JOINT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES STUDY TEAM

Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Final Report 

JANUARY 2004 

Executive Summary 

In March 2003, the Secretary of Defense chartered a study—formally named the 

Joint Defense Capabilities Study—to examine how the Department of Defense 

(DoD) develops, resources, and provides joint capabilities. The Secretary selected 

the Honorable Pete Aldridge, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, to lead the study. The Study Team’s task was to e

amine and improve DoD processes for determining needs, creating solutions, 

making decisions, and providing capabilities to support joint warfighting needs. 

Based on that examination, the Study Team developed streamlined processes and 

alternative organizations to better integrate defense capabilities in support of joint 

objectives. 

x-

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Why change? Although the current processes have produced the best armed 

forces in the world, they do not optimize our investment in joint capabilities to 

meet current and future security challenges. From its discussions with senior personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Services, and 

Combatant Commands (CoComs), along with reviews of past studies and analyses of current processes, the Study Team found the following: 

Services dominate the current requirements process. Much of DoD’s focus is on Service programs and platforms rather than capabilities required

to accomplish Combatant Command missions. A Service focus does not 

provide an accurate picture of joint needs, nor does it provide a consistent 

view of priorities and acceptable risks across DoD. 

Service planning does not consider the full range of solutions available to 

meet joint warfighting needs. Alternative ways to provide the equivalent 

capability are not adequately considered—especially if the alternative solutions are resident in a different Service or Defense Agency. 

The resourcing function focuses senior leadership effort on fixing problems 

at the end of the process, rather than being involved early in the planning 

process. OSD programming guidance exceeds available resources and does 

not provide realistic priorities for joint needs. “Jointness” is forced into the 

program late in the process during an adversarial and time-consuming program review. The resulting program does not best meet joint needs, or provide the best value for the nation’s defense investment. 

 iii 
 

Capabilities-Based Process 

The Study Team recommends a capabilities-based process for identifying needs, 

creating choices, developing solutions, and providing capabilities. The recommended process differs from the current process in the following ways: 

Joint needs would form the foundation for the defense program. These 

needs must be developed using a consistent view of priorities and risks, 

provided by the Secretary of Defense. Combatant Commanders would 

have major input into the formulation of joint needs. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Planning for major joint capabilities would be accomplished at the Department, rather than Component level. A process in which all stakeholders participate would encourage innovation and seek the “best 

solution” to meet joint capability needs. Needs would be expressed as “capabilities” or “desired effects” to allow for the widest range of possible solutions. Solutions would be evaluated using open and explicit analysis to 

provide the best possible information for decision makers. 

Senior leaders would focus on providing guidance and making decisions 

in the “front end” of the process. The Secretary of Defense would provide 

strategic direction for capabilities planning and be iteratively engaged in 

the entire process. Major issues currently addressed in the program review 

would be examined early in the process, when there is more time for deliberate analysis and greater solution space for the Secretary’s decision 

making. 

As shown in Figure 1, the new process has four major elements: strategy, enhanced planning, resourcing, and execution and accountability. These elements 

differ from the processes they replace in the following ways: 

Strategy. Combatant Commanders would be assigned a much larger role 

in shaping the defense strategy articulated in Strategic Planning Guidance 

(SPG). The SPG would focus on strategic objectives, priorities, and risk 

tolerance, rather than on programmatic solutions. It would initiate the 

planning process and dictate those areas where joint planning efforts must 

focus. 

Enhanced planning. The Enhanced Planning Process would support assessment of capabilities to meet joint needs. Military needs would be identified primarily through Combatant Command operational plans and 

operating concepts. Enterprise (non-warfighting) needs would be identified by the Services and OSD. 

Resourcing. The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) would reflect the decisions made in the Enhanced Planning Process and provide fiscally executable guidance for the development of the Components’ programs. 

 iv 
Executive Summary 

Because the guidance would be fiscally executable, the remainder of the 

resourcing process would be relatively simple, and the program and 

budget reviews would be reduced in scope and level of effort. 

Execution and accountability. The new process would focus on performance assessment and be organized around the capabilities categories and 

objectives outlined in the SPG and addressed in the JPG. Outcomeoriented capability categories spanning both operational and enterprise 

functions would serve as the framework for every phase of the new process. The SPG, Enhanced Planning Process, JPG, internal defense budget, 

and assessment report would be organized by capability categories. 

¡ 

Figure 1. Simplified End State Process Model 

Defense

Resourcing

Process

Feedback during next cycle

WHAT

TO DO? HOW TO DO IT?

HOW WELL

DID WE DO?

SecDef

Joint

Programming

Guidance

- SecDef decision points

- Iterative SecDef engagement

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

(Non-Warfighting)

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Resources

STRATEGY ENHANCED

PLANNING RESOURCING EXECUTION & 

ACCOUNTABILITY

Execution and

Feedback

SecDef

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Organizational Alternatives 

The Study Team developed first- and second-order organizational alternatives. The 

first-order organizational alternatives address the Department/corporate-level 

changes needed to implement the new capabilities-based process. These alternatives are built around the Enhanced Planning Process. The second-order organizational alternatives address changes within major enterprise functions—acquisition; 

research, development, test, and evaluation; logistics; infrastructure; and workforce 

planning—to accomplish end state planning and execution processes. For both levels of changes, the Study Team developed a set of moderate, aggressive, and radical alternatives, based on the level of change proposed. 

 v 
 

In general, the moderate alternative would use the existing OSD and Joint Staff 

structure, with minor modifications, to partially achieve the end state through the 

use of matrixed capability teams and ad hoc organizations. The aggressive a

native would reorganize those parts of OSD and the Joint Staff that support capabilities-based planning and resource allocation. The radical option would comb

duplicative functions in OSD and the Joint Staff to support capabilities-based 

planning and resourcing at the Department-level; it would also require a major 

reorganization. 

lterine 

Although the focus of the organizational alternatives in this study is on OSD and 

the Joint Staff, additional realignments may be beneficial. Elements that define 

joint capabilities (predominantly CoComs) and provide a wide range of alternatives to capability needs (predominantly Services and Agencies) should consider 

internal realignment to improve integration with the new process. 

Implementation 

The Study Team’s recommendations are substantial. Consequently, any effort to 

implement them would likely encounter bureaucratic resistance. Using an implementation team to manage the recommended changes will therefore be critical to 

keeping the changes on track, particularly during the transition period. To be effective, this implementation team should be led by an individual who has direct 

access to the leadership of the Department, especially the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. The head of the implementation team and supporting staff 

would need to establish a Department-wide governance process to drive the 

change effort. This process should clearly spell out what needs to be done, who 

needs to do it, and when it needs to be completed. Department leadership should 

receive regular progress reviews. 

Equally important is the need to communicate the need for change, the goal of the 

change effort, and the organization’s progress toward meeting that goal. The implementation team, working closely with Public Affairs, should spearhead efforts 

to create an external and internal communication strategy. 

 vi 
Contents 

Chapter 1 Introduction...................................................................................... 1-1 

BACKGROUND................................................................................................................... 1-1 

STUDY APPROACH ............................................................................................................ 1-2 

Chapter 2 Capabilities-Based Process.............................................................. 2-1 

OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 2-1 

THE CURRENT PROCESS—WHAT’S BROKEN .................................................................... 2-2 

An Unclear Defense Strategy..................................................................................... 2-3 

Stovepiped Capabilities Planning .............................................................................. 2-4 

Inefficient Resourcing Process .................................................................................. 2-5 

Weak Feedback and Accountability .......................................................................... 2-5 

THE “END STATE” PROCESS—WHAT’S NEEDED.............................................................. 2-6 

A New Framework—Joint Capability Categories..................................................... 2-7 

Senior Oversight—The Strategic Planning Council.................................................. 2-8 

Top-Down Strategy Development ............................................................................. 2-9 

Capabilities Planning—Enhanced Planning Process............................................... 2-10 

“Born Joint” Resourcing Process............................................................................. 2-16 

Improved Assessment and Feedback Process.......................................................... 2-17 

Process Timeline...................................................................................................... 2-18 

Chapter 3 Organizational Alternatives ............................................................. 3-1 

DEPARTMENT/CORPORATE LEVEL (FIRST-ORDER ALTERNATIVES) ................................. 3-1 

Alternative 1: Enhance the Functional Capability Boards......................................... 3-3 

Alternative 2: Establish a Corporate Planning Staff.................................................. 3-4 

Alternative 3: Streamline the Executive Staff ........................................................... 3-5 

FUNCTIONAL LEVEL (SECOND-ORDER ALTERNATIVES)................................................... 3-7 

Acquisition................................................................................................................. 3-7

RDT&E.................................................................................................................... 3-10 

Logistics................................................................................................................... 3-12 

 vii 
 

Infrastructure............................................................................................................ 3-15 

Workforce Planning................................................................................................. 3-18 

Chapter 4 Implementation ................................................................................ 4-1 

WHY CHANGE................................................................................................................... 4-1 

LEADING CHANGE ............................................................................................................ 4-1 

CREATING AN IMPLEMENTATION TEAM............................................................................ 4-2 

SUMMARY......................................................................................................................... 4-4 

Appendix A Implementation Memoranda 

Appendix B Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership 

Review Group 

Appendix C Key Assumptions, Guidance, and Other Studies 

Appendix D Strategy: Outline for Secretary of Defense Strategic 

Planning Guidance 

Appendix E Enhanced Planning 

Appendix F Capability Categories 

Appendix G Resourcing 

Appendix H Performance 

Appendix I Steering Group Members 

Appendix J Study Team Members 

Appendix K Chronology/Decision Points 

Appendix L Organizational Alternatives—First Order 

Appendix M Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

 viii 
Contents 

FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Overview of Capabilities-Based Approach......................................................... 1-1 

Figure 2-1. Relative Emphasis in “As-Is” and End State Processes...................................... 2-2 

Figure 2-2. “As-Is” Versus End State Comparison ............................................................... 2-3 

Figure 2-3. Simplified End State Process Model................................................................... 2-6 

Figure 2-4. Capability Categories.......................................................................................... 2-8 

Figure 2-5. Simplified Capabilities Planning Process ......................................................... 2-11 

Figure 2-6. New Roles and Responsibilities for Joint Needs .............................................. 2-12 

Figure 2-7. Department-Level Analysis Engine .................................................................. 2-13 

Figure 2-8. Analysis Engine Activities................................................................................ 2-14 

Figure 2-9. Major Trades and Integration............................................................................ 2-15 

Figure 2-10. Capabilities Decision Process......................................................................... 2-15 

Figure 2-11. Activity Calendar............................................................................................ 2-19 

Figure 3-1. Overall Process with Organizational Change Requirements.............................. 3-2 

Figure 3-2. Alternative 1—Moderate Change ....................................................................... 3-3 

Figure 3-3. Alternative 2—Aggressive Change..................................................................... 3-5 

Figure 3-4. Alternative 3—Radical Change .......................................................................... 3-6 

Figure 4-1. Successful Change Effort with Handoff ............................................................. 4-4 

 ix 
 

 x 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review directed the Department of Defense 

(DoD) to pursue a capabilities-based approach to defining its needs. This approach is markedly different from the traditional threat-based approach because it 

focuses on delivering capabilities to meet a wide range of security challenges 

rather than defeating a specific adversary. 

In March 2003, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) chartered the Joint Defense 

Capabilities Study to examine the process and organizational changes necessary 

to implement a capabilities-based approach across the Department. 

BACKGROUND

The United States cannot definitively predict who its next adversary will be or 

where the next conflict will occur. A capabilities-based approach would help 

mitigate this uncertainty by emphasizing the nation’s ability to shape the battlefield, regardless of whom we fight or where we fight. Figure 1-1 is an overview of 

a capabilities-based approach. 

Figure 1-1. Overview of Capabilities-Based Approach 

• Mitigates the uncertainty of defining future adversaries by posturing

to meet a wide range of security challenges

• Focuses on effects rather than weapon systems to support strategy

• Addresses the range of materiel and non-materiel resources required for 

each capability, ensuring warfighting and enterprise needs are integrated

Strategy Desired

Effects Capabilities

Fielded

Systems

Doctrine

Organizations

Training

Materiel

Leadership

Personnel

Facilities

Why A Capabilities-Based Approach?

Supports Top-Down Capabilities Planning

A capabilities-based approach elevates the discussion of joint needs to a more 

strategic level, centering on desired effects rather than specific weapon systems 

and platforms. In addition, strategic objectives would frame the desired effects, 

which in turn would define the needed capabilities, and ultimately the platforms 

and weapon systems to be acquired. This approach would reverse our current 

 1-1 
 

practices of packaging weapon systems and platforms into capabilities, assessing 

what effects we can achieve on the battlefield, and planning operations based on 

those achievable effects. Because a capabilities-based approach begins at the strategic level, top-down guidance should be easier to incorporate, making the entire 

process more responsive to senior leader decisions. 

Another advantage to a capabilities-based approach is that every capability would 

be broken into doctrine, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, 

and facilities elements. As a result, it would consider all resources when planning 

for capabilities. It also would consider enterprise and warfighting needs simultaneously, supporting a fiscally constrained resourcing process. 

STUDY APPROACH

The Honorable Pete Aldridge, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics led the Joint Defense Capabilities Study. Mr. Aldridge 

was supported by a Study Team drawn from selected offices within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the Services. The study also drew 

on the expertise of the Combatant Commands (CoComs) and other organizations. 

The Study Team began its work by researching the many recent and ongoing 

studies that have dealt with DoD internal processes. A complete listing of these 

study efforts is included in Appendix C. 

This report presents the Study Team’s results. It describes an improved Department-wide process for delivering the greatest achievable joint warfighting and 

support capabilities from the nation’s defense investment, and it identifies alternative organizational changes needed to support the new process. The report also 

briefly discusses implementation considerations. 

The Study Team received considerable guidance and support from the SecDef and 

other senior leaders within the department. The SecDef received monthly briefings and actively provided feedback and direction. The Senior Leadership Review 

Group discussed the study results and Mr. Aldridge’s recommendations on 12 

September and 31 October 2003. At the 31 October meeting, the SecDef signed a 

memorandum announcing his decision to implement the new process. 

 1-2 
Chapter 2 

Capabilities-Based Process 

OVERVIEW

This study advocates a capabilities-based process for determining and satisfying 

joint needs. Under that process, joint needs would be defined with a Departmentwide view based on extensive input from all users of defense capabilities, particularly the CoComs. Capabilities planning would characterize and quantify both 

warfighting and enterprise needs, ensuring that doctrine, organizational, training, 

personnel, leadership, and facilities issues are considered simultaneously with 

platforms, weapon systems, and costs. The key differences from the current approach are summarized below: 

Attempts to meet needs and maximize output would occur at the joint 

level, rather than individual Component level. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Strategic objectives and joint needs would be expressed in terms of outcomes (what is to be accomplished) instead of specific platforms and systems. 

An array of innovative solutions to joint needs, including trade analysis 

across Services and Defense Agencies, would be available to determine 

the best options. 

A wide range of threats would be addressed rather than a single or primary 

threat in meeting the needs of the current and future warfighter. 

The process proposed by the Joint Defense Capabilities Study begins with a unified, resource-informed strategy that would guide planning, resourcing, and 

budget execution. A collaborative analytical process would define joint needs that 

drive the defense program, and the Services would offer competing solutions to 

meet those needs. Senior leadership would be engaged early, when greater decision space exists, to provide top-down guidance and make decisions on key issues. Performance reporting would be focused on outcomes to ensure that 

delivered capabilities fully support defense strategy. The goal of this process 

would be to move the Department from where it is now (the “as-is”) to a desired 

“end state.” 

The desired end state is a streamlined, collaborative, yet 

competitive process that produces a fully integrated joint 

warfighting capability. 

 2-1 
 

Transitioning to the proposed process requires changes in four major defense activities: strategy development, capabilities planning, resourcing, and program

execution and accountability. The process has several tenets: 

Strategic guidance reflects decisions by the senior leadership on defense 

objectives and acceptable levels of risk. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

The defense program is “born joint,” in an objective analytical process that 

responds to strategic guidance. 

Programmatic guidance is fiscally constrained, so the resourcing process is 

streamlined and simplified. 

A review process assesses and reports on how well the Department is acquiring the capabilities needed to achieve the defense strategy. 

Overall, this process emphasizes articulation of strategy and joint capabilities 

planning rather than focusing on weapons system and platform programmatics. 

Figure 2-1 depicts this shift in emphasis. 

Figure 2-1. Relative Emphasis in “As-Is” and End State Processes 

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

A definitive front-end strategy and planning guidance would define the joint 

needs, drive a more streamlined and less labor-intensive resourcing process, and 

facilitate outcome-based resource allocation and execution management. This 

shift would provide guidance on risk and priorities as a part of the strategy development process and enable early consideration of major program alternatives at 

the joint capability level in the planning process. 

THE CURRENT PROCESS—WHAT’S BROKEN

Although the current process has produced the best armed forces in the world, 

DoD has significant room for improvement, particularly as it positions itself for 

the uncertainties of tomorrow. Specifically, DoD needs to improve its ability to 

plan, resource, and field joint capabilities and to ensure that the best solutions are 

brought forward and implemented. Improving interoperability among the Services 

is key, which requires greater coordination and collaboration at the department 

 2-2 
Capabilities-Based Process 

level. Figure 2-2 summarizes the problems in the current process and lists key 

attributes of the end state process. The following subsections discuss how the current process prevents efficient and effective allocation of resources to provide the 

needed capabilities. 

Figure 2-2. “As-Is” Versus End State Comparison 

• Focus on performance / results

• Reduced cycle-time so that capabilities are developed to meet 

emerging needs

• Human capital managed strategically

• All warfighting and enterprise capability costs considered and 

continually refreshed

• Execution performance serves as a starting point for next

planning cycle

• Focus on expenditure / adherence to regulations

• Prolonged and complicated process to produce new

capabilities

• Human capital planning and costs are not addressed

• Logistics & acquisition cycle time and support are not 

timely or cost-effective

• Execution data not useful for DoD decision making

Execution and 

Accountability

• Joint Programming Guidance is provided early and is fiscally

constrained

• Streamlined, efficient process produces early decisions

• Senior leadership attends to issues of compliance and 

executability

• Components’ programs cannot comply with all of the 

requirements of the DPG

• Adversarial, labor-intensive process

• Senior leadership forces “Jointness” into the process at

the end, with great effort

• Gaps and excesses in Joint capabilities render the 

Defense program cost-ineffective

Resourcing

• Outcome-focused joint needs are defined up front in the 

process

• CoComs drive joint needs; Services provide solutions

• Capabilities trade-off analysis is conducted at the Departmentlevel

• Developed collaboratively, with extensive involvement by all

stakeholders

• Services and Defense agencies define needs at the 

Component level

• Focus is on platforms and weapon systems rather than

capability outputs

• Services and Defense agencies conduct trades within

their Component

Planning

• Single translation of NSS into Department objectives, priorities

and risk tolerance

• Conceptual framework and focus for planning and capability

development

• Resource-informed Strategic Planning Guidance

• Multiple documents

• Heavy emphasis on programmatic guidance

• Guidance is not integrated, prioritized, or resourceinformed

Strategy

“As-Is” Problems End State Attributes Major 

Process

• Focus on performance / results

• Reduced cycle-time so that capabilities are developed to meet 

emerging needs

• Human capital managed strategically

• All warfighting and enterprise capability costs considered and 

continually refreshed

• Execution performance serves as a starting point for next

planning cycle

• Focus on expenditure / adherence to regulations

• Prolonged and complicated process to produce new

capabilities

• Human capital planning and costs are not addressed

• Logistics & acquisition cycle time and support are not 

timely or cost-effective

• Execution data not useful for DoD decision making

Execution and 

Accountability

• Joint Programming Guidance is provided early and is fiscally

constrained

• Streamlined, efficient process produces early decisions

• Senior leadership attends to issues of compliance and 

executability

• Components’ programs cannot comply with all of the 

requirements of the DPG

• Adversarial, labor-intensive process

• Senior leadership forces “Jointness” into the process at

the end, with great effort

• Gaps and excesses in Joint capabilities render the 

Defense program cost-ineffective

Resourcing

• Outcome-focused joint needs are defined up front in the 

process

• CoComs drive joint needs; Services provide solutions

• Capabilities trade-off analysis is conducted at the Departmentlevel

• Developed collaboratively, with extensive involvement by all

stakeholders

• Services and Defense agencies define needs at the 

Component level

• Focus is on platforms and weapon systems rather than

capability outputs

• Services and Defense agencies conduct trades within

their Component

Planning

• Single translation of NSS into Department objectives, priorities

and risk tolerance

• Conceptual framework and focus for planning and capability

development

• Resource-informed Strategic Planning Guidance

• Multiple documents

• Heavy emphasis on programmatic guidance

• Guidance is not integrated, prioritized, or resourceinformed

Strategy

“As-Is” Problems End State Attributes Major 

Process

An Unclear Defense Strategy 

Defense strategy is not articulated in a concise form that provides integrated department-wide objectives, priorities, and roles as a framework for planning joint 

capabilities development. It is conveyed in numerous documents, many of which 

are outdated or contradictory. 

Much of the material in the current strategy documents originates in working 

groups and committees. This bottom-up process frequently results in a signatureready document. But, it does not support early senior leadership involvement to 

shape strategic guidance up-front. 

 2-3 
 

Furthermore, the Department’s planning guidance is platform centric. Specific 

programmatics, communicated before Department-wide planning is conducted, 

often reflect “special interest” lobbying rather than sound analysis. Defense guidance, as written today, tends to foreclose the planning process with specific programmatic guidance, without any analytic transition from the strategic guidance 

that begins the process to the programmatic guidance that ends it. There should be 

a clear linkage from defense strategy to the capabilities needed to support it and to 

decisions on how those capabilities need to be changed. The CoComs have a 

unique perspective in this regard, but today’s process uses that perspective only 

on the margins. 

The problems arising from the lack of a single, well-articulated defense strategy 

are exacerbated by guidance that is neither prioritized nor fiscally constrained. As 

a result, those receiving the guidance are left to determine what aspects should be 

implemented. Strategic direction breaks down and loses credibility. 

Stovepiped Capabilities Planning 

The Services dominate planning for capabilities, even when those capabilities are 

inherently joint and specifically support the CoComs. Historically, the Services 

have defined the needs, developed the alternatives, and selected and resourced the 

solutions. These actions are typically accomplished in a stovepiped fashion, with 

minimal consideration for cross-Service trades or multi-Service efficiencies. 

Under the old Requirements Generation System, Services presented their mission 

need statements to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for approval. Because it approached candidate requirements and resources on a case-bycase basis rather than with a DoD-wide view, the JROC was predisposed to accept 

Service-defined needs. In addition, the JROC was unable to prioritize needs, particularly across Services, which made it difficult to terminate lower priority programs later in the process. 

The Services were primarily responsible for creating mission need statements

within their assigned domains. Needs that were uniquely joint were slow to be 

identified and filled when no specific Service had responsibility. In some cases, 

joint needs were incongruent with the Services’ strategic direction or they competed with Service priorities and were therefore ignored. 

