RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4587-16T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN 

THE INTEREST OF Z.M., a Juvenile.

___________________________________

Submitted March 8, 2018 – Decided July 12, 2018

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, 

Docket No. FJ-19-0136-17.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant Z.M. (Brian P. Keenan, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).

Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent State of New Jersey

(Shaina Brenner, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the Brief).

PER CURIAM

After his motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant 

was denied, juvenile Z.M., born in June 2000, pled guilty to 

committing acts of delinquency which, if committed by an adult, 

would constitute second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); third-degree unlawful possession of cocaine, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession of certain 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-4587-16T4

controlled dangerous substances (CDS) without a prescription, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.5(a)(3); possession of under fifty grams of 

marijuana, a disorderly persons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4); 

and possession of drug paraphernalia, a disorderly persons 

offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2. By way of disposition, on June 9, 

2017, in accordance with the plea agreement, the Family Part judge 

placed Z.M. on probation for a period of three years, subject to 

standard and special conditions of probation. 

On appeal, Z.M. raises the following contentions for our 

consideration:

POINT I

THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE 

JUVENILE'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE NEITHER 

THE COMMUNITY[-]CARETAKING, NOR THE 

EMERGENCY[-]AID DOCTRINE APPLY TO THE 

WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS ROOM.

A. BECAUSE THE JUVENILE WAS IN NO 

DANGER AFTER MIDNIGHT WHEN HE WAS AT 

HOME SLEEPING IN HIS BEDROOM, AND 

THE INFORMATION CONNECTING HIM TO A 

GUN WAS TENUOUS AT BEST, THE POLICE 

HAD NO OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BASIS 

TO CONCLUDE THAT AN EMERGENCY WAS 

ONGOING; CONSEQUENTLY, NEITHER THE 

EMERGENCY[-]AID, NOT THE 

COMMUNITY[-]CARETAKING DOCTRINES 

APPLY TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 

HIS ROOM.

B. THE EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE 

JUVENILE'S ROOM AFTER HE WAS REMOVED 

MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE 

POLICE HAD NO OBJECTIVELY 
3 A-4587-16T4

REASONABLE BASIS TO REMAIN IN HIS 

ROOM AFTER IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE 

WAS NO EMERGENCY OCCURRING THERE.

After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced 

on appeal, we affirm.

We glean the following facts from the evidence presented by 

the State at the suppression hearing conducted on May 10 and 15, 

2017, during which the State elicited testimony from Patrolman

Sean Perry and Sergeant David Dehardt of the Vernon Township Police 

Department and New Jersey State Troopers Jason Smith, Sean 

Sullivan, and Shamik Songui. The juvenile's father also testified 

for the State. 

At approximately 11:00 p.m. on January 2, 2017, Z.M.'s father 

went to Vernon Township police headquarters, expressing concerns 

about his son's wellbeing. Z.M. had lived with his father in 

Vernon Township until about July 2016 when he moved in with his 

mother after his parents divorced. Vernon Township police officers 

were familiar with Z.M. based on prior reports of truancy, 

threatening behavior, anger issues and mental health concerns. 

Z.M.'s father showed Patrolman Perry and Sergeant Dehardt a 

photograph on his phone, depicting visible injuries on his son's

face. He explained that he had received the photograph from his 

son at approximately 1:25 a.m. earlier that day during a Facebook

messaging exchange, in which Z.M. indicated that the person who 
4 A-4587-16T4

assaulted him would "learn his lesson." Z.M.'s father explained 

further that at approximately 10:30 p.m. that night, he received 

a photograph from one of his daughters depicting a handgun, a 

loaded magazine and a large sum of cash with a caption stating

"[s]hotty for the body." Z.M. had reportedly posted the photograph 

on Snapchat and a former neighbor had forwarded the photo to his 

daughter, who in turn forwarded it to him. Z.M.'s father forwarded 

both photographs to Patrolman Perry and told the officers he had 

attempted to contact his ex-wife and his son several times 

throughout the day without success. Although his other daughter 

who resided with Z.M. had just texted that Z.M. was home asleep, 

he was still concerned and agreed that the police should check on 

his son.

At 11:33 p.m., Sergeant Dehardt contacted the State Police 

Barracks in the town where Z.M.'s mother resided and spoke to 

Trooper Smith, relaying the information provided by Z.M.'s father

as well as the department's prior experience with Z.M. Although 

Sergeant Dehardt was unsure whether Z.M. had the gun depicted in 

the Snapchat posting in his possession, he requested a welfare 

check on the juvenile to allay his father's concerns.

