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FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

(THE MUSGRAVE AMENDMENT)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.J. Res. 56

MAY 13, 2004

Serial No. 90

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel 

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman

STEVE KING, Iowa 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Chief Counsel 

E. STEWART JEFFRIES, Counsel 

HILARY FUNK, Counsel 

MINDY BARRY, Full Committee Counsel 

DAVID LACHMANN, Minority Professional Staff Member 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 13, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Ohio, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution ............................ 1

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution ....... 3

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Marilyn Musgrave, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Colorado 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

Judge Robert Bork, McLean, VA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 16

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17

The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Massachusetts 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 19

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21

Mr. Jay Sekulow, The American Center for Law and Justice, Inc. 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 22

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

National Review article by Stanley Kurtz, witness at April 22, 2004, ‘‘Legal 

Threats to Traditional Marriage: Implications for Public Policy,’’ Constitution Subcommittee Hearing. Article submitted by Chairman Steve Chabot .. 56

CBO and GAO reports submitted by the Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in Congress From the State of Alabama ........................................ 61

April 22, 2004 testimony by Stanley Kurtz submitted by the Honorable Tom 

Feeney, a Representative in Congress From the State of Florida ................... 84

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress From the State of Michigan ........................................................... 103

Letter submitted by The American Center for Law and Justice, Inc. to Chairman Cabot ............................................................................................................. 104

Response to Additonal Questions by Representative Musgrave .......................... 105

Additional Questions Submitted to Judge Bork .................................................... 108

Response to Additional Questions by Judge Bork ................................................ 109

Additional Questions submitted to Representative Frank ................................... 110

Response to Additional Questions by Representative Frank ............................... 113

Second set of Additional Questions submitted to Representative Frank ............ 117

Response to second set of Additional Questions by Representative Frank ........ 118

Additional Questions submitted to Mr. Sekulow .................................................. 121

Response to Additional Questions by Mr. Sekulow .............................................. 122

Additional Materials submitted by Stanley Kurtz ................................................ 124

Additional Letter and Materials submitted by Mr. Sekulow ............................... 174

Submission by Stanley Kurtz in response to Representative Frank’s answers 

to additional questions ......................................................................................... 194
Page

IV

Article Submitted by the Honorable Tammy Baldwin, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of Wisconsin ............................................................... 198
(1)

FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

(THE MUSGRAVE AMENDMENT) 

THURSDAY, MAY 13, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (Chair of 

the Subcommittee) Presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The Committee will come to order. This is the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution. 

On May 21, 2003, Representative Marilyn Musgrave introduced 

a constitutional amendment, H.J. Res. 56, stating: ‘‘Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of 

a man and woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of 

any State, nor State or Federal law, shall be construed to require 

that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 

unmarried couples or groups.’’

The intent behind the amendment is to allow the States and 

Congress to enact civil unions but to reserve ‘‘marriage’’ as a legal 

concept applicable only to the union of man and a women. 

To make that clear, Representative Musgrave announced in 

March that she supported deleting from the amendment the phrase 

‘‘nor State or Federal law,’’ such that the revised amendment would 

be, and I will quote that as well: ‘‘Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of 

a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the Constitution 

of any State shall be construed to require that marital status or the 

legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or 

groups.’’

The intent of the rewording of the amendment is to make clear 

that State legislatures and Congress could, by statute, create samesex civil unions, if they so chose. 

At the House Constitution Subcommittee’s previous oversight 

hearing on ‘‘Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage: Implications 

For Public Policy,’’ we received testimony providing evidence for the 

following propositions: 

Several judicial decisions over the past year threaten to undermine the age-old consensus of civilization that marriage is uniquely 

between a man and a woman. 

That would be the first. 

The second, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held 

that ‘‘marriage’’ in that State must include same-sex ‘‘marriages.’’
2

While the Massachusetts legislature has passed a constitutional 

amendment barring same-sex ‘‘marriage’’, the earliest that amendment could go into effect is in the year 2006. Before that time, 

Massachusetts will be forced by the decision of the Massachusetts 

Supreme Judicial Court to issue same-sex ‘‘marriage’’ licenses beginning on Monday, May 17. 

Third, we received testimony that it is, quote, ‘‘increasingly 

clear’’ that the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, the intent of 

which is to prevent one State from having to recognize a same-sex 

marriage license granted in another State, will be held unconstitutional under the legal rationales articulated by the Massachusetts 

Supreme Judicial Court, namely that the three reasons the State 

of Massachusetts gave for giving preferred status to heterosexual 

marriage—promoting procreation, encouraging the raising of children in two-parent biological families, and conserving limited State 

resources—have ‘‘no rational basis.’’

I might note that, although it says ‘‘increasingly clear’’, there was 

testimony to the contrary as well, that it might well be held constitutional. 

Next, consequently, all States and the Federal Government will 

be required by courts to define ‘‘marriage’’ to include same-sex 

‘‘marriages.’’

Fifth, we also received testimony that the effects of a court-imposed definition of ‘‘marriage’’ that includes same-sex ‘‘marriages 

will be felt throughout Federal law.’’

Six, finally, we received testimony that recent data from the 

Netherlands shows that legalizing same-sex marriage in the United 

States and thereby decoupling marriage from parenthood may contribute significantly to an increase in the out-of-wedlock birth rate 

for heterosexual couples, to the detriment of children. 

Article IV, section 4, of the Constitution states that, ‘‘the United 

States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican 

form of government.’’ This means a form of government under rules 

passed by the duly elected representatives of the people, not by 

judges who are not charged with reflecting the people’s will. 

James Madison, in Federalist Paper number 39, wrote: 

‘‘What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form 

of government? It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable 

proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise, a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their 

powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their 

government the honorable title of republic.’’

Today, 44 States, so far, have enacted laws that provide that 

marriage shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. 

These 44 States constitute 88 percent of the States—well more 

than the 75 percent required to approve a constitutional amendment—and they include 86 percent of the U.S. Population. This 

hearing will explore whether H.J. Res. 56 should be passed by Congress and sent to the States for ratification to help guarantee a republican form of government by preserving marriage policy as enacted by the people’s duly elected representatives in the States. 
3

I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, the 

Ranking Member of this Committee, for the purpose of making an 

opening statement. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Before I read the opening statement that I prepared, I must comment on the rather extraordinary words of the Chairman. I hope 

the Chairman did not mean when he talked about guaranteeing a 

republican form of government that he believes that the Federal 

Government should start second-guessing the States as to what authority the States choose to grant to their court system in interpreting their own constitutions. Rather than guaranteeing a republican form of government, that would be about the most egregious 

form of States’ rights violations that I could think of. 

Mr. Chairman, today, the House Constitution Subcommittee is 

scheduled to hold its third in a series of five hearings on the subject of same-sex marriage. Evidently, this critical threat to our Nation’s future requires the most extensive analysis of anything the 

Committee on the Judiciary has done in this Congress. By comparison, the proposed constitutional amendments dealing with the 

preservation of our democracy in the event of a catastrophic annihilation of the Congress by a terrorist attack have received no hearings whatsoever. 

We will be making time after today’s hearing to vote on a very 

important bill that would declare the oak tree as the national tree 

of the United States. So we deal with the time of this Committee. 

What is the crisis? Could it be that the Republic cannot withstand the possibility that loving families could avail themselves of 

the protection of law even if they have the audacity to love someone of the same gender? Will the Nation be destroyed if the children of those families receive the same protections in law as the 

children of other families, or must we also punish little children because their parents are lesbian or gay? 

I have trouble deciding what is worse, self-proclaimed defenders 

of marriage mobilizing to prevent people from getting married, or 

the hysterical assertion that, as we were told at our last hearing, 

that heterosexuals will no longer want to marry if lesbians and 

gays can also marry. So here is the Congress of the United States. 

Million of Americans cannot take their children to the doctor, millions of Americans are out of work, patriotic young Americans are 

being killed in Iraq, while it is clear that the President has not a 

clue as to what he is doing there, and the most important thing on 

the agenda is this anti-marriage amendment. 

If equal protection of the laws has any meaning, it must be that 

all people, all families must be treated fairly and equally. That 

should include lesbian and gay families, whether or not anyone approves of them. 

Most importantly for all Americans, it means that we must not 

become the first generation in our Nation’s history to amend the 

Constitution to take away, rather than to enhance, liberty. It would 

indeed be another shameful legacy for this Congress. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The Chair would ask that any other Members who would like to 

make opening statements would submit them for the record so we 
4

can get right to the panel, if that is acceptable to the Members. We 

appreciate it. 

I would ask unanimous consent that the Member from Wisconsin, Ms. Baldwin, be permitted to ask questions as any other 

Member of the Committee would be. She is not a Member of this 

Committee but is a Member of the full Committee on the Judiciary. 

So, without objection, so ordered. 

I will now introduce the panel. 

We begin with our first witness, who is Representative Marilyn 

Musgrave. Mrs. Musgrave represents Colorado’s Fourth District, 

and she is the lead House sponsor of the Federal Marriage Amendment. Serving her first term, Representative Musgrave sits on the 

House Agriculture, Small Business and Education and Workforce 

Committees. 

Representative Musgrave was elected and served 4 years ago as 

a State representative during which time she was elected the Senate Republican Caucus Chairman. She also has taught school in 

eastern Colorado. 

We welcome you here this morning, Marilyn. 

Our second witness is Robert H. Bork. Judge Bork is a leading 

author and educator and former judge of the United States Court 

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Judge Bork has 

been the Alexander M. Bickel Professor at Public Law at Yale Law 

School, a partner at the law firm of Kirkland and Ellis, and the author of several books, including The Tempting of America and The 

Political Seduction of the Law.

Judge Bork was nominated by President Reagan to serve as an 

Associate Justice on the United States Supreme Court, but his confirmation was denied by the United States Senate. Judge Bork is 

currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Hudson Institute. 

We welcome you here, Judge Bork. 

Our third witness is Representative Barney Frank, who represents the Massachusetts Fourth District. He is the Ranking 

Member on the House Financial Services Committee, and he is also 

a Member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. Previously, he was a Massachusetts State Representative and an assistant to the Mayor of Boston; and we always welcome you here, 

Barney. 

Our fourth and final witness is Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel 

for The American Center for Law and Justice, an international 

public interest law firm and educational organization. An accomplished and respected judicial advocate, Mr. Sekulow has presented 

oral arguments before the Supreme Court in numerous cases in defense of constitutional freedoms. 

Founded in 1990, The American Center for Law and Justice specializes in constitutional law. The ACLJ under Mr. Sekulow’s direction is involved in public interest and public policy issues that 

threaten people of faith and the American family. 

The National Law Journal has twice named Mr. Sekulow one of 

the 100 most influential lawyers in the United States. 

We welcome all four of the witnesses here this morning. 

We will begin with Mrs. Musgrave; and, as I am sure most of you 

are aware, we have the 5-minute rule which will be in effect. When 

the yellow light comes on, you have a minute to wrap up. We will 
5

give you a little leeway. But when the red light comes on, as all 

the witnesses know, we would appreciate it if you will wrap up 

your testimony by then. 

Mrs. Musgrave, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARILYN MUSGRAVE, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Mrs. MUSGRAVE. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Nadler, 

and other distinguished Members of the Judiciary Committee, 

thank you very much for allowing me to come before you today. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I bring before you 

House Joint Resolution 56, the FMA, or Federal Marriage Amendment, a proposal to amend the Constitution of the United States 

of America. 

I assure you that I do not lightly propose to amend the Constitution, because I am persuaded that simple prudence dictates the 

Constitution should be amended only as a last resort. Indeed, I 

wish devoutly that the FMA were unnecessary and that we did not 

have to be here today to discuss it. I wish I could tell the American 

people that they have a choice about whether their Constitution 

will be amended. 

Unfortunately, leaving the Constitution unaltered is not an option that is open to us. Let me say that again. 

For better or ill, as we sit here today, the Constitution of the 

United States of America is on the verge of being amended; and the 

only choice we have in the matter is whether it will be amended 

de jure through the Democratic process for proposing and ratifying 

amendments set forth in article V of the Constitution itself or de 

facto by court ruling. 

The Declaration of Independence states that all men are created 

equal and endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights. 

Including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This very 

foundational document of our Nation assumes that our rights exist 

between within the context of God’s created order. The self-evident 

differences and complementary design of men and women are part 

of that created order. We are created as male and female, and for 

this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined 

with his wife and the two shall become one in the mystical, spiritual, and physical union we call marriage. 

The self-evident biological fact that men and women are designed 

to complement one another is the reason that for the entire history 

of mankind, in all societies, at all times and in all places marriage 

has been a relationship between persons of the opposite sex. In a 

very real sense, it is impossible for a man to ‘‘marry’’ a man or a 

woman to ‘‘marry’’ a woman, and the very meaning of the word 

‘‘marriage’’ necessarily contemplates a relationship between a man 

and a woman. 

For nearly 228 years every State in the Union has followed this 

millennia-old tradition. Not once in the history of this Nation have 

the people—speaking through their elected representatives or otherwise—passed a single law altering this in the slightest way. 

If this is the case, why is the FMA necessary? Sadly, the answer 

to that question lies in the fact that certain judges do not seem to 
6

care about the text and structure of the Constitution or the unbroken history and traditions of our Nation. Instead, they seek to use 

their power to interpret the Constitution as a means of advancing 

a social revolution unsought and unwanted by the American people. 

I have introduced the FMA to stop this judicial activism and preserve the right of self-determination for the American people with 

respect to the vitally important laws governing marriage, the most 

important and basic of all of our social institutions. 

The FMA is a measured and a moderate response to the serious 

problem I outlined above. The proposed amendment is only 51 

words long and states: 

‘‘Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of 

a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution 

of any State, nor State or Federal law, shall be construed to require 

that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 

unmarried couples or groups.’’

The first sentence is designed to ensure that no governmental entity—whether in the legislative, executive or judicial branch—at 

any level of government—Federal, State or local—shall have the 

power to alter the definition of marriage so that it is other than 

a union of one man and one woman. 

The second sentence is designed to prevent any court from construing, one, the Federal Constitution, two, a State constitution, or, 

three, Federal or State statutory or common law of general applicability, to require any legislative body or executive agency to enact—

or recognize under the Full Faith and Credit Clause—so-called civil 

unions or domestic partnership laws or any law that would confer 

a subset of the benefits, protections and responsibilities of marriage 

on unmarried persons. 

Opponents of the FMA have attacked it as an attempt to constitutionalize discrimination against homosexuals and make them 

permanent second-class citizens. Nothing could be further from the 

truth. Gays are not excluded from the benefits of marriage by others. They are excluded by their own choices. Marriage is and for 

the entire history of mankind has always been a relationship between persons of the opposite sex, and the primary function of marriage has always been to provide a legal context for procreation and 

child rearing by fathers and mothers. Even the dictionary tells us 

that the very meaning of the word marriage necessarily contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Ms. Musgrave. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Musgrave follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARILYN MUSGRAVE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Nadler, and other distinguished members of 

the Judiciary Committee, thank you for the privilege to come before you today. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I bring before you House Joint Resolution 56 (the ‘‘FMA’’), a proposal to amend the Constitution of the United States of 

America. 

I assure you that I do not lightly propose to amend the Constitution, because I 

am persuaded that simple prudence dictates the Constitution should be amended 
7

only as a last resort. Indeed, I wish devoutly that the FMA were unnecessary and 

that we did not have to be here today to discuss it. I wish I could tell the American 

people they have a choice about whether their Constitution will be amended. 

Unfortunately, leaving the Constitution unaltered is not an option that is open 

to us. Let me say that again. For better or ill, as we sit here today, the Constitution 

of the United States of America is on the verge of being amended, and the only 

choice we have in the matter is whether it will be amended de jure through the 

democratic process for proposing and ratifying amendments set forth in Article V 

of the Constitution itself, or de facto by court ruling. 

The Declaration of Independence states that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, including life, liberty and 

the pursuit of happiness. The very foundational document of our nation assumes 

that our rights exist within the context of God’s created order. The self-evident differences and complementary design of men and women are part of that created 

order. We were created as male and female, and for this reason a man will leave 

his father and mother and be joined with his wife, and the two shall become one 

in the mystical spiritual and physical union we call ‘‘marriage.’’

The self-evident biological fact that men and women are designed to complement 

one another is the reason that for the entire history of mankind, in all societies, 

at all times, and in all places marriage has been a relationship between persons of 

the opposite sex. In a very real sense it is impossible for a man to ‘‘marry’’ a man 

or a woman to ‘‘marry’’ a woman, and the very meaning of the word ‘‘marriage’’ necessarily contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman. 

For nearly 228 years every state in the union has followed this millennia-old tradition. Not once in the history of this nation have the people—speaking through 

their elected representatives or otherwise—passed a single law altering this in the 

slightest way. 

If this is the case, why is the FMA necessary? Sadly, the answer to that question 

lies in the fact that certain judges do not seem to care about the text and structure 

of the Constitution or the unbroken history and traditions of our nation. Instead, 

they seek to use their power to interpret the Constitution as a means of advancing 

a social revolution unsought and unwanted by the American people. 

I have introduced the FMA to stop this judicial activism and preserve the right 

of self-determination for the American people with respect to the vitally important 

laws governing marriage, the most important and basic of all our social institutions. 

THE TEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The FMA is a measured and moderate response to the serious problem I outlined 

above. The proposed amendment is only 51 words long and states:

Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 

woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or 

federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.

The first sentence is designed to ensure that no governmental entity (whether in 

the legislative, executive or judicial branch) at any level of government (federal, 

state or local) shall have power to alter the definition of marriage so that it is other 

than a union of one man and one woman. 

The second sentence is designed to prevent any court from construing (1) the federal Constitution, (2) a state constitution, or (3) federal or state statutory or common law of general applicability, to require any legislative body or executive agency 

to enact (or recognize under the Full Faith and Credit Clause) so-called civil union 

or domestic partnership laws or any law that would confer a subset of the benefits, 

protections and responsibilities of marriage on unmarried persons. 

Over the past few months some have misinterpreted the FMA, especially the 

words ‘‘nor state or federal law,’’ and have argued that the text is more than a limitation on judicial activism and would constrain even legislatures from enacting civil 

union laws. Let me be very clear about this point. It is not now, nor has it ever 

been, my intention to impose any sort of constraint on legislatures with respect to 

passing civil union laws. 

While I personally oppose such laws and would vote against any such proposal 

were I in the Colorado legislature, by no means am I seeking to establish this position in the Constitution. The FMA would establish a general rule against same-sex 

marriage while leaving the matter of civil unions, domestic partnerships and other 

nonmarital arrangements to the state legislatures to decide as they will. This has 

always been my intent, and I will support any amendment to the FMA necessary 

to make that intent clear. 
8

In this regard, Senator Allard has introduced Senate Joint Resolution 30, the text 

of which is very similar to House Joint Resolution 56. For the record, I fully support 

the clarifying changes Senator Allard has made in that bill. 

THE FMA DOES NOT NATIONALIZE MARRIAGE LAW

Some have questioned the FMA on the grounds that it will nationalize marriage 

law. Mr. Chairman, no one is a stronger supporter of the principles of federalism 

than I, and if I thought for a single moment the FMA would operate to nationalize 

marriage law I would not be here today. 

Historically, the law of marriage has been a matter of state law, and the federal 

government has had little or no role in the area. For example, laws providing for 

the legal requirements for civil marriage; who has capacity to marry; types of marriages that are prohibited; and whether common law marriages are valid are all 

matters of state law. The FMA does not alter this state of affairs in any way except 

in the very narrow area of defining marriage as between a man and a woman. Indeed, far from depriving state legislatures of power the FMA is intended to empower 

legislatures against the advances of activist courts. 

With respect to the limited area of marriage law that would be nationalized by 

the FMA (i.e., defining marriage as between a man and a woman), the nationalization of marriage law is precisely what the activists pressing for same-sex marriage 

are on the edge of achieving. In other words, this area of marriage law is about to 

be nationalized whether the FMA is ratified or not. 

The activists expect that in the next few years same-sex marriage will be decreed 

by the Supreme Court, and recent Supreme Court rulings seem to make that expectation a reasonable one. As Justice Scalia explained in his dissent in Lawrence v. 

Texas:

[T]he Court says that the present case ‘‘does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons 

seek to enter.’’ . . . Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage 

in the Court’s opinion, which notes the constitutional protections afforded to 

‘‘personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,’’ and then declares that ‘‘[p]ersons in a 

homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do’’ . . . Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual 

and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. 

If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘‘no legitimate state interest’’

for purposes of proscribing that conduct . . . what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples[?]