Combatant Command involvement was minimal. Their needs were implicitly 

communicated through operational plans and Integrated Priorities Lists (IPLs) 

rather than explicitly through requirements documents. However, the Services 

viewed the IPLs as unconstrained wish lists, while the CoCom saw the IPLs as 

largely ignored until the Services were forced to fund selected aspects during program review. In the aggregate, the lack of strong CoCom influence resulted in capabilities being “pushed” to them rather than identifying and “pulling” the 

capabilities they needed.

 2-4 
Capabilities-Based Process 

The new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) addresses many of the above problems, but the analytical capability continues to reside predominantly in the Services. The CoComs have an “on ramp” to the JROC 

via capability change recommendations, but it remains unclear if the Services will 

embrace those recommendations because they compete with Service priorities. 

Also, cross-Service prioritization continues to be a challenge, and enterprise needs 

do not receive the same degree of attention as warfighting needs. 

To solve many of these problems, DoD has undertaken several initiatives to implement a capabilities-based approach for determining military needs. Primarily, 

it has started developing the necessary tools to support such an approach, such as 

metrics, methods, and capability categories. However, a capabilities-based approach has not yet been institutionalized across the Department. 

Inefficient Resourcing Process 

Because the Services receive more guidance than they can resource, they are 

forced to make their own tradeoffs to comply with fiscal constraints. Service 

needs routinely compete with joint needs, with tough choices required to create a 

fiscally responsible program. Service decisions made in their own best interests 

are then second-guessed by the CoComs, the Joint Staff, and OSD, and often are 

overturned during program review. Consequently, the Services have little incentive to fund joint needs before program review. 

This process has resulted in an annual “train wreck” during program review. The 

train wreck occurs because joint needs are forced into the process after each Service has developed its integrated program. The resulting budget does not optimize 

capabilities at either the Department or the Service level. The effort to modify the 

program and the budget late in the process is labor intensive and often adversarial. 

Weak Feedback and Accountability 

A significant portion of DoD’s workforce is dedicated to ensuring compliance 

with budgetary rules and regulations. This effort focuses on how money is being 

spent rather than on determining whether the capabilities being acquired support 

the overall strategy. As a result, too much emphasis is placed on monetary input 

rather than capabilities output, and much of the submitted information does not 

support senior leader decision making. Generally, reports, including budget exhibits, are compiled to meet an external customer such as the Congress or the Office 

of Management and Budget. Senior decision makers need to know how well the 

Department is being resourced to meet current and future mission requirements—

a message that has not been clearly presented in the aggregate.

The CoComs have not played a significant role in this part of the process. As the 

authors of the Department’s operational plans, they are best suited to determine if

the right capabilities are being delivered, which means they should be driving the 

 2-5 
 

strategy and feasibility assessments. Their lessons learned also should be given a 

formal process for consideration in the strategy or planning processes. 

THE “END STATE” PROCESS—WHAT’S NEEDED

The Study Team developed a general process model for achieving the desired end 

state. Figure 2-3 depicts a simplified model of the end state process. 

Figure 2-3. Simplified End State Process Model 

Defense

Resourcing

Process

Feedback during next cycle

WHAT

TO DO? HOW TO DO IT?

HOW WELL

DID WE DO?

SecDef

Joint

Programming

Guidance

- SecDef decision points

- Iterative SecDef engagement

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

(Non-Warfighting)

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Resources

STRATEGY ENHANCED

PLANNING RESOURCING EXECUTION & 

ACCOUNTABILITY

Execution and

Feedback

SecDef

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

The new process model differs from how business is done today in several major 

respects. First, CoComs would be given the opportunity to play a larger role in 

shaping defense strategy, which is articulated in the Strategic Planning Guidance 

(SPG). The SPG, which initiates the planning process, would define those areas 

where joint planning efforts will focus, particularly where cross-Service capabilities tradeoffs may be appropriate. 

The planning process must allow for three distinct activities: 

¡ Identifying joint needs through the use of effects-based terms

¡ 

¡ 

Providing a wide range of alternatives to meet those needs 

Analyzing cross-Service trades to select the best options. 

The CoComs would play a leading role in the first activity. Joint needs are driven 

by operating concepts and the unique demands of various theaters of operation. 

 2-6 
Capabilities-Based Process 

The Services would also play a vital role by offering innovative approaches to 

warfighting within their functional specialties. At this stage of the process, those 

innovations must be driven by concepts, not weapons or platforms. 

The Services, and in some cases Defense Agencies, would offer proposed solutions to meet joint needs. Selection of the best alternatives must be preceded by 

appropriate planning and analysis, and conducted with sufficient transparency that 

all stakeholders accept the validity of the results. Analysis would be conducted by 

teams from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services, with CoCom representation to 

ensure that analysis reflects a realistic assessment of current and future warfighting concepts. 

Ultimately, the choice of alternatives to fulfill key joint needs is the responsibility 

of the Secretary of Defense. Those decisions must be supported with independent 

military advice and with full recognition of their costs, benefits, and opportunity 

costs. 

The Secretary of Defense’s decisions would be used to update a set of rolling capabilities plans that outline current and future capabilities, anticipated schedules, 

performance metrics, and estimated costs. Annual Joint Programming Guidance 

(JPG) would solidify the decisions made within a given year and subject the totality of the guidance to a fiscal adequacy test to ensure that the Services and Defense Agencies have sufficient resources to comply with the guidance. This 

process would force all stakeholders to confront inevitable tradeoffs, and to prioritize their needs. The result would be an agreed-upon statement of defense needs 

and a realistic business plan for meeting those needs within available resources. 

Finally, DoD’s annual performance review process must focus on how the investments made in the preceding year’s budget addressed the strategic priorities in 

the SPG and the capabilities directed by the JPG. 

The following discussion outlines the attributes of the proposed process in greater 

detail. 

A New Framework—Joint Capability Categories 

To support needs definition, gap and excess analysis, major trade analyses, and 

capabilities planning, DoD’s capabilities must be divided into manageable groups, 

or capability categories. The defining of joint capability categories is an essential 

early step to implementing a capabilities-based approach because they would 

provide the framework for capabilities planning, for comparing Service 

contributions to joint warfighting and enterprise support, and for facilitating 

cross-Service trades. 

Capability categories can be created along functional or operational lines. Functional 

capability categories would be useful because there are relatively few of them, representing those activities or processes that must take place if the Department success-

 2-7 
 

fully pursued its military activities. The Joint Staff has created five—force application, protection, logistics, command and control, and battle-space awareness—all 

focused on warfighting needs. To address enterprise needs, the Department may 

need to add more categories such as force management and infrastructure. 

Alternatively, joint capability categories can be built along operational lines (i.e., 

military activities). Examples of these categories include denying sanctuary to the 

adversary, ensuring freedom of navigation, and denying adversary access to space. 

The functional categories would be more enduring of the two types—they are less 

apt to change because of new technologies, emerging threats, or doctrine updates, 

so they may be a more appropriate basis for organizational changes. They also 

offer clearer boundaries to assign weapon systems and platforms, thereby reducing redundant assignment of platforms to categories, which would further improve the ability of functional capability managers to develop and implement 

capabilities planning. 

In contrast, operational categories provide a direct link to the CoComs and would 

support major trade analysis by military operation. 

Whether organized along functional or operational lines, the new categories must 

enable all Services, Defense Agencies, and CoComs to focus their planning on 

capabilities. If the right categories are created, strategic guidance, analytical capabilities, and programs and budgets could also be organized around them. Figure 2-

4 depicts how capability categories could be used as an organizing construct for 

both information and analytical activities across the entire process. 

Figure 2-4. Capability Categories 

Strategy Planning Resourcing Execution

Feedback

Provide a framework to articulate a capabilities-based approach across

strategy development, planning, resourcing, and execution

• A common structure for organizing and communicating information

• A consistent message across the Department

• A framework for capability assessments and trade-off analyses

Capability #1

Capability #2

Senior Oversight—The Strategic Planning Council 

Since it expends enormous resources in support of the national strategy, DoD 

must maintain a clear linkage between that strategy and how the resources are 

 2-8 
Capabilities-Based Process 

used. A Strategic Planning Council (SPC) would provide senior leaders with a 

venue to offer formal inputs to shape defense strategy and support effective oversight throughout the end-to-end process of strategy development, capabilities 

planning, resourcing, and execution. Members of the SPC would set the direction 

of the Department and assess whether the process is moving in that direction. 

Chaired by the Secretary of Defense, the SPC would be comprised of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries, the CJCS, the Service Secretaries 

and Service Chiefs, and the CoComs. It would meet three times per year, or more 

frequently at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. 

Top-Down Strategy Development 

The Department of Defense’s support for national strategy should reflect the 

judgment of its most senior leaders. The SPC would provide the forum in which 

the CoComs could air their views on the challenges they face and shape the 

strategy to meet their near- and long-term challenges. Those views would become

the “top-down” input to the strategy development process. The CoComs’ staffs 

would need to shoulder increased responsibility for identifying issues and 

coordinating closely with the Joint Staff to ensure that the strategy meets the 

demands of their theaters. The lower-level working groups and committees that 

actually draft strategic planning guidance would need to ensure that the explicit 

inputs of the SPC are incorporated. 

The SPG should be a single, unified, fiscally-informed document covering both 

warfighting and enterprise capabilities. It also should do the following: 

Establish strategic objectives and priorities. The SPG should include a 

view of the near- and far-term strategic environment and objectives to 

support national strategy. It also should address force sizing and employment concepts, desired response times, assumptions, and priorities by 

theater and mission area. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Identify fiscal and other planning constraints. The SPG should identify the 

planning assumptions used in developing the Department’s top-line funding, as well as other factors such as personnel increases or reductions. Although detailed costing is not possible at this stage, the intent would be to 

avoid a “two MTW strategy with a one MTW top line.” Other planning 

constraints, such as ongoing operations, should be stated as well. 

Articulate priorities and risk tolerance. The Secretary of Defense should 

use this section to formally state priorities for the Department and to define the acceptable level of risk within capability categories, theaters of

operation, and the four Quadrennial Defense Review risk categories (operational risk, future risk, institutional risk, and force management risk). 

 2-9 
 

Establish joint capability objectives. The SPG should identify the joint capability objectives defined in prior-year planning and studies. These objectives should be framed in effects-based terms that do not preclude any 

potential alternatives, and where possible, include metrics and scenarios. 

Force providers would use this guidance to develop and evaluate alternative capabilities. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Identify strategic concepts for planning future enterprise functions. The 

SPG should clearly identify the strategic goals for the Department’s work 

force, infrastructure, “overhead” support, and acquisition, which would 

ensure that enterprise activities are fully integrated with warfighting plans.

Identify future joint operational and organizing concepts. The SPG should 

assign experimentation, science and technology, and capability priorities 

to enable new operating concepts. 

The SPG may direct studies as necessary to identify issues for future consideration in the planning process. Normally, the SPG would not provide programmatic 

guidance, but instead provide unified direction to the Department’s joint planning 

efforts, which in turn would produce the programmatic direction intended to support defense strategy. The intent of the SPG would be to begin the Department’s 

planning process by providing strategic direction rather than end the process with 

specific programmatic guidance. 

Capabilities Planning—Enhanced Planning Process 

The Enhanced Planning Process is designed to link strategy to program development 

by assessing current capabilities, analyzing gaps and excesses, and recommending 

alternatives for the SecDef’s decisions. These decisions are captured in a rolling capabilities plan and are then disseminated for action through the annual JPG. 

The rolling capabilities plan is not envisioned as a published document, but would 

serve as a repository of capabilities decisions made throughout the year. It would 

be a management tool (potentially web based) that communicates to the Department current and future capabilities, gaps and excesses, and the associated efforts 

to address those gaps and excesses. It would also provide a forum for sharing information about anticipated schedules, performance metrics, and estimated costs 

of joint programs and about experimentation, technology development, and lessons learned. Rolling capabilities plans would be developed for each joint capability category. 

Key joint stakeholders, such as the CoComs, would need to participate extensively in the process to ensure that solutions are “born joint.” A competitive process would develop alternative solutions to achieve the needed joint warfighting 

capabilities. Services and Defense Agencies would be responsible for developing 

innovative alternatives to achieve the desired capability. 

 2-10 
Capabilities-Based Process 

The alternatives would typically be developed as end-to-end solutions using various approaches. The alternatives would be evaluated in an open and collaborative 

analytical process, based on their overall contribution to joint operational c

bilities. This would allow the Department to decide “how much is enough” in a 

given capability area, and could result in cross-Service trades or trades among 

major capability areas. 

apaFigure 2-5 describes the Enhanced Planning Process in simplified terms. At the 

heart of the process is a comparison of current capabilities with those needed to 

perform tasks and missions. Scenarios and concepts give context to the tasks and 

missions. The disconnects can be characterized as capability gaps (implying that 

tasks or missions cannot be accomplished with existing capabilities) or capability 

excesses (unnecessary redundancy exists or a specific capability is no longer 

needed). This analysis would begin the process that shapes future capabilities. 

The Enhanced Planning Process would receive input from two major domains: 

warfighting needs and enterprise needs. Warfighting needs are the resources 

needed to execute warfighting missions, while the enterprise needs cover areas 

such as infrastructure and the workforce. Combined, these needs reflect the spectrum of considerations—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). 

Figure 2-5. Simplified Capabilities Planning Process 

As-Is

Capabilities

Missions

& Tasks

Gaps &

Excesses

To-Be

Capabilities

Scenarios

& Concepts

Because the Department has more needs than resources, it must seek the highest 

levels of efficiency and effectiveness, eliminate unnecessary duplication among 

Services, and develop multi-Service efficiencies. This capability requires an assessment of needs above the Service level. 

Figure 2-6 shows the changed role of the Services in determining needs and choosing 

solutions to those needs. At the Department level, an analytical capability would define the joint needs and conduct cross-Service/Component analysis to satisfy those 

needs. This analytical activity, or analysis engine, must provide a collaborative environment that brings the views of the CoComs, Joint Staff, Defense Agencies, Services, and OSD into a single forum and integrates all aspects of capabilities planning. 

 2-11 
 

Figure 2-6. New Roles and Responsibilities for Joint Needs 

Alternatives

Presented

Gaps

Identified

Solutions

Selected

Solutions

Resourced

Services Services Services Services

Dept-Wide Services Dept Level Services

OLD

NEW

Alternatives

Presented

Gaps

Identified

Solutions

Selected

Solutions

Resourced

Services Services Services Services

Dept-Wide Services Dept Level Services

OLD

NEW

The analysis engine, the heart of the Enhanced Planning Process, would perform

five key functions: defining joint needs, identifying gaps and excesses in current 

and future capabilities, conducting top-level trade analyses in capability terms, 

assessing alternatives that have been nominated by the Services to fill capability 

gaps, and prioritizing these actions to ensure that the most pressing issues are 

fully resourced. 

To perform these functions, the analysis engine needs to do the following: 

Create and maintain the methodologies and tools required to conduct 

capabilities analysis at the Department level 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Articulate outcome-oriented joint needs from a Department rather than a 

Component view 

Identify current gaps and excesses by characterizing current capabilities 

with respect to assigned missions and tasks 

Identify future gaps and excesses by characterizing future capabilities with 

respect to operating concepts and projected missions and tasks 

Prioritize current and future gaps 

Assess the impact on capabilities of SPG, lessons learned, 

experimentation, technical opportunities, study recommendations, 

operating concepts, and emerging threats 

Assess proposed alternatives to fill gaps in capabilities 

Present decisions, particularly those concerning major trades, for senior 

leadership 

Create a “living” audit trail of capabilities decisions and associated 

rationale in a transparent rolling capabilities plan 

 2-12 
Capabilities-Based Process 

Translate joint capabilities decisions, where appropriate, into 

programmatics for inclusion in the JPG. 

¡ 

The analysis engine would require substantial analytical support and warfighter 

assessment. At the Department level, the analytical capability does not exist to 

support all the activities listed above. Analytical support would need to be contracted or moved from other parts of the Department. (Federally Funded Research 

and Development Centers, or FFRDCs, are potential candidates for providing that 

support.) Warfighters and analysts would need to be brought together in a structured way to populate the analysis engine with the necessary expertise. 

As shown in Figure 2-7, capability teams would provide a forum of expertise to 

accomplish the needed analytical support. These teams could be arrayed by capability category or by functional discipline. The goal would be to facilitate capabilities analysis and planning, ensuring that the range of warfighting and 

enterprise issues is addressed in the Enhanced Planning Process. 

Figure 2-7. Department-Level Analysis Engine 

SPG

Analysis Engine

JPG

Capability Teams

Warfighting and Enterprise Areas

Stakeholder Participation • Services

• Joint Staff

• CoComs

• OSD

Improving the analytical capability at the Department-level through an analysis 

engine would help identify cross-Service interoperability issues and concerns. The 

analysis engine requires a counterpart activity, also at the Department-level, to 

assess interoperability needs and communicate the technical standards to resolve 

them. Systems engineering support would also be required, perhaps at U.S. Joint 

Forces Command or OSD, to provide interoperability standards and harmonize 

net-centric and command and control needs across the joint community. 

The activities within the analysis engine occur throughout the year. The teams 

would review study results, experimentation, lessons learned, threat changes, 

technology opportunities, and capability needs documents to identify areas that 

could affect the capabilities for which they provide analytical support. These efforts would be included in each team’s rolling capabilities plan. Once a year, 

these decisions would be captured in the fiscally constrained JPG and disseminated to the Department. 

 2-13 
 

Figure 2-8 summarizes the process that would occur inside the analysis engine. 

This process is designed to capture the joint warfighting and enterprise needs of 

the Department. 

Figure 2-8. Analysis Engine Activities 

Inputs

(SPG, study results,

experiments, etc.)

Identify

Joint

Needs

Enterprise

Needs

Determine

Gaps &

Excesses

Enterprise

Capabilities

Define

Solution

Parameters

Assess

Service

Alternatives

Leadership

Selects

Solution

Rolling

Capabilities

Plan JPG

Services

Develop

Alternatives

Warfighting

Needs

Warfighting

Capabilities

The process would address issues that fall within a single capability category or 

cross capability categories. Cross-cutting issues would require ad hoc teams (or 

“tiger teams”) to be formed from the analysis engine to assess the specific problem and present decision opportunities for senior leadership. Examples of crosscutting issues include determining global presence, operational availability, and 

active and reserve component mix. The results would then be passed to the capability teams for integration into capabilities planning for their area of responsibility and ultimately translated into programmatic guidance. 

To develop the JPG, the analysis engine would need to prioritize and integrate 

needs and solutions, and ensure that all doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership, personnel, and facilities considerations are addressed. Therefore, a forum must exist to harmonize recommendations and decisions before they are incorporated into the rolling capabilities plans. These recommendations and 

decisions would be accumulated throughout the year, and when viewed in totality 

for inclusion in the JPG, some may not be affordable and set aside. Determining 

the decisions that should be resourced will be difficult, but setting priorities at the 

front end should improve the process. Figure 2-9 illustrates the idea. 

 2-14 
Capabilities-Based Process 

Figure 2-9. Major Trades and Integration 

SPG Capabilities Planning JPG Integration (Refine Fiscal Constraints)

Cross-Cutting Issues

(Major Trades)

Current Capabilities Gaps Alternatives Solutions Future Capabilities

Many of the skill sets needed to populate the analysis engine are resident in the 

Joint Staff and OSD. They are essentially a hybrid of today’s program review issue teams and the Functional Capabilities Boards. The issue teams have been very 

successful in solving problems by carefully framing each issue, representing all 

views, and presenting alternatives for leadership selection. 

The Functional Capabilities Boards have created a collaborative environment to 

vet disparate views and provide a capabilities management function that develops 

and maintains methodologies, metrics, and assumptions needed for analysis. 

Bringing both skill sets together would create a powerful analytical capability. 

After the analysis engine has a recommendation ready for decision, it would forward the recommendation to a mid-level review board and then to a senior decision body (see Figure 2-10). Recommendations would be submitted in the form of 

alternatives, with pros and cons, rather than a single solution. To the maximum

extent possible, senior leaders would be given the opportunity to choose from viable and distinct alternatives. 

Figure 2-10. Capabilities Decision Process 

Analysis

Engine

Mid-Level

Review

Senior

Decision

Body

Identify Needs,

Assess Trades/Solutions,

Present Alternatives

Review Alternatives,

Provide Comments &

Minority Opinions

Select 

Alternative

3-Star Level SecDef or

DepSecDef Chairs

 2-15 
 

The mid-level review body would consist of 3-star equivalents from the Services, 

Joint Staff, OSD, and Defense Agency stakeholders. (CoComs may seek opportunities to attend, but because this body meets weekly their attendance may not be 

practical without an expanded presence in the Pentagon.) This body would review 

all alternatives forwarded by the analysis engine and then send all comments and 

recommendations, including minority opinions, to the senior decision body. 

The senior decision body—currently the Senior Leadership Review Group—

would be chaired by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense and consist of 

senior representatives from the Services, Joint Staff, OSD, CoComs (to the extent

practical), and applicable Defense Agencies. This body, which would meet less 

frequently than the mid-level review body, would focus on selecting alternatives 

and resolving major or contentious issues. To the extent agreeable to the stakeholders, the senior decision body may return some decisions—such as approval 

for concepts, study assumptions, metrics, methods, and capability plans—to the 

mid-level review body. 

“Born Joint” Resourcing Process 

Decisions from the Department’s leadership would be captured during the year 

and then incorporated in the annual JPG. The JPG is a fiscally constrained business plan that addresses the totality of the defense budget, describes the capability 

needs that were collaboratively developed during the Enhanced Planning Process, 

and identifies the means for meeting those needs. It also communicates specific 

programmatic actions on issues of concern to the Secretary of Defense and the 

joint capability resourcing needs stemming from the Enhanced Planning Process. 

Output-based metrics would be provided to ensure that the capability needs of the 

joint community are met. The SPC would review the JPG prior to signature to ensure compliance with the top-down guidance contained in the SPG. The JPG 

would also do the following: 

Comply with the Strategic Planning Guidance. The JPG would address the 

extent to which the program guidance complies with the priorities, strategic objectives, and risk tolerance conveyed in the SPG. Specific programmatics contained in the JPG must clearly support the defense strategy. 

¡ 

¡ Provide directive guidance on selected joint capability issues. Programmatic guidance would be provided in a format similar to a Program Decision Memorandum. Components are required to incorporate directive 

guidance in their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). Guidance in 

this section may also be used to correct or maintain prior-year decisions. 

Although this section of the JPG would be compulsory, it incorporates decisions made during the Enhanced Planning Process. The Components 

should not be surprised by the guidance contained in this section of the 

JPG because they have been full participants in the capabilities planning 

process. 

 2-16 
Capabilities-Based Process 

Identify programmatic areas that are delegated to the Components. The 

vast majority of the defense program would be delegated to the Components. Within the delegated guidance areas, the SecDef may elect to identify goals, objectives, or measures of effectiveness on resource allocation. 

For example, the SecDef may require that a certain percentage of the 

budget be dedicated to a specific program area such as science and technology. These metrics would be designed to coordinate the Department’s 

resourcing efforts, while not being overly prescriptive of Service responsibilities. 

