FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS

Debra D. Zedalis

June 2004
ii

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of 

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; 

distribution is unlimited.

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My thanks to Colonel Russ Santala for suggesting this truly interesting topic. Thanks also go to Colonel Harry Tomlin 

for helping me think through the tough questions. Additionally, the U.S. Army War College Library staff is absolutely 

excellent. This paper would not have been so well researched without the help of the entire staff, but most especially 

Mr. Bohdan I. Kohutiak and Ms. Jane E. Gibish, who vigilantly watched for information on female suicide bombers. My 

appreciation also to Mr. Shawn Mosholder, the Strategic Research Program (SRP) template wizard, for his assistance in fi nal 

preparation and formatting. My fi nal thanks to Dr. Anna Waggener who was the absolute best SRP advisor―kept me on 

track and focused on strategic issues with encouragement, help, advice, and good will.

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ISBN 1-58487-162-8
iii

PREFACE

 The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military offi cers and 

government civilians to refl ect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic 

issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army and 

Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its Carlisle 

Papers in Security Strategy Series.

Ms. Debra Zedalis, member of the Army War College Class of 2004, is the author of this paper. She 

reviews the history of female suicide bombers, focuses on their characteristics, analyzes recent changes 

in their use by various terrorist organizations, and provides implications of change within a strategic 

assessment of future female suicide bombings.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

Director of Research

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DEBRA D. ZEDALIS is a Department of the Army civilian who was a member of the U.S. Army War 

College Class of 2004. Prior to attending the Army War College, Ms. Zedalis was the Chief of Staff for 

the Installation Management Agency, Europe Region, Heidelberg, Germany. She has worked for the 

U.S. Army in Europe since 1988, serving as the Chief of the Management Division, Offi ce of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Resource Management, as well as the Chief of the Installation Management Support 

Division, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Installation Management. Prior to her 

European assignment, Ms. Zedalis worked at the U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox as a program 

analyst and manpower analyst. She holds a Master’s Degree in Business Administration from Syracuse 

University and a Bachelor of Arts in Managerial Psychology from the University of Kentucky.
v

ABSTRACT

Suicide bombers are today’s weapon of choice. Terrorists are using suicide bombers because they 

are a low cost, low technology, and low risk weapon. Suicide bombers are readily available, require 

little training, leave no trace behind, and strike fear into the general population. The success of suicide 

bombers depends upon an element of surprise, as well as accessibility to targeted areas or populations. 

Both of these required elements have been enjoyed by women suicide bombers. Female suicide bombers 

were used in the past; however, the recent spate of them in different venues, in different countries, and 

for different terrorist organizations forces us to study this terrorist method. 

This research paper reviews historical female suicide bombers, focuses on female suicide bomber 

characteristics, analyzes recent changes in application by various terrorist organizations, and provides 

implications of change within a strategic assessment of future female suicide bombings.

1

FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS

I have to tell the world that if they do not defend us, then we have to defend ourselves with the only thing we have, 

our bodies. Our bodies are the only fi ghting means at our disposal.

Hiba, 28-year old, mother of fi ve, 

Suicide Bomber Trainee

Suicide bombers are today’s weapon of choice. An action that was once so surprising, horrifi c, and 

terrifying has now become the daily fare of the nightly news. “From Jerusalem to Jakarta and from 

Bali to Baghdad, the suicide bomber is clearly the weapon of choice for international terrorists.”1 The 

raw number of suicide attacks is climbing;2 suicide bombs are now used by 17 terror organizations 

in 14 countries.3 “In terms of casualties, suicide attacks are the most effi cient form of terrorism. From 

1980 to 2001, suicide attacks accounted for 3 percent of terrorist incidents but caused half of the total 

deaths due to terrorism―even if one excludes the unusually large number of fatalities of 9/11.”4 Into 

this boiling cauldron of terror, a new element has been added―women as suicide bombers. The success 

of suicide bombers considerably depends upon surprise and accessibility to targets. Both of these 

requirements have been met by using women. The recent spate of female suicide bombers in different 

venues, different countries, and different terrorist organizations warrants careful study of this strategic 

weapon.

Prior to September 11, 2001, the use of suicide bombers was not seen by the U.S. public as a major 

threat; however, this weapon now evokes a visceral response. The Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) Alert 03-025 provided warnings of male and female suicide bombers,5 and New York City was 

on heightened alert in December 2003 over fears of an attack by a female suicide bomber.6 Jessica Stern, 

a terrorism expert, recently criticized DHS procedures and warned of the dangers of ignoring female 

terrorists: “The offi cial profi le of a typical terrorist―developed by the DHS to scrutinize visa applicants 

and resident aliens―applies only to men. Under a program put in place after September 11, 2001, males 

aged between 16-45 are subject to special scrutiny; women are not.”7 Terrorists seek out vulnerabilities 

in the enemy government’s countermeasures, so lack of scrutiny of women entering the United States 

could encourage Al Qaeda to use them.8

This paper reviews the history of female suicide bombers, focuses on bomber characteristics, 

analyzes recent attacks, and predicts future trends within a strategic assessment of future female 

suicide bombings. According to a terrorist expert, “This research is particularly demanding as there 

are not enough reports with descriptions of the cases, there is not enough documentation on how these 

women are treated in terrorist groups, there are not enough testimonies, and it is diffi cult to profi le 

these murderers.”9 Most chilling, however, is that those who could tell us their stories―those who went 

through with this death act―cannot share their thoughts and motivation. 