Only five months later the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court answered Justice Scalia’s poignant question. In Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, relying on 

the Lawrence ruling, the Massachusetts court decreed by judicial fiat that beginning 

next week—on Monday, May 17 to be exact—for the first time in the history of this 

nation a state will be required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 

Goodridge was a 4 to 3 decision. The swing of a single vote among the seven members of the Massachusetts high court has resulted in a radical redefinition of marriage in Massachusetts that is wholly unsupported by the text, history or structure 

of that state’s constitution or by the history and traditions of its people. Judicial hubris of this kind cannot be allowed to stand. 

In addition, it is now clear that same-sex couples will travel to any state that allows them to marry or enter civil unions, and will then demand that their home 

states give ‘‘full faith and credit’’ to the judgment that recognizes their status. Many 

of the same-sex couples contracting civil unions in Vermont, for instance, do not live 

in Vermont, and just this week the media reported that a lesbian couple who entered into a Vermont civil union have filed for a divorce not in Vermont but in New 

York. The couple is seeking to have the New York courts recognize the Vermont civil 

union under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 

An additional declared strategy of the activists is to attack the constitutionality 

of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, overwhelmingly adopted by Congress in 

1996, and such challenges have already begun. 

One way or another, therefore, the principles of federalism are bound to be compromised with respect to the recognition of same-sex unions. The only choice we 

have in the matter is whether the millennia-old tradition of defining marriage as 

a legally-recognized relationship between male and female will be compromised as 

well. 
9

PRESERVING TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE IS NOT DISCRIMINATION

Opponents of the FMA have attacked it as an attempt to constitutionalize discrimination against homosexuals and make them permanent second class citizens. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. 

Gays are not excluded from the benefits of marriage by others. They are excluded 

by their own choices. Marriage is and for the entire history of mankind has always 

been a relationship between persons of the opposite sex, and the primary function 

of marriage has always been to provide a legal context for procreation and child 

rearing by fathers and mothers. Even the dictionary tells us that the very meaning 

of the word ‘‘marriage’’ necessarily contemplates a relationship between a man and 

a woman. It is not discrimination for the state to recognize this fundamental biological reality. 

A falcon might say he looks a lot like an eagle and can do many of the same 

things as an eagle and therefore it is discrimination to refuse to call him an eagle. 

But a falcon is not an eagle, and passing an ‘‘antidiscrimination’’ law requiring that 

henceforth all falcons shall be called eagles does not magically turn falcons into eagles. In the same way, calling a same-sex union a ‘‘marriage’’ does not mean that 

it is a marriage in any meaningful sense of that word. 

We can understand homosexuals’ yearning for public approval of their sexual 

choices. But same-sex marriage is not marriage. At most it is a pretending to be 

something like the relationship between husband and wife that is marriage. The reality is not changed, however, if the state collaborates in the pretense and calls it 

marriage. Conversely, refusing to call a same-sex union something that it is not and 

can never be is not discrimination. 

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORT TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE

Finally, Mr. Chairman, polling date supports the common sense conclusion that 

the American people do not support any radical redefinition of marriage. In a CBS 

News/New York Times poll of 1,206 adults, conducted over March 10–14 59% of 

those polled reported that they favor an amendment to the United States Constitution that would allow marriage only between a man and a woman. Only 35% of 

those polled were opposed to the amendment and 6% did not know. The poll had 

a margin of error of 3%. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I respect the Supreme Court and the role it plays in our constitutional republic. But there is a Latin phrase that captures perfectly the dilemma we 

find ourselves in when the court imposes its policy choices on the nation under the 

guise of interpreting the Constitution.

quis custodiet ipsos custodes

The phrase means, ‘‘Who guards the guardians?’’

Can there be any doubt that in Lawrence the court overstepped its bounds? And 

I fear that, as Justice Scalia warned and the Goodridge ruling confirms, it may soon 

overstep its bounds by a much wider margin. Speaking of another case in which the 

Supreme Court overstepped its bounds—the court’s infamous Dred Scott ruling—

President Lincoln said:

The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital 

questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of 

the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that 

eminent tribunal.

President Lincoln was not willing to resign the government of the nation into the 

hands of the Supreme Court on the issue of slavery. And while he did not live to 

see his work finally accomplished, the Dred Scott decision was finally reversed when 

the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments were ratified in the wake of the civil war. 

In our constitutional republic the answer to the question ‘‘Who guards the guardians?’’ is ‘‘we the people’’ do. 

That is why I have introduced the FMA. 

The Supreme Court is poised to take away from the people their right to declare 

how they will be governed with respect to the issue of same-sex unions. The purpose 

of the FMA is to give the people a voice, to allow them to tell the guardians of their 

liberties that they have erred.

Latin pronunciation guide:
10

quis custodiet ipsos custodes

KWis KUSTodiet IPsos KustoDEES
11
12
13
14
15

Mr. CHABOT. Before we go to Judge Bork, if I could make one 

point that I wanted to mention. We have a markup after this hearing for Members, if they could stay around, on H.R. 568 and 1775. 
16

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, point of information, is that the oak 

tree bill? 

Mr. CHABOT. One of them is. 

Mr. NADLER. Yes, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, further points of information—seriously this time. 

Mr. CHABOT. That was not serious? 

Mr. NADLER. Not really. 

Mr. Chairman, I am a little confused after Mrs. Musgrave’s 

statement. I had thought that in the text of the resolution before 

us the words ‘‘nor State or Federal law’’ had been removed, and yet 

your testimony seems to indicate that those words are still there. 

Which is the case in the proposal? 

Mr. CHABOT. If the gentlewoman would like to respond, although 

we are really not in the question part, but just as a point of order. 

Mr. NADLER. As a point of information, does your proposal still 

have those words or have you removed those words? 

Mrs. MUSGRAVE. Senator Allard made those changes in the Senate. It has not officially been changed here, but I am amenable to 

changes that make the intent very clear. 

Mr. NADLER. But as of now it is still there. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Judge Bork, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JUDGE ROBERT BORK, McLEAN, VA 

Judge BORK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here 

at the invitation of the Subcommittee to discuss the wording of this 

Federal Marriage Amendment. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would you pull the mike closer, Judge? Thank you. 

Judge BORK. I think it is wise to say that of all the contested terrain in the culture war we are now engaged in, the subject of the 

homosexual rights is the most awkward to discuss. Because almost 

all of us know homosexuals who are decent, intelligent, compassionate people; and we have no desire to wound them. Yet this subject has been thrust upon us by the courts, and yet we unfortunately have to discuss it. 

It is a problem created by the courts, and the objection is that 

part of the case for the Federal Marriage Amendment is to restore 

the branch of government which should be predominant in these 

matters, the legislature, to decide what the relationship should be, 

and to stop the process of courts ordering things that are nowhere 

to be found in any constitution. 

The other problem is the substance of what the courts have done. 

Because I think, as you said, Mr. Chairman, there is evidence coming now from the Netherlands and there has been evidence from 

Sweden that the institution of gay marriage, same-sex marriage 

leads to——

In the first place, very few homosexuals apply for marriage licenses, because I do not think that is the point. Most of the point 

is gaining cultural approbation. They want an official statement 

that their life style is as normal as any other. But what does happen is a decline in the marriage rate among heterosexuals which 

among itself is problematical. But, in addition to that, that is followed by the dissolution of families so that you wind up increasingly with a lot of children being raised in one-parent families, 
17

which is—as all we know, leads to social pathologies we do not care 

to see. 

Now we have had three State courts hold that homosexual marriage is required. One of them offered the alternative of civil 

unions. I think most court watchers believe that within, say, two 

to three years the Supreme Court of the United States will hold 

that there is a Federal constitutional right to homosexual marriage; and that will come up either directly through the Federal 

courts as a challenge or it will come up when some State asserts 

the Defense of Marriage Act to prevent full faith and credit being 

given to a marriage they contracted in Massachusetts being imported into Texas. For that reason, this prospect of a Nationwide 

rule in favor of same-sex marriage is right now before us, and it 

is imminent. 

There is some argument that we ought to leave the matter to the 

States. This matter will not be left to the States by the courts. We 

will have a Nationwide rule either allowing same-sex marriage or, 

because of this amendment, disallowing same-sex marriage. 

Since I had something to do with the drafting of the version of 

the House amendment proposal, I think I am free to say that I am 

now not entirely happy with what we did. The first sentence is 

quite clear. The second sentence, however, which was intended to 

say that a court should not require civil unions as a matter of constitutional law, only legislatures could do that, some people said, 

well, the second sentence could be read to say that the legislatures 

could not do it either. 

Now we are prepared to argue that point, but it is not a point 

worth arguing because we have no intention of trying to prevent 

any democratically enacted form of civil unions. So for that reason 

I agree with Congressman Musgrave that the Senate version is the 

one that should now be made, that the House version should be 

made congruent with the Senate version so that it is quite clear 

that marriage is between a man and a woman and that civil unions 

are up to the various legislatures in what they may decide. Thus, 

Vermont, which now has a civil union legislation enacted under coercion of the courts, would be free either to retain or to repeal that 

legislation. 

The Senate language makes absolutely clear that was intended 

in the House version from the beginning; and I recommend that 

that version, the Senate version, be adopted by the House. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Judge Bork. 

[The prepared statement of Judge Bork follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. BORK

I am pleased to be here at the invitation of the Judiciary Subcommittee on the 

Constitution to discuss the wording of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment 

embodied in House Joint Resolution 56. 

Of all the contested terrain in the culture war, the subject of homosexual rights 

is the most awkward to discuss. Almost all of us know homosexuals who are decent, 

intelligent and compassionate people, and we have no inclination to wound them. 

Yet ‘‘gay rights’’ have come to the fore and we must have a discussion, free of ad 

hominem accusations, about whether homosexual acts and relationships are to be 

regarded as on a par with the marital relationship of a man and a woman. The immediate problem is the homosexual activists’ drive for same-sex marriage. 
18

By no means all homosexuals want the right to marry, and in Sweden, where they 

have that right, very few exercise it. It seems clear that the drive for same-sex marriage is primarily about a constitutional ruling as the ultimate expression of moral 

approbation of homosexual behavior. The tactic of the activists is to seek judicial 

rulings because it is clear that a majority of the American public and their elected 

representatives do not want same-sex marriages. Judges, however, have pushed and 

continued to push our culture in ever more permissive directions and do not hesitate 

to strike down laws that for all of our history, for well over two centuries, have been 

regarded as legitimate defenses of the moral order. Homosexuals have already won 

significant victories in the courts and they see as the last obstacle to the complete 

normalization of homosexual behavior the ages-old understanding that marriage is 

the union of a man and a woman. 

The activists won in Hawaii under the state constitution, but were then defeated 

by the Hawaiian electorates’ amendment of that constitution to overturn the decision. The activists largely won in Vermont where the court, again acting in the 

name of the state constitution, told the legislature it must provide either a right 

to homosexual marriage or a right to civil unions. The Vermont constitution takes 

years to amend and so the legislature chose civil unions. The Supreme Judicial 

Court of Massachusetts, however, gave the activists what they wanted, an unambiguous right to homosexual marriage in a state where amending the constitution is 

an arduous process that can not be completed in time to meet the court’s deadline. 

Many court watchers believe that within one to three years the Supreme Court 

will hold either that there is a federal constitutional right to homosexual marriage 

or that all states are required to accept Massachusetts marriages as valid within 

their own borders. Either way there will be a nationwide rule. The matter will not 

be left to individual states to decide. 

For that reason, Representative Marilyn Musgrave put forward a proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. Since I had something to do with the drafting of that 

proposal, I think I may be allowed to say that it was in some respects deficient. The 

amendment as introduced said:

‘‘Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and 

a woman. Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state 

or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.’’

The first sentence clearly means that no branch of any government in the United 

States—executive, legislative, or judicial and whether the government is federal, 

state or local—may alter the definition of marriage as the union of a man and a 

woman. Moreover, no court or other branch of any such government may recognize 

a same-sex marriage contracted in another country. The purpose of this sentence is 

thus clearly to preserve the institution of marriage as it has been understood for 

millennia and as it has formed the basis for our society. 

The second sentence, however, is directed to activists courts. They are not to construe language in constitutions or legislation to require the recognition of civil 

unions, unless, of course, legislatures make a deliberative choice to authorize such 

unions. The question of civil unions is thus left to democratic determination. 

Objections to this second sentence have convinced me that it is poorly drafted and 

causes needless controversy. Critics say that, read literally, the sentence would forbid courts to implement legislatively-enacted civil unions. That was not the intent. 

It was hoped that this objection could be avoided by making the intention of the 

sentence clear in the debates that would surround the amendment in Congress and, 

if sent to the states, in the ratification debates. It was thought, moreover, that the 

word ‘‘construed’’ would indicate that the sentence was intended merely to restrain 

activists courts from requiring civil unions against the desires of the legislature involved. 

There is no point in debating this matter when altering the language of the second sentence can make the point clear. For that reason, I recommend the version 

of the second sentence contained in Senate Joint Resolution 30: ‘‘Marriage in the 

United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this 

Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that 

marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 

union of a man and a woman.’’ There is no doubt whatever, that this sentence 

leaves legislatures free to provide for civil unions if they wish. Thus, Vermont, 

which now has civil union legislation enacted under the coercion of its supreme 

court, would be free either to retain or repeal that legislation. The Senate language 

makes absolutely clear what was intended in the House version of the Federal Marriage Amendment.
19

Mr. CHABOT. The Honorable Barney Frank is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARNEY FRANK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman and Members, I appreciate the way 

that Judge Bork began by saying he did not wish to give offense. 

So I want to reciprocate and, given the title to one of his books 

which was not mentioned, I am fighting my natural tendency to 

slouch. I am going to try to sit up very straight. 

The amendment has been wildly underdescribed, although the 

gentlewoman from Colorado did accurately describe it at one point. 

This is not an amendment to prevent judges from making this decision. It is not an amendment to prevent the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause from going into effect. We may have a referendum in Massachusetts. We will have one if our legislature wants to have one. 

So if the democratically elected legislature of Massachusetts decides under our constitution to put an amendment on the ballot by 

a simple majority of next year’s legislature and if the voters of 

Massachusetts allow same-sex marriage to stand, this constitutional amendment knocks it out. So let us not talk about this as 

a way to stop the judges from doing something or to stop the Full 

Faith and Credit Clause or the U.S. Supreme Court. If that is what 

proponents want to do, I do not agree with it, but they know how 

to do it. 

Indeed, as Judge Bork pointed out, this amendment differentiates. It says nobody, no legislature, no referendum, no combination of democratic procedures in a State, can enact same-sex marriage, even if we were to confine that to that State. 

He then says, let us have a second section, reword it to say 

courts cannot require civil unions, legislatures can. In other words, 

they know how to differentiate. 

So let us be clear. This is a conscious decision not to prevent 

judges from deciding and not to interfere with that, to amend the 

effect of Full Faith and Credit, but to prevent any State by democratic procedures from going forward with this. 

Now why do people say that? I think there are two groups of people who oppose same-sex marriage. There is a group that, frankly, 

does not like those of us who are gay and lesbian individually and, 

not liking us individually, they are geometrically more unhappy at 

the notion of a couple of us hanging out. 

I will pass up on the question of our physical capability that the 

gentlewoman from Colorado raised. 

There is a broader group, however, I believe, which represents 

the most important group numerically. Those are people who are 

not themselves in any way inclined to make the lives of gay and 

lesbian people less than others. They do not dislike us. They are 

prepared to work with us. They are prepared to share their lives 

with us in a lot of ways. But people whom they respect, religious 

leaders, political leaders and others, have told them that if samesex marriage is allowed this will be very disarranging to society. 

Now I have been working on anti-discrimination measures for 

more than 30 years as a legislator. Every time we deal with dis-
20

crimination based on race or gender or religion, which is a choice 

by the way, purely a choice, or disability or age or sexual orientation, we hear predictions that chaos will ensue. The world will be 

greatly disarranged. None of those are ever true. 

We had in Massachusetts a bill passed to ban discrimination 

based on sexual orientation 15 years ago. It has been very well enforced by Republican governors ever since. It has not caused any 

problem. 

I believe we are now hearing, and I think the critical element 

here, are people—not those who are opposed to us in principle getting married, not people who believe that marriage should always 

be between people of opposite sex—and I was impressed that the 

gentlewoman of Colorado did not repeat the formula that marriage 

has always been between one man and one woman, because, clearly, it has not. It has often been between one man and at least one 

woman. Figures such as Joshua or Abraham in the Bible, for instance, are in that situation. 

But the question then is, what will happen if we allow a State— now let us take this amendment at its fullest. Suppose the State 

of Massachusetts votes in a referendum that it is okay for men and 

men or women and women to get married. Well, let us lay our predictions out. Let me make my predictions. 

One, there will be no polygamy. Two, the divorce rate will not 

go up compared to what it has been. Three, children will not be 

abused. Four, there will not be an erosion of family stability in any 

particular minority community. 

Now we have heard references to a prediction that somehow this 

is going to lead heterosexuals to stop getting married. Indeed, if it 

has any effect—and this may be already happening—it may put 

some pressure on heterosexuals to get married, not that I want to 

dictate to their lives any more than I want them to dictate to mine. 

But there are now in various institutions in the private sector and 

in some governments domestic partnership benefits, and some people have extended the domestic partnership benefits to people of 

the opposite sex as well as the same sex. 

I think it is very plausible to say that once people of the same 

sex can get married, they have to do that, and they do not have 

the option of domestic partnership benefits. Some have already 

begun to say that. So the result of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts will be a diminution of opposite-sex domestic partnerships. So 

some heterosexuals will decide that they are going to have to get 

married. 

I do not think most people make those calculations based on economics. But I really do think it is important for the Committee—

let us lay out our predictions. I have laid out mine. I guess what 

people seem to sometimes forget is same-sex marriage will be entirely optional, even in Massachusetts, and it will have an effect on 

those people who choose to get married, and it will have no effect 

on people who choose not to. 

Civil unions were referenced. I will close with this. 

We had this debate a few years ago in Vermont. Vermont was 

one of the courts to which Judge Bork alluded, and they ordered 

something, and they got civil unions. Virtually all of the arguments 

about the socially disorganizing effects of marriage were made 
21

about civil unions in Vermont 4 years ago. Today, civil unions in 

Vermont are boring to all the people who are not in them and, 

given human nature, to a few of the people who are, but they have 

had no negative social impacts whatsoever. 

So let us lay out our predictions. Massachusetts will go ahead 

and have marriage. A year from now, I hope you will convene this 

hearing again and we can see whose predictions are right. 

I say no polygamy. There will not be a Full Faith and Credit 

Clause. The Supreme Court of the United States will not require 

this. There will not be an increase in the divorce rate. There will 

be thousands of thousands of people married in Massachusetts. 

Most of them will live happily ever after, some of them will not, 

and that will be it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frank follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARNEY FRANK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

During my years in elected office, I have been involved in a number of debates 

involving measures that deal with discrimination. I have supported legislation to 

prohibit inappropriately unequal treatment of individuals based on their race, their 

religion, their gender, their sexual orientation, their age and whether or not they 

are disabled. In every case, opponents of the legislation have made predictions that 

social chaos will ensue. In no case of which I am aware have these predictions 

turned out to be accurate. That is, in every case of which I am aware, enactment 

of legislation prohibiting unfair treatment of people based on various personal characteristics has had some beneficial effects for those in the category being protected 

against mistreatment, and no negative effects on society at large. 

Unfortunately, while the predictions of social chaos are often widely discussed in 

legislative bodies, the media, and elsewhere before enactments, they are rarely examined afterwards. This is unfortunate, because were we to make a regular practice 

of going back to these debates after various anti-discriminatory laws were enacted 

to check on the validity of the predictions made by their opponents, we would see 

a very clear pattern: vivid forecasts of social upheaval, moral decay, interference 

with the legitimate rights of the majority of people to go about their business, the 

destruction of important social institutions, and other negative effects; then, after 

adoption of the cause of all this worry , none of the above. 

This has been particularly clear in the area of legislation dealing with discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identification. In Massachusetts, the 

legislature passed and the Governor signed a law in 1989 banning discrimination 

based on sexual orientation and employment. It was passed under Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis and it has been administered by a series of Republican Governors since, all of whom have supported the continuation of the law, and in none 

of whose administrations have any negative consequence resulted. 

Similarly, in Vermont, in the years leading up to the adoption of civil unions, the 

state was riven by controversy, with opponents of civil unions predicting that the 

implementation of the policy in the state would have terribly negative consequences 

on the institution of marriage, and morality in general. Indeed, the election of 

Vermont in 2000 was dominated by this. 