¡ 

¡ Ensure fiscal adequacy. All guidance, directed and delegated, must be fiscally executable. This portion of the JPG would demonstrate that the 

Components have not been given more guidance than they can resource. 

With clear and fiscally constrained guidance in the JPG, the Services and Defense 

Agencies would be given information to build POMs that are in the best, overall 

interest of the Department. Ultimately, this practice should result in a less contentious program review process, particularly because the Services and Defense 

Agencies would only be given programmatic guidance that has already incorporated joint needs. Building in “bill payers” or “salami slicing” programs to support joint programs added late in the process should no longer be required. 

The program review would focus primarily on ensuring JPG compliance and addressing fact-of-life issues and unforeseen events. The CoComs would need to 

participate in the program review to assess the impact of fact-of-life changes. A 

mechanism similar to a Program Change Proposal or issue paper may be required 

to accommodate these views. 

To further streamline the resourcing process, program and budget reviews should 

be accomplished simultaneously. Doing so would shorten the amount of time between POM submission and the President’s Budget. Eventually, as the Enhanced 

Planning Process matures, it may be feasible to delay POM submission until late 

September or early October. The later these documents can be submitted, the 

greater the likelihood that the Department would be able to incorporate emerging 

fact-of-life changes. 

Improved Assessment and Feedback Process 

This portion of the process focuses on assessing how well the Department did 

what it set out to do. The “providers,” primarily the Services, would report on 

“what they actually got” for the resources provided. The “users,” led by the CoComs, would report on whether they were able to perform their missions with the 

capabilities provided and whether those capabilities were sufficient to execute the 

strategy. The results of the assessment would be be presented to the SPC for discussion, used as a mechanism to develop subsequent planning guidance, and 

 2-17 
 

transmitted once a year to Congress as part of the Secretary’s Annual Report to 

the Congress. 

Assessments would be prepared by an independent office, possibly supported by a 

small staff. The role of the assessor would be to: 

Integrate assessments of current capabilities provided by the CoComs, 

Joint Staff, Service Chiefs, Principal Staff Assistants, Agency Heads, and 

team leaders in the Enhanced Planning Process. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Assess whether the capabilities were delivered as expected and as directed

in the JPG (in both delegated and directive sections). 

Determine whether total capabilities were sufficient to meet the strategy as

a whole. 

The performance assessment process would take two forms: periodic briefings 

and a written annual report. Both would address warfighting and enterprise activities and be organized around the capabilities categories and objectives outlined in 

the SPG and JPG. 

The primary audience for the periodic briefings on program execution would be 

the SPC. These briefings would be based on capability metrics defined in the Enhanced Planning Process. The annual performance assessment report, intended for 

both internal and external audiences, would summarize overall performance and 

relate it to the Department’s goals. It would be at a high level of aggregation and 

use a Balanced Scorecard framework. After full transition to the new process, the 

report would become the basis of the Annual Report to the Congress. 

Process Timeline 

Figure 2-11 provides an overview of the major activities of this process. The 

process would begin with a spring SPC meeting to develop top-down guidance for 

the SPG to be released in the fall. The top-down guidance would be based on 

feedback from the previous cycle and issues developed by the SPC members. In 

the fall, the SPC would review the draft SPG to ensure that top-down guidance 

was incorporated. 

 2-18 
Capabilities-Based Process 

Figure 2-11. Activity Calendar 

POM POM

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Review

Draft

Enhanced Planning Process (Continuous)

POM Build Prog/Budget Review

Top-Down Guidance

Execution

and

Feedback

SPG

PB

POM

JPG

PAR

SPC SPC SPC Strategy Issue Dev

Planning

Resourcing

POM – Program Objective Memorandum

SPC – Strategic Planning Council

SPG – Strategic Planning Guidance

ADR – Annual Defense Report

JPG – Joint Programming Guidance

PB – President’s Budget

ADR

SPG-directed issues and studies then enter the Enhanced Planning Process. Decisions from the Enhanced Planning Process would be captured in rolling capabilities plans and then articulated in the annual JPG. The SPC, in its spring meeting, 

would review the draft JPG to ensure compliance with the SPG. The Services 

would incorporate the JPG into their POMs, which are submitted in the fall. 

Program and budget reviews would be accomplished simultaneously with a 

budget submitted to the Congress in January. Budget execution would occur during the next fiscal year. After execution, an assessment would be provided to the 

winter SPC on how well the Department acquired desired capabilities to meet the 

defense strategy. Feedback would be used to influence the next SPG, and the 

process repeats. 

One of the key concerns in this process is balancing workloads throughout the 

year. Care must be taken not to overburden the system, particularly during program and budget reviews when the SPG would be published. 

 2-19 
 

 2-20 
Chapter 3 

Organizational Alternatives 

The Study Team identified two levels of organizational alternatives that address 

the structural changes needed to implement the new capabilities-based process. 

First-order organizational alternatives address the changes needed at the Department/corporate level to support capability-based planning. The second-order organizational alternatives address changes within major enterprise functions (such 

as acquisition and logistics) to accomplish the end state planning and execution 

processes. For both levels, the Study Team developed a set of moderate, aggressive, and radical alternatives, based on the extent of the needed change. 

DEPARTMENT/CORPORATE LEVEL 

(FIRST-ORDER ALTERNATIVES) 

The Study Team developed detailed recommendations for each of the processes 

within the four major end state phases: strategy, enhanced planning, resourcing, 

and execution and accountability. The Team then assessed whether organizational 

change was needed to better identify joint needs and deliver the capabilities to 

satisfy those needs, in accordance with the end state processes. The Team concluded that organizational changes were not needed to support the proposed process changes to the strategy and resourcing phases, but changes are required to 

achieve the end state in the other phases. Figure 3-1 illustrates this distinction. 

The Enhanced Planning Process would require a Department-level organization 

capable of identifying gaps and excesses, and leading DoD-wide trade analysis 

across warfighting and enterprise functions. The analytic function would comprise 

the “engine” around which the headquarters planning activities should form. The 

options presented in this section address alternative organizational structures for 

carrying out the functions of the analysis engine, while potentially reducing the 

total headquarters staffing. 

 3-1 
 

Figure 3-1. Overall Process with Organizational Change Requirements 

Strategy Enhanced

Planning Resourcing Execution

and 

Accountability

Conduct analysis to effect

capability trades for 

warfighting and 

enterprise resources

Ensure that

planning decisions

are translated and 

communicated in

the budget process

Understand what

outcomes are achieved

for the resources

provided

Need cross-DoD

assessment of

capability achievement

Need a common framework

Process

change

required

Process 

change

required

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SecDef

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Produce unified,

resource-informed

strategic direction

Need combination of

functional expertise and

objective analysis--with

DoD-wide view

SecDef

Joint

Programming

Guidance

- SecDef decision points

-Iterative SecDef engagement

Process and

organizational change

required

Process and

organizational change

required

In addition to addressing Enhanced Planning Process (analysis engine) functions, 

the organizational options discussed below include proposed changes to accomplish the execution and accountability phase. The goal is to create the ability to 

perform independent assessments of the capabilities actually delivered and to 

formulate judgments about whether those capabilities met the strategic objectives. 

These first-order organizational alternatives would not involve changes to the Services or the CoComs. However, in all of the options, the CoComs and Services 

would play a different role than in the current planning process: 

The CoComs would have an increased role in defining joint needs and priorities. ¡ 

¡ The Services/Defense Agencies would focus on providing solutions to 

joint needs. 

Although internal changes to accomplish these roles should be left to those organizations, both would be encouraged to align themselves to support the new end 

state. CoComs in particular may require an increased presence in the Pentagon to 

participate more fully in the new process. 

 3-2 
Organizational Alternatives 

The question that drives the alternative organizational options is how to most efficiently structure OSD and the Joint Staff to interact with the key stakeholders in 

leading the definition of needs and determining the right solutions to those needs. 

The following are other design criteria for the organizational alternatives: 

¡ The roles of the SecDef and the CJCS would not change. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Top-level needs, gaps, and excesses would be identified by an organization with a DoD-wide view. 

Both warfighting and enterprise areas would be considered 

The size of the headquarters staff would not increase. 

Alternative 1: Enhance the Functional Capability Boards 

The first alternative, depicted in Figure 3-2, leverages the current Joint Staff 

Functional Capability Board initiative to analyze warfighting capability needs and 

solutions using an ad hoc format with broad stakeholder participation. This alternative would build on that structure by expanding it to include enterprise functions. The OSD divisions with expertise in the enterprise functions could sponsor 

the additional Functional Capability Boards. These boards would be co-chaired by 

the Joint Staff and OSD. 

Figure 3-2. Alternative 1—Moderate Change 

Joint Staff

DepSecDef

CJCS

SecDef

PA&E

USD AT&L

USD Policy

USD Compt

USD (I) USD P&R

JCC 1

JCC 2

JCC 3 

JCC 4 

JCC 5 SES

JCC 6 SES

JCC n SES

Enterprise CBs

Warfighting CBs

Capability

Boards/Services

Refine needs, identify solutions

PA&E

PA&E, J-8

Lead Org

Translate joint solutions into program

guidance

Identify top-level gaps and excesses

Process Functions

Strategy

Enhanced Planning

Resourcing

Execution / Feedback

• CBs augment analytical capability (e.g. focus FFRDCs)

• Develop and maintain architectures and roadmaps

• Assistance and augmentation from CoComs, Services,

and others

Sponsorship

Reporting

(Accomplished Collaboratively with All Stakeholders)

DoD Mgmt

GC,

LA,

PA,

IG

OT&E,

CIO,

Admin

JCC = Joint Capability Category

To enable the Functional Capability Boards to accomplish their objectives, they 

should have dedicated analytical tools, provided by redirecting the efforts of current Department analysis centers, refocusing the efforts of FFRDCs, or using 

other contracted analytical expertise. The CoComs and Service staffs would be 

 3-3 
 

required to provide additional subject matter expertise to these capability boards. 

In this organization, the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPA&E), 

working with J-8, would perform the analysis scoping function that identifies toplevel gaps and excesses. It would also integrate the output of the analysis engine 

and translate it into programming guidance. 

DPA&E would lead the execution and accountability process, and the CoComs

and Joint Staff would perform the assessments of military and operational capabilities. The Services would execute the programs, and provide feedback through 

their existing reporting processes. 

This alternative would rely on issue teams to analyze and assess joint capability 

needs to inform programming decisions. This alternative would use ad hoc team

members, drawn from organizations with an equity stake in the outcomes. Without a formal reporting structure, this option would be relatively more reliant on 

leadership personalities to achieve corporate-level joint planning. 

Alternative 2: Establish a Corporate Planning Staff 

This alternative, shown in Figure 3-3, is an aggressive change that moves away 

from the ad hoc nature of the joint planning organization. It would merge existing 

staff elements into a Joint Capability Planning organization under the direction of 

a Principal Staff Assistant for Capability Planning—PSA(CP). It would include 

most of the other principal assistants on the OSD staff and be the single Department headquarters entity performing capability planning. It would serve both the 

CJCS and SecDef. This organization would be formed by dual-hatting personnel 

from the Joint Staff (primarily J-8) and merging them with elements of the current 

PA&E and potentially other OSD organizations. The DJ-8 on the Joint Staff 

would be dual-hatted as the Deputy Director for Capability Planning to provide 

senior warfighting expertise and a direct reporting path to CJCS. Service and CoCom participation would be the same as for Alternative 1. 

This alternative would add an independent performance assessment division that 

reports directly to the Secretary. The division would lead the execution and accountability phase of the process. It would be small, formed from elements of 

other OSD divisions, and draw on information provided by the Services, Agencies, CoComs and Joint Staff. 

A separate capability planning division would combine operational and analytic 

expertise from both warfighting and enterprise functions into a single, corporatelevel organization. This organization would have the skills needed to conduct Department-wide analyses and capability planning, with the participation of the 

Components and the CoComs. It would also consolidate and integrate analyses to 

support corporate-level decision-making. This alternative enhances the CJCS’s 

role. Although the alternative recommends a realignment of Joint Staff resources, 

the Chairman would gain access to an expanded analytic capability, with a view 

 3-4 
Organizational Alternatives 

of enterprise and other Department-level issues. Initially, some organizational 

turbulence would be associated with the staff migration. 

Figure 3-3. Alternative 2—Aggressive Change 

Joint Staff(-)

DepSecDef CJCS

SecDef

USD Policy PSA(CP)

USD Compt(-)

USD P&R(-)

USD I(-) 

JCC 1 

JCC 2 

JCC 3 

JCC 4 

JCC 5 DASD

JCC 6 DASD

JCC n DASD

Enterprise

Warfighting

USD AT&L(-)

Capability

Boards/ 

Services

Refine needs, identify

solutions

PSA(CP)

PSA(CP)

Lead Org

Translate joint solutions 

into program guidance

Identify top-level gaps

and excesses

Process Functions

Performance

Assessment

(Accomplished Collaboratively

with All Stakeholders)

Deputy/DJ-8

DoD Mgmt

GC, 

LA,

PA,

IG

OT&E,

CIO,

Admin

Strategy

Enhanced Planning

Resourcing

Execution / Feedback

JCC = Joint Capability Category

Alternative 3: Streamline the Executive Staff 

This alternative, shown in Figure 3-4, would provide a completely revised and 

streamlined Executive Staff organized around the principal tasks and implementing 

functions for Department headquarters. The number of Under Secretaries of Defense 

would be reduced to four and charged with overseeing the planning and military 

operations tasks, and the resourcing and enterprise implementation functions. The 

Executive Staff would be formed and streamlined by merging large portions of the 

current Joint and OSD staffs, with the option of using CoCom representatives to 

form the core of the Operations Staff. Current redundant staff functions would be 

reduced by having military members of the Executive Staff dual-hatted to serve both

the SecDef and CJCS. Military Deputies to the PSAs would provide the direct 

reporting path to the CJCS. The CJCS would retain a smaller joint staff, with 

dedicated support in areas directly related to operational planning and execution. The 

capability planning staff in this alternative would have the responsibility for 

capability analysis and integration, as it would in Alternative 2. 

This alternative would reduce the overlap of functions between OSD and the Joint 

Staff. The OSD staff would focus on policy and oversight functions, while the 

Joint Staff would concentrate on military planning and operational issues. This 

reduction in duplication could result in a smaller staff for the OSD and Joint Staff.

The interaction needed to manage cross-cutting issues would be achieved through 

increased use of matrix management and issue-oriented teams. Within this alternative is the option to change the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

 3-5 
 

Staff to include serving as the Operations Director. Title 10 changes may be required if this option is pursued. 

Figure 3-4. Alternative 3—Radical Change 

Performance

Assessment

DepSecDef CJCS Joint Staff(-)

SecDef

JCC 1 

JCC 2 

JCC 3 

JCC 4 

JCC 5 DASD

JCC 6 DASD

JCC n DASD

Enterprise

Warfighting

PSA

Resourcing 

PSA(CP)

Deputy/DJ-8

PSA (P)

PSA (P&R)

PSA(AT&L)

PSA (I)

DoD Mgmt

GC, LA, PA, IG, 

OT&E, CIO, Admin

PSA

Operations

Deputy Deputy Deputy

PSA Enterprise

Functions

Strategy

Enhanced Planning

Resourcing

Execution / Feedback

JCC = Joint Capability Category

Like Alternative 2, this alternative includes an independent performance assessment division to lead the execution and accountability phase of the process. This 

organization would be small, formed from elements of other OSD divisions, and 

report directly to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. 

This radical change alternative would provide the analytical capability needed to 

execute the end state process, have the greatest potential to significantly reduce 

the total headquarters staff, and allow for greater integration of the operations 

tasks with the implementation and oversight functions. At the same time, this alternative has implementation risks: it could require Congressional approval in areas pertinent to Title 10 (especially dealing with the “independent” nature of the 

support to CJCS for his military advice responsibility), and it involves significant 

staff migration and realignment. The dual-hatted nature of the staff and reporting 

paths from the military deputies to the CJCS are designed to meet the Chairman’s 

military advice responsibilities. Properly effecting the realignment would require 

regular leadership involvement and oversight. 

 3-6 
Organizational Alternatives 

FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 

(SECOND-ORDER ALTERNATIVES) 

A large percentage of DoD’s resources is devoted to enterprise operations. Those 

operations encompass a wide range of necessary and vital support functions, such 

as acquisition, facilities management, and recruiting, that enable the Department 

to prepare for, deploy to, execute, sustain, and rapidly recover from its military 

operations. The Department’s investment in enterprise operations, and the resulting capabilities, must be accounted for in a comprehensive and fiscally disciplined 

SPG, Enhanced Planning Process, and JPG. 

Currently, the assessment and management of the Department’s enterprise capabilities are decentralized among OSD, the Services, and other Component leaders, 

with varying goals, time horizons, and risk strategies. Many of the issues within 

the functional elements of enterprise operations are often addressed “after the 

fact,” and critical decisions on major warfighting capabilities are often made 

without full consideration of the enterprise implications. 

The Enhanced Planning Process calls for a comprehensive assessment of all Departmental capabilities, including the enterprise functions. In this effort, the Study 

Team focused on five key functions: acquisition; research, development, test, and 

evaluation (RDT&E); logistics; infrastructure; and workforce planning. Under the 

existing organizational structures, a comprehensive assessment under the Enhanced 

Planning Process would be difficult and inefficient because enterprise responsibilities, information, funding, and overall control are dispersed throughout the Department and resident in multiple Components. 

The five functional elements addressed by the Study Team are important to both 

the planning and the execution and accountability phases. It is imperative to have 

an established means to monitor the results in these areas against the desired 

(funded) capabilities and validated joint needs. The following subsections discuss 

some of the organizational changes needed to improve the visibility of those enterprise operations at the Department level, assess alternative strategies for supporting joint needs, and provide necessary feedback on program execution to 

Department leaders. Each alternative is consistent with the broader first-order organizational alternatives. 

Acquisition 

The current acquisition process is largely Service-based and lacks a direct link 

between identifying, programming, and delivering needed joint capabilities. Recent changes are beginning to shift the focus to a capabilities-based approach to 

identifying requirements. These changes are designed to streamline a rigid, eventdriven, and lengthy process. But even with the recent changes, the acquisition 

planning process separates the customers, particularly the CoComs, from acquisition decision makers. Other shortfalls, such as an inability to capture life-cycle 

 3-7 
 

and support costs during planning, as well as the difficulty in canceling programs

that are not cost-effective, hinder the Department’s joint capability-based process. 

The following alternatives would leverage the ongoing changes within the Department’s acquisition community and provide organizational constructs to facilitate the planning, development, and delivery of needed joint and Service 

capabilities. Each alternative attempts to provide a more effective means to establish continuous customer-user engagement in the planning process. 

ALTERNATIVE 1: MULTIPLE JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVES

The moderate alternative to the current acquisition process entails establishing a 

Joint Program Executive (JPE) for each of the functional capability categories, 

reporting through the Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs). The JPEs would 

work within their Component’s corporate-decision structure to provide input on 

current joint in-development, in-production, and legacy programs. They would 

manage resources for their specific programs provided by the Components, as 

stipulated in the JPG, and they would participate in the enhanced planning 

process. The Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) would be 

transformed into a virtual, cross-Service process to allow for Department-wide 

management across capability categories. This DAES transformation would 

permit the establishment of a cross-cutting Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 

organized by capability category. 

This alternative has several additional features: 

JPEs would provide input to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)—

USD(AT&L)—on current programs, linking the acquisition process to 

joint needs planning and development. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

JPEs would oversee resources allocated from the Components’ total obligation authority to support directed joint programs (JPG-directed guidance) to ensure compliance with the JPG. SAEs would retain resource 

control for Service programs under the delegated guidance within the JPG. 

DAE, with JPE and SAE input, would develop a comprehensive acquisition strategy that leverages the JCIDS process to clearly articulate goals 

and objectives to meet departmental joint capability needs. A comprehensive acquisition strategy would allow for immediate, near- and long-term

programmatic planning to meet joint capability needs. 

The major advantage of this alternative is that it would provide increased interoperability and better materiel solutions because it focuses on capabilities rather than 

on platforms. In addition, the defining, planning, and delivering of joint capabilities 

would be improved with increased connectivity between “requires” and “acquires.” 

 3-8 
Organizational Alternatives 

ALTERNATIVE 2: SINGLE JOINT ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE 

The aggressive acquisition alternative would establish a single Joint Acquisition 

Executive (JAE) with oversight and decision authority on all joint developmental, 

in-production, and legacy programs. This authority would include management of 

all funds appropriated for joint programs. The JAE would be supported by expanding the responsibilities of a selected acquisition agency. Portions of selected 

Component organizations would need to be migrated into this entity. As with the 

moderate alternative, the JAE would participate in the Enhanced Planning Process 

by providing input on the development of a comprehensive acquisition strategy. 

The corporate decision structure would be transformed along capability categories 

to allow the JAE to manage cross-cutting joint capabilities within individual programs, while the overall program is managed by a Component. 

Some of the additional features of this alternative include: 

JAE and SAEs, through the cross-cutting DAB, would provide input to the 

DAE on current joint in-development, in-production, and legacy programs. This approach would establish a direct link between central oversight and the acquisition process for joint needs planning and 

development. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Appropriate portions of the Components’ staffs—Services and Agencies 

such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Information 

Systems Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)—would be migrated into an entity that acts as the JAE field activity. 

As with the moderate alternative, the JAE would participate in the development of a comprehensive acquisition strategy, and the DAB would be 

transformed along capability categories to align cross-cutting joint capabilities. 

A significant advantage of this alternative is that it would create, from within an 

existing organization, an execution arm for joint capabilities, with a field activity 

to manage joint programs. It also would provide improved planning, greater coordination, and more efficient means to deliver joint capabilities. However, this alternative could result in a loss of authority by some Components and be seen as 

usurping some of the Services’ Title 10 authority.

ALTERNATIVE 3: MULTIPLE CAPABILITIES ACQUISITION EXECUTIVES

The radical acquisition alternative would establish Capability Acquisition Executives (CAEs) for each of the joint capability categories. The CAEs would have 

oversight and decision authority on all defense developmental, in-production, and 

legacy programs. The overall acquisition process, management, and structure 

would be realigned by capability category. The CAEs would control all acquisition resources for their respective capability categories. The Services would estab-

 3-9 
 

lish Service Program Executive Offices (SPEOs) to manage their unique ACAT I 

and II programs. The SPEOs would report to CAEs on all programmatic issues. 

The CAEs would be directly involved in the development of a comprehensive acquisition strategy to meet Department capability needs. 

This alternative also includes the following: 

The CAEs would reside in a dedicated joint entity (agency or field activity) developed to support this concept and organized from existing acquisition agencies. ¡ 

¡ The comprehensive acquisition strategy would leverage JCIDS and Service-unique requirements to clearly articulate goals and objectives to meet 

Department-wide capability needs. 

The advantages to this alternative are similar to those of the aggressive alternative. However, the establishment of the CAEs would remove control of program

development from the Services, which clearly has Title 10 implications. In addition, completely realigning the current acquisition structure to support a capability-based approach would be a significant undertaking. 