HISTORY OF SUICIDE BOMBING

“A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed as early as the 11th century. The 

Assassins (Ismalis-Nizari), Muslim fi ghters, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the 

cause of Islam. These perpetrators perceived their deaths as acts of martyrdom for the glory of God.”10

Further, 

The Assassins’ aim, like that of Islamist extremists today, was to spread a “pure” version of Islam. Like 

contemporary suicide bombers, they considered their own lives to be sacrifi cial offerings. Unlike today’s suicide 

bombers, the Assassins murdered particular individuals rather than randomly targeting people whose only crime 

is to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.11
2

Female suicide bombers are relatively new. Their fi rst known attack came in 1985 when a 16-yearold girl, Khyadali Sana, drove a truck into an Israeli Defense Force convoy and killed two soldiers. 

Since then, women have driven bomb-laden vehicles, carried bomber “bags,” and strapped massive 

explosives and metal implements on their bodies in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Israel, and Turkey. 

Terrorist groups which have publicized their use of females include the Syrian Socialist National 

Party (SSNP/PPS), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), 

Chechen rebels, Al Aqsa Martyrs, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and, most recently, Hamas. 

There are many “fi rsts” in this listing of organized feminine terror. While the SSNP has the 

distinction of deploying the fi rst female suicide bomber, the “LTTE became the world’s foremost 

suicide bombers and proved the tactic to be so unnerving and effective that their methods and killing 

innovations were studied and copied, most notably in the Middle East.”12 The LTTE has committed 

the most attacks, close to 200, using women bombers in 30-40 percent. The largest number killed (170) 

was in Moscow in October 2002 when Chechen rebels (including a high percentage of women) held 

hostages in the Theater Center, and the police killed 129 captives and 41 rebels in a futile rescue effort. 

During the last 2 years, Palestinian suicide bombers have carried out the largest number of attacks. 

Not all bombers are known nor are all the data known to be correct. The youngest appears to be 

either Khyadali Sana (SSNP/PPS, 1985), 16, or Laila Kaplan, (PKK, 1996), 17; the oldest was Shagir 

Karima Mahmud (SSNP/PPS, 1987), 37. The fi rst LTTE bomber, Dhanu, successfully killed Prime 

Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. The fi rst female PKK suicide bombing (June 1996), which may also 

be the fi rst instance of an apparently pregnant bomber, killed six Turkish soldiers; the bomber’s name is 

unknown. The fi rst Russian “Black Widow” or saliheen, Hawa Barayev, acted on behalf of the Chechen 

rebels in June 2000 and killed 27 Russian Special Forces soldiers. In January 2002, the fi rst istish-hadiyat

(female martyr) in Israel, representing the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, was Wafa Idris, a paramedic 

who detonated a 22-pound body bomb fi lled with nails and metal objects in a shopping district. Wafa 

killed an 81-year-old man and injured more than 100. The fi rst PIJ bomber was a 19-year-old student, 

Hiba Daraghmeh, who detonated a bomb in a shopping mall, killing three people. The second PIJ 

bomber, 29-year-old lawyer Hanadi Jaradat, also received much publicity as she strolled into a highly 

frequented restaurant in October 2003 and killed 21 Israeli and Arab men, women, and children. The 

most recent “fi rst” was the fi rst female Hamas bomber, 22-year-old Reem al-Reyashi, who, on January 

14, 2004, killed four Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint. Of particular note is that Reem was also a mother 

who left behind a husband, a 3-year-old son, and a 1-year-old daughter. A “fi rst” yet to strike is the 

fi rst female suicide bomber representing Al Qaeda (See Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 lists successful female 

suicide bombers. Table 2 shows those who were unsuccessful for some reason or who are trainees.) 

SUICIDE BOMBERS

A suicide bomber, someone willing to die for a cause, is puzzling. What is a suicide bomber? Why 

use suicide bombers? Who becomes a suicide bomber? Most importantly, why would one voluntarily 

die in order to kill other innocent people?

What is a Suicide Bomber?

The Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) defi ned suicide bombing as an “operational method in 

which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator. The terrorist is fully 

aware that if she/he does not kill her/himself, the planned attack will not be implemented.”13 “Suicide 

bomber” is an emotionally-laden term. Some describe these individuals as “homicide bombers” or 

“suicide terrorists” to emphasize the murder and terror brought about by this act; others deem these 

individuals as “martyrs” who have died for their faith.
3

Table 1. Successful Suicide Bombers.
4

Table 1. Successful Suicide Bombers (continued).
5

Table 1. Successful Suicide Bombers (concluded).
6

Table 2. Unuccessful Suicide Bombers.
7

Why Use Suicide Bombers?

Terrorism has been defi ned as “a synthesis of war and theater.”14 This descriptor aptly applies to 

female suicide bombings. Suicide bombing is used because:

• It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape route or rescue mission).

• It increases the likelihood of mass casualties and extensive damage (since the bomber can choose 

the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack).

• There is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their 

deaths are certain).