1 Accompanied 

by four other troopers who were all briefed on the details, Trooper 

 

1 The recorded telephone conversation between Dehardt and Smith 

was played during the hearing. 
5 A-4587-16T4

Smith responded to the juvenile's mother's home, arriving at about 

midnight. When Z.M.'s mother opened the door, Trooper Smith 

explained that they were there to conduct a welfare check based 

on the concerns Z.M.'s father expressed to Vernon Township police 

officers.2 Z.M.'s mother, who by all accounts was fully 

cooperative, invited them into her home and escorted four of the 

troopers upstairs to Z.M.'s bedroom, while one trooper remained 

outside to secure the exterior of the home. 

Initially, Z.M.'s mother knocked repeatedly on Z.M.'s locked 

bedroom door. When there was no answer, she retrieved a tool from 

the kitchen and unlocked the door. As the door opened, all four 

troopers detected the odor of burnt marijuana and, once inside the 

bedroom, two of the troopers detected the odor of raw marijuana. 

When Trooper Smith turned on the bedroom lights, the troopers 

observed a bong on the floor in the center of the room and Z.M. 

sleeping on the bed. Troopers Smith and Sullivan noted that Z.M. 

"had a black eye" and Trooper Songui recalled that Z.M. "was beat 

up pretty bad[ly]." After some difficulty waking Z.M., Trooper 

Smith finally awakened him and escorted him to an adjacent living 

 

2 A welfare or well-being check was described as "a call into the 

station" by "either [a] concerned relative or friend or neighbor," 

requesting police to check on the well-being of an individual 

based on a concern that the person may be "sick, not feeling well, 

depressed, [or] threaten[ed] their own life." 
6 A-4587-16T4

room about twenty feet away. While Troopers Smith and Nugnes 

remained with Z.M., Troopers Songui and Sullivan secured the 

bedroom. The troopers testified that given the possible presence 

of a handgun, they were all concerned about officer safety as well 

as the safety of the other occupants in the house and the 

possibility of Z.M. retrieving the weapon. 

Upon entering the bedroom, which was described as about ten 

feet by ten feet, Trooper Songui "traced" the "strong odor of 

marijuana" to a dresser where the dresser drawer "was cracked 

open" over two inches. Using his flashlight, he "kind of peaked 

in" the dresser drawer and observed "a huge bag of weed" inside. 

Although Trooper Songui testified that he pointed out his discovery 

to Trooper Sullivan before exiting the room, Trooper Sullivan had 

no recollection of that.

Trooper Sullivan testified that from where he was standing 

in the center of the room, about two to three feet away, he 

observed one of the dresser drawers that was about "waist height"

"an inch to two inches" ajar. Inside the drawer, he observed "the 

muzzle of a handgun . . . stamped Smith & Wesson" laying upside 

down. Referring to the gun, he immediately announced he "got it." 

Trooper Smith confirmed he heard Trooper Sullivan yell out that 

he "found it," and both troopers testified that the discovery was 

made within thirty seconds to a minute of Trooper Sullivan entering
7 A-4587-16T4

the bedroom. When Trooper Sullivan opened the drawer to retrieve 

the handgun, he observed cash, drug paraphernalia and other drugs 

in the drawer, which later tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, 

and Alprazolam. Thereafter, Z.M. was handcuffed and detained. 

At the hearing, Trooper Sullivan testified that the handgun 

depicted in the Snapchat photo matched the handgun he recovered 

in Z.M.'s dresser drawer. He also testified that none of the 

troopers had their guns drawn during the entire encounter. 

Further, the troopers testified that at no point did they yell or 

scream at anyone in the residence or enter any other part of the 

residence.

Following the hearing, in an oral decision, Judge Michael C. 

Gaus denied the motion, finding that the search and seizure of the 

gun, the drugs and the paraphernalia were valid under the 

emergency-aid, community-caretaking and plain-view exceptions to 

the warrant requirement, and that Z.M.'s mother provided consent 

for the troopers to enter the residence and Z.M.'s bedroom. 

Initially, noting that the troopers' testimony was generally 

consistent and "[m]any of the facts [were] not in dispute," the 

judge acknowledged the discrepancy between Trooper Sullivan's and 

Songui's testimony, regarding Songui pointing out to Sullivan his

observation of "a huge bag of weed" in the dresser drawer. 

The judge noted 
8 A-4587-16T4

[w]hile that testimony is certainly 

inconsistent, it does not mean that the 

troopers don't have any credibility and that 

they're making up the story in order to cover 

up . . . an illegal search of the room. As a 

matter of fact, if they were trying to cover 

up an illegal search of the room, Trooper 

Songui, one would think would have done a much 

better job of coming up with some kind of a 

story for his actions.

. . . .