RDT&E 

The Department’s RDT&E resources and infrastructure are decentralized across 

the Components. In fast-moving technology areas, this decentralized approach to 

planning, programming, and execution results in inefficiencies, duplications, 

missed opportunities, and the inability to mass critical expertise in emerging areas. Currently, several AT&L offices and the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation monitor Component RDT&E programs within the Department, but 

they have limited ability to effect major transformational efforts. 

The following alternative management structures would provide for more effective 

and efficient end-to-end planning and execution of the Department’s RDT&E investment. These alternatives support the Enhanced Planning Process and are intended to 

result in an RDT&E management structure that optimizes Department resources. 

ALTERNATIVE 1: COORDINATED INVESTMENT

The moderate approach to RDT&E reform would be to take advantage of initiatives already underway. The Department is required by law to develop a single 

performance review process, applicable to all Military Departments, for rating the 

quality and relevance of the work performed by DoD labs. The first step in this 

proposal would be to evaluate the recommendations from the studies directed by 

Section 913 of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. The intent is to 

more closely link technology development to the acquisition process and to the 

CoComs’ joint needs. A second step would be to formalize the technology transition process, including binding agreements between Science and Technology 

 3-10 
Organizational Alternatives 

(S&T) sources and specific program offices. Funding managed by the Director 

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to support the transition of technology development efforts—such as the Advanced Concept Technology Development programs—would reduce the likelihood of “orphaned” technologies. 

The development of a comprehensive DoD S&T strategy that is capability based 

but Component driven would be a significant improvement over current practices. 

Additionally, this alternative would provide for a better transition of technology 

from S&T to acquisition and improved utilization of the S&T and T&E investments through a single review process, with no changes in current legislation. 

ALTERNATIVE 2: CENTRALIZED FUNDING AND CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

A more aggressive approach to RDT&E reform would be to centrally manage resources in an Integrated Process Team (IPT) process. The Joint and Service Acquisition Executives, who control R&D resources, would work with the Defense 

Technology Executive (DTE), who controls S&T resources, to provide innovative 

capability solutions through representation on each of the capability teams. In 

addition, this alternative would include those activities described in the moderate 

alternative. Centers of Excellence (COEs) would be established within the current 

DoD/Service lab resources (including the universities doing basic research) to concentrate S&T and R&D efforts in specific areas. Although specialized, COEs could 

invest in several areas to provide competition for “best-of-breed” selection. They 

could do both S&T work for the DTE and R&D work for the JAEs and SAEs. The 

COEs would be challenged to present proposals for different governance options 

such as federal corporations or government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) 

entities that are more conducive to broadening the business base. 

As with the moderate alternative, this alternative would provide for the development of a comprehensive DoD S&T strategy that would be capability based and 

centrally managed, while optimizing the S&T investment and reducing duplication through a single review and allocation process. The transition of technology 

from S&T to acquisition would be accomplished through an IPT process linking 

capabilities, technology, and acquisition. One disadvantage of this aggressive approach would be the dichotomy of centrally funding S&T programs while leaving 

labs and R&D centers the responsibility of the Components. 

ALTERNATIVE 3: CENTRAL DOD LAB SYSTEM

A radical approach to RDT&E reform would be to centrally manage all resources 

between the CAEs and DTE in an IPT process. COEs would be established within 

a central lab system to concentrate S&T and R&D efforts in specific areas. Although specialized, COEs could invest in several areas to provide competition for 

“best-of-breed” selection. A single Office for Basic Research with a defense research lab would manage and execute all basic research for DoD. 

 3-11 
 

A central DoD lab system would support a more comprehensive and coordinated 

DoD RDT&E strategy. The CAE and DAE would have the authority, resources, and 

infrastructure to better support DoD warfighting capabilities and the spiral development of technology uniquely designed to meet DoD capability needs. However, a 

complete realignment of RDT&E structure and the loss of Component control of 

RDT&E resources could pose a significant challenge. Legislative changes would be 

required to authorize a DoD Office of Basic Research, alternative governance charters for federal corporations and GOCO entities, and a change in reporting authority 

of DTE (DDR&E). 

Logistics 

Currently, no single logistics entity within the Department can provide the information and assessments needed to support capability planning, operations, and 

execution. The existing logistics responsibilities are a mixture of centralized and 

decentralized capabilities. No central planning function integrates the highly related logistics support functions of supply, maintenance, and transportation. In 

addition, current logistics planning reflects fragmented approaches among the acquisition process, Service and Defense Agency supply systems, and organic capabilities. Decentralized execution is needed at the operational and tactical levels. 

Nonetheless, strategic-level logistics planning, like operational planning, is 

needed to provide the comprehensive and interactive capabilities needed to best 

support joint operations. 

The following alternatives present three options for managing the end-to-end 

planning and execution of the Department’s logistics capabilities. These alternatives are consistent with the Enhanced Planning Process and maximize efficient 

use of Department resources. 

ALTERNATIVE 1: STRENGTHENED DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXECUTIVE

This alternative would strengthen the role of the Defense Logistics Executive 

(DLE) as the single Logistics Global Supply Chain Manager with oversight and 

decision authority for defense materiel, maintenance, and visibility of movement. 

This alternative would not require major organizational changes because it simply 

expands the recently established duties of the USD(AT&L) as the DLE, by adding 

the responsibility for joint programs. 

Under this alternative, the DLE, with the assistance of the Joint Logistics Board, 

would set policy for logistics (and logistics-related transportation matters) and 

would control funds for joint logistics efforts. The joint logistics efforts would 

include in-theater operations, Department-wide logistics programs, and organic 

repair and manufacturing. The DLE would also take the following actions: 

Establish a joint office for in-theater management in support of military 

operations. 

¡ 

 3-12 
Organizational Alternatives 

¡ Manage the organizations that accomplish joint logistics programs. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Oversee sustainment plans organized by joint capability missions, not by 

Service or Agency. 

Integrate sustainment planning and execution across the Department and 

focus them on warfighting support and readiness. 

Plan for efficiencies in operations, such as eliminating excess capacity in 

organic repair facilities. 

Engage and direct strategic, operational, and enhanced capabilities planning that addresses logistics and supply chain considerations and develop 

a strategic logistics plan with performance parameters. This plan would 

h articulate performance goals and provide a road map to meet them; 

h drive input to the operational plans development; and 

h provide a holistic view of departmental logistics requirements and how 

they support DoD needs. 

Be consistent with guidance stipulated in SPG. 

Leverage best practices and processes used by DoD, coalition partners, 

and industry to improve efficiency and quality with the global supply 

chain. 

The strengthened DLE alternative would provide for improved oversight of the 

logistics supply chain and enable the planning and assessment needed to support 

the Enhanced Planning Process. This alternative would not address all logistics 

areas. The Services, Joint Staff, Transportation Command, and Defense Agencies 

would continue to control most of the resources and line of authority. This alternative would further retain the current, decentralized infrastructure that supports the 

logistics operations (depots, repair facilities, and organic manufacturing). 

ALTERNATIVE 2: CENTRALIZED LOGISTICS/JOINT COMMAND

This alternative would further centralize logistics planning and management by 

establishing a single Logistics Global Supply Chain Organization (Joint Command/Agency) with oversight and decision authority for all defense materiel, 

maintenance, movement, and transportation. The organization would control the 

funding for Service and joint materiel. Consolidation of the organic repair capabilities would greatly improve their operations and efficiencies. This alternative 

also would do the following: 

Consolidate all funding for joint and single Service materiel and logistics 

support by creating an appropriation authority; execution authority would 

 3-13 
 

be performed by newly established entities previously part of Services and 

Defense Agencies 

¡ Provide total asset visibility and accessibility for all DoD materiel

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Create Department-wide policies and procedures for common logistics 

practices and procedures, including financial investments 

Incorporate all duties and responsibilities of the proposed DLE. 

This alternative would enhance warfighter support and readiness by consolidating 

management of key Department logistics capabilities. The organization would be 

a critical part of the planning process for strategy, operations, and capabilities. 

The disadvantages of this alternative include (1) it restricts Service flexibility in 

the key Title 10 areas of equipping and sustaining and (2) it would require reallocating Component assets to create a large agency or command to manage logistics. 

ALTERNATIVE 3: CORPORATE LOGISTICS

This alternative would adopt radical governance structures to meet Department 

logistics requirements by retaining core or critical operations and using non-DoD 

assets to meet remaining needs. Most logistics responsibilities would be removed 

from the Services and Defense Agencies and be placed in an entity (Command 

structure most likely) reporting to OSD. The alternative structure could include 

public-private partnerships, federal government corporations, and EmployeeOwned Stock Ownership Program (ESOP) entities. 

At an extreme, the retained functions could be limited to combat logistics or intheater operational support. Overall, the intent would be to find the best means 

and provider through a comprehensive business case analysis that includes the 

flexibility and reliability needed to support the joint warfighter. Innovative contracts and incentives would be needed to fully implement this alternative. 

This alternative would also do the following: 

Divide logistics services along functional lines (such as combat logistics and 

operational support) with selected items remaining in DoD. These operations 

would be run on a commercial basis with a term appointment (for example, 6 

years). 

Develop and publish a Strategic Logistics Plan and coordinate execution 

with subordinate Command entities. 

Integrate best business practices into the logistics planning and execution 

processes, along with commercial-like entities to perform the mission. 

 3-14 
Organizational Alternatives 

Given the variety of options available, this alternative offers great flexibility and 

optimizes logistics investments for the Department. The disadvantages include the 

possibility of increased fragmentation of the integrated supply chain, major impact on DoD and Service organizations, and the need for Congressional consultation and approval for some of the changes. 

Infrastructure 

As with the other enterprise functions, the responsibilities, information, funding, 

and overall control of infrastructure is dispersed among multiple Components, 

with little or no strategic capability planning. Infrastructure planning is focused on 

the maintenance and support of existing facilities, with little emphasis on consolidation and divestiture. Recent direction suggests a greater emphasis on joint-use 

facilities, but implementation of this concept in DoD-wide capabilities planning 

has been minimal. 

The proposed infrastructure alternatives are designed to provide organizational 

changes that would increase the participation of infrastructure owners/managers 

in the Department’s capabilities analysis, decision, and integration processes. The 

goal is to develop DoD-wide infrastructure plans that are integrated to meet joint 

needs, are efficiently organized to reduce cost, and directly support current and 

future operation and capability plans. 

ALTERNATIVE 1: JOINT FACILITIES DIRECTORATE

The moderate alternative to the Department’s infrastructure organization entails 

the establishment of a Joint Facilities Directorate (JFD). The JFD would be organized by modifying the current OSD staff to better participate in the Department’s 

capabilities analysis and integration processes. Portions of the OSD staff would be 

realigned to support the JFD, which would reside in OUSD(AT&L). The JFD 

would become the focal point within the Department for infrastructure issues to 

meet joint capabilities and serve as the lead for infrastructure related issues within 

the Enhanced Planning Process. It would head a Joint Facilities Board (JFB), 

which would lead the effort to define needs across the Department and coordinate 

execution activities. Special emphasis would be placed on facilities that most directly support the joint warfighter, such as depots, training ranges, and certain 

bases. However, Components would still maintain execution authority for assigned infrastructure. 

Additional features of this alternative are as follows: 

The JFD would develop and publish a Strategic Infrastructure Plan (building on the work in the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan) that ¡ 

h contains a comprehensive view of Department assets and how they 

support joint needs, 

 3-15 
 

h is consistent with the SPG, and 

h integrates best business practices into the planning and execution 

processes. 

The JFD would develop and publish appropriate directives to manage joint 

infrastructure requirements. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

The process would link to other enterprise functions (such as logistics) for 

planning. 

The major advantage to this alternative is that it could reduce costs through better 

utilization of resources such as eliminating excess capacity and maximizing joint use 

of facilities. In addition, it would provide a centralized integrated planning structure 

for all Department infrastructure requirements. A disadvantage to this alternative is 

the requirement to realign current organizations to meet staffing requirements. 

ALTERNATIVE 2A: ASD, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT—JOINT

The Study Team identified two aggressive infrastructure alternatives. Both alternatives would create an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), Installations and 

Environment, within OUSD(AT&L), but with different responsibilities. 

In this first aggressive infrastructure alternative, the ASD would resource and direct selected joint infrastructure functions across the Department. The ASD staff 

would have facilities planning and oversight functions for the Department and 

resourcing and directive responsibilities for those facilities and activities that most 

directly support the joint warfighter. To facilitate these actions, the ASD would 

maintain and direct a percentage of the overall DoD infrastructure budget to support joint needs, with financial reporting to track execution and performance. 

Execution authority would remain with the designated or appropriate Service or

Agency. The ASD would provide directed guidance on joint infrastructure needs 

and delegate guidance to Services and Agencies on the management of assigned 

infrastructure. 

The ASD would develop and publish a biennial Strategic Infrastructure Plan 

(building on the work currently done in the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan), that

links to logistics requirements, 

provides a comprehensive view of departmental assets and how they support joint needs, 

is consistent with the SPG, and 

integrates best business practices into the planning process. 

 3-16 
Organizational Alternatives 

Having an ASD that directly supports the capabilities-based focus of the Department’s joint infrastructure needs is a significant advantage of this alternative. As with 

the moderate alternative, the Department would reduce its costs. This alternative 

would provide centralized resourcing, direction, and integrated planning for all joint 

infrastructure requirements. A disadvantage is that this alternative would require realignment of existing OSD organizations and could generate legislative issues. 

ALTERNATIVE 2B: ASD, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT—DOD-WIDE

In this second aggressive infrastructure alternative, the ASD, Installations and Environment, would resource and direct DoD-wide infrastructure functions across the 

Department, while execution authority would remain with the designated or appropriate Service or Agency. The ASD would have facilities planning and oversight 

functions for the Department and resourcing and directive responsibilities for all 

DoD infrastructure. The ASD would also provide directed guidance on specific 

infrastructure needs and delegate the remainder to Services and other Agencies for 

management of assigned properties. To facilitate these actions, the ASD would 

maintain and direct the overall DoD infrastructure budget, with financial reporting 

to track execution and performance. As with the previous alternative, the ASD 

would develop and publish a biennial Strategic Infrastructure Plan. 

The primary advantage of this alternative is that it would provide a centralized, 

single manager who directly supports the capabilities-based focus of the Department’s total infrastructure needs. Costs would be reduced through better utilization of resources, focused on eliminating excesses and maximizing joint assets. 

This alternative would require realignment of existing OSD organizations and 

significant changes in DoD policy. In addition, significant legislative issues would 

arise with the redirection of infrastructure resources away from the Services and 

Agencies to the ASD. 

ALTERNATIVE 3: DOD CORPORATE INFRASTRUCTURE

The radical alternative would merge all DoD infrastructure under an OSD-led entity. Ownership would be removed from the Services and other Agencies and be 

placed under the responsibility of this OSD entity. The infrastructure services 

would be divided along functional lines (such as housing, hospitals, airfields, and 

ports), regional lines (west, east), or a combination of functional and regional 

lines. The OSD entity would oversee alternative governance structures for the 

various infrastructure services as appropriate. Those structures could include performance-based organizations, cooperative partnerships, federal government corporations, GOCO entities, and public-private partnerships or ventures. Under this 

alternative, OSD would develop and publish a Strategic Infrastructure Plan. 

The advantages to this alternative are that decisions would be insulated from Service or Agency agendas, the return on the facilities investment would be maximized, and the alternative governance structures would provide increased 

flexibility in personnel and acquisition matters. However, the profit motive of cer-

 3-17 
 

tain governance structures could conflict with DoD’s needs. In addition, this alternative would require new organizational structures, and the potential exists for 

fragmented support from using a multitude of service providers. More importantly, some of the required changes would require Congressional approval. 

Workforce Planning

As with the other functional elements of the enterprise domain, workforce development is often reactive to decisions concerning joint capabilities, rather than being fully considered when those decisions are made. To effectively support the 

new planning processes, human capital needs must be addressed systematically 

and proactively. Two major changes are required to achieve that goal: workforce 

and training requirements must be fully incorporated into the analyses of alternatives for all capabilities, and the pool of experts available to perform those analyses must be greatly expanded. 

The current organizational structure is adequate to support the Enhanced Planning 

Process. However, the scope and depth of workforce analyses must vary to support the broader Department- and corporate-level alternatives for the planning 

process (see Appendix M). 

In all alternatives, workforce requirements (e.g., number of people, skills, and 

training) would be systematically included in the analyses of all options to fill capabilities gaps or to reduce overlaps. Projections of future requirements of civilian 

and contractor personnel would augment current Service planning, which focuses 

almost exclusively on military manpower. OSD (Personnel and Readiness) would 

consolidate Service and Agency projections for military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors, to produce a Department-wide picture of future needs. 

All human resources planning would take into account active and reserve roles in 

future operations. Steps would be taken to better link single-Service training 

events to joint warfighting needs, as established by the Joint Staff and Joint 

Forces Command. 

 3-18 
Chapter 4 

Implementation 

WHY CHANGE

The United States cannot definitively predict who its next adversary will be or 

where the next conflict will occur; nevertheless, its military forces must be able to 

successfully meet the uncertainties of this new era. The Department of Defense 

may have produced the best armed forces in the world, but its processes do not 

optimize the investment in joint capabilities to meet current and future security 

challenges. The time is ripe to improve DoD’s processes for determining needs, 

creating solutions, making decisions, and providing capabilities to support the 

joint warfighters. A capabilities-based approach to making those improvements 

would mitigate much of the uncertainty by emphasizing the nation’s ability to 

shape the battlefield, regardless of whom we fight or where we fight. 

 The Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team examined past and current studies 

and developed recommendations for streamlined processes and for alternative organizations to better integrate defense capabilities in support of joint objectives. 

If implemented, these recommendations would dramatically change the way the 

Department does business because they focus on delivering capabilities to meet a 

wide range of security challenges rather than defeating a specific adversary. The 

next step is to bring about the necessary changes in the Department by implementing the recommendations, an important and challenging task that is critical to 

successfully meeting the security demands of the future. 

LEADING CHANGE

John P. Kotter, professor of leadership at Harvard Business School, has written 

extensively about change. In his book, Leading Change, he writes that although 

the need for change is widely recognized and acknowledged, creating that change 

and, more important, making the change “stick” are extremely difficult. Kotter 

details eight common errors in organizational change efforts: 

1. Allowing too much complacency 

2. Failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition 

3. Underestimating the power of vision 

4. Under-communicating the vision 

5. Permitting obstacles to block the vision 

 4-1 
 

6. Failing to create short-term wins 

7. Declaring victory too soon 

8. Neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate culture. 

For most organizations, the biggest challenge is leading change. Only leadership 

can blast through the many sources of bureaucratic inertia; motivate the actions 

needed to alter behavior in any significant way; and get change to stick by anchoring it in the very culture of the organization. 

But leadership cannot be confined to one larger-than-life individual who charms

thousands into being obedient followers. Large organizations like DoD are far too 

complex to be transformed solely by the strength of a single personality. The 

leadership effort includes many senior leaders from across the Department—

Principal Staff Assistants, CJCS, Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, 

and Joint Chiefs—who must push the new agenda within their sphere of activity. 

These leaders and their staffs are the stakeholders in the new joint capabilitiesbased process and must take ownership of it to ensure its successful adoption. 

The recommendations and actions found in this report will demand a dedicated 

effort to ensure successful implementation. Given the broad nature of the processes and the extent of the changes being recommended, a strong commitment to 

implementation is critical for success. Without leadership’s strong commitment to 

implementation, not only will results be suboptimized, but the current, ineffective 

processes will continue to our detriment. 

CREATING AN IMPLEMENTATION TEAM

Critical to any successful change initiative is the change management or implementation team that works with the leadership to keep change efforts on track. 

The head of this team should have direct access to the leadership of the Department, especially the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The head of the 

team and supporting staff will need to establish a Department-wide governance 

process to drive the change effort. This process should clearly spell out what 

needs to be done, who needs to do it, and when it needs to be completed. Regular 

progress reviews should be given to the Department leadership. 

Equally important is the need to communicate the need for change, the goal of the 

change effort, and the organization’s progress toward meeting that goal. Both internal and external communication strategies need to be created, and the implementation team, working closely with Public Affairs, should spearhead these 

efforts. These communication strategies should educate, train, and enable the 

stakeholders to fully embrace the new capabilities-based approach. For general 

awareness and widespread access, a website dedicated to the new process should 

be created. More traditional methods such as pamphlets, press releases, and 

speeches also should be pursued. The audiences for these communication efforts 

 4-2 
Implementation 

should include DoD’s workforce, the “school houses,” industry and trade associations, and the Congress. 

Not all of the proposed changes involve processes; some changes to the organizational structure will be needed as well. With the initiation of a joint capabilitiesbased process, the planning process will require a fundamental realignment. Organizational changes involving the planning process could range from changes 

within existing organizations to the creation of totally new organizations. 

Regardless of the nature of the change, the results should be captured in the formal documentation of the Department. Directives, instructions, manuals, and 

other documents will need to be altered to reflect the process and organizational 

changes. These documents should be reviewed and updated, and the new documents widely distributed. These actions are critical particularly as the responsibility for change transfers over time from the implementation leader—who sets the 

process and organizational changes in place, guides the transition process, maintains the focus and key principles, and establishes a Department-wide governance 

process— to the stakeholders themselves. 

Through his experience in observing change efforts in many organizations, John 

Kotter has developed an eight-stage model for implementing change. Each stage 

is associated with one of the eight fundamental errors (listed above) that undermine transformation efforts: 

¡ Establish a sense of urgency 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Create the guiding coalition 

Develop a vision and strategy 

Communicate the change vision 

Empower a broad base of people to take action 

Generate short-term wins 

Consolidate gains and producing even more change 

Institutionalize new approaches in the culture—in other words, to ground 

the changes in the corporate culture and make them stick. 

This eight-stage model could provide the foundation for the Department’s transition to joint capabilities-based planning and ground the changes in the corporate 

culture and make them stick. In seeking those objectives, the Study Team further 

recommends that DoD make a concerted effort to follow this eight-stage model 

and to “hand off” as much responsibility as possible from the implementation 

 4-3 
 

leader to the process owners within the next year. The handoff (depicted in Figure 4-1) includes the following key activities: 

¡ Change agents develop around new processes and organizations 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

Leaders inherit institutional knowledge and principles 

Responsibility for oversight of remaining change is transferred to new 

process owners and organizations 

SECDEF manages through the governance process. 

Figure 4-1. Successful Change Effort with Handoff 

Time

Responsibility for Change

Process Owners

Implementation

Leader

SUMMARY

The success of moving to a joint capabilities-based process depends on leadership 

support and involvement, and on a strong implementation team. Together they 

need to communicate Department goals, map out what it takes to achieve the 

goals, and hold people accountable for meeting them. These are the essential ingredients to implementing change. 

If DoD works through these steps, it will be successful. The recommendations for 

change found in this report are only one part of the change process. The followthrough that takes place in the implementation phase is crucial to getting to the 

finish line and making the changes stick. This effort is too important to the Department of Defense not to see it through to a successful conclusion. 