• It has an immense impact on the public and the media (because it precipitates an overwhelming 

sense of helplessness).15

Others note that suicide terrorism “infl icts profound fear and anxiety and produces a negative 

psychological effect on an entire population and not just on the victims of the actual attack.”16 Finally, 

a “suicide attack attracts wide media coverage and is seen as a newsworthy event.”17 Female suicide 

bombers (youngest, oldest, mother, Red Cross worker, jilted fi ancé, avenger of dead family members) 

have an added media aspect which encourages terrorists to capitalize on the sensationalism.

Organizations which routinely use suicide bombers “have utilized the notion of martyrdom and 

self-sacrifi ce as a means of last resort against their conventionally more powerful enemies.”18 These 

groups believe that suicide bombs are successful in bringing notice to their plight and contend that 

suicide bombers are the only effective weapons they have, in contrast to their enemies’ much larger 

wealth, weapons, soldiers, and political means. Abu Shanab, a Hamas leader, stated that “all that is 

required is a bomb, a detonator, and a moment of courage, and courage is the scarce resource.”19

Why Use Female Suicide Bombers?

The use of women as suicide bombers poses confl icts with some fundamental religious leaders’ 

beliefs, while serving the tactical need for a stealthier weapon. In January 2002, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, 

the spiritual leader of Hamas, “categorically renounced the use of women as suicide bombers.”20 In 

March 2002 after the second Fatah bombing, he reported that “Hamas was far from enthusiastic about 

the inclusion of women in warfare, for reasons of modesty.”21 That position dramatically shifted on 

January 14, 2004, when the fi rst Hamas female suicide bomber struck. Why was she used? Yassin 

defended this change as a “signifi cant evolution in our fi ght. The male fi ghters face many obstacles,”22

so women can more easily reach the targets. He concluded his statement by noting that “Women are 

like the reserve army―when there is a necessity, we use them.”23 Terrorist organizations use women as 

weapons because they provide:

• Tactical advantage: stealthier attack, element of surprise, hesitancy to search women, female 

stereotype (e.g., nonviolent).

• Increased number of combatants.

• Increased publicity (greater publicity = larger number of recruits).

• Psychological effect.

“It is the ultimate asymmetric weapon,” explained Magnus Ranstorp, director of the Center for the 

Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. “You can assimilate among the people and then attack with an 

element of surprise that has an incredible and devastating shock value.”24 In the words of a commander 

in charge of training future suicide bombers, “The body has become our most potent weapon. When 

we searched for new ways to resist the security complications facing us, we discovered that our women 
8

could be an advantage.”25 One trainer even boastfully described them as the new “Palestinian human 

precision bomb.”26 Those who study Middle East cultures cite another reason: “The use (of female 

suicide bombers) by Palestinian militant groups is designed to embarrass the Israeli regime and show 

that things are so desperate that women are fi ghting instead of men.”27 Suicide bombers provide the 

low-cost, low-technology, low-risk weapon that maximizes target destruction and instills fear―women 

are even more effective with their increased accessibility and media shock value. 

Who Becomes a Suicide Bomber?

The answer to this question is elusive for both males and females. Some suggest there are defi nite 

trends, others dispute that conclusion, and still others maintain that a profi le cannot be developed as it 

is “unlikely that the search would be successful in creating a set of common denominators that could 

span several continents, time periods, cultures, and political confi gurations.”28 Some of the factors 

assessed included age, education, economic status, and socialization toward violence.29 The only factor 

that “all the experts seem to agree on is that suicide bombers are primarily young people.”30 Analysts 

note “The positive attitudes toward political violence―already well entrenched in persons under 17 

years of age (14.5 percent)―actually increases in the population up to the age of 24 (14.9 percent) 

and decreases thereafter (6 percent at 64 years of age).”31 In addition to age, it appears that education 

plays a role as “the percentage increases with the level of education: 8.3 percent among those with an 

elementary school diploma versus 12.8 percent among those with a university degree.”32

Profi les may be developed for specifi c sets of suicide bombers. For example, Jessica Stern profi les 

the typical male Palestinian suicide bomber (young, unmarried, mosque attendee, etc.). Other experts 

concur, such as Ariel Merari, a leading Israeli authority on suicide terrorism33 and Boaz Ganor, 

Executive Director of the ICT.34 Additionally, most suicide bombers tend to be of average economic 

status (although a disproportionate number come from refugee camps).35 Likewise, “as logical as the 

poverty-breeds-terrorism argument may seem, studies show that suicide attackers are rarely ignorant 

or impoverished.”36 Two other critical fi ndings reveal that more than half had spent time in Israeli 

prisons37 and “had expressed the desire to avenge the death or injury of a relative or a close friend.”38

Who Becomes a Female Suicide Bomber?

