PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-3462

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JUSTIN J. CLARK,

a/k/a HECTOR,

 Justin J. Clark,

 Appellant 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(No. 2:05-cr-00099-001)

District Judge: Hon. Alan N. Bloch

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 16, 2013

Before: SMITH, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 13, 2013)

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OPINION

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Karen Sirianni Gerlach, Esq.

Lisa B. Freeland, Esq. 

Office of Federal Public Defender

1001 Liberty Avenue

1500 Liberty Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellant 

David J. Hickton, Esq.

Donovan Cocas, Esq.

Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

700 Grant Street, Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellee 

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Justin Clark violated the conditions of his supervised 

release. At his revocation hearing, the District Court revoked 

Clark’s release and imposed a new term of imprisonment 

followed by another term of supervised release. On appeal, 

Clark challenges only the new term of supervised release, 

arguing that its imposition was procedurally unreasonable and 

that the procedural defects rendered the sentence 

substantively unreasonable as well. 

The statute that governs imposition and revocation of 

supervised release directs the sentencing court to consider 

factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3583(c), 3583(e). Clark’s appeal presents a question of first 

impression for this Court: whether a district court must 
3

conduct one § 3553(a) analysis for post-revocation 

incarceration and another § 3553(a) analysis for a new term 

of supervised release. We hold that it need not. A district 

court may provide a single analysis that reflects meaningful 

consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors to support each 

portion of a revocation sentence. 

Though we reject Clark’s contention that a district 

court imposing a post-revocation term of supervised release 

must conduct a second § 3553(a) analysis, we nonetheless 

hold that the sentence imposed was procedurally 

unreasonable. The record before us does not reflect 

meaningful consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. 

We will therefore vacate and remand the District Court’s 

judgment of sentence.

I.

Clark pled guilty to one count of possession with intent 

to distribute a substance containing cocaine base in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). In 2006, he 

was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment followed by 

five years of supervised release. Clark later moved for a 

reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. The 

District Court granted the motion and reduced Clark’s 

sentence to 100 months of imprisonment. The Government 

later moved for another reduction pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 35(b). The District Court granted that 

motion as well and reduced Clark’s sentence to time served. 

Clark began his five-year term of supervised release in 

November 2009. 
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During his term of supervised release, Clark agreed to 

two modifications to the conditions of his release — to 

participate in mental health and anger management 

counseling and to be subject to electronic monitoring. On 

July 24, 2012, Clark’s probation officer filed a Petition on 

Supervised Release, alleging that Clark had left the judicial 

district without the permission of the court or his probation 

officer in violation of the conditions of his release. The 

petition reported that Clark was a passenger in a vehicle that 

had been pulled over in Iowa and that Clark “was found to be 

in possession of $20,000 cash.” Appendix (“App.”) 32. 

Clark admitted to the violation. At his revocation 

hearing, where he faced an advisory United States Sentencing 

Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 7 to 13 months of 

imprisonment, Clark requested house arrest instead of a new 

term of incarceration and emphasized that he had not been 

arrested or charged with any crime in connection with the 

incident in Iowa. The Government sought revocation and 

asked the District Court to impose 13 months of 

incarceration, the top of the advisory Guidelines range. The 

Government also represented that two separate amounts of 

money were found in the car — $10,000 and $20,000.

The District Court observed that the amount of money 

recovered from the car in Iowa was “questionable,” even 

though Clark was not charged with any crime, and detailed 

other misconduct that occurred during Clark’s supervised 

release including three traffic citations, failure to make 

payments on fines arising from those citations, failure to 

make payments on a bank loan, and a drug test that indicated 

the presence of marijuana. App. 52-53. The court concluded 

that Clark’s “overall conduct has demonstrated a general 
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pattern of noncompliance with supervision and has indicated 

that a term of imprisonment is necessary pursuant to Title 18 

of the United States Code, Section 3553(a).” App. 53. The 

court then revoked Clark’s supervised release and sentenced 

him to 13 months of imprisonment followed by a 47-month 

term of supervised release. The hearing concluded with 

additional discussion of the relevant § 3553(a) factors:

After considering the sentences 

available, the advisory guideline 

range, and the factors set forth in . 

. . Section 3553, the Court finds 

that this sentence is consistent 

with the nature, circumstances, 

and seriousness of the defendant’s 

violations and his history, 

characteristics, educational, 

vocational and corrective needs, 

as well as the need for just, nondisparate punishment, deterrence, 

and protection of the public. . . . 

We adjourn. 

App. 55. Defense counsel immediately objected to the 

imposition of 47 months of supervised release as unsupported 

by the record and unreasonable based on the facts of the case. 

The District Court did not address the objection on the record. 