 4-4 
Appendix A 

Implementation Memoranda 

Initiation of a Joint Capabilities Development Process 

Memorandum.................................................................................................... A-2 

Integrated Priority Lists Memorandum............................................................. A-4 

 A-1 
 

 A-2 
Implementation Memoranda 

 A-3 
 

 A-4 
Appendix B 

Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior 

Leadership Review Group 

Study Team Briefing to the SecDef (19 Jun 03)............................................... B-2 

Senior Leadership Review Group Brief (12 Sep 03).........................................B-7 

Senior Leadership Review Group Brief (31 Oct 03) .......................................B-14 

 B-1 
 

Study Team Briefing to the SecDef (19 Jun 03)

A DoD “Process” Study for 

Enabling Joint Force Capabilities

Briefing to the Secretary of Defense

June 19, 2003

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

1

Agenda

 Assumptions

 “As Is” – what problems are we trying to

solve?

 Desired “End State” attributes

 Process definition – what would be

different?

 Next Steps – options to get to “End State”

 B-2 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

2

Desired End State

Streamlined, collaborative yet 

competitive, efficient process 

that produces a fully integrated 

Joint warfighting capability.

Current Process:

Today’s process is repetitive, adversarial, and laborintensive. Despite producing the best-in-the-world 

component forces, today’s process is not as costeffective as it should be.

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Moving to the end state requires a realignment of 

process levels of effort

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

3

Assumptions

 Implement for FY06 FYDP; 80% solution is acceptable

 Study will assess processes first, then consider implications for

organization, etc.

 Services and Combatant Commanders will remain intact

 Capabilities must be optimized across the Department, not within

Components, to support near and far term joint warfighting needs

 Decisions must be based on open and explicit analysis

 Response times for innovation, decision making, and

implementation must be shortened

 The choice of acceptable level of risk needs to be made by senior

decision makers through a collaborative process, not through a

consensus-driven process at lower levels

 New processes must remain viable with level or reduced resources

 B-3 
 

4

The “As-Is” Baseline

 No single statement of what needs to be done and how the

Department should do it.

 Joint needs and guidance are not integrated, prioritized,

or fiscally informed.

 Components build programs before guidance is received

 Components cannot fund all elements of the guidance.

 Programs optimized to meet Service / Agency

requirements and varying interpretations of the guidance.

 Combatant Commander input to “Requirements” is

uneven, near-term focused, and overshadowed by Service 

influence.

 Skill vs. need planning mismatch in the workforce.

 No provisions to allow tradeoffs between Components.

 Leadership engages too late to effect large changes.

 Gaps and overlaps in Joint capabilities.

 Service capabilities “forced” Joint, not “born Joint.”

 Tradeoff of capability within, not across Services.

 Total program does not maximize cost-effectiveness.

 Measures dollar input vice capability outcomes.

 Schedule slips, cancellations, reductions in quantity.

 Cumbersome processes discourage non-traditional

suppliers.

 Overall program is not as cost effective as it should be.

OPOPLANs OP LANs LANs “Requirements” Exceed

Resources

Independent POMs

Program Review

Large Effortfor Small Changes

Independent Progra nt Programs and Budge d Budgets

Multiple, 

General

Strategy

Documents

Programming

and

Fiscal

Guidance

Budget

Execution

Changed in de ged in development and exec t and execution

OPOPLANs LANs

Weakly

Linked

Process Problems

5

“As-Is” Versus End State

 Focus on performance / results

 Reduced cycle-time so that capabilities are developed to

meet emerging needs

 Human capital managed strategically

 Full costs (acquisition and logistics sustainment)

considered and continually refreshed

 Execution performance serves as a starting point for next

planning cycle

 Focus on expenditure / adherence to regulations

 Prolonged and complicated process to produce new

capabilities

 Human capital planning and costs are not addressed

 Logistics & acquisition cycle time and support are 

not timely or cost-effective

 Execution data not useful for decision making

Execution and

Accountability

 Collaborative, efficient process produces early decisions

 Senior leadership attends to issues of compliance and

executability

 Components’ programs cannot comply with all of the

requirements of the DPG

 Adversarial, labor-intensive process

 Senior leadership forces “Jointness” into the 

process at the end, with great effort.

 Gaps and redundancies in Joint capabilities render

the Defense program cost-ineffective

Resourcing

 “Jointness” is born at the beginning of the process.

 Joint Programming Guidance is provided early and is

fiscally constrained

 Developed collaboratively, with extensive involvement by

Combatant Commanders and Components

 Articulates a single statement of joint needs that reflects 

decisions on tradeoffs among Components

 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is provided late

and is not fiscally constrained

 DPG is developed by OSD

 The DPG makes little, if any, provision for tradeoffs

among Components

Planning

• Single translation of NSS into Department objectives,

priorities and risk tolerance

• Conceptual framework and focus for planning and

capability development

• Resource informed Strategic Planning Guidance

 Multiple documents

 Joint needs and guidance not integrated, prioritized,

Strategy or fiscally informed

“As-Is” Problems End State Attributes Major

Process

 B-4 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

6

STRATEGY

End State Process

EXECUTION & 

ACCOUNTABILITY

ENHANCED 

PLANNING

Military

Operations

Support

Operations

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Defense

Resourcing

Process

RESOURCING

Feedback during next cycle

WHAT

TO DO? HOW TO DO IT?

HOW WELL 

DID WE DO?

Capabilities

Planning

Resources

Joint

Programming

Guidance

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

- SECDEF decision points

- Iterative SECDEF engagement

7

What’s Different?

 New Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and 

Joint Programming Guidance (JPG)

 SPG and JPG are fiscally achievable

 OSD, JCS, Services, and CoComs have shared 

values and objectives

 New collaborative process to achieve Joint

capabilities

 New process measures output rather than input

 New process allows Services to compete to

provide capabilities; and the Secretary of

Defense to make early trade-offs among 

Components

 B-5 
 

8

Next Steps

 Phase 1 Determine Study Azimuth: (May – June)

3⁄4 Review ongoing change efforts

3⁄4 Develop a desired end state for the proposed changes

 Phase 2 Build Alternatives : (July – August)

3⁄4 Develop alternatives to meet the desired end state

3⁄4 Determine the resource, organizational, process, and other implications of each 

alternative

 Phase 3 Evaluate Alternatives: (September – October)

3⁄4 Assess suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of alternatives to achieve end state

• Conduct “Business Game” of selected alternatives

3⁄4 Provide recommended option(s)

 Phase 4 Implement Decision: (November – December)

3⁄4 Execute decision guidance to produce chosen alternative

3⁄4 Provide a transition / implementation plan 

Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 .......... Alt n

Implications Implications Implications Implications

Phase 2 (Jul-Aug)

• Alternatives

• Evaluation

criteria

• Downselect

• Early candidates for 

trial implementation Scope of change

Moderate Aggressive Radical

Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 .......... Alt n

Implications Implications Implications Implications

Phase 2 (Jul-Aug)

• Alternatives

• Evaluation

criteria

• Downselect options

• Early candidates for 

trial implementation Scope of change

Moderate Aggressive Radical

2d SECDEF Brief

 B-6 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

Senior Leadership Review Group Brief (12 Sep 03)

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Joint Defense Capabilities Study

briefing to the

Senior Leadership Review Group

September 12, 2003

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Study Charter and Membership

Commissioned by Secretary Rumsfeld in

March 2003 to: 

Provide streamlined processes, alternative 

functions, and organizations to better

integrate Defense capabilities in support of

joint warfighting objectives

1

Study Team Membership

Study Lead- Pete Aldridge

Study Director- Mary Margaret Evans

Study Team- Representatives from:

Joint Staff, USJFCOM, Services,

USD(C), USD(P&R), ODPAE, ODA&M

 B-7 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Assumptions and Guidance

• Implement for FY06 FYDP; 80% solution is

acceptable

• Capability-based processes identify joint needs 

up front; Services supply these needs

• Capabilities must be optimized across the 

Department, not within Components, to support 

near- and far-term joint warfighting needs

• Acceptable risk levels should be identified up 

front by senior decision makers in a 

collaborative, vice consensus-driven, process

• Combatant Commanders’ input is critical

Focus on processes first,

then consider organizational implications 2

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Study Phases

• Phase 1- Develop “as-is” baseline and desired end state 

• Phase 2- Build draft process alternatives and their 

attributes to meet the desired end state 

– Identify critical actions for POM 06

– Engage Combatant Commanders in process

– Identify alternatives

– Determine evaluation criteria

• Phase 3- Refine and develop organizational alternatives,

based on SECDEF direction 

• Phase 4 Implement Decision (November – December)

– Study Leader recommendation to SECDEF

– Provide a transition / implementation plan

3

Brief Today

 B-8 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Elements of the Joint Defense

Capabilities Process

• Strategy - What we want the DoD to accomplish - an

integrated, resource-informed statement of the SECDEF’s major 

Joint strategic objectives

• Enhanced Planning - How we want to accomplish the 

objectives of the strategy - A collaborative, competitive analytical 

process, leading to specific program goals

• Resourcing - Provides a fiscally executable program and 

budget that responds to prioritized Defense needs identified 

through the planning processes.

• Execution & Accountability - Reports from Military

Departments and Agencies on how well the Department goals

were met, in output terms

4

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Desired End State

Streamlined, collaborative yet competitive,

efficient process that produces a fully

integrated joint warfighting capability.

Current Process:

Repetitive, adversarial, and labor intensive.

Produces best-in-the-world component forces,

but is not as cost-effective as it should be.

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Execution &

Accountability

Resourcing

Planning

Strategy

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

Execution

Strategy

Planning

Resourcing

The Desired End State

5

Moving to the

end state requires

a realignment of

effort

 B-9 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY “End State” Process

Defense

Resourcing

Process

Feedback during

next cycle

WHAT

TO DO? HOW TO DO IT?

HOW WELL

DID WE DO?

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

- SECDEF decision points

-Iterative SECDEF engagement

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Strategy

Enhanced

Planning

Resourcing Execution and

Accountability

(Resource

informed) (Fiscally

constrained)

6

JUN DEC JUL

NOV

(As Required)

Component

Program / 

Budget 

Process

APR

(Continuous process)

(Continuous process)

(Update)

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

STRATEGY

EXECUTION &

ACCOUNTABILITY

ENHANCED

PLANNING

PROCESS

RESOURCING

End State Timeline

2004 2005 2006

Studies and Assessments (Continuous)

Program Execution and Performance Tracking (Continuous)

Performance

Report

Performance

Report

Performance

Report

SECDEF decision points Iterative SECDEF engagement

1

2

3

n

Capability Category

Major Study

Major Study

Major Study

Major Study

Major Study Major Study

Major Study

Rolling Capabilities Planning

Major Study

7

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Defense

Resourcing

Process

Defense

Resourcing

Process

Defense

Resourcing

Process

QDR

 B-10 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

What’s Different?

• SECDEF Strategic Planning Guidance – What to do?

– Single, unified, resource-informed strategic guidance

that begins the planning cycle, not ends it

– Separate from programming guidance

• Enhanced planning process where capabilities

are “born joint” – How to do it?

– Collaborative, but competitive, process involving all users and providers

– Considers a wide range of alternatives and trade options

– Capability categories express trades in meaningful terms across DoD

• SECDEF Joint Programming Guidance –Fiscally constrained, directive 

guidance on key joint capabilities – Do it!

– Remainder of program delegated to Services, with associated metrics

– Up-front decision making prevents the Program/Budget Review “train wreck”

• Annual performance review – How well did we do?

– Focused on outcomes and meeting current and future joint warfighting needs

8

Defense program driven by current and future joint needs 

Combatant Commanders engaged throughout the process

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Characteristics of the Organization

to Support the End State

• A strong analytical planning and programming organization 

leads DoD capabilities-based planning and resourcing

processes with a common framework, language, and toolset

• OSD and JS organized to support capabilities-based planning

and resourcing processes, and trade-offs across functional

and organizational lines

- Both warfighting and infrastructure/support capabilities to be considered

• Need for independent program execution monitor

Standard Joint Capability Categories should be used for 

consistent organization and communication across the

Department

9

 B-11 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Why Capability Categories?

• Provide a common framework to address Joint warfighting objectives

• Support the assessment of programs on the basis of their contribution to

Joint capabilities, rather than their merits as an individual program

• Allow the identification of trade areas to support gap analyses and 

evaluation of program contributions to the capability

• Foster a “capabilities culture” that:

- Simultaneously considers costs and needs

- Provides a wide range of choices and competitive solutions to meet 

Joint warfighting needs

- Timely consideration of risk by senior decision makers

- Addresses both near and far term needs

- Considers divestiture in tandem with initiatives

10

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

• MID 913 is a good start -

- Two year budget cycle

- Single Program/Budget database

- Performance metrics

• Current DPG studies share characteristics of new process -

- Increased Joint, CoCom, and Service collaboration

• Action required to -

- Provide resource informed, prioritized, strategy guidance

- Implement capabilities-based planning

- Connect planning decisions to programmatic action

11

Provide for iterative SECDEF decision making 

throughout the process

Moving in the Right DirectionFurther Action is Needed

 B-12 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Required Actions to Affect POM-06

12

As soon as

possible

JS, ODPA&E,

OUSD(P)

Joint Capability Categories – Develop standard joint capability

definitions and a framework to express trades in meaningful

terms across the Department.

Study Team, Fall 03

OUSD(C),

ODPA&E,

OASD(LA)

Congressional Engagement – Begin discussions with key

Congressional staffers regarding the presentation of budget

information.

ODPA&E, Apr 04

OUSD(C)

Capability Planning / SECDEF Joint Programming Guidance 

(SJPG) – Identify metric-based, outcome-focused capability

needs on selected major joint issues. Assess competing options 

to meet the needs. Provide fiscally constrained programming 

guidance to implement SECDEF decisions.

OUSD(P), JS, Dec 03

ODPA&E

SECDEF Strategic Planning Guidance (SSPG) – Provide

unified, resource-informed strategic objectives, key

assumptions, priorities, fiscal projections, and acceptable risks. 

Identify selected Joint capability focus issues for analysis during

FYDP 06. Focus on “what” needs to be done, not “how.”

Required

By

Responsible

Office(s) Action

All stakeholders (CoComs, Services, etc.) will 

participate at each stage

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Moving Towards the End State:

Transition Year

• Tasking memoranda to outline specific near term actions by OSD and Joint Staff

− Priorities are Joint Capability Categories, SECDEF Strategic Planning Guidance and 

SECDEF Joint Programming Guidance

• Study Team to develop organizational options

13

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SecDef

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SecDef

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

- SecDef decision points

- Iterative SecDef engagement

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Strategy

Enhanced

Planning Resourcing Execution

and

Accountability

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

MAR 04 DEC 04

DEC APR 04 03 APR 05

 B-13 
 

Senior Leadership Review Group Brief (31 Oct 03)

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Joint Defense Capabilities Study

briefing to the

Senior Leadership Review Group

October 31, 2003

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

1

Agenda

• September 12th SLRG Recap

• Decision Process Details

• Implementation of the Process

 B-14 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

2

“End State” Process

Strategy Enhanced

Planning Resourcing Execution

and 

Accountability

Conduct analysis to affect 

capability trades for 

warfighting and 

enterprise resources

Ensure planning

decisions are

translated and

communicated in

the budget process

Combined program/

budget review

Understand what

outcomes are achieved

for the resources

provided

Conduct cross-DoD

assessment of

capability achievement

Joint Capability Categories Provide Common Effects-Based Framework

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SecDef

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Produce unified,

resource-informed

strategic direction

Identify needs, gaps,

and overlaps

SecDef

Joint

Programming

Guidance

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Based on topdown guidance

Assess alternative

solutions to Joint needs

- SecDef decision points

- Iterative SecDef engagement

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

3

Required Actions to Effect POM-06

(from 12 SEP)

ODPA&E Nov 03

OUSD(P)

JS(DJ8)

Joint Capability Categories – Refine joint capability category

definitions from those developed by the Joint Staff to best support 

the evolving Joint Operating Concepts and end state process.

ODPA&E, Apr 04

OUSD(C)

SecDef Joint Programming Guidance (SJPG) – Provide fiscally

constrained programming guidance to implement SecDef decisions.

Identify issues: 

14 Nov 03

Assess options:

Apr 04

ODPA&E 

OSD(P)

JS(DJ8)

Capability Planning – Identify metric-based, outcome-focused 

capability needs on selected major joint issues for FY06. Assess 

competing options to meet the needs and present for SecDef

decisions. 

SecDef Strategic Planning Guidance (SSPG) – Provide unified, OUSD(P) Dec 03

resource-informed strategic objectives, key assumptions, priorities, 

fiscal projections, and acceptable risks. Programmatic guidance on 

issues of paramount importance only. Focus on “what” needs to be

done, not “how.”

Action Lead Office(s) Required By

All stakeholders (CoComs, Services, etc.) will 

participate at each stage

 B-15 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

4

Corporate Board of Directors that:

• Drives strategy and frames major planning issues

• Reviews joint needs and solutions to ensure congruency with strategy

• Assesses feedback on execution performance

Strategic Planning Council

Strategic Planning

Council (SPC)

• SecDef Chairs

• SLRG Principals plus

CoCom Commanders

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

(Resource

informed) (Fiscally 

Trades Across: constrained) • Capabilities

• Components

• Warfighting & 

Enterprise

Drives

Revie

ws

Assesses

- SecDef decision points

- Iterative SecDef engagement

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

SPG SPG

The SPG is produced as needed to

communicate Defense strategy, top priorities, 

risk tolerance, and broad capability guidance. It 

is top-down and resource informed. 

Validate compliance

with top-down guidance

(Draft) (Final)

SecDef

Decision

Defense Strategy

• Strategy construct

(e.g., 1-4-2-1)

• Key strategic goals

and objectives

• Force size, posture,

and response times

• Link to National

Strategy

Priorities and Risk

• SecDef priorities

for the Department

(includes metrics)

• Risk tolerance by

category, theater,

and mission area

Capability Guidance

• Major enterprise 

and warfighting

needs, gaps, and 

overlaps 

• Broad guidance for

each capability

category

Other Guidance

• Studies list

• Key assumptions

on threats and

opportunities

• Broad resource

constraints (TOA

increase/decrease 

and end strength) 

Organized by

Capability Category

SPG Development Process

Strategic Planning

Council (SPC)

Strategic Planning

Council (SPC)

Top-Down Process

Input:

• Strategic realities

• Process feedback

• Member ideas

Traditional DPG-Like Process

Input:

•

• Process feedback

•

• Department inputs

Working

Groups

5

SPC vectors

Capabilitiesbased IPLs

 B-16 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

Capability Decision Process

• All stakeholders participate – OSD, JS, Components, CoComs

• Transparent forum for capabilities deliberation – all views shared 

• Presents alternatives (vice a single recommendation) to leadership

• Provides a standard vetting process for capabilities-related issues

- Capability needs, gaps, and overlaps

- Study scenarios, assumptions, metrics, etc

- Concepts and architectures

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures 

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures 

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

• Title 10 docs

• Major studies

• Lessons learned

• New concepts

• Experiments

• Tech push

• Threat changes

• Plan analysis

• IPL/JQRR items SecDef/DepSecDef

Chairs

Senior

Decision

Body

Identify Needs,

Assess Trades/Solutions,

Present Alternatives

Review Alternatives,

Provide Comments

& Minority Opinions

Select

Alternative 

Major Inputs

Analysis

Engine

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Strategy Enhanced Planning Resourcing Execution and Accountability

SECDEF

Decision

Mid-Level

Review

Board

6

JPG Development Process

The JPG captures joint capabilities decisions

made over the year in the Enhanced Planning

Process and translates them into fiscally

constrained programming guidance. 

Capability decisions made

throughout the year

Validate compliance

with the SPG

JPG

(Draft)

JPG

(Final)

SecDef

Decision

Compliance w/SPG

• Evaluate extent to

which JPG meets

objectives specified

in SPG

• Describe reasons

for differences (e.g.

fact of life changes,

execution feedback)

Directive Guidance

• PDM-like direction

for a handful of 

joint capability issues

• SecDef special

interest items

• Maintains/corrects

prior year decisions

Delegated Guidance

• Develops metrics

and measures of 

sufficiency for

remainder of program

• Collaborate with

Components to

address all costs of

directive guidance 

Fiscal Adequacy

• Developed with

Components

• Demonstrates that

top lines are

adequate to execute

all guidance—SPG 

(if any) and JPG

Organized by

Capability Category

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Strategy Enhanced Planning Resourcing Execution and Accountability

Strategic Planning

Council (SPC)

7

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

SecDef/DepSecDef

Chairs

Senior

Decision

Body

Identify Needs,

Assess Trades/Solutions,

Present Alternatives

Review Alternatives,

Provide Comments

& Minority Opinions

Select

Alternative 

Analysis

Engine

Mid-Level

Review

Board

 B-17 
 

Resourcing Process

Integrate directed,

delegated programs

• Ensure compliance with JPG

• Fact of life changes 

• Decisions via PDMs, PBDs, 

but no new major initiatives

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Strategy Enhanced Planning Resourcing Execution and Accountability

Publish

JPG

Complete programs / 

budgets

Streamlined program /

budget reviews

Finalize 

budget

Decisions from

Enhanced Planning

President’s

Budget

• Streamlined program/budget review

• Common framework for managing resources information across

the Department. 

• Program and budget displays designed for DoD decision makers

and external audiences

– Organized by capability categories

SECDEF

Decision

8

Performance Assessment Report

Development Process

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Strategy Enhanced Planning Resourcing Execution and Accountability

Assessment of how well the Department met the 

guidance in the SPG and the JPG; tees up issues for

the SPC to discuss as they consider the future.

Organized by

Capability Category

Periodic Internal Management Review (internal assessment)

Annual

Defense 

Report

Status of Delegated

Capabilities

• Components report 

progress/problems 

meeting sufficiency 

goals in the current 

JPG.

Status of Directed Joint

Capabilities

• Assessment of “big

issues” ; topics staggered 

through the year. 

Feasibility of the Strategy

• Annually: Assessment of whether the 

totality of current/planned capabilities is

sufficient to execute the current strategy 

within risk tolerance.

• Identifies selected capabilities 

issues for SPC discussion.

Annual Performance Assessment Report (external report)

Summary Assessment

•

status by capability 

categories using balanced 

scorecard assessments.

Link to QDR and Strategic

Goals

Describe links between

capability categories and

goals of the current SPG.