“The reasons for women’s participation in deadly attacks vary greatly and it is hard to generalize, 

for this phenomenon is too recent and the attacks have been too few. Either not enough research has 

been conducted yet or the sample size is too small to make effective generalizations.”39 Although 

the data are limited, female suicide bombers, just like male suicide bombers, have one characteristic 

which typifi es all―they are young. The average age varies from 21.5 (Turkey) to 23 (Lebanon), a small 

differential. Other characteristics do not hold. Some are widows and others have never been married; 

some are unemployed and others are professionals; some are poor and others are middle class. Most 

analysts can easily compare the Black Widows in Russia with the Palestinian suicide bombers, since 

both appear to be serving “struggles of national identity”40 with religious overtones. Additionally, as 

is true of the male counterparts, several female suicide bombers have experienced the loss of a close 

friend or family member. The selection of women for suicide operations and the methods used to 

persuade them generally are similar to those employed for men. The recruiters take advantage of the 

candidates’ innocence, enthusiasm, personal distress, and thirst for revenge.41

Finally, the question of when to recruit comes into play. Some believe that recruiters of female 

suicide bombers try to “get them while they are young as the LTTE leaders personally brainwashed 

preadolescent boys and girls, many of them orphans.”42 Russian authorities seem to believe that “you 
9

need complete control of all their conditioning, usually from the time they are 11 or 12.”43 At the same 

time,however, the Russians obviate their own argument by noting that the Chechen insurgency hasn’t 

been going on long enough to “grow” the number of female suicide bombers who have attacked 

them.44 Other Russians believe that the female suicide bombers are “sold” to terrorist organizations, 

drugged to perform such acts, and/or raped and blackmailed if they do not participate. Finally, as one 

journalist describing the Black Widows concluded, “There are so many theories to explain the women’s 

motivation that it is impossible to sort through them.”45

Why Become a Suicide Bomber?

There are “religious, nationalistic, economic, social, and personal rewards” for suicide bombers.46

Researchers believe there are “few differences between a man and a woman carrying out such a 

mission. It may be a surprise, but motivations are the same: they do believe, they are committed, they 

are patriotic, and this is combined with a religious duty.”47

Religious terrorism is a particularly potent form of violence; religion offers the moral justifi cation 

for committing seemingly immoral acts. Nationalistic fanatics court suicide bombers and use rhetoric 

to stir up feelings of patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization.48 Suicide 

bombers then see their own actions as being driven by a higher order; they believe their sacrifi ce will 

provide rewards for them in the afterlife.49 Devout Muslims believe that, in death, every martyr, male 

or female, is welcomed by a minimum of 70 apparitions (houri-el-ein) of unnatural beauty who wipe 

away the martyrs’ sins, open the gates of heaven, and provide them with all the pleasures that God has 

given to mankind.50

Beyond religious and patriotic motivations, suicide bombers may receive large sums of money, 

improve their family’s social status, and enhance their reputation. After their death, their families are 

showered with honor and receive substantial fi nancial rewards.51 Additionally, suicide bombers expect 

to be admired and envied by those left behind. Photographs capture them in heroic positions, and these 

photos will be used as recruitment posters.52 In fact, a “study of world attitudes by the Pew Research 

Center showed ever-rising support for ‘martyrs,’ and recruiters tell researchers that volunteers are 

beating down the door to join.”53

Finally, many organizations deliberately are targeting women for strategic purposes because 

female suicide bombers receive more media attention. Research has shown that “public perceptions of 

the level of terrorism in the world appear to be determined not by the level of violence, but rather by the 

quality of the incidents, the location, and the degree of media coverage.”54 So the media provides both 

an advertising and recruitment tool for terrorist groups. Analysts noted that, when the fi rst Palestinian 

female bombing occurred, the “news was given great prominence . . . far more than any male suicide 

bomber would have received. Women who kill or threaten to kill are hot news. It is a reaction that 

knows no state or religious boundaries.”55 Experts worry that “if this catastrophe leads to more women 

following suit, this will attract disproportionate publicity.”56 This disproportionate publicity, in turn, 

may arouse worldwide sympathies for suicide bombers and can also serve as a terrorist recruitment 

tool.

How are Female Suicide Bombers Trained?

Until recently, very little has been known about the female suicide bombers’ training. Indeed, in 

February 2003 the ICT published an article which stated that Palestinian female bombers were not 

trained nor prepared psychologically for suicide attacks.57 However, the most recent information, 

which came from women who have either backed out or been unsuccessful in bombing attempts, 
10

proved that wrong. Russian Security Forces captured at least two potential female suicide bombers, 

and the Israeli Army is said to have 17-20 in custody.58

Russian offi cials maintain that the female suicide bombers “were trained abroad by Islamic 

fundamentalists outside of Russia, are paid for abroad, and are organized by the head of the Arab 

agents of Al Qaeda.”59 All potential bombers “are thoroughly trained by Arab psychologists and 

demolition experts,”60 and “clandestine training centers have become a conveyor belt in turning out 

female cannon fodder.”61 Zarima Muzhikhoyeva, the fi rst live shakhidka (martyr), was captured when 

her purse fi lled with 1.5 kilograms of military-issue explosives failed to detonate. 

Ms. Muzhikhoyeva’s husband was killed in the fi rst war in Chechnya when she was pregnant with 

her daughter. A female friend offered to help her and agreed to pay her debts, give her grandparents 

money, and provide for her daughter―all that was required in return was that she choose the true road 

to Allah. She was taken by rebel fi ghters to the mountains for 1 month. There, she cooked and washed 

the fi ghters’ clothes, prayed daily, and listened to the atrocities of the Russian troops in Chechnya. 

When her training was complete, she went to Moscow and was housed with the two young women 

who later blew themselves up at a rock concert. After her capture, she led police to the house and 

yard where they found a buried metal container fi lled with explosive belts.62 The Russians released 

little information from her interrogation or from interrogation of another unsuccessful female suicide 

bomber, Mareta Dudeyeva.