Clark filed this timely appeal, arguing that the 

imposition of 47 months of supervised release for his 

revocation violation was procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. 
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II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise jurisdiction over Clark’s appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). 

Clark challenges the imposition of a 47-month term of 

supervised release for the revocation violation and contends 

that the District Court committed procedural and substantive 

error by failing to apply separately the § 3553(a) factors when 

imposing the new term of supervised release. We review the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of a revocation 

sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Doe, 617 

F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010). When considering a 

procedural challenge to a revocation sentencing hearing, we 

ask whether the district court has given “rational and 

meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors.” 

Id. (quotation marks omitted). If we conclude that the 

sentence was procedurally sound, our inquiry shifts to 

substantive reasonableness. To address a defendant’s 

contention that the sentence imposed was substantively 

unreasonable, we ask “whether the final sentence, wherever it 

may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised 

upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant 

factors.” Id. at 770 (quotation marks omitted). A defendant 

who alleges substantive unreasonableness carries a heavy 

burden; “we will affirm the sentencing court ‘unless no 

reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same

sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 

district court provided.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 

III.
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A.

Clark asserts that procedural error arose from the 

District Court’s failure to adhere to the familiar three-step 

sentencing process. A sentencing court must (1) calculate the 

advisory Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on any departure 

motions and state how those rulings affect the advisory range, 

and (3) exercise its discretion pursuant to the factors set forth 

in § 3553(a). United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 237-38 

(3d Cir. 2009). In a revocation hearing, however, the court 

must also adhere to the statutory requirements set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3583. See Doe, 617 F.3d at 771-72; United States v. 

Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Section 3583 controls post-conviction and postrevocation supervised release. When imposing a defendant’s 

initial term of imprisonment, a district court may, after 

considering certain factors set forth in § 3553(a), include a 

term of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(a), 3583(c). A 

defendant serving a term of supervised release must adhere to 

certain conditions, both mandatory and discretionary. See id.

§ 3583(d). If the defendant violates those conditions, the 

court may, after considering the same § 3553(a) factors 

relevant to the initial term of supervised release, revoke or 

modify the defendant’s supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(e). Even though § 3583(e) omits some of the § 3553(a) 

factors, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (directing the court 

to consider the seriousness of the offense), consideration of 

those omitted factors is not prohibited. United States v. 

Young, 634 F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2011).

If the court revokes supervised release and sentences 

the defendant to a new term of imprisonment, it may include 

a new term of supervised release as well. 18 U.S.C. § 
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3583(h) (“subsection (h)”). Though subsection (h) does not 

specify a procedure for reimposition of supervised release, we 

hold that sentencing courts are to consider those § 3553(a) 

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), the provision governing 

imposition of the initial term of supervised release. See

United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 594 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 

2010) (“As subsection (h) does not list the factors to be 

considered in imposing a term of supervised release as part of 

a revocation sentence, it is a reasonable inference that the 

factors are the same as those to be considered in imposing an 

initial term of supervised release.”). 

We turn now to the issue of whether the District Court 

was obligated to conduct two § 3553(a) analyses: one with 

respect to Clark’s 13-month term of imprisonment and one 

with respect to Clark’s 47-month term of supervised release. 

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has considered 

this question and held that a district court did not err when it 

conducted a single § 3553(a) analysis for both portions of a 

defendant’s post-revocation sentence. United States v. Penn, 

601 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (10th Cir. 2010). In Penn, the

sentencing judge had discussed several of the § 3553(a) 

factors and “stated his reasons for imposing both 

reimprisonment and supervised release.” Id. at 1012. The 

defendant challenged the imposition of supervised release as 

part of the revocation sentence, arguing that the district court 

erroneously failed to discuss the § 3553(a) factors as they 

related to the new term of supervised release. Id. at 1011. 

The court rejected the challenge and declined to require a 

separate § 3553(a) discussion when imposing supervised 

release. “Because we do not require ritualistic incantations of 

these factors,” the court reasoned, “and because the district 

court explained his consideration of the defendant’s 
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characteristics, protecting the public, and the appropriate 

statutes and guidelines, we conclude the district court 

adequately considered the relevant factors and therefore 

committed no error, and certainly no plain error.” Id. at 1012. 