Summary of fiscal year end

•

9

 B-18 
Products for Secretary of Defense and Senior Leadership Review Group 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

10

POM06 Approach

• FY06 SPG: strategic focus; programmatic guidance on issues of

paramount importance

• Enhanced planning: conducted by issue teams and Functional

Capability Boards (FCB)

• JPG: - directive guidance on major issues

- delegated programming authority with metrics

- proof of fiscal adequacy

• Execution/Performance 

• Near term actions: 

- Sign Implementation Memo

- Establish corporate decision making 

- Define interaction of issue teams and FCBs to address warfighting

and enterprise issues/trades

- Refine capability categories and their application

- Define POM06 Strategic Issues

 B-19 
 

 B-20 
Appendix C 

Key Assumptions and Guidance; Other Studies 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Assumptions and Guidance

• Implement for FY06 FYDP; 80% solution is

acceptable

• Capability-based processes identify joint needs 

up front; Services supply these needs

• Capabilities must be optimized across the 

Department, not within Components, to support 

near- and far-term joint warfighting needs

• Acceptable risk levels should be identified up 

front by senior decision makers in a 

collaborative, vice consensus-driven, process

• Combatant Commanders’ input is critical

Focus on processes first,

then consider organizational implications

 C-1 
 

10

Related Efforts

 Joint Concept of Operations

3⁄4 LtGen James Cartwright (J8), lead

 DSB Task Force on Enabling Joint 

Force Capabilities

3⁄4 Gen Larry Welch and Dr Bob 

Hermann, co-chairs

 Streamlining Decision Processes (PPBS)

3⁄4 Mr. Mike Dominguez (USAF),

lead

 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols

3⁄4 Dr. John Hamre (CSIS), lead

 Competency-based Management

3⁄4 BrigGen Rich Hassan (USAF),

lead

 Core Competency Efforts by Services

3⁄4 Mr. John MacDonald (USA)

3⁄4 Mr. Mike Dominguez (USAF)

 OSD/JS Core Competencies & 

Collaboration

3⁄4 Mr. Marty Hoffman, chair

 Project Equinox (Organizational

Approaches to OSD)

3⁄4 Jeff McKitrick (SAIC), lead

 Options for Improving Logistics

3⁄4 Mr. Brad Berkson (AT&L), lead

 MID 909 – Supply Chain Study

3⁄4 Mr. Brad Berkson (AT&L), lead

 IBM Study on Supply Chain Transformation

3⁄4 Mr. Brad Berkson (AT&L), lead

 Business Management Modernization Program

3⁄4 Ms. Joann Boutelle (OUSDC),

lead

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

 C-2 
Appendix D 

Strategy: Outline for Secretary of Defense Strategic 

Planning Guidance 

This appendix proposes an outline for the Secretary of Defense Strategic Planning 

Guidance (SPG). 

Objective – Define strategic objectives, key priorities, risk tolerance levels, 

overarching assumptions and operational/organizing concepts that support the 

National Security Strategy and Policy and the execution of that strategy by 

Combat Commanders and other DoD components. The strategic direction 

contained in the SPG must provide the key, corporate level direction needed for 

the operational, enterprise, and capabilities planning processes. The objectives, 

priorities, risks and assumptions described in the SPG will drive the trade analysis 

conducted in the Enhanced Planning Process, which in turn will result in Joint 

Programming Guidance.

1. Define National Security Strategy/Policy Requirements. Provide a 

unified, outcome-focused strategic direction for Combatant, Functional 

and Component Commands. 

a. Describe force employment concepts to achieve the objectives of the 

National Security Strategy, incorporate feedback from program 

execution--including Readiness Reporting (DRRS)--and identify 

needed changes to current program execution. 

b. State strategic priorities, show integration of theater strategies and 

priorities, and provide a global focus that integrates theater and 

functional mission priorities. 

c. Identify the joint capability categories that will provide a common 

framework and consistent definitions, support the assessment of 

programs on the basis of their contribution to joint capabilities, and 

allow the identification of trade areas to support gap analyses 

(essential for the first cycle, FY06). 

2. Identify ROM fiscal and other constraints. The strategy, and the plans 

that support it, should be consistent with the resources expected to be 

available for the timeframe of the plans. The planning guidance should 

indicate, as specifically as possible, the fiscal and other resource 

constraints to be used in developing plans; it should also be the basis for 

DoD’s business strategy. Any other constraints (e.g., political, 

 D-1 
 

organizational) that directly affect planning processes should be 

highlighted. 

3. Provide a framework for Enhanced Planning.

a. Incorporate an assessment of the future geo-strategic security 

environment. The assessment should be consistent with the best 

projection of the capability and the methods of future adversaries to 

provide a baseline for all planning efforts. Key threat assumptions, 

such as weapon system proliferation rates, asymmetric application of 

low-tech equipment, and ability to attack information systems, should 

be included. 

b. Establish and specify strategy objectives (including the SecDef 

transformation policies and objectives). 

i) Identify capability objectives that enable the strategy (e.g., defeat 

adversaries who can neutralize current/emerging stealth 

technology; target capital ships from 1000nm; deny APOD/SPOD 

access; neutralize satellites; disrupt SIPRNet; and target the United 

States or allies w/WMD). 

ii) Identify the decisions desired, by capability category, for the time

frame of the guidance and the analytical efforts required to support 

those decisions. 

iii) Describe and prioritize desired near- and long-term capabilities and 

operational characteristics of the Joint Force and Components. 

Based on the results of the Enhanced Planning Process, capabilities 

should be quantified to the extent the strategy demands (e.g., 

deliver “x” amount of strike to “y” areas with 96 hours warning; 

control “x” facilities/airfields/ports within 96 hours; project “y” 

ground forces ashore to “n” nm within 10 days of warning; and 

perform forcible entry operations at the brigade level in x days 

without host nation support). 

iv) Specify, by operational theater (CoCom AoRs), expected force 

postures to execute the strategy, including how regional 

partnerships should be factored into planning (including integrated 

global footprint and Security Cooperation Guidance). 

Component roles should be indicated as appropriate (e.g., total 

strike capability should be “x percent ” by Naval forces in 

these AoRs, “y percent” by USAF; “z percent” of total ISR 

should come from space assets by 2010 in the following 

theaters...).

¡ 

 D-2 
Strategy: Outline for Secretary of Defense Strategic Planning Guidance 

v) Incorporate the decisions and priorities of the Nuclear Posture 

Review by Functional Mission Area (e.g., strategic forces, 

logistics, and intelligence). 

The future size, readiness posture, and response times of 

nuclear deterrent forces. 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

¡ 

The type and persistence required of ISR capabilities by 

operational theater. 

c. Identify the strategic concepts for planning future enterprise functions

(e.g., work force strategy, business practices, and infrastructure). 

Provide the organizing principles and new concepts for future 

enterprise management. Those principles and concepts should be tied 

to concepts for future joint operations (JOCs) and incorporate specific 

priorities and goals of the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG). 

i) Identify strategic approach to workforce planning and 

management. 

Identify criteria for utilization of military personnel, and the 

decision strategy for choosing between use of active and 

reserve component personnel. 

Identify criteria for utilization of civilian employees rather than 

contractors. 

Define, describe, and establish metrics for personnel 

management functions (including planning functions). 

ii) Identify strategic approach to “overhead” support functions. 

Identify strategic goals of central support functions. 

Identify criteria for choosing among options. 

iii) Identify strategic plan for such areas as bases, ranges, and housing. 

Identify criteria for maintenance priorities, consolidations, 

closings, and new facilities. 

Define, describe, and establish metrics for infrastructure

management (including long-range planning). 

iv) Identify strategic plan for acquisition enterprise operations. 

Identify strategic approach (e.g., spiral development). 

Identify acceptable levels of technological risk. 

 D-3 
 

d. Articulate risk tolerance. Risks are currently characterized as force 

management, operational, future and institutional. The planning

guidance should state where and how much risk is acceptable in each 

risk area and theater or mission area. The SPG should indicate where 

we can afford to accept more risk or, conversely, where DoD needs to 

reduce risk. The trade analysis conducted in the Enhanced Planning 

Process will be conducted consistent with this guidance. 

4. Identify operational and organizing concepts for future Joint Force 

Operations to structure experimentation, research and development, 

and capability planning. These concepts may come in the form of the 

JopsC, but they should provide the direction for development of new 

capabilities that may change the way the Joint force operates in the future. 

The concepts should incorporate the transformation goals and objectives 

of the TPG. 

 D-4 
Appendix E 

Enhanced Planning 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Enhanced Planning Process 

Inputs

Define

Needs

Create

Choices 

& Make 

Decisions

Outputs

SSPG

• Strategic Objectives

• Scenario Space

• Macro threat assumptions

• Risk Tolerance

• Enterprise Goals

• Joint Warfighting

• DoD-wide enterprise processes

Identify current and

+

Identify excesses, gaps,

efficiencies

• Identify and quantify areas with:

- Excess capability

- Sufficient capability

• Identify and quantify gaps:

- Prioritized

- Time-phased (near, mid, far)

Potential reductions to cost per

unit of capability

Identify Needed Capabilities

• Studies and Analysis

• S&T and R&D

• Experimentation and Exercises

Adjust Investment Portfolio

Define Solution Parameters

• Assumptions

• Boundaries

• Common set of facts

Conduct

Analysis

Provide Make a Decision

Assess value to DoD

•

Material

Solutions

Non-Material

Solution

JPG

(For solutions requiring 

programmatic action)

Functional and

Business Plans

Service

POMs

Service

Plans

• OPLANs

• Execution Feedback

• Laws, PolicyRe, gs

• Cost Factors

• Industrial capabilities, benchmarks

• Human Capital

• Economic Conditions

Identify current and programmed 

business processes

-

programmed capabilities

-

-

-

- -

-

Regs

•

•

•

•

SSPG

• Strategic Objectives

• Scenario Space

• Macro threat assumptions

• Risk Tolerance

• Enterprise Goals

Department-wide studies to

define current and future needs

• Joint Warfighting

• DoD-wide enterprise processes

Identify current and

Identify excesses, gaps,

efficiencies, and opportunities

• Identify and quantify areas with:

- Excess capability

- Sufficient capability

• Identify and quantify gaps:

- Prioritized

- Time-phased (near, mid, far)

Potential reductions to cost per

unit of capability

Identify Needed Capabilities

• Studies and Analysis

• S&T and R&D

• Experimentation and Exercises

Adjust Investment Portfolio

Define Solution Parameters

• Assumptions

• Boundaries

• Common set of facts

Develop

Alternative

Solutions

Conduct

Analysis

Provide Recommendations

Material

Solutions

Non-Material

Solution

JPG

(For solutions requiring 

programmatic action)

Functional and

Business Plans

Service

POMs

Service

Plans

Other Input

• OPLANs

• Execution Feedback

• Laws, PolicyRe, gs

• Cost Factors

• Industrial capabilities, benchmarks

• Human Capital

• Economic Conditions

Identify current and programmed 

business processes

+

-

programmed capabilities

-

-

-

- -

-

Regs

•

•

•

•

• Resource Constraints

• Workforce numbers and

skill sets

Resourcing Enhance

d Plannin

g Strateg

y

Key CoCom engagement

•

Make resource trades

•

 E-1 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Analysis Engine

• Alternatives • SPG

• Study results 

• Lessons Learned 

• Experimentation

• Tech Push

• “Joint needs” defined as required effects, not platforms

• Services offer capabilities proposals to meet needs

• Transparent analysis with full Service participation

• Analysis intended to produce a set of alternatives

• Approval through new DoD “corporate structure”

Set Up DoD-wide trades DoD-wide, fiscally constrained

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Joint Capability Category 1 (Warfare)

Joint Capability Category 2 (Warfare)

Joint Capability Category 3 (Warfare)

Joint Capability Category 4 (Warfare)

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Joint Capability Category 5 (Warfare/Enterprise)

Joint Capability Category 6 (Enterprise)

Joint Capability Category 7 (Enterprise)

 E-2 
Appendix F 

Capability Categories 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Capability Framework

November 3, 2003

 F-1 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Purpose

“Flesh-out” the September 12th SLRG decision to develop

joint capability categories. These categories should enable

us to:

• Focus on outcomes and effects

• Manage and plan for capabilities

• Conduct trade analysis to determine best solutions

• Track performance and share information

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

The Problem Today

If you want to answer...

• What? How Much? When? Then...

At the Department level, you need to: • Elevate the discussion above the platform and “single solution” level

• Communicate consistently, with a shared vision and common language

• Have a single set of facts and assumptions to guide analysis and decisions

To-Be

Joint

Needs

USAF

USN

USA

USMC Others

83 Capability

Categories

61 Capability

Categories

TBD Capability

Categories

TBD Capability

Categories

TBD Capability

Categories

• Currently no linkage to commonly defined

Joint capabilities

• Difficult to do cross-Service capability trades

• Services define Joint capability needs

• Joint community defines Joint needs

• Allows Services to map to Joint capabilities

• Facilitates analysis by capability

USAF

USN

USA

USMC Others

Joint

Needs

As-Is

 F-2 
Capability Categories 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Capability Categories 

Two Approaches

• Capability categories can be based on functions or operations

- Functional categories focus on how military activities are to be enabled such 

as command and control, logistics, and force application.

- Operational categories focus on military activities to be performed such as major 

theater war, nuclear war, special operations, etc.

• Functionally aligned categories:

- Allows a fewer number of more enduring categories

- Provides a basis for organization and covers warfighting and enterprise capabilities

- Reduces redundant representation of platforms and systems

- Better for capabilities planning or management functions

• Operationally aligned categories:

- Provides the basis for conducting cross-Service trade analyses

- Easier to link platforms and weapon systems to required tasks and missions

- Better for translating CoCom needs into capabilities

- Clearer link to an outcome/effects-based orientation

Both approaches are necessary to plan and manage the

full spectrum of a capabilities-based approach to warfighting

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Functional Capability Categories

Basis for Management

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

• Experts organized to assess alternatives for joint capability needs

• Responsible for maintaining capabilities-based tools and methodologies:

- Metrics, attributes, architectures, and concepts

- Capabilities roadmaps

• Fewer, broader categories are needed to translate between Components, 

Interagency Agency and Coalition partners – a forum for collaboration

(transition yr)

All

Stakeholders

Represented

 F-3 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Functional Capability Categories

Across the Processes

Strategy Planning Resourcing Execution

Feedback

Capability categories track across processes, from Strategy to Execution

• A common structure for articulating joint capabilities

• A consistent message across the Department

• Clear lanes for roles and responsibilities

• A framework for capability assessments and trade-off analyses

• Supports senior leadership decision making on capabilities resourcing

Feedback informs decision makers throughout the process 5

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Manpower

Infrastructure

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Operational Capabilities

Basis for Trade Space

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures 

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures 

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Much greater number

that change over time

(CoCom driven)

1. Deter adversaries and reduce the need for military force to achieve national objectives.

2. Prevent the initiation and escalation of armed conflict.

3. Increase the capability of allies/coalition partners to assist in achieving security objectives.

4. Defend the United States against enemy missile attack.

5. Protect DoD personnel, dependents, facilities, and installations from terrorist or other attacks.

6. Locate and identify the capabilities of potential military adversaries.

7. Locate and identify the capabilities of potential non-military adversaries.

8. Identify the intentions of potential military adversaries.

9. Identify the intentions of potential non-military adversaries.

10. Maintain the use of the sea and littorals for U.S. military objectives.

11. Maintain the use of the air for U.S. military objectives.

12. Maintain the use of space for U.S. military objectives.

13. Maintain the use of information and the electromagnetic spectrum for U.S. military objectives.

14. Deny the use of the sea and littorals to adversaries.

15. Deny the use of the air to adversaries.

16. Deny the use of space to adversaries.

17. Deny the use of information and the electromagnetic spectrum to adversaries.

18. Detect, locate, and destroy adversary WMD capability.

19. Locate and destroy hard and deeply-buried targets.

20. Deny adversaries the use of their installations, facilities, and infrastructure.

21. Locate, identify, and destroy moving and time-sensitive targets.

22. Seize and control terrain.

23. Deny adversaries sanctuary in urban areas.

24. Deny sanctuary to individuals and small groups.

25. Destroy or neutralize adversary military capabilities.

26. Control the behavior of noncombatants without the use of lethal force.

27. Deny sanctuary to adversaries intermingled with noncombatants.

28. Stabilize and maintain order in Nations and non-State areas.

29. Protect deployed forces from air, sea, space, land, and information attack.

• Operational capabilities are trade areas – required tasks and missions 

• Every functional category contributes to each trade area

• When scenarios and concepts are applied, trades can be determined

• Experts from each function work together to determine trades 

 F-4 
Capability Categories 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Trade Areas and Functional Capabilities

Working Together

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

For each trade area, scenarios and operating 

concepts are applied to determine the

functional capability needs, gaps, and overlaps

Functional capability gaps/overlaps

are translated into programmatics

for weapon systems, manpower,

training, organizations, logistics, 

infrastructure, etc.

• Decisions are made in trade areas and are tracked along functional

lines until they are translated into programmatics

• Functional capability roadmaps are kept current as decisions are made

CoCom

Demand

Signal

Supply Decisions

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

Trade Areas and Functional Capabilities

A Notional Example

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Example: Deter potential adversaries from initiating 

nuclear hostilities (ensure US response can 

levy unacceptable consequences)

Air Bases Weapons Storage Nuclear Bunkers

Operators

Maintainers

Active Duty Nuclear Specialties

Weapons Supply Nuclear Warheads SST

DSP Satellites

Ground Radars

Surveillance Missile Detection

NAOC

TACAMO

National C2 Airborne

Missile Defense Homeland TBD

Minuteman III

Trident D5

TLAM/N

Nuclear Unmanned

Sub-Category

Sub-SubCategory System/Resource

Ultimately, capability decisions must be translated into programmatics

Based on CoCom

Operating

Concepts and

Agreed Upon

Scenarios

 F-5 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

A Holistic Look

Demand Signal

Determine 

Excesses and Gaps

1. Excess

2. Maintain current

advantage

3. Hedge against

emerging threats

4. “Big Bets”

that change the

character of

warfare

Notional Joint

Capability

Categories

Locate / destroy WMD

Deny enemy

urban sanctuary

Notional Trade Areas

(Effects-based tasks that

change over time)

Force Protection

Force Application

Command and Control

Logistics

Battlespace Awareness

Human Capital

Infrastructure

Locate / destroy hard

and deeply buried targets

Deny the use of space

to adversaries

Prevent the initiation and

escalation of armed conflict

Locate, identify, and destroy

moving/time-sensitive targets

Deny sanctuary to individuals

and small groups

Deny use of sea and

littorals to adversaries

9

Current and Future Joint Needs

(Heavy CoCom Influence and Participation)

Future concepts Threat Current missions

Technology and experimentation Lessons learned

Near Term

Far Term

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-Decisional

What Needs To Be Done

• Reach a common definition of “capability” and associated terms

• Identify capability categories and trade areas

• Develop a hierarchy of capability categories that support:

- Cross Service trades

- Strategy guidance articulation

- Inclusion of operational and support capabilities

- Gap analyses and evaluation of program contributions to the capability

- Assessment of program execution

• Develop a compatible planning and programming framework

• Foster a “capabilities culture” that considers divestiture in tandem with

initiatives; integrates risk; considers near and far term needs; is fiscally 

responsible

10

 F-6 
Appendix G 

Resourcing 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Resourcing Process

Input

Provide

Guidance

Formulate

Budget Input from Enhanced Planning (EP)

Decisions from the

Enhanced Planning (EP) process

(Close to fiscally-balanced)

Refine EP decisions based on--

• “Fact of Life” changes

• Execution feedback

Adjustments to achieve fiscal balance

• Reconcile the EP input and other

“must make” adjustments to provide

fiscally-balanced program guidance

• SECDEF considers impact of changes on

joint capabilities

• Feedback on adjustments informs the EP

process

Joint Programming Guidance (JPG)

• Directive “PDM-like” guidance on major

Joint capabilities

• Programming authority for the 

remainder of the program delegated to

the Components, with outcome

measures or other measures of sufficiency

Develop

Programs

Finalize Component Programming

• Final integration of JPG into

Component programs

C

o

m

pliance

Check

Abbreviated POM Review

• Ensure that JPG guidance

has been implemented in

Component programs

• Ensure integration across

Components

Decision

Documents

President’s

Budget

Ongoing Budget

formulation actions

Ongoing Service 

planning and POM

builds closely 

linked to Joint 

planning and 

programming

Outline for Secretary of Defense Joint Programming Guidance 

Objective – To define Joint, Component, and CoCom programming objectives to 

support SecDef decisions recorded in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and 

developed in the Enhanced Planning Process. The Joint Programming Guidance 

(JPG) will provide Program Decision Memorandum-like directive guidance for 

selected major joint issues. It will delegate authority to develop the remainder of

the program to the Components and CoComs, with associated performance 

measures and metrics. 

1. Implementation of the Strategic Planning Guidance. The SPG is a 

multi-year document. This section of the JPG will summarize the 

objectives outlined in the SPG that are to be addressed in the current

programming cycle and identify any issues associated with key SPG 

objectives that will not be accomplished in this cycle. 

 G-1 
 

a. SPG Objectives Addressed in the Programming Guidance. This 

section will identify SPG objectives to be addressed in the current 

programming cycle, whether the capability will be fully or partially 

addressed, and the rough costs associated with providing the specified 

level of capability. 

b. SPG Objectives Not Addressed in the Programming Guidance. This 

section will identify SPG objectives that will not be addressed in the 

programming guidance and the reasons for not addressing them.

c. Risk Assessment. This section will assess the risk associated with the 

total program for this cycle and compare it to the risk guidance in the 

SPG.

2. Directive Guidance for Joint Capabilities. This section will provide 

PDM-like detail to implement the decisions made by the SecDef during 

the enhanced planning process. 

a. Organization. This section will be organized in accordance with the 

capability categories and issues in the SPG. 

b. Content. This section will specify which Component will execute the 

program, the quantities of personnel or systems to be provided, and 

milestones for the delivery of the capability. 

3. Guidance for Delegated Programming. This section will provide 

guidance on the portions of the program that are delegated to the 

Components and CoComs. The delegated programming will contain 

performance measures or measures of sufficiency for capabilities. 

a. Organization. This section will be organized in accordance with the 

capability categories and issues in the SPG. 

b. Content. This section will specify the outcome or level of effort 

required, and identify how compliance or success will be measured. 

4. Reconciliation of Guidance and Resources Available. This section will 

demonstrate that the sum of the funding requirements imposed by the JPG, 

and SPG when applicable, is less than or equal to the resources available 

for the programming period. 

 G-2 
Appendix H 

Performance 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY Execution & Accountability Process

Assess

ment

Inputs

Planning & Resourcing

Enacted Budget

Service Programs & Plans

Performance Parameters

Planning Adjustments

• Fact of Life Changes

• Changes in Enacted Budget

• Change in Strategic Direction

Outputs

Execute the program as 

finalized in accordance

with established policies,

procedures, and regulations.

Performance

Execution

Reports

Deliver

Joint 

Capabilities

Conduct 

Joint

Operations

Ongoing acquisition programs

Ongoing operations, maintenance, and support programs

Ongoing joint warfighting and enterprise operations

New Programs

New Starts

Performance and Accountability

Reporting

• Is the program executing in accordance

with guidance?

• Reporting by “Suppliers”- primarily Services

and Defense Agencies

• Informs execution management, resourcing,

and enhanced planning processes

Readiness Reporting

• What capabilities are we actually getting?

• Can current joint operational requirements

be met?

• Reporting by “Users” - CoComs provide

assessments

• Informs the execution management, 

operations, operational planning, resourcing, 

enhanced planning, and strategy development 

processes

Capability Assessment

• Are we getting what we actually

need to execute the strategy?

• Is there a better way to provide the

capability, or increase efficiency?

• Do we need to---

– Modify capability delivery plans?