In Israel, 25-year-old Tawriya Hamamra, from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, discussed the training 

she received in May 2002 before she decided to abort her mission. Two weeks before her mission, she 

was sent to Nablus, met by a Fatah offi cial, placed in a student fl at, and began training. Four people 

trained her in two 45-minute sessions on Friday and Saturday. On Saturday she told the trainers that 

she had changed her mind. Although they were angry, they allowed her to leave. She was arrested the 

next day in an Israeli raid in the nearby city of Tulkarm.63

The most recent and in-depth look at Palestinian training of female suicide bombers was published 

in December 2003. The reporter met the commander in charge, trainers, and nine future Palestinian 

female suicide bombers:

. . . women were handling explosives and familiarizing themselves with Kalashnikov sub-machineguns. Girls 

are taught to assemble and dismantle their AK-47 assault rifl es, and target practice follows―as do hours of 

theory about the “enemy and its tactics.” The details and outcome of each attack are dissected, revised, debated, 

and discussed. The women spend as much as 6 hours a day familiarizing themselves with explosives. They are 

introduced to the bomb belts that will rip their fl esh, while killing and maiming those around them. Finally, the 

girls have to practice moving around with the weight of the explosive belts strapped to their bodies. Sometimes 

the explosives are distributed around the body; some strapped to their legs, others to their backs or abdomens. 

“It all depends on the build and shape of the woman and how best to strap her without over-bulging parts of her 

body,” a male handler explained.64

IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE

In March 2002, after an 18-year-old female killed two innocent people in a supermarket in Israel, 

a professor of Middle East Studies commented: “I have a great fear that, if this continues, they will 

pull in younger and younger women. Once they break the boundaries of what is accepted on a human 

level, there are no boundaries.”65 For female suicide bombers, there appear to be few boundaries left to 

cross.

From a strategic perspective, the most signifi cant change has been the clergy’s approval of female 

martyrs. Suicide bombers believe they are martyrs and are told they are the “true defenders of the 

oppressed and dispossessed.”66 Many experts perceive the problem to be the “blurring of differences 

and the increased confusion between nationalism and religiosity.”67 Until the Chechen terrorist 
11

campaign, “the use of female suicide bombers was a clear indicator of secular terrorism. The growth in 

the number of Chechen female suicide bombers signaled the beginning of a change in the position of 

fundamentalist Islamic organizations regarding the involvement of women in suicide attacks.”68

Some fundamentalist clerics have expressed theological dilemmas in sanctioning suicide 

bombing,69 as Islam explicitly forbids suicide (inithar). The Koran states: “And do not kill yourself, for 

God is indeed merciful to you.”70 Others note that the Prophet Mohammed explicitly forbade suicide 

and decreed, “He who drinks poison and kills himself will carry his poison in his hand and drink it 

in Hell for ever and ever.”71 Militant religious leaders thus have asserted that these attacks are acts of 

martyrdom (istishhad) as a means of last resort.72 And while God punishes those who commit suicide, 

he rewards the martyr. According to the Koran, “Think not of those who are slain in the cause of God 

as dead. Nay, they are alive in the presence of the Lord and are granted gifts from him.”73

“According to the level of religiosity, terrorist organizations have different policies concerning 

women suicide bombers. Saudia Arabia originally refused to legitimize female suicide bombings 

as martyrdom; however, in August 2001, the High Islamic Council in Saudi Arabia issued a fatwa

encouraging Palestinian women to become suicide bombers.”74 Lebanese Muslim cleric Sheikh 

Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah declared, “It is true that Islam has not asked women to carry out jihad 

(holy war), but it permits them to take part if the necessities dictate that women should carry out 

regular military operations or suicide operations.”75 The Koran states that jihad can be carried out by 

women as well as men, but “most contend that women can serve as combatants only after the male 

ranks have been depleted. This is the demarcation that had kept Hamas from recruiting women.”76 In 

January 2004, that demarcation disappeared.

Another strategic concern is the possibility that female suicide bombing is being supported, 

fi nanced, and directed by a global terror network. Some believe that the “resort to martyrdom can be 

explained by an increasing level of internationalization between groups in terms of contact, similarity 

of causes, and examples of strategies.”77 In the Chechen terrorist campaign, “while the groups involved 

act in the name of an ethnic-nationalist ideology, they are thought to be cooperating with global jihad 

organizations connected to Al Qaeda and count several ‘Afghan alumni’ among their commanders.”78

Additionally, in March 2003, “the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat Asharq Al-Awsat published an e-mail interview with a published an e-mail interview with a 

leader of the female mujahedeen of Al Qaeda. She told them her instructions came from Al Qaeda and 

the Taliban, mainly via internet.”79 The woman went on to state that the organization was planning “a 

new attack which would make the United States forget September 11, and that the idea came from the 

martyr operations carried out by the Palestinian women.”80 She further outlined training methods and 

potential locations. This communiqué is especially interesting because currently Al Qaeda has 