 

So the [c]ourt finds that it is certainly 

possible for Trooper Sullivan to have been in 

the room, but to have been looking in another 

part of the room and not have seen Trooper 

Songui make that move. . . . [I]t's also 

possible that Trooper Songui has simply not 

recalled the incidents of that day correctly. 

 

Next, citing State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586 (2004), the judge

found that "the actions of the officers were clearly justified"

under the emergency-aid doctrine as they were 

inside the room . . . for the purpose of 

rendering aid based upon the reports of the 

potential injuries that Z.M. had sustained 

coupled with the mental health issues that had 

been previously described by Sergeant Dehardt 

to Trooper Smith and were then . . . conveyed 

to the other troopers along with the threat 

of an assault . . . , particularly considering 

Z.M.'s threat that the person who assaulted 

him would get what he had coming to him.

The judge also found support under the community-caretaking 

doctrine as "a separate basis [for the troopers] to gain access 

to determine that Z.M., in fact, was not in need of further 

assistance." 
9 A-4587-16T4

The judge rejected the juvenile's reliance on State v. 

Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117 (2012). In Edmonds, the Court invalidated 

a warrantless search under either the emergency-aid or communitycaretaking exception where the police responded to an "unverified 

9-1-1 call" reporting an alleged domestic dispute at a residence,

possibly involving a handgun. Id. at 121. Despite the resident's

assurance "that there was no problem in her home[,]" the police 

entered the residence without her consent and found her elevenyear-old son inside "unharmed, without any visible injuries or 

signs of distress and no indication of a domestic disturbance 

inside the apartment." Ibid. Nonetheless, the police removed the 

defendant, who was watching television, from an adjoining room and 

frisked him, and then proceeded to search the area where the 

defendant had been seated, finding a handgun underneath a pillow. 

Ibid. 

Judge Gaus found that "there [were] many, many distinguishing 

facts between [Edmonds] and . . . this case." First, the judge 

noted that "the original concern was raised by Z.M.'s father," 

rather than "an unidentified caller." Next, Z.M.'s mother 

"[c]ooperated fully," "invited the [troopers] inside" the 

residence, and "consented" to them entering Z.M.'s bedroom. 

Further, the troopers found Z.M. "injured" and in the condition 

that "had been described to them," in contrast to Edmonds where 
10 A-4587-16T4

there was no identifiable victim. Additionally, when the troopers 

entered Z.M.'s bedroom, "they immediately noticed the bong in the 

center of the room and . . . the strong odor of both burnt and raw 

marijuana," in contrast to Edmonds where "[t]here was no evidence" 

of "any other crime." Finally, according to Judge Gaus, in 

Edmonds, the suspect "had already been detained and frisked before 

the police undertook a search of the room where he was originally 

located" and the weapon was ultimately found "in a pillow," rather 

than in plain view as was the case here. 

Turning to the discovery of the gun in the dresser drawer, 

relying on State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77 (2016), and State v. 

Padilla, 321 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 1999), Judge Gaus determined 

that the search was justified under the plain-view doctrine. The 

judge found that the troopers' "primary motivation . . . was 

determining whether or not Z.M. was safe and whether or not he 

required any aid." Further, as in Padilla, the judge was 

"satisfied that once inside the room, they did not conduct a 

search." Rather, "they made a visual observation throughout the 

room in light of the information" conveyed to the troopers going 

to the scene. The judge found that the troopers "acted reasonably 

in making visual observations to assure themselves that no weapons 

were present," and to ensure "that Z.M. could not try to make an 

unanticipated movement . . . in order to try to get to a weapon."
11 A-4587-16T4

The judge concluded that the troopers 

were lawfully in the [viewing] area in order 

to render aid and to fulfill their community[-

]caretaking role.

 

They were not aware of the specific 

location of any gun. And they clearly did not 

enter the premises in order to rely upon plain 

view as . . . a pretext. They could have no 

way of anticipating that the gun would be out 

in plain view. . . .

. . . And, obviously a Smith & Wesson 

handgun being in the partially ajarred drawer

[of a] [sixteen]-year old was certainly 

associated with criminal activity. That gave 

Trooper Sullivan the authority to open the 

drawer and that led to the discovery of the 

other items that were found therein.

 

The judge entered a memorializing order and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the juvenile argues that "[t]he motion judge erred 

in determining that the evidence seized . . . was admissible 

pursuant to the emergency[-]aid and community[-]caretaking 

exceptions to the warrant requirement" because "[t]here were no 

exigent circumstances." The juvenile argues further that "[e]ven 

if the troopers' presence within [Z.M.'s] room was initially 

appropriate, they exceeded the scope of the exceptions when they 

remained in the room for an additional ninety seconds looking 

around until they found the gun." We disagree.

