239 

artillery organization. and strength: 25. 

97,191,216,220 

artiJIery units expansion: 204-05, 218, 

220,229 

Associate Battery Program: 19.!1 

combat effectiveness and deficiencies: 

25, 35-39, 190-9S, 195- 96, 202- 03, 

214-15, 219-20, 223, 225, 227-28, 230, 

239-40 

difficulties with commanders: 89 

exchanges, battery personnel: 199 

instructor training: 201--02, 204, 229 

leaders, lack of and training: 25-26, 

SI, 203 

organization and strength: 21 

self. sufficiency program: 215-19. See 

aLso Vietnamization program. 

training programs: 25-26, 1M, 190-94, 

198-205,216-18,220,229 

weapons deliveries to: 197 

Repu blic of Vietnam Marine Corps: U8, 

224 

Rese rves, tactical use of: 40 

Resuppl y. Su Supply systems and operations. 

Riot control agents: 174 

River Assault Flotilla I: 76 

Riverine operations: 75-80, 258 

Rivers: 6 

Road system: 27, 107 

Rocket artillery, aerial. Ste Aerial rocket 

artillery. 

Rocket assaults, enemy: 11- 15, 68, 70, 

118, 122-24, 138,145,149, 156 

Rockpile area (Khe Sanh) : 150, 153, 155 

Ragen, Lieutenant Colonel Charles S.: 

1_7 

Ruses: 100 

Rme!l, enemy: 138 

Saigon area: 18, 21, 25, 37n, 81, 138, 

143-47, 157, 163, 166-69 

Saigon River: 144 

Sanctuaries, enemy: 92, 205. See also 

Cambodia; Laos. 

Sanitation measures: 39 

Sapper assaults, enemy: 14-17, 122 

Schaible, Captain Dennis 1.: 124-29 

Schlenker. Captain Leonard L.: 109 

Seaman, Lieutenant General Jonathan 

0 .: 111 

Search and destroy operations: 81, 92. 

101 , 106-10, 112- 17, 156-57. See also 

Patrol actions; Reconnaissance. 

Searchlights: 73 

Secretary of Defense. See McNamara, 

Robert S. 

Section chiefs: ISS, U6 

Security measures and operations: 11. 19, 

39-40, 80, 89, 100, 107- 08, 112, 124, 

143,198,204,215,217, 238 

Security measures and operations, enemy: 

15 

Sensor devices: 179, 181-82,235 

Sentries: 39 

Separate battalions: 86 

Shelling reports: 85 

Sihanouk, Prince: 205 

Smith, Captain Theodore F.: 35 

Smoke, tactical usc or: 1M, 175,236 

Snipers, enemy: 61, 91 

Song Be: loe 

Soui Cut: 120-21, 156 

Soui Da: 107, 112 

Soui Tre: 1I.!1 

Sound·and-flash ranging: 179, 232 

South China Sea: 98 

South Vietnam. Set Republic of Vietnam. 

Southern Plains area: 5-7 

Soviet Union: 11 , 231 

Spare parts. Ste Maintenance and repair. 
252 FIELD ARTILLERY 

Special Forces trOOps: 101, 148, 17~, 191, 

193, 200, 213 

Special Warfare School: 23 

State, Dcparlmcnt of: 22 

Storage depots: 17 

Strategic air support: 45 

!ilralcgic hamlets program: 20 

Supply systems and operations: 27, 44, 

75, ) 85. 239. See also Airlifts of 

troops and supplies. 

Supply systems and operations, enemy: 

138, 159-60 

Surut, Lieutenant Colonel Lee E.: 81,83 

Surveillance. See Reconnaissance. 

Surveys and survey equipment: 106, 116, 

183-84,199-200,228,232 

Survival training: 39 

Svay Rieng: 207 

Sweeps. See Search and destroy operations. 

Tactical air support: SO, 45. 47, 8S. 88. 

90-96, 100-10, 117-20, 129, 145-47, 

150-57, 160-61, 167, 210-12, 218-19, 

223. 228. See also Aerial rocket artillery: Strategic air support. 

Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: 

53-54 

Tactical operations center: 48 

Tactics: 25. 39-47 

enemy: 7-8, 10-11, 14-15, 27, 30-31, 

39, 42 

Republic of Vietnam Army: 26-27. 29 

Tam Ky: .... 121 

Tan Son Nhut: 144-45. 179 

Tanh Canh: 118.222 

Tank-gun support: 151 

Target acquisition and designalion: 32-

33, 41, 48, 73, 75, 85, 96, 106, 179-

84, 187, 198,211,214,216, 219, 2~7-

28,231-33 

Task Forces 

ALPHA: 86-87 

BAt BAC I (Cannon I) : 192-93 

OUTER: 82 

HAY: 169 

INCRAM: 89 

ORECON:- 110. See also Infantry Divi· 

sions. 23d. 

SHOEMAKER: 207-12 

SURUT: 81 

WARE: 145, 169 

Task organizations. See Artillery unil$. 

Tay Ninh: 107, 112-13, 165, 182, 207, 

221 - 22 

Tay Ninh Province: 106-17 

Tchepone: 218-19 

Terrain, effect on operations: 3--7, 18. 