. . . refrained from including women in their operations except in supporting roles. The religious and ideological 

leap required [to use female suicide bombers] apparently represents a daunting challenge for Al Qaeda. But if the 

outcome seems worthwhile, there is a real prospect that Al Qaeda, too, will cross the Rubicon, and then fi nd some 

religious justifi cation for it.81

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

“Although profi ling suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant 

in the real-world struggle against terrorism than understanding the modus operandi of terrorist 

leaders.”82 Some analysts are concerned most with structural issues: “The most important factor is the 

organization: almost nobody does this as an individual.”83 They point out the need to counter terrorist 

organizations: “Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it 

cannot be conducted on an individual level.”84 Most important, “organizations only implement suicide 

terrorism if their community approves of its use.”85 These organizations, however, are not equally 
12

reliant on suicide bombers: “A careful study of all the organizations that have resorted to terrorism 

since 1983 suggested that the most meaningful distinction among them involves the degree to which 

suicide bombing is institutionalized.”86 Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert, agrees. “I think we’d all agree 

that suicide bombing is abnormal. The fact that abnormal behavior is applauded in the community 

refl ects abnormal conditions. If normal conditions are restored, then normal behavior should return―at 

least they would be less tolerant of abnormal behavior.”87

But why would a community view suicide bombing as normal behavior? Some blame military 

occupation and/or deplorable economic and social conditions.88 While those may be valid 

considerations, why haven’t all cultures that have endured similar experiences supported suicide 

bombers? Brian Barber, a psychologist, interviewed 900 young adults from Gaza and a comparison 

group of Bosnian Muslims “who had also suffered through violence but had not become a source of 

suicide bombers. Faith was the largest difference: the Palestinians routinely invoked religion to invest 

personal trauma with social meaning, whereas Bosnians did not consider religion signifi cant to their 

lives.”89 This is a critical distinction: “The strictly hierarchical nature of religious terrorist groups with a 

highly disciplined structure and obedient cadre means not only that the main clerical leaders command 

full control over the political as well as military activities of the organization, but also the strategies of 

terrorism are unleashed in accordance with general political directives and agendas.”90

Even if the community supports this weapon which is legitimized by the religious hierarchy, why 

are suicide bombings increasing, especially among the young? One explanation is that suicide bombers 

are seen as successful because their service is for a higher cause;91 this success “incentivizes those who 

recruit and send the suicide bombers on their lethal missions.”92 Jessica Stern proposes the answer 

might be “social contagion:” 

Ordinary suicide has been shown to spread through social contagion especially among youth. Studies have shown 

that a teenager whose friend or relative commits suicide is more likely to commit suicide himself. Suicide bombing 

entails a willingness not only to die, but also to kill others. The situation in Gaza suggests that suicide-murder can 

also be spread through social contagion. “Martyrdom operations” are part of the popular culture. For example, on 

the streets of Gaza, children play a game call shuhada, which includes a mock funeral for a suicide bomber. Teenage 

rock groups praise martyrs in their songs. Asked to name their heroes, young Palestinians are likely to include 

suicide bombers.93

Research indicates that terrorist organizations will continue to use suicide bomber tactics and 

employ female suicide bombers. A comprehensive counterterrorism plan should recognize the 

increasing potential for use of suicide bombers, including females. Specifi cally, the United States must 

continue to lead the way in this fi ght with terrorism. The United States has the capabilities (diplomatic, 

economic, information, military) to provide leadership in combating these problems. 

Diplomatically, the United States should continue to obtain international and United Nations (UN) 

support in public designation of terrorists, as well as improved information sharing, tightened border 

security, and reduction of terrorist fi nancing.The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which 

requires all states to prevent and suppress the fi nancing of terrorist acts, to include freezing funds 

and fi nancial assets. In the words of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Diplomacy helps us to take 

the war to the terrorist, to cut off resources they need and depend upon to survive.”94 Reducing their 

funding and tightening worldwide controls should reduce the global reach of terrorist organizations 

that employ suicide bombers. Additionally, since the most recent bombings have occurred as a result 

of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, the United States needs to push for peaceful resolution of problems in 

that area. 

Worldwide terrorism uses people as bombs under the guise of addressing human problems, so 

“prevention will require a great improvement in the social conditions that produce, beget, or trigger 

terrorist acts.”95 Economically, the United States should help develop an “effective counterterrorist 
13

strategy that would seek to reduce the terrorist group’s base of support through development 

programs.”96 This aid would provide economic, material, and psychological support to those who have 

identifi ed with terrorist groups. One major reason Hamas has been so successful is because it provides 

“social aid” that assists the poor, provides medical care, and educates the children. However, it has 

also been proven that many of these organizations are merely fronts for funneling money to terrorist 

organizations. “Fundraising, training, indoctrination, and criminal activities are usually covered by all 

kinds of harmless organizations ranging from religious to humanitarian institutions.”97 These fronts 

must be identifi ed, and their funding streams eliminated. At the same time, the true humanitarian need 

can be met by recognized and authentic relief agencies. 

On the information front, several actions are appropriate. First, as noted above, suicide bombers 

are part of a larger organization. These organizations and their support of suicide terrorists should 

be made known and roundly castigated by the international community. Their religious rationale 

should be debunked. They should be condemned widely for attacking noncombatants and for the 

overwhelming viciousness of their attacks. Suicide bombers should no longer be seen as “victims” 

but as “assassins.” The key is to change peoples’ perceptions and thus to deny support for them. 