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "must uphold the 

factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as 
12 A-4587-16T4

those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence on 

the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting 

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those findings warrant 

particular deference when they are 'substantially influenced by 

[the trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and 

to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot 

enjoy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson, 200 

N.J. at 15). However, "[t]o the extent that the trial court's 

determination rests upon a legal conclusion, we conduct a de novo, 

plenary review." Ibid.

"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey

Constitution guarantee an individual's right to be secure against 

unreasonable searches or seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 

307, 318 (2012). Searches and seizures conducted without a 

warrant, "particularly in a home, are presumptively unreasonable." 

Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 129 (quoting State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 

585 (1989)). As such, the State has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that such searches and seizures are 

"justified by one of the '"well-delineated exceptions" to the 

warrant requirement.'" State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409 (2012) 

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 598).

Two such exceptions to the warrant requirement are the 

emergency-aid and community-caretaking doctrines. State v. 
13 A-4587-16T4

Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 468-69 (2015); State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 

438, 452 (2015). Under the community-caretaking doctrine, 

"[c]ourts have allowed warrantless searches . . . when police 

officers have acted not in their law enforcement or criminal 

investigatory role, but rather in a community[-]caretaking 

function." State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009). "In performing 

these tasks, typically, there is not time to acquire a warrant 

when emergent circumstances arise and an immediate search is 

required to preserve life or property." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 141. 

Our Supreme Court has held, however, that the community-caretaking 

doctrine prohibits "the warrantless entry into or search of a home 

in the absence of some form of exigent circumstances" or 

"objectively reasonable emergency." State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 

301, 305, 321 (2013).

The Court also made clear that "[p]olice officers serving in 

a community-caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless 

entry into a home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant 

requirement." Id. at 323. The emergency-aid doctrine, first 

enunciated in Frankel, and later modified in Edmonds, "is derived 

from the commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may 

require public safety officials, such as the police, . . . to 

enter a dwelling without a warrant for the purpose of protecting 
14 A-4587-16T4

or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." Hathaway, 222 

N.J. at 469 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 598).

Courts apply a "two-prong test" that considers "the totality 

of the circumstances" to determine whether the emergency-aid 

doctrine justifies a warrantless search of a home. Id. at 470, 

472. To that end, the State must show that "(1) the officer had 

an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 

require[d] that he provide immediate assistance to protect or 

preserve life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a 

reasonable nexus between the emergency and the area or places to 

be searched." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Edmonds, 

211 N.J. at 132). The doctrine does not require "certitude" of 

danger but only reasonable belief that immediate action is 

required. Ibid. (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). 

Reasonableness turns on the circumstances at the time and "does 

not depend on whether it is later determined that the danger 

actually existed." Ibid.

If an emergency exists, "[t]he emergency-aid doctrine, 

particularly when applied to the entry of a home, must be 'limited 

to the reasons and objectives that prompted' the need for immediate 

action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 

599). "Therefore, police officers looking for an injured person 

may not extend their search to small compartments such as 'drawers, 
15 A-4587-16T4

cupboards, or wastepaper baskets." Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470) 

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 

'observed in plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully 

on the premises and is not exceeding the scope of the search,' 

that evidence will be admissible." Ibid. (quoting Frankel, 179 

N.J. at 599-600). "When the exigency that justifies immediate 

action dissipates, the rationale for searching without a warrant 

is no longer present." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134. 

Here, we conclude that the troopers had an objectively 

reasonable basis to believe that immediate assistance was required 

to protect a life or prevent serious injury, and there was a nexus 

between the emergency and the area searched. Moreover, the

troopers did not impermissibly expand their search to any other 

part of the residence. Although the troopers had removed the 

juvenile to an adjoining room when Sullivan observed the gun in 

plain view, his actions were reasonable for officer safety and the 

safety of the other occupants in the residence, including Z.M., 

who, given his mental health issues and threat to retaliate, may 

have harmed himself or another with the gun. See Gonzales, 227 

N.J. at 82 (holding that "[p]rovided . . . a police officer is 

lawfully in the viewing area and the nature of the evidence is 

immediately apparent . . . , the evidence may be seized" under the 

plain-view warrant exception). We are therefore satisfied that 
16 A-4587-16T4

the motion judge correctly applied the emergency-aid doctrine to 

uphold this search and seizure3 and affirm substantially for the 

reasons expressed by Judge Gaus in his oral opinion delivered from 

the bench on May 15, 2017.

Affirmed.

 

3 In light of our holding, we need not address Judge Gaus' 

application of the community-caretaking doctrine.