Since that time, this has become essentially a non-issue in Vermont. Indeed, my 

impression is that if someone not interested in a civil union with someone not of 

his or her own sex were to move from another state to Vermont today, and that 

individual was not a student of recent history nor particularly interested in the ins 

and outs of domestic law, he or she would probably go for a long time without knowing that there was such a thing as civil unions, unless he or she met a couple involved in one. And then it would be a matter of perhaps some interest, but of no 

impact on that individual’s life. 

I believe we would do public policy debates in this country a service by beginning 

now a new procedure: let’s have both sides in this current debate make very explicit 

in these days just before Massachusetts begins actually performing same-sex marriage our predictions of what the consequences will be. 
22

Mine are very simple: several thousand people in Massachusetts of the same sex 

will marry each other. They will then live married lives very similar to the married 

lives of other people. Most, we hope, will be happy. Some will not be. The effects 

of either sort of marriage will be primarily on those engaged in the marriage, with 

some impact on those of their friends and relatives who choose to associate with 

them. There will be no serious effort to extend the right to marry to people interested in polygamy, because while some differences are hard to maintain, the difference between two people and three people is a fairly clear-cut one. There will be 

no diminution whatsoever, in the number of heterosexual marriages that happen, 

everything else being equal. That is, the ratio of heterosexual marriages among eligible people in Massachusetts to those that take place elsewhere in the country will 

not be altered by this. Indeed, since some private employers have announced that 

they will no longer honor domestic partnership benefits between people who are unmarried, now that everyone in the Commonwealth will have the right to get married, there may in fact an incentive for some people to enter into heterosexual marriages, who have not previously done so, because they might otherwise lose some 

benefits. But I think this will be at most an incidental effect. 

There will be no negative impact whatsoever of this on marriage within any particular community in Massachusetts, including racial and ethnic minorities. Nor will 

there be any increased incidence in the number of people who discover that they 

are gay, lesbian or bisexual, and there will be no negative effect whatsoever on the 

raising of children. 

In this context, the most important thing to note about same-sex marriage is one 

that debates seem to me sometimes to overlook: it is optional. This means that it 

will have an impact almost exclusively on those who decide to take advantage of 

the option. It will not affect the behavior of gay and lesbian people who decide not 

pursue this option, and it will clearly have no effect whatsoever on heterosexual people who are completely uninterested in marrying people of their own sex. I urge the 

Committee in its questioning to ask those who are opponents to be equally explicit 

about their predictions, and I further urge the Committee one year from now to 

come back and have a hearing in which the various predictions that those of us 

make about this can be scrutinized in the light of experience.

Mr. CHABOT. Our final witness this morning will be Mr. Sekulow. 

STATEMENT OF JAY SEKULOW, THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR 

LAW AND JUSTICE, INC. 

Mr. SEKULOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Nadler and Members of the Judiciary Subcommittee. Thank you for 

inviting me to participate in a hearing that I think is important. 

Like marriage itself, amending the Constitution is not something 

to be entered into lightly. 

In calling for a constitutional amendment here to uphold marriage as a union between a man and a woman, the proposal reflects 

the reality that a rush of push-the-envelope activist judges, four 

unelected appointed-for-life judges in Massachusetts have initiated 

a process that has, in reality, completely thwarted the legislative 

deliberative process; and that is because those four justices in the 

majority in the Goodrich case demanded that the State legislature 

redraft the laws concerning marriage and insert the phrase that 

marriage shall be defined now as one spouse to the exclusion of all 

others. 

This was a mandate. The entire legislative deliberative process 

in Massachusetts was thwarted through this because, in reality, it 

is now an after-the-fact response, as Congressman Frank alluded 

to, regarding the constitutional amendment. 

There will also be—and this is one of those rare occasions, I believe, where there is the convergence of legal confusion, a thwarting of the legislative process, and ultimately litigation that will 

probably ensue rather quickly in all 50 States. 
23

With reference to where this is going to go in the predictions, I 

will give one prediction. I will not be as bold as Congressman 

Frank in predicting this, but I will give you this prediction. That 

by this time next year litigation will be ensued in most of the 

States challenging the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage 

Act. In fact, today in Florida a Federal lawsuit was filed challenging DOMA, despite the fact that no State yet has legally issued 

a marriage license. I think the inevitable and the resulting conflict 

in the courts is going to be quite significant on the Defense of Marriage Act. 

We saw that, emboldened by the four judges’ decision in Massachusetts, the bare majority, that officials in San Francisco issued 

thousands of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even though 

that was intentionally contrary to California’s Defense of Marriage 

Act which was passed by an overwhelming majority just a few 

years ago. 

By the way, California also passed as a legislative enactment, 

protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation, but 

they also have a prohibition on same-sex marriage. 

Public officials in States like Oregon, of course, New York, New 

Jersey, New Mexico have also attempted similar legal experiments, 

despite legislation to the contrary. In fact, I think it is fair to say 

that the Mayor in San Francisco literally took the law into his own 

hands, because there was not yet a determination by any court 

with regard to the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. The only 

legislation that was in place specifically prohibited that activity. 

Yet he issued licenses. That currently, of course, is now before the 

California Supreme Court. 

The effect of these decisions and the intent of the litigation strategy behind them is unmistakable, and that is to establish same-sex 

marriage as a civil right, not through the legislative process but 

rather, through the courts. Because, in reality, the legislative process thus far has not been responsive to the claims made and the 

positions advocated by the legal strategy of the same-sex advocates. 

To reach the outcome that was desired, it took a majority in this 

particular case in Massachusetts, of four judges to change the law 

in Massachusetts. And, as I said, the prediction that I will make 

is that by this time next year there will be litigation in a host of 

States, probably a majority of the States. Because individuals in 

Massachusetts that are duly authorized residents of Massachusetts 

that will seek a marriage license, obtain that marriage license, 

they may get transferred in their jobs, they may decide to move 

under their own volition, they are going to want recognition under 

the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 

I will tell you that my prediction on that, and I will limit these 

to just a few, will be that the Supreme Court of the United 

States—I personally would not want to rest the institution of marriage on the United States Supreme Court at this point. 

We think that this resolution as modified by the Senate’s 

version—I think the modifications are important to clarify exactly 

what is at issue—should be put into effect. We have heard from, 

in just a few weeks, over 230,000 of our members from around the 
24

1See May 17, 2004 letter from ACLJ to Chairman Chabot in the Appendix. The referenced 

petition was submitted to the Constitution Subcommittee and can be found in the official heaing 

docket. 

country.1 There are two concerns, and I think these are the two 

fundamental concerns in this issue. 

That is, number one, the deliberative process has been completely eviscerated by the decision of the four judges in Massachusetts; and, number two, the very institution of marriage as it has 

traditionally been understood, at least in the United States since 

colonial times, is also subject to significant change and redirection. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Sekulow. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sekulow follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAY ALAN SEKULOW

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Nadler, and members of the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, thank you for extending the invitation to appear before the Subcommittee to testify in support of House Joint Resolution 56, the ‘‘Federal Marriage Amendment’’ (The Musgrave Amendment). 

I respectfully request that the entirety of my personal statement be made a part 

of the record of today’s hearing. 

OPENING REMARKS

Like marriage itself, amending the Constitution is not something to be entered 

into lightly. 

In calling for a constitutional amendment to uphold marriage as a union between 

a man and a woman, H.J. Res. 56 reflects the reality that a rush of push-the-envelope activism by some state courts and local officials has left no other option available to resolve the debate over the unique nature, purpose and legal status of marriage. There is no doubt that how the issue is settled will shape the future of our 

society and the course of constitutional government in the United States. 

Beginning with a trial court in Hawaii in 1993, followed by the Alaska Superior 

Court in 1998, and a Vermont Supreme Court ruling in 1999, state courts have determined that marriage as it has always been in this country, from Colonial times 

to the present, discriminates based on gender preference. Then, in November 2003, 

the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that traditional marriage upholds persistent prejudices and that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to 

marry. 

Emboldened by such activism, San Francisco officials issued thousands of ‘‘marriage licenses’’ to same-sex couples, even though intentionally contrary to California’s Defense of Marriage Act, passed by an overwhelming majority just a few years 

ago. Public officials in other states, like Oregon, New York, New Jersey, and New 

Mexico, have also attempted similar legal experiments, all under the claim that limiting traditional marriage to one man and one woman is discriminatory, and unconstitutional. 

The effect of these decisions, and the intent of the litigation strategy behind them, 

is unmistakable: to establish same-sex marriage as a civil right, a right that the federal government would be constitutionally obligated to secure nationwide. Advocates 

of same-sex marriage demand, and will accept, nothing less. To reach this outcome, 

activist judges have simply ignored the custom and experience of recorded Western 

history, flouting the laws of our country, and condescending to every major religious 

tradition in the world. The startling holding by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 

Court, a legal preference for traditional marriage is ‘‘irrational,’’ chillingly illustrates 

the need to resolve this matter now. 

The shock of these startling attempts to change marriage by judicial edict is all 

the more troubling because they skirt the democratic process. This shreds the rule 

of law, excludes the people from this fundamental debate and decision, and 

emboldens local officials to determine for themselves which laws they will and will 

not enforce. 

This is why H.J. Res. 56 is so essential. Its passage will allow, once and for all, 

the states to decide through the democratic process whether marriage will remain 

the union of one man and one woman. No other process will accomplish this imperative. 
25

1 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 (1993). 2Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples—A History, Oct. 1, 2002, available at http://

www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1067. 3 Baehr, 74 Haw. at 561; 852 P.2d at 59. 4 Id. at 583, 852 P.2d at 68. 5Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples—A History, supra note 2. 6 Id.

7 B.A. Robinson, Homosexual (Same-Sex) Marriages in Alaska, Jan. 20, 2004, available at

http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom—mar9.htm. 8 Id.

9 Id.; see also Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 at 1 (Alaska Super. Ct. 

1998). 

Social science, and human experience over hundreds of years, tells us that marriage is best for the family, and especially for children. Children are hurt when either the father or the mother is absent. Given its purpose and function in society, 

there can be no doubt marriage is sui generis and our most vital institution. The 

question must therefore be settled: is the marriage of one man and one woman, and 

the hope of children it provides, the cornerstone of our welfare, of our liberties and 

of our responsibilities as a free people; and if so, it must be protected? 

I look forward to this discussion, and to any questions Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

I. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY

For many years now, lawyers for same-sex marriage proponents have been trying 

to extend the institution of marriage to embrace same-sex relationships. Having 

been unsuccessful in swaying the public opinion in favor of recognizing same-sex 

marriage through the legislative process, proponents have turned to the courts. 

A. Litigation in the states 

1. Hawaii 

The same-sex marriage legal situation began in earnest in 1993 in the State of 

Hawaii. In that year, the Hawaii State Supreme Court ruled in Baehr v. Lewin 1

that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples ‘‘may violate the Hawaii Constitution’s ban on sex discrimination.’’ 2 The Court found that the denial of marriage 

licenses to same-sex couples constituted sex-based discrimination in violation of the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution.3 In light of this conclusion, the 

Court remanded the case to the circuit court with the following, ominous instructions: 

On remand, in accordance with the ‘‘strict scrutiny’’ standard, the burden will 

rest on [the State] to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572–1 is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.4

When a Court requires a statute to pass ‘‘strict scrutiny,’’ the law in question has 

little chance of surviving. 

In 1996, the Hawaii Circuit Court ruled that the state did not have a compelling 

reason to restrict marriage only to couples of the opposite sex, and held that the 

same-sex couples ‘‘should therefore be allowed to marry.’’ 5 The case went back to 

the Hawaii Supreme Court, but before it could issue an order requiring the issuance 

of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the people of Hawaii approved a constitutional amendment ‘‘restricting marriage to men and women only.’’ 6 The amendment 

passed by an overwhelming seventy percent vote in favor with only thirty percent 

opposed. 

2. Alaska 

In 1994, a gay couple in Alaska filed for a marriage license.7 Their request was 

denied. The couple brought a lawsuit, asking that Alaska’s Marriage Code be found 

unconstitutional because it restricted marriage to heterosexual couples.8 In 1998, an 

Alaska Superior Court judge acquiesced, ruling that ‘‘marriage, i.e., the recognition 

of one’s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right. The state must therefore 

have a compelling interest that supports its decision to refuse to recognize the exercise of this fundamental right by those who choose same-sex partners rather than 

opposite-sex partners.’’ 9 Similar to the situation in Hawaii, the Alaska Court system 

forced the state to support its marriage laws under the difficult-to-satisfy strict scrutiny standard. 
26

10 Robinson, supra note 7. 11 Id. 12 Id; see also Alaska CONST. Art. I, § 25 (2004). 13 Robinson, supra note 7. 14 Id. 15 Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 226 (1999). 16 Id. at 226. 17 Id. at 197–98. 18Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples—A History, supra note 2. 19 Id. 20 News Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Sweeping Gay Marriage Lawsuit in New Jersey Aims for U.S. History (June 26, 2002), available at http://www.lambdalegal. 

org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1074. 21 News Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lower-Court Loss in Lawsuit 

Seeking Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in New Jersey ‘Propels Us Forward’’ To Higher Courts 

Where Case Will Be Decided, Lambda Legal Says, Nov. 5, 2003, available at http://

www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1345. 22 Id. 23 ‘‘Marriage in New Jersey,’’ available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=17267&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/

ContentDisplay.cfm 24 Id. (not a direct quote from AG, but rather a quote from the AP’s summary on the web 

site). 25 ‘‘Marriage in San Francisco,’’ available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=16860&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/

ContentDisplay.cfm. 26 Id.

During the pendency of the couple’s lawsuit, concerned Alaskans were working to 

get a constitutional amendment regarding marriage on the ballot.10 In November 

1998, Measure 2 appeared on ballots in Alaska.11 This measure provided, ‘‘Each 

marriage contract in this State may be entered into only by one man and one 

woman.’’ 12 Alaskans overwhelmingly approved this measure, 68% for to 32% 

against.13 The passage of this amendment made the same-sex couple’s request for 

a marriage license moot, and their case was dismissed.14 As in Hawaii, but for the 

passage of this constitutional amendment, same-sex marriage would likely be a reality in Alaska today. 

3. Vermont 

In 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Vermont 15 that the State was ‘‘constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits 

and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.’’ 16 The Court instructed the Vermont legislature that it must adopt one of two alternatives to fulfill 

this requirement: 1) issue marriage licenses to homosexual couples, or 2) enact a 

domestic partnership or similar system that provides homosexual couples with all 

the rights and privileges married couples enjoy.17 In 2000, the Vermont legislature 

passed a law that created ‘‘civil unions’’ for same-sex couples.18 This law gives ‘‘these couples all the rights and benefits of marriage under Vermont law but not 

marriage licenses.’’ 19 In Vermont, then, the same-sex marriage movement is just 

one step away from realizing their ultimate goal. 

4. New Jersey 

In June 2002, seven homosexual couples filed a lawsuit, captioned Lewis et. al. v. Harris et. al., requesting the recognition of same-sex marriage in New Jersey.20

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed the lawsuit on behalf of these couples. A state judge ruled against the plaintiffs in November 2003.21 The case is currently on appeal. Lambda Legal expects this case to ultimately be decided by the 

New Jersey Supreme Court.22

More recently, the City of Asbury Park, N.J., following the lead of San Francisco 

Mayor Gavin Newsom, started issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.23 The 

city commenced this practice on March 8, 2004. New Jersey’s Attorney General ‘‘said 

he would seek an injunction to halt the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex 

couples in the state.’’ 24 The American Center for Law and Justice filed a state court 

action against the City of Asbury Park concerning the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses. 

5. California 

In contravention of a California initiative passed just a few years ago by an overwhelming majority of California voters that limited marriage to heterosexual couples, San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom directed city officials to begin issuing 

marriage licenses to same-sex couples.25 San Francisco started issuing licenses on 

February 12, 2004, and has currently issued more than 4,000 licenses.26 On March 
27

27 Bob Egelko, Court Halts Gay Vows, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 12, 2004, available at

http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&Template=/ContentManagement/

ContentDisplay.cfm&Cont entID=17392. 28 Id. 29 Alliance Alert, Alliance Defense Fund, Status Report: California Same Sex Marriage Litigation (Apr. 12, 2004), available at http://www.alliancealert.org/index.php?ID=171. 30 News Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lambda Legal and Northwest 

Women’s Law Center File Lawsuit Seeking Full Marriage for Lesbian and Gay Couples in Washington State (March 8, 2004), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/

record?record=1464. 31 Id. 32Gene Johnson, Gay Couples Sue for Right to Marry, The Associated Press, March 9, 2004, 

available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=17205&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ 

ContentDisplay.cfm; see also Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 26.04.010 (2004). 33Marriage in Oregon, available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=17512&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/

ContentDisplay.cfm. 34Theresa Hogue, In Benton, the Wedding’s Off: County to Halt All Marriage Licenses, Corvallis Gazette-Times, March 23, 2004, available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&Template=/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=17659. 35Marriage in Oregon, supra note 33. 36Letter from Oregon Attorney General Hardy Myers to Oregon Governor Ted Kolongoski, 

(March 12, 2004), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/pdfs/AG—samesexopinion.pdf. 37Lyle Denniston, Oregon Judge Upholds Rights for Gay Couples, Boston Globe, April 21, 

2004. 38Marriage in New York, available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=17083&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/

ContentDisplay.cfm. 39 Id.

12, 2004, the California Supreme Court ‘‘ordered an immediate halt . . . to samesex weddings in San Francisco.’’ 27 The Court will not address whether the state law 

limiting marriage to heterosexuals is unconstitutional, but instead will decide the 

narrower issue of whether ‘‘Newsom can ignore the state law if he considers it unconstitutional.’’ 28 Several lawsuits have been filed in California challenging the constitutionality of California’s Defense of Marriage Act.29

6. Washington 

On March 8, 2004, Lambda Legal filed a lawsuit in a Washington state court on 

behalf of six same-sex couples seeking the right to marry.30 Jamie Pedersen, CoChair of Lambda Legal’s Board of Directors, said of the lawsuit, ‘‘As long as gay 

couples cannot marry, they are not treated equally under the law. This case seeks 

full marriage for lesbian and gay couples in Washington—nothing more and nothing 

less.’’ 31 Complicating the same-sex marriage issue in Washington, Seattle Mayor 

Greg Nickels recently announced that ‘‘the city would begin recognizing same-sex 

marriages from other jurisdictions,’’ despite Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act 

that limits marriage to opposite-sex couples.32

7. Oregon 

Two County Boards in Oregon, Benton and Multnomah, voted to issue marriage 

licences to same-sex couples in March 2004.33 Benton County has ceased issuing licenses to any couples, gay or straight, in response to Oregon Attorney General 

Hardy Myers’s threat to sue the County and his promise to accelerate a constitutional challenge to Multnomah’s decision to issue licenses to gay couples.34 Multnomah County has not stopped issuing licenses, and currently has granted licenses 

to over 2,400 same-sex couples.35 In a legal memorandum written to Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski, General Myers predicted that the Oregon Supreme Court 

would likely ‘‘conclude that withholding from same-sex couples the legal rights, benefits and obligations that . . . are automatically granted to married couples of the 

opposite sex violates’’ Oregon’s constitutional provision guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.36

8. New York 

In New York three issues are in play. First, mayors of three New York towns have 

taken actions favorable to the recognition of same-sex marriages. On February 27, 

2004, the mayor of New Paltz, New York, Jason West, started marrying same-sex 

couples without issuing them licenses.37 West’s renegade conduct ceased when the 

local district attorney charged him with 19 criminal counts.38 On February 28, 2004, 

John Shields, mayor of Nyack, promised to ‘‘lead a group of same-sex couples to the 

clerk’s office to apply for marriage licences.’’ 39 And on March 2, 2004, the mayor 
28

40 Id. (direct quote from the article, not the person). 41 Id. (direct quote from the article, not the person). 42Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, Attorney General 

Issues Opinion on Same Sex Marriage (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/

press/2004/mar/mar03a—04.html. 43 Id. 44 News Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lambda Legal Files Historic 

Lawsuit Seeking Full Marriage for Gay Couples in New York (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http:/

/www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1462. 45Judge Quits N.M. Gay Marriage Case, The Associated Press, Mar. 30, 2004, available at

http://www. hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=17834&TEMPLATE=/

ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm. 46 Id. 47 Jessica Walker, Agency Looks to Block Inmates Marriage, The Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 

15, 2004. 48 Alliance Alert, Alliance Defense Fund, Same Sex Marriage Pending and Recent Litigation 

Summary (Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://www.alliancealert.org/aa2004/2004—04—13.htm. 49Judge: Same-Sex Marriage Lawsuit Can Proceed, CNN Law Center, Nov. 11, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/11/samesex.lawsuit.ap. 