Changes in behavior will occur when the community no longer views suicide bombings as accepted, 

normal―even heroic―behavior. The United States and humanitarian organizations should review the 

education of younger children in schools that are supported by terrorist organizations, since “pictures 

of training camps showing small children learning to become suicide bombers have had great impact 

on public opinion in the international audience.”98 Further, “Goals of a long-range policy should include 

deterring alienated youth from joining a terrorist organization in the fi rst place. A counterstrategy 

could be approached within a framework of advertising and civic-action programs which would help 

to discredit the terrorist group and have a negative impact on their recruitment efforts.”99 For “Without 

popular support, a terrorist group cannot survive.”100

The United States should not respond to suicide bombers militarily unless it has specifi c, credible 

information that directly links a given organization to terrorists and suicide bombers; however, given 

that suicide bombers want to die, attacking them militarily may only encourage others to take up the to die, attacking them militarily may only encourage others to take up the 

cause. Finally, Israel repeatedly has struck against the Palestinians―destroying suicide bombers’ homes, 

displacing their families, militarily retaliating. To date, Israel military responses have engendered an 

escalating, ever-intensifying hostile reaction. Most importantly, “the question of the moral legitimacy 

of counterterrorist activities must be analyzed accordingly. How far can a state go in combating 

terrorism without risking endangering its democratic structure?”101

Operationally, the United States must improve its intelligence capability, using both human and 

technical information gathering. “Intelligence is the fi rst link in the chain of thwarting any terror attack, 

but is of the utmost importance in thwarting suicide attacks before they are put into practice.”102 In 

dealing with suicide attacks, the United States should rely on “more and better human intelligence 

enabling us to penetrate the movement’s armies, monitor its recruitment drives, and predict its 

evolution―including the type of personnel it will recruit.”103 Our counterterrorism strategies should 

not “rely on standard operation procedures such as race and gender-based profi ling,”104 because doing 

so “puts the safety of the American people at risk.”105

Given the globalization of terror from nonstate actors, experts believe that suicide bombings, which 

will include female suicide bombers, will increase. The next “fi rst” will be the “fi rst” Al Qaeda female 

suicide bomber. “The Federal Bureau of Investigation has acknowledged that Al Qaeda is actively 

recruiting women,”106 perhaps for just this role. International terrorist organizations will assess U.S. 

security vulnerabilities and exploit weaknesses. While this terrorist weapon may not change the 

political outcome for the United States or its allies, it will negatively and emotionally impact American 

lives, beliefs, and morale. 
14

ENDNOTES

1. Don Van Natta, Jr., “Big Bang Theory: The Terror Industry Fields Its Ultimate Weapon,” New York Times, August 24, 

2003, sec. 4, p. 1.

2. Robert A. Pape, “Dying to Kill Us,” New York Times, September 23, 2003, sec. 1A, p. 19.

3. Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Bombings: The Ultimate Weapon?” August 7, 2001; available from http://www.ict.org.il/

articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=373; Internet; accessed September 5, 2003.

4. Pape, sec. 1A, p. 19.

5. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory System Increases to National Level ORANGE, Alert 03-

025, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 20, 2003, p. 2.

6. “Terror Attack Fears,” Sunday Mail (SA), December 21, 2003, sec. Foreign, p. 35, database on-line; available from 

Lexis-Nexis; accessed January 15, 2004.

7. Jessica Stern, “When Bombers are Women,” Washington Post, December 18, 2003, sec. 1A, p. 35.

8. Ibid.

9. Clara Beyler, “Messengers of Death, Female Suicide Bombers,” February 12, 2003; available from http://www.ict.org.il/

articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=471; Internet; accessed September 5, 2003. 

10. Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September-October 2000, p. 68.

11. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God, New York: Harper Collins, 2003, p. xxiii.

12. Amy Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” New York Times, January 14, 2003, sec. 

A, p. 1.

13. Boaz Ganor, “The First Iraqi Suicide Bombing. A Hint of Things to Come?” March 30, 2003; available from http:

//www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid-477; Internet; accessed September 5, 2003.

14. Cindy C. Combs and Martin Slann, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2002, p. 20.

15. Sprinzak, p. 68.

16. Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics,” April 21, 2000; available from http://

www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.dfm?articleid=112; Internet; accessed September 5, 2003.

17. Ganor, “The First Iraqi Suicide Bombing.”

18. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, 

p. 130.

19. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, p. 40.

20. Arnon Regular, “Mother of Two Becomes First Female Suicide Bomber for Hamas,” Haaretz, January 16, 2004. 

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.
15

24. Van Natta, sec.4, p. 1.

25. Hala Jaber, “The Avengers,” Sunday Times (London), December 7, 2003, sec. Features, p. 1, database on-line; available 

from Lexis-Nexis; accessed January 15, 2004.

26. Ibid.

27. Phillip Smucker, “Arab Women Take to the Streets; Pro-Palestinian Demonstrations in Arab Nations This Week 

Have Included More Women,” Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2002, sec. World, p. 6, database on-line; available from 

Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

28. Combs and Slann, p. 215.

29. Ibid., pp. 216-218.

30. Ibid., p. 215.

31. Luisella Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini, Women and Terrorism, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 24.

32. Ibid.

33. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, p. 51.

34. Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Terrorism: An Overview,” February 15, 2000; available from http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articl

edet.cfm?articleid=128; Internet; accessed September 5, 2003.