20,34,56-59, 70, 75, 96, 98, 108. 124-

25, 130, 132,236 

Tests, proficiency: 134 

Tel offensive: IS7-57, 168-69, 193 

Thach Han River: 224 

Thailancl forces: 48, 134 

Thien Ngon: 165 

Thien Phuoc: 121 

Thiell, Nguyen Van: 3711, 197 

Thu Dau Mot: 25 

Thu Due: 144 

Thua Thien Province: 159 

Ti Ti woods: 142 

Time-on·target fires. See Fire support. 

Timmes, Major Ceneral Charles J.: 28. 

See also United States Military Assist. 

ance Advisory Croup. Vietnam. 

TOAN TUANC opera tion : 157 

TOAN TIIANC operation 42: 206-15 

Tonic Sap: 6 

Training programs: 3, 2S-24. Sa-S9, 45, 

81, 87, 95-97, 133-36, 168-73, 231, 

233-34, 238-39 

enemy: 17 

Republic of Vietnam: 25-26, 134, 190-

94,198-205,215-18,220,229 

Training Rela tions and Instruction Mis· 

sion: 22 

Trang Sup: 200 

Transportation sY$lems: 51-53 

Trien Phong: 224 

Troop transport. See Airlifts of troops 

and supplies. 

Troop units, artillery. Set Artillery Battalions: Artillery units. 

Troop units, general 

arrivals and departures: 38, 167-68, 

201 

buildup and reduction: 81, 96. 217, 

220, 225-30 

enemy: 9-10 

Republic of Vietnam: 21 

Trucks. Set Motor vehicles. 

Tunnel systems, enemy: 214 
INDEX 253 

United States Air Force: 17. 45. 47, 52, 

89-90. 94. 108. 113. 148. 179. 200. 

228, 235. Su: abo Strategic air sup· 

port; Tactical air support. 

United States Army. Vietnam: 45. 86, 

143. 172.177.187.228. 

See also Abrams. General Creighton 

W.; WestmOl'elancl, General William 

C. 

United States Army Support Command, 

Vietnam : 86 

United Stales Embassy: 3711, 144 

United States Marine Corps: 38. 48, 81. 

86.98.101.138-43.148-57 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: 81 

III Madne Amphihiolll! Force': 86, 149-

50, 168-69.201 

3d Division : 155.201 

9th Expeditionary Bdgade: S8 

1st Regiment: 155-57 

26th Rigment : 155-57 

1st Battalion, 135th Regiment : 151, 155 

United States Military Assistance Advis· 

ory Group, Vietnam: S. 21-22. See 

also O'Daniel. Lieutenant General 

John W .; Timmes. Major General 

Charles J. 

United States Military Assistance Com· 

mand, Vietnam: 106, 158, 169, 196-

97. 202-05. 211. 215. 217-18. 220. 

257. See also Abrams. General 

Creighton W.; Westmoreland. Gen· 

eral William C. 

United States Navy: 76, 200. See also 

Naval air and gunfire support; Riv· 

erine operations. 

Unily of command. See Command and 

control. 

Vegetation, effect on operations: 6-7. 

85.96. 116. 130.236 

Vessey. Lieutenant Colonel John W.: 

115 

Vien, General Cao Vah, Republic of Vietnam Army: 218 

Viet Cong: 9, 30-51. M. 82. 87-96, 106-

II. 117. 120-29. 137. 142. 147. 166. 

182, 188, 196. 198,205. See also Peo· 

pie's Liberation Armed Force. 

250lh Training Division : 10 

S20th Training Division: 10 

Viet Cong-Continued 

1I50th Division: 10 

338th Brigade: 10 

22<1 Training Group: 10 

1st Regiment : 100 

272d Regiment: J 13 

27.5d Regiment: 146 

V-25 Battalion: 17 

5141h Hallalion: SO 

Viet Minh : 8, 10,21.27 

Victnamizalion program: 190. 196-206, 

214-19. 225-30 

Village Administrative Committee: 19 

Village Citizen's Council: 19 

Village organization: 19 

Vinh Long: 147 

Vllng Tall: 19 

Walker, Captain Edward G.: 108 

War Zone C: 112-17, 166 

War Zone D: 83,85,173 

Ware. Major General Keith L.: 145 

Warsaw Pace 231 

WaShington conference, 1955: 22 

Waler transportation : 52. 76 

Walerways: 6 

Weapons. S,.~ h)' typ~. 

Weapons losses. See Materiel losses. 

Weather. effect on operations: 7.34. 101. 

123, 157-59, 224 

Westmoreland , General William C.: 143. 

145. 149. 169, 190. See also United 

States Army, Vietnam; United States 

Military Assistance Command, Viet· 

nam. 

Weyand. Lieutenant General Frederick 

C.: 143. 145-46 

WUEELER operation: 121 -24, 181 

White phosphorous rounds: 85. 130 

WIIITE WING operation: 98-110 

Williamson. Brigadier General Ellis W.: 

81. 84-85 

Wind cards: 136 

Winfield, Colonel Richard M., Jr.: 142 

\Virc communications. Su Communications systems and operations. 

Wire obstacles: 59, 73 

World War II experience: 151 

Xuan Loc: 145, 147 

1) U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1995 394-905