50 Id. 51Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 52 Id. at 312. 53 Id. (emphasis added) 54Massachusetts Approves Gay Marriage Ban, Legalizes Civil Unions, CNN Law Center, Mar. 

30, 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/29/gay.marriage.ap/. 

of Ithaca, Carolyn Peterson, said the city ‘‘will accept applications [for same-sex 

marriage licenses] and forward them to the state’s health department for individual 

determinations.’’ 40

Second, on March 3, 2004, New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer issued an 

opinion on the state of same-sex marriages in New York. The opinion instructed 

state officials that New York law prohibits the issuance of marriage licenses to 

same-sex couples.41 The General’s opinion also stated, however, that same-sex marriages entered into outside the State ‘‘should be recognized in New York.’’ 42

Third, on March 5, 2004, Lambda Legal filed a lawsuit in New York, as it has 

in several other states, seeking the recognition of same-sex marriage. Kevin 

Cathcart, Executive Director of Lambda Legal, said, ‘‘This is the whole enchilada. 

We seek, and intend to win, full marriage for lesbian and gay couples across New 

York.’’ 43

9. New Mexico 

On February 20, 2004, Sandoval County Clerk Victoria Dunlap started issuing 

marriage licenses to same-sex couples.44 Dunlap issued 66 licenses before a judge 

issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the further issuance of licenses to 

same-sex couples.45 The status of same-sex marriage in New Mexico is now, as elsewhere, in the hands of the courts. 

10. Other States with Pending Same-Sex Marriage Lawsuits 

Individuals in several other states have filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of denying same-sex couples the right to marry. In Alabama, two male prison inmates have sued for the right to marry each other.46 In Florida, a homosexual 

couple has filed a lawsuit in Broward County challenging the state’s marriage 

laws.47 In Nebraska, a lawsuit has been filed in federal court challenging the state’s ban on same-sex marriage.48 The same situations exist in Arizona, Indiana, and 

North Carolina.49

11. Massachusetts 

The key state in the same-sex marriage controversy right now, of course, is Massachusetts. In Goodridge v. Department of Pubic Health,50 the Supreme Judicial 

Court of Massachusetts ruled that the State ‘‘may [not] deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex 

who wish to marry.’’ 51 The Court stated that the State has failed to ‘‘identify any 

constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples.’’ 52

The Court has ordered that same-sex marriage licenses begin to be issued starting 

May 17, 2004.53 As it currently stands, for the first time in our nation’s history, 

same-sex couples will be able to legally marry in just a few short days. 

B. At the federal level—the Defense of Marriage Act

In 1996, the Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the Defense 

of Marriage Act.54 The enactment of DOMA was a welcome moment in the longerterm struggle to support the ongoing stability of society’s bedrock unit: the family. 

At the time of its consideration and adoption, DOMA was a measured response to 
29

55Thirty-eight States, relying on DOMA, have enacted statutory or constitutional provisions 

limiting marriage to the union of opposite sex couples. See http://www.marriagewatch.org/states/

doma.htm. In doing so, this super majority of the States have expressly announced the strong 

public policy preference for limiting marriage to opposite sex unions. 56 James Madison explained these alternatives as reflecting the opportunity for either the 

States or the general government to seek amendment when the experiences of the one or the 

other suggested the propriety of doing so. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 278 (Rossiter ed.) 

(amendment process ‘‘equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the 

amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the 

other’’). Thus, where need was apparent to the one, but not the other, amendment was still, 

at least, a possibility. 

an orchestrated plan to change the law of the fifty States on the question of marriage without the democratic support of the People of the States. That revolution 

would have occurred had persons joined in licensed, same-sex marriages from a single jurisdiction, Hawaii, began traveling to other jurisdictions and then demanding 

legal recognition of their relationships, or of judgments reflecting legitimacy on their 

same-sex unions. The plotted intention was to force States to bend their will and 

abdicate their important public policy interests by weight of the Full Faith and 

Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. 

Exercising its clear authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress 

defined precisely the respect that sister States were bound to give to ‘‘judgments’’

of sister States that two persons of the same sex were married. In crafting DOMA, 

Congress showed its profound respect for the cooperative federalism that is the hallmark of our Republic. In that instance, recognizing the indisputably primary role 

of the States in defining the estate of marriage, and providing for its creation, maintenance, and dissolution, Congress deferred to the judgment of each State the question of whether any union other than that between one man and one woman could 

be accorded legal status as a marriage under state law. At the same time, the Congress properly took account of federal dimensions of marital relationships (under, 

for example, the Internal Revenue Code). 

As far as DOMA goes, it is justified as an exercise of clear Congressional authority under the Constitution, and is substantially relied upon by the States.55 Of 

course, that DOMA suffices for these purposes does not mean that the work of the 

Congress in this area is complete. This is especially so in the wake of Goodridge 

and the penchant of many courts to replace the democratic process with judicial fiat. 

II. THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

The United States Constitution provides for its own amendment as needed to 

meet the needs of the Nation over time. Article V provides the process for amending 

the Constitution. It states:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 

shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 

Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and 

Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 

three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, 

as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; 

Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth 

Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its 

Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

United States Const. Art. V. 

Article V proposes two means for initiating the amendment process and two 

means for ratifying propounded amendments. The first means is essentially federal 

in nature and origin and occurs ‘‘whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem 

it necessary,’’ such that the Congress ‘‘shall propose Amendments to this Constitution....’’ The second means is the product of the States, when, ‘‘on the Application 

of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,’’ Congress calls ‘‘a Convention 

for proposing Amendments....’’ 56

Whichever of the two means initiates the amendment process, an amendment propounded to the States becomes valid when ratified. Article V provides that an 

amendment is ‘‘valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,’’ in 

either of two cases: first, when a propounded amendment is ‘ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States;’’ or, second, when a propounded amendment is ratified by ‘‘Conventions in three fourths’’ of the several States. Pursuant 
30

57 Congress has, with one exception, always preferred to subject the question of ratification 

to approval by the Legislatures of the several States. The twenty-first amendment was the exception to the practice, and resulted in the rapid ratification of the twenty-first amendment (repealing, in turn, the eighteenth amendment). See http:www.usconstitution.net/

constamnotes.html#Am21. 

to Article V, Congress holds the power to choose between the two alternative means 

of ratification.57

House Joint Resolution 56 proposes an amendment to the United States Constitution:

The provisions of House Joint Resolution 56 fall within two broad categories: substantive and procedural. These are treated in turn below. 

A. The Substantive Provisions of the Proposed Amendment 

The Federal Marriage Amendment proposed by H.J. Res. 56 accomplishes two 

tasks. 

First, if ratified, the FMA authoritatively defines the term ‘‘marriage’’ for purposes of federal and state law throughout the United States. 

Second, if ratified, the FMA expressly bars any construction of constitutions or 

laws, whether federal or state, in a way that requires either that marital status be 

conferred on those who are unmarried or that the legal incidents of marriage be conferred on such unmarried couples or groups. Great hue and cry can be anticipated 

from opponents of the amendment. Despite that, the FMA does not, in fact, work 

a surprising, unpredictable, or sudden change in the status of law in the United 

States. Rather, the FMA serves to resolve the uncertainties that have been artificially interjected into what would otherwise be fairly described as an entirely and 

clearly settled question of law. 

1. The FMA Uniformly Confirms the Established, Long-standing and Broadly 

Accepted Definition of Marriage 

On this point, the FMA is definitive and clear: 

‘‘Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 

woman.’’

Not two men. Not two women. Not a man and two or more women. Not a woman 

and two or more men. Not a commune. This ineffable nature of marriage as a union 

between a man and a woman was long established before it was noted by William 

Blackstone:

By statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 38. it is declared, that all persons may lawfully 

marry, but such as are prohibited by God’s law; and that all marriages contracted by lawful persons in the face of the church, and consummate with bodily 

knowledge, and fruit of children, shall be indissoluble.
31

58Over time, the traditional attribution of this story to Abraham Lincoln has been questioned. 

Nonetheless, the story serves well to illustrate fallacious logic. Moreover, that Lincoln cannot 

be shown by original sources to have used this story has not stopped the Judicial Branch from 

employing the story for its economic effectiveness. See, e.g., Bellas v. CBS, Inc. 221 F.3d 517, 

540 (3rd Cir. 2000) (applying Lincoln’s aphorism); First Liberty Investment Group v. Nicholsberg,

145 F.3d 647, 652 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1998) (same); Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 996 F.2d 837, 

841 n.5 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). 

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1, Ch. 15 (emphasis 

added). 

Within a century of its birth, our nation tested the meaning of that common law 

tradition, found that it served the common good, and made it the principle by which 

marriage would be governed in Territories of the United States. The effect of that 

determination was the ban on polygamous marriage, a ban that had particular impact in the Utah Territory, where the Mormon Church had settled. 

The leading case considering the constitutionality of the federal ban on polygamy 

was Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Chief Justice Waite wrote the 

opinion for the Court in Reynolds, affirming a criminal conviction for polygamy, over 

a claim that the prohibition violated the right to free exercise of religion. After disposing of the free exercise defense, the Court addressed the underlying interest in 

monogamous marriage sought to be preserved by the statute in question in Reynolds:

[I]t is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom 

was intended to prohibit legislation [limiting marriage to one man and one 

woman] in respect to this most important feature of social life. Marriage, while 

from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said 

to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and 

duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according 

as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles 

on which the government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests. Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when 

applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while 

that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy. Chancellor Kent 

observes that this remark is equally striking and profound. . . . An exceptional 

colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for 

a time without appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of 

constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social 

life under its dominion.

98 U.S. at 165–66. 

None of the several States has ever, by constitutional provision or by legislative 

enactment, altered the estate of marriage so to admit to it any relationship other 

than that of one man and one woman. No objection to the contrary of this fact can 

be made. Marriage as sanctioned by the States has ever been only that which the 

FMA now makes express and indefeasible. 

2. The FMA Finally Resolves and Places Beyond Judicial Adventure the Uniformly Established, Long-standing and Broadly Accepted Definition of Marriage 

Abraham Lincoln famously questioned, if one called a dog’s tail a leg, how many 

legs the dog would have? Veterinary mathematicians could be counted on to reply, 

‘‘why, five, of course.’’ And that sought after response would draw the laugh of the 

great man, along with his rebuff that, no matter what you called a tail, it was never 

going to be a leg.58 And, no matter what you call the union of any grouping of persons other than one man and one woman, it will never be a marriage. Nonetheless, 

judges in a number of States have been busy counting five legged dogs and creating 

judicial mandates for marital constellations no less bizarre. 

For centuries of American legal history and a millennium of common law, marriage has been only one thing: the union of one man and one woman. Call three 

men and a baby a marriage, if you must, but Lincoln would as surely chuckle as 

if you had counted five legs on his hound. Nonetheless, the ongoing struggle of our 

States to preserve to themselves the power to define the institution of marriage is 

suffering blow after blow from judges that have never counted fewer than five legs 

on Lincoln’s dog. We have indicated above some of the instances of the judicial rearrangement of marriage. 
32

59See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (‘‘the important public interest in marital harmony’’) (discussing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (affirming federal spousal 

privilege, limiting ability to assert privilege to the testifying spouse). 60See KSA § 60–423(b) (testimonial privilege in criminal cases); KSA § 60–248 (more limited 

spousal privilege in civil litigation). 61See, e.g., Freedman v. McCandless, 539 Pa. 584, 654 A.2d 529 (1995); but see 701 A.2d 176 

(Pa. 1996) (noting limitations on the presumption of paternity resulting from changing patterns 

of family life and changes in legal status of children born out of wedlock). 

Plainly, it is within the power of the States to put any question, any issue, beyond 

the reach of special interest groups and judges that have usurped the power of the 

people and the role of the legislature. There is no constitutional offense committed 

against the sovereignty of the States when, for their mutual aid and care, the States 

compact together in the manner proposed by the FMA. The donation of a small portion of sovereignty, over the definition of marriage and the judicially compelled disposition of its benefits, if it occurs, will be by the vote of the States. The voluntary 

act of free and independent States is the crown of liberty not the source of injury. 

3. The FMA Leaves to the States the Power to Decide What Shall Be the Legal 

Incidents of Marriage, Only Preventing Constructions of Constitutions and 

Laws, whether Federal or State, in a Manner that Requires That Marital 

Status or the Legal Incidents of Marital Status Be Conferred on Unmarried 

Couples or Groups. 

The FMA ultimately defines marriage for purposes of law in the United States. 

It does not stop there. Rather, the FMA addresses the root of the present dispute 

over the nature of marriage and the right to adjust the definition of marriage to 

fit relational groupings other than those of one man and one woman. That root, as 

we explained above, is in the judicial perturbations arising from disputes over allegations that limiting legal marriage to the union of one man and one woman violates either a fundamental right or a duty under the Constitution of government actors not to discriminate. The FMA responds to those perturbations by placing beyond the reach of those whose duties include construction of federal and state laws 

and constitutions the ability to use their positions to effect a construction of law 

that would require the expansion of marriage to groupings other than the union of 

one man and one woman, or the allocation of the legal incidents of marriage to such 

other groupings. 

Here we consider the provision of the FMA regarding the legal incidents of marriage. These, we think, are determined by the law of the jurisdictions to which a 

marital union is subject. For example, a married couple is entitled, under federal 

law, to file their federal income tax returns and pay any liabilities thereon under 

the unique formulation of ‘‘married filing jointly.’’ To no other grouping of individuals is such a special categorization allowed. Thus, under federal law, an incident 

of marriage is the right to file tax returns using that categorization. 

Similarly, States may provide such a legal incident to marriage in their system 

of income or other taxation. In addition, States may create special capacities of relation between such married couples and property. A good example of this latter approach is the property holding category of ‘‘tenancy by the entireties.’’ While others 

than a married couple may hold property as tenants in common, ‘‘tenancy by the 

entireties’’ grants to each spouse the right to survivorship, meaning that upon the 

death of the other, the surviving spouse takes title to the property as though it was 

always in their name alone. 

Still other legal incidents of marriage have existed and may yet be created. 

One such incident arises in the judicial setting. That legal incident is the spousal 

privilege protecting marital communications from compelled disclosure. The grant of 

the privilege serves what the Supreme Court has recognized to be an important governmental interest in preserving marital harmony.59

The application of the spousal testimony rule well illustrates the sovereignty retained by the States in this regard. Many States follow the federal approach as explained in the Trammell decision. Others choose to formulate the spousal privileges 

in other ways. Kansas, for example, has rejected Trammel and allows a defendant 

spouse to assert the testimonial privilege even against a willing spouse.60 Under the 

FMA, States would be free to refine and reconsider such privileges. All that the 

FMA does in this regard is to prevent the States from being compelled to enlarge 

the spousal testimonial privilege so that it becomes akin to the ‘‘lovers privilege,’’

the ‘‘really good friends for a long time privilege,’’ or the ‘‘we want it because we 

want it’’ privilege. 

One long-standing privilege relates to the legal presumption regarding offspring 

or issue of the marriage.61 Although this presumption may be changing with the 
33

62David Frum, The Fall of France: What Gay Marriage Does to Marriage, National Review, 

Nov. 8, 1999, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf—dls/m1282/21—51/56899757/p2/article.jhtml?term+. 63 Id. 64Maggie Gallagher, The Stakes: Why We Need Marriage, National Review, July 14, 2003, 

available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-gallagher071403.asp. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 Id.

times and with changes in society, the States have had the power in law to craft 

such a presumption and to give legal effect to it. 

Still other legal incidents of marriage may be defined, discovered or recognized. 

We do not pretend to exhaust the definitional exercise of identifying those incidents. 

Whatever they may be in any given State of the Union, those legal incidents are 

given a kind of insulation by the FMA. The FMA leaves to the States the power 

to decide what legal incidents belong to marriage. At the same time, the FMA bars 

judges, mayors, town clerks, and others from using the guise of statutory construction as the means to extend outside of the marital union the availability of any such 

incidents as may be recognized by State law. 

B. The Federal Marriage Amendment Properly Recognizes Opposite Sex Marriage as 

the Key to Stable and Healthy Societies 

Europe’s experience with same-sex marriage is instructive to us on why we must 

clearly define marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and accept nothing 

less. In The Fall of France: What Gay Marriage Does to Marriage,62 David Frum 

commented on the relevance of France’s experience to the same-sex marriage debate 

in the United States: 

The argument over gay marriage is only incidentally and secondarily an argument over gays. What it is first and fundamentally is an argument over marriage. . . . [G]ay marriage will turn out in practice to mean the creation of an 

alternative form of legal coupling that will be available to homosexuals and 

heterosexuals alike. Gay marriage, as the French are vividly demonstrating, 

does not extend marital rights; it abolishes marriage and puts a new, flimsier 

institution in its place. Proponents of gay marriage freely borrow analogies from 

the civil-rights movement. But we are not talking here about throwing open the 

country club to people of all races; we are talking about bulldozing the country 

club and building something entirely different in its place.63

Social commentator Maggie Gallagher concurs. ‘‘A look at Europe,’’ she says, demonstrates that ‘‘if marriage and children’’ become ‘‘just one of many lifestyle choices, 

people stop getting married and they stop having children in numbers large enough 

to replace the population.’’ 64 Indeed, ‘‘[t]he U.N. is now issuing urgent warnings 

about European depopulation.’’ 65 Thus the legal recognition of any relationship on 

the same level as traditional marriage will wreak irreversible harm on American 

society, as it has on European society. 

Marriage has taken a serious hit in our culture in the last 40 years. Its weakening has led to ‘‘a gigantic expansion of state power and a vast increase in social 

disorder and human suffering.’’ 66 As Gallagher observes, 

The results of the marriage retreat are not merely personal or religious. When 

men and women fail to form stable marriages, the first result is a vast expansion of government attempts to cope with the terrible social needs that result. 

There is scarcely a dollar that state and federal government spends on social 

programs that is not driven in large part by family fragmentation: crime, poverty, drug abuse, teen pregnancy, school failure, mental and physical health 

problems. Even Medicare spending is inflated, as elderly singles spend more of 

their years in nursing homes.67

Same-sex marriage will not simply undermine traditional marriage, it will transform our society and the nature and reach of government. That transformation will 

lead to more, not less, government growth and social chaos. The Federal Marriage 

Amendment will insure such a profound and elemental change does not occur without the opportunity of the people and society to exercise the democratic model and 

vote through their elected state houses. 

It is not surprising that virtually ever society has expressed, by statutes, laws, 

and regulations, a strong preference for marriage. At a minimum, the larger society 

has depended on the conjoining of men and women in fruitful unions to secure society’s continued existence. Traditional marriages, in which one man and one woman 
34

68See ‘‘New Study Outlines Benefits of Marriage,’’ The Washington Times, Oct. 17, 2000. 69See id. 70There are at least two recent and thorough declamations of the argument that children in 

the homes of same-sex couples suffer from no diminution of socially relevant factors. One of 

those objections takes the form of affidavit testimony in the Canadian same-sex marriage case. 

See http://www.marriagewatch.org/issues/parenting/htm (linking Affidavit of University of Virginia Professor Steven Lowell Nock filed in Halpern et al. v. The Attorney General of Canada,

Docket No. 684/0 (Ontario Court of Justice, Quebec)) (critiquing studies addressing the question 

of same-sex parenting. Professor Nock found that all the reviewed studies contained fatal flows 

in design or execution, and that each study failed to accord with ‘‘general accepted standards 

of scientific research’’). The other document is a monograph available from the same webpage. 

That monograph, Lerner and Nagai, ‘‘No Basis’’ (2001), examines 49 studies of same-sex parenting and concludes that the studies are fatally flawed and do not provide a sound scientific 

basis for policy or law-making. 

create a lasting community, transmit the values and contributions of the past to establish the promise of the future. 

Nor do the benefits of traditional marriage flow only from the couple to the society 

made stable by the creation of enduring marriages. The valued role of marriage in 

increasing the level of health, happiness and wealth of spouses, compared to unmarried partners, is established.68 And the known research indicates that the offspring 

of traditional marital relations also trend toward greater health and more developed 

social skills.69

In contrast, sexual identicality, not difference, is the hallmark of same-sex relationships. Thus, to admit that same-sex relationships can be valid marriages requires a concession that sexual distinctions are meaningless. That conclusion is not 

sensible or empirically supported. Consider, for example, the principal difference between married couples that would procreate and same-sex couples seeking to do 

likewise. Children can never be conceived as the fruit of a union between couples 

of the same sex, perforce requiring the intervention of a third person, the donating 

participant with the same-sex couple. If the identity of this donor is secret, then it 

is guaranteed that the child of such same-sex unions will be deprived of an intimate 

relationship with their biological parent. If the donor is included into the relationship, the transmogrified same-sex union is changed again into a tri-unity. While the 

math of these problems may be easy to follow, claims that raising children as the 

children of a homosexual union appear to be based entirely on a game of ‘‘hide the 

ball’’ that serves to leave no doubt that such placements are consistent with the best 

interests of the child, even though, in fact, every major study reaching that conclusion is impeached by flawed constructions and conclusions.70

Traditional marriage makes such significant contributions to society that it is simply a sound policy judgment to prefer such marriages over lesser relationships in 

kind (such as co-habitation) or entirely different in character (same-sex relationships). The unique nature of marriage justifies the endorsement of marriage and the 

omission of endorsements for same-sex marriage. 