35. Stern, Terror in the Name of God.

36. Scott Atran, “Who Wants to be a Martyr?” New York Times, May 5, 2003, sec. A, p. 23, database on-line; available 

from ProQuest; accessed September 16, 2003.

37. Stern, Terror in the Name of God.

38. Ganor, “Suicide Terrorism: An Overview.”

39. Beyler.

40. “This Litany of Carnage Explodes the Myth That Terrorism Can Be Easily Defeated,” Independent (London), May 19, 

2003, sec. Comment, p. 14, database on-line; available from Lexis Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

41. Yoram Schweitzer, “A Fundamental Change in Tactics,” Washington Post, October 19, 2003, sec. B, p. 3, database 

on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed January 15, 2004.

42. Jonathan Kay, “Watching Her Go from a Doll to a Rock to a Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, January 30, 2002, sec. 

California Metro, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

43. Randy Boswell, “Black Widows Put Moscow Under Siege: Female Suicide Bombers Spread Wave of Terror Across 

Russian Capital,” Ottawa Citizen, July 11, 2003, sec. A, p. 1, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 

5, 2003.

44. Ibid.

45. Mark McDonald, “Chechnya’s Eerie Rebels: Black Widows―the 19 Black-Clad Female Terrorists in Moscow’s 

Theater Siege―Are Still Shrouded in Mystery, One Year Later,” Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), October 24, 2003, sec. A, p. 4, 

database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed November 7, 2003.
16

46. Ganor, Suicide Terrorism: An Overview.

47. Gregg Zoroya, “Her Decision to be a Suicide Bomber,” USA Today, April 22, 2003, sec. A, p. 1, database on-line; 

available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

48. Sprinzak, p. 69.

49. Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 310.

50. Jaber.

51. Ganor, “Suicide Terrorism: An Overview.”

52. Stern, Terror in the Name of God.

53. Atran.

54. Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, eds., Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, New York: 

Pergamon Press, 1981, p. 8.

55. Melanie Reid, “Myth that Women are the Most Deadly Killers of All,” Herald (Glasgow), January 29, 2002, sec. A, p. 

14, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

56. Ibid.

57. Beyler.

58. “The Bomber Next Door,” 60 Minutes II 60 Minutes II, May 28, 2003, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed , May 28, 2003, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 

September 5, 2003.

59. “Female Suicide Bombers Were Trained Abroad―Russian Security Service,” BBC Worldwide, database on-line; 

available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed January 15, 2004.

60. Ibid.

61. Argumenty i Fakty, “How Many More Suicide Bombers?” What the Papers Say (Russia), July 11, 2003, sec. Shorts, p. 

1, 6, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed January 15, 2004.

62. Luba Vinogradova, “Deadly Secret of the Black Widows,” Times (London), October 22, 2003, sec. Features, p. 4, 

database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003. 

63. Matthew Kalman, “Inside the Mind of a Suicide Bomber; Recruit Reveals Training of Females for Mission,” Standard 

(St. Catharines), May 31, 2002, sec. C, p. 10, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

64. Jaber.

65. Margo Harakas, “Palestinian Women Defy Islamic Tradition to Become Suicide Bombers,” Sun-Sentinel, April 15, 

2002, sec. Lifestyle, p. 10, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

66. Howard and Sawyer, p. 129.

67. “This Litany of Carnage.”

68. Schweitzer.

69. Howard and Sawyer, p. 130.
17

70. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, p. 52.

71. Jonathan Kay, “Defaming Islam―One Bomb at a Time,” National Post National Post (Canada), July 16, 2003, sec. A, p. 14, database (Canada), July 16, 2003, sec. A, p. 14, database 

on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

72. Howard and Sawyer.

73. Stern, Terror in the Name of God.

74. Beyler.

75. “Lebanese Muslim Cleric OK’s Female Suicide Bombers,” Business Recorder Business Recorder, April 2, 2002, database on-line; available , April 2, 2002, database on-line; available 

from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

76. Harakas.

77. Howard and Sawyer, p. 128.

78. Schweitzer.

79. “Bin Laden Sets up Female Suicide Squads to Bomb U.S.,” Agence France Presse, March 12, 2003, sec. International 

News, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

80. Ibid.

81. Schweitzer.

82. Sprinzak, p. 69.

83. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, p. 51.

84. Sprinzak.

85. Ibid., p. 72.

86. Ibid., p. 69.

87. Van Natta.

88. Combs and Slann, p. 84.

89. Atran.

90. Howard and Sawyer, p. 128.

91. Combs and Slann, p. 213.

92. Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 26.

93. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, pp. 52-53.

94. Congress, House, International Relations Committee, Hearing of the International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, March 26, 2003.

95. Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, eds., Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, New York: 

Pergamon Press, 1981, p. 30.
18

96. Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” Library of 

Congress, September, 1999, database on-line; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed September 5, 2003.

97. Eric Herren, “Counter-Terrorism Dilemmas,” April 15, 2002; available from http://222.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?

articleid=432; Internet; accessed September 5, 2003.

98. Ibid.

99. Hudson.

100. Ibid.

101. Herren.

102. Ganor, “Suicide Terrorism: An Overview.”

103. Stern, “When Bombers are Women.”

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.