Though this Court has not previously ruled on the 

question raised by Clark’s appeal, our jurisprudence 

regarding the required procedure for post-conviction 

sentencing is instructive. District courts must exercise their 

discretion to vary above or below the advisory Guidelines 

range by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Lofink, 

564 F.3d at 238. But we have never required that a district 

court conduct two § 3553(a) analyses, one related to the term 

of imprisonment and a second related to the term of 

supervised release. See United States v. Joline, 662 F.3d 657, 

660 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, when imposing a 

sentence that includes supervised release, a sentencing court 

must simply “furnish an explanation of the sentence . . . 

sufficient for the reviewing court to see that the particular 

circumstances of the case have been given meaningful 

consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a)” (quotation 

marks omitted)); see also United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 

558, 572 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a district court’s 

consideration of the § 3553(a) factors sufficient to justify a 

term of incarceration as procedurally reasonable can also 

demonstrate that the imposition of special conditions [of 

supervised release] is procedurally reasonable”); United 

States v. O’Georgia, 569 F.3d 281, 289 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(observing that “repetition” of the court’s § 3553(a) analysis 

“would serve no useful purpose in the ordinary case”). 

More broadly, we value formality in sentencing to the 

extent that it promotes the goals of procedural uniformity, 
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meaningful review, and substantive fairness. See United 

States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 318 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining 

that both the form and the substance of sentencing are “of 

high importance . . . to ensure that a substantively reasonable 

sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way” 

(quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ausburn, 502 

F.3d 313, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring a record sufficient 

for review, not a “rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors” 

(quotation marks omitted)). We ultimately review a sentence 

for reasonableness and ask “whether the record as a whole 

reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors 

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Grier, 

475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). For instance, a 

district court need not “discuss and make findings as to each 

of the § 3553(a) factors” so long as the record makes clear 

that the court has taken them into account. United States v. 

Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

omitted); see also Lofink, 564 F.3d at 238 n.13; Tomko, 562 

F.3d at 568. The relevant inquiry is whether the District 

Court gave “meaningful consideration to the relevant §

3553(a) factors,” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216 

(3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted), such that, on 

review, we may understand the “rationale by which [the] 

district court reache[d] a final sentence,” Grier, 475 F.3d at 

572. 

Clark invites this Court to require additional procedure 

when a post-revocation sentence includes a new term of 

supervised release. Because these added layers of formality 

would not necessarily further any substantive end, we decline 

to add additional procedural requirements. We therefore hold 

that, when imposing a post-revocation sentence, a district 

court must conduct a § 3553(a) analysis that gives meaningful 
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consideration to the relevant factors, including those factors 

made relevant to post-revocation sentencing by 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(e) and (h). While a sentencing court may wish to divide 

its analysis by discussing the § 3553(a) factors in the context 

of incarceration and again in the context of supervised 

release, such separation is not required. In many cases, such 

a division would be unnecessarily redundant. A full 

discussion of relevant factors, which include the nature of the 

offense, the defendant’s history, the need for deterrence, and 

the need to protect the public, will likely include analysis that 

supports the punitive purposes of post-revocation 

incarceration, see Bungar, 478 F.3d at 544 (explaining that 

post-revocation imprisonment is imposed “primarily to 

sanction the defendant’s breach of trust”), as well as the 

rehabilitative purposes of supervised release, see United 

States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2012) 

(explaining that “the primary purpose of supervised release is 

to facilitate the reentry of offenders into their communities, 

rather than to inflict punishment”). 

B.

We now evaluate the procedure followed at Clark’s 

revocation hearing in light of the foregoing standards. In 

particular, we ask whether the District Court’s § 3553(a) 

discussion indicated meaningful consideration of those 

factors that would support post-revocation incarceration and 

supervised release. 

The District Court focused its § 3553(a) discussion on 

§ 3553(a)(1), which directs the court to consider “the nature 

and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant.” The court first addressed 
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the nature of Clark’s offense that led to revocation and 

considered Clark’s history — his “general pattern of 

noncompliance with supervision.” App. 53. After a full 

discussion of the first relevant factor, however, the court 

merely enumerated the remaining § 3553(a) factors relevant 

to a revocation sentence, stating that the sentence imposed “is 

consistent with . . . the defendant’s . . . educational, 

vocational and corrective needs as well as the need for just, 

non-disparate punishment, deterrence, and protection of the 

public.” App. 55. This rote recitation of the relevant factors, 

see Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 328-29, cannot support a conclusion 

that “the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 

consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a),” Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (quotation marks omitted). 

Nor can we determine, from the record before us, that the 

court “reasonably applied those factors to the circumstance of 

the case.” Bungar, 478 F.3d at 540. 

When the record does not evidence “rational and 

meaningful consideration [of] the relevant § 3553(a) factors,” 

Doe, 617 F.3d at 769 (quotation marks omitted), we are 

bound to conclude that the sentence imposed was 

procedurally unreasonable, and we do so here. Because we 

will vacate and remand on this basis, we need not address 

Clark’s contention that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable as well. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 

Court’s judgment of sentence and will remand for 

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.