For all of these reasons, Congress should pass H.J. Res. 56, and allow the states 

the opportunity to resolve the matter through the democratic process of a Constitutional amendment.

Mr. CHABOT. We have now reached the point where Members of 

the Committee will have five minutes each to ask questions. I yield 

myself five minutes at this time to ask questions. 

First of all, the thing that brings us here today, obviously, is the 

fact that many of us believe—in fact, the overwhelming majority, 

I believe, in this country believes that marriage has always been 

a cornerstone of our society. It is an institution that is important, 

obviously, for raising children; and it has always been recognized 

as a man and a woman. 

If we are going to change something that has been as essential 

to our society as the institution of marriage is, it ought to be done 

by the will of the people; and that is expressed through their elected representatives either here in Congress, at the Federal level, or 

in the State legislatures at the State level. 

Many are concerned that, even though we passed DOMA back in 

’97 by an overwhelming vote here in the House and by something 

like 85 to 14 in the Senate, that DOMA may well be at risk be-
35

cause of Full Faith and Credit which is the Constitution; and, of 

course, the Constitution trumps a statute any time. 

So dealing with DOMA itself, Mr. Sekulow, I would like to start 

with you, if I could, and you have already commented on this somewhat. Could you comment on what you believe relative to DOMA 

and the likelihood of it withstanding a constitutional challenge ultimately? 

Mr. SEKULOW. I think that DOMA, in light of Lawrence v. Texas, will be difficult to maintain its constitutionality. Because in reading—and I think what Justice Scalia said in his dissent is correct. 

The Lawrence decision is a significant shift in the way the law has 

developed with regard to, in that particular case, the practice of 

sodomy. It overturned specifically Bowers.

I think we have to realize there will be some courts that will find 

DOMA constitutional. There will be others that find that it is not. 

Ultimately, that means it goes to the Supreme Court of the United 

States. If that case was this year or next, depending on the makeup of the court, I would suspect—and I am pretty confident of 

this—that in light of Lawrence v. Texas and some other decisions 

of the court recently, that it would be probable that that statute 

would be struck as unconstitutional, violating Full Faith and Credit. 

Mr. CHABOT. Barney. 

Mr. FRANK. First, I know you are not supposed to say I told you 

so. You are supposed to pretend you do not like to. But I find it 

is one of the few pleasures that improves with age. So I will say 

I voted against DOMA in ’96, not ’97—not coincidentally, it was a 

presidential election year—and I am interested to see that those 

who voted for it now have retroactively decided it was unconstitutional. But I voted against it because I think it is constitutionally 

irrelevant. 

I think when the Supreme Court comes—as to the first section, 

when the Supreme Court comes to dealing with whether or not 

Full Faith and Credit applies, I do not think that is a subject into 

which they will invite congressional input in any serious way. I believe the Court will decide this on its own. 

Let us make this prediction: I believe the Supreme Court will not 

find that Full Faith and Credit covered—that has not been the 

case. We have the case of Loving in Virginia in which is the Supreme Court knocked down racial laws. If in fact Full Faith and 

Credit fully applied, there would not have been a need for that 

case, because whites and blacks married in another State could 

have gone to Virginia and be covered. I think the history has been 

that, by and large, States have been allowed to set their own policies. 

We have this interesting phenomenon where people are now predicting something which, if it were to come up, they would then 

yell against it and try to stop it. So I do not think Full Faith and 

Credit will be found. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Judge Bork, would you like to weigh in. 

Judge BORK. Yes. I think, contrary to what has just been said, 

unless the Court steps back because it feels that public outrage will 

break out on a decision that homosexual marriage is a constitu-
36

tional right, unless the Court shies away for that reason, I think 

DOMA is absolutely a dead letter constitutionally, not because it 

would be under the original Constitution but because it is under 

the way this Court is behaving. I suspect the vote against DOMA 

would be six to three. I do not see any prospect of sustaining it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Marilyn, have you had a chance to consider this? 

Mrs. MUSGRAVE. I was going to say that even in a State like Nebraska that has passed DOMA by 70 percent constitutional amendment in the State of Nebraska, the Attorney General there does not 

expect that to stand. I believe that this is an evolving process, and 

since 1996 we see all of the challenges in various ways to DOMA, 

and I believe it is very likely that Federal DOMA will not stand. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

My next question I was going to get into civil unions and its relationship here, but my time has just run out, but I am sure other 

Members will probably get into that area. 

I want to thank the witnesses, and I yield now to the gentleman 

from New York. Mr. Nadler is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I have a number of questions, so I hope 

the answers will be brief. The questions will be brief and to the 

point. 

Judge Bork, when was the last time the Constitution of the 

United States was amended to sustain an existing law on the assumption that the Supreme Court might decide that existing law 

was unconstitutional? 

Judge BORK. Offhand, I do not recall. 

Mr. NADLER. So, in other words, we have never done that. 

Judge BORK. I did not say that. I said, offhand, I do not recall. 

Mr. NADLER. I have been unable to find anybody who can answer 

that question in the affirmative. 

What you are really proposing is that we should—that the Supreme Court will declare something unconstitutional and amend 

the constitution in advance of that. 

Judge BORK. We know that that is happening. We know that is 

coming. 

Mr. NADLER. We know the question is coming. We do not know 

how the Court is going to rule. We can make assumptions on that. 

Let me ask you a different question, Judge Bork. Should 

unelected judges ever have the power to overrule a legislative enactment on constitutional grounds or should we dispense with 

Marbury v. Madison? 

Judge BORK. No, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. That is the question you raised, 

Judge BORK. I know. I was thinking that that was a very odd 

way to put it. Nobody wants to dispense with Marbury v. Madison, 

and of course judges will have the power to override legislation 

that is unconstitutional. The problem arises when judges begin to 

depart from the Constitution and make up their own idea of the 

Constitution, and that is precisely what has been happening in this 

area. That is what happened in Lawrence v. Texas. 

Mr. NADLER. Let me ask you the next question. 

There are a number of rights recognized by the Supreme Court 

that are not explicitly in the Constitution, for example, the right 
37

to marry, the right of parents to control the upbringing of their 

children. Do you think the Court was wrong to discover these 

rights or was it acting extraconstitutionally, as you are saying the 

Court is doing in other cases? 

Judge BORK. I think it was extraconstitutional. There are a lot 

of activist court decisions back in the—prior to 1937 that I, as a 

political matter, like. As a judicial matter, they were none of the 

business of the courts; and the court should not have done it. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Sekulow, let me ask you the same question. 

The rights the Supreme Court discovered in the Constitution—the 

right to marry, the right of parents to control the upbringing of 

their children—do you think this is the Supreme Court inventing 

constitutional rights that do not exist in the Constitution? 

Mr. SEKULOW. The Court has consistently through its history 

adopted, through its liberty interests that it has asserted, most recently in the last 40 or 50 years, and they have discovered rights, 

some of which you might agree with, some of which you might not. 

The difficulty, of course, specifically in the Massachusetts situation 

was there the Court did not just hold the statute was unconstitutional as was the case in Vermont, but, rather, in Massachusetts 

the Court not only held the statute unconstitutional, but told the 

legislature this is the only way you can fix it and did not provide 

for even the alternative, as was available in Vermont, of a civil 

union. So the Court there really overstepped its bounds not just in 

determining something unconstitutional but, rather, employing the 

remedy, specifically drafting legislation. 

Mr. NADLER. So you would, by the same logic, say that the remedies ordered by the courts in the progeny cases after Brown v. 

Board of Education were also wrong. 

Mr. SEKULOW. No, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education—

the subsequent cases held that decisions of the lower courts had to 

be consistent with the individual decision of the—in that particular 

case, the Federal court. 

Mr. NADLER. But the lower courts and the Supreme Court upheld 

very specific remedies when legislatures and town governments 

and city governments refused to remedy the situation. 

Mr. SEKULOW. Congressman Nadler, what the Supreme Court 

did in Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny was have the 

lower courts issue opinions and orders consistent with the Supreme 

Court opinion. They did not draft the individual order. 

Mr. NADLER. The lower courts drafted the specific orders. 

Mr. SEKULOW. That is right. Those were orders to enforce a judicially recognized situation. In Massachusetts, the——

Mr. NADLER. I fail to see the difference. 

Mr. SEKULOW. There is a difference between State and Federal 

court. 

Mr. NADLER. Judge Bork, you talk about unelected judges and 

Mrs. Musgrave and everyone talks about unelected judges making 

these terrible decisions, or impositions, I should say, on the democratic legislation. If the legislature of Massachusetts or of some 

other State were to pass a law recognizing gay marriage and allowing gay marriage within the State of Massachusetts, do you think 

that the Federal Constitution should prohibit the legislature of 
38

Massachusetts from doing that, or of any other State from doing 

that? 

Judge BORK. I do. There are some institutions and some basic 

things about our Government, about our society that the Constitution ought to protect. I think that the——

Mr. NADLER. So, in other words, all the rhetoric about the 

unelected judges is out the window. What you are really saying is 

that the superior wisdom of the people drafting this Constitution 

or presumably the Congress, et cetera, should amend the Constitution to prohibit the people of any State or local government through 

their elected representatives from doing this thing which you think 

is terrible. 

Judge BORK. Mr. Nadler, every constitutional provision prevents 

people from doing things through their legislatures. The Bill of 

Rights is nothing but a list of things that legislatures may not do. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. NADLER. Can I have an additional minute? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman, by unanimous consent, has 1 additional minute. 

Mr. NADLER. Barney, would you comment on that? 

Mr. FRANK. I thank you for making that point. 

If they really were only looking at unelected judges—of course, 

some judges are elected in some State courts. But if they are only 

looking at judges, what they would do is get rid of the first sentence and deal with it the way they do it in the second sentence. 

That is, they now, after working this out among themselves, those 

who are supporting this say it does not stop legislatures and electorates from having civil unions. It only stops courts from ordering 

it. 

I would not be for that amendment, but they could do that. So 

it is clear. I think your questioning has made this clear. This is not 

based on the decision that judges should not say this. It is a substantive decision. 

We, the Federal Government, will say that no State by whatever 

means, no matter how democratic, will allow two people of the 

same sex to get married, and that is what it says. They have the 

ability to do less than that. They have the ability to also deal with 

Full Faith and Credit. So it does seem to me that people ought to 

be called upon to defend what it is they are trying to do. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to thank the panel. It is 

a very esteemed panel here. 

Judge Bork, I am pleased to see you here in front of us, along 

with our distinguished panel members. 

I want to make a couple of comments along the way. 

Marilyn Musgrave, the presentation that you made in that opening 5 minutes was as complete and concise and succinct as anything I have heard delivered on this subject; and I will be getting 

a draft copy of that to preserve for my reference. 

As I listen to the testimony across the panel, there are a couple 

of things that come to mind. Massachusetts has got to be a fascinating place, and I need to spend more time there so I can begin 
39

to better understand the politics that flows from Massachusetts. 

There is no question about your ability, Mr. Frank. 

As I look at it this way, lay out our predictions, and I am willing 

to do that. In fact, I would illustrate the prediction that there will 

not be an issue of Full Faith and Credit and that in Vermont civil 

unions have become boring. Maybe they are boring in Vermont, but 

when they manifest themselves through an interpretation of Full 

Faith and Credit in Iowa, it is not boring. 

It is not boring when I have a Judge Neery in Sioux City, Iowa, 

that grants a dissolution of marriage for a Vermont civil union in 

my back yard and I end up before the State Supreme Court to try 

to resolve that issue. That is not boring. 

And it is continuing, as Mr. Sekulow said. We are going to see 

this flow across this Nation in multiple ways, ways we cannot 

begin to comprehend, because of the confusion that is driven into 

this thing by the courts. And I certainly hand this over to the legislative process and in our States and in our Nation, but I think we 

need to preserve marriage in all those ways. 

So I will make my prediction, and it will sound a little bit like 

the Santorum prediction, and that is that if we do not draw the 

line, then what comes along the way? What do you allow a court 

to make a decision on? 

If they are going to base their decision on a rule of law, then 

where do you draw it? If it is not between marriage by the pure 

definition of marriage, and then marriage can be distorted in its 

meaning to include between a man and a man or a woman and a 

woman, then how do you draw the line between group marriage, 

bigamy, polygamy, and all the living arrangements there are? How 

do you slow this race toward a pure socialistic society where group 

marriages can be arranged for the purposes of benefits that come 

by the incentive out there by just being able to claim those kind 

of living arrangements? 

I think Rick Santorum was right, and I think he is right on the 

line. I pose this question to Mr. Frank, and that is that if we do 

not draw the line here, if we do not protect this here—and in spite 

of your predictions, mine are different, and I am consistent with 

Justice Scalia, Lawrence v. Texas, do believe it. It does directly effect marriage. Certainly Scalia was right in his prediction and that 

found its way into the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 

But if we do not draw the line here at this point with a constitutional amendment, then where and how and under what legal circumstances could a line be drawn? Someplace between homosexual 

marriage and bigamy, polygamy, group marriage and the other 

things on the Santorum list? Should it be drawn? 

Mr. FRANK. Yes, a couple of points. Some lines are very hard to 

draw in public policy. The line between two people and three people in my experience has always been fairly clear. That is, I think 

it is perfectly reasonable for society to say, as a matter of public 

policy, we believe having two people legally as well as emotionally 

committed to each other promotes stability. 

There was reference to children. This argument that this is bad 

for children does not go nearly far enough, if that is what your concern is. Remember, gay people can now have children. Lesbians can 

now have children. Single people can have children. In fact, what 
40

this does is it makes it more likely that the children of any such 

operation will have two parents on whom they can make legal 

claim. 

Mr. KING. But should not the line be drawn and under what 

legal circumstances? 

Mr. FRANK. Yes, well, I am trying to get to the point. I cannot 

simplify it any more. 

What I am saying is we can say it is better for two people to be 

raising the children. It is better for two people to be involved. That 

is socially stabilizing. 

When you get into three way and other relationships—and, by 

the way, I do not know why you thought it was socialistic. The 

views on homosexuality that prevailed in those self-described socialist societies that we have had are much closer to yours than to 

mine, in China or Russia or North Korea. I do not believe socialism 

has been practiced——

Mr. KING. I can make that case, but I will save it for another 

time. 

Mr. FRANK. What I am saying is you say two consenting adults 

committing themselves to each other legally is socially stabilizing, 

whereas having someone who cannot consent or is not of the legal 

age or having three or four people, that that is socially destabilizing, and that is the way you draw the line. 

You do say that, yes, two consenting adults, that can be an element of social stability, but if you get into three and four and five, 

no, that has inherent difficulties. It is not the way, which children 

are they, etc. 

Mr. KING. So you would draw the line at two people, not three. 

Mr. FRANK. Yes. 

I would make one other prediction. I am struck by the number 

of people here who are now purporting to believe—and I use those 

words quite deliberately—that Lawrence v. Kansas requires the 

U.S. Supreme Court to allow same-sex marriage. I will predict that 

if any such case comes up, one, I do not think the Supreme Court 

will say that; and, two, those who are now claiming to believe that 

Lawrence v. Kansas compels it will be taking the opposite position 

when in fact that case gets argued 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I would point out that the second half 

of this question, which is under what legal circumstance——

Mr. FRANK. The Judge correctly——

Mr. KING.—I do not have an answer to. But I would yield time 

back to the Chair and hope we have a second round of questions. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for five 

minutes. 

I might mention that we generally have not gone to a second 

round in this Committee except under extraordinary circumstances. 

Mr. FRANK. I have all morning. 

Mr. CHABOT. But we have a markup on two bills after this. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, on a previous Committee I think we 

accomplished that this amendment would have no legal effect on 

traditional marriages, but, Judge Bork, did I understand your testi-
41

mony to say that if same-sex marriages were allowed, opposite-sex 

couples might be less likely to get married? 

Judge BORK. That is the evidence that particularly Stanley 

Kurtz, who I believe has testified before this Subcommittee, that is 

the evidence one gathers from Sweden and from the Netherlands 

and perhaps from Norway. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Let me ask another question, Judge Bork. The whole subject of 

domestic relations belongs to the laws of States and not to the laws 

of the United States. That was language from France v. United 

States, a D.C. Circuit case in 1983. The case goes on to say, family 

law continues to be regarded as almost entirely a State matter, and 

so strong has this tradition been that it was simply a given that 

Federal power could not touch this area of life. 

Do you agree with that language? 

Judge BORK. Well, no, I do not agree. Because what is happening 

now is Federal power is reaching that area of life and is doing so 

through the courts. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, this is a Federal constitutional—let me get 

back. You do not agree with the language. 

Judge BORK. I agree with the language in the—in the context of 

that case, it probably was correct. But if you say that the Federal 

power will never be able to reach family law, that simply is not 

true. Federal power reaches family law all the time, and now it is 

reaching it through constitutional rulings from Federal courts. 

Mr. SCOTT. As we read the proposed constitutional amendment, 

you have to read the whole thing not just the first sentence. The 

first sentence, as has been pointed out, is fairly clear, but—the second sentence makes it apparent that civil unions may not be required, but they appear to be permitted; is that correct? 

Judge BORK. That is correct. Permitted by the legislature. 

Mr. SCOTT. Under this amendment, could you have a civil union 

that is substantively equivalent to a marriage, that is, all the 

rights, privileges and responsibilities of a marriage but not called 

a marriage? Would that be permissible for a State to do that under 

this constitutional amendment? 

Judge BORK. I think it probably would be. 

Mr. SCOTT. Just so we don’t call it a marriage? 

Judge BORK. The symbolism is crucial in cultural matters. And 

the symbolism of marriage is one of the most basic symbols in our 

society. 

Mr. SCOTT. I want to get the substance. Substantively, you could 

have a legal entity absolutely precisely identical to a marriage? 

Judge BORK. I would have to go through the list of all the things 

we are talking about to know whether it would be identical, but it 

certainly would be very close. 

Mr. SCOTT. That would be possible. 

Let me follow through and follow up on one of the questions that 

was asked about Full Faith and Credit. How is the Full Faith and 

Credit question affected by the passage or not passage—failure to 

pass of this amendment; and that is to say, does Virginia have to 

recognize a Vermont civil union now or a Massachusetts marriage 

now? And will it have to recognize a marriage or a civil union if 

this thing were to be adopted? 
42

Judge BORK. Well, without the amendment, let me start that 

way, people get married—same-sex couples get married in Massachusetts; for some reason, they wind up in Virginia and claim the 

benefits of marriage. Let us suppose that Virginia says no. That is 

contrary to our public policy and furthermore, it is contrary to 

State DOMA if we have a State DOMA. And furthermore, it is contrary to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act. That couple will then 

go into Federal Court and challenge the constitutionality of Virginia’s public policy and Virginia’s DOMA and the Federal DOMA. 

And it is my firm belief that that couple will succeed in constitutional litigation. 

Mr. SCOTT. Today? 

Judge BORK. Today. 

Mr. SCOTT. If this amendment were to pass, it doesn’t say anything about Full Faith and Credit. Would you have the same result? 

Judge BORK. No, because the Massachusetts marriage would no 

longer be something that was valid. 

Mr. SCOTT. What about the Vermont civil union? 

Judge BORK. Civil unions might be. There would be an argument 

about that. 

I don’t predict what the outcome would be under a Full Faith 

and Credit argument there, but certainly marriage would be, and 

the various public policies and citations of various Federal and 

State DOMAs would not prevail. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank the Chairman. 

I would say this to the panel: Next to nothing has been said 

about the effects of civil unions or same-sex marriages on the Federal Treasury or the State treasuries. I know that GAO has asked 

to take a look at this, and they identified 1,138 Federal benefit programs in which the determining factor in receiving benefits was 

marital status. 

Judge Bork and Congresswoman Musgrave, have you all made 

any estimates on the cost of this and the cost of Social Security, 

food stamps, disability payments, welfare, unemployment benefits, 

Medicare, Medicaid? Won’t this just break the bank? 

