COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00008-CR

KEITH WAYNE 

JOHNSON

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Keith Wayne Johnson was indicted for committing an aggravated 

assault of a family member with a deadly weapon (―a razor or box cutter that in 

the manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious 

bodily injury‖). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2010)

(stating that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon causing serious bodily 

injury to a family member is a first-degree felony). He made an open plea of 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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guilty and asked the trial court to assess punishment. The trial court found him 

guilty and assessed fifty-five years’ confinement as punishment. See id. § 12.32 

(Vernon 2009) (stating that an individual adjudged guilty of a first-degree felony 

shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than 

ninety-nine years or less than five years).

Johnson’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and 

motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a 

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

We gave Johnson an opportunity to file a pro se brief, and he has done so, 

arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge 

was biased against him and violated his due process rights by reviewing the PSI 

before pronouncing guilt. The State filed a brief, responding to Johnson’s 

arguments, and Johnson filed a reply brief to the State’s response, essentially 

reiterating his complaints and adding that the State misquoted his allegations in 

responding to them.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 
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we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

Because Johnson entered an open plea of guilty, our independent review 

for potential error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of 

Johnson’s plea, error that is not independent of and supports the judgment of 

guilt, and error occurring after entry of the guilty plea. See Monreal v. State, 99 

S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666–67 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, Johnson’s brief and 

reply brief, the State’s brief, the PSI, and the photographic exhibits of the crime 

scene and the complainant’s injuries entered in evidence at the punishment 

hearing. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without 

merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.2 See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also 

Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we 

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

 

2Specifically, we note that ineffective assistance claims are usually best 

addressed by a postconviction writ of habeas corpus. See Thompson v. State, 9 

S.W.3d 808, 814 & n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 

475–76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, DAUPHINOT, and GARDNER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 2, 2010