– Adjust resourcing?

– Change the capability mix?

– Change the strategy?

+

• Identified capability needs met in accordance with 

guidance: materiel and non-materiel

• Additional excesses, gaps and efficiencies identified

• Areas needing additional S&T, R&D, experimentation, 

and proof of concept evaluated

• Potential changes to Plans and Policies recommended

• Reallocation of funds examined 

FEEDBACK

+

Outline for Secretary of Defense Performance Assessment Process 

Objective – To integrate user and provider assessments of current capabilities and 

risks in order to provide an overall review of current and planned future 

capabilities relative to the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the Joint 

Programming Guidance (JPG); determine whether those capabilities are sufficient 

to execute the strategy; identify capability and resourcing issues for discussion by 

the Strategic Planning Council (SPC); and inform decisions to be incorporated in 

subsequent planning and programming guidance. 

1. Format. The performance assessment process will take two forms: 

briefings and a written annual report. Both forms will be comprehensive; 

that is, each will include all capabilities and activities in the Department. 

They will be organized around the capabilities categories and objectives 

outlined in the SPG and addressed in the JPG. 

 H-1 
 

a. One form of assessment will be periodic briefings to the SPC to 

support regular internal management review. The briefings will be 

based on capability metrics used in the Enhanced Planning Process. 

b. The second form of assessment will be an annual Performance 

Assessment Report (PAR), intended for both external and internal 

audiences. This report will summarize overall performance and relate 

it to the Department’s overall goals. It will be at a high level of

aggregation and based on a Balanced Scorecard approach. 

2. Reporting responsibilities. Assessments will be made by an independent 

assessor, possibly supported by a small staff. The role of the assessor will 

be to (1) integrate input concerning current capabilities that is provided by 

Combatant Commanders, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service 

Chiefs, Principal Staff Assistants and Agency Heads, and analysis engine 

team leaders; (2) determine whether the capabilities are being delivered as 

expected and as directed in the JPG (in both delegated and directive 

sections); and (3) decide whether the total capabilities are sufficient to 

meet the strategy. 

a. Combatant Commanders report to the assessor as to whether the 

capabilities they have are sufficient to meet their Joint Operational 

Requirements. 

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reports the capability of the 

United States as compared with those of its potential adversaries; this 

assessment is made for all warfighting capabilities. 

c. For enterprise capabilities, the PSA may be an Under Secretary or 

another designated person (such as the DoD Human Capital Officer for 

workforce capabilities and the Chief Acquisition Executive for 

acquisition capabilities). The PSAs report whether the current levels 

and expected longer term changes in enterprise capabilities are 

sufficient to support the strategy enunciated in the SPG and JPG for 

enterprise capabilities. They also report whether any efficiencies or 

capabilities they are directed to provide under the Directed 

Programming Guidance are being achieved as specified in the JPG. 

Finally, the PSAs, together with Agency Heads, supply all input not 

provided elsewhere, so that the assessor receives reports concerning 

the totality of DoD spending. 

d. The Service Chiefs report whether the capabilities they are directed to 

provide under the Directed Programming Guidance are being achieved 

as specified in the JPG. They also report on the sufficiency measures 

specified in the delegated guidance section of the JPG.

 H-2 
Performance 

e. The analysis engine team leaders report on the results of their 

evaluations of the achieved levels of capabilities in their areas of

responsibility. 

3. Briefings to the Strategic Planning Council 

a. The assessor will periodically brief the SPC on (1) whether the 

program is executing in accordance with guidance, (2) what 

capabilities are being provided, and (3) whether those capabilities are 

sufficient to support the strategy. The assessments of capabilities will 

be based on the metrics and measures (objective and subjective) used 

in the SPG and JPG, and the requirements set in those documents. 

b. One SPC briefing each year will be comprehensive (include all 

capabilities and risk) and occur in May, in time to inform SPC review 

and comment on the current JPG. This briefing will also serve as a 

major input into the next SPG. The SPC and the participants in the 

Enhanced Planning Process then must decided whether to modify 

capability delivery plans (including resourcing), change the capability 

mix, or change the strategy. 

c. The briefings to the SPC that occur between the annual comprehensive 

assessments will focus on selected capabilities and be staggered so that

all important issues are reviewed over the course of a year. The 

briefings will be based on the stakeholder reports provided for the 

annual comprehensive brief, as well as any more recent information 

that is readily available (e.g., through execution reviews). 

4. Annual Performance Assessment Report 

a. This report, which will be transmitted by the Secretary to Congress 

and the public, will summarize the strategy and capabilities of the 

Department of Defense. It will cover accomplishments of the previous 

fiscal year’s budget, in capability terms. 

b. The PAR will explicitly link the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

to the SPG and JPG. 

c. The PAR will follow a balanced scorecard approach for major goals, 

with an overall determination of “red-yellow-green,” relative to the 

guidance in the SPG and JPG. It almost certainly will not use the 

metrics and measures of each capability category, and may not assess

capability categories individually. 

After full transition to the new process, the PAR will become the basis of the Annual Defense Report transmitted to Congress every January.

 H-3 
 

 H-4 
Appendix I 

Steering Group Members 

Mr. William Haynes 

Department of Defense General Counsel 

Mr. Peter Geren 

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

Mr. Ken Krieg 

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation 

Mr. Larry Lanzillotta 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Management Reform) 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

Mr. Philip Grone 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary (Installations and Environment) 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

Ms. Jeanne Fites 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Integration) 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personel and Readiness) 

Mr. Brad Berkson 

Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics) 

***** 

Lieutenant General James Cartwright 

Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8) 

Joint Staff

***** 

Lieutenant General James L. Lovelace 

Director of the Army Staff 

United States Army 

 I-1 
 

Lieutenant General Benjamin S. Griffin 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 

United States Army 

***** 

Mr. Pat Tamburrino 

Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Requirements and 

Assessments) (N8B) 

United States Navy 

Major General Jim Battalini (USMC) 

Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (N75) 

United States Navy 

Rear Admiral Kevin Cosgriff 

Director, Warfare Integration and Assessment Division (N70) 

United States Navy 

***** 

Mr. Michael Dominguez 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs) 

United States Air Force 

Major General Ron Bath

Director, Strategic Planning (AF/XPX) 

United States Air Force 

***** 

Mr. Joe Masciarelli 

Assistant Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources (P&R) 

United States Marine Corps 

***** 

Dr. Tom Allen 

Former President 

Military Operations Research Society 

Mr. Tom Morehouse 

Consultant 

Institute for Defense Analysis 

 I-2 
Steering Group Members 

Mr. John Tillson 

Senior Analyst 

Institute for Defense Analysis 

Dr. Kathy Webb 

Policy Sciences Group Manager 

RAND Corporation 

Mr. Chris Williams

Consultant 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

 I-3 
 

 I-4 
Appendix J 

Study Team Members 

The Honorable E.C. Aldridge, Jr. 

Study Leader 

Ms. Mary Margaret Evans 

Executive Director 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 

Mr. Robin Farley 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

Ms. Judy Fernandez 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) 

Dr. Vance Gordon 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis & Evaluation) 

Mr. Frank Leaming 

Directorate of Administration and Management 

Mr. Steve Reeder 

United States Joint Forces Command 

Colonel Mike Morgan 

Joint Staff, J-8 

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Mathis 

United States Army 

Captain Wilhelm A. Hansen, Jr. 

United States Navy 

Colonel Robert Suminsby, Jr. 

United States Air Force 

Colonel Nathan Webster 

United States Marine Corps 

***** 

Mr. Yvonne Whichard 

American Telephone & Telegraph 

 J-1 
 

Mr. Rick Jackson 

Logistics Management Institute 

Ms. Elaine Simmons 

Logistics Management Institute 

Mr. Simon Hernaez 

Logistics Management Institute 

Mr. Rick Wallace 

Science Applications International Corporation 

 J-2 
Appendix K 

Chronology/Decision Points 

Date Major Event

03 APR 03 SecDef commissions Mr. Aldridge to conduct study 

19 MAY 03 Study Team formed – study begins 

17 JUN 03 As-is/end state briefing presented to Steering Group 

19 JUN 03 Mr. Aldridge briefs SecDef on as-is/end state 

20 AUG 03 Mr. Aldridge briefs SecDef on the Study Team’s proposed process 

10 SEP 03 Study Team presents process brief to the Steering Group 

12 SEP 03 Mr. Aldridge presents proposed process to the Senior Leader Review 

Group 

14 SEP 03 Overarching memo recording the agreements made during the SLRG is 

coordinated throughout DoD 

19 OCT 03 Study Team presents process brief to OPSDEP Tank 

23 OCT 03 Mr. Aldridge meets with SecDef to discuss the status of the overarching 

memo and level one alternatives 

30 OCT 03 Capabilities-based processes brief presented to Defense Science Board 

31 OCT 03 Mr. Aldridge presents capabilities-based processes brief to the Senior 

Leader Review Group 

31 OCT 03 Secretary Rumsfeld signs directive to implement specific steps towards 

end state process for POM 06 

22 NOV 03 Mr. Aldridge submitted draft final report along with his final recommendations to SecDef 

JAN 04 Final report published. 

 K-1 
 

DRAFT—[Click here and type report #)] —1/16/04K-2 SA307S1 Appendix K_2 
Appendix L 

Organizational Alternatives—First Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Alternatives Brief

Part I – First Order Changes

October 28, 2003

 L-1 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

“End State” Process

Organizational Assessment

Strategy Enhanced

Planning Resourcing Execution

and 

Accountability

Conduct analysis to effect

capability trades for

warfighting and

enterprise resources

Ensure that

planning decisions

are translated and

communicated in

the budget process

Understand what

outcomes are achieved

for the resources

provided

Need cross-DoD

assessment of

capability achievement

Process and

organizational change

required

Need a common framework

Process 

change

required

Process 

change

required

Process and

organizational change

required

Defense

Resourcing

Process

SECDEF

Strategic

Planning

Guidance

Operational

Planning

Enterprise

Planning

Capabilities

Planning

Program

Execution

&

Performance

Reporting

Produce unified,

resource-informed

strategic direction

1

Need combination of

functional expertise and

objective analysis--with

DoD-wide view

SECDEF

Joint

Programming

Guidance

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Strategic Planning

Council

(SecDef, SLRG

principals + CoComs)

Enhanced Planning (Bottom-Up Process) Strategy (Top-Down Process)

Output:

• Strategic objectives

• Capabilities focus

• Overall risk tolerance

• Top priorities

• Overarching Assumptions

• Studies

Input:

• Strategic realities

• Performance and

Accountability Report

• Member ideas

Reflected 

in SPG

Corporate Processes

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Defense

Capabilities

Board

JCB

SecDef, 

DepSecDef

(4 Star)

Senior

Decision

Body

Mid-level Review

(3 Star)

JROC

Present 

Alternatives

Review

Alternatives

Recommend/

Select Alternatives

Input:

• SPG

• Title 10 Docs

• Capability Chg

Drivers

Analytical Engine

Reflected 

in JPG

Performance (Independent Process)

Reflected 

in PAR

Strategic Planning

Council

(SecDef, SLRG

principals + CoComs)

Performance /

Accountability

Reporting

• Is the program executing 

in accordance with

guidance?

Readiness Reporting

• What capabilities are 

we actually getting?

• Can current joint

operational requirements

be met?

+

Input:

• Enacted Budget

• Performance Parameters

Capability Assessment

• Are our capabilities

sufficient to execute the 

strategy?

Output:

• Modify capability delivery plans?

• Adjust resourcing?

• Change the capability mix?

• Change the strategy?

 L-2 
Organizational Alternatives—First Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

SLRG

Major

Issue

Refine needs, identify & assess solutions

Joint Capability Category 1

Joint Capability Category 2

Joint Capability Category 3

Joint Capability Category 4

Joint Capability Category 5

Joint Capability Category 6

Joint Capability Category n

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Task analysis

Analysis Engine

(Functional View Underlying Organization Change)

3

For Warfighting and Support Capabilities

Set up DoD-wide trades DoD-wide, fiscally constrained Translate Joint solutions

into progra

m guidance

Identify top-level

gaps and exces

• Threat

ses

Assessments

• Lessons 

learned

• War plan 

Analysis

• Tech push

• Experiments

•New concepts

•Title 10 Docs

Task analysis

Task analysis

Task analysis

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Analysis Engine

Builds on the JS Functional Capability

Board concept to provide a collaborative

yet competitive process to support trade

analysis across Components and capabilities. 

A Defense Capability Panel for each capability category

• Representatives from Services, Agencies, CoComs, OSD, JS

• Dedicated support and analytical staff led by Flag Officer / SES

• Integrates warfighting and enterprise concerns

Needs Gaps/Overlaps Priorities Programmatics

As-Is

Architectures

Concepts/

Scenarios

To-Be Architectures 

and Capability Roadmaps

Service

Solutions

Defense Capability Panel

Enhanced Planning Process

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures 

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

Capability Categories

Force Application

Protection

Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Logistics

Workforce

Infrastructure

CoComs Services Agencies OSD Joint Staff

Identification of Joint Needs,

Gaps, and Excesses

Integration

Function

Dedicated Analytical

Support

Architectures 

and Concepts

Metrics and

Methodologies

Integration of Capabilities proposals

Into the Defense Program

4

SPG

JPG

SECDEF

Decision

Evaluate

Alternatives

 L-3 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Performance Assessment Development Process

Integrate stakeholder assessments to produce an overall

review of current capabilities/risks compared with the goals in

the SPG and the guidance in the JPG; tee up issues for the

SPC to discuss as they consider future SPGs and JPGs.

Summary Assessment

• Summary of fiscal-year-end 

status by capability

categories using balanced 

scorecard assessments.

Status of Directed Joint 

Capabilities

• Assessment of “big 

issues”; topics staggered

through the year. 

Feasibility of the Strategy

• Annually: Assessment of whether the 

totality of current/planned capabilities is

sufficient to execute the current strategy

within risk tolerance.

• Quarterly: Identifies selected 

capabilities’ issues for SPC discussion.

5

Organized by

Capability Category

Internal Management Review, quarterly briefings (classified)

Annual Performance Assessment Report (external report)

Current

JPG

Next

SPG

Link to QDR and Strategic 

Goals

• Describe links between 

capability categories and 

goals of the current SPG.

Annual 

Defense 

Report

Status of Delegated 

Capabilities

• Services report 

progress/problems 

meeting sufficiency

goals in the current 

JPG.

Strategic Planning

Council (SPC)

Review, 

Comment 

Major inputs and revisions

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Joint Staff

DepSecDef

CJCS

SecDef

PA&E

USD AT&L

USD Policy

USD Compt

USD (I) USD P&R

JCC 1*

JCC 2*

JCC 3*

JCC 4*

JCC 5 SES

JCC 6 SES

JCC n SES

Enterprise CBs

Warfighting CBs

6

Enhanced Capability Boards—Moderate

• Use current OSD, Joint Staff Functional Capability Board (FCB) Structure and JCIDS foundation.

• Expand FCBs to address warfighting and enterprise issues.

• PA&E and J-8 lead effort to identify DoD-wide trade space.

• No net staff growth; SMEs drawn from across the Department.

• Performance monitoring led by PA&E; assessment by Joint Staff

Capability

Boards/Services

Refine needs, identify solutions

PA&E

PA&E, J-8

Lead Org

Translate Joint solutions into 

program guidance

Identify top-level gaps and excesses

Process Functions

Strategy

Enhanced Planning

Resourcing

Execution / Feedback

• CBs augment analytical capability (e.g. focus FFRDCs)

• Develop and maintain architectures and roadmaps

• Assistance and augmentation from CoComs, Services, 

and others

Sponsorship

Reporting 

(Accomplished Collaboratively with All Stakeholders)

DoD Mgmt

GC, 

LA,

PA,

IG

OT&E,

CIO,

Admin

 L-4 
Organizational Alternatives—First Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

DoD Mgmt

GC, 

LA,

PA,

IG

OT&E,

CIO,

Admin

Joint Staff(-)

DepSecDef CJCS

SecDef

USD Policy PSA(CAI)

USD Compt(-)

USD P&R(-)

USD I(-) 

JCC 1 **

JCC 2 **

JCC 3 **

JCC 4 **

JCC 5 DASD

JCC 6 DASD

JCC n DASD

Enterprise

Warfighting

7

USD AT&L(-)

PSA (Capabilities Analysis and 

Integration)--Aggressive

• Create DoD corporate Planning Entity (OSD(CAI)) 

– Manages enhanced planning and creates the JPG

– Reports to both SECDEF and CJCS

• Uses “dual-hatted” elements of OSD and Joint Staff. 

• Adds independent performance monitoring and assessment leader

Capability

Boards/ 

Services

Refine needs, identify

solutions

PSA(CAI)

PSA(CAI)

Lead Org

Translate Joint solutions

into program guidance

Identify top-level gaps 

and excesses

Process Functions

Strategy

Enhanced Planning

Resourcing

Execution / Feedback

Performance

Assessment

(Accomplished Collaboratively

with All Stakeholders)

Deputy/DJ-8

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

Performance

Assessment

DepSecDef CJCS Joint Staff(-)

SecDef

10

HQ (Lite) -- Radical

(Streamlined Executive Staff)

Capability 

Boards/

Services

Refine needs,

identify

solutions

PSA(CP)

PSA(CP)

Lead Org

Translate 

Joint 

solutions into

program

guidance

Identify toplevel gaps

and excesses

Process 

Functions

Strategy

Enhanced Planning

Resourcing

Execution/Feedback

JCC 1 **

JCC 2 **

JCC 3 **

JCC 4 **

JCC 5 DASD

JCC 6 DASD

JCC n DASD

Enterprise

Warfighting

PSA

Resourcing

• Organize OSD/Joint Staff along:

– Principal tasks; Planning, Operations 

– Implementing functions; Work Force, AT&L, Resourcing, Policy, Intelligence

• Reduces HQ redundancies:

– merges staffs for implementing functions to support 

both SECDEF and CJCS

– Matrix enterprise implementation functions across 

ops priorities

PSA(CP)

Deputy/DJ-8

PSA (P)

PSA ( P&R)

PSA( AT&L)

PSA (I)

• Joint Staff focus on CJCS military ops roles (J-2,3,5,7)

• PSA Operations (USD or VCJCS dual-hatted);

– CoCom representatives form Ops Staffs 

• PSA (CP) Capabilities Planning Staff

– Dual-hatted Joint Staff, and OSD Staff elements

• Adds independent performance monitoring/assessment

DoD Mgmt

GC, LA, PA, IG, 

OT&E, CIO, Admin

PSA

Operations

Depu Deputy *** ty *** Deputy *** 

PSA Enterprise

Functions

 L-5 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Pre-decisional

General Observations

Basic characteristics of all three options--

• Roles of SECDEF, CJCS and Services do not change

• Top-level needs, gaps, and excesses are identified by

an organization with a DoD-wide view

• Consideration of both warfighting and enterprise 

capabilities

• Collaborative effort with all stakeholders, including

CoComs and Services

 L-6 
Appendix M 

Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

 M-1 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Establish Joint Program Executives (JPE) for each of the designated Joint Programs.

Alt 1 - Moderate – Multiple JPE Concept 

Enterprise Planning - Acquisition

• Designate Joint Program Executives (JPE) (reports through the Service Acquisition Executive), one for each Joint Capabilities 

Category (JCC), through the Joint Capability Boards (JCB) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).

• Provide input to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) (USD (AT&L)) on current joint in-development, in-production 

programs. This links the acquisition process to joint needs planning and development. 

• Resources pulled from the Components for Joint Programs (JPG directed guidance) with oversight by JPE, reporting to DAE. 

SAEs retain resources for Service programs.

• DAE, with JPE and SAE input, develops a comprehensive acquisition strategy/plan which leverages the JCIDS process to 

clearly articulate goals/objectives to meet departmental joint capability needs. A comprehensive acquisition strategy allows for 

immediate, near term and long term programmatic planning to meet joint capability needs.

• Transform the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) into a virtual, cross service process to allow for Department

wide management across capability categories and within specific platforms. This DAES transformation permits the

establishment of a cross cutting DAB. 

Pros:

• Increased interoperability and material solutions execution due to capability focused vice platform centric planning and 

programming.

• Improved planning and coordination to meet joint capability needs.

• Improved efficiency in defining/delivering joint systems due to a better connectivity between “requires” and “acquires,” as well

as a more focused planning and upfront resourcing for joint programs. 

Cons:

• Apportionment of resources specifically for joint programs could create gaps.

• Would enable but not ensure Service cross trade.

• Still dependent on existing Service or Agency to execute Joint Programs.

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Acquisition Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Moderate)

Program

Managers

PEOs

SAEs

JPEs

DAE USD(AT&L)

1

2 Service Programs

Joint Programs

DAB 

SecDef

JROC

(JCB)

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

Enterprise

Warfighting

1 2

 M-2 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Establish a single Joint Acquisition Executive with oversight and decision authority on

all joint developmental and in-production programs.

Enterprise Planning - Acquisition

• JAE and SAEs, through JCB/DAB, provide input to the DAE on current joint in-development, in-production programs. This

provides a direct link with central oversight to the acquisition process for joint needs planning and development. 

• Acquisition resources for joint programs managed by the JAE would be supported by expanding the responsibilities of a 

selected acquisition agency to act as the JAE field activity. An appropriate portion of Component organizations would be 

integrated into this joint entity. 

• DAE, with JAE and SAE input, develops a comprehensive acquisition strategy/plan which leverages the JCIDS process to 

clearly articulate goals/objectives to meet departmental joint capability needs. A comprehensive acquisition strategy allows for 

immediate, near term and long term programmatic planning to meet joint capability needs.

• DAB transformed along capability categories to align cross cutting joint capabilities, e.g., aircraft carrier command and control

would be managed by the JAE, while the overall program is managed by the Navy. 

Pros:

• Increased interoperability and material solutions execution due to capability focused vice platform centric planning and 

programming. 

• Improved planning and coordination to meet joint capability needs through a single JAE.

• More efficiency in defining/delivering joint systems due to a better connectivity between “requires” and “acquires,” as well as a 

more focused planning and upfront resourcing for joint programs.

• Creates an execution arm for joint capabilities with a field activity to manage joint programs without creating a new

organization.

Cons:

• Loss of authority by Components. Services may argue this usurps some of their Title X authority.

Alt 2 – Aggressive – Single JAE Concept 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Acquisition Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Aggressive)

Program

Managers

PEOs

SAEs

DAE USD(AT&L)

JCB

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

JAE PDUSD (AT&L)

SecDef

1

2 Service Programs

Joint Programs

DAB 

JPEOs

1 2

 M-3 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Establish Capabilities Acquisition Executives (CAE) for each of the established Joint

Capabilities Categories. The CAE would have oversight and decision authority on all Defense

developmental and in-production programs.

Enterprise Planning - Acquisition

• CAEs, through JCB/DAB, provides input to the DAE on current in-development, in-production, S&T and experimental

programs. Acquisition process, management and structure directly support DoD capability needs development. All acquisition 

resources controlled by CAEs for their respective capability categories. As with the aggressive alternative, a joint entity or field

activity would be established to support the CAEs.