Canada was considering this, and this is what stopped it in Canada. They found the retroactive Social Security benefits, if this 

thing went through—alone, that they couldn’t afford that, just the 

one program. 

Mrs. MUSGRAVE. Well, I certainly do not have any estimates of 

how much it would cost, but I think this gives evidence to the argument that when you are contemplating in the public policy arena 

something like same-sex marriage and the benefits that go along 

with it, it should be done in this deliberative legislative arena in 

the States, not done by judges. 

In fact, there is no State in the Union that has recognized gay 

marriage. In fact, States that have recognized civil unions go out 

of their way to say that this is not marriage. So these things, Mr. 

Bachus, you bring up, they are very pertinent to the debate, but 

we haven’t been allowed to have that debate. 
43

Mr. BACHUS. Not only that, but the news media and the press 

in this country, in covering this—and I have watched it for 3 

months, and I have spoken about the cost in billions of dollars to 

Social Security, the cost in billions of dollars to Medicare and billions of dollars to Medicaid, billions of dollars to unemployment 

benefits, they have not covered that. It is something that has not 

been highlighted. 

And let me say this. When I talk about the cost of money, I am 

not implying that there is not a heavy cost morally or socially to 

this country in undermining our traditional institution of marriage. 

That will always be in my mind; the greatest cost will be the devastation there. And I—but I believe that the one thing that proponents of this—these unions, if they just want to be recognized— I just want to be publicly recognized, I want the same benefits; 

what they are not saying to the American people is, I want Social 

Security, I want retirement benefits, I want these billions of dollars 

worth of coverage. 

And I know one person, I think, that has been honest about that 

is Representative Frank, because he proposed this domestic partnership benefit for Federal employees, and he actually did request 

from the Congressional Budget Office what the cost of that would 

be. And just part of that was 41.4 billion, and that is just for a certain number of Federal employees, a certain benefit for them. 

But I mean—and I would like to introduce that for the record if 

I could. And this is just one benefit for one Federal employee that 

CBO scored. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, it will be included in the record. 

Mr. BACHUS. I would like to introduce the GAO record, which estimates that this could impact 1,138 Federal statutory provisions 

in the U.S. Code in which marital status is the factor in determining receiving benefits, rights and privileges. This would not 

simply be a recognition of these people and a blessing of it; it would 

be asking those constituents that I represent, that you represent 

and that all of us represent to pay millions of dollars more. And 

I wonder where the AARP and other senior citizens and other veterans groups are in this debate and why they are not sitting out 

there in the audience. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, it will be included in the record. 

[The information referred to follows in the Appendix] 

Mr. CHABOT. Congressman Frank. 

Mr. FRANK. I will plead guilty to the same thing, to say that gay 

people should be fully eligible for Social Security. As to everybody 

else, I would say two things. 

Judge Bork did say, and he would not agree with you because 

he said he thought very few gay and lesbian couples would get 

married. Obviously, then it isn’t going to cost very much money. I 

would note what the gentlewoman from Colorado said. Well, we 

should have a debate. 

That is the point. The amendment prevents the debate. The 

amendment says there can be no marriage, so the amendment prevents the debate. 

With regard to civil unions in Vermont, they couldn’t confer Federal benefits; they conferred Vermont benefits. It was not very costly. 
44

In effect, domestic partnership benefits, in general, that have 

been granted by various private entities, the leading corporations 

in America—Microsoft, IBM, et cetera—none of them have found 

this to be a financial burden. 

Mr. BACHUS. Let me say this——

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is granted an additional minute. 

Mr. BACHUS. If I was in the legislature of Massachusetts and 

there was an additional cost to the people of Massachusetts, then 

I would take it out of the budget of the supreme court of Massachusetts. They have passed a tax increase on the people of Massachusetts. And it just shows us the judicial activism in this country. 

This ought to be another wake-up call, as if we hadn’t had enough. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman has a witness that is chomping at 

the bit. 

Mr. SEKULOW. Two points quickly: In Hawaii, the issue of the 

economic cost analysis was actually part of the factor in the legislative process. Again, they were able to utilize the deliberative process in their domestic partnership program as they tailored the benefits to specific items because of the cost concerns and the insurance companies’ concerns over the general cost of this. But it does 

point out, as the Congressman said—and I think it is the most significant aspect of this—that regardless of where you fall on the 

issue, the debate has stopped. And it wasn’t stopped because of the 

legislature in Massachusetts, it was not stopped because of this 

constitutional amendment, if it were to pass, because it still would 

have to be ratified by the States; it stopped because four unelected 

judges decided it would stop. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Wisconsin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I can’t resist responding to the comments about costs, because I 

look at it oftentimes from the other side. I think of partners in 

Vermont raising a young child, a son named Trevor. One chose to 

stay home to raise Trevor, the other worked for wages. And the 

working mom, who is not the legally recognized mother, was struck 

and killed in a car accident. What is the cost of Trevor that he can’t 

collect Social Security benefits for a lost parent? 

There are so many examples like that. We have to weigh those 

costs, too. 

But I want to get to the substance that is before the Committee 

this morning, Mr. Sekulow, and ask you—if you could answer this 

briefly, because I don’t want to spend a lot of time—as an attorney 

and Federal marriage proponent, what do you believe the meaning 

of the phrase ‘‘legal incidents thereof’’ are in the second sentence 

of the proposed amendment? Real brief. 

Mr. SEKULOW. We looked at that both from what I understand 

the legislation to be and what the courts have said about that, and 

it is usually associated with the benefits that obtain to or would 

be included within the context of marriage, everything from economic benefits to spousal privilege in cross-examination of witnesses. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Do you believe the Federal Marriage Amendment 

could be interpreted by the courts to invalidate laws such as civil 
45

unions and domestic partnership legislation, or laws, as they currently exist or might be enacted in the future? 

Mr. SEKULOW. It is hard to say what a court would do or 

wouldn’t do. I don’t think it would be because of the language of 

the amendment, especially as modified by the Senate version, 

which clearly leaves the issue of civil unions to the States to determine. The question would be in the context of, as Congressman 

Scott mentioned, if Virginia would not have a civil unions program, 

but Vermont did, and individuals from Vermont then came to Virginia, would Virginia be forced to recognize the civil union? 

I would suspect the arguments would be made that they should. 

I have a better chance of winning that case, though, if Virginia did 

not want to recognize the Full Faith and Credit aspect. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. Frank. 

Mr. FRANK. I am pleased to see again this distinction between 

marriage and civil union. Once again it proves, if the proponents 

wanted to leave this up to the political process and not the courts, 

they knew how to do that. 

But, secondly, I have to stress, I wish people would go back and 

look at the debates that happened in Vermont about civil unions. 

Now we are being told that civil unions are a much less harmful 

form. All of the arguments being made against marriage were 

made against civil unions. And the total absence of any of those 

predicted negative consequences in Vermont, I think is a pretty 

good model for what is going to happen once we have marriages in 

Massachusetts. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. Sekulow, you and the American Center for 

Law and Justice were involved in a challenge to a San Francisco 

local ordinance requiring companies that do business with the city 

to provide domestic partnership coverage benefits? 

Mr. SEKULOW. That is correct. 

Ms. BALDWIN. At the time you said, and I quote, ‘‘This is a critical issue that focuses on a cultural shift under way in corporate 

America that is designed to legitimize same-sex relations. We are 

vigorously challenging an ordinance that we believe undermines 

the institution of marriage and conflicts with the moral values of 

most Americans,’’ end quote. 

Is it your view that laws creating civil unions and domestic partnerships that give legal recognition to the relationships of same-sex 

couples undermine the institution of marriage? 

Mr. SEKULOW. I think civil unions can certainly undermine the 

institution of marriage. And in the particular case that you mentioned in San Francisco, the litigation there was because the ordinances involved actually required domestic partnership benefits 

and civil unions to not be given just to employees in California, but 

to the employees that were located in their home office in Minnesota. 

Ms. BALDWIN. If they wanted to do business. 

Mr. SEKULOW. If they wanted to do any business. 

Ms. BALDWIN. As you know, California recently enacted assembly 

bill 205, which gives registered domestic partners in California 

many, if not most, of the rights given married heterosexual couples. 

It is being challenged by the Alliance Defense Fund. 

Are you familiar with the lawsuit? 
46

Mr. SEKULOW. Yes. 

Ms. BALDWIN. The principal basis of the Alliance Defense Fund’s 

challenge is its claim that a California law that provides only marriage between a man and a woman is valid, means that the State 

legislature cannot enact a domestic partnership statute. 

Do you agree with the Alliance Defense Fund that California’s 

Defense of Marriage Act should be interpreted to invalidate AB 

205? 

Mr. SEKULOW. That is not the legal position I would advocate. In 

California, while they have a specific prohibition on same-sex marriage, as I mentioned in my testimony, they also have a specific reference to sexual orientation as part of their protected class under 

their civil rights. So I don’t think that that would be the approach 

I would take. 

The question is, does the State Defense of Marriage Act reach a 

civil union situation, and it probably was not the legislative intent. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hostettler, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Congressman Frank, as you brought the discussion of the historical basis for polygamy, you suggested a couple 

of cases, namely Abraham and I believe it was Joshua. If I can 

somehow set the record straight with regard to the marital status 

of Abraham. I believe he had one wife and one concubine that was 

suggested in the Scripture as not a wife. 

Mr. FRANK. Is that better or worse? In a role model is that better 

or worse? I am taking your Biblical guidance. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. It was not an issue of marriage; it is not a role 

model for me. 

And with regard to Joshua, I am not sure of a Scriptural connotation to his marital status, but if we can turn to a relative of 

Abraham and that is we are talking about the societal impact of 

the marriage status and the societal imprimatur on homosexual relationships, you will admit there is Biblical precedent for Abraham’s nephew, Lot, and an adverse impact on society in the case 

of Sodom. 

Mr. FRANK. Not just homosexuality, but of people trying to force 

themselves on other people. That is an abusive situation in which 

visitors to the town were being threatened with forcible sexual activity. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Which is the etymology for the term ‘‘sodomy’’

that we recognize in our laws today. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for clarification? I do 

not believe Scripture actually specifies the sins of the people in 

Sodom and Gomorrah. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. If I could set the record straight: that the visitors that the gentleman speaks about were men, and Lot recommended daughters—that people, explicitly the men of the Old 

Testament, denied and would rather be given the men. 

Mr. FRANK. Would it have been better if they tried to do this to 

women? I don’t think so. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I think this is a hearing——

Mr. FRANK. Why did you bring it up then? 
47

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Because you were historically inaccurate in 

your basis. 

And so, that being said, we have talked a little bit about 

Marbury v. Madison here, and the basis for the need of a constitutional amendment. In his paper, Louis Fisher, senior specialist in 

separation of powers, puts Marbury v. Madison in the proper political context when he says, quote, ‘‘It is evident that Marshall did 

not think he was powerful enough in 1803 to give orders to Congress and the President. He realized he could not uphold the constitutionality of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and direct 

Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commissions to the 

disappointed would-be judges. President Thomas Jefferson and 

Madison would have ignored such an order. Everyone knew that, 

including Marshall. As Chief Justice, Warren Burger’’—and he 

quotes Burger here—quote, ‘‘The Court could stand hard blows, but 

not ridicule, and the ale houses would rock with hilarious laughter 

had Marshall issued a mandamus that the Jefferson administration ignore,’’ end quote. 

And so we are talking with regard to what the—as opposed to 

what is going to happen inside the courtroom, what is going to happen in society should the Court, for example, strike down DOMA, 

if the Court should opine or decide that DOMA is not constitutional. But, in fact, as Louis Fisher points out, that will have to be 

a political decision. It is a political decision that was made by the 

Court at that time to say that we know that Jefferson and Madison 

will not uphold this mandamus. 

And so, today, we know that ultimately—if DOMA is struck 

down, it will ultimately take an executive enforcement action to 

make, for example, the State of Indiana recognize a marriage license from the State of Massachusetts. 

In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court carries on the political nature 

of their decisions. In the discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, they 

bring up an issue that is not relevant to the case and that is the 

issue of marriage. When Justice Kennedy alludes to it in his majority opinion, quote, it ‘‘does not involve—the case does not involve 

the Government, whether the Government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexuals seek to enter,’’ obviously a reference to marriage. And Justice O’Connor is a little more 

straightforward when she says, quote, ‘‘Texas cannot assert any legitimate State interest here,’’ and that is in precluding homosexual 

sodomy, ‘‘such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations, the asserted State interests in this case, other reasons exist 

to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.’’

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. BACHUS. Unanimous consent, an additional minute. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court continues its 

recognition of the political nature of the decisions it hands down. 

Just as in Marbury v. Madison Chief Justice Marshall knew that 

Jefferson was not going to uphold a mandamus to seat Marbury 

and his associates, the Court recognizes in Lawrence v. Texas that 

if they step on the issue of traditional marriage by placing their 

imprimatur on marriage, there will be wholesale revolt by the peo-
48

ple of the United States through their elected representatives or 

through the executive branch, which, like Jefferson, it is hoped will 

not uphold a writ to grant same-sex marriage in the State of Indiana to couples that have gotten that in the State of Massachusetts. 

And so I believe that the Court has signaled itself that it is not 

willing to enter this debate. However, I think that we should enter 

that debate and that we should continue to preserve the institution 

of marriage as it has been known for centuries in this country and 

that is a sacred union between one man and one woman. 

Mr. FRANK. May I make one word correction of something I said? 

I should have said Jacob and not Joshua. It was Jacob I was alluding to and not Joshua. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Hart, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to try to ask 

a different question, and some of you may or may not be familiar 

with some of the testimony from prior hearings, from Stanley 

Kurtz, who is a research fellow. He testified before the Subcommittee on recent data from the Netherlands that showed that 

legalizing same-sex marriage, in his opinion, thereby decoupling 

marriage from parenthood, may have contributed to an increase in 

the out-of-wedlock birthrate for heterosexual couples to the detriment of children which—most of us agree that people are better 

off with two parents. 

Do any of you, and especially Representative Frank, have any 

evidence for any theory that would otherwise explain the uniquely 

large reduction in heterosexual marriages in the Netherlands following that country’s legalization of same-sex marriages; and 

from—I understand similar statistics have also come to light in 

Sweden and Norway, which have done the same kind of thing. 

And I will start with Representative Frank. 

Mr. FRANK. I have not seen that fully, but I wonder why you 

would look to foreign societies when we have some here. 

Ms. HART. We don’t have any here. 

Mr. FRANK. We have Vermont. 

Ms. HART. I am not talking about civil unions. 

Mr. FRANK. I am because you would have been talking about 

same-sex marriage. All the arguments made against same-sex marriage were made against civil unions, as the gentlewoman from 

Wisconsin’s arguments made clear. 

Ms. HART. I am not following that line of questioning. My reasoning is different, and I think Mr. Kurtz’s was as well. 

Mr. FRANK. I think you are wrong about that. I think the argument has been allowing these same-sex relationships—of course, 

we have seen nothing negative in Vermont. With regard to that 

data, it is not very well thought out. 

Ms. HART. Have you any suggestions for why it is occurring outside of that suggestion that Professor Kurtz has made? 

Mr. FRANK. As a continuation of trends that have been going on 

in those societies, I would say this. We are talking about three foreign countries about which none of us are particularly expert in 

terms of analyzing their social consequences. I can see no logical 

connection here. 
49

The notion—and this is the argument—that because same-sex 

couples can get married, opposite sex couples stop getting married, 

imputes to the opposite sex couples a degree of irrationality which 

needs a much heavier burden of proof. 

I don’t think Kurtz’s analysis is a very good one. His statistics 

aren’t good. I notice, by the way, that you said he suggested that 

it may have caused it; I don’t think he proves it. 

Ms. HART. No. I am not suggesting that he did; I am suggesting—— Mr. FRANK. We have Vermont, which you don’t want to talk 

about. It contradicts your thesis. People have made the same argument about Vermont and it has had no negative effect after 4 years 

in an American jurisdiction, no negative effect whatsoever on marriage. 

Ms. HART. I got what you said. I happen to think they are different, and I understand you are not interested in answering the 

question that I have posed. 

Mr. SEKULOW. Here is what the law is within the context of the 

European Union and the experience in Europe. We have an office 

in Strasbourg, the European Center for Law and Justice, and they 

have examined these issues both in the Netherlands and other 

countries where this has been explored. 

And the reason that the evidence seems to indicate, at this point, 

because there a difference between a civil union recognition and its 

impact and the actual granting of marriage licenses, the uniqueness of the relationship as viewed by the state changes. Therefore, 

those entering into it view the uniqueness as no longer important; 

and that is why you are seeing an increase in out-of-wedlock births 

and you are seeing a decrease in the amount of marriages. 

It is the uniqueness of it and the special categories on which it 

was based, and the protections given have been removed and that 

is not a trend of something for 4 years; that has been a trend in 

the context of Europe for 15. 

Mr. FRANK. They haven’t had same-sex marriages for 15 years in 

these countries you are mentioning. I think that is the point. They 

have not had same-sex marriages for 15 years in Norway and Denmark. 

Ms. HART. I think I am asking the questions here. 

Mr. CHABOT. Could we have order? 

Ms. HART. I would like answers to the questions that I have to 

ask and not someone else using up my time, thanks. 

And I would like to ask Representative Musgrave, maybe you 

have more information on this. I would like to hear your comments 

on this particular issue of decoupling. 

Mrs. MUSGRAVE. I think in his testimony Judge Bork cited the 

research. He is more familiar with it than I am. But it is interesting to me that in the Lawrence decision that justices cited European and Canadian court decisions. 

So I mean, on one hand, Congressman Frank doesn’t want us to 

look at those situations in the Netherlands or in other countries. 

However, the Court’s decision, when they looked to other countries 

when they made decision, that is okay. 

I think that common sense tells all of us that when you are cavalier about the institution of marriage—and I would be the first to 
50

admit, and we all know, that heterosexuals in this country are cavalier about marriage; but when you redefine marriage, you, in effect, make it meaningless. 

I was interested in what Congressman King said in regard to the 

line, when Congressman Frank responded, ‘‘Well, we will move the 

line, but we will draw it between two and three.’’ Well, if you are 

using a moral judgment to draw the line, you can draw the line 

anywhere your morals take you; and that is why it is imperative 

that we do not allow four judges against the vehement opposition 

of three judges in the State of Massachusetts to redefine marriage, 

because for children, a union between a man and a woman, committed, married, is the best environment. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady’s time has expired and the gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FEENEY. I want to thank and welcome all the witnesses. We 

appreciate all of you being advocates for your respective positions. 

To the extent it wasn’t done in the original hearing, I would ask 

unanimous consent that the Kurtz research be submitted as part 

of the record. 

Mr. NADLER. I object to that travesty—I withdraw my objection. 

It was just a motion. 

Mr. FEENEY. That piece of research was based on studies in Sweden and Norway and——

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, it is admitted in the record. I believe it was admitted in the previous hearing. 

[The information referred to follows in the Appendix] 

Mr. FEENEY. And, again, I appreciate all of our witnesses. 

Mr. NADLER. I am reserving my right to object. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. FEENEY. If I could have an extension of time, I would be 

happy to yield for a moment. 

Mr. CHABOT. So ordered. 

Mr. NADLER. As I understand, you want this study of foreign conditions entered into the record? 

Mr. FEENEY. I believe it is appropriate for us too, as legislators, 

not as judges imposing laws. 

Mr. NADLER. I think you are anticipating my question. And you 

are going to be offering your resolution against ever citing foreign 

decisions? 

Mr. FEENEY. We would be delighted to have people interested in 

Lawrence v. Texas back for that markup. 

Mr. NADLER. Let me just say before withdrawing my objection, 

I think the last hearing showed pretty conclusively that—as a matter of social research, that Mr. Kurtz’s work is a piece of garbage, 

frankly. 

Mr. CHABOT. The time belongs to the gentleman from Florida. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Unanimous consent motion. 

Mr. CHABOT. Make your motion. 

Ms. BALDWIN. I would just ask that the article that I referred to 

at the last hearing labeling his research as ‘‘crack research,’’ that 

was published in last week’s New Republic, also be admitted for 

the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection. They can both be admitted. 
51

We make access to many different studies and sources of information, and ultimately, the decision is made by the votes that are 

taken in this Committee and other Committees in Congress. 

[The information referred to follows in the Appendix] 

Mr. FEENEY. If I could start my 5 minutes, I would be grateful 

now that we have cleared up the introduction of studies. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is recognized for the balance of his 

time, which we put on hold before. 