• DAE, with CAE and SAE input, develops a comprehensive acquisition strategy/plan which leverages the JCIDS and Service 

unique requirements to clearly articulate goals/objectives to meet departmental capability needs.

• In addition to establishing an “expanded DCMA” as responsible for joint requirements acquisitions, establish an Agency which 

has oversight for Service Program Executive Offices (SPEOs). The SPEOs would manage ACAT I and II programs, through 

the Service Acquisition Executives.

Pros:

• Development of a comprehensive and seamless departmental S&T through acquisition system complete with resources and 

authority.

• Increased interoperability and material solutions execution of all DoD warfighting capabilities.

• Acquisition planning uniquely designed to meet DOD capability needs.

• Improved efficiency in defining/delivering joint systems due to a fully integrated system of “requires” and “acquires,” as well as 

a more focused planning and upfront resourcing for joint programs.

Cons:

• Compete realignment of acquisition structure.

• Centralization under single acquisition executive could cause loss of focus on support programs.

• Loss of Service control of program development. 

Alt 3 – Radical – Multiple CAE Concept 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Acquisition Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Radical)

SAEs

DAE USD(AT&L)

SecDef

DAB 

USD Capabilities

Integration

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

SPEOs

Program

Managers

CAEs

(Joint Field

Activity)

JPEOs

1

2 Service Programs

Joint Programs

1 2

 M-4 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Establish through DDR&E, a coordinated investment strategy that would support the

Joint Capabilities Categories and provide information and oversight of RDT&E programs.

Alt 1 - Moderate – Coordinated Investment 

Enterprise Planning – RDT&E

• Section 913 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 required SECDEF to conduct a performance review of the 

relevance of the work performed by DoD labs. Additionally, it required DoD to develop a single performance review process, 

applicable to all military departments, for rating the quality and relevance of the work performed by DoD labs. This proposal

assumes full implementation of recommendations from Section 913 studies including a performance review process.

• Service S&T Executives organize to support Joint Capabilities Categories (JCC). This would more closely link technology 

development to the acquisition process and to COCOM generated joint needs planning and development.

• Develop a process to allow effective transition from S&T to acquisition. Process would include formal, binding agreements 

between S&T sources and specific program offices, as well as transitional funding managed by DDR&E to support the 

transition. (BA1-4 is S&T and managed by the S&T community, BA5-7 is R&D managed by acquisition and T&E managed by 

the DOT&E community)

• Realign ACTD funding process to DoD budget cycle to make transition to acquisition more efficient by using investment funds 

managed at OSD.

• Fully implement the authorities of the Defense Test Resource Management Center (DTRMC), created by the 2003 National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for oversight of T&E policy, processes, personnel and infrastructure. The NDAA charters 

the DTRMC Director with producing a “Strategic Plan” and certifying the “adequacy” of T&E operating and maintenance 

budgets. Incentivize T&E organizations to get involved earlier in the acquisition cycle to speed delivery and reduce cost.

Pros:

• Development of a comprehensive DoD S&T strategy that would be capability based but Component driven.

• Better transition of technology from S&T to acquisition and maximize the S&T and T&E investment through a single review

process.

• No legislation required. 

Cons:

• Impact of improved processes and oversight would not be fully realized if Components still own the resources. 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

RDT&E Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Moderate)

Component S&T

Organizations

Component

T&E Facilities

SecDef

DOT&E

Service Lab &

Engineering 

Centers

DDR&E

USD(AT&L)

JROC

(JCB)

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

Enterprise

Warfighting

 M-5 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Change flow of RDT&E resources through Defense Technology Executive, Defense 

Acquisition Executive and DOT&E directly to the Service S&T/T&E agencies vice through the 

Services. Establish Centers of Excellence within the current DoD Lab structure that would 

concentrate S&T and R&D investment.

Enterprise Planning – RDT&E

• RDT&E resources centrally managed by the JAE, SAE’s and DTE in an IPT process to provide innovation through competition 

and seamless transition through all phases of development to sustainment. Technology Readiness Levels would be uniformly

enforced to ensure appropriateness of S&T vs. R&D funding and ACTDs would be fully integrated into the process. Process 

would include coordinated S&T investment by representation on each of the capability teams promoting transition funding to

spiral technology through R&D directly into joint and Service programs. 

• Centers of Excellence would be established within the current DoD/Service lab resources (including the Universities doing 

Basic Research) to concentrate S&T and R&D efforts in specific areas. COE’s could also rotate workforce for professional

development and compete for “best of breed” decisions. They could do both S&T work for the DTE and R&D work for the 

JAE’s and SAE’s. (COE’s would be challenged to present proposals for different governance option such as Federal

corporations or Government owned/contractor operated entities that are more conducive to broadening the business base.)

•T&E resources would be managed through the DTRMC under the auspices of DOT&E. Note: Developmental testing is done 

by the acquisition community. Incentivize T&E community to get involved earlier to speed delivery and reduce cost.

•Pros:

• Development of a comprehensive DoD S&T strategy that would be capability based and centrally managed (JWSTP recently

restructured along capability categories).

• Maximize the S&T investment and reduce duplication through a single review and allocation process and better transition of 

technology from S&T to acquisition through an IPT process linking capabilities, technology and acquisition.

• Alignment with COCOM/JCB priorities would provide checks and balances needed to compensate for DTE “special interests”.

•Cons:

• S&T would be centrally funded but R&D funds would still be allocated to the JAE’s and SAE’s.

• Although Component S&T organizations would be centrally funded for programs, infrastructure costs would remain the 

responsibility of the Components .

Alt 2 – Aggressive – Centralized Funding and Centers of Excellence

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

RDT&E Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Aggressive)

SAEs

JCB

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

JAE PDUSD (AT&L)

SecDef

1

2 Service Programs

Joint Programs

DAB

Component

S&TAgencies

T&E 

Facilities

JPEOs PEOs

Centers of

Excellence

1 2

DAE USD(AT&L)

Defense

Technology

Executive

(DDR&E)

DOT&E

T

E

C

H

R

E

P

S

 M-6 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Establish a centralized DoD Lab system (for S&T and R&D) owned and operated by a 

Defense Technology Executive who would be responsible for delivering technology to the

Capabilities Acquisition Executives. DOT&E would own and operate T&E facilities.

Enterprise Planning – RDT&E

• RDT&E resources centrally managed by the CAEs and DTE in an IPT process to provide innovation through competition and 

seamless transition from basic research to sustainment. Technology Readiness Levels would be uniformly enforced to ensure

appropriateness of S&T (6.1-6.3) vs. R&D (6.4-6.5) funding and ACTDs would be fully integrated into the process. Process 

would include coordinated S&T investment by representation on each of the capability teams promoting transition funding to

spiral technology through R&D directly into programs.

• Centers of Excellence would be established within a central lab system to concentrate S&T and R&D efforts in specific areas. 

Although specialized, COE’s could invest in several areas to provide competition for “best of breed” decisions. (COE’s would 

be challenged to present proposals for different governance option such as Federal corporations or Government 

owned/contractor operated entities that are more conducive to broadening the business base.)

• A single Office of Research with a Defense Research Lab would manage/execute all basic research for DoD including

University research.

• T&E resources would be managed through the DTRMC under the auspices of DOT&E and they would be involved from 

Milestone A through deployment.

Pros:

• Development of a comprehensive and coordinated DoD RDT&E strategy complete with authority, resources and infrastructure

to better support DoD warfighting capabilities .

• Spiral development of technology uniquely designed to meet DOD capability needs.

Cons:

• Compete realignment of RDT&E structure.

• Loss of Component control of RDT&E resources.

• Legislative changes required to authorize a DOD Office of Basic Research and Lab, alternative governance charters for

FedCorps or GO/CO’s, and a change in reporting authority of DTE (DDR&E).

Alt 3 – Radical – Central DoD Lab System

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

SecDef

JCB

DAB

USD Capabilities

Integration

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

SAEs

DAE USD(AT&L)

PEOs

JPEOs

Program

Managers

CAEs

Defense

Research

Lab

Office of 

Research

Office of 

Technology and

Engineering

Centers of

Excellence

Defense

Technology

Executive

(DDR&E)

RDT&E Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Radical)

T

E

C

H

R

E

P

S

T&E 

Facilities

DOT&E

 M-7 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Use the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) as the single Logistics, Global Supply Chain Manager with

oversight and decision authority for Defense material and maintenance, with visibility of movement. 

Enterprise Planning - Logistics

• Combine logistics related responsibilities (material management, repair, overhaul and transportation) under the DLE with

authority to set policy, control joint funds and support the warfighter and readiness. Position to be part of a USD level (already 

existing as AT&L) and supported by a Joint Logistics Board. This individual would:

• Determine the DoD Logistics Total Obligation Authority (TOA) for joint logistics programs and acquisitions (TOA

amount and % for Joint TBD) as identified by the capabilities process. 

• Establish a Joint Office, for in theater management in support of military operations. 

• Manage the organization which accomplishes Joint Log Programs, e.g., DLA.

• Oversees sustainment plans organized by joint capability missions, not by Service or Agency.

• Responsible for integration sustainment planning and execution across the Department, focused on warfighting support 

and readiness.

• Plan for efficiencies in operations, e.g., eliminate excess capacity in organic repair facilities.

• Engage and direct strategic, operational and enhanced capabilities planning, presenting logistics/ supply chain 

considerations and develops Strategic Log Plan with performance parameters (see Radical alternative for details).

• Leverage best practices and processes from within DoD, coalition partners and industry to improve efficiency and 

quality with the global supply chain.

•Pros:

• Improves oversight of logistics supply chain by elevating work to a USD level manager. 

• Enhances joint warfighter support by ensuring comprehensive department wide policies and direction.

• Strengthens support operations in execution phase by having upfront, comprehensive planning.

• Eliminates excess capacities and duplications.

• Separate POM for Joint Logistics.

•Cons:

• Lines of authority and majority of resources remain fragmented through Services, joint staff, TRANSCOM and DLA.

• True savings not realized unless infrastructure is taken into account.

Alt 1 – Moderate – Strengthened Defense Logistics Executive

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Logistics Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Moderate)

JOINT LOGISTICS BOARD

USD(AT&L)

DLE

SecDef

Service

Material

Commands

J-4 DLA Services

I&L JFCOM TRANSCOM

JCB

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

Reports directly to DLE

Directs logistics policy for

below organizations

 M-8 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Establish a single Logistics, Global Supply Chain Organization (Joint Command/Agency) with oversight 

and decision authority for all Defense material, maintenance, movement and transportation. 

Enterprise Planning - Logistics

• Combine all logistics related activity (material management, repair, overhaul and transportation) into a single Command with 

authority to set policy, issue and distribute material, for warfighter support and readiness. The entity, either Command or an 

Agency, to report at the USD level with J-4 (3 star) as deputy who is dual reporting. This Command/Agency will:

• Consolidate all funding for joint and single service materials and logistics support by creating an appropriation authority. 

Execution authority is performed by newly established entities previously part of Services and Defense Agencies. 

• Own all materiel available across DoD with total asset visibility and accessibility.

• Create department wide policies and procedures for common logistics practices and procedures, to include financial

investments.

• Combine organic repair capabilities, which drives potential inputs to the current BRAC process.

• Incorporate all duties & responsibilities of the proposed Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) such as develops Strategic 

Log Plan with performance parameters (see Radical alternative for details).

•Pros:

• Enhances joint warfighter support and readiness by ensuring comprehensive department wide policies and direction.

• Makes logistics and supply chain full partners in the planning phases for strategy, operations and capabilities.

• Gains greater efficiencies in organic repair capabilities through involvement with BRAC.

•Cons:

• Splits the Services (as users) from critical logistics support.

• Creates large organization under the USD which may be difficult to establish.

• Possible Title X issues – Services’ responsibilities.

• Establishment of either Agency or Command has separate implications and needs to be examined which is proper.

Alt 2 – Aggressive – Centralize Logistics/Joint Command

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Logistics Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Aggressive)

USD(AT&L)

SecDef

Service

Material

Commands

JLA

USD Capabilities

Integration

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

J-4 Services

I&L JFCOM TRANSCOM

JOINT LOGISTICS AGENCY

JOINT LOGISTICS BOARD

DLA

 M-9 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Under the OSD-led Command/Agency, pursue alternative governance structures for the various activities to

support department logistics requirements; retaining ‘core’ or critical operations. Best alternative governance structure

selection and oversight reside within OSD. Appoint to a term position, with financial performance incentives.

Enterprise Planning - Logistics

Alt 3 – Radical – Corporate Logistics 

• Most logistics ownership removed from Services and other DoD agencies, and is placed in an entity (Command structure 

most likely) that reports to OSD. OSD selects the appropriate governance structure to support the requirement. Division of 

logistics services would be established along functional lines (e.g. combat logistics, operational support, etc.) with limited 

selected items as needed remaining in DoD. Run on a commercial type basis with a term appointment (e.g., 6 year) 

• Alternative governance structures include PBOs, cooperative partnerships, federal government corporations, governmentowned contractor operated (GOCO), public-private partnership or joint venture, and ESOPs.

• OSD develops and publishes a Strategic Logistics Plan and coordinates execution with subordinate Command, entity or

entities.

• Articulates goals and roadmap to meet them in published performance plans.

• Drives input to the Operational plans development.

• Holistic view of departmental logistics requirements and how they support DoD needs.

• Consistent with guidance stipulated in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

• Integrates “best business practices” into the logistics planning and execution processes. 

Pros:

• Insulated from Component agendas.

• Maximizes return on logistics investments.

• Alternative governance structures provide increased flexibility in personnel and acquisition matters.

Cons:

• Variations of risk associated with each governance structure, e.g., profit motive of certain governance structures might 

conflict with DoD needs.

• Requires new organizational structures; potential to fragment support from a multitude of service providers.

• Congressional approval required for several of the alternative governance structures. 

• A step removed from the integrated supply chain concept as it disperses logistics functions.

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Logistics Alternatives Organizational Chart

(Radical)

USD(AT&L)

SecDef

USD Capabilities

Integration

JCC1

JCC2

JCC3

JCC4

JCC5

JCC6

JCC7

J-4 Services 

I&L JFCOM TRANSCOM

JOINT LOGISTICS AGENCY JLA

DLA

GOVERNANCE

ORGANIZATIONS

 M-10 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Modify current OSD staff to better participate in the Department’s capabilities analysis and integration

processes. OSD staff to be realigned/augmented with Service, CoCOM and other DoD agency headquarter staff 

members to provide a deeper analytic capability. This staff becomes the focal point within the Department on how 

infrastructure issues meet joint capabilities. 

• Directorate resides within AT&L and is staffed with representatives from the Services, CoCOMs and other DoD agencies. 

Components maintain management responsibilities for assigned infrastructure. 

• Directorate heads a Joint Facilities Planning Board that leads the effort to define needs across the Department and oversees 

and coordinates execution activities. Special emphasis will be placed on those facilities that most directly support the joint

warfighter such as depots, training ranges and facilities, joint use bases, and CoCom facilities. 

• The staff develops and publishes a biennial Strategic Infrastructure Plan (building on the work done in the Defense Facilities

Strategic Plan).

• Holistic view of departmental assets and how they support joint needs.

• Consistent with guidance stipulated in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

• Integrates “best business practices” into the planning and execution processes. 

• The staff develops and publishes appropriate directives to manage joint infrastructure requirements. 

• Links to other Enterprise functions (such as logistics) for planning.

• Linked to the Capability Board responsible for Infrastructure. 

Pros:

• Cost reductions through better utilization of resources.

• Focused oversight allows identification of excesses.

• Joint approach maximizes assets.

• Centralized integrated planning for all infrastructure requirements.

Cons:

• Requires realignment of current organization(s).

• Staffing requirements.

• Limited ability to change current operations.

Alt 1 – Moderate – Joint Facilities Directorate 

Enterprise Planning - Infrastructure

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Create an ASD (Installations & Environment), within AT&L, that would resource and direct selected joint 

infrastructure functions across the Department.

• ASD staff has facilities planning and oversight functions for the Department and resourcing and directive responsibilities for 

those facilities and activities that most directly support the joint warfighter. Execution authority stays with the

designated/appropriate Service or agency.

• Provides directed guidance on joint infrastructure needs, and delegated guidance to Services and other agencies on 

management of assigned infrastructure.

• Maintains and directs percentage of infrastructure budget to support joint infrastructure capabilities, with financial reporting to 

track execution and performance.

• ASD develops and publishes a biennial Strategic Infrastructure Plan (building on the work done in the Defense Facilities 

Strategic Plan), with particular linkage to logistics requirements.

• Holistic view of departmental assets and how they support joint needs.

• Consistent with guidance stipulated in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

• Integrates “best business practices” into the planning process. 

Pros:

• Supports the capabilities-based focus of the Department (vice Component-based focus).

• Cost reductions through better utilization of resources.

• Focused oversight allows identification of excesses.

• Joint approach maximizes joint assets.

• Centralized resourcing, direction and integrated planning for all joint infrastructure requirements.

Cons:

• Realignment of existing OSD organization.

• Possible legislative issues.

Alt 2a – Aggressive – ASD Installations & Environment (Joint)

Enterprise Planning - Infrastructure

 M-11 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Create an ASD (Installations & Environment), within AT&L, that would resource and direct DoD Wide 

infrastructure functions across the Department.

• ASD staff has facilities planning and oversight functions for the Department and resourcing and directive responsibilities for 

facilities and activities. Execution authority stays with the designated/appropriate Service or agency.

• Provides directed guidance on specific infrastructure needs, and delegates remainder to Services and other agencies on 

management of assigned infrastructure.

• Maintains and directs infrastructure budget to support capabilities, with financial reporting to track execution and performance. 

• ASD develops and publishes a biennial Strategic Infrastructure Plan (building on the work done in the Defense Facilities 

Strategic Plan), with particular linkage to logistics requirements.

• Holistic view and enforcement of departmental assets and how they support capability needs.

• Consistent with guidance stipulated in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

• Integrates “best business practices” into the planning process. 

Pros:

• Supports the capabilities-based focus of the Department (vice Component-based focus).

• Cost reductions through better utilization of resources.

• Focused oversight allows identification of excesses.

• DoD wide approach maximizes assets.

• Centralized direction and integrated planning for all infrastructure requirements.

Cons:

• Realignment of existing OSD organization.

• Possible legislative issues.

Alt 2b – Aggressive – ASD Installations & Environment (DoD Wide)

Enterprise Planning - Infrastructure

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Merge all DoD infrastructure functions under one OSD-led entity. OSD would then pursue alternative 

governance structures for the various activities as appropriate. Alternative governance structure selection and

oversight reside within OSD. 

• Infrastructure ownership removed from Services and other DoD agencies, and is placed in an entity that reports to OSD. 

OSD selects the appropriate governance structure to support the requirement. Division of infrastructure services would be

established along functional and/or regional lines (e.g. housing, hospitals, airfields, ports, etc.)

• Alternative governance structures include PBOs, cooperative partnerships, federal government corporations, 

government-owned contractor operated (GOCO), public-private partnership or joint venture, and ESOPs.

• OSD develops and publishes a Strategic Infrastructure Plan and coordinates execution with subordinate entity or entities.

• Articulates goals and roadmap to meet them.

• Holistic view of departmental assets and how they support DoD needs.

• Consistent with guidance stipulated in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

• Integrates “best business practices” into the planning and execution processes. 

Pros:

• Insulated from Component agendas.

• Maximizes return on facilities investments.

• Alternative governance structures provide increased flexibility in personnel and acquisition matters.

Cons:

• Profit motive of certain governance structures might conflict with DoD needs.

• Requires new organizational structures; potential to fragment support from a multitude of service providers.

• Congressional approval required. 

Alt 3 – Radical – DoD Corporate Infrastructure

Enterprise Planning - Infrastructure

 M-12 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Strengthens strategic workforce planning. Strengthens links between joint

warfighting and unit training in the Services.

Alt 1 - Moderate – More Strategic Approach

• USD(P&R) and J-7 are mandated to actively participate on all Functional Capability Boards and 

cross-cutting study groups when alternative solutions have major implications on workforce costs, 

numbers, training, or skills. 

• For strategic planning purposes, USD(P&R) collects and integrates Service projections concerning 

future numbers, competencies, and skill requirements for military personnel, for civilians, and for 

contractors used as staff extension.

• All human resources planning would take into account rebalanced active/reserve roles in future

operations.

• Tasks trained in single-Service unit training exercises are linked directly to the Universal Joint Task

List maintained by Joint Staff.

• JFCOM has increased content control over joint training curricula in Service training and education

courses.

Pros:

• Enhances integration of operations and enterprise planning.

• Expands strategic planning to all parts of the workforce.

• Improves links between Service training events and joint warfighting tasks.

Cons:

• Increases workload due to more analysis of workforce implications of capabilities decisions.

Workforce Planning Process

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Integrates workforce planning across different types of personnel. Strengthens

links between joint warfighting and schoolhouse and unit training in the Services.

Alt 2 – Aggressive – Integrated Workforce Planning; Improved

Joint Content In Training

• USD(P&R) and J-7 are mandated to actively participate within Functional Capability Boards and crosscutting study groups to ensure that all alternative solutions presented to decision-makers on capability

issues accurately and fully capture workforce implications -- costs, strength, skill requirements, etc.

• Based on input from the Components, OSD(P&R) produces a single integrated strategic workforce

roadmap for combined requirements for military, civilian and contractor personnel used as staff extension.

• All human resources planning would take into account rebalanced active/reserve roles in future

operations.

• Training curricula at all organizational levels in the Services (including individual training) directly support 

the Universal Joint Task List maintained by Joint Staff.

• JFCOM certifies Service training, both individual and collective, as having appropriate joint context.

• Personnel databases document joint training courses taken by civilians as well as military.

Pros:

• Expands strategic planning to all parts of the workforce.

• Strengthens joint training.

• Improves visibility of individuals with joint skills/education.

Cons:

• Requires more complex workforce and training management.

Workforce Planning Process

 M-13 
 

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

JOINT DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES STUDY

Description: Integrates workforce planning across different types of personnel. Fully 

integrates Service training curricula and the Joint National Training Capability.

Alt 3 – Radical – JFCOM Manages All Joint Training and

Education

• USD(P&R) and J-7 are mandated to actively participate within Functional Capability Boards and crosscutting study groups to ensure that all alternative solutions presented to decision-makers on capability

issues accurately and fully capture workforce implications -- costs, strength, skill requirements, etc.

• Based on input from the Components, OSD(P&R) produces a single integrated strategic workforce

roadmap for combined requirements for military, civilian and contractor personnel

• All human resources planning would take into account rebalanced active/reserve roles in future

operations.

• Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) expands to include all schoolhouse training and Professional

Military Education for joint specialties/missions/strategy.

• JNTC Management Office in JFCOM has fiscal control of all joint exercises, joint courses (including 

schoolhouse and distance learning), and joint and coalition schools.

Pros:

• Fully integrates workforce and training into joint capabilities planning and execution.

Cons:

• Greatly increases workload and requires new competencies in the JNTC Management Office

• Will encounter significant opposition from the Services.

Workforce Planning Process

 M-14 
Organizational Alternatives—Second Order 

 M-15