Mr. FEENEY. I believe that no amount of erudite argument between my friend, Mr. Frank, and I, based on Biblical history or philosophy or research, is going to resolve the issue about whether or 

not we are better off with or without the clear sanction of marriage 

between a man and a woman. But I think it is appropriate that we 

do look at the appropriate role Congress has here because, after all, 

we had this issue dumped in our lap by a number of cases. 

Judge Bork, you were asked earlier by the gentleman from New 

York whether you were aware, where a constitutional amendment 

was based on anticipating breaches of law in general and courts in 

specific. Most, if not all, of the Bill of Rights actually anticipates 

abuses that had not necessarily occurred, but were being headed off 

by the amendments themselves. 

Judge BORK. The entire Bill of Rights, in that sense, is heading 

off anticipated problems. 

Mr. FEENEY. The first amendment passed by the United States 

of America after the Bill of Rights was article XI, which prohibited 

the judiciary from certain anticipatory abuses. 

Judge BORK. The judiciary had already done it and this was to 

correct what they had done. 

Mr. FEENEY. Thank you very much, but anticipating abuses is 

one of the things we do with constitutional amendments. 

Congresswoman Musgrave, like Congressman King, I was impressed by your testimony, both oral and written. It is erudite and 

it is very compelling. But I do think there was a fair question suggested, that I didn’t get an answer to, that maybe you or Judge 

Bork would answer; and that is, we are anticipating here that some 

Goodrich type abuse by the United States Supreme Court, like the 

Massachusetts abuse—the court abused its legitimate judicial authority by lawmaking, after 220 years or so of a Massachusetts constitution, in creating some new right out of thin air; we are anticipating a potential abuse here just by our U.S. Supreme Court. 

Where do we end the line, because they are making law on a 

fairly regular basis? Can we anticipate all of their abuses which— I suppose the answer to it is certainly no. Where do we draw the 

line in terms of which potential abuses we ought to deal with here 

through the constitutional mandatory process, and why don’t we 

wait to see what they do before we try to react? 

Mrs. MUSGRAVE. I think marriage is something that the American people understand. You know—I mean, the frustration with 

the courts is ubiquitous. Citizens are frustrated with the Court. 

Legislators are frustrated with the Court. And there are various 

constitutional amendments that have been proposed here. 

But this amendment deals with something that is at the very 

core of our culture: marriage between a man and a woman. So this 

is the one that I am focusing on. 
52

You know, as you said, we didn’t ask for this struggle. It was 

forced upon us. Judges legislating from the bench, State judges, supreme courts in one State forcing their public policy decisions—attempting to force it on other States. 

Mr. FEENEY. I want to get in one last question. In fairness—I 

think Congresswoman Frank can take the last question, and I will 

be finished. 

Number one, I want to commend you with respect to your public 

position on what was happening in San Francisco because it shows 

no matter how important the end is to you that there is a certain 

respect for the rule of law, which is something we can agree on 

even though we can’t agree on where that rule of law starts and 

finishes. 

I am concerned about judge-made law in this instance and other 

instances. Plato suggested that government by philosopher, kings, 

might be an appropriate thing, but it is not our form of Government. And assuming arguendo, there is a gray area here that we 

may not be able to agree on here in terms of the Lawrence decision, 

the Goodrich decision in Massachusetts, let us take a black-andwhite case; and I would like you to tell me what Congress’ remedy 

is. 

For example, article I, section 1, first substantive clause in the 

Constitution, invests all legislative power in the Congress. Supposing tomorrow from the bench five members of the U.S. Supreme 

Court declare that they had legislative power and went on to legislate. 

What would be the appropriate remedy in your view? 

Mr. FRANK. In the case of a blatantly unconstitutional decision 

which violated that, the only one is impeachment, and there are 

cases when that would be appropriate. But I would say this: The 

amendment today, that is not what we are talking about. This is 

an amendment today that says if there is a referendum in Massachusetts that allows same-sex marriage, it is canceled out. 

The issue you raised is a good one. There is a whole line of decisions by this current Supreme Court, mostly 5-4, that basically 

says that citizens cannot sue their own States for violation of Federal discrimination laws that I think is against the plain text of the 

11th amendment and is a very serious interference with congressional rights for disability. I would—I have quarrels with that. 

But this amendment is not a judicial restraint amendment; it is 

a specific subject amendment that says, no one, no referendum or 

State legislature can allow same-sex marriage. 

I would be glad to have a debate on this, on how do you respond 

to a blatantly erroneous constitutional decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. This amendment is not primarily about that and goes 

much beyond that and, in fact, deals with the rights of States 

through the political process to make decisions that people here 

don’t like. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Judge BORK. When I agreed to come, I was told that the starting 

time was 10 o’clock. I informed whoever that I had a doctor’s appointment at 1:30. 

Mr. CHABOT. That was our last questioner here. 
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I want to thank the panel. Without objection, all Members will 

have 5 legislative days to submit additional materials for the 

record. 

There was also—there had been a request for a second round. We 

generally have refrained from that in the 3 years I chaired this 

Committee, and we would like to do that. However, if the panel 

will submit, we would like to have any Members that would like 

to submit questions in writing, if we could have those submitted to 

you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Panel members will have the opportunity to do 

that. 

I want to personally thank all four witnesses for their very helpful testimony here this afternoon. 

This Committee—— Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a copy 

of the resolution, that is being considered on the floor as this Committee was conducted, honoring Brown v. Board of Education be inserted into this hearing record so that people will recognize that all 

of us are not offended by judge-made law nor are we required to 

have a cost-benefit analysis on civil rights. 

Mr. CHABOT. Gentleman, without objection, that will be so ordered. 

Mr. CHABOT. We are going to move into a markup at this time. 

Those who are aren’t interested, if you could make your way out 

into the hallway. 

I want to thank the panel. We are going to shift at this point 

from this hearing into a markup. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the Subcommittee proceeded to other 

business.] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY KURTZ

My name is Stanley Kurtz. I have a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from Harvard 

University (1990). My scholarly work has long focused on the intersection of culture 

and family life. My book, All the Mothers Are One (Columbia University Press, 

1992), is about the cultural significance of the Hindu joint-family. I have published 

in scholarly journals on the subject of the family and psychology in cross-cultural 

perspective. 

I have been a Research Associate of the Committee on Human Development of 

the University of Chicago, a program that specializes in the interdisciplinary study 

of the family and psychology. I have also been a postdoctoral trainee with the Culture and Mental Health Behavioral Training Grant (NIMH), administered by the 

University of Chicago’s Committee on Human Development. For two years, I was 

Assistant Director of the Center for Culture and Mental Health, and Program Coor-
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dinator of the Culture and Mental Health Training Grant (NIMH), at the University 

of Chicago’s Committee on Human Development. There I helped train graduate students and postdoctoral fellows. I taught in the ‘‘Mind’’ sequence of the University 

of Chicago’s core curriculum, and also taught a graduate seminar on cultural psychology in the Committee on Human Development. I was also awarded a Dewey 

Prize Lectureship in the Department of Psychology at the University of Chicago. 

For several years, I was also a Lecturer in the Committee on Degrees in Social 

Studies of Harvard University. Harvard’s Committee on Degrees in Social Studies 

is an interdisciplinary undergraduate major in the social sciences. 

I am currently a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, a 

contributor to print journals including Policy Review and The Weekly Standard, and 

a Contributing Editor at National Review Online. The views I put forward in this 

testimony are my own, and do not represent the views of either the Hoover Institution, or of the venues in which I publish. 

In a recently published article, ‘‘The End of Marriage in Scandinavia’’ (The Weekly 

Standard, February 2, 2004), I show how the system of marriage-like same-sex registered partnerships established in the late eighties and early nineties in Scandinavia has contributed significantly to the ongoing decline of marriage in that region. My research on Scandinavia is based on my reading of the demographic and 

sociological literature on Scandinavian marriage. I have also consulted with Scandinavian scholars, and with American scholars with expertise on Scandinavia. 

Shortly, I will be publishing the results of my research on the condition of marriage in yet another country, the Netherlands. That research is based on my reading 

of the demographic and sociological literature on marriage in the Netherlands, as 

well as on consultation with scholars and experts on that country. In my forthcoming publications on the Netherlands, I will show that same-sex marriage has 

contributed significantly to the decline of marriage in that nation. 

The research discussed below is drawn from demographic information provided by 

European statistical agencies, and from scholarly monographs and journal articles 

by demographers and sociologists expert on the state of the family in Europe. After 

summarizing the results of my published research on Scandinavian marriage, I 

shall summarize the results of my soon to be published research on marriage in the 

Netherlands. 

SCANDINAVIA

Marriage in Scandinavia is in serious decline. A majority of children in Sweden 

and Norway are now born out-of-wedlock, as are sixty percent of first born children 

in Denmark. In some of the more socially liberal districts of Scandinavia, marriage 

itself has virtually ceased to exist. 

When Scandinavia’s system of marriage-like same-sex registered partnerships was 

enacted in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the rate at which Scandinavian parents 

married was already in decline. Although many Scandinavians were having children 

out-of-wedlock, it was still typical for parents to marry sometime before the birth 

of the second child. 

While a number of these out-of-wedlock births were to single parents, most were 

to cohabiting, yet unmarried, couples. The drawback of this practice is that cohabiting parents break up at two to three times the rate of married parents. A high 

breakup rate for unmarried parents is found in Scandinavia, and throughout the 

West. For this reason, rising rates of out-of-wedlock birth—even when such births 

are to cohabiting, rather than single, parents—mean rising rates of family dissolution. 

Since demographers and sociologists take rising out-of-wedlock birthrates as a 

proxy for rising rates of family dissolution, we know that the family dissolution rate 

in Scandinavia has been growing. We also have studies that confirm for Scandinavia 

what we already know for the United States—that children of intact families are 

significantly better off than children in families that experience parental breakup. 

Out-of-wedlock birthrates were already rising in Scandinavia prior to the enactment of same-sex registered partnerships. Those rates have continued to rise since 

the enactment of same-sex partnerships. While the out-of-wedlock birthrate rose 

swiftly during the 1970’s and 1980’s, those rapidly rising rates reflected the ‘‘easy’’

part of the shift toward a system of unmarried parenthood. That is, the common 

practice in Scandinavia through the 1980’s was to have the first child out of wedlock. Prior to the nineties in Norway, for example, a majority of parents—even in 

the most socially liberal districts—got married prior to the birth of a second child. 

During the nineties, however—following the debate on, and adoption of, same-sex 

registered partnerships—the out-of-wedlock birthrate began to move through the 

toughest areas of cultural resistance. At the beginning of the nineties, for example, 
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traditionally religious and socially conservative districts of Norway had relatively 

low out-of-wedlock birthrates. Now those rates have risen substantially, for both 

first and second-and-above births. In socially liberal districts of Norway, where it 

was already common to have the first child outside of marriage by the early nineties, a majority of even second-and-above born children are now born out-of-wedlock. 

Marital decline in Scandinavia is the product of a confluence of factors: contraception, abortion, women in the workforce, cultural individualism, secularism, and the 

welfare state. Scandinavia is extremely secular, and its welfare state unusually 

large. Scandinavian law tends to treat marriage and cohabitation alike. Yet the factors driving marital decline in Scandinavia are present in all Western countries. 

Scholars have long taken Scandinavian family change as a bellwether for family 

change throughout the West. Scholars agree that the Scandinavian pattern of births 

to unmarried, cohabiting parents is sweeping across Europe. Northern and middle 

European countries are most affected by the trend, while the southern European 

countries are least affected. Scholarly debate among comparative students of marriage now centers on the question of whether, and how quickly, the Scandinavian 

family pattern is likely to spread through Europe and North America. 

There is good reason to believe that same-sex marriage, and marriage-like samesex registered partnerships, are both an effect and a reinforcing cause of this Scandinavian trend toward unmarried parenthood. The increasing cultural separation 

between the ideas of marriage and parenthood makes same-sex marriage more conceivable. Once marriage is separated from the idea of parenthood, there seems little 

reason to deny marriage, or marriage-like partnerships, to same-sex couples. By the 

same token, once marriage (or a status close to marriage) has been redefined to include same-sex couples, the symbolic separation between marriage and parenthood 

is confirmed, locked-in, and reinforced. 

Same-sex partnerships in Scandinavia have furthered the cultural separation of 

marriage and parenthood in at least two ways. First, the debate over same-sex partnerships has split the Norwegian church. The church is the strongest cultural check 

on out-of-wedlock birth in Norway, since traditional clergy preach against unmarried parenthood. Yet differences within Norway’s Lutheran church on the same-sex 

marriage issue have weakened the position of traditionalist clergy, and strengthened the position of socially liberal clergy who effectively accept both same-sex partnerships and the practice of unmarried parenthood. 

This pattern has been operative since the establishment of same-sex registered 

partnerships early in the nineties. The phenomenon has lately been most evident 

in the socially liberal Norwegian county of Nordland, where many churches now fly 

rainbow flags. Those flags welcome clergy in same-sex registered partnerships, and 

signal that clergy who preach against homosexual behavior are banned. 

When scholars draw conclusions about the causal effects on marriage of various 

beliefs and practices, they do so by combining statistical correlations with a cultural 

analysis. For example, we know that out-of-wedlock birthrates are unusually low in 

traditionally religious districts of Norway, where clergy actively preach against the 

practice of unmarried parenthood. Scholars reasonably conclude that the low outof-wedlock birthrates in such districts are causally related to the preaching of these 

traditionalist clergy. 

The judgement that same-sex marriage has contributed to rising out-of-wedlock 

birthrates in Norway is of exactly the same order as the aforementioned scholarly 

conclusion. If traditionalist preachers in socially conservative districts of Norway 

help to keep out-of-wedlock birthrates low, it follows that a ban on conservative 

preachers in socially liberal districts of Norway removes a critical barrier to an increase in those rates. Since the division within the Norwegian church caused by the 

debate over same-sex unions has led to a banning of traditionalist clergy (the same 

clergy who preach against unmarried parenthood), it follows that the controversy 

over same-sex partnerships has helped to raise the out-of-wedlock birthrate. 

In concluding that same-sex registered partnerships have contributed to higher 

out-of-wedlock birthrates, we do not simply rely on the experience of the Norwegian 

church. The cultural meaning of marriage-like same-sex partnerships in Scandinavia tends to heighten the separation of marriage and parenthood in secular, as 

well as religious, contexts. As the influence of the clergy has declined in Scandinavia, secular social scientists have taken on a role as cultural arbiters. These secular social scientists have touted same-sex registered partnerships as proof that traditional marriage is outdated. Instead of arguing that de facto marriage by samesex couples ought to encourage marriage among heterosexual parents, secular opinion leaders have drawn a different lesson. Those opinion leaders have pointed to 

same-sex partnerships to argue that marriage itself is outdated, and that single 

motherhood and unmarried parental cohabitation are just as acceptable as parenthood within marriage. 
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This socially radical cultural reading of same-sex partnerships was revealed in 

2002, when Sweden added the right of adoption to same-sex registered partnerships. 

During that debate, advocates of the reform associated same-sex adoption with single parenthood. Same-sex adoption was not used to heighten the cultural connection 

between marriage and parenthood. On the contrary, same-sex adoption was taken 

to prove that the traditional family was outdated, and that novel social forms—like 

single parenthood, were now fully acceptable. 

The socially liberal districts where Norway’s secular intellectuals ‘‘preach’’ this 

view of the family experience significantly higher out of wedlock birthrates than 

more traditional and religious districts. Therefore, in the same way that scholars 

conclude that traditionalist clergy keep out-of-wedlock birthrates low in religious 

districts, we can conclude that the advocacy of culturally radical public intellectuals 

has helped to spread the practice of unmarried parenthood in socially liberal districts. These secular intellectuals have consistently pointed to same-sex registered 

partnerships as evidence that marriage is outdated, and unmarried parenthood as 

acceptable as any other family form. In this way, we can isolate the causal effect 

of same-sex registered partnerships as one among several causes contributing to the 

decline of marriage in Scandinavia. 

In the socially liberal Norwegian county of Nordland, where rainbow flags fly on 

churches as signs that same-sex registered partnerships are fully accepted, the outof-wedlock birthrate in 2002 was 67.29 percent—markedly higher than the rate for 

Norway as a whole. The out-of-wedlock birthrate for first born children in Nordland 

county in 2002 was 82.27 percent. More significantly, the out-of-wedlock birthrate 

for second-and-above born children in Nordland county in 2002 was 58.61 percent. 

In the early nineties, when the debate on same-sex partnerships began, most 

Nordlanders already bore their first child out-of-wedlock. Yet in 1990, 60.26 percent 

of Nordland’s parents still married before the birth of the second-or-above born 

child. By 2002, the situation had reversed. Just under sixty percent of Nordlanders 

now bear even second-and-above born children out-of-wedlock. 

That nearly twenty point shift in the out-of-wedlock birthrate for second-andabove born children since 1990 signals that marriage itself is now a rarity in 

Nordland county. What began as a practice of experimenting with the relationship 

through the birth of the first child has now turned into a general repudiation of 

marriage itself. 

The figures are similar in the socially liberal county of Nord-Troendelag, which 

borders on the university town of Trondheim, home to some of the prominent public 

intellectuals who point to same-sex registered partnerships as proof that marriage 

itself is outdated and unnecessary. In 2002, 83.27 percent of first born children in 

Nord-Troendelag were born out-of-wedlock. More significantly, in 2002, 57.74 percent of second-and-above born children were born out-of-wedlock. That compares to 

38.12 percent of second-and-above born children born out of wedlock in 1990, just 

before the debate over marriage-like same-sex partnerships began. 

With a clear majority of even second-and-above born children now born out-ofwedlock, it is evident that marriage has nearly disappeared in some socially liberal 

counties of Norway. In the parts of Norway where de facto gay marriage finds its 

highest degree of acceptance, marriage itself has virtually ceased to exist. This fact 

ought to give pause. 

THE NETHERLANDS

The situation in the Netherlands confirms and strengthens the argument for a 

causal contribution of same-sex marriage to the decline of marriage. This is so for 

two reasons. In the Netherlands, a system of marriage-like registered partnerships 

open to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples was authorized by parliament in 

1996, and took effect in 1998. More recently, in 2000, parliament adopted full and 

formal same-sex marriage, which took effect in 2001. The experience of the Netherlands shows that not only marriage-like registered partnerships open to same-sex 

couples, but also full and formal same-sex marriage, contribute to the decline of 

marriage. The particular cultural situation of marriage in the Netherlands, moreover, makes it easier to isolate the causal effect of same-sex marriage from other 

contributors to marital decline. In effect, the Netherlands shows how same-sex marriage draws down the ‘‘cultural capital’’ on which the system of married parenthood 

depends. 

Marriage in the Netherlands has long been liberalized in a legal sense. Nearly a 

decade before the adoption of registered partnerships in the nineties, the Netherlands began to legally equalize marriage and cohabitation. The practice of premarital cohabitation is very widespread in the Netherlands, and in a European con-
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text, high rates of premarital cohabitation are generally associated with high outof-wedlock birthrates. 

Yet scholars note that the practice of cohabiting parenthood in the Netherlands 

has been surprisingly rare, despite the early legal equalization of marriage and cohabitation, and despite the frequency of premarital cohabitation. Most scholars attribute the unexpectedly low out-of-wedlock birthrates in the Netherlands to the 

strength of conservative cultural tradition in the Netherlands. 

Yet the striking fact of the matter is that, ever since Dutch parliamentary proposals for formal gay marriage and/or registered partnerships were first introduced 

and debated in 1996, and continuing through and beyond the authorization of full 

and formal same-sex marriage in 2000, the out-of-wedlock birthrate in the Netherlands has been increasing at double its previous speed. The movement for same-sex 

marriage in the Netherlands began in earnest in 1989. After several attempts to legalize gay marriage through the courts failed in 1990, a campaign of cultural-political activism was launched. This campaign involved the establishment of symbolic 

marriage registries—and ceremonies—in sympathetic municipalities (although these 

marriages had no legal force), and favorable treatment of same-sex marriage in the 

largely sympathetic mainstream news and entertainment media. 

The movement for same-sex marriage picked up steam after the election of a socially liberal government in 1994—a government that for the first time included no 

representatives of the socially conservative Christian Democratic party. At that 

point, the movement for same-sex marriage went into high gear, with a series of 

parliamentary debates and public campaigns running from 1996 through the adoption of full gay marriage in 2000. 

In 1996, just as the campaign for gay marriage went into high gear, the unusually 

low Dutch out-of-wedlock birthrate began to rise at a rate of two percent per year, 

in contrast to it’s earlier average rise of only one percent per year. Dutch demographers are at a loss to explain this doubling of the rate of increase by reference 

to legal changes, or changes in welfare policy. 

Some might argue that the ‘‘marriage lite’’ of registered partnerships—open to 

both same-sex and opposite-sex couples—can account for the rapid increase in the 

out-of-wedlock birthrate in the mid-nineties. After all, since the Netherlands allows 

even heterosexual couples to enter registered partnerships, any children they might 

have would by definition be born outside of marriage. So it could be argued that 

had the Netherlands established full and formal gay marriage in the mid-nineties, 

instead of a system of registered partnerships open to same-sex and opposite-sex 

couples, out-of-wedlock birthrates would have remained low. 

It is important to note, however, that the open aim of the gay marriage movement 

in the Netherlands was always full and formal marriage. Even at the moment when 

registered partnerships were authorized in 1996, a majority in the Dutch parliament 

also called for full and formal gay marriage. The Dutch cabinet demurred at that 

time, for political reasons. Yet the ultimate goal of full and formal same-sex marriage was affirmed by majority sentiment in parliament—and by the gay marriage 

movement itself—all along. Moreover, even during the years of registered partnership, the Dutch media continued to treat same-sex unions as marriages. So the symbolic core of the gay marriage movement in the Netherlands was the quest for full 

and formal marriage—not ‘‘marriage lite.’’

Moreover, Dutch demographers discount the ‘‘marriage lite’’ effect on the out-ofwedlock birthrate. The number of heterosexual couples entering into registered partnerships in the nineties was simply too small to account for the two-fold increase 

in growth of the out of wedlock birthrate during this period. By the same token, 

the out-of-wedlock birthrate has continued to climb at a very fast two percent per 

year since the vote for full and formal gay marriage in 2000. [See the graph attached to this testimony for an illustration of this process.] It must be emphasized that it is relatively rare for a country to sustain a two percent per year 

increase in the out-of-wedlock birthrate for seven consecutive years. As a rule, this 

only happens when a country is on the way to a Scandinavian style system of nonmarital parental cohabitation. 

In light of all this, it is reasonable to conclude that the traditionalist ‘‘cultural 

capital’’ that scholars agree kept the Dutch out-of-wedlock birthrate artificially low 

(despite the legal equalization of marriage and cohabitation in the eighties) has 

been displaced and depleted by the long public campaign for same-sex marriage. 

Same-sex marriage has increased the cultural separation of marriage from parenthood in the Netherlands, just as it has in Scandinavia. 

This history enables us to isolate the causal mechanism in question. Since legal 

and structural factors affecting marriage had failed to produce high out-of-wedlock 

birthrates in the Netherlands through the mid-nineties, the scholarly consensus was 

that cultural factors—and only cultural factors—were keeping the out-of-wedlock 
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birthrates low. It took a new cultural outlook on the connection between marriage 

and parenthood to eliminate the traditional cultural barriers to unmarried parental 

cohabitation. Same-sex marriage, along with marriage-like registered partnerships 

open to same-sex couples, provided that outlook. Now, with the 2003 Dutch out-ofwedlock birthrate at 31 percent, and the practice of cohabiting parenthood on the 

rise, the Netherlands appears to be well along the Scandinavian path. 

AMERICA’S PROSPECTS

The experience of Scandinavia and the Netherlands make it clear that same-sex 

marriage could widen the separation between marriage and parenthood here in the 

United States. America is already the world leader in divorce. Our high divorce 

rates have significantly weakened the institution of marriage in this country. For 

all that, however, Americans differ from Europeans in that they commonly assume 

that couples ought to marry prior to having children. Although the association of 

marriage and parenthood is relatively weak among the urban poor, it is still remarkably strong in the rest of American society. Scandinavia, in contrast, has no 

large concentrations of urban poor. The practice of unmarried parenthood is widespread in Scandinavia’s middle and upper-middle classes, because the cultural association between marriage and parenthood has been lost in much of Europe. 

Yet, the first signs of European-style parental cohabitation are now evident in 

America. And the prestigious American Law Institute recently proposed a series of 

legal reforms that would tend to equalize marriage and cohabitation (‘‘The Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,’’ 2000). As of yet, these harbingers of the 

Scandinavian family pattern have had a limited effect on the United States. The 

danger is that same-sex marriage could introduce the sharp cultural separation of 

marriage and parenthood in America that is now familiar in Scandinavia. That, in 

turn, could draw out the budding American trends toward unmarried but cohabiting 

parenthood, and the associated legal equalization of marriage and cohabitation. 

Same-sex marriage has every prospect of being even more influential in America 

than it has already been in Europe. That’s because, in Scandinavia, same-sex partnerships came at the tail end of a process of marital decline that centered around 

unmarried parental cohabitation. In the United States, same-sex marriage would be 

the leading edge, rather than the tail end, of the Scandinavian cultural pattern. And 

a combination of the Scandinavian cultural pattern with America’s already high divorce rate would likely mean a radical weakening of marriage—perhaps even the 

end of marriage itself. After all, we are witnessing no less than the end of marriage 

itself in Scandinavia. 

America’s concentrations of urban poor compound the potential dangers of importing a Scandinavian-style separation between marriage and parenthood. Scandinavia 

has no substantial concentrations of urban poverty. America does. A weakening of 

the ethos of marriage in the middle and upper-middle classes would likely undo the 

progress made since welfare reform in stemming the tide of single parenthood 

among the urban poor. This is foreshadowed in Great Britain, where the Scandinavian pattern of unmarried but cohabiting parenthood is rapidly spreading. Britain, 

like the United States, does have substantial pockets of urban poverty. Since the 

spread of the Scandinavian family pattern to Britain’s middle classes, the rate of 

births to single teenaged parents among Britain’s urban poor has risen significantly. 

In Scandinavia, a massive welfare state largely substitutes for the family. Should 

the Scandinavian cultural pattern take root in the United States, with its accompanying effects on the urban poor, we shall be forced to choose between significant 

social disruption and a substantial increase in our own welfare state. The fate of 

marriage therefore impacts the broadest questions of governance. 

Note also that scholars of marriage widely discuss the likelihood that the Scandinavian family pattern will spread throughout the West—including the United 

States. And in effect, the spread of the movement for same-sex marriage from Scandinavia to Europe and North America is further evidence that what happens in 

Scandinavia can and does have every prospect of spreading to the United States. 

Unless we take steps to block same-sex marriage and prevent the legal equalization 

of marriage and cohabitation, it is entirely likely that America will experience marital decline of the type now familiar in Scandinavia—and rapidly on the rise in the 

Netherlands. 

In effect, the adoption of same-sex marriage in the Netherlands has prefigured 

this entire process. The socially conservative Netherlands equalized marriage and 

cohabitation, then adopted same-sex marriage. The effects of liberalized cohabitation 

were minimal, at first. After same-sex marriage was added to the mix, however, the 

traditional connection between marriage and parenthood eroded. In a classic case 

of ‘‘depleted cultural capital,’’ the Netherlands’ relative cultural conservatism in the 
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matter of marriage was drawn down. That country is now firmly on the path to the 

Scandinavian system of unmarried, cohabiting parenthood. And in the Netherlands, 

same-sex marriage was on the leading edge, rather than the tail end, of marital decline. 

In short, since the adoption of same-sex registered partnerships—and of full, formal same-sex marriage—marriage has declined substantially in both Scandinavia 

and the Netherlands. In the districts of Scandinavia most accepting of same-sex 

marriage, marriage itself has almost entirely disappeared. I have shown that samesex marriage contributed significantly to this pattern of marital decline. The social 

harm in all this is the damage to children. Children will suffer greatly if the Scandinavian pattern takes hold, because the concomitant of the Scandinavian pattern 

is a rising tide of family dissolution. And a further decline of marriage and family 

is sure to bring calls for a major expansion of the welfare state. For all these reasons, steps to block same-sex marriage should be taken.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR. 

So we’re finally in the middle of our five-part series of hearings on whether we 

should pass an amendment enshrining discrimination into the Constitution. This is 

not only unlikely but unneeded and inflammatory. 

No one seriously believes this amendment could garner the two-thirds vote it 

needs to pass the House. That begs the question of why we are even discussing it. 

To most Americans, the answer is clear: the Republican leadership wants to score 

political points with its right-wing base in an election year. 

Motives aside, the amendment is unneeded. Each state has the right to establish 

its own policy on this issue. President Bush tried to galvanize conservatives by saying there is a grave risk ‘‘that every state would be forced to recognize any relation-
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ship that judges in Boston . . . choose to call a marriage.’’ This statement is totally 

false, and the President knows that. 

Any first-year law student can tell you that the full faith and credit clause does 

not force one state to recognize a marriage from another state that conflicts with 

the first state’s public policy. In fact, perhaps we should have a first-year law student testify at these hearings. 

In any event, the President misunderstands Massachusetts law. The law voids 

any marriage performed in Massachusetts if the couple is not eligible to be married 

in their home state. Even advisers to Governor Mitt Romney (R-MA) have said that 

out-of-state residents cannot use a Massachusetts same sex marriage to circumvent 

their home state laws. It is clear that a constitutional amendment is not required 

to accomplish the discriminatory goals of the right-wing. 

The President is also wrong to argue that Congress has been forced into this position by ‘‘activist judges.’’ Anyone who has followed this knows that those in San 

Francisco, Portland, and New York who have pressed this issue are elected officials, 

not judges. As a matter of fact, it is judges in California who have stopped the licenses from being issued. 

It goes without saying that this amendment is beyond inflammatory. This Subcommittee has done nothing about preventing hate crimes, preserving the right to 

vote in a presidential election year, or ensuring women have the right to health 

care. Instead, we are wasting five days on trying to take a basic right away from 

committed couples. 

In closing, this amendment would, for the first time in our nation’s history, write 

intolerance into our Constitution. We have debated civil rights issues before, but 

those issues were about ending slavery, liberating women, safeguarding freedom of 

religion, and protecting the disabled. As you can see, those were all efforts to eradicate discrimination. Leave it to the Bush Administration to buck the trend and actually try to legalize discrimination.
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REP. MARILYN MUSGRAVE’S ANSWERS TO REP. HOSTETTLER QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

JUNE 22, 2004

1. It seems to me that there is very little substantive difference between civil 

unions, domestic partnerships, and marriage. If there is no real difference, 

why would we leave states free to enact civil unions, which would be in fact 

marriage by another name?

I believe preserving the institution of marriage is a worthy goal, both in substance 

and in symbolism. As Judge Bork noted in his testimony before the committee, symbols are vitally important to a culture. Indeed, symbols are a culture’s life’s blood, 

and the importance of the symbolism of the marriage institution cannot be overstated. 

If activist courts continue to undermine marriage, the devastating impact on the 

country’s families will be incalculable. The centuries-old tradition of marriage as a 

sacred mystical union between one man and one woman will be sullied at best and 

perhaps damaged irreparably. Conversely, if the amendment were to become part 

of the Constitution, this sacred institution would be preserved in the highest law 

of the land, and this nation would have expressed in its fundamental law that marriage between a man and a woman is the true form and that civil unions are derivative and subsidiary. Thus, preserving the sanctity of the institution of marriage 

could be this generation’s legacy to posterity. 

Yes, it is true that civil unions would still be possible. But importantly the 

amendment removes activists judges from the equation, and while I do not trust activist courts, I do trust our democratically elected legislatures. 

In summary, part of the amendment is substantive in that seeks to prevent courts 

from imposing homosexual marriage and/or civil unions on the nation. Another part 

of the amendment seeks to make a statement about the institution of marriage and 

its symbolism. Symbols are vitally important to a culture. Thus, properly understood, the amendment’s effort to preserve the symbol of marriage is not a weakness 

of the proposed amendment, but one of it main strengths.

2. If Senator Allard’s amendment language is adopted—striking the prohibition 

on a judge construing a state or federal law (leaving only a prohibition on 

a judge construing a federal or state constitution)—do we leave open the door 

for a judge to give the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples when they 

construe simple state law, such as a state tax statute? It seems like this new 

language leaves open the possibility of much judicial mischief.

Answer: 

The importance of the second sentence is that it removes the courts’ constitutional 

‘‘trump card’’ and gives democratically-elected legislatures complete latitude when 

dealing with this matter. It is true that a court could still erroneously construe a 

state law such as a state tax statute. Importantly, however, any such mischief 

would be subject to a legislative check. In other words, if a court were to erroneously 

construe a state law as requiring a benefit to be conferred on a same-sex couple, 

the legislature would be free to overturn the court’s ruling by simply amending the 

statute. Under present law the activist courts purport to be construing constitutional provisions, and this leaves no avenue for any legislative remedy to their mischief.
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REP. MARILYN MUSGRAVE’S ANSWERS TO REP. NADLER’S QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

JUNE 22, 2004

1. With your prepared testimony for last Thursday’s hearing, you included a 

‘‘Memorandum Regarding Meaning of the Musgrave Federal Marriage 

Amendment,’’ (‘‘Memo’’) which sets forth your position on the meaning of the 

FMA’s terms. In discussing the meaning of the FMA’s ‘‘legal incidence thereof’’ language, you include a non-exhaustive list of 17 ‘‘incidents of marriage.’’

Included among these are the right to hospital visitation, the right to adopt 

children, the right to inherit under probate law, as well as the rights and 

responsibilities under terminal care documents or medical powers of attorney. [p. 4–5] Your Memo then goes on to state that your intention is to prevent courts from construing laws to require these rights for gay and lesbian 

couples, not to prevent state legislatures from conferring such rights if they 

so wish. Your argument on this point presents the following questions:

• Your Memo presumes that gay and lesbian couples would enjoy none of 

these ‘‘incidents of marriage,’’ even those based on private contracts, unless a legislature affirmatively and specifically grants these rights to gay 

and lesbian couples. Does this mean that the FMA would strip gay couples of these rights as they presently exist—including hospital visitation 

rights and the right to adopt children—pending further action by their 

respective state legislatures?

Answer: The FMA makes no changes whatsoever in contract law. Whatever rights 

a person presently has under state contract law, he would continue to have if the 

FMA is ratified.

• The FMA states that ‘‘no[] state or federal law[] shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents be conferred upon unmarried couples...’’ Your Memo argues that the phrase ‘‘to require’’ following the word ‘‘construed’’ is meant to act as a restraint on courts, but 

would not prevent state legislatures from conferring any or all of your 

proffered ‘‘incidents of marriage’’ upon gay and lesbian couples. [p. 3] 

However, ‘‘construe’’ means to ‘‘discover and apply the meaning and intention of with reference to a particular state of affairs.’’ WEBSTER’S 

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 489 (3d ed. 1993). Further, ‘‘require’’ means to ‘‘direct, order, demand, instruct, command . . . 

[or] compel.’’ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (6th ed. 1990). Considering these terms together, the FMA would expressly prevent any court 

from granting effect to any state law granting any ‘‘incidence of marriage’’

rights to same sex couples. For instance, if a person was denied hospital 

visitation to their partner in violation of a state law, and went to court 

to enforce that right, the only way the court could sustain the visitation 

right would be to ‘‘apply the meaning’’ of the statute at issue with reference to the facts of that case, or ‘‘with reference to a particular state 

of affairs,’’ then direct or order, in other words ‘‘require,’’ the hospital to 

comply with the law. In short, the court would be forced to construe a 

state law to require that a visitation right, which you term an incident 

of marriage, be granted. Such on outcome is expressly prohibited by the 

FMA. Would not the FMA, by its express terms, prevent courts from 

granting effect to any law conferring any of the ‘‘incidents of marriage’’

included in your Memo, as that would require construing the law in question to confer the legal incidents of marriage upon unmarried couples?

Answer. As explained in the memo, the purpose of the language you quote is to 

prevent courts from construing laws of general applicability not otherwise having 

to do with conferring the legal incidents of marriage on unmarried persons from 

being interpreted to require such incidents of marriage to be conferred on unmarried 

persons.

As I stated in my testimony, however, to the extent this language has caused confusion or has been misconstrued, I support the changes Senator Allard has made 

to clarify this matter.

• Continuing with this point, your Memo also lists the right to group insurance for public and private employees as an incident of marriage. [p. 5] 

As you know, many private employers grant the partners of gay and lesbian employees the right to participate in the employers’ group health 

plan, and the right to participate in such group insurance plans is often 
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included in private employment contracts. Would not the FMA nullify 

this aspect of any private employment contract by making the contract 

right to group health insurance unenforceable in court as a legal incident 

of marriage?

Answer. No, as explained above, it would not.

2. You testified that you introduced the FMA ‘‘to stop judicial activism and preserve the right of self-determination for the American people’’ with respect 

to defining marriage. [Statement, p. 2.] Yet, you also acknowledge that the 

first sentence of the FMA ensures that ‘‘no governmental entity (whether in 

the legislative, executive or judicial branch) . . . shall have power to alter 

the definition of marriage.’’ [Statement, p. 2.] If you purport to be taking aim 

at ‘‘judicial activism,’’ why does your amendment tie the hands of other 

branches of government, as well? Why are you denying legislatures the right 

to define marriage as their constituents demand?

Answer. As Judge Bork has written, the democratic integrity of law depends entirely upon the degree to which its processes are legitimate. In a democratic society 

the people make the law and courts interpret it. This is the very essence of the 

democratic rule of law. It is illegitimate, therefore, for a willful court to use its 

power to interpret the constitution to impose its policy choices on the American people. It is not illegitimate, however, for a people to set forth in their fundamental 

law an understanding of marriage that until very recently was taken for granted 

by all people in all places at all times. This is especially true now that that understanding has come under attack by activist courts bent on a reshaping the institution of marriage in a way that is wholly unsupported by the text, history or structure of the constitution or by the history and traditions of this nation.

3. You have stated that the second sentence only prevents courts from construing laws of ‘‘general applicability’’ to require that the incidents of marriage be conferred upon unmarried persons. [Memo, p. 3.] However, the 

amendment does not contain the term ‘‘general applicability,’’ and you have 

not defined it in your statements thus far. How do you define ‘‘general applicability’’? Who is to determine whether or not a statute is one of ‘‘general 

applicability’’ if not the courts?

Answer. As with any constitutional provision, the courts will construe the meaning of the FMA if it is ratified. As explained in the memo, the purpose of the language you quote is to prevent courts from construing laws of general applicability 

not otherwise having to do with conferring the legal incidents of marriage on unmarried persons from being interpreted to require such incidents of marriage to be 

conferred on unmarried persons. As I stated in my testimony, however, to the extent 

this language has caused confusion or has been misconstrued, I support the changes 

Senator Allard has made to clarify this matter.

4. You concede that ‘‘it is impossible to set forth a definitive list’’ identifying 

the legal incidents of marriage. [Memo, p. 4.] How are the courts supposed 

to identify the limits on their authority if this term is undefined? Who is to 

construe this language if not the courts?

Answer: Most terms in the constitution are undefined. Therefore, as with any provision of the constitution, the courts will interpret the terms used in the FMA using 

various sources, including, but not limited to, the legislative history of the amendment.
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JUDGE ROBERT BORK’S RESPONSES TO REP. JOHN HOSTETTLER’S QUESTIONS

JUNE 5, 2004

Marriage and civil unions are treated alike by the proposed amendment in that 

both are placed beyond the reach of activist courts. Overreaching courts are the 

main, almost the only, danger in this area. 

Marriage and civil unions are treated differently in that legislatures could not 

change the fundamental nature of marriage but could permit civil unions. There are 

several reasons for making that distinction. The pragmatic reason is that the American people make a distinction; they are against homosexual marriage but inclined 

to support civil unions or at least some aspects, such as the right to hospital visits. 

We have been told by leading members of Congress that attempting to ban civil 

unions would greatly harm the prospects of getting the marriage amendment out 

of Congress and then ratified by the states. 

There is an historical parallel to our present situation. After the Supreme Court’s 

outrageous rewriting of the Constitution in Roe v. Wade, there was a chance for a 

constitutional amendment that would have overturned Roe and returned the issue 

of abortion to state legislatures. Anti-abortion absolutists, however, insisted on an 

amendment that would ban all abortions in all states. The result was that they got 

nothing, and the situation today is far worse than would have been the case with 

the more moderate version of the amendment. 

Second, marriage carries an emotional symbolism that civil unions do not. That 

is why homosexual activists will not settle for civil unions. They want marriage, not 

so much for the benefits it may confer, but as a public approval of homosexuality 

as in no way different from heterosexuality. They want moral approbation that only 

the symbolism of marriage can confer. It is important for the remaining vitality of 

traditional marriage and for the benefit of impressionable and uncertain young people that complete moral approbation not be given. 

It will be much easier to oppose in political forums civil unions that are the equivalent of marriage if marriage has been defined as the union of a man and a woman. 

There may be others, but these seem to me the primary reasons for not attempting to prohibit publicly supported forms of civil unions by constitutional amendment. 

Sincerely,

Robert H